Recent from talks
Nothing was collected or created yet.
Economy of Iraq
View on Wikipedia
Baghdad — the capital | |
| Currency | Dinar (IQD) |
|---|---|
| Calendar year | |
Trade organisations | OPEC |
Country group |
|
| Statistics | |
| Population | |
| GDP | |
| GDP rank | |
GDP growth |
|
GDP per capita | |
GDP per capita rank | |
GDP by sector |
|
| 3.2% (2024)[4] | |
Population below poverty line | |
| 29.8 low (2023)[7] | |
Labour force | |
Labour force by occupation |
|
| Unemployment | |
Main industries | petroleum, chemicals, textiles, leather, construction materials, food processing, fertilizer, metal fabrication/processing |
| External | |
| Exports | |
Export goods | crude oil 92%, crude materials excluding fuels, food and live animals |
Main export partners |
|
| Imports | |
Import goods | food, medicine, manufactures |
Main import partners |
|
FDI stock | |
| Public finances | |
| −3.056% (of GDP) (2021 est.) | |
| Revenues | 90.204 billion (2019)[5] |
| Expenses | 64.512 billion (2019)[5] |
| B− (Fitch, January 2022)[14] | |
All values, unless otherwise stated, are in US dollars. | |
The economy of Iraq is dominated by the oil sector.[15] The IFAD has classified Iraq as an oil-rich upper middle income country. In 2025, the economy is estimated to be at $690 billion (GDP PPP). making it as the fifth largest economy in the Arab world, seventh largest in the Middle East and North Africa and world's 51st largest.[16][17] It is one of the top five Arab countries with gold reserves and 30th globally.[18][19][20][21][22]
Iraq experienced economic growth by in the 1970s. Oil industry was nationalized in 1972, followed by a sharp increase in the price of petroleum. Revenue generated from the oil sector were utilized in development and expanding social services, which turned Iraq into a highly developed country. However, the Gulf War and subsequent sanctions drained the country economically. An oil-for-food program by the United Nation, allowed Iraq to sell oil in exchange of humanitarian goods for the civilian population.
Gradually, the economic situation quite improved. Many countries resumed trade with Iraq and the government rebuilt large swaths of country after the war. However, the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the war damaged much of the country's infrastructure. Although economy expanded rapidly due to privatization, it was interrupted by escalating war. Since 2022, under the leadership of Prime MInister Muhammad Shayya al-Sudani, Iraq has seen a period of relative economic stability.[23]
Iraq is traditionally an oil-rich state, with oil industry being the dominant sector. In 2024, it provