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Āstika and nāstika
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Āstika (Sanskrit: आस्तिक, IAST: āstika) and nāstika (Sanskrit: नास्तिक, IAST: nāstika) are mutually exclusive terms that modern scholars use to classify the schools of Indian philosophy as well as some Hindu, Buddhist and Jain texts.[1][2][4] The various definitions for āstika and nāstika philosophies have been disputed since ancient times, and there is no consensus.[5][6] One standard distinction, as within ancient- and medieval-era Sanskrit philosophical literature, is that āstika schools accept the Vedas, the ancient texts of India, as fundamentally authoritative, while the nāstika schools do not.[7][8][5] However, a separate way of distinguishing the two terms has evolved in current Indian languages like Telugu, Hindi and Bengali, wherein āstika and its derivatives usually mean 'theist', and nāstika and its derivatives denote 'atheism'.[9]
Still, philosophical tradition maintains the earlier distinction, for example, in identifying the school of Sāṃkhya, which is non-theistic (as it does not explicitly affirm the existence of God in its classical formulation), as āstika (Veda-affirming) philosophy, though "God" is often used as an epithet for consciousness (purusha) within its doctrine.[10] Similarly, though Buddhism is considered to be nāstika, Gautama Buddha is considered an avatar of the god Vishnu in some Hindu denominations.[11] Due to its acceptance of the Vedas, āstika philosophy, in the original sense, is often equivalent to Hindu philosophy: philosophy that developed alongside the Hindu religion.
Āstika (Sanskrit: आस्तिक; from Sanskrit: asti, 'there is, there exists') means one who believes in the existence of a Self or Brahman, etc. It has been defined in one of three ways:[5][12]
- as those who accept the epistemic authority of the Vedas;
- as those who accept the existence of ātman;
- as those who accept the existence of Ishvara.
Nāstika (Sanskrit: नास्तिक; from Sanskrit: na, 'not' + āstika), by contrast, are those who deny all the respective definitions of āstika;[5] they do not believe in the existence of Self.[13]
The six most studied Āstika schools of Indian philosophies, sometimes referred to as orthodox schools, are Nyāyá, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta. The five most studied Nāstika schools of Indian philosophies, sometimes referred to as heterodox schools, are Buddhism, Jainism, Chārvāka, Ājīvika, and Ajñana.[14][15] However, this orthodox-heterodox terminology is a construct of Western languages, and lacks scholarly roots in Sanskrit. Recent scholarly studies state that there have been various heresiological translations of Āstika and Nāstika in 20th century literature on Indian philosophies, but many are unsophisticated and flawed.[5]
Etymology
[edit]Āstika is a Sanskrit adjective and noun that derives from asti ('there is or exists'),[13] meaning 'knowing that which exists' or 'pious.'[16] The word Nāstika (na, not, + āstika) is its negative.
One of the traditional etymologies of the term āstika—based on Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.4.60 ("astināstidiṣṭam matiḥ")—defines the concept as 'he whose opinion is that Īśvara exists' (asti īśvara iti matir yasya).[17] According to Sanskrit grammarian Hemachandra, āstika is a synonym for 'he who believes'.[17] Other definitions include:
- 'opposite of nāstika' (nāstika bhinna);
- 'he whose idea is that Īśvara exists' (īśvara asti iti vādī); and
- 'he who considers the Vedas as authorities' (vedaprāmāṇyavādī).
As used in Hindu philosophy, the differentiation between āstika and nāstika does not refer to theism or atheism.[5] The terms often, but not always, relate to accepting Vedic literature as an authority, particularly on their teachings on Self. The Veda and Hinduism do not subscribe to or include the concept of an almighty that is separate from oneself i.e. there is no concept of God in the Christian or Islamic sense. N. N. Bhattacharya writes:
The followers of Tantra were often branded as Nāstika by the political proponents of the Vedic tradition. The term Nāstika does not denote an atheist since the Veda presents a godless system with no singular almighty being or multiple almighty beings. It is applied only to those who do not believe in the Vedas. The Sāṃkhyas and Mīmāṃsakas do not believe in God, but they believe in the Vedas and hence they are not Nāstikas. The Buddhists, Jains, and Cārvākas do not believe in the Vedas; hence they are Nāstikas.
— Bhattacharyya 1999, pp. 174
Āstika is also a name, such as that of a Vedic scholar born to the goddess Mānasā ('Mind') and the sage Jaratkaru.[18]
Classification of schools
[edit]| Views of the six heretical teachers | |
|---|---|
| The views of six śramaṇa in the Pāli Canon, known as the six heretical teachers, based on the Sāmaññaphala Sutta.[19] | |
| Pūraṇa Kassapa | |
| Amoralism (akiriyavāda; natthikavāda) | There is no reward or punishment for either good or bad deeds. |
| Makkhali Gośāla (Ājīvika) | |
| Fatalism (ahetukavāda; niyativāda) | We are powerless; suffering is pre-destined. |
| Ajita Kesakambalī (Charvaka) | |
| Materialism (ucchedavāda; natthikavāda) | Live happily; with death, all is annihilated. |
| Pakudha Kaccāyana | |
| Eternalism and categoricalism (sassatavāda; sattakāyavāda) | Matter, pleasure, pain and the soul are eternal and do not interact. |
| Nigaṇṭha Ñāṭaputta (Jainism) | |
| Restraint (mahāvrata) | Be endowed with, cleansed by, and suffused with [merely] the avoidance of all evil.[20] |
| Sañjaya Belaṭṭhiputta (Ajñana) | |
| Agnosticism (amarāvikkhepavāda) | "I don't think so. I don't think in that way or otherwise. I don't think not or not not." Suspension of judgement. |
The terms Āstika and Nāstika have been used to classify various Indian intellectual traditions.
Āstika
[edit]The āstika schools are six systems or ṣaḍdarśana that consider the Vedas a reliable and authoritative source of knowledge.[21] These are often coupled into three groups for both historical and conceptual reasons.
