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Antonin Scalia
Antonin Scalia
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Antonin Gregory Scalia[n 1] (March 11, 1936 – February 13, 2016)[n 2] was an American jurist who served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1986 until his death in 2016. He was described as the intellectual anchor for the originalist and textualist position in the U.S. Supreme Court's conservative wing. For catalyzing an originalist and textualist movement in American law, he has been described as one of the most influential jurists of the twentieth century,[7] and one of the most important justices in the history of the Supreme Court.[8] Scalia was posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 2018, and the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University was named in his honor.

Key Information

Scalia was born in Trenton, New Jersey. A devout Catholic, he attended the Jesuit Xavier High School before receiving his undergraduate degree from Georgetown University. Scalia went on to graduate from Harvard Law School and spent six years at Jones Day before becoming a law professor at the University of Virginia. In the early 1970s, he served in the Nixon and Ford administrations, eventually becoming an assistant attorney general under President Gerald Ford. He spent most of the Carter years teaching at the University of Chicago, where he became one of the first faculty advisers of the fledgling Federalist Society. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan appointed Scalia as a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Four years later, Reagan appointed him to the Supreme Court, where Scalia became its first Italian-American justice following a unanimous confirmation by the U.S. Senate 98–0.[n 3]

Scalia espoused a conservative jurisprudence and ideology, advocating textualism in statutory interpretation and originalism in constitutional interpretation. He peppered his colleagues with "Ninograms" (memos named for his nickname, "Nino") intending to persuade them to his point of view. He was a strong defender of the powers of the executive branch and believed that the U.S. Constitution permitted the death penalty and did not guarantee the right to either abortion or same-sex marriage. Furthermore, Scalia viewed affirmative action and other policies that afforded special protected status to minority groups as unconstitutional. Such positions would earn him a reputation as one of the most conservative justices on the Court. He filed separate opinions in many cases, often castigating the Court's majority—sometimes scathingly so.

Scalia's most significant opinions include his lone dissent in Morrison v. Olson (arguing against the constitutionality of an Independent-Counsel law), and his majority opinions in Crawford v. Washington (defining a criminal defendant's confrontation right under the Sixth Amendment) and District of Columbia v. Heller (holding that the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees an individual right to handgun ownership).

Early life and education

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Scalia was born on March 11, 1936, in Trenton, New Jersey.[9] He was the only child of Salvatore Eugenio "Eugene" Scalia (1903–1986), an Italian immigrant from Sommatino, Sicily. Salvatore graduated from Rutgers University and was a graduate student at Columbia University and clerk at the time of his son's birth.[10] The elder Scalia would become a professor of Romance languages at Brooklyn College, where he was an adherent to the formalist New Criticism school of literary theory.[11] Scalia's mother, Catherine Louise (née Panaro; 1905–1985), was born in Trenton to Italian immigrant parents and worked as an elementary school teacher.[10][12]

In 1939, Scalia and his family moved to Elmhurst, Queens, where he attended P.S. 13 Clement C. Moore School.[13][14] After completing eighth grade,[15] he obtained an academic scholarship to Xavier High School, a Jesuit military school in Manhattan,[16] from which he graduated ranked first in his class in 1953.[17] Scalia achieved a 97.5 average at Xavier, earning decorations in Latin, Greek, and debate, among other subjects, in addition to being a distinguished member of its Glee club.[18] He later reflected that he spent much of his time on schoolwork and admitted, "I was never cool."[19]

While a youth, Scalia was also active as a Boy Scout and was part of the Scouts' national honor society, the Order of the Arrow.[20] Classmate and future New York State official William Stern remembered Scalia in his high school days: "This kid was a conservative when he was 17 years old. An archconservative Catholic. He could have been a member of the Curia. He was the top student in the class. He was brilliant, way above everybody else."[9][21]

In 1953, Scalia enrolled at Georgetown University, where he majored in history. He became a champion collegiate debater in Georgetown's Philodemic Society and a critically praised thespian.[22] He took his junior year abroad in Switzerland at the University of Fribourg.[9] Scalia graduated from Georgetown in 1957 as class valedictorian with a Bachelor of Arts, summa cum laude.[23] Scalia then went to Harvard Law School, where he was a notes editor for the Harvard Law Review.[24] He graduated in 1960 with a Bachelor of Laws, magna cum laude, among the top of the class.[23] During his time at Harvard, Scalia was awarded a Sheldon Fellowship, which allowed him to travel abroad in Europe during 1960 and 1961.[25]

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Scalia began his legal career at the law firm Jones, Day, Cockley and Reavis (now Jones Day) in Cleveland, Ohio, where he worked from 1961 to 1967.[24] He was highly regarded at the law firm and would most likely have been made a partner but later said he had long intended to teach. He left Jones Day in 1967 to become a professor at the University of Virginia School of Law, moving his family to Charlottesville.[26]

After four years in Charlottesville, Scalia entered public service in 1971. President Richard Nixon appointed him general counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy, where one of his principal assignments was to formulate federal policy for the growth of cable television. From 1972 to 1974, he was chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States, a small independent agency that sought to improve the functioning of the federal bureaucracy.[25] In mid-1974, Nixon nominated him as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel.[25] After Nixon's resignation, the nomination was continued by President Gerald Ford, and Scalia was confirmed by the Senate on August 22, 1974.[27]

In the aftermath of Watergate, the Ford administration was engaged in a number of conflicts with Congress. Scalia repeatedly testified before congressional committees, defending Ford administration assertions of executive privilege regarding its refusal to turn over documents.[28] Within the administration, Scalia advocated a presidential veto for a bill to amend the Freedom of Information Act, which would greatly increase the act's scope. Scalia's view prevailed, and Ford vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode it.[29] In early 1976, Scalia argued his only case before the Supreme Court, Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba. Scalia, on behalf of the U.S. government, argued in support of Dunhill, and that position was successful.[30] Following Ford's defeat by President Jimmy Carter, Scalia worked for several months at the American Enterprise Institute.[31]

He then returned to academia, taking up residence at the University of Chicago Law School from 1977 to 1982,[32] though he spent one year as a visiting professor at Stanford Law School.[33] During Scalia's time at Chicago, Peter H. Russell hired him on behalf of the Canadian government to write a report on how the United States was able to limit the activities of its secret services for the McDonald Commission, which was investigating abuses by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. The report—finished in 1979—encouraged the commission to recommend that a balance be struck between civil liberties and the essentially unchecked activities of the RCMP.[34] In 1981, he became the first faculty adviser for the University of Chicago's chapter of the newly founded Federalist Society.[32]

U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit (1982–1986)

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When Ronald Reagan was elected president in November 1980, Scalia hoped for a major position in the new administration. He was interviewed for the position of solicitor general of the United States, but the position went to Rex E. Lee, to Scalia's great disappointment.[35] Scalia was offered a judgeship on the Chicago-based U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in early 1982 but declined it, hoping to be appointed to the more influential U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Later that year, Reagan offered Scalia a seat on the D.C. Circuit, which he accepted.[36] He was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on August 5, 1982, and was sworn in on August 17, 1982.

On the D.C. Circuit, Scalia built a conservative record while winning applause in legal circles for powerful, witty legal writing which was often critical of the Supreme Court precedents he felt bound as a lower-court judge to follow. Scalia's opinions drew the attention of Reagan administration officials, who, according to The New York Times, "liked virtually everything they saw and ... listed him as a leading Supreme Court prospect".[37]

Nomination to the Supreme Court of the United States (1986)

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Ronald Reagan and Scalia (his nominee) in the Oval Office, July 7, 1986
Judge and Mrs. Scalia (left) and President Reagan (right) watch as Chief Justice Warren Burger swears William Rehnquist in as the next Chief Justice, September 26, 1986.

In 1986, Chief Justice Warren Burger informed the White House of his intent to retire. Reagan first decided to nominate Associate Justice William Rehnquist to become Chief Justice. That choice meant that Reagan would also have to choose a nominee to fill Rehnquist's seat as associate justice.[38] Attorney General Edwin Meese, who advised Reagan on the choice, seriously considered only Scalia and Robert Bork, a fellow judge on the DC Circuit.[39] Feeling that this might well be Reagan's last opportunity to pick a Supreme Court justice, the president and his advisers chose Scalia over Bork. Many factors influenced the decision. Reagan wanted to appoint the first Italian-American justice.[40] In addition, Scalia was nine years younger and would likely serve longer on the Court.[38] Scalia also had the advantage of not having Bork's "paper trail";[41] the elder judge had written controversial articles about individual rights.[42] Scalia was called to the White House and accepted Reagan's nomination.[38]

When Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on Scalia's nomination opened in August 1986, he faced a committee that had just argued divisively over the Rehnquist nomination. Witnesses and Democratic senators contended that before becoming a judge, Rehnquist had engaged in activities designed to discourage minorities from voting. Committee members had little taste for a second battle over Scalia and were in any event reluctant to oppose the first Italian-American Supreme Court nominee.[43][44] The judge was not pressed heavily on controversial issues such as abortion or civil rights.[45] Scalia, who attended the hearing with his wife and nine children seated behind him, found time for a humorous exchange with Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH), whom he had defeated in a tennis match in, as the nominee put it, "a case of my integrity overcoming my judgment".[46]

Scalia met no opposition from the committee. The Senate debated Scalia's nomination only briefly, confirming him 98–0 on September 17, thereby making him the Court's first Italian-American Justice. That vote followed Rehnquist's confirmation as Chief Justice by a vote of 65–33 on the same day. Scalia took his seat on September 26, 1986. One committee member, Senator and future President Joe Biden (D-DE), later stated that he regretted not having opposed Scalia "because he was so effective".[47][48]

Supreme Court

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Governmental structure and powers

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Separation of powers

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Justice Scalia testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about separation of powers and checks and balances of the U.S. Government

It was Scalia's view that clear lines of separation among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches follow directly from the Constitution, with no branch allowed to exercise powers granted to another branch.[49] In his early days on the Court, he authored a powerful—and solitary—dissent in Morrison v. Olson (1988), in which the Court's majority upheld the Independent Counsel law. Scalia's thirty-page draft dissent surprised Justice Harry Blackmun for its emotional content; Blackmun felt "it could be cut down to ten pages if Scalia omitted the screaming".[50] Scalia indicated that the law was an unwarranted encroachment on the executive branch by the legislative. He warned, "Frequently an issue of this sort will come before the Court clad, so to speak, in sheep's clothing ... But this wolf comes as a wolf".[50]

The 1989 case of Mistretta v. United States challenged the United States Sentencing Commission, an independent body within the judicial branch whose members (some of whom were federal judges) were removable only for good cause. The petitioner argued that the arrangement violated the separation of powers and that the United States Sentencing Guidelines promulgated by the commission were invalid. Eight justices joined in the majority opinion written by Blackmun, upholding the Guidelines as constitutional.[51] Scalia dissented, stating that the issuance of the Guidelines was a lawmaking function that Congress could not delegate[52] and dubbed the Commission "a sort of junior-varsity Congress".[50]

In 1996, Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act, which allowed the president to cancel items from an appropriations bill (a bill authorizing spending) once passed into law. The statute was challenged the following year. The matter rapidly reached the Supreme Court, which struck down the law as violating the Presentment Clause of the Constitution, which governs what the president is permitted to do with a bill once it has passed both houses of Congress.[53] Scalia dissented, seeing no Presentment Clause difficulties and feeling that the act did not violate the separation of powers. He argued that authorizing the president to cancel an appropriation was no different from allowing him to spend an appropriation at his discretion, which had long been accepted as constitutional.[54]

Detainee cases

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Nine judges in black robes pose for a photograph with three other men in suits.
The 2009–2010 Court, with President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and retiring justice David Souter with Scalia fourth from right

In 2004, in Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that federal courts had jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions brought by detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detainment camp. Scalia accused the majority of "spring[ing] a trap on the Executive" by ruling that it could hear cases involving persons at Guantanamo when no federal court had ever ruled that it had the authority to hear cases involving people there.[55]

Scalia, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, also dissented in the 2004 case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, involving Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen detained in the United States on the allegation he was an enemy combatant. The Court held that although Congress had authorized Hamdi's detention, Fifth Amendment due process guarantees giving a citizen such as Hamdi held in the United States as an enemy combatant the right to contest that detention before a neutral decision maker. Scalia opined that the AUMF (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists) could not be read to suspend habeas corpus and that the Court, faced with legislation by Congress that did not grant the president power to detain Hamdi, was trying to "Make Everything Come Out Right".[56]

In March 2006, Scalia gave a talk at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. When asked about detainee rights, he responded: "Give me a break ... I had a son on that battlefield and they were shooting at my son, and I'm not about to give this man who was captured in a war a full jury trial. I mean it's crazy".[57] Although Scalia was not referring to any particular individual, the Supreme Court was about to consider the case of Salim Ahmed Hamdan, supposed driver to Osama bin Laden, who was challenging the military commissions at Guantanamo Bay.[57] A group of retired military officers that supported Hamdan's position asked Scalia to recuse himself, or step aside from hearing the case, which he declined to do.[58] The Court held 5–3 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the federal courts had jurisdiction to consider Hamdan's claims; Scalia, in dissent, contended that any Court authority to consider Hamdan's petition had been eliminated by the jurisdiction-stripping Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.[59]

Federalism

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Scalia (left) at the University of Virginia School of Law, 2010

