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The Rohingya people (/rˈhɪnə, -ɪŋjə/; Rohingya: 𐴌𐴗𐴥𐴝𐴙𐴚𐴒𐴙𐴝, romanized: ruáingga; IPA: [rʊˈɜi̯ɲ.ɟə][citation needed]) are a stateless Indo-Aryan ethnolinguistic group[17][18] who predominantly follow Islam[10][19][20] from Rakhine State, Myanmar. Before the Rohingya genocide in 2017, when over 740,000 fled to Bangladesh, an estimated 1.4 million Rohingya lived in Myanmar.[21][1][22][23][24] One of the most persecuted minorities in the world,[25][26][27] the Rohingya are denied citizenship under the 1982 Myanmar nationality law.[28][29][30] There are also restrictions on their freedom of movement, access to state education and civil service jobs.[30][31] The legal conditions faced by the Rohingya in Myanmar have been compared to apartheid[32][33][34][35] by some academics, analysts and political figures, including Nobel laureate Bishop Desmond Tutu, a South African anti-apartheid activist.[36] The most recent mass displacement of Rohingya in 2017 prompted the International Criminal Court to investigate crimes against humanity, and the International Court of Justice to hear a case alleging genocide.[37]

The Rohingya maintain they are indigenous to western Myanmar with a heritage of over a millennium and influence from the Arabs, Mughals, and Portuguese. The community claims it is descended from people in precolonial Arakan and colonial Arakan; historically, the region was an independent kingdom between Southeast Asia and the Indian subcontinent.[38][24] The Myanmar government considers the Rohingya as British colonial and postcolonial migrants from Chittagong in Bangladesh. It argues that a distinct precolonial Muslim population is recognised as Kaman, and that the Rohingya conflate their history with the history of Arakan Muslims in general to advance a separatist agenda.[39][40][41][42][43] In addition, Myanmar's government does not recognise the term "Rohingya" and prefers to refer to the community as "Bengali".[44][45] Rohingya campaign groups and human rights organisations demand the right to "self-determination within Myanmar".[46]

Various armed insurrections by the Rohingya have taken place since the 1940s and the population as a whole has faced military crackdowns in 1978, 1991–1992,[47] 2012, 2015, and particularly in 2016–2018, when most of the Rohingya population of Myanmar was driven out of the country, into neighbouring Bangladesh.[48][49][50][51][52][53] By December 2017, an estimated 625,000 refugees from Rakhine, Myanmar, had crossed the border into Bangladesh since August 2017.[54][55][56][57][58] UN officials and Human Rights Watch have described Myanmar's persecution of the Rohingya as ethnic cleansing.[59][60] The UN human rights envoy to Myanmar reported "the long history of discrimination and persecution against the Rohingya community... could amount to crimes against humanity",[61] and there have been warnings of an unfolding genocide.[62][63] Probes by the UN have found evidence of increasing incitement of hatred and religious intolerance by "ultra-nationalist Buddhists" against Rohingyas while the Myanmar security forces have been conducting "summary executions, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill-treatment, and forced labour" against the community.[64][65][66]

Before the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis and the military crackdown in 2016 and 2017, the Rohingya population in Myanmar was close to 1.4 million,[21][22][67][68][1][69] chiefly in the northern Rakhine townships, which were 80–98% Rohingya.[70] Since 2015, over 900,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to south-eastern Bangladesh alone,[71] and more to other surrounding countries, and major Muslim nations.[72][73][74][7][75] More than 100,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar are confined in camps for internally displaced persons.[76][77] Shortly before a Rohingya rebel attack that killed 12 security forces on 25 August 2017, the Myanmar military launched "clearance operations" against the Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State[78][79] that, according to NGOs, the Bangladeshi government and international news media, left many dead, and many more injured, tortured or raped, with villages burned. The government of Myanmar has denied the allegations.

Nomenclature

[edit]

The modern term Rohingya emerged from colonial and pre-colonial terms Rooinga and Rwangya.[80] The Rohingya refer to themselves as Ruáingga /ɾuájŋɡa/.[citation needed] In Burmese they are known as rui hang gya (following the MLC Transcription System) (Burmese: ရိုဟင်ဂျာ /ɹòhɪ̀ɴd͡ʑà/) while in Bengali they are called Rohingga (Bengali: রোহিঙ্গা /ɹohiŋɡa/). The term "Rohingya" may come from Rakhanga or Roshanga, the words for the state of Arakan. The word Rohingya would then mean "inhabitant of Rohang", which was the early Muslim name for Arakan.[81][82][83][84]

The usage of the term Rohingya has been historically documented prior to the British Raj. In 1799, Francis Buchanan wrote an article called "A Comparative Vocabulary of Some of the Languages Spoken in the Burma Empire", which was found and republished by Michael Charney in the SOAS Bulletin of Burma Research in 2003.[85][86][87] Among the native groups of Arakan, he wrote are the: "Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan, and who call themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan."[88][85][83] The Classical Journal of 1811 identified "Rooinga" as one of the languages spoken in the "Burmah Empire". In 1815, Johann Severin Vater listed "Ruinga" as an ethnic group with a distinct language in a compendium of languages published in German.[89]

In 1936, when Burma was still under British rule, the "Rohingya Jam'iyyat al Ulama" was founded in Arakan.[90][43][note 1]

According to Jacques Leider, the Rohingya were referred to as "Chittagonians" during the British colonial period, and it was not controversial to refer to them as "Bengalis" until the 1990s.[93] Leider also states that "there is no international consensus" on the use of the term Rohingya, as they are often called "Rohingya Muslims", "Muslim Arakanese" and "Burmese Muslims".[94][note 2] Others, such as anthropologist Christina Fink, use Rohingya not as an ethnic identifier but as a political one.[95] Leider believes the Rohingya is a political movement that started in the 1950s to create "an autonomous Muslim zone" in Rakhine.[96]

The government of Prime Minister U Nu, when Burma was a democracy from 1948 to 1962, used the term "Rohingya" in radio addresses as a part of peace-building effort in Mayu Frontier Region.[97] The term was broadcast on Burmese radio and was used in the speeches of Burmese rulers.[38] A UNHCR report on refugees caused by Operation King Dragon referred to the victims as "Bengali Muslims (called Rohingyas)".[98] Nevertheless, the term Rohingya wasn't widely used until the 1990s.[97][98][99]

Today the use of the name "Rohingya" is polarised. The government of Myanmar refuses to use the name.[97] In the 2014 census, the Myanmar government forced the Rohingya to identify themselves as "Bengali".[100] Many Rohingya see the denial of their name similar to denying their basic rights,[101] and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar has agreed.[61] According to journalist Shafiur Rahman, the name "Bengali" is used to brand the Rohingya as recent interlopers by erasing their historic ties to the region.[102] Jacques Leider writes that many Muslims in Rakhine simply prefer to call themselves "Muslim Arakanese" or "Muslims coming from Rakhine" instead of "Rohingya".[94][87][103] The United States embassy in Yangon continues to use the name "Rohingya".[100]

History

[edit]

Early history

[edit]

The Rohingya population is concentrated in the historical region of Arakan, an old coastal country in Southeast Asia. By the 4th century, Arakan became one of the earliest Indianized kingdoms in Southeast Asia. The first Arakanese state flourished in Dhanyawadi. Power then shifted to the city of Waithali. Sanskrit inscriptions in the region indicate that the founders of the first Arakanese states were Indian. Arakan was ruled by the Chandra dynasty.[104] The British historian Daniel George Edward Hall stated that "The Burmese do not seem to have settled in Arakan until possibly as late as the tenth century CE. Hence earlier dynasties are thought to have been Indian, ruling over a population similar to that of Bengal. All the capitals known to history have been in the north near modern Akyab".[105][24]

Arrival of Islam

[edit]

Due to its coastline on the Bay of Bengal, Arakan was a key centre of maritime trade and cultural exchange between Burma and the outside world, since the time of the Indian Maurya Empire.[106][24] According to Syed Islam, a political science scholar, Arab merchants had been in contact with Arakan since the third century, using the Bay of Bengal to reach Arakan.[107] A southern branch of the Silk Road connected India, Burma, and China since the Neolithic period.[108][109] Arab traders are recorded in the coastal areas of southeast Bengal, bordering Arakan, since the 9th century.[110] The Rohingya population trace their history to this period.[111]

According to Syed Islam, the earliest Muslim settlements in the Arakan region began in the 7th century. The Arab traders were also missionaries and they began converting the local Buddhist population to Islam by about 788 CE, states Syed Islam. Besides these locals converting to Islam, Arab merchants married local women and later settled in Arakan. As a result of intermarriage and conversion, the Muslim population in Arakan grew.[107] This claim by Sayed Islam saying that, by 788 CE, locals in Arakan were converting to Islam clearly contradicts historian Yegar's findings which say, even in 1203, Bengal is the easternmost point of Islamic expansion, not to say further into Arakan.[112]

The alternate view contests that Islam arrived in the Arakan region in the 1st-millennium. According to this view, this Rohingya history is not based on any evidence, rather is based on "fictitious stories, myths and legends".[113] According to Southeast Asian Buddhism history scholar and an ordained Buddhist monk Ashon Nyanuttara, there is scant historical data and archaeological evidence about the early political and religious history of the Arakan people and the Rakhaing region. The limited evidence available suggests that Buddhism, possibly the Mahayana tradition, was well established by the 4th century in the region under the Candra Buddhist dynasty.[114] Muslim community's expansion and the growth of Islam into the region came much later with Bengali Muslims from the region that is now a part of Bangladesh. Further, the term "Rohingya" does not appear in any regional text of this period and much later. That term was adopted by "a few Bengali Muslim intellectuals who were direct descendants of immigrants from Chittagong district [Bengal]" in the 20th-century, states historian Aye Chan.[113][114]

Kingdom of Mrauk U

[edit]
A coin from Arakan used in the Bengal Sultanate, minted c. 1554–1555
Set against the backdrop of the Arakan Mountains, Mrauk U was home to a multiethnic population, including the poet Alaol

The Rakhines were one of the tribes of the Burmese Pyu city-states.[24] The Rakhines began migrating to Arakan through the Arakan Mountains in the 9th century. The Rakhines established numerous cities in the valley of the Lemro River. These included Sambawak I, Pyinsa, Parein, Hkrit, Sambawak II, Myohaung, Toungoo and Launggret. Burmese forces invaded the Rakhine cities in 1406.[104] The Burmese invasion forced Rakhine rulers to seek help and refuge from neighbouring Bengal in the north.[104]

Early evidence of Bengali Muslim settlements in Arakan date back to the time of Min Saw Mon (1430–34) of the Kingdom of Mrauk U. After 24 years of exile in Bengal, he regained control of the Arakanese throne in 1430 with military assistance from the Bengal Sultanate. The Bengalis who came with him formed their own settlements in the region.[115][112] The Santikan Mosque built in the 1430s,[115][116] features a court which "measures 65 ft from north to south and 82 ft from east to west; the shrine is a rectangular structure measuring 33 ft by 47 ft."[117][24]

King Min Saw Mon ceded some territory to the Sultan of Bengal and recognised his sovereignty over the areas. In recognition of his kingdom's vassal status, the Buddhist kings of Arakan received Islamic titles and used the Bengali gold dinar within the kingdom. Min Saw Mon minted his own coins with the Burmese alphabet on one side and the Persian alphabet on the other.[112]

Arakan's vassalage to Bengal was brief. After Sultan Jalaluddin Muhammad Shah's death in 1433, Narameikhla's successors invaded Bengal and occupied Ramu in 1437 and Chittagong in 1459. Arakan would hold Chittagong until 1666.[118][119]

Even after independence from the Sultans of Bengal, the Arakanese kings continued the custom of maintaining Muslim titles.[120] The Buddhist kings compared themselves to Sultans and fashioned themselves after Mughal rulers. They also continued to employ Muslims in prestigious positions within the royal administration.[121] Some of them worked as Bengali, Persian and Arabic scribes in the Arakanese courts, which, despite remaining Buddhist, adopted Islamic fashions from the neighbouring Bengal Sultanate.[121][115]

The population increased in the 17th century, as slaves were brought in by Arakanese raiders and Portuguese settlers following raids into Bengal.[121][81][115] Slaves included members of the Mughal nobility. A notable royal slave was Alaol, a renowned poet in the Arakanese court. The slave population were employed in a variety of workforces, including in the king's army, commerce and agriculture.[81][122]

In 1660, Prince Shah Shuja, the governor of Mughal Bengal and a claimant of the Peacock Throne, fled to Arakan with his family after being defeated by his brother Emperor Aurangzeb during the Battle of Khajwa. Shuja and his entourage arrived in Arakan on 26 August 1660.[123][24] He was granted asylum by King Sanda Thudhamma. In December 1660, the Arakanese king confiscated Shuja's gold and jewellery, leading to an insurrection by the royal Mughal refugees. According to varying accounts, Shuja's family was killed by the Arakanese, while Shuja himself may have fled to a kingdom in Manipur. However, members of Shuja's entourage remained in Arakan and were recruited by the royal army, including as archers and court guards. They were king makers in Arakan until the Burmese conquest.[124] The Arakanese continued their raids of Mughal Bengal. Dhaka was raided in 1625.[125]

Emperor Aurangzeb gave orders to his governor in Mughal Bengal, Shaista Khan, to end what the Mughals saw as Arakanese-Portuguese piracy.[126][127] In 1666, Shaista Khan led a 6000 man army and 288 warships to seize Chittagong from the Kingdom of Mrauk U.[128] The Mughal expedition continued up till the Kaladan River. The Mughals placed the northern part of Arakan under its administration and vassalage.[129]

Burmese conquest

[edit]

Following the Konbaung Dynasty's conquest of Arakan in 1785, as many as 35,000 people of the Rakhine State fled to the neighbouring Chittagong region of British Bengal in 1799 to escape persecution by the Bamar and to seek protection under the British Raj.[130] The Bamar executed thousands of men and deported a considerable portion of the population to central Burma, leaving Arakan a scarcely populated area by the time the British occupied it.[131][24]

According to an article on the "Burma Empire" published by the British Francis Buchanan-Hamilton in 1799, "the Mohammedans, who have long settled in Arakan", "call themselves Rooinga, or natives of Arakan".[85] However, according to Derek Tokin, Hamilton no longer used the term to refer to the Muslims in Arakan in his later publications.[103] Sir Henry Yule saw many Muslims serving as eunuchs in Konbaung while on a diplomatic mission to the Burmese capital, Ava.[132][133]

British colonial rule

[edit]
An old mosque in Akyab during British rule
A mosque in Akyab

British policy encouraged Bengali inhabitants from adjacent regions to migrate into the then lightly populated and fertile valleys of Arakan as farm labourers. The East India Company extended the Bengal Presidency to Arakan. There was no international boundary between Bengal and Arakan and no restrictions on migration between the regions. In the early 19th century, thousands of Bengalis from the Chittagong region settled in Arakan seeking work.[134] It is hard to know whether these new Bengal migrants were the same population that was deported by force to Bengal's Chittagong during the Burmese conquest in the 18th century and later returned to Arakan as a result of British policy or if they were a new migrant population with no ancestral roots to Arakan.[135]

The British census of 1872 reported 58,255 Muslims in Akyab District. By 1911, the Muslim population had increased to 178,647.[136] The waves of migration were primarily due to the requirement of cheap labour from British India to work in the paddy fields. Immigrants from Bengal, mainly from the Chittagong region, "moved en masse into western townships of Arakan". Albeit Indian immigration to Burma was a nationwide phenomenon, not just restricted to Arakan.[137] For these reasons historians believed that most Rohingyas arrived with the British colonialists in the 19th and 20th centuries with some tracing their ancestry much further.[93]

According to Thant Myint-U, historian and adviser to President Thein Sein, "At the beginning of the 20th century, Indians were arriving in Burma at the rate of no less than a quarter million per year. The numbers rose steadily until the peak year of 1927, immigration reached 480,000 people, with Rangoon exceeding New York City as the greatest immigration port in the world. This was out of a total population of only 13 million; it was equivalent to the United Kingdom today taking 2 million people a year." By then, in most of the largest cities in Burma, Rangoon, Akyab, Bassein and Moulmein, the Indian immigrants formed a majority of the population. All of Burma was officially a Province within the British Indian Empire ('the Raj') from November 1885 until 1937, when Burma became a separate Crown colony within the British Empire. The Burmese under British rule felt helpless, and reacted with a "racism that combined feelings of superiority and fear".[137] Professor Andrew Selth of Griffith University writes that although a few Rohingya trace their ancestry to Muslims who lived in Arakan in the 15th and 16h centuries, most Rohingyas arrived with the British colonialists in the 19th and 20th centuries.[138][139] Most have argued that Rohingya existed from the four waves of Muslim migrations from the ancient times to medieval, to the British colony. Gutman (1976) and Ibrahim (2016) claiming that the Muslim population dates before the arrival of ethnic Rakhine in the 9th to 10th century. Suggesting the Rohingya are descendants of a pre-Arakan population who existed for 3 thousand years and waves of Muslim who intermingled forming modern Rohingya.[140]

The impact of this immigration was particularly acute in Arakan. Although it boosted the colonial economy, local Arakanese bitterly resented it.[141] According to historian Clive J. Christie, "The issue became a focus for grass-roots Burmese nationalism, and in the years 1930–31 there were serious anti-Indian disturbances in Lower Burma, while 1938 saw riots specifically directed against the Indian Muslim community. As Burmese nationalism increasingly asserted itself before the Second World War, the 'alien' Indian presence inevitably came under attack, along with the religion that the Indian Muslims imported. The Muslims of northern Arakan were to be caught in the crossfire of this conflict."[142]

In the 1931 census, the Muslim population of Burma was 584,839, 4% of the total population of 14,647,470 at the time. 396,504 were Indian Muslims and 1,474 Chinese Muslims, while 186,861 were Burmese Muslims. The census found a growth in the number of Indian Muslims born in Burma, primarily due to their permanent settlement in Akyab. 41% of Muslims of Burma lived in Arakan at that time.[143]

Shipping

[edit]
A Royal Indian Navy ship in Akyab Harbour

Due to the difficult terrain of the Arakan Mountains, the Arakan region was historically most accessible by sea.[144] In British Arakan Division, the port of Akyab had ferry services and a thriving trade with the ports of Chittagong, Narayanganj, Dacca and Calcutta in British India;[145] as well as with Rangoon. Akyab was one of the leading rice ports in the world, hosting ship fleets from Europe and China.[146] Many Indians settled in Akyab and dominated its seaport and hinterland. The 1931 census found 500,000 Indians living in Akyab.[147]

Legislators

[edit]

Several Rohingyas were elected to Burmese native seats in the Legislative Council of Burma and Legislature of Burma. During the 1936 Burmese general election, Advocate U Pho Khaine was elected from Akyab West and Gani Markan was elected from Maungdaw-Buthidaung. In 1939, U Tanvy Markan was elected from Maungdaw-Buthidaung.