- Nyāyá-Vaiśeṣika
- Nyaya, the school of logic
- Vaisheshika, the atomist school
- Sāṃkhya-Yoga
- Mimāṃsā-Vedanta
- Mīmāṃsā, the tradition of Vedic exegesis
- Vedanta or Uttara Mimāṃsā, the Upaniṣadic tradition.
Nāstika
[edit]The main schools of Indian philosophy that reject the Vedas were regarded as heterodox in the tradition:[3]
The use of the term nāstika to describe Buddhism and Jainism in India is explained by Gavin Flood as follows:
At an early period, during the formation of the Upaniṣads and the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, we must envisage a common heritage of meditation and mental discipline practiced by renouncers with varying affiliations to non-orthodox (Veda-rejecting) and orthodox (Veda-accepting) traditions.... These schools [such as Buddhism and Jainism] are understandably regarded as heterodox (nāstika) by orthodox (āstika) Brahmanism.
— Gavin Flood[22]
Tantric traditions in Hinduism have both āstika and nāstika lines; as Banerji writes in Tantra in Bengal:
Tantras are ... also divided as āstika or Vedic and nāstika or non-Vedic. In accordance with the predominance of the deity the āstika works are again divided as Śākta, Śaiva, Saura, Gāṇapatya and Vaiṣṇava.
— Banerji[23]
Usage in religion
[edit]Hinduism
[edit]Manusmriti, in verse 2.11, defines Nāstika as those who do not accept "Vedic literature in entirety based on two roots of science of reasoning (Śruti and Smriti)".[5] The 9th century Indian scholar Medhatithi analyzed this definition and stated that Nāstika does not mean someone who says "Vedic literature are untrue", but rather one who says "Vedic literature are immoral". Medhatithi further noted verse 8.309 of Manusmriti, to provide another aspect of the definition of Nāstika as one who believes, "there is no other world, there is no purpose in giving charity, there is no purpose in rituals and the teachings in the Vedic literature."[5]
Manusmriti does not define, or imply a definition for Astika. It is also silent or contradictory on specific rituals such as animal sacrifices, asserting Ahimsa (non-violence, non-injury) is dharma in its verses such as verse 10.63 based on Upanishadic layer of Vedic literature, even though the older layer of Vedic literature mention such sacrifices unlike the later layer of Vedic literature.[24] Indian scholars, such as those from Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vedanta schools, accepted Astika to be those that include Śabda (शब्द; or Aptavacana, testimony of Vedic literature and reliable experts) as a reliable means of epistemology, but they accepted the later ancient layer of the Vedic literature to be superseding the earlier ancient layer.[5]
Without reference to Vedas
[edit]In contrast to Manusmriti, the 6th century CE Jain scholar and doxographer Haribhadra, provided a different perspective in his writings on Astika and Nāstika. Haribhadra did not consider "reverence for Vedas" as a marker for an Astika. He and other 1st millennium CE Jaina scholars defined Astika as one who "affirms there exists another world, transmigration exists, virtue (punya) exists, vice (paapa) exists."[5][6]
The 7th century scholars Jayaditya and Vamana, in Kasikavrtti of Pāṇini tradition, were silent on the role of or authority of Vedic literature in defining Astika and Nāstika. They state, "Astika is the one who believes there exists another world. The opposite of him is the Nāstika."[5][25]
Similarly the widely studied 2nd–3rd century CE Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, in Chapter 1 verses 60–61 of Ratnāvalī, wrote Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya schools of Hinduism were Nāstika, along with Jainism, his own school of Buddhism and Pudgalavadins (Vātsīputrīya) school of Buddhism.[26][27]
Based on belief in Atman
[edit]Astika, in some texts, is defined as those who believe in the existence of Atman (Self), while Nastika being those who deny there is any "Self" in human beings and other living beings.[12][28] All six schools of Hinduism classified as Astika philosophies hold the premise, "Atman exists". Buddhism, in contrast, holds the premise, "Atman does not exist."[29][30] Asanga Tilakaratna translates Astika as 'positivism' and Nastika as 'negativism', with Astika illustrated by Brahmanic traditions who accepted "Self and God exists", while Nastika as those traditions, such as Buddhism, who denied "Self and God exists."[31]
Jainism
[edit]According to G. S. Ghurye, the Jain texts define na+astika as one "denying what exists" or any school of philosophy that denies the existence of the Self.[32] The Vedanta sub-traditions of Hinduism are "astika" because they accept the existence of Self, while Buddhist traditions denying this are referred to as "nastika".[32]
One of the earliest mentions of astika concept in Jain texts is by Manibhadra, who states that an astika is one who "accepts there exist another world (paraloka), transmigration of Self, virtue and vice that affect how a Self journeys through time".[33]
The 5th–6th century Jainism scholar Haribhadra, states Andrew Nicholson, does not mention anything about accepting or rejecting the Vedas or god as a criterion for being an astika or nastika. Instead, Haribhadra explains nastika in the manner of the more ancient Jain scholar Manibhadra, by stating a nastika to be one "who says there is no other worlds, there is no purpose in charity, there is no purpose in offerings".[33] An astika, to Haribhadra, is one who believes that there is a purpose and merit in an ethical life such as ahimsa (non-violence) and ritual actions.[33] This exposition of the word astika and nastika by Haribhadra is similar to one by the Sanskrit grammarian and Hindu scholar Pāṇini in section 4.4.60 of the Astadhyayi.[34]
The 12th century Jaina scholar Hemachandra similarly states, in his text Abithana Chintamani, that a nastika is any philosophy that presumes or argues there is "no virtue and vice."[35]
Buddhism
[edit]Nagarjuna, according to Chandradhar Sharma, equates Nastikya to "nihilism".[36]
The 4th century Buddhist scholar Asanga, in Bodhisattva Bhumi, refers to nastika Buddhists as sarvaiva nastika, describing them as who are complete deniers. To Asanga, nastika are those who say "nothing whatsoever exists", and the worst kind of nastika are those who deny all designation and reality.[37] Astika are those who accept merit in and practice a religious life.[37] According to Andrew Nicholson, later Buddhists understood Asanga to be targeting Madhyamaka Buddhism as nastika, while considering his own Yogachara Buddhist tradition to be astika.[37] Initial interpretations of the Buddhist texts with the term astika and nastika, such as those composed by Nagarjuna and Aśvaghoṣa, were interpreted as being directed at the Hindu traditions. However, states John Kelly, most later scholarship considers this as incorrect, and that the astika and nastika terms were directed towards the competing Buddhist traditions and the intended audience of the texts were Buddhist monks debating an array of ideas across various Buddhist traditions.[38]
The charges of being a nastika were serious threat to the social standing of a Buddhist, and could lead to expulsion from Buddhist monastic community. Thus, states Nicholson, the colonial era Indologist definition of astika and nastika schools of Indian philosophy, was based on a narrow study of literature such as a version of Manusmriti, while in truth these terms are more complex and contextually apply within the diverse schools of Indian philosophies.[37]
The most common meaning of astika and nastika, in Buddhism, Hinduism and Jainism was the acceptance and adherence to ethical premises, and not textual validity or doctrinal premises, states Nicholson. It is likely that astika was translated as orthodox, and nastika as heterodox, because the early European Indologists carried the baggage of Christian theological traditions and extrapolated their own concepts to Asia, thereby distorting the complexity of Indian traditions and thought.[37]
See also
[edit]
Notes
[edit]Citations
[edit]- ^ Perrett, Roy. 2000. Indian Philosophy. Routledge. ISBN 978-0815336112. p. 88.
