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Raphael's depiction of the unmoved mover from the Stanza della Segnatura

The unmoved mover (Ancient Greek: ὃ οὐ κινούμενον κινεῖ, romanized: ho ou kinoúmenon kineî, lit. 'that which moves without being moved')[1] or prime mover (Latin: primum movens) is a concept advanced by Aristotle as a primary cause (or first uncaused cause)[2] or "mover" of all the motion in the universe.[3] As is implicit in the name, the unmoved mover moves other things, but is not itself moved by any prior action. In Book 12 (Ancient Greek: Λ) of his Metaphysics, Aristotle describes the unmoved mover as being perfectly beautiful, indivisible, and contemplating only the perfect contemplation: self-contemplation. He also equates this concept with the active intellect. This Aristotelian concept had its roots in cosmological speculations of the earliest Greek pre-Socratic philosophers[4] and became highly influential and widely drawn upon in medieval philosophy and theology. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, elaborated on the unmoved mover in the Five Ways.

First philosophy

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Aristotle argues, in Book 8 of the Physics and Book 12 of the Metaphysics, "that there must be an immortal, unchanging being, ultimately responsible for all wholeness and orderliness in the sensible world."[5]

In the Physics (VIII 4–6) Aristotle finds "surprising difficulties" explaining even commonplace change, and in support of his approach of explanation by four causes, he required "a fair bit of technical machinery".[6] This "machinery" includes potentiality and actuality, hylomorphism, the theory of categories, and "an audacious and intriguing argument, that the bare existence of change requires the postulation of a first cause, an unmoved mover whose necessary existence underpins the ceaseless activity of the world of motion".[7] Aristotle's "first philosophy", or Metaphysics ("after the Physics"), develops his peculiar theology of the prime mover, as πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον: an independent divine eternal unchanging immaterial substance.[8]

Celestial spheres

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Aristotle adopted the geometrical model of Eudoxus of Cnidus to provide a general explanation of the apparent wandering of the classical planets arising from uniform circular motions of celestial spheres.[9] While the number of spheres in the model itself was subject to change (47 or 55), Aristotle's account of aether, and of potentiality and actuality, required an individual unmoved mover for each sphere.[10]

Final cause and efficient cause

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Simplicius argues that the first unmoved mover is a cause not only in the sense of being a final cause—which everyone in his day, as in ours, would accept—but also in the sense of being an efficient cause (1360. 24ff.), and his master Ammonius wrote a whole book defending the thesis (ibid. 1363. 8–10). Simplicius's arguments include citations of Plato's views in the Timaeus—evidence not relevant to the debate unless one happens to believe in the essential harmony of Plato and Aristotle—and inferences from approving remarks which Aristotle makes about the role of Nous in Anaxagoras, which require a good deal of reading between the lines. But he does point out rightly that the unmoved mover fits the definition of an efficient cause—"whence the first source of change or rest" (Phys. II. 3, 194b29–30; Simpl. 1361. 12ff.). The examples which Aristotle adduces do not obviously suggest an application to the first unmoved mover, and it is at least possible that Aristotle originated his fourfold distinction without reference to such an entity. But the real question is whether his definition of the efficient cause includes the unmoved mover willy-nilly. One curious fact remains: that Aristotle never acknowledges the alleged fact that the unmoved mover is an efficient cause (a problem of which Simplicius is well aware: 1363. 12–14)...[11]

— D. W. Graham, Physics

Despite their apparent function in the celestial model, the unmoved movers were a final cause, not an efficient cause for the movement of the spheres;[12] they were solely a constant inspiration,[13] and even if taken for an efficient cause precisely due to being a final cause,[14] the nature of the explanation is purely teleological.[15]

Aristotle's theology

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The unmoved mover, if they were anywhere, were said to fill the outer void beyond the sphere of fixed stars:

It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time, outside the heaven. Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outermost motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most self sufficient of lives… From [the fulfilment of the whole heaven] derive the being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but other feebly, enjoy.[16]

