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Influenza
Influenza
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Influenza
Other namesflu, grippe (French for flu)
Influenza virus
SpecialtyInfectious disease
SymptomsFever, runny nose, sore throat, muscle pain, headache, coughing, fatigue
Usual onset1–4 days after exposure
Duration2–8 days
CausesInfluenza A, B, and C viruses
PreventionHand washing, flu vaccines
MedicationAntiviral drugs such as oseltamivir
Frequency1 billion cases of seasonal influenza per year[1]
Deaths290,000–650,000 deaths per year[1]

Influenza, commonly known as the flu, is an infectious disease caused by influenza viruses. Symptoms range from mild to severe and often include fever, runny nose, sore throat, muscle pain, headache, coughing, and fatigue. These symptoms begin one to four (typically two) days after exposure to the virus and last for about two to eight days. Diarrhea and vomiting can occur, particularly in children. Influenza may progress to pneumonia from the virus or a subsequent bacterial infection. Other complications include acute respiratory distress syndrome, meningitis, encephalitis, and worsening of pre-existing health problems such as asthma and cardiovascular disease.

There are four types of influenza virus: types A, B, C, and D. Aquatic birds are the primary source of influenza A virus (IAV), which is also widespread in various mammals, including humans and pigs. Influenza B virus (IBV) and influenza C virus (ICV) primarily infect humans, and influenza D virus (IDV) is found in cattle and pigs. Influenza A virus and influenza B virus circulate in humans and cause seasonal epidemics, and influenza C virus causes a mild infection, primarily in children. Influenza D virus can infect humans but is not known to cause illness. In humans, influenza viruses are primarily transmitted through respiratory droplets from coughing and sneezing. Transmission through aerosols and surfaces contaminated by the virus also occur.

Frequent hand washing and covering one's mouth and nose when coughing and sneezing reduce transmission, as does wearing a mask. Annual vaccination can help to provide protection against influenza. Influenza viruses, particularly influenza A virus, evolve quickly, so flu vaccines are updated regularly to match which influenza strains are in circulation. Vaccines provide protection against influenza A virus subtypes H1N1 and H3N2 and one or two influenza B virus subtypes. Influenza infection is diagnosed with laboratory methods such as antibody or antigen tests and a polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to identify viral nucleic acid. The disease can be treated with supportive measures and, in severe cases, with antiviral drugs such as oseltamivir. In healthy individuals, influenza is typically self-limiting and rarely fatal, but it can be deadly in high-risk groups.

In a typical year, five to 15 percent of the population contracts influenza. There are 3 to 5 million severe cases annually, with up to 650,000 respiratory-related deaths globally each year. Deaths most commonly occur in high-risk groups, including young children, the elderly, and people with chronic health conditions. In temperate regions, the number of influenza cases peaks during winter, whereas in the tropics, influenza can occur year-round. Since the late 1800s, pandemic outbreaks of novel influenza strains have occurred every 10 to 50 years. Five flu pandemics have occurred since 1900: the Spanish flu from 1918 to 1920, which was the most severe; the Asian flu in 1957; the Hong Kong flu in 1968; the Russian flu in 1977; and the swine flu pandemic in 2009.

Signs and symptoms

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Symptoms of influenza,[2][3] with fever and cough the most common symptoms[4]

The symptoms of influenza are similar to those of a cold, although usually more severe and less likely to include a runny nose.[5][6] The time between exposure to the virus and development of symptoms (the incubation period) is one to four days, most commonly one to two days. Many infections are asymptomatic.[7] The onset of symptoms is sudden, and initial symptoms are predominately non-specific, including fever, chills, headaches, muscle pain, malaise, loss of appetite, lack of energy, and confusion. These are usually accompanied by respiratory symptoms such as a dry cough, sore or dry throat, hoarse voice, and a stuffy or runny nose. Coughing is the most common symptom.[8] Gastrointestinal symptoms may also occur, including nausea, vomiting, diarrhea,[9] and gastroenteritis,[10] especially in children. The standard influenza symptoms typically last for two to eight days.[11] Some studies suggest influenza can cause long-lasting symptoms in a similar way to long COVID.[12][13][14]

Symptomatic infections are usually mild and limited to the upper respiratory tract, but progression to pneumonia is relatively common. Pneumonia may be caused by the primary viral infection or a secondary bacterial infection. Primary pneumonia is characterized by rapid progression of fever, cough, labored breathing, and low oxygen levels that cause bluish skin. It is especially common among those who have an underlying cardiovascular disease such as rheumatic heart disease. Secondary pneumonia typically has a period of improvement in symptoms for one to three weeks[15] followed by recurrent fever, sputum production, and fluid buildup in the lungs,[8] but can also occur just a few days after influenza symptoms appear.[15] About a third of primary pneumonia cases are followed by secondary pneumonia, which is most frequently caused by the bacteria Streptococcus pneumoniae and Staphylococcus aureus.[7][8]

Virology

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Types of virus

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Influenza virus nomenclature (for a Fujian flu virus)

Influenza viruses comprise four species, each the sole member of its own genus. The four influenza genera comprise four of the seven genera in the family Orthomyxoviridae. They are:[8][16]

Influenza A virus is responsible for most cases of severe illness as well as seasonal epidemics and occasional pandemics. It infects people of all ages but tends to cause severe illness disproportionately in the elderly, the very young, and those with chronic health issues. Birds are the primary reservoir of influenza A virus, especially aquatic birds such as ducks, geese, shorebirds, and gulls,[17][18] but the virus also circulates among mammals, including pigs, horses, and marine mammals.

Subtypes of Influenza A are defined by the combination of the antigenic viral proteins haemagglutinin (H) and neuraminidase (N) in the viral envelope; for example, "H1N1" designates an IAV subtype that has a type-1 hemagglutinin (H) protein and a type-1 neuraminidase (N) protein.[19] Almost all possible combinations of H (1 through 16) and N (1 through 11) have been isolated from wild birds.[20][21] In addition H17, H18, N10 and N11 have been found in bats.[22][21] The influenza A virus subtypes in circulation among humans are H1N1 and H3N2.[23]

Influenza B virus mainly infects humans but has been identified in seals, horses, dogs, and pigs.[21] Influenza B virus does not have subtypes like influenza A virus but has two antigenically distinct lineages, termed the B/Victoria/2/1987-like and B/Yamagata/16/1988-like lineages,[8] or simply (B/)Victoria(-like) and (B/)Yamagata(-like).[21][23] Both lineages are in circulation in humans,[8] disproportionately affecting children.[9] However, the B/Yamagata lineage might have become extinct in 2020/2021 due to COVID-19 pandemic measures.[24] Influenza B viruses contribute to seasonal epidemics alongside influenza A viruses but have never been associated with a pandemic.[21]

Influenza C virus, like influenza B virus, is primarily found in humans, though it has been detected in pigs, feral dogs, dromedary camels, cattle, and dogs.[10][21] Influenza C virus infection primarily affects children and is usually asymptomatic[8][9] or has mild cold-like symptoms, though more severe symptoms such as gastroenteritis and pneumonia can occur.[10] Unlike influenza A virus and influenza B virus, influenza C virus has not been a major focus of research pertaining to antiviral drugs, vaccines, and other measures against influenza.[21] Influenza C virus is subclassified into six genetic/antigenic lineages.[10][25]

Influenza D virus has been isolated from pigs and cattle, the latter being the natural reservoir. Infection has also been observed in humans, horses, dromedary camels, and small ruminants such as goats and sheep.[21][25] Influenza D virus is distantly related to influenza C virus. While cattle workers have occasionally tested positive to prior influenza D virus infection, it is not known to cause disease in humans.[8][9][10] Influenza C virus and influenza D virus experience a slower rate of antigenic evolution than influenza A virus and influenza B virus. Because of this antigenic stability, relatively few novel lineages emerge.[25]

Influenza virus nomenclature

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Diagram of influenza nomenclature

Every year, millions of influenza virus samples are analysed to monitor changes in the virus' antigenic properties, and to inform the development of vaccines.[26]

To unambiguously describe a specific isolate of virus, researchers use the internationally accepted influenza virus nomenclature,[27] which describes, among other things, the species of animal from which the virus was isolated, and the place and year of collection. As an example – "A/chicken/Nakorn-Patom/Thailand/CU-K2/04(H5N1)":

  • "A" stands for the genus of influenza (A, B, C or D).
  • "chicken" is the animal species the isolate was found in (note: human isolates lack this component term and are thus identified as human isolates by default)
  • "Nakorn-Patom/Thailand" is the place this specific virus was isolated
  • "CU-K2" is the laboratory reference number that identifies it from other influenza viruses isolated at the same place and year
  • "04" represents the year of isolation 2004
  • "H5" stands for the fifth of several known types of the protein hemagglutinin.
  • "N1" stands for the first of several known types of the protein neuraminidase.[28]

The nomenclature for influenza B, C and D, which are less variable, is simpler. Examples are B/Santiago/29615/2020 and C/Minnesota/10/2015.[28]

Genome and structure

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Structure of the influenza virion. The hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) proteins are shown on the surface of the particle. The viral RNAs that make up the genome are shown as red coils inside the particle and bound to ribonucleoproteins (RNP).

Influenza viruses have a negative-sense, single-stranded RNA genome that is segmented. The negative sense of the genome means it can be used as a template to synthesize messenger RNA (mRNA).[7] Influenza A virus and influenza B virus have eight genome segments that encode 10 major proteins. Influenza C virus and influenza D virus have seven genome segments that encode nine major proteins.[10]

Three segments encode three subunits of an RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp) complex: PB1, a transcriptase, PB2, which recognizes 5' caps, and PA (P3 for influenza C virus and influenza D virus), an endonuclease.[29] The M1 matrix protein and M2 proton channel share a segment, as do the non-structural protein (NS1) and the nuclear export protein (NEP).[8] For influenza A virus and influenza B virus, hemagglutinin (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) are encoded on one segment each, whereas influenza C virus and influenza D virus encode a hemagglutinin-esterase fusion (HEF) protein on one segment that merges the functions of HA and NA. The final genome segment encodes the viral nucleoprotein (NP).[29] Influenza viruses also encode various accessory proteins, such as PB1-F2 and PA-X, that are expressed through alternative open reading frames[8][30] and which are important in host defense suppression, virulence, and pathogenicity.[31]

The virus particle, called a virion, is pleomorphic and varies between being filamentous, bacilliform, or spherical in shape. Clinical isolates tend to be pleomorphic, whereas strains adapted to laboratory growth typically produce spherical virions. Filamentous virions are about 250 nanometers (nm) by 80 nm, bacilliform 120–250 by 95 nm, and spherical 120 nm in diameter.[32]

The core of the virion comprises one copy of each segment of the genome bound to NP nucleoproteins in separate ribonucleoprotein (RNP) complexes for each segment. There is a copy of the RdRp, all subunits included, bound to each RNP. The genetic material is encapsulated by a layer of M1 matrix protein which provides structural reinforcement to the outer layer, the viral envelope.[33] The envelope comprises a lipid bilayer membrane incorporating HA and NA (or HEF[25]) proteins extending outward from its exterior surface. HA and HEF[25] proteins have a distinct "head" and "stalk" structure. M2 proteins form proton channels through the viral envelope that are required for viral entry and exit. Influenza B viruses contain a surface protein named NB that is anchored in the envelope, but its function is unknown.[8]

Life cycle

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Host cell invasion and replication by the influenza virus

The viral life cycle begins by binding to a target cell. Binding is mediated by the viral HA proteins on the surface of the envelope, which bind to cells that contain sialic acid receptors on the surface of the cell membrane.[8][17][33] For N1 subtypes with the "G147R" mutation and N2 subtypes, the NA protein can initiate entry. Prior to binding, NA proteins promote access to target cells by degrading mucus, which helps to remove extracellular decoy receptors that would impede access to target cells.[33] After binding, the virus is internalized into the cell by an endosome that contains the virion inside it. The endosome is acidified by cellular vATPase[30] to have lower pH, which triggers a conformational change in HA that allows fusion of the viral envelope with the endosomal membrane.[31] At the same time, hydrogen ions diffuse into the virion through M2 ion channels, disrupting internal protein-protein interactions to release RNPs into the host cell's cytosol. The M1 protein shell surrounding RNPs is degraded, fully uncoating RNPs in the cytosol.[30][33]

RNPs are then imported into the nucleus with the help of viral localization signals. There, the viral RNA polymerase transcribes mRNA using the genomic negative-sense strand as a template. The polymerase snatches 5' caps for viral mRNA from cellular RNA to prime mRNA synthesis and the 3'-end of mRNA is polyadenylated at the end of transcription.[29] Once viral mRNA is transcribed, it is exported out of the nucleus and translated by host ribosomes in a cap-dependent manner to synthesize viral proteins.[30] RdRp also synthesizes complementary positive-sense strands of the viral genome in a complementary RNP complex which are then used as templates by viral polymerases to synthesize copies of the negative-sense genome.[8][33] During these processes, RdRps of avian influenza viruses (AIVs) function optimally at a higher temperature than mammalian influenza viruses.[11]

Newly synthesized viral polymerase subunits and NP proteins are imported to the nucleus to further increase the rate of viral replication and form RNPs.[29] HA, NA, and M2 proteins are trafficked with the aid of M1 and NEP proteins[31] to the cell membrane through the Golgi apparatus[29] and inserted into the cell's membrane. Viral non-structural proteins including NS1, PB1-F2, and PA-X regulate host cellular processes to disable antiviral responses.[8][31][33] PB1-F2 also interacts with PB1 to keep polymerases in the nucleus longer.[18] M1 and NEP proteins localize to the nucleus during the later stages of infection, bind to viral RNPs and mediate their export to the cytoplasm where they migrate to the cell membrane with the aid of recycled endosomes and are bundled into the segments of the genome.[8][33]

Progeny viruses leave the cell by budding from the cell membrane, which is initiated by the accumulation of M1 proteins at the cytoplasmic side of the membrane. The viral genome is incorporated inside a viral envelope derived from portions of the cell membrane that have HA, NA, and M2 proteins. At the end of budding, HA proteins remain attached to cellular sialic acid until they are cleaved by the sialidase activity of NA proteins. The virion is then released from the cell. The sialidase activity of NA also cleaves any sialic acid residues from the viral surface, which helps prevent newly assembled viruses from aggregating near the cell surface and improving infectivity.[8][33] Similar to other aspects of influenza replication, optimal NA activity is temperature- and pH-dependent.[11] Ultimately, presence of large quantities of viral RNA in the cell triggers apoptosis (programmed cell death), which is initiated by cellular factors to restrict viral replication.[30]

Antigenic drift and shift

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Evolution mechanisms of IAV. (A) Antigenic Drift: Gradual accumulation of mutations in the genome of IAVs leads to emergence of new virus variants. (B) Antigenic Shift: The reassortment of genetic segments between two or more invading IAVs in a host cell can lead to emergence of an antigenically novel subtype.