- ^ Mittal, Sushil, and Gene Thursby. 2004. The Hindu World. Routledge. ISBN 978-0415772273. pp. 729–30.
- ^ a b Flood 1996, pp. 82.
- ^ Flood: "These schools [such as Buddhism and Jainism] are understandably regarded as heterodox (nāstika) by orthodox (āstika) Brahmanism."[3]
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k Nicholson, Andrew J. 2013. Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History. Columbia University Press. ISBN 978-0231149877. ch. 9.
- ^ a b Doniger, Wendy. 2014. On Hinduism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0199360079. p. 46.
- ^ Grayling, A. C. (2019). The History of Philosophy. Penguin Books. p. 519.
- ^ Chatterjee, Satischandra, and Dhirendramohan Datta. 1984. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy (8th reprint ed.). Calcutta: University of Calcutta. p. 5n1: "In modern Indian languages, 'āstika' and 'nāstika' generally mean 'theist' and 'atheist,' respectively. But in Sanskrit philosophical literature, 'āstika' means 'one who believes in the authority of the Vedas'. ('nāstika' means the opposite of these). The word is used here in the first sense. The six orthodox schools are 'āstika', and the Cārvāka is 'nāstika' in both the senses."
- ^ For instance, the Atheist Society of India produces a monthly publications Nastika Yuga, which it translates as 'The Age of Atheism'. Archived 18 April 2007 at the Wayback Machine.
- ^ Francis Clooney (2008). "Restoring 'Hindu Theology' as a category in Indian intellectual discourse". In Gavin Flood (ed.). The Blackwell Companion to Hinduism. Blackwell Academic. pp. 451–455. ISBN 978-0-470-99868-7. "By Sāṃkhya reasoning, the material principle itself simply evolves into complex forms, and there is no need to hold that some spiritual power governs the material principle or its ultimate source."
- ^ Literature review of secondary references of Buddha as Dashavatara which regard Buddha to be part of standard list:
- Britannica
- A Dictionary of Asian Mythology By David Adams Leeming p. 19 "Avatar"
- Hinduism: An Alphabetical Guide By Roshen Dalal p. 112 "Dashavatara" ""The standard and most accepted list found in Puranas and other texts is: ... Rama, Krishna, Buddha, Kalki."
- The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Hinduism: A-M p. 73 "Avatar"
- Hindu Gods and Goddesses By Sunita Pant Bansal p. 27 "Vishnu Dashavatara"
- Hindu Myths (Penguin Books) pp. 62–63
- The Book of Vishnu (see index)
- Seven secrets of Vishnu By Devdutt Pattanaik p. 203 "In the more popular list of ten avatars of Vishnu, the ninth avatar is shown as Buddha, not Balarama."
- A Dictionary of Hinduism p. 47 "Avatara"
- BBC
- Flood, Gavin D. (13 July 1996). An Introduction to Hinduism. Cambridge University Press. p. 116. ISBN 978-0-521-43878-0.
- ^ a b GS Ghurye, Indian Sociology Through Ghurye, a Dictionary, Ed: S. Devadas Pillai (2011), ISBN 978-8171548071, page 354
- ^ a b Monier-Williams 2006
- ^ Flood 1996, pp. 82, 224–49
- ^ For an overview of this method of classification, with detail on the grouping of schools, see: Radhakrishnan & Moore 1989
- ^ Apte 1965, pp. 240
- ^ a b Squarcini, Federico (2011). "Traditions against Tradition. Criticism, Dissent and the Struggle for the Semiotic Primacy of Veridiction". In Squarcini, Federico (ed.). Boundaries, Dynamics and Construction of Traditions in South Asia. Anthem Press. p. 446. doi:10.7135/UPO9781843313977.018. ISBN 9781843313977.
- ^ George Williams (2003), Handbook of Hindu Mythology, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0195332612, page 65
- ^ "DN 2 Sāmaññaphala Sutta; The Fruits of the Contemplative Life". www.dhammatalks.org. Retrieved 10 July 2024.
- ^ Bhikku, Ñāṇamoli; Bhikku, Bodhi (9 November 1995). The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya (Fourth ed.). Simon and Schuster. pp. 1258–59. ISBN 978-0-86171-072-0. Retrieved 10 July 2024.