— Aristotle, De Caelo, I.9, 279 a17–30

The unmoved mover is an immaterial substance (separate and individual beings), having neither parts nor magnitude. As such, it would be physically impossible for them to move material objects of any size by pushing, pulling, or collision. Because matter is, for Aristotle, a substratum in which a potential to change can be actualized, any potentiality must be actualized in an eternal being, but it must not be still because continuous activity is essential for all forms of life. This immaterial form of activity must be intellectual and cannot be contingent upon sensory perception if it is to remain uniform; therefore, eternal substance must think only of thinking itself and exist outside the starry sphere, where even the notion of place is undefined for Aristotle. Their influence on lesser beings is purely the result of an "aspiration or desire,"[17] and each aetheric celestial sphere emulates one of the unmoved movers, as best it can, by uniform circular motion. The first heaven, the outmost sphere of fixed stars, is moved by a desire to emulate the prime mover (first cause),[18][note 1] about whom, the subordinate movers suffer an accidental dependency.

Many of Aristotle's contemporaries complained that oblivious, powerless gods are unsatisfactory.[8] Nonetheless, it was a life which Aristotle enthusiastically endorsed as one most enviable and perfect, the unembellished basis of theology. As the whole of nature depends on the inspiration of the eternal unmoved movers, Aristotle was concerned with establishing the metaphysical necessity of the perpetual motions of the heavens. Through the Sun's seasonal action upon the terrestrial spheres, the cycles of generation and corruption give rise to all natural motion as efficient cause.[15] The intellect, nous, "or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine" is the highest activity, according to Aristotle (contemplation or speculative thinking, theōríā). It is also the most sustainable, pleasant, self-sufficient activity;[19] something which is aimed at for its own sake. (Unlike politics and warfare, it does not involve doing things we'd rather not do, but rather something we do at our leisure.) This aim is not strictly human: to achieve it means to live following not mortal thoughts but something immortal and divine within humans. According to Aristotle, contemplation is the only type of happy activity that it would not be ridiculous to imagine the gods having. In Aristotle's psychology and biology, the intellect is the soul (see also eudaimonia).

According to Giovanni Reale, the first Unmoved Mover is a living, thinking, and personal God who "possesses the theoretical knowledge alone or in the highest degree...knows not only Himself, but all things in their causes and first principles."[20]

First cause

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In Book VIII of his Physics,[21] Aristotle examines the notions of change or motion, and attempts to show by a challenging argument, that the mere supposition of a 'before' and an 'after', requires a first principle. He argues that in the beginning, if the cosmos had come to be, its first motion would lack an antecedent state; and, as Parmenides said, "nothing comes from nothing". The cosmological argument, later attributed to Aristotle, thereby concludes that God exists. However, if the cosmos had a beginning, Aristotle argued, it would require an efficient first cause, a notion that Aristotle took to demonstrate a critical flaw.[22][23][24]

But it is a wrong assumption to suppose universally that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so ... Thus Democritus reduces the causes that explain nature to the fact that things happened in the past in the same way as they happen now: but he does not think fit to seek for a first principle to explain this 'always' ... Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our contention that there never was a time when there was not motion, and never will be a time when there will not be motion.

— Physics VIII, 2[25]

The purpose of Aristotle's cosmological argument that at least one eternal unmoved mover must exist is to support everyday change.[26]

Of things that exist, substances are the first. But if substances can, then all things can perish... and yet, time and change cannot. Now, the only continuous change is that of place, and the only continuous change of place is circular motion. Therefore, there must be an eternal circular motion and this is confirmed by the fixed stars which are moved by the eternal actual substance that's purely actual.[27]

In Aristotle's estimation, an explanation without the temporal actuality and potentiality of an infinite locomotive chain is required for an eternal cosmos with neither beginning nor end: an unmoved eternal substance for whom the Primum Mobile[note 2] turns diurnally, whereby all terrestrial cycles are driven by day and night, the seasons of the year, the transformation of the elements, and the nature of plants and animals.[10]

