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Nativism (politics)
Nativism (politics)
from Wikipedia

Nativism is the political policy of promoting or protecting the interests of native-born or indigenous people over those of immigrants,[1][2] including the support of anti-immigration and immigration-restriction measures.[3]

Definition

[edit]

According to Cas Mudde, a University of Georgia professor, nativism is a largely American notion that is rarely debated in Western Europe or Canada; the word originated with mid-19th-century political parties in the United States, most notably the Know Nothing party, which saw Catholic immigration from nations such as Germany and Ireland as a serious threat to native-born Protestant Americans.[4] In the United States, nativism does not refer to a movement led by Native Americans, also referred to as American Indians.[5]

Causes

[edit]

According to Joel S. Fetzer, opposition to immigration commonly arises in many countries because of issues of national, cultural, and religious identity. The phenomenon has especially been studied in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, as well as in continental Europe. Thus, nativism has become a general term for opposition to immigration which is based on fears that immigrants will "distort or spoil" existing cultural values.[6] In situations where immigrants greatly outnumber the original inhabitants,[7] nativists seek to prevent cultural change.

Beliefs that contribute to anti-immigration sentiment include:[8]

  • Economic
    • Employment: The belief that immigrants acquire jobs that would have otherwise been available to native citizens, limiting native employment, and the belief that immigrants also create a surplus of labor that results in lowered wages.
    • Government expense: The belief that immigrants do not pay enough taxes to cover the cost of the services they require.[9]
    • Welfare: The belief that immigrants make heavy use of the social welfare systems.
    • Housing: The belief that immigrants reduce vacancies, causing rent increases.
  • Cultural
    • Language: The belief that immigrants isolate themselves in their own communities and refuse to learn the local language.
    • Culture: The belief that immigrants will outnumber the native population and replace its culture with theirs.
    • Crime: The belief that immigrants are more prone to crime than the native population.[10]
    • Patriotism: The belief that immigrants damage a nation's sense of community based on ethnicity and nationality.
  • Environmental
    • Environment: The belief that immigrants increase the consumption of limited resources.
    • Overpopulation: The belief that immigration contributes to overpopulation.
  • Decolonization: The belief immigrants are colonizing those considered native or indigenous people.[11]
  • Settler colonialism: The belief the rights and interests of the original settlers (or their descendants) should be prioritized over those of Indigenous populations and subsequent immigrant groups.[12]

Hans-Georg Betz examines three facets of nativism: economic, welfare, and symbolic. Economic nativism preaches that good jobs ought to be reserved for native citizens. Welfare nativism insists that native citizens should have absolute priority in access to governmental benefits. Symbolic nativism calls on the society and government to defend and promote the nation's cultural heritage. Betz argues that economic and welfare themes were historically dominant, but that since the 1990s symbolic nativism has become the focus of radical right-wing populist mobilization.[13][14]

By country and region

[edit]

Asia-Pacific

[edit]

Australia

[edit]

Many Australians opposed the influx of Chinese immigrants at time of the nineteenth-century gold rushes. When the separate Australian colonies formed the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the new nation adopted "White Australia" as one of its founding principles. Under the White Australia policy, entry of Chinese and other Asians remained controversial until well after World War II, although the country remained home to many long-established Chinese families dating from before the adoption of White Australia. By contrast, most Pacific Islanders were deported soon after the policy was adopted, while the remainder were forced out of the canefields where they had worked for decades.[15]

Antipathy of native-born white Australians toward British and Irish immigrants in the late 19th century was manifested in a new party, the Australian Natives' Association.[16][17]

Since early 2000, opposition has mounted to asylum seekers arriving in boats from Indonesia.[18]

Pakistan

[edit]

The Pakistani province of Sindh has seen nativist movements, promoting control for the Sindhi people over their homeland. After the 1947 Partition of India, large numbers of Muhajir people migrating from India entered the province, becoming a majority in the provincial capital city of Karachi, which formerly had an ethnically Sindhi majority. Sindhis have also voiced opposition to the promotion of Urdu, as opposed to their native tongue, Sindhi.

These nativist movements are expressed through Sindhi nationalism and the Sindhudesh separatist movement. Nativist and nationalist sentiments increased greatly after the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971.

Taiwan

[edit]

Taiwan nativist literature (鄉土文學) is a genre of Taiwanese literature that was born in the 1920s, the Taiwan under Japanese rule. Taiwan nativist literature was suppressed by the rise of Japanese fascism in 1937, and after the surrender of Japan, it was suppressed by the White Terror of the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and began to gain attention again in the 1970s.

After the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan became a sanctuary for Chinese nationalists who followed a Western ideology,[clarification needed] fleeing from communists. The new arrivals governed through the Kuomintang until the 1970s. Taiwanese identity constructed through literature in the post-civil war period led to the gradual acceptance of Taiwan's unique political destiny. This led to a peaceful transition of power from the Kuomintang to the Democratic Progressive Party in the 2000s. A-chin Hsiau (Author of Politics and Cultural Nativism[19]) claims the origins of Taiwanese national identity to the 1970s, when youth activism transformed society, politics and culture which some are still present.[20][21]

Americas

[edit]

Brazil

[edit]

The Brazilian elite desired the racial whitening of the country, similarly to Argentina and Uruguay. The country encouraged European immigration, but non-white immigration always faced considerable backlash. On 28 July 1921, representatives Andrade Bezerra and Cincinato Braga proposed a law whose Article 1 provided: "The immigration of individuals from the black race to Brazil is prohibited." On 22 October 1923, representative Fidélis Reis produced another bill on the entry of immigrants, whose fifth article was as follows: "The entry of settlers from the black race into Brazil is prohibited. For Asian [immigrants] there will be allowed each year a number equal to 5% of those residing in the country.(...)".[22]

In the 19th and 20th centuries, there were negative feelings toward the communities of German, Italian, Japanese, and Jewish immigrants, who conserved their languages and cultures instead of adopting Portuguese and Brazilian habits (so that nowadays, Brazil has the most communities in the Americas of Venetian speakers, and the second-most of German), and were seen as particularly likely to form ghettos and to have high rates of endogamy (in Brazil, it is regarded as usual for people of different backgrounds to marry), among other concerns.

It affected the Japanese more harshly, because they were Asian, and thus seen as an obstacle to the whitening of Brazil. Oliveira Viana, a Brazilian jurist, historian and sociologist described the Japanese immigrants as follows: "They (Japanese) are like sulfur: insoluble". The Brazilian magazine O Malho in its edition of December 5, 1908 issued criticised the Japanese immigrants in the following quote: "The government of São Paulo is stubborn. After the failure of the first Japanese immigration, it contracted 3,000 yellow people. It insists on giving Brazil a race diametrically opposite to ours".[23] In 1941 the Brazilian minister of justice, Francisco Campos, defended the ban on the admission of 400 Japanese immigrants into São Paulo writing: "their despicable standard of living is a brutal competition with the country's worker; their selfishness, their bad faith, their refractory character, make them a huge ethnic and cultural cyst located in the richest regions of Brazil".[23]

Years before World War II, the government of President Getúlio Vargas initiated a process of forced assimilation of people of immigrant origin in Brazil. In 1933, a constitutional amendment was approved by a large majority and established immigration quotas without mentioning race or nationality and prohibited the population concentration of immigrants. According to the text, Brazil could not receive more than 2% of the total number of entrants of each nationality that had been received in the last 50 years. Only the Portuguese were excluded. The measures did not affect the immigration of Europeans such as Italians and Spaniards, who had already entered in large numbers and whose migratory flow was downward. However, immigration quotas, which remained in force until the 1980s, restricted Japanese immigration, as well as Korean and Chinese immigration.[24][23][25]

During World War II they were seen as more loyal to their countries of origin than to Brazil. In fact, there were violent revolts in the Japanese community of the states of São Paulo and Paraná when Emperor Hirohito declared the Japanese surrender and stated that he was not really a deity, which news was seen as a conspiracy perpetrated in order to hurt Japanese honour and strength. Nevertheless, it followed hostility from the government. The Japanese Brazilian community was strongly marked by restrictive measures when Brazil declared war against Japan in August 1942. Japanese Brazilians could not travel the country without safe conduct issued by the police; over 200 Japanese schools were closed and radio equipment was seized to prevent transmissions on short wave from Japan. The goods of Japanese companies were confiscated and several companies of Japanese origin suffered restrictions, including the use of the newly founded Banco América do Sul. Japanese Brazilians were prohibited from driving motor vehicles (even if they were taxi drivers), buses or trucks on their property. The drivers employed by Japanese had to have permission from the police. Thousands of Japanese immigrants were arrested or expelled from Brazil on suspicion of espionage. There were many anonymous denunciations because of "activities against national security" arising from disagreements between neighbours, recovery of debts and even fights between children.[23] Japanese Brazilians were arrested for "suspicious activity" when they were in artistic meetings or picnics. On July 10, 1943, approximately 10,000 Japanese and German immigrants who lived in Santos had 24 hours to close their homes and businesses and move away from the Brazilian coast. The police acted without any notice. About 90% of people displaced were Japanese. To reside in Baixada Santista, the Japanese had to have a safe conduct.[23] In 1942, the Japanese community who introduced the cultivation of pepper in Tomé-Açu, in Pará, was virtually turned into a "concentration camp" (expression of the time) from which no Japanese could leave. This time, the Brazilian ambassador in Washington, D.C., Carlos Martins Pereira e Sousa, encouraged the government of Brazil to transfer all the Japanese Brazilians to "internment camps" without the need for legal support, in the same manner as was done with the Japanese residents in the United States. No single suspicion of activities of Japanese against "national security" was confirmed.[23]

Nowadays, nativism in Brazil affects primarily migrants from elsewhere in the Third World, such as the new wave of Levantine Arabs (this time, mostly Muslims from Palestine instead of overwhelmingly Christian from Syria and Lebanon), South and East Asians (primarily Mainland Chinese), Spanish-speakers and Amerindians from neighbouring South American countries and, especially, West Africans and Haitians. Following the 2010 Haiti earthquake and considerable illegal immigration to northern Brazil and São Paulo,[26] a subsequent debate in the population was concerned with the reasons why Brazil has such lax laws and enforcement concerning illegal immigration.

According to the 1988's Brazilian Constitution, it is an unbailable crime to address someone in an offensive racist way, and it is illegal to discriminate against someone on the basis of his or her race, skin colour, national or regional origin or nationality; thus, nativism and opposition to multiculturalism would be too much of a polemic and delicate topic to be openly discussed as a basic ideology for even the most right-leaning modern political parties.

Canada

[edit]

Throughout the 19th century, well into the 20th, the Orange Order in Canada attacked and tried to politically defeat the Irish Catholics.[27] In the British Empire, traditions of anti-Catholicism in Britain led to fears that Catholics were a threat to the national (British) values. In Canada, the Orange Order campaigned vigorously against the Catholics throughout the 19th century, often with violent confrontations. Both sides were immigrants from Ireland and neither side claimed loyalty to Canada.