- ^ Flood 1996, pp. 231–2
- ^ Flood 1996, pp. 82
- ^ Banerji 1992, pp. 2
- ^ Sanskrit: Manusmriti with six scholar commentaries VN Mandlik, page 1310
English: Manusmriti 10.63 Berkeley Center for World Religion, Peace and World Affairs, Georgetown University - ^ P. Haag and V. Vergiani (Eds., 2009), Studies in the Kāśikāvṛtti, Firenze: Società Editrice Fiorentina, ISBN 978-8860321145
- ^ Markus Dressler and Arvind Mandair (2011), Secularism and Religion-Making, Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0199782949, page 59 note 39
- ^ Ernst Steinkellner (1991), Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Proceedings of the Second International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, Volume 222, Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, ISBN 978-3700119159, pages 230–238
- ^ C Sharma (2013), A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120803657, page 66
- ^ Dae-Sook Suh (1994), Korean Studies: New Pacific Currents, University of Hawaii Press, ISBN 978-0824815981, page 171
- ^ John C. Plott et al (2000), Global History of Philosophy: The Axial Age, Volume 1, Motilal Banarsidass, ISBN 978-8120801585, page 63, Quote: "The Buddhist schools reject any Ātman concept. As we have already observed, this is the basic and ineradicable distinction between Hinduism and Buddhism".
- ^ Asanga Tilakaratna (2003, Editors: Anne Blackburn and Jeffrey Samuels), Approaching the Dhamma: Buddhist Texts and Practices in South and Southeast Asia, Pariyatti, ISBN 978-1928706199, pages 128–129;
God, states Tilakaratna, in Brahmanic traditions is Parama-atma (universal Self, Ishvara, Brahman) - ^ a b S. Devadas Pillai (1997). Indian Sociology Through Ghurye, a Dictionary. Popular Prakashan. pp. 353–354. ISBN 978-81-7154-807-1.
- ^ a b c Andrew J. Nicholson (2013). Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History. Columbia University Press. pp. 172–175. ISBN 978-0-231-14987-7.
- ^ Andrew J. Nicholson (2013). Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History. Columbia University Press. p. 173. ISBN 978-0-231-14987-7.
- ^ Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2011). Studies on the Carvaka/Lokayata. Anthem Press. pp. 164–166. ISBN 978-0-85728-433-4.
- ^ Chandradhar Sharma (2000). A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy. Motilal Banarsidass. p. 101. ISBN 978-81-208-0365-7.
- ^ a b c d e Andrew J. Nicholson (2013). Unifying Hinduism: Philosophy and Identity in Indian Intellectual History. Columbia University Press. pp. 174–176. ISBN 978-0-231-14987-7.
- ^ John D Kelly (1996). Jan E. M. Houben (ed.). Ideology and Status of Sanskrit: Contributions to the History of the Sanskrit Language. BRILL Academic. pp. 88–89. ISBN 90-04-10613-8.
Sources
[edit]- Apte, V. S. (1965), A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary
- Banerji, S. C. (1992), Tantra in Bengal (Second Revised and Enlarged ed.), Delhi: Manohar, ISBN 81-85425-63-9
- Bhattacharyya, N. N. (1999), History of the Tantric Religion (Second Revised ed.), New Delhi: Manohar, ISBN 81-7304-025-7
- Flood, Gavin (1996), An Introduction to Hinduism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ISBN 81-7596-028-0
- Francis Clooney (2003). Flood, Gavin (ed.). Blackwell companion to Hinduism. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-21535-2.
- Monier-Williams, Monier (2006), Monier-Williams Sanskrit Dictionary, Nataraj Books, ISBN 1-881338-58-4
- Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli; Moore, Charles A. (1989) [1957], A Source Book in Indian Philosophy (Princeton paperback 12th ed.), Princeton University Press, ISBN 0-691-01958-4
- Vivekananda, Swami (1900), Complete Works of, Volume 1, Lectures and Discourses, ISBN 978-8185301761
{{citation}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
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Āstika and nāstika
View on GrokipediaEtymology and Terminology
Etymology of Āstika
The term āstika derives from the Sanskrit root asti, which means "there is," "it exists," or "being," combined with the suffix -ka to form an adjective signifying "one who says 'there is'" or "affirmer of existence." This etymological foundation emphasizes affirmation of reality, whether in a general ontological sense or specific beliefs about the world. According to the Monier-Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary, āstika thus conveys notions of piety, faithfulness, or belief in enduring entities like the self or divine order.[5] Early textual appearances of āstika occur in the Vedic corpus, where the root asti pervades hymns and philosophical speculations, denoting existence and laying the semantic groundwork for the derived term. In the Rigveda, for instance, asti appears prominently in the Nasadiya Sukta (RV 10.129), affirming the primordial reality amid queries about creation: "Then there was neither existence (asti) nor non-existence (nāsti)." Similarly, the Upanishads employ asti to articulate affirmations of ultimate truth, such as the self's eternal being in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad (BU 1.4.10), where it underscores belief in an abiding reality beyond illusion. These usages highlight āstika as rooted in Vedic affirmations of cosmic and spiritual existence. By the time of the Mahabharata, the term āstika evolves from this general affirmatory sense toward a more defined association with Vedic orthodoxy. It first emerges as a proper name for the sage Astika, son of the rishi Jaratkaru and the serpent-princess Manasa, who is so named because his father uttered "asti" (there is) as he departed for the forest, affirming the child's existence while still in the womb, symbolizing affirmation of life and dharma (MBh 1.13-36). This narrative illustrates the term's shift, increasingly connoting adherence to Vedic principles over mere existential assertion, setting the stage for its later philosophical denotation while contrasting with nāstika as its negation.Etymology of Nāstika
The term nāstika originates from the Sanskrit prefix na- ("not") combined with āstika, derived from the root asti ("there is" or "exists"), literally meaning "one who says 'there is not'" or a denier of existence, particularly in ritual or doctrinal contexts.[6] This negation parallels āstika as an affirmation but emphasizes rejection.[7] In early Vedic and post-Vedic literature, nāstika denoted skeptics or those rejecting ritualistic affirmations and Vedic authority, as seen in the Manusmṛti (2.11), where it describes individuals who decry the Veda, fail to distinguish virtue from vice, or deny scriptural validity.[8] The term evolved in epic literature, such as the Mahābhārata, to signify unbelievers in Vedic orthodoxy, marking a shift toward broader connotations of heterodoxy.[9] Phonetic and semantic variations appear in regional languages: in Prakrit texts, forms like ṇaṭṭhia or ṇāhiya emerge, adapting the denial motif to local phonology, while in Pāli Buddhist literature, nāstika retains its core meaning to label non-Vedic or atheistic views.[9] These shifts reflect the term's adaptation across Middle Indo-Aryan languages without altering its fundamental sense of negation.[10]Core Concepts and Definitions
