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Millennia
Centuries
  • 21st century
  • 22nd century
  • 23rd century
  • 24th century
  • 25th century
  • 26th century
  • 27th century
  • 28th century
  • 29th century
  • 30th century

In contemporary history, the third millennium is the current millennium in the Anno Domini or Common Era, under the Gregorian calendar. It began on 1 January 2001 (MMI) and will end on 31 December 3000 (MMM), spanning the 21st to 30th centuries.

Ongoing futures studies seek to understand what will likely continue and what could plausibly change in this period and beyond.

Predictions and forecasts not included on this timeline

[edit]
Prediction or forecast Reason for exclusion
Apocalyptic events Redundant to: List of dates predicted for apocalyptic events
Astronomical events Redundant to: List of future astronomical events, there are also articles for upcoming lunar and solar eclipses in the 21st century.
Calendar events Redundant to: List of future calendar events
Fictional events Redundant to: Near future in fiction and List of films set in the future
Near future centennial (bi, tri, etc.) events These are not included due to global bias issues.
Population Redundant to: Projections of population growth
Second Coming Redundant to: Predictions and claims for the Second Coming
Time capsules Redundant to: List of time capsules, there are between 10,000 and 15,000 time capsules worldwide.[1]

21st century

[edit]
For coverage of past events, see 21st century and Timeline of the 21st century.

2000s

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Main article: 2000s

2010s

[edit]
Main article: 2010s

2020s

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Main article: 2020s

2030s

[edit]
Main article: 2030s

2040s

[edit]
"2040" redirects here. For the film, see 2040 (film).
"2042" redirects here. For the game, see Battlefield 2042.
"2045" redirects here. For the game, see 2045 (game).
"2046" redirects here. For the film, see 2046 (film).

2050s

[edit]
"2050" redirects here. For the film, see 2050 (film). For the baseball feat, see 20–50 club.
"2055" redirects here. For the song, see 2055 (song).

2060s

[edit]
"2061" and "2067" redirect here. For other uses, see 2061 (disambiguation) and 2067 (disambiguation).

2070s

[edit]
"2071" redirects here. For the play, see 2071 (play).
"2073" redirects here. For the Asif Kapadia film, see 2073 (film).
"2077" redirects here. For the video game, see Cyberpunk 2077.
  • 2070: According to an announcement made by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi in 2021, India will be carbon neutral.[23]
  • 2079: For computer software using unsigned 16-bit binary day counts and an epoch of 1 January 1900, the counts will overflow after 65,536 (216) days, which will occur on 6 June 2079.

2080s

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"2081" redirects here. For the short film, see 2081 (film).
"2085" redirects here. For the song by AJR, see 2085 (AJR song).
"2088" redirects here. For the 2016 album, see Twenty88.
  • 2085: The "secret" letter of Queen Elizabeth II will be opened in Sydney, Australia.[24]
  • 2089: During the months of May and June, insect Magicicada broods X (17-year) and XIX (13-year) will emerge simultaneously. This will be the first time this will occur since 1868; next time will be in 2310. This event occurs only once in every 221 years.[25]

2090s

[edit]
"2091" redirects here. For the TV series, see 2091 (TV series).
"2093" redirects here. For the Yeat album, see 2093 (album).
"2099" redirects here. For the Marvel Comics imprint, see Marvel 2099.

22nd century

[edit]
Several terms redirect here. For other uses, see 22nd century (disambiguation), 2150 (disambiguation), the song 2120 South Michigan Avenue, the video games Battlefield 2142, Earth 2140 and Earth 2160, the short film 21-87, and SMPTE 2110 video networking standard

2100s

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2110s

[edit]

2140s

[edit]
"2140" redirects here. For the video game, see Earth 2140.
"2142" redirects here. For the video game, see Battlefield 2142.

2150s

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  • 2155: The year type in MySQL supports dates up to 31 December 2155.[42]

2160s

[edit]
"2160" redirects here. For the video game, see Earth 2160.

2170s

[edit]
  • 2178: On 23 March, Pluto will have completed its first full orbit since its discovery in 1930.[43]

2180s

[edit]
  • 2182: On 24 September, asteroid 101955 Bennu has a 1-in-2,700 chance of impacting Earth.[44]

2190s

[edit]
  • c. 2198: The Vanguard I satellite, launched in 1958, is expected to re-enter the atmosphere and burn up due to orbital decay assuming it is not retrieved or collides with another object.[45]

23rd century

[edit]

24th century

[edit]
"2312" redirects here. For the novel, see 2312 (novel).
"2357" redirects here. For Taiwanese multinational computer, phone hardware and electronics manufacturer, see Asus.
"2359" redirects here. For the film, see 23:59 (film).
"2400" redirects here. For the end of a day, see Midnight.
For minor planets numbered 2301–2400, see List of minor planets: 2001–3000 § 301. For the similarly numbered century BC, see 24th century BC. For noteworthy numbers in the range 2301–2400, see 2000 (number).
  • 2333: It is projected that the Dounreay nuclear site will be safe to use for other purposes.[46]
  • 2386: If not repealed or otherwise voided, the Treaty of Windsor (1386) between England and Portugal, currently the oldest military alliance still in effect, will have stood for one thousand years.[47]

25th century

[edit]
  • 2425: The annual funding increase of $325 per student to Wisconsin public schools, which began in 2023, is set to end.[48]
  • c. 2439: The "Across the Universe" message broadcast by NASA in 2008 will reach Polaris.[49]

26th century

[edit]
  • c. 2500: Climate projections predict a barren landscape for the Amazon rainforest amid low water levels due to vegetation decline.[50][51]
  • c. 2531: Professor Hiroshi Yoshida of Tohoku University conducted a study in 2024 which suggests every Japanese person will have the surname "Satō" unless a law regulating couples to a single surname is not changed before this time.[52][53]

27th century

[edit]

28th century

[edit]
  • Earth will experience 241 lunar eclipses.[55]

29th century

[edit]
"2894" redirects here. For the novel, see 2894 (novel).