Substance and change

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Aristotle begins by describing substance, of which he says there are three types: the sensible, subdivided into the perishable, which belongs to physics, and the eternal, which belongs to "another science." He notes that sensible substance is changeable and that there are several types of change, including quality and quantity, generation and destruction, increase and diminution, alteration, and motion. Change occurs when one given state becomes something contrary to it: that is to say, what exists potentially comes to exist actually (see potentiality and actuality). Therefore, "a thing [can come to be], incidentally, out of that which is not, [and] also all things come to be out of that which is, but is potentially, and is not actually." That by which something is changed is the mover, that which is changed is the matter, and that into which it is changed is the form.[citation needed]

Substance is necessarily composed of different elements. The proof for this is that there are things that are different from each other and that all things are composed of elements. Since elements combine to form composite substances, and because these substances differ from each other, there must be different elements: in other words, "b or a cannot be the same as ba."[citation needed]

Number of movers

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Near the end of Metaphysics, Book Λ, Aristotle introduces a surprising question, asking "whether we have to suppose one such [mover] or more than one, and if the latter, how many."[28] Aristotle concludes that the number of all the movers equals the number of separate movements, and we can determine these by considering the mathematical science most akin to philosophy, i.e., astronomy. Although the mathematicians differ on the number of movements, Aristotle considers that the number of celestial spheres would be 47 or 55. Nonetheless, he concludes his Metaphysics, Book Λ, with a quotation from the Iliad: "The rule of many is not good; one ruler let there be."[29][30]

Influence

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See also: Ontological argument, Apophatic theology, and Hellenistic philosophy and Christianity

John Burnet (1892) noted[31]

The Neoplatonists were quite justified in regarding themselves as the spiritual heirs of Pythagoras; and, in their hands, philosophy ceased to exist as such, and became theology. And this tendency was at work all along; hardly a single Greek philosopher was wholly uninfluenced by it. Perhaps Aristotle might seem to be an exception; but it is probable that, if we still possessed a few such "exoteric" works as the Protreptikos in their entirety, we should find that the enthusiastic words in which he speaks of the "blessed life" in the Metaphysics and in the Ethics (Nicomachean Ethics) were less isolated outbursts of feeling than they appear now. In later days, Apollonios of Tyana showed in practice what this sort of thing must ultimately lead to. The theurgy and thaumaturgy of the late Greek schools were only the fruit of the seed sown by the generation which immediately preceded the Persian War.

Aristotle's principles of being (see section above) influenced Anselm's view of God, whom he called "that than which nothing greater can be conceived." Anselm thought God did not feel emotions such as anger or love but appeared to do so through our imperfect understanding. The incongruity of judging "being" against something that might not exist may have led Anselm to his famous ontological argument for God's existence.

Many medieval philosophers used the idea of approaching a knowledge of God through negative attributes. For example, we should not say that God exists in the usual sense of the term; all we can safely say is that God is not nonexistent. We should not say that God is wise, but we can say that God is not ignorant (i.e., in some way, God has some properties of knowledge). We should not say that God is One, but we can state that there is no multiplicity in God's being.

Many later Jewish, Islamic, and Christian philosophers accepted Aristotelian theological concepts. Key Jewish philosophers included ibn Tibbon, Maimonides, and Gersonides, among many others. Their views of God are considered mainstream by many Jews of all denominations, even today. Preeminent among Islamic philosophers who were influenced by Aristotelian theology are Avicenna and Averroes. In Christian theology, the key philosopher influenced by Aristotle was undoubtedly Thomas Aquinas. There had been earlier Aristotelian influences within Christianity (notably Anselm), but Aquinas (who, incidentally, found his Aristotelian influence via Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides) incorporated extensive Aristotelian ideas throughout his theology. Through Aquinas and the Scholastic Christian theology of which he was a significant part, Aristotle became "academic theology's great authority in the thirteenth century"[32] and influenced Christian theology that became widespread and deeply embedded. However, notable Christian theologians rejected[a] Aristotelian theological influence, especially the first generation of Christian Reformers,[b] most notably Martin Luther.[33][34][35] In subsequent Protestant theology, Aristotelian thought quickly reemerged in Protestant scholasticism.