The Ku Klux Klan spread in the mid-1920s from the U.S. to parts of Canada, especially Saskatchewan, where it helped topple the Liberal government. The Klan creed was, historian Martin Robin argues, in the mainstream of Protestant Canadian sentiment, for it was based on "Protestantism, separation of Church and State, pure patriotism, restrictive and selective immigration, one national public school, one flag and one language—English."[16][28]

In World War I, Canadian naturalized citizens of German or Austrian origins were stripped of their right to vote, and tens of thousands of Ukrainians (who were born in the Austro-Hungarian Empire) were rounded up and put in internment camps.[29]

Hostility to the Chinese and other Asians was intense, and involved provincial laws that hindered immigration of Chinese and Japanese and blocked their economic mobility. In 1942 Japanese Canadians were forced into detention camps in response to Japanese aggression in World War II.[30]

Hostility of native-born Canadians to competition from English immigrants in the early 20th century was expressed in signs that read, "No English Need Apply!" The resentment came because the immigrants identified more with England than with Canada.[31]

Cartoon from Puck, August 9, 1899, by J. S. Pughe. Angry Uncle Sam sees hyphenated voters (including an Irish-American, a German-American, a French-American, an Italian-American, and a Hungarian-American) and demands, "Why should I let these freaks cast whole votes when they are only half Americans?"

United States

[edit]

According to the American historian John Higham, nativism is:

an intense opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreign (i.e., "un-American") connections. Specific nativist antagonisms may and do, vary widely in response to the changing character of minority irritants and the shifting conditions of the day; but through each separate hostility runs the connecting, energizing force of modern nationalism. While drawing on much broader cultural antipathies and ethnocentric judgments, nativism translates them into zeal to destroy the enemies of a distinctively American way of life.[32]

Colonial era
[edit]

There was nativism in the colonial era shown by English colonists against the Palatine German immigrants in the Pennsylvania Colony.[33] Benjamin Franklin questioned about allowing Palatine refugees to settle in Pennsylvania. He was concerned about the potential consequences of their arrival, particularly regarding the preservation of Pennsylvania's English identity and heritage. He questioned whether it was prudent for a colony established by English settlers to be overwhelmed by newcomers who might not integrate into English culture and language.[34]

Early republic
[edit]

Nativism was a political factor in the 1790s and in the 1830s–1850s. Nativism became a major issue in the late 1790s, when the Federalist Party expressed its strong opposition to the French Revolution by trying to strictly limit immigration, and stretching the time to 14 years for citizenship. At the time of the Quasi-War with the French First Republic in 1798, the Federalists and Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, including the Alien Act, the Naturalization Act and the Sedition Act. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison fought against the new laws by drafting the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions. In 1800, Jefferson was elected president, and removed most of the anti-immigrant legislation.[35]

1830–1860
[edit]
Guardians of Liberty, an anti-Catholic caricature by the Ku Klux Klan-affiliate Alma White (1943), founder and bishop of the Pillar of Fire Church

The term "nativism" was first used by 1844: "Thousands were Naturalized expressly to oppose Nativism, and voted the Polk ticket mainly to that end."[36] Nativism gained its name from the "Native American" parties of the 1840s and 1850s. In this context "Native" does not mean Indigenous Americans or American Indians but rather descendants of the inhabitants of the original Thirteen Colonies. It impacted politics in the mid-19th century because of the large inflows of immigrants after 1845 from cultures that were different from the existing American culture. Nativists objected primarily to Irish Roman Catholics because of their loyalty to the Pope and also because of their supposed rejection of republicanism as an American ideal.[5]

Nativist movements included the Know Nothing or "American Party" of the 1850s, the Immigration Restriction League of the 1890s, the anti-Asian movements in the Western states, resulting in the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the "Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907", by which the government of Imperial Japan stopped emigration to the United States. Labor unions were strong supporters of Chinese exclusion and limits on immigration, because of fears that they would lower wages and make it harder for workers to organize unions.[37]

Nativist outbursts occurred in the Northeast from the 1830s to the 1850s, primarily in response to a surge of Irish Catholic immigration. In 1836, Samuel Morse ran unsuccessfully for Mayor of New York City on a nativist ticket, receiving 1,496 votes. In New York City, an Order of United Americans was founded as a nativist fraternity, following the Philadelphia Nativist Riots of the preceding spring and summer, in December 1844.[38] The American historian Eric Kaufmann has suggested that American nativism has been explained primarily in psychological and economic terms due to the neglect of a crucial cultural and ethnic dimension. Furthermore, Kauffman claims that American nativism cannot be understood without reference to an American ethnic group which took shape prior to the large-scale immigration of the mid-19th century.[39]

The nativists went public in 1854 when they formed the "American Party", which was especially hostile to the immigration of Irish Catholics, and campaigned for laws to require longer wait time between immigration and naturalization; these laws never passed. It was at this time that the term "nativist" first appeared, as their opponents denounced them as "bigoted nativists". Former President Millard Fillmore ran on the American Party ticket for the presidency in 1856. Henry Winter Davis, an active Know-Nothing, was elected on the American Party ticket to Congress from Maryland. He told Congress the un-American Irish Catholic immigrants were to blame for the recent election of Democrat James Buchanan as president, stating:[40]

The recent election has developed in an aggravated form every evil against which the American party protested. Foreign allies have decided the government of the country -- men naturalized in thousands on the eve of the election. Again in the fierce struggle for supremacy, men have forgotten the ban which the Republic puts on the intrusion of religious influence on the political arena. These influences have brought vast multitudes of foreign-born citizens to the polls, ignorant of American interests, without American feelings, influenced by foreign sympathies, to vote on American affairs; and those votes have, in point of fact, accomplished the present result.

The American Party also included many former Whigs who ignored nativism, and included (in the South) a few Roman Catholics whose families had long lived in North America. Conversely, much of the opposition to Roman Catholics came from Protestant Irish immigrants and German Lutheran immigrants, who were not native at all and can hardly be called "nativists."[41]

This form of American nationalism is often identified with xenophobia and anti-Catholic sentiment. In Charlestown, Massachusetts, a nativist mob attacked and burned down a Roman Catholic convent in 1834 (no one was injured). In the 1840s, small scale riots between Roman Catholics and nativists took place in several American cities. In Philadelphia, Pennsylvania in 1844, for example, a series of nativist assaults on Roman Catholic churches and community centers resulted in the loss of lives and the professionalization of the police force. In Louisville, Kentucky, election-day rioters killed at least 22 people in attacks on German and Irish Catholics on 6 August 1855, in what became known as "Bloody Monday."[42]

The new Republican Party kept its nativist element quiet during the 1860s, since immigrants were urgently needed for the Union Army. European immigrants from England, Scotland, and Scandinavia favored the Republicans during the Third Party System (1854–1896), while others especially Irish Catholics and Germans, were usually Democratic. Hostility toward Asians was very strong in the Western region from the 1860s to the 1940s. Anti-Catholicism experienced a revival in the 1890s in the American Protective Association. It was led by Protestant Irish immigrants hostile to the Irish Catholics.[43]

Anti-German nativism
[edit]

From the 1840s to the 1920s, German Americans were often distrusted because of their separatist social structure, their German-language schools, their attachment to their native tongue over English, and their neutrality during World War I.

The Bennett Law caused a political uproar in Wisconsin in 1890, as the state government passed a law that threatened to close down hundreds of German-language elementary schools. Catholic and Lutheran Germans rallied to defeat Governor William D. Hoard. Hoard attacked German American culture and religion:

"We must fight alienism and selfish ecclesiasticism.... The parents, the pastors and the church have entered into a conspiracy to darken the understanding of the children, who are denied by cupidity and bigotry the privilege of even the free schools of the state."[44]

Hoard, a Republican, was defeated by the Democrats. A similar campaign in Illinois regarding the "Edwards Law" led to a Republican defeat there in 1890.[44]

In 1917–1918, a wave of nativist sentiment due to American entry into World War I led to the suppression of German cultural activities in the United States, Canada, and Australia. There was little violence, but many places and streets had their names changed (The city of "Berlin" in Ontario was renamed "Kitchener" after a British hero), churches switched to English for their services, and German Americans were forced to buy war bonds to show their patriotism.[45] In Australia thousands of Germans were put into internment camps.[46]

Anti-Chinese nativism
[edit]

In the 1870s and 1880s in the Western states, ethnic White immigrants, especially Irish Americans and German Americans, targeted violence against Chinese workers, driving them out of smaller towns. Denis Kearney, an immigrant from Ireland, led a mass movement in San Francisco in the 1870s that incited attacks on the Chinese there and threatened public officials and railroad owners.[47] The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was the first of many nativist acts of Congress which attempted to limit the flow of immigrants into the U.S.. The Chinese responded to it by filing false claims of American birth, enabling thousands of them to immigrate to California.[48] The exclusion of the Chinese caused the western railroads to begin importing Mexican railroad workers in greater numbers ("traqueros").[49]

20th century
[edit]

In the 1890s–1920s era, nativists and labor unions campaigned for immigration restriction following the waves of workers and families from Southern and Eastern Europe, including the Kingdom of Italy, the Balkans, Congress Poland, Austria-Hungary, and the Russian Empire. A favorite plan was the literacy test to exclude workers who could not read or write their own foreign language. Congress passed literacy tests, but presidents—responding to business needs for workers—vetoed them.[50] Senator Henry Cabot Lodge argued the need for literacy tests, and described its implication on the new immigrants:

It is found, in the first place, that the illiteracy test will bear most heavily upon the Italians, Russians, Poles, Hungarians, Greeks, and Asiatics, and lightly, or not at all, upon English-speaking emigrants, or Germans, Scandinavians, and French. In other words, the races most affected by the illiteracy test are those whose emigration to this country has begun within the last twenty years and swelled rapidly to enormous proportions, races with which the English speaking people have never hitherto assimilated, and who are most alien to the great body of the people of the United States.[51]

Responding to these demands, opponents of the literacy test called for the establishment of an immigration commission to focus on immigration as a whole. The United States Immigration Commission, also known as the Dillingham Commission, was created and tasked with studying immigration and its effect on the United States. The findings of the commission further influenced immigration policy and upheld the concerns of the nativist movement.[50] Following World War I, nativists in the 1920s focused their attention on Southern and Eastern Europeans due to their Roman Catholic and Jewish faith, and realigned their beliefs behind racial and religious nativism.[52]

Three Klansmen talking to PI reporter Robert Berman in Seattle, Washington (circa 1923). Photograph currently preserved by the Museum of History & Industry.

Between the 1920s and the 1930s, the Ku Klux Klan developed an explicitly nativist, pro-Anglo-Saxon Protestant, anti-Catholic, anti-Irish, anti-Italian, and anti-Jewish stance in relation to the growing political, economic, and social uncertainty related to the arrival of European immigrants on the American soil, predominantly composed of Irish people, Italians, and Eastern European Jews.[53] The racial concern of the anti-immigration movement was linked closely to the eugenics movement that was sweeping in the United States during the same period. Led by Madison Grant's book, The Passing of the Great Race nativists grew more concerned with the racial purity of the United States. In his book, Grant argued that the American racial stock was being diluted by the influx of new immigrants from the Mediterranean, Ireland, the Balkans, and the ghettos. The Passing of the Great Race reached wide popularity among Americans and influenced immigration policy in the 1920s.[50] In the 1920s, a wide national consensus sharply restricted the overall inflow of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. The Second Ku Klux Klan, which flourished in the United States during the 1920s, used strong nativist, anti-Catholic, and anti-Jewish rhetoric,[53] but the Catholics led a counterattack, such as in Chicago in 1921, where ethnic Irish residents hanged a Klan member in front of 3,000 people.[54]

After intense lobbying from the nativist movement, the United States Congress passed the Emergency Quota Act in 1921. This bill was the first to place numerical quotas on immigration. It capped the inflow of immigrations to 357,803 for those arriving outside of the western hemisphere.[50] However, this bill was only temporary, as Congress began debating a more permanent bill. The Emergency Quota Act was followed with the Immigration Act of 1924, a more permanent resolution. This law reduced the number of immigrants able to arrive from 357,803, the number established in the Emergency Quota Act, to 164,687.[50] Though this bill did not fully restrict immigration, it considerably curbed the flow of immigration into the United States, especially from Southern and Eastern Europe. During the late 1920s, an average of 270,000 immigrants were allowed to arrive, mainly because of the exemption of Canada and Latin American countries.[52] Fear of low-skilled Southern and Eastern European immigrants flooding the labor market was an issue in the 1920s, the 1930s, and the first decade of the 21st century (focused on immigrants from Mexico and Central America).

An immigration reductionism movement formed in the 1970s and continues to the present day. Prominent members often press for massive, sometimes total, reductions in immigration levels. American nativist sentiment experienced a resurgence in the late 20th century, this time directed at undocumented workers, largely Mexican, resulting in the passage of new penalties against illegal immigration in 1996. Most immigration reductionists see illegal immigration, principally from across the United States–Mexico border, as the more pressing concern. Authors such as Samuel Huntington have also seen recent Hispanic immigration as creating a national identity crisis and presenting insurmountable problems for US social institutions.[55]

Despite the fact that, Mexican people descend from actual natives to the region, when noting Mexican immigration in the Southwest, the European-American Cold-War diplomat George F. Kennan wrote in 2002 he saw "unmistakable evidences of a growing differentiation between the cultures, respectively, of large southern and southwestern regions of this country, on the one hand", and those of "some northern regions". In the former, he warned:

the very culture of the bulk of the population of these regions will tend to be primarily Latin-American in nature rather than what is inherited from earlier American traditions ... Could it really be that there was so little of merit [in America] that it deserves to be recklessly trashed in favor of a polyglot mix-mash?"[56]

David Mayers argues that Kennan represented the "tradition of militant nativism" that resembled or even exceeded the Know Nothings of the 1850s.[57]

21st century
[edit]

By late 2014, the "Tea Party movement" had turned its focus away from economic issues, spending, and Obamacare, and towards President Barack Obama's immigration policies, which it saw as a threat to transform American society. It planned to defeat leading Republicans who supported immigration programs, such as Senator John McCain. A typical slogan appeared in the Tea Party Tribune: "Amnesty for Millions, Tyranny for All." The New York Times reported:

What started five years ago as a groundswell of conservatives committed to curtailing the reach of the federal government, cutting the deficit and countering the Wall Street wing of the Republican Party has become a movement largely against immigration overhaul. The politicians, intellectual leaders and activists who consider themselves part of the Tea Party have redirected their energy from fiscal austerity and small government to stopping any changes that would legitimize people who are here illegally, either through granting them citizenship or legal status.[58]

Political scientist and pollster Darrell Bricker, CEO of Ipsos Public Affairs, argues nativism is the root cause of the early 21st century wave of populism.

[T]he jet fuel that’s really feeding the populist firestorm is nativism, the strong belief among an electorally important segment of the population that governments and other institutions should honour and protect the interests of their native-born citizens against the cultural changes being brought about by immigration. This, according to the populists, is about protecting the "Real America" (or "Real Britain" or "Real Poland" or "Real France" or "Real Hungary") from imported influences that are destroying the values and cultures that have made their countries great.
Importantly, it’s not just the nativists who are saying this is a battle over values and culture. Their strongest opponents believe this too, and they are not prepared to concede the high ground on what constitutes a "real citizen" to the populists. For them, this is a battle about the rule of law, inclusiveness, open borders, and global participation.[59]

In his 2016 bid for the presidency, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump was accused of introducing nativist themes via his controversial stances on temporarily banning foreign Muslims from six specific countries entering the United States, and erecting a substantial wall between the US-Mexico border to halt illegal immigration. Journalist John Cassidy wrote in The New Yorker that Trump was transforming the GOP into a populist, nativist party:

Trump has been drawing on a base of alienated white working-class and middle-class voters, seeking to remake the G.O.P. into a more populist, nativist, avowedly protectionist, and semi-isolationist party that is skeptical of immigration, free trade, and military interventionism.[60]

Donald Brand, a professor of political science, argues:

Donald Trump's nativism is a fundamental corruption of the founding principles of the Republican Party. Nativists champion the purported interests of American citizens over those of immigrants, justifying their hostility to immigrants by the use of derogatory stereotypes: Mexicans are rapists; Muslims are terrorists.[61]
Language
[edit]
Sticker sold in Colorado

American nativists have promoted English and deprecated the use of German and Spanish. English Only proponents in the late 20th century proposed an English Language Amendment (ELA), a Constitutional Amendment making English the official language of the United States, but it received limited political support.[62]

Europe

[edit]

In recent decades distrust of immigrating populations and populism have become major themes in considering political tensions in Europe. Many observers see the post-1950s wave of immigration in Europe as fundamentally different to the pre-1914 patterns. They debate the role of cultural differences, ghettos, race, Muslim fundamentalism, poor education and poverty play in creating nativism among the hosts and a caste-type underclass, more similar to white-black tensions in the US.[63] Sociologists Josip Kešić and Jan Willem Duyvendak define nativism as an intense opposition to an internal minority that is portrayed as a threat to the nation because of its different values and priorities. There are three subtypes: secularist nativism; racial nativism; and populist nativism that seeks to restore the historic power and prestige of indigenous elites.[64]

France

[edit]

Once Italian workers in France had understood the benefit of unionism, and French unions were willing to overcome their fear of Italians as strikebreakers, integration was open for most Italian immigrants. The French state, which was always more of an immigration state than other Western European nations, fostered and supported family-based immigration, and thus helped Italians on their immigration trajectory, with minimal nativism.[63] Algerian migration to France has generated nativism, characterized by the prominence of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his National Front.[63]

Since the 1990s France experienced rising levels of Islamic antisemitism and acts.[65] By 2006, rising levels of antisemitism were recorded in French schools. Reports related to the tensions between the children of North African Muslim immigrants and North African Jewish children.[66] In the first half of 2009, an estimated 631 recorded acts of antisemitism took place in France, more than the whole of 2008.[67] Speaking to the World Jewish Congress in December 2009, the French Interior Minister Hortefeux described the acts of antisemitism as "a poison to our republic". He also announced that he would appoint a special coordinator for fighting racism and antisemitism.[68]

Germany

[edit]

For the Poles in the mining districts of western Germany before 1914, nationalism (on both the German and the Polish sides) kept Polish workers, who had established an associational structure approaching institutional completeness (churches, voluntary associations, press, even unions), separate from the host German society. Lucassen found that religiosity and nationalism were more fundamental in generating nativism and inter-group hostility than the labor antagonism.[63]

Nativism grew rapidly in the 1990s and since.[69][70]

United Kingdom

[edit]

The city of London became notorious for the prevalence of nativist viewpoints in the 16th century, and conditions worsened in the 1580s. Many European immigrants became disillusioned by routine threats of assault, numerous attempts at passing legislation calling for the expulsion of foreigners, and the great difficulty in acquiring English citizenship. Cities in the Dutch Republic often proved more hospitable, and many immigrants left London permanently.[71] Nativism emerged in opposition to Irish and Jewish arrivals in the early 20th century.[72] Irish immigrants in Great Britain during the 20th century became estranged from British society, something which Lucassen (2005) attributes to the deep religious divide between Irish Protestants and Catholics.[63]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Nativism in politics refers to an or stance that prioritizes the interests, rights, and of native-born or long-established populations over those of immigrants and foreign-born minorities, frequently advocating for immigration restrictions to preserve national cohesion and resources. This opposition often targets perceived threats from rapid influxes of newcomers who differ in , , or , framing them as challenges to economic opportunities, social norms, and political . Defined by historian John Higham as "opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreignness," nativism distinguishes itself from broader by emphasizing cultural and rather than inherent racial inferiority, though the two have historically overlapped in practice. Prominent in American history, nativism surged during the mid-19th century with the Know-Nothing Party (American Party), which mobilized against Irish Catholic immigrants amid fears of papal influence and urban disorder, securing electoral victories in several states before fracturing over . It resurfaced in the early , culminating in the , which imposed national origins quotas to favor Northern European stock and sharply reduce entries from Southern and , Asia, and elsewhere, reflecting empirical concerns over assimilation strains evidenced by rising urban poverty and labor competition. These movements achieved policy successes in curbing unchecked migration but sparked controversies over exclusionary tactics, including violence and discriminatory enforcement, while critics in academia and media—often exhibiting left-leaning biases—have portrayed nativism as inherently xenophobic, downplaying data on native wage suppression and cultural erosion from high immigration levels. In contemporary politics, nativist elements underpin populist platforms in and the , advocating border controls and preference for skilled, culturally compatible migrants to mitigate fiscal burdens and identity dilution, as supported by studies linking unchecked immigration to native discontent and populist voting surges. Though decried as regressive, nativism aligns with first-principles recognition that sovereign nations exist to safeguard their people's welfare, with causal evidence showing demographic shifts correlating to policy backlashes when integration fails.

Definition and Core Principles

Definition

Nativism in politics constitutes a orientation or ideological position that advances the welfare, cultural dominance, and preferential of native-born or indigenous populations relative to immigrants or foreign-origin groups. This stance typically advocates measures such as controls, assimilation mandates, and resource allocation favoring established residents to mitigate perceived dilutions of or . Historically rooted in responses to rapid demographic shifts, nativism posits that states owe primary allegiance to their core ethnic or civic constituencies, often framing unchecked inflows as erosive to social trust and institutional stability. Political scientist John Higham defined it as "opposition to an internal minority on the grounds of its foreignness," emphasizing nativism's reactive nature against groups viewed as retaining allegiances or customs incompatible with host societies. Empirical analyses link nativist sentiments to tangible pressures like labor market competition and cultural fragmentation, rather than mere , though academic frequently attributes it to irrational fears without disaggregating causal factors. Distinct from blanket , nativism operates on the principle that bounded communities possess legitimate claims to , including limits on external membership expansion; for instance, it underpins arguments for numerical caps on entrants to sustain per-capita public goods and cohesion metrics observed in low-immigration polities. Proponents substantiate this via data on native suppression—such as U.S. studies showing 3-5% earnings declines for low-skilled workers amid high inflows—and elevated correlations in unassimilated migrant clusters, countering narratives that dismiss such positions as inherently discriminatory.