30th century

[edit]
"3000 A.D." redirects here. For the film, see Captive Women. For the Busted song, see Year 3000.
  • c. 2965: The SNAP-10A nuclear satellite, launched in 1965 into an orbit 700 km (430 mi) above Earth, will return to the surface.[57][58]
  • 2999: The Longplayer composition will finish on 31 December of that year, marking the end of the thousand-year piece of music.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

3rd millennium

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
The 3rd millennium is the current millennium of the / in the , commencing on 1 2001 and concluding on 31 December 3000. This era spans the 21st through 30th centuries. The 30th century begins on January 1, 2901, and ends on December 31, 3000, adhering to the Gregorian calendar convention where centuries commence in years ending in 01, as exemplified by the 21st century starting in 2001. In its initial quarter-century, this era has been characterized by accelerated , demographic shifts toward and aging populations in developed regions, and in computational power enabling digital ubiquity. Technological innovations have profoundly reshaped daily life and economies, with the smartphone's introduction around 2007 facilitating constant connectivity, the expansion of broadband transforming information access and , and breakthroughs in such as in 2012 opening avenues for precise genetic interventions. systems have advanced from narrow applications to generative models capable of human-like outputs, while deployments, particularly solar photovoltaics, have scaled dramatically due to cost reductions exceeding 80% since 2010. has seen private sector involvement surge, with reusable rocket technology reducing launch costs and enabling missions like crewed orbital flights by non-governmental entities. Geopolitically, the millennium's onset was defined by the 11 September 2001 attacks on the , killing nearly 3,000 and catalyzing interventions in and as part of counter-terrorism campaigns that reshaped Middle Eastern alliances and security doctrines. Subsequent developments include China's economic ascent to surpass as the world's second-largest economy by , Russia's 2022 invasion of disrupting global energy and food supplies, and persistent challenges from non-state actors like . The 2008 global financial crisis exposed vulnerabilities in leveraged financial systems, leading to sovereign debt issues in and policy shifts toward . The , originating in 2019 and peaking in 2020-2021, caused over 7 million confirmed deaths worldwide and accelerated , supply chain reconfigurations, and deployments. Socially, the period has witnessed declining fertility rates in most nations, contributing to workforce contractions in high-income countries, alongside migration pressures from conflict zones and economic disparities. Empirical indicators show substantial progress in human welfare, including a halving of rates since 2000 through market-driven growth in and a rise in global despite pandemics and conflicts. Debates over and environmental policies persist, with data revealing increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations but also adaptations via technology rather than solely regulatory measures. As the millennium progresses, projections hinge on sustaining innovation amid geopolitical frictions and demographic transitions.

Prediction Reliability and Methodology

Historical Accuracy of Forecasts

Forecasts for events within the 3rd millennium (2001–3000 CE), particularly those made in the late , have exhibited low overall accuracy, with experts often underestimating human adaptability and technological innovation while overemphasizing resource constraints and linear extrapolations of trends. Philip Tetlock's extensive studies of over 28,000 predictions by 284 experts in , , and related fields found that the average expert performed only slightly better than chance for outcomes beyond a few years, with long-term geopolitical and economic forecasts showing systematic errors due to overconfidence and failure to update beliefs in light of new evidence. Superforecasters, selected for probabilistic thinking and iterative revision, achieve higher short-term accuracy but still face diminishing reliability for horizons exceeding a , as unforeseen causal factors like shifts or breakthroughs dominate. In demographic and resource projections, prominent failures underscore the pitfalls of Malthusian assumptions. Paul Ehrlich's 1968 book forecasted mass famines killing hundreds of millions in the 1970s and 1980s, alongside the collapse of nations like by 2000 due to overpopulation; instead, global food production surged via the , averting widespread starvation and enabling population growth to 8 billion by 2022 without the predicted crises. Similarly, theories, building on M. King Hubbert's 1956 model that accurately pinpointed the U.S. conventional oil peak around 1970, repeatedly erred on global timelines; predictions of peaks in the early 2000s faltered as hydraulic fracturing and deepwater exploration expanded reserves, with production rising from 73 million barrels per day in 2000 to over 100 million by 2019. Technological forecasts show a mixed record, with successes in exponential trends but misses on timelines and specifics. Gordon Moore's 1965 observation of density doubling approximately every two years held through the , enabling the revolution and AI advancements unforeseen in scope by many pre-2000 predictors; mobile device penetration reached 6.8 billion subscriptions by 2023, transforming communication as vaguely anticipated in concepts like Vannevar Bush's 1945 . However, analyses of futurists like reveal only about 7% accuracy for detailed timelines, such as widespread or self-driving ubiquity by the , which lagged due to regulatory, economic, and integration hurdles. Broader surveys of expert technology predictions yield success rates of 38–39% when allowing a ±30% margin on timing, highlighting over-optimism for disruptive shifts like or .
CategoryExample PredictionSource/YearOutcome
Resource ScarcityGlobal famine killing 100s of millions by 1980s, 1968Failed; agricultural yields doubled, no mass
Energy ProductionWorld oil peak by early 2000sVarious post-Hubbert models, 1990s–2000sFailed; output increased via , new fields
Computing doubling every ~2 years through 21st century, 1965Largely successful; powered modern tech ecosystem
Geopolitics/EconomicsExpert forecasts on regime stability, warsTetlock studies, 1980s–2000s dataPoor; accuracy ~chance for >5-year horizons
These patterns reveal that while trend-based projections in controlled domains like succeed when grounded in empirical scaling laws, holistic long-term forecasts for the 3rd millennium falter on compounding uncertainties, including black swan events like the or , which deviated from pre-2000 baselines. This track record underscores the value of probabilistic, revisable methods over deterministic narratives, as rigid ideologies—often amplified in academic and media sources—correlate with greater errors.

