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White flight
White flight
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The white flight, also known as white exodus,[1][2][3] refers to the sudden or gradual large-scale migration of white people from areas becoming more racially or ethnoculturally diverse to more racially homogenous suburban or exurban regions.[4][5] The term has more recently been applied to other migrations by whites from older, inner suburbs to rural areas, as well as from the American Northeast and Midwest to the milder climate in the South and West.[6][7][8] The term 'white flight' has also been used for large-scale post-colonial emigration of whites from Africa, or parts of that continent,[9][10][11][12][13] driven by levels of violent crime and anti-colonial or anti-white state policies.[14] Starting in the 1950s and 1960s, the terms became popular, especially in the United States.

Migration of middle-class white populations was observed during the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s out of cities such as Baltimore, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City and Oakland, although racial segregation of public schools had ended there long before the Supreme Court of the United States' decision Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. In the 1970s, attempts to achieve effective desegregation (or "integration") by means of busing in some areas led to more families' moving out of former areas.[15][16] More generally, some historians suggest that white flight occurred in response to population pressures, both from the large migration of blacks from the rural Southern United States to urban cities of the Northeastern United States, Midwestern United States and the Western United States in the Great Migration and the waves of new immigrants from around the world.[17]

Other historians have challenged the phrase "white flight" as a misnomer whose use should be reconsidered. In her study of West Side in Chicago during the post-war era, historian Amanda Seligman argues that the phrase misleadingly suggests that whites immediately departed when blacks moved into the neighborhood, when in fact, many whites defended their space with violence, intimidation, or legal tactics.[18] Leah Boustan, Professor of Economics at Princeton, attributes white flight both to racism and economic reasons.[19] Urban decay and crime have also been cited as one of the reasons.[20]

The business practices of redlining, mortgage discrimination, and racially restrictive covenants contributed to the overcrowding and physical deterioration of areas with large minority populations. Such conditions are considered to have contributed to the emigration of other populations. The limited facilities for banking and insurance, due to a perceived lack of profitability, and other social services, and extra fees meant to hedge against perceived profit issues, increased their cost to residents in predominantly non-white suburbs and city neighborhoods.[21][22] According to the environmental geographer Laura Pulido, the historical processes of suburbanization and urban decentralization contribute to contemporary environmental racism.[23]

History

[edit]

In 1870, The Nation covered the large-scale migrations of white Americans; "The report of the Emigration Commissioners of Louisiana, for the past year, estimates the white exodus from the Southern Atlantic States, Alabama, and Mississippi, to the trans-Mississippi regions, at scores of thousands".[24] By 1888, with rhetoric typical of the time, Walter Thomas Mills's The Statesman publication predicted:

Social and political equality and the political supremacy of the negro element in any southern state must lead to one of three things: A white exodus, a war of races, or the destruction of representative institutions, as in the District of Columbia.[25]

An 1894 biography of William Lloyd Garrison reveals the abolitionist's perception of the pre-Civil War tension and how "the shadows of the impending civil disruption, had brought about a white exodus" of Northerners to Southern states such as Georgia.[26]

In the years leading up to World War I, the newspapers in the Union of South Africa were reporting on the "spectre of white flight", in particular due to Afrikaners travelling to the Port of Durban in search of ships for Britain and Australia.[27]

Academic research

[edit]

In 1958, political scientist Morton Grodzins identified that "once the proportion of non-whites exceeds the limits of the neighborhood's tolerance for interracial living, whites move out." Grodzins termed this phenomenon the tipping point in the study of white flight.[28]

In 2004, a study of UK census figures at the London School of Economics demonstrated evidence of white flight, resulting in ethnic minorities in inner-city areas becoming increasingly isolated from the ethnic White British population.[29] The study, which examined the white population in London, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, and Greater Manchester between 1991 and 2001, also concluded that white population losses were largest in areas with the highest ethnic minority populations.[30]

In 2018, research at Indiana University showed that between 2000 and 2010 in the US, of a sample size of 27,891 Census tracts, 3,252 experienced "white flight".[31] The examined areas had "an average magnitude loss of 40 percent of the original white population." Published in Social Science Research, the study found "relative to poorer neighborhoods, white flight becomes systematically more likely in middle-class neighborhoods at higher thresholds of black, Hispanic, and Asian population presence."[32]

Checkerboard and tipping models

[edit]

In studies in the 1980s and 1990s, blacks said they were willing to live in neighborhoods with 50/50 ethnic composition. Whites were also willing to live in integrated neighborhoods, but preferred proportions of more whites. Despite this willingness to live in integrated neighborhoods, the majority still live in largely segregated neighborhoods, which have continued to form.[33]

In 1969, Nobel Prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling published "Models of Segregation", a paper in which he demonstrated through a "checkerboard model" and mathematical analysis that even when every agent prefers to live in a mixed-race neighborhood, almost complete segregation of neighborhoods emerges as individual decisions accumulate. In his "tipping model", he showed that members of an ethnic group do not move out of a neighborhood as long as the proportion of other ethnic groups is relatively low, but if a critical level of other ethnicities is exceeded, the original residents may make rapid decisions and take action to leave. This tipping point is viewed as simply the end-result of a domino effect originating when the threshold of the majority ethnicity members with the highest sensitivity to sameness is exceeded. If these people leave and are either not replaced or replaced by other ethnicities, then this in turn raises the level of mixing of neighbors, exceeding the departure threshold for additional people.[34]

Africa

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South Africa

[edit]

About 800,000 out of an earlier total population of 5.2 million whites left post-apartheid South Africa after 1995, according to a 2009 report in Newsweek.[35] The country has suffered a high rate of violent crime, a primary stated reason for emigration.[36] Other causes cited in the Newsweek report include attacks against white farmers, concern about being harmed by affirmative action programs, political instability, and worries about corruption.[35] Many of those who leave are highly educated, resulting in skills shortages.[36] Some observers fear the long-term consequences, as South Africa's labour policies make it difficult to attract skilled immigrants. In the global economy, some professionals and skilled people have been attracted to work in the U.S. and European nations.[14][35]

Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia)

[edit]

Until 1980, the unrecognised Republic of Rhodesia held a well-publicised image as being one of two nations in sub-Saharan Africa where a white minority of European descent and culture held political, economic, and social control over a preponderantly black African majority.[37] Nevertheless, unlike white South Africans, a significant percentage of white Rhodesians represented recent immigrants from Europe.[37] After World War II, there was a substantial influx of Europeans migrating into the region (formerly known as Southern Rhodesia), including former residents of India, Pakistan, and other parts of Africa. Also represented were working-class emigrants responding to economic opportunities.[37] In 1969, only 41% of Rhodesia's white community were natural-born citizens, or 93,600 people.[37] The remainder were naturalised European and South African citizens or expatriates, with many holding dual citizenship.[37]

During the Rhodesian Bush War, almost the entire white male population between eighteen and fifty-eight was affected by various military commitments, and individuals spent up to five or six months of the year on combat duty away from their normal occupations in the civil service, commerce, industry, or agriculture.[38] These long periods of service in the field led to an increased emigration of men of military age. In November 1963, state media cited the chief reasons for emigration as uncertainty about the future, economic decline due to embargo and war, and the heavy commitments of national service, which was described as "the overriding factor causing people to leave".[38] Of the male emigrants in 1976 about half fell into the 15 to 39 age bracket. Between 1960 and 1976 160,182 whites immigrated, while 157,724 departed. This dynamic turnover rate led to depressions in the property market, a slump in the construction industry, and a decline in retail sales.[38] The number of white Rhodesians peaked in 1975 at 278,000, and rapidly declined as the bush war intensified. In 1976, around 14,000 whites left the country, marking the first year since Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 that more whites had left the country than arrived,[39] with most leaving for South Africa.[40] This became known as the 'chicken run', the earliest use of which was recorded the following year,[41] often by Rhodesians who remained to contemptuously describe those who had left.[42][43] Other phrases such as 'taking the gap' or 'gapping it' were also used.[44] As the outward flow increased, the phrase 'owl run' also came into use, as leaving the country was deemed by many to be a wise choice.[45] Disfavour with the biracial Zimbabwe Rhodesia administration in 1979 also contributed to a mass exodus.[37]

