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Anti-Japanese sentiment
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| Country polled | Positive | Negative | Neutral | Pos − neg |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | -53 | |||
| 25 | 3 | |||
| 5 | 47 | |||
| 42 | 18 | |||
| 38 | 28 | |||
| 39 | 29 | |||
| 19 | 31 | |||
| 19 | 33 | |||
| 5 | 35 | |||
| 18 | 36 | |||
| 20 | 36 | |||
| 37 | 37 | |||
| 26 | 40 | |||
| 12 | 42 | |||
| 5 | 53 | |||
| 15 | 55 | |||
| 5 | 61 | |||
| 11 | 65 |
| Country polled | Favorable | Unfavorable | Neutral | Fav − Unfav |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | -86 | |||
| 1 | -55 | |||
| 42 | 44 | |||
| 4 | 60 | |||
| 6 | 62 | |||
| 9 | 67 | |||
| 14 | 74 |
| Country polled | Positive | Negative | Neutral | Pos − Neg |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 | -53 | |||
| 42 | -10 | |||
| 51 | 19 | |||
| 42 | 24 | |||
| 48 | 26 | |||
| 16 | 26 | |||
| 44 | 30 | |||
| 16 | 32 | |||
| 17 | 33 | |||
| 34 | 34 | |||
| 14 | 34 | |||
| 24 | 38 | |||
| 34 | 38 | |||
| 19 | 41 | |||
| 8 | 43 | |||
| 12 | 48 | |||
| 16 | 48 | |||
| 18 | 50 | |||
| 21 | 51 | |||
| 17 | 51 | |||
| 13 | 51 | |||
| 20 | 52 | |||
| 26 | 54 | |||
| 28 | 58 | |||
| 4 | 72 | |||
| 8 | 78 |
Anti-Japanese sentiment (also called Japanophobia, Nipponophobia[4] and anti-Japanism) is the fear or dislike of Japan or Japanese culture. Anti-Japanese sentiment can take many forms, from antipathy toward Japan as a country to racist hatred of Japanese people.
Overview
[edit]Anti-Japanese sentiments range from animosity towards the Japanese government's actions during the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War II, to disdain for Japanese culture, or to racism against the Japanese people. Sentiments of dehumanization have been fueled by the anti-Japanese propaganda of the Allied governments in World War II; this propaganda was often of a racially disparaging character. Anti-Japanese sentiment may be strongest in Korea and China,[5][6][7][8] due to atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese military.[9]
In the past, anti-Japanese sentiment contained innuendos of Japanese people as barbaric. Following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan was intent to adopt Western ways in an attempt to join the West as an industrialized imperial power, but a lack of acceptance of the Japanese in the West complicated integration and assimilation. Japanese culture was viewed with suspicion and even disdain.[citation needed]
While passions have settled somewhat since Imperial Japan's surrender in the Pacific War theater of World War II, tempers continue to flare on occasion over the widespread perception that the Japanese government has made insufficient penance for their past atrocities, or has sought to whitewash the history of these events.[10] Today, though the Japanese government has effected some compensatory measures, anti-Japanese sentiment continues based on historical and nationalist animosities linked to Imperial Japanese military aggression and atrocities. Japan's delay in clearing more than 700,000 (according to the Japanese Government[11]) pieces of life-threatening and environment contaminating chemical weapons buried in China at the end of World War II is another cause of anti-Japanese sentiment. [citation needed]
Periodically, individuals within Japan spur external criticism. Former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was heavily criticized by South Korea and China for annually paying his respects to the war dead at Yasukuni Shrine, which enshrines all those who fought and died for Imperial Japan as part of the Axis Powers during World War II, including 1,068 convicted war criminals. Right-wing nationalist groups have produced history textbooks whitewashing Japanese atrocities,[12] and the recurring controversies over these books occasionally attract hostile foreign attention.[citation needed]
Some anti-Japanese sentiment originates from business practices used by some Japanese companies, such as dumping.[citation needed]
By region
[edit]Brazil
[edit]Like the elites in Argentina and Uruguay, the Brazilian elite wanted to racially whiten the country's population during the 19th and 20th centuries. The country's governments always encouraged European immigration, but non-white immigration was always greeted with considerable opposition. The communities of Japanese immigrants were seen as an obstacle to the whitening of Brazil and they were also seen, among other concerns, as being particularly tendentious because they formed ghettos and they also practiced endogamy at a high rate. Oliveira Viana, a Brazilian jurist, historian, and sociologist, described the Japanese immigrants as follows: "They (Japanese) are like sulfur: insoluble." The Brazilian magazine O Malho in its edition of 5 December 1908, issued a charge of Japanese immigrants with the following legend: "The government of São Paulo is stubborn. After the failure of the first Japanese immigration, it contracted 3,000 yellow people. It insists on giving Brazil a race diametrically opposite to ours."[13] On 22 October 1923, Representative Fidélis Reis produced a bill on the entry of immigrants, whose fifth article was as follows: "The entry of settlers from the black race into Brazil is prohibited. For Asian [immigrants] there will be allowed each year a number equal to 5% of those residing in the country...."[14]
Years before World War II, the government of President Getúlio Vargas initiated a process of forced assimilation of people of immigrant origin in Brazil. In 1933, a constitutional amendment was approved by a large majority and established immigration quotas without mentioning race or nationality and prohibited the population concentration of immigrants. According to the text, Brazil could not receive more than 2% of the total number of entrants of each nationality that had been received in the last 50 years. Only the Portuguese were excluded. The measures did not affect the immigration of Europeans such as Italians and Spaniards, who had already entered in large numbers and whose migratory flow was downward. However, immigration quotas, which remained in force until the 1980s, restricted Japanese immigration, as well as Korean and Chinese immigration.[15][13][16]
When Brazil sided with the Allies and declared war on Japan in 1942, all communication with Japan was cut off, the entry of new Japanese immigrants was forbidden, and many restrictions affected the Japanese Brazilians. Japanese newspapers and teaching the Japanese language in schools were banned, which left Portuguese as the only option for Japanese descendants. As many Japanese immigrants could not understand Portuguese, it became exceedingly difficult for them to obtain any extra-communal information.[17] In 1939, research of Estrada de Ferro Noroeste do Brasil in São Paulo showed that 87.7% of Japanese Brazilians read newspapers in the Japanese language, a much higher literacy rate than the general populace at the time.[13] Japanese Brazilians could not travel without safe conduct issued by the police, Japanese schools were closed, and radio receivers were confiscated to prevent transmissions on shortwave from Japan. The goods of Japanese companies were confiscated and several companies of Japanese origin had interventions by the government. Japanese Brazilians were prohibited from driving motor vehicles, and the drivers employed by the Japanese had to have permission from the police. Thousands of Japanese immigrants were arrested or deported from Brazil on suspicion of espionage.[13] On 10 July 1943, approximately 10,000 Japanese and German and Italian immigrants who lived in Santos had 24 hours to move away from the Brazilian coast. The police acted without any notice. About 90% of the people displaced were Japanese. To reside in coastal areas, the Japanese had to have a safe conduct.[13] In 1942, the Japanese community that introduced the cultivation of pepper in Tomé-Açu, in Pará, was virtually turned into a "concentration camp". This time, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, DC, Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa, encouraged the government of Brazil to transfer all Japanese Brazilians to "internment camps" without the need for legal support, just as was done with the Japanese residents in the United States. However, no suspicion of activities of the Japanese against "national security" was ever confirmed.[13]
Even after the war ended, anti-Japanese sentiment persisted in Brazil. After the war, Shindo Renmei, a terrorist organization formed by Japanese immigrants that murdered Japanese-Brazilians who believed in Japanese surrender, was founded. The violent acts committed by this organization increased anti-Japanese sentiment in Brazil and caused several violent conflicts between Brazilians and Japanese-Brazilians.[13] During the National Constituent Assembly of 1946, the representative of Rio de Janeiro Miguel Couto Filho proposed an amendment to the Constitution saying "It is prohibited the entry of Japanese immigrants of any age and any origin in the country." In the final vote, a tie with 99 votes in favour and 99 against. Senator Fernando de Melo Viana, who chaired the session of the Constituent Assembly, had the casting vote and rejected the constitutional amendment. By only one vote, the immigration of Japanese people to Brazil was not prohibited by the Brazilian Constitution of 1946.[13]
In the second half of the 2010s, a certain anti-Japanese feeling has grown in Brazil. The former Brazilian president, Jair Bolsonaro, was accused of making statements considered discriminatory against Japanese people, which generated repercussions in the press and in the Japanese-Brazilian community,[18][19] which is considered the largest in the world outside of Japan.[20] In addition, in 2020, possibly as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, some incidents of xenophobia and abuse were reported to Japanese-Brazilians in cities such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro.[21][22][23][24]
According to a 2017 BBC World Service survey, 70% of Brazilians view Japan's influence positively, with 15% expressing a negative view, making Brazil one of the most pro-Japanese countries in South America.[1]
Canada
[edit]Like other countries to which the Japanese immigrated in significant numbers, anti-Japanese sentiment in Canada was strongest during the 20th century, with the formation of anti-immigration organizations such as the Asiatic Exclusion League in response to Japanese and other Asian immigration. Anti-Japanese and anti-Chinese riots also frequently broke out such one in early 1900s Vancouver. During World War II, Japanese Canadians were interned like their American counterparts. Financial compensation for surviving internees was finally paid in 1988 by the Brian Mulroney government.[25]
China
[edit]

Anti-Japanese sentiment is felt very strongly in China, and distrust, hostility and negative feelings towards Japan and the Japanese people and culture is widespread in China. Anti-Japanese sentiment is a phenomenon that mostly dates back to modern times (since 1868). Like many Western powers during the era of imperialism, Imperial Japan negotiated treaties that often resulted in the annexation of land from China towards the end of the Qing dynasty. Dissatisfaction with Japanese settlements and the Twenty-One Demands by the Japanese government led to a serious boycott of Japanese products in China.
Today, bitterness persists in China[26] over the atrocities of the Second Sino-Japanese War and Japan's postwar actions, particularly the perceived lack of a straightforward acknowledgment of such atrocities, the Japanese government's employment of known war criminals, and Japanese historic revisionism in textbooks. In elementary school, children are taught about Japanese war crimes in detail. For example, thousands of children are brought to the Museum of the War of Chinese People's Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in Beijing by their elementary schools and required to view photos of war atrocities, such as exhibits of records of the Japanese military forcing Chinese workers into wartime labor,[27] the Nanjing Massacre,[28] and the issues of comfort women.[29] After viewing the museum, the children's hatred of the Japanese people was reported to significantly increase. Despite the time that has passed since the end of the war, discussions about Japanese conduct during it can still evoke powerful emotions today, partly because most Japanese are aware of what happened during it although their society has never engaged in the type of introspection which has been common in Germany after the Holocaust.[30] Hence, the usage of Japanese military symbols is still controversial in China, such as the incident in which the Chinese pop singer Zhao Wei was seen wearing a Rising Sun Flag while she was dressed for a fashion magazine photo shoot in 2001.[31] Huge responses were seen on the Internet, a public letter demanding a public apology was also circulated by a Nanjing Massacre survivor, and the singer was even attacked.[32] According to a 2017 BBC World Service Poll, only 22% of Chinese people view Japan's influence positively, and 75% express a negative view, making China the most anti-Japanese nation in the world.[1] Online hate speech against the Japanese is common on Chinese social media.[33]
Anti-Japanese sentiment can also be seen in war films and anime that are currently being produced and broadcast in Mainland China. More than 200 anti-Japanese films were produced in China in 2012 alone.[34] In one particular situation involving a more moderate anti-Japanese war film, the government of China banned the 2000 fictional film, Devils on the Doorstep because it depicted a Japanese soldier being friendly with Chinese villagers. While Lycoris Recoil considered too violent in Southeast Asia since the assassination of Shinzo Abe.[35]
France
[edit]Japan's public service broadcaster, NHK, provides a list of overseas safety risks for traveling, and in early 2020, it listed anti-Japanese discrimination as a safety risk on travel to France and some other European countries, possibly because of fears over the COVID-19 pandemic and other factors.[36] Signs of rising anti-Japanese sentiment in France include an increase in anti-Japanese incidents reported by Japanese nationals, such as being mocked on the street and refused taxi service, and least one Japanese restaurant has been vandalized.[37][38][39] A group of Japanese students on a study tour in Paris received abuse by locals.[40] Another group of Japanese citizens was targeted by acid attacks, which prompted the Japanese embassy as well as the foreign ministry to issue a warning to Japanese nationals in France, urging caution.[41][42] Due to rising discrimination, a Japanese TV announcer in Paris said it's best not to speak Japanese in public or wear a Japanese costume like a kimono.[43]
Germany
[edit]According to the Japanese foreign ministry, anti-Japanese sentiment and discrimination has been rising in Germany, especially recently when the COVID-19 pandemic began affecting the country.[44]
Media sources have reported a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment in Germany, with some Japanese residents saying suspicion and contempt towards them have increased noticeably.[45] In line with those sentiments, there have been a rising number of anti-Japanese incidents such as at least one major football club kicking out all Japanese fans from their stadium over fears of the coronavirus, locals throwing raw eggs at Japanese people's homes and a general increase in the level of harassment toward Japanese residents.[46][47][48]
Indonesia
[edit]In a press release, the embassy of Japan in Indonesia stated that incidents of discrimination and harassment of Japanese people had increased, and they were possibly partly related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, and it also announced that it had set up a help center in order to assist Japanese residents in dealing with those incidents.[49] In general, there have been reports of widespread anti-Japanese discrimination and harassment in the country, with hotels, stores, restaurants, taxi services and more refusing Japanese customers and many Japanese people were no longer allowed in meetings and conferences. The embassy of Japan has also received at least a dozen reports of harassment toward Japanese people in just a few days.[50][51] According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), anti-Japanese sentiment and discrimination has been rising in Indonesia.[44]
Japan
[edit]Korea
[edit]
The issue of anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea is complex and multifaceted. Anti-Japanese attitudes in the Korean Peninsula can be traced as far back as the Japanese pirate raids and the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598), but they are largely a product of the Japanese occupation of Korea which lasted from 1910 to 1945 and the subsequent revisionism of history textbooks which have been used by Japan's educational system since World War II.