Factors Influencing Prediction Errors

Prediction errors in long-term , such as those concerning the 3rd millennium, arise from a confluence of cognitive, methodological, and systemic factors that amplify uncertainty over extended horizons. Overconfidence is a primary cognitive driver, where forecasters assign unwarranted to their estimates, leading to errors; professional forecasters, for instance, report 53% confidence in their but achieve accuracy only 23% of the time. This persists across domains, with experts in political and performing no better than random chance, as demonstrated in large-scale studies tracking thousands of . Overconfidence compounds in long-term scenarios due to the , where forecasters overestimate their understanding of complex causal chains spanning centuries. Methodological shortcomings exacerbate these issues, particularly the tendency to extrapolate recent linear trends into nonlinear futures, a common pitfall in that ignores technological discontinuities or shifts. For instance, forecasts fail when underlying theories are misspecified, models poorly capture dynamics, or parameters are inaccurately estimated, as seen in economic projections disrupted by structural changes like policy shifts or technological breakthroughs. Anchoring bias further distorts outcomes, where initial estimates unduly influence subsequent adjustments, hindering adaptation to new evidence in iterative . Base-rate , another prevalent error, leads forecasters to disregard historical frequencies of events, such as rare geopolitical upheavals, in favor of case-specific narratives. Systemic unpredictability introduces irreducible errors from unforeseen shocks and unknown unknowns, including events like pandemics or wars that invalidate baseline assumptions. In expert predictions, "" thinkers—those committed to a single —fare worse than "foxes" who integrate diverse perspectives, with fame correlating inversely to accuracy due to entrenched ideologies over empirical updating. Long-horizon forecasts for the 3rd millennium are particularly vulnerable, as compounding uncertainties from interdependent systems (e.g., demographics interacting with and ) outpace probabilistic models, often resulting in instrumental assumptions without evidential support, such as presuming stable growth paths amid potential existential risks. Mitigating these requires probabilistic reasoning, frequent updating, and aggregation of diverse forecasts, though even superforecasters exhibit limits against tail risks.

Evidence-based Approaches to Projections

Evidence-based approaches to projections emphasize methods rigorously tested for improving accuracy, drawing from experimental on forecasting principles. These include combining multiple forecasts, applying causal models where underlying mechanisms are identifiable, and using structured judgmental adjustments to historical trends, as validated in meta-analyses of forecasting experiments. Probabilistic framing, expressing outcomes as probability distributions rather than point estimates, enhances by accounting for , particularly over extended horizons like the 3rd millennium where deterministic predictions falter due to errors. Superforecasting techniques, derived from large-scale tournaments involving thousands of predictors, prioritize habits such as breaking complex questions into subcomponents, seeking disconfirming , and regularly updating beliefs with new —practices that yielded 30% higher accuracy than experts in geopolitical and economic forecasts. For instance, superforecasters maintain numerical precision in probabilities (e.g., 70% rather than "likely"), aggregate diverse independent judgments to reduce biases, and apply base rates from analogous historical events, outperforming analysts in controlled studies. These methods mitigate overconfidence, a common error in long-term projections, by enforcing checklists like examining assumptions and balancing optimism with realism. In demographic projections spanning centuries, Bayesian probabilistic models integrate , mortality, and migration trends with distributions, producing fan charts that widen over time to reflect variance in low-probability events like shifts or pandemics. Such approaches, used in global assessments, condition scenarios on empirical storylines (e.g., sustained low in high-income nations) while avoiding ungrounded , achieving better alignment with out-of-sample validations than deterministic variants. For technological trends, quantitative trend analyzes and performance across domains, identifying S-curves of maturation but incorporating causal factors like R&D investment rates to project diffusion, with empirical tests showing improved accuracy when adjusted for saturation effects. Causal realism underpins effective long-term methods by modeling interactions, such as how constraints influence climate-tech trajectories, rather than relying on isolated correlations; techniques, blending statistical models with expert input, further reduce errors by weighting components based on historical performance. However, even optimized approaches acknowledge inherent limits for millennium-scale forecasts, where black-swan dominate; thus, emphasis shifts to with probabilistic branching, validated against past forecast errors to prioritize robust over precise outcomes. Academic and media sources promoting alarmist or utopian narratives often deviate from these principles, favoring narrative coherence over empirical calibration, underscoring the need for skeptic evaluation of projections lacking transparent .