The establishment of the Republic of Zimbabwe in 1980 sounded the death knell for white political power, and ushered in a new era of black majority rule.[37] White emigration peaked between 1980 and 1982 at 53,000 persons, with the breakdown of law and order, an increase in crime in the rural areas, and the provocative attitude of Zimbabwean officials being cited as the main causes.[46] Political conditions typically had a greater impact on the decision to migrate among white than black professionals.[47] Between 1982 and 2000 Zimbabwe registered a net loss of 100,000 whites, or an average of 5,000 departures per year.[48] A second wave of white emigration was sparked by President Robert Mugabe's violent land reform programme after 2000.[47] Popular destinations included South Africa and Australia, which emigrants perceived to be geographically, culturally, or sociopolitically similar to their home country.[48]

From a strictly economic point of view, the departure figures were not as significant as the loss of the skills of those leaving.[37] A disproportionate number of white Zimbabwean emigrants were well educated and highly skilled. Among those living in the United States, for example, 53.7% had a bachelor's degree, while only 2% had not completed secondary school.[48] Most (52.4%) had occupied technical or supervisory positions of critical importance to the modern sector of the economy.[48] Inasmuch as black workers did not begin making large inroads into apprenticeships and other training programs until the 1970s, few were in a position to replace their white colleagues in the 1980s.[37]

Europe

[edit]

Denmark

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A study of school choice in Copenhagen found that an immigrant proportion of below 35% in the local schools did not affect parental choice of schools. If the percentage of immigrant children rose above this level, Danes are far more likely to choose other schools. Immigrants who speak Danish at home also opt out. Other immigrants, often more recent ones, stay with local schools.[49][non-primary source needed]

Finland

[edit]

In Finland, white flight has been observed in districts where the share of non-Finnish population is 20% or above. In Greater Helsinki region, there are more than 30 such districts.[50] Those include e.g. Kallahti in Helsinki, Suvela in Espoo, and Länsimäki in Vantaa.[51] Outside the Greater Helsinki region, the phenomenon has been witnessed at least in Varissuo district of Turku.[52]

Ireland

[edit]

A 2007 government report stated that immigration in Dublin has caused "dramatic" white flight from elementary schools in a studied area (Dublin 15). 27% of residents were foreign-born immigrants. The report stated that Dublin was risking creating immigrant-dominated banlieues, on the outskirts of a city, similar to such areas in France. The immigrants in the area included Eastern Europeans (such as those from Poland), Asians, and Africans (mainly from Nigeria).[53]

Norway

[edit]

White flight in Norway has increased since the 1970s, with the immigration of non-Scandinavians from (in numerical order, starting with the largest): Poland, Pakistan, Iraq, Somalia, Vietnam, Iran, Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, the former Yugoslavia, Thailand, Afghanistan, and Lithuania.

The eastern part of Oslo is more mixed, with some schools up to 97% of immigrant background and in the borough of Groruddalen in 2008, the ethnic Norwegian population decreased by 1,500, while the immigrant population increased by 1,600.[54]

Schools in Oslo are increasingly divided by ethnicity.[55][56] For instance, in the Groruddalen (Grorud valley), four boroughs which currently have a population of around 165,000 saw the ethnic Norwegian population decrease by 1,500 in 2008, while the immigrant population increased by 1,600.[57] In thirteen years, a total of 18,000 ethnic Norwegians have moved from the borough.[58]

In January 2010, a news feature from Dagsrevyen on the public Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation said, "Oslo has become a racially divided city. In some city districts the racial segregation starts already in kindergarten." Reporters said, "In the last years the brown schools have become browner, and the white schools whiter," a statement which caused a minor controversy.[58][59]

Sweden

[edit]

After the Second World War, immigration into Sweden occurred in three phases. The first was a direct result of the war, with refugees from concentration camps and surrounding countries in Scandinavia and Northern Europe. The second, prior to 1970, involved immigrant workers, mainly from Finland, Italy, Greece, and Yugoslavia. In the most recent phase, from the 1970s onwards, refugees immigrated from the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, joined later by their relatives.[60]

A study which mapped patterns of segregation and congregation of incoming population groups[61] found that, if a majority group is reluctant to accept a minority influx, they may leave the district, avoid the district, or use tactics to keep the minority out. The minority group in turn react by either dispersing or congregating, avoiding certain districts in turn. Detailed analysis of data from the 1990s onwards indicates that the concentration of immigrants in certain city districts, such as Husby in Stockholm and Rosengård in Malmö, is in part due to an immigration influx, but primarily caused by white flight.[62][63]

According to researcher Emma Neuman at Linnaeus University, the white flight phenomenon commences when the fraction of non-European immigrants reaches 3-4%, but European immigration shows no such effect.[64] High income earners and the highly educated move out first, so the ethnic segregation also leads to class segregation.[64]

In a study performed at Örebro University, mothers of young children were interviewed to study attitudes on Swedishness, multiculturalism and segregation. It concluded that while many expressed values such as ethnic diversity being an enriching factor, when, in practice, it came to choosing schools or choosing which district to move to, ensuring the children had access to a school with a robust Swedish majority was also a consideration. This was because they did not want their children to grow up in a school where they were a minority, and wanted them to be in a good environment for learning the Swedish language.[64]

United Kingdom

[edit]

For centuries, London was the destination for refugees and immigrants from continental Europe. Although all the immigrants were European, neighborhoods showed ethnic succession over time, as older residents moved out and new immigrants moved in, an early case of white flight (though the majority of London's population was still ethnic British).[65]

In the 2001 census, the London boroughs of Newham and Brent were found to be the first areas to have non-white majorities.[66] The 2011 census found that, for the first time, less than 50% of London's population were white British, and that in some areas of London white British people make up less than 20% of the population. A 2005 report stated that white migration within the UK is mainly from areas with a high ethnic minority population to those with predominantly white populations; white British families have moved out of London, as many immigrants have settled in the capital. The report's writers expressed concern about British social cohesion, and stated that different ethnic groups were living "parallel lives"; they were concerned that lack of contact between the groups could result in fear more readily exploited by extremists. In a study, the London School of Economics found similar results.[29] A 2016 BBC documentary, Last Whites of the East End, covered the migration of whites from Newham to Essex. A 2019 Guardian article stated that "came to represent 'white flight' in the UK",[67] and a 2013 Prospect magazine article gave Essex as an example of white flight.[68]

The London Borough of Barking and Dagenham, a traditionally White British working class borough in East London, had one of the most extreme instances of white flight and demographic change in the 21st centruy. At the 2001 census, the White British and Irish population comprisedt 82% of the borough's population, a modest decrease from the 90% in the 1991 census. By the 2011 census, their share of the population had dropped to 49%. By 2021, it had fallen again to 31%. Estimates for 2031 hover between 17-28% due to and the increased scale of immigration to the United Kingdom. Like other East London boroughs, Essex has been a popular choice to move to, owing due cultral, social and socio-economic simmalrities between the East London working class and many areas in Essex.

Researcher Ludi Simpson has stated that the growth of ethnic minorities in Britain is due mostly to natural population growth (births outnumbering deaths), rather than immigration. Both white and non-white Britons who can do so economically are equally likely to leave mixed-race inner-city areas. In his opinion, these trends indicate counter urbanisation, rather than white flight.[69][70]

North America

[edit]

Canada

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Toronto

[edit]

In 2013, the Toronto Star examined the "identity crisis" of Brampton (a suburban city in the Greater Toronto Area), and referring to white Canadians, the "loss of more than 23,000 people, or 12 per cent, in a decade when the city's population rose by 60 per cent". The paper reported University of Manitoba sociologist Jason Edgerton's analysis that "After you control for retirement, low birth rate, etc. some of the other (shrinkage) could be white flight — former mainstream communities not comfortable being the minority."[71]

A 2016 article from The Globe and Mail, addressing the diversity of Brampton, acknowledged that while academics in Canada are sometimes reluctant to use the term of white flight, it reported that:

[...] the Brampton story reveals that we have our own version of white flight, and before we figure out how to manage hyper-diverse and increasingly polarized cities like Greater Toronto, we need to reflect on our own attitudes about race and ethnic diversity.[72]

In 2018, The Guardian covered the white flight that had occurred in Brampton, and how the suburban city had been nicknamed "Bramladesh" and "Browntown", due to its "73% visible minority, with its largest ethnic group Indian". It was also reported how "the white population fell from 192,400 in 2001 to 169,230 in 2011, and now hovers around 151,000."[73]

Vancouver

[edit]

In 2014, the Vancouver Sun addressed the issue of white flight across Metropolitan Vancouver. Detailing the phenomenon of "unconscious segregation", the article points to large East Asian and South Asian enclaves within Greater Vancouver such as Burnaby, East Vancouver, Richmond, South Vancouver and Surrey. In contrast, other cities and neighbourhoods within the metropolitan region such as Tsawwassen, South Surrey, White Rock and Langley host equally large white enclaves.[74]