See also

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  • Big Bang – Physical theory
  • Book of the 24 Philosophers – Philosophical and theological medieval text of uncertain authorship
  • Brahman – Metaphysical concept, unchanging Ultimate Reality in Hinduism
  • Conceptions of God
  • Dynamics of the celestial spheres – Classical theories concerning movement of spheres
  • Eternal recurrence
  • Existence of God – Philosophical question
  • Henosis – Classical Greek word for mystical oneness
  • Henotheism – Worshipping a god, accepting others may exist
  • Logos – Concept in philosophy, religion, rhetoric, and psychology
  • Monad – Philosophical concept of a most basic substance, or supreme being
  • The One – Philosophical system
  • Primum Mobile – Outermost moving sphere in the geocentric model of the universe
  • Causa sui – Term that denotes something that is generated within itself
  • Tao – Philosophical concept native to China

Notes

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References

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Sources

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Unmoved mover

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The unmoved mover (: πρῶτον κινοῦν ἄκινητον) is a foundational concept in Aristotle's metaphysics, denoting an eternal, immaterial, and indivisible substance that initiates all motion and change in the without itself being subject to motion or alteration. Introduced primarily in Metaphysics Book Λ (Lambda, or 12), it represents the ultimate of the sensible , ensuring the perpetual of the heavens as the primary form of change. Aristotle characterizes the unmoved mover as pure actuality (energeia), devoid of any potentiality, and thus free from the and form that defines changeable beings. It operates not through physical contact or efficient causation in the manner of moved movers, but as the final cause—the object of desire and thought—for the celestial intelligences or souls that govern the eternal revolutions of the and . In this way, the unmoved mover sustains the ordered, cyclical structure of the universe without participating in its temporal processes, embodying necessity and supreme goodness. equates it with divine intellect (nous), a living being that eternally contemplates itself, stating: " is a living being, eternal, most good." This concept resolves the problem in Aristotle's physics, where every motion requires a prior mover, culminating in an unchanging source that is both substance and actuality. It influenced later philosophical and theological traditions, notably in Aquinas's Summa Theologica, where the unmoved mover forms the basis of the first of the Five Ways to demonstrate God's existence, arguing that all observed motion traces back to an immobile first mover understood as divine. In Aristotelian cosmology, the unmoved mover thus bridges the realms of physics and metaphysics, providing a rational foundation for the eternity and teleological order of the world.

Origins in Aristotle's Philosophy

Core Definition

The unmoved mover is a central concept in 's philosophy, defined in Metaphysics Book as an eternal, immaterial substance that serves as the ultimate cause of motion in the universe without undergoing any change itself. Specifically, posits that "there must be an eternal unmovable substance" whose is pure actuality, lacking any or potentiality for change, as anything with potentiality could not persist eternally without actualization. This substance moves other things by being the object of desire or thought, akin to how a beloved or an intelligible goal inspires action without itself being altered: "The object of desire and the object of thought move in this way; they move without being moved." As the primary (substance) among beings, it represents the highest form of reality, fully actual and unchanging. Aristotle introduces the unmoved mover to resolve the problem of eternal motion, distinguishing it sharply from moved movers that require prior causes. In the natural world, every instance of motion or change traces back through a chain of efficient causes, where each mover is itself moved by something else; without an endpoint, this would imply an , which Aristotle deems impossible for explaining the continuous, eternal motions observed in the . To avoid this regress, there must be a first mover that is unmoved, serving as the origin of all motion: "that which moves and is moved is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved." This unmoved source ensures the chain of causation terminates in a self-sufficient , grounded in actuality rather than potentiality. The key attributes of the unmoved mover underscore its role as the foundational of being and motion. It is eternal, existing without beginning or end, and thus imperishable, as only fully actual entities can endure indefinitely without the risk of privation. Unchanging and immaterial, it possesses no magnitude or parts that could introduce divisibility or alteration, making it indivisible and simple in essence. As pure actuality (energeia), it has no unrealized potentialities, embodying complete and serving as the primary that all other substances emulate in their striving toward actuality.

Role in Metaphysics

In Aristotle's metaphysics, the unmoved mover occupies a central position within "first philosophy," which he defines as the study of being qua being and the investigation of primary causes and principles that apply universally to all entities. This discipline, distinct from other sciences, examines the fundamental nature of existence, including immutable substances that transcend particular categories like those studied in or . The unmoved mover exemplifies this as a divine, separate substance (choristos), an eternal and purely actual entity that serves as the pinnacle of being, ensuring the coherence and unity of the metaphysical order. The unmoved mover integrates into Aristotle's causal framework primarily as the final cause (telos), attracting all things toward itself through desire or thought, thereby initiating motion without undergoing change itself. While it operates beyond the material and efficient causes associated with physical interactions, it functions as an efficient cause in a non-physical manner by being the ultimate source of actuality that actualizes potentialities across the cosmos. This causal role underscores its status as the supreme principle, where form and substance converge to explain the essence and purpose of being. Unlike physics, which concerns itself with changeable beings that possess and undergo motion, metaphysics addresses unchanging principles that govern all change without being subject to it. The unmoved mover embodies this distinction as the eternal, immaterial foundation behind physical phenomena, providing the stable explanatory ground for the observed regularity and eternity of motion in the .

Cosmological Framework

Celestial Spheres

In Aristotle's geocentric cosmology, detailed in his work On the Heavens and building on earlier models by Eudoxus and Callippus, the universe consists of numerous concentric celestial spheres centered on the Earth, each carrying heavenly bodies such as the planets, Sun, Moon, and fixed stars in eternal, uniform circular motion. These spheres ensure the observed regularity of celestial phenomena, with the outermost sphere encompassing all others and rotating once per day to account for the daily rising and setting of stars. Each sphere is impelled by its own unmoved mover, acting as a final cause that attracts the sphere toward perfect circular rotation without itself undergoing change. The material composition of these spheres differs fundamentally from the sublunary realm below the Moon. Sublunary elements—earth and water, which naturally move downward toward the center, and air and fire, which move upward away from it—follow straight-line paths to their natural places, subject to generation, corruption, and irregular motion. In contrast, the celestial spheres are composed of aether, a divine fifth element whose natural motion is perpetual circular revolution around the Earth's center, immune to decay or deviation and requiring no mechanical push but only an eternal attractive cause. This model arises from empirical observations of the heavens: the uniform, anomaly-free, and unending circular paths of and , persisting without fatigue or interruption over millennia, demand an intelligent, non-material cause beyond physical mechanics to explain their perfection and eternity. Later astronomers, including in the 2nd century CE, refined the mathematical description of these motions in the by incorporating epicycles and deferents to more precisely account for observed planetary retrogressions and irregularities, while preserving the principle of uniform .

Efficient and Final Causes

In Aristotle's framework of the , the unmoved mover serves as the primary efficient cause of motion, initiating change in the without itself experiencing any alteration. This causation occurs through attraction, whereby the unmoved mover draws other entities toward itself, much like a beloved object inspires movement in the lover without the object itself moving. As detailed in Physics Book VIII, this mechanism ensures eternal motion, particularly the circular movements of celestial bodies, by providing an unchanging source of impetus that terminates any potential infinite series of prior movers. Complementing its efficient role, the unmoved mover operates as the ultimate final cause, embodying the highest good toward which all natural processes aspire. It attracts entities not through physical force but by evoking desire or intellectual pursuit, guiding them from potentiality to fuller actuality as the , or end, of cosmic order. This draws the entire , including the heavens, into perpetual striving for perfection, with the unmoved mover's own nature as pure thought reinforcing its status as the exemplary object of aspiration. The interplay between these causal functions is central to 's resolution of motion's in Physics Book VIII, where motion constitutes the actualization of potentiality sustained indefinitely. Here, the unmoved mover, existing solely as energeia or pure actuality devoid of unrealized potential, enables this process without itself requiring a prior cause, thus halting regress and grounding all change in an immutable . Scholarly analysis confirms this dual , noting that the mover's stems from its finality as an object of noetic attraction, unifying the causal chain in a single, self-sufficient entity.