21st century

2000s

The 2000s decade was characterized by rapid , technological acceleration, and geopolitical upheaval following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks by , which killed 2,977 people and prompted the to launch military operations in in October 2001 to dismantle the regime harboring the perpetrators. This initiated the broader War on Terror, including the under President , justified on intelligence claims of weapons of mass destruction that later proved unsubstantiated, leading to prolonged insurgencies and over 4,000 U.S. military deaths by decade's end. Domestically in the U.S., the 2000 presidential election between Bush and was decided by a 5-4 ruling halting Florida's recount, amid allegations of voting irregularities that highlighted electoral vulnerabilities. Economically, the decade opened with the burst of the , causing a mild U.S. in 2001, but global GDP growth averaged approximately 3-4% annually through much of the period, driven by emerging markets like and . The mid-decade housing boom in the U.S. and elsewhere fueled credit expansion, culminating in the 2008 global triggered by subprime mortgage defaults and ' bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, which led to a sharp contraction with world GDP growth falling to -1.7% in 2009. Governments responded with massive bailouts and stimulus, including the U.S. authorizing $700 billion in October 2008, averting deeper collapse but sparking debates over and fiscal sustainability. Technological progress accelerated with the mainstreaming of broadband internet and platforms, enabling via sites like (launched 2005) and (expanded globally post-2006). The introduction of the by Apple on June 29, 2007, revolutionized by integrating interfaces, , and apps, setting the stage for ubiquity and app economies that transformed communication and commerce. In science, the achieved a draft sequence in 2003, advancing and , while the became fully operational by 2000, facilitating continuous human presence in orbit. Demographically, grew from 6.17 billion in 2000 to about 6.95 billion by 2010, at an annual rate of around 1.3%, with accelerating in developing regions. Environmentally, concerns over intensified, evidenced by the Kyoto Protocol's entry into force on February 16, 2005, committing industrialized nations to reductions, though U.S. non-ratification underscored geopolitical divides; natural disasters like the December 26, 2004, Indian Ocean tsunami, which killed over 230,000, highlighted vulnerabilities to seismic events amid rising sea levels and weather extremes. These trends laid empirical foundations for later projections, revealing both human adaptability and exposure to systemic risks.

2010s

The 2010s were characterized by widespread political instability and social movements globally. The Arab Spring, sparked by self-immolation in on December 17, 2010, triggered protests across the , leading to the ouster of leaders in (January 14, 2011), (February 11, 2011), (October 20, 2011), and (February 2012). These events contributed to ongoing conflicts, including the starting in March 2011 and the rise of the (ISIS), which declared a in June 2014 across parts of and before losing territorial control by March 2019. In the West, the movement began on September 17, 2011, in , protesting and corporate influence, inspiring similar demonstrations worldwide. Populist shifts included the United Kingdom's referendum on June 23, 2016, where 51.9% voted to leave the , and the election of as U.S. President on November 8, 2016, amid debates over and . Economically, the decade featured recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis, with U.S. real GDP growth averaging 2.3% annually from mid-2009 through 2019, though quarterly patterns were uneven. Unemployment in the U.S. declined to below 4% in 2018, the lowest since 1970, supported by policies like the 2017 . Globally, China's economy continued rapid expansion, contributing to shifting trade dynamics, while income inequality widened in advanced economies, with the top 1% capturing a disproportionate share of gains post-crisis. Events like the on April 20, 2010, in the —the largest marine spill in history—highlighted sector risks and prompted regulatory changes. Technological progress accelerated daily life integration of digital tools, with smartphones becoming ubiquitous; by 2019, over 80% of U.S. adults owned one, enabling ride-hailing apps like (launched 2010) and streaming services like Netflix's dominance in original content. Advancements included widespread networks rollout starting around 2010, the emergence of cryptocurrencies like (peaking in value in 2017), and early prototypes from companies such as . Artificial intelligence saw foundational developments, including applications in image recognition and voice assistants like (2011). Environmentally, the on December 12, 2015, united 196 parties to limit global warming, though implementation faced challenges from varying national commitments. Natural disasters, such as the 9.0-magnitude Tōhoku earthquake and Fukushima nuclear disaster in on March 11, 2011, underscored vulnerabilities in and systems.