United States

[edit]

In the United States during the 1940s, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956, low-cost mortgages through the G.I. Bill, and residential redlining enabled white families to abandon inner cities in favor of suburban living and prevent ethnic minorities from doing the same. The result was severe urban decay that, by the 1960s, resulted in crumbling "ghettos". Prior to national data available in the 1950 US census, a migration pattern of disproportionate numbers of whites moving from cities to suburban communities was easily dismissed as merely anecdotal. Because American urban populations were still substantially growing, a relative decrease in one racial or ethnic component eluded scientific proof to the satisfaction of policy makers. In essence, data on urban population change had not been separated into what are now familiarly identified its "components." The first data set potentially capable of proving "white flight" was the 1950 census. But original processing of this data, on older-style tabulation machines by the US Census Bureau, failed to attain any approved level of statistical proof. It was rigorous reprocessing of the same raw data on a UNIVAC I, led by Donald J. Bogue of the Scripps Foundation and Emerson Seim of the University of Chicago, that scientifically established the reality of white flight.[75]

It was not simply a more powerful calculating instrument that placed the reality of white flight beyond a high hurdle of proof seemingly required for policy makers to consider taking action. Also instrumental were new statistical methods developed by Emerson Seim for disentangling deceptive counter-effects that had resulted when numerous cities reacted to departures of a wealthier tax base by annexation. In other words, central cities had been bringing back their new suburbs, such that families that had departed from inner cities were not even being counted as having moved from the cities.[76]

During the later 20th century, industrial restructuring led to major losses of jobs, leaving formerly middle-class working populations suffering poverty, with some unable to move away and seek employment elsewhere. Real estate prices often fall in areas of economic erosion, allowing persons with lower income to establish homes in such areas. Since the 1960s and changed immigration laws, the United States has received immigrants from Mexico, Central and South America, Asia, and Africa. Immigration has changed the demographics of both cities and suburbs, and the US has become a largely suburban nation, with the suburbs becoming more diverse. In addition, Latinos, the fastest growing minority group in the US, began to migrate away from traditional entry cities and to cities in the Southwest, such as Albuquerque, Phoenix and Tucson. In 2006, the increased number of Latinos had made whites a minority group in some western cities.[77]

Catalysts

[edit]
[edit]

In the 1930s, states outside the South, where racial segregation was legal, practiced unofficial segregation via exclusionary covenants in title deeds and real estate neighborhood redlining[78][79] – explicit, legally sanctioned racial discrimination in real property ownership and lending practices. Blacks were effectively barred from pursuing homeownership, even when they were able to afford it.[80] Suburban expansion was reserved for middle-class and working-class white people, facilitated by their increased wages incurred by the war effort and by subsequent federally guaranteed mortgages (VA, FHA, HOLC) available only to whites to buy new houses, such as those created by the Federal Housing Administration.[81] In 1948, the Supreme Court ruled that racially restrictive covenants could not constitutionaly be enforced by the states.[82]

Roads
[edit]

After World War II, aided by the construction of the Interstate Highway System, many white Americans began leaving industrial cities for new housing in suburbs.[80] The roads served to transport suburbanites to their city jobs, facilitating the development of suburbs, and shifting the tax base away from the city. This may have exacerbated urban decay.[83] In some cases, such as in the Southern United States, local governments used highway road constructions to deliberately divide and isolate black neighborhoods from goods and services, often within industrial corridors. In Birmingham, Alabama, the local government used the highway system to perpetuate the racial residence-boundaries the city established with a 1926 racial zoning law. Constructing interstate highways through majority-black neighborhoods eventually reduced the populations to the poorest proportion of people financially unable to leave their destroyed community.[84]

Blockbusting
[edit]

The real estate business practice of "blockbusting" was a for-profit catalyst for white flight, and a means to control non-white migration. By subterfuge, real estate agents would facilitate black people buying a house in a white neighborhood, either by buying the house themselves, or via a white proxy buyer, and then re-selling it to the black family. The remaining white inhabitants (alarmed by real estate agents and the local news media),[85] fearing devalued residential property, would quickly sell, usually at a loss. The realtors profited from these en masse sales and the ability to resell to the incoming black families, through arbitrage and the sales commissions from both groups. By such tactics, the racial composition of a neighborhood population was often changed completely in a few years.[86]

Association with urban decay
[edit]
Urban decay in the US: the South Bronx, New York City, was exemplar of the federal and local government's abandonment of the cities in the 1970s and 1980s; the Spanish sign reads "FALSAS PROMESAS", the English sign reads "BROKEN PROMISES".

Urban decay is the sociological process whereby a city, or part of a city, falls into disrepair and decrepitude. Its characteristics are depopulation, economic restructuring, abandoned buildings, high local unemployment (and thus poverty),[87] fragmented families, political disenfranchisement, crime, and a desolate, inhospitable city landscape. White flight contributed to the draining of cities' tax bases when middle-class people left. Abandoned properties attracted criminals and street gangs, contributing to crime.[87]

In the 1970s and 1980s, urban decay was associated with Western cities, especially in North America and parts of Europe. In that time, major structural changes in global economies, transportation, and government policy created the economic, then social, conditions resulting in urban decay.[88]

White flight in North America started to reverse in the 1990s, when the rich suburbanites returned to cities, gentrifying the decayed urban neighborhoods.[80][89]

Government-aided white flight
[edit]
Aerial view of Levittown, Pennsylvania c. 1959

New municipalities were established beyond the abandoned city's jurisdiction to avoid the legacy costs of maintaining city infrastructures; instead new governments spent taxes to establish suburban infrastructures. The federal government contributed to white flight and the early decay of non-white city neighborhoods by withholding maintenance capital mortgages, thus making it difficult for the communities to either retain or attract middle-class residents.[90]

The new suburban communities limited the emigration of poor and non-white residents from the city by restrictive zoning; thus, few lower-middle-class people could afford a house in the suburbs. Many all-white suburbs were eventually annexed to the cities their residents had left. For instance, Milwaukee, Wisconsin partially annexed towns such as Granville; the then mayor, Frank Zeidler, complained about the socially destructive "Iron Ring" of new municipalities incorporated in the post–World War II decade.[91] Analogously, semi-rural communities, such as Oak Creek, South Milwaukee, and Franklin, formally incorporated as discrete entities to escape urban annexation. Wisconsin state law had allowed Milwaukee's annexation of such rural and suburban regions that did not qualify for discrete incorporation per the legal incorporation standards.[92][93]

Desegregation of schools
[edit]

In some areas, the post–World War II racial desegregation of the public schools catalyzed white flight. In 1954, the US Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education (1954) ordered the de jure termination of the "separate, but equal" legal racism established with the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) case in the 19th century. It declared that segregation of public schools was unconstitutional. Many southern jurisdictions mounted massive resistance to the policy. In some cases, white parents withdrew their children from public schools and established private religious schools instead. These schools, termed segregation academies, sprung up in the American South between the late 1950s and mid-1970s and allowed parents to prevent their children from being enrolled in racially mixed schools.[94]

Upon desegregation in 1957 in Baltimore, Maryland, the Clifton Park Junior High School had 2,023 white students and 34 black students; ten years later, it had twelve white students and 2,037 black students. In northwest Baltimore, Garrison Junior High School's student body declined from 2,504 whites and twelve blacks to 297 whites and 1,263 blacks in that period.[95] At the same time, the city's working class population declined because of the loss of industrial jobs as heavy industry restructured.