Today, issues of Japanese history textbook controversies, Japanese policy regarding the war, and geographic disputes between the two countries perpetuate that sentiment, and the issues often incur huge disputes between Japanese and South Korean Internet users.[52] South Korea, together with Mainland China, may be considered as among the most intensely anti-Japanese societies in the world.[53] Among all the countries that participated in BBC World Service Poll in 2007 and 2009, South Korea and the People's Republic of China were the only ones whose majorities rated Japan negatively.[54][55]
Peru
[edit]Anti-Japanese sentiment in Peru started during 20th century as part of a general anti-Asiatic sentiment after Chinese immigration in Perú, because Japanese and Chinese people were catalogued as a "yellow menace" that deteriorate the race and invaded Peruvian territory. Politicians and intellectuals tried to generate repudiation against Asians through publications such as bulletins and articles in newspapers and pamphlets that ridiculed them, even inciting the Peruvian people to attack Peruvian-Japanese citizens and their businesses.[56] Peruvian worker protests led to the creation of an Anti-Asian Association in 1917 and the abolition of contract migration in 1923.[57]
Then, the pre-war times were especially difficult for Japanese immigrants, coming to influence the Peruvian government itself (with the deportations of Japanese to concentration camps in the United States during World War II, specially to the country's only family internment camp in Crystal City, Texas). Although there had been ongoing tensions between non-Japanese and Japanese Peruvians, the situation was drastically exacerbated by the war.[58] The economic success of Japanese farmers and businessmen in niche but visible sectors, the significant amount of remittances sent back to Japan, the fear that Japanese were taking jobs from the locals and a growing trade imbalance between Japan and Peru were motives to implement legislation in order to curb Japanese immigration into its borders.[57] Like In 1937, in which Peruvian government passed a decree revoking citizenship rights of Peruvians who had Japanese ancestry, followed by a second decree making it even more difficult to maintain citizenship, the results of which included stigmatization of Japanese immigrants as "bestial", "untrustworthy", "militaristic,". and "unfairly" competing with Peruvians for wages.[58] These contributed to increasing nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment which worsened alongside the depressed and unstable Peruvian economy.[57]
Fueled by legislative discrimination and media campaigns, a massive race riot (referred to as the "Saqueo") began on May 13, 1940, and lasted for three days. During the riots Japanese Peruvians were attacked and their homes and businesses destroyed.[59] There were damaged over 600 Japanese residences and businesses in Lima, resulting in dozens of injuries and one Japanese death. Not only was it the “worst rioting in Peruvian history,” but it was also the first to target a racial group (because Peruvians mostly discriminate by social class, but doesn't had a tradition of discrimination by race).[57] Despite its massive scale, the saqueo was underreported, a reflection of public sentiment towards the Japanese population at the time.[59]
The deportees were viewed as a threat to both Peru and the United States before and after the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, being registered pressure from the United States, which was an influence for Peruvians’ “anti-Japanese attitude” against their own citizens.[60] The deportation of Japanese Peruvians to the United States also involved expropriation without compensation of their property and other assets in Peru.[61] As noted in a 1943 memorandum, Raymond Ickes of the Central and South American division of the Alien Enemy Control Unit had observed that many ethnic Japanese had been sent to the United States "... merely because the Peruvians wanted their businesses and not because there was any adverse evidence against them."[62]
During post-war, decreased anti-Japanese sentiment on Peruvian society, specially after 1960 (when Japan started to develop closer relations with Peru and their Nikkei community). However, there was a light revival of those sentiments after the government of Alberto Fujimori, a Peruvian-Japanese who was involved in Corruption in Peru, which generated antipathy against Japan in Peruvian circles.[63] This revival of the sentiment was so intense that were concerned by the Japan government, after Alberto Fujimori's arrest and trial, the Japanese embassy in Peru and the local media have received frequent telephone calls threatening to harm Japanese-Peruvians, Japanese businesses in Peru, the installations of the embassy and its staff.[64]
Philippines
[edit]
Anti-Japanese sentiment in the Philippines can be traced back to the Japanese occupation of the country during World War II and its aftermath. An estimated 1 million Filipinos out of a wartime population of 17 million were killed during the war, and many more Filipinos were injured. Nearly every Filipino family was affected by the war on some level. Most notably, in the city of Mapanique, survivors have recounted the Japanese occupation during which Filipino men were massacred and dozens of women were herded in order to be used as comfort women. Today, the Philippines has peaceful relations with Japan. In addition, Filipinos are generally not as offended as Chinese or Koreans are by the claim from some quarters that the atrocities are given little, if any, attention in Japanese classrooms. This feeling exists as a result of the huge amount of Japanese aid which was sent to the country during the 1960s and 1970s.[65]
The Davao Region, in Mindanao, had a large community of Japanese immigrants which acted as a fifth column by welcoming the Japanese invaders during the war. The Japanese were hated by the Moro Muslims and the Chinese.[66] The Moro juramentadoss performed suicide attacks against the Japanese, and no Moro juramentado ever attacked the Chinese, who were not considered enemies of the Moro, unlike the Japanese.[67][68][69][70]
According to a 2011 BBC World Service Poll, 84% of Filipinos view Japan's influence positively, with 12% expressing a negative view, making Philippines one of the most pro-Japanese countries in the world.[3]
Singapore
[edit]The older generation of Singaporeans have some resentment towards Japan due to their experiences in World War II when Singapore was under Japanese Occupation but because of developing good economical ties with them, Singapore is currently having a positive relationship with Japan.[71]
Taiwan
[edit]Due to Japan's various oppression and enslavement of Taiwan during World War II and the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, anti-Japanese sentiment in Taiwan is very common, and most Taiwanese people have a negative impression of Japan.[72] However, according to other surveys, Taiwan's anti-Japanese sentiment is seen as much weaker or relatively favorable compared to South Korea, which was affected by the same Japanese colonialism.[73][74] Anti-Japanese sentiment appears weaker in Taiwan than anti-Chinese (especially anti-PRC) sentiment.[75]
The Kuomintang (KMT) victory in 2008 was followed by a boating accident resulting in Taiwanese deaths, which caused recent tensions. Taiwanese officials began speaking out on the historical territory disputes regarding the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, which resulted in an increase in at least perceived anti-Japanese sentiment.[76]
Thailand
[edit]Anti-Japanese sentiment was widespread among Thai pro-democracy student protesters in the 1970s. Demonstrators viewed the entry of Japanese companies into the country, invited by the Thai military, as an economic invasion.[77]
Russian Empire and Soviet Union
[edit]In the Russian Empire, the Imperial Japanese victory during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 halted Russia's ambitions in the East and led to a loss of prestige. During the later Russian Civil War, Japan was part of the Allied interventionist forces that helped to occupy Vladivostok until October 1922 with a puppet government under Grigorii Semenov. At the end of World War II during the Soviet-Japanese War in August 1945, the Red Army accepted the surrender of nearly 600,000 Japanese POWs after Emperor Hirohito announced the Japanese surrender on 15 August; 473,000 of them were repatriated, 55,000 of them had died in Soviet captivity, and the fate of the others is unknown. Presumably, many of them were deported to China or North Korea and forced to serve as laborers and soldiers.[78] The Kuril Islands dispute is a source of contemporary anti-Japanese sentiment in Russia.[citation needed]
United Kingdom
[edit]In the 1902, the United Kingdom signed a formal military alliance with Japan. However, the alliance was especially discontinued in 1923, and by the 1930s, bilateral ties became strained when Britain opposed Japan's military expansion. During World War II, British anti-Japanese propaganda, much like its American counterpart, featured content that grotesquely exaggerated physical features of Japanese people, if not outright depicting them as animals such as spiders.[79] Post-war, much anti-Japanese sentiment in Britain was focused on the treatment of British POWs (See The Bridge on the River Kwai).
United States
[edit]Pre-20th century
[edit]In the United States, anti-Japanese sentiment had its beginnings long before World War II. As early as the late 19th century, Asian immigrants were subjected to racial prejudice in the United States. Laws were passed which openly discriminated against Asians and sometimes, they particularly discriminated against Japanese. Many of these laws stated that Asians could not become US citizens and they also stated that Asians could not be granted basic rights such as the right to own land. These laws were greatly detrimental to the newly arrived immigrants because they denied them the right to own land and forced many of them who were farmers to become migrant workers. Some cite the formation of the Asiatic Exclusion League as the start of the anti-Japanese movement in California.[80]
Early 20th century
[edit]
Anti-Japanese racism and the belief in the Yellow Peril in California intensified after the Japanese victory over the Russian Empire during the Russo-Japanese War. On 11 October 1906, the San Francisco, California Board of Education passed a regulation in which children of Japanese descent would be required to attend racially-segregated separate schools. Japanese immigrants then made up approximately 1% of the population of California, and many of them had come under the treaty in 1894 which had assured free immigration from Japan.
The Japanese invasion of Manchuria, China, in 1931 and was roundly criticized in the US. In addition, efforts by citizens outraged at Japanese atrocities, such as the Nanking Massacre, led to calls for American economic intervention to encourage Japan to leave China. The calls played a role in shaping American foreign policy. As more and more unfavorable reports of Japanese actions came to the attention of the American government, embargoes on oil and other supplies were placed on Japan out of concern for the Chinese people and for the American interests in the Pacific. Furthermore, European-Americans became very pro-China and anti-Japan, an example being a grassroots campaign for women to stop buying silk stockings because the material was procured from Japan through its colonies.
When the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, Western public opinion was decidedly pro-China, with eyewitness reports by Western journalists on atrocities committed against Chinese civilians further strengthening anti-Japanese sentiments. African-American sentiments could be quite different than the mainstream and included organizations like the Pacific Movement of the Eastern World (PMEW), which promised equality and land distribution under Japanese rule. The PMEW had thousands of members hopefully preparing for liberation from white supremacy with the arrival of the Japanese Imperial Army.
World War II
[edit]

The most profound cause of anti-Japanese sentiment outside of Asia started by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which propelled the United States into World War II. The Americans were unified by the attack to fight the Empire of Japan and its allies: the German Reich and the Kingdom of Italy.

