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Rashidun cavalry
Rashidun cavalry
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Rashidun cavalry
Army of the marches (Jaish al‐Zaḥf Arabic: جيش الزحف)
Mobile guard (Tulai'a Mutaharrika Arabic: طليعة متحركة)
The Army of Sharpeners
Active632–661
AllegianceRashidun Caliphate
TypeCavalry
RoleShock troops
Flanking maneuver
Mounted archery
Siege
Expeditionary warfare
Reconnaissance
Raid
Horse breeding
Provincial Headquarters (Amsar)Medina (632–657)
Kufa (657–661)
Jund Hims (634–?)
Jund Dimashq (?–?)
Jund al-Urdunn (639–?)
Basra (632–661)
Jund Filastin (660–?)
Fustat (641–?)
Tawwaj (640-?)
Mosul
Haditha
Engagements
Commanders
Supreme CommandersKhalid ibn al-Walid
Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah
Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas
Amr ibn al-As
Notable Commanders

The Fursān (cavalrymen) of the Rashidun army constituted the mounted arm of early Muslim forces during the Muslim conquest of Syria. Within this arm, an elite cavalry formation emerged that later sources and modern historians commonly describe as the Mobile Guard (Arabic: طليعة متحركة, ṭalīʿa mutaḥarrika, or Arabic: الحرس المتحرك, al-ḥaras al-mutaḥarrik), sometimes also referred to as the Marching Army (جيش الزحف, Jaish al-Zaḥf). This formation was commanded by Khalid ibn al-Walid, who organized it as a centralized body of cavalry under his direct control rather than dispersing it among the infantry formations. The unit was composed largely of experienced horsemen drawn from earlier campaigns in Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Palestine, resulting in a concentration of battle-hardened veterans with prior experience fighting the Byzantine and Sasanian empires.

In battle, the Mobile Guard was typically held in reserve during the initial phase of engagement and committed at critical moments, often against exposed flanks, overextended formations, or to counter enemy breakthroughs. Its mobility allowed it to shift rapidly across the battlefield, conduct flanking attacks, reinforce threatened sectors, and exploit enemy disorganization once contact had been made by the main army. After successful engagements, elements of the formation were frequently employed in pursuit operations, contributing to the breakdown and retreat of opposing forces. The unit played a significant role in major engagements against the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, including the Battle of Chains, Battle of Walaja, Battle of Ajnadayn, Battle of Firaz, Battle of Marj al-Dibaj, the Siege of Damascus (634), the Battle of Yarmouk, the Battle of Hazir, and the Battle of the Iron Bridge.[1] Elements of this cavalry force later operated under al-Qaʿqaʿ ibn ʿAmr al-Tamimi, participating in the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, Battle of Jalula, and the Second Siege of Emesa.[1]

This cavalry unit likely rode horses of Arabian lineage, reflecting the emphasis placed on horse breeding by early Islamic communities, where equestrian traditions were closely integrated with military practice.[2][3][4][5] Horses of this type were widespread among Arab populations during the 6th and 7th centuries.[2]

History

[edit]

Muhammad's cavalry, the predecessor of the caliphate's, is recorded to have had 10,000 horsemen during the Expedition of Tabuk.[6] The Muslim cavalry units were commonly called Fursan.[6]

After the decisive victory at the Battle of Ajnadayn in 634 CE, Khalid, from his Iraqi army, which after Ajnadayn numbered about 8000 men, organised a force of 4000 horsemen, which the early historians refer to as The Army of Sharpeners.[7][page needed][8] Khalid kept this force under his personal command. Aside from horses for use in attacks, the Rashidun cavalry also rode camels for transportation and in defensive battles, as camels could repel even heavy cavalry such as Byzantine and Sassanid cataphracts, and are large enough to withstand a heavy cavalry's charge.[9] At the onset of the Battle of Yarmuk in 636 AD, around 3,000 cavalry reinforcements were sent to the Syrian front, including those from Yemen led by Qays ibn Makshuh.[10]

Mahmud Shakir said the cavalry corps called al-Haras al-Mutaharikkah, had a distinguishing role in the battle of Yarmuk.[11] The first recorded use of this mounted force was during the Siege of Damascus (634). During the battle of Yarmuk Khalid ibn Walid used them to his advantage at critical points in the battle. With their ability to engage and disengage, and turn back and attack again from the flank or rear, the Mobile Guard inflicted a shattering defeat of the Byzantine army. This strong mobile striking force was often used in later years as an advance guard.[7][page needed] It could rout opposing armies with its greater mobility that gave it an upper hand against any Byzantine army. One of the victories of the mobile guard was at Battle of Hazir in 637 CE under the command of Khalid, in which not a single Byzantine soldier survived.[8] The Mobile guard remained under the personal command of Khalid ibn Walid for about four years (634-638 CE) until Khalid was dismissed from army by Caliph Umar after the completion of the conquest of the Levant.

With the dismissal of Khalid, this powerful cavalry regiment was dismantled. One of its brilliant commanders Qa'qa' ibn 'Amr al-Tamimi had been sent to the Persian front in 637 CE along with reinforcements for the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah, in which he played an important part. A part of it was later sent to the Persian front as reinforcements for the Muslim conquest of Persia. Many of its members died in the plague during 639-640 CE which killed approximately 25,000 Muslims in Syria. This included many sub-commanders of the mobile guard like Zirrar ibn Azwar, those who survived accompanied the army under the command of Amr ibn al-'As to conquer Egypt. After the conquest of Egypt, the Rashidun Army continued to invade and besiege Bahnasa, as the enemy were reinforced by an arrival of 50,000 according to the report of al-Maqqari.[12][13] The siege dragged for months, until Khalid ibn al Walid commanded Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Dhiraar ibn al-Azwar and other commanders to intensify the siege and assign them to lead around 10,000 Companions of the Prophet, with 70 among them were veterans of battle of Badr.[14] They besiege the city for 4 months as Dhiraar leading 200 horsemens, while Zubayr ibn Al-Awwam lead 300 horsemen, while the other commanders such as Miqdad, Abdullah ibn Umar and Uqba ibn Amir al-Juhani leading similar number with Dhiraar with each command 200 horsemens.[14] After Bahnasa finally subdued,[14] where they camped in a village which later renamed as Qays village, in honor of Qays ibn Harith, the overall commander of these Rashidun cavalry.[15] The Byzantines and their copt allies showering the Rashidun army with arrows and stones from the city wall, As the bitter fights has rages on as casualties increases,[Notes 1] until the Rashidun overcame the defenders, as Dhiraar, the first emerge, came out from the battle with his entire body stained in blood, while confessed he has slayed about 160 Byzantine soldiers during the battle.[14] Chroniclers recorded the Rashidun army has finally breached the city gate under either Khalid ibn al-Walid or Qays ibn Harith finally managed to breach the gate and storming the city and forcing surrender to the inhabitant.[Notes 2] [Notes 3]

Later, some of the caliphate's horsemen rebelled against the caliphate under Hurqus ibn Zuhayr as-Sa'di, a Tamim tribe chieftain and veteran of the Battle of Hunayn.[19][20] Hurqus joined with another warrior tribe from Bajila,[21] led by Abd Allah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi, who participated in the early conquests of Persia under Sa'd ibn abi Waqqas.[22]

As Muslim conquests of North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula progressed.[23] they also brought their breeds of horse to Africa and Spain in the form of Arabian horses, Barb horses, and to a lesser extent the Turkoman horse[24]

Unit characteristics

[edit]

Cavalry were highly regarded by the military rulers of early Medina, as the early Medina Islam constitution and the Caliphates' put emphasis by giving the cavalry troopers at least two portions of war spoils and booty compared to regular soldier, while regular infantry only received a single portion.[25] The core of the caliphate's mounted division was an elite unit which early Muslim historians named Tulai'a Mutaharrika (طليعة متحركة), or the mobile guard.[26]

Initially, the nucleus of the mobile guard formed from veterans of the horsemens under Khalid ibn al-Walid during the conquest of Iraq. They consisted half of the forces brought by Khalid from Iraq to Syria 4.000 soldiers out of 8.000 soldiers.[26] This shock cavalry division played important roles in the victories at the Battle of Chains, Battle of Walaja, Battle of Ajnadayn, Battle of Firaz, Battle of Maraj-al-Debaj, Siege of Damascus, Battle of Yarmouk, Battle of Hazir and the Battle of Iron Bridge against the Byzantine and the Sassanid.[26] Later, a splinter of this cavalry division under Al-Qa'qa ibn Amr at-Tamimi was also involved in the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, Battle of Jalula, and the Second siege of Emesa.[26]

Equipment

[edit]
Chain mail

Contrary to popular belief among historians, that the Arabians during the 6th century were unarmored light cavalry raiders, Eduard Alofs argues that the Arab horsemen, whether they are Rashiduns, Ghassanids, or Lakhmids were in fact heavily armoured elite nobles,[Notes 4] akin to Cataphract in armors.[Notes 5] The Muslim army in time of Muhammad also had a particular type of body armour called "al-Kharnaq", which was characterized as flexible.[29]

For their armaments, the Early Arabic horsemens are theoretically used the following arms in battle:

  • Arab sword of various types, one of the most famous types is as-Sayf al-Qala'i, a curved sword type.[29] Muhammad owned this type of sword which preserved in modern-day in Topkapı Palace museum, the sword blade were around 100 cm length which has inscription in its hilt: "Hadha Sayf al-Mashrafi li Bayt Muhammad Rasulullah". The Indian manufactured swords which used by Arabs during Muhammad era were straight and double edged.[30] certain cavalry commanders such as Amr ibn Ma'adi Yakrib, also known to possess multiple swords.[31][32] while Khalid ibn al-Walid reportedly brought at least nine swords during single battle.
  • Lance used by Rashidun cavalry by swinging them during close-combat, such as in the record of record of Tabari.[33] Early caliphate cavalry held their Lance overhead posture with both hands.[34] A personal lance belong to Muhammad consisted a lance which head was made of brass.[35]
  • Mounted archery with flying gallop was practiced casually by Rashidun caliphate onwards,[36][37] as it was used by early Muslim warriors such as Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, who are reported as an expert for retreating mounted shot[38] Their quivers were reportedly contained 50 arrows.[35] Leaders and commanders also obliged the usage of bows, as there are records of Muhammad himself of usage of the bow during the battle of Uhud.[35]
  • Javelins also used by caliphate horsemens' their weapon. Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, a seasoned Muhajirun and early convert who always brought horses during battles,[39] were recorded have killed his enemies with javelin in at least in two occasions during his life. The first occasion when he recorded has killed Quraish nobleman Ubaydah ibn Sa'id from Umayyad clan during the Battle of Badr, who was wearing a full set of armor and Aventail that protected his entire body and face.[25] Zubayr hurled his javelin aiming at the unprotected eye of Ubaydah and killed him immediately.[25] The second occasion is during the Battle of Khaybar, Zubayr fought in a duel against a Jewish nobleman Yassir which Zubayr killed with a powerful javelin strike.[25] Firsthand witnesses reported that Zubayr brandishing himself across the battlefield during the Battle of Hunayn while hung two javelins in his back.[25]
  • Rounded shield to protect the rider from arrows.[40]

Armour and horse armour

[edit]

Regarding their defensive and supporting equipments, despite there is not yet archeological proof of Arabian armory before the era of Ayyubid and Mamluk found, literary sources indicates the Arabs already using body armour, such as coat of Chain mail called Dir that was found from the literary sources from the era before the advent of Islam,[41] or as an Umayyad poetries that mentioned the armour of the caliphate army during caliph Umar until Umayyad era.[40] During the Battle of Uhud, Jami'at Tirmidhi recorded Zubayr ibn al-Awwam testimony that Muhammad wearing two layers of mail coat.[42][43] However, there is still not yet archaeological founding of Arabic armor in such time.[44] Waqidi recorded the Qurayshite Arab horsemens also using horse armor which held by Crupper on the back of the horse, which are used by a Qurayshite warrior named Hubayr ibn Abi Wahb al Makhzumi during the battle of the Trench.[45]