Definition of Āstika
In Indian philosophy, āstika denotes the orthodox traditions that affirm the authority of the Vedas as śruti, the foundational revealed scriptures considered infallible and eternal.[1] This core criterion establishes āstika as Vedic orthodoxy, encompassing philosophical systems that integrate Vedic teachings into their doctrines without questioning their scriptural primacy.[11] In contrast, nāstika traditions reject this Vedic authority, marking a fundamental divide in Indian thought.[12] The āstika designation transcends mere theism, accommodating diverse metaphysical positions including theistic, atheistic, and dualistic views, as long as they uphold Vedic sanction.[13] For example, the Sāṁkhya school, which posits an atheistic dualism between puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (matter) without reference to a creator deity, remains āstika due to its alignment with Vedic epistemology.[14] Similarly, Mīmāṃsā emphasizes ritualistic interpretations of the Vedas in a non-theistic framework, illustrating the breadth of āstika beyond monotheistic assumptions.[15] Āstika philosophies universally incorporate the interrelated concepts of saṃsāra (the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth), karma (the law of moral causation governing actions and their consequences), and mokṣa (liberation from saṃsāra through realization or ethical practice), all situated within the Vedic cosmological structure.[11] These attributes provide a shared soteriological orientation, where karma propels the soul through saṃsāra until mokṣa is attained via Vedic-guided paths such as knowledge, devotion, or discipline. This framework underscores the āstika commitment to a structured path toward ultimate freedom, rooted in scriptural authenticity.[1]Definition of Nāstika
In Indian philosophy, nāstika denotes a heterodox position characterized by the non-acceptance or explicit rejection of the Vedas as infallible and authoritative scripture. This stance positions nāstika thought outside the orthodox framework, emphasizing independence from Vedic textual authority as the defining criterion rather than adherence to ritualistic or doctrinal elements derived from those texts.[11][16] The term thus highlights a fundamental divergence in epistemological foundations, where validity is sought through non-Vedic means such as direct perception, inference, or alternative revelatory sources.[17] Nāstika perspectives span diverse ontological and soteriological orientations, incorporating materialist views that outright deny concepts like an afterlife or transcendent realms, alongside spiritual approaches that envision liberation through non-Vedic ethical and meditative practices.[1] These include both skeptical materialisms focused on empirical reality and idealistic spiritualities that prioritize inner transformation over scriptural exegesis.[18] Crucially, nāstika is not equivalent to atheism in the modern sense, as it does not inherently preclude belief in deities, souls, or metaphysical entities; rather, such affirmations, when present, occur outside Vedic validation and may reinterpret traditional notions in novel ways. This boundary underscores nāstika's role as a marker of philosophical autonomy rather than outright negation of the divine, contrasting sharply with āstika's Vedic-centric basis.[19]Classification of Indian Philosophical Schools
Āstika Traditions
The āstika traditions, collectively known as the ṣaḍdarśana or six orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, are unified by their acceptance of the Vedas as authoritative scripture and their pursuit of liberation (mokṣa) within a Vedic framework.[20][21] These darśanas—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta—provide systematic explorations of reality, knowledge, and ethics, often paired in complementary relationships to form a cohesive philosophical corpus rooted in Vedic texts.[20][22] Nyāya, attributed to the sage Gautama, centers on logic and epistemology, emphasizing the four pramāṇas (means of knowledge): perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony, with the latter validating the authority of Vedic texts.[20] Its realistic and pluralistic approach aims to eliminate error through rigorous debate, establishing valid cognition as the path to liberation.[21] Vaiśeṣika, founded by Kaṇāda, complements Nyāya with an atomistic ontology, classifying reality into categories such as substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence, and non-existence, thereby providing a physics-like framework for understanding the material world.[20] Rooted in Vedic cosmology, it posits eternal atoms as the building blocks of the universe, integrating with Nyāya's epistemological methods in later developments to support Vedic dharma leading to mokṣa.[22] Sāṃkhya, originating from the teachings of Kapila, posits a dualism between puruṣa (pure consciousness) and prakṛti (primordial matter), enumerating 25 tattvas (principles of reality) to explain the evolution of the cosmos without invoking a creator deity.[20] Though its roots trace to Upaniṣadic speculations within the Vedic tradition, it serves as a theoretical foundation for understanding bondage and release through discriminative knowledge.[21] Yoga, systematized in Patañjali's Yoga Sūtras, builds directly on Sāṃkhya's metaphysics but adds practical disciplines, including the eight limbs (aṣṭāṅga) such as ethical restraints (yama), observances (niyama), and meditation (samādhi), to achieve isolation (kaivalya) of the self.[20] Aligned with Vedic soteriology, it incorporates a theistic element through the concept of Īśvara (a special puruṣa) while emphasizing meditation and ethics as means to transcend mental fluctuations.[22] Mīmāṃsā, or Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, founded by Jaimini, focuses on the hermeneutics of Vedic rituals (karma-kāṇḍa), defending the eternal and apauruṣeya (authorless) nature of the Vedas to justify injunctions for dharma and worldly benefits.[20] It prioritizes action over speculation, interpreting Vedic texts to ensure proper ritual performance as the primary path to fulfillment.[21] Vedānta, or Uttara Mīmāṃsā, attributed to Bādarāyaṇa, interprets the Upaniṣads (jñāna-kāṇḍa) to explore the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality, encompassing diverse views such as Advaita (non-dualism) of Śaṅkara, which asserts the identity of Ātman and Brahman, and Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-dualism) of Rāmānuja, which posits a qualified unity.[20] Deeply embedded in Vedic philosophy, it emphasizes knowledge as the means to mokṣa, synthesizing earlier ritualistic emphases.[22] These darśanas interconnect as pairs—Nyāya with Vaiśeṣika for logic and ontology, Sāṃkhya with Yoga for theory and practice, and Mīmāṃsā with Vedānta for action and knowledge—forming the ṣaḍdarśana as interdependent visions that collectively uphold Vedic orthodoxy while excluding non-Vedic perspectives like those of Buddhism.[20][21]Nāstika Traditions
The nāstika traditions represent heterodox schools of Indian philosophy that reject the authority of the Vedas, emphasizing empirical observation and rational inquiry over scriptural revelation.[23] These schools developed independently of Vedic orthodoxy, focusing on alternative paths to understanding reality, ethics, and liberation.[24] The Cārvāka, also known as Lokāyata, is a materialist school that posits the world as composed solely of four elements—earth, water, fire, and air—with consciousness arising from their combination, rejecting any supernatural entities, afterlife, or eternal soul.[17] It advocates hedonism as the ethical ideal, promoting the enjoyment of sensory pleasures in this life while dismissing Vedic rituals as exploitative, and limits valid knowledge to direct perception (pratyakṣa), occasionally supplemented by inference (anumāna).[23] Buddhism, as a nāstika tradition, centers on the Four Noble Truths—suffering (duḥkha), its origin in craving, its cessation, and the path to end it—without relying on Vedic deities or sacrificial rites.[25] The Eightfold Path, comprising right view, intention, speech, action, livelihood, effort, mindfulness, and concentration, serves as the practical guide to enlightenment (nirvāṇa), prioritizing ethical conduct and mental discipline over ritualistic practices.[25] Jainism teaches non-violence (ahimsa) as the supreme virtue, viewing karma as subtle material particles that bind to the soul (jīva) and obscure its inherent purity, with liberation achieved through shedding these karmas via ascetic practices.[24] Its doctrines stem from the teachings of 24 tīrthaṅkaras, enlightened beings who guide followers toward omniscience, and emphasize the five vows (mahāvrata)—non-violence, truthfulness, non-stealing, celibacy, and non-possession—for monks and a modified set for laypeople.[26] The Ājīvika school, founded by Makkhali Gosāla, espouses absolute determinism (niyati), where all events unfold according to cosmic fate without free will, leading to inevitable cycles of rebirth and eventual release.[27] It promotes rigorous asceticism, including nudity and endurance of hardships, as a means to align with this inexorable order, and is often underrepresented in later accounts due to its decline.[27] Across these traditions, a shared emphasis emerges on direct experience through perception (pratyakṣa) as the primary epistemic tool, supplanting Vedic scripture, alongside innovative cosmologies that challenge hierarchical Vedic views with egalitarian or mechanistic models of existence.[23]Historical Context and Evolution
Origins in Vedic and Post-Vedic Periods
The āstika-nāstika dichotomy emerged implicitly during the Vedic period (c. 1500–500 BCE), though the terms themselves do not appear in the core Vedic texts like the Rigveda. Instead, the Rigveda reflects early tensions between those affirming the efficacy of ritual sacrifices and cosmic order (ṛta) and skeptics who questioned the exclusivity of Vedic hymns and priestly authority, as seen in hymns that critique blind adherence to rituals without inner understanding.[1] This period's Brahmanical tradition emphasized Vedic revelation (śruti) as infallible, laying the groundwork for later āstika affirmation of Vedic authority, while nascent doubts foreshadowed nāstika critiques. By the later Vedic phase, distinctions between affirmers of Vedic truths and skeptics appear in texts, portraying the latter as rejecting foundational aspects of Vedic cosmology or ritual efficacy. These divisions highlight growing philosophical scrutiny within Brahmanical circles, where Vedic rituals were defended against internal skepticism. In the post-Vedic period (c. 500 BCE–200 CE), the dichotomy became more pronounced amid the rise of śramaṇa movements, which challenged Brahmanical dominance by rejecting Vedic monopoly on knowledge and emphasizing personal asceticism over priestly mediation.[28] Śramaṇas, including early Buddhists and Jains, positioned themselves as nāstika by critiquing animal sacrifices and caste-based rituals, as evidenced in early Buddhist suttas like the Kuṭadanta Sutta, which debates and dismisses Vedic yajña as ineffective for spiritual liberation compared to ethical conduct.[29] The Upanishads (c. 800–200 BCE) mark a transitional phase, shifting focus from external rituals to internal realization of ātman-Brahman unity, implicitly aligning with āstika evolution while incorporating śramaṇa-like introspective elements.[2] This synthesis is evident in the Bhagavad Gītā (c. 200 BCE–200 CE), part of the Mahābhārata, which critiques rejection of scriptural injunctions (16.23–24), warning that disregarding Vedic guidance leads to delusion and lower births, thereby reinforcing āstika orthodoxy against emerging heterodoxies. These texts illustrate the socio-political context of Brahmanical efforts to consolidate authority amid śramaṇa proliferation, fostering debates that shaped Indian philosophical classifications.Development Through Medieval and Modern Eras
During the medieval period (c. 500–1500 CE), the āstika-nāstika distinction evolved through philosophical syntheses and devotional reforms that occasionally transcended rigid boundaries. Adi Shankara (c. 788–820 CE), a key exponent of Advaita Vedanta, consolidated the āstika schools by systematizing non-dualistic interpretations of the Upanishads and Vedas, establishing a unified orthodox framework that emphasized Brahman as the ultimate reality while critiquing nāstika positions like those of Buddhism.[30] This consolidation reinforced Vedic authority as central to āstika thought, yet it also engaged critically with nāstika ideas, incorporating elements such as logical analysis from Buddhist dialectics to strengthen Vedantic arguments.[31] The Bhakti movements, flourishing from the 7th century onward in South India and spreading northward, further blurred the āstika-nāstika lines by prioritizing emotional devotion (bhakti) over scholastic debates, drawing from diverse traditions including tantric and ascetic practices associated with nāstika schools.[32] For instance, nirguna Bhakti poets like Kabir synthesized āstika Vedic reverence with nāstika critiques of ritualism and caste, fostering a more inclusive spiritual ethos that appealed across sectarian divides.[33] A notable example of this absorption is the integration of yogic techniques into āstika Hinduism; while Patanjali's Yoga Sutras (c. 2nd century BCE–4th century CE) formed an āstika darshana, medieval Hindu traditions adapted Buddhist-influenced meditation and breath control practices, as seen in the development of Hatha Yoga within Shaiva and Vaishnava sects.[34][35] In the colonial era (18th–20th centuries), European Indologists, influenced by Orientalist paradigms, rigidified the āstika-nāstika binary by equating āstika schools with an essentialized "Hindu orthodoxy" rooted in Vedic texts, while marginalizing nāstika traditions like Buddhism and Jainism as peripheral "heterodoxies."[36] Scholars such as William Jones and H.H. Wilson framed this division to construct a coherent "Hinduism" amenable to comparative study with Western monotheism, often overlooking syncretic historical interactions and reinforcing colonial narratives of Indian philosophical fragmentation.[37] This portrayal influenced nationalist responses, with figures like Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920) reinterpreting āstika texts such as the Bhagavad Gita to emphasize karmic action and tolerance toward diverse Indian traditions, including nāstika elements, as part of a unified cultural heritage.[38] Post-independence (1947 onward), the framework underwent nationalist revivals and academic reevaluations, with Indian scholars highlighting its fluidity to counter colonial binaries and promote cultural unity. Tilak's earlier emphasis on Vedic antiquity and ethical reinterpretations of karma inspired mid-20th-century thinkers to view nāstika schools not as oppositional but as integral to India's pluralistic ethos, fostering tolerance in philosophical discourse.[39] In contemporary contexts, the āstika-nāstika lens informs interfaith dialogues, enabling discussions on shared meditative practices between Hindu and Buddhist communities, though academic coverage of 21st-century applications remains limited, often focusing on historical rather than dialogic dimensions. This evolution reflects a shift toward syncretism in postcolonial scholarship, tying back briefly to ancient roots without revisiting Vedic specifics.[40]Usage Across Religious Traditions
In Hinduism
In Hinduism, the classification of philosophical and religious traditions as āstika overwhelmingly dominates, with all six major darśanas—Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta—regarded as orthodox due to their acceptance of the Vedas as the supreme and infallible authority on dharma, cosmology, and liberation. These schools derive their core doctrines from Vedic saṃhitās, brāhmaṇas, āraṇyakas, and upaniṣads, viewing the Vedas as apauruṣeya (authorless and eternal) revelations that provide the foundational pramāṇa (means of knowledge) for understanding reality, including the existence of ātman (self) and brahman (ultimate reality). This Vedic primacy ensures āstika status, distinguishing them from heterodox systems, and underpins Hinduism's diverse yet unified intellectual framework.[4][20] Certain peripheral traditions within Hinduism, such as some Tantric and folk practices, have occasionally been labeled nāstika by strict Vedic orthodoxy for relying on non-Vedic āgamas and rituals that emphasize esoteric rites, maṇtras, and deity worship over śrauta sacrifices. Tantric lineages, while embedded in Hindu cosmology and affirming ātman-brahman unity, prioritize tantras and regional texts that challenge Vedic ritual exclusivity, leading to historical critiques from brāhmaṇical authorities who saw them as deviations from śruti. However, these traditions were often reintegrated through syncretic adaptations, as seen in the incorporation of Tantric elements into Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava sects, preserving their āstika essence under broader Hindu inclusivity. Internal debates within Hinduism, such as those between Smārta and Śaiva traditions, center on interpretations of ātman and Vedic authority without typically revoking āstika status from one another. Smārtas, following Advaita Vedānta, emphasize a non-dual ātman identical with nirguṇa brahman and equate all deities as manifestations of Vedic brahman, while Śaivas, particularly in traditions like Śaiva Siddhānta, uphold a qualified non-dualism where ātman remains distinct yet united with Śiva as per āgamic and upaniṣadic readings. These discussions highlight tensions over Vedic exegesis but reinforce shared orthodoxy. In contrast, Purāṇic literature depicts historical persecution of explicit nāstikas like the Cārvākas, portraying them as materialistic heretics who deny Vedic validity, karma, and afterlife; narratives in texts like the Mahābhārata show Cārvākas condemned or divinely punished to deter challenges to Vedic order and uphold brāhmaṇical dominance.[17] Hinduism's evolving inclusivity is exemplified by 19th-century reformers like Dayananda Saraswati, founder of the Ārya Samāj, who advocated a purist Vedic revival by rejecting post-Vedic texts such as Purāṇas, Tantras, and smṛti as human interpolations that introduced idolatry and superstition, effectively deeming them nāstika influences corrupting original Vedic monotheism and rationality. In his Satyārth Prakash, Dayananda argued that only the four Vedas (limited to saṃhitās) hold divine authority, dismissing later compositions as deviations that contradicted Vedic ethics and cosmology, thereby fostering a reformed Hinduism focused on direct Vedic study and social equity. This approach spurred debates on scriptural hierarchy but aligned with āstika principles by centering Vedas as the sole pramāṇa.[41]In Jainism and Buddhism
In Jainism, the tradition positions itself as an eternal śramaṇa path, independent of Vedic orthodoxy and emphasizing ascetic renunciation for spiritual purification.[42] This self-perception underscores Jainism's rejection of the Vedas as authoritative scripture, viewing them instead as one limited perspective among many in a multifaceted reality (anekāntavāda).[43] Despite this non-Vedic stance, Jainism affirms the existence of the ātman, conceptualized as the jīva or eternal soul, which is conscious and bound by karma until liberated through ethical conduct and knowledge.[42] The foundational text Tattvārthasūtra (ca. 2nd–5th century CE), attributed to Umāsvāti, outlines this non-Vedic epistemology through categories like right faith, knowledge, and conduct, classifying reality into jīva (soul), ajīva (non-soul), and influx of karma, thereby establishing an independent framework for liberation (mokṣa).[43] Buddhism similarly identifies as a nāstika tradition within the broader Indian philosophical landscape, explicitly denying the efficacy of Vedic rituals and the varṇāśrama system of caste hierarchy.