In federalism cases pitting the powers of the federal government against those of the states, Scalia often took the states' positions. In 1997, the Supreme Court considered the case of Printz v. United States, a challenge to certain provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, which required chief law enforcement officers of localities in states to perform certain duties. In Printz, Scalia wrote the Court's majority decision. The Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional the provision that imposed those duties as violating the Tenth Amendment, which reserves to the states and to the people those powers not granted to the federal government.[60] In 2005, Scalia concurred in Gonzales v. Raich, which read the Commerce Clause to hold that Congress could ban the use of marijuana even when states approve its use for medicinal purposes. Scalia opined that the Commerce Clause, together with the Necessary and Proper Clause, permitted the regulation. In addition, Scalia felt that Congress may regulate intrastate activities if doing so is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.[61] He based that decision on Wickard v. Filburn, which he now wrote "expanded the Commerce Clause beyond all reason".[62]

Scalia rejected the existence of the negative Commerce Clause doctrine,[63][64] calling it "a judicial fraud".[65]

Scalia took a broad view of the Eleventh Amendment, which bars certain lawsuits against states in the federal courts. In his 1989 dissent in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Scalia stated that there was no intent on the part of the framers to have the states surrender any sovereign immunity and that the case that provoked the Eleventh Amendment, Chisholm v. Georgia, came as a surprise to them. Professor Ralph Rossum, who wrote a survey of Scalia's constitutional views, suggests that the justice's view of the Eleventh Amendment was actually contradictory to the language of the Amendment.[66]

Individual rights

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Abortion

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Scalia argued that there is no constitutional right to abortion and that if the people desire legalized abortion, a law should be passed to accomplish it.[19] In his dissenting opinion in the 1992 case of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Scalia wrote:

The States may, if they wish, permit abortion on demand, but the Constitution does not require them to do so. The permissibility of abortion, and the limitations upon it, are to be resolved like most important questions in our democracy: by citizens trying to persuade one another and then voting.[67]

"We can now look forward to at least another Term with carts full of mail from the public, and streets full of demonstrators, urging us — their unelected and life-tenured judges who have been awarded those extraordinary, undemocratic characteristics precisely in order that we might follow the law despite the popular will — to follow the popular will."

— Scalia, concurring in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services

Scalia repeatedly called upon his colleagues to strike down Roe v. Wade. Scalia hoped to find five votes to strike down Roe in the 1989 case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services but was not successful in doing so. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor cast the deciding vote, allowing the abortion regulations at issue in the case to stand but not overruling Roe. Scalia concurred only in part,[68] writing, "Justice O'Connor's assertion, that a 'fundamental rule of judicial restraint' requires us to avoid reconsidering Roe cannot be taken seriously".[69] He noted, "We can now look forward to at least another Term of carts full of mail from the public, and the streets full of demonstrators".[70]

The Court returned to the issue of abortion in the 2000 case of Stenberg v. Carhart, in which it invalidated a Nebraska statute outlawing partial-birth abortion. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the Court that the law was unconstitutional because it did not allow an exception for the health of the woman. Scalia dissented, comparing the Stenberg case to two of the most reviled cases in Supreme Court history: "I am optimistic enough to believe that, one day, Stenberg v. Carhart will be assigned its rightful place in the history of this Court's jurisprudence beside Korematsu and Dred Scott. The method of killing a human child ... proscribed by this statute is so horrible that the most clinical description of it evokes a shudder of revulsion".[71]

In 2007, the Court upheld a federal statute banning partial-birth abortion in Gonzales v. Carhart.[72] University of Chicago law professor Geoffrey R. Stone, a former colleague of Scalia's, criticized Gonzales, stating that religion had influenced the outcome because all five justices in the majority were Catholic, whereas the dissenters were Protestant or Jewish.[73] This angered Scalia to such an extent that he stated he would not speak at the University of Chicago as long as Stone was there.[74]

Race, gender, and sexual orientation

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Scalia generally voted to strike down laws that make distinctions by race, gender, or sexual orientation. In 1989, he concurred with the Court's judgment in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., in which the Court applied strict scrutiny to a city program requiring a certain percentage of contracts to go to minorities, and struck down the program. Scalia did not join the majority opinion, however. He disagreed with O'Connor's opinion for the Court, holding that states and localities could institute race-based programs if they identified past discrimination and if the programs were designed to remedy the past racism.[75] Five years later, in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, he concurred in the Court's judgment and in part with the opinion that extended strict scrutiny to federal programs. Scalia noted in that matter his view that government can never have a compelling interest in making up for past discrimination by racial preferences:

To pursue the concept of racial entitlement—even for the most admirable and benign of purposes—is to reinforce and preserve for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race slavery, race privilege and race hatred. In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American.[76]

In the 2003 case of Grutter v. Bollinger, involving racial preferences in the University of Michigan's law school, Scalia mocked the Court majority's finding that the school was entitled to continue using race as a factor in admissions to promote diversity and to increase "cross-racial understanding". Scalia noted:

This is not, of course, an "educational benefit" on which students will be graded on their Law School transcript (Works and Plays Well with Others: B+) or tested by the bar examiners (Q: Describe in 500 words or less your cross-racial understanding). For it is a lesson of life rather than law—essentially the same lesson taught to (or rather learned by, for it cannot be "taught" in the usual sense) people three feet shorter and twenty years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout troops to public-school kindergartens.[77]

Opening page of Scalia's dissent in Lawrence v. Texas

Scalia argued that laws that make distinctions between genders should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny, requiring that the gender classification be substantially related to important government objectives.[78] When, in 1996, the Court upheld a suit brought by a woman who wished to enter the Virginia Military Institute in the case of United States v. Virginia, Scalia filed a lone, lengthy dissent. Scalia said that the Court, in requiring Virginia to show an "extremely persuasive justification" for the single-sex admission policy, had redefined intermediate scrutiny in such a way "that makes it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny".[79]

In one of the final decisions of the Burger Court, the Court ruled in 1986 in Bowers v. Hardwick that "homosexual sodomy"[80] was not protected by the right of privacy and could be criminally prosecuted by the states.[81] In 1995, however, that ruling was effectively gutted by Romer v. Evans, which struck down a Colorado state constitutional amendment, passed by popular vote, that forbade antidiscrimination laws' being extended to sexual orientation.[82] Scalia dissented from the opinion by Justice Kennedy, believing that Bowers had protected the right of the states to pass such measures and that the Colorado amendment was not discriminatory but merely prevented homosexuals from gaining favored status under Colorado law.[83] Scalia later said of Romer, "And the Supreme Court said, 'Yes, it is unconstitutional.' On the basis of—I don't know, the Sexual Preference Clause of the Bill of Rights, presumably. And the liberals loved it, and the conservatives gnashed their teeth".[84]

In 2003, Bowers was formally overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, from which Scalia dissented. According to Mark V. Tushnet in his survey of the Rehnquist Court, during the oral argument in the case, Scalia seemed so intent on making the state's argument for it that the Chief Justice intervened.[85] According to his biographer, Joan Biskupic, Scalia "ridiculed" the majority in his dissent for being so ready to cast aside Bowers when many of the same justices had refused to overturn Roe in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.[86] In March 2009, openly gay Congressman Barney Frank described him as a "homophobe".[87] Maureen Dowd described Scalia in a 2003 column as "Archie Bunker in a high-backed chair".[88] In an op-ed for The New York Times, federal appeals judge Richard Posner and Georgia State University law professor Eric Segall called Scalia's positions on homosexuality radical and characterized Scalia's "political ideal as verg[ing] on majoritarian theocracy".[89] Former Scalia clerk Ed Whelan called this "a smear and a distraction."[90] Professor John O. McGinnis responded as well,[91] leading to further exchanges.[92][93]

In the 2013 case of Hollingsworth v. Perry, which involved a California ballot initiative known as Proposition 8 that amended the California State Constitution to ban same-sex marriage, Scalia voted with the majority to uphold a lower court decision overturning the ban. The decision was based on the appellants' lack of standing to appeal and not on the substantive issue of the constitutionality of Proposition 8.[94]

Also in 2013, Scalia dissented from the majority opinion in United States v. Windsor. In Windsor, the Court held Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (which—for federal government purposes—defined the terms "marriage" and "spouse" as applicable only to opposite-sex unions) unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[95] Scalia's dissent, which was joined in full by Justice Thomas and in part by Chief Justice Roberts,[96] opened:

This case is about power in several respects. It is about the power of our people to govern themselves, and the power of this Court to pronounce the law. Today's opinion aggrandizes the latter, with the predictable consequence of diminishing the former. We have no power to decide this case. And even if we did, we have no power under the Constitution to invalidate this democratically adopted legislation.

Scalia argued that the judgment effectively characterized opponents of same-sex marriage as "enemies of the human race":[97][98] He argued that the Court's ruling would affect state bans on same-sex marriage as well:

As far as this Court is concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of listening and waiting for the other shoe. By formally declaring anyone opposed to same-sex marriage an enemy of human decency, the majority arms well every challenger to a state law restricting marriage to its traditional definition.[99]

Scalia concluded by saying that the Supreme Court "has cheated both sides, robbing the winners of an honest victory, and the losers of the peace that comes from a fair defeat."[95]

Demonstrations outside the Supreme Court awaiting the decision in Obergefell v. Hodges

In 2015, Scalia dissented from the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, in which the Court ruled that the fundamental right to marry was guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his dissent, Scalia stated that the Court's decision effectively robbed the people of "the freedom to govern themselves", noting that a rigorous debate on same-sex marriage had been taking place and that—by deciding the issue nationwide—the democratic process had been halted.[100] Addressing the claimed Fourteenth Amendment violation, Scalia asserted that because a same-sex marriage ban would not have been considered unconstitutional at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption, such bans are not unconstitutional in 2015.[101] He claimed there was "no basis" for the Court to strike down legislation that the Fourteenth Amendment did not expressly forbid, and directly attacked the majority opinion for "lacking even a thin veneer of law".[101] Lastly, Scalia faulted the actual writing in the opinion for "diminish[ing] this Court's reputation for clear thinking and sober analysis" and for "descend[ing] from the disciplined legal reasoning of John Marshall and Joseph Story to the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie."[102]

Criminal law

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Scalia, wearing a beige jacket over shirt and tie, shakes hands with Jurij Toplak of European Election Law Association, while looking forward towards the camera.
Scalia (right) at Harvard Law School on November 30, 2006

Scalia believed the death penalty to be constitutional.[103][104] He dissented in decisions that hold the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to certain groups, such as those who were under the age of 18 at the time of offense. In Thompson v. Oklahoma (1988), he dissented from the Court's ruling that the death penalty could not be applied to those aged 15 at the time of the offense, and the following year authored the Court's opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, sustaining the death penalty for those who killed at age 16. However, in 2005, the Court overturned Stanford in Roper v. Simmons, and Scalia again dissented, mocking the majority's claims that a national consensus had emerged against the execution of those who killed while underage, noting that less than half of the states that permitted the death penalty prohibited it for underage killers. He castigated the majority for including in their count states that had abolished the death penalty entirely, stating that doing so was "rather like including old-order Amishmen in a consumer-preference poll on the electric car. Of course they don't like it, but that sheds no light whatever on the point at issue".[105] In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the Court ruled the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to mentally retarded people. Scalia dissented, stating that it would not have been considered cruel or unusual to execute mildly mentally retarded people at the time of the 1791 adoption of the Bill of Rights and that the Court had failed to show that a national consensus had formed against the practice.[106]

Scalia strongly disfavored the Court's ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, which held that a confession by an arrested suspect who had not been advised of their rights was inadmissible in court, and he voted to overrule Miranda in the 2000 case of Dickerson v. United States but was in a minority of two with Justice Clarence Thomas. Calling the Miranda decision a "milestone of judicial overreaching", Scalia stated that the Court should not fear to correct its mistakes.[107]

Although, in many areas, Scalia's approach was unfavorable to criminal defendants, he took the side of defendants in matters involving the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees defendants the right to confront their accusers. In multiple cases, Scalia wrote against laws that allowed alleged victims of child abuse to testify behind screens or by closed-circuit television.[108] In a 2009 case, Scalia wrote the majority opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, holding that defendants must have the opportunity to confront lab technicians in drug cases and that a certificate of analysis is not enough to prove a substance was a drug.[109]

Scalia maintained that every element of an offense that helps determine the sentence must be either admitted by the defendant or found by a jury under the Sixth Amendment's jury guarantee. In the 2000 case of Apprendi v. New Jersey, Scalia wrote a concurrence to the Court's majority opinion that struck down a state statute that allowed the trial judge to increase the sentence if the judge found the offense was a hate crime. Scalia found the procedure impermissible because whether it was a hate crime had not been decided by the jury.[110] In 2004, he wrote for the Court in Blakely v. Washington, striking down Washington state's sentencing guidelines on similar grounds. The dissenters in Blakely foresaw that Scalia would use the case to attack the federal sentencing guidelines (which he had failed to strike down in Mistretta), and they proved correct, as Scalia led a five-member majority in United States v. Booker, which made those guidelines no longer mandatory for federal judges to follow (they remained advisory).[110]

In the 2001 case of Kyllo v. United States, Scalia wrote the Court's opinion in a 5–4 decision that cut across ideological lines.[n 4] That decision found thermal imaging of a home to be an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court struck down a conviction for marijuana manufacture based on a search warrant issued after such scans were conducted, which showed that the garage was considerably hotter than the rest of the house because of indoor growing lights.[111] Applying that Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure to arrest, Scalia dissented from the Court's 1991 decision in County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, allowing a 48-hour delay before a person arrested without a warrant is taken before a magistrate, on the ground that at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, an arrested person was to be taken before a magistrate as quickly as practicable.[112] In a 1990 First Amendment case, R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Scalia wrote the Court's opinion striking down a St. Paul, Minnesota, hate speech ordinance in a prosecution for burning a cross.[113] Scalia noted, "Let there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible. But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First Amendment to the fire".[114]

Second Amendment

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"Undoubtedly some think that the Second Amendment is outmoded in a society where our standing army is the pride of our Nation, where well-trained police forces provide personal security, and where gun violence is a serious problem. That is perhaps debatable, but what is not debatable is that it is not the role of this Court to pronounce the Second Amendment extinct."