Two key processes that influenza viruses evolve through are antigenic drift and antigenic shift. Antigenic drift is when an influenza virus' antigens change due to the gradual accumulation of mutations in the antigen's (HA or NA) gene.[17] This can occur in response to evolutionary pressure exerted by the host immune response. Antigenic drift is especially common for the HA protein, in which just a few amino acid changes in the head region can constitute antigenic drift.[23][25] The result is the production of novel strains that can evade pre-existing antibody-mediated immunity.[8][9] Antigenic drift occurs in all influenza species but is slower in B than A and slowest in C and D.[25] Antigenic drift is a major cause of seasonal influenza,[34] and requires that flu vaccines be updated annually. HA is the main component of inactivated vaccines, so surveillance monitors antigenic drift of this antigen among circulating strains. Antigenic evolution of influenza viruses of humans appears to be faster than in swine and equines. In wild birds, within-subtype antigenic variation appears to be limited but has been observed in poultry.[8][9]

Antigenic shift is a sudden, drastic change in an influenza virus' antigen, usually HA. During antigenic shift, antigenically different strains that infect the same cell can reassort genome segments with each other, producing hybrid progeny. Since all influenza viruses have segmented genomes, all are capable of reassortment.[10][25] Antigenic shift only occurs among influenza viruses of the same genus[29] and most commonly occurs among influenza A viruses. In particular, reassortment is very common in AIVs, creating a large diversity of influenza viruses in birds, but is uncommon in human, equine, and canine lineages.[35] Pigs, bats, and quails have receptors for both mammalian and avian influenza A viruses, so they are potential "mixing vessels" for reassortment.[21] If an animal strain reassorts with a human strain,[23] then a novel strain can emerge that is capable of human-to-human transmission. This has caused pandemics, but only a limited number, so it is difficult to predict when the next will happen.[8][9] The Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System of the World Health Organization (GISRS) tests several millions of specimens annually to monitor the spread and evolution of influenza viruses.[36][26]

Mechanism

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Transmission

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People who are infected can transmit influenza viruses through breathing, talking, coughing, and sneezing, which spread respiratory droplets and aerosols that contain virus particles into the air. A person susceptible to infection can contract influenza by coming into contact with these particles.[15][37] Respiratory droplets are relatively large and travel less than two meters before falling onto nearby surfaces. Aerosols are smaller and remain suspended in the air longer, so they take longer to settle and can travel further.[37][38] Inhalation of aerosols can lead to infection,[39] but most transmission is in the area about two meters around an infected person via respiratory droplets[7] that come into contact with mucosa of the upper respiratory tract.[39] Transmission through contact with a person, bodily fluids, or intermediate objects (fomites) can also occur,[7][37] since influenza viruses can survive for hours on non-porous surfaces.[38] If one's hands are contaminated, then touching one's face can cause infection.[40]

Influenza is usually transmissible from one day before the onset of symptoms to 5–7 days after.[9] In healthy adults, the virus is shed for up to 3–5 days. In children and the immunocompromised, the virus may be transmissible for several weeks.[7] Children ages 2–17 are considered to be the primary and most efficient spreaders of influenza.[8][9] Children who have not had multiple prior exposures to influenza viruses shed the virus at greater quantities and for a longer duration than other children.[8] People at risk of exposure to influenza include health care workers, social care workers, and those who live with or care for people vulnerable to influenza. In long-term care facilities, the flu can spread rapidly.[9] A variety of factors likely encourage influenza transmission, including lower temperature, lower absolute and relative humidity, less ultraviolet radiation from the sun,[39][41] and crowding.[37] Influenza viruses that infect the upper respiratory tract like H1N1 tend to be more mild but more transmissible, whereas those that infect the lower respiratory tract like H5N1 tend to cause more severe illness but are less contagious.[7]

Pathophysiology

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How the different sites of infection (shown in red) of H1N1 and H5N1 influences their transmission and lethality[42]

In humans, influenza viruses first cause infection by infecting epithelial cells in the respiratory tract. Illness during infection is primarily the result of lung inflammation and compromise caused by epithelial cell infection and death, combined with inflammation caused by the immune system's response to infection. Non-respiratory organs can become involved, but the mechanisms by which influenza is involved in these cases are unknown. Severe respiratory illness can be caused by multiple, non-exclusive mechanisms, including obstruction of the airways, loss of alveolar structure, loss of lung epithelial integrity due to epithelial cell infection and death, and degradation of the extracellular matrix that maintains lung structure. In particular, alveolar cell infection appears to drive severe symptoms since this results in impaired gas exchange and enables viruses to infect endothelial cells, which produce large quantities of pro-inflammatory cytokines.[15]

Pneumonia caused by influenza viruses is characterized by high levels of viral replication in the lower respiratory tract, accompanied by a strong pro-inflammatory response called a cytokine storm.[8] Infection with H5N1 or H7N9 especially produces high levels of pro-inflammatory cytokines.[17] In bacterial infections, early depletion of macrophages during influenza creates a favorable environment in the lungs for bacterial growth since these white blood cells are important in responding to bacterial infection. Host mechanisms to encourage tissue repair may inadvertently allow bacterial infection. Infection also induces production of systemic glucocorticoids that can reduce inflammation to preserve tissue integrity but allow increased bacterial growth.[15]

The pathophysiology of influenza is significantly influenced by which receptors influenza viruses bind to during entry into cells. Mammalian influenza viruses preferentially bind to sialic acids connected to the rest of the oligosaccharide by an α-2,6 link, most commonly found in various respiratory cells,[8][17][33] such as respiratory and retinal epithelial cells.[30] AIVs prefer sialic acids with an α-2,3 linkage, which are most common in birds in gastrointestinal epithelial cells[8][17][33] and in humans in the lower respiratory tract.[43] Cleavage of the HA protein into HA1, the binding subunit, and HA2, the fusion subunit, is performed by different proteases, affecting which cells can be infected. For mammalian influenza viruses and low pathogenic AIVs, cleavage is extracellular, which limits infection to cells that have the appropriate proteases, whereas for highly pathogenic AIVs, cleavage is intracellular and performed by ubiquitous proteases, which allows for infection of a greater variety of cells, thereby contributing to more severe disease.[8][35][44]

Immunology

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Cells possess sensors to detect viral RNA, which can then induce interferon production. Interferons mediate expression of antiviral proteins and proteins that recruit immune cells to the infection site, and they notify nearby uninfected cells of infection. Some infected cells release pro-inflammatory cytokines that recruit immune cells to the site of infection. Immune cells control viral infection by killing infected cells and phagocytizing viral particles and apoptotic cells. An exacerbated immune response can harm the host organism through a cytokine storm.[8][11][30] To counter the immune response, influenza viruses encode various non-structural proteins, including NS1, NEP, PB1-F2, and PA-X, that are involved in curtailing the host immune response by suppressing interferon production and host gene expression.[8][31]

B cells, a type of white blood cell, produce antibodies that bind to influenza antigens HA and NA (or HEF[25]) and other proteins to a lesser degree. Once bound to these proteins, antibodies block virions from binding to cellular receptors, neutralizing the virus. In humans, a sizeable antibody response occurs about one week after viral exposure.[45] This antibody response is typically robust and long-lasting, especially for influenza C virus and influenza D virus.[8][25] People exposed to a certain strain in childhood still possess antibodies to that strain at a reasonable level later in life, which can provide some protection to related strains.[8] There is, however, an "original antigenic sin", in which the first HA subtype a person is exposed to influences the antibody-based immune response to future infections and vaccines.[23]

Prevention

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Vaccination

[edit]
Giving an influenza vaccination

Annual vaccination is the primary and most effective way to prevent influenza and influenza-associated complications, especially for high-risk groups.[7][8][46] Vaccines against the flu are trivalent or quadrivalent, providing protection against an H1N1 strain, an H3N2 strain, and one or two influenza B virus strains corresponding to the two influenza B virus lineages.[7][23] Two types of vaccines are in use: inactivated vaccines that contain "killed" (i.e. inactivated) viruses and live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIVs) that contain weakened viruses.[8] There are three types of inactivated vaccines: whole virus, split virus, in which the virus is disrupted by a detergent, and subunit, which only contains the viral antigens HA and NA.[47] Most flu vaccines are inactivated and administered via intramuscular injection. LAIVs are sprayed into the nasal cavity.[8]

Vaccination recommendations vary by country. Some recommend vaccination for all people above a certain age, such as 6 months,[46] whereas other countries limit recommendations to high-risk groups.[8][9] Young infants cannot receive flu vaccines for safety reasons, but they can inherit passive immunity from their mother if vaccinated during pregnancy.[48] Influenza vaccination helps to reduce the probability of reassortment.[11]

An Influenza A&B Antigen Test (bottom) showing negative results for both Influenza A and B)

In general, influenza vaccines are only effective if there is an antigenic match between vaccine strains and circulating strains.[7][23] Most commercially available flu vaccines are manufactured by propagation of influenza viruses in embryonated chicken eggs, taking 6–8 months.[23] Flu seasons are different in the northern and southern hemisphere, so the WHO meets twice a year, once for each hemisphere, to discuss which strains should be included based on observation from HA inhibition assays.[7][33] Other manufacturing methods include an MDCK cell culture-based inactivated vaccine and a recombinant subunit vaccine manufactured from baculovirus overexpression in insect cells.[23][49]

Antiviral chemoprophylaxis

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Influenza can be prevented or reduced in severity by post-exposure prophylaxis with the antiviral drugs oseltamivir, which can be taken orally by those at least three months old, and zanamivir, which can be inhaled by those above seven years. Chemoprophylaxis is most useful for individuals at high risk for complications and those who cannot receive the flu vaccine.[7] Post-exposure chemoprophylaxis is only recommended if oseltamivir is taken within 48 hours of contact with a confirmed or suspected case and zanamivir within 36 hours.[7][9] It is recommended for people who have yet to receive a vaccine for the current flu season, who have been vaccinated less than two week since contact, if there is a significant mismatch between vaccine and circulating strains, or during an outbreak in a closed setting regardless of vaccination history.[9]

Infection control

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These are the main ways that influenza spreads

  • by direct transmission (when an infected person sneezes mucus directly into the eyes, nose or mouth of another person);
  • the airborne route (when someone inhales the aerosols produced by an infected person coughing, sneezing or spitting);
  • through hand-to-eye, hand-to-nose, or hand-to-mouth transmission, either from contaminated surfaces or from direct personal contact such as a hand-shake.

When vaccines and antiviral medications are limited, non-pharmaceutical interventions are essential to reduce transmission and spread. The lack of controlled studies and rigorous evidence of the effectiveness of some measures has hampered planning decisions and recommendations. Nevertheless, strategies endorsed by experts for all phases of flu outbreaks include hand and respiratory hygiene, self-isolation by symptomatic individuals and the use of face masks by them and their caregivers, surface disinfection, rapid testing and diagnosis, and contact tracing. In some cases, other forms of social distancing including school closures and travel restrictions are recommended.[50]

Reasonably effective ways to reduce the transmission of influenza include good personal health and hygiene habits such as: not touching the eyes, nose or mouth;[51] frequent hand washing (with soap and water, or with alcohol-based hand rubs);[52] covering coughs and sneezes with a tissue or sleeve; avoiding close contact with sick people; and staying home when sick. Avoiding spitting is also recommended.[50] Although face masks might help prevent transmission when caring for the sick,[53][54] there is mixed evidence on beneficial effects in the community.[50][55] Smoking raises the risk of contracting influenza, as well as producing more severe disease symptoms.[56][57]

Since influenza spreads through both aerosols and contact with contaminated surfaces, surface sanitizing may help prevent some infections.[58] Alcohol is an effective sanitizer against influenza viruses, while quaternary ammonium compounds can be used with alcohol so that the sanitizing effect lasts for longer.[59] In hospitals, quaternary ammonium compounds and bleach are used to sanitize rooms or equipment that have been occupied by people with influenza symptoms.[59] At home, this can be done effectively with a diluted chlorine bleach.[60]

Since influenza viruses circulate in animals such as birds and pigs, prevention of transmission from these animals is important. Water treatment, indoor raising of animals, quarantining sick animals, vaccination, and biosecurity are the primary measures used. Placing poultry houses and piggeries on high ground away from high-density farms, backyard farms, live poultry markets, and bodies of water helps to minimize contact with wild birds.[8] Closure of live poultry markets appears to the most effective measure[17] and has shown to be effective at controlling the spread of H5N1, H7N9, and H9N2.[18] Other biosecurity measures include cleaning and disinfecting facilities and vehicles, banning visits to poultry farms, not bringing birds intended for slaughter back to farms,[61] changing clothes, disinfecting foot baths, and treating food and water.[8]

If live poultry markets are not closed, then "clean days" when unsold poultry is removed and facilities are disinfected and "no carry-over" policies to eliminate infectious material before new poultry arrive can be used to reduce the spread of influenza viruses. If a novel influenza viruses has breached the aforementioned biosecurity measures, then rapid detection to stamp it out via quarantining, decontamination, and culling may be necessary to prevent the virus from becoming endemic.[8] Vaccines exist for avian H5, H7, and H9 subtypes that are used in some countries.[17] In China, for example, vaccination of domestic birds against H7N9 successfully limited its spread, indicating that vaccination may be an effective strategy[35] if used in combination with other measures to limit transmission.[8] In pigs and horses, management of influenza is dependent on vaccination with biosecurity.[8]

Diagnosis

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X-ray of 29-year-old person with H1N1

Diagnosis based on symptoms is fairly accurate in otherwise healthy people during seasonal epidemics and should be suspected in cases of pneumonia, acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), sepsis, or if encephalitis, myocarditis, or breakdown of muscle tissue occur.[15] Because influenza is similar to other viral respiratory tract illnesses, laboratory diagnosis is necessary for confirmation. Common sample collection methods for testing include nasal and throat swabs.[8] Samples may be taken from the lower respiratory tract if infection has cleared the upper but not lower respiratory tract. Influenza testing is recommended for anyone hospitalized with symptoms resembling influenza during flu season or who is connected to an influenza case. For severe cases, earlier diagnosis improves patient outcome.[46] Diagnostic methods that can identify influenza include viral cultures, antibody- and antigen-detecting tests, and nucleic acid-based tests.[62]

Viruses can be grown in a culture of mammalian cells or embryonated eggs for 3–10 days to monitor cytopathic effect. Final confirmation can then be done via antibody staining, hemadsorption using red blood cells, or immunofluorescence microscopy. Shell vial cultures, which can identify infection via immunostaining before a cytopathic effect appears, are more sensitive than traditional cultures with results in 1–3 days.[8][46][62] Cultures can be used to characterize novel viruses, observe sensitivity to antiviral drugs, and monitor antigenic drift, but they are relatively slow and require specialized skills and equipment.[8]

Serological assays can be used to detect an antibody response to influenza after natural infection or vaccination. Common serological assays include hemagglutination inhibition assays that detect HA-specific antibodies, virus neutralization assays that check whether antibodies have neutralized the virus, and enzyme-linked immunoabsorbant assays. These methods tend to be relatively inexpensive and fast but are less reliable than nucleic-acid based tests.[8][62]

Direct fluorescent or immunofluorescent antibody (DFA/IFA) tests involve staining respiratory epithelial cells in samples with fluorescently-labeled influenza-specific antibodies, followed by examination under a fluorescent microscope. They can differentiate between influenza A virus and influenza B virus but can not subtype influenza A virus.[62] Rapid influenza diagnostic tests (RIDTs) are a simple way of obtaining assay results, are low cost, and produce results in less than 30 minutes, so they are commonly used, but they can not distinguish between influenza A virus and influenza B virus or between influenza A virus subtypes and are not as sensitive as nucleic-acid based tests.[8][62]

Nucleic acid-based tests (NATs) amplify and detect viral nucleic acid. Most of these tests take a few hours,[62] but rapid molecular assays are as fast as RIDTs.[46] Among NATs, reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) is the most traditional and considered the gold standard for diagnosing influenza[62] because it is fast and can subtype influenza A virus, but it is relatively expensive and more prone to false-positives than cultures.[8] Other NATs that have been used include loop-mediated isothermal amplification-based assays, simple amplification-based assays, and nucleic acid sequence-based amplification. Nucleic acid sequencing methods can identify infection by obtaining the nucleic acid sequence of viral samples to identify the virus and antiviral drug resistance. The traditional method is Sanger sequencing, but it has been largely replaced by next-generation methods that have greater sequencing speed and throughput.[62]

Management

[edit]

Treatment in cases of mild or moderate illness is supportive and includes anti-fever medications such as acetaminophen and ibuprofen,[63] adequate fluid intake to avoid dehydration, and rest.[9] Cough drops and throat sprays may be beneficial for sore throat. It is recommended to avoid alcohol and tobacco use while ill.[63] Aspirin is not recommended to treat influenza in children due to an elevated risk of developing Reye syndrome.[64] Corticosteroids are not recommended except when treating septic shock or an underlying medical condition, such as chronic obstructive pulmonary disease or asthma exacerbation, since they are associated with increased mortality.[46][65] If a secondary bacterial infection occurs, then antibiotics may be necessary.[9]

Antivirals

[edit]
Antiviral drugs[11]
Drug Route of administration Approved age of use
Oseltamivir Oral At least two weeks old
Zanamivir Inhalation At least five years old
Peramivir Intravenous injection At least 18 years old
Laninamivir Inhalation[8] 40 milligrams (mg) dose for people at least 10 years old,
20 mg for those under 10[66]
Baloxavir marboxil Oral[38] At least 12 years old[46]

Antiviral drugs are primarily used to treat severely ill patients, especially those with compromised immune systems. Antivirals are most effective when started in the first 48 hours after symptoms appear. Later administration may still be beneficial for those who have underlying immune defects, those with more severe symptoms, or those who have a higher risk of developing complications if these individuals are still shedding the virus. Antiviral treatment is also recommended if a person is hospitalized with suspected influenza instead of waiting for test results to return and if symptoms are worsening.[8][46] Most antiviral drugs against influenza fall into two categories: neuraminidase (NA) inhibitors and M2 inhibitors.[11] Baloxavir marboxil is a notable exception, which targets the endonuclease activity of the viral RNA polymerase and can be used as an alternative to NA and M2 inhibitors for influenza A virus and influenza B virus.[7][17][38]

NA inhibitors target the enzymatic activity of NA receptors, mimicking the binding of sialic acid in the active site of NA on influenza A virus and influenza B virus virions[8] so that viral release from infected cells and the rate of viral replication are impaired.[9] NA inhibitors include oseltamivir, which is consumed orally in a prodrug form and converted to its active form in the liver, and zanamivir, which is a powder that is inhaled nasally. Oseltamivir and zanamivir are effective for prophylaxis and post-exposure prophylaxis, and research overall indicates that NA inhibitors are effective at reducing rates of complications, hospitalization, and mortality[8] and the duration of illness.[11][46][38] Additionally, the earlier NA inhibitors are provided, the better the outcome,[38] though late administration can still be beneficial in severe cases.[8][46] Other NA inhibitors include laninamivir[8] and peramivir, the latter of which can be used as an alternative to oseltamivir for people who cannot tolerate or absorb it.[46]

The adamantanes amantadine and rimantadine are orally administered drugs that block the influenza virus' M2 ion channel,[8] preventing viral uncoating.[38] These drugs are only functional against influenza A virus[46] but are no longer recommended for use because of widespread resistance to them among influenza A viruses.[38] Adamantane resistance first emerged in H3N2 in 2003, becoming worldwide by 2008. Oseltamivir resistance is no longer widespread because the 2009 pandemic H1N1 strain (H1N1 pdm09), which is resistant to adamantanes, seemingly replaced resistant strains in circulation. Since the 2009 pandemic, oseltamivir resistance has mainly been observed in patients undergoing therapy,[8] especially the immunocompromised and young children.[38] Oseltamivir resistance is usually reported in H1N1, but has been reported in H3N2 and influenza B viruss less commonly.[8] Because of this, oseltamivir is recommended as the first drug of choice for immunocompetent people, whereas for the immunocompromised, oseltamivir is recommended against H3N2 and influenza B virus and zanamivir against H1N1 pdm09. Zanamivir resistance is observed less frequently, and resistance to peramivir and baloxavir marboxil is possible.[38]

Prognosis

[edit]

In healthy individuals, influenza infection is usually self-limiting and rarely fatal.[7][9] Symptoms usually last for 2–8 days.[11] Influenza can cause people to miss work or school, and it is associated with decreased job performance and, in older adults, reduced independence. Fatigue and malaise may last for several weeks after recovery, and healthy adults may experience pulmonary abnormalities that can take several weeks to resolve. Complications and mortality primarily occur in high-risk populations and those who are hospitalized. Severe disease and mortality are usually attributable to pneumonia from the primary viral infection or a secondary bacterial infection,[8][9] which can progress to ARDS.[11]

Other respiratory complications that may occur include sinusitis, bronchitis, bronchiolitis, excess fluid buildup in the lungs, and exacerbation of chronic bronchitis and asthma. Middle ear infection and croup may occur, most commonly in children.[7][8] Secondary S. aureus infection has been observed, primarily in children, to cause toxic shock syndrome after influenza, with hypotension, fever, and reddening and peeling of the skin.[8] Complications affecting the cardiovascular system are rare and include pericarditis, fulminant myocarditis with a fast, slow, or irregular heartbeat, and exacerbation of pre-existing cardiovascular disease.[7][9] Inflammation or swelling of muscles accompanied by muscle tissue breaking down occurs rarely, usually in children, which presents as extreme tenderness and muscle pain in the legs and a reluctance to walk for 2–3 days.[8][9][15]

Influenza can affect pregnancy, including causing smaller neonatal size, increased risk of premature birth, and an increased risk of child death shortly before or after birth.[9] Neurological complications have been associated with influenza on rare occasions, including aseptic meningitis, encephalitis, disseminated encephalomyelitis, transverse myelitis, and Guillain–Barré syndrome.[15] Additionally, febrile seizures and Reye syndrome can occur, most commonly in children.[8][9] Influenza-associated encephalopathy can occur directly from central nervous system infection from the presence of the virus in blood and presents as sudden onset of fever with convulsions, followed by rapid progression to coma.[7] An atypical form of encephalitis called encephalitis lethargica, characterized by headache, drowsiness, and coma, may rarely occur sometime after infection.[8] In survivors of influenza-associated encephalopathy, neurological defects may occur.[7] Primarily in children, in severe cases the immune system may rarely dramatically overproduce white blood cells that release cytokines, causing severe inflammation.[7]

People who are at least 65 years of age,[9] due to a weakened immune system from aging or a chronic illness, are a high-risk group for developing complications, as are children less than one year of age and children who have not been previously exposed to influenza viruses multiple times. Pregnant women are at an elevated risk, which increases by trimester[8] and lasts up to two weeks after childbirth.[9][46] Obesity, in particular a body mass index greater than 35–40, is associated with greater amounts of viral replication, increased severity of secondary bacterial infection, and reduced vaccination efficacy. People who have underlying health conditions are also considered at-risk, including those who have congenital or chronic heart problems or lung (e.g. asthma), kidney, liver, blood, neurological, or metabolic (e.g. diabetes) disorders,[7][8][9] as are people who are immunocompromised from chemotherapy, asplenia, prolonged steroid treatment, splenic dysfunction, or HIV infection.[9] Tobacco use, including past use, places a person at risk.[46] The role of genetics in influenza is not well researched,[8] but it may be a factor in influenza mortality.[11]

Epidemiology

[edit]
Influenza mortality in symptomatic cases in the US for the 2018/2019 season[67]

Influenza is typically characterized by seasonal epidemics and sporadic pandemics. Most of the burden of influenza is a result of flu seasons caused by influenza A virus and influenza B virus. Among influenza A virus subtypes, H1N1 and H3N2 circulate in humans and are responsible for seasonal influenza. Cases disproportionately occur in children, but most severe causes are among the elderly, the very young,[8] and the immunocompromised.[38] In a typical year, influenza viruses infect 5–15% of the global population,[33][62] causing 3–5 million cases of severe illness annually[8][23] and accounting for 290,000–650,000 deaths each year due to respiratory illness.[33][38][68] 5–10% of adults and 20–30% of children contract influenza each year.[21] The reported number of influenza cases is usually much lower than the actual number.[8][48]

During seasonal epidemics, it is estimated that about 80% of otherwise healthy people who have a cough or sore throat have the flu.[8] Approximately 30–40% of people hospitalized for influenza develop pneumonia, and about 5% of all severe pneumonia cases in hospitals are due to influenza, which is also the most common cause of ARDS in adults. In children, influenza and respiratory syncytial virus are the two most common causes of ARDS.[15] About 3–5% of children each year develop otitis media due to influenza.[7] Adults who develop organ failure from influenza and children who have PIM scores and acute renal failure have higher rates of mortality.[15] During seasonal influenza, mortality is concentrated in the very young and the elderly, whereas during flu pandemics, young adults are often affected at a high rate.[11]

Seasonal risk areas for influenza: November–April (blue), April–November (red), and year-round (yellow)

In temperate regions, the number of influenza cases varies from season to season. Lower vitamin D levels, presumably due to less sunlight,[41] lower humidity, lower temperature, and minor changes in virus proteins caused by antigenic drift contribute to annual epidemics that peak during the winter season. In the northern hemisphere, this is from October to May (more narrowly December to April[11]), and in the southern hemisphere, this is from May to October (more narrowly June to September[11]). There are therefore two distinct influenza seasons every year in temperate regions, one in the northern hemisphere and one in the southern hemisphere.[8][9][23] In tropical and subtropical regions, seasonality is more complex and appears to be affected by various climatic factors such as minimum temperature, hours of sunshine, maximum rainfall, and high humidity.[8][69] Influenza may therefore occur year-round in these regions.[11] Influenza epidemics in modern times have the tendency to start in the eastern or southern hemisphere,[69] with Asia being a key reservoir.[11]

Influenza A virus and influenza B virus co-circulate, so have the same patterns of transmission.[8] The seasonality of influenza C virus, however, is poorly understood. Influenza C virus infection is most common in children under the age of two, and by adulthood most people have been exposed to it. Influenza C virus-associated hospitalization most commonly occurs in children under the age of three and is frequently accompanied by co-infection with another virus or a bacterium, which may increase the severity of disease. When considering all hospitalizations for respiratory illness among young children, influenza C virus appears to account for only a small percentage of such cases. Large outbreaks of influenza C virus infection can occur, so incidence varies significantly.[10]

Outbreaks of influenza caused by novel influenza viruses are common.[29] Depending on the level of pre-existing immunity in the population, novel influenza viruses can spread rapidly and cause pandemics with millions of deaths. These pandemics, in contrast to seasonal influenza, are caused by antigenic shifts involving animal influenza viruses. To date, all known flu pandemics have been caused by influenza A viruses, and they follow the same pattern of spreading from an origin point to the rest of the world over the course of multiple waves in a year.[8][9][46] Pandemic strains tend to be associated with higher rates of pneumonia in otherwise healthy individuals.[15] Generally after each influenza pandemic, the pandemic strain continues to circulate as the cause of seasonal influenza, replacing prior strains.[8] From 1700 to 1889, influenza pandemics occurred about once every 50–60 years. Since then, pandemics have occurred about once every 10–50 years, so they may be getting more frequent over time.[69]

History

[edit]
The main types of influenza viruses in humans. Solid squares show the appearance of a new strain, causing recurring influenza pandemics. Broken lines indicate uncertain strain identifications.[70]

The first influenza epidemic may have occurred around 6000 BC in China,[71] and possible descriptions of influenza exist in Greek writings from the 5th century BC.[69][72] In both 1173–1174 AD and 1387 AD, epidemics occurred across Europe that were named "influenza". Whether these epidemics or others were caused by influenza is unclear since there was then no consistent naming pattern for epidemic respiratory diseases, and "influenza" did not become clearly associated with respiratory disease until centuries later.[73] Influenza may have been brought to the Americas as early as 1493, when an epidemic disease resembling influenza killed most of the population of the Antilles.[74][75]

The first convincing record of an influenza pandemic was in 1510. It began in East Asia before spreading to North Africa and then Europe.[76] Following the pandemic, seasonal influenza occurred, with subsequent pandemics in 1557 and 1580.[73] The flu pandemic in 1557 was potentially the first time influenza was connected to miscarriage and death of pregnant women.[77] The 1580 influenza pandemic originated in Asia during summer, spread to Africa, then Europe, and finally America.[69] By the end of the 16th century, influenza was beginning to become understood as a specific, recognizable disease with epidemic and endemic forms.[73] In 1648, it was discovered that horses also experience influenza.[76]

Influenza data after 1700 is more accurate, so it is easier to identify flu pandemics after this point.[78] The first flu pandemic of the 18th century started in 1729 in Russia in spring, spreading worldwide over the course of three years with distinct waves, the later ones being more lethal. Another flu pandemic occurred in 1781–1782, starting in China in autumn.[69] From this pandemic, influenza became associated with sudden outbreaks of febrile illness.[78] The next flu pandemic was from 1830 to 1833, beginning in China in winter. This pandemic had a high attack rate, but the mortality rate was low.[34][69]

A minor influenza pandemic occurred from 1847 to 1851 at the same time as the third cholera pandemic and was the first flu pandemic to occur with vital statistics being recorded, so influenza mortality was clearly recorded for the first time.[78] Fowl plague (now recognised as highly pathogenic avian influenza) was recognized in 1878[78] and was soon linked to transmission to humans.[76] By the time of the 1889 pandemic, which may have been caused by an H2N2 strain,[79] the flu had become an easily recognizable disease.[76]

The microbial agent responsible for influenza was incorrectly identified in 1892 by R. F. J. Pfeiffer as the bacteria species Haemophilus influenzae, which retains "influenza" in its name.[76][78] From 1901 to 1903, Italian and Austrian researchers were able to show that avian influenza, then called "fowl plague",[35] was caused by a microscopic agent smaller than bacteria by using filters with pores too small for bacteria to pass through. The fundamental differences between viruses and bacteria, however, were not yet fully understood.[78]

The difference between the influenza mortality age distributions of the 1918 epidemic and normal epidemics. Deaths per 100,000 persons in each age group, United States, for the interpandemic years 1911–1917 (dashed line) and the pandemic year 1918 (solid line).[80]

From 1918 to 1920, the Spanish flu pandemic became the most devastating influenza pandemic and one of the deadliest pandemics in history. The pandemic, caused by an H1N1 strain of influenza A,[78] likely began in the United States before spreading worldwide via soldiers during and after the First World War. The initial wave in the first half of 1918 was relatively minor and resembled past flu pandemics, but the second wave later that year had a much higher mortality rate.[69] A third wave with lower mortality occurred in many places a few months after the second.[34] By the end of 1920, it is estimated that about a third[11] to half of all people in the world had been infected, with tens of millions of deaths, disproportionately young adults.[69] During the 1918 pandemic, the respiratory route of transmission was clearly identified[34] and influenza was shown to be caused by a "filter passer", not a bacterium, but there remained a lack of agreement about influenza's cause for another decade and research on influenza declined.[78] After the pandemic, H1N1 circulated in humans in seasonal form[8] until the next pandemic.[78]

In 1931, Richard Shope published three papers identifying a virus as the cause of swine influenza, a then newly recognized disease among pigs that was characterized during the second wave of the 1918 pandemic.[77][78] Shope's research reinvigorated research on human influenza, and many advances in virology, serology, immunology, experimental animal models, vaccinology, and immunotherapy have since arisen from influenza research.[78] Just two years after influenza viruses were discovered, in 1933, influenza A virus was identified as the agent responsible for human influenza.[77][81] Subtypes of influenza A virus were discovered throughout the 1930s,[78] and influenza B virus was discovered in 1940.[21]

During the Second World War, the US government worked on developing inactivated vaccines for influenza, resulting in the first influenza vaccine being licensed in 1945 in the United States.[8] Influenza C virus was discovered two years later in 1947.[21] In 1955, avian influenza was confirmed to be caused by influenza A virus.[35] Four influenza pandemics have occurred since WWII. The first of these was the Asian flu from 1957 to 1958, caused by an H2N2 strain[8][82] and beginning in China's Yunnan province. The number of deaths probably exceeded one million, mostly among the very young and very old.[69] This was the first flu pandemic to occur in the presence of a global surveillance system and laboratories able to study the novel influenza virus.[34] After the pandemic, H2N2 was the influenza A virus subtype responsible for seasonal influenza.[8] The first antiviral drug against influenza, amantadine, was approved in 1966, with additional antiviral drugs being used since the 1990s.[38]

In 1968, H3N2 was introduced into humans through a rearrangement between an avian H3N2 strain and an H2N2 strain that was circulating in humans. The novel H3N2 strain emerged in Hong Kong and spread worldwide, causing the Hong Kong flu pandemic, which resulted in 500,000–2,000,000 deaths. This was the first pandemic to spread significantly by air travel.[33][34] H2N2 and H3N2 co-circulated after the pandemic until 1971 when H2N2 waned in prevalence and was completely replaced by H3N2.[33] In 1977, H1N1 reemerged in humans, possibly after it was released from a freezer in a laboratory accident, and caused a pseudo-pandemic.[34][78] This H1N1 strain was antigenically similar to the H1N1 strains that circulated prior to 1957. Since 1977, both H1N1 and H3N2 have circulated in humans as part of seasonal influenza.[8] In 1980, the classification system used to subtype influenza viruses was introduced.[83]

Thermal imaging camera and screen, photographed in an airport terminal in Greece during the 2009 flu pandemic. Thermal imaging can detect elevated body temperature, one of the signs of swine flu.

At some point, influenza B virus diverged into two strains, named the B/Victoria-like and B/Yamagata-like lineages, both of which have been circulating in humans since 1983.[21]

In 1996, a highly pathogenic H5N1 subtype of influenza A was detected in geese in Guangdong, China[35] and a year later emerged in poultry in Hong Kong, gradually spreading worldwide from there. A small H5N1 outbreak in humans in Hong Kong occurred then,[44] and sporadic human cases have occurred since 1997, carrying a high case fatality rate.[17][62]

The most recent flu pandemic was the 2009 swine flu pandemic, which originated in Mexico and resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths.[34] It was caused by a novel H1N1 strain that was a reassortment of human, swine, and avian influenza viruses.[18][38] The 2009 pandemic had the effect of replacing prior H1N1 strains in circulation with the novel strain but not any other influenza viruses. Consequently, H1N1, H3N2, and both influenza B virus lineages have been in circulation in seasonal form since the 2009 pandemic.[8][34][35]

In 2011, influenza D virus was discovered in pigs in Oklahoma, USA, and cattle were later identified as the primary reservoir of influenza D virus.[10][21]

In the same year,[62] avian H7N9 was detected in China and began to cause human infections in 2013, starting in Shanghai and Anhui and remaining mostly in China. Highly pathogenic H7N9 emerged sometime in 2016 and has occasionally infected humans incidentally. Other avian influenza viruses have less commonly infected humans since the 1990s, including H5N1, H5N5, H5N6, H5N8, H6N1, H7N2, H7N7, and H10N7, and have begun to spread throughout much of the world since the 2010s.[17] Future flu pandemics, which may be caused by an influenza virus of avian origin,[35] are viewed as almost inevitable, and increased globalization has made it easier for a pandemic virus to spread,[34] so there are continual efforts to prepare for future pandemics[77] and improve the prevention and treatment of influenza.[8]

Etymology

[edit]

The word influenza comes from the Italian word influenza, from medieval Latin influentia, originally meaning 'visitation' or 'influence'. Terms such as influenza di freddo, meaning 'influence of the cold', and influenza di stelle, meaning 'influence of the stars' are attested from the 14th century. The latter referred to the disease's cause, which at the time was ascribed by some to unfavorable astrological conditions. As early as 1504, influenza began to mean a 'visitation' or 'outbreak' of any disease affecting many people in a single place at once. During an outbreak of influenza in 1743 that started in Italy and spread throughout Europe, the word reached the English language and was anglicized in pronunciation. Since the mid-1800s, influenza has also been used to refer to severe colds.[84][85][86] The shortened form of the word, "flu", is first attested in 1839 as flue with the spelling flu confirmed in 1893.[87] Other names that have been used for influenza include epidemic catarrh, la grippe from French, sweating sickness, and, especially when referring to the 1918 pandemic strain, Spanish fever.[88]

In animals

[edit]

Birds

[edit]

Aquatic birds such as ducks, geese, shorebirds, and gulls are the primary reservoir of influenza A viruses (IAVs).[17][18]

Because of the impact of avian influenza on economically important chicken farms, a classification system was devised in 1981 which divided avian virus strains as either highly pathogenic (and therefore potentially requiring vigorous control measures) or low pathogenic. The test for this is based solely on the effect on chickens – a virus strain is highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) if 75% or more of chickens die after being deliberately infected with it. The alternative classification is low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) which produces mild or no symptoms.[89] This classification system has since been modified to take into account the structure of the virus' haemagglutinin protein.[90] At the genetic level, an AIV can be identified as an HPAI virus if it has a multibasic cleavage site in the HA protein, which contains additional residues in the HA gene.[18][35] Other species of birds, especially water birds, can become infected with HPAI virus without experiencing severe symptoms and can spread the infection over large distances; the exact symptoms depend on the species of bird and the strain of virus.[89] Classification of an avian virus strain as HPAI or LPAI does not predict how serious the disease might be if it infects humans or other mammals.[89][91]

Symptoms of HPAI infection in chickens include lack of energy and appetite, decreased egg production, soft-shelled or misshapen eggs, swelling of the head, comb, wattles, and hocks, purple discoloration of wattles, combs, and legs, nasal discharge, coughing, sneezing, incoordination, and diarrhea; birds infected with an HPAI virus may also die suddenly without any signs of infection.[61] Notable HPAI viruses include influenza A (H5N1) and A (H7N9). HPAI viruses have been a major disease burden in the 21st century, resulting in the death of large numbers of birds. In H7N9's case, some circulating strains were originally low pathogenic but became high pathogenic by mutating to acquire the HA multibasic cleavage site. Avian H9N2 is also of concern because although it is low pathogenic, it is a common donor of genes to H5N1 and H7N9 during reassortment.[8]

Migratory birds can spread influenza across long distances. An example of this was when an H5N1 strain in 2005 infected birds at Qinghai Lake, China, which is a stopover and breeding site for many migratory birds, subsequently spreading the virus to more than 20 countries across Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.[17][35] AIVs can be transmitted from wild birds to domestic free-range ducks and in turn to poultry through contaminated water, aerosols, and fomites.[8] Ducks therefore act as key intermediates between wild and domestic birds.[35] Transmission to poultry typically occurs in backyard farming and live animal markets where multiple species interact with each other. From there, AIVs can spread to poultry farms in the absence of adequate biosecurity. Among poultry, HPAI transmission occurs through aerosols and contaminated feces,[8] cages, feed, and dead animals.[17] Back-transmission of HPAI viruses from poultry to wild birds has occurred and is implicated in mass die-offs and intercontinental spread.[18]

AIVs have occasionally infected humans through aerosols, fomites, and contaminated water.[8] Direction transmission from wild birds is rare.[35] Instead, most transmission involves domestic poultry, mainly chickens, ducks, and geese but also a variety of other birds such as guinea fowl, partridge, pheasants, and quails.[18] The primary risk factor for infection with AIVs is exposure to birds in farms and live poultry markets.[17] Typically, infection with an AIV has an incubation period of 3–5 days but can be up to 9 days. H5N1 and H7N9 cause severe lower respiratory tract illness, whereas other AIVs such as H9N2 cause a more mild upper respiratory tract illness, commonly with conjunctivitis.[8] Limited transmission of avian H2, H5-7, H9, and H10 subtypes from one person to another through respiratory droplets, aerosols, and fomites has occurred, but sustained human-to-human transmission of AIVs has not occurred.[8][23]

Pigs

[edit]
Chinese inspectors checking airline passengers for fever, a common symptom of swine flu

Influenza in pigs is a respiratory disease similar to influenza in humans and is found worldwide. Asymptomatic infections are common. Symptoms typically appear 1–3 days after infection and include fever, lethargy, anorexia, weight loss, labored breathing, coughing, sneezing, and nasal discharge. In sows, pregnancy may be aborted. Complications include secondary infections and potentially fatal bronchopneumonia. Pigs become contagious within a day of infection and typically spread the virus for 7–10 days, which can spread rapidly within a herd. Pigs usually recover within 3–7 days after symptoms appear. Prevention and control measures include inactivated vaccines and culling infected herds. Influenza A virus subtypes H1N1, H1N2, and H3N2 are usually responsible for swine flu.[92]

Some influenza A viruses can be transmitted via aerosols from pigs to humans and vice versa.[8] Pigs, along with bats and quails,[21] are recognized as a mixing vessel of influenza viruses because they have both α-2,3 and α-2,6 sialic acid receptors in their respiratory tract. Because of that, both avian and mammalian influenza viruses can infect pigs. If co-infection occurs, reassortment is possible.[18] A notable example of this was the reassortment of a swine, avian, and human influenza virus that caused the 2009 flu pandemic.[18][38] Spillover events from humans to pigs appear to be more common than from pigs to humans.[18]

Other animals

[edit]

Influenza viruses have been found in many other animals, including cattle, horses, dogs, cats, and marine mammals. Nearly all influenza A viruses are apparently descended from ancestral viruses in birds. The exception are bat influenza-like viruses, which have an uncertain origin. These bat viruses have HA and NA subtypes H17, H18, N10, and N11. H17N10 and H18N11 are unable to reassort with other influenza A viruses, but they are still able to replicate in other mammals.[8]

Equine influenza A viruses include H7N7 and two lineages[8] of H3N8. H7N7, however, has not been detected in horses since the late 1970s,[29] so it may have become extinct in horses.[18] H3N8 in equines spreads via aerosols and causes respiratory illness.[8] Equine H3N8 preferentially binds to α-2,3 sialic acids, so horses are usually considered dead-end hosts, but transmission to dogs and camels has occurred, raising concerns that horses may be mixing vessels for reassortment. In canines, the only influenza A viruses in circulation are equine-derived H3N8 and avian-derived H3N2. Canine H3N8 has not been observed to reassort with other subtypes. H3N2 has a much broader host range and can reassort with H1N1 and H5N1. An isolated case of H6N1, likely from a chicken, was found infecting a dog, so other AIVs may emerge in canines.[18]

A wide range of other mammals have been affected by avian influenza A viruses, generally due to eating birds which had been infected.[93] There have been instances where transmission of the disease between mammals, including seals and cows, may have occurred.[94][95][29] Various mutations have been identified that are associated with AIVs adapting to mammals. Since HA proteins vary in which sialic acids they bind to, mutations in the HA receptor binding site can allow AIVs to infect mammals. Other mutations include mutations affecting which sialic acids NA proteins cleave and a mutation in the PB2 polymerase subunit that improves tolerance of lower temperatures in mammalian respiratory tracts and enhances RNP assembly by stabilizing NP and PB2 binding.[18]

Influenza B virus is mainly found in humans but has also been detected in pigs, dogs, horses, and seals.[21] Likewise, influenza C virus primarily infects humans but has been observed in pigs, dogs, cattle, and dromedary camels.[10][21] Influenza D virus causes an influenza-like illness in pigs but its impact in its natural reservoir, cattle, is relatively unknown. It may cause respiratory disease resembling human influenza on its own, or it may be part of a bovine respiratory disease (BRD) complex with other pathogens during co-infection. BRD is a concern for the cattle industry, so influenza D virus' possible involvement in BRD has led to research on vaccines for cattle that can provide protection against influenza D virus.[21][25] Two antigenic lineages are in circulation: D/swine/Oklahoma/1334/2011 (D/OK) and D/bovine/Oklahoma/660/2013 (D/660).[21]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Influenza is a contagious acute respiratory infection caused by enveloped, negative-sense, single-stranded RNA viruses of the family Orthomyxoviridae, primarily types A and B in humans, which infect the upper and lower respiratory tract. These viruses replicate via helical nucleocapsids and exhibit antigenic drift and shift, enabling seasonal epidemics and occasional pandemics. Transmission occurs mainly through aerosolized respiratory droplets from infected individuals, with secondary spread via contaminated surfaces, and an incubation period typically of 1–4 days, averaging about 2 days. Clinical manifestations include abrupt fever, nonproductive cough, sore throat, myalgia, and fatigue, often resolving in 3–7 days but complicated by secondary bacterial pneumonia in vulnerable groups. Seasonal influenza predominates in temperate regions during autumn and winter, correlating with lower humidity and indoor crowding that facilitate viral stability and transmission. Globally, it imposes a substantial burden, causing an estimated 290,000–650,000 respiratory-associated deaths annually, predominantly among the elderly, young children, and those with comorbidities, though excess cardiovascular and other non-respiratory mortality amplifies the total impact. Type A viruses, originating from zoonotic reservoirs in birds and swine, drive pandemics via major antigenic shifts, as seen historically with H1N1 and H3N2 subtypes. Antiviral drugs like neuraminidase inhibitors offer modest symptom reduction if administered early, while annual aim to match circulating strains but exhibit variable , often 40–60% in randomized trials, influenced by immune imprinting from prior exposures that can lead to mismatched protection. Empirical data underscore challenges in predicting dominant variants due to rapid , prompting scrutiny of overreliance on modeled forecasts from institutions prone to institutional incentives over raw incidence tracking. Despite emphasis on , natural herd dynamics and cross-immunity from related exposures contribute substantially to population-level control, highlighting causal limits of interventions amid viral adaptability.