The Muslim Arabic cavalry during early caliphate already knew of stirrups. However, caliph Umar forbid or neglected the use of stirrups for his soldiers as riding without stirrups could train riders better for horsemanship.[46][47] Despite the rejection or neglect of stirrups,[48][49] Arab cavalry, especially the Kharijites group who will revolt after the conquest, were feared for their fearless charge, which, as Adam Ali mentioned in his work on al-Jahiz, "can throw any defense line into disarray".[50] Military history reconstructors like Marcus Junkelmann have determined from historical reenactment that mounted close combat specialists like Mubarizuns could fight effectively on top of their mounts without stirrups.[48] This is used by Alofs as an argument to debunk the assertion held by most historians that horsemen cannot fight effectively in close combat without the use of stirrups.[48]

Inscriptions of Hima mountain

David Nicolle brought the theory of Pre-Islamic Arabia Arabic-speaking peoples adoption of armory among horsemen as he quoted Claude Cahen, who categorically stated that horse armor was very common in the early Islamic period.[51] Nicolle thought those Arabians were exposed to external culture influences such as from external military influence from Turkish Uyghurs, originating in Xinjiang, which then spread further to Iran and beyond, eventually reaching the Middle east,[51] Nicolle divided the evidence from three pinpoint areas:

  1. Dura-Europos, located in Syrian borderlands of the Byzantine Empire, where horse armor of bronze scales, Roman Syria or Parthian origin, from the 3rd century AD are found.[51] Although Nicolle dismissed the Byzantines as being unlikely as heavily armoured cavalry were not Byzantine tradition in the first place, and only adopted such in the late era, unlike the Persians.[51]
  2. Shabwa, Yemen, as Nicole pointed there is carved plaque depicting armoured cavalry, both the rider and the horse, which Nicolle surmised originated from 6th–early 7th AD, and theoretically were Asawiran Sassanids heavy cavalry who garrisoned Yemen for decades before the expansion of Islam circa 570 to 630 AD.[51] While Ogden pointed out Yemen were also known as an important coastal sea trade between India and the Red Sea since ancient times and were exposed to the latter's metallurgy.[52] the team of Bir Hima archeology excavation and researchers has found southwestern edge of the modern city of Najran, a depiction of a heavily built horse similar in form to the extinct Nisean horse breed which rode by Zaweyan elite troops of Sassanids of the 6th century BCE, which according to the team, indicating Persian influence.[53] Elwyn Hartley Edwards also added it is possible that the Arabs also had influence in the breeding of legendary Nisean horses, since geographically the breed theoritically was bred in western Iran of Medes.[54] Edwards further remarked the possibility that the Nisean were also infused with Arabian horse breed.[54]
  3. Wadi Aday, 8 km south of Muttrah, Oman.,[51] where Nicolle pointed out many armoured horsemen carvings, armed with spears and a sword, that, according to Nicole, traditionally identified as Arabs.[51] according to researchers, south-eastern Arabia including Oman has for a long time been exposed to Iron since the Iron Age, which presumably is from external influence such as India, just as for Yemen.[55] Regarding this theory, Nicolle suggested the horse armour adopted by Pre-Islamic Oman and Yemen Arabs which he implied from Sasanian Yemen influence.[56]

Aside from those three locations that are pointed by Nicolle, Bir Hima archaeological researchers team also found evidence of Arabian armoured cavalry in the form of hundreds, if not thousands of petroglyphs in Bir Hima, which is located about 30 km northeast of Najran.[53] The excavation sites are dominated by images of mounted cavalry that are highly stylized, which the researchers theorized riding Arabian breed horses.[53] The cavalrymen are armed with long lances, swords, Sayf swords and khanjar daggers which are worn in the waist.[53] The team also notice that there are indication the carvings of those horsemen probably wearing something like helmets and cutlasses.[53]

Military standard

[edit]

Before the advent of Islam, banners as tools for signaling had already been employed by the pre-Islamic Arab tribes and the Byzantines. Early Muslim army naturally deployed banners for the same purpose.[57] Early Islamic flags, however, greatly simplified its design by using plain color, due to the Islamic prescriptions on aniconism.[58] According to the Islamic traditions, the Quraysh had a black liwāʾ and a white-and-black rāya.[59] It further states that Muhammad had an ʿalam in white nicknamed "the Young Eagle" (Arabic: العقاب al-ʿuqāb); and a rāya in black, said to be made from his wife Aisha's head-cloth.[60] This larger flag was known as " the Banner of the Eagle" (Arabic: الراية العقاب al-rāyat al-ʻuqāb), as well as "the Black Banner" (Arabic: الراية السوداء ar-rāyat as-sawdāʾ).[61] Other examples are the prominent Arab military commander 'Amr ibn al-'As using red banner,[62] and the Khawarij rebels using red banner as well.[63] Banners of the early Muslim army in general, however, employed a variety of colors, both singly and in combination.[64]

According to modern historian David Nicolle in Warrior magazine series published by Osprey Publishing, as the caliphate army were mainly consisted of tribal based corps and divisions, most of the following flags appeared in the Battle of Siffin on both sides:

Training, tactics and strategy

[edit]

As the mainstay strategy of the Rashidun army were interchangeably and derived from Islamic teaching, the main doctrine of the Rashidun cavalry also borrowed from the religious ethic itself, as example the aim for building such military sophistication were in fact aimed to cause fear and discourage the enemy from offering resistance, and if possible, cause the enemy to submit peacefully, as it is said the main idea from Verse Quran chapter al-Anfal verse[Quran 8:60].[65]

Aside from that distinguishing role which characterized by the Mobile Guard cavalry were their task to plugging the gaps between Muslim ranks to avoid enemy penetration, which they practiced during the battle of the Yarmuk.[11] During the reign of caliph Umar. The caliph instructed Salman Ibn Rabi'ah al-Bahili to establish systematic military program to maintain the quality of caliphate mounts. Salman enlisted most of the steeds within realm of caliphate to undergo such steps:[66]

  1. Recording number and quality of horses available.
  2. Differences between the Arabian purebreed and the hybrid breeds was to be carefully noted.
  3. Arabic structural medical examination and Hippiatrica on each horses in regular basis including isolation and quarantine of sick horses.
  4. Regular training between horses and their masters to achieve the disciplined communication between them.
  5. Collective response training of the horses done in general routine.
  6. Individual response training of the horses on advanced level.
  7. Endurance and temperament training to perform in crowded and noisy places.[67]

Meanwhile, technical training method of each horsemen in this cavalry was recorded in al-Fann al-Harbi In- Sadr al-Islam and Tarikh Tabari:[66]

  1. Riding horses with saddles.
  2. Riding horses without saddles.
  3. Sword fighting without horses
  4. Horse charging with stabbing weapons.
  5. Fighting with swords from the back of a moving horse.
  6. Archery.
  7. Mounted archery while the horse running.
  8. Close combat while changing their seat position on the back of moving horse, facing backwards.

At the end of the program, both riders and horses obligated to enlisted in formal competition sponsored by Diwan al-Jund which consisted into two category:

  1. Racing competition to measure the speed and stamina of each hybrids.[36] This racing activities are also encouraged by caliphate commanders such as Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah who himself also engaged in such sport.[68]
  2. Acrobat competition to measure the ability of the horses for difficult maneuvers during war.[36]

Additionally, In the wartime, there are special trainings established cavalry divisions were obliged to undertook:

  • simulated combat operation raids during the winter and summer seasons, known as Tadrib al-Shawati wa al-Sawd'if, which were intended to maintain the quality of each cavalry forces, while also maintain the pressures towards the Byzantines, Persians, and other caliphate enemies while there is no major military campaign.[36]
  • Special drills that required for particular operasion, such as during the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, The Muslim cavalry undergo drill training that involved by maneuvering their horses nearby elephant dummy statues, to train the horses so they did not afraid during the battle as they were tasked to charge against Sasanian Empire elephant corps[69]

Cavalry archery

[edit]

Alof theorized "Mubarizun" elite division, a unit specialized in close combat duels, also used archery in close-combat duels for maximum arrow penetration against opponent armor.[70] This select few apparatus of mounted soldiers who particularly skilled in duel were tasked to find the enemy generals or field officers, in order to kidnap or slay them in close combat, so the enemy will lose their commanding figure amidst of battle.[71] Aside from fighting with swords, lances, or maces, these duel specialists also possessed a unique ability to use archery in close combat, where Alofs theorized that in mid range about five meters from the adversary, the duelists will exchange his lance with his bow and shoot the enemy from close range to achieve maximum penetration, while the duelist held the lance strapped between right leg and saddle.[72] In fact, James Hardy theorized based on his quote from John Haldon and Romilly Jenkins, one of the decisive main factor for the Rashidun historical victory in battle of Yarmuk were due to their superb cavalry archers.[73] While James Francis LePree has written that the factor of "unquestionably great cavalry skill of the Arabs' horse archers" during the battle of Yarmuk.[74]

Cavalry archers also used to bait the opposing army from their position, which were reported by Tabari during the Battle of Nahavand, when Tulayha planned to lure the bulk of enemy forces by sending armoured cavalry archers forth and shooting them while retreating to bait them to the favorable terrain for Muslim army to fight the Sassanids.[75]

Cavalry usage during siege warfare

[edit]

The tactics used by Iyad ibn Ghanm in his Mesopotamian campaign were similar to those employed by the Muslims in Palestine, though in Iyad's case the contemporary accounts reveal his specific modus operandi, particularly in Raqqa.[76] The operation to capture that city entailed positioning cavalry forces near its entrances, preventing its defenders and residents from leaving or rural refugees from entering.[76] Concurrently, the remainder of Iyad's forces cleared the surrounding countryside of supplies and took captives.[76] These dual tactics were employed in several other cities in al-Jazira.[76] They proved effective in gaining surrenders from targeted cities running low on supplies and whose satellite villages were trapped by hostile troops.[76]

Ubadah ibn al-Samit, another Rashidun commander, is also recorded to have developed his own distinct strategy which involved the use of cavalry during siege warfare. During a siege, Ubadah would dig a large hole, deep enough to hide a considerable number of horsemen near an enemy garrison, and hid his cavalry there during the night. When the sun rose and the enemy city opened their gates for the civilians in the morning, Ubadah and his hidden cavalry then emerged from the hole and stormed the gates as the unsuspecting enemy could not close the gate before Ubadah's horsemen entered. This strategy was used by Ubadah during the Siege of Laodicea[77][78] and Siege of Alexandria.[77]

Mounts

[edit]

The possession of horse among Arab peoples were long time traditionally considered as symbol of wealth and prestige.[79] The musing of pure Arabian horse breed in Arab community social standing also found in the dialogue between caliph Umar with one of his cavalry commander, Amr ibn Ma'adi Yakrib, which recorded in the Al-ʿIqd al-Farīd anthology of adab authored by Ibn Abd Rabbih.[80] According to Schiettecatte, Earliest osteological evidence for the horses in Arabia were found in Bahrain in a middle of the 1000 BC.[81] The developments of early cavalry regiments within caliphate were effected due to the availability of the rich Meccan Arabs to field sufficient horses.[79]

Notables among Arab Muslims, especially those of Companions of the Prophet, were recorded possessed multiple horses and camels privately, such as Khalid ibn al-Walid, who reportedly possessed at least 16 horses which all named.[82] This practice of possessing multiple horses were not unlike Amr ibn Ma'adi Yakrib, the cavalry commander who had mythical reputation, also had at least four named horses of his own,[31] which number grown further as later the governor of Basra rewarded Amr with foal pregnant mare with preserved pedigree from al-Ghabra type (dust colored type).[83] Meanwhile, other warriors like Zubayr ibn al-Awwam owns a swooping number of 1,000 horses in his private stable.[84] while on the other hand, Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf reportedly possessed hundreds of horses and 1,000 camels, [85] and Dhiraar ibn al-Azwar, who also reportedly owns about 1,000 camels even before embracing Islam and pledge his allegiance to the Caliphate.[Notes 6]