Ideological Foundations

Nativism's ideological core rests on the assertion that owe primary allegiance to their indigenous or long-established populations, viewing unchecked as a vector for cultural dilution and social fragmentation. This framework conceptualizes not as an abstract civic but as an extended kinship-like community forged through historical continuity, shared , , and , which fosters the mutual trust essential for collective self-rule. Proponents argue that foreign influxes, particularly from culturally distant sources, impose asymmetric assimilation burdens, eroding the organic bonds that underpin national resilience and leading to parallel societies with divergent loyalties. The doctrine draws from cultural nationalism, prioritizing the preservation of a dominant national ethos against cosmopolitan or multicultural alternatives that treat identity as fluid and interchangeable. It posits that genuine political legitimacy derives from the native majority's consent, rather than imposed pluralism, and critiques universalist ideologies for ignoring kin-selection dynamics in human group formation, where in-group preferences evolved to safeguard resources and norms against out-group competition. Empirical grounding includes observations of heightened intergroup tensions in diverse settings, where native populations experience relative deprivation in employment, welfare access, and symbolic dominance, rationalizing exclusionary measures as restorative justice rather than mere prejudice. While often conflated with xenophobia or racism in academic critiques—predominantly from institutions exhibiting left-leaning orientations that downplay native agency—nativism theoretically accommodates non-ethnic rationales, such as religious or civilizational incompatibility, as seen in opposition to mass Muslim immigration in Europe on grounds of incompatible governance models like sharia preferences documented in surveys of immigrant attitudes. This meta-distinction highlights source biases: mainstream analyses, influenced by progressive paradigms, frame nativism as pathological deviation from liberal norms, yet first-hand polling data reveals widespread native support for border controls correlating with tangible metrics like crime rates among certain immigrant cohorts, which exceed native averages in host countries such as Sweden post-2015 migrant wave.

Historical Origins and Evolution

Pre-Modern and Early Modern Instances

In ancient , nativist tendencies emerged through ' Citizenship Law enacted in 451/450 BCE, which stipulated that only individuals with both parents as Athenian citizens could hold citizenship, thereby disqualifying children born to Athenian fathers and foreign mothers (metics) and limiting political rights to those of pure native descent. This policy, amid rising numbers of resident foreigners contributing to the economy but excluded from governance, aimed to safeguard the ethnic and political integrity of the citizen body against dilution by outsiders. Scholars interpret this as an early form of nativism, intertwining with ethnic exclusivity, which contributed to ' isolation and eventual decline by alienating potential allies and trade partners. Medieval Europe exhibited analogous exclusionary measures against groups perceived as non-native or unassimilable, particularly , whose long residence did not mitigate views of them as alien due to religious and economic differences. In 1290, King Edward I of issued the , banishing approximately 2,000-3,000 and seizing their property, motivated by royal debts, usury bans, and popular resentment framing as exploitative foreigners undermining Christian society. followed suit in 1306 under Philip IV, expelling to consolidate monarchical power and alleviate fiscal pressures, with readmissions and re-expulsions recurring amid similar nativist pretexts. These actions, while rooted in , reflected proto-nationalist impulses to prioritize native Christian populations by eliminating perceived internal threats to cultural and economic cohesion. In the early , rising merchant immigration and artisanal competition fueled overt nativist backlash, as seen in England's Evil May Day riot of May 1, 1517, when thousands of apprentices assaulted Flemish, French, and Italian immigrants, destroying their homes and workshops over grievances of job displacement and preferential royal privileges granted to foreigners. The unrest, quelled by King 's pardons after executions of ringleaders, underscored tensions between native laborers and immigrant craftsmen in burgeoning urban economies. Concurrently, statutes targeted nomadic groups like Roma (then termed "Egyptians"), with 1530 legislation under imposing death penalties for refusing settlement and assimilation, viewing their itinerant culture as incompatible with native social order. Such policies echoed broader European efforts to enforce cultural uniformity amid early and internal migrations.

19th-Century Developments

In the , nativist sentiments intensified during the and due to mass from , driven by the Great Famine, and from amid political upheavals, with over 1.5 million Irish arriving between 1845 and 1852 alone. Native-born Protestants feared that Catholic immigrants prioritized allegiance to the over American institutions, exacerbating economic competition in urban labor markets. This led to the formation in 1849 of the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, a secret society in that required members to respond "I know nothing" to inquiries about its activities, reflecting widespread anti-immigrant conspiracy theories. The organization evolved into the American Party, popularly known as the Know-Nothing Party, which by 1854 had expanded nationally on a platform demanding a 21-year residency for , exclusion of Catholics from public office, and restrictions on to preserve Protestant cultural dominance. In the 1854–1856 elections, the party achieved significant success, securing governorships in states including , , [Rhode Island](/page/Rhode Island), and , as well as control of several state legislatures and electing approximately 43 members to in 1855. Its 1856 presidential candidate, former President , garnered about 22% of the popular vote, though the party's influence waned thereafter due to internal divisions over and the Civil War. By the late 19th century, nativism shifted westward, targeting Chinese laborers who arrived in large numbers after the 1848 , with over 300,000 entering by 1880, prompting fears of wage undercutting and cultural dilution among native workers. In , Denis Kearney's Workingmen's Party rallied with the slogan "The Chinese Must Go," influencing federal policy culminating in the of 1882, the first U.S. law to restrict immigration based on nationality. In Europe, nativist undercurrents emerged amid industrialization and internal migrations, though less formalized than in the U.S.; for instance, British opposition to Irish Catholic inflows echoed similar religious and economic anxieties, contributing to sectarian tensions without coalescing into a dominant political party during the period.

20th-Century Manifestations

![Three Klansmen talking to a reporter, circa 1923](./assets/Three_Klansmen_talking_to_PI_reporter_Robert_Berman%252C_circa_1923_MOHAI15411MOHAI_15411 In the United States during the 1920s, nativism surged amid post-World War I anxieties, including economic pressures from returning veterans and fears of Bolshevik radicalism imported by immigrants. This led to the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, which imposed the first numerical limits on immigration by capping entries at 3% of each nationality's population as recorded in the 1910 census, primarily targeting Southern and Eastern Europeans perceived as culturally incompatible. The subsequent Immigration Act of 1924, also known as the Johnson-Reed Act, further restricted quotas to 2% based on the 1890 census—favoring Northern and Western Europeans—and effectively banned immigration from most Asian countries, reflecting eugenics-influenced concerns over preserving Anglo-Saxon racial stock. These laws reduced annual immigration from over 800,000 in 1920 to about 300,000 by 1924, with quotas explicitly designed to maintain demographic homogeneity. The resurgence of the in the 1915-1920s era exemplified grassroots nativism, attracting up to 4-5 million members by 1925 who opposed Catholic, Jewish, and influences alongside their anti-Black campaigns. The 's platform emphasized "100% Americanism," advocating for Protestant dominance and curbs, influencing politics in states like and where it elected officials. High-profile cases like the Sacco-Vanzetti trial (1920-1927) fueled nativist suspicions of anarchists, amplifying calls for and exclusion. In , the —formalized by the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901—persisted as a cornerstone of nativist governance throughout much of the , using arbitrary dictation tests in European languages to exclude non-whites, particularly Asians. This policy, supported across political parties, limited non-British migration to preserve a homogeneous British-descended population, with minimal relaxations until the and full dismantlement by 1973. Annual non-European arrivals remained under 1,000 until post-1966 reforms, reflecting sustained fears of cultural dilution and labor competition. European manifestations were less legislatively formalized but evident in interwar nationalist movements wary of internal minorities with foreign ties, though often intertwined with broader ideological conflicts rather than standalone immigration restriction. In Britain and , anti-immigrant rhetoric targeted Jewish communities pre-1930s, but low immigration volumes delayed quota systems until later decades.

Causal Drivers and Empirical Basis

Economic Pressures

Economic pressures contribute to nativism by intensifying competition for jobs, suppressing wages for native low-skilled workers, and straining public finances in host countries. Large-scale immigration, particularly of low-skilled migrants, expands the labor supply in sectors like , , and services, where natives and immigrants compete directly. Empirical analysis by economist George Borjas indicates that a 10 percent increase in immigrant labor supply reduces wages for competing native workers by approximately 3 to 4 percent, with stronger effects on high school dropouts and minorities facing similar skill levels. This wage depression arises from basic supply-demand dynamics, as immigrants often accept lower pay due to limited alternatives, displacing or undercutting native employment opportunities. While aggregate studies sometimes report negligible overall wage impacts on natives—estimating reductions of 0 to 1 percent from a 10 percent immigrant influx—these mask heterogeneous effects, with low-education natives experiencing disproportionate harm. For instance, , periods of high coincide with stagnant for non-college-educated workers, from about $25 per hour in 1979 (adjusted for ) to roughly $23 by 2019 in real terms for similar cohorts. Such outcomes foster nativist backlash, as affected groups perceive as a zero-sum threat to livelihoods, a view supported by labor market data rather than dismissed as mere . In , similar patterns emerged post-2008 , where in countries like exceeded 40 percent amid migrant inflows, bolstering support for nativist parties emphasizing economic . Fiscal burdens exacerbate these tensions, as low-skilled immigrants frequently draw more from welfare, , and healthcare systems than they contribute in taxes, especially in the initial decades of settlement. A 2024 analysis estimates that an immigrant arriving at age 25 with no imposes a net lifetime fiscal cost of about $300,000 to $1 million per person in the U.S., factoring in benefits usage and lower tax payments. Historical precedents illustrate : during the U.S. , unemployment peaking at 25 percent in 1933 prompted the of over 400,000 Mexican nationals and descendants between 1929 and 1936 to alleviate job scarcity for natives. In developing contexts, "sons-of-the-soil" nativism arises when urban migrants compete with indigenous groups for resources, leading to policies restricting , as seen in India's regional quotas. These pressures, grounded in verifiable resource constraints, drive nativist demands for controls to safeguard native economic interests, irrespective of broader GDP gains that accrue unevenly.

Cultural Preservation Imperatives

Nativists contend that unchecked , particularly from populations with divergent cultural norms, poses an existential threat to the host society's core values, traditions, and social cohesion, necessitating policies to prioritize cultural continuity. This imperative stems from observations that large-scale influxes often result in the formation of ethnic enclaves where immigrants maintain parallel societies, limiting interaction with natives and hindering full assimilation. Empirical studies indicate that high concentrations of co-ethnics can foster , reducing incentives for adopting host customs and perpetuating imported practices incompatible with liberal democratic norms, such as attitudes toward or secular governance. In , data reveal persistent value gaps between Muslim immigrants and native populations, with surveys showing significant portions of Muslim respondents favoring law implementation and rejecting , contrasting sharply with secular host societies' emphasis on individual rights and tolerance. For instance, a across multiple European countries found widespread native concerns that Islam's communal orientation impedes acceptance of pluralism, a worry validated by subsequent integration challenges like honor-based and demands for religious accommodations in public spaces. These clashes underscore nativists' : without preservation measures, such as immigration restrictions favoring cultural compatibility, host cultures risk erosion through demographic tipping points where minority norms gain institutional leverage. United States historical patterns similarly inform this view, where past waves of immigration from culturally proximate enabled eventual assimilation, but contemporary flows from and the exhibit slower cultural convergence, evidenced by sustained bilingualism, enclave economies, and divergent family structures. on cultural persistence demonstrates that immigrants reshape local norms—such as increasing conservative religious adherence in affected communities—rather than uniformly adopting host values, fueling nativist calls for selective policies to safeguard the Anglo-Protestant foundational ethos that underpins American civic . Proponents argue this is not mere but a pragmatic response to empirical realities, where rapid diversity without assimilation correlates with declining trust and rising identity-based conflicts.