Clinical Features

Signs and Symptoms

Influenza typically manifests with abrupt onset of constitutional and upper symptoms, distinguishing it from gradual-onset illnesses like the . There is no single universal first or earliest symptom of influenza, as symptoms vary by individual. Common early symptoms include sudden fever or chills, fatigue, body aches, headache, sore throat, cough, or runny or stuffy nose. Common symptoms include fever or chills (present in approximately 68% of cases, though afebrile rates of 32%–56% have been reported across studies, varying by population and setting; for instance, approximately 51% of cases among healthcare workers were afebrile, and around 60% of household secondary infections lacked fever, with asymptomatic infections comprising about 16% and afebrile but symptomatic cases forming a notable portion), dry (93%), , runny or stuffy nose, muscle or body aches (myalgias)—often described as bone pain or "dolor de huesos" in Spanish-speaking regions, referring to severe muscle, joint, and body aches resulting from the body's inflammatory response—, and profound . These symptoms usually begin 1-4 days after exposure to the , with fever often reaching 38-40°C (100-104°F), most prominent in the first 3–4 days and usually starting to resolve by day 4 or 5 (with many noticing improvement by day 5 as fever decreases or resolves; during this recovery phase around day 5, mild temperature fluctuations up to 99.8°F (37.7°C) represent normal physiological variation and are not indicative of active fever, defined as ≥100.4°F (38°C), though fatigue, cough, or mild symptoms can linger); fever persists for 3-5 days in uncomplicated cases. Severity varies by age, strain, and host factors; children may experience gastrointestinal symptoms such as , , and abdominal pain more frequently than adults, though these are less common than respiratory symptoms; diarrhea occurs in about 23% of confirmed cases. These differ from "stomach flu" (viral gastroenteritis), which primarily affects the intestines. Influenza B is sometimes associated with more prominent GI symptoms. Children may manifest irritability as fussiness rather than reporting specific complaints, while anxiety and restlessness are not standard symptoms but may arise secondarily from fatigue, discomfort, or inflammation, with evidence indicating influenza can exacerbate mood and anxiety particularly in children and adolescents; elderly individuals often report higher rates of and lower fever responses. Objective signs include tachycardia, tachypnea, and changes in blood pressure, reflecting systemic inflammation driven by cytokine release. Temporary elevations in blood pressure may occur due to the body's stress response, inflammation, and fever, while hypotension may occur in severe cases or complications such as pneumonia. Some hospitalized patients may develop new-onset hypertension. In empirical studies, the combination of and fever exhibits high predictive value for influenza (64% in confirmed cases versus 33% in non-influenza illnesses). Uncomplicated influenza symptoms generally resolve within 3-7 days for most patients, though and may linger for 2 weeks or more. and are less prominent than in infections, and extreme exhaustion often exceeds that seen in bacterial respiratory diseases. Severe cases, particularly in vulnerable populations, may progress to complications signaled by emergency warning signs requiring immediate medical attention, including difficulty breathing or shortness of breath, chest pain, persistent vomiting, confusion, signs of dehydration (such as decreased urination), or fever persisting beyond 3-5 days, returning after initial improvement, or exceeding 104°F (40°C).

Virology

Virus Types and Classification

Influenza viruses belong to the family , classified into genera Alphainfluenzavirus (type A), Betainfluenzavirus (type B), Gammainfluenzavirus (type C), and Deltainfluenzavirus (type D), distinguished by antigenic differences in and matrix protein antigens. Types A and B possess eight negative-sense segments, while C and D have seven. Influenza A viruses infect a wide range of hosts including humans, birds, swine, and horses, enabling zoonotic transmission and pandemics such as the 1918 H1N1 and 2009 H1N1 outbreaks. Subtypes are defined by (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) surface glycoproteins, with 18 HA subtypes (H1–H18) and 11 NA subtypes (N1–N11) identified to date; over 130 HA-NA combinations occur in nature, though only H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2 have circulated widely in humans since 1957. Influenza B viruses circulate almost exclusively in humans, causing seasonal epidemics, and diverged into two antigenic lineages—Victoria (predominant since the 1980s) and Yamagata—in the 1970s–1980s based on differences. The Yamagata lineage showed reduced detection globally after March 2020, with no confirmed natural detections by mid-2023, indicating very low risk, though strains persist in production. Influenza C viruses cause sporadic, mild upper respiratory infections, primarily in children aged 1–6 years, with limited due to lower impact. Influenza D viruses, discovered in 2011 from swine samples, infect cattle asymptomatically or with mild and swine, but lack evidence of human epidemics or sustained transmission. follows a standardized format: for type A, "A/[place of isolation]/[isolate number]/[year] (H#N#)"; for B, similar without subtype, e.g., B/Victoria/2/2011-like; types C and D use analogous host-location-year designations.

Genomic Structure and Replication

The genome of influenza viruses, members of the family, consists of eight segments of linear, negative-sense, single-stranded for influenza A and B viruses, totaling approximately 13.5 kilobases, while influenza C and D viruses have seven segments. Each RNA segment is encapsidated by multiple copies of the viral (NP) and associated with a heterotrimeric complex composed of PB1, PB2, and PA subunits, forming viral ribonucleoprotein (vRNP) complexes that protect the genome and facilitate transcription and replication. The terminal sequences of each segment are partially complementary, enabling panhandle formation that aids in packaging, and the segments encode 10–11 proteins: polymerase subunits PB1 (also expressing PB1-F2 in some strains via alternative ), PB2, and PA; surface glycoproteins (HA) and neuraminidase (NA); internal proteins NP, matrix 1 (M1), and M2 ; and non-structural proteins NS1 and nuclear export protein (NEP). Influenza replication is unique among RNA viruses in occurring primarily in the host cell nucleus, driven by the virus's reliance on host capped primers for efficient transcription. The cycle initiates with HA-mediated attachment to receptors on the host cell, followed by clathrin-dependent ; endosomal acidification (pH ~5–6) triggers HA conformational change for membrane fusion and M2-mediated virion uncoating, releasing vRNPs into the for nuclear import via NP nuclear localization signals. In the nucleus, the performs cap-snatching by cleaving 5' caps from host pre-mRNAs to prime viral mRNA synthesis from vRNA templates, yielding polycistronic mRNAs that are exported, spliced (for some segments like M and NS), and translated in the to produce viral proteins. Genomic replication follows transcription and requires newly synthesized polymerase and NP: positive-sense complementary RNA (cRNA) intermediates are synthesized using vRNA templates, then serving as templates for new negative-sense vRNA without caps or poly-A tails. Progeny vRNPs assemble in the nucleus with incoming polymerases recycling to amplify replication; NEP facilitates nuclear export of vRNPs via CRM1-mediated pathways, associating with M1 at the . Assembly occurs at the plasma membrane, where HA and NA embed via lipid rafts, M1 lattices underlie the envelope recruiting vRNPs via specific packaging signals, and virions bud; NA sialidase activity cleaves host sialic acids to prevent aggregation and enable release, completing the cycle in 6–8 hours with yields of 10^3–10^4 virions per cell. This nuclear phase enables host mRNA competition and antagonism by NS1, but also exposes the virus to nuclear defenses like RIG-I sensing.

Antigenic Drift and Shift

Antigenic drift denotes the incremental accumulation of point mutations within the genes encoding the and neuraminidase (NA) surface proteins of influenza viruses, yielding subtle antigenic variations that diminish recognition by pre-existing antibodies. These mutations stem from the inherent infidelity of the viral , which operates without mechanisms, introducing errors at a rate of approximately 10^{-5} to 10^{-4} substitutions per site per replication cycle. Selective pressure from population-level immunity favors variants with altered epitopes, particularly in the globular head of HA, enabling reinfection and driving annual epidemics; for instance, influenza A(H3N2) exhibits faster drift than A(H1N1), correlating with higher epidemic severity in some seasons. Antigenic shift, conversely, constitutes an abrupt, substantial reconfiguration of HA and/or NA antigens, predominantly in influenza A viruses, arising via reassortment of segments from co-infecting strains within a single host, often involving human and avian or viruses. The segmented nature of the influenza —eight single-stranded segments—facilitates this genetic shuffling during , potentially generating novel subtypes unrestricted by prior human adaptation. Such shifts underpin pandemics due to minimal ; documented cases include the 1957 H2N2 "Asian flu," resulting from avian-human reassortment introducing H2 HA and N2 NA, infecting over 20% of the global population with 1-2 million deaths, and the 1968 H3N2 "," featuring avian H3 HA on a prior human backbone, causing around 1 million deaths worldwide. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic similarly emerged from triple reassortment in , combining segments from North American swine, Eurasian , and human lineages. While drift occurs across influenza types A, B, and C, shift is largely confined to type A owing to its broader host reservoir, including aquatic birds as natural amplifiers, facilitating zoonotic jumps and reassortment events. This dichotomy necessitates vigilant global surveillance; drift prompts routine vaccine strain updates via WHO consultations twice yearly, whereas shift preparedness relies on detecting novel HA subtypes (H1-H18) and NA subtypes (N1-N11) in animal populations to preempt pandemics. Empirical tracking via hemagglutination inhibition assays quantifies antigenic distances, guiding responses, though intrasubtypic drifts can occasionally mimic shift-like immune escape, as observed in the 1947 H1N1 vaccine failure.

Transmission and Pathogenesis

Modes of Transmission

Influenza viruses primarily transmit from person to person through respiratory droplets generated when infected individuals cough, sneeze, or talk, with these droplets carrying virus particles that can be inhaled or deposited on mucous membranes of susceptible hosts within close proximity (typically 1-2 meters). This droplet-mediated route accounts for the majority of transmissions in household and community settings, as evidenced by epidemiological studies showing high secondary attack rates (10-38%) among close contacts during outbreaks, corresponding to a basic reproduction number (R₀) typically ranging from 1.3 to 2.0, with a median of about 1.3. Fine aerosols—smaller particles less than 5 micrometers that can remain suspended in air for extended periods—also contribute, particularly in poorly ventilated indoor environments, where experimental data indicate aerosol inhalation as a viable mechanism independent of large droplets or direct contact. Contact transmission occurs less frequently and involves either direct transfer of virus-laden secretions via skin-to-skin contact or indirect transmission through touching contaminated surfaces followed by self-inoculation to the eyes, , or mouth. Influenza A viruses can persist on non-porous surfaces for up to 48 hours and on porous materials like tissues for 8-12 hours at ambient temperatures; low temperatures, such as exposing contaminated clothing to frost, do not inactivate the influenza virus but instead preserve viral viability by inducing dormancy, allowing potential infectivity upon thawing or warming—this contrasts with effects on non-viral entities like dust mites, which may be killed by frost, though enveloped viruses like influenza remain resilient on fabrics. facilitating potential spread, though controlled experiments demonstrate low transmission efficiency from such routes, with infection rates near zero even after repeated exposure to virus-contaminated . Relative contributions of these modes vary by environmental factors, such as (lower levels favoring stability) and , with droplet and routes dominating in temperate climates during winter peaks. Transmission requires sufficient , which peaks 1 day prior to symptom onset and persists for 5-7 days in adults (longer in children and immunocompromised individuals), correlating with detectable viral in respiratory secretions. Individuals with influenza are most infectious during the first 3–4 days of illness, aligning with peak viral shedding shortly after symptom onset. Even after fever breaks and symptoms improve, contagiousness persists for several days, with CDC guidance recommending precautions such as masking, improved ventilation, hand hygiene, and distancing for at least the next 5 days from symptom onset or longer until full symptom resolution to reduce transmission risk; children and immunocompromised individuals may remain contagious for extended periods. and presymptomatic shedding further amplifies spread, with studies estimating 30-50% of infections occurring without overt symptoms yet capable of onward transmission via the same respiratory mechanisms. No evidence supports significant non-respiratory routes, such as fecal-oral or vector-borne transmission, in human influenza .

Pathophysiological Mechanisms

Influenza viruses initiate infection by attaching to sialic acid-containing receptors on the surface of respiratory epithelial cells via the (HA) glycoprotein, with human-adapted strains preferentially binding α2,6-linked sialic acids in the upper . Following , the fuses with the endosomal membrane at low pH, releasing the ribonucleoprotein complexes into the for nuclear import. Viral replication occurs uniquely in the nucleus, where the transcribes and replicates the eight-segmented negative-sense , exploiting host nuclear machinery. New viral proteins and genomic RNAs are exported to the for assembly at the plasma membrane, where neuraminidase (NA) cleaves residues to prevent viral aggregation and facilitate budding and release of progeny virions. This cycle peaks around 48 hours post-inoculation, leading to direct cytopathic effects including epithelial cell , , and airway denudation, which impair and predispose to secondary bacterial infections. In severe cases, such as with highly pathogenic strains like 1918 H1N1 or H5N1, infection extends to the lower , targeting type II pneumocytes via α2,3-linked receptors and causing . Host innate immune responses detect viral RNA via pattern recognition receptors like TLR7 and RIG-I, triggering type I interferon production; however, the viral non-structural protein NS1 antagonizes this pathway, promoting unchecked replication. Subsequent proinflammatory cytokine and chemokine release (e.g., TNF-α, IL-6, CXCL10) recruits neutrophils and macrophages, contributing to symptoms like fever and myalgia. The associated systemic inflammation and physiological stress response can lead to transient cardiovascular effects, such as elevations in blood pressure, though hypotension may develop in severe cases or complications. This response also exacerbates tissue injury through excessive inflammation, endothelial damage, and potential cytokine storm in vulnerable individuals. Adaptive responses, including neutralizing antibodies against HA and NA, and CD8+ T cell-mediated cytotoxicity, eventually clear the virus but can perpetuate lung pathology if dysregulated, as seen in high-risk groups with comorbidities. Secondary bacterial superinfections, often by Streptococcus pneumoniae or Staphylococcus aureus, account for much of the mortality in pandemics, facilitated by virus-induced impairment of antibacterial defenses.