The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor without a declaration of war was commonly regarded as an act of treachery and cowardice. After the attack, many non-governmental "Jap hunting licenses" were circulated around the country. Life magazine published an article on how to tell the difference between Japanese and Chinese by describing the shapes of their noses and the statures of their bodies.[81] Additionally, Japanese conduct during the war did little to quell anti-Japanese sentiment. The flames of outrage were fanned by the treatment of American and other prisoners-of-war (POWs). The Japanese military's outrages included the murder of POWs, the use of POWs as slave laborers by Japanese industries, the Bataan Death March, the kamikaze attacks on Allied ships, the atrocities which were committed on Wake Island, and other atrocities which were committed elsewhere.[citation needed]
The US historian James J. Weingartner attributes the very low number of Japanese in US POW compounds to two key factors: a Japanese reluctance to surrender and a widespread American "conviction that the Japanese were 'animals' or 'subhuman' and unworthy of the normal treatment accorded to POWs."[82] The latter reasoning is supported by Niall Ferguson: "Allied troops often saw the Japanese in the same way that Germans regarded Russians [sic] — as Untermenschen."[83] Weingartner believed that to explain why merely 604 Japanese captives were alive in Allied POW camps by October 1944.[84] Ulrich Straus, a US Japanologist, wrote that frontline troops intensely hated Japanese military personnel and were "not easily persuaded" to take or protect prisoners, as they believed that Allied personnel who surrendered got "no mercy" from the Japanese.[85]
Allied soldiers believed that Japanese soldiers were inclined to feign surrender in order to launch surprise attacks.[85] Therefore, according to Straus, "[s]enior officers opposed the taking of prisoners[,] on the grounds that it needlessly exposed American troops to risks...."[85]

An estimated 112,000 to 120,000 Japanese migrants and Japanese Americans from the West Coast were interned regardless of their attitude to the US or to Japan. They were held for the duration of the war in the Continental US. Only a few members of the large Japanese population of Hawaii were relocated in spite of the proximity to vital military areas.[citation needed]
A 1944 opinion poll found that 13% of the US public supported the genocide of all Japanese.[86][87] Daniel Goldhagen wrote in his book, "So it is no surprise that Americans perpetrated and supported mass slaughters - Tokyo's firebombing and then nuclear incinerations - in the name of saving American lives, and of giving the Japanese what they richly deserved."[88]
Decision to drop the atomic bombs
[edit]
Weingartner argued that there was a common cause between the mutilation of Japanese war dead and the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.[89] According to Weingartner, both of these decisions were partially the result of the dehumanization of the enemy: "The widespread image of the Japanese as sub-human constituted an emotional context which provided another justification for decisions which resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands."[90] Two days after the Nagasaki bomb, US President Harry Truman stated: "The only language they seem to understand is the one we have been using to bombard them. When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him like a beast. It is most regrettable but nevertheless true."[84][91]
Postwar
[edit]In the 1970s and the 1980s, the waning fortunes of heavy industry in the United States prompted layoffs and hiring slowdowns just as counterpart businesses in Japan were making major inroads into US markets. That was most visible than in the automobile industry whose lethargic Big Three (General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler) watched as their former customers bought Japanese imports from Honda, Subaru, Mazda, and Nissan because of the 1973 oil crisis and the 1979 energy crisis. (When Japanese automakers were establishing their inroads into the US and Canada. Isuzu, Mazda, and Mitsubishi had joint partnerships with a Big Three manufacturer (GM, Ford, and Chrysler) in which its products were sold as captives). Anti-Japanese sentiment was reflected in opinion polling at the time as well as in media portrayals.[92] Extreme manifestations of anti-Japanese sentiment were occasional public destruction of Japanese cars and in the 1982 murder of Vincent Chin, a Chinese-American who was beaten to death after he had been mistaken for being Japanese.[citation needed]
Anti-Japanese sentiments were intentionally incited by US politicians as part of partisan politics designed to attack the Reagan presidency.[93]
Other highly-symbolic deals, including the sale of famous American commercial and cultural symbols such as Columbia Records, Columbia Pictures, 7-Eleven, and the Rockefeller Center building to Japanese firms, further fanned anti-Japanese sentiment.
Popular culture of the period reflected American's growing distrust of Japan.[citation needed] Futuristic period pieces such as Back to the Future Part II and RoboCop 3 frequently showed Americans as working precariously under Japanese superiors. The film Blade Runner showed a futuristic Los Angeles clearly under Japanese domination, with a Japanese majority population and culture, perhaps[original research?] a reference to the alternate world presented in the novel The Man in the High Castle by Philip K. Dick, the same author on which the film was based in which Japan had won World War II. Criticism was also lobbied in many novels of the day. The author Michael Crichton wrote Rising Sun, a murder mystery (later made into a feature film) involving Japanese businessmen in the US. Likewise, in Tom Clancy's book, Debt of Honor, Clancy implies that Japan's prosperity was caused primarily to unequal trading terms and portrayed Japan's business leaders acting in a power-hungry cabal.[citation needed]
As argued by Marie Thorsten, however, Japanophobia was mixed with Japanophilia during Japan's peak moments of economic dominance in the 1980s. The fear of Japan became a rallying point for techno-nationalism, the imperative to be first in the world in mathematics, science, and other quantifiable measures of national strength necessary to boost technological and economic supremacy. Notorious "Japan-bashing" took place alongside the image of Japan as superhuman, which mimicked in some ways the image of the Soviet Union after it launched the first Sputnik satellite in 1957, and both events turned the spotlight on American education.[citation needed]
US bureaucrats purposely pushed that analogy. In 1982, Ernest Boyer, a former US Commissioner of Education, publicly declared, "What we need is another Sputnik" to reboot American education, and he said that "maybe what we should do is get the Japanese to put a Toyota into orbit."[94] Japan was both a threat and a model for human resource development in education and the workforce, which merged with the image of Asian-Americans as the "model minority."[citation needed]
Both the animosity and the superhumanizing peaked in the 1980s, when the term "Japan bashing" became popular, but had largely faded by the late 1990s. Japan's waning economic fortunes in the 1990s, now known as the Lost Decade, coupled with an upsurge in the US economy as the Internet took off, largely crowded anti-Japanese sentiment out of the popular media.[citation needed]
Yasukuni Shrine
[edit]The Yasukuni Shrine is a Shinto shrine in Tokyo, Japan. It is the resting place of thousands of not only Japanese soldiers, but also Korean and Taiwanese soldiers killed in various wars, mostly in World War II. The shrine includes 13 Class A criminals such as Hideki Tojo and Kōki Hirota, who were convicted and executed for their roles in the Japanese invasions of China, Korea, and other parts of East Asia after the remission to them under the Treaty of San Francisco. A total of 1,068 convicted war criminals are enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine.[citation needed]
In recent years, the Yasukuni Shrine has become a sticking point in the relations of Japan and its neighbours. The enshrinement of war criminals has greatly angered the people of various countries invaded by Imperial Japan. In addition, the shrine published a pamphlet stating that "[war] was necessary in order for us to protect the independence of Japan and to prosper together with our Asian neighbors" and that the war criminals were "cruelly and unjustly tried as war criminals by a sham-like tribunal of the Allied forces". While it is true that the fairness of these trials is disputed among jurists and historians in the West as well as in Japan, the former Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, has visited the shrine five times; every visit caused immense uproar in China and South Korea. His successor, Shinzo Abe, was also a regular visitor of Yasukuni. Some Japanese politicians have responded by saying that the shrine, as well as visits to it, is protected by the constitutional right of freedom of religion. Yasuo Fukuda, chosen Prime Minister in September 2007, promised "not to visit" Yasukuni.[95]
Derogatory terms
[edit]There are a variety of derogatory terms referring to Japan. Many of these terms are viewed as racist. However, these terms do not necessarily refer to the Japanese race as a whole; they can also refer to specific policies, or specific time periods in history.
In English
[edit]- Especially prevalent during World War II, the word "Jap" (short for Japanese) or "Nip" (short for Nippon, Japanese for "Japan" or Nipponjin for "Japanese person") has been used mostly in America, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore as a derogatory word for the Japanese throughout the 19th and the 20th century when they came to Western countries, mostly the United States in large numbers. During WW2, some in the United States Marine Corps tried to combine the word Japs with apes to create a new description, Japes, for the Japanese, although this slur never became popular.
- The word Japanazi has also been used in English language media, a combination of the words "Japan" and "Nazi" (after Nazi Germany) as a derogatory word to insult Japan and the Axis powers in general.
In Chinese
[edit]- Riben guizi (Chinese: 日本鬼子; Cantonese: Yaatboon gwaizi; Mandarin: Rìběn guǐzi) – literally "Japanese devils" or "Japanese monsters". This is used mostly in the context of the Second Sino-Japanese War, when Japan invaded and occupied large areas of China. This is the title of a Japanese documentary on Japanese war crimes during WWII. Recently, some Japanese have taken the slur and reversed the negative connotations by transforming it into a cute female personification named Hinomoto Oniko, which is an alternate reading in Japanese.
- Wokou (Chinese: 倭寇; pinyin: wōkòu; Jyutping: wo1 kau3; Cantonese Yale: wō kau) – originally referred to Japanese pirates and armed sea merchants who raided the Chinese coastline during the Ming dynasty. The term was adopted during the Second Sino-Japanese War to refer to invading Japanese forces (similarly to Germans being called "Huns" In France and Britain). The word is today sometimes used to refer to all Japanese people in extremely negative contexts.
- Xiao Riben (Chinese: 小日本; pinyin: xiǎo Rìběn) – literally "puny Japan(ese)", or literally "little Japan(ese)". This term is very common (Google Search returns 21,000,000 results as of August 2007).[needs update] The term can be used to refer to either Japan or individual Japanese people.
- Riben zai (Chinese: 日本仔; pinyin: rì běn zǎi; Jyutping: jat6 bun2 zai2; Cantonese Yale: yaht bún jái) – this is the most common term in use by Cantonese speaking Chinese, having similar meaning to the English word "Jap". The term literally translates to "Japanese kid". This term has become so common that it has little impact and does not seem to be too derogatory compared to other words below.
- Wo (Chinese: 倭; pinyin: wō) – this was an ancient Chinese name for Japan, but was also adopted by the Japanese. Today, its usage in Mandarin is usually intended to give a negative connotation. The character is said to also mean "dwarf", although that meaning was not apparent when the name was first used. See Wa.
- Riben gou (Chinese: 日本狗; pinyin: Rìběn gǒu; Jyutping: jat6 bun2 gau2; Cantonese Yale: yaht bún gáu) – "Japanese dogs". The word is used to refer to all Japanese people in extremely negative contexts.
- Da jiaopen zu (Chinese: 大腳盆族; pinyin: dà jiǎopén zú) – "big foot-basin race". Ethnic slur towards Japanese used predominantly by Northern Chinese, mainly those from the city of Tianjin.
- Huang jun (Chinese: 黃軍; pinyin: huáng jūn) – "Yellow Army", a pun on "皇軍" (homophone huáng jūn, "Imperial Army"), used during World War II to represent Imperial Japanese soldiers due to the colour of the uniform. Today, it is used negatively against all Japanese. Since the stereotype of Japanese soldiers are commonly portrayed in war-related TV series in China as short men, with a toothbrush moustache (and sometimes round glasses, in the case of higher ranks), huang jun is also often used to pull jokes on Chinese people with these characteristics, and thus "appear like" Japanese soldiers. Also, since the colour of yellow is often associated with pornography in modern Chinese, it is also a mockery of the Japanese forcing women into prostitution during World War II.
- Zi wei dui (Chinese: 自慰隊; pinyin: zì wèi duì; Jyutping: zi6 wai3 deoi6; Cantonese Yale: jih wai deuih) – a pun on the homophone "自衛隊" (same pronunciation, "self-defense forces", see Japan Self-Defense Forces), the definition of "慰" (Cantonese: wai3; pinyin: wèi) used is "to comfort". This phrase is used to refer to Japanese (whose military force is known as "自衛隊") being stereotypically hypersexual, as "自慰隊" means "self-comforting forces", referring to masturbation.
- Ga zai / Ga mui (Chinese: 㗎仔 / 㗎妹; Jyutping: gaa4 zai2 / gaa4 mui1; Cantonese Yale: gàh jái / gàh mūi) – used only by Cantonese speakers to call Japanese men / young girls. "㗎" (gaa4) came from the frequent use of simple vowels (-a in this case) in Japanese language. "仔" (zai2) means "little boy(s)", with relations to the stereotype of short Japanese men. "妹" (mui1) means "young girl(s)" (the speaker usually uses a lustful tone), with relations to the stereotype of disrespect to females in Japanese society. Sometimes, ga is used as an adjective to avoid using the proper word "Japanese".
- Law bak tau (Chinese: 蘿蔔頭; pinyin: luo bo tou; Jyutping: lo4 baak6 tau4; Cantonese Yale: lòh baahk tàuh) – "daikon head". Commonly used by the older people in the Cantonese-speaking world to call Japanese men.
In Korean
[edit]- Jjokbari (Korean: 쪽발이) – translates as "a person with cloven hoof-like feet".[96] This term is the most frequently used and strongest ethnic slur used by Koreans to refer to Japanese. Refers to the traditional Japanese footwear of geta or tabi, both of which feature a gap between the big toe and the other four toes. The term compares Japanese to pigs. The term is also used by ethnic Koreans in Japan.[97]
- Seom-nara won-sung-i (Korean: 섬나라 원숭이) – literally "island country monkey", more often translated as simply "island monkey". Common derogatory term comparing Japanese to the Japanese macaque native to Japan.
- Wae-in (Korean: 왜인; Hanja: 倭人) – translates as "small Japanese person", although used with strong derogatory connotations. The term refers to the ancient name of Yamato Japan, Wae, on the basis of the stereotype that Japanese people were small (see Wa).
- Wae-nom (Korean: 왜놈; Hanja: 倭놈) – translates as "small Japanese bastard". It is used more frequently by older Korean generations, derived from the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592–1598).
- Wae-gu (Korean: 왜구; Hanja: 倭寇) – originally referred to Japanese pirates, who frequently invaded Korea. The word is today used to refer to all Japanese people in an extremely negative context.
In Filipino
[edit]- Sakang is a Filipino insult meaning bow-legged, mainly directed towards Japanese people.