Their elections in the Burmese native category set them apart from immigrant Indian legislators.[148]

World War II

[edit]
Australian officers with Rohingya men wearing typical lungis

During World War II, the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) invaded British-controlled Burma. The British forces retreated and in the power vacuum left behind, considerable inter-communal violence erupted between Arakanese and Muslim villagers. The British armed Muslims in northern Arakan in order to create a buffer zone that would protect the region from a Japanese invasion when they retreated[149] and to counteract the largely pro-Japanese ethnic Rakhines.[81] The period also witnessed violence between groups loyal to the British and the Burmese nationalists.[149] The Arakan massacres in 1942 involved communal violence between British-armed V Force Rohingya recruits and pro-Japanese Rakhines, polarising the region along ethnic lines.[150]

Tensions boiling in Arakan before the war erupted during the Japanese invasion of Southeast Asia and Arakan became the frontline in the conflict. The war resulted in a complete breakdown of civil administration and consequent development of habits of lawlessness exacerbated by the availability of modern firearms. The Japanese advance triggered an inter-communal conflict between Muslims and Buddhists. The Muslims fled towards British-controlled Muslim-dominated northern Arakan from Japanese-controlled Buddhist-majority areas. This stimulated a "reverse ethnic cleansing" in British-controlled areas, particularly around Maungdaw. Failure of a British counter-offensive, attempted from December 1942 to April 1943, resulted in the abandonment of even more of the Muslim population as well as an increase in inter-communal violence.[151]

Moshe Yegar, a research fellow at Truman Institute, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, noted that hostility had developed between the Muslims and the Buddhists who had brought about a similar hostility in other parts of Burma. This tension was let loose with the retreat of the British. With the approach of the Japanese into Arakan, the Buddhists instigated cruel measures against the Muslims. Thousands, though the exact number is unknown, fled from Buddhist-majority regions to eastern Bengal and northern Arakan with many being killed or dying of starvation. The Muslims in response conducted retaliatory raids from British-controlled areas, causing Buddhists to flee to southern Arakan.[152]

Aye Chan, a historian at Kanda University in Japan, has written that as a consequence of acquiring arms from the British during World War II, Rohingyas[note 3] tried to destroy the Arakanese villages instead of resisting the Japanese. Chan agrees that hundreds of Muslims fled to northern Arakan, though states that the accounts of atrocities on them were exaggerated. In March 1942, Rohingyas from northern Arakan killed around 20,000 Arakanese. In return, around 5,000 Muslims in the Minbya and Mrauk-U Townships were killed by Rakhines and Red Karens.[42][153]

As in the rest of Burma, the IJA committed acts of rape, murder and torture against Muslims in Arakan.[154] During this period, some 22,000 Muslims in Arakan were believed to have crossed the border into Bengal, then part of British India, to escape the violence.[155][30][156] The exodus was not restricted to Muslims in Arakan. Thousands of Burmese Indians, Anglo-Burmese and British who settled during the colonial period emigrated en masse to India.

To facilitate their reentry into Burma, the British formed Volunteer Forces with Rohingya. Over the three years during which the Allies and Japanese fought over the Mayu peninsula, the Rohingya recruits of the V-Force, engaged in a campaign against Arakanese communities, using weapons provided by V-Force.[150] According to the secretary of the British governor, the V Force, instead of fighting the Japanese, destroyed Buddhist monasteries, pagodas, and houses, and committed atrocities in northern Arakan. The British Army's liaison officer, Anthony Irwin, on the other hand, praised the role of the V Force.[157][158]

Pakistan Movement

[edit]

During the Pakistan Movement in the 1940s, Rohingya Muslims in western Burma organised a separatist movement to merge the region into East Pakistan.[133] The commitments of the British regarding the status of Muslims after the war are not clear. V Force officers like Andrew Irwin felt that Muslims along with other minorities must be rewarded for their loyalty. Muslim leaders believed that the British had promised them a "Muslim National Area" in Maungdaw region. They were also apprehensive of a future Buddhist-dominated government. In 1946, calls were made for annexation of the territory by Pakistan as well as of an independent state.[151][152] Before the independence of Burma in January 1948, Muslim leaders from Arakan addressed themselves to Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, and asked his assistance in incorporating the Mayu region to Pakistan considering their religious affinity and geographical proximity with East Pakistan.[133] The North Arakan Muslim League was founded in Akyab (modern Sittwe) two months later.[133] The proposal never materialised since it was reportedly turned down by Jinnah, saying that he was not in a position to interfere in Burmese matters.[133]

Post-WWII migration

[edit]

The numbers and the extent of post-independence immigration from Bangladesh are subject to controversy and debate. In a 1955 study published by Stanford University, the authors Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff write, "The post-war (World War II) illegal immigration of Chittagonians into that area was on a vast scale, and in the Maungdaw and Buthidaung areas they replaced the Arakanese."[159] The authors further argue that the term Rohingya, in the form of Rwangya, first appeared to distinguish settled population from newcomers: "The newcomers were called Mujahids (crusaders), in contrast to the Rwangya or settled Chittagonian population."[159] According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), these immigrants were actually the Rohingyas who were displaced by World War II and began to return to Arakan after the independence of Burma but were rendered as illegal immigrants, while many were not allowed to return.[160] ICG adds that there were "some 17,000" refugees from the Bangladesh liberation war who "subsequently returned home".[160]

Burmese independence

[edit]
M. A. Gaffar, a member of Burma's constituent assembly, called for recognising Rohingyas in 1948

On 25 September 1954, the then Prime Minister U Nu in his radio address to the nation talked about Rohingya Muslims' political loyalty to predominantly Buddhist Burma. This usage of the term 'Rohingya' is important in the sense that today Myanmar denies to accept this category altogether and calls them 'Bengali'. During the same time a separate administrative zone May Yu was established comprising most of the present North Rakhine State, which had Rohingya as its majority ethnic group. One of the objectives of this Muslim majority zone was to 'strive for peace with Pakistan'. Brigadier Aung Gyi, one of the deputies of General Ne Win, in 1961 explained Rohingya as; "On the west, May Yu district borders with Pakistan. As is the case with all borderlands communities, there are Muslims on both sides of the borders. Those who are on Pakistan's side are known as Pakistani while the Muslims on our Burmese side of the borders are referred to as 'Rohingya'.[88] But since Burma's military junta took control of the country in 1962, the Rohingya have been systematically deprived of their political rights.[161] In 1962 military dictator General Ne Win, took over the government and started implementing a Nationalist agenda, which had its roots in racial discrimination. In 1978 military government launched operation Nagamin to separate nationals from non-nationals. This was the first concerted large scale violent attack on Rohingya. National Registration Cards (NRC) were taken away by state actors never to be replaced. Violence that followed forced 200,000 Rohingya to flee to Bangladesh. Bangladesh denied Rohingya admission into her territory and blocked food rations leading to death of 12,000 of them. After bilateral negotiations Rohingya were repatriated.[88]

Rohingya political participation in Burma

[edit]

In the prelude to independence, two Rohingyas were elected to the Constituent Assembly of Burma in 1947, M. A. Gaffar and Sultan Ahmed. After Burma became independent in 1948, M. A. Gaffar presented a memorandum of appeal to the Government of the Union of Burma calling for the recognition of the term "Rohingya", based on local Indian names of Arakan (Rohan and Rohang), as the official name of the ethnicity. Sultan Ahmed, who served as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Minorities, was a member of the Justice Sir Ba U Commission charged with exploring whether Arakan Division should be granted statehood. During the 1951 Burmese general election, five Rohingyas were elected to the Parliament of Burma, including one of the country's first two female MPs, Zura Begum. Six MPs were elected during the 1956 Burmese general election and subsequent by-elections. Sultan Mahmud, a former politician in British India, became Minister of Health in the cabinet of Prime Minister of Burma U Nu. In 1960, Mahmud suggested that either Rohingya-majority northern Arakan remain under the central government or be made a separate province. However, during the 1960 Burmese general election, Prime Minister U Nu's pledges included making all of Arakan into one province. The 1962 Burmese coup d'état ended the country's Westminster-style political system. The 1982 Burmese citizenship law stripped most of the Rohingyas of their stake in citizenship.

Rohingya community leaders were supportive of the 8888 uprising for democracy. During the 1990 Burmese general election, the Rohingya-led National Democratic Party for Human Rights won four seats in the Burmese parliament. The four Rohingya MPs included Shamsul Anwarul Huq, Chit Lwin Ebrahim, Fazal Ahmed and Nur Ahmed. The election was won by the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi, who was placed under house arrest and not permitted to become prime minister. The Burmese military junta banned the National Democratic Party for Human Rights in 1992. Its leaders were arrested, jailed and tortured.

Rohingya politicians have been jailed to disbar them from contesting elections. In 2005, Shamsul Anwarul Huq was charged under Section 18 of the controversial 1982 Burmese citizenship law and sentenced to 47 years in prison. In 2015, a ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party MP Shwe Maung was disbarred from the 2015 Burmese general election, on grounds that his parents were not Burmese citizens under the 1982 citizenship law.[162]

As of 2017, Burma does not have a single Rohingya MP and the Rohingya population have no voting rights.[163]

Mayu Frontier District

[edit]

A separate administrative zone for the Rohingya-majority northern areas of Arakan existed between 1961 and 1964. Known as the Mayu Frontier District, the zone was set up by Prime Minister U Nu after the 1960 Burmese general election, on the advice of his health minister Sultan Mahmud. The zone was administered directly from Rangoon by the national government. After the Burmese military coup in 1962, the zone was administered by the Burmese army. It was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1964 by the Union Revolutionary Council. The socialist military government inducted the zone into Arakan State in 1974.

Expulsion of Burmese Indians

[edit]

Racism towards people with links to the Indian subcontinent increased after the 1962 Burmese coup. The socialist military government nationalised all property, including many enterprises of the white collar Burmese Indian community. Between 1962 and 1964, 320,000 Burmese Indians were forced to leave the country.[164][165]

Refugee crisis of 1978

[edit]

As a result of Operation King Dragon by the Burmese junta, the first wave of Rohingya refugees entered Bangladesh in 1978. An estimated 200,000 Rohingyas took shelter in Cox's Bazar. Diplomatic initiatives over 16 months resulted in a repatriation agreement, which allowed the return of most refugees under a process facilitated by UNHCR.[166] The return of refugees to Burma has been the second largest repatriation process in Asia after the return of Cambodian refugees from Thailand.[166]

1982 Citizenship Law

[edit]

In 1982, the citizenship law enacted by the Burmese military junta did not list the Rohingya as one of the 135 "national races" of Burma. This made much of the Rohingya population in Burma stateless in their historical homeland of Arakan.[167] General Ne Win drafted the Citizenship Act in 1982, which denied citizenship rights to any community/group that was not listed in a survey conducted by British in 1823.[168] All other ethnic groups were considered aliens to the land or invaders. Eight major ethnicities Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Kayah, Mon, Shan, and Burmese were broken into 135 small ethnic groups. Groups like Rohingya who do not belong to any of these 135 ethnicities were denied citizenship rights.

Scholars like Maung Zarni have argued that Burmese military 'encoded its anti-Indian and anti-Muslim racism in its laws and policies'. He further argues;

"The 1982 Citizenship Act serves as the state's legal and ideological foundation on which all forms of violence, execution, restrictions, and human rights crimes are justified and committed with state impunity if carried out horizontally by the local ultra-nationalist Rakhine Buddhists.

In light of the on-the-ground link between the legalised removal of citizenship from the Rohingya and the implementation of a permanent set of draconian laws and policies—as opposed to periodic "anti-immigration" operations—amount to the infliction on the Rohingya of conditions of life designed to bring about serious bodily and mental harm and to destroy the group in whole or in part. As such, the illegalisation of the Rohingya in Myanmar is an indication of the intent of the State to both remove the Rohingya permanently from their homeland and to destroy the Rohingya as a group."[88]

Refugee crisis of 1991–1992

[edit]

After Burmese military junta began persecuting the political opposition following Aung San Suu Kyi's victory in the 1990 election and the earlier 1988 Uprising, military operations targeting Muslims (who strongly favoured the pro-democracy movement) began in Arakan State. The Rohingya-led NDPHR political party was banned and its leaders were jailed. Suu Kyi herself was placed under house arrest by the junta led by General Than Shwe.

As the Burmese military increased its operations across the country, the Maungdaw, Buthidaung and Rathedaung townships in northern Arakan became centers of persecution. The 23rd and 24th regiments of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) were responsible for promoting forced labour, rape, the confiscation of houses, land and farm animals, the destruction of mosques, a ban on religious activities and the harassment of the religious priests.[166] An estimated 250,000 refugees crossed over into Bangladesh.[166] In Bangladesh, the refugee influx was a challenge for the newly elected government of the country's first female prime minister Khaleda Zia (who headed the first parliamentary government since 1975). Both Bangladesh and Burma mobilised thousands of troops along the border during the crisis. The government of Bangladesh emphasised a peaceful resolution of the crisis.[169][170]

After diplomatic negotiations, a repatriation agreement was put in place to allow the return of refugees to Burma under a UNHCR-supervised process.[166][171]

Name change from Arakan to Rakhine State

[edit]

In 1989, the junta officially changed the name of Burma to Myanmar. In the 1990s, the junta changed the name of the province of Arakan to Rakhine State,[172] which showed a bias towards the Rakhine community, even though the Rohingya formed a substantial part of the population. The name of the region was historically known as Arakan for centuries.

Denial of the "Rohingya" term

[edit]

The colloquial term Rohingya can be traced back to the pre-colonial period. The Rohingya community have also been known as Arakanese Indians and Arakanese Muslims.[173][174] Since the 1982 citizenship law, Burmese juntas and governments have strongly objected to the usage of the term of Rohingya, preferring to label the community as "bengali illegal immigrants". The derogatory slur kalar is widely used in Myanmar against the Rohingya.[175] Myanmar's government has often pressured diplomats and foreign delegates against uttering the term Rohingya.[175]

Conflict in Arakan

[edit]

The Rakhine for their part felt discriminated against by the governments in Rangoon dominated by the ethnic Burmese with one Rakhine politician saying, "we are therefore the victims of Muslimisation and Burmese chauvinism."[141] The Economist wrote in 2015 that from the 1940s on and right to this day, the Burmens have seen and see themselves as victims of the British Empire while the Rakhine see themselves as victims of the British and the Burmens; both groups were and are so intent upon seeing themselves as victims that neither has much sympathy for the Rohingyas.[141]

After Jinnah's refusal to accept northern Arakan into the Dominion of Pakistan, some Rohingya elders who supported a jihad movement, founded the Mujahid party in northern Arakan in 1947.[176] The aim of the Mujahid party was to create an autonomous Islamic state in Arakan. By the 1950s, they began to use the term "Rohingya" which may be a continuation of the term Rooinga to establish a distinct identity and identify themselves as indigenous. They were much more active before the 1962 Burmese coup d'état by General Ne Win, a Burmese general who began his military career fighting for the Japanese in World War II. Ne Win carried out military operations against them over a period of two decades. The prominent one was Operation King Dragon, which took place in 1978; as a result, many Muslims in the region fled to neighbouring Bangladesh as refugees.[177] In addition to Bangladesh, a large number of Rohingyas also migrated to Karachi, Pakistan.[178] Rohingya mujahideen are still active within the remote areas of Arakan.[179]

From 1971 to 1978, a number of Rakhine monks and Buddhists staged hunger strikes in Sittwe to force the government to tackle immigration issues which they believed to be causing a demographic shift in the region.[180] Ne Win's government requested UN to repatriate the war refugees and launched military operations which drove off around 200,000 people to Bangladesh. In 1978, the Bangladesh government protested against the Burmese government concerning "the expulsion by force of thousands of Burmese Muslim citizens to Bangladesh". The Burmese government responded that those expelled were Bangladesh citizens who had resided illegally in Burma. In July 1978, after intensive negotiations mediated by UN, Ne Win's government agreed to take back 200,000 refugees who settled in Arakan.[181] In the same year as well as in 1992, a joint statement by governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh "acknowledged that the Rohingya were lawful Burmese residents".[182] In 1982, the Burmese government enacted the citizenship law and declared the "Bengalis" are foreigners.[183]

There are widespread beliefs among Rakhine people that significant number of immigrants arrived even after the 1980s when the border was relatively unguarded. However, there is no documentation proof for these claims as the last census was conducted in 1983.[67] Successive Burmese governments have fortified the border and built up border guard forces.