In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), the Supreme Court ordered the desegregation busing of poor black students to suburban white schools, and suburban white students to the city to try to integrate student populations. In Milliken v. Bradley (1974), the dissenting Justice William Douglas observed, "The inner core of Detroit is now rather solidly black; and the blacks, we know, in many instances are likely to be poorer." Likewise, in 1977, the Federal decision in Penick v. The Columbus Board of Education (1977) accelerated white flight from Columbus, Ohio. Although the racial desegregation of schools affected only public school districts, the most vehement opponents of racial desegregation have sometimes been whites whose children attended private schools.[96][97]

A secondary, non-geographic consequence of school desegregation and busing was "cultural" white flight: withdrawing white children from the mixed-race public school system and sending them to private schools unaffected by US federal integration laws. In 1970, when the United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered the Pasadena Unified School District desegregated, the proportion of white students (54%) reflected the school district's proportion of whites (53%). Once the federally ordered school desegregation began, whites who could afford private schools withdrew their children from the racially diverse Pasadena public school system. By 2004, Pasadena had 63 private schools educating some 33% of schoolchildren, while white students made up only 16% of the public school populace. The Pasadena Unified School District superintendent characterized public schools as "like the bogey-man" to whites. He implemented policies to attract white parents to the racially diverse Pasadena public school district.[98]

Crime
[edit]

Studies suggest that rising crime rates were one of the reasons that white households left cities for suburbs in the 1960s and 1970s.[20][99] Samuel Kye (2018) cites several studies that identified "factors such as crime and neighborhood deterioration, rather than racial prejudice, as more robust determinants of white flight".[100] Ellen and O'Regan (2010) found that lower crime rates in city centers are associated with less out-migration to suburbs, but they did not find an effect on lower levels of crime attracting new households to the city.[101]

Oceania

[edit]

Australia

[edit]

In Sydney, Australian-born minority (white and non-white) people in Fairfield and Canterbury fell by three percentage points, six percentage points in Auburn, and three percentage points in Strathfield between 1991 and 1996. Only in Liverpool, one of the more fast growth areas of Sydney, did both the Australia-born and overseas-born male population increase over the 1991-1996 period. However, the rate of growth of the overseas-born was far greater than that of the Australia-born, thus the sharp increase in Liverpool's population share from 43.5 per cent to 49 per cent by 1996. The Australia-born movers from the south-western suburbs relocated to Penrith in the northwest and Gosford and Wyong in the northeast.[102]

According to the New South Wales Secondary Principals Council and the University of Western Sydney, public schools in that state have experienced white flight to private and Catholic schools wherever there is a large presence of Aboriginal and Middle Eastern students.[103]

In 2018, NSW Labor Opposition leader Luke Foley talked about White flight in Fairfield, where he stated that Iraqi and Syrian refugees are replacing the Anglo-Australians in the suburb, although he later apologised for the comments.[104][105][106]

New Zealand

[edit]

White flight has been observed in low socioeconomic decile schools in New Zealand. Data from the Ministry of Education found that 60,000 New Zealand European students attended low-decile schools (situated in the poorest areas) in 2000, and had fallen to half that number in 2010. The same data also found that high-decile schools (which are in the wealthiest areas) had a corresponding increase in New Zealand European students.[107] The Ministry claimed demographic changes were behind the shifts, but teacher and principal associations have attributed white flight to racial and class stigmas of low-decile schools, which commonly have majority Maori and Pacific Islander rolls.[108]

In one specific case, white flight has significantly affected Sunset Junior High School in a suburb of the city of Rotorua, with the total number of students reduced from 700 to 70 in the early 1980s. All but one of the 70 students are Maori. The area has a concentration of poor, low-skilled people, with struggling families, and many single mothers. Related to the social problems of the families, student educational achievement is low on the standard reading test.[109]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
White flight refers to the substantial out-migration of white residents from central cities to suburbs , accelerating after as African American populations grew in urban areas due to the Great Migration. This pattern, most pronounced from the 1950s through the 1970s, involved whites departing neighborhoods where the proportion of black residents increased, often leading to rapid racial tipping points and heightened residential segregation. Empirical analyses indicate that for every black arrival in a city, approximately 2.7 whites left for the suburbs, a response not fully explained by rising costs but tied directly to racial demographic shifts. The phenomenon contributed significantly to postwar , with white flight accounting for about 20% of the growth in suburban populations during this era, while central cities experienced white population declines of up to 20-30% in affected metros. Key triggers included school desegregation efforts following the 1954 decision and forced busing in the 1970s, which correlated with accelerated white exits from urban districts. Urban riots in the , alongside rising rates in diversifying neighborhoods, further incentivized departures, as whites sought areas with lower violence and better-maintained public services. Studies confirm that white mobility was responsive to the size of the local black population, with out-migration probabilities rising sharply as minority shares exceeded 10-20%, independent of socioeconomic factors like income or education levels. Controversies surrounding white flight center on its causation, with some attributing it solely to racial , while data-driven research highlights rational preferences for neighborhoods offering superior schools, safety, and property value stability amid correlated declines in urban . This migration exacerbated urban fiscal strains, as wealthier white taxpayers relocated to suburbs with independent , leaving cities with concentrated and reduced tax bases. Though less acute today, echoes persist in ongoing patterns of white avoidance of high-minority areas, underscoring enduring preferences for racial homogeneity in residential choices.

Definition and Conceptual Framework

Core Definition and Characteristics

White flight refers to the large-scale relocation of white residents from central cities to surrounding suburbs, particularly during the postwar era from to 1970, in direct response to increasing populations in urban areas. This phenomenon was most pronounced in northern and cities receiving waves of migrants from the rural , totaling around four million individuals during this period. Empirical analysis of data reveals that cities experiencing a rise in share of population saw accelerated white movement to suburbs, with each arrival associated with approximately 2.7 white departures from the central city. Key characteristics include its concentration among middle-class whites seeking to maintain racial homogeneity, often facilitated by new suburban housing developments like , which initially enforced restrictive covenants barring non-white occupancy. Between 1960 and 1970, white populations in many central cities declined sharply; for instance, metropolitan areas with significant black in-migration exhibited white rates up to 15 percentage points higher than comparable cities without such inflows. Unlike general driven by economic factors such as lower taxes and expanded , white flight demonstrated a specific sensitivity to local racial composition changes, as evidenced by higher departure rates in neighborhoods crossing perceived "tipping points" of minority presence around 10-20%. The process contributed to heightened urban-rural divides, with central cities retaining disproportionate shares of —64% of metropolitan poor resided there by 1973—while suburbs grew whiter and more affluent. Studies confirm that white mobility was not evenly distributed but clustered in response to proximate minority , underscoring a pattern of avoidance rather than uniform dispersal. This migration was predominantly intra-metropolitan, preserving overall metropolitan white populations but reshaping their toward peripheral areas.

Distinction from Economic Migration and Gentrification

White flight differs from economic migration in that the former is characterized by white residents' departure from urban neighborhoods specifically in response to increasing shares of black or other minority populations, rather than solely pursuit of better employment or housing affordability. Empirical analyses of postwar U.S. data indicate that each black arrival in central cities prompted approximately 2.7 white departures to suburbs, accounting for about 20% of suburban white population growth between 1940 and 1970, even after controlling for broader economic expansions like postwar manufacturing booms. This pattern persisted into later decades, with individual-level studies showing whites' annual probability of exiting a neighborhood rising significantly as the local black population share grew, independent of changes in local income or job markets. In contrast, economic migration encompasses broader relocations driven by factors such as lower suburban taxes, superior school quality, or industrial shifts, which affected populations regardless of racial demographics; for instance, white-to-white suburban moves occurred without corresponding minority influxes, highlighting white flight's unique tie to racial aversion. Gentrification represents the inverse dynamic to white flight, involving the influx of higher-income, often white, residents into previously devalued, minority-majority urban areas, resulting in rising property values and potential displacement of original inhabitants through economic pressures rather than demographic flight. Unlike white flight's exodus amid racial turnover—evident in mid-20th-century city cores where white shares plummeted from over 70% to below 50% in many cases amid black in-migration— entails selective reinvestment and demographic reversal, frequently following crime declines that made areas more attractive. Data from urban markets show this "white return" concentrated in coastal cities, with whites comprising a growing share of buyers in historically black neighborhoods, yet comprising only a fraction of overall dynamics compared to ongoing white flight in non-gentrifying areas. Thus, while both phenomena involve racial shifts, white flight reflects avoidance of integration's perceived costs, whereas signals preference for revitalized spaces post-decline, often without the original triggers of minority-led neighborhood change.

Causes and Contributing Factors

Primary Attributed Causes: Racial Prejudice vs. Rational Choice

White flight has been attributed to racial prejudice by some scholars, who posit that it reflects irrational white aversion to demographic integration, often modeled through indicators of symbolic or traditional bias influencing residential decisions. This perspective draws on surveys linking white out-migration to perceived threats of racial change, interpreting avoidance as rooted in rather than material concerns. In contrast, empirical evidence supports a rational choice framework, where departures respond to tangible deteriorations in neighborhood conditions, including elevated , diminished quality, and falling values following racial transitions. A 2002 national survey of recent movers found declining values and quality-of-life issues—such as and maintenance—as the most cited reasons for leaving integrated or minority-heavy areas, outranking explicit racial animus. Property records from transitioning U.S. cities in the mid-20th century document average value drops of 20-50% within 5-10 years of substantial black influx, correlating with increased vacancy rates and abandonment. Economist argues that white flight mirrors broader patterns of class-based avoidance, not inherent racial , as evidenced by similar exits from neighborhoods invaded by whites or even by lower-income members of one's own group. He cites historical data showing that stable, middle-class black communities in cities like experienced internal "flight" when poorer blacks arrived post-1940s, driven by rising disorder rather than skin color alone, paralleling white suburbanization. This aligns with studies attributing out-migration to concentration, where incoming groups' behavioral norms—linked to higher involvement—erode livability, independent of . FBI from 1960-1980 reveal rates in transitioning urban cores surging 2-3 times national averages, prompting families to prioritize safety and asset preservation via relocation. Academic models favoring often overlook these correlations, potentially reflecting institutional preferences for attitudinal explanations over socioeconomic causation, as critiqued in analyses of segregation persistence. Rational choice proponents counter that individuals weigh costs like proficiency declines—e.g., post-integration drops in test scores by 10-15% in affected —and property devaluation against staying, yielding net benefits from exit, especially with federal highway subsidies enabling suburban access after 1956. While isolated may contribute, aggregated data indicate rational adaptation to empirically verifiable risks predominates, as whites (and increasingly Asians and middle-class minorities) exhibit similar flight patterns in response to disorder across ethnic contexts.

Empirical Correlations: Crime, Schools, and Property Values

Empirical studies have documented correlations between shifts in neighborhood racial composition toward greater non-white majorities and subsequent increases in reported rates, which in turn contribute to white out-migration. For instance, by Cullen and Levitt (1999) analyzed from U.S. metropolitan areas between 1960 and 1990, finding that a 10% increase in central city rates was associated with a 1-2% rise in suburban white share, indicating that crime served as a key driver of urban-to-suburban relocation. Similarly, Quillian and (2001) examined perceptions of neighborhood in Chicago, revealing a strong bivariate correlation between higher black shares and elevated rates, with residents' assessments aligning closely with actual victimization rather than mere . These patterns suggest that observable rises in violent and property s, often coinciding with demographic transitions, prompted rational avoidance by white families seeking safer environments. In education, white flight has been linked to declining public school performance metrics as minority enrollment increases, prompting exits to suburbs or private alternatives. Epple and Romano (2002), using National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data, found that white households were more likely to enroll children in private schools when local public schools had higher proportions of non-white students, with elasticities indicating a 5-10% increase in private enrollment for every 10% rise in minority share, tied to lower test scores and higher dropout rates in affected districts. Court-ordered desegregation efforts in the 1970s, such as those in the South, correlated with 6-12% drops in white public school enrollment, as documented by Reber (2005) using census data from affected cities like Atlanta and Charlotte, where white families cited deteriorating academic outcomes and discipline issues post-integration. Longitudinal analyses, including those by Johnson (2011), further show that desegregation narrowed some input gaps like per-pupil spending but failed to sustain long-term quality improvements, exacerbating flight as white students transferred to higher-performing suburban systems. Property values exhibit a parallel decline during periods of rapid racial turnover, accelerating white exodus. Cutler and Glaeser (1997), studying U.S. cities from 1970 onward, estimated that neighborhoods crossing a 10% threshold experienced 10-20% drops in housing prices relative to stable areas, attributable to anticipated and risks rather than supply constraints. More recent work by Anagol et al. (2019) on post-1968 transitions confirmed that racial shifts toward non-white majorities led to sustained value erosion, with home prices falling by up to 15% in transitioning blocks, as buyers discounted future stability amid rising vacancies and foreclosures. Boustan (2010), analyzing 1950-1970 census data, quantified that in-migration to growing metros raised vacancy rates and depressed prices by 5-8%, incentivizing sellers to relocate before further depreciation. These dynamics underscore a self-reinforcing cycle where perceived and realized declines in asset values, driven by correlated social indicators, hastened departures.

Role of Government Policies and Incentives


Federal housing policies in the mid-20th century United States significantly incentivized white suburbanization by providing subsidized mortgage insurance and loans primarily accessible to white families for homes in racially homogeneous suburbs. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), established in 1934, insured mortgages but systematically favored developments like Levittown, Pennsylvania, where restrictive covenants barred non-white buyers until 1950, enabling mass production of affordable single-family homes for white veterans. This created a stark incentive structure: white households gained access to appreciating assets through low-down-payment, long-term loans under the GI Bill's VA guarantees, which by 1950 accounted for over half of suburban home purchases, while urban properties in minority areas were "redlined" and denied financing, accelerating capital flight from cities.
Redlining practices, formalized through maps from 1933 and adopted by the FHA, graded neighborhoods "D" (hazardous) if they contained racial minorities, denying federal backing and private investment to urban cores, which depressed property values and prompted white residents to relocate to subsidized suburbs. Empirical analysis shows that FHA-insured suburbs experienced rapid white population growth, with cities like seeing white exodus rates doubling in redlined-adjacent areas post-1940, as families pursued stable, appreciating insulated from urban integration pressures. These policies not only facilitated physical relocation but also entrenched economic disparities, as white suburbanites benefited from federal guarantees that covered 98% of FHA loans by the , while urban dwellers faced credit scarcity. The funded over 40,000 miles of interstate highways, enabling efficient commutes from suburbs to urban jobs and directly contributing to white flight by bisecting minority neighborhoods in cities like and , displacing over 475,000 low-income households by 1970 and prompting further suburban migration. Studies indicate that proximity to new highways increased suburban white population shares by 10-15% in metropolitan areas between 1950 and 1980, as the infrastructure reduced the time-cost of fleeing urban centers amid rising integration. This federal investment, totaling $425 billion in equivalent modern dollars, prioritized automobile-dependent sprawl over , reinforcing incentives for whites to abandon city tax bases. Public housing initiatives, initially segregated under the , later concentrated low-income minorities in high-rise urban projects after 1949 policy shifts ended -only allocations, fostering localized poverty and crime that deterred remaining residents. By the , over 80% of tenants were non- in major cities, correlating with accelerated departure as property values plummeted and set in, exemplified by Chicago's Cabrini-Green complex where vacancy rates exceeded 20% amid surrounding flight. These policies inadvertently amplified flight incentives by subsidizing urban concentration of social challenges, reducing city appeal for middle-class s seeking family stability.

Historical Origins

Pre-20th Century Precursors

The influx of Irish immigrants during the Great Famine (1845–1852) precipitated early patterns of residential avoidance in U.S. cities, as native-born Protestants sought distance from the newcomers' concentrated settlements amid rising urban disorder. Approximately 1.7 million Irish arrived in this period, overwhelming cities like New York—where their numbers swelled from 50,000 in 1840 to over 130,000 by 1850—and , forming impoverished enclaves linked to heightened disease outbreaks, such as cholera epidemics, and nativist perceptions of moral decay, intemperance, and job competition. Nativist organizations, including the Know-Nothing Party, amplified these concerns by portraying Catholic immigrants as threats to Anglo-Protestant cultural dominance, fueling demands for separation rather than assimilation. Technological advancements in urban transport, particularly streetcars introduced in the , enabled the initial suburban exodus of affluent native-born residents to nascent peripheral developments, prefiguring later flight dynamics. In , for instance, lines extending to areas like Roxbury and by the 1860s supported population shifts where middle-class families relocated to escape immigrant-dense cores, prioritizing cleaner environments, lower densities, and preserved social homogeneity; by 1870, suburban growth in such corridors had begun absorbing significant native-born outflows. Similar patterns emerged in , where streetcar extensions to Germantown and Chestnut Hill drew Protestant elites wary of Irish Catholic majorities in central wards, with suburban lots marketed explicitly for their separation from urban "foreign" influences. These migrations, though limited by walking-city constraints and lacking the scale of 20th-century auto-enabled sprawl, established precedents for driven by ethnic and class anxieties over neighborhood composition changes. Antebellum encounters with free Black populations in northern cities provided additional, albeit smaller-scale, analogs, as whites in places like and imposed informal barriers or relocated amid growing Black enclaves post-1800. Philadelphia's Black population rose from 1,500 in 1790 to over 20,000 by 1830, prompting white flight to outlying townships and early zoning-like restrictions to preserve exclusivity, reflecting causal links between demographic shifts and property value fears akin to later mechanisms. Such responses, rooted in against non-European-descended groups, underscored enduring patterns of majority avoidance without relying on formal policies, contrasting with the voluntary yet prejudice-fueled relocations from European immigrants.