Ontological Foundations

Substance and Change

In Aristotle's Categories, substance (ousia) is identified as the primary category of being, encompassing individual entities such as particular organisms that exist independently and serve as the subjects to which other predicates—known as accidents—are attributed. These primary substances, like an or , are ontologically basic, capable of undergoing change while maintaining their identity, in contrast to accidents such as color or size, which depend on substances for their existence and cannot exist separately. Secondary substances, including and genera (e.g., "" or "animal"), further specify primary substances but remain subordinate to them in primacy. Aristotle develops this notion in the Metaphysics, particularly Book Z, where substance is elaborated as the or "what it is" for a thing, underlying all other categories and constituting the foundational of beings. Here, substances are distinguished as independent entities that do not inhere in others, emphasizing their role as the primary beings (prota ) that ground the existence of qualities, quantities, relations, and other non-substantial categories. This framework establishes substance as the stable subject capable of receiving change, essential for understanding the persistence of entities amid transformation. Central to Aristotle's account of change (kinēsis) is its occurrence within substances, as detailed in Physics Book V, where he delineates four types: substantial change (generation and corruption, involving the coming-to-be or passing-away of a substance), qualitative change (alteration, such as a shift from hot to cold), quantitative change (growth or diminution, affecting size), and local change (motion from place to place). All forms of kinēsis involve the realization of a potential within a substance, transitioning from what it may become to what it actually is, though this process applies primarily to composite, material substances in the sublunary realm. In contrast, certain separate substances, such as the heavenly movers discussed in Metaphysics Book Λ, are characterized by their immutability, existing as pure forms devoid of and thus incapable of undergoing kinēsis. These immaterial substances, fully actualized without potentiality for change, differ fundamentally from sublunary composites that combine form and and are subject to alteration, growth, or decay. This unchanging nature of pure forms ensures their eternal stability, enabling them to function as unchanging causes of motion in the .

Potentiality and Actuality

In Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Θ (Theta), potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia) form a fundamental distinction that underpins his account of change and being. Potentiality refers to the capacity of a thing to undergo change or to become something else, such as a possessing the potential to develop into a mature tree. Actuality, by contrast, is the realization or fulfillment of that potential, exemplified by the fully grown tree embodying its complete form. This pair is not merely descriptive but explanatory, as uses it to analyze processes of becoming, where potentiality represents an incomplete state oriented toward actuality as its end. Actuality holds priority over potentiality in three key respects, as outlined in Metaphysics Θ.8. First, in or account (), potentiality is understood only in relation to actuality, since the capacity for change presupposes the fulfillment it aims toward (1049b5–17). Second, in time, actuality precedes potentiality for eternal entities, such as the mature existing before the that will produce it, countering the in generation (1049b24–1050a10). Third, in nature or substance, actuality is more fundamental, as potential beings are dependent and perishable, while pure actuality is complete and self-sufficient (1050b6–19). This prioritization resolves paradoxes like Zeno's arguments against motion, by framing change as the progressive actualization of potentiality rather than an impossible infinite division (1050b20–23). The unmoved mover exemplifies pure actuality (energeia), possessing no unrealized potentiality and thus requiring no external cause to initiate its being or activity. As described in Metaphysics Λ, this entity is fully actual, eternal, and the source of all motion through its own self-sufficient perfection, attracting other things as their final end without itself changing (1071b20–22; 1072b3). In this way, the distinction ensures the unmoved mover's immutability while explaining its causal role in the .

Theological Aspects

Aristotle's Theology

In Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Lambda (Λ), the unmoved mover is characterized as a divine intellect, embodying pure actuality without potentiality. This entity is described as noesis noeseos—thought thinking itself—wherein the intellect contemplates its own essence in an eternal, unchanging act of self-awareness. The prime mover's activity consists solely in this self-reflective contemplation of eternal truths, such as the most divine and estimable principles, which constitute the highest form of life and pleasure. Aristotle's conception of the unmoved mover reflects an impersonal , devoid of anthropomorphic qualities like will, creation, or providential intervention in the world. Rather than actively willing motion, the mover attracts the celestial bodies as an object of desire, functioning as a final cause that inspires eternal circular movement through its inherent perfection. This passive influence underscores the mover's separation from the sensible realm, emphasizing its role as an eternal principle rather than a personal engaged in worldly affairs. The holds a hierarchical position above other subordinate divinities, each associated with the motion of individual . These lesser movers, akin to mythical gods in traditional accounts, are themselves attracted to the , ensuring the unified order of the .