After 1988 Burmese pro-democracy uprising

[edit]

Since the 1990s, a new 'Rohingya' movement which is distinct from the 1950s armed rebellion has emerged. The new movement is characterised by lobbying internationally by overseas diaspora, establishing indigenous claims by Rohingya scholars, publicising the term "Rohingya" and denying Bengali origins by Rohingya politicians.[70]

Rohingya scholars[who?] have claimed that Rakhine was previously an Islamic state for a millennium, or that Muslims were king-makers of Rakhine kings for 350 years. They often traced the origin of Rohingyas to Arab seafarers. These claims have been rejected as "newly invented myths" in academic circles.[citation needed] Some Rohingya politicians have labelled Burmese and international historians as "Rakhine sympathizers" for rejecting the purported historical origins.[184]

The movement has garnered sharp criticisms from ethnic Rakhines and Kamans, the latter of whom are a recognised Muslim ethnic group in Rakhine. Kaman leaders support citizenship for Muslims in northern Rakhine but believe that the new movement is aimed at achieving a self-administered area or Rohang State as a separate Islamic state carved out of Rakhine, and condemn the movement.[185]

Rakhines' views are more critical. Citing Bangladesh's overpopulation and density, Rakhines perceive the Rohingyas as "the vanguard of an unstoppable wave of people that will inevitably engulf Rakhine".[186] However, for moderate Rohingyas, the aim may have been no more than to gain citizenship status. Moderate Rohingya politicians agree to compromise on the term Rohingya if citizenship is provided under an alternative identity that is neither "Bengali" nor "Rohingya". Various alternatives including "Rakhine Muslims", "Myanmar Muslims" or simply "Myanmar" have been proposed.[103][187]

Burmese juntas (1990–2011)

[edit]

The military junta that ruled Myanmar for half a century relied heavily on mixing Burmese nationalism and Theravada Buddhism to bolster its rule, and, in the view of the US government, heavily discriminated against minorities like the Rohingyas. Some pro-democracy dissidents from Myanmar's ethnic Bamar majority do not consider the Rohingyas compatriots.[188][189][190][191]

Successive Burmese governments have been accused of provoking riots led by Buddhist monks against ethnic minorities like the Rohingyas[192] In the 1990s, more than 250,000 Rohingya fled to refugee camps in Bangladesh. In the early 2000s, all but 20,000 of them were repatriated to Myanmar, some against their will.[193] In 2009, a senior Burmese envoy to Hong Kong branded the Rohingyas "ugly as ogres" and a people that are alien to Myanmar.[194][195]

Under the 2008 constitution, the Myanmar military still control much of the country's government, including the ministries of home, defence and border affairs, 25% of seats in parliament and one vice-president.[196][197]

Rakhine State conflicts and refugees (2012–present)

[edit]

2012 Rakhine State riots

[edit]
Emergency food, drinking water and shelter to help people displaced in Rakhine State, western Burma, 2012.
2014 view of ruins of Narzi, former Rohingya neighbourhood in Sittwe town destroyed and razed in the 2012 anti-Rohingya pogroms.

The 2012 Rakhine State riots were a series of conflicts between Rohingya Muslims who form the majority in the northern Rakhine and ethnic Rakhines who form the majority in the south. Before the riots, there were widespread fears among the Buddhist Rakhines that they would soon become a minority in their ancestral state.[186] The riots occurred after weeks of sectarian disputes, including a gang rape and murder of a Rakhine woman by Rohingyas and killing of ten Burmese Muslims by Rakhines.[198][199] There is evidence that the pogroms in 2012 were incited by the government asking the Rakhine men to defend their "race and religion".[189] The Rakhine men were said to have been given knives and free food, and bused in from Sittwe.[141] The Burmese government denied having organised the pogroms, but has never prosecuted anyone for the attacks against the Rohingyas.[141] The Economist argued that since the transition to democracy in Burma in 2011, the military has been seeking to retain its privileged position, forming the motivation for it to encourage the riots in 2012 and allowing it to pose as the defender of Buddhism against Muslim Rohingya.[141]

On both sides, entire villages were "decimated".[199][200] According to the Burmese authorities, the violence between ethnic Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims left 78 people dead, 87 injured, and up to 140,000 people displaced.[201][202] The government has responded by imposing curfews and deploying troops in the region. On 10 June 2012, a state of emergency was declared in Rakhine, allowing the military to participate in the administration of the region.[203][204] Rohingya NGOs abroad have accused the Burmese army and police of targeting Rohingya Muslims through arrests and participating in violence.[201]

A field observation conducted by the International Crisis Group concluded that both communities were grateful for the protection provided by the military.[205] A number of monks' organisations have taken measures to boycott NGOs which they believe helped only Rohingyas in the past decades even though Rakhines were equally poor.[190] In July 2012, the Burmese Government did not include the Rohingya minority group in the census—classified as stateless Bengali Muslims from Bangladesh since 1982.[206] About 140,000 Rohingya in Myanmar remain confined in IDP camps.[77]

2015 refugee crisis

[edit]

In 2015, the Simon-Skjodt Centre of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum stated in a press statement the Rohingyas are "at grave risk of additional mass atrocities and even genocide".[141] In 2015, to escape violence and persecution, thousands of Rohingyas migrated from Myanmar and Bangladesh, collectively dubbed as 'boat people' by international media,[207] to Southeast Asian countries including Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand by rickety boats via the waters of the Strait of Malacca and the Andaman Sea.[207][208][209][210] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates about 25,000 people have been taken to boats from January to March in 2015.[211][212] There are claims that around 100 people died in Indonesia,[213] 200 in Malaysia,[214] and 10 in Thailand[215] during the journey. An estimated 3,000 refugees from Myanmar and Bangladesh have been rescued or swum to shore and several thousand more are believed to remain trapped on boats at sea with little food or water. A Malaysian newspaper claimed crisis has been sparked by smugglers.[216] However, the Economist in an article in June 2015 wrote the only reason why the Rohingyas were willing to pay to be taken out of Burma in squalid, overcrowded, fetid boats as "... it is the terrible conditions at home in Rakhine that force the Rohingyas out to sea in the first place."[141]

Autumn 2016 – Summer 2017

[edit]

On 9 October 2016, insurgents attacked three Burmese border posts along Myanmar's border with Bangladesh.[217] According to government officials in the mainly Rohingya border town of Maungdaw, the attackers brandished knives, machetes and homemade slingshots that fired metal bolts. Several dozen firearms and boxes of ammunition were looted by the attackers from the border posts. The attack resulted in the deaths of nine border officers.[218] On 11 October 2016, four soldiers were killed on the third day of fighting.[219] Following the attacks, reports emerged of several human rights violations allegedly perpetrated by Burmese security forces in their crackdown on suspected Rohingya insurgents.[220]

Shortly after, the Myanmar military forces and extremist Buddhists started a major crackdown on the Rohingya Muslims in the country's western region of Rakhine State in response to attacks on border police camps by unidentified insurgents.[221] The crackdown resulted in wide-scale human rights violations at the hands of security forces, including extrajudicial killings, gang rapes, arsons, and other brutalities.[220][222] The military crackdown on Rohingyas drew criticism from various quarters including the United Nations, human rights group Amnesty International, the US Department of State, and the government of Malaysia.[223][224][225][226][227]

The de facto head of government Aung San Suu Kyi has particularly been criticised for her inaction and silence over the issue and for doing little to prevent military abuses.[220][222][228]

Government officials in Rakhine State originally blamed the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), an Islamist insurgent group mainly active in the 1980s and 1990s, for the attacks;[229] however, on 17 October 2016, a group calling itself the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) claimed responsibility.[230] In the following days, six other groups released statements, all citing the same leader.[231] The Myanmar Army announced on 15 November 2016 that 69 Rohingya insurgents and 17 security forces (10 policemen, 7 soldiers) had been killed in recent clashes in northern Rakhine State, bringing the death toll to 134 (102 insurgents and 32 security forces). It was also announced that 234 people suspected of being connected to the attack were arrested.[232][233]

A police document obtained by Reuters in March 2017 listed 423 Rohingyas detained by the police since 9 October 2016, 13 of whom were children, the youngest being ten years old. Two police captains in Maungdaw verified the document and justified the arrests, with one of them saying, "We, the police, have to arrest those who collaborated with the attackers, children or not, but the court will decide if they are guilty; we are not the ones who decide." Myanmar police also claimed that the children had confessed to their alleged crimes during interrogations, and that they were not beaten or pressured during questioning. The average age of those detained is 34, the youngest is 10, and the oldest is 75.[234][235]

The Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw) stated on 1 September 2017 that the death toll had risen to 370 insurgents, 13 security personnel, 2 government officials and 14 civilians.[236] The United Nations believes over 1,000 people have been killed since October 2016, which contradicts the death toll provided by the Myanmar government.[237][238]

Autumn 2017 crisis

[edit]
Rohingyas at the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh, October 2017

Starting in early August 2017, the Myanmar security forces began "clearance operations" against the Rohingya in northern Rakhine state.[78][79] Following an attack by Rohingya militants of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) against several security forces' outposts, 25 August, the operations escalated radically—killing thousands of Rohingya, brutalising thousands more, and driving hundreds of thousands out of the country into neighbouring Bangladesh while their villages burned—with the Myanmar military claiming that their actions were solely attacks on rebels in response to the ARSA attack. However, subsequent reports from various international organisations have indicated that the military operations were widespread indiscriminate attacks on the Rohingya population, already underway before the ARSA attacks, to purge northern Rakhine state of Rohingya, through "ethnic cleansing" and/or "genocide."[239] In August 2018, study[81] estimated that more than 24,000+ Rohingya people were killed by the Myanmar military and the local Buddhists since the "clearance operations" started on 25 August 2017. The study[81] also estimated that 18,000+ the Rohingya Muslim women and girls were raped, 116,000 Rohingya were beaten, 36,000 Rohingya were thrown into fire[81][240][241][242][243][244]

Precipitating events
[edit]

According to BBC reporters, during the summer of 2017, the Myanmar military began arming and training Rakhine Buddhist natives in northern Rakhine state, and in late summer advised that any ethnic Rakhines "wishing to protect their state" would be given the opportunity to join "the local armed police." Matthew Smith, chief executive of human rights organisation Fortify Rights says that arming the Rakhines "was a decision made to effectively perpetrate atrocity crimes against the civilian population." At the same time, northern Rakhine state faced food shortages, and, starting in mid-August, the government cut off all food supply to the area. On 10 August, the military flew in a battalion of reinforcements to the area, triggering a public warning from the resident United Nations human rights representative to Myanmar, who urged Myanmar authorities to restrain themselves.[239]

A few weeks later, on 24 August 2017, the Rakhine Commission (chaired by former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan)—established by the new civilian Myanmar government to recommend solutions to the ethnic conflict and related issues in Rakhine state—released its recommendations for alleviating the suffering of minorities (especially the Rohingya), calling for measures that would improve security in Myanmar for the Rohingya, but not calling for all measures sought by various Rohingya factions.[245][246]

The following morning, according to Myanmar military officials, a Rohingya rebel group (ARSA, or Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army) led multiple coordinated attacks on 30 police outposts and border guards, killing a dozen government forces, at the cost of over 50 dead among the rebels.[245][247][248][249][250][246][251]

Conflict escalation
[edit]
Rohingyas at the Kutupalong refugee camp in Bangladesh, October 2017

Almost immediately the Myanmar military—apparently teaming with local authorities with mobs of Rakhine Buddhist civilians—launched massive reprisals that it described as its anti-terrorist "clearance operations" (which, UN investigators and BBC reporters later determined, had actually begun earlier[78][79][239])—attacking Rohingya villages throughout northern Rakhine state.[245][249][248][250]

Within the first three weeks, the military reported over 400 dead (whom it described as mostly "militants" and "terrorists")—the U.N. estimated over 1,000 dead (mostly civilians), and other sources initially suggested as many as 3,000—in the first four weeks of the reprisals.[245][249][248][250]

However, in December 2017, following a detailed survey of Rohingya refugees, a humanitarian organisation serving refugees, Médecins Sans Frontières calculated that at least 6,700 Rohingya men, women and children were killed in the first month of the major attacks, including at least 750 children (that number later revised to "over 1,000"). MSF estimated that 69% were killed by gunshots, 9% were burnt to death (including 15% of children killed), and 5% beaten to death. However, MSF cautioned "The numbers of deaths are likely to be an underestimation, as we have not surveyed all refugee settlements in Bangladesh and because the surveys don't account for the families who never made it out of Myanmar."[252][253][254]

Refugees reported numerous civilians—including women and children—being indiscriminately beaten, raped, tortured, shot, hacked to death or burned alive. and whole villages being burnt down by authorities and Buddhist mobs. Human Rights Watch released satellite photos showing the villages burning, but the Myanmar government insisted the fires were lit by Rohingya, themselves, or specifically Rohingya militants—though the authorities offered no proof of the allegation, and refused or tightly controlled all media and foreign access to the area.[245][247][248][250][246]

Myanmar's presidential spokesman reported that 176 ethnic Rohingya villages—out of the original a total of 471 Rohingya villages in three townships—had become empty. In addition to the 176 "abandoned" villages, some residents reportedly fled from at least 34 other villages.[245]

In the first four weeks of the conflict, over 400,000 Rohingya refugees (approximately 40% of the remaining Rohingya in Myanmar) fled the country on foot or by boat (chiefly to Bangladesh—the only other country bordering the Rakhine state area under attack) creating a major humanitarian crisis. In addition, 12,000 Rakhine Buddhists, and other non-Muslim Rakhine state residents were displaced within the country.[247][248]

On 10 September 2017, ARSA declared a temporary unilateral ceasefire to allow aid groups to work in the region. Its statement read that "ARSA strongly encourages all concerned humanitarian actors resume their humanitarian assistance to all victims of the humanitarian crisis, irrespective of ethnic or religious background during the ceasefire period." However, the Myanmar government dismissed the gesture, saying "we don't negotiate with terrorists."[255][256][257]

The violence and humanitarian 'catastrophe,' inflamed international tensions, especially in the region, and throughout the Muslim world.[245][247][248][249]

13 September, Myanmar's presidential spokesman announced Myanmar would establish a new commission to implement some recommendations of Annan's Rakhine Commission, in their August 2017 report.[245]

The United Nations initially reported in early September 2017 that more than 120,000 Rohingya people had fled Myanmar for Bangladesh due to a recent rise in violence against them.[258] The UNHCR, on 4 September, estimated 123,000 refugees have escaped western Myanmar since 25 August 2017.[259] (By 15 September, that number had surpassed 400,000[248]) The situation was expected to exacerbate the current refugee crisis as more than 400,000 Rohingya without citizenship were trapped in overcrowded camps and in conflict regions in Western Myanmar.[258]

Myanmar's de facto civilian leader and Nobel Laureate, Aung San Suu Kyi,[260][261] criticised the media's reporting on the crisis, saying that her government is protecting everyone in Rakhine state, and argued that the reporting was misinformation that benefitted the aims of terrorists.[262]

Some reports suggest that the Myanmar military has ceded some border outposts to rebels armed with wooden clubs as part of encouraging Rohingyas to leave the country.[257]

A Holy See diplomat stated that at least 3000 people were killed by Myanmar security forces in August and September 2017.[263]

The U.N. Secretary General issued a statement, 13 September 2017, implying that the situation facing the Rohingya in Rakhine state was "ethnic cleansing." He urged Myanmar authorities to suspend military action and stop the violence—insisting that Myanmar's government uphold the rule of law, and (noting that "380,000" Rohingya had recently fled to Bangladesh) recognise the refugees' right to return to their homes.[248][245]

The same day, the U.N. Security Council issued a separate, unanimous statement, on the crisis following a closed-door meeting about Myanmar. In a semi-official press statement (its first statement on the situation in Myanmar in nine years)—the Council expressed "concern" about reported excessive violence in Myanmar's security operations, called for de-escalating the situation, reestablishing law and order, protecting civilians, and resolution of the refugee problem.[248][245]

On 19 September 2017, Myanmar's civilian leader, State Councillor Aung San Suu Kyi, made a major televised speech on the crisis—in English—stating "We condemn all human rights violations and unlawful violence," and indicated a desire to know why the Rohingya were fleeing. But Suu Kyi largely defended her prior position supporting the Myanmar military and its actions, and deflected international criticism by saying most Rohingya villages remained intact, and conflict had not broken out everywhere. Expressing no criticism of the Myanmar military, and denying that it had engaged in any "armed clashes or clearance operations" since 5 September, she added, "We are committed to the restoration of peace and stability and rule of law throughout the state," and that the country was "committed to a sustainable solution... for all communities in this state", but was vague as to how that would be achieved.[260][264][265][266]

By the end of September, conflicts between Rohingya Muslims and outnumbered Hindus, became apparent—including the killing of around 100 Hindu villagers in Rakhine state, around late August—according to the Myanmar military who claimed to have found the bodies of 20 women and eight boys in mass graves, 24 September, after a search near Ye Baw Kya village, in northern Rakhine state. The search was reportedly in response to a refugee in Bangladesh who contacted a local Hindu leader in Myanmar. Authorities quoted the refugee as saying about 300 ARSA militants, on 25 August, marched about 100 people out of the Hindu village and killed them. ARSA denied involvement, saying it was committed to not killing civilians. International news media were not immediately allowed free access to the area to verify the reports.[267][268][269]

In other cases, in Myanmar and in Bangladeshi refugee camps Hindu (particularly women) are reported to have faced kidnapping, religious abuse and "forced conversions" by Muslim Rohingyas.[268][270]

By the end of September 2017, UN, Bangladesh and other entities were reporting that—in addition to 200,000–300,000 Rohingya refugees already in Bangladesh after fleeing prior attacks in Myanmar[271][272]—the current conflict, since late August 2017, had driven 500,000 more Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh,[271][272][273] creating what UN Secretary General António Guterres described as "the world's fastest-developing refugee emergency ... a humanitarian nightmare."[272][274]

In November 2017 Myanmar and Bangladesh signed a memorandum of understanding for the return home of Rohingya refugees.[275] In April 2018 the first group of Rohingya refugees returned to Myanmar from Bangladesh.[276]

Relocation to Bhasan Char island

[edit]

In January 2016, the government of Bangladesh initiated a plan to relocate tens of thousands of forcibly displaced Rohingyas, who had fled to the country following persecution in Myanmar.[277][278] The refugees are to be relocated to the island of Bhasan Char.[277][278][279] The move has received substantial opposition. Human rights groups have seen the plan as a forced relocation.[277][278] Additionally, concerns have been raised about living conditions on the island, which is low-lying and prone to flooding.[277][278] The island has been described as "only accessible during winter and a haven for pirates".[277][278] It is nine hours away from the camps in which the Rohingya currently live.[277][278] In October 2019, Bangladeshi authorities again announced plans to relocate refugees to the island.[280]

On 9 July 2020, HRW urged Bangladeshi authorities to immediately move over 300 Rohingya refugees, including children, from the silt island of Bhasan Char to the Cox's Bazar refugee camps to let them reside with their families. Families in Cox's Bazar told HRW that relatives on Bhasan Char are being held without freedom of movement or adequate access to food or medical care, and face severe shortages of safe drinking water.[281]

Since the 2021 coup d'état

[edit]
Aung Kyaw Moe, a Deputy Minister of Human Rights for the National Unity Government of Myanmar speaks with VOA about Rohingya conscription on 8 March 2024.