Horses

[edit]
White Arabian horse

Caliphate Arabian noble cavalry[Notes 7] almost certainly rode the legendary purebred Arabian horse, by fact the quality breeding of horses were held so dearly by the early caliphates who integrated traditions of Islam with their military practice.[2][87][4][5] The soldiers who possessed the pureblood Arabian horse even had the right to acquire bigger war spoils after battles than the soldiers who used other breeds or hybrid breed horses.[88] The horses are culturally related with war in pre-Islamic Arabia as described in the long poems by Antarah ibn Shaddad and Dorayd bin Al Soma.[89]

These horses are also pretty common breed amongst Arab community during 6th to 7th century.[2] This special breed of steed were famous for their speed which allowed for large-scale conquests of the caliphate during their early days.[2][46] The Arabian breed is forged by the harsh life in desert and raised by nomadic Bedouins who spread it throughout their travels, and erect it as a symbol of social and cultural status, in parallel with a martial selection.[90] This breed are known as a hot-blooded breed that are known for their competitiveness. Long withstanding periods of Arabian nomadic society closeness with the horses also contributed to fertility of equestrian masters which produced best class horse breed in Arabia.[91] The phenomenal speed, stamina, intelligence, along with very well documented pedigrees quality even for modern era standard,[92][93] caused the Rashidun leaders to initiate a formal programs to distinguish them from inferior hybrids with unknown pedigrees including horses recently captured from the defeated enemies.[36] Earlier attempts of Muslim horse-breeding were found in the aftermath of Siege series of Khaybar fotresses when the Muslims acquired massive booties of horses from the Jewish castles. In response Muhammad personally instructed the breeding separations between purebred Arabian and the hybrid-class steeds.[67] in later cases, such tradition of glorifying the breed of pure Arabian steeds are recorded by caliphate soldiers during the conquest of Persia.[94] While another detailed example were Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, who owned many horses.[84] The most famous Arabian horse that owned and being named by az-Zubayr were al-Ya'sūb, which he ride in the Battle of Badr.[95] al-Ya'sūb pedigree was preserved carefully by az-Zubayr's clansmens, banu Asad ibn Abd al-Uzza branch from Quraysh tribe, who create a system of "horse-clan", the "horse-clan" system of recording their horses ancestry and lineage are meant carefully maintain the horses genealogical purity and quality while also manage to keep the steeds genealogy traceable, as in al-Ya'sūb case, who belong to a horse-clan namely al-Asjadi.[96] the al-Asjadi horse clan were keep by az-Zubayr for generations.[96]

Al-Baihaqi transmitted in Shuab al-iman about "Birdhaun breed", or horse of poor breed that are hailing not Arabian breed, more specifically a Turkish horses breed, which caliph Umar warned his governors against riding such horses.[97] According to Bayhaqi, prohibiting a breed considered second-rate makes it obvious that to ride horses of the best Arab breed would be even a greater sign of pride.[97] The Arabian theory were justified in the medieval tradition as Mamluk Furusiyya treatises of hippiatry distinguished lineages of Arabian horses were named based on their geographical provenance (Hejaz, Najd, Yemen, Bilād al‑Shām, Jezirah, Iraq), the noblest breed, according to Ibn al‑Mundhir were the Hijazi breed.[98]

The early caliphate army preferred mares than stallion as warhorses.[99] Khalid ibn al-Walid were said preferred mare by reason it believed that the mares were more fitt for cavalry combats.[99] The specific explanation is that mares are not as vocal as either horses or geldings, and the Arabs often believed mares did not need to stop to urinate, which saves times of the army mobilization.[99] Another reason for the Arabian cavalry to uniformly prefer mares during battles because bringing stallions during combat can potentially disrupt the riders rank as the mares in heat can incite stallions libido and caused the stallion difficult to control.[99]

Mahranite cavalry

[edit]
Map of contemporary Yemen showing Al Mahrah Governorate from where Mahri tribes hailed.

Caliphate cavalry recruited from Al-Mahra tribe were known for their military prowess and skilled horsemen that often won battles with minimal or no casualties at all, which Amr ibn al As in his own words praised them as "peoples who kill without being killed",[Notes 8]

Ibn Abd al-Hakam remarks their relative minimal casualties whenever engaged in military operations. Amr was amazed by these proud warriors for their ruthless fighting skill and efficiency During Muslim conquest where they spearheaded Muslim army during the Battle of Heliopolis, the Battle of Nikiou, and Siege of Alexandria.[100] Their commanders, Abd al-sallam ibn Habira al-Mahri were entrusted by 'Amr ibn al-'As to lead the entire Muslim army during the Arab conquest of north Africa. Abd al-sallam defeated the Byzantine imperial army in Libya, and throughout these campaigns Al-Mahra were awarded much land in Africa as recognition of their bravery.[100] When Amr established the town of Fustat, he further rewarded Al-Mahri members additional land in Fustat which then became known as Khittat Mahra or the Mahra quarter.[100] This land was used by the Al-Mahra tribes as a garrison.[100]

During the turmoil of Second Fitna, more than 600 Mahranites were sent to North Africa to fight Byzantines and the Berber Kharijite revolts.[100]

Camels

[edit]

Aside from horses, Rashidun cavalry used camels as their means of transportation as they want to save their horses energy, while outside the battle, the camels were used to transport the provisions of the soldiers, as each soldiers of the caliphate were expected to provide his own provisions at the very least outside the main army provided by the leaders or wealthy soldiers.[35]

During the battle, the Rashidun cavalry immediately change their ride to the horses, while their camels are hobbled along the defensive perimeters of Muslim army.[9] Their camels are used defensively during battle as the bulk of camel lines perimeter will blunt the enemy heavy cavalry charge[9] Sometimes, these Arab cavaliers also recorded to ride their camels simultaneously with their horse in one battle depending on the situation, as recorded in the report about Muslim horsemen named Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, when he fought on the Battle of the Yarmuk, at one point he is reported charging with his horse, breaching the Byzantine army line.[101] While in the same battle, he also reported has changed his ride to camel, while fighting defensively and praying at the same time.[102]

Aside from carrying provisions, transportations, and for battle usage, the camel mares were valued for their milk production for the warhorses daily nourishments.[79] The camels milk reserved as substitution for the Rashidun army horses drink whenever water supply unavailable. [79] Two camel mares milk were expected to nourish one horse each day.[79]

Emergency rations and Khalid legendary camels march

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Geographical Map detailing the route of Khalid ibn al-Walid's invasion of Syria
A map showing one of a series of possible itineraries of Khalid's march to Syria from Iraq

Desperate caravaners are known to have consumed camels' urine and to have slaughtered them when their resources were exhausted.[103]

Around 634, after the clash at the Battle of Firaz against intercepting Byzantine forces, caliph Abu Bakr immediately instructed Khalid to reinforce the contingents of Abu Ubaydah, Amr ibn al-As, Mu'awiyah, and Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan which started to invade Syria. Khalid immediately started his nearly impossible journey with his elite forces after leaving Muthanna ibn Haritha as his deputy in Iraq and instructed his soldiers to make each camel drink as much as possible before they started the six-day nonstop march without resupply.[104][Notes 9] In the end, Khalid managed to reach Suwa spring and immediately defeated the Byzantine garrison in Arak, Syria,[106] who were surprised by Khalid's force's sudden emergence from the desert.[107]

According to Hugh Kennedy, historians across the ages assessed this daring journey with various expressions of amazement. Classical Muslim historians praised the marching force's perseverance as a miracle work of Allah, while most western modern historians regard this as solely the genius of Khalid.[108] It is Khalid, whose, in Hugh Kennedy's opinion, imaginative thinking effected this legendary feat.[108] The historian Moshe Gil calls the march "a feat which has no parallel" and a testament to "Khalid's qualities as an outstanding commander",[109] while Laura Veccia Vaglieri dismissed the adventure of Khalid as never having happened as Vaglieri thought such journey were logically impossible.[110] Nevertheless, military historian Richard G. Davis explained that Khalid imaginatively employed camel supply trains to make this journey possible.[104] Those well hydrated camels that accompanied his journey were proven before in the Battle of Ullais for such a risky journey.[111] Khalid resorted to slaughtering many camels for provisions for his desperate army.[104]

Rashidun army camels also bore offspring while marching to the battle, as Tabari recorded the Rashidun vanguard commander Aqra' ibn Habis, testified before the Battle of al-Anbar, the camels belongs to his soldiers were about to give birth. However, since the Aqra' would not halt the operation, he instructed his soldiers to carry the newborn camels on the rumps of adult camels.[112]

Mahranite camelier corps

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Amr ibn al-As led a ruthless cavalry corps from tribes of Al-Mahra who were famous for their "invincible battle skills on top of their mounts", during the conquests of Egypt and north Africa[Notes 10]. Al-Mahra tribes were experts in camelry and famed for their high-class Mehri camel breed which were renowned for their speed, agility and toughness.[100]

Hima breeding ground

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Arabian Camel herd grazing near the Riyadh River, southeast Diriyah

Hima natural reserve which instituted by the early leaders of Islam caliphate were one of the main factor for their army to be able to keep supplying mounts in large numbers.[79] This breeding institution were formed by the caliphs Nejd, where the steppe vegetation apparent in Arabia.[79] The Hima breeding fields were consisted of large area maintained the vegetative and the animals could lived and bred completely free, as no one are allowed to enter the Hima except the rightful owner of the animals which bred on there.[79]

The history of Hima breeding grounds preservation as an effort to supply the army with mounts were rooted from the early Islam period, where Modern Islamic studies researchers theorized institution of Hima by caliph Umar, who inspired by the earliest Hima established in Medina during the time of Muhammad.[113] Muhammad has declared the valley of Naqi (Wadi an-Naqi) to be reserved for the army mounts usage.[114] Another known Hima breeding grounds during the caliphate were in Kufa, which supervised by Rabi' al Kinda, father in law of the son of Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas, governor of Kufa during caliphate of Umar and Uthman.[115] Muhammad himself instructed that some of private property at the outskirts of Medina was transformed into Hima.[116] Banu Kilab tribe from Hawazin confederation were known to manage the Ḥima Ḍarīyya in Nejd.[117][118][120]

Caliph Umar particularly ordered the extensive establishments of Hima in the conquered areas in Iraq and Levant after the battle of Yarmuk and the battle of Qadisiyyah, as the Rashidun caliphate gained large swath of territory after those two battles.[79] Another reason the caliph Umar moved Hima from Medina was the increasing military demand for camels for which the lands near Medina no longer sufficed.[113] According to classical Muslim sources, caliph Umar acquired some fertile land in Arabia which were deemed fit for large-scale camel breeding to be established as Hima, government-reserved land property used as pasture to raise camels that were being prepared to be sent to the front line for Jihad conquests.[121] Early sources recorded that the Hima of Rabadha and Diriyah produced 4.000 war camels annually during the reign of Umar, while during the reign of Uthman, both Hima lands further expanded until al-Rabadha Hima alone could produce 4.000 war camels.[122] At the time of Uthman's death, there were said to be around 1.000 war camels already prepared in al-Rabadhah.[122]

The Hima breeding program of stockbreeding were soon adopted by the Ghassanids Arabs who supplied horses to the Byzantines.[79] The Lakhmids Arabs in Iraq who used the Persian breed as their horses, also adopted the Hima system with success.[79] The Hima breeding grounds in Nejd survived until the 20th century during the reign of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia government abolished those reserve places in 1957.[123] The reason of the abolition were presumed by Shamekh as the effort of Saudi government to encourage sendentarization.[123]