— Scalia, writing for the majority in District of Columbia v. Heller

In 2008, the Court considered a challenge to the gun laws in the District of Columbia. Scalia wrote the majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, which found an individual right to own a firearm under the Second Amendment. Scalia traced the word "militia", found in the Second Amendment, as it would have been understood at the time of its ratification, stating that it then meant "the body of all citizens".[115] The Court upheld Heller's claim to own a firearm in the District.[115]

Scalia's opinion for the Heller Court was criticized by liberals and applauded by conservatives.[116] Seventh Circuit judge Richard Posner disagreed with Scalia's opinion, stating that the Second Amendment "creates no right to the private possession of guns". Posner called Scalia's opinion "faux originalism" and a "historicizing glaze on personal values and policy preferences".[117] In October 2008, Scalia stated that the court's originalists needed to show only that at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, the right to bear arms did not have an exclusively military context and that they were successful in so showing.[118]

Litigation and standing

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Following the death of Scalia, Paul Barrett, writing for Bloomberg Businessweek, reported that: "Translating into liberal argot: Scalia changed the rules for who could sue". The issue elevated the recognition of Scalia as a notable influence on establishing and determining the conditions under which cases could be brought to trial and for litigation—and by whom such litigation could take place.[119] David Rivkin, from the conservative standpoint, said, "He (Scalia) did more to clarify and limit the bounds and scope of judicial power than any Supreme Court Justice in history, particularly in the area of standing and class actions". Scalia indicated his long-held position from the time of his 1983 law review article titled "The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers". As summarized by Barrett, "He (Scalia) wrote that courts had misappropriated authority from other branches of government by allowing too many people to sue corporations and government agencies, especially in environmental cases". In a practical sense, Scalia brought to the attention of the Court the authority to restrict "standing" in class action suits in which the litigants may be defined in descriptive terms rather than as well-defined and unambiguous litigants.[120]

Other cases

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Scalia concurred in the 1990 case of Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, in which the family of a woman in a vegetative state sought to have her feeding tube removed so she would die, believing that to have been her wish. The Court found for the State of Missouri, requiring clear and convincing evidence of such a desire. Scalia stated that the Court should have remained away from the dispute and that the issues "are [not] better known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory".[115]

Scalia joined the majority per curiam opinion in the 2000 case of Bush v. Gore, which effectively ended recounts of ballots in Florida following the 2000 US presidential election, and also both concurred separately and joined Rehnquist's concurrence.[121] In 2007, he said of the case, "I and my court owe no apology whatever for Bush v. Gore. We did the right thing. So there! ... get over it. It's so old by now".[122] During an interview on the Charlie Rose show, he defended the Court's action:

The decision was not close, it was 7–2 on the principal issue of whether there had been a constitutional violation ... But what if it was unconstitutional to have that recount? You're going to let it continue and come to a conclusion? And then overturn it? The reason to stop it sooner was not, "Ooh, we're worried that it's going to come out the wrong way"...  you forget what was going on at the time. We were the laughingstock of the world. The world's greatest democracy that couldn't conduct an election. We didn't know who our next president was going to be. The lengthy transition that has become standard when you change from one president to another could not begin because you didn't know who the new president was going to be. It was becoming a very serious problem. The issue before the United States Supreme Court is: having decided the case, having decided this is unconstitutional, should we nonetheless let the election go on? Or is it time cut it off and let's move on?[123]

[edit]

Judicial performance

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Scalia in 2010

During oral argument before the Court, Scalia asked more questions and made more comments than any other justice.[124] A 2005 study found that he provoked laughter more often than any of his colleagues did.[125] His goal during oral arguments was to get across his position to the other justices.[126] University of Kansas social psychologist Lawrence Wrightsman wrote that Scalia communicated "a sense of urgency on the bench" and had a style that was "forever forceful".[124] After Chief Justice John Roberts joined the Court in 2005, he took to quizzing lawyers in a manner similar to Scalia's; sometimes the two questioned counsel in seeming coordination.[126] Dahlia Lithwick of Slate described Scalia's technique as follows:

Scalia doesn't come into oral argument all secretive and sphinxlike, feigning indecision on the nuances of the case before him. He comes in like a medieval knight, girded for battle. He knows what the law is. He knows what the opinion should say. And he uses the hour allocated for argument to bludgeon his brethren into agreement.[127]

Scalia wrote numerous opinions from the start of his career on the Supreme Court. During his tenure, he wrote more concurring opinions than any other justice. Only two other justices have written more dissents.[128] According to Kevin Ring, who compiled a book of Scalia's dissenting and concurring opinions: "His opinions are ... highly readable. His entertaining writing style can make even the most mundane areas of the law interesting".[129] Conor Clarke of Slate comments on Scalia's written opinions, especially his dissents:

His writing style is best described as equal parts anger, confidence, and pageantry. Scalia has a taste for garish analogies and offbeat allusions—often very funny ones—and he speaks in no uncertain terms. He is highly accessible and tries not to get bogged down in abstruse legal jargon. But most of all, Scalia's opinions read like they're about to catch fire for pure outrage. He does not, in short, write like a happy man.[130]

Scalia speaks at the US mission within Geneva in 2011

At the Supreme Court, justices meet after the case is briefed and argued and vote on the result. The task of writing the opinion is assigned by the Chief Justice or—if the Chief Justice is in the minority or is not participating—by the senior justice in the majority. After the assignment, the justices generally communicate about a case by sending notes and draft opinions to each other's chambers.[131] In the give-and-take of opinion-writing, Scalia did not compromise his views in order to attract five votes for a majority (unlike the late Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., who would accept less than what he wanted in order to gain a partial victory).[132] Scalia attempted to influence his colleagues by sending them "Ninograms"—short memoranda aimed at persuading them of the correctness of his views.[128][133]

In an October 2013 issue of New York magazine, Scalia revealed that he scanned The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Times, obtained most of his news from talk radio, and did not read The New York Times or The Washington Post. He described The Washington Post as "shrilly liberal".[134]

Textualism

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Scalia was a textualist in statutory interpretation, believing that the ordinary meaning of a statute should govern.[135] In interpreting statutes, Scalia did not look to legislative history. In the 2006 case of Zedner v. United States, he joined the majority opinion written by Justice Samuel Alito—all except one paragraph of the opinion, in which Alito cited legislative history. In a concurring opinion in that case, Scalia noted, "The use of legislative history is illegitimate and ill advised in the interpretation of any statute".[136] His dislike of legislative history may have been a reason that other justices have become more cautious in its use.[137] Gregory Maggs wrote in the Public Interest Law Review in 1995 that by the early 1990s, legislative history was being cited in only about forty percent of Supreme Court cases involving the interpretation of statutes and that no case of that era used legislative history as an essential reason for the outcome. Maggs suggested:

With Justice Scalia breathing down the necks of anyone who peeks into the Congressional Record or Senate reports, the other members of the Court may have concluded that the benefit of citing legislative history does not outweigh its costs. It is likely for this reason that the percentage of cases citing it has decreased dramatically. No one likes an unnecessary fight, especially not one with as formidable an opponent as Justice Scalia.[137]

Originalism

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Scalia's official Supreme Court portrait by Nelson Shanks

In 1998, Scalia vociferously opposed the idea of a living constitution, or the power of the judiciary to modify the meaning of constitutional provisions to adapt them to changing times.[19] Scalia warned that if one accepted that constitutional standards should evolve with a maturing society, "the risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views".[138] He compared the Constitution to statutes he contended were not understood to change their meaning through time.[24] Scalia described himself as an originalist, meaning that he interpreted the United States Constitution as it would have been understood when it was adopted. According to Scalia in 2008, "It's what did the words mean to the people who ratified the Bill of Rights or who ratified the Constitution".[19]

Constitutional amendments, such as the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment, according to Scalia, were to be interpreted based on their meaning at the time of ratification.[139] Scalia was often asked how that approach justified the result in the 1954 case of Brown v. Board of Education, which held that segregated schools were unconstitutional and which relied on the Fourteenth Amendment for the result.[140] Scalia responded to this argument in two ways. He noted research by Michael McConell that "persuasively establishes that this was the original understanding of the post Civil War Amendments." However, Scalia continues by arguing that even if non-originalist methods occasionally produce better results than originalism, "It is in no way remarkable... that taking power from the people and placing it instead with a judicial aristocracy can produce some creditable results that democracy might not achieve. The same can be said of monarchy and totalitarianism. But once a nation has decided that democracy... is the best system of government, the crucial question becomes which theory of textual interpretation is compatible with democracy. Originalism unquestionably is. Non-originalism, by contrast, imposes on society statutory prescriptions that were never democratically adopted. When applied to the Constitution, nonoriginalism limits the democratic process itself, prohibiting... acts... that 'We The People' never, ever, voted to outlaw".[141] In a 2009 public conversation, Justice Stephen Breyer questioned Scalia, indicating that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did not intend to end school segregation. Scalia called this argument "waving the bloody shirt of Brown" and indicated that he would have joined the first Justice Harlan's solitary dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the 1896 case that Brown overruled.[142]

Scalia's originalist approach came under attack from critics, who viewed it as "a cover for what they see as Scalia's real intention: to turn back some pivotal court decisions of the 1960s and 70s" reached by the Warren and Burger Courts.[19] Ralph Nader argued in 2008 that Scalia's originalist philosophy was inconsistent with the justice's acceptance of the extension of certain constitutional rights to corporations when at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification, corporations were not commonly understood to possess constitutional rights.[143] Nader's view preceded the Court's 2010 decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. Scalia, in his concurrence in that case, traced his understanding of the rights of groups of individuals at the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights. His argument was based on the lack of an exception for groups such as corporations in the free speech guarantee in the Bill of Rights and on several examples of corporate political speech from the time of the adoption of the Bill of Rights.[144] Professor Thomas Colby of George Washington University National Law Center argued that Scalia's votes in Establishment Clause cases do not stem from originalist views but simply from conservative political convictions.[145] Scalia responded to his critics that his originalism "has occasionally led him to decisions he deplores, like his upholding the constitutionality of flag burning", which according to Scalia was protected by the First Amendment.[19]

In 2006, before George W. Bush appointees Roberts and Alito had had time to make an impact, Rossum wrote that Scalia had failed to win converts among his conservative colleagues for his use of originalism,[146] whereas Roberts and Alito, as younger men with an originalist approach, greatly admired Scalia battling for what he believed in.[147] Following the appointments of Roberts and Alito, subsequent appointees Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh are identified in their judicial temperament as being originalists with Kavanaugh referred to as "a stalwart originalist" in the tradition of Scalia.[148][149]

Public attention

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Requests for recusals

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Two men in shirtsleeves work at a table, there are quantities of paper in front of them..
Scalia (right) works on a book with lexicographer Bryan A. Garner

Scalia recused himself from Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004), a case brought by atheist Michael Newdow alleging that recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance (including the words "under God") in school classrooms violated the rights of his daughter, who he said was also an atheist. Shortly after the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in Newdow's favor but before the case came before the Supreme Court, Scalia spoke at a Knights of Columbus event in Fredericksburg, Virginia, stating that the Ninth Circuit decision was an example of how the courts were trying to excise God from public life. The school district requested that the Supreme Court review the case, and Newdow asked that Scalia recuse himself because of this prior statement, which he did without comment.[150]

Scalia declined to recuse himself from Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia (2005), a case concerning whether Vice President Dick Cheney could keep secret the membership of an advisory task force on energy policy. Scalia was asked to recuse himself because he had gone on a hunting trip with various persons including Cheney, during which he traveled one way on Air Force Two. Scalia issued a lengthy in-chambers opinion refusing to recuse himself, stating that though Cheney was a longtime friend, he was being sued merely in his official capacity and that were justices to step aside in the cases of officials who are parties because of official capacity, the Supreme Court would cease to function. Scalia indicated that it was far from unusual for justices to socialize with other government officials, recalling that the late Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson played poker with President Harry Truman and that Justice Byron White went skiing with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Scalia stated that he was never alone with Cheney during the trip, the two had not discussed the case, and the justice had saved no money because he had bought round-trip tickets, the cheapest available.[151] Scalia was part of the 7–2 majority once the case was heard, a decision that generally upheld Cheney's position.[152] Scalia later described his refusal to recuse himself as his "most heroic opinion" because it had exposed him to a great deal of criticism.[153][154]