Demographic and Security Realities

In many Western nations, native-born populations exhibit total fertility rates well below the replacement level of 2.1 children per woman, with the recording 1.6 births per woman in 2023 and averaging 1.4 to 1.6. These low rates, sustained for decades, result in natural absent , as evidenced by projections indicating 's population could fall by over a third to 295 million by 2100 without net migration. from regions with historically higher fertility, such as parts of and the , offsets this decline but accelerates shifts in ethnic composition, with foreign-born residents comprising 9.9% of the population as of January 2024 and contributing disproportionately to population growth in countries like and . Projections underscore the scale of these transformations: in the United States, are expected to constitute less than 50% of the by 2044, marking a transition to majority-minority status driven primarily by and differential birth rates. Similar trajectories appear in , where studies forecast ethnic Germans becoming a minority around 2065 under continued high , while in the , individuals may fall below majority status within 40 years based on current trends in births and inflows. These changes strain social cohesion, as rapid demographic shifts outpace assimilation, fostering nativist responses rooted in preserving cultural and institutional continuity amid perceived existential threats to the host society's foundational identity. Security concerns amplify nativist motivations, with empirical data revealing overrepresentation of certain immigrant groups in . In , where migrants constitute 33% of the , they account for 58% of suspects in total crimes on reasonable grounds as of 2017, including disproportionate involvement in violent offenses like . Germany's experience post-2015 influx similarly shows localized spikes in crime correlated with arrivals, particularly property and sexual offenses, per district-level from 2003–2016. Such patterns, often linked to unvetted from unstable regions, heighten public apprehensions about internal threats, including —evident in where jihadist attacks since 2015 have frequently involved radicalized migrants or their descendants—prompting demands for stricter border controls to safeguard . These realities, grounded in rather than anecdotal narratives, causally underpin nativism as a defensive reaction to unmanaged inflows that erode both demographic stability and public safety.

Regional and National Variations

North America

In , nativism has historically prioritized the interests of established settler populations, often of European descent, over newcomers perceived as threats to cultural cohesion, , and . This manifested through political movements, legislative restrictions, and social campaigns amid waves of from , Catholic , , and later Southern and . Empirical drivers included labor competition—such as Chinese workers undercutting wages in railroads and —and fears of political influence from unassimilated groups, evidenced by rising urban poverty and rates correlated with immigration surges in the 1840s-1850s and 1880s-1920s. While mainstream academic narratives often frame nativism solely as , primary records show causal links to verifiable demographic shifts, with foreign-born populations reaching 14.8% of the U.S. total by and similar pressures in during resource booms. United States nativism peaked in organized forms during the mid-19th century with the American Party, known as the Know-Nothings, a secret society originating in New York in as the Order of the Star Spangled Banner, opposing Catholic immigrants' alleged loyalty to the Pope over American institutions. The party expanded rapidly amid Irish and German influxes—immigration rose from 1.7 million in the 1840s to over 4 million in the 1850s—gaining control of state legislatures in and by 1855 and electing 43 House members in 1854. Its platform demanded longer naturalization periods and barred foreign-born officeholders, reflecting data on immigrant-heavy urban violence like Philadelphia's 1844 nativist riots, where 20 died amid anti-Catholic tensions. The movement fragmented by 1856 over but influenced later restrictions. Legislative nativism intensified with the of May 6, 1882, banning Chinese laborers for 10 years after and railroad eras saw Chinese numbers grow from negligible to 105,000 by 1880, amid documented wage depression—Chinese miners earned $1-2 daily versus $3-4 for whites—and sanitation fears in overcrowded Chinatowns. Renewed in 1892 and made indefinite in 1902, it set precedents for race-based bars, excluding wives and reducing Chinese immigration to under 20,000 annually post-1882. The 1924 Immigration Act imposed national origins quotas, capping total entries at 150,000 yearly based on 1890-1910 censuses favoring Nordics—e.g., 65,721 British slots versus 5,802 Italian—slashing Southern/Eastern European inflows by 90% from 1920-1929 peaks and barring most Asians entirely. Enacted amid post-WWI and advocacy citing IQ differentials in Army tests, it stabilized demographics until 1965 reforms. The Ku Klux Klan's 1920s resurgence, peaking at 4-5 million members, amplified nativism against Catholics, Jews, and immigrants, influencing 1924 quotas and state laws.

Canada

Canadian nativism, while less politically formalized than in the U.S., emphasized British-Protestant primacy and economic , targeting non-Anglo groups during Confederation-era expansions. Early examples included the Orange Order's anti-Catholic campaigns against Irish and , fueling 19th-century riots like Toronto's election violence over immigrant voting blocs. The 1885 Chinese Immigration Act imposed a $50 head tax—raised to $500 by 1903—on Chinese laborers post-Pacific Railway completion, where 15,000-17,000 worked under exploitative contracts, comprising 90% of such labor amid nativist complaints of wage undercutting in , where Chinese earned half of whites. Exclusion extended via the 1923 Chinese Immigration Act, banning virtually all Chinese until 1947, reducing their population growth to near zero during 1920s-1940s. The 1908 Continuous Journey Regulation effectively halted Indian immigration by requiring unbroken voyages, stranding Komagata Maru passengers in 1914 and reflecting fears of Sikh "turbaned horde" disrupting homogeneity after 5,000 South Asians arrived 1904-1908. nativism spurred deportations: 1930-1935 policies prioritized British/American entries, expelling 10,000-20,000 "British subjects" (often recent immigrants) via Order-in-Council PC 695, amid 30% unemployment where immigrants comprised 25% of urban poor. The 1910 Immigration Act empowered exclusions by race or nationality, barring "undesirables" like Eastern Europeans, with quotas post-WWI limiting non-British to 1913 levels. These measures preserved Anglo dominance—British Isles sources fell from 60% pre-1914 to stabilized lows—though post-1945 shifts toward diluted overt nativism, despite persistent regional backlashes like 1970s anti-refugee sentiments.

United States

Nativism in the United States arose in the early 19th century as a response to mass immigration from Ireland and Germany, predominantly Catholic, which native-born Protestants perceived as undermining cultural homogeneity and political institutions. Between 1845 and 1854, approximately 2.9 million immigrants arrived, intensifying fears of economic competition and foreign influence. The Order of the Star Spangled Banner, founded in 1849 and evolving into the Know Nothing or American Party by 1853, embodied these sentiments through secrecy and anti-immigrant rhetoric, demanding a 21-year naturalization period, deportation of foreign criminals, mandatory Protestant Bible reading in schools, and exclusion of Catholics from public office. The party achieved peak influence in the mid-1850s, electing over 100 congressmen, eight governors, and controlling several state legislatures, though it fragmented over slavery debates by the late 1850s. In the late , nativist pressures targeted Chinese laborers in , where they were blamed for depressing wages and altering social norms amid and railroad construction. The of 1882 suspended of Chinese laborers for ten years, barred them from , and effectively halted , reducing Chinese arrivals from tens of thousands annually to near zero. This marked the first U.S. restricting immigration by nationality, driven by labor competition and racial anxieties rather than abstract ideology. Early 20th-century nativism focused on Southern and Eastern European immigrants, Jews, and others seen as unassimilable, amid a surge of over 18 million arrivals from 1890 to 1920. The Immigration Restriction League, formed in 1894, advocated literacy tests, leading to the Immigration Act of 1917 imposing such requirements. The Immigration Act of 1924 established national origins quotas based on the 1890 census, allocating 2% of each nationality's foreign-born residents as the annual limit, totaling about 164,000 visas favoring Northern and Western Europeans (initially 82% of quotas) while capping others sharply. This reduced total immigration from over 800,000 in 1920-1921 to under 200,000 annually, reflecting concerns over rapid demographic shifts straining wages, urban infrastructure, and cultural cohesion. Post-World War II nativism addressed illegal Mexican , culminating in in 1954, which deported over 1 million individuals through coordinated federal-local efforts. Economic drivers included empirical findings of modest suppression for low-skilled natives; meta-analyses indicate reduces wages for high school dropouts by 0-5%, with stronger effects in localized labor markets. Cultural and security imperatives arose from assimilation challenges, with rapid immigrant —rather than absolute scale—correlating with heightened nativist sentiment, as seen in historical spikes following influxes exceeding 1% of the native population annually. In contemporary politics, nativist elements resurfaced in the 1990s with California's Proposition 187, denying public services to undocumented immigrants, and intensified during Donald Trump's campaign emphasizing border security against illegal entries estimated at 11-12 million undocumented residents. Policies like the Migrant Protection Protocols () and asylum restrictions reduced southern border encounters by up to 90% in peak enforcement periods compared to prior administrations' averages, addressing fentanyl trafficking and crime linked to unvetted crossings. These measures echoed historical causal realism: unchecked immigration correlates with public resource strain and security vulnerabilities, prompting policy reversals toward restriction when native interests predominate.

Canada

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Canadian nativism expressed itself through discriminatory immigration policies targeting non-European arrivals, particularly from , to safeguard economic opportunities and cultural homogeneity for the Anglo-French settler majority. The Chinese Immigration Act of 1885 introduced a head tax of $50 on Chinese laborers, raised to $100 in 1900 and $500 in 1903, which collected over $23 million from approximately 82,000 individuals by 1923, effectively deterring and settlement. This measure followed the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway, after which Chinese workers were deemed surplus labor threatening white employment. The policy culminated in the Chinese Immigration Act of 1923, which prohibited nearly all Chinese immigration until its repeal in 1947, reflecting widespread anti-Asian sentiment fueled by labor competition and racial exclusionism. Similar nativist impulses affected other groups, including South Asians and Japanese. The 1914 saw 376 Indian passengers denied entry in , leading to their amid fears of economic displacement and security risks from British India's unrest. During , naturalized citizens of German, Austrian, or Ukrainian origin faced disenfranchisement and internment, with over 8,500 "enemy aliens" registered and thousands detained, driven by suspicions of divided loyalties. The intensified these tendencies, with orders surging to over 9,000 annually by 1935, targeting unemployed immigrants perceived as burdens on relief systems amid 30% unemployment rates. Post-World War II, Canada shifted toward selective immigration via the points system in 1967, prioritizing skills over origin, which diluted overt nativism but did not eliminate underlying concerns over rapid demographic change. The official adoption of multiculturalism in 1971 further marginalized nativist rhetoric in mainstream politics, yet regional expressions persisted, such as in Alberta's historical anti-Catholic and anti-radical movements opposing Ukrainian and Mormon settlers as threats to Protestant Anglo-Saxon norms. In contemporary politics, the (PPC), founded in 2018 by , represents a modern nativist strain by advocating a cap on permanent at 150,000 annually—down from over 400,000 in recent years—a five-year moratorium on most non-permanent residents, and stricter integration requirements to preserve and address shortages exacerbated by . These positions, polling under 5% federally, highlight nativism's marginal status amid consensus on high , though public surveys in 2023 showed 58% of favoring reductions due to infrastructure strains.