Post-World War II Suburbanization in the United States

Following , the experienced rapid , with the suburban share of the population increasing from 19.5% in 1940 to 30.7% by 1960, while homeownership rates rose from 44% to nearly 62%. This shift was fueled by economic prosperity, the , and returning veterans seeking single-family homes, as urban housing shortages persisted amid wartime production priorities. By 1950, suburbs housed 23.3% of the metropolitan population, compared to 32.8% in central cities, setting the stage for further deconcentration as white residents departed urban areas. Federal policies significantly accelerated this trend through subsidized lending and infrastructure. The GI Bill of 1944 provided low-interest VA-guaranteed mortgages to over 2 million veterans, enabling widespread suburban purchases, but implementation at local levels discriminated against veterans, with fewer than 100 of 67,000 insured mortgages in New York and going to nonwhites. Similarly, the (FHA), established in 1934, insured mortgages favoring new suburban developments while urban neighborhoods as high-risk, directing only 2% of $120 billion in from 1934 to 1962 toward nonwhites and upholding racially restrictive covenants. These practices created whites-only suburbs, exemplified by , where developers imposed covenants barring nonwhite occupancy until challenged in 1957, when the first family faced riots. The authorized the , constructing over 40,000 miles of roads that enhanced suburban accessibility and contributed to central city population declines of about 18% per new radial highway by facilitating white commuters' exodus. This infrastructure, combined with exclusionary zoning and lending, entrenched , as white families leveraged policy advantages to relocate from cities amid the Great Migration of southern blacks northward, laying foundational patterns for later white flight when urban integration intensified. The resulting homeownership disparities persisted, with white rates reaching 72.1% by 2020 versus 43.4% for black households, underscoring the long-term effects of these postwar dynamics.

Academic Research and Models

Tipping Point and Checkerboard Theories

The describes a threshold in neighborhood racial composition beyond which majority residents, typically whites in the context of U.S. urban segregation, rapidly depart, leading to a swift transition to minority-majority status. Formulated by economist in his 1971 paper "Dynamic Models of Segregation," the model assumes individuals have a preferred minimum share of same-race neighbors—often as low as 20-30%—and once the minority share exceeds this tolerance, sequential moves create a feedback loop of accelerating flight. Empirical observations from 1950s and suggested tipping thresholds around 10-20% black population, after which white out-migration rates surged, often emptying neighborhoods within years. Schelling's analysis emphasized that this dynamic arises not from outright but from mild, self-reinforcing preferences for similarity, amplified by spatial interdependence where one family's move signals decline to others. Closely related, Schelling's checkerboard model simulates segregation on a grid akin to a chessboard, with cells occupied by agents of two types (e.g., black and white disks) representing racial groups. Agents relocate to vacant cells if the local proportion of the opposite type exceeds their tolerance threshold, even if they accept substantial integration overall. Starting from random or mildly clustered distributions, iterations reveal emergent clustering: isolated minorities attract same-type inflows while majorities flee, yielding complete segregation far beyond initial preferences. For instance, if agents tolerate only 40% opposite neighbors, the model predicts total separation, mirroring white flight patterns where integrated blocks fragmented into homogeneous enclaves. These models integrate tipping and checkerboard elements into a unified framework, where local dissatisfaction propagates citywide via chain reactions, explaining why stable integration proves elusive without enforced thresholds. Schelling drew from real-world data, such as reports of "panic selling" in response to initial entries, to argue that rational avoidance of perceived risks—like falling property values or social mismatch—drives outcomes independent of coordinated malice. Subsequent adaptations, including spatial extensions, confirm that vacancy rates and move costs modulate tipping speed but not the end-state segregation. In white flight applications, the theories underscore causal mechanisms rooted in individual choices aggregating to macro patterns, rather than solely institutional forces.

Empirical Critiques and Alternative Explanations

Empirical evaluations of the tipping point model, popularized by , reveal limited support for uniform racial thresholds triggering mass exodus in observational data. Analyses of U.S. census tracts from 1950 to 1990 indicate that purported tipping levels—often cited around 10-20% minority share—vary substantially by and , with no consistent empirical threshold emerging across diverse contexts; instead, of white out-migration correlates more closely with localized surges in concentration and degradation than fixed demographic triggers. This variability undermines the model's predictive precision, as simulations assuming mild racial preferences fail to replicate observed stasis in many integrated neighborhoods where persists. Alternative explanations frame white flight as a rational response to measurable declines in urban neighborhood quality, particularly rising and falling educational outcomes, rather than undifferentiated . Econometric studies of 1960-1980 metropolitan data show that a doubling of central rates—such as the national rate increase from 5.1 to 10.2 per 100,000—predicts accelerated white , with each additional reported per capita associated with roughly 0.8% population loss from urban cores. In Chicago's South Shore, for instance, rates tripled by the mid-1970s amid demographic shifts, preceding sharp property value drops of up to 50% and prompting middle-class departures independent of overt racial animus surveys. Similarly, parental mobility decisions track public school performance metrics: districts experiencing proficiency declines and heightened disciplinary incidents—often linked to enrollment changes—see heightened enrollment or suburban transfers, as evidenced by 1970s National Longitudinal Surveys where concerns outweighed racial composition in stated preferences. These patterns extend beyond whites, suggesting broader aversion to correlated risks rather than group-specific bias. Multiethnic analyses of Miami-Dade County (1989-2001) reveal that households exhibit stronger flight from black-majority areas (26% odds increase per 11% black share rise) than Anglos, while blacks show minimal response to ethnic composition, implying preferences for socioeconomic compatibility over pan-racial prejudice. Critiques of prejudice-centric models highlight potential omitted variables: racial shares often proxy unmeasured behavioral indicators, such as FBI documenting persistent disparities in violent offense rates (e.g., blacks comprising 50%+ of arrests despite 13% population share in 1970s-1980s cities), which rationally inform location choices without invoking animus. While some regressions retain racial effects post-controls, endogeneity in —where influxes precede crime spikes—supports causal realism prioritizing amenity erosion over attitudinal surveys prone to .

Manifestations in North America

United States: Key Cities and Catalysts

In , the white population declined from 1,553,000 in 1950 (84% of the total city population of 1,850,000) to 1,200,000 in 1960 (72% of 1,670,000), further dropping to 844,000 in 1970 (56% of 1,511,000) and 267,000 in 1980 (22% of 1,203,000), as the black population share rose from 16% to 63%. This exodus accelerated after the July 1967 riots, which lasted five days, caused 43 deaths (33 blacks and 10 whites), injured over 1,189 people, led to 7,200 arrests, and destroyed 2,509 buildings with property damage exceeding $40 million in 1967 dollars. The unrest, triggered by a on an unlicensed bar but fueled by longstanding grievances over police brutality and amid the Great Migration's demographic shifts, prompted immediate white departures; between 1967 and 1970, over 100,000 whites left the city proper for suburbs like Warren and . Empirical analyses attribute much of this to rational responses to rising and property value drops, with cities experiencing larger black inflows from 1940-1970 seeing 20% of postwar suburbanization driven by urban white relocation. Chicago exhibited parallel trends, with the white population falling from approximately 2,800,000 in 1960 (72% of the 3,550,000 total) to 1,800,000 by 1980 (40% of 3,000,000), as black residents increased via the Great Migration. Catalysts included the 1966 Division Street riots on the West Side, sparked by a police shooting and resulting in three deaths, 134 injuries, and $3 million in damage, alongside a national violent crime rate that quadrupled from 161 per 100,000 in 1960 to over 700 by 1980, disproportionately affecting urban cores. Studies link these outflows to crime surges and school desegregation efforts, such as busing post-Brown v. Board of Education (1954), which correlated with white enrollment drops from 70% in 1960 to under 20% by 1980 in city schools; econometric models show each black arrival prompting 2.7 white departures, independent of housing prices alone. Los Angeles saw its white population share decrease from 78% in 1960 (of 2,479,000 total) to 54% by 1980 (of 2,968,000), hastened by the August 1965 , which involved 34 deaths, 1,032 injuries, 3,438 arrests, and $40 million in damage over six days, ignited by a amid tensions over and policing. The violence, occurring in a neighborhood that was 99% black by 1965 after earlier white exits, accelerated flight to suburbs like the , where white populations grew amid citywide property value instability. Cross-city data from 1960-1980 confirm riots and correlated spikes—violent offenses rose 300% in affected areas—as key accelerators, with white mobility tied to empirical fears of disorder over abstract . Other cities like and followed suit, with white shares halving between 1950 and 1980 amid similar 1960s unrest (e.g., Cleveland's 1966 Hough riots killing four and displacing thousands) and crime waves that depopulated centers by 10-20% per decade. Overall, U.S. Census analyses of 100 largest cities show white flight explaining 20-30% of suburban growth, primarily responsive to black in-migration's association with elevated risks to safety and assets.

Canada: Urban Examples

In Toronto's suburban areas, such as , white residents have increasingly relocated amid rapid influxes of South Asian immigrants, leading to a marked decline in the white population share. Brampton's population grew from approximately 433,000 in 2006 to over 656,000 by 2021, with visible minorities rising to over 80% of residents, prompting what local reports describe as white flight driven by unease over cultural and demographic shifts. By 2016, white residents constituted less than 25% of Brampton's population, down from higher shares in prior decades, as families cited changing community dynamics and infrastructure strains. Statistics Canada projections indicate that these trends will intensify, with visible minorities expected to comprise 63% of the Census Metropolitan Area's population by 2031, rendering those of European origin a numerical minority in the region. patterns have concentrated visible minorities further in urban cores and inner suburbs, while native-born Canadians of European descent have moved outward to exurban or rural-adjacent areas within or interprovincially. Net interprovincial outflows from the area reached record levels, exceeding 40,000 residents annually in recent years, correlating with high housing costs and demographic homogenization in immigrant-heavy neighborhoods. In Metro Vancouver, similar dynamics emerged, with a net outflow of 9,345 white residents to other parts of recorded in the year ending July 2016, amid visible minority populations surpassing 50% metro-wide by 2021. Suburbs like Richmond and transitioned from majority-white to majority-Asian enclaves between the 1990s and 2010s, as East and South Asian immigration accelerated, prompting white departures to peripheral regions or out-of-province. data project whites comprising only 41% of Metro Vancouver's population by 2031, reflecting sustained out-migration alongside low white birth rates and high immigration. Overall net migration from mirrored Toronto's, with over 40,000 annual losses contributing to deconcentration of European-origin groups from the urban core. These urban examples in differ from U.S. patterns by emphasizing immigration-driven shifts over internal racial migrations, yet exhibit parallel causal mechanisms: preferences for culturally familiar environments, concerns over school quality and property values amid rapid change, and policy-facilitated suburban expansion. Empirical analyses link such relocations to tendencies, where white households avoid majority-minority areas, exacerbating enclave formation without explicit legal barriers.

International Examples

Europe: Nordic and Western Cases

In Sweden, ethnic residential segregation in cities like , , and has intensified since the 1990s, driven primarily by native ' low in-migration to immigrant-dense neighborhoods rather than high out-migration rates, a termed "Swedish avoidance." Between 1990 and 2000, native in-migration to areas with over 20% foreign-born residents was markedly lower than to native-majority areas, while out-mobility, though elevated in distressed neighborhoods, affected all groups and was not uniquely pronounced among natives. This dynamic has led to "white flight" effects in practice, with native population growth positive only in predominantly white neighborhoods and declining elsewhere as non-European rose, particularly after 2015. Denmark exhibits similar native out-migration patterns, with the probability of residents leaving neighborhoods increasing alongside the share of immigrants, especially non-Western ones, based on register data from 2008 to 2015. In , native families, including parents of -age children, show from areas with high concentrations of non-Western immigrant students, as evidenced by discontinuities at school catchment borders where enrollment is geography-based. Across , segregation levels are highest in , where ethnic isolation in major cities exceeds those in or , correlating with native preferences for culturally similar environments amid rising inflows. In the , residents departed at a rate of approximately 620,000 between 2001 and 2011, coinciding with a net population gain of over one million largely from , reducing the share from 58% to 45%. This exodus, concentrated in inner-city areas like , reflects avoidance of rapid demographic shifts, with out-migration tripling compared to the prior decade and correlating with rising non-European immigrant densities. Similar patterns appear in other English cities, where native departure rates exceed national averages in diverse locales, though some analyses emphasize economic factors like housing costs alongside ethnic preferences. The Netherlands provides evidence of "white flight" among native Dutch in and metropolitan areas, where gravity models of migration from 2008–2012 show natives relocating to less diverse neighborhoods as ethnic minority shares (e.g., Turkish, Moroccan, ) rise, leading to clustering and ethnic drift. In 's IJburg district, dissatisfaction with increasing immigrant presence prompted native outflows by 2014, mirroring school-level "white flight" where parents avoid "black schools" with over 70% non-native pupils. Native out-migration accelerates at minority shares above 20–30%, per tipping point analyses, though moderates the effect. France shows less direct parallels to Anglo-American white flight, with native Europeans concentrating in city centers or affluent suburbs while non-European immigrants segregate into peripheral banlieues like those around Paris, formed via post-1970s public housing policies rather than mass native suburban exodus. Native avoidance contributes to this spatial divide, but empirical studies highlight policy-driven clustering over voluntary flight, with limited quantitative evidence of widespread native relocation triggered by immigrant influxes comparable to Nordic or UK cases.

Africa: Post-Colonial Transitions

In the wake of across during the mid-20th century, European communities—primarily French, , and British—experienced rapid as newly independent governments implemented policies prioritizing indigenous majorities, often amid violence and economic disruption. This exodus, peaking between 1962 and the late 1970s, depleted skilled labor and capital, contributing to post-independence instability in several nations. In , following from on July 5, 1962, approximately 800,000 European s known as pieds-noirs—of French, Spanish, Italian, and Maltese origin—fled to mainland within months, driven by reprisal killings, property seizures, and the collapse of settler privileges under the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) regime. Similar patterns emerged in colonies; after and gained in 1975 following the in , over 500,000 s evacuated amid civil wars, guerrilla insurgencies by groups like the MPLA and , and forced nationalizations that targeted white-owned farms, businesses, and infrastructure. Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 delayed but did not prevent white flight; upon transition to in 1980 under Robert Mugabe's ZANU-PF, the white population, which stood at around 220,000 at independence, plummeted as fears of land redistribution and ethnic violence prompted mass departures. By 1986, roughly 100,000 whites had left for destinations including , the , and , with the remainder accelerating after the 2000 fast-track land reforms that involved farm invasions and compensation shortfalls, reducing the community to about 70,000 by 2000. In Kenya, British settlers in the faced outflows after 1963 independence and the earlier Mau Mau uprising (1952–1960), with many selling estates under government buyback schemes amid land pressures and political uncertainty, though a core group retained holdings and the white population stabilized or grew modestly thereafter due to retained citizenship options. South Africa's transition from apartheid in 1994 marked a slower but sustained trend, with the share of the falling from 11% in 1996 to 8% by 2021, as over 1 million skilled professionals—disproportionately —departed for economic opportunities abroad amid rising crime rates, policies favoring non-whites in employment, and governance challenges under the . These movements were not merely racial but tied to tangible risks: (peaking at 89.7 sextillion percent in 2008), Angola's civil war (1975–2002) displacing settlers, and Algeria's post-independence purges, where European assets were largely expropriated without recourse. Empirical data from migration records underscore that while some returns occurred (e.g., limited repatriation to in the ), net losses reflected causal factors like policy-induced uncertainty rather than isolated , as corroborated by demographic censuses showing persistent declines absent countervailing .

Oceania: Australia and New Zealand

In Australia, patterns akin to white flight have emerged in major cities such as and , where Anglo-Australian residents have increasingly relocated from inner-urban and western suburbs characterized by rising non-European immigrant populations to outer suburbs or regional areas. For instance, in western Sydney electorates like those encompassing and Fairfield, the proportion of residents identifying as having ancestry declined from around 70% in the to approximately 30% by the 2010s, coinciding with post-1973 immigration policy liberalization that boosted arrivals from and the . This shift, described by New South Wales opposition leader in 2018 as "white flight," was attributed by some observers to concerns over school quality, crime rates, and cultural cohesion in diversifying neighborhoods, though critics labeled the term politically charged. Empirical data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics' 2021 Census indicate that overseas-born residents comprised 27.6% of the national , with concentrations in urban hubs driving localized ethnic shifts; however, broader segregation trends in cities like are primarily income-driven rather than strictly racial, as affluent households—disproportionately —seek homogeneous, higher-resource suburbs. In Melbourne's northwest, similar outflows from areas like Broadmeadows to growth corridors in the southeast have been documented, fueled by perceptions of declining public services amid demographic change. These movements parallel U.S. but are amplified by Australia's high rates, with net regional gains of 40,000 people annually in recent years from urban departures. In , white flight manifests prominently through parental choices in the system, particularly in , where European-descended () families avoid low-decile schools in south and west suburbs with high proportions of , , and recent immigrant students. Since the 1989 Tomorrow's Schools reforms introduced open enrollment and , enrollment of European students in such schools has plummeted; for example, some high schools report fewer than 5% pupils as of 2016, despite the city's overall European population at around 50%. Principals and researchers attribute this to perceptions of inferior quality tied to socioeconomic disadvantage, though studies emphasize that standards do not vary systematically by , suggesting fear-driven avoidance over empirical deficits. Residential segregation in New Zealand has also intensified modestly since the 1990s, with ethnic diversity rising due to —over 25% of Auckland's population foreign-born by 2006—but remaining lower than in comparable Western cities; concentrations persist in affluent eastern suburbs, while migrants cluster in the south and west. This pattern, quantified in school enrollment data, reflects class-linked preferences for environments perceived as safer and academically stronger, though community leaders argue it perpetuates inequities without addressing root causes like . Overall, in both nations, these dynamics are intertwined with and policy choices rather than overt racial animus, distinguishing them from North American precedents while yielding similar urban-rural divides.