[44] Central to its doctrine is anattā (no-self), which rejects the Brahmanical notion of an eternal ātman, positing instead that all phenomena lack inherent essence and arise dependently.[44] Theravāda texts, such as the Suttanipāta (ca. 3rd century BCE), critique Brahmanical views by mocking ritualistic sacrifices and priestly privileges, as in the Vāseṭṭha Sutta, which questions birth-based superiority.[44] Mahāyāna scriptures, including the Vajrasūcī (ca. 7th century CE), further challenge āstika orthodoxy by dismantling caste distinctions and affirming universal potential for enlightenment (bodhi) through ethical insight rather than Vedic adherence.[44] Jainism and Buddhism share a nāstika identity as śramaṇa movements, both originating in the 6th–5th centuries BCE as alternatives to Vedic ritualism, promoting ahimsā (non-violence) as a core ethical principle and personal liberation from saṃsāra through ascetic discipline. This shared heritage is evident in their mutual influences, such as parallel developments in karma theory—where both view it as a subtle substance binding the soul—and monastic codes emphasizing non-possession and meditation for ethical purification. Despite doctrinal divergences, like Jainism's affirmation of jīva versus Buddhism's anattā, these traditions reinforced each other's emphasis on individual effort over divine intervention. Externally, Hindu āstika schools have consistently labeled both Jainism and Buddhism as nāstika due to their repudiation of Vedic authority, as articulated in Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya texts that defend ritual orthodoxy against śramaṇa critiques.[44] Yet, in medieval periods, syncretic practices emerged, integrating elements like shared temple iconography and philosophical dialogues; for instance, Buddhist and Jain motifs appear in Hindu tantric traditions, and deities such as Tārā exhibit hybrid forms across boundaries.[45] This interplay highlights a complex coexistence, where nāstika traditions influenced āstika ethics without fully merging.Comparative Analysis and Modern Interpretations
Comparisons Between Āstika and Nāstika Views
The primary distinction between āstika and nāstika philosophical traditions lies in their epistemological frameworks, particularly regarding the validity of pramāṇas (means of knowledge). Āstika schools, such as Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta, accept four or more pramāṇas, including śabda (verbal testimony), which privileges the infallible authority of the Vedas as a source of transcendent knowledge beyond empirical limits. In contrast, nāstika schools like Buddhism, Jainism, and Cārvāka reject śabda in this Vedic sense, relying instead on pratyakṣa (direct perception) and anumāna (inference) as primary or sole valid means, emphasizing empirical verification and logical reasoning without deference to scriptural revelation. For instance, while Nyāya systematizes anumāna through syllogistic structures involving five propositions to support metaphysical claims, Buddhist Sautrāntika epistemology limits inference to momentary perceptual concomitance, viewing it as unreliable for eternal truths.[46][46] To illustrate these epistemological contrasts:| Pramāṇa | Āstika Acceptance | Nāstika Acceptance |
|---|---|---|
| Śabda | Valid, especially Vedic testimony for ultimate reality (e.g., Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta). | Rejected; alternative texts or none (e.g., Buddhist sūtras, Jaina āgamas). |
| Pratyakṣa | Sensory perception, often determinate after initial indeterminacy (e.g., Sāṃkhya). | Core method, but momentary and conditioned (e.g., Buddhism); sole valid in Cārvāka. |
| Anumāna | Logical inference tied to Vedic insights for ontology (e.g., Nyāya syllogism). | Empirical inference only, without Vedic extension (e.g., Jaina anumāna qualified by syādvāda). |
Contemporary Relevance and Misconceptions
In contemporary scholarship on comparative religion, the terms āstika and nāstika are interpreted with greater fluidity, emphasizing syncretic interactions across Indian traditions rather than rigid oppositions. Wendy Doniger's analysis highlights how narratives in Hindu texts incorporate elements from Buddhist and Jain perspectives, blurring the boundaries between Vedic authority and heterodox views through shared mythological motifs and alternative voices from marginalized groups. Similarly, Andrew J. Nicholson argues that modern categorizations of āstika as "orthodox" and nāstika as "heterodox" impose Western Christian frameworks onto Indian philosophies, advocating instead for understandings rooted in historical debates over Vedic validity rather than doctrinal conformity. Scholars also note that the binary overlooks extensive mutual influences, such as āstika adoption of nāstika ethical emphases like ahiṃsā in later texts.[50] A common misconception equates nāstika traditions solely with atheism, overlooking the theistic elements in schools like Jainism, which affirm divine beings (such as tīrthaṅkaras) while rejecting Vedic authority. This oversimplification ignores the nuanced Indic distinction where nāstika primarily denotes non-acceptance of the Vedas, not denial of the divine, as seen in Buddhist and Jain cosmologies that integrate ethical theism without scriptural orthodoxy. Colonial-era Indologists further distorted these terms by translating them through a lens of Christian heresy, portraying nāstika schools as primitive or deviant to justify imperial narratives of civilizational hierarchy.[13] In post-2000s India, interfaith dialogues among Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain communities have gained prominence, fostering collaborative ethical frameworks that challenge the āstika/nāstika dichotomy by emphasizing shared principles like non-violence (ahiṃsā). For instance, initiatives exploring self-discipline across these traditions promote mutual understanding in multicultural settings, highlighting common responses to social issues without prioritizing Vedic norms. Globally, the revival of yoga (rooted in āstika practices) and Buddhism has led to syncretic movements that integrate meditative and ethical elements from both, as evident in international forums addressing religious pluralism in diverse societies.[51][52] Recent studies from the 2020s have linked nāstika concepts of ahiṃsā to environmental ethics, applying Jain and Buddhist non-violence to climate activism, such as advocating sustainable practices to protect interdependent life forms. These works underscore how nāstika traditions offer ecological models for global challenges, yet remain underrepresented in broader discussions of Indian philosophy.[53]References
- https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/nastika