2020s

The 2020s began with the , which emerged in late 2019 but escalated globally in 2020, causing over 760 million confirmed cases and millions of deaths by mid-2023, with profound disruptions to economies, education, and healthcare systems. Lockdowns and restrictions implemented in many countries led to a sharp global GDP contraction of approximately 3 percent in 2020, the deepest since the , alongside supply chain breakdowns and surges in unemployment. Vaccine development accelerated through initiatives like , with mRNA vaccines authorized for emergency use by December 2020, enabling widespread inoculation that mitigated later waves, though debates persisted over efficacy against variants and policy responses. Geopolitically, the decade featured Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, escalating from prior tensions and resulting in significant territorial gains for Russian forces, including control over by mid-2022 and incremental advances through 2025, amid high casualties and Western sanctions. The conflict disrupted global energy and food supplies, contributing to inflation spikes, while received substantial military aid from allies. Concurrently, the Israel-Hamas war erupted on , 2023, following attacks, leading to Israeli operations in Gaza with thousands of casualties and regional escalations involving and Iran-backed groups. These events highlighted shifting alliances and the limits of international deterrence. In politics, populist and nationalist movements gained traction, exemplified by Donald Trump's victory in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, where he secured over 270 electoral votes against , marking a return to the presidency after 2020. This outcome reflected voter concerns over inflation, immigration, and foreign policy, with Trump projected to win key swing states like . Similar trends appeared in , with gains for conservative parties challenging established liberal consensuses, amid critiques of institutional biases in media coverage favoring progressive narratives. Economically, post-pandemic recovery was uneven, with global peaking at around 8.6 percent in mid-2022 for many economies before declining to 4.5 percent projected for , driven by energy shocks from the Ukraine war and fiscal stimuli. Growth remained tepid, positioning the as potentially the weakest decade for global GDP expansion since the , at under 3 percent annually, hampered by debt burdens and demographic slowdowns in advanced economies. U.S. GDP contracted 2.16 percent in but rebounded, though reached multi-decade highs by 2022. Technological progress accelerated, particularly in artificial intelligence, with breakthroughs in large language models enabling autonomous systems for logistics, navigation, and data analysis, transforming industries from transportation to . Space achievements included reusable advancements by private firms, enhancing deployments and lunar mission preparations, while AI integration improved real-time processing for missions. These developments underscored innovation outpacing government-led efforts in prior decades. Environmentally, empirical records showed 2023 and 2024 as among the hottest years, with global temperatures about 1.2°C above pre-industrial averages by 2020, linked to events like intensified wildfires and heatwaves, though attribution studies emphasized natural variability alongside anthropogenic factors. Data indicated rising frequency of extremes like droughts and floods, but mainstream projections often amplified alarm without fully accounting for and historical precedents.

Future Projections (22nd to 30th centuries)

Projections for demographic trends from the 22nd to 30th centuries indicate a global that, under medium-variant assumptions, peaks in the early 22nd century before stabilizing or slightly declining, contingent on rates converging toward replacement levels after an initial sub-replacement phase. The ' 2002 long-range medium scenario forecasts a peak of 9.22 billion in 2075, followed by a decline to 8.43 billion by 2175 and a modest recovery to approximately 9 billion by 2300, driven by assumed rebounds in developing regions. Alternative low- scenarios, reflecting persistent total rates (TFR) around 1.85 without rebound, project sharper declines to 2.3 billion by 2300, while high variants exceed 36 billion. Extending these trajectories into the 23rd–30th centuries implies potential stabilization below 10 billion or further contraction to 2–3 billion if sub-replacement endures, as modeled by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), which emphasizes the stabilizing effect of low but persistent TFRs around 1.5–1.8. These forecasts hinge on extrapolations from 21st-century trends, where global TFR has fallen below replacement (2.1) in over 95% of countries by 2100 projections, with limited historical evidence of spontaneous rebounds absent aggressive policy interventions of unproven long-term efficacy. Fertility rates are projected to remain low globally, averaging 1.8–2.0 births per through the 22nd century before any assumed convergence to replacement in medium scenarios, perpetuating population decline post-peak. In low-persistence models, TFR stabilization below 1.85 leads to exponential contraction, as cohort sizes shrink without offsetting or mortality shifts, a pattern observed in current ultra-low fertility nations like those in and . Regional disparities persist: Africa's TFR drops from current highs to 1.9–2.0 by mid-22nd century, sustaining relative growth to 23% of by 2300, while and see TFRs lock in at 1.6–1.8, accelerating depopulation. Empirical drivers include sustained (nearing 90% globally), rising and labor participation, and economic disincentives like high child-rearing costs, which correlate strongly with fertility suppression across cohorts since the . Mortality improvements extend to 92–97 years by 2300 in medium projections, with developed regions exceeding 100 years, partially offsetting low birth rates but exacerbating aging. Global age rises to 47–50 by 2300, up from 31 in , with the proportion aged 65+ reaching 32%, compared to 10% today; in more developed regions, this fraction hits 35–40%, straining old-age dependency ratios to 60–80% (elderly per working-age person). Africa's slower aging keeps its age around 46, but even there, elderly shares climb to 30% by 2300. These shifts imply compressed morbidity if spans extend, but causal links prolonged to higher dependency without gains from or policy. Migration's role diminishes post-2100 in most models, assumed net-zero after 2050, though short-term flows from high-fertility and to aging and could temporarily bolster developed-region populations to 1.2–1.3 billion by 2300. Long-term, declining origin populations limit inflows, potentially reversing trends if destination fertility remains suppressed. Urbanization completes its transition, with 80–90% global residency in cities by 22nd century, amplifying density pressures in megacities exceeding 50 million, particularly in and .
Scenario2100 Population (billions)2300 Population (billions)Key Assumption
UN Medium9.19.0Fertility rebounds to 2.05 post-2175
UN Low5.52.3Persistent TFR ~1.85
IIASA Low Persistence~8–9 (2100 est.)~2–3No rebound, continued decline
Uncertainty escalates beyond 2300, with 23rd–30th century outcomes hinging on unforeseen factors like biotechnological fertility enhancements or societal adaptations, though baseline trends favor gradual depopulation if 21st-century fertility drivers—economic individualism and opportunity costs—persist without reversal.