Judge Gilbert S. Merritt Jr. of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals called for Scalia's recusal in Bush v. Gore at the time.[155] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, writing in Law and Philosophy, later chronicled such calls and contended that "There were many ways for Justice Scalia's sons to benefit from a decision in favor of Bush. Together these benefits could be substantial. Hence, [the law] required recusal".[156] Republicans dismissed such calls as partisan, noting that Merritt was a close friend of the Gores and a rumored Gore Supreme Court nominee.[155]

Religious views

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Scalia's official portrait, 2005

Scalia was a devout traditionalist Catholic, and his son Paul entered the priesthood. Uncomfortable with the changes brought about following Vatican II, Scalia drove long distances to parishes he felt were more in accord with his beliefs, including parishes that celebrated the Tridentine Latin Mass in Chicago and Washington,[157] and one celebrating the Latin version[158] of the Mass of Paul VI at St. Catherine of Siena in Great Falls, Virginia.[159] In a 2013 interview with Jennifer Senior for New York, Scalia was asked whether his beliefs extended to the Devil, and he stated, "Of course! Yeah, he's a real person. Hey, c'mon, that's standard Catholic doctrine! Every Catholic believes that." When asked whether he had seen recent evidence of the Devil, Scalia replied: "You know, it is curious. In the Gospels, the Devil is doing all sorts of things. He's making pigs run off cliffs, he's possessing people and whatnot ... What he's doing now is getting people not to believe in him or in God. He's much more successful that way."[134] In another 2013 interview to the Houston Chronicle, Scalia said, "In order for capitalism to work, in order for it to produce a good and stable society, traditional Christian virtues are essential."[160]

In 2006, upon leaving church, Scalia was asked by a reporter whether being a traditionalist Catholic had caused problems for him, and he responded by asking, "You know what I say to those people?" and with a gesture, cupping his hand under his chin and flicking his fingers out. The gesture, which got captured by a photographer, was initially reported by the Boston Herald as obscene. Scalia responded to the reports with a letter to the editor, accusing the news staff of watching too many episodes of The Sopranos and stating that the gesture was a strong brush-off. Roger Axtell, an expert on body language, described the gesture as possibly meaning "I've had enough, go away" and noted, "It's a fairly strong gesture".[161] The gesture was parodied by comedian Stephen Colbert during his performance at the White House Correspondents' Association Dinner later that year, with the justice in attendance; cameras showed that, unlike most of the butts of Colbert's jokes that evening, Scalia was laughing.[162][163]

1996 presidential election

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According to John Boehner, as chairman of the House Republican Conference, he sought to persuade Scalia to run for election as vice president with Bob Dole in 1996. As related by Boehner, Scalia listened to the proposal and dictated the same reply Justice Charles Evans Hughes had once given to a similar query: "The possibility is too remote to comment upon, given my position". Dole did put Scalia on his list of potential running mates but eventually decided upon Jack Kemp.[164]

Personal life

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Scalia (left) at the swearing-in of his son, Eugene Scalia, as Solicitor of Labor on February 25, 2002

On September 10, 1960, Scalia married Maureen McCarthy at St. Pius X church in Yarmouth, Massachusetts.[165] The two had met on a blind date while he was at Harvard Law School. Maureen was an undergraduate student at Radcliffe College when they met; she subsequently obtained a degree in English from the school.[166]

The Scalias had five sons and four daughters.[167] Two of their sons, Eugene Scalia and John Scalia, became attorneys,[168] with Eugene later becoming Secretary of Labor in the first Trump administration.[169][170] Paul Scalia became a Catholic priest, Matthew Scalia had a military career, and Christopher Scalia became a writer. All four Scalia daughters—Catherine, Ann, Margaret, and Mary—have families. According to Scalia, Maureen raised all nine children "with very little assistance from me".[168] The family resided in McLean, Virginia, a suburb of Washington, D.C.[171]

Scalia enjoyed a warm friendship with fellow justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, considered a member of the court's liberal wing, with the two attending the opera together and appearing together onstage as supernumeraries in Washington National Opera's 1994 production of Ariadne auf Naxos.[124] Ginsburg was a colleague of Scalia on the D.C. Circuit, and the Scalias and Ginsburgs had dinner together every New Year's Eve.[172]

Scalia also enjoyed a friendship with fellow Justice Elena Kagan, also considered a member of the court's liberal wing. When Justice David Souter retired, Scalia told David Axelrod, an adviser to then-President Barack Obama, that he hoped that Obama would nominate Kagan to replace him. While Obama nominated Sonia Sotomayor instead, a year later when Justice John Paul Stevens retired, Obama nominated Kagan.[173] An avid hunter, Scalia taught Justice Kagan how to hunt; the two hunted ducks, birds, deer and antelope together.[174][175]

Death and funeral

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Scalia's gravesite at Fairfax Memorial Park

Scalia died in his sleep[1] at age 79. His body was discovered on the morning of February 13, 2016, in his room[6] at Cibolo Creek Ranch, near Shafter, Texas in Presidio County, Texas.[176] He had gone quail hunting the afternoon before, and then dined as the guest of John B. Poindexter, owner of the ranch.[177][178] After Poindexter discovered the body, he called the Presidio County sheriff's department to ask for the number of the U.S. Marshals Service to report a death. Poindexter was reluctant to say who had died to Sheriff Danny Dominguez. Dominguez had the Marshal's Service call the ranch owner, and both the marshals and the sheriff went to the ranch, where they were shown Scalia's body. Dominguez instructed his office to call local justice of the peace Juanita Bishop, but she was out of town.[179]

County judge Cinderela Guevara pronounced Scalia dead of natural causes.[180] She did not see the body, which under Texas law is not required, nor did she order an autopsy.[6] Bishop, as well as David Beebe, another justice of the peace, later disagreed with the decision not to order an autopsy for Scalia. Guevara, who conferred by telephone with Scalia's physician, stated that she made the determination to pronounce Scalia dead from natural causes after being told by county sheriff Dominguez on the scene that "there were no signs of foul play" and that Scalia "was having health issues".[6][181] Scalia's physician, Rear Admiral Brian P. Monahan, told her Scalia had a history of heart trouble, including high blood pressure, and was recently deemed too weak to undergo surgery for a torn rotator cuff.[182][183] According to Sunset Funeral Home director Chris Lujan, Scalia's family also declined to have an autopsy performed after his body was transferred to his El Paso funeral home, prior to its return to Fairfax, Virginia.[184]

Kansas v. Carr (2016) was the last majority opinion written by Justice Scalia before his death in February 2016, though his last dissenting opinion was in FERC v. Electric Power Supply Association (2016).[185] Following his death, Scalia lay in repose in the Great Hall of the United States Supreme Court Building on February 19, 2016.[186] Scalia's son, Father Paul Scalia, celebrated a Catholic funeral Mass and delivered the homily on February 20, 2016, at the Basilica of the National Shrine of the Immaculate Conception in Washington, D.C.[187] The Obama administration was represented at the funeral by Vice President Joe Biden; President Barack Obama did not attend.[188] Scalia's remains were interred at a private ceremony at Fairfax Memorial Park in Fairfax, Virginia.[187][189]

Conspiracy theories

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The circumstances surrounding Scalia's death prompted conspiracy theories alleging that he may have been murdered.[190] These conspiracy theories were stimulated by Guevara's decision not to conduct an autopsy and her pronouncement of Scalia's death by a phone call, as well as by Scalia's refusal of a United States Marshals Service security detail, uncertainty over the precise cause of Scalia's death, and Poindexter's initial assertion that he found Scalia in bed with a pillow over his head. Poindexter later clarified that the pillow was in between Scalia's head and the bed's headboard, not over his face.[191] The conspiracy theory was promoted by William Ritchie, a former head of criminal investigations for the Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia, and by Alex Jones, a far-right talk show host.[192][193][194] Donald Trump, then a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, referenced the homicide allegations on Michael Savage's radio show The Savage Nation, saying that "they say they found a pillow on his face, which is a pretty unusual place to find a pillow."[190] Eugene Scalia rejected the theories, saying that "our family just has no doubt that he was taken from us by natural causes."[195]

Legacy

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The Roberts Court (October 2010 – February 2016). Front row: Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, John Roberts (Chief), Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Back row: Sonia Sotomayor, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, Elena Kagan

Influence

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Writing in The Jewish Daily Forward in 2009, J. J. Goldberg described Scalia as "the intellectual anchor of the court's conservative majority".[196][197] Scalia traveled to the nation's law schools, giving talks on law and democracy.[128] His appearances on college campuses were often standing room only.[198] Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg indicated that Scalia was "very much in tune with the current generation of law students ... Students now put 'Federalist Society' on their resumes".[199] John Paul Stevens, who served throughout Scalia's tenure until his 2010 retirement, said of Scalia's influence, "He's made a huge difference. Some of it constructive, some of it unfortunate".[199] Of the nine sitting justices, Scalia was most often the subject of law review articles.[198]

In 2009, after nearly a quarter century on the Court, Scalia characterized his victories as "damn few".[200]

Writing in the American Spectator, Adam Carrington noted that:

Since his death in February of 2016, Scalia's influence of course continues through his three decades of judicial opinions. But he still exerts great influence in another, less-discussed way. In 2012, he co-authored the book Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts with Bryan A. Garner. This work describes numerous "canons," or rules regarding how to interpret legal documents ... A mere seven years since its publication, Reading Law has been cited in over 1,000 state and federal cases. Just this spring, for instance, Supreme Court justices referenced the work in 10 cases.[201]

Scalia accepts the Semper Fidelis Award, 2013

Scalia's promotion of textualism and originalism on the high court led to a shift in the American judiciary's approach to textual interpretation, with greater attention paid to the text itself. The liberal political philosopher Ronald Dworkin said that because of Scalia, "we are all originalists now." For this reason, he is often described as one of the most influential jurists of the twentieth century.[7] The statement by Ronald Dorker was made earlier by Elena Kagan, for Elena Kagan said during her 2010 Senate confirmation hearings that "we are all originalists."[202][203][204] Kagan declared in a 2015 interview at Harvard Law School honoring her then-colleague Scalia that "we are all textualists now."[202][205] In 2017, Harvard University established an endowed professorship at its law school dedicated in honor of Scalia; as of July 1, 2021, it is occupied by Stephen E. Sachs.[8][206]

[edit]

Derrick Wang's opera Scalia/Ginsburg depicts the friendship of Scalia and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, both known for their shared love of opera.[207][208][209] The opera was introduced before Scalia and Ginsburg at the Supreme Court in 2013,[210] premiered at the Castleton Festival in 2015,[211][212] and was revised after Scalia's death,[213] with the revised version broadcast on national radio on November 7, 2020.[214][215] Scalia and Ginsburg both wrote forewords to the libretto,[216] and Ginsburg cited the opera in her statement on Scalia's death[217] and in her foreword to the book Scalia Speaks.[218]

John Strand's play The Originalist was performed in Washington, DC in 2015; it received a positive review from The New York Times. The play depicted Justice Scalia's interaction with a (fictional) liberal court clerk and their mutual criticism and eventual support of each other. The play had a cross-country tour from Washington, D.C. to the Pasadena Playhouse.[219] The play aired on PBS in 2017.[220][221]

Posthumous tributes

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According to NBC News, tributes to "larger-than-life Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia poured in [from] both sides of the political aisle" following his death.[222] President Barack Obama called Scalia "one of the towering legal figures of our time" and former president George W. Bush described Scalia as "a brilliant jurist".[222] U.S. attorney general Loretta Lynch called Scalia "one of the most influential and eloquent justices to ever serve on the U.S. Supreme Court".[222]

President Trump presents Scalia's Medal of Freedom posthumously to his widow, Maureen

In May 2016, George Mason University renamed its law school the "Antonin Scalia Law School" after an anonymous donor pledged $20 million to the school, with an additional $10 million donated by the Charles Koch Foundation, contingent upon the name change in Scalia's honor.[223][224] The dedication ceremony occurred on October 6, 2016, and was attended by Supreme Court justices. At the ceremony, Justice Elena Kagan called Scalia "one of the most important Supreme Court justices ever, and also one of the greatest".[8]

In October 2016, the Italy–USA Foundation posthumously awarded Scalia its America Award. The ceremony was conducted in front of the Italian parliament in Rome.[225]

In 2018, President Donald Trump posthumously awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom to Scalia.[226][227]

Writing for the plurality in Borden v. United States, Justice Kagan referenced Scalia, writing "Indeed, the Court has made a similar point before, in an opinion by one of its great wordsmiths."[228]

In a concurring opinion in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, Justice Neil Gorsuch praised Scalia for his willingness to reconsider his earlier views, writing that "rather than cling to the pride of personal precedent, the Justice began to express doubts over the very project that he had worked to build... If Chevron's ascent is a testament to the Justice's ingenuity, its demise is an even greater tribute to his humility"[229]

Succession

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Merrick Garland with Barack Obama following the announcement that he is Obama's nominee to succeed Scalia (March 16, 2016)

Scalia's death—only the second death of a serving justice in a span of sixty years[230]—left eight justices remaining on the Supreme Court, split 4–4 between fairly conservative and fairly liberal, during a presidential election year.[231][232] Cases that were pending before the Court at Scalia's death were decided by the remaining eight members.[233] A 4–4 deadlock would result in the ruling of the lower court being upheld, but no precedent being set, and the justices would not publish written opinions on the merits of the case.[233][234]

In a 2012 interview, Scalia had said he would prefer Judge Frank H. Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals as his successor.[235] On March 16, 2016, President Barack Obama, a Democrat, nominated Merrick Garland, Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to fill Scalia's seat,[236] but the Republican-controlled Senate declined to take any action on the nomination; the nomination expired with the end of the 114th Congress on January 3, 2017.[237] On January 31, 2017, Republican President Donald Trump announced the nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to succeed Scalia.[238] Gorsuch was confirmed by the Senate on April 7, 2017.[239]

Selected works

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Books
  • Scalia, Antonin (1997), Gutmann, Amy (ed.), A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law, Princeton N.J.: Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-00400-5
  • —; Garner, Bryan A. (2008), Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges, St. Paul: Thomson West, ISBN 978-0-314-18471-9
  • —; Garner, Bryan A. (2012), Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, St. Paul: Thomson West, ISBN 978-0-314-27555-4
  • —; Scalia, Christopher J.; Whelan, Edward (2017). Scalia Speaks: Reflections on Law, Faith, and Life Well Lived. Crown Publishing Group. ISBN 9780525573326.
Articles

See also

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Footnotes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Antonin Gregory Scalia (March 11, 1936 – February 13, 2016) was an American jurist who served as an associate justice of the for nearly three decades, from 1986 until his death. Appointed by President to succeed retiring Warren Burger, Scalia was confirmed unanimously by the and became the first Italian American to sit on the high court. A graduate of and , he had previously taught law at the Universities of and , served in executive branch roles under Presidents Nixon and Ford, and sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Scalia championed and as methods of constitutional and , respectively, insisting that legal texts be understood based on their ordinary public meaning at the time of enactment rather than evolving societal views or policy preferences. His majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) affirmed an individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, while his dissents—often marked by sharp —critiqued perceived judicial overreach in cases involving executive power, , and social issues. Scalia's influence extended beyond the bench through his writings, lectures, and co-authorship of Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012), which systematized textualist canons, shaping conservative jurisprudence and sparking debates over interpretive fidelity.