In Portuguese
[edit]- Japa is a term used in Brazil to refer to Japanese immigrants and their descendants many times accepted by the Japanese community, not analogous to English Jap.[98]
Other
[edit]- Corona – There have been strong indications that the word "corona", from the coronavirus (referring specifically to the COVID-19 pandemic), has become a relatively common slur toward Japanese people in several Arabic-speaking countries, with the Japanese embassy in Egypt acknowledging that "corona" had become one of the most common slurs at least in that country,[99] as well as incidents against Japanese aid workers in Palestine involving the slur.[100] In Jordan, Japanese people were chased by locals yelling "corona".[101] Outside of the Arabic-speaking world, France has also emerged as a notable country where use of the slur toward Japanese has become common, with targets of the slur ranging from Japanese study tours to Japanese restaurants and Japanese actresses working for French companies such as Louis Vuitton.[99][102][103]
See also
[edit]- Kàngrì (抗日)
- Senkaku Islands
- Japanese war crimes
- 2012 China anti-Japanese demonstrations
- Internment of Japanese Americans
- Internment of Japanese Canadians
- Tanaka Memorial
- Second Sino-Japanese War
- China–Japan relations
- Japan–Russia relations
- Japan–Korea disputes
- Japan–North Korea relations
- Japan–South Korea relations
- Anti-Chinese sentiment
- Anti-Korean sentiment
- Anti-Vietnamese sentiment
- Anti-Japanese propaganda
- Japan–United States relations
- Pacific War
- Anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States
- John P. Irish (1843–1923), fought against anti-Japanese sentiment in California
- Japanese racial equality proposal, 1919
- Racism
- Stereotypes of East Asians in the United States
- Tatarophobia
- United States Executive Order 9066
- Yellow Peril
- Yoshihiro Hattori
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a derogatory term for Japanese. It refers to Japanese traditional footwear Geta, which separates the thumb toe and the other four toes. [일본 사람을 낮잡아 이르는 말. 엄지발가락과 나머지 발가락들을 가르는 게다를 신는다는 데서 온 말이다.]
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- Weingartner, James J. (February 1992). "Trophies of War: U.S. Troops and the Mutilation of Japanese War Dead, 1941–1945". Pacific Historical Review. 61 (1): 53–67. doi:10.2307/3640788. ISSN 0030-8684. JSTOR 3640788. S2CID 159919957.
- Yap, Felicia. "Prisoners of war and civilian internees of the Japanese in British Asia: the similarities and contrasts of experience." Journal of Contemporary History 47.2 (2012): 317-346.
- Filipinas, Volume 11, Issues 117-128. Filipinas Pub. 2002. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
- Bijdragen tot de taal-, land- en volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indië, Volume 129. Contributor Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde (Netherlands). M. Nijhoff. 1973. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)
External links
[edit]- China's angry young focus their hatred on old enemy
- The Impact of Asian-Pacific Migration on U.S. Immigration Policy
- Kahn, Joseph. China Is Pushing and Scripting Anti-Japanese Protests. The New York Times. 15 April 2005
Anti-Japanese sentiment
View on GrokipediaConceptual Foundations
Definition and Scope
Anti-Japanese sentiment refers to prejudice, hostility, or discriminatory actions directed against individuals of Japanese descent, Japanese nationals, or the Japanese nation as a whole, often manifesting as negative stereotypes, exclusionary policies, or violence rooted in perceived threats or historical animosities.[10] This differs from broader xenophobia by its specific focus on Japanese identity, including portrayals of Japanese people as collectively militaristic, deceitful, or economically predatory, which have been perpetuated through wartime propaganda and unresolved grievances. Such sentiment typically exceeds factual assessment of government actions, incorporating irrational generalizations about an entire ethnic group. The scope of anti-Japanese sentiment spans multiple continents and eras, with roots traceable to Japan's Meiji-era industrialization and imperial ambitions in the late 19th century, which provoked fears in neighboring Asian states and Western powers.[11] It intensified globally during World War II, where Allied nations interned over 120,000 Japanese Americans in the United States from 1942 to 1945, citing security risks unsubstantiated by intelligence, amid widespread public support for exclusion driven by racial fears.[12] Postwar, it persisted in East Asia through state-sponsored narratives emphasizing Japan's wartime atrocities, such as the 1937 Nanjing Massacre, fueling periodic outbursts like China's 2012 protests over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute, which involved attacks on Japanese businesses and vehicles, causing damages estimated at over 10 billion yuan.[13] In Western contexts, economic manifestations emerged in the 1980s U.S. "Japan bashing," where perceptions of unfair trade practices led to congressional hearings and cultural depictions of Japan as a ruthless competitor, correlating with a 20-30% decline in Japanese car imports due to consumer boycotts.[14] While less prevalent today in the West, residual forms appear in media or online discourse, whereas in Asia, territorial frictions and educational curricula sustain higher levels, with surveys indicating 80-90% unfavorable views of Japan among Chinese and South Korean publics as of 2020.[15] This global variance underscores how local histories shape its intensity, from institutional policies to mob violence, without conflating it with justified opposition to specific Japanese foreign policies.Distinction from Legitimate Criticism of Japanese Policies
Criticism of Japanese policies becomes anti-Japanese sentiment when it shifts from evidence-based evaluation of specific governmental or institutional actions to irrational generalizations attributing inherent negative traits—such as deceitfulness, aggression, or cultural inferiority—to Japanese people as an ethnic group.[16] Legitimate criticism, by contrast, remains targeted, empirical, and open to counterarguments, focusing on measurable outcomes like economic data, environmental impacts, or human rights records without invoking stereotypes rooted in historical animus. This boundary is evident in analyses of 1980s U.S.-Japan trade disputes, where factual concerns over Japan's $50 billion annual trade surplus with the U.S. in 1987—driven by non-tariff barriers and currency undervaluation—degenerated into ethnic slurs like "yellow peril" rhetoric when critics extrapolated policy choices to innate national character.[16] One domain of legitimate policy critique involves Japan's whaling practices, which have persisted despite a 1986 International Whaling Commission (IWC) moratorium on commercial hunting. In 2019, Japan withdrew from the IWC to resume commercial whaling in its exclusive economic zone, catching species like minke whales, a move decried by conservationists for lacking sufficient scientific justification and undermining global biodiversity efforts, as the program's prior "scientific" hunts yielded data deemed redundant by the International Court of Justice in 2014.[17][18] Australia's government, for instance, expressed "deep disappointment" in 2024 over Japan's expansion to include vulnerable fin whales, citing risks to endangered populations without evidence of sustainable management.[19] Such objections rest on verifiable data from marine population surveys and treaty obligations, not cultural disdain for Japanese traditions. Japan's immigration framework provides another example, where restrictive policies—such as indefinite detention of asylum seekers and low refugee acceptance rates (just 202 granted in 2022 out of 10,375 applications)—have been faulted for exacerbating demographic decline, with the working-age population shrinking by 0.8 million annually amid a fertility rate of 1.26 births per woman in 2023.[20][21] Human rights organizations highlight systemic failures, including poor detention conditions leading to deaths, as violations of international standards under the UN Refugee Convention, which Japan ratified in 1981.[22] These critiques emphasize policy-induced labor shortages, projected to reduce GDP growth by 0.5-1% yearly without reform, rather than portraying Japanese society as innately exclusionary.[23] Debates over historical accountability, particularly government-approved textbooks that minimize wartime events like the Nanjing Massacre (estimated 200,000-300,000 deaths in 1937-1938 per multiple eyewitness accounts), illustrate the line's fragility.[24] Criticisms target specific omissions—such as downplaying forced labor in Korea or comfort women systems affecting up to 200,000 women—as impediments to regional trust, backed by declassified Allied records and survivor testimonies, without denying Japan's post-1945 democratization or economic contributions.[25] When such discourse invokes perpetual "Japanese militarism" as an ethnic destiny, echoing wartime propaganda, it veers into prejudice, as seen in sporadic East Asian protests conflating policy with collective guilt. Maintaining the distinction fosters accountability: empirical policy scrutiny has prompted shifts, like Japan's 2018 immigration expansion to admit 345,000 foreign workers over five years, addressing causal labor gaps without ethnic animus.[26]Historical Origins and Causes
Pre-Imperial Era Instances
Instances of antagonism toward Japan predating its modern imperial expansion emerged primarily in East Asia due to maritime raids and military incursions. During the 14th to 16th centuries, wokou—raiders often of Japanese origin, sometimes allied with Chinese outlaws—conducted repeated coastal attacks on Ming China, devastating regions along the southeastern seaboard and prompting defensive fortifications and military campaigns by Chinese authorities.[27] These incursions, peaking in the Jiajing era (1521–1567), involved plundering villages, enslaving inhabitants, and disrupting trade, fostering perceptions of Japanese as predatory seafaring threats in Chinese historical records.[28] Similar wokou activities plagued Joseon Korea, where raids exacerbated border insecurities and contributed to enduring narratives of Japanese aggression in Korean chronicles.[28] The scale of destruction—estimated to have affected thousands of coastal settlements—instilled localized hostility, though interactions remained limited by Japan's internal fragmentation and Korea's tributary relations with China. A more acute episode unfolded with Toyotomi Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea (1592–1598), launched as a stepping stone for continental conquest. Japanese forces, numbering over 150,000 in the initial wave, rapidly overran much of the peninsula, committing widespread atrocities including mass executions, village burnings, and cultural looting, such as the seizure of royal archives and artisans.[29] These actions, resisted fiercely by Korean naval and Ming Chinese reinforcements, resulted in hundreds of thousands of Korean deaths and deepened generational resentment, evident in Joseon-era literature and memorials portraying the invaders as barbaric.[30] The failed campaigns, culminating in Hideyoshi's death in 1598, did not erase the trauma, which persisted in Korean collective memory independent of later colonial rule.[31] Beyond East Asia, pre-19th-century European encounters with Japan were minimal and trade-oriented, yielding no documented widespread prejudice; Portuguese and Dutch traders from the 1540s onward viewed Japan pragmatically as a commercial partner rather than a target of enmity.[32] Thus, pre-imperial anti-Japanese sentiment was regionally confined, rooted in tangible depredations rather than ideological or racial abstractions.Imperial Expansion and Atrocities (1894-1945)
Japan's victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) marked the onset of its imperial expansion in East Asia, resulting in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ceded Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaodong Peninsula to Japan, while affirming Japanese dominance over Korea.[33] During the campaign, Japanese forces committed atrocities, including the Port Arthur Massacre in November 1894, where thousands of Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed after the city's fall, contributing to early anti-Japanese resentment amid reports of excessive brutality beyond military necessity. This war transformed perceptions of Japan from a victim of Western imperialism to an aggressor, fostering lasting bitterness in China over territorial losses and perceived humiliations.[34] The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) further solidified Japan's regional power, with victories securing influence in southern Manchuria and Korea, culminating in the 1910 annexation of Korea as a colony.[35] Japanese colonial administration in Korea suppressed Korean culture, language, and independence movements, enforcing assimilation policies and exploiting resources, which bred widespread resentment among Koreans, evident in uprisings like the 1919 March First Movement where thousands protested against Japanese rule.[36] Harsh suppression, including mass arrests and executions, intensified anti-Japanese sentiment, framing Japan as an oppressive occupier rather than a modernizer.[37] The Manchurian Incident of September 18, 1931, involved a staged explosion on the Japanese-controlled South Manchuria Railway, providing pretext for the Kwantung Army's invasion and occupation of Manchuria, leading to the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932.[38] This aggression sparked massive anti-Japanese boycotts and protests across China, with economic sanctions and volunteer armies forming in response, heightening nationalist fervor against Japanese expansionism.[39] The invasion displaced populations and involved reprisals against Chinese resistors, deepening regional animus toward Japan as an unprovoked conqueror.[40] The Second Sino-Japanese War erupted in July 1937 following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, escalating into full-scale invasion with atrocities like the Nanjing Massacre (December 1937–January 1938), where Japanese troops systematically killed Chinese civilians and disarmed soldiers, looted, and raped on a massive scale. Credible estimates place the death toll at 40,000 to over 200,000, based on contemporaneous accounts and post-war tribunals, though exact figures remain disputed due to incomplete records and denialist claims. Throughout the war, Japanese forces conducted scorched-earth campaigns, killing millions of Chinese civilians through bombings, mass executions, and forced labor, embedding profound hatred rooted in direct experiences of brutality.[41] Japan's entry into World War II via the Pacific expansion from 1941 onward amplified atrocities across Asia-Pacific, including the Bataan Death March in April 1942, where 75,000 American and Filipino prisoners endured forced marches with inadequate food and water, resulting in 5,000 to 18,000 deaths from exhaustion, starvation, and executions.[41] In occupied territories, programs like Unit 731 conducted lethal human experiments on thousands of prisoners, including vivisections and biological weapons tests, primarily on Chinese and Allied captives, while the comfort women system forcibly recruited up to 200,000 women from Korea, China, and Southeast Asia for sexual slavery.[42] These systematic violations, documented in Allied trials and survivor testimonies, cemented anti-Japanese sentiment as a visceral response to unrepentant militarism and dehumanization.[41]Economic and Immigration-Related Factors in the West