Climate and Environmental Changes

Projections for climate and environmental changes from the 22nd to 30th centuries depend heavily on post-2100 anthropogenic emission pathways, carbon cycle feedbacks, and potential technological interventions, with models indicating persistent warming commitments even under stabilization scenarios. Simulations extending to 2300 or beyond, such as those using Earth system models, show that atmospheric CO2 concentrations could remain elevated for millennia if net emissions are not reversed, leading to gradual equilibration of ocean heat uptake and ice sheet responses. Under extended RCP4.5 or RCP6.0 scenarios, global mean surface temperatures may continue rising beyond 2100, potentially reaching 3–5°C above pre-industrial levels by 2300 if radiative forcing stabilizes at mid-century peaks, though equilibrium climate sensitivity estimates range from 1.5–4.5°C per CO2 doubling across models. These trajectories reflect causal lags in deep ocean circulation and permafrost thaw, where empirical paleoclimate data validate slow carbon release from soils and methane hydrates under sustained warming. Sea-level rise represents a multi-century commitment, with thermal expansion and glacier melt dominating early phases, transitioning to ice sheet contributions later. Probabilistic assessments project global mean sea-level increases of 0.5–1.2 meters by 2100 under high-emission scenarios (RCP8.5), escalating to 2–5 meters by 2300 due to if warming exceeds 2–3°C, based on semi-empirical models calibrated to data. High-end estimates, incorporating low-probability rapid discharge, suggest up to 9–10 meters by 2300 under unmitigated emissions, though these rely on uncertain dynamical processes like marine ice cliff , which lack direct observational analogs. Regional variations amplify risks, with equatorial amplification of rise exacerbating coastal inundation, but adaptation via dikes or relocation could mitigate human impacts absent systemic policy shifts. Terrestrial and marine ecosystems face compounded pressures from shifting biomes and , with accelerating if warming displaces beyond dispersal limits. Model ensembles indicate that climate-driven could surpass land-use change as the primary driver by mid-21st century, projecting 10–20% of at risk of local extirpation by 2300 under 3°C warming, drawing from species-area relationships and turnover rates during past hyperthermals. reefs and polar exhibit high vulnerability, with aragonite undersaturation persisting in oceans for centuries post-emission peak, reducing rates by 20–50% in simulations. However, evolutionary and assisted migration may buffer some losses, as evidenced by refugia patterns, underscoring that projections undervalue genetic resilience without integrating paleoecological constraints. Technological interventions like (CDR) or solar radiation management could alter trajectories, but their scalability and side effects remain empirically untested at global scales. Large-scale or might draw down 5–10 GtCO2 annually by 22nd century if deployed aggressively, potentially halving committed warming by 2300 per integrated assessment models, though land competition and energy demands pose causal trade-offs. could mimic volcanic cooling to offset 1–2°C, but risks include disrupted monsoons and , as simulated in perturbed physics ensembles, highlighting governance challenges over unilateral deployment. Absent such measures, environmental changes lock in altered , with intensified extremes like megadroughts persisting regionally for centuries, informed by tree-ring reconstructions of analog events. Overall, first-order physics dictates that radiative imbalance resolution requires net-negative emissions, rendering optimistic outcomes contingent on policy realism rather than model assumptions alone.

Technological Advancements

Projections for technological advancements from the 22nd to 30th centuries rely on extrapolations from current exponential trends in computational power, which have increased by orders of magnitude since the mid-20th century, potentially culminating in (AGI) and a by mid-century. Futurist forecasts AGI arriving by 2029, enabling superintelligent systems that surpass human cognition, followed by a singularity around 2045 where AI-driven accelerates beyond predictable limits. Surveys of AI experts align with a estimate of AGI emergence between 2040 and 2050 (over 50% probability), with 90% likelihood by 2075, setting the stage for recursive self-improvement in technology. Post-singularity, computational paradigms may shift to quantum-neuromorphic hybrids, simulating complex physical systems at scales rivaling the , though historical patterns indicate possible decelerations amid resource constraints or paradigm shifts. In and human augmentation, 22nd-century developments could include widespread human-AI via non-invasive neural interfaces and intravascular nanorobots, amplifying cognitive capacities by millions-fold and enabling networks for real-time problem-solving across planetary scales. By the 23rd century, to durable substrates might become feasible, decoupling from biological frailty and allowing persistence through environmental upheavals, predicated on detailed reverse-engineering achieved post-AGI. These enhancements, while promising transhumanist outcomes like enhanced creativity and error-free decision-making, carry risks of dependency or misalignment, as noted in analyses of superintelligent trajectories. Extending to the 30th century, super-exponential AI growth could yield galactic-scale computational megastructures, optimizing energy harvesting from stars to fuel simulations indistinguishable from physical reality. Biotechnological progress, accelerated by AI-optimized genomics and proteomics, may achieve radical life extension by the late 21st century, with 22nd-century therapies employing swarms of programmable nanobots to repair DNA damage, eliminate senescence, and customize phenotypes at the molecular level. Kurzweil anticipates longevity escape velocity—where life expectancy increases faster than time passes—by the 2030s, evolving into optional biological immortality by 2100, potentially stabilizing populations against demographic decline but raising ethical questions about overpopulation and inequality in access. In subsequent centuries, synthetic biology could engineer hybrid organisms or de novo life forms tailored for extreme environments, integrating cybernetic implants for seamless human-machine evolution, though empirical limits on biological complexity might constrain outcomes without full computational mastery of biochemistry. Energy and materials sciences are projected to mature into systems of abundance, with controlled fusion reactors—building on 21st-century prototypes—providing virtually unlimited baseload power by 2100, scalable to Dyson swarm configurations for stellar energy capture in later eras. , enabled by singularity-level computation, could realize Drexlerian assemblers for atomically precise fabrication, dismantling in and enabling that reconfigures on demand. By the 25th century, these might converge with advanced to form self-healing infrastructures resilient to cosmic hazards, though projections assume sustained and avoidance of geopolitical disruptions that historically impede scaling. Over the , such technologies could underpin resource-based economies, minimizing through closed-loop atomic , but realization depends on overcoming thermodynamic and informational barriers evident in current physics.