Following the 2021 Myanmar coup d'état, a growing number of Burmese have voiced support for the Rohingya people.[282] The underground National Unity Government, formed as an opposition to the authoritarian State Administration Council, issued recognition of the war crimes committed by the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya people for the first time, which was hailed as a major step toward ethnic reconciliation.[283][284]

In 2022, the Tatmadaw lifted a 2012 ban on Rohingya studying in tertiary educational institutions. However, they are not allowed to live in dormitories. Government officials and educational faculties continually discriminate against them. Travel restrictions first imposed in January 2024 in response to Arakan Army attacks largely prevent Rohingya students from commuting to such institutions. These factors led numerous students to either seek opportunities abroad or drop out entirely.[285][286]

Since 10 February 2024, the Tatmadaw reportedly conscripted young Rohingya men between the ages of 18 and 35, despite the law only applying to citizens. Including 100 men from four villages in Buthidaung Township, they undergo 14 days of basic training while the junta promises them ID cards, a bag of rice, and a monthly salary of US$41. Those who refuse service are fined half a million kyats.[287] For Rohingya who dodge the draft, many of them endeavour to fight for the Arakan Army rather than ARSA or the RSO.[288][289]

Due to overcrowding and security concerns in the refugee camps, Border Guard Bangladesh and the BCG actively block Rohingya attempting to flee across the border via the Naf River since early 2024.[290]

The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina, declared that 35,000 Rohingya were transferred to Bhasan Char to "keep Rohingya youth away from criminal activities." She also emphasised the difficulty of repatriating Rohingya back to Myanmar due to the civil war, and preventing foreign armed groups from using Bangladesh as a guerrilla sanctuary.[291]

Since February 2024, the Arakan Army began offering a safe haven for Rohingya living in Rakhine State to avoid conscription by the Tatmadaw. While they denied regime claims that they were targeting them for recruitment, the AA encouraged anyone to volunteer if they wished, regardless of ethnicity or religion.[292]

According to Free Rohingya Coalition co-founder, Nay San Lwin, the Tatmadaw compelled Rohingya in Buthidaung Township to demonstrate against AA to stir up communal tension.[293][294]

On 26 March 2024, Arakan Army leader, Twan Mrat Naing, posted two tweets where he posited that calling Rohingya people living in Myanmar "Bengali" is not malicious in itself. He further points out that Rakhine people live in Bangladesh as citizens. He concludes his sentiments by calling on the international community to move past the naming issue and encourage reconciliation.[295][296]

According to Rohingya who escaped conscription, Tatmadaw commanders quote the Qur'an to instill religious conflict against the Arakan Army.[297]

Since 2024, the United League of Arakan and the Arakan Army is continually attempting reconciliation with the Rohingya in its administered areas. This includes allowing freedom of movement in central Rakhine and Paletwa. However, considering the past actions of AA towards the Rohingya, and accusations of atrocities, the community remains split in regards to the ULA's efforts.[298]

Genocide

[edit]

In 2015, an assessment by the Yale Law School concluded that the government of Myanmar was waging a concerted campaign against the Rohingya, a campaign which could be classified as genocide under international law.[299] An investigation by the media channel Al Jazeera English, along with the group Fortify Rights, found that the Myanmar military was systematically targeting the Rohingya population because of its ethnicity and religion.[299] The International State Crime Initiative of the University of London issued a report stating that a genocide is taking place against the Rohingya.[300]

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees has used the term ethnic cleansing to describe the exodus of Rohingya from Myanmar.[301] In December 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, dismissed the Myanmar government's claims that its operations were merely a response to rebel attacks, and it also indicated that "for us, it was clear... that these operations were organised and planned," and could amount to "genocide."[302]

On 24 August 2018, the day before the anniversary of the eruption of extreme violence that came to be known as the "Rohingya Crisis," the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report (which was not made public until 27 August) which summarised its findings after an investigation was completed into the events of August–September 2017. It declared that the events constituted cause for the Myanmar government—particularly the Myanmar military (the "Tatmadaw") and its commanding officers—to be brought before the International Criminal Court and charged with "crimes against humanity", including "ethnic cleansing" and "genocide."[48][49][50][51][52][53][303]

In July 2022, a report from Reuters revealed an extensive plan by the Tatmadaw to eradicate the Rohingyas.[304]

Demographics

[edit]
The yellow-green striped section show the approximate location of the Rohingya in Myanmar
Rohingya people in Rakhine State

Those who identify as Rohingyas typically reside in the northernmost townships of Arakan bordering Bangladesh where they form 80–98% of the population. A typical Rohingya family has four or five surviving children but numbers up to twenty eight have been recorded in rare cases.[67][305] Rohingyas have 46% more children than Myanmar's national average.[67] In 2018, 48,000 Rohingya babies were born in Bangladesh, out of a total population of 120,000 fertile women.[306] As of 2014, about 1.3 million Rohingyas lived in Myanmar and an estimated 1 million lived overseas. They constitute 40% of Rakhine State's total population or 60% of it if the overseas Rohingya population is included. As of December 2016, 1/7th stateless of the entire world's stateless population is Rohingya according to United Nations figures.[1][307]

Prior to the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis and the military crackdown in 2016 and 2017, the Rohingya population in Myanmar was around 1.1 to 1.3 million[69][67][68][1] They reside mainly in the northern Rakhine townships, where they form 80–98% of the population.[70] Many Rohingyas have fled to southeastern Bangladesh, where there are over 900,000 refugees,[71] as well as to India,[72] Thailand,[73] Malaysia,[73] Indonesia,[74] Saudi Arabia[7] and Pakistan.[75] More than 100,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar live in camps for internally displaced persons, and the authorities do not allow them to leave.[76][77]

The following table shows the statistics of Muslim population in Arakan. The data is for all Muslims in Arakan (Rakhine), regardless of ethnicity. The data for Burmese 1802 census is taken from a book by J. S. Furnivall. The British censuses classified immigrants from Chittagong as Bengalis. There were a small number of immigrants from other parts of India. The 1941 census was lost during the war. The 1983 census conducted under the Ne Win's government omitted people in volatile regions. It is unclear how many were missed. British era censuses can be found at Digital Library of India.

Year Muslims
in Arakan
Muslims in
Akyab District
Indians in
Akyab District
Akyab's
population
Percentage
of Muslims
in Akyub
Indians in Arakan Indians born
outside of Burma
Arakan's total
population
Percentage
of Muslims
in Arakan
1802 census
(Burmese)
Lost? 248,604
1869 24,637 10% 447,957 5%
1872 census 64,315 58,255 276,671 21% 484,963 13%
1881 census 359,706 113,557 71,104 588,690
1891 census 416,305 137,922 62,844 673,274
1901 census 162,754 154,887 481,666 32% 173,884 76,445 762,102 21%
1911 census 178,647 529,943 30% 197,990 46,591 839,896
1921 census 576,430 206,990 51,825 909,246
1931 census 255,469 242,381 210,990[308] 637,580 38% 217,801 50,565 1,008,535 25.3%
1983 census 584,518 2,045,559 29%

Culture

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Rohingya culture is distinct and different from the other ethnic groups in the region. The clothing worn by most Rohingyas is indistinguishable from those worn by other groups in Myanmar.[309]

Men wear bazu (long sleeved shirts) and longgi or doothi (loincloths) covering down to the ankles. Religious scholars prefer wearing kurutha, jubba or panjabi (long tops). In special occasions, Rohingya men sometimes wear taikpon (collarless jackets) on top of their shirts.[309]

Lucifica is a type of flat bread regularly eaten by Rohingyas,[309] while bola fica is a popular traditional snack made of rice noodles.[310][311] Betel leaves, colloquially known as faan, are also popular amongst Rohingyas.[309]

Language

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Rohingya virtual keyboard, or Rohingya "on-screen" keyboard.

The Rohingya language is part of the Indo-Aryan sub-branch of the greater Indo-European language family and is related to the Chittagonian language spoken in the southernmost part of Bangladesh bordering Myanmar.[23] While both Rohingya and Chittagonian are related to Bengali, they are not mutually intelligible with the latter. Rohingyas do not speak Burmese, the lingua franca of Myanmar, and face problems in integration. Rohingya scholars have written the Rohingya language in various scripts including the Arabic, Hanifi, Urdu, Roman, and Burmese alphabets, where Hanifi is a newly developed alphabet derived from Arabic with the addition of four characters from Latin and Burmese.[161]

More recently, a Latin alphabet has been developed using all 26 English letters A to Z and two additional Latin letters Ç (for retroflex R) and Ñ (for nasal sound). To accurately represent Rohingya phonology, this alphabet also uses five accented vowels (áéíóú). It has been recognised by ISO with ISO 639-3 "rhg" code.[312]

Religion

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Rohingya orphans in a madrasa in Selayang, Malaysia

Due to the fact that members of Burma's Rohingya Muslim population are not considered citizens of the country, they are not protected against discrimination by the Burmese government. Therefore, concerns exist with regard to the community's lack of religious freedom, especially in the legal and political sphere.[313]

The overwhelming majority of Rohingya people practice Islam, including a blend of Sunni Islam and Sufism.[314][315][11][316] Significant minorities of the Rohingya practice Hinduism[11][12][13] and Christianity.[317][16] The government restricts their educational opportunities; as a result, many pursue fundamental Islamic studies as their only option. Mosques and madrasas are present in most villages. Traditionally, men pray in congregations and women pray at home.[318]

Many Rohingya Hindus reject the "Rohingya" label and identify themselves as "Chittagonian" or "Burmese Hindus" to distance themselves from Rohingya Muslims.[319][320] They wear bindis and armbands to distinguish themselves.[321] Unlike Muslim refugees, some Hindus express willingness to return to Myanmar without citizenship believing they would be safe.[322][323]

Muslims have often faced obstacles and struggled to practice their religion in the same way as other individuals in Burma. These struggles have manifested themselves in the form of difficulty in receiving approval for the construction of places of worship, whether they be informal or formal. In the past, they have also been arrested for teaching and practising their religious beliefs.[313]

Health

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Rohingya children with their mother after being treated for diphtheria by the UK's emergency medical team in Kutupalong refugee camp.

The Rohingya face discrimination and barriers to health care.[1][324] According to a 2016 study published in the medical journal The Lancet, Rohingya children in Myanmar face low birth weight, malnutrition, diarrhoea, and barriers to reproduction on reaching adulthood.[1] Rohingya have a child mortality rate of up to 224 deaths per 1,000 live births, more than 4 times the rate for the rest of Myanmar (52 per 1,000 live births), and 3 times rate of rest non-Rohingya areas of Rakhine state (77 per 1,000 live births).[1] The paper also found that 40% of Rohingya children suffer from diarrhoea in internally displaced persons camp within Myanmar at a rate five times that of diarrhoeal illness among children in the rest of Rakhine.[1]

Human rights and refugee status

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Kutupalong refugee camp in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. The camp is one of three, which house up to 300,000 Rohingya people fleeing inter-communal violence in Myanmar.
Police checkpoint in Sittwe with closed-off Rohingya Muslim area in the background.

The Rohingya people have been described as "one of the world's least wanted minorities" and "some of the world's most persecuted people".[325][326] Médecins Sans Frontières claimed that the discrimination and human rights challenges which the Rohingya people have faced at the hands of the country's government and military are "among the world's top ten most under-reported stories of 2007."[327] In February 1992, Myanmar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated in a press release, "In actual fact, although there are (135) national races living in Myanmar today, the so-called Rohingya people is not one of them. Historically, there has never been a 'Rohingya' race in Myanmar."[327]

The Rohingya are denied freedom of movement as well as the right to receive a higher education.[328] They have been denied Burmese citizenship since the 1982 nationality law was enacted.[329] Post the 1982 law, Burma has had different types of citizenship. Citizens possessed red identity cards; Rohingyas were given white identity cards which essentially classified them as foreigners who were living in Burma. Limitations and restrictions imposed on Rohingya are facilitated by this difference in citizenship. For example, Rohingyas cannot enlist in the army or participate in the government, and they are potentially faced with the issue of illegal immigration. The citizenship law also significantly underlies the human rights violations against the Rohingya by the military. [330]

They are not allowed to travel without official permission and they were previously required to sign a commitment not to have more than two children, though the law was not strictly enforced. They are subjected to routine forced labour. (Typically, a Rohingya man has to work on military or government projects one day a week, and perform sentry duty one night a week.)[64] The Rohingya have also lost a lot of arable land, which has been confiscated by the military and given to Buddhist settlers who have moved there from elsewhere in Myanmar.[331][329]

The military is partially responsible for the human rights violations which have been committed against the Rohingya. These violations include destruction of property and forced relocation to another country. One such violation was committed when the military forced Rohingyas in Rakhine to move to Bangladesh. Other human rights violations against Rohingya Muslims include physical violence and sexual violence. The country's military officials rationalised these violations by stating that they were required as part of a census that was going to be conducted in Burma and the military needed to perform these acts in order to find out what the Rohingya Muslims's nationality was.[330] According to Amnesty International, the Rohingya have been subjected to human rights violations by Burma's military dictatorship since 1978, and many of them have fled to neighbouring Bangladesh as a result.[332] The dislocation of the Rohingya Muslims from their homes to other areas can be attributed to factors such as how isolated and undeveloped Rakhine is, the conflict between the Rohingya Muslims and the Buddhists, and the discrimination which they have been subjected to by the government.[333] 

Members of the Rohingya community were displaced to Bangladesh where the government of the country, non-governmental organisations and the UNHCR gave aid to the refugees by providing them with homes and food. These external organisations (other than those which were controlled by the government) were important because the immigration of the Rohingyas was massive due to the number of people who needed help.[333]  In 2005, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees helped the Bangladeshi government repatriate Rohingyas from Bangladesh, but allegations of human rights abuses inside the refugee camps threatened this effort.[334] In 2015, 140,000 Rohingyas were still living in IDP camps, three years after fleeing communal riots in 2012.[335] Despite earlier repatriation efforts by the UN, the vast majority of Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh are unable to return to Myanmar due to the communal violence which occurred there in 2012 and their fear of persecution. The Bangladeshi government has reduced the amount of support it allocates to the Rohingyas in order to prevent an outflow of Rohingya refugees into Bangladesh.[336] In February 2009, many Rohingya refugees were rescued by Acehnese sailors in the Strait of Malacca, after 21 days at sea.[337]

The Rakhine community as a whole has tended to be cast internationally as violent extremists – ignoring the diversity of opinions that exist, the fact that the Rakhine themselves are a long-oppressed minority, and rarely attempting to understand their perspective and concerns. This is counterproductive: it promotes a siege mentality on the part of the Rakhine, and obscures complex realities that must be understood if a sustainable way forward is to be found.

—The International Crisis Group, The Politics of Rakhine State, 22 October 2014[160]

Thousands of Rohingyas have also fled to Thailand. There have been charges that Rohingyas were shipped and towed out to the open sea from Thailand. In February 2009, evidence showing the Thai army towing a boatload of 190 Rohingya refugees out to sea surfaced. A group of refugees who were rescued by Indonesian authorities stated that they were captured and beaten by the Thai military, and then abandoned at sea.[338]

Steps to repatriate Rohingya refugees began in 2005. In 2009, the government of Bangladesh announced that it would repatriate around 9,000 Rohingyas who were living in refugee camps inside the country back to Myanmar, after a meeting with Burmese diplomats.[339][340] On 16 October 2011, the new government of Myanmar agreed to take back registered Rohingya refugees. However, these repatriation efforts were hampered by the Rakhine riots in 2012.[341][342]

On 29 March 2014, the Burmese government banned the word "Rohingya" and asked that members of the minority group be registered as "Bengalis" in the 2014 Myanmar Census, the first census to be held in three decades.[343][344] On 7 May 2014, the United States House of Representatives passed the United States House resolution on persecution of the Rohingya people in Burma that called on the government of Myanmar to end the discrimination and persecution.[345][346] Researchers from the International State Crime Initiative at Queen Mary University of London suggest that the Myanmar government is in the final stages of an organised process of genocide against the Rohingya.[347][348] In November 2016, a senior UN official in Bangladesh accused Myanmar of ethnic cleansing of Rohingyas.[222] However, Charles Petrie, a former top UN official in Myanmar, commented: "Today using the term [genocide], aside from being divisive and potentially incorrect, will only ensure that opportunities and options to try to resolve the issue to be addressed will not be available."[349]

In September 2020, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet, has warned that the killing and abductions of Rohingyas have not stopped, despite the International Court of Justice ordering Myanmar's leadership to prevent genocide and stop the killings in December 2019.[350]

Some countries like Malaysia have rejected the resettlement of Rohingya refugees and sent them back to sea because of economic difficulties and the Coronavirus pandemic.[351][352] Malaysian authorities have also expressed concern that militant Rohingya groups have been raising funds by extorting money from Rohingya refugees in the country.[353] Rohingya immigrants are often seen very negatively in many Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Bangladesh and Pakistan.[354][355]

On 27 December 2023, hundreds of students from various universities in Aceh, such as: Abulyatama University, Bina Bangsa Getsempena University, and University of Muhammadiyah Aceh, stormed a shelter for Rohingya refugees and forced them out of a convention centre in the city of Banda Aceh, demanding they be deported.[356][357] The students also seen kicking the belongings of the Rohingya men, women, and children who seated on the floor and crying in fear.[356] They burned tyres while chanting derogatory slurs such as "Kick them out" and "Reject Rohingya in Aceh".[356]

See also

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Explanatory notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Rohingya are a predominantly Sunni Muslim whose members speak a of Bengali and trace their presence in 's (formerly ) to Muslim settlements dating back at least to the 15th century under the Mrauk-U Kingdom, though claims of earlier 8th-century origins lack conclusive archaeological corroboration and are disputed by Burmese nationalists who emphasize later migrations from during British colonial rule (1824–1948). Numbering approximately 1.2 million refugees in as of 2024—primarily from the 2017 exodus triggered by clashes between Rohingya militants of the (ARSA) and Myanmar security forces—the group faces under Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law, which excludes them from national recognition, viewing most as post-colonial Bengali interlopers rather than indigenous. Their plight stems from intertwined factors of demographic competition in resource-scarce Rakhine, historical Rohingya insurgencies seeking Islamic autonomy (e.g., 1947–1962 rebellions), reciprocal communal riots with Buddhist Rakhine (e.g., 2012 violence), and Myanmar's post-independence policies prioritizing ethnic Burman-Buddhist consolidation amid fears of Islamist separatism. While international bodies like the UN have labeled state responses as genocidal, empirical analyses highlight bidirectional violence, including Rohingya attacks on civilians and economic incentives in rice-producing areas driving selective pogroms, underscoring causal roles of , illegal border flows from Bangladesh, and mutual ethnic animosities over land rather than unilateral extermination intent. The Rohingya's defining characteristics include a patrilineal system, oral traditions blending Persian-Arabic influences with local , and a diaspora spanning , , and , where remittances sustain remittances amid ongoing insurgencies displacing remnants. Notable figures like 20th-century leader M.A. Gani advanced claims, but internal divisions—exacerbated by ARSA's jihadist ties and competition with Rakhine Buddhist militias—have perpetuated cycles of flight and in camps, challenging efforts.