Early Life and Education

Family Background and Upbringing

Antonin Gregory Scalia was born on March 11, 1936, in , as the only child of Salvatore Eugene Scalia and Catherine Louise Panaro Scalia. His father, Salvatore, immigrated from in his youth, initially attempting a career in the newspaper business before transitioning to teaching and eventually becoming a at . His mother, Catherine, daughter of Italian immigrants, worked as an elementary school teacher. The family adhered to traditional Catholic values, emphasizing education and cultural heritage from their Italian roots. In 1941, the Scalias relocated to Queens, New York, following Salvatore's academic appointment in Brooklyn, where Antonin—nicknamed "Nino" by family and friends—grew up in a multi-ethnic neighborhood. He attended public elementary school locally, consistently earning straight-A grades, before enrolling at Xavier High School, a Jesuit military preparatory institution in Manhattan. At Xavier, Scalia studied Latin and Greek, excelled academically, and graduated as valedictorian in 1953. This formative environment, combining rigorous discipline, intellectual pursuit, and familial expectations of achievement, shaped his early development amid the post-World War II urban landscape of New York City.

Academic Achievements and Influences

Scalia completed his undergraduate studies at , earning a degree in in 1957; he graduated summa cum laude as class . His education at the Jesuit institution emphasized classical liberal arts, logic, and rhetorical skills, which honed his capacity for precise argumentation and textual analysis—traits central to his later judicial philosophy. During this period, Scalia also spent time studying at the in , broadening his exposure to European intellectual traditions alongside his American formative experiences. At Harvard Law School, Scalia distinguished himself academically, serving as an editor of the Harvard Law Review and graduating magna cum laude with an LL.B. in 1960. He received the Sheldon Fellowship from Harvard, enabling post-graduate travel and study that further refined his analytical approach to law. These honors reflected his exceptional aptitude for and constitutional reasoning, influenced by Harvard's pedagogy, which prioritized close reading of legal texts over broader policy considerations—a method aligning with his eventual advocacy for . Scalia's law school experience, amid a faculty favoring theory, reinforced his skepticism toward , shaping his preference for original public meaning in constitutional exegesis.

Pre-Judicial Career

Following his graduation from in 1960, Scalia served as a to Judge Henry J. Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from 1961 to 1962. He then entered private practice as an associate at the Cleveland, Ohio, firm of , Cockley & Reavis (later known as ), where he worked from 1961 to 1967. During this period, Scalia handled primarily commercial litigation, including cases involving labor law and antitrust issues. Colleagues at the firm noted his exceptional analytical skills and wit, though he grew dissatisfied with the repetitive aspects of large-firm document review, such as a prolonged price-fixing investigation that prompted his departure for academia. In 1971, President appointed Scalia as to the White House Office of Policy (OTP), a newly established tasked with coordinating federal policy. Scalia served in this role until 1972, advising on regulatory matters such as the allocation of broadcast spectrum and the structuring of rules amid . From 1972 to 1974, Scalia chaired the Administrative Conference of the , an independent federal agency established by in 1968 to study and recommend improvements to administrative procedures across government agencies. In this nonpartisan position, he oversaw recommendations on processes, , and , emphasizing efficiency and fairness in executive branch operations without policymaking authority. In August 1974, shortly before Nixon's resignation amid the , the president nominated Scalia to serve as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) in the Department of Justice. President , who succeeded Nixon, supported the nomination, and the confirmed Scalia in the role, which he held from 1974 to 1977. As head of the OLC, Scalia directed a staff of about 20 attorneys in providing binding legal opinions to the executive branch on questions of constitutional, statutory, and , including analyses of executive authority, interpretations, and conflicts between branches of . His tenure emphasized strict adherence to statutory text and principles in advising on matters like reforms following Watergate-era investigations.

Academic and Scholarly Contributions

Scalia joined the faculty of the School of Law in 1967, serving as a until 1974. During this period, he taught courses in , commercial transactions, , problems in U.S. communication policy, and contracts. His teaching emphasized rigorous analysis of legal texts and practical application, influencing generations of students who later credited him with instilling disciplined approaches to statutory and constitutional interpretation. In 1977, Scalia accepted a position on the faculty of the , where he taught until 1982. At Chicago, he continued to focus on and regulatory issues, serving as the original faculty advisor to the student chapter of the , which promoted originalist and textualist principles in . His lectures and seminars critiqued expansive judicial to administrative agencies, foreshadowing his later judicial skepticism toward unchecked regulatory authority. Scalia's scholarly output during this era included co-editing the journal , published by the , where he contributed to debates on federal regulatory reform alongside economist Murray Weidenbaum. This work highlighted inefficiencies in administrative rulemaking and advocated for clearer statutory constraints on agency discretion, aligning with his emerging textualist views that prioritized legislative text over policy-driven interpretations. Though specific peer-reviewed articles from this period are limited, his academic efforts helped cultivate a generation of lawyers committed to formalist methods, countering prevailing purposivist trends in legal academia.

Judicial Service on the D.C. Circuit

Appointment and Overview

Antonin Scalia was nominated by President on July 15, 1982, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of Judge . The nomination followed Scalia's service as a professor at the and his prior roles in the Nixon and Ford administrations, positioning him as a conservative legal scholar with expertise in . The Senate Judiciary Committee reported the nomination to the full on August 4, 1982, and confirmed it the following day without recorded opposition, reflecting broad bipartisan support for his qualifications. Scalia received his judicial commission on August 17, 1982, and assumed office shortly thereafter, beginning a tenure that lasted until his elevation to the in 1986. The D.C. Circuit, often called the second most important federal due to its oversight of executive branch agencies and national regulatory matters, provided Scalia with a platform to address complex issues in , antitrust, and constitutional challenges to actions. Over his approximately four years on the bench, he participated in hundreds of cases, authoring opinions that emphasized strict and skepticism toward expansive agency deference, approaches that anticipated his later jurisprudence. Scalia's service on the circuit was marked by unanimous and minimal , underscoring his reputation as a principled rather than a partisan figure at that stage. He handled high-profile appeals involving environmental regulations, labor disputes, and executive authority, contributing to precedents that reinforced in reviewing administrative decisions. This period solidified his influence in conservative legal circles, paving the way for his rapid ascent to the nation's highest court.

Key Rulings and Approach

Scalia's tenure on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, from September 1982 to March 1986, featured a docket heavy in challenges to federal agency actions, where he applied a textualist lens to , prioritizing the plain meaning of enacted text over legislative history or inferred congressional intent. In reviewing agency decisions, he insisted on clear statutory authorization for administrative expansions of power, critiquing what he viewed as undue judicial that allowed regulators to stray from legislative boundaries. This approach reflected his broader commitment to , limiting courts to enforcing Congress's explicit directives rather than filling ambiguities with policy preferences. His opinions demonstrated incisive reasoning and rhetorical precision, often employing vivid analogies to underscore textual fidelity and expose interpretive excesses by colleagues or agencies. For instance, Scalia rejected reliance on committee reports or floor statements, arguing they invited subjective judicial policymaking under the guise of discernment. This earned acclaim for his writing's clarity and intellectual force, even among ideological opponents, while establishing a conservative record skeptical of federal overreach. Though fewer individual D.C. Circuit rulings achieved the prominence of his work due to the court's intermediate role and Scalia's brief service, his contributions there refined the that later defined his , emphasizing democratic accountability through faithful statutory construction over evolving judicial norms.

Supreme Court Nomination and Confirmation

Political Context and Process

Chief Justice announced his retirement on June 17, 1986, effective after the Supreme Court's 1985-1986 term concluded on July 10, to focus on preparations for the U.S. Constitution's bicentennial. President , in his second term following the 1984 landslide victory, announced on the same day the of Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist to succeed Burger as and D.C. of Appeals Judge Antonin Scalia to fill Rehnquist's associate justice seat. The formal documents were transmitted to the on June 24, 1986. This dual reflected Reagan's strategy to advance a conservative judicial philosophy emphasizing and amid perceptions of liberal in areas like and . The political landscape favored the nominations, as Republicans held a majority in the 99th (53-47) until the November 1986 elections. Scalia, appointed to the D.C. Circuit by Reagan in 1982 and confirmed 98-0 at that time, enjoyed a reputation for scholarly excellence and conservative without personal scandals, distinguishing his process from Rehnquist's more divisive elevation. Democrats, focusing opposition on Rehnquist's record—including allegations of civil rights insensitivity—eschewed filibusters or holds against Scalia, viewing him as a qualified despite ideological differences. The Judiciary Committee, chaired by , commenced hearings on July 31, 1986, with Scalia testifying over two days on August 5 and 6. The committee approved the nomination unanimously, 18-0, on August 14, after brief reflecting minimal contention. The full , after limited floor debate overshadowed by Rehnquist proceedings, confirmed Scalia on September 17, 1986, by a 98-0 vote, with Senators Lowell P. Weicker Jr. and absent. This unanimity marked Scalia as the last nominee to receive such support, preceding the politicization intensified by Bork's 1987 rejection.

Senate Confirmation and Unanimity

President nominated Antonin Scalia to the on June 24, 1986, to fill the associate vacancy created by Warren Burger's retirement as . The Judiciary Committee conducted confirmation hearings in late July and early August 1986, during which Scalia faced minimal scrutiny, with committee members praising his legal acumen and judicial record on the D.C. Circuit. The committee reported his nomination favorably without dissent on August 5, 1986. The full confirmed Scalia on September 17, 1986, by a unanimous vote of 98-0, with two senators absent. This marked the first unanimous confirmation since 1888 and made Scalia the first Italian-American in U.S. . Debate on the Senate floor was brief, lasting less than an hour, reflecting broad bipartisan consensus on his qualifications. Scalia was sworn in as an associate on September 26, 1986. The unanimity stemmed in significant part from the political dynamics surrounding the concurrent nomination of to succeed Burger as , which drew intense opposition from Democrats and consumed their resources in a failed 65-33 floor fight. With Senate Democrats unwilling or unable to mount a similar challenge against Scalia after expending on Rehnquist, and given Scalia's established reputation as a rigorous appellate and legal , no substantial opposition materialized. At the time, confirmation processes for nominees exhibited less partisan polarization than in later decades, further facilitating the swift, unopposed approval.

Judicial Philosophy

Textualism in Statutory and Regulatory Interpretation


Scalia's textualism emphasized interpreting statutes according to their ordinary meaning as understood by reasonable persons at the time of enactment, treating the enacted text as the sole authoritative law rather than inferred legislative intent or purpose. He argued that purposivism, which prioritizes broad policy goals over textual precision, invites judicial subjectivity and undermines democratic accountability by allowing unelected judges to override clear statutory language. In his 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation, Scalia critiqued reliance on legislative history, such as committee reports, as fabricated evidence not enacted by Congress and prone to manipulation by interest groups.
This approach extended to regulatory interpretation, where Scalia insisted that enabling statutes be construed textually to constrain administrative agencies, rejecting expansive readings that defer to agency purposes absent textual support. He supported Chevron deference in cases of genuine statutory ambiguity but only after exhausting textual tools to discern meaning, criticizing agencies for stretching vague terms beyond ordinary usage to achieve policy ends. In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012), co-authored with Bryan A. Garner, Scalia and Garner codified textualist canons, such as the surplusage avoidance rule—requiring every word to have effect—and the whole-text canon, interpreting provisions in contextual harmony, applying these to statutes, regulations, and contracts alike. These principles aimed to promote predictability and fidelity to enacted law, countering what Scalia saw as purposivist tendencies that enabled regulatory overreach. Scalia's dissents often highlighted textual deviations in regulatory cases; for instance, in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA (2014), he condemned the Environmental Protection Agency's reinterpretation of "greenhouse gas" under the Clean Air Act as atextual, arguing it transformed ambiguous delegation into unlimited authority contrary to statutory limits. He maintained that textualism safeguards separation of powers by confining agencies to explicit congressional grants, preventing judges from supplying unstated purposes that blur legislative and executive roles. Though influential in shifting Supreme Court practice toward textual primacy, Scalia acknowledged interpretive challenges like ambiguity, advocating fixed canons over ad hoc pragmatism to ensure consistent application.