Space Exploration and Human Expansion

Projections for human expansion into space during the 22nd to 30th centuries hinge on extrapolations from 21st-century technological trajectories, including reusable launch systems that have reduced costs per kilogram by orders of magnitude and in-situ resource utilization (ISRU) for propellant production. Sustained lunar outposts, as outlined in international frameworks like the Global Exploration Roadmap, could evolve into permanent habitats by the mid-22nd century, serving as staging points for Mars missions with nuclear thermal propulsion enabling transit times under six months. However, scaling to self-sustaining populations remains contingent on resolving propulsion efficiencies beyond chemical rockets, with nuclear electric systems potentially allowing routine solar system travel but requiring gigawatt-scale power sources not yet demonstrated at scale. Mars colonization efforts, driven by private entities like aiming for city-scale settlements, face insurmountable near-term barriers in , where galactic cosmic rays deliver doses eight times Earth's surface levels, elevating cancer risks without adequate shielding such as subsurface lava tubes or artificial magnetic fields. Life support systems must achieve near-100% closure for , oxygen, and food recycling to support populations beyond resupply chains, yet current prototypes recycle only 90-95% of , with psychological isolation compounding microgravity-induced health declines like loss at 1-2% per month. Peer-reviewed analyses indicate that while robotic precursors could establish resource extraction by late 21st century, human permanence demands breakthroughs in for radiation resistance or via rotating habitats, neither of which current trajectories guarantee within centuries. Expansion beyond Mars to asteroid belts and Jovian moons appears more feasible for resource-driven outposts, leveraging ISRU for metals and volatiles to in-space manufacturing, potentially enabling orbital economies by the 23rd century if propulsion advances like variable magnetoplasma rockets mature. Challenges persist in the vast distances—Jupiter orbits require 2-3 years transit with advanced drives—and environmental hostility, including Europa's cryogenic subsurface oceans demanding cryoprotectant habitats. Economic models suggest viability only if space-derived resources like platinum-group metals undercut terrestrial markets, but historical overoptimism in space , as seen in delayed ISS commercialization, tempers expectations for widespread presence. Interstellar human travel remains implausible through the 30th century under known physics, as even optimistic schemes demand energy equivalents to global annual output for decades-long voyages to Alpha Centauri, with relativistic effects and drag further complicating crewed missions. Theoretical concepts like generation ships or face insurmountable failures over centuries, compounded by evolutionary divergence in isolated populations, while travel violates per . Probes, not humans, offer the realistic path for extrasolar expansion, with laser-sail designs potentially reaching nearby stars in decades, but scaling to crewed expansion requires paradigm-shifting discoveries in or warp metrics absent empirical basis. Overall, solar system-bound human expansion could mitigate Earth-centric existential risks through redundancy, but causal constraints—radiation lethality without Mars' thin atmosphere providing minimal shielding, propulsion limits capping velocities below 10% lightspeed, and life support entropy buildup—constrain projections to sparse outposts rather than thriving civilizations, contingent on sustained outpacing geopolitical disruptions.