Nomenclature and ethnic identity

Etymology and self-designation

The term "Rohingya" serves as the primary self-designation for the Muslim population concentrated in Myanmar's , pronounced in their dialect as Ruáingga or similar variants, and is asserted by the group to signify "inhabitants of Rohang," an endonym for the historical region of (modern Rakhine). This etymology traces "Rohang" to linguistic adaptations of "Arakan," with the suffix -ya or -ga denoting origin or belonging in local dialects, reflecting claims of longstanding ties to the territory dating to at least the 9th–10th centuries when the name "Rohan" or "Rohang" was reportedly applied to the area. Historical linguistic analysis links the term to pre-colonial references, such as Persian designations like "Rkon" or Chakma usages of "Roang" for the region, evolving into "Rohingya" through phonetic shifts in Bengali-influenced Muslim communities. Earlier colonial-era attestations include British records from the late referring to "Rooinga" or "Rwangya" for Muslim groups in , suggesting continuity rather than invention, though the term's formal adoption as an ethnoreligious identifier gained prominence in the mid-20th century amid political mobilization. Alternative derivations, such as from the raḥm ("mercy") tied to early traders, have been proposed but lack robust empirical support compared to the regional toponymic origin, which aligns with self-narratives emphasizing indigenous Muslim presence in predating significant Bengali migrations. Myanmar authorities reject "Rohingya" as a fabricated label to obscure migrant Bengali roots, preferring "Bengali" and viewing it as a post-colonial construct, a stance rooted in demographic records showing influxes during British rule (). This contention underscores how self-designation functions politically, with Rohingya usage asserting autochthony against official narratives of foreign origin.

Debate on indigeneity versus migrant origins

The debate centers on whether the Rohingya constitute an indigenous ethnic group with deep historical roots in (formerly ), or primarily descendants of Bengali Muslim migrants who arrived in significant numbers during the British colonial period. Proponents of Rohingya indigeneity, including community leaders and some historians, argue that have resided in since at least the 8th or , tracing origins to Arab, Persian, and Portuguese traders who intermarried with locals and established early settlements. These claims posit a continuous Muslim presence predating the dominant Rakhine Buddhist population's arrival in the 9th-10th centuries, with the term "Rohingya" derived from "Rohang," an ancient name for . However, such assertions rely heavily on oral traditions and selective interpretations of chronicles, lacking robust archaeological or epigraphic corroboration for a distinct pre-colonial "Rohingya" identity or large-scale indigenous Muslim communities. In contrast, Myanmar's government and Rakhine nationalists maintain that the Rohingya are not indigenous but largely "Bengalis" who migrated from (in present-day ) during British rule (1824-1948), when colonial authorities encouraged Indian labor inflows to cultivate rice paddies and address shortages in Arakan's agrarian economy. Historical estimates indicate Arakan's pre-colonial population was sparse, with comprising a minority—possibly around 30,000 out of 100,000 total inhabitants before British conquest—suggesting limited indigenous roots for the current demographic scale. British records document substantial Bengali settlement, contributing to a sharp post-1826 population rise, while post-independence censuses and refugee flows underscore ongoing cross-border movements rather than ancient continuity. Empirical data favors the migrant-origin perspective for the bulk of the modern Rohingya population, as pre-19th-century Muslim communities in Arakan were smaller, more integrated into the kingdom's multi-ethnic fabric, and not self-identified as "Rohingya"—a ethnonym emerging prominently only in the 20th century amid identity politics. The absence of verifiable ancient artifacts or inscriptions linking Rohingya specifically to early Islamic arrivals undermines claims of millennium-old indigeneity, while colonial labor policies provide a causal explanation for demographic expansion, aligning with patterns observed in other British-administered regions like Assam. Myanmar's denial of the "Rohingya" label reflects this view, classifying them outside the 135 recognized indigenous nationalities and attributing statelessness to undocumented migration rather than historical entitlement. This stance, while politically charged, draws on demographic records showing minimal Muslim presence in northern Rakhine before colonial incentives, contrasting with activist narratives that amplify early contacts without proportional evidence.

Myanmar official stance and denial of "Rohingya" term

The government of does not recognize "Rohingya" as a legitimate ethnic designation for the Muslim population in , viewing it as a fabricated or politically motivated term that lacks historical basis within the country's official ethnic classifications. Instead, officials consistently refer to this group as "" or "," emphasizing their purported origins as migrants from (modern-day and parts of ) rather than as an indigenous ethnic group native to . This terminology aligns with the state's narrative that the population's presence stems primarily from colonial-era labor migrations under British rule, rather than pre-colonial settlement, thereby justifying restrictions on and rights under the 1982 Citizenship Law, which grants full citizenship only to members of the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups with documented pre-1823 residency. In practice, this denial manifests in policy and discourse: during the 2014 national census, enumerators were instructed not to allow self-identification as "Rohingya," forcing respondents to select "Bengali" or other categories, which contributed to widespread boycotts and undercounting of the population. State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi explicitly requested in May 2016 that the United States avoid using the term "Rohingya" during diplomatic engagements, citing its potential to exacerbate communal tensions in Rakhine State, and similarly urged a UN special rapporteur in June 2016 to refrain from it in official communications. During her December 2019 appearance at the International Court of Justice defending Myanmar against genocide allegations, Suu Kyi again omitted the term entirely, referring to the group as "the population of Rakhine State" or avoiding ethnic labels altogether. The military-led government and successive administrations maintain that accepting "Rohingya" as an ethnic identity would confer undue indigenous status, potentially entitling the group to and land rights in , where demographic pressures and resource competition with the ethnic Rakhine Buddhist majority fuel ongoing conflicts. Foreign Ministry spokesperson Kyaw Zay Ya articulated in 2016 that "Rohingya are not recognized as among the 135 official ethnic groups," underscoring the stance as rooted in legal and historical criteria rather than contemporary self-identification. This position persists under the post-2021 , which continues to classify the group outside Myanmar's constitutional ethnic framework, linking the denial to broader security concerns over alleged insurgent activities and illegal immigration from .

Historical migrations and settlement

Pre-Islamic Arakan and early Muslim arrivals

The region of , now in , developed early Indianized kingdoms from the 4th century CE onward, characterized by , , and religious influences from and . The Dhanyawadi kingdom, flourishing approximately from the 4th to 8th centuries CE, represented one of Southeast Asia's initial polities with Indian cosmological layouts, including reservoirs and moats for and defense, and served as a hub for Buddhist practices centered on artifacts like the image. This era reflected agrarian advancements and trade links with and Southeast Asian cultures such as the Pyu and Mon. Succeeding Dhanyawadi, the Vesali kingdom endured from roughly the 6th to 11th centuries CE, featuring fortified cities with brick temples, inscriptions in and local scripts, and a syncretic blend of , , and indigenous animist elements. Vesali's rulers, documented in stone pillars like the Anandacandra inscription from the , maintained prosperity through maritime commerce and internal stability, though the kingdom declined amid invasions and environmental shifts by the . Archaeological evidence, including terracotta plaques and coinage, underscores Vesali's role as a transitional hub before the rise of later dynasties, with no indications of Islamic presence in these pre-12th-century layers. Arakan's Bay of Bengal coastline enabled early interactions with Muslim traders from the and Persia starting in the CE, primarily via maritime routes disrupted by monsoons and shipwrecks. Local chronicles, such as those referenced in later Arakanese histories, describe the arrival of Arab sailors around 788 CE, who survived strandings, introduced Islamic teachings, and formed nascent communities through intermarriage with Arakanese Buddhists and . These contacts, echoed in oral traditions and some Persian accounts, involved small-scale settlements of merchants dealing in spices, textiles, and slaves, but lacked corroboration from contemporary inscriptions or large-scale artifacts, suggesting limited demographic impact prior to the 12th century. Claims of widespread Islamization or indigenous Muslim lineages tracing to Vesali-era Arabs, advanced in certain advocacy narratives, rely on unverified genealogies rather than material evidence. Subsequent waves of Muslim entrants in the 9th to 13th centuries included Persian and Moorish traders, alongside refugees from conflicts in after its 1204 conquest by Turkish forces under bin Bakhtiyar Khilji, though these remained sporadic and integrated marginally into 's predominantly Buddhist society. No or epigraphic records indicate a sizable Muslim in before the ; instead, early Muslims functioned as coastal enclaves, with spreading gradually through commerce rather than conquest or mass migration. This pre-kingdom phase set the stage for later amplifications under the dynasty, when political alliances with drew thousands more settlers.

Arakan Kingdom era (15th-18th centuries)

The Kingdom of Mrauk U, ruling Arakan from 1430 to 1784, saw expanded Muslim presence amid alliances with Bengal sultanates and Portuguese adventurers, though Buddhists comprised the majority population. In 1430, exiled prince Min Saw Mon regained the throne with support from Muslim forces from Bengal, prompting settlement of Bengali Muslims as soldiers and administrators. This era featured Arakanese kings adopting Persianate titles like Sultan and issuing coins with Arabic inscriptions from approximately 1430 to 1645, reflecting cultural borrowing rather than religious conversion of the monarchy. Muslim numbers grew through maritime trade, intermarriage, and captives from joint Arakanese- raids on 's coastal regions during the 16th and 17th centuries, which enslaved tens of thousands, many of whom were Muslim integrated into Arakanese society as laborers, soldiers, or settlers. These raids, targeting competitors and Mughal territories, supplied slaves to Mrauk U's multiethnic court and countryside, contributing to a noticeable Muslim minority concentrated in northern near the frontier. Historical accounts indicate limited voluntary conversions from to , with the Muslim community maintaining distinct Bengali linguistic and cultural traits, distinct from the Buddhist Arakanese majority. By the 18th century, as Mrauk U declined amid internal strife and Burmese incursions, the Muslim population faced increasing marginalization, yet retained communities in areas like present-day Maungdaw and Buthidaung, where they engaged in agriculture and trade. Portuguese chronicles and Bengali literary references document Muslim poets and nobles at the Arakanese court, underscoring Islamic cultural influence without altering the kingdom's Theravada Buddhist core. These developments laid foundations for the enduring Muslim presence in Arakan, though later narratives diverge on whether descendants formed an indigenous ethnic group or retained migrant origins tied to Bengal.

British colonial labor migrations from Bengal

Following the (1824–1826), Britain annexed (present-day ) as part of the in 1826, incorporating it into the to exploit its fertile coastal plains for rice cultivation and other agriculture. British administrators actively encouraged labor inflows from the neighboring region in to address labor shortages, offering uncultivated lands for reclamation and higher wages than in , particularly amid local famines and cyclones driving emigration. This policy intensified after 1839 with systematic agricultural development, transforming seasonal workforce needs into opportunities for , especially as the opening of the in 1869 facilitated broader Indian migration to Burma. Migrants, predominantly Muslim peasants from known as Chittagonians, initially arrived as seasonal agricultural laborers for rice planting and harvesting cycles, with estimates of 15,000 crossing annually from by 1872, rising to 80,000–200,000 per year in the 1880s and averaging around 50,000 by 1917. Permanent settlement accelerated in the late , with approximately 500 families establishing homesteads yearly in the 1870s, clearing wastelands in northern townships like and Buthidaung for paddy fields; by the 1880s, Chittagonians comprised about 70% of 's population. The Government of Burma Act of 1935 further prompted mass permanent relocation due to fears of impending restrictions, shifting transient workers into rooted communities. These migrations drove marked demographic changes, with the Muslim population in Arakan Division rising from 12.24% in 1869 to 25.56% by 1931, and in Akyab District (encompassing northern areas) from 20.67% to 38.41% over the same period. Census records indicate 58,255 Muslims in District by 1872, increasing to 178,642 by 1911, with British-era settlers outnumbering pre-colonial Muslim residents by roughly 4:1 in 1931; northern townships like reached 80% Muslim and Buthidaung 60%, often displacing local Buddhists southward due to land competition. These shifts, documented in decennial censuses and administrative gazetteers, reflected economic incentives over indigenous claims, though later classifications distinguished "Chittagonian Mahomedans" (immigrants) from "Arakan Mahomedans" (earlier settlers).

Post-colonial demographic shifts

Following Burmese independence from Britain on January 4, 1948, the Muslim in Arakan Division—predominantly Bengali-speaking and including those later self-identifying as Rohingya—continued its expansion amid a porous border with (present-day ). The 1953 enumerated 582,984 , representing 28.5% of Arakan's total of 1,186,738, an increase from 25.9% (255,361 ) recorded in the 1931 colonial . This post-independence uptick reflected a combination of natural demographic pressures and cross-border movements, as economic opportunities in Arakan's rice cultivation drew seasonal and permanent migrants from , building on colonial-era patterns. By the 1973 census, Muslims constituted 35.1% of Arakan's population, numbering 1,118,731 out of 1,712,838 residents—a proportional rise that outpaced the overall state growth rate. Government assessments attributed much of this shift to , estimating sustained inflows from after the 1947 partition of Bengal, which displaced populations and encouraged settlement in adjacent Arakan townships like and Buthidaung. The 1971 further accelerated entries, with refugees and economic migrants exploiting weak border controls, leading to Muslim majorities in northern Rakhine subdistricts (exceeding 80% in some areas by the late 1970s). These shifts heightened ethnic tensions, as the expanding Muslim communities—often viewed by Burmese authorities and Rakhine Buddhists as non-indigenous Bengali interlopers—encroached on land and resources traditionally held by the Rakhine majority. While data confirm the numerical surge, Myanmar officials have emphasized migration over endogenous growth, citing incomplete enumeration of earlier indigenous Muslims (e.g., Kamans) and exclusion of "Rohingya" as a category in official records to underscore foreign origins. Independent analyses of trends support a higher Muslim growth rate (approximately 2.5% annually from 1931–1973) compared to non-Muslims, driven partly by inflows that strained local demographics and fueled insurgent activities by groups like the Rohingya Patriotic Front in the 1970s.

Demographics and population dynamics

Current estimates and geographic spread

Estimates of the remaining Rohingya population in Myanmar vary due to restricted access, ongoing conflict, and lack of official census data recognizing the group, but figures from international observers place it at approximately 300,000 to 350,000 individuals, primarily concentrated in northern , including internally displaced persons camps near and . These numbers reflect the aftermath of the 2017 exodus and subsequent displacements amid clashes between the and Myanmar military forces since 2024. The largest concentration outside is in , where over 1.1 million Rohingya refugees reside as of mid-2025, with UNHCR registering 1,133,981 individuals across 235,128 households in camps and island by April 2025. This population has grown slightly from 2017 peaks due to continued arrivals fleeing violence, totaling around 1.16 million by late 2024 in 33 camps. hosts nearly 90% of displaced Rohingya, straining local resources amid floods and camp overcrowding. Smaller Rohingya communities exist in diaspora , including an estimated 40,000 to 200,000 undocumented in , many facing detention and deportation risks, with 676 held in immigration facilities as of September 2024. In , tens of thousands live as undocumented migrants, while , , and the UAE host historical communities numbering in the thousands to low tens of thousands, often integrated through labor migration or earlier exoduses. Overall, the global Rohingya exceeds 2 million, with the stateless and dependent on host or aid.