Originalism in Constitutional Adjudication

Scalia advocated interpreting the according to its fixed original public meaning, understood by reasonable persons at the time of its , rather than evolving interpretations or the subjective intentions of individual framers. This approach, he argued, constrains judicial discretion and promotes democratic accountability by limiting judges to the document's enacted text and historical context, avoiding the policymaking inherent in "living constitutionalism." In his 1989 essay "Originalism: The Lesser Evil," delivered as a speech at the , Scalia described as a "faint-hearted" but necessary , acknowledging challenges like ambiguous historical evidence yet deeming it preferable to nonoriginalism's allowance for judges to update meanings based on contemporary values. He critiqued original intent originalism—focusing on framers' private motives—as impractical and subjective, favoring instead the objective public meaning derived from ratification-era usage, dictionaries, and practices. In constitutional adjudication, Scalia applied this framework by prioritizing historical analysis over modern policy rationales, often dissenting when the Court deviated toward functionalism. For instance, in (2004), his majority opinion revived the Sixth Amendment's to require live testimony for testimonial hearsay, rejecting prior balancing tests in favor of the original understanding that excluded uncross-examined out-of-court statements used against defendants. Similarly, in (2008), Scalia authored the 5-4 decision holding the Second Amendment protects an individual's right to possess firearms unconnected to service, drawing on founding-era treatises, state constitutions, and English precedents to ascertain the 1791 public meaning, while dismissing district-level handgun bans as incompatible with that history. These rulings exemplified his method of consulting period-specific sources—such as Samuel Johnson's 1792 for terms like "arms"—to resolve textual ambiguities without deference to legislative intent post-ratification. Scalia's extended to structural provisions, insisting that and be gauged by original design rather than utilitarian outcomes. He rejected substantive due process expansions of unenumerated rights, as in his Lawrence v. Texas (2003) dissent, arguing the Fourteenth Amendment did not originally encompass privacy for consensual sodomy, viewing such claims as judicial invention absent textual or historical warrant. Though critics noted inconsistencies—such as his occasional reliance on precedent (stare decisis) over pure originalism—Scalia maintained that original meaning provided a rule-of-law baseline, binding future generations unless amended through Article V processes. This philosophy, articulated in works like A Matter of Interpretation (1997), influenced subsequent justices and debates, positioning originalism as a bulwark against what he termed the "rule of judges" in constitutional cases.

Rejection of Judicial Activism and Living Constitutionalism

Scalia advocated originalism as the proper method of constitutional interpretation, insisting that the document's meaning is fixed by its original public understanding at ratification rather than subject to evolution through judicial fiat. He famously described the Constitution not as a "living" document adaptable to contemporary moral or societal shifts, but as "dead" or, more precisely, "enduring," meaning it conveys today only the sense it held for its enactors. This stance, articulated in lectures and writings such as his 1989 essay "Originalism: The Lesser Evil," positioned originalism as a restraint on judges who might otherwise substitute personal policy views for democratic processes. In Scalia's view, living constitutionalism exemplified by inviting courts to "update" the text based on evolving norms, thereby enabling unelected judges to override legislative majorities and predictably favor progressive outcomes on issues like or same-sex relations, which find no explicit basis in the document. He contended this approach produced arbitrary results, as judges' "lived" interpretations reflected subjective moral intuitions rather than verifiable historical evidence, eroding the and democratic accountability. For instance, Scalia argued that derived from vague phrases like "" under a living framework invited , whereas demanded fidelity to ratification-era understandings, deferring policy innovation to amendments or elected bodies. Scalia extended this critique to statutory interpretation in his 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation, condemning purposivism and common-law-style judging—which seek legislative intent or evolving purposes—as gateways to judicial legislation in a civil-law system like the United States. Instead, he championed textualism, requiring judges to apply ordinary meaning at enactment, to curb discretion and prevent courts from "improving" laws under activist pretenses. This philosophy, he maintained, aligned with judicial restraint by anchoring decisions in objective evidence over subjective evolution, though he acknowledged originalism's imperfections while deeming it superior to alternatives that empowered judicial willfulness.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Separation of Powers and Executive Authority

Scalia viewed the separation of powers as a foundational constitutional principle designed to prevent any branch from encroaching upon the authority of another, emphasizing that the executive power must remain unified under the president to ensure accountability and effective governance. He advocated for the unitary executive theory, under which Article II vests all executive authority in the president, who exercises plenary control over subordinate officers through appointment and removal powers, rejecting congressional attempts to insulate executive functions from presidential oversight. This approach, Scalia argued, aligns with the framers' intent to avoid diffused executive power, which historically led to inefficiency and tyranny in pre-constitutional governments. In (1988), Scalia delivered the sole dissent against the Ethics in Government Act's provision for an independent counsel, contending that it unconstitutionally impaired the president's core executive function of prosecuting violations of federal criminal law by limiting removal authority to "good cause" rather than at-will. He warned that such restrictions fragment executive power, erode presidential accountability to the electorate, and invite legislative overreach, predicting long-term consequences for the balance of powers including the rise of unaccountable bureaucracies. Scalia's in this case laid groundwork for later challenges to independent agencies, reinforcing that is inherently executive and cannot be delegated without presidential control. Scalia extended these principles in Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (2010), authoring the 5-4 that invalidated dual layers of for-cause removal protections for members appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Court held that this structure violated Article II by creating officers too insulated from presidential supervision, thereby undermining the president's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Scalia distinguished limited protections for pure inferior officers but struck down the double insulation as incompatible with historical practice and the need for hierarchical accountability within the executive branch. This ruling curtailed Congress's ability to create independent entities with quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers, affirming that tenure protections must not thwart effective executive direction. In Mistretta v. United States (1989), Scalia dissented from the delegation of authority to the Sentencing Commission, arguing that vesting legislative policymaking—such as binding sentencing guidelines—in an executive-branch body blurred the lines between branches and concentrated undue power in unelected officials. He criticized the majority for tolerating non-delegation doctrine exceptions that effectively allowed to evade responsibility, insisting that demands clear distinctions in function to preserve democratic legitimacy. Throughout his tenure, Scalia's consistently prioritized structural safeguards over pragmatic accommodations, cautioning that incremental erosions of executive authority could lead to an unaccountable administrative state.

Federalism and State Sovereignty

Scalia consistently championed a federalist structure that preserved state sovereignty against federal encroachment, arguing that the Constitution established a system of dual sovereignty where states retained independent authority not delegated to the national government. His approach drew from the original understanding of the Tenth Amendment, which reserves powers to the states or the people, and emphasized limits on Congress's enumerated powers, particularly under the Commerce Clause, to prevent the federal government from supplanting state functions. In cases involving federal preemption, Scalia supported it only when Congress explicitly intended to displace state law, as in AT&T Corporation v. Iowa Utilities Board (1999), but otherwise resisted expansive federal regulatory authority that undermined state autonomy. A cornerstone of Scalia's federalism jurisprudence was the anti-commandeering doctrine, prohibiting from compelling state officials to enforce federal policies. In Printz v. United States (1997), Scalia wrote the majority opinion invalidating interim provisions of the of 1993, which required local law enforcement to conduct background checks on handgun purchasers. He reasoned that such mandates violated the Constitution's structural principles of separate federal and state spheres, citing historical evidence from the Founding era that rejected federal conscription of state executives, and affirmed that the Tenth Amendment protects states from being reduced to administrative arms of the federal government. This built on New York v. United States (1992), where Scalia joined Justice O'Connor's majority in striking down portions of the Low-Level Policy Amendments of 1985 that coerced states into legislating or regulating in specific ways, reinforcing that cannot shift its responsibilities onto unwilling states. These rulings established that federal incentives short of outright compulsion, like conditional funding, might skirt the doctrine only if not coercive in effect. Scalia also enforced boundaries on the Commerce Clause to safeguard state sovereignty. Joining Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Lopez (1995), he helped invalidate the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which criminalized firearm possession near schools, as exceeding Congress's authority under Article I, Section 8. The Court held that the activity lacked a substantial relation to interstate commerce, rejecting the government's aggregation theory that permitted regulation of intrastate non-economic conduct with attenuated effects on national markets. This decision marked the first Commerce Clause limitation since 1937, signaling a revival of federalism by requiring Congress to justify intrusions into traditional state domains like education and crime control. While Scalia occasionally upheld federal power where constitutionally enumerated—concurring in Gonzales v. Raich (2005) to affirm regulation of intrastate marijuana under broad Commerce Clause precedents—his dissents and opinions more broadly critiqued judicial tolerance of federal overreach, advocating textual fidelity to enumerated powers over functionalist expansions.

Individual Rights and Criminal Procedure

Scalia's jurisprudence in criminal procedure emphasized an originalist interpretation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, prioritizing the historical understanding of their text over policy-driven balancing tests or prophylactic rules. He advocated for bright-line rules derived from the Constitution's original public meaning, which frequently aligned him with criminal defendants' rights against perceived judicial inventions, despite his personal preference for robust . This approach contrasted with more flexible, modern interpretations that incorporated evolving societal norms or deterrence rationales. In Fourth Amendment cases involving searches and seizures, Scalia rejected the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test from (1967) in favor of a property-based originalist framework, requiring warrants for intrusions into protected spaces or effects. In (2001), he authored the majority opinion holding that thermal imaging scans of a home constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment, as they revealed details within the home's constitutionally protected enclosure without a warrant. Similarly, in , Scalia wrote for the Court that attaching a GPS device to a effected a physical trespass on , triggering Fourth Amendment protections and necessitating a warrant, thereby critiquing reliance on subjective expectations. He expressed frustration with the ambiguity of Fourth Amendment balancing, once remarking that such cases resembled "a question" unfit for judicial resolution. Regarding the Fifth Amendment's privilege against , Scalia maintained that it originally protected only against compelled communications, not non- acts like providing . In Mitchell v. United States (1999), he concurred in the judgment but argued that the privilege did not bar adverse inferences from a defendant's silence at sentencing regarding drug quantity, as silence in that context was not compulsion under the Amendment's original meaning. His skepticism extended to (1966), which he viewed as a court-imposed prophylactic rule rather than a constitutional mandate; in (2000), he dissented from the majority's holding that Miranda announced a constitutional rule immune to congressional override, asserting that § 3501 of Title 18 U.S.C. validly prioritized voluntary confessions over ritualistic warnings. Scalia's most transformative contribution to Sixth Amendment rights came in Crawford v. Washington (2004), where he authored the majority opinion overruling Ohio v. Roberts (1980) and its reliability-based test for admitting . He held that the bars admission of testimonial statements from absent witnesses unless the defendant had a prior opportunity for , restoring the Clause's core purpose of preventing civil-law style inquisitorial abuses prevalent at the Founding. This decision, grounded in historical evidence of the Clause's focus on live confrontation, significantly expanded protections for defendants against uncross-examined accusations, influencing subsequent cases on forensic reports and child testimony. He also enforced the of choice under the Sixth Amendment; in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006), Scalia joined the majority in ruling that erroneous deprivation of a preferred attorney warranted automatic reversal of conviction, without harmless-error analysis, to safeguard the structural right to effective adversarial testing.

Second Amendment and Gun Rights

Scalia applied his originalist methodology to the Second Amendment, interpreting its text and historical context to affirm an individual right to keep and bear arms unconnected to service. In his view, the amendment's operative clause—"the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed"—protected a pre-existing right akin to those in English and colonial practices, with the prefatory clause serving only to illustrate a purpose rather than impose a limitation. He drew on founding-era dictionaries, , and 18th-century treatises, such as those by and , to substantiate that "keep arms" meant possession for , not merely collective service. The landmark case , decided on June 26, 2008, exemplified this approach. Scalia authored the 5-4 majority opinion, striking down a District of Columbia law that banned possession in the home and required firearms to be kept unloaded and disassembled or trigger-locked, rendering them inoperable for immediate . The Court held that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right to possess usable for lawful purposes like , rejecting the D.C. government's collective-rights theory as inconsistent with the amendment's grammar, historical usage of "the people" (as in the First and Fourth Amendments), and from the Founding showing private arms ownership predating organized militias. Scalia emphasized that this right was not unlimited, upholding longstanding prohibitions on possession by felons or the mentally ill, laws forbidding carry in sensitive places like schools, and restrictions on "dangerous and unusual weapons," but invalidated D.C.'s near-total ban as incompatible with the core lawful use of arms for home protection. Two years later, in , decided on June 28, 2010, Scalia supported extending Heller's individual-right holding to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. The 5-4 decision invalidated Chicago's handgun ban, with the majority incorporating the Second Amendment through the . Scalia concurred in the judgment but criticized reliance on , arguing instead for revival of the to protect fundamental rights like bearing arms against state infringement—a position rooted in originalist fidelity to the Fourteenth Amendment's post-Civil War intent to safeguard freed slaves' rights. He maintained that historical evidence, including Reconstruction-era debates, confirmed arms-bearing as a privilege of citizenship essential to personal security. Scalia's jurisprudence consistently prioritized textual fidelity over policy-driven balancing, influencing subsequent cases like (2016), where his Heller framework led him to concur that stun guns qualified as protected "arms" bearable for . Critics from gun-control advocacy groups contended his historical analysis overlooked evolving societal threats, but Scalia countered that judicial restraint demanded adherence to original public meaning rather than contemporary utilities.