Geopolitical and Societal Developments

Projections for geopolitical developments in the 22nd to 30th centuries hinge on extrapolations from demographic and technological trends, with high uncertainty due to potential disruptions like artificial superintelligence or catastrophic events. In medium-fertility scenarios, global population stabilizes around 9 billion by 2300 after peaking mid-21st century, with 's share rising to 23.5% from 13% in 2000, holding at 55%, and 's falling to 6.8%, implying a southward shift in and economic gravity. This redistribution could foster a multipolar order dominated by , , , and the by 2100, extending into subsequent centuries if fertility rates converge near replacement levels without reversal. Low-fertility paths, however, project declines to 2 billion or fewer by 2300, potentially contracting state capacities in low-growth regions like and , while high-growth areas face resource strains from densities exceeding 70 persons per km² in . Causal factors such as migration pressures from high-fertility, low-income zones (e.g., growing 3% annually to 2050) may exacerbate border tensions or spur supranational alliances, though historical patterns of demographic windows—temporary low dependency ratios enabling economic booms—suggest transient advantages for powers like (projected 2010–2050 window) rather than permanent . Geopolitical models anticipate fragmentation risks in overpopulated states unable to manage aging (global median age reaching 48 by 2300) or density-induced scarcities, potentially leading to regional blocs rather than global unipolarity, as divergent growth rates undermine unified governance. In high-variance scenarios, unchecked technological disparities could amplify asymmetries, with advanced entities leveraging AI for control, though multipolarity persists across climate-adaptation models extending to 2100. Societal developments may center on aging and fertility declines, with over 32% of the global population aged 65+ by 2300 in medium scenarios, straining pension systems and caregiving in low-migration regions like Europe (dependency ratios nearing 50), while prompting cultural adaptations toward emotional resilience and gender-balanced labor in high-density areas. Below-replacement fertility (converging to 2.0 children per woman by 2100) risks persistent depopulation without policy interventions, fostering societies with inverted pyramids—fewer workers supporting elders—which could erode traditional family structures and accelerate automation dependence. Urbanization trends, already concentrating 55% of humanity in cities by 2018, may intensify to near-universal levels, reshaping social norms around density-tolerant living and resource-efficient tech, though inequality from uneven access persists as a driver of unrest. Technological convergence, including AI and , could induce posthuman shifts, where enhancements extend lifespans and cognition, altering governance toward meritocratic or AI-augmented systems, as posited in analyses of pathways leading to singleton control or distributed augmentation by mid-millennium. Such changes might dissolve conventional societal divides, enabling economies that mitigate environmental pressures from population densities (e.g., at 160 persons/km² by 2300), but risk exacerbating divides if adoption favors elites, per critiques of transhumanist trajectories emphasizing unequal human modification. Overall, resilience to existential pressures like pandemics or climate variability will determine whether societies evolve toward integrated global cultures or fragmented enclaves, with demographic momentum favoring adaptive, high-mobility groups.

Existential Risks and Human Resilience

Projections for the 22nd to 30th centuries posit that existential risks—events capable of causing or permanently curtailing humanity's potential—will primarily stem from anthropogenic sources, particularly misuse or malfunction of advanced technologies, rather than , assuming survival through the more immediate "precipice" period of heightened vulnerability in the 21st and early 22nd centuries. Philosopher identifies "bangs" such as uncontrolled self-replicating that could dismantle the or misaligned superintelligent AI optimizing for unintended goals, leading to human obsolescence or elimination. These risks could manifest if technological development outpaces safety measures, with Bostrom estimating an overall probability exceeding 25% for existential catastrophe across humanity's future, though specific long-term timelines remain qualitative due to uncertainty in innovation trajectories. Engineered pandemics, evolved from , also persist as threats, potentially evading defenses through latency and high transmissibility. Natural risks like large impacts (>1 km diameter, occurring roughly once every 500,000 years) or supervolcanic eruptions carry low annual probabilities but could compound with technological vulnerabilities. Longer-term "whimpers," involving gradual decline through evolutionary drift toward non-expansive traits or exhaustion preventing a transition to stages, represent subtler existential threats, where humanity stagnates without acute catastrophe. In scenario-based forecasting, risks extend to wars, genetic , and amid competition, potentially escalating if interstellar expansion fragments governance. characterizes the current era as a temporary precipice lasting a few centuries, after which successful risk mitigation could yield existential , implying reduced baseline threats by the 23rd century through accumulated wisdom and institutional safeguards, though new technological frontiers might introduce unforeseen perils. Climate-induced collapses, while prominent nearer-term, diminish in existential relevance long-term due to projected solutions like planetary control via vast harness (e.g., 10^18 watts by 2400 AD). Human resilience against these risks hinges on diversification and proactive defenses, with emerging as a core strategy to hedge against Earth-bound extinctions by establishing self-sustaining off-world populations. A multiplanetary configuration distributes risks across separated habitats, ensuring from solar-system-specific events like strikes or global bioweapons release, with models indicating that self-replenishing colonies (e.g., on Mars) maximize long-term species persistence. Projections envision space populations reaching 100 million by 2200 AD and tens of billions by 2900 AD, supported by mature for habitat construction and interstellar probes launching around 2100 AD, fostering autonomous communities less vulnerable to terrestrial failures. Technological adaptations, including for enhanced intelligence and resilience by the 22nd century, cybernetic immortality via (feasible by 2250 AD), and differential development prioritizing defensive technologies (e.g., nanotech immune systems over offensive replicators), bolster individual and collective robustness. Global coordination, ethical frameworks, and evolution further mitigate risks, with scenarios depicting consensus-based and enforced moral codes by 2200 AD to avert conflicts over resources or AI deployment. Societal diversification into biologically enhanced humans, cyborgs, and artificial entities by 3000 AD could yield hybrid resilience, where redundant cognitive architectures and tailored ecologies reduce single-point failures. However, expansion introduces counter-risks, such as prioritization errors favoring short-term gains over safety or inter-colony conflicts, underscoring the need for preemptive international regimes to align incentives. Overall, resilience trajectories depend on navigating the precipice successfully, transitioning from planetary dependence to a distributed, technologically fortified capable of sustaining Earth's intelligent lineage across millennia.

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