Fertility rates and growth compared to Rakhine Buddhists

The Rohingya Muslim population in demonstrates markedly higher fertility rates than the indigenous Rakhine Buddhist population, contributing to divergent demographic trajectories. Surveys indicate a (TFR) of approximately 3.8 children per woman among Rohingya communities, driven by cultural norms favoring early and larger families, with limited contraceptive use. In contrast, the TFR for overall was 2.7 children per woman in select districts as of 2014, while the national average stood at 2.3, reflecting broader trends of declining influenced by and among Buddhist-majority groups. Rakhine Buddhist households typically average 2-3 children, compared to 4-5 for Rohingya households, amplifying the gap through sustained high birth rates. This disparity manifests in population growth rates, with Rohingya estimates at 3-3.5% annually, approximately 1.5 times faster than the average of around 1.2% or the national rate. Rakhine growth lags at 0.6%, constrained by lower and out-migration, while Rohingya expansion is bolstered by a younger age structure—27% under age 10 in 2012 surveys versus 18.5% nationally—indicating a of future births. Between 1983 and 2014, population grew 56%, slightly above the national 51%, but Rohingya comprised a growing share, reaching about 40% (~1.2 million) of the state's ~3.2 million by 2014, heightening local concerns over ethnic balance. These trends, rooted in differing religious and socioeconomic factors—such as Islamic emphases on size versus Buddhist monastic influences and modernization—have fueled Rakhine perceptions of existential demographic threat, though empirical data confirms the faster Rohingya growth independent of migration debates. Rohingya fertility exceeds even regional Muslim-majority norms like Bangladesh's 2.2 TFR, underscoring endogenous drivers over external pressures. Without policy interventions like access, projections suggest continued divergence, potentially exacerbating resource strains in .

Internal displacements within Myanmar

The most significant internal displacements of Rohingya within stemmed from the 2012 in . This unrest began on May 28, 2012, when three Rohingya men raped and murdered a 27-year-old Rakhine Buddhist woman in Ramri township, prompting retaliatory killings of ten traveling by bus on June 3 and igniting widespread riots between Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists. Both communities committed documented atrocities during the clashes, which spread to townships including , , and Buthidaung, resulting in at least 78 deaths and the destruction of thousands of homes. The riots displaced approximately 145,000 individuals, predominantly Rohingya, who were herded into segregated camps in central , such as those near and Pauktaw, while many Rakhine were resettled in new housing. The government imposed these relocations citing security imperatives to prevent further , though restrictions on movement, , and persist, confining most Rohingya to camp-like conditions with limited access to services. By 2024, an estimated 235,862 Rohingya—out of roughly 550,000 stateless persons in —remain internally displaced in , comprising about 41% of the remaining Rohingya population there. Living conditions in these camps are dire, marked by overcrowding, inadequate shelter, food insecurity, and restricted , exacerbated by ongoing insurgent activities and government controls. Escalating conflict since November 2023 between the military and the has triggered additional displacements, affecting an estimated 327,000 people in and adjacent areas, with Rohingya villages caught in crossfire and subjected to forced recruitment or evacuation orders by both sides. The government attributes such instability to Rohingya-linked militant groups and illegal border movements, framing displacements as necessary countermeasures rather than targeted .

Language, culture, and religion

Rohingya dialect and linguistic roots

The , known natively as Ruáingga or Ruaingga, is classified as an Eastern Indo-Aryan language within the Bengali-Assamese subgroup of the Indo-European family. It shares close with the Chittagonian dialect spoken in southeastern , reflecting historical migrations and cultural exchanges across the border. Linguistic analysis indicates that Rohingya diverged from proto-Bengali-Assamese forms, incorporating phonological and lexical features typical of coastal Bengali varieties, such as simplified consonant clusters and influenced by regional substrates. Dialectal variation exists across Rakhine State townships, with northern variants in and Buthidaung preserving more archaic Chittagonian traits, while southern forms near show greater admixture from neighboring Rakhine Buddhist speech patterns and Burmese loanwords. The core vocabulary derives predominantly from Bengali roots, with approximately 70-80% lexical overlap with Chittagonian, as evidenced by shared terms for , , and daily life; for instance, words like báir (outside) and khamar () mirror Chittagong usages. Phonologically, Rohingya features 20-25 consonant phonemes, including aspirated stops (ph, bh) and retroflex sounds (, ), alongside a system of 10 monophthongs, distinguishing it from like Rakhine but aligning it with eastern Indo-Aryan patterns. Islamic influences have introduced substantial Arabic and Persian loanwords, comprising up to 15-20% of religious and abstract vocabulary, such as namaz (, from Arabic ṣalāh) and kitab (, from Persian kitāb), reflecting centuries of religious scholarship and trade contacts rather than direct ethnic descent. Urdu elements appear in formal registers due to South Asian Muslim interactions, while post-1970s refugee contexts in have accelerated borrowing from standard Bengali and Chittagonian, diluting purer northern dialects among communities. Writing systems historically include modified Arabic (Rohingya Farsi), the Hanifi script developed in the 1980s for phonetic representation, and Latin-based Rohingyalish with diacritics for five accented vowels; the language received designation as "rhg" in 2007 to formalize its distinct status. These elements underscore a linguistic profile shaped by Bengali substrate and Islamic superstrate, with limited evidence of pre-Bengali Arakanese substrates, pointing to relatively recent formation through demographic inflows from .

Traditional customs and social structure

The Rohingya social structure is organized around extended patriarchal families and clan-based units known as gushti, which traditionally formed the basis of community solidarity and decision-making in village settings. These clans collectively constituted shomaz (communities), governed by committees of male elders who handled dispute resolution, resource allocation, and social norms through informal councils resembling salish systems influenced by Bengali Muslim traditions. ties emphasize patrilineal descent, with eldest sons inheriting primary household authority and responsibilities upon the father's death or incapacity, reinforcing male dominance in family and communal affairs. Mosques serve as central hubs for social cohesion, where religious leaders (maulvis) advise on ethical and customary matters, blending Sunni Islamic principles with localized practices. Marriage customs are predominantly arranged by families, adhering to Islamic law, with love matches discouraged to preserve clan alliances and familial honor. Ceremonies involve formal contracts (nikah), separate gatherings for men and women, and elaborate rituals including feasts, exchanges, and emotional songs (honlas) performed at weddings to express joy or sorrow. Early marriage is culturally entrenched, with girls typically wed between ages 16 and 20, and boys between 20 and 24, justified by beliefs in premarital purity, economic burdens, and readiness for adult roles, though child marriages under 18 persist due to socio-religious norms. practices, including , clothing, and household items from the bride's family, underscore the economic dimensions of unions, often leading to indebtedness but strengthening inter-clan bonds. Gender roles reflect patriarchal norms, with men as primary breadwinners engaged in agriculture, fishing, or labor, while women manage domestic duties, childcare, and sometimes fieldwork, though purdah (seclusion) limits female public participation. Community customs prioritize collective welfare, such as mutual aid during harvests or funerals, governed by Islamic ethics prohibiting alcohol, pork, and usury, alongside vernacular traditions like thanaka paste application for skincare, symbolizing continuity with Arakanese influences. Dispute resolution favors mediation by elders over formal courts, emphasizing reconciliation to maintain social harmony within gushti networks.

Islamic practices and influences

The Rohingya people overwhelmingly adhere to , characterized by a Sufi-inflected variation that incorporates mystical elements alongside orthodox practices. This blend reflects historical influences from traders who introduced to the region as early as the 8th century through trade routes, gradually integrating with local customs and later reinforced by migrations from . They strictly observe the five pillars of , including salat (daily prayers) performed in mosques that dot most villages and sawm (), with religious adherence emphasized as a core aspect of identity tied to claimed and Pathan ancestries. Religious education plays a central role, conducted in madrasas where children memorize the and study (Islamic jurisprudence), fostering clerical leadership within communities. Imams and ustads (religious teachers) wield significant authority, advising on spiritual matters, resolving disputes, and addressing supernatural afflictions like jinn possession through recitations and ruqyah (exorcism prayers), often blending Quranic healing with folk traditions. These leaders also influence social behavior, promoting conservative norms such as veiling for women and segregation in public spaces, while mosques serve as hubs for communal gatherings during and . Sufi influences manifest in veneration of saints (awliya) and participation in dhikr (remembrance rituals), though recent decades have seen tensions with rising Salafi currents funded externally, potentially eroding traditional syncretic elements amid broader Islamist networking. Despite Myanmar's restrictions on religious infrastructure, Rohingya piety remains resilient, with underground networks sustaining practices amid displacement, underscoring Islam's role in preserving cultural continuity against assimilation pressures.

Citizenship and political status

Pre-1982 recognition and participation

Under the Union Citizenship Act of , enacted following Burma's independence, citizenship was granted to individuals born within the territory or descended from residents prior to January 1, 1942, encompassing many Rohingya Muslims in (Rakhine State) who had long-standing presence in the region. This law established a hybrid regime combining and principles, allowing Rohingya to obtain identity documents and equal status alongside other ethnic groups. The Burmese government under Prime Minister officially recognized the term "Rohingya" in official communications, including radio broadcasts aimed at peace-building with ethnic minorities during the democratic period from to 1962. Rohingya participated actively in national politics during this era, with full voting rights extended to all citizens in general elections held in 1950, 1956, and 1960. Voters elected multiple Rohingya representatives to ; records indicate at least 17 Rohingya served as members of across various terms up to the early 1960s, including two women and figures such as U Sultan Mahmood, who was appointed a cabinet minister in U Nu's government. In the 1951 elections, Muslim candidates, predominantly Rohingya in , secured five seats—four in the and one in the —often aligned with the or independent lists. Following the 1962 military coup led by General , political participation became more restricted under socialist rule, though formal citizenship rights under the 1948 framework persisted for Rohingya until the enactment of the 1982 Citizenship Law. During this interim period, Rohingya continued to hold cards and access some public services, but faced increasing administrative hurdles and ethnic tensions exacerbated by insurgencies in the 1950s and 1970s. Burmese authorities at times classified Rohingya as "Arakan Muslims" rather than a distinct ethnic group, reflecting ongoing debates over their indigenous status versus claims of Bengali migration during British colonial rule (1824–1948), yet pre-1982 legal recognition afforded them equality absent the later law's stringent ancestral proof requirements.

1982 Citizenship Law criteria and exclusions

The Burma Citizenship Law, promulgated on October 15, , by the under General Ne Win's regime, delineates three categories of citizenship: full Citizens, Associate Citizens, and Naturalized Citizens, with full citizenship reserved primarily for members of recognized "national races" (taingyintha). Full Citizens are defined as those belonging to ethnic groups—such as Kachin, Kayah, Karen, , Burman, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—that settled in Burmese territory before 1185 B.E. ( A.D.), marking the onset of British colonial influence via the . The holds authority to designate qualifying ethnic groups, effectively limiting automatic to approximately 135 indigenous races based on ancestral settlement predating colonial migrations. Citizenship by birth requires both parents to be nationals (full Citizens), while descent-based claims extend to children of at least one full Citizen parent combined with an Associate or Naturalized Citizen parent, provided birth is registered within one year domestically or at a Burmese embassy abroad. Associate Citizenship applies to individuals who held provisional certificates or applied under the pre-1948 Union Citizenship Act but lacked full processing; eligibility demands an to the state, with children required to affirm by age 18 or forfeit status. Naturalized Citizenship targets pre-Independence (January 4, 1948) residents or those meeting post-1982 criteria, including being at least 18 years old, fluent in one of Myanmar's national languages (e.g., Burmese), of good character and sound mind, and having resided continuously for at least three years if married to a Citizen—or longer otherwise—while conforming to loyalty oaths and excluding those with criminal records or security risks. The law prohibits dual citizenship and permits revocation for acquiring foreign , permanent emigration, fraudulent acquisition, or actions endangering state security, such as disloyalty or , punishable by fines up to 50,000 kyats and imprisonment. The Rohingya are systematically excluded from full citizenship as they are not classified among the taingyintha; Myanmar authorities regard them as Bengali migrants from Chittagong (modern Bangladesh) who arrived during British colonial rule or later, lacking verifiable ancestral ties predating 1823. This non-recognition bars automatic birthright claims, while denials of Associate or Naturalized status often stem from insufficient documentation of pre-1948 residency or failure to meet evidentiary standards imposed by local scrutiny committees, which prioritize ethnic indigeneity over individual proofs. Enacted amid post-1978 refugee returns and security concerns in Rakhine State, the law's ethnic-centric framework has rendered most Rohingya stateless, restricting access to movement, employment, and services, though some with pre-1982 documents initially received temporary Associate-like papers that were later invalidated.

Exclusion from 135 official ethnic groups

The Myanmar government designates 135 ethnic groups as taingyintha (national races), a classification tied to eligibility for full citizenship under the 1982 Citizenship Law, which requires demonstrable settlement in the country's territories prior to 1823, the start of British colonial rule. These groups encompass sub-ethnicities derived from eight principal races—Kachin, Kayah, Karen, , Burman (Bamar), Mon, Rakhine, and Shan—expanded into 135 categories by the regime in the early to enumerate indigenous populations. The list's compilation, initiated around 1983 by the (armed forces), lacked rigorous anthropological basis and served administrative purposes, including census enumeration and political control, rather than reflecting historical migrations or self-identification. Rohingya Muslims are explicitly excluded from this roster, as the government maintains they do not qualify as taingyintha due to origins traced to Bengali-speaking migrants from (now in ) arriving primarily during or after the British era, rather than pre-1823 indigenous settlement. This position, articulated in official statements and census policies, contrasts with Rohingya claims of centuries-old presence in , supported by some historical records of Muslim communities predating British rule, but dismissed by authorities as fabricated or irrelevant to ethnic indigeneity criteria. The exclusion perpetuates a where non-listed groups, including Rohingya, Chinese, and Indians, face barriers to naturalized or associate , requiring proof of long-term residency and loyalty oaths that are rarely granted in practice. In operational terms, the 135-group framework has influenced national censuses, such as the 2014 enumeration, where Rohingya were prohibited from self-identifying as such and instead directed to register as "Bengali," reinforcing their foreign status and ineligibility for ethnic quotas in politics or resources. Government-aligned narratives, echoed in , portray inclusion of Rohingya as a threat to Rakhine Buddhist demographics and national unity, prioritizing ethnic purity over demographic evidence of intermarriage and . Critics, including international observers, argue the arbitrary nature of the list—expanded without transparent methodology—systematically marginalizes Muslim minorities, but Myanmar's stance remains that only pre-colonial taingyintha embody the state's foundational races, excluding post-arrival groups regardless of generational tenure. This policy has contributed to over a million Rohingya lacking documents, exacerbating vulnerabilities to displacement and rights denial.

Insurgencies and security threats

Post-WWII mujahideen and separatist movements

Following Burma's independence from Britain on January 4, 1948, Rohingya Muslim leaders in northern (present-day ) initiated an armed insurgency against the central government, seeking to establish an autonomous Islamic region or attach the area to . In July 1946, the North Arakan Muslim League had been formed to advocate for the Muslim-majority northern 's secession from Burma, laying groundwork for subsequent militant demands. The Mujahid Party, established in 1947 by Rohingya elites including religious scholars, formalized these separatist goals, explicitly calling for an independent in northern or its incorporation into amid the subcontinent's partition. By 1950, fighters—self-identified as holy warriors—launched coordinated attacks, targeting government officials, police stations, and military outposts in townships such as and Buthidaung, where they temporarily seized control of rural areas and established parallel administration. These operations, numbering in the dozens annually during the early , aimed to exploit post-independence instability and ethnic tensions, with drawing support from local Rohingya communities disillusioned by unfulfilled promises of regional under the Burmese . The insurgency persisted through the 1950s, with forces peaking at several hundred armed fighters who coordinated with other ethnic rebels against Yangon's authority. A 1954 Mujahid conference in Taungbro, Township, reaffirmed demands for an autonomous Muslim state, rejecting integration into Buddhist-majority Burma. Burmese military operations gradually eroded mujahideen strongholds, culminating in their effective defeat by 1961, after which surviving cadres dispersed or integrated into later Rohingya insurgent formations. This period marked the initial phase of organized Rohingya , driven by irredentist aspirations tied to Islamic identity rather than broader grievances, and contributed to enduring mutual between Rohingya communities and the Arakanese Buddhist majority. In the mid-1970s, the Rohingya Independence Army reorganized as the Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), led by Muhammad Jafar Habib, continuing low-level guerrilla operations against Burmese forces along the Bangladesh-Myanmar border from bases in refugee camps. The RPF sought an independent Rohingya state in northern Rakhine, conducting ambushes and sabotage but lacking significant manpower or arms, with activities peaking in the late 1970s before declining amid Burmese efforts. By the early , the (RSO) emerged as a splinter or successor group, establishing training camps in and launching cross-border raids into , including attacks on outposts in and Buthidaung townships. RSO operations intensified in the late , contributing to heightened tensions that prompted Myanmar's 1991-1992 operations, which displaced over 250,000 Rohingya to . These groups fragmented by the mid-1990s due to internal divisions, limited resources, and Burmese suppression, though remnants persisted in exile. Reports from the period indicate Rohingya militants, particularly RSO factions, developed operational ties with Pakistani jihadist networks in the and early 1990s, including training in camps linked to Afghan mujahideen veterans returning from the Soviet-Afghan War. n funding and proselytizing efforts, channeled through madrasas and refugee aid since the late 1970s, facilitated ideological radicalization and recruitment, with some militants attending religious schools in or . By the 1990s, RSO elements reportedly collaborated with Bangladeshi groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI), which had indirect connections to through shared training pipelines, though direct operational command from transnational jihadists remained unverified and limited in scale. These links, while not transforming Rohingya insurgencies into full-scale jihadist fronts, introduced external tactics and rhetoric emphasizing Islamic solidarity over purely separatist goals. Skeptics, including some analysts, argue such connections were exaggerated by authorities to justify crackdowns, but refugee testimonies and intercepted militant communications provide corroborating evidence of foreign support.