First Cause

In 's Physics Book VIII, the unmoved mover is posited as the eternal first cause necessary to explain the observed in the . argues that motion must be eternal, without beginning or end, because any initiation of motion would require a prior motion, leading to an impossible . Thus, the itself is ungenerated and imperishable, sustained by continuous circular motions that prevent dissolution into elemental chaos. The unmoved mover initiates this eternal chain of motion without itself being moved, serving as the primary principle that ensures the 's unending activity. This argument is further developed in Metaphysics Book Lambda (XII), where the unmoved mover is identified as the ultimate arche—the foundational principle not only of motion but of the entire of dependent beings. As pure actuality without potentiality, it causes motion eternally by being the object of desire for the primary , thereby unifying and perpetuating the cosmos's order. Its uniqueness lies in being one both in and number, transcending the multiplicity of moved entities and standing as the singular source from which all subsequent causal dependencies flow. Aristotle's conception explicitly rejects the notion of creation ex nihilo, envisioning the unmoved mover instead as the sustainer of eternal cosmic cycles rather than an originator of temporal beginnings. The , in this view, has always existed in motion, with the first cause serving as the eternal object of desire and thought for the , thereby sustaining its imperishable structure. This framework positions the unmoved mover as a contemplative divine that eternally thinks itself, briefly aligning with theological attributes while emphasizing its causal primacy.

Plurality and Nature

Number of Movers

In Aristotle's Metaphysics Book Λ (Lambda), chapter 8, he posits the existence of multiple unmoved movers, estimating their number to correspond with the plurality of responsible for observed planetary motions. Drawing on the astronomical models of Eudoxus and Callippus, Aristotle calculates approximately 47 or 55 such movers in total, accounting for the spheres of the , sun, , and the five , with each mover serving as the final cause for the eternal of its respective sphere. This plurality arises from the need to account for the distinct, uniform motions of the seven traditional planets plus the , without implying mechanical interaction among the spheres themselves. Among these, distinguishes a single prime mover as the supreme, eternal substance that governs the entire as its ultimate final , while the others function as subordinate intellects attracting their specific spheres toward . The , described as pure actuality and thought thinking itself, ensures the necessity and unity of the universe's overall order, even as the lesser movers maintain localized celestial regularities. Aristotle does not prescribe a definitive, unchanging number of movers, as his count depends on contemporaneous astronomical observations subject to refinement. In medieval , scholars like (Ibn Rushd) engaged with this multiplicity, allowing for multiple unmoved movers in principle while emphasizing at minimum one primary cause, thereby debating the balance between cosmic unity and plurality in Aristotelian terms.

Hierarchical Structure

In Aristotle's cosmological framework, the unmoved movers are arranged in a strict hierarchy, with the prime mover at the apex as an eternal, immaterial substance embodying pure thought (noesis) that causes the eternal circular motion of the outermost celestial sphere. This motion then cascades downward through subordinate movers, each responsible for the uniform rotation of successive inner spheres, ensuring the coordinated harmony of the entire cosmos without any direct physical interaction. The subordination among these movers operates through a chain of intellectual desire and , wherein each lower mover eternally and aspires toward the superior one above it, finding its own in emulating that higher . As objects of thought and desire, the higher movers attract the lower ones, propagating motion indirectly as final causes that inspire unending aspiration, with itself engaged in self- as the most perfect and divine object. This hierarchical multiplicity of movers—numbering around 47 to 55 to match the observed celestial motions—achieves unity through their shared divine as eternal, thinking substances, though they differ in according to the of their contemplative objects. The single prime mover thus unifies the entire system, resolving tensions between polytheistic plurality and monotheistic singularity by subordinating all others to its supreme, unchanging primacy.