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japanese immigration to the United States West Coast, particularly to California, Hawaii, and Washington, intensified economic competition in labor-intensive sectors such as agriculture, fishing, and railroads, where Japanese workers were perceived by unions and native-born laborers as accepting lower wages and displacing American jobs.[43] This perception fueled organized opposition from groups like the Asiatic Exclusion League, formed in 1905, which lobbied for immigration restrictions amid claims that Japanese laborers depressed wages by up to 20-30% in some industries.[2] The 1907 Gentlemen's Agreement between the U.S. and Japan curtailed further labor migration but did not alleviate underlying resentments, as existing Japanese communities continued to thrive economically, owning about 10% of California's truck farms by 1910 despite alien land laws aimed at blocking their property acquisition.[44] These tensions culminated in the Immigration Act of 1924, which explicitly barred Japanese immigrants by extending the national origins quota system to exclude Asians entirely, reflecting widespread sentiment that Japanese economic success posed an existential threat to American workers and cultural homogeneity.[45] Similar dynamics played out in Canada, where Japanese arrivals in British Columbia from the 1890s onward competed in logging, fishing, and mining, prompting the 1908 Continuous Journey Regulation that effectively halted most immigration by requiring direct Pacific voyages, which Japanese ships could not provide.[46] In Australia, the White Australia Policy under the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act used dictation tests in European languages to exclude Japanese laborers, particularly from the pearling and sugar industries in Queensland and northern territories, where they were viewed as undercutting British settlers' earnings during economic downturns like the 1890s depression.[47] Post-World War II, anti-Japanese sentiment in the West shifted toward economic rivalry as Japan's export-led growth eroded Western manufacturing bases; in the U.S., Japanese auto imports surged from 1.8 million vehicles in 1980 to over 3 million by 1987, contributing to a bilateral trade deficit exceeding $56 billion that year and the loss of approximately 1.5 million manufacturing jobs between 1979 and 1985, often attributed to Japan's non-tariff barriers and currency undervaluation.[48] This sparked "Japan bashing," including congressional hearings decrying "unfair" practices like closed markets for U.S. semiconductors and demands for voluntary export restraints, with public figures warning of Japan's potential economic hegemony, as echoed in Ezra Vogel's 1979 book Japan as Number One.[49] European Community nations imposed similar restraints on Japanese cars in the 1980s, limiting imports to 1.3 million units annually by 1985 amid fears of market flooding that threatened domestic producers like British Leyland and French Peugeot, though overt sentiment was less racialized than pre-war immigration debates and more framed as protectionism.[50] In Canada and Australia, analogous concerns arose over Japanese investment in resources and autos, but these were tempered by alliance ties, with trade deficits prompting bilateral agreements rather than widespread public backlash.[51]World War II Era Intensification
Japanese Military Actions and Allied Propaganda
The surprise attack by the Imperial Japanese Navy on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, killed 2,403 Americans, including 68 civilians, and wounded 1,178 others, while sinking or damaging 18 ships and destroying 188 aircraft.[52][53] This unprovoked assault, involving 353 aircraft launched from six carriers, shattered American isolationism and generated immediate outrage, with President Franklin D. Roosevelt declaring it "a date which will live in infamy" in his address to Congress the following day.[52] The event's shock value, amplified by reports of treachery despite ongoing diplomatic talks, crystallized perceptions of Japanese militarism as inherently deceitful and aggressive, fueling domestic calls for vengeance.[54] Japanese forces committed systematic atrocities during their Pacific conquests, exacerbating Allied resolve. In the Philippines, after the fall of Bataan Peninsula on April 9, 1942, approximately 75,000 American and Filipino prisoners—12,000 U.S. troops and 63,000 Filipinos—were forced on a 65-mile march to Camp O'Donnell under extreme deprivation, with guards executing stragglers and denying food or water; estimates place deaths at 5,000–18,000 from exhaustion, beatings, bayoneting, and disease during the march itself, followed by tens of thousands more in subsequent camps.[55] Similar brutality marked occupations elsewhere, including the execution of surrendering Chinese troops and civilians in the 1937–1938 Nanjing campaign, where Japanese soldiers killed an estimated 200,000–300,000 noncombatants and raped 20,000–80,000 women over six weeks of unchecked pillage.[56] These acts, documented in eyewitness accounts from neutral observers and later war crimes trials, demonstrated a policy of terror to subdue resistance, distinct from combat necessities and rooted in imperial ideology emphasizing racial superiority over occupied populations. Allied governments deployed propaganda to portray Japanese actions as evidence of innate savagery, justifying unrestricted warfare and eroding inhibitions against the enemy. U.S. Office of War Information posters depicted Japanese soldiers as subhuman—often as snarling monkeys, rats, or bespectacled insects—to evoke revulsion and cultural superiority, with slogans like "This is the Enemy" accompanying images of mutilated Allied POWs.[57] Cartoonists such as Dr. Seuss contributed over 400 wartime drawings in PM newspaper, caricaturing Japanese leaders like Hideki Tojo as knife-wielding fiends or horde-like invaders, while guidelines like "How to Spot a Jap" instructed civilians to identify "the enemy" by physical stereotypes, reinforcing racial animus.[58] British and Australian media similarly amplified atrocity reports, such as the 1942 Banka Island massacre of 21 nurses, to stir hatred and boost enlistment, though some exaggerations occurred for morale purposes.[58] This messaging, disseminated via films, leaflets, and radio, built on verified barbarities but generalized them to the Japanese populace, cultivating a view of the nation as collectively treacherous and expendable, which persisted beyond military necessities.[59] The interplay of real military aggression and propagandistic framing intensified anti-Japanese sentiment across Allied societies, with polls showing near-universal support for total victory by 1943.[59] While propaganda drew from empirical horrors like POW executions and civilian massacres—totaling millions of Asian deaths under Japanese occupation—it prioritized emotional mobilization over nuance, sidelining Japanese grievances such as resource embargoes and framing the war as a civilizational clash. Postwar analyses, including Tokyo Tribunal records, confirmed the atrocities' scale without attributing them solely to propaganda distortion, underscoring causal links between Japanese strategic doctrine and the resulting hatred.[60]Internment and Domestic Policies in Allied Nations
In the United States, following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066 on February 19, 1942, authorizing the forced relocation and internment of approximately 120,000 individuals of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast, two-thirds of whom were American-born citizens.[61][62] These persons were deemed potential security risks amid widespread fears of espionage, despite the absence of documented sabotage by Japanese Americans; they were removed from their homes, with most families losing property and businesses valued in the millions, and confined to 10 relocation centers operated by the War Relocation Authority from 1942 to 1945.[63][61] Canada implemented similar measures starting in early 1942, under the War Measures Act, targeting over 22,000 Japanese Canadians—comprising more than 90% of the Japanese-descended population in British Columbia—who were forcibly relocated inland, interned in camps, or deported, with families separated and property seized or sold at undervalued prices without consent.[64][65] These policies persisted until 1949, driven by security concerns and public pressure from anti-Japanese groups, though post-war reviews found no evidence of widespread disloyalty among the interned.[64] In Australia, the National Security Act of 1939 enabled the internment of nearly all Japanese residents—estimated at around 1,100 individuals, or 98% of the pre-war Japanese population—beginning shortly after Pearl Harbor, with internees held in camps such as Loveday in South Australia until Japan's surrender in 1945, after which most non-Australian-born were repatriated.[66][67] Restrictions extended to employment bans and asset liquidation, reflecting heightened domestic suspicions amid Japan's Pacific advances. Other Allied nations, including the United Kingdom, applied internment selectively to Japanese nationals under defense regulations, though on a smaller scale due to limited resident populations; in the UK, fewer than 100 Japanese were interned by 1942, often alongside other Axis nationals, with policies emphasizing surveillance and property controls rather than mass relocation.[68] These measures across Allied countries amplified anti-Japanese sentiment through official endorsement of ethnic-based suspicion, contributing to social ostracism and economic hardship for affected communities, even as military tribunals later documented no proportional threat from civilian populations.[66][64]Post-War Persistence and Regional Variations
East Asia
In post-war East Asia, anti-Japanese sentiment has endured most intensely in China and South Korea, rooted in the Imperial Japanese military's occupation, atrocities, and colonial exploitation from 1931 to 1945, including the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 200,000 Chinese civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed between December 1937 and January 1938, and biological experiments by Unit 731 that resulted in thousands of deaths.[69] These historical grievances were amplified by state-controlled education and media portraying Japan as an unrepentant aggressor, though such narratives were subdued in China during the Mao era to prioritize class struggle over nationalism.[69] In South Korea, resentment stems from 35 years of colonial rule (1910-1945), forced labor of up to 780,000 Koreans, and the coercion of 200,000 women, predominantly Korean, into sexual slavery as "comfort women" for Japanese troops.[70][71] Territorial disputes have periodically reignited protests, as seen in China's 2012 demonstrations following Japan's nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on September 11, 2012, which drew tens of thousands to streets in over 80 cities, leading to attacks on Japanese vehicles, businesses, and the embassy in Beijing where protesters hurled bottles and eggs.[6][72] In South Korea, the "comfort women" issue persists despite a 2015 agreement where Japan provided 1 billion yen for a foundation to support survivors, which Seoul's subsequent government dissolved in 2018, citing insufficient atonement, fueling annual protests and a 2023 court ruling ordering Japan to compensate survivors with 100 million won each.[73][71] Governments in both nations have leveraged these sentiments for domestic political cohesion, with China's Communist Party directing protests to channel public discontent while maintaining control, and South Korean administrations using historical claims to rally support amid economic frictions like the 2019 export controls dispute.[74] Taiwan presents a stark contrast, where Japanese colonial rule (1895-1945) is often nostalgically viewed for introducing modern infrastructure, education, and sanitation that elevated living standards, fostering pro-Japanese affinity among older generations despite wartime hardships.[75] A 2025 survey indicated that Taiwanese perceptions of Japan improved, with many elderly respondents favoring Japan over the United States or China, reflecting a counter-hegemonic memory that contrasts with mainland narratives and aligns with Taiwan's strategic distancing from Beijing.[76] This divergence underscores how anti-Japanese sentiment in East Asia is not uniform but shaped by local political contexts, with Taiwan's emphasis on Japanese-era modernization mitigating historical animus compared to the victimhood-focused discourses in China and Korea.[77]China: Propaganda-Driven Nationalism
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has employed state-controlled propaganda to nurture anti-Japanese sentiment as a tool for fostering nationalism, particularly emphasizing historical grievances from the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945). This includes the Patriotic Education Campaign launched in 1991, which mandates curricula in schools and universities that highlight Japanese atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre, where estimates indicate 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed between December 1937 and January 1938.[4] Empirical studies confirm that exposure to such state-sanctioned textbooks significantly correlates with heightened negative views toward Japan among university students, with reliance on official materials increasing anti-Japanese bias by measurable margins.[78] State media and cultural outputs further amplify this narrative, producing wartime dramas and films that dramatize Chinese resistance against Japanese forces, often coinciding with anniversaries like the September 18, 1931, Mukden Incident marking Japan's invasion of Manchuria. In 2025, a surge in such productions, including series depicting heroic Chinese victories, has drawn large audiences and evoked emotional responses, while state outlets like CCTV broadcast commemorative programs reinforcing victimhood and unresolved historical animosities.[79] These efforts align with CCP directives under Xi Jinping to integrate patriotic education into all levels of society, resulting in commercialized anti-Japanese content that blends ideology with entertainment to sustain public fervor.[80] Orchestrated protests exemplify the instrumental use of sentiment for political ends, as seen in the 2012 Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, where the government initially permitted widespread demonstrations—drawing tens of thousands in over 100 cities—that involved vandalism of Japanese businesses and vehicles, before reining them in to mitigate economic damage from Japan-dependent trade. Analysts attribute the CCP's selective tolerance to channeling public discontent amid domestic challenges, with protests peaking on September 15–18, 2012, following Japan's islands nationalization.[81] Recent incidents, such as the September 2024 stabbing of a Japanese child in Shenzhen on the Mukden anniversary and attacks on Japanese nationals, coincide with amplified state media coverage, suggesting propaganda sustains volatility despite official calls for restraint.[82] This propaganda-driven approach prioritizes causal narratives of Japanese aggression as enduring threats, sidelining post-war reconciliation efforts like the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, to legitimize CCP rule through unified external enmity. While surveys indicate over 80% of Chinese respondents hold unfavorable views of Japan in polls from 2013–2023, the intensity fluctuates with state signaling, underscoring manipulation over organic persistence.[83]Korea: Colonial Legacy and Political Exploitation