Abortion, Affirmative Action, and Equal Protection

Scalia maintained that the Constitution affords no right to abortion, viewing Roe v. Wade (1973) as an act of judicial invention unsupported by the text or original understanding of the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In his dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas, Scalia argued that the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause does not encompass a woman's choice to terminate her pregnancy, criticizing the joint opinion's undue burden standard as a facade preserving Roe without principled justification and urging the Court to return the issue to democratic processes. He contended that Roe had engendered social division akin to Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857), lacking any historical tradition of abortion as a fundamental right. In Stenberg v. Carhart (2000), Scalia dissented from the 5-4 invalidation of Nebraska's ban on partial-birth abortions, asserting that the procedure lacked constitutional protection and that states possessed ample authority to prohibit it without health exceptions if rationally related to preserving life; he expressed optimism that the decision would eventually be recognized as an aberration in the Court's jurisprudence. Scalia later concurred in the 5-4 majority opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart (2007), which upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, agreeing that the law satisfied and did not impose an undue burden under Casey, while joining Justice Thomas's separate concurrence emphasizing adherence to existing precedent despite his broader critique of abortion rights. Throughout, Scalia emphasized deference to legislative judgments on and moral concerns, rejecting expansions as unmoored from the Constitution's original public meaning. On , Scalia consistently opposed race-based preferences as violations of the , applying to deem them presumptively unconstitutional absent a compelling interest and narrow tailoring, which he argued racial diversity in education failed to satisfy. In Grutter v. Bollinger (2003), he filed a concurrence in the judgment and dissent joined in part by Justice Thomas, criticizing the majority's endorsement of the Law School's admissions policy as perpetuating a regime of racial classifications that stigmatized beneficiaries and contradicted the color-blind principle inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment's post-Civil War origins. Scalia described such programs as "racial " that assumed minorities required lowered standards, echoing Justice Thomas's view that they hindered true equality by implying inferiority, and predicted they would endure indefinitely absent judicial intervention. Scalia's equal protection jurisprudence prioritized formal equality under law, interpreting the Clause to prohibit government classifications based on race or suspect traits unless overcoming exacting scrutiny, with no tolerance for benign discrimination that entrenched divisions. He advocated a "color-blind" reading, rooted in the Amendment's intent to secure equal citizenship for freed slaves without authorizing compensatory preferences, dismissing arguments for diversity or remedial justice as policy matters for legislatures rather than constitutional mandates. In abortion contexts, he rejected Roe's equal protection rationale—framing fetal discrimination by sex or viability—as ahistorical, insisting the Clause protected persons born or enslaved, not unborn life. This framework extended to gender, where Scalia upheld intermediate scrutiny for sex-based distinctions but critiqued expansions beyond original equal protection for freedmen, maintaining that the Constitution's text and history did not embed evolving societal equalities.

Free Speech and Religious Liberty

Scalia consistently defended robust First Amendment protections against government restrictions on speech, emphasizing that the clause prohibits content- and viewpoint-based discrimination even in categories of low-value expression such as fighting words. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul (1992), he authored the majority opinion invalidating a municipal ordinance that criminalized symbols evoking racial or ethnic bias, such as cross-burning, on the grounds that it selectively punished speech based on its offensive message while permitting other provocative content; he reasoned that the First Amendment demands evenhanded treatment, rejecting the government's argument for selective proscriptions to combat bias. Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson (1989), Scalia joined the 5-4 majority holding that burning the American flag as political protest constituted protected expressive conduct, not mere conduct regulable without regard to message, as the state's interest in preserving the flag as a symbol did not justify suppressing dissent. His approach prioritized textual fidelity to the amendment's plain language, viewing exceptions like obscenity or incitement as narrow and historically grounded, while criticizing modern expansions of unprotected categories as judicial overreach. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002), Scalia wrote for the majority in striking down state judicial canons that barred candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, arguing that such "announce" clauses compelled silence on matters central to judicial elections and thus violated core political speech protections; he distinguished this from permissible restrictions on judicial post-election, underscoring that the First Amendment safeguards pre-office expression to inform voters. Scalia's free speech jurisprudence extended to dissenting against regulations on violent video games in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass'n (2011), where he rejected California's attempt to analogize them to , insisting that content-based bans on disfavored media forms flout the amendment's historical safeguards for provocative ideas. On religious liberty, Scalia advocated a neutralist interpretation of the , holding that it does not mandate exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious practices, as such a rule would elevate orthodoxy above civic order and invite endless litigation. In (1990), his majority opinion denied unemployment benefits to Native American respondents fired for sacramental use, reasoning that the clause permits enforcement of valid criminal prohibitions without religious carve-outs, lest it undermine the state's compelling interest in uniform drug laws; he drew on precedents like (1879) to argue that free exercise protects belief but not conduct defying neutral rules, critiquing prior hybrid-rights balancing as unprincipled. This stance provoked backlash, prompting Congress's (RFRA), which Scalia later curtailed in (1997) by joining the opinion invalidating RFRA's application to states as exceeding Congress's remedial powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; he maintained that Smith aligned with original meaning by preserving legislative primacy over exemptions. Regarding the Establishment Clause, Scalia dissented against expansive secularism, favoring historical practices and original intent that tolerated noncoercive religious acknowledgments by government. In McCreary County v. ACLU (2005), he criticized the majority's endorsement of the Lemon test for invalidating courthouse Ten Commandments displays, arguing that longstanding American traditions—like legislative chaplains and national mottoes—reflected no endorsement of religion but cultural heritage, and that judicial purging of such symbols imposed a "relentless extirpation" alien to the framers' design. In his Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) dissent on same-sex marriage, Scalia warned that the ruling's logic threatened religious dissenters by equating moral disapproval with bigotry, potentially coercing complicity in ceremonies against conscience and eroding institutional pluralism. His framework sought equilibrium: shielding religion from targeted hostility while rejecting privileges that fracture legal uniformity, grounded in the amendment's aim to prevent federal meddling in conscience without subsidizing sects.

Controversies and Criticisms

Recusal Issues and Ethical Concerns

In Cheney v. (2004), Justice Scalia faced a recusal motion from the under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), which requires disqualification if a judge's might reasonably be questioned. The motion stemmed from a January 2004 duck-hunting trip to with , taken after the granted in the case on December 15, 2003; Cheney was the named respondent in his official capacity, challenging a order to disclose energy task force records. Scalia traveled on and stayed as a guest of mutual friend Wallace Carline at a private hunting camp, joining about 13 other hunters for roughly 48 hours; no costs were borne personally by Cheney, and the group discussed no pending litigation. On March 18, 2004, Scalia issued a 21-page denying recusal, arguing that longstanding social ties with executive officials in official-capacity suits do not warrant disqualification absent of influence, and that a reasonable, well-informed observer—aware of judicial norms—would not doubt his based on a non-private, government-facilitated outing. He emphasized historical precedents, such as Justice Byron White's non-recusal in cases involving despite close friendship, and rejected media-driven public perceptions as irrelevant to the objective § 455(a) standard. Scalia participated in the decision, issued May 24, 2004, which vacated the order 7-2 in Cheney's favor. Critics, including the and Democratic senators, contended the trip created an unacceptable appearance of partiality, given Cheney's direct involvement and the timing amid public scrutiny of executive . They argued that even social interactions with a party could erode public confidence, urging institutional review or peer intervention absent self-enforcement. Scalia countered that recusal on such grounds would paralyze the , as justices routinely maintain friendships across branches without case discussions, and that the episode reflected routine courtesies among officials rather than corruption. No formal violation was found, aligning with the era's self-regulated judicial conduct lacking binding codes or external oversight. Beyond recusal, Scalia drew scrutiny for accepting undisclosed luxury travel and hospitality from private benefactors, including those with business interests before the Court, under financial disclosure rules permitting exemptions for "personal hospitality" from non-litigants. A 2024 Senate Judiciary Committee report, led by Democrats, alleged Scalia accepted more such gifts than any other justice over a decade, including hundreds of trips, in violation of disclosure requirements under the , though enforcement was absent and rules ambiguous on private invitations. Scalia publicly defended such practices as traditional and non-influential, arguing they posed no risk of bias in judging abstract legal questions rather than personal favors. No emerged of decisions swayed by these interactions, and contemporaries noted similar norms among justices across ideologies prior to modern scrutiny.

Public Remarks and Political Engagements

Scalia frequently delivered public lectures and speeches promoting his judicial philosophy of and , emphasizing adherence to the Constitution's original meaning and statutory text over evolving interpretations. In one notable address on October 5, 2011, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he discussed , attributing it to the nation's unique constitutional structure rooted in and individual liberty rather than geography or ethnicity. These engagements often occurred at universities, law schools, and conservative organizations like the , where he critiqued "living constitutionalism" as judicial legislation. While justices traditionally avoid overt partisan activity, Scalia occasionally expressed views on political matters in interviews and speeches, drawing criticism for perceived partisanship. In a 2012 interview, he defended the Court's decision, arguing it safeguarded First Amendment rights by preventing government restrictions on corporate political speech, and dismissed concerns about undisclosed as unfounded given historical norms. He also valued transparency in political spending, as evidenced by his opinions supporting disclosure requirements in cases. Scalia participated in international engagements, such as discussions with legal scholars on , underscoring his broader influence on constitutional discourse. A posthumous collection, Scalia Speaks (2017), compiled by his son Christopher J. Scalia, includes over 40 speeches spanning constitutional theory, , and culture, revealing his rhetorical style—witty, combative, and idea-focused rather than personal attacks. Critics from left-leaning outlets argued such public advocacy risked undermining judicial impartiality, though Scalia maintained it targeted flawed methodologies, not outcomes or individuals. His engagements reinforced originalist principles amid debates over , influencing legal academia and conservative thought without direct electoral involvement.

Ideological Criticisms from Opponents

Judge Richard A. Posner, a prominent federal appeals court judge, critiqued Scalia's advocacy for as fundamentally incoherent, asserting that Scalia selectively invoked historical practices and dictionary definitions to rationalize conservative policy preferences rather than adhering to a consistent interpretive methodology. Posner argued that this approach masked ideological bias under the guise of neutrality, as Scalia deviated from strict in cases where original meanings conflicted with modern conservative priorities, such as expansive readings of federal commerce power. Liberal scholars echoed this, viewing as a rigid framework that prioritized 18th- and 19th-century understandings over adaptive constitutional interpretation suited to contemporary societal changes. Scalia's dissents in landmark cases on drew particular ire from progressive critics for defending traditional moral judgments as legitimate bases for law, which they characterized as intolerant and discriminatory. In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), his opinion contended that state bans on homosexual reflected rational moral disapproval rather than animus, prompting accusations from opponents that it endorsed second-class citizenship for LGBTQ individuals and ignored evolving standards of decency. Likewise, in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), Scalia's dissent lambasted the majority's recognition of as a "judicial Putsch" that bypassed democratic processes, a stance critics decried as dismissive of equality principles and laced with that undermined judicial . These positions were seen by detractors as reflecting a broader hostility to protections for personal liberties not explicitly enumerated in the text. On abortion, Scalia's repeated calls to overrule Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992)—arguing no to abortion exists and that the issue belongs to state legislatures—were condemned by pro-choice advocates as extreme and out of step with women's reproductive . Critics contended his originalist lens ignored historical undercurrents of and , framing abortion restrictions as mere democratic choices rather than threats to . In public remarks, such as a debate, Scalia reiterated that abortion was not among the envisioned by the Framers, reinforcing liberal portrayals of his as regressive on issues of personal and equal protection.

Personal Life and Public Persona

Family and Relationships

Antonin Scalia married Maureen McCarthy, a graduate whom he met while studying at , on September 10, 1960. The marriage lasted until Scalia's death in 2016, spanning 55 years and producing nine children: Ann Forrest, Eugene, John Francis, Catherine Elisabeth, Mary Clare, Paul David, Matthew, Christopher James, and Megan. The resided primarily in , during Scalia's tenure on the D.C. Circuit and , where they maintained a close-knit rooted in traditional Catholic practices, including daily dinners and attendance at St. Catherine of Siena Parish. Scalia frequently credited his wife with managing the demands of their large family, once remarking in jest that he focused on the while she handled "everything else." Despite his intense professional commitments, he prioritized family bonding, such as annual vacations and trips with his sons, fostering strong relationships among the children. One son, Paul David Scalia, became a Catholic in the Diocese of Arlington, , and later delivered the homily at his father's funeral Mass. Several children pursued careers in and , including , who served as U.S. Secretary of Labor from 2019 to 2021. By the time of Scalia's death, the family had expanded to include dozens of grandchildren, reflecting the justice's emphasis on marital fidelity and procreation as central to personal fulfillment.