Legacy

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Modern historians and genealogists concluded that the stocks of early caliphate cavalry army that conquered from the western Maghreb of Africa, Spain to the east of Central Asia are drawn from the stock of fierce Bedouin pastoral nomads who take pride of their well-guarded mares genealogy,[124][125][126][127] and called themselves the "People of the lance".[Notes 11] Thus, this caused many aspect of influences, whether the Animal breedings[128] or another social and religious development within the territories they have conquered,[129] Including Indian subcontinent.[130]

Horsebreeding

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The Mammals beast of burden brought by these desert warriors on horseback in massive scale unanimously agreed by historians and breeding researchers as bringing some degree of cultural influences towards their subjugated lands, whether it by the massive scale utilization of dromedaries,[127][131] or their horses, as Muslim conquests of North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula brought large numbers of Arabian horses,[23] The regular supply of horses from Hima breeding grounds has taken effect particularly after Muslim conquest of Persia, North Africa, and central Asia.[79]

The Barb horse may have come with the Umayyad Caliphate army who settled in the Guadalquivir valley, as both the Arabian strain were brought by the Muslim empires to Europe, which implied by Margareth Greely, through military mean.[128] The Barb horse spread theory were supported by Helen Goldstein who theorized about how the conqueror of Spain, Tariq ibn Ziyad brought the Barb horses along with the Arabian strain during the Muslim conquest of Iberia, as the Barb horses are favored for spare mounts by forces of Tariq as Goldstein theorized the Muslim invaders prized the Arabian breed so much, so they keep them most of the times, while they used the Barbs for trivial routines. The Barbs brought by them crossbreeded through ages with native Spanish horses.[132] Barbs crossbreedings with Spanish stock under 300 years of Umayyad patronage has developed the Andalusian horse (and the Lusitano) breeds.[133] Regarding the Portuguese claimed Lusitano breed, Juan Valera-Lemait noted the evidence of the exchange of blood between the Iberian breeds with Barb breeds were mutually beneficial, to the point that modern Barb more resembling the Iberian breed stock as well as the criollo horses of South America. while the introduction to America continent were related to the Muslim invasion medieval era, when Spain and Portugal were in constant war with the Berber invaders where horse and horsemanship had become finely attuned to the war exercises. Thus resulted the Conquistadors introduced and dispersed the breed throughout America.[134]

Meanwhile, the genetics strength of the desert-bred Arabian horse, Arabian bloodlines have played a part in the development of nearly every modern light horse breed, including the Orlov Trotter,[135] Morgan,[136] American Saddlebred,[137] American Quarter Horse,[136] and Warmblood breeds such as the Trakehner.[138] Arabian bloodlines have also influenced the development of the Welsh Pony,[136] the Australian Stock Horse,[136] Percheron draft horse,[139] Appaloosa,[140] and the Colorado Ranger Horse.[141] In modern era, peoples cross Arabians with other breeds to add refinement, endurance, agility and beauty. In the US, Half-Arabians have their own registry within the Arabian Horse Association, which includes a special section for Anglo-Arabians (Arabian-Thoroughbred crosses).[142] Some crosses originally registered only as Half-Arabians became popular enough to have their own breed registry, including the National Show Horse (an Arabian-Saddlebred cross),[143] the Quarab (Arabian-Quarter Horse),[144] the Pintabian[145] the Welara (Arabian-Welsh Pony),[146] and the Morab (Arabian-Morgan).[147]

Another possible strain of horse that came to Europe with these Islamic cavalry invaders was the Turkoman horse,[24] which was possibly brought from Muslim conquest of Transoxiana and Persia.

Mamluk horse

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The successful Hima breeding programs of the early caliphates has effected the inexhaustable supply of manpowers and warhorses, which extended to the Mamluk Sultanate 150 years of cavalry superiority before the advent of firearms.[79]

Aside from practical military use, The breeding of pure Arabian breed were practiced by the military regime of Mamluk as way to gain social prestige in a middle of Arabian aristocratic society in Egypt, Sham, and Hejaz.[98] Since the Mamluks were hailed from slave backgrounds, which consisted from Turkic peoples from the Eurasian Steppe,[148][149][150] and also from Circassians,[149][151] Abkhazians,[152][153][154] Georgians,[155][156][157][158] Armenians,[159] Albanians,[160] Greeks,[155] South Slavs[155][160][161] (see Saqaliba) or Egyptians.[162] The Mamluk thought that the genealogical purity of their steeds were symbols of martial horsery culture of Arabians, religious purity, and military might.[98]

Arabian horses also spread to the rest of the world via the Ottoman Empire, which rose in 1299. this Turkish empire obtained many Arabian horses through trade, diplomacy and war.[5] The Ottomans encouraged formation of private stud farms in order to ensure a supply of cavalry horses.[163]

Delhi Sultanate and Mughal Empire

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During the Umayyad campaigns in India, Muhammad ibn Qasim has brought cavalry of 6000 riding fine Arabian Horses.[164] Since then, exports of horses via the maritime routes through the Persian Gulf, supplied mainly from Arabian peninsula and southern Iran has flowed through India.[165] Since then, the Muslim regimes in India has undergoing extensive cavalry army building which revolved around the Arabian horse, such as Delhi Sultanate,[130] and also the Mughal Empire,[166] as it is attested further by the period of Mughal of the 16th to 17th century, when horses were imported from the countries of Arabia, Iran, Turkey and Central Asia to India.[167]

the Bhimthadi horse, or Deccani horse breed, gets its name from the vast Deccan Plateau in India. A major trade in Arabian horse breeds in the ports of Deccan began after the Bahamani Sultanate revolted against the Delhi Sultanate.[168] The Bhimthadi breed was developed in Pune district in 17th and 18th centuries during the Maratha rule by crossing Arabian and Turkic breeds with local ponies.[169][170]

Rise of Saudi

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Arabian horses were classified based on their geographical provenance by their bedouin masters, such as Hejaz, Najd, Yemen, Bilād al‑Shām, Jezirah, or Iraq breed as example.[98]

The Najd breed were somehow found their prominence both in warfare and cultural heritage in accordance with the rise of their master's regime, House of Saud and Wahhabism religious movement which spanned from the time of Wahhabi War on early 18th AD century, towards the aftermath of World War I.[171] During Unification of Saudi Arabia war, high ranked Arabian peninsula desert communities such as Sharif of Mecca and the first Saudi Emirate put emphasis on their Arabian horse breedings, in well documented records from Carl Raswan and other desert researchers.[171]

In modern era, royal family from Kingdom of Saud also known for their love for breeding horses and spent expenses for such effort.[172]

Islamic ruling regarding war horses breeds

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The profound tradition of Arabian horse breeding exaltation by early caliphate soldiers even became a basis for scholars of later era. Muslim jurists who codified Islamic law from the mid‑eighth century to strongly connect the horse with Jihad, as They especially stated that it should receive shares in the plunder: two parts of the fourth‑fifths share by Maliki, Shafiʽi school and Hanbali, while one for Abū Ḥanīfa.[98] Accordingl, there are belief in Islam about the Arabian horses which found in Hadith that an Arabian breeds were praying for their owners to God two times a day.[173]

Shafi'i jurist, Al-Mawardi, to establish the ruling of regular military share that the owner of noble purebreed Arabian(al‑khayl al‑ʿitāq) should be rewarded a share of booty three times of regular infantry soldiers, while owners of inferior mixed breeds received only twice infantry soldiers' share.[87] Al-Mawardi seems based his ruling from hadith tradition from companion of the prophet named Abd Allah ibn Amr ibn al-As.[98] While Ahmad ibn Hanbal ruled that "a mixed‑breed birdhawn (al‑birdhawn al‑hajīn) should be given the half share of the noble Arabian [horse] (al‑ʿarabī al‑ʿatīq). Henceforth, the rider (fāris) of the birdhawn should be given two shares whereas the rider of the noble Arabian horse should be given three shares"[98] The related tradition of cavalry spoils privilege from Miqdad ibn Aswad[Notes 12] and Zubayr ibn al-Awwam privileged share of five times that of normal soldiers by the ruling that Zubayr were owner of warhorse and also a relative of Muhammad were discussed by modern Salafi scholars as valid rules based on those hadiths.[Notes 13]

Military, religious and political legacy

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During the Second Fitna, Najdat controlled Yamama in central Arabia, whereas Azariqa controlled Fars and Kirman in southern Persia.

Chroniclers recorded Kharijites as among fiercest and most zealous element within caliphate cavalry hailed from the Bedouin tribes of Arabs[50] and Berbers,[176][Notes 14] that will later revolt against their own caliphate.[129] 8th century chronicler, Al-Jahiz noted Kharijites horsemen ferocity, who spent parts of their early career in Kufa as Rashidun garrison troop during the Muslim conquest of Persia.[178]

The Kharijites were feared for their powerful cavalry charge with their lances which could break any defensive line, and almost never lose when pitted against equal number of opponents.[50] This claim also supported by Akbar Shah Khan Najibabadi, who has given measure that a valiant Kharijite army sometimes could even defeat an opponent whose number were ten times or twenty times bigger than them.[179] The testament Kharijites prowess are when the Kharijites quietists faction[Notes 15] led by Abu Bilal Mirdas,[Notes 16] who hailed from Tamim tribe decimated the 2,000 Umayyad force from Basra under Aslam ibn Zur'a al-Kilabi, with only forty men in the encounter at the village of Asak near Ramhurmuz.[182][183][184]

Meanwhile, Al-Jahiz also pointed out Kharijites steeds' speed could not intercepted by most rival cavalrymen in medieval era, save for the Turkish Mamluks,[50] As Tabari recorded the stamina and nimbleness of Kharijites, where they will even retreat long time, as it takes early morning until time for Salah prayer for Abu al-Rawwagh, caliphate commander, to pursue them without breaking down.[185]

Furthermore, legendary perseverance of the Kharijites in history were recorded several times in the medieval chronicles, such as when Abd al-Rahman ibn Muljam, member of Kharijite assassin who murdered Ali, did not flinch in pain or shown fear when his arms, legs, and eyes mutilated by Ali sons, Hasan ibn Ali and Husayn ibn Ali, before being executed. Ibn Muljam only shown fear when it is his tongue are about cut, due to his reason that if his tongue were cut, he cannot pray with his mouth again before executed.[186][187] or when the Ibadi Rustamid warriors under Abd al-Wahhab ibn Abd al-Rahman are said never flinched against hails of enemy arrows, and even laughed when arrows stuck on their bodies.

Hurqus and Iraqi Kharijites

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According to Al-Shahrastani, an 11th AD century Shafiite scholar, the proto Kharijite group were called al-Muhakkima al-Ula.[188] they were rooted in the Muslim warriors existed in the times of Muhammad.[19] the al-Muhakkima al-Ula group were led by a figure named Dhu al-Khuwaishirah at-Tamimi,[189] more famously known as Hurqus ibn Zuhayr as-Sa'di, a Tamim tribe chieftain, veteran of the Battle of Hunayn and first generation Kharijites who protested the war spoils distribution.[19][20] Hurqus were recorded being prophesied by a Hadith from Muhammad that he will revolt against Caliphate later.[190]

At first, Hosts of Hurqus were among those who participated in the Muslim conquest of Persia led by Arfajah, Rashidun general who commands the army and navy in Iraq. During Conquest of Khuzestan, Hurqus defeated Hormuzan in 638 at Ahvaz (known as Hormizd-Ardashir in modern era) to subdue the city.[191] However, later during the reign of Uthman, Hurqus was one of the ringleaders from Basra that conspired to assassinate Uthman.[190] They are the soldiers of Ali during the battle of Siffin, who later rebelled towards the Caliphate of Ali and planned their rebellion in the village of Haruri.[188] Despite being suppressed by Ali, remnants of Hurqus group of Muhakkima al-Ula or the Haruriyya proto-Kharijites has survived and would later influenced the splinter sects of Azariqa, Sufriyyah, Ibadiyyah, Yazidiyyah, Maimuniyyah, Ajaridah, al-Baihasiyyah, and the Najdat radical sects.[188][Notes 17] These violent warrior sects would plague the entire history of Rashidun Caliphate, Umayyad, and Abbasid with endemic rebellions.