Consequences and Long-Term Effects

Impacts on Departing and Remaining Populations

The out-migration of white residents to suburbs provided departing families with access to public schools featuring higher per capita spending—averaging 20% more than in central cities across 39 standard metropolitan statistical areas studied in the —and generally lower tax rates, with suburbs having reduced effective rates in 36 of those areas. These moves also correlated with relocation to lower-crime environments and newer stock, enhancing overall quality of life amid urban challenges like density and service strains in the postwar era. Empirical analyses attribute about 20% of suburban population growth from 1940 to 1970 to such relocations, driven by responses to central-city demographic shifts. For remaining urban populations, white flight depleted municipal tax bases through the exodus of higher-income households, reducing revenues that fund schools, , and public safety. This fiscal erosion concentrated poverty in central cities, where 64% of metropolitan-area poor resided by 1973, straining service provision and correlating with such as business flight and infrastructure neglect. In , white population fell from 85.9% in 1950 to 49.6% in 1980, accompanying a rate surge from 10.5 to 30.7 per 100,000 between 1960 and 1990, alongside neighborhood vacancy rates reaching 20% on commercial strips by the mid-1970s. Specific cases illustrate intensified effects: lost 30%–40% of its college-educated residents to suburbs from 1965 to 1970, far outpacing losses among less-educated groups and contributing to a shrinking base that hampered school funding and municipal solvency amid . Quantitative models show black in-migrations prompting white departures at a ratio of roughly two whites per black arrival across 70 metro areas from 1940 to 1970, yielding net urban drops of up to 17% in affected cities and 1.4%–2.1% relative declines in central-city housing prices.

Effects on Urban Policy and Segregation Patterns

White flight contributed to the erosion of central city tax bases, as middle-class white households departed for suburbs offering lower property taxes and superior public services, thereby constraining municipal revenues and fostering fiscal dependencies on state and federal aid. This demographic shift, peaking in the and , compelled urban policymakers to prioritize short-term revenue measures, such as higher taxes on remaining residents and businesses, which further deterred investment and accelerated decay in cities like and , where white population losses exceeded 20% between 1960 and 1970. In response, federal initiatives like the (1966) and Community Development Block Grants (1974) aimed to rehabilitate inner-city infrastructure, yet these often failed to reverse out-migration due to underlying mismatches between policy incentives and residents' preferences for safer, higher-quality suburban environments. Efforts to counteract segregation through mandatory school busing, upheld by decisions like Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971), inadvertently intensified white flight by prompting mass exits from urban districts; for instance, in , busing orders in 1974 correlated with a 15-20% white enrollment drop in affected schools within a decade, as families sought private or suburban alternatives. Such policies, intended to dismantle segregation, instead reinforced residential sorting by accelerating the concentration of minority populations in urban cores, where dissimilarity indices—a measure of evenness in racial distribution—reached highs of 0.80 or above in major metros by the mid-1970s. Empirical analyses attribute 30-34% of metropolitan segregation to white departures triggered by black in-migration during the postwar era, with each additional black arrival prompting approximately 2.5-2.7 white exits at the neighborhood level, independent of housing price effects alone. This dynamic perpetuated patterns of concentrated , as departing whites left behind neighborhoods with declining property values and services, influencing subsequent policies like the Fair Housing Act amendments and , though these measures yielded limited integration absent addressing root drivers such as crime rates and school performance disparities. Long-term, these segregation patterns have sustained urban-suburban divides, with 2020 data showing persistent racial isolation in cities where flight originated, complicating policy efforts to equalize fiscal capacities across jurisdictions.

Modern Developments and Debates

Post-2020 Accelerants: Riots, Pandemic, and Remote Work

The widespread urban unrest following the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, contributed to a sharp rise in across major U.S. cities, exacerbating incentives for residents to relocate. Protests in over 140 cities often escalated into riots involving , , and assaults, prompting calls to "defund the police" and reductions in staffing or in places like , New York, and Portland. Homicide rates surged 30% nationwide in 2020 compared to 2019, with aggravated assaults rising 10%, patterns that persisted into 2021 in many jurisdictions. These developments heightened perceptions of disorder and vulnerability, particularly in densely populated urban cores, accelerating outflows among higher-income groups, including working-age who departed large cities at rates exceeding those of other demographics. The , declared March 11, , intensified urban depopulation by highlighting risks of high- living, disruptions to daily life, and prolonged closures that disproportionately affected families. Between July and July 2021, over 1.2 million people exited large urban counties, contributing to a net loss of approximately two million from America's biggest cities by 2022. Urban core populations declined by 0.91% during the height of restrictions, with at least 20% of internal migrations directly tied to pandemic factors such as concerns and remote schooling. White population shares in 41 of 56 major metro areas fell between and 2023, reflecting selective exits by families and professionals seeking safer, more spacious environments amid elevated transmission rates and in cities. The rapid expansion of , necessitated by lockdowns, further facilitated this migration by decoupling from urban proximity. By 2021, remote-capable workers—disproportionately white-collar and higher-earning—moved farther from city centers, with interstate migration rising due to flexible arrangements adopted by 28% of pandemic-driven relocators. Young families, in particular, shifted away from major cities at elevated rates, contributing to absolute declines in urban white demographics while suburbs and exurbs saw inflows of over 36 million Americans between 2020 and 2024. This convergence of factors marked a modern intensification of departure patterns, with empirical data indicating sustained white population losses in urban areas through 2023.

Educational Flight and School Choice Movements

Educational flight constitutes a specific dimension of white flight, wherein families relocate or seek alternative schooling options to evade urban public schools experiencing academic decline, heightened disciplinary issues, and demographic shifts post-desegregation. Following the 1954 Supreme Court decision mandating school integration, white student enrollment in affected districts plummeted; empirical analyses indicate that desegregation policies prompted a 10-15% reduction in white enrollment within five years in urban areas like and , as parents opted for suburban districts or private alternatives to avoid busing and integrated environments. This pattern persisted, with national data showing white public school enrollment falling from 63% of total students in 1997 to 49.7% by 2023, disproportionately in urban settings where minority-majority schools correlated with lower test scores and safety concerns. School choice movements emerged partly as a response to such flight, promoting mechanisms like and charter schools to enable intra-district options without necessitating residential moves. Economists advocated in 1955—predating widespread desegregation —as a market-based tool to foster competition and improve public school performance, though Southern states like implemented tuition grants in the 1950s and 1960s explicitly to fund "segregation academies" amid resistance to integration. By 2019, over half of U.S. states had enacted or tax-credit programs, with proponents arguing they mitigate flight by retaining middle-class families; for instance, Milwaukee's initiative, launched in 1990, saw participating private schools achieve higher graduation rates (e.g., 10-15% gains for low-income students) compared to district averages, potentially stabilizing enrollment. However, longitudinal studies reveal mixed outcomes: while choice programs can reduce residential flight in theory by offering high-performing options, they often exacerbate segregation, as white families disproportionately select lower-minority charters, with 52.5% of charters majority-white by 2021 versus 40% of traditional publics. Critics, including analyses from progressive think tanks, attribute choice expansion to perpetuating racial isolation akin to historical white flight, citing where 72% of students were in against 52% in publics, though such claims overlook peer-reviewed evidence that parental preferences prioritize measurable outcomes like proficiency rates over explicit racial avoidance. Empirical models from the National Educational Longitudinal Study (1988-1992 cohorts) confirm white flight to privates correlates inversely with sending-school minority composition, independent of income controls, underscoring causal drivers in perceived quality disparities rather than solely ideological motives. In urban contexts like , charter proliferation since the 1990s has stemmed some exodus but concentrated advantaged students, leaving traditional publics with higher concentrations of at-risk youth and funding shortfalls. Overall, while offers empirical benefits in academic mobility—e.g., 5-10% reading score improvements in randomized trials—it has not reversed broader enrollment declines, as families weigh options against suburban flight for holistic factors.

References

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