Religious Faith and Views

Antonin Scalia was a devout traditional Roman Catholic whose faith profoundly shaped his and moral worldview, though he insisted it did not dictate his judicial interpretations. Raised in a Catholic family of Italian immigrant heritage, Scalia attended daily , prayed the each morning en route to the , and engaged in spiritual reading following services. He emphasized traditional for his nine children, teaching them and ensuring weekly attendance at the Latin when possible, reflecting discomfort with certain post-Vatican II liturgical reforms. Scalia's son, Father Paul Scalia, eulogized him at his funeral on February 19, 2016, as a man whose "soul was at peace" through unwavering adherence to Church teachings on sacraments, confession, and eternal truths. In public addresses, Scalia openly defended core Christian doctrines against secular skepticism, urging believers to exhibit courage amid societal derision of tenets such as Christ's divinity, the Virgin Birth, and the . His 2010 book On Faith: Lessons from an American Believer, a compilation of speeches, articulated Catholicism as essential to human flourishing, critiquing and affirming objective truth derived from divine . Yet Scalia maintained a strict demarcation between personal faith and legal reasoning, arguing that judges must apply the Constitution's original public meaning rather than infuse it with religious convictions; he viewed as a neutral compatible with, but independent of, his Catholicism. This approach led to outcomes aligning with traditional Catholic positions—such as dissenting against (1973) on abortion and (2015) on —but grounded in , not theology. Regarding the First Amendment's religion clauses, Scalia contended that the Establishment Clause prohibits from establishing a but permits government accommodation of over , mirroring the Founding era's preference for theistic morality. In his majority opinion in (1990), he ruled that neutral, generally applicable laws do not violate the even if they incidentally burden religious practices, prioritizing democratic processes over judicial exemptions for believers. He criticized expansive free exercise claims as inviting , insisting religious freedom thrives under rather than special privileges, a stance rooted in his realist view of governance as reflecting informed by widespread religiosity. Scalia's framework thus balanced religious liberty with legal uniformity, eschewing both coercion of conscience and unchecked exemptions.

Intellectual Style and Extracurricular Pursuits

Scalia's intellectual approach emphasized , which prioritizes the ordinary meaning of statutory text as understood at enactment, and , which interprets the according to its public meaning at . He rejected evolving interpretations or judicial policymaking, viewing them as departures from democratic processes, and adhered strictly to text and historical tradition over modern policy preferences. His opinions featured a distinctive rhetorical style marked by sharp wit, vivid metaphors, and forceful critiques, particularly in dissents where he could write without compromise. Scalia employed of abstract concepts, elaborate analogies, and biting to dismantle opposing views, as seen in his use of phrases like "jiggery-pokery" in King v. Burwell (2015) to critique perceived judicial sleight-of-hand. This approach, while praised for clarity and engagement, drew criticism for , though defenders argued it effectively highlighted logical flaws without diluting substance. Beyond the bench, Scalia pursued diverse interests, including a deep affinity for , which he attended frequently, sometimes with Justice Ginsburg, and even appeared in as an extra on occasion. He was an avid hunter, a hobby rooted in his Queens childhood where he trapped rabbits, and later taught Kagan the ; this passion led to trips like the one preceding his death in 2016. Scalia also enjoyed , playing monthly games with figures like Rehnquist, and co-authored influential works such as (2012) with , promoting textualist canons. His extracurricular engagements extended to public speaking and education, with dozens of privately funded trips annually for lectures, moot courts, and seminars in locations like and , often hosted by conservative or legal groups. Scalia delivered speeches emphasizing , such as at universities and law societies, and served as an at the School of Law, where he taught constitutional interpretation. These pursuits amplified his influence, blending rigorous scholarship with accessible, often humorous delivery to advocate for principled judging.

Death and Immediate Aftermath

Circumstances of Death

Antonin Scalia arrived at the Cibolo Creek Ranch, a 30,000-acre luxury resort near Marfa in Presidio County, Texas, on February 11, 2016, at the invitation of ranch owner John Poindexter, a Houston businessman, for a private retreat described by Poindexter as a quail hunting weekend. Scalia, who had informed companions of recent health concerns including shoulder surgery and breathing difficulties, did not participate in hunting but observed activities and engaged in social events with about a dozen other guests, including members of the International Order of St. Hubertus, a hunting society. On the evening of February 12, Scalia attended a group dinner at the ranch, appearing congenial but retiring early around 9 p.m. without complaint, after which he was not seen alive. The following morning, February 13, Scalia failed to appear for breakfast, prompting Poindexter to enter his room around 11:50 a.m., where he discovered Scalia unresponsive in bed, clad only in underwear, with a pillow partially over his head and appearing peaceful but cold to the touch, indicating he had likely died hours earlier during the night of February 12 or early morning of February 13. A ranch employee immediately called 911 at approximately 11:52 a.m., reporting the discovery to Presidio County authorities, who dispatched emergency services but found no pulse upon arrival; Scalia was pronounced dead at the scene without resuscitation attempts due to the circumstances. Presidio County Judge Cinderela Guevara, acting as justice of the peace, conducted a telephonic inquest under Texas law, interviewing Poindexter and observing photos of the body, and ruled the death natural causes with no evidence of foul play or suspicious circumstances, deferring to the family's request to forgo an autopsy. The U.S. Marshals Service, responsible for Scalia's security, confirmed no signs of trauma or external involvement in initial assessments. Scalia's body was subsequently transported by private aircraft to Fairfax, Virginia, for family arrangements. The absence of an autopsy, while legally permissible in Texas for apparent natural deaths when family objects, later prompted public speculation and calls for further investigation, though official reports maintained the determination of non-suspicious circumstances.

Autopsy Findings and Medical Cause

An autopsy was not conducted on Antonin Scalia after his death on February 13, 2016, at Cibolo Creek Ranch in Presidio County, Texas, as local authorities deemed it unnecessary under state procedures for apparent natural causes. Presidio County Judge Cinderela Guevara, acting as justice of the peace, pronounced death via telephone after receiving descriptions from ranch owner John Poindexter, who reported Scalia appearing pale and unresponsive with a pillow over his head, consistent with sleep, and no signs of trauma or foul play. Texas law permits such determinations without autopsy or medical examiner involvement when death seems natural and the body is not transported out of county. The death certificate, signed by Guevara, listed the immediate cause as natural causes, with —a heart attack—as a contributing factor, based on Scalia's medical history including , , , and . No or further pathological examination occurred, leading some forensic pathologists to criticize the process for lacking definitive evidence to rule out other possibilities like or , though Scalia's age (79) and comorbidities supported the cardiac assessment. Early media reports reflected initial confusion, with Guevara stating it "wasn't a heart attack" before clarifying the certificate's terminology. The U.S. Marshals Service, present with Scalia, confirmed no evidence of criminality.

Funeral Arrangements and Succession

Scalia's remains lay in repose in the Great Hall of the United States Supreme Court on February 19, 2016, following a for deceased justices, where President and First Lady paid respects but did not attend the subsequent funeral Mass. A public Requiem Mass was celebrated on February 20, 2016, at the Basilica of the National Shrine of the in , presided over by Archbishop Wilton Daniel Gregory, with a delivered by Scalia's friend Father Paul Scalia emphasizing the justice's Catholic faith and intellectual rigor. The service, attended by over 3,000 mourners including , drew tributes from political figures across the spectrum, though President Obama was represented by the vice president. A private burial followed the Mass at Fairfax Memorial Park in Fairfax, Virginia, with the gravesite initially kept undisclosed at the family's request but later identified publicly through cemetery records and online mapping. Scalia's death on February 13, , created an immediate vacancy, prompting Senate Majority Leader to announce within hours that no nominee would receive hearings or votes during the 2016 election year, arguing the decision should defer to the incoming president and Senate elected by the public. President Obama nominated , Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, on March 16, 2016, to fill the seat, but the Republican-controlled adhered to its stance, holding no confirmation proceedings despite Garland's prior bipartisan confirmation to the appeals court. The vacancy persisted for 416 days—the longest since the —until President nominated on January 31, 2017, who was confirmed by the on April 7, 2017, by a 54–45 vote, restoring the Court's nine-justice complement. During the interim, the Court operated with eight justices, resulting in several 4–4 deadlocked decisions that left lower court rulings intact, including in cases on and public unions.

Legacy and Influence

Impact on Originalist Jurisprudence

Antonin Scalia significantly advanced originalist by championing the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution according to its original public meaning at the time of , rather than evolving societal values or judicial intent. Appointed to the in 1986, Scalia became the leading proponent of this methodology, arguing in his 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation that constrains judicial discretion and upholds democratic legitimacy by fixing constitutional meaning to historical evidence. His advocacy shifted constitutional discourse from "living constitutionalism" toward textual fidelity, influencing legal scholars and judges to prioritize historical practices over policy outcomes. Scalia extended originalist principles to statutory interpretation through textualism, emphasizing the ordinary meaning of enacted text over legislative history or purposivism. Co-authoring Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts in 2012 with , he codified canons of construction grounded in how lawyers and judges historically read laws, rejecting subjective intent as unreliable and manipulable. This approach gained traction across ideological lines; even Justice acknowledged in 2017 that Scalia "taught everybody how to do differently," rendering purposivist methods largely obsolete in modern opinions. By 2017, analyses showed the Court had become markedly more textualist, with Scalia's dissents and concurrences providing persuasive frameworks adopted in subsequent rulings. In constitutional cases, Scalia's yielded landmark applications, such as his majority opinion in (2008), where historical analysis affirmed an individual right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment, unconnected to service. Though often in the minority during his tenure, his rigorous dissents—exemplified in critiques of expansions—educated the bench and bar, fostering a jurisprudence resistant to judicial policymaking. Posthumously, Scalia's framework informed the appointments of originalist justices like and influenced decisions overturning precedents via historical review, solidifying originalism's role in restraining judicial overreach. His methodology's emphasis on verifiable historical data over abstract theory addressed criticisms of prior interpretive regimes, promoting causal accountability to the Constitution's enacting era.

Influence on Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions

Scalia's majority opinion in (2008) established an individual right to possess firearms for unconnected with service, rejecting collective rights interpretations and providing the analytical foundation for later expansions of Second Amendment protections. This framework directly informed McDonald v. Chicago (2010), which incorporated the right against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022), which struck down New York's restrictive concealed-carry licensing regime by mandating that modern regulations align with historical analogues from the founding era—a test echoing Scalia's emphasis on historical evidence over interest-balancing. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization (2022), the Court's overruling of Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) drew explicitly on Scalia's dissenting critique in Casey of substantive due process as an unmoored invention lacking textual or historical roots, reinforcing originalist arguments that unenumerated rights must not override democratic processes on policy matters like abortion. The Dobbs majority cited Scalia's Casey dissent approvingly, noting its prediction that retaining Roe's core would invite endless judicial tinkering with abortion regulations, a view validated by the decision's return of the issue to state legislatures. Scalia's advocacy for reshaped , prioritizing ordinary public meaning over legislative history or purposivism, as evidenced in cases like Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), where Justice Gorsuch's majority opinion—applying Title VII's plain text to extend protections against discrimination based on and —invoked Scalia's methodological insistence on fidelity to enacted words regardless of policy outcomes. Successors such as Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett have frequently cited Scalia's opinions and writings to justify originalist and textualist approaches in dissents and concurrences, including in Second Amendment disputes like United States v. Rahimi (2024), where historical analysis of disarmament traditions built on Heller's originalist baseline. His dissents critiquing stare decisis as overly rigid—arguing that erroneous precedents warrant correction when they depart from constitutional text—gained traction in the post-Scalia Court, facilitating reversals in areas like administrative deference (West Virginia v. EPA, 2022) by undermining Chevron deference, which Scalia long opposed as an abdication of judicial duty. Overall, Scalia's influence persists through a textualist-originalist bloc that has prioritized constitutional structure and historical practice, altering outcomes in gun rights, abortion, and statutory cases while elevating democratic accountability over judicial policymaking.

Scholarly Recognition and Cultural Depictions

Scalia's advocacy for textualism and originalism profoundly shaped statutory and constitutional interpretation in American jurisprudence, influencing judicial practice across federal courts and earning widespread citation in legal scholarship. His 1997 book A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law articulated a critique of legislative history in favor of plain text, becoming a cornerstone text for textualist methodology. Co-authored with Bryan A. Garner, the 2012 treatise Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts systematized canons of construction, achieving over 10,000 citations in judicial opinions by 2020 and serving as a standard reference in law schools. Academic institutions honored Scalia for these contributions, including the University of Virginia's Medal in Law on February 14, 2008, recognizing his professorial tenure and interpretive scholarship. conferred its Marshall-Wythe Medallion, the faculty's highest honor, on September 10, 2012, for his exceptional accomplishments in law. Posthumously, renamed its law school the in 2016, reflecting his impact on legal education. President awarded him the on November 16, 2018, citing his role as one of the greatest justices for authoring over 500 opinions grounded in . In cultural depictions, Scalia appears as a central figure in John Strand's 2015 play The Originalist, which premiered at and portrays him mentoring a fictional amid debates over the Defense of Marriage Act, emphasizing his intellectual rigor and personal charisma. The work, performed in multiple venues including Court Theatre, humanizes Scalia through interactions highlighting his wit and ideological convictions. Derrick Wang's Scalia/Ginsburg, first performed in 2013, satirically depicts Scalia's unlikely friendship with Justice via operatic arias adapted from and Puccini, underscoring their shared love of while contrasting jurisprudential views. These portrayals, drawing from his public persona of sharp dissents and cultural engagement, position Scalia as a polarizing yet vivid in American legal iconography.

References

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