Japan formally annexed Korea on August 22, 1910, establishing colonial rule that lasted until Japan's defeat in World War II on August 15, 1945. During this period, Japanese authorities implemented policies of cultural assimilation, including banning the Korean language in schools by 1941 and requiring Koreans to adopt Japanese names under the sōshi-kaimei campaign starting in 1939. Forced labor mobilization intensified from 1939, with approximately 5.4 million Koreans conscripted for wartime labor in Japan, Manchuria, and Pacific islands, often under harsh conditions leading to high mortality rates from malnutrition and abuse. The "comfort women" system, operational from 1932 to 1945, involved the coerced recruitment of an estimated 20,000 to 200,000 women, predominantly from Korea, into military brothels, where they endured systematic sexual slavery; Japanese government investigations in the 1990s confirmed state involvement through deception and force in many cases. Post-liberation, South Korea's national narrative has emphasized these colonial-era grievances, embedding them in education and public memory to foster ethnic solidarity but also perpetuating resentment.[84] History textbooks in South Korea highlight Japanese atrocities, such as the March 1, 1919 independence movement suppression that killed thousands, portraying colonization as unmitigated exploitation without acknowledging economic developments like infrastructure growth under Japanese rule.[85] Japan issued official apologies, including the 1993 Kono Statement acknowledging coercion in comfort women recruitment and the 1995 Murayama Statement expressing remorse for colonial rule, alongside reparations via the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations, which provided $800 million in grants and loans to South Korea.[86] However, South Korean courts have since ruled that the treaty does not preclude individual claims, leading to 2018 Supreme Court decisions mandating compensation from Japanese firms for forced labor victims, despite the treaty's explicit settlement of all claims.[87] Political leaders in South Korea have recurrently leveraged anti-Japanese sentiment to consolidate domestic support, diverting attention from internal challenges.[88] For instance, under President Moon Jae-in (2017-2022), the 2015 comfort women agreement—providing ¥10 billion ($89 million) for victims and a joint foundation—was effectively dismantled in 2018 amid protests, with the South Korean government demanding additional apologies despite prior Japanese concessions.[89] The Dokdo/Takeshima islets dispute, where South Korea administers the rocks since 1954 while Japan claims historical sovereignty, has sparked mass protests, such as the 2012 demonstrations involving tens of thousands after Japan's cabinet endorsed its territorial claims, resulting in property damage and boycotts.[90] In 2019, Japan's export controls on semiconductor materials to South Korea—citing national security and flawed export procedures—were framed by Seoul as retaliation for forced labor rulings, igniting a "No Japan" boycott campaign that saw Japanese beer sales drop 97% and tourism plummet, though economic data indicated minimal long-term impact.[87] These episodes illustrate how historical grievances, while rooted in verifiable events, are amplified through state media and education to serve electoral purposes, hindering bilateral cooperation despite mutual security interests against North Korea.[88][91]Taiwan: Divergent Perspectives
Taiwan's experience under Japanese colonial rule from 1895 to 1945 has resulted in markedly lower levels of anti-Japanese sentiment compared to mainland China or South Korea, with many Taiwanese crediting Japan for significant advancements in infrastructure, education, public health, and economic development during that era.[92][93] Unlike in other former colonies, post-war Taiwanese attitudes toward Japan have generally remained favorable, influenced by the relative benevolence of Japanese administration—such as investments in railways, sugar production, and universal education—and the subsequent repressive rule of the Kuomintang (KMT) regime after 1945, which included events like the 228 Incident in 1947.[94] Recent surveys underscore this affinity: a 2025 poll found 76% of Taiwanese viewing Japan as their most favored foreign country, far ahead of others like South Korea (4%) or the United States (3%), while 81% deemed Japan trustworthy—the highest trust rating recorded since the survey began.[95][96] Divergent perspectives emerge primarily along political lines, with pro-independence groups (associated with the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP) often emphasizing the positive legacies of Japanese rule to underscore Taiwan's distinct historical trajectory from mainland China, portraying the colonial period as a time of modernization that laid foundations for contemporary prosperity.[92] In contrast, pro-unification or China-oriented factions (linked to the KMT) tend to highlight aspects of colonial oppression, such as resource extraction, cultural assimilation policies, and suppression of resistance movements like the 1915 Tapani Incident or earlier uprisings, framing Japanese rule as exploitative imperialism akin to narratives in Beijing.[92] This divide reflects broader identity debates: independence advocates leverage pro-Japan sentiment to foster ties with Tokyo as a democratic counterweight to China, evidenced by robust bilateral exchanges in tourism, culture, and unofficial diplomacy, while unification supporters, influenced by historical KMT anti-Japanese education, express wariness over issues like the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute.[75] Generational differences add nuance, with older Taiwanese who experienced the immediate post-colonial transition sometimes retaining ambivalence due to wartime hardships or KMT-imposed narratives, though surveys indicate even this cohort has shifted toward favoring Japan over rivals like the US or China in recent years.[76] Overall, these perspectives contribute to Taiwan's unique position, where anti-Japanese protests are rare—absent the scale seen elsewhere in East Asia—and cultural affinity manifests in phenomena like widespread consumption of Japanese media, cuisine, and travel, with Japan hosting over 1.5 million Taiwanese visitors annually pre-COVID.[95] Despite occasional tensions, such as isolated vandalism during the 2012 Senkaku disputes, public sentiment prioritizes pragmatic alliance-building over historical grievance.[97]Southeast Asia
During World War II, Japanese forces occupied much of Southeast Asia from 1941 to 1945, initially welcomed in some areas as liberators from European colonial rule but soon provoking resentment through brutal exploitation and atrocities. In the Philippines, the occupation led to events like the Bataan Death March of April 1942, in which Japanese troops forced approximately 75,000 American and Filipino prisoners of war to endure a 65-mile trek under conditions of starvation, dehydration, and summary executions, resulting in an estimated 5,000 to 18,000 Filipino deaths and 500 to 650 American deaths. Manila suffered extensive destruction in 1945 as Japanese forces retreated, contributing to one of the war's highest civilian tolls in the region. In Indonesia, the Japanese implemented the romusha forced labor system, conscripting between 4 million and 10 million Indonesians for infrastructure projects and military support, with mortality rates estimated at 10-20% or higher due to malnutrition, disease, and overwork, leading to hundreds of thousands of deaths. Famine during the 1944-1945 period exacerbated losses, with net population declines of around 3.3 million attributed to occupation policies. Despite these horrors, Japan's sponsorship of Indonesian nationalist training and its 1945 declaration of independence from Dutch rule facilitated post-war anti-colonial struggles, tempering long-term enmity.[98][99][100] Post-war, anti-Japanese sentiment in Southeast Asia proved less enduring than in East Asia owing to the occupation's brevity (about 3.5 years versus decades of colonization elsewhere), suppression of leftist resistance groups that might have amplified grievances, and Japan's proactive reconciliation measures including reparations, official apologies, and over $97 billion in official development assistance since 1954. In the Philippines, Emperor Hirohito's apology and reparations payments were accepted, while economic partnerships have positioned Japan as a strategic ally against regional threats like China, with minimal public backlash to events such as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's 2013 Yasukuni Shrine visit. Indonesia, a top recipient of Japanese aid, experienced 1974 riots during Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka's visit, but these stemmed from economic anxieties over Japanese investment rather than historical atonement.[100][101] Similar patterns hold in Malaysia and Singapore, where atrocities like the Sook Ching massacres targeted ethnic Chinese but were addressed through compensation—such as Singapore's 1966 "blood debt" settlement of $50 million—and policies like Malaysia's "Look East" initiative promoting Japanese economic models. Overall, while memories of wartime suffering persist among older generations and in survivor testimonies, pragmatic priorities of development and security have marginalized historical resentments, with no equivalent to East Asian-style textbook disputes or annual commemorative protests.[100][102]
Philippines and Indonesia: Occupation Legacies
During World War II, Japanese forces invaded and occupied the Philippines starting in December 1941, with full control achieved by May 1942 following the fall of Corregidor. The occupation, lasting until liberation in 1945, was marked by widespread atrocities that engendered profound resentment among Filipinos. The Bataan Death March, commencing on April 9, 1942, forced approximately 75,000 American and Filipino prisoners on a 65-mile trek under brutal conditions, resulting in 5,000 to 18,000 Filipino deaths from disease, starvation, and summary executions by Japanese troops. In the Battle of Manila from February to March 1945, Japanese defenders systematically massacred civilians, with estimates of 100,000 Filipino non-combatants killed through bayoneting, arson, and rape, contributing to the city's status as one of the most devastated urban areas of the war outside Europe.[103] These events, alongside forced labor and economic exploitation, solidified anti-Japanese sentiment, manifesting post-war in discrimination against Japanese-Filipino children and demands for reparations.[104] Post-liberation trials, such as that of General Tomoyuki Yamashita, convicted Japanese leaders for failing to prevent such crimes, reinforcing perceptions of Japanese barbarity.[103] Japan's 1956 reparations agreement, providing $550 million in goods and services, aimed to address grievances, yet initial public outrage persisted, with guerrilla remnants targeting suspected collaborators. Over time, economic partnerships, including Japanese investments in infrastructure, have tempered historical animus, though memorials to occupation victims, like the Bataan Death March sites, sustain awareness of the era's horrors.[105]
In Indonesia, formerly the Dutch East Indies, Japanese occupation from March 1942 to August 1945 began with initial acquiescence from nationalists viewing Japan as an anti-colonial ally against Dutch rule. However, the regime's demands for resources led to severe impositions, including the romusha system that conscripted 4 to 10 million Indonesians for forced labor in construction, mining, and military projects, with mortality rates exceeding 10% due to malnutrition, disease, and abuse—potentially over 300,000 deaths.[106] Famine exacerbated by rice requisitions and economic disruption claimed an additional 3 to 4 million lives, particularly in Java.[106] Despite these hardships, Japanese policies inadvertently advanced Indonesian agency by forming administrative and paramilitary units like PETA, training future independence leaders such as Suharto.[107] The occupation's dual legacy—brutality offset by empowerment—has muted enduring anti-Japanese sentiment relative to neighbors. Japan's surrender enabled Sukarno's independence proclamation on August 17, 1945, framing the period as a catalyst for sovereignty despite the costs. Under Suharto's New Order (1966–1998), discourse on Japanese war crimes was curtailed to prioritize economic ties, including reparations and aid, preventing widespread revanchism.[108] Sporadic protests, such as 1970s demonstrations against perceived Japanese economic dominance, occurred but lacked the intensity seen elsewhere, with contemporary views often pragmatic due to Japan's role in development projects.[109]
Americas and Oceania
In the Americas and Oceania, anti-Japanese sentiment following World War II transitioned from wartime hostilities to primarily economic grievances, particularly in the United States and Canada, where Japan's postwar economic miracle fueled perceptions of unfair competition. This shift was evident in the 1970s and 1980s, as Japanese imports, especially automobiles and electronics, contributed to manufacturing job losses and trade deficits. In Australia, wartime fears of invasion subsided over time due to burgeoning commercial ties, though lingering resentments from Pacific War experiences persisted among some veterans and communities. Latin American countries, such as Peru, saw earlier anti-Japanese actions tied to economic success during the war era, but postwar expressions were less pronounced and more localized.United States: From War Hysteria to Economic Resentment
Postwar economic resentment peaked in the 1980s amid Japan's rapid industrialization, which American policymakers and industries viewed as predatory, with accusations of dumping products and intellectual property theft exacerbating tensions. A 1982 poll revealed a reversal of postwar goodwill, showing increased American resentment toward Japanese economic practices. In California, businessmen advocated boycotts of Japanese goods, while the state governor warned that the U.S. risked becoming an "economic colony" of Japan. This climate of "Japan bashing" was linked to the decline of the U.S. auto sector, where Japanese efficiency and market share gains displaced American workers.[110][111] A stark manifestation occurred on June 19, 1982, when Vincent Chin, a Chinese-American engineer, was beaten to death in Detroit by two laid-off autoworkers who mistook him for Japanese amid blame directed at Japan's role in industry woes. The perpetrators received probation after pleading guilty to manslaughter, igniting protests over lenient sentencing perceived as tolerating anti-Asian violence fueled by economic nationalism. This incident galvanized the Asian American civil rights movement, leading to federal scrutiny of hate crimes and reforms in Michigan sentencing laws to prevent similar plea deals without victim input. By the 1990s, mutual respect grew as economic interdependence deepened, with surveys indicating shared positive views despite past rivalries.[112][113]Canada and Other Western Contexts