The host of Hurqus also contained another troublesome Kharijite embryos that also came to Iraq under Arfajah were the ones that hail from Bajila tribe,[21] Notable seditionist warriors from this tribe were Abd Allah ibn Wahb al-Rasibi, who participated in the early conquests of Persia under Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas.[22] and later joined the hosts of Hurqus against caliphate of Ali in the battle of Nahrawan.[129]

Scholars evaluations about Kharijites

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According to Shafiite scholar Abdul Qahir ibn Thahir Bin Muhammad Al Baghdadi in his book of encyclopedia of astray sect within Islam, al-Farq bain al-Firaq, The Azariqa were the most strongest faction with biggest followers.[188] They are the first target by Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr to be suppressed, who sent Al-Muhallab ibn Abi Sufra for the operation.[188] Despite their military strength and fanatical zealotry, the Azariq followers were superficially prone to disunity and Divide and rule strategy launched by Muhallab, who acknowledged of the shallowness of the Azariqa Jihad concept when faced by Muhallab own jurists, engaging some religious debate towards some of their key members of the Kharijites regarding the flaw of their Islamic practice and Jihad, thus enticed most of them to indirectly serving Muhallab by striking their own allies.[188] This fatal flaw were, according to Akbar Shah Najibabadi, the reason why Muhallab never lose his battle against the fearsome Kharijites, while seven of Muhallab sons also shown exemplarly success during anti-Kharijite operations.[179]

Dr. Adam Ali M.A.PhD. postulated that Al-Jahiz's assessment of the military quality of Kharijites are synonymous with the regular Arab cavalry in general term of speed and charging maneuver.[50] In fact, ʿAbd al-Malik ibn Ḥabīb, a jurist and historian in the 9th century described the Berber Kharijites as a mirror match for the Caliphate army, as they are resembling the Arabic caliphate martial tradition, except for the loyalty to authority.[176] Ibn Nujaym al-Hanafi, Hanafi scholar, outlined his evaluation about Kharijites: "... kharijites are a folk possessing strength and zealotry, who revolt against the government due to a self-styled interpretation. They believe that government is upon falsehood, disbelief or disobedience that necessitates it being fought against, and they declare lawful the blood and wealth of the Muslims...”.[129]

Scholars of later such as Al-Dhahabi, Abu Dawud al-Sijistani Muhammad ibn al-Uthaymeen, and Majd ad-Dīn Ibn Athir era has observed the historical influence of Dhu al-Khuwaishirah Hurqus at-Tamimi and Abu Bilal Mirdas at-Tamimi on their commentary notes as a warning against the danger of Khawarij, even when they are just criticizing the superiors in public and not openly rebelled.[181][180]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Rashidun cavalry comprised the mounted forces of the (632–661 CE), the first Islamic state succeeding the , characterized primarily as light horsemen emphasizing speed, flanking attacks, and minimal armor to exploit mobility advantages over the heavier armored cavalry of Byzantine and Sassanid foes. These units, drawn from tribal warriors and augmented by converted , numbered relatively few—often a small elite core within larger infantry-heavy armies—but proved decisive through tactical versatility, including charges, , and occasional use, while forgoing initial adoption of common among opponents. Their defining role emerged in the caliphate's explosive conquests, enabling the overrun of Sassanid Persia and Byzantine , , and within two decades, as seen in pivotal victories like the Battle of Yarmouk (636 CE), where Arab horsemen's agility outpaced Byzantine cataphracts amid harsh terrain and dust storms, and the (636–637 CE), which shattered Persian dominance through repeated flank disruptions and pursuit of routing foes. These successes stemmed from causal factors including religious zeal fostering cohesion, decentralized command allowing adaptive maneuvers, and logistical simplicity suited to desert origins, contrasting with enemies' cumbersome supply lines and internal divisions—though later accounts from Abbasid-era chroniclers introduce potential hagiographic inflation of numbers and feats, underscoring the need for cross-verification with archaeological and non-Islamic sources. By Caliph Umar's era, cavalry integration of captured Persian tactics and equipment further amplified their shock potential, laying groundwork for enduring Islamic military traditions despite the caliphate's internal fractures post-661 CE.

Origins and Development

Formation During Ridda Wars

The (632–633 CE), launched by Caliph shortly after Muhammad's death on 8 June 632 CE, necessitated the rapid assembly of mobile forces to suppress widespread and tribal rebellions across Arabia, marking the initial organization of what would become the Rashidun cavalry. divided the available Muslim warriors—estimated at around 12,000–13,000 from and loyal environs—into 11 expeditionary columns, each comprising supported by horsemen drawn from affluent tribal elements capable of maintaining , such as members of the and Ansar clans. These early cavalry detachments, typically numbering 100–400 per column based on surviving tribal resources, emphasized light horse units for , pursuit, and flanking, leveraging Arabia's nomadic warfare traditions where camels handled while horses enabled bursts of speed in combat. Khalid ibn al-Walid's central column exemplified this formation, integrating for decisive maneuvers against rebels like Tulayha of the tribe; in the (late 632 CE), mounted warriors executed enveloping attacks that exploited the rebels' dispersed formations, securing victory and consolidating 's reputation for tactics. Similarly, at the Battle of Yamama (December 632–January 633 CE) against Musaylima's , charges disrupted infantry lines, though at high cost with up to 1,200 Muslim casualties reported. These campaigns highlighted the 's causal role in restoring unity: their mobility allowed coverage of 1,000+ miles of terrain in months, preventing rebel coalescence, while reliance on personal equipment—lances, swords, and minimal mail—kept units agile against numerically superior but less coordinated foes. Abu Bakr's insistence on centralized command over tribal levies formalized recruitment, prioritizing loyalty and horsemanship over sheer numbers, laying groundwork for scaled expansion.

Expansion Under Umar and Uthman

During Caliph Umar's reign (634–644 CE), the Rashidun cavalry expanded from tribal auxiliaries into a structured force integral to the caliphate's conquests, with Umar establishing permanent garrisons (misr) in conquered lands that included mounted units for rapid response and pursuit. The elite fursan (cavalry knights) units, initially formed under Khalid ibn al-Walid, grew to several thousand horsemen across multiple fronts, leveraging light armor and Arabian horses' stamina for superior mobility over Byzantine heavy cavalry and Sasanian cataphracts. This expansion enabled coordinated campaigns, such as detaching Syrian cavalry reinforcements to the Persian theater after 636 CE. In key battles, cavalry tactics proved decisive; at the Battle of Yarmouk (August 636 CE), approximately 8,000–10,000 Muslim horsemen under commanders like executed flanking attacks and gap-plugging maneuvers, routing a Byzantine force of up to 100,000 and securing . Similarly, during the (late 636 CE), cavalry charges by Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas's forces disrupted Sasanian elephant corps and , leading to the collapse of Persian resistance in despite numerical inferiority (Muslim army ~30,000 vs. Persian ~100,000+). In Egypt's conquest (639–642 CE), led ~4,000 troops, with cavalry enabling reconnaissance, raids, and the siege of , culminating in the fall of . Under Caliph (644–656 CE), cavalry forces further proliferated through recruitment from new provinces and access to superior Persian and Byzantine breeds, supporting expeditions into (642–652 CE), , and initial North African incursions under . Armies grew to 20,000–40,000 per theater, with mounted contingents comprising 20–30% for scouting and , as seen in the 647 CE raid on . However, Uthman's favoritism toward Umayyad kin strained tribal loyalties, diverting resources from military refinement amid rising internal revolts, though the cavalry retained its role as the empire's vanguard for territorial consolidation.

Evolution Under Ali

During the of ibn Abi Talib (656–661 CE), the Rashidun cavalry shifted from external conquests to internal suppression of rebellions and confrontation with Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan's Syrian forces amid the , emphasizing mobility for rapid response over sustained offensive campaigns. This period tested the cavalry's reliance on tribal loyalty and light armament, as political fractures led to defections and indiscipline within units previously unified under conquest incentives. In the Battle of the Camel (December 656 CE) near , Ali's cavalry supported the infantry in encircling rebel positions led by , Talha, and al-Zubayr, contributing to the of approximately 3,000–13,000 rebels while sustaining 500–5,000 losses; mounted warriors exploited the terrain for flanking, highlighting their role in close-quarters tribal warfare rather than open-field charges against foreign . The (July 657 CE) along the represented the cavalry's adaptation to prolonged standoffs, with Ali's estimated 80,000–90,000 troops—including several thousand mounted—engaging in skirmishes where conducted probing assaults and secured water access against Muawiya's larger 120,000-man force; tactics focused on fixing enemy with archers before strikes on flanks, though halted decisive maneuvers and exposed vulnerabilities to ideological . Subsequent clashes, such as the (658 CE) against the —who had splintered from 's ranks after Siffin—underscored evolving challenges, as these rebels employed fanatical lance charges that could shatter lines, forcing 's to prioritize disciplined formations over aggressive pursuit; this internal threat refined emphasis on command loyalty, with appointing proven leaders like to integrate tribal horsemen effectively against similarly equipped foes. Overall, the retained its light composition of lances, swords, and minimal armor for speed, but civil strife diminished recruitment and cohesion, foreshadowing fragmentation into factional forces beyond the era.

Organization and Personnel

Recruitment and Tribal Composition

The Rashidun cavalry was recruited primarily through tribal levies from Arab tribes that had pledged allegiance to the caliphate after the Ridda Wars (632–633 CE), with warriors self-equipping based on personal or tribal resources. Nomadic and semi-nomadic groups, such as those from the Banu Asad and Sulaym, predominated in cavalry roles due to their horsemanship and access to Arabian steeds, forming elite mobile units like the fursan that numbered around 3,000–4,000 during key battles such as Yarmouk in 636 CE. Initial recruitment under Abu Bakr (r. 632–634 CE) relied on volunteers from the Muhajirun (Meccan emigrants, mainly Quraysh) and Ansar (Medinan helpers), but expanded to incorporate subdued apostate tribes, ensuring broad tribal participation while maintaining Islamic unity over pre-existing feuds. Under Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE), the diwan al-jund (military registry) formalized recruitment by assigning stipends ('ata) scaled to early conversion dates and service, with cavalrymen receiving double or triple pay to offset horse maintenance costs, thus incentivizing affluent tribesmen to join. This system drew from central Arabian tribes like , Thaqif, and Hudhayl for the Syrian front, where they comprised the bulk of mounted forces, while eastern campaigns against the Sasanians incorporated northern tribes such as Bakr ibn Wa'il and Tamim, known for their raiding expertise. Tribal contingents operated under their own shaykhs, preserving internal cohesion but subordinating to caliphal commanders, with Yemenite tribes like contributing auxiliary cavalry after their pacification around 632 CE. Tribal composition reflected Arabia's fragmented structure, with providing leadership cadres due to their prophetic lineage, but numerical strength from peripheral alliances that bolstered mobility without diluting core loyalty. Excluded initially were non-Arab converts and unreliable fringes, prioritizing cohesive Arab Muslim units; by Uthman's reign (r. 644–656 CE), however, selective integration of frontier tribes like the Mahra enhanced specialized horsemen for desert operations. This tribal framework ensured rapid mobilization—up to 40,000 total forces by 636 CE—but risked factionalism, mitigated through booty distribution favoring mounted victors.