Europe

In contemporary European politics, nativism has gained traction as a response to sustained high levels of , particularly from non-Western regions, which have altered demographic compositions and strained social cohesion. Between 2015 and 2023, the experienced net migration inflows exceeding 10 million people, including over 1.2 million asylum seekers in 2015 alone from , , and , prompting widespread demands for policies prioritizing native populations in employment, welfare, and cultural norms. Nativist platforms typically advocate border securitization, repatriation of irregular migrants, and restrictions on to mitigate perceived risks of parallel societies and resource competition. Empirical analyses correlate spikes in culturally distinct immigration with electoral gains for nativist-oriented parties, which emphasize exclusionary to counter globalization's erosion of national . For instance, regions facing intense trade shocks and influxes have shown up to 20-30% higher vote shares for such parties compared to less affected areas, driven by native workers' displacement and concerns from unintegrated communities. By 2023, non-EU nationals comprised approximately 6% of the EU's population, fueling public opposition where surveys indicate 50-70% of respondents in countries like , , and favor reduced levels. This nativist resurgence reflects causal pressures beyond economics, including empirical evidence of elevated crime rates in high-immigration locales—such as Germany's 2023 federal crime statistics showing non-citizens overrepresented in violent offenses by factors of 2-5—and failures of multiculturalism leading to ghettoization in urban areas like Sweden's Malmö or France's banlieues. Mainstream parties have increasingly adopted nativist rhetoric, such as Denmark's 2019-2023 coalition limiting asylum grants by 80%, to stem voter losses, though critics from institutions like Human Rights Watch argue this mainstreaming exacerbates exclusion; however, such views often overlook data on native wage suppression and welfare system overload from unchecked inflows. Policies enacted include the EU's 2024 Migration Pact, mandating faster returns and burden-sharing, alongside national measures like Italy's 2023 Albania deal outsourcing migrant processing to curb Mediterranean crossings by 60%. Despite accusations of xenophobia, nativist arguments ground in verifiable demographic shifts—projected non-EU population shares reaching 10-15% by 2040 in Western Europe—and prioritize causal realities of assimilation challenges over normative ideals of open borders.

France

In France, nativism has manifested primarily through the Rassemblement National (RN), founded in 1972 as the Front National by , which advocates prioritizing French citizens in employment, welfare, and housing while advocating strict limits on to preserve and security. The party's platform emphasizes reducing legal and , with proposals to condition on assimilation and to deport foreign nationals convicted of crimes, responding to empirical pressures such as the estimated 890,000 to 1.2 million undocumented immigrants and repeated jihadist attacks, including the 2015 Paris assaults that killed 130 people. Under Marine Le Pen's leadership since 2011, the RN has reoriented toward socioeconomic issues affecting native workers, attributing wage stagnation and unemployment—peaking at 10.4% in 2015 amid migrant influxes—to unchecked from non-EU countries. France's immigrant population reached approximately 7.5 million by 2023, constituting 10.8% of the total populace, with 48% originating from , correlating with heightened nativist sentiment in regions experiencing cultural enclaves and integration failures, such as the banlieues marked by riots in 2005 and 2023. RN policies seek to halt what proponents describe as demographic replacement, citing data showing immigrants' higher fertility rates and ; for instance, non- migrants accounted for 41.2% of permanent entries from 2005-2020, straining public finances estimated at billions in net costs annually. This stance gained traction amid security realities, including over 300 deaths from Islamist terrorism since 2012, fueling demands for border controls independent of directives. Electoral gains underscore nativism's appeal: RN secured 31.4% in the 2024 European Parliament elections, reflecting voter concerns over immigration's cultural and economic toll, as native French face competition in low-skill sectors where immigrant labor depresses wages by up to 5-10% per studies on similar European contexts. In the 2022 presidential runoff, Le Pen garnered 41.5% against , with support strongest in deindustrialized areas burdened by migrant-related fiscal loads, where non-EU immigrants contribute disproportionately to —foreigners comprising 24% of prison inmates despite being 9% of the population. Proponents argue these positions derive from causal realities of resource and identity erosion, rather than , bolstered by data showing slower assimilation among Muslim immigrants compared to earlier European waves.

Germany

In contemporary German , nativism manifests primarily as opposition to mass and , driven by concerns over , security, and economic strain. This sentiment gained prominence following waves of immigration, including Turkish guest workers from the 1960s onward and the 2015-2016 influx of over 1.2 million asylum seekers, predominantly from , , and , under Angela Merkel's open-border policy. The policy, encapsulated in Merkel's "" statement on , 2015, correlated with a surge in nativist backlash, including heightened support for restrictive measures amid incidents like the New Year's Eve sexual assaults in on December 31, 2015, involving over 1,200 reported crimes by migrants. Empirical data from the Federal Crime Office (BKA) indicated that non-citizens, comprising about 12% of the population by 2016, accounted for 30% of crime suspects, fueling demands for tighter border controls and deportation. The Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident () movement, founded in on October 20, 2014, exemplifies nativism, organizing weekly protests that peaked at 25,000 attendees in 2015, chanting "Wir sind das Volk" to protest perceived threats from Islamic immigration and parallel societies. 's platform emphasized preserving German cultural identity, opposing "," and criticizing elite , resonating in eastern where economic disparities post-reunification amplified grievances. The movement influenced broader discourse, though it faced counter-protests and scrutiny for extremist elements, disbanding formally in October 2024 after shifting influence to electoral politics. Studies attribute 's appeal to pre-existing nativist attitudes in the region, rather than solely the 2015 crisis, with surveys showing eastern Germans expressing higher concerns over demographic change. The (AfD), established on February 6, 2013, initially as a euroskeptic party, pivoted to nativism post-2015, advocating "" of incompatible migrants, asylum moratoriums, and prioritization of ethnic Germans (). The party's 2017 federal election breakthrough, securing 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats—primarily in the east—stemmed from nativist mobilization, with vote shares correlating to local anti-immigrant sentiment predating the crisis. By the February 23, 2025, federal election, AfD garnered around 20% nationally, capitalizing on ongoing migration debates, though constitutional protections limited coalition inclusion. AfD policies include skilled-worker preferences over refugees and border fences, reflecting data-driven arguments on integration failures, such as 2023 BAMF reports showing only 50% employment rates among 2015-2016 arrivals after years in-country. Public opinion polls underscore nativism's empirical base: a January 2025 Deutschlandtrend survey found 58% of favoring fewer refugee intakes, with immigration ranking as the top voter concern alongside the . Reuters-Infratest data from 2023 revealed 70% dissatisfaction with government migration handling, linked to fiscal burdens exceeding €50 billion annually for asylum processing and welfare. These views persist despite mainstream media portrayals often framing nativism as xenophobic, with academic analyses confirming higher nativist potentials in eastern states explaining AfD's asymmetric success. Historical precedents, such as post-World War II integration of 12 million ethnic from , highlight Germany's prior emphasis on ethnic , contrasting with post-1990 multicultural shifts that nativists seek to reverse.

United Kingdom

In the , nativism has manifested as opposition to high levels of , particularly from non-Western sources, driven by concerns over cultural cohesion, strain, and national sovereignty. A pivotal early expression occurred in 1968 when Conservative MP delivered his in Birmingham, warning that unchecked from countries—projected to reach 3.5 million by 1985—would lead to communal violence and reverse racial hierarchies, citing constituent anecdotes of social tensions. Powell's remarks, drawing on Virgil's for imagery of "rivers of blood," resonated with segments of the public amid rising arrivals post-Windrush (1948 onward), as Gallup polls indicated 74% favored halting primary and 82% supported repatriation incentives. Despite condemnation from party leader , who dismissed him from the shadow cabinet, the speech galvanized nativist sentiment, evidenced by dockworkers' marches in support and Powell topping popularity polls briefly. The late 20th and early 21st centuries saw nativism intensify with EU enlargement, as free movement swelled inflows from Eastern Europe, peaking at 252,000 net EU migration in 2015. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), founded in 1993 and led by Nigel Farage from 2006, channeled these concerns into demands for stricter border controls and EU exit, framing immigration as eroding British identity and wages for native low-skilled workers. UKIP's 2014 European Parliament success (27.5% vote share) pressured Conservatives to promise a referendum, culminating in the 2016 Brexit vote, where Leave won 51.9% nationally, with immigration cited as the top issue by 33% of Leave voters per British Election Study data—stronger in areas of prior low immigration experiencing rapid change. Brexit nativism combined cultural preservation imperatives with anti-elitist distrust, as high-nativism respondents were 17 percentage points more pro-Leave when holding anti-elite views. Post-Brexit, nativism persists amid record net migration—906,000 for year ending June 2023, driven by non-EU work/study visas and humanitarian routes, falling to 431,000 by year ending December 2024 per provisional estimates. Public opinion reflects sustained concern: 48% named the top issue in August 2025 Ipsos polling, up from prior years, with 58% selecting it among top three concerns in YouGov surveys; 70% favor limits on student migration and majority support reducing overall inflows, particularly irregular Channel crossings (45,000 in 2022). , succeeding UKIP, polled 14% in 2024 elections on platforms prioritizing native interests, including halting non-essential migration to alleviate shortages ( accounting for 89% of 1.34 million household shortfall 2021-2024). These positions align with empirical pressures: native-born in low-skill sectors declined amid , while NHS waiting lists hit 7.6 million in 2023 partly due to outpacing . Mainstream sources often frame such nativism as xenophobic, yet data from apolitical bodies like the Migration Observatory underscore causal links between inflows and strain, validating core nativist diagnostics over bias-influenced dismissals.

Asia-Pacific and Other Regions

In , nativism historically culminated in the , formalized through the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, which imposed dictation tests to effectively bar non-European immigrants and prioritize British settlers to preserve a homogeneous society. This policy reflected fears of economic competition and cultural dilution from Asian laborers, particularly Chinese miners during the 19th-century gold rushes, leading to restrictive measures that persisted until gradual dismantling in the and . Contemporary nativism remains embedded in Australian , evidenced by stringent border controls, offshore detention of asylum seekers since 2001, and public support for limiting to maintain social cohesion; a 2019 survey found 53% of Australians agreeing with nativist sentiments favoring native-born interests. Parties like One Nation have channeled these views, advocating reduced levels amid debates over housing pressures and cultural integration post-2010 population surges.