Host Immune Responses

The host immune response to influenza A virus (IAV) infection encompasses innate and adaptive mechanisms that detect, contain, and ultimately clear the virus from respiratory epithelial cells, though dysregulated responses can contribute to tissue damage. Innate immunity acts first, recognizing viral RNA via pattern recognition receptors such as Toll-like receptors (TLRs) 3 and 7 in endosomes and retinoic acid-inducible gene I (RIG-I) in the cytoplasm, triggering signaling cascades that induce type I interferons (IFNs) like IFN-α and IFN-β. These IFNs activate the Janus kinase-signal transducer and activator of transcription (JAK-STAT) pathway in neighboring cells, upregulating interferon-stimulated genes (ISGs) that inhibit viral replication through mechanisms including protein kinase R-mediated translation blockade and 2'-5'-oligoadenylate synthetase activation of RNase L. Macrophages and dendritic cells produce proinflammatory cytokines such as interleukin-6 (IL-6), tumor necrosis factor-α (TNF-α), and IL-1β, recruiting neutrophils and natural killer (NK) cells to the site of infection; NK cells provide early cytotoxicity against infected cells via perforin and granzymes. Adaptive immunity develops subsequently, with humoral responses generating virus-specific antibodies that neutralize (HA) to prevent viral attachment or inhibit neuraminidase (NA) to block release of progeny virions, peaking around 10-14 days post-infection. Secretory IgA at mucosal surfaces limits initial viral entry, while serum IgG facilitates and complement activation. Cellular adaptive responses involve CD4+ T helper cells, which differentiate into subsets like Th1 cells producing IFN-γ to enhance macrophage antiviral activity and support class switching, and CD8+ cytotoxic T lymphocytes (CTLs) that recognize HA- or nucleoprotein-derived peptides presented on , inducing in infected cells via and granzymes to achieve viral clearance. CD8+ T cells are particularly critical for resolving infection in the absence of neutralizing antibodies, as demonstrated in models where their depletion prolongs viral persistence. In severe cases, such as those involving highly pathogenic strains like H5N1, exaggerated production—termed a ""—involves elevated levels of IL-6, TNF-α, and like IP-10, correlating with lung immunopathology and (ARDS). However, experimental inhibition of proinflammatory s in animal models does not consistently mitigate lethality, suggesting that while excessive responses exacerbate damage, baseline cytokine signaling is necessary for viral control. Age influences efficacy: in younger hosts, robust + T cell responses correlate with faster clearance, whereas in the elderly, senescent T cells and impaired IFN production lead to prolonged shedding and higher morbidity. IAV evades these responses via NS1 protein suppression of RIG-I signaling and HA-mediated binding that shields antigens, underscoring the virus-host arms race. Influenza B virus elicits comparable innate immune responses, inducing elevated pro-inflammatory cytokines such as IL-6 and soluble tumor necrosis factor receptor 1 (sTNFR1) during the acute phase, reflecting similar systemic inflammation to influenza A. Cytokine profiles differ, however, with influenza A typically showing higher IFN-γ and IL-4 levels, while influenza B is associated with elevated adaptive cytokines including IL-17A, IL-29, and IP-10. Despite these parallels, influenza A generally causes more severe disease and complications, such as pneumonia, relative to influenza B.

Prevention

Vaccination Programs: Development and Efficacy

Annual influenza vaccination is recommended by public health authorities as the cornerstone of prevention, with the annual flu vaccine reducing the risk of infection, severity of illness, hospitalization, and transmission to others. The development of influenza vaccines began in the 1930s with early experimental work on inactivated viruses grown in embryonated chicken eggs, leading to the first licensed inactivated vaccine in 1945 by Thomas Francis Jr. and , supported by the U.S. Army for military use during . This whole-virus inactivated formulation was later refined into split-virus and subunit vaccines by the 1970s, which reduced reactogenicity by purifying (HA) and neuraminidase (NA) surface antigens while discarding internal viral components. Live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV), administered intranasally, emerged in the 1980s from Russian research and were licensed in the U.S. in 2003, mimicking natural infection to elicit mucosal immunity. Recombinant vaccines, produced without eggs using insect cells to express HA protein, were approved in 2013 to address egg-adaptation mutations that can reduce antigenic match to circulating strains. Global vaccination programs rely on annual strain selection by the (WHO), which convenes twice yearly to recommend trivalent or quadrivalent formulations based on surveillance data from the Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), targeting HA from two influenza A subtypes (H1N1 and H3N2) and one or two influenza B lineages. For the 2025–2026 northern hemisphere season, WHO advised trivalent vaccines containing A/Victoria/4897/2022 (H1N1)pdm09-like, A/Darwin/9/2021 (H3N2)-like, and B//1359417/2021 (B/Victoria)-like viruses. National programs, such as those from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), recommend annual vaccination for all persons aged 6 months and older without contraindications, prioritizing high-risk groups like the elderly, young children, and those with comorbidities, with coverage rates varying widely (e.g., around 54% among U.S. adults in 2024). To protect infants younger than 6 months, who are ineligible for influenza vaccination, the CDC recommends vaccinating household members and caregivers to reduce transmission risk, as these infants have a higher risk of hospitalization from influenza. These programs emphasize pre-season by October for optimal protection, though uptake is influenced by factors like perceived and side effects. Vaccine efficacy (VE), measured primarily against laboratory-confirmed influenza in randomized controlled trials (RCTs), averages 50–60% for inactivated in healthy adults when strains match well, reducing risk from approximately 2.3% in unvaccinated to 0.9% in vaccinated cohorts over a (number needed to vaccinate: ~55). In children over 2 years, live attenuated show higher RCT of 79% against culture-confirmed cases compared to . However, real-world , derived from observational test-negative design studies, is lower and -dependent due to antigenic drift, egg-propagation mismatches, and biases like healthy vaccinee effects; CDC data from 2004–2025 seasons indicate adjusted VE against outpatient medically attended influenza ranging from 19% (poor match years) to 60%, with a around 40–50%.
Population GroupTypical RCT Efficacy (vs. Lab-Confirmed Influenza)Real-World VE Range (Observational, Outpatient)Notes
Healthy Adults50–60%30–50%Lower with strain mismatch; absolute risk reduction ~1–2%
Elderly (≥65 years)~60% (low certainty)20–40%Diminished by ; high-dose formulations may improve modestly
Children (6–59 months)60–80% (inactivated or LAIV)40–70%Two doses needed for naive children; better against severe outcomes
For the 2024–2025 season, interim CDC estimates showed 42% VE against influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 in outpatient settings, though not statistically significant against hospitalization for some strains, highlighting variability from circulating evolution. Overall, while vaccines reduce influenza incidence and severe outcomes (e.g., hospitalization VE 40–60% in adults), they do not prevent all infections, particularly in mismatched seasons, and observational estimates may overestimate benefits due to factors like prior immunity or testing biases. Efforts toward universal vaccines targeting conserved epitopes aim to overcome annual reformulation limitations, but none are yet licensed.

Antiviral Prophylaxis

Antiviral prophylaxis, also known as chemoprophylaxis, involves the use of neuraminidase inhibitors or other antivirals to prevent influenza in individuals at high risk following exposure or during outbreaks, particularly when is not feasible or during the . The primary agents approved for this purpose in the United States include (Tamiflu), (Relenza), and (Xofluza), which target influenza A and B viruses by inhibiting . Prophylaxis is recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) for high-risk groups such as older adults, immunocompromised persons, pregnant individuals, and unvaccinated children under 2 years, especially post-exposure within 48 hours or in institutional settings like nursing homes during outbreaks. For , is administered orally at 75 mg once daily for adults and adolescents (adjusted for weight and renal function in children and those with impaired clearance), typically for 7-10 days or until exposure risk subsides. , an inhaled powder, is dosed at 10 mg once daily for the same duration but is contraindicated in patients with or due to risk of . offers a single-dose option (40-80 mg based on weight) effective against both influenza A and B, providing convenience for short-term prophylaxis. In institutional outbreaks, the CDC advises prophylaxis for at least 2 weeks or until the outbreak is controlled, prioritizing unvaccinated staff and residents in high-risk facilities. Clinical trials demonstrate substantial efficacy: oseltamivir prophylaxis reduced influenza incidence by 90% in facilities during outbreaks, with similar results in settings showing 84% protective efficacy against from confirmed cases. A confirmed that post-exposure prophylaxis with , , or baloxavir decreases symptomatic influenza risk by 55-82%, though effectiveness wanes if initiated beyond 48 hours post-exposure. Shorter regimens, such as 5 days of , have shown noninferiority to 10 days in preventing nosocomial transmission, with incidence rates below 4%. Limitations include emerging antiviral resistance, particularly to in seasonal H1N1 strains (reported rates up to 1-2% in some data), necessitating susceptibility testing in severe or outbreak scenarios. Common adverse effects encompass and with (affecting 10-15% of users) and rare neuropsychiatric events, though remains debated in observational data. Prophylaxis does not supplant , which remains the cornerstone of prevention; preventive antiviral administration provides short-term suppression of infection onset in high-exposure situations but is not routinely recommended, whereas vaccination offers long-term protection against onset and severe outcomes and is strongly advised for children from 6 months of age, including 1-year-olds, to mitigate risks such as influenza encephalopathy. The endorses antivirals for prophylaxis in high-risk exposures to or zoonotic strains but emphasizes from randomized trials over anecdotal institutional preferences.

Infection Control Measures

Frequent handwashing with and water for at least 20 seconds effectively removes influenza from hands and reduces transmission risk in both community and healthcare settings, with studies showing comparable efficacy to alcohol-based sanitizers in certain contexts. Additional hygiene practices include avoiding touching the eyes, nose, and mouth to prevent introduction of the virus from contaminated surfaces. Respiratory hygiene practices, including covering coughs and sneezes with disposable tissues or the elbow crook followed by immediate hand hygiene, limit the dispersal of infectious droplets, a primary transmission mode for influenza. Sick individuals should isolate at home until at least 24 hours after symptoms are improving overall and no fever without the use of fever-reducing medications, minimizing secondary spread in households and communities; this measure aligns with observed reductions in influenza activity during periods of enforced absence from social settings. In healthcare facilities, droplet precautions—such as placing symptomatic patients in single rooms or cohorting, using surgical masks on patients for source control, and requiring masks or respirators on personnel within 3 feet of patients—are implemented, though randomized trials indicate limited evidence that surgical masks alone prevent laboratory-confirmed influenza transmission when worn by either infected or exposed persons. Surface disinfection with EPA-registered products effective against influenza and improved ventilation, such as opening windows or ensuring HVAC systems filter air adequately, support transmission reduction by decreasing environmental viral persistence, particularly in crowded indoor spaces. Community-level controls like temporary or workplace closures have demonstrated efficacy in modeling studies for scenarios by interrupting chains of transmission, but their application for seasonal influenza requires balancing against social and economic costs given variable real-world impacts. Overall, these measures' effectiveness depends on high adherence rates, with hand and isolation showing stronger empirical support than masks for routine seasonal control.

Diagnosis and Surveillance

Diagnostic Methods

Diagnosis of influenza relies on a combination of clinical assessment and testing, as symptoms like acute fever, , , and overlap with other respiratory illnesses. Clinical diagnosis alone is common in outpatient settings during peak season but lacks specificity, prompting confirmation for hospitalized patients, severe cases, or antiviral treatment decisions. Rapid influenza diagnostic tests (RIDTs) detect viral antigens in nasopharyngeal swabs or aspirates, yielding results in 10-15 minutes via . These point-of-care tests exhibit high specificity (90-100%) but moderate sensitivity (50-70%), leading to frequent false negatives, particularly in low-prevalence settings or with suboptimal specimen collection. The U.S. requires RIDTs to achieve at least 90% sensitivity for influenza A and 80% for B against . Negative RIDT results necessitate confirmatory testing in high-risk patients. Nucleic acid amplification tests (NAATs), primarily (RT-PCR), represent the reference standard for acute diagnosis, detecting viral with sensitivity and specificity exceeding 90-100%. These assays process respiratory specimens within 30-90 minutes using automated systems and enable subtyping of influenza A viruses (e.g., H1N1, H3N2). Optimal detection requires specimen collection within 3-4 days of symptom onset, as viral shedding peaks early. Rapid NAATs at point-of-care improve turnaround over lab-based RT-PCR while maintaining accuracy. Viral culture from respiratory samples provides the gold standard for virus isolation and antigenic characterization but requires 3-10 days, limiting utility for acute management. assays on clinical specimens offer rapid results (2-4 hours) with sensitivity approaching RT-PCR but demand specialized equipment and expertise. Serologic tests, measuring rises between acute and convalescent sera (e.g., hemagglutination inhibition), confirm past retrospectively but are impractical for timely . Guidelines from the CDC recommend molecular testing for hospitalized or immunocompromised patients to guide and control.

Epidemiological Surveillance

Epidemiological surveillance of influenza entails the systematic collection, analysis, and reporting of data on virus circulation, disease incidence, severity, and antiviral susceptibility to inform measures, strain selection, and preparedness. This involves integrating syndromic indicators, such as (ILI) rates from outpatient settings, with virological confirmation from laboratory-tested specimens. systems prioritize representative sampling from diverse populations to capture seasonal trends and novel variants, though underreporting of mild cases can limit estimates of total incidence. The World Health Organization's Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS), established in 1952, serves as the primary global framework, comprising over 140 National Influenza Centres (NICs) and 10 WHO Collaborating Centres that share virus isolates, genetic sequences, and epidemiological data biannually. NICs conduct routine virological testing using real-time (RT-PCR) on nasopharyngeal swabs from ILI or severe respiratory cases to identify subtypes like A(H1N1)pdm09, A(H3N2), and influenza B lineages. This network facilitated early detection of threats, such as the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, by enabling rapid genetic characterization and risk assessment. Nationally, systems like the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) FluView integrate multiple streams: sentinel provider reports track the percentage of outpatient visits for ILI (fever ≥100°F with cough or ), with regional baselines typically 1-3% outside peak season; laboratory monitors the proportion of respiratory specimens testing positive for influenza (e.g., 10-30% during peaks); and the Influenza Hospitalization Network (FluSurv-NET) calculates lab-confirmed hospitalization rates across 14 states, reporting figures such as 8.7 to 102.9 per 100,000 population in pre-2020 seasons, highest among those aged 65 and older. Additional metrics include pediatric mortality and excess /influenza deaths from vital statistics, providing proxies for overall burden. Antiviral resistance surveillance, embedded in these systems, tests isolates for markers like oseltamivir resistance in neuraminidase genes, with global data showing low rates (e.g., <2% for seasonal strains in recent years) but vigilance for clusters. Data dissemination occurs weekly during seasons via platforms like WHO's FluNet and CDC reports, enabling thresholds for severity classification—such as high hospitalization rates (>50 per 100,000) or widespread ILI (>5% visits)—to guide interventions. Limitations include reliance on healthcare-seeking behavior and lab capacity, which can delay real-time insights, prompting supplementary tools like or syndromic for earlier signals.