In Canada, postwar anti-Japanese measures lingered until 1949, when restrictions on Japanese Canadians were lifted, though many suffered lasting property losses from wartime expropriations without compensation until the 1988 redress agreement. Economic sentiments echoed U.S. patterns but were milder, with trade frictions over autos and resources not escalating to widespread public backlash. Australia, facing direct wartime threats like the 1942 Darwin bombings, saw initial postwar hostility among returned POWs and civilians, yet reconciliation accelerated through 1950s trade pacts and Japan's role as a key partner, effectively muting war-era animosities by the 1970s. In Latin America, postwar sentiment remained subdued compared to wartime deportations from Peru, where pre-1945 riots targeted Japanese economic niches, but integration and smaller communities limited ongoing hostility.[114]United States: From War Hysteria to Economic Resentment
Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States intensified dramatically, driven by widespread war hysteria and government-backed propaganda that portrayed Japanese people as inherently deceitful, animalistic, and racially inferior.[115][57] This rhetoric, disseminated through posters, films, and media emphasizing subhuman features and threats to American women, contributed to public support for severe domestic measures; a 1942 poll indicated 93% of Americans favored interning non-citizen Japanese residents.[116] Such views were amplified by pre-existing racial prejudices, including earlier immigration restrictions like the 1924 Asian Exclusion Act, but the Pacific War's immediacy transformed latent biases into acute national animosity, with isolated vigilante attacks and demands for total exclusion from West Coast communities.[57] Postwar reconstruction under U.S. occupation from 1945 to 1952, coupled with Japan's alignment as a Cold War ally, initially tempered these hostilities, fostering economic interdependence and positive public views—polls in 1972 showed 72% of Americans holding favorable opinions of Japan.[110] However, Japan's rapid export-led growth in the 1970s and 1980s reversed this trend, as U.S. trade deficits with Japan ballooned from $1.7 billion in 1974 to $50 billion in 1985, accounting for roughly two-thirds of America's overall trade imbalance by decade's end.[110][48] Economic resentment manifested as "Japan bashing," a mix of rhetorical criticism from politicians and literal protests at manufacturing hubs, particularly in the auto and steel sectors where Japanese imports—rising to 15.6% of U.S. imports by the mid-1980s—were blamed for plant closures and unemployment spikes exceeding 10% in Rust Belt states.[48][117] This led to policy responses like the 1981 voluntary export restraints on Japanese automobiles, limiting shipments to 1.68 million units annually, and the 1985 Plaza Accord, which aimed to weaken the dollar against the yen to curb imports.[48] Public sentiment soured accordingly; by 1982, unfavorable views had climbed from 12% in 1980 to a notable reversal, with polls capturing widespread frustration over Japan's perceived non-tariff barriers and "unfair" advantages in capturing U.S. markets.[110] Unlike wartime racial animus, this phase emphasized competitive threat over inherent inferiority, though stereotypes of Japanese as ruthless economic predators echoed earlier propaganda tropes.Canada and Other Western Contexts
In Canada, anti-Japanese sentiment had deep roots in British Columbia, where pre-World War II racism fueled discriminatory measures, including the provincial denial of voting rights to Japanese Canadians as early as 1895, amid broader anti-Asian agitation by politicians and media.[118] Following Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, federal authorities invoked the War Measures Act to designate a 100-mile coastal exclusion zone, forcibly displacing over 21,000 Japanese Canadians—comprising more than 90% of the national Japanese population, nearly all from British Columbia—starting March 27, 1942.[64] Approximately 12,000 were interned in self-supporting camps in the interior provinces, while about 4,000 men were separated into labor camps for road-building projects; families lost homes, businesses, and over $400 million in assets (in 1940s values) through coerced sales or government liquidation.[119] Canadian military and Royal Canadian Mounted Police assessments found no evidence of disloyalty or security risks among the community, yet British Columbia officials, capitalizing on wartime hysteria, pressured Ottawa for mass uprooting.[119] Postwar policies perpetuated exclusion through mandatory dispersal eastward of the Rocky Mountains, property seizures, and deportation orders affecting up to 10,000 citizens and residents until revocation in 1947–1949.[120] Advocacy by groups like the National Association of Japanese Canadians culminated in the 1988 Redress Agreement: on September 22, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney delivered a parliamentary apology, providing $21,000 per surviving internee (totaling about $12 million), a $12 million community endowment, $24 million for a Canadian Race Relations Foundation, and restored citizenship rights.[121][122] These measures addressed violations of civil liberties but highlighted enduring legacies of economic loss and cultural trauma, with no full restitution for seized properties. In Australia, historical exclusion under the White Australia Policy restricted Japanese immigration until gradual relaxations post-1952, reflecting prewar fears of Asian "invasion" tied to labor competition and racial purity doctrines.[46] Wartime sentiment peaked with Darwin's bombing on February 19, 1942, amplifying calls for vigilance against perceived threats, though the resident Japanese population numbered only around 1,000 before internment or repatriation.[123] Economic anxieties resurfaced in the 1980s amid Japan's postwar boom, when surging investments—reaching 10% of foreign direct investment by 1989—sparked public backlash, including protests against property buys and rhetoric framing Japan as a neo-imperial economic aggressor.[124] Polls from the era showed over 50% of Australians viewing Japanese influence negatively, often invoking WWII memories, though such views waned by the 1990s with alliance-building and trade normalization.[125] New Zealand's experience involved limited civilian internment of Japanese from Pacific territories—around 50 individuals—rather than local residents, with anti-Japanese measures focusing on POW camps holding over 800 captured soldiers by 1945, marked by tensions like the 1943 Featherston incident where 48 prisoners and one guard died in a search-related clash.[126][127] Across these contexts, postwar integration and alliances have marginalized overt sentiment, shifting focus to historical reckoning over active prejudice.Europe and Russia
United Kingdom, France, and Germany
In the United Kingdom, post-World War II anti-Japanese sentiment primarily stemmed from the brutal treatment of British prisoners of war in Japanese captivity, where tens of thousands endured forced labor, starvation, and medical experiments, resulting in high mortality rates.[128] This led to lingering resentment among survivors and their families, with negative media portrayals of Japanese atrocities persisting into the 1990s, particularly around the 50th anniversary of the war's end in 1995, when public discourse highlighted unaddressed grudges from events like the Burma Railway.[129] However, broader societal attitudes shifted toward reconciliation through diplomatic normalization in the 1950s and economic ties, with anti-Japanese incidents remaining rare and confined largely to veteran communities rather than widespread public hostility.[130] In France, sentiment was influenced by Japan's occupation of French Indochina from 1940, which involved collaboration with Vichy authorities but escalated into direct conflict after 1945; post-war views focused more on colonial losses than racial animus, with limited evidence of sustained popular resentment compared to Allied experiences in Asia.[131] Germany, as a former Axis ally, experienced wartime propaganda framing Japan positively as a partner against communism, but post-war denazification and focus on Holocaust accountability overshadowed any Japanese-specific animus, leading to rapid economic engagement without notable persistence of hostility.[132] Across these nations, pre-war "Yellow Peril" fears had largely dissipated by the mid-20th century, supplanted by admiration for Japan's economic recovery.Russian Empire and Soviet Union
Anti-Japanese sentiment in Russia traces to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, a humiliating defeat that exposed military weaknesses, contributed to the 1905 Revolution, and fostered a narrative of Japanese aggression as a threat to Russian expansion in East Asia.[133] This legacy persisted into the Soviet era, where Japan's undeclared border conflicts, such as the 1939 Battles of Khalkhin Gol, reinforced perceptions of Japan as an imperialist rival, culminating in the USSR's 1945 invasion of Japanese-held Sakhalin and the [Kuril Islands](/page/Kuril Islands). Post-1945, Soviet annexation of these territories solidified control, but unresolved claims by Japan over the Southern Kurils (known as Northern Territories in Japan) have prevented a peace treaty, with Russia viewing such demands as revanchist and unlawful.[134] In contemporary Russia, state-sponsored narratives amplify historical grievances, portraying Japan as historically aggressive and currently aligned with Western anti-Russian policies, including propaganda emphasizing alleged Japanese war crimes and rejecting territorial compromises.[135] Actions such as banning Japanese NGOs advocating for the islands' return in 2025 and suspending foreign navigation rights near the Kurils underscore this stance, framing Japan as a security threat amid ongoing militarization of the archipelago.[136][137] Public opinion polls and media reflect entrenched distrust, with little enthusiasm for concessions despite economic interests in joint development.[138]United Kingdom, France, and Germany
In the United Kingdom, anti-Japanese sentiment intensified after Japan's declaration of war in December 1941 and the rapid conquest of British territories in Southeast Asia, culminating in the fall of Singapore on February 15, 1942, which Prime Minister Winston Churchill described as the worst disaster in British military history. British propaganda efforts, coordinated by the Ministry of Information, depicted Japanese forces as treacherous and barbaric, often portraying them in cartoons and posters as ape-like figures or sneaky assassins to evoke fear and hatred among the public and boost recruitment. These materials emphasized atrocities such as the treatment of prisoners, drawing on reports from the Burma campaign where Japanese forces executed surrendering Allied troops. Overall, around 30,000 personnel from the British Empire died combating Japan across theaters from India to the Pacific islands between 1941 and 1945.[139][140] Postwar, lingering resentment persisted among some British ex-prisoners of war who endured harsh conditions in Japanese camps, with groups like the Japan Ex-POW Association advocating for reparations into the 1990s, though official reconciliation advanced through the 1951 Treaty of Peace and subsequent economic partnerships. By the 1980s, as Japan's export surge—particularly in automobiles and electronics—eroded British manufacturing sectors like British Leyland, public discourse reflected economic anxiety rather than ethnic animus, with trade imbalances prompting voluntary export restraints from Tokyo in 1981 to avert protectionist backlash. Contemporary surveys indicate negligible organized anti-Japanese prejudice, overshadowed by broader Anglo-Japanese alliances in security and culture.[130] In France, sentiment against Japan arose primarily from the 1940-1941 Japanese occupation of French Indochina, where Imperial forces pressured the Vichy government into ceding airfields and resources, leading to military clashes like the September 1940 invasion of Tonkin and the displacement of French administrators. Free French forces under Charles de Gaulle condemned Japan as an aggressor, aligning with Allied propaganda that highlighted Japanese expansionism as a threat to European colonial holdings, though French public focus remained predominantly on the European theater. Postwar decolonization and Japan's economic aid to former colonies tempered direct hostility, but isolated incidents of verbal harassment against Japanese expatriates have been reported in urban areas, often conflated with general anti-Asian biases amid immigration debates.[141] Germany's wartime alignment with Japan via the 1936 Anti-Comintern Pact and 1940 Tripartite Pact fostered mutual respect rather than animosity, with Nazi ideology classifying Japanese as "honorary Aryans" despite underlying racial hierarchies, enabling cooperation against common foes like the Soviet Union and Britain. Post-1945, German reckoning with its own atrocities through denazification and education contrasted with perceptions of Japanese reticence on wartime conduct, prompting scholarly and media critiques—such as in 1995 analyses noting Germany's more forthright apologies versus Japan's—that occasionally spilled into skepticism toward Tokyo's historical narratives, though without widespread popular prejudice against Japanese individuals. Economic competition in the 1980s, including Japanese firms acquiring stakes in German industries like electronics, elicited calls for fairer trade but lacked the vitriol seen in U.S. "Japan-bashing," as evidenced by stable bilateral investment flows. Recent upticks in discrimination, linked to COVID-19 origin debates, remain anecdotal and subsumed under broader anti-Asian incidents rather than targeted Japanophobia.[131][142]Russian Empire and Soviet Union
In the Russian Empire, anti-Japanese sentiment emerged prominently amid territorial rivalries in East Asia during the late 19th century, escalating with Russia's expansion into Manchuria and Korea, which clashed with Japan's imperial ambitions. This tension culminated in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, triggered by Japan's surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur on February 8, 1904. The conflict, rooted in geopolitical competition and mutual racial prejudices, fostered widespread Russian perceptions of Japanese forces as embodying a "yellow peril"—a racially inferior yet fanatical threat capable of humiliating European superiority. Russian military observers and policymakers often invoked racist stereotypes, depicting Japanese soldiers as subhuman mimics of Western tactics driven by blind obedience rather than genuine martial prowess, which rationalized Russia's unexpected defeats at battles like Tsushima (May 27–28, 1905) where the Japanese navy annihilated the Russian Baltic Fleet.[143][144] The war's outcome, resulting in Russia's loss of Port Arthur, southern Sakhalin, and influence in Korea via the Treaty of Portsmouth (September 5, 1905), fueled domestic humiliation and nationalist resentment, contributing to the 1905 Revolution but also reinforcing anti-Japanese rhetoric in imperial discourse.[145] Under the Soviet Union, anti-Japanese sentiment manifested through state policy and wartime actions rather than overt popular racism, aligning with ideological opposition to Japanese imperialism as a fascist extension of capitalism. Border clashes, such as the Battles of Khalkhin Gol (May–September 1939), where Soviet forces under Georgy Zhukov decisively defeated the Japanese Kwantung Army—inflicting approximately 20,000 Japanese casualties—solidified mutual enmity, though Soviet propaganda framed it as anti-imperialist rather than racial. This escalated in August 1945 with the Soviet declaration of war on Japan (August 8), followed by the invasion of Japanese-held Manchuria (Operation August Storm), capturing over 600,000 Japanese military personnel and civilians. These internees faced internment in 76 labor camps across Siberia and Central Asia, where they endured forced labor on infrastructure projects under grueling conditions, including subzero temperatures, inadequate food (often 300–500 grams of bread daily), and disease outbreaks; mortality estimates range from 55,000 to 60,000 deaths between 1945 and 1956 due to starvation, exhaustion, and neglect.[146][147] The Soviet rationale emphasized reparations and reconstruction needs post-World War II, bypassing Geneva Convention standards (which the USSR had not ratified for POW treatment), with releases staggered until 1956 amid Cold War pressures; this episode, distinct from official Soviet anti-racism campaigns, reflected pragmatic enmity toward Japan as a defeated Axis power rather than ideological consistency.[146]Key Controversies and Flashpoints