ARSA formation and 2010s attacks

The (ARSA), initially operating under the name Harakah al-Yaqin ("Movement of Faith"), coalesced in the early 2010s among Rohingya communities disillusioned with prior insurgent groups, drawing recruits from displaced populations in and abroad. Its leadership included , a Rohingya raised in with reported militant training, who positioned ARSA as a defensive force against perceived Burmese oppression while invoking Islamic rhetoric to mobilize fighters. By , ARSA had organized several hundred lightly armed operatives, primarily young Rohingya men lacking formal military experience, and established clandestine networks for weapons and explosives across the Bangladesh border. ARSA's debut attacks occurred on October 9, 2016, targeting three border guard police outposts in Township—Kyee Gon Taung, Border Guard Police headquarters, and Thandar Chaung—using knives, sticks, and crude firearms, resulting in the deaths of nine policemen and the seizure of arms and ammunition. The group, numbering around 150-200 fighters in this operation, framed the raids as retaliation for arrests and village restrictions, but the assaults exposed ARSA's tactical limitations, as security forces quickly repelled them, killing an estimated 15-20 militants in the ensuing clashes. These events marked the first coordinated Rohingya insurgency since the , prompting a lockdown of northern and heightened scrutiny of foreign jihadi influences, though ARSA denied direct ties to groups like . Escalation peaked on August 25, 2017, when approximately 1,000 ARSA fighters, divided into four waves, simultaneously assaulted over 30 police posts and the 8th Regiment headquarters in , Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships, employing hit-and-run tactics with , slingshots, and captured weapons. The offensive killed 12-59 security personnel (reports vary by source) and temporarily overran several outposts, but ARSA suffered heavy losses, with forces reporting over 150 militants neutralized in the immediate counteraction. Independent investigations later confirmed ARSA's role in contemporaneous civilian atrocities, including the machete killings of 45-99 Hindu villagers in and Chut Pyin, where fighters executed non-combatants after separating them by , actions that analysts attribute to ARSA's strategy of to consolidate Rohingya-held areas. Sporadic ARSA operations persisted through the late 2010s, including ambushes on patrols and border skirmishes, sustaining low-level amid military cordons that restricted militant mobility. With an estimated 300-500 active members by 2018, ARSA relied on videos and fatwas from sympathetic clerics to recruit, but its improvised explosives and small-arms focus limited strategic impact, often serving to provoke disproportionate responses that fueled displacement rather than territorial gains. authorities classified ARSA as a terrorist entity in , citing cross-border linkages, while the group's persistence highlighted unresolved grievances over and land rights in Rakhine.

Rohingya militant activities post-2021 coup

Following the 2021 military coup in , Rohingya militant groups, primarily the (ARSA) and the (RSO), intensified recruitment and cross-border operations from refugee camps into northern , amid escalating clashes between the junta and the (AA). These activities focused on countering AA advances, with militants claiming territorial gains and conducting ambushes, though many assertions remain disputed by AA forces. Recruitment drives in camps surged in 2023, drawing 3,000 to 5,000 fighters—some coerced, including children as young as 13—through promises of , , cash, and weapons offered by the junta. ARSA fighters began crossing into Maungdaw Township from mid-2023, engaging AA positions in coordination with junta forces to defend areas like Buthidaung after AA captured Rathedaung earlier that year. A captured junta major, Hlaing Win Tun, claimed in June 2024 that orchestrated joint operations with ARSA, forcibly conscripting and training 750 Rohingya youths near Buthidaung for and looting against Rakhine Buddhist villages. These tactics included burning homes and targeting civilians, aligning with broader junta strategies to exploit ethnic tensions post-coup amid its weakening control. In September 2025, ARSA announced the seizure of a junta base near the border, but AA dismissed it as to bolster recruitment. By October 23, 2025, Rohingya militants ambushed an AA convoy in , killing two Rakhine civilians, as reported by AA sources. Such incidents have exacerbated intercommunal violence, with militants basing operations in Rohingya villages, complicating AA efforts to differentiate combatants from civilians. While ARSA's against AA shows limited success, it has deepened divisions and drawn in camp-based gangs, raising risks of broader destabilization without altering junta or AA territorial dominance significantly.

Major conflicts and operations

1978 Nagamin operation

The Nagamin operation, also known as , was a military campaign launched by the in early 1978 under the government of General to screen for illegal immigrants in (then ), particularly targeting Muslim populations suspected of originating from . The operation's stated purpose was a nationwide registration effort ahead of a to distinguish citizens from foreigners, with Burmese authorities emphasizing the expulsion of who had allegedly entered illegally during British colonial rule (1824–1948) or post-independence, viewing much of the Rohingya population as non-indigenous settlers rather than a recognized ethnic group entitled to . This rationale stemmed from demographic concerns in border regions, where influxes from had reportedly swelled Muslim numbers, exacerbating tensions with the Buddhist Rakhine majority and fueling insurgent activities. Military actions involved intensive identity checks, house-to-house searches, and evictions across northern Rakhine townships like , Buthidaung, and , often escalating into reported manhunts and requisitions of hundreds of Muslim homes for army use. Refugees later claimed widespread atrocities, including rapes, arbitrary killings, and , with one account estimating over 1,700 Muslim assassinations amid a "" that implicated local communities. The operation lasted approximately eight weeks, prompting a rapid exodus as families fled to avoid scrutiny or violence, with Burmese officials interpreting the flight as confirmation of illegal status rather than evidence of . By May 1978, over 200,000 Rohingya had crossed into , swelling makeshift camps near the and marking the first major involving the group. protested the influx, initially restricting aid and threatening to arm refugees, while international pressure from the UNHCR and ICRC facilitated bilateral negotiations. Under a July 1978 agreement, Burma committed to repatriating non-criminal returnees screened as pre-1823 residents or eligible citizens, leading to the return of 180,000–190,000 by late 1978 and into 1979 via the UNHCR-monitored Shwe Hintha operation; remaining refugees dispersed to or . The episode highlighted enduring disputes over Rohingya indigeneity, with repatriated individuals often facing ongoing restrictions that presaged the 1982 Citizenship Law's exclusions.

1991-1992 refugee outflows

In late 1991, intensified military operations in northern , prompted by concerns over potential Islamist insurgent activities and border security following domestic political unrest, escalated into widespread abuses against the Rohingya population, including forced labor, relocations, rapes, and killings. These actions, occurring amid the junta's consolidation of power after the uprising, triggered a mass flight as Rohingya sought to escape persecution and enforced by army units. The government, viewing many Rohingya as undocumented migrants from rather than indigenous citizens, justified heightened security measures to curb illegal movements and potential rebellions linked to foreign militants, though independent reports documented systematic brutality driving the exodus. By early 1992, approximately 250,000 to 260,000 Rohingya had crossed into southeastern , primarily via the , overwhelming local resources and leading to the establishment of makeshift camps near . This outflow marked the largest single Rohingya displacement since , with refugees reporting village burnings, arbitrary arrests, and demands for portering that exacerbated famine risks in the arid region. , despite its own economic strains, initially provided asylum but imposed movement restrictions to deter permanent settlement and facilitate future returns. The crisis highlighted longstanding tensions, as Myanmar's 1982 Citizenship Law had already stripped most Rohingya of , rendering them stateless and vulnerable to such crackdowns framed as counter-insurgency efforts. While organizations emphasized ethnic targeting, Burmese authorities maintained the operations targeted unauthorized border activities, not the population per se, though evidence of widespread evictions contradicted claims of precision. UNHCR began monitoring the border in response, setting the stage for negotiated repatriations starting in 1992, though many returnees later fled again due to persistent abuses.

2012 Rakhine-Rohingya riots

The 2012 riots in were precipitated by the and of a 27-year-old Rakhine Buddhist woman, Ma Thida Htwe, on May 28 near township, allegedly committed by three Rohingya Muslim men who were subsequently arrested. In response to rumors and leaflets about the trial, a Rakhine Buddhist mob attacked a bus carrying Muslim passengers in Taungup on June 3, killing ten. Tensions escalated on June 8 when Rohingya residents in township rioted, killing two police officers, a official, and one civilian while burning over 20 Rakhine homes. Violence rapidly spread to other townships including Buthidaung, Rathedaung, and by June 10-11, involving widespread , , and clashes between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya , with mobs from both communities targeting neighborhoods of the opposing group. The government declared a in on June 10, deploying troops and imposing curfews to quell the unrest. Official figures reported at least 78 deaths, including approximately 49 Rohingya and 16 Rakhine, though independent verification was limited amid the chaos. The riots resulted in the destruction of thousands of homes, primarily in Rohingya areas, displacing over 140,000 people, the majority Rohingya Muslims who were confined to internal displacement camps segregated from Rakhine communities. Reports documented atrocities by both sides, including killings, rapes, and arson, exacerbating longstanding ethnic and religious tensions rooted in competition for resources and demographic pressures from Rohingya population growth and migration. The government's security measures, while restoring order, involved mass arrests disproportionately targeting Rohingya, with allegations of excessive force by security forces primarily against Muslim populations.

2016-2017 military clearances

On October 9, 2016, militants from the (ARSA), then operating under the name Harakah al-Yaqin, launched coordinated attacks on three border police outposts in Township, northern , killing nine police officers and wounding several others. Myanmar's military, the , responded with counter-insurgency operations in the area, imposing curfews and conducting sweeps to neutralize the threat, which resulted in clashes killing at least four soldiers and additional militants, with eight attackers reported dead and two captured. These initial assaults marked ARSA's emergence as an organized force, prompting the to classify the group as terrorists and escalate security measures amid concerns over cross-border links to Islamist networks. Tensions persisted through early 2017 with sporadic violence, but escalated dramatically on August 25, 2017, when ARSA militants attacked approximately 30 police posts and one army regiment headquarters across , Rathedaung, and Yotphaing townships, using knives, machetes, and firearms to kill at least 12 personnel and wound others in the deadliest single assault to date. The immediately initiated large-scale "clearance operations" (known in Burmese as kye bein) across northern Rakhine, deploying thousands of troops, police, and border guards to dismantle ARSA networks, secure border areas, and prevent further incursions, with the government framing the actions as targeted counter-terrorism to protect national sovereignty rather than ethnic targeting. These operations involved house-to-house searches, village cordons, and destruction of suspected militant hideouts, which Myanmar officials justified as necessary to eliminate armed threats embedded in civilian areas, while denying systematic civilian harm and attributing some fires to ARSA arson or accidental causes. The clearances triggered massive flight, with over 723,000 Rohingya crossing into by early October 2017, primarily from , Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships, creating the world's largest refugee influx in recent history. documented extensive destruction, including the burning or bulldozing of structures in at least 214 to 392 Rohingya villages, with estimating near-total demolition in affected sites by September 2017. Casualty figures remain disputed: Myanmar reported killing over 200 ARSA fighters in the initial weeks, with total security force losses at around 30; Rohingya sources and aid groups like claimed up to 6,700 deaths from violence, though government investigations acknowledged isolated abuses while rejecting inflated totals as . ARSA also perpetrated killings, including a documented of nearly 100 in in August-September 2017, highlighting insurgent atrocities amid the chaos. Myanmar's government maintained that the operations disrupted ARSA's operations and restored order, with post-conflict infrastructure like security camps built on cleared sites, but international observers, including UN reports, alleged disproportionate force and potential , though Myanmar contested these as biased and one-sided, emphasizing the insurgent provocation and lack of evidence for genocidal intent. The clearances effectively neutralized ARSA's immediate capabilities in Rakhine but fueled long-term displacement and , with the group claiming regrouping abroad.

Escalations since 2023 Arakan Army clashes

The (AA), an ethnic Rakhine insurgent group, escalated its offensive against the Myanmar military in following the breakdown of a in November 2023, capturing significant territory including much of northern Rakhine by mid-2025. This advance placed Rohingya communities in contested areas under direct AA control or , leading to new restrictions and violence. The AA imposed severe movement controls, forced labor, extortion, and arbitrary arrests on Rohingya populations, framing these measures as security necessities amid perceived threats from Rohingya militants aligned with the junta. In May 2024, AA forces set fires in Buthidaung township, displacing thousands of Rohingya residents after ordering evacuations, with reports of looting and destruction of homes. By August 2024, clashes intensified in Maungdaw township, where AA attacks on Rohingya areas resulted in civilian casualties and further displacement. The AA's capture of Maungdaw in December 2024 marked a pivotal escalation, prompting thousands of additional Rohingya to flee toward the border amid ongoing fighting. Rohingya militant groups, including the (ARSA) and others, responded by unifying under a November 2024 agreement to counter AA advances, with fighters crossing from Bangladesh refugee camps to engage in combat. Some Rohingya factions allied with the Myanmar military against the AA, complicating the conflict dynamics and leading to reciprocal accusations of and . By October 2025, the had displaced nearly one million people in Rakhine, with Rohingya facing acute humanitarian needs including food shortages and lack of shelter. Human Rights Watch documented AA abuses such as torture and killings of Rohingya suspected of junta ties, while noting that both AA and military forces have targeted civilians indiscriminately. The International Crisis Group warned of a burgeoning Rohingya fueled by camp militancy in , predicting spillover effects including cross-border raids and heightened regional instability. As of October 2025, no resolution appeared imminent, with Rohingya communities enduring the brunt of the multi-front conflict.

Refugee crises and international displacement

Flows to Bangladesh (1978-present)

The first major influx of Rohingya into occurred in 1978 amid Operation Nagamin (Dragon King), a Myanmar military campaign involving village destructions, forced relocations, and documented atrocities that displaced approximately 200,000 individuals across the border. hosted these arrivals in temporary camps near the , providing initial shelter despite lacking formal refugee infrastructure. By late 1978, under a bilateral agreement facilitated by the , around 184,000 had repatriated to , though reports indicated many returned to insecure conditions including ongoing restrictions on movement and citizenship. A second significant wave unfolded between 1991 and 1992, triggered by escalated military operations, forced labor impositions, and village burnings, prompting an estimated 250,000 Rohingya to cross into . This exodus strained Bangladeshi resources in , leading to the establishment of camps like Kutupalong and Nayapara, where refugees faced overcrowding and limited aid. efforts, again UN-brokered, saw over 230,000 returns by 1997, but retained official recognition for only about 20,000 as refugees, classifying others as undocumented and restricting their rights to work or move freely. Intermittent smaller flows continued through the 2000s and early 2010s, often via perilous sea routes, with maintaining a policy of non-recognition for new arrivals to deter ; by 2016, an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 unregistered Rohingya lived in makeshift settlements alongside the registered population. The , involving clashes between Rohingya and Rakhine communities that killed dozens and displaced over 140,000 internally in , spurred additional border crossings, though intercepted many boats and refused camp access, resulting in pushbacks and growth of informal hillside camps. The largest exodus commenced in October 2016 following Rohingya insurgent attacks on police posts, prompting clearances that drove about 87,000 across the border by early ; this escalated dramatically after August 25, , when coordinated militant assaults triggered a sweeping response, leading to over 740,000 arrivals in by year's end. The influx overwhelmed existing sites, expanding Kutupalong to become the world's largest settlement, with refugees reporting flight from arson, killings, and rapes in northern Rakhine villages. , without granting formal refugee status and labeling arrivals as Forcibly Displaced Myanmar Nationals, coordinated with UNHCR for registration and but imposed movement curbs and repatriation pressures. Since 2017, flows have been sporadic, with UNHCR documenting around 150,000 additional entries through mid-2025 amid ongoing Rakhine instability, though verification challenges persist due to border porosity and informal crossings. Natural in camps has compounded numbers, yielding a total population exceeding 1.1 million as of October 2025, predominantly in (over 970,000) and Bhasan Char island (about 35,000 relocated since 2021). attempts have repeatedly failed due to Myanmar's refusal to guarantee or safety, leaving the camps in protracted with rising vulnerabilities to , floods, and aid shortfalls.

Conditions in Cox's Bazar camps

The Rohingya refugee camps in , , house approximately 1 million people, forming the world's largest refugee settlement, with confined to 33 congested sites spanning hilly, landslide-prone terrain that heightens vulnerability to natural disasters. Overcrowding remains acute, with inadequate shelter consisting primarily of bamboo structures susceptible to monsoon damage and fire hazards, exacerbating exposure to environmental risks. Sanitation facilities are limited, contributing to outbreaks of waterborne diseases, while restricted prevents refugees from seeking external remedies or employment. Health challenges persist amid dwindling international aid, including U.S. funding reductions in 2025 that have curtailed access to medical services for chronic conditions like diphtheria and hepatitis. The World Health Organization's 2025 assessments highlight ongoing efforts to bolster essential health services, yet refugees report persistent gaps in care, with overcrowding facilitating disease transmission. Nutrition insecurity affects vulnerable groups, compounded by aid dependency and limited self-sufficiency options due to Bangladeshi restrictions on formal work. Security issues have intensified, with organized criminal networks engaging in trafficking, , kidnappings, and violent crimes, fostering an environment of fear. In 2025, evictions within camps surged by 116%, displacing thousands and stripping them of protections, while abductions and gender-based violence remain prevalent, particularly targeting women and children. Reports indicate at least 14 fatalities linked to camp violence in early 2025, amid broader spirals of insecurity that undermine protection mechanisms. Education and livelihoods face severe constraints, with foreign aid cuts in 2025 disrupting schooling for hundreds of thousands of children, heightening risks of recruitment into criminal activities or militancy. Refugees lack legal work rights, perpetuating economic stagnation and reliance on humanitarian rations, which have been strained by global funding shortfalls. Informal economies persist through and labor violations, but these expose individuals to exploitation without addressing systemic idleness.