Training and Discipline

The cavalry forces of the Rashidun Caliphate, drawn primarily from tribal Arab horsemen, underwent training rooted in the Bedouin nomadic traditions of pre-Islamic Arabia, where riding skills were acquired from childhood through daily survival and raiding activities. Horsemanship was a cultural hallmark, symbolizing prestige and wealth, with young Arabs learning to handle Arabian horses in desert environments, emphasizing endurance, speed, and maneuverability over formalized drills. Practical proficiency in mounted archery, lance charges, and swordplay developed via experiential warfare, including the ghazw raids and the Ridda Wars (632–633 CE), rather than structured academies, as systematic equestrian martial codes like furusiyya emerged only in later medieval Islamic periods. Caliph (r. 634–644 CE) introduced organizational reforms to enhance effectiveness, including emphasis on training for soldiers to bolster ranged capabilities from horseback, a integral to tactics. These efforts built on inherent Arab mobility advantages, enabling rapid adaptation to conquest campaigns against Byzantine and Sasanian forces, where units executed flanking maneuvers and pursuits honed through battlefield repetition rather than peacetime regimens. Discipline within Rashidun cavalry units was maintained through a combination of religious motivation, tribal cohesion, and administrative oversight, yielding a force noted for strategic adherence despite its tribal composition. Umar formalized military structure in 637 CE by integrating the army into state administration, beginning with Quraysh and Ansar contingents, and instituting regular stipends to reduce reliance on spoils and curb looting indiscipline. He appointed monitoring officers known as 'arif to enforce conduct, penalizing cowardice, desertion, or breaches like unauthorized plunder, while promoting loyalty via merit-based promotions and shared jihad incentives. This system, coupled with Islamic doctrines of obedience to divinely sanctioned leaders, minimized internal fractures during expansions, as evidenced by coordinated operations at battles like Yarmouk (636 CE) and Qadisiyyah (636 CE), where cavalry held formations under duress. Such mechanisms contrasted with looser pre-caliphal tribal warfare, fostering reliability in prolonged sieges and pursuits.

Equipment and Armament

Weapons and Personal Gear

The primary armament of Rashidun cavalry consisted of the (rumḥ) and , optimized for mobility and rather than prolonged melee engagements. The , typically a long-shafted thrusting weapon, was wielded overarm or two-handed to exploit the speed of Arabian horses for flanking attacks on disorganized foes, as evidenced in battles like Yarmouk in 636 CE where such maneuvers disrupted Byzantine formations. Swords, often straight-bladed types inherited from pre-Islamic Arabian traditions, served for close-quarters cutting or thrusting once lances were discarded or broken; early curved variants like as-sayf al-qala'i emerged but were not dominant until later periods. Secondary weapons included composite bows for , enabling harassing volleys during advances or retreats, a technique rooted in Bedouin skirmishing practices and adapted for larger-scale conquests under commanders like . Javelins or short spears supplemented these for throwing at range, though less emphasized than in roles, reflecting the cavalry's emphasis on velocity over sustained firepower. Personal gear prioritized lightness: small round shields of leather-covered wicker or wood for deflection, quivers slung across the back for arrows, and simple scabbards or sheaths attached to belts, all minimizing encumbrance to preserve the endurance of mounts over vast terrains from Arabia to . Daggers or short knives, akin to precursors of the , were standard sidearms for utility and last-resort defense, often carried in sheaths at the waist alongside water skins and minimal rations to support extended raids without logistical trains. This equipment suite underscored causal trade-offs in design—favoring agility and tribal familiarity over the heavier panoplies of Sasanian or Byzantine cataphracts, which proved decisive in outmaneuvering numerically superior enemies during the conquests of 632–661 CE. Archaeological finds from early Islamic sites, such as lanceheads and sword fittings, corroborate this lightweight profile, with iron blades showing simple forging techniques suited to nomadic smithing.

Armor and Protective Measures

The Rashidun cavalry, emphasizing speed and maneuverability in open and desert terrains, employed minimal to avoid encumbering their mounts and riders during rapid charges and retreats. Primary protections included quilted or padded garments made from felt, , or layered fabric, which offered defense against slashes and light projectiles while remaining lightweight and breathable in arid climates; these were locally produced in Arabia and drew from pre-Islamic traditions. Leather lamellar or scale constructs, sewn onto tunics, supplemented these for wealthier warriors, providing flexibility without the rigidity of heavier metal equivalents. Chain mail hauberks (dir'), though known through trade and conquests, were uncommon among core Arab light horsemen due to their prohibitive weight—often exceeding 20 kilograms—and the scarcity of skilled armorers in early 7th-century Arabia; adoption increased sporadically via spoils from Sassanid or Byzantine arsenals, but even then, s prioritized unarmored agility over comprehensive encasement. Helmets, when worn, typically comprised simple conical iron or reinforced caps, sometimes augmented by turbans for sun protection and minor impact absorption; mail aventails draping the neck and face appeared in limited contexts but were not standard. Shields formed the cavalry's most ubiquitous defensive tool, favoring small, convex round types (dhal) of 60-80 cm constructed from , , or hide frames covered in thick or rawhide, often bossed with iron for parrying lances or arrows; these weighed under 5 kilograms, enabling one-handed use alongside lances or bows. Larger oval shields occasionally supplemented for prolonged engagements, but horse barding remained absent, as encumbering mounts contradicted the force's doctrinal reliance on unhindered pursuit and evasion. This equipment profile, verified through archaeological parallels from 7th-century Levantine sites and contemporary accounts, underscored a tactical calculus favoring offensive momentum over static resilience, contributing to victories against heavier-armored foes at battles like Yarmouk in 636 CE.

Military Standards


The Rashidun cavalry utilized military standards primarily consisting of black banners designated as al-raya, employed for wartime identification and rallying combat units, alongside white al-liwa' standards reserved for command and civil purposes. These banners, carried by dedicated standard-bearers within cavalry formations, facilitated unit cohesion during rapid maneuvers and charges, drawing from pre-Islamic Arab traditions adapted to Islamic conquests. Historical accounts indicate that black al-raya symbolized jihad and were prominently featured in campaigns under Caliphs Abu Bakr and Umar, such as the Ridda Wars and invasions of Syria and Iraq, where they helped coordinate tribal contingents amid the chaos of battle.
Tribal banners supplemented the central Islamic standards, reflecting the cavalry's composition from clans like , Ansar, and others, each bearing distinctive colors and symbols to denote allegiance and origin. For instance, commanders such as employed red standards in Egyptian campaigns, while units carried flags with black or green motifs evoking prophetic traditions. These varied standards, often plain or inscribed with the , underscored the decentralized yet unified structure of Rashidun forces, enabling cavalry leaders to signal advances or retreats effectively across diverse terrains from 632 to 661 CE. No original artifacts survive, with reconstructions based on textual descriptions from early chroniclers, highlighting potential interpretive variances in design.

Mounts and Sustainment

Arabian Horses and Breeds

The , indigenous to the , served as the primary mount for Rashidun cavalry forces during the 7th-century Islamic conquests, valued for its adaptation to arid environments and suitability for light, mobile warfare. Selectively bred by tribes over centuries prior to the Rashidun era (632–661 CE), these horses exhibited traits such as superior endurance, allowing riders to cover vast desert distances—often exceeding 100 kilometers per day—on scant rations of water and forage, which underpinned the rapid advances of armies against Persian and Byzantine foes. This resilience stemmed from in harsh nomadic conditions, where horses were integrated into tribal life, tethered in tents for protection and loyalty, fostering a bond that enhanced their reliability in and pursuits. Physically, the breed featured compact builds averaging 14 to 15 hands in height, dense bones for durability under combat stress, efficient for tolerance, and strong hooves suited to rocky terrains without frequent shoeing. These attributes enabled the cavalry's emphasis on speed and agility over heavy armor, with horses typically unencumbered to maximize mobility; historical accounts from Islamic sources highlight their role in outpacing heavier-equipped adversaries, as seen in campaigns like the Battle of Yarmouk (636 CE). Early caliphs, including and , prioritized acquiring purebred (asil) specimens through tribal alliances and spoils, recognizing their strategic edge in sustaining offensives across , , and . Distinct strains within the Arabian type existed among tribes, though formal nomenclature like Kuhaylan or Saglawi developed later in medieval Islamic texts; in the period, variations arose from tribal breeding practices emphasizing warhorse lineages, with and other groups maintaining herds for raiding prowess. Quality was ensured through rigorous selection against defects, with inferior animals culled or gelded, preserving genetic purity that later influenced global via conquest-era exports. This system yielded horses integral to the caliphate's expansion, where contingents, often numbering 3,000 to 10,000 per major , leveraged their mounts' stamina to execute feigned retreats and flanking maneuvers effectively.

Camels for Mobility and Logistics

The dromedary camel (Camelus dromedarius) served as the primary beast of burden and transport mount for forces during non-combat phases, facilitating rapid traversal of arid terrains that hindered enemy supply lines reliant on horses or wagons. These animals enabled armies to cover distances of 100–150 kilometers per day under favorable conditions while carrying loads up to 200–300 kilograms of provisions, including , dates, , and equipment, thus sustaining operations far from settled regions. Their physiological adaptations—storing fat in humps for energy and retaining efficiently in multi-chambered stomachs—permitted on minimal intake, with individuals enduring 3–5 days without drinking by drawing on reserves equivalent to 100–150 liters post-hydration. In practice, Rashidun commanders mounted infantry on camels for strategic marches, preserving scarce horses for decisive charges and avoiding exhaustion from constant foraging in desert fringes. This approach underpinned the mobility of campaigns like the 634 invasion of southern Iraq under Khalid ibn al-Walid, where camel trains bridged gaps between oases and supported encirclements against Sasanian garrisons. Logistics emphasized decentralized supply, with tribal contingents managing their own camel herds—often numbering thousands per corps—to haul tents, spare weapons, and medical stores, minimizing vulnerability to interdiction compared to the Persians' canal-dependent systems. Camel usage extended to auxiliary roles, such as towing light or wounded personnel post-battle, and provided secondary benefits like for hydration (yielding 5–10 liters daily per animal) and hides for emergency shelters. By integrating pastoral expertise, the (632–661) leveraged camels' endurance to outpace Byzantine and Sasanian logistics, which faltered in water-scarce zones during pursuits or retreats, as evidenced in the 636–637 Syrian theater where Arab forces maintained cohesion over extended fronts. Limitations included slower speeds than horses (averaging 40–50 km/h bursts versus camels' sustained 10–15 km/h) and vulnerability to cold or lush terrains, prompting hybrid horse-camel formations for versatility.

Breeding and Supply Systems

The Rashidun cavalry relied on practices inherited from pre-Islamic traditions, where Arabian were prized for their endurance, speed, and intelligence, with tribes maintaining strict purity through limited matings due to scarce resources. These practices emphasized as symbols of prestige, with breeding focused on war-ready traits like cooperative temperament and soundness, often documented orally via nasab (lineage) records preserved by tribal families. Camels, integral to cavalry sustainment, were similarly bred for resilience in arid conditions, supporting mobility without taxing horse stocks. Supply systems combined tribal herds with institutional measures like hima reserves—protected grazing lands established by early caliphs such as and to sustain cavalry mounts, charitable camels, and poor livestock, preventing overgrazing and ensuring fodder availability during campaigns. Conquests augmented supplies, as warriors captured superior Persian and Byzantine horses as booty or ; by the late Rashidun period under (r. 644–656), this influx enabled expanded cavalry forces, with armies foraging and relying on loot for maintenance. Camels formed the logistical backbone, transporting the entire army (including ) to preserve horse energy, carrying , provisions, and even being slaughtered in emergencies for hydration. This hybrid system of breeding, reserves, and acquisition sustained rapid expansions despite initial numerical disadvantages in mounts.