Historical Influence

Medieval and Islamic Philosophy

In medieval Islamic philosophy, Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980–1037) profoundly adapted Aristotle's concept of the unmoved mover by integrating it into his doctrine of the Necessary Existent (wajib al-wujud), positing this entity as the uncaused First Principle that bridges Aristotelian metaphysics with Islamic monotheism. The Necessary Existent is pure existence itself, devoid of any potentiality or composition, serving as the singular essence of God who eternally causes the existence of the cosmos without undergoing change. This synthesis reconciles the unmoved mover's role in initiating cosmic motion with the Qur'anic emphasis on God's absolute unity and necessity, portraying the divine as the sole necessary being from which all contingent entities emanate through a hierarchical chain of intellects. Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198) further developed this tradition by defending the existence of multiple unmoved movers, each corresponding to the distinct motions of the celestial spheres, while subordinating them to a single, supreme divine cause that unifies all existence. In his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Averroes argues that these subordinate movers—intellectual forms or souls actualizing spherical motions—operate as final causes, desiring the eternal, unchanging First Cause as their ultimate object. This hierarchical structure preserves Aristotelian cosmology within an Islamic framework, emphasizing God's transcendence as the primary formal and final cause beyond the plurality of secondary movers. Averroes' interpretations, transmitted through Latin translations in the 13th century, significantly influenced Latin Averroism, shaping debates on celestial causation and divine unity in medieval European scholasticism. In Christian medieval thought, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) explicitly equated the unmoved mover with the Christian God, presenting it as the first of his "five ways" to demonstrate divine existence in the Summa Theologica (I, q. 2, a. 3). Aquinas argues that all motion requires a mover, precluding an infinite regress and necessitating a first unmoved mover that is pure act (actus purus), entirely actual without potentiality, which all understand to be God. This pure act sustains the chain of causation and motion in creation, aligning the argument with the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo by portraying God not merely as an impersonal principle but as the personal Creator who freely wills the universe into being. Through this adaptation, Aquinas transforms Aristotle's cosmological insight into a robust theistic proof, emphasizing divine immutability and the dependence of all contingent beings on the necessary divine essence.

Renaissance to Modern Interpretations

In the , revitalized Aristotle's unmoved mover through Neoplatonic synthesis, portraying it as the supreme intellect at the ontological summit, blending Aristotelian final causality with Platonic emanation to affirm a hierarchical infused with divine compatible with . 's translations and commentaries, such as those on and , positioned the mover as an eternal, self-contemplating principle that inspires cosmic order without mechanical intervention. Similarly, incorporated the unmoved mover into his syncretic , elevating it as a transcendent cause superior to mere motion, drawing on Aristotelian, Kabbalistic, and Christian sources to emphasize human dignity within a divinely ordered . During the Enlightenment, critiqued the unmoved mover's underlying in his (1779), challenging the necessity of a first cause by questioning why an infinite regress of causes could not suffice and arguing that causal chains explain parts without requiring a singular origin. , in the (1781), further dismissed ontological proofs involving the unmoved mover, treating the idea of a necessary first cause as a regulative for guiding reason's systematic unity rather than an object of theoretical knowledge or empirical proof. In the early 20th century, Alfred North Whitehead reinterpreted the unmoved mover in his process theology, transforming it from a static Aristotelian entity into a dynamic "creative advance" where God lures the universe toward novelty without coercive power, emphasizing relational becoming over unchanging perfection as outlined in Process and Reality (1929). In contemporary metaphysics, the unmoved mover retains a niche role in debates on causation, particularly as a model for non-temporal efficient-final causality post-Copernican cosmology, which diminished its explanatory power in physical astronomy but preserved its abstract utility. It also informs discussions of divine simplicity, where the mover's pure actuality underscores God's indivisible essence as the uncaused cause of all contingent being, as defended in modern Thomistic analyses.

References

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  35. https://aporia.byu.edu/pdfs/spencer-a_defence_of_the_metaphysics_of_divine_simplicity.pdf
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