Boat migrations and deaths

Rohingya refugees and migrants have increasingly resorted to irregular sea voyages across the and since the early 2010s, primarily departing from in or overcrowded camps in , , aiming for destinations such as , , and . These journeys, facilitated by smugglers charging fees equivalent to years of camp wages, involve unseaworthy vessels overloaded with passengers, leading to frequent capsizings, engine failures, and abandonment at sea. From 2012 to 2015, approximately 170,000 Rohingya undertook such voyages, often mixed with Bangladeshi economic migrants, amid pushbacks by regional navies that exacerbated stranding. The 2015 Andaman Sea crisis exemplified the perils, with up to 8,000 individuals stranded after traffickers abandoned boats following Thai pushbacks; an estimated 370 died from starvation, dehydration, and disease before limited rescues by , , and . Departures peaked that year, with around 25,000 to 50,000 leaving by boat from January to March alone, driven by Myanmar's citizenship denials and camp restrictions in . Regional governments' "help on the high seas" policy prioritized towing boats back rather than disembarkation, prolonging exposure to elements and trafficker violence. Post-2017 exodus to , secondary migrations from camps surged due to intra-camp violence, including kidnappings, murders, and turf wars among armed groups like the (ARSA), alongside movement restrictions and aid shortfalls that fostered desperation. Arrivals by boat in rose 700% in 2024 compared to prior years, with over 1,500 Rohingya landing in and other provinces by mid-year. In 2023, at least 569 Rohingya died or went missing at sea—the highest toll since 2014—across more than 140 documented journeys, often from drowning or abuse. Notable incidents underscore the ongoing risks: On March 21, 2024, a boat carrying 142 Rohingya capsized off , , killing 67, including 27 children. In May 2025, two vessels sank off Myanmar's coast—one on May 9 with 267 aboard (201 presumed dead, 66 survivors) and another with 247 (226 presumed dead)—carrying refugees from camps and Rakhine amid escalating clashes. These events reflect combined push factors: Myanmar's displacements and Bangladesh camp lawlessness, where lack of safe repatriation or third-country resettlement leaves economic survival as a primary motivator for many departures. Regional gaps and anti-trafficking crackdowns have not curbed voyages, with 2024 marking Asia's deadliest year for migrant sea deaths at over 2,500, though Rohingya-specific figures remain underreported due to unregistered departures. Smugglers' tactics, including withholding food to extract ransoms from families, contribute to fatalities, while host countries like provide ad hoc rescues but resist permanent settlement.

Relocation to Bhasan Char and repatriation failures

In response to overcrowding, security threats, and vulnerability to natural disasters in the Cox's Bazar camps hosting over one million Rohingya refugees, the Bangladeshi government initiated relocation to Bhasan Char, a low-lying silt island in the Bay of Bengal approximately 40 kilometers offshore, beginning on December 4, 2020. The project, funded by Bangladesh at an estimated cost exceeding $300 million, involved constructing embankments, multi-story housing blocks, hospitals, schools, and cyclone shelters to accommodate up to 100,000 people, with the government claiming transfers were voluntary and provided superior facilities including reliable electricity, clean water, and reduced exposure to crime and trafficking prevalent on the mainland. By January 2025, around 35,000 refugees had been relocated in phased batches, with ongoing transfers such as the 24th phase in October 2024 involving over 500 individuals. Critics, including organizations, have described Bhasan Char as an "island jail" due to severe movement restrictions enforced by armed security, limited access to the mainland for family visits or medical care, and the island's geological instability as a sedimentary formation prone to , flooding, and cyclones despite mitigation efforts. counters that the isolation enhances security by curbing organized crime, drug smuggling, and militant recruitment that have escalated in Cox's Bazar—issues exacerbated by the camps' proximity to porous borders—and points to resident surveys indicating preferences for the island's structured environment over mainland vulnerabilities. Relocation has proceeded amid reports of initial coercion through incentives like cash payments and threats of aid cuts, though subsequent phases have seen higher voluntary participation rates. Parallel efforts to repatriate Rohingya to have repeatedly failed since the 2017 exodus, despite bilateral agreements signed in 2017 and formalized in a 2018 committing to verify and accept returnees. A planned pilot in November 2017 collapsed when refugees rejected participation without guarantees of , safe zones, and property restitution, conditions unmet by 's framework denying Rohingya ethnic status and requiring proof of pre-1823 residency under its 1982 law, which classifies most as stateless Bengali migrants. Subsequent attempts, including a 2019 initiative for 3,000 returnees, aborted due to similar refusals, with Rohingya leaders citing ongoing risks of violence and lack of legal protections, while has repatriated negligible numbers—fewer than 10 individuals by 2023—and conditioned returns on biometric verification excluding ethnic recognition. Failures persist into 2025, fueled by Myanmar's internal civil war eroding control over , where no secure repatriation areas exist, and bilateral negotiations excluding Rohingya input, leading to distrust and non-starter proposals like Myanmar's 2025 "return initiative" lacking enforceable safeguards. has linked relocations to repatriation incentives, offering improved conditions contingent on cooperation, but core impasses remain: Myanmar's insistence on demographic verification without granting , contrasted by Rohingya demands for full , rendering large-scale returns infeasible absent third-party verification or political concessions unlikely under current regimes.

Controversies and competing narratives

Genocide allegations versus counter-insurgency claims

The allegations of against the Rohingya people, particularly during the 2017 military operations in northern , were formalized in a 2018 Fact-Finding Mission report, which concluded that Myanmar's armed forces committed acts including killings, , and with "genocidal intent" to destroy the group in whole or in part, based on survivor testimonies, of over 350 villages burned, and patterns of affecting thousands. The report estimated at least 10,000 Rohingya deaths and the displacement of over 720,000 to between August and September 2017, framing the violence as systematic rather than isolated. These claims gained traction in international forums, leading to Gambia's 2019 case at the accusing Myanmar of breaching the , with provisional measures ordered in January 2020 to protect remaining Rohingya. In response, Myanmar's government rejected the genocide label, asserting that the operations were proportionate counter-insurgency actions triggered by coordinated attacks on August 25, , by the (ARSA), a Rohingya group that targeted 30 police outposts and an army base, killing 12 security personnel and injuring others with knives, machetes, and firearms. Myanmar's Anti-Terrorism Central Committee designated ARSA a terrorist organization the same day, citing its ties to transnational jihadist networks and prior smaller-scale attacks in 2016 that killed nine police. Government statements emphasized that "clearance operations" aimed to dismantle infrastructure, with official figures reporting 376 ARSA fighters killed and minimal civilian casualties, while attributing village burnings to , ARSA arson to draw international sympathy, or local disputes rather than state policy. A government-appointed commission similarly found "no evidence" of , highlighting ARSA's role in escalating communal tensions in a region plagued by decades of and . Supporting the counter-insurgency narrative, independent reports documented ARSA's own atrocities, including the September 2017 massacre of at least 99 —mostly women and children—in Maungdaw Township, where militants abducted and executed villagers after demanding they declare allegiance, as verified through interviews and forensic . ARSA's leadership admitted to defensive rhetoric and infiltration tactics, slipping fighters across the border for attacks, which argued justified area-wide security measures amid intelligence of planned bombings and ambushes. Critics of the allegations, including officials, contend that UN and NGO findings overemphasize Rohingya victimhood while understating militant agency and historical context, such as ARSA's emergence from fragmented Rohingya armed groups active since the 1990s; they note discrepancies in casualty estimates (e.g., ' 6,700 death toll relied on unverified reports) and lack direct proof of centralized extermination orders beyond battlefield excesses common in asymmetric counter-terrorism. The debate hinges on intent: proponents of cite de facto discrimination via the 1982 Citizenship Law excluding Rohingya and pre-2017 pogroms as evidence of ethnic targeting, whereas frames the crisis as a security response in a multi-ethnic where Rohingya militants exploited civilian cover, with operations ceasing after ARSA threats subsided and villages cleared of insurgents. Both narratives acknowledge atrocities—extrajudicial killings and by security forces, alongside ARSA's civilian attacks—but diverge on proportionality and motive, with empirical data like satellite burns concentrated in ARSA-active areas supporting claims of tactical necessity, though the scale displaced far beyond militants alone. International skepticism toward 's account persists due to restricted access for investigators, yet the government's consistent denial of , coupled with ARSA's documented , underscores counter-insurgency as a plausible causal driver amid biased reporting favoring narratives from advocacy groups.

Demographic engineering accusations from both sides

Rakhine Buddhists and Myanmar nationalists have accused the Rohingya of pursuing demographic engineering through sustained from and higher fertility rates, aiming to establish Muslim majorities in northern and erode Rakhine ethnic identity. These claims portray Rohingya —estimated at around 1 million prior to the 2017 exodus, concentrated in Muslim-majority townships—as a deliberate strategy akin to "demographic ," with historical influxes during British colonial labor migrations (1824–1948) and post-independence waves exacerbating local fears of cultural and territorial displacement. Myanmar's military regimes have amplified this narrative since the , citing rapid growth rates (historically 2–3 times higher than the national average) as evidence of existential threat to Buddhist dominance in a state where Rakhine Buddhists comprise roughly 4% of Myanmar's population but face localized outnumbering. Conversely, Rohingya advocates and international observers accuse Myanmar's military and allied Rakhine groups, including the (AA) since 2023 clashes, of demographic engineering via forced expulsions, village destruction, and denial of repatriation rights to consolidate Buddhist control over Rakhine territory. Post-2017 clearances displaced over 700,000 Rohingya, with reports of systematic burning of 392 villages and prevention of returns to facilitate land reallocation, potentially to non-Muslim settlers, though verified resettlement of other ethnic groups remains limited and disputed. In AA-controlled areas as of 2025, Rohingya face restrictions on movement, forced labor, and taxation, prompting accusations of indirect displacement to achieve Rakhine homogeneity amid the group's territorial gains covering 90% of . These claims, often from NGOs like and —which exhibit systemic advocacy biases favoring minority narratives over state security concerns—frame such actions as continuations of to reverse perceived Muslim overpopulation. Empirical data underscores the mutual fears: northern Rakhine's Muslim proportion rose from under 20% in early 20th-century censuses to over 50% in disputed estimates, fueling Rakhine grievances, while Rohingya pre-exodus (up to 600 per sq km in townships) contrasted with post-clearance depopulation, enabling contested land claims. Both narratives persist amid dynamics, with Rohingya armed factions like ARSA clashing with AA since 2024, intensifying zero-sum demographic contests without resolution.

Media and NGO biases in reporting

Reporting on the Rohingya crisis has frequently emphasized narratives of unilateral victimization by Myanmar's military, often omitting or minimizing the role of Rohingya militant groups such as the (ARSA) in precipitating violence. On August 25, 2017, ARSA militants launched coordinated attacks on 30 police posts and an army base in northern , killing at least 12 security personnel and prompting a military counter-operation that escalated the conflict. While atrocities against civilians occurred during the ensuing clearances, media coverage has tended to frame the events as unprovoked , downplaying these initial assaults as a trigger and the broader context of . NGOs and international media have relied heavily on refugee testimonies from camps in Bangladesh, which, while documenting real hardships, have contributed to unverified or exaggerated claims of scale. Myanmar's military leadership asserted in October 2017 that reports of mass casualties and systematic destruction were inflated, with independent analyses noting inconsistencies in casualty figures propagated by advocacy groups. For instance, documented ARSA's massacre of at least 99 Hindu villagers in Township in August-September 2017, including women and children, yet such incidents received limited attention compared to allegations against the . Similarly, credible reports exist of Rohingya militants setting fires to homes during clashes, complicating attributions of village burnings solely to security forces, but these nuances are often absent from dominant narratives. Government restrictions on access to have exacerbated one-sided reporting, with journalists facing arrests—such as the 2017 detention of two reporters for possessing leaked military documents—and reliance on local fixers or remote sources, fostering repetitive victim-focused stories that Rakhine Buddhists as perpetrators while sidelining moderate voices or communal tensions. This dynamic, compounded by limited on-the-ground verification, has perpetuated a binary Muslim-victim versus Buddhist-oppressor framing, hindering understanding of underlying security concerns like cross-border militancy and demographic pressures. UN fact-finding missions have faced accusations of bias from officials, who argue the processes prioritize Rohingya accounts without balanced inquiry into insurgent actions. Western media and NGOs, influenced by institutional predispositions favoring narratives of minority Muslim in majority-Buddhist contexts, have underreported Rohingya agency in , such as ARSA's recruitment and attacks, which international observers link to jihadist influences. Coverage disparities are evident: while events garnered extensive attention, similar or greater displacements in other conflicts receive less scrutiny, suggesting selective outrage driven by ideological alignments rather than empirical parity. This pattern risks misinforming policy, as seen in sanctions and designations that overlook counter-insurgency imperatives evidenced by ARSA's ongoing operations.

Current situation as of 2025

Status in amid

The escalation of Myanmar's in since late 2023 between the (AA), an ethnic Rakhine insurgent group, and the Myanmar has profoundly impacted the remaining Rohingya population, estimated at around 600,000 prior to intensified fighting. The conflict has displaced nearly one million people in Rakhine, with Rohingya communities in northern townships like , Buthidaung, and Rathedaung bearing significant brunt due to their concentration there. Both the junta and AA have been accused of targeting civilians, including extrajudicial killings and attacks on Rohingya villages, exacerbating pre-existing vulnerabilities from decades of and the 2017 clearance operations. By mid-2025, had seized control of much of northern Rakhine, including key areas near the border, establishing a proto-state amid ongoing clashes that left the junta controlling only isolated positions. Reports from organizations detail AA-imposed restrictions on Rohingya movement, forced labor in wartime construction and logistics, and detentions in labor camps, often under threats of violence for non-compliance. For instance, in 2025, dozens of Rohingya were held for months in such facilities before partial releases, with minorities including also subjected to hazardous duties like frontline portering. These practices, documented through witness interviews, reflect AA efforts to consolidate authority but have fueled fears of ethnic subjugation, despite AA public statements offering inclusion for Rohingya who align with Rakhine goals. The junta, retreating but retaliatory, has continued shelling and airstrikes in Rohingya areas, stoking inter-ethnic tensions by portraying Rohingya as collaborators with rebels, while imposing blockades that worsened and health crises. Rohingya face acute shortages, with movement curbs preventing access to markets or aid, and forced recruitment by both sides reported. In response, Rohingya militias such as the (ARSA) have clashed with AA forces, allying with Bangladesh-based groups to counter perceived threats, leading to cycles of reprisals. assessments describe civilians, including Rohingya, as trapped in a "vortex of violence" from all conflict parties, with over 3,000 civilian casualties in Rakhine since 2023. As of October 2025, the Rohingya's status remains precarious, with no safe zones amid AA dominance in contested areas and junta holdouts in southern Rakhine like . Humanitarian access is severely limited, contributing to rates exceeding emergency thresholds in displacement sites, and raising concerns over feasibility of from given ongoing instability. Independent verification is challenged by conflict zones, though patterns of abuse align with historical ethnic fault lines rather than solely counter-insurgency needs.

Violence in Bangladesh refugee camps

Violence in the Rohingya refugee camps in , , has escalated since 2017, driven primarily by intra-community armed groups such as the (ARSA) and criminal gangs engaging in s, kidnappings, , and forced recruitment. By 2023, documented over 50 targeted killings attributed to these groups, including executions of perceived collaborators with Bangladeshi police or rival factions, with ARSA specifically implicated in assassinations like the March 2023 of a refugee's brother for aiding authorities. rackets demand payments from residents and aid workers, often enforced through threats of violence or , contributing to a climate of pervasive fear that has prompted thousands to risk perilous sea voyages. ARSA, designated a terrorist organization by Bangladesh and Myanmar, has intensified recruitment and operations within the camps, using them as bases to launch cross-border attacks into Myanmar's amid the ongoing civil war. In 2024, the group mobilized fighters to combat the , resulting in at least dozens of Rohingya deaths from intra-camp clashes and retaliatory killings, as reported by Fortify Rights in 2025. Criminal gangs, often overlapping with militants, have shifted toward abductions and drug trafficking by mid-2025, with September reports noting a surge in kidnappings for despite a temporary decline in overt homicides. ACLED data indicates ARSA's involvement in at least four militant incidents in the camps by 2025, exacerbating insecurity in settlements housing over 900,000 refugees. Bangladeshi authorities' efforts to curb the , including arrests of over 700 suspects since 2021, have been hampered by the camps' dense, ungoverned terrain and limited cooperation due to distrust of police. Victims rarely report crimes, fearing reprisals, which perpetuates impunity; highlighted in September 2025 that unchecked extortion and assaults undermine any safe prospects. This internal strife, rooted in factional power struggles and external insurgent ambitions rather than external aggression, has transformed the camps into hotspots of self-perpetuating conflict, distinct from the initial flight from .

International responses and aid challenges

The has pursued legal accountability through the (ICJ), where instituted proceedings against in November 2019 under the , alleging failure to prevent and punish genocidal acts against the Rohingya; as of July 2025, the case advanced with interventions from seven states and ongoing merits phase following rejection of Myanmar's preliminary objections in 2022. The ICJ issued provisional measures in January 2020 and July 2022, ordering Myanmar to protect Rohingya communities and preserve evidence, though compliance remains disputed amid continued military operations. UNHCR and other UN agencies have coordinated humanitarian responses, sheltering over 1.2 million Rohingya in camps since the 2017 exodus of approximately 750,000, with operations extending to 's where access is restricted. Western governments imposed targeted sanctions on Myanmar's military leadership and entities linked to Rohingya abuses, including U.S. designations of generals in 2019 and entities in 2022 under 14014, alongside EU measures since 2018 prohibiting arms exports and asset freezes on responsible officials. Canada and others followed with similar arms embargoes and individual sanctions, though enforcement varies and broader responses emphasized non-interference, with limited repatriation facilitation. Aid delivery, led by WFP, UNHCR, and IOM, includes food rations, water, and shelter for camps in , but U.S. aid reductions in 2025—framed as bureaucratic streamlining—exacerbated shortfalls, prompting warnings of halved rations without new funds. Persistent challenges include chronic underfunding, with the 2025-2026 Joint Response Plan facing a $500 million gap for core needs, forcing cuts to , , and livelihoods programs amid donor fatigue and competing global crises. In Bangladesh, host government restrictions on refugee movement, work, and formal —intended to encourage —compound vulnerabilities, while camp insecurity from armed groups like ARSA, , and like monsoons heighten risks; a 2025 MSF survey found 58% of refugees feeling unsafe in camps and 84% unwilling to return to due to ongoing threats. 's denial of and blocked access for independent verification impedes safe returns, stalling tripartite agreements, as Rakhine conflict escalates with gains but without Rohingya protections. These dynamics reflect geopolitical caution, with powers like and prioritizing stability over enforcement, limiting aid efficacy despite empirical evidence of protracted displacement.

References

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