Tactics and Operational Roles

Light Cavalry Maneuvers

The Rashidun , comprising mobile horsemen lightly equipped for speed, specialized in and disruption, scouting enemy positions and supply lines over vast distances in the Syrian and Mesopotamian theaters during the conquests of 632–661 CE. These units, often drawn from tribes accustomed to desert raiding, executed rapid advances and withdrawals to gather intelligence without engaging in prolonged combat, enabling commanders like to anticipate Byzantine and Sassanid movements. In battle, their primary maneuvers involved flanking assaults and , striking enemy wings or rear guards with lances and swords before disengaging to avoid countercharges from heavier armored foes. This tactic exploited the agility of Arabian mounts, which allowed to outmaneuver lumbering cataphracts or , as seen in the encirclement phases where small detachments of 500–1,000 horsemen would feign retreats to draw pursuers into ambushes coordinated with . supplemented these actions, with riders employing the "flying gallop" to loose volleys during charges or retreats, a technique inherited from pre-Islamic warfare and refined for open-field engagements. Pursuit after enemy routs formed another core maneuver, where relentlessly harried fleeing formations, preventing reorganization and maximizing casualties; at the Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 CE, such pursuits extended over 100 kilometers, contributing to the collapse of Byzantine forces under . Similarly, during the in 636–637 CE, cavalry under commanders like executed wide envelopments against Persian flanks, using dust and terrain to mask approaches and disrupt cohesion. These operations underscored the cavalry's role in decisive exploitation rather than frontal confrontation, leveraging numerical inferiority through superior operational tempo.

Integration with Infantry

The Rashidun armies relied predominantly on as the core of their formations, with serving in a supportive role to enhance mobility and tactical flexibility. units, typically organized into tribal-based regiments armed with spears, swords, and shields, formed dense lines to withstand frontal assaults and maintain cohesion against superior numbers, as in the engagements against Byzantine and Sassanid forces. , comprising a smaller elite contingent often drawn from the ahl al-jihad (people of the struggle) or Mobile Guard under commanders like , was deployed on the wings to protect these centers from envelopment, engage opposing mounted units, and exploit gaps created by pressure. This integration emphasized defensive resilience complemented by 's speed for counter-maneuvers, reflecting adaptations from pre-Islamic Arabian raiding tactics to large-scale pitched battles. In major confrontations, such as the Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 CE, Khalid restructured the army into approximately 36 infantry regiments across four corps, supported by four cavalry regiments positioned to shield the flanks and execute targeted strikes. When Byzantine infantry and cavalry threatened to overwhelm the Muslim center, Rashidun horsemen maneuvered to disrupt enemy cohesion, launching charges against exposed flanks and reserves to alleviate infantry strain and force retreats. Similarly, at the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah in 636 CE, cavalry under leaders like al-Ash'ath ibn Qays coordinated with infantry for combined flank assaults on Sassanid lines, where mounted units disrupted enemy formations after initial infantry probes weakened defenses. These operations underscored cavalry's role not as an independent shock force but as an enabler for infantry advances, preventing isolation and enabling pursuit of disorganized foes. This proved effective due to the 's superior horsemanship and the 's , honed through religious and tribal , though it required precise command to avoid overextension. Historians note that while numbers remained limited—often 20-25% of total forces—their integration allowed commanders to offset logistical disadvantages against professional armies by prioritizing rapid response over sustained clashes. Limitations arose in prolonged engagements where fatigue could expose flanks if reserves were committed prematurely, as critiqued in analyses of early battles.

Adaptations for Archery and Sieges

The cavalry, primarily organized as light equipped with lances and swords for rapid flanking and pursuit, demonstrated limited but practical adaptations for , relying on portable bows that could be used from horseback during skirmishes or when direct charges were impractical. These units carried composite or self bows of Arabian design, such as the masnu'ah variant constructed from layered horn, wood, and sinew for greater power in compact form, enabling riders to loose while maintaining mobility against heavier Byzantine cataphracts or Sassanid . However, scholarly examination of early conquest narratives reveals that was not a core tactical emphasis in the era (632–661 CE), with horse archers playing a secondary role compared to bowmen; the cavalry's speed facilitated hit-and-run volleys to harass flanks or disrupt formations, but sustained barrages were more commonly delivered by dismounted specialists or foot integrated into operations. This restraint stemmed from the Arab forces' initial reliance on pre-Islamic tribal warfare patterns, where supplemented rather than defined cavalry function, evolving only modestly through captured Persian equipment post-Qadisiyyah in 636 CE. In siege warfare, Rashidun cavalry shifted from open-field maneuvers to supportive roles, leveraging their endurance and scouting prowess to enforce blockades, intercept relief columns, and deny foraging parties access to resources, thereby accelerating enemy capitulation without direct assault on fortifications. For instance, during the Siege of Jerusalem (636–637 CE), mounted units under Abu Ubaydah ibn al-Jarrah maintained an outer cordon to prevent Byzantine reinforcements from Emperor Heraclius, while inner infantry conducted the investment, showcasing cavalry's adaptation to static operations through sustained patrols over extended desert terrains. Innovative tactics included concealing horsemen in excavated pits near besieged garrisons, as employed by , allowing sudden mounted counterattacks against sorties and minimizing exposure of valuable horses to fire. Dismounting for or spear work further enabled cavalry to contribute to ladder assaults or , though their primary value lay in preserving operational tempo by securing rear areas and supply camel trains, compensating for the army's initial scarcity of dedicated engineers until the adoption of Byzantine and Persian siege machinery after 640 CE. These adaptations underscored the cavalry's versatility in transitioning from nomadic raiding to imperial campaigns, prioritizing encirclement over breaching walls.

Performance in Major Engagements

Battle of Yarmouk

The Battle of Yarmouk, occurring between August 15 and 20, 636 AD, represented a decisive engagement where Rashidun cavalry's mobility and tactical flexibility proved instrumental in overcoming a numerically superior Byzantine army led by commanders such as Vahan and Theodore Trithyrius. The Muslim forces, totaling an estimated 20,000 to 40,000 men under Khalid ibn al-Walid's overall command, included a significant cavalry component comprising light horsemen organized into three to four divisions or regiments, often held in reserve or positioned on the flanks to exploit gaps in the enemy line. Byzantine estimates varied widely in primary accounts, with some Arabic sources claiming up to 200,000 opponents, though modern analyses suggest 40,000 to 80,000, incorporating heavy cataphract cavalry and infantry phalanxes that struggled against the Arabs' hit-and-run skirmishing. Rashidun cavalry, primarily lightly armored riders on swift Arabian horses, disrupted Byzantine advances through repeated feigned retreats and flank attacks during the initial days of skirmishes, preventing the consolidation of the larger formations and wearing down supply lines in the arid near the . deployed these units to shield the Muslim center, where bore the brunt of frontal assaults, while under leaders like Dharar ibn al-Azwar conducted diversions against Byzantine sub-commanders such as Dairjan, creating chaos without committing to prolonged . This approach leveraged the horsemen's superior speed and endurance, contrasting with the slower, chain-mailed Byzantine , which failed to pursue effectively due to logistical strains and overextended lines. The battle's climax on hinged on a masterful cavalry maneuver by , who repositioned his mobile guard—elite horsemen—to link the fragmented right and left wings, then launched a coordinated that struck the Byzantine rear amid a , precipitating a as spread through the disoriented ranks. This tactical cohesion, enabled by the 's ability to rapidly reform and strike decisively, compensated for the Muslims' inferior numbers and heavy reliance on infantry elsewhere, ultimately shattering Byzantine cohesion and opening to conquest. Primary Islamic chronicles, such as those by , emphasize these exploits but inflate enemy figures, reflecting a historiographical tendency to magnify victories; nonetheless, the pattern of dominance over rigid heavy formations aligns with causal factors like terrain exploitation and command initiative observed in subsequent analyses.

Battle of Qadisiyyah

The Battle of al-Qadisiyyah, fought from 16 to 19 November 636 CE near the ruins of al-Hirah in southern , featured Rashidun cavalry as a pivotal mobile element in the Muslim army of approximately 30,000 under against a larger Sassanid force led by , estimated at 30,000 to 100,000 including heavy cataphracts and war elephants. The Rashidun cavalry, primarily light horsemen equipped with bows, lances, and swords, operated in wings flanking the center; the right wing under al-Zuhrah ibn al-Hawiyyah and the left under Hashim ibn Utba emphasized speed and archery to harass and outmaneuver the Persians' armored charges. This composition allowed for tactical flexibility, contrasting the Sassanids' reliance on massed and elephants, which proved vulnerable to amid the battle's dust storms and prolonged engagements over four days. Early phases saw Rashidun cavalry employing karr wa farr ( and ) to disrupt Persian advances, particularly countering elephant charges that panicked Sassanid mounts and ; on the second day, cavalry flanks repelled Mihran ibn Bahram's wing, preventing of the Muslim despite Sa'd's illness confining him to a howdah atop a for command. Reinforcement arrived mid-battle in the form of Qa'qa' ibn Amr al-Tamimi with about 1,000 cavalry, who executed a daring maneuver to strike the Persian rear, exploiting chaos from fleeing Sassanid frightened by Muslim and javelins. These actions fixed Persian forces, wearing down their cohesion through repeated probes rather than direct clashes, as the light cavalry's Arabian enabled sustained mobility in the arid where heavier Persian units fatigued. The climax unfolded on the fourth day when a sudden shift blinded with , prompting a coordinated assault; wings surged forward to shatter Rostam's center, killing the general in and routing the army, with pursuing horsemen under Hashim and Qa'qa' inflicting heavy casualties during the retreat across the Ateeq River, where many drowned. This victory, attributing over half the Sassanid losses to pursuit, opened to Muslim conquest and demonstrated the horsemen's superiority in exploiting environmental factors and enemy disarray over brute force. Historical accounts, drawing from early chroniclers like , highlight 's role in turning numerical disadvantage into decisive success, though Persian sources are scarce, underscoring potential biases in narratives toward emphasizing mobility over contributions.

Other Key Campaigns

In the of 632–633 CE, the cavalry forces under facilitated swift suppression of widespread apostasy and tribal rebellions across Arabia, enabling coordinated strikes against distant threats like the under , which preserved central authority in despite limited infantry resources. The on July 30, 634 CE, saw reinforce with approximately 10,000 cavalry-heavy troops, who traversed the arid desert by alternating horses and camels—slaughtering the latter for water—to launch a surprise assault on Byzantine forces numbering around 40,000, resulting in a rout that opened central to Muslim advances. During the conquest of Egypt from 640 to 642 CE, led an initial force of about 4,000–10,000 mobile troops, predominantly , across the ; their superior speed outmaneuvered Byzantine garrisons, securing victories at (640 CE) and the fortress of (641 CE) through encirclement and harassment, culminating in the surrender of and the establishment of as a base. In the Battle of Nahavand (642 CE), commander al-Nu'man ibn Muqrin's army of roughly 30,000, including significant elements, initiated a fueled by disseminated rumors of Caliph Umar's death to lure 150,000–200,000 Sasanian troops from their fortified positions; concealed then maneuvered behind a hill to strike the Persian rear, exploiting leadership vacuums after the deaths of both commanders to shatter Sasanian cohesion and facilitate the fall of western .