Pakistan and Taiwan

In Pakistan's Sindh province, nativist movements have emphasized Sindhi ethnic primacy against internal migration from Punjab and Urdu-speaking settlers displaced during the 1947 partition, manifesting in demands for quotas in jobs and land allocation to protect local resources; such tensions fueled violence in the 1980s and ongoing separatist rhetoric from groups like the Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz. These efforts prioritize indigenous control over demographic shifts, though suppressed under national Islamic frameworks that sometimes exacerbate ethnic divides rather than unify. Taiwan's nativism emerged prominently in the through xiangtu (nativist) literature and cultural movements, which critiqued elite and promoted a localized Taiwanese identity rooted in rural experiences and indigenous heritage, countering the dominant Kuomintang-imposed from mainland exiles. This shift, accelerated by youth narratives post-1949 influx, framed Taiwan as a distinct , influencing and independence-leaning politics; debates in the 1979 nativist highlighted tensions between provincial marginalization and assertive localism against Beijing's unification claims. By prioritizing native over external cultural imposition, these movements laid groundwork for policies favoring Taiwanese , as seen in referendums and identity polls showing over 60% self-identification as solely Taiwanese by 2023. Elsewhere in the , Japan's nativism has intensified amid demographic decline, with anti-immigrant rhetoric rising since 2020 as foreign residents reached 2.3% of the population by 2023; politicians from parties like decry immigrants for straining welfare and crime rates, advocating stricter naturalization despite labor shortages from an aging society with fertility at 1.26 births per woman in 2023. In , subnational nativism drives "sons-of-the-soil" policies in states like , where historically enforced Marathi preferences in employment against out-of-state migrants, correlating with riots and electoral gains tied to booms.

Australia

Australia's nativist politics originated with the , enacted via the , which imposed a dictation test in any European language to effectively bar non-European immigrants and preserve a predominantly British-descended population. This measure, driven by fears of economic competition from Asian laborers and cultural preservation amid gold rush-era inflows, garnered bipartisan support from labor unions and politicians alike, reflecting widespread sentiment that unrestricted non-white migration threatened wages and social cohesion. The policy underwent gradual erosion post-World War II due to labor shortages and international pressures, with key reforms in 1966 under Harold Holt's Migration Act abolishing overt racial quotas and preferences for European migrants. Full dismantlement occurred in 1973 under the Whitlam Labor government, which eliminated remaining discriminatory elements and embraced as official policy. Despite this shift, nativist undercurrents persisted, as evidenced by periodic surges in anti-immigration targeting groups perceived to strain resources or alter cultural norms. In contemporary politics, nativism is prominently associated with party, founded in 1997 following her decrying and Asian as reverse against . The party, which secured Senate representation in 2016 and maintains a focus on prioritizing native-born citizens for jobs, reducing overall , and opposing policies seen as eroding national , draws support from voters concerned with globalization's impacts. Policies such as , initiated in September 2013 by the Abbott , operationalize nativist priorities through military-led border enforcement, including boat turnbacks and mandatory offshore processing for unauthorized maritime arrivals, resulting in a sharp decline in such attempts from over 20,000 in 2013 to near zero thereafter. Public opinion surveys reveal enduring nativist leanings amid high legal rates exceeding 500,000 annually in recent years; a 2021 poll indicated 57% favor employers prioritizing natives during job scarcity, while 38% believe the country would strengthen by halting . More recent 2025 data shows 36% agreeing would be stronger without , up from prior years, correlating with debates over shortages and pressures linked to . These views, while not dominant, underscore nativism's role in shaping demands for controlled inflows prioritizing economic and realism over unrestricted global mobility.

Pakistan and Taiwan

In Pakistan, nativist movements have primarily arisen in Sindh province, where indigenous have mobilized against the post-1947 influx of Muhajir migrants from , who numbered around 7 million and concentrated in urban centers like , altering demographic balances and sparking resource competition. By the 1981 census, these migrants and their descendants formed a significant portion of Sindh's urban population, prompting Sindhi ethno-nationalist groups such as the Jeay Sindh Muttahida Mahaz to advocate for quotas reserving government jobs, education seats, and land for native , alongside promotion of the over . These efforts reflect a prioritization of pre-partition inhabitants' claims to provincial sovereignty, often framing Muhajirs—despite their Pakistani citizenship—as external disruptors to Sindhi cultural and economic primacy. More recently, nativist pressures have targeted , who peaked at over 1.4 million registered in by 2021 amid prolonged conflict spillover. Security concerns, including alleged affiliations, fueled public and governmental demands for , culminating in a 2023 policy shift under interim Prime Minister to deport undocumented Afghans, resulting in over 600,000 expulsions by October 2024 despite economic contributions from the refugee population in labor sectors. This stance prioritizes native ' access to jobs and services, though critics attribute it partly to xenophobic amid domestic exceeding 20% in 2023. In Taiwan, nativism surfaced in the as a cultural backlash against Kuomintang-imposed , with "xiangtu" (native soil) literature emphasizing benshengren (pre-1945 Hoklo and Hakka settlers, comprising about 70% of the population) experiences of rural life, Japanese colonial legacies, and local dialects over waishengren (post-1945 mainlanders and descendants, around 12-15%) narratives tied to continental . This intellectual ferment, documented in debates from 1972 onward, critiqued KMT authoritarianism and fostered Taiwanese consciousness among youth, contributing to the 1980s dangwai opposition movement that evolved into the (DPP). Politically, it manifested in policies post-1987 democratization, such as reviving in education and media by the , aiming to dilute Mandarin dominance and assert island-specific identity against unification pressures. Contemporary nativism reinforces Taiwan's , with DPP administrations since 2016 promoting curricula highlighting indigenous and colonial histories over dynastic links, amid surveys showing over 60% of youth identifying solely as Taiwanese by 2023. While bolstering resistance to Beijing's claims—evident in 2024 election rhetoric framing mainland influence as cultural erasure—it has drawn accusations of marginalizing communities, who report subtle in promotions and . This dynamic underscores nativism's role in consolidating native-majority solidarity, though empirical data on inter-ethnic tensions remain limited to qualitative accounts.

Latin America

In , nativism has historically been subdued compared to or , as the region has long served as a net exporter of migrants rather than a primary destination, with immigration primarily intra-regional and culturally proximate. However, the Venezuelan humanitarian crisis, which displaced approximately 7.7 million people by August 2023—making it the largest migration outflow in Latin American history—has triggered notable nativist reactions in host countries like , , , , and , where Venezuelan arrivals strained public services, housing, and labor markets. These inflows, peaking at over 4 million departures from Venezuela in 2018-2019 alone, correlated with rising local resentment, as empirical studies indicate that exposure to in-county migrant influxes exacerbated anti-migrant sentiment, independent of prior attitudes. Public opinion surveys reveal a sharp shift: in , by 2021, fewer than 5% of respondents viewed Venezuelan immigrants as having a positive economic impact, amid widespread perceptions of increased and resource . Similarly, across the region, 70% of television coverage linking Venezuelans to issues amplified these views, though suggests local economic pressures—such as wage suppression in informal sectors—drove attitudes more than media alone, with nativist opposition manifesting in demands for stricter controls and . In , for instance, violent clashes in 2018-2019 between locals and Venezuelan communities prompted the government to deport over 5,000 irregular migrants by 2021, reflecting policy responses to public backlash over alleged gang infiltration and urban overcrowding. experienced analogous tensions, with anti-immigrant riots in 2021 targeting Haitian and Venezuelan neighborhoods, fueled by a 300% migrant increase from 2010 to 2020, leading to temporary closures and heightened police patrols. Politically, nativism has gained traction in far-right platforms, though it remains secondary to authoritarian appeals, differing from European models where anti-immigration defines ideology. In , President Javier Milei's administration since 2023 implemented restrictive measures mirroring U.S. approaches, including asylum caps, residency revocations for undocumented entrants, and reduced access to , justified by claims of fiscal unsustainability from unchecked inflows. Ecuador's 2023 elections saw candidates emphasizing nativist controls amid rising Venezuelan-related violence, while under (2019-2022) tightened regularization processes despite earlier humanitarian visas, prioritizing national sovereignty over open borders. These developments underscore nativism's emergence as a response to tangible causal factors like resource scarcity and spikes—Peru's homicide rate rose 20% post-2017 Venezuelan surge—rather than abstract , though academic sources note that left-leaning media often downplay such data in favor of cosmopolitan narratives.

Brazil

Nativism in Brazil emerged during the colonial period as a reaction against Portuguese dominance, evolving into expressions of local identity and resentment toward foreign influences following independence in 1822. In the 19th century, nativist riots shook urban centers across the country in the 1820s, 1830s, and 1840s, often targeting Portuguese merchants and other immigrants perceived as economic threats amid post-independence instability and competition for resources. These disturbances reflected broader tensions between native-born Brazilians and newcomers, contributing to a reevaluation of the government's prior encouragement of European immigration to replace slave labor; by the late 19th century, rising nativist pressures led to selective restrictions, including quotas on certain nationalities like Asians and Germans, amid anti-foreign propaganda and envy of immigrant economic success. In the 20th century, nativism subsided as Brazil promoted itself as a multicultural "racial democracy," actively recruiting immigrants to bolster population and economy, though sporadic xenophobia persisted against groups like Japanese and Lebanese. Contemporary manifestations are limited and not central to major political movements, with scholars observing that nativism plays a marginal role in Brazilian politics compared to or the , often overshadowed by class-based or anti-socialist rhetoric. Instances of anti-immigrant sentiment have targeted Haitian arrivals, numbering over 100,000 since the 2010 earthquake, who faced , job discrimination, and violent attacks in southern states like by 2014, fueled by perceptions of cultural incompatibility and resource strain. Jair Bolsonaro's 2018-2022 presidency highlighted debates, with rhetoric criticizing prior open-border policies under and opposing the UN in 2018, yet his administration processed over 400,000 Venezuelan refugee claims by 2021, framing inflows as evidence of socialism's failures rather than advocating strict nativist exclusion. Analyses of Bolsonaro's discourse confirm an absence of core nativist elements, prioritizing sovereign and anti-elite over ethnic . Public attitudes show mixed , higher against Haitians than Europeans, but Brazil's success stems from assimilation pressures rather than organized nativist backlash.

Controversies, Criticisms, and Rebuttals

Accusations of Xenophobia and Racism

Critics of nativism, including scholars and mainstream media commentators, often equate its emphasis on prioritizing native-born populations with —a pathological fear or hatred of foreigners—and , defined as or based on perceived racial differences. These accusations posit that nativist policies, such as restrictions or preferences for assimilation, serve as coded appeals to ethnic exclusion rather than responses to demographic pressures or cultural cohesion concerns. For instance, academic analyses describe nativism as a " for racist ," arguing it masks cultural racism by framing immigrants as threats to without explicit racial animus. In the United States, former President Donald Trump's nativist rhetoric, including his 2015 campaign statement that Mexico sends "rapists" and criminals across the border, has been widely accused of racism and xenophobia by outlets like and , which link it to historical patterns of anti-immigrant . researchers have claimed empirical data show Trump's support correlates with racist attitudes, interpreting his border security focus as emboldening white nationalist sentiments rather than addressing verifiable crime rates among undocumented populations. Similarly, opposition to the 1924 Act's quotas on non-Nordic Europeans has been retroactively framed as racially motivated nativism, with critics arguing it institutionalized xenophobic hierarchies favoring Anglo-Saxon stock. European examples include France's under , accused by analysts and of perpetuating through policies favoring "national preference" in welfare and jobs, despite the party's rebranding to distance from overt . Washington Post reporting highlights persistent antisemitic and racist undertones in party circles, portraying Le Pen's anti-immigration stance as a veneer for ethnic exclusion. In the , the referendum's nativist undertones—emphasizing control over EU migration—drew scholarly claims of , with studies in Ethnic and Racial Studies attributing anti-migrant sentiment to postcolonial racial anxieties rather than economic sovereignty arguments. Such accusations frequently originate from left-leaning academic and journalistic sources, which may conflate empirical immigration impacts—like strain on public services or —with irrational , thereby framing nativist advocacy as inherently bigoted without engaging causal of policy trade-offs. Critics like those in and WSJ opinion pieces note that labeling nativism as xenophobic risks oversimplifying voter concerns over rapid demographic change, yet mainstream narratives persist in portraying it as a resurgence of exclusionary ideologies akin to 19th-century Know-Nothingism.