Management and Treatment

Antiviral Treatments

Antiviral treatments for influenza target viral replication and are recommended primarily for high-risk patients, such as those with chronic conditions, , or severe disease, to mitigate complications. The four FDA-approved agents include three neuraminidase inhibitors—, , and —and the endonuclease inhibitor . These drugs inhibit key viral enzymes: neuraminidase inhibitors prevent virion release from infected cells, while baloxavir blocks viral mRNA capping to halt replication. Clinical guidelines from the CDC prioritize their use within 48 hours of symptom onset for optimal efficacy, though benefits persist in hospitalized cases even if initiated later. Initiation within 48 hours, ideally within 24 hours, shortens the typical 3-5 day fever period and overall illness duration by approximately 1 day through inhibition of viral replication, potentially reducing fever to 2-3 days or even 1 day; this effect is observed with neuraminidase inhibitors such as oseltamivir, zanamivir, laninamivir, and baloxavir, though shorter durations may also result from mild cases, robust host immune responses, prior immunity via vaccination or previous exposure, or milder strains like influenza B. It also reduces complications, with oseltamivir administered orally twice daily for five days, zanamivir inhaled twice daily for five days, peramivir as a single intravenous dose for severe cases, and baloxavir as a single oral dose. Oseltamivir, administered orally twice daily for five days, shortens symptom duration by about 12-21 hours in adults with uncomplicated influenza compared to in randomized trials. In severe cases, such as hospitalized older adults, it reduces 30-day mortality risk by up to 25-40% when started early, with similar benefits observed even beyond 48 hours, particularly for influenza A. A 2024 network meta-analysis of severe influenza confirmed decreases hospital stay length by approximately one day versus standard care. However, in nonsevere outpatient settings, meta-analyses indicate no significant reduction in hospitalization or mortality rates, highlighting limited impact for low-risk individuals.01307-2/fulltext) Zanamivir, delivered via inhalation twice daily for five days, and intravenous peramivir offer alternatives for patients unable to tolerate oral oseltamivir, such as those with gastrointestinal issues or requiring parenteral therapy. Zanamivir reduces symptom duration comparably to oseltamivir in meta-analyses but is contraindicated in asthma due to bronchospasm risk. Peramivir, approved for single-dose IV use, may shorten hospitalization in severe influenza, per the same 2024 meta-analysis, though evidence is sparser than for oseltamivir. Both exhibit similar modest effects on viral load reduction, with no clear superiority in preventing complications across large trials.01307-2/fulltext) Baloxavir marboxil, a single-dose oral option, achieves faster viral clearance than in children and adults, reducing titers by day 2 in phase 3 trials. Network meta-analyses position it as potentially superior for symptom resolution and in uncomplicated cases, with fewer adverse events reported. Nonetheless, emergence of resistance mutations, such as I38T in acidic protein, has been noted in up to 10-20% of treated pediatric cases, raising concerns for transmission in outbreaks. CDC tracks adamantane resistance as near-universal, rendering those drugs obsolete since 2006. Empirical data underscore that antivirals do not eradicate but attenuate severity in vulnerable populations; a 2023 CDC analysis linked early to 40% lower 30-day mortality versus delayed initiation in hospitalized patients. Prophylactic use post-exposure reduces incidence by 55-89% in contacts, per meta-analyses, but is reserved for institutional outbreaks due to resistance risks and marginal population-level benefits. Overall, while effective against circulating strains, their modest absolute risk reductions—often under 1% for hospitalization in low-risk groups—necessitate targeted deployment informed by rapid diagnostics.01357-6/fulltext)

Supportive Care

Supportive care for uncomplicated influenza primarily consists of rest, adequate hydration, and symptomatic relief to alleviate discomfort while the combats the viral ; there is no cure, but early supportive measures and antiviral initiation within 48 hours of symptom onset can reduce duration and complications. Patients are advised to remain at home to recover, prevent transmission, and conserve energy, staying home for at least 24 hours after fever ends without medication; increased facilitates recovery. Oral fluid intake, including plenty of water, broths, or drinks, is recommended to counteract from fever-induced and reduced appetite, which can impair and exacerbate symptoms. Consideration of diagnostic testing for influenza, COVID-19, or RSV is recommended to guide treatment decisions and isolation practices, particularly for high-risk patients or to prevent spread around vulnerable populations. Patients should seek prompt medical attention if high-risk (e.g., elderly, pregnant, or with chronic conditions) or if severe symptoms develop, and urgent or emergency care for indicators such as difficulty breathing or shortness of breath, chest pain, sudden dizziness, confusion or sudden behavioral changes, persistent vomiting or diarrhea lasting more than a few days, severe weakness, signs of severe dehydration (e.g., dry mouth, reduced urine output), persistent high fever beyond 3–5 days, or symptoms that improve then worsen. Fever and are managed with antipyretics like acetaminophen or nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs such as ibuprofen, following dosing instructions, which reduce discomfort without antiviral effects; decongestants or cough suppressants may be used as needed for additional symptom relief. Aspirin is contraindicated in children and adolescents due to its association with Reye's syndrome, a rare but severe linked to salicylate use during influenza or varicella infections, with incidence dropping sharply after public health advisories in the 1980s. Throat irritation can be soothed with warm soups, honey (for adults and children over 1 year), or humidified air. Cough suppressants or expectorants may provide marginal relief, though evidence for their efficacy in influenza is limited beyond effects. For persistent symptoms such as cough and sore throat, adequate rest and consumption of plenty of warm fluids (e.g., tea, soup) are recommended, along with steam or humidified air; sore throat can be soothed with lozenges or salt water gargles. Consultation with a doctor is advised for evaluation if secondary infection is suspected (e.g., requiring antibiotics), and emergency care should be sought if symptoms worsen (high fever, shortness of breath, colored sputum, chest pain). In severe cases requiring hospitalization, supportive measures escalate to address complications like or (ARDS). Intravenous fluids maintain hydration when oral intake is insufficient, while supplemental oxygen via or mask corrects . , often with lung-protective strategies such as low tidal volumes, supports patients with , reducing ventilator-induced lung injury. Prone positioning during ventilation has been associated with improved outcomes in moderate-to-severe ARDS from influenza by enhancing ventilation-perfusion matching. Studies comparing antiviral therapy to supportive care alone in hospitalized patients indicate that the latter yields longer illness duration and higher risks of adverse outcomes, underscoring supportive care's role as adjunctive rather than curative. No specific interventions beyond these have demonstrated consistent benefits in reducing or immune-mediated damage through supportive means alone.

Prognosis

Mortality and Morbidity Rates

Seasonal influenza results in an estimated 1 billion cases of symptomatic illness annually worldwide, with 3 to 5 million cases progressing to severe illness requiring hospitalization. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates 9.3 million to 41 million influenza-associated illnesses each year, leading to 120,000 to 710,000 hospitalizations. These figures derive from modeling approaches that account for underreporting and excess healthcare utilization during peak seasons, though estimates vary due to differences in methods and assumptions about asymptomatic transmission. Mortality from seasonal influenza is concentrated among vulnerable populations, with the (WHO) estimating 290,000 to 650,000 respiratory deaths globally each year. In the US, CDC models attribute 6,300 to 52,000 deaths annually to influenza, predominantly in adults over 65 years, who account for the majority of fatalities. Case fatality rates for seasonal strains typically range from 0.1% to 0.2%, far lower than pandemic events like the 1918 H1N1 outbreak (estimated 2-3% CFR) or the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (around 0.02-0.1% CFR), reflecting antigenic drift versus shift in . analyses, which compare observed deaths to baseline expectations, underpin these estimates but face criticism for potential overattribution to influenza amid co-circulating pathogens and modeling uncertainties. Global death rates show an overall decline from 1990 to 2019, though increases occurred in older adults and certain regions.
MetricGlobal EstimateUS Estimate
Annual Illnesses1 billion symptomatic cases9.3–41 million
Severe Cases/Hospitalizations3–5 million120,000–710,000
Respiratory Deaths290,000–650,0006,300–52,000 (all causes)
Case Fatality Rate0.1–0.2% (seasonal)Similar to global

Risk Factors for Severe Outcomes

Individuals aged 65 years and older face the highest risk of severe influenza outcomes, including hospitalization and death, due to age-related and higher prevalence of comorbidities; in industrialized countries, most influenza-associated deaths occur in this group. Young children under 2 years old also experience elevated rates of hospitalization, with influenza complicating respiratory and other systems more frequently than in older children. Chronic medical conditions significantly elevate the risk of severe disease. These include , chronic lung diseases (such as COPD or ), (e.g., heart valve issues, hypertension), , neurologic and neurodevelopmental conditions (e.g., epilepsy), blood disorders, endocrine disorders, kidney or liver disorders, and metabolic disorders; individuals with these conditions face higher risk for rapid progression to complications like pneumonia and sepsis due to underlying physiological impairments, reduced reserve capacity, and predisposition to secondary infections, with early antiviral treatment helping to mitigate severity. the presence of multiple such factors further amplifies the likelihood of hospitalization or mortality. independently increases the risk of severe outcomes, including ICU admission and , across age groups. Immunocompromised states, whether from primary immunodeficiencies, , cancer treatments, or , heighten vulnerability to prolonged and secondary bacterial infections leading to or . , particularly in the second and third trimesters, is associated with increased hospitalization rates due to cardiopulmonary changes and higher susceptibility to complications like ARDS. Certain racial and ethnic minorities, such as non-Hispanic , Hispanic, and American Indian/Alaska Native populations, exhibit higher hospitalization and mortality rates, attributable to disparities in underlying health conditions, access to care, and social determinants rather than inherent biological differences.
  • Age extremes: Highest hospitalization rates in children <5 years (especially <2) and adults ≥65.
  • Comorbidities: Conditions like or hematologic disorders double or triple odds of severe outcomes in adults.
  • Lifestyle factors: exacerbates chronic lung disease risks, though direct causation for influenza severity requires further empirical linkage beyond .
Overall, the cumulative number of CDC-defined risk factors correlates directly with hospitalization odds; adults with ≥3 factors show markedly higher rates of ICU admission and death compared to those without.

Epidemiology

Global and Seasonal Patterns

Influenza viruses circulate globally, causing an estimated 1 billion cases annually, including 3–5 million severe illnesses and 290,000 to 650,000 respiratory deaths. In temperate regions of the , influenza activity typically peaks between and , coinciding with winter conditions that favor viral transmission through reduced humidity and lower temperatures. Similarly, in the Southern Hemisphere's temperate zones, epidemics peak during the local winter, generally from June to August, reflecting analogous environmental and behavioral factors such as increased indoor gatherings. In tropical and subtropical regions, influenza transmission occurs year-round without pronounced seasonality, though localized peaks may align with rainy seasons or other climatic variations, such as in during periods. This persistent circulation complicates timing and compared to the more predictable temperate patterns, where low absolute and cold air have been identified as key drivers enhancing stability and viral survival. Global facilitates inter-hemispheric seeding of strains, contributing to the synchronization of strain selection by bodies like the , which recommends formulations based on from both hemispheres.

Burden of Disease Estimates

estimates that seasonal influenza results in approximately 1 billion cases annually worldwide, including 3 to 5 million severe illnesses and 290,000 to 650,000 deaths from respiratory causes alone. These figures derive from statistical modeling that accounts for underdiagnosis, as most influenza cases and deaths lack confirmation, relying instead on and hospitalization data adjusted for influenza's attributable fraction. Independent analyses suggest additional cardiovascular deaths linked to influenza, potentially raising the total annual global mortality to around 700,000, though ranges vary due to differences in modeling approaches across studies. In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) model annual seasonal influenza burden as ranging from 9.3 million to 41 million illnesses, 120,000 to 710,000 hospitalizations, and 6,300 to 52,000 deaths, with variability driven by circulating strains, vaccination coverage, and population immunity. For the 2023-2024 season, CDC estimates included 40 million illnesses, 18 million medical visits, and 470,000 hospitalizations, reflecting a moderate-to-high severity year. Preliminary data for the 2024-2025 season indicate at least 43 million symptomatic illnesses, 19 million medical visits, 510,000 hospitalizations, and 27,000 deaths, underscoring ongoing annual fluctuations influenced by and measures. Burden estimates highlight disproportionate impacts on vulnerable groups, with higher hospitalization and death rates among children under 5, adults over 65, and those with comorbidities, though global data gaps persist in low-income regions where is limited. These modeled projections, while essential for policy, carry uncertainties from assumptions about influenza's causal role in excess deaths, potentially over- or underestimating true incidence amid competing respiratory pathogens.

Recent Developments (2020s)

The significantly disrupted global influenza transmission patterns from 2020 to 2022, with non-pharmaceutical interventions such as masking, , and travel restrictions leading to sharply reduced seasonal activity and near-absent in many regions. , influenza detections fell to historic lows during the 2020–2021 and 2021–2022 seasons, with global epidemic durations gradually recovering but peak intensities remaining subdued through early 2023. By the 2023–2024 season, activity normalized with widespread regional circulation, reflecting the virus's adaptability amid waning measures. The 2024–2025 influenza season marked a return to elevated severity, characterized by increased hospitalizations among both children and adults, including immunocompetent individuals previously considered low-risk. In the United States, activity rose from mid-November 2024, peaked in early February 2025, and declined thereafter, with CDC estimates indicating substantial burden including over 240,000 prevented hospitalizations via , predominantly in older adults. Globally, temperate regions experienced winter peaks, while tropical areas saw year-round circulation, underscoring persistent epidemiological variability. Avian influenza A(H5N1) clade 2.3.4.4b emerged as a major zoonotic concern starting in 2020, causing unprecedented outbreaks in wild birds and across all continents except by 2025, with over 3,000 incidents reported in 2020–2021 alone leading to millions of bird deaths or culls. The virus expanded into mammals, including U.S. herds (over 995 affected by mid-2025) and sporadic cases, including the first U.S. H5N1-related death and instances of severe . This multi-species transmission heightened pandemic risks, prompting enhanced surveillance and early warning systems for spillovers, including AI-assisted analysis revealing immune evasion adaptations in recent strains. Vaccine research advanced with a focus on broader protection, including recombinant hemagglutinin-based options like Flublok, expanded post-2020 for trivalent and quadrivalent formulations, and ongoing trials for universal influenza vaccines targeting conserved viral epitopes to mitigate antigenic drift. The U.S. National Influenza Vaccine Modernization Strategy (2020–2030) emphasized cell-based and adjuvant-enhanced platforms, while mRNA technologies, accelerated by lessons, showed promise for rapid strain adaptation. Annual WHO strain recommendations continued, with 2024–2025 updates targeting circulating variants to address evolving threats like H5N1. Initiatives like the Influenza Vaccines R&D Roadmap reported pipeline progress toward durable, cross-protective candidates by 2025.

History

Etymology

The word influenza originates from Italian, where it denoted an or visitation attributed to celestial influences, deriving from influetia ("influence" or "flowing in"), ultimately from Latin influere ("to flow into"). This etymology reflects medieval European beliefs that resulted from intangible fluids or emanations from stars and planets affecting human affairs, rather than microbial causes. In , the term was applied to outbreaks of respiratory diseases by the late 16th century, evolving from broader astrological references to visitations used for ailments as early as the 15th century. It entered English usage in 1743 during a widespread European of , supplanting earlier terms like "the grippe" or descriptive phrases for such contagions. The shortened form "flu" appeared in English by 1839, mirroring the disease's rapid onset and prostration.

Historical Pandemics

The influenza pandemic of 1918–1920, caused by an likely originating from avian reassortment, infected approximately one-third of the global population and resulted in an estimated 50 million deaths worldwide, with excess mortality peaking in the fall of 1918 and a characteristic W-shaped age distribution favoring young adults due to pathology. The virus first circulated detectably in , , in March 1918 among , spreading globally via troop mobilizations during , though serological evidence indicates precursor circulation as early as spring 1917 in some regions. studies confirm bacterial superinfections contributed to many fatalities, but the virus's inherent drove primary pulmonary damage. The 1957–1958 Asian flu pandemic arose from reassortment between human H1N1 and avian strains, yielding an H2N2 subtype that caused over 1 million deaths globally, with waves beginning in February 1957 in China's province and spreading via air travel.31201-0/fulltext) was concentrated in the elderly and those with comorbidities, contrasting the pattern, and U.S. deaths exceeded 70,000 amid limited availability until late 1957.31201-0/fulltext) The pandemic's antigenically novel enabled immune evasion, though overall case-fatality remained lower than in due to less aggressive . The 1968–1969 pandemic, triggered by H3N2 reassortment incorporating avian genes into a prevailing H2N2 backbone, led to approximately 1 million deaths worldwide, originating in in July 1968 and propagating through international travel.31201-0/fulltext) Mortality skewed toward older adults, with U.S. estimates at 34,000 excess deaths, facilitated by partial immunity from prior H2N2 exposure mitigating severity compared to fully novel shifts.31201-0/fulltext) The pandemic's dual waves reflected seasonal influenza dynamics but amplified by subtype novelty. The 2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, declared by WHO on June 11, 2009, stemmed from triple reassortment in hosts yielding a novel with genes from avian, , and human lineages, causing an estimated 151,700–575,400 associated respiratory and cardiovascular deaths in its first year.70121-4/fulltext) First detected in and the U.S. in 2009, it disproportionately affected younger populations and those with or , with global laboratory-confirmed deaths exceeding 18,500 by August 2010, though underreporting and modeling adjustments elevated totals. Unlike prior pandemics, rapid development and antiviral deployment tempered impact, transitioning it to seasonal circulation by 2010. Earlier pandemics, such as potential events in 1889 (linked to H3 emergence) and 1847 (first reliably global outbreak), lack viral sequencing confirmation but align with historical descriptions of widespread respiratory epidemics recurring every 10–40 years pre-1918, driven by antigenic shifts undocumented until modern . These underscore influenza's zoonotic potential and periodicity, with inter-pandemic gaps averaging decades amid localized epidemics.