Yasukuni Shrine Visits
Yasukuni Shrine, established in 1869, enshrines the souls of over 2.4 million Japanese military personnel and civilians who died in conflicts from the Boshin War through World War II, including 14 Class-A war criminals such as former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, secretly enshrined in 1978.[148] Visits to the shrine by Japanese prime ministers and cabinet officials have repeatedly ignited anti-Japanese sentiment in China and South Korea, where they are interpreted as endorsements of imperialism and insufficient remorse for wartime atrocities, including the invasions of Asia and Pacific during the 1930s and 1940s.[149] These reactions stem from the shrine's association with Shinto state rituals that blend commemoration of the war dead with perceived glorification of Japan's militaristic past, contrasting with Allied postwar convictions of shrine-honored figures for crimes against peace and humanity.[150] Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's annual visits from 2001 to 2006, culminating in an August 15, 2006, visit on the anniversary of Japan's WWII surrender, prompted sharp condemnations from Beijing and Seoul, with China suspending high-level dialogues and South Korea expressing outrage over the perceived lack of atonement.[151] These actions exacerbated anti-Japanese protests in both countries, including demonstrations in Seoul and Beijing that highlighted historical grievances like forced labor and comfort women, framing the visits as revanchist signals.[152] Similarly, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's December 26, 2013, visit—his first as prime minister—drew immediate diplomatic backlash, with China labeling it "absolutely unacceptable" and summoning Japan's ambassador, while South Korea deemed it "deplorable," reigniting public anger and boycotts of Japanese goods amid broader territorial tensions.[149] No subsequent prime minister has visited in office, reflecting domestic divisions where polls showed roughly half of Japanese opposing such actions due to international repercussions.[153] Cabinet ministers' visits have sustained the controversy, as seen in August 15, 2022, offerings and visits by officials that prompted South Korean calls to end historical tensions and Chinese condemnations of "erroneous" behavior.[154] On August 15, 2024, and again in 2025 marking the 80th anniversary of WWII's end, ministers' participation drew protests from Seoul and Beijing, reinforcing narratives of Japanese unrepentance and fueling nationalist media coverage that amplifies anti-Japanese stereotypes in East Asia.[155] [156] Such incidents perpetuate a cycle where shrine visits serve as flashpoints, validating claims of historical revisionism and hindering reconciliation efforts, though Japanese defenders argue they honor national sacrifices without endorsing aggression.[157]Historical Education and Textbook Disputes
Disputes over the content of Japanese history textbooks have been a recurring flashpoint in anti-Japanese sentiment, particularly from China and South Korea, where critics argue that Japanese educational materials systematically minimize or equivocate on Imperial Japan's wartime atrocities, such as the Nanjing Massacre and the comfort women system.[24] These controversies often escalate into diplomatic protests and public demonstrations, fueled by differing national narratives: Japanese textbooks, screened by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), typically include brief references to events like the Nanjing Massacre—describing it as an "incident" resulting in "many" deaths without endorsing the Chinese claim of 300,000 victims—but devote less space and detail compared to textbooks in affected countries.[158] Mainstream Japanese texts, used by the vast majority of schools, acknowledge Japanese aggression and civilian suffering, yet revisionist proposals from conservative groups have drawn outsized international scrutiny, amplifying perceptions of denialism despite their limited adoption (e.g., less than 0.039% of junior high schools used the most controversial version in 2001).[159] The 1982 textbook screening process marked the first major international crisis, when MEXT instructed publishers to replace terms like "invasion" (shinryaku) with neutral phrasing such as "advance" (shinshutsu) for Japan's 1931 entry into Manchuria, prompting outrage in China and South Korea over perceived whitewashing of aggression.[160] Reported by Asahi Shimbun on June 26, 1982, the changes affected multiple books and led to UNESCO complaints and boycotts of Japanese goods in China, though Japanese officials maintained the revisions ensured factual neutrality amid domestic debates on militarism.[161] This incident highlighted causal tensions: while Japanese conservatives viewed the original wording as ideologically biased against national pride, critics in neighboring states saw it as evading responsibility for initiating conflicts that caused millions of deaths, with empirical records from Japanese military archives confirming aggressive intent in Manchuria.[162] Subsequent flare-ups centered on the "New History Textbook" drafted by the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, approved by MEXT in 2001 despite domestic protests from over 200 historians who condemned its portrayal of the Nanjing Massacre as unsubstantiated and its framing of the Pacific War as self-defense against Western imperialism.[163] The textbook's approval triggered mass demonstrations in Seoul and Beijing, with South Korean students burning Japanese flags and Chinese authorities organizing rallies that escalated into violence against Japanese diplomatic properties; only a fraction of schools adopted it, but its existence fueled narratives of systemic Japanese revisionism.[24] In South Korea, disputes intensified over comfort women coverage, where Japanese texts often describe the system as involving licensed prostitution rather than military coercion, contrasting with Korean curricula emphasizing forced recruitment of an estimated 200,000 women, primarily Korean; bilateral talks, including the 2015 agreement, have not resolved educational divergences, as Korean activists decry Japanese materials for insufficient acknowledgment of coercion evidenced by survivor testimonies and Imperial Army documents.[164] These textbook frictions reflect broader causal realism in historical memory: Japanese education prioritizes post-war pacifism via Article 9 of the Constitution, mandating reflection on war guilt, yet faces pressure from both internal nationalists seeking to bolster morale and external actors leveraging grievances for political unity—evident in Chinese state-orchestrated protests amid territorial disputes.[165] Empirical analyses show that while minority revisionist texts provoke backlash, prevailing Japanese curricula include atrocity references, suggesting disputes often stem from interpretive framing rather than outright omission, though biased amplification in Chinese and Korean media—prone to nationalist exaggeration—exacerbates anti-Japanese mobilization.[166] MEXT's 2020s screenings continue to balance these pressures, approving texts with Nanjing mentions but rejecting unsubstantiated denialist claims, underscoring that verifiable facts from trials like Tokyo 1946-1948 affirm Japanese responsibility without necessitating the hyperbolic victim tallies promoted abroad.[167]Comfort Women Issue and Reparations Claims
The "comfort women" system involved the recruitment of women, primarily from Korea, China, the Philippines, and other regions, to provide sexual services in military brothels operated under Japanese Imperial Army oversight from the early 1930s to 1945, aimed at reducing random rapes and venereal disease among troops. Scholarly estimates of the total number range from 20,000 to 50,000 women across Asia, with Korean women comprising the largest group at approximately 20,000–30,000, though activist claims often cite 200,000 without primary documentary support.[168][169] Japanese government records indicate recruitment was largely handled by private brokers and licensed procurers who advertised jobs in factories or laundries, with military authorities establishing and regulating stations but not typically conducting mass abductions; evidence of direct coercion is documented in isolated cases, such as among European women in Java, but Korean testimonies frequently describe deception or economic duress rather than widespread military kidnapping.[170][171] Harvard law professor J. Mark Ramseyer, in a peer-reviewed article, argued that surviving contracts and economic incentives suggest many women entered voluntarily as prostitutes under enforceable agreements, a view contested by historians emphasizing post-war testimonies of force, though critics note inconsistencies in victim accounts and potential influence from activist coaching.[172] Japan's first official acknowledgment came in the 1993 Kono Statement, where Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono expressed regret for the military's "direct or indirect" involvement in coercing women, based primarily on interviews with 16 former Korean comfort women and Japanese officials rather than archival documents. A 2014 Japanese government review revealed that South Korean officials influenced the statement's wording during bilateral talks and that key claims of widespread coercion lacked corroborating evidence, prompting conservative critics to argue it prioritized diplomacy over historical rigor.[173] Subsequent apologies included Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama's 1995 statement on wartime suffering and the creation of the Asian Women's Fund (1995–2007), which distributed approximately 4.7 billion yen in private donations plus government-funded medical support to 285 Korean and other Asian victims, accompanied by official letters of atonement; however, many recipients rejected the fund as insufficiently direct from the state.[86] Reparations claims trace to post-war treaties, notably the 1965 Japan–Republic of Korea Normalization Treaty, under which Japan transferred $300 million in grants and $200 million in low-interest loans to Seoul—equivalent to twice South Korea's annual GNP at the time—as economic cooperation explicitly settling all claims arising from Japan's 1910–1945 colonial rule, including individual damages, with South Korea's foreign minister confirming no further demands.[86] Japan maintains this and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty extinguished such obligations, a position upheld in multiple international legal opinions, yet South Korean activists and courts have pursued separate suits, arguing the treaty did not explicitly cover comfort women or individual rights; for instance, a 2023 Seoul High Court ruling ordered Japan to pay 100 million won each to 16 plaintiffs, overriding the treaty despite Japan's sovereign immunity protests.[174][175] A 2015 bilateral agreement aimed to resolve lingering disputes, with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe offering "deepest apologies and heartfelt remorse" for the women's suffering and Japan contributing 1 billion yen (about $8.3 million) to a Seoul-managed Reconciliation and Healing Foundation for victim support, both governments affirming the issue as "finally and irreversibly" settled.[86] The Moon Jae-in administration repudiated this in 2018 by disbanding the foundation after victim groups rejected the funds as non-admission of legal responsibility, citing inadequate consultation, which Japan viewed as a breach enabling renewed litigation and anti-Japanese activism.[176][177] These unresolved claims have intensified anti-Japanese sentiment, particularly in South Korea, where nationalist narratives portray Japan as evading accountability despite over 20 official apologies since 1990 and billions in aid; protests, "statue diplomacy" (e.g., "comfort woman" memorials abroad), and school curricula amplify coercion claims, often drawing from testimonies vetted by advocacy groups with ties to leftist networks, while downplaying treaty settlements or evidence of pre-existing prostitution economies in Korea.[89] Such framing sustains boycotts and diplomatic tensions, as seen in 2010s rallies demanding "official" reparations, though empirical reviews highlight how post-Cold War activism, influenced by gender studies paradigms in Western academia, has politicized the issue beyond verifiable wartime records.[178][179]Derogatory Terms and Cultural Stereotypes
Linguistic Derogations Across Languages
In English-speaking countries, particularly the United States during World War II, the term "Jap" emerged as a widespread ethnic slur abbreviating "Japanese," often deployed in propaganda to dehumanize the enemy and justify internment policies affecting over 120,000 Japanese Americans from 1942 to 1945.[59] This abbreviation, appearing in posters, media, and official rhetoric, carried connotations of inferiority and threat, persisting post-war as a marker of residual resentment despite declining overt usage by the 1970s.[180] Similarly, "Nip," derived from "Nippon" (Japan's endonym), functioned as another pejorative, amplified in wartime cartoons and speeches to evoke subhuman imagery, though less documented in formal records than "Jap." In Chinese, historical animosities from the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) birthed terms like Rìběn guǐzi (日本鬼子, "Japanese devils"), a slur portraying Japanese as demonic invaders responsible for atrocities including the Nanjing Massacre, where an estimated 200,000 civilians perished in late 1937.[181] This phrase, rooted in wartime propaganda, recurs in modern nationalist discourse, such as online forums during territorial disputes, blending literal demonization with calls for retribution.[182] Complementing it, xiǎo Rìběn (小日本, "little Japan") employs diminutive mockery to imply cultural or physical inferiority, originating in the same era but gaining traction in post-1949 media under the People's Republic, where it underscores perceived Japanese arrogance despite economic interdependence. Korean linguistic derogations, fueled by the 35-year Japanese occupation (1910–1945) involving forced labor of over 780,000 Koreans and comfort women conscription, include jjokbari (쪽바리, "cloven-footed" or "split-hoof"), evoking bestial traits and referencing historical footwear differences or mythological devils.[183] Deployed in protests and media, as seen in 2024 incidents barring Korean visitors from Japanese sites amid Dokdo/Takeshima disputes, the term embodies enduring grievances over unaddressed reparations, with usage spiking during events like the 2019 export controls crisis.[184]| Language | Term | Literal Translation/Origin | Historical Context |
|---|---|---|---|
| English | Jap | Abbreviation of "Japanese" | WWII propaganda and internment (1942–1945)[59] |
| Chinese | Rìběn guǐzi | Japanese devils | Sino-Japanese War atrocities (1937–1945)[181] |
| Korean | Jjokbari | Cloven-footed | Japanese occupation exploitation (1910–1945)[183] |