Strengths, Limitations, and Critiques

Advantages in Speed and Cohesion

The cavalry achieved superior speed through the use of lightweight equipment and dual-mount systems, employing camels for extended marches to conserve horse stamina while reserving swift Syrian-Arab bred horses—known for their agility and endurance—for maneuvers. This combination enabled rapid flanking and pursuit tactics, as seen in the exploitation of enemy retreats where cavalry units hovered on the flanks to strike disorganized foes. In contrast to the heavier Byzantine and Sassanid cavalries burdened by extensive armor, the forces prioritized mobility, allowing them to cover vast distances quickly during campaigns like the conquest of in 634–636 CE. Unit cohesion was bolstered by tribal loyalties reinforced with religious zeal under the caliphs, fostering low desertion rates and disciplined formations even in prolonged engagements. Leaders like maintained tight command structures, with cavalry often operating as integrated reserves that could transition seamlessly between mounted charges using long lances (5–11 cubits in length) and dismounted defense if encircled. This adaptability stemmed from pre-Islamic raiding traditions, adapted to unified Islamic command, enabling cohesive responses to dynamic battlefields without the fragmentation seen in multi-ethnic imperial armies. These attributes compounded in operational effectiveness, permitting the Rashidun cavalry to outpace and envelop slower adversaries, as evidenced by their ability to trap retreating forces at bottlenecks during the Battle of Yarmouk in 636 CE. Historians attribute much of the caliphate's early expansion—from Arabia to Persia and the within two decades—to this synergy of velocity and solidarity, which multiplied the impact of numerically inferior forces.

Vulnerabilities and Defeats

The Rashidun cavalry, primarily composed of lightly armed horsemen equipped with lances, swords, and minimal protective gear, exhibited vulnerabilities in direct confrontations against heavily armored opponents, such as Sasanian savaran (elite ) or war elephants, where their lack of plate armor and shields increased susceptibility to missile fire and charges. In the (636 CE), Persian heavy cavalry inflicted heavy casualties on Arab flanks, routing one Rashidun cavalry assault led by Jarir ibn Abd Allah al-Bajali before Muslim forces adapted through , archery, and reinforcements to secure victory after four days of fighting. This engagement underscored the cavalry's dependence on maneuverability and commander skill to mitigate equipment disparities, as prolonged exposure to disciplined heavy units could lead to disproportionate losses despite overall numerical inferiority in mounted troops. Logistical constraints further hampered effectiveness, including limited horse numbers—initially far fewer than Byzantine or Persian forces—and reliance on , which strained sustained operations away from Arabian pastures. Terrain also posed challenges; while mobility favored , engagements in open plains or against fortified positions exposed the to counter-charges if feigned retreats failed against disciplined foes. These limitations were evident in smaller-scale actions where fursan units, though cohesive, could not compensate for understrength detachments without support. Defeats were rare in major campaigns but occurred in the (632–633 CE), where fragmented apostate tribes exploited initial Muslim disorganization. Near , Abu Bakr's main army, including mobile elements, was repelled by Tulayha's forces in an early clash, forcing a retreat and highlighting vulnerabilities in untrained levies lacking full cavalry cohesion. At Yamama, Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl's detachment suffered defeat against Musaylima's apostates, prompting reassignment, while Shurahbil ibn Hasana's unauthorized advance was similarly routed, necessitating Khalid ibn al-Walid's reinforced cavalry to reclaim the field in the decisive second Battle of Yamama (633 CE). These setbacks, overcome through centralized command and rapid mobilization, demonstrated risks in decentralized tribal warfare where cavalry superiority could be neutralized by numerical surprises or false prophets' rallying of riders.

Historiographical Debates

Historians debate the reliability of primary sources for reconstructing Rashidun operations, as most accounts derive from later Abbasid-era chronicles like those of (d. 923 CE) and (d. 892 CE), compiled over a century after the events and reliant on oral traditions that emphasize heroic feats and divine favor. These texts often exaggerate enemy numbers—claiming up to 200,000 Byzantines at Yarmouk in 636 CE—while minimizing Muslim casualties, potentially inflating the perceived decisiveness of maneuvers. Non-Muslim contemporaries, such as the Armenian historian (), corroborate the conquests' scale but provide scant tactical details, leaving room for about specifics like flanking or pursuit roles. Modern scholars like Hugh Kennedy argue that such sources reflect 9th-century Abbasid revisionism to legitimize caliphal authority, urging caution against uncritical acceptance of -centric narratives without cross-verification from or logistics analysis. A central historiographical contention concerns the cavalry's tactical primacy in victories over Byzantine and Sassanid forces, traditionally attributed to Arab mobility, feigned retreats, and harassment unfamiliar to foes depleted by mutual wars (e.g., Byzantine-Sassanid conflict 602–628 CE). Proponents of this view, drawing from Islamic chronicles, highlight instances like the horse-archers and lancers enveloping routed at Qadisiyyah (636–637 CE), enabling rapid exploitation of breakthroughs. However, revisionist analyses, including those by David Nicolle, contend that constituted only 10–20% of forces (e.g., 3,000–4,000 horsemen out of 30,000 at Yarmouk), with and camel corps providing cohesion; effectiveness stemmed more from enemy disunity, superior Arab motivation, and terrain adaptation than innate superiority. Kennedy further posits that overemphasis on ignores logistical enablers like camel-mounted supply lines, which sustained long campaigns across 5,000 km by 651 CE, and critiques romanticized depictions as anachronistic projections of later . Debates also persist on equipment and organization, with sparse archaeological evidence—such as limited 7th-century gear—challenging chronicle claims of widespread lances and . Nicolle reconstructs Rashidun cavalry as predominantly light, with leather or partial for riders suited to endurance, evolving via captured Byzantine cataphracts rather than pre-Islamic tribal norms alone. Critics of maximalist views note institutional biases in sources favoring elites, potentially underrepresenting tribal auxiliaries' contributions, while empirical modeling of battle outcomes supports cavalry's role in pursuit (e.g., annihilating 50,000+ Sassanids post-Qadisiyyah) but not as the sole causal factor amid broader imperial collapses. These discussions underscore a shift from hagiographic to causal analyses, prioritizing verifiable logistics over mythic invincibility.

Enduring Influence

Military Tactical Legacies

The cavalry's tactical emphasis on light, mobile forces equipped primarily with lances, swords, and bows enabled rapid flanking maneuvers, harassment of enemy flanks, and exploitation of breakthroughs created by infantry engagements. This approach contrasted with the heavier, more rigid formations of Byzantine cataphracts and Sassanid , prioritizing speed and versatility to compensate for numerical disadvantages in major battles such as Yarmouk in August 636 CE, where approximately 4,000-6,000 cavalry out of a 20,000-40,000-strong army executed envelopments against a Byzantine force exceeding 100,000. Feigned retreats, a pre-Islamic Arabian technique refined under commanders like , lured opponents into disorganized pursuits, allowing counterattacks that disrupted cohesion—a method causally linked to victories despite inferior armor and numbers. These tactics formed the doctrinal core for successor states, with Umayyad armies (661-750 CE) retaining as the primary mobile element for , raids, and decisive strikes, often comprising 10-20% of forces but pivotal in sustaining conquests into Iberia by 711 CE. The model of integrating tribal horsemen into a centralized Mobile Guard (ahl al-jihad) under caliphal stipend systems influenced Umayyad professionalization via the diwan registers, ensuring loyalty and tactical flexibility amid expansions that tripled the empire's territory. While Abbasid forces (750-1258 CE) gradually incorporated heavier armored cavalry influenced by Central Asian recruits, the foundational reliance on light horse for operational maneuverability persisted, as seen in their campaigns against , where hit-and-run archery and pursuit mirrored precedents. Historiographical analysis attributes this legacy's endurance to the causal effectiveness of mobility in arid terrains, where logistical constraints favored unencumbered over supply-heavy heavy units, a realism evident in the caliphates' avoidance of prolonged sieges in favor of field battles until administrative maturity allowed hybrid evolutions. Later Islamic warfare, including Seljuk and Ayyubid adaptations, echoed these elements in combined-arms doctrines, though Turkic influxes shifted emphasis toward cataphract-style charges by the , diluting pure dominance without erasing the Rashidun-derived preference for offensive flexibility.

Impact on Islamic Warfare Traditions

The cavalry's reliance on light, mobile horsemen armed primarily with lances and swords for flanking maneuvers, rear attacks, and pursuit established a core tactical paradigm in early Islamic warfare, emphasizing speed and harassment over the heavier, archery-dependent cavalry of and Sassanid foes. This approach, honed during conquests from 632 to 661 CE, integrated tribal Arab traditions of raiding with disciplined unit cohesion under commanders like , enabling rapid territorial expansion across diverse terrains without initial adoption of . Such tactics proved decisive in engagements like the Battle of Yarmouk (636 CE), where an estimated 20,000-40,000 horsemen exploited enemy disarray through feigned retreats and countercharges, setting precedents for that prioritized exploiting enemy fatigue from prior conflicts between and Persia. This model profoundly shaped Umayyad (661-750 CE) and Abbasid (750-1258 CE) military traditions by institutionalizing as the vanguard of expansion, with Umayyad forces scaling up to 60,000-100,000 mounted troops in campaigns like the conquest of (647-709 CE), retaining for scouting and shock while incorporating limited Sassanid heavy elements for flexibility. Abbasid armies built on this by professionalizing through the diwan al-jund administrative system and early precursors, blending Arab mobility with Persian influences to field hybrid units capable of sustained operations, as seen in the 762 CE founding of as a logistical hub for mounted expeditions. The persistence of Rashidun-style roles in ghazi frontier raiding against —numbering thousands annually by the 8th century—fostered a cultural valorization of horsemanship in Islamic martial ethos, evident in poetry and praising equine prowess. Long-term, the legacy entrenched a cavalry-dominant that influenced Ottoman and successors, where mounted forces comprised up to 70% of field armies into the , delaying full integration of firearms despite their availability post-1300 CE; this stemmed from the proven efficacy of mobility in and environments, though it contributed to defeats like the 1517 against Ottoman gunpowder tactics. Historians such as Hugh Kennedy argue this evolution reflected adaptive continuity rather than rupture, with early caliphal payment systems (e.g., Umar's ata stipends tied to horse ownership) incentivizing equestrian specialization that echoed tribal levies. Empirical analyses of battle outcomes underscore causal factors like superior cohesion from religious motivation over technological edges, countering narratives of inherent Arab martial superiority by highlighting opportunistic exploitation of imperial overextension.

Modern Scholarly Evaluations

Modern scholars assess the Rashidun cavalry as an evolution from pre-Islamic raiding forces, characterized by light armament and high mobility that proved decisive in the rapid conquests of the 630s and 640s CE. Hugh Kennedy describes these units as inheriting tribal skills in , enabling swift maneuvers that outpaced the heavier cavalry of the Sassanid Persians and Byzantine thematic armies, particularly in arid terrains where enemy logistics faltered. David Nicolle emphasizes their initial reliance on unarmored or lightly mailed horsemen armed with lances, swords, and javelins, suited for flanking and pursuit rather than frontal charges against armored foes. This tactical profile, often comprising 20-30% of field armies like the 36,000-strong force at Yarmouk in 636 CE, allowed integration with to fix enemies before strikes, as analyzed in studies of battles such as Qadisiyyah in 636-637 CE. Evaluations highlight limitations, including limited numbers—estimated at under elite riders empire-wide by mid-century—and dependence on captured and Byzantine/Sassanid defectors for expansion, underscoring that early successes stemmed more from operational tempo than numerical or technological superiority. argues the cavalry's edge lay in exploiting the post-war exhaustion of rival empires, whose mutual conflicts (602-628 CE) depleted reserves, rather than inherent martial exceptionalism. Kennedy further notes professionalization under caliphs like (r. 634-644 CE), with stipends fostering loyalty but revealing vulnerabilities in sustained sieges, where cavalry proved less effective without support. Historiographical debates center on source credibility, with Abbasid-era chroniclers like (d. 923 CE) inflating cavalry feats to glorify Arab origins, potentially overstating unit cohesion and underplaying non-Arab auxiliaries. Modern analyses, informed by and comparative , temper these narratives; Nicolle uses artifact to confirm gradual adoption of lamellar armor post-650 CE, challenging views of uniformly elite forces. Consensus holds that while ideologically unified—drawing on motivation—the cavalry's effectiveness was causally tied to adaptive leadership and enemy disarray, not fanaticism alone, as evidenced by defeats like the 638 CE Mu'tah campaign against reinforced Byzantine lancers.

References

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