Zoonotic Aspects

Influenza in Birds and Poultry

Wild aquatic birds, including ducks, geese, swans, and , function as the principal for influenza A viruses, sustaining 16 (HA) and 9 neuraminidase (NA) subtypes asymptomatically in their gastrointestinal tracts. These birds shed virus in feces, contaminating shared water sources and enabling persistence and reassortment among strains. Migratory waterfowl drive intercontinental spread, with viruses detected in wild bird populations across , , and annually. Avian influenza viruses introduced to domestic from wild reservoirs typically present as low-pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI), inducing mild or subclinical respiratory, enteric, or egg-production deficits in species like chickens and turkeys. LPAI strains, such as certain H9N2 subtypes, circulate endemically in poultry flocks with low mortality but can mutate or reassort into highly pathogenic forms via cleavage site insertions in the protein. In contrast, highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) elicits systemic infection, rapid onset of , , and neurological signs, culminating in 90-100% mortality within 48 hours in gallinaceous birds. Pathogenicity relies on intravenous tests in chickens, where HPAI exceeds 75% mortality, distinguishing it from LPAI's negligible lethality. HPAI subtypes, notably H5N1 (clade 2.3.4.4b since 2020) and sporadically H7N9 or H5N8, have triggered recurrent outbreaks in commercial poultry operations, often traced to wild bird incursions via shared waterways or inadequate biosecurity. In the United States, HPAI detections since February 8, 2022, have impacted 1,689 flocks and 168.62 million birds by April 23, 2025, predominantly turkeys and egg-laying hens, necessitating depopulation to curb aerosol and fomite transmission. Europe reported 295 HPAI outbreaks in commercial poultry across 20 countries by October 2025, with H5N1 dominating and amplifying via dense flock housing. Control strategies emphasize surveillance, quarantine, and stamping-out policies, as vaccination risks masking subclinical spread without eradicating reservoirs. H5N1's adaptation for poultry virulence stems from serial passage and reassortment, yet wild hosts remain tolerant, perpetuating spillover risks.

Swine and Other Mammals

Influenza A viruses (IAVs) have circulated in populations since at least the 1930s, with the first documented outbreak occurring in pigs in 1930, coinciding with the . Modern IAVs in primarily include triple reassortant H1N1 and H3N2 variants, which derive internal genes from , , and avian lineages, enabling efficient replication and transmission within pig herds. Pigs serve as "mixing vessels" for genetic reassortment because their expresses both avian-preferring α-2,3-linked and -preferring α-2,6-linked receptors, facilitating co-infection and segment exchange among , avian, and -origin es. This reassortment potential contributed to the 2009 H1N1 strain, a quadruple reassortant that emerged in through successive genetic swaps involving triple reassortant H1N2 and Eurasian avian-like H1N1 lineages before spilling over to s. Reverse zoonosis—transmission from humans to pigs—occurs more frequently than swine-to-human spillover, seeding swine herds with novel human-adapted strains that can then reassort with endemic porcine viruses. Occupational exposure at swine farms heightens spillover risks, with studies detecting IAV antibodies in up to 30-50% of exposed workers, though sustained human epidemics from swine strains remain rare outside the event. Swine IAVs cause acute respiratory illness in pigs, typically resolving in 7-10 days, but persistent infections in herds enable ongoing reassortment events, as seen in detections of novel H1avN2 triple reassortants in European pigs. Beyond swine, IAVs infect various mammals, serving as reservoirs or intermediate hosts with varying zoonotic potential. , primarily H3N8 subtype, has circulated in horses since the 1950s, causing global outbreaks like the 2007 Australian epizootic affecting over 140,000 horses, and has spilled over to dogs, establishing canine H3N8 lineages. viruses include H3N8 (equine-origin) and H3N2 (avian-origin from ), with U.S. outbreaks since 2015 linked to H3N2 causing fatal in dogs. Cats are susceptible to multiple subtypes, including equine H3N8 and highly pathogenic avian H5N1, with natural infections documented in outbreaks near infected birds or horses. Ferrets, while primarily a model for human IAV transmission, have shown susceptibility to swine and avian strains in experimental settings, mimicking mammalian spread. Other mammals, such as seals and , have experienced sustained outbreaks, notably H3N8 in seals and recent H5N1 panzootics in and wildlife, underscoring inter-mammalian transmission risks. These non-swine reservoirs rarely drive human pandemics but amplify genetic diversity through spillovers, as evidenced by H5N1's mammal-to-mammal spread in fur farms.

Inter-Species Transmission Risks

Influenza A viruses facilitate inter-species transmission primarily through zoonotic spillover from avian and reservoirs to s, with pigs acting as key intermediate hosts due to their dual receptivity to avian-like and mammalian-adapted strains. This susceptibility enables co-infection and genetic reassortment, where segmented genomes exchange genes to produce novel variants potentially capable of efficient human-to-human spread. Empirical evidence from data underscores pigs' role as "mixing vessels," as demonstrated by the detection of reassortants involving , , and avian segments in porcine populations. The 2009 H1N1 illustrates swine-mediated inter-species risk, originating from a triple-reassortant in pigs that incorporated genes from North American swine, Eurasian avian-like swine, and lineages, with initial emergence traced to in early 2009. This strain jumped to humans, causing an estimated 151,700 to 575,400 deaths worldwide in its first year. Bidirectional transmission has since occurred, with the pandemic H1N1 introduced into swine herds approximately 400 times globally, allowing further and potential for new zoonoses. Avian subtypes like H5N1 pose acute spillover risks, with 900 human cases documented worldwide from 2003 to 2024, mostly via direct contact, yielding a 52% case-fatality rate based on confirmed infections. Between January and August 2025, 26 additional cases were reported globally, reflecting ongoing circulation in wild birds and . Limited human-to-human clusters, such as a 2004 family incident involving two transmissions, indicate rare but feasible adaptation, though sustained chains remain absent. The 2024 detection of H5N1 in U.S. elevates reassortment concerns, as co-circulation with seasonal human viruses could yield pandemic-potential hybrids. Factors amplifying transmission risks include intensive farming, live animal markets, and migratory bird patterns, which concentrate viruses at human-animal interfaces. While other mammals like ferrets and seals support occasional spills, birds and swine dominate empirical pandemic precursors, necessitating targeted surveillance to preempt adaptation events.

Controversies

Debates on Vaccine Effectiveness

Influenza vaccines demonstrate variable effectiveness against laboratory-confirmed infection, typically ranging from 40% to 60% in observational studies, though randomized controlled trials (RCTs) report higher efficacy rates of around 60% for inactivated vaccines in healthy adults, reducing influenza incidence from 2.3% to 0.9%. Effectiveness is often lower against mild illness and higher against severe outcomes like hospitalization, with meta-analyses indicating reductions in hospitalizations among older adults but wide confidence intervals that include minimal benefit. These estimates are influenced by antigenic drift, where circulating strains mismatch vaccine formulations predicted by the World Health Organization, leading to seasons with near-zero or negative effectiveness, as observed in some years for influenza A(H3N2). A key debate centers on waning immunity, with s showing vaccine protection declining over time post-, particularly within 6 months, reducing overall seasonal effectiveness. Repeated annual vaccination has been criticized for potentially attenuating protection, especially against H3N2; a 2022 and found worse effectiveness in repeatedly vaccinated individuals compared to those vaccinated after a prior-year hiatus, with pooled data suggesting a loss of up to 20-30% relative protection. Proponents argue this reflects biological interference from , where prior exposures prime suboptimal responses, while critics question whether observational data sufficiently controls for confounders like prior infection history. Healthy user bias represents another contentious issue, as vaccinated populations tend to exhibit healthier behaviors, leading to overestimation of benefits in observational studies; a 2008 estimated that alone could account for reported mortality reductions in the elderly, with unadjusted data showing apparent benefits that diminish after propensity matching. This is exacerbated by differential testing rates, where vaccinated individuals are 27% more likely to be tested for influenza, inflating apparent protection against confirmed cases. Cochrane reviews, prized for their rigorous methodology, highlight modest absolute risk reductions (e.g., 1.4% for hospitalization in adults), questioning the population-level impact for healthy groups despite . Critics, including some independent analyses, argue that public health claims of substantial or mortality prevention lack robust causal evidence, particularly given low baseline influenza attack rates (2-6% in unvaccinated adults) and the vaccines' failure to prevent transmission effectively. A 2025 preprint study reported higher influenza risk among vaccinated working-aged adults during the 2024-2025 season, attributing it to potential negative interference or mismatched strains, though such findings await and replication. Defenders emphasize indirect benefits, such as reduced and secondary complications, supported by network models, but acknowledge that effectiveness metrics from government surveillance (e.g., CDC's test-negative designs) may overestimate due to institutional incentives favoring programs. These debates underscore the need for universal vaccines targeting conserved antigens to mitigate annual variability, rather than relying on strain-specific formulations.

Challenges in Burden Estimation

Estimating the global burden of influenza, encompassing symptomatic illnesses, hospitalizations, and deaths, relies heavily on statistical modeling due to incomplete direct data, resulting in wide uncertainty intervals. For instance, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) annually estimates 9.3 to 41 million illnesses, 120,000 to 710,000 hospitalizations, and 6,300 to 52,000 deaths from seasonal influenza, with ranges reflecting methodological uncertainties in extrapolating from sentinel sites. Globally, the attributes 290,000 to 650,000 respiratory deaths yearly to influenza, but these figures exclude cardiovascular and other non-respiratory sequelae, potentially understating total impact. Such estimates often employ multipliers applied to confirmed cases or models, which assume consistent test positivity rates and viral circulation patterns that may not hold across diverse populations. A primary challenge is underdiagnosis and underreporting, as laboratory confirmation occurs in only a fraction of cases; most mild illnesses go untested, and severe outcomes in resource-limited settings lack systematic virological data. Population-based , while valuable, typically captures data from select hospitals or clinics, leading to underascertainment—capture-recapture analyses in young children, for example, have revealed undetected hospitalization burdens exceeding reported figures by factors of 2 to 5. Distinguishing influenza from similar respiratory pathogens like (RSV) or requires widespread molecular testing, which is infeasible at scale, prompting reliance on syndromic that conflates etiologies. Attributing mortality poses further difficulties, particularly in older adults where background death rates from comorbidities obscure influenza's role; methods struggle to isolate signals amid high baseline cardiovascular and respiratory deaths, yielding imprecise all-age estimates in low-burden countries. Non-respiratory outcomes, such as influenza-triggered ischemic heart disease (contributing an estimated 3.9% to global ischemic deaths on average), are rarely captured in respiratory-focused , necessitating indirect modeling with inherent assumptions about attribution fractions. Global disparities exacerbate this: high-income nations benefit from robust systems, but low-resource areas suffer from sparse data, limiting representative extrapolations and introducing biases toward over- or underestimation based on local healthcare access. Seasonal variability and co-circulating viruses like further complicate year-to-year comparisons, as hybrid must adjust for diagnostic shifts. These limitations underscore the need for enhanced primary , including expanded virological testing and standardized global protocols, though logistical barriers persist in achieving comprehensive direct measurement. Different modeling approaches yield overlapping yet divergent results—for example, three methods estimated global influenza-associated respiratory deaths at 290,000 to 650,000 annually, with credible intervals spanning hundreds of thousands, highlighting sensitivity to input and model structure. While useful for policy, such estimates should be interpreted cautiously, as overreliance on them without addressing gaps risks misallocating resources.

Policy and Public Health Responses

The 1976 swine flu vaccination program exemplified risks in precautionary mass immunization efforts amid uncertain pandemic threats. Following a February 1976 outbreak of swine-origin H1N1 influenza at , , which killed one soldier and infected over 200, federal officials, fearing a recurrence of the 1918 , initiated a nationwide campaign in October 1976 to vaccinate the entire population of approximately 210 million. By December, the program was suspended after reports linked the vaccine to 450 cases of Guillain-Barré syndrome, including 25 deaths, at a rate of about 1 per 100,000 doses, prompting lawsuits and eroding public trust in government-led responses. No widespread materialized, rendering the effort—costing over $135 million and vaccinating 40 million—a in overreaction driven by incomplete data and pressure for decisive action, though proponents argued it averted potential catastrophe had transmission escalated. The 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic response drew criticism for both overhyped severity and logistical shortcomings in global coordination. Declared a pandemic by the on June 11, 2009, after initial detections in and the , the event prompted school closures, travel restrictions, and accelerated development, yet s were not widely available until late 2009 due to egg-based production delays and novel adjuvant formulations raising safety concerns. Public uptake remained low, with hesitancy fueled by media portrayals of risk and historical precedents like 1976, while retrospective analyses estimated 284,000 global deaths—tenfold higher than initial figures—highlighting underestimation in low-resource regions but questioning the proportionality of alarmist messaging that strained healthcare systems without matching lethality. Critics, including evaluations by the Government Accountability Office, faulted inadequate pre-planning for supply chains and communication, exacerbating inequities in distribution. Ongoing debates surround annual seasonal influenza vaccination policies, which recommend universal for all persons aged six months and older since 2010 in the , amid evidence of variable effectiveness and potential drawbacks from repeated dosing. Vaccine against typically ranges from 40-60%, often lower due to antigenic drift and mismatch with circulating strains, prompting questions about cost-benefit for healthy adults. Multiple studies indicate that prior-year may attenuate protection in subsequent seasons, particularly against drifted variants, through immune interference mechanisms, with one finding reduced effectiveness in repeatedly vaccinated individuals. Uptake hovers around 50% annually, hindered by perceptions of marginal benefit and rare adverse events, alongside structural barriers like access, fueling arguments for targeted rather than universal strategies despite emphasis on herd effects. Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) for influenza control remain contentious, with historical and modeling supporting in pandemics but limited applicability and compliance challenges for seasonal outbreaks. During the 1918 pandemic, city-level implementations of school closures, public gathering bans, and reduced peak mortality by up to 30% in modeling reconstructions, yet faced widespread defiance, legal challenges, and enforcement costs that strained resources. Community mask mandates and hand hygiene show modest effects in household settings but inconsistent broader impact, per reviews, due to adherence issues and weaker transmission dynamics compared to respiratory droplets in SARS-CoV-2. Recent shifts, such as Louisiana's 2024 directive barring state health workers from promoting influenza vaccines, reflect growing skepticism toward top-down NPIs and pharmaceutical-centric approaches, potentially influenced by post-2009 and experiences.

References

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