Defenses Grounded in Data and First Principles

Proponents of nativism argue that unrestricted , particularly of low-skilled workers, depresses for native-born workers in direct competition, as basic supply-and-demand dynamics in labor markets predict increased labor supply lowers equilibrium for comparable skill levels. A study analyzing U.S. labor concludes that significant inflows of immigrants suppress for native-born workers competing in the same sectors, with effects most pronounced for those without degrees. Similarly, meta-analyses of immigration's labor effects indicate negative impacts on low-skilled natives, countering claims of negligible influence by highlighting distributional consequences rather than aggregates. Fiscal analyses further substantiate nativist positions by demonstrating that many immigrants, especially those with lower levels, impose net costs on host countries' welfare systems and public services over their lifetimes. In the , low-skilled immigrants generate substantial fiscal deficits, with estimates showing that a 30-year-old high school dropout immigrant costs federal budgets approximately $5,000 net in the first decade before partial offsets later, while illegal immigrants overall receive more in services than they contribute in taxes. Updated projections attribute trillions in lifetime burdens from recent border surges to strains on , healthcare, and , exacerbating resource scarcity for natives. On public safety, while aggregate incarceration rates for immigrants may appear lower in some datasets, nativists point to elevated offending among specific undocumented subgroups and in high-immigration locales, where causal links to persist despite methodological challenges in tracking legal status. Texas data from 2012–2018 reveal undocumented immigrants' criminal conviction rates exceed those of natives for and , underscoring risks from and underreporting. Cultural defenses emphasize empirical patterns of incomplete assimilation under mass , where high inflows foster ethnic enclaves that hinder , intermarriage, and value convergence, leading to persistent parallel societies. Longitudinal studies show immigrants often retain origin-country attitudes toward and social norms, with second-generation outcomes varying by host-country restriction levels; lax policies correlate with slower integration and rising intergroup tensions. From first principles, nations function as voluntary associations with inherent rights to , including to maintain demographic stability and reciprocal cultural cohesion essential for trust-based institutions. Finite territorial resources and evolutionary preferences for kin-group imply that unchecked demographic shifts erode the social contracts underpinning liberal democracies, as causal chains from population composition to policy preferences demonstrate: diverse electorates prioritize redistribution over , per observed shifts in high-immigration jurisdictions. Prioritizing natives aligns with causal realism, recognizing that host societies bear disproportionate costs without equivalent benefits to cohesion or .

Impact on Policy and Society

Nativist influences have directly shaped restrictive immigration policies, such as the U.S. , which imposed national origins quotas based on the 1890 census, slashing annual immigrant admissions from over 700,000 in the early 1920s to roughly 150,000 by decade's end and barring most Asian entries. This legislation, motivated by concerns over labor competition and cultural dilution, fostered a tighter domestic labor market that spurred internal workforce shifts, including accelerated recruitment of African American migrants from the South to Northern factories during the Great Migration. By limiting rapid demographic changes, it enabled prior immigrant waves—primarily from —to assimilate more fully into American society, reducing immediate pressures on urban infrastructure and public services. In economic terms, such policies have yielded mixed outcomes, with empirical studies showing local adaptations through capital investment and labor substitution rather than uniform wage gains for natives, though tighter markets correlated with industrial expansion in the . Societally, nativist-driven restrictions have preserved national cultural cohesion in the short term, as seen in the temporary stabilization of the U.S. ethnic composition, but they have also intensified debates over exclusion, exemplified by the Act's role in limiting Jewish refugee admissions amid rising European in . Contemporary nativism has propelled policy shifts toward enforcement, including the Trump administration's expansions of border security and deportations, which removed over 1.2 million immigrants from the U.S. workforce by mid-2025 and exerted upward pressure on wages in immigrant-dependent sectors like and . In , nativist electoral gains post-2015 influenced asylum tightenings in nations like and , correlating with stabilized public spending on integration and reduced inflows straining social welfare systems. These measures have heightened societal polarization, with data indicating both bolstered native confidence in institutional efficacy amid perceived threats and criticisms of eroded humanitarian norms.

Recent Developments and Ongoing Debates

Post-2010 Surge in Populist Contexts

In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, nativist elements within populist politics gained traction in and , as voters in deindustrialized regions expressed concerns over job competition, cultural preservation, and public resource allocation amid rising . This surge manifested in electoral breakthroughs for parties prioritizing native-born citizens' interests, with nativism defined by opposition to and advocacy for over supranational migration policies. Empirical analyses link these developments to measurable increases in net migration rates, which heightened perceptions of strain on welfare systems and social cohesion in host countries. The , involving approximately 1.3 million irregular border crossings primarily from , , and , accelerated nativist populist gains by amplifying public anxieties over rapid demographic shifts and integration challenges. In , the (AfD) party, founded in 2013 with initial anti-euro focus, pivoted to anti- nativism post-crisis, securing 12.6% of the vote in the 2017 federal election and entering parliament for the first time. Similar patterns emerged elsewhere: ' support rose from 5.7% in 2010 to 17.5% in 2018, correlating with voter data showing immigration as a top concern; in , Lega's vote share climbed from 4.1% in 2013 to 17.4% in 2018, enabling participation with promises of mass deportations. These advances reflected not mere rhetoric but policy responses, such as Denmark's 2018 "ghetto laws" tightening assimilation requirements for non-Western immigrants, justified by official reports on parallel societies. In the United States, Trump's 2016 presidential campaign exemplified nativist , emphasizing and a proposed wall with to curb unauthorized entries, which averaged 400,000 apprehensions annually pre-2016. Trump's platform resonated in states, where white working-class voters cited economic displacement from trade and ; exit polls indicated 64% of his supporters viewed immigrants as a burden on the economy, compared to 29% of Clinton's. This contributed to his victory, despite losing the popular vote, and subsequent policies like the 2017 travel ban on several Muslim-majority countries, framed as measures amid data on foreign-born incidents. The referendum in the UK, with 51.9% voting Leave in June 2016, similarly incorporated nativist appeals, as campaigners highlighted EU free movement leading to net migration of 332,000 in 2015, promising restored controls to prioritize British workers. Cross-national studies attribute this populist nativist wave to causal factors beyond elite manipulation, including stagnant wages in low-skill sectors—down 0.2% annually in the EU from 2008-2015—and localized spikes in non-EU immigration, which econometric models show boosting radical-right vote shares by 1-2% per percentage-point increase in migrant inflows. While mainstream sources often frame these movements as reactionary, data from voter surveys reveal underlying grievances rooted in observable disparities, such as higher welfare usage among recent immigrants in Scandinavian countries (e.g., 60% of non-Western immigrants in Denmark reliant on benefits vs. 10% natives). By 2020, right-wing populist parties held governing roles or significant parliamentary influence in at least eight European states, marking a shift from marginality to institutional embedding.

Nativism Versus Globalism

Nativism in contemporary politics positions itself as a direct counter to by emphasizing the primacy of national borders, cultural continuity, and economic policies favoring native-born populations over international integration. frameworks, often advanced through institutions like the and multilateral trade pacts, promote unrestricted flows of goods, capital, and people to maximize efficiency and innovation, but nativists argue these erode sovereignty and disadvantage natives. For instance, the rapid expansion of global trade following China's 2001 entry into the WTO exposed U.S. workers to import competition, resulting in the loss of approximately 2.4 million jobs by 2011, with persistent effects including elevated unemployment and reduced lifetime earnings in affected regions. This "" accounted for about 59% of U.S. job declines from 2001 to 2019, particularly in labor-intensive sectors, fueling nativist demands for tariffs and reshoring. Economically, nativists cite evidence that globalist immigration policies depress wages for native low-skilled workers, with economist George Borjas estimating a 3-4% reduction due to labor market competition, and illegal immigration alone imposing $99-118 billion in annual wage losses on natives. Protectionist measures aligned with nativism, such as those implemented during the Trump administration's 2017-2021 term, correlated with tighter labor markets and wage gains for low-skilled natives, as reduced inflows allowed demand to outpace supply. Globalism's proponents counter that openness drives overall growth, yet data from globalization shocks reveal uneven distribution, with gains accruing disproportionately to skilled elites and corporations while natives in trade-exposed areas face prolonged dislocation. Nativism thus advocates reciprocal trade and immigration caps to realign incentives toward national welfare, viewing unchecked globalism as prioritizing abstract cosmopolitan ideals over tangible native interests. Culturally, nativism resists globalism's push for , drawing on empirical findings that rapid ethnic diversity erodes social trust and civic cohesion. Robert Putnam's 2007 analysis of U.S. communities showed that higher diversity leads to decreased generalized trust, lower volunteering, and reduced interpersonal interactions, as residents "hunker down" amid perceived threats to shared norms. Meta-analyses confirm this pattern, with diversity negatively impacting trust across contexts, challenging globalist assumptions of seamless assimilation. Nativist policies, by limiting inflows and promoting assimilation, aim to preserve the high-trust environments that underpin economic and social stability, as evidenced by higher cohesion in more homogeneous societies. In recent populist surges, such as the 2016 referendum where 52% voted to reclaim from EU supranationalism, nativism has manifested as a causal response to globalism's , including identity dilution and policy alienation. In , nativist parties have consolidated influence through electoral gains and policy impacts as of 2025, with seven member states—including , , and the —now featuring such parties in governing coalitions. This trend reflects public sentiment favoring immigration restrictions, as surveys indicate majorities in seven Western European nations view inflows as excessively high and mismanaged, often linking them to negative economic and social effects. Empirical data on integration failures, such as elevated rates in migrant-heavy areas and welfare strains, underpin this shift, prompting EU-wide measures like stricter border controls and external processing deals, which have stabilized irregular arrivals but not resolved underlying demographic pressures. In the United States, nativist priorities have shaped Republican platforms post-2024, emphasizing enforcement amid a foreign-born of over one million since mid-2024, the first such drop since the . Gallup polling in 2025 shows 48% of Americans advocating reduced levels, down from prior peaks but still indicative of sustained restrictionist majorities driven by labor market competition and concerns. These attitudes correlate with , including wage suppression in low-skill sectors from high inflows, fostering prospects for sustained rigor under incoming administrations. Globally, nativism's trajectory favors persistence over decline, as causal factors like uneven —manifesting in job and cultural dilution—intersect with migration surges from conflict zones, outpacing assimilation capacities in host societies. While globalist frameworks promise prosperity, empirical shortfalls in integration outcomes and fiscal burdens have eroded their appeal, elevating nativist realism in debates over and . Absent reversals in migration drivers, such as stabilized source-country conditions, nativist policies are poised for incremental normalization, potentially mitigating overextension risks through targeted rather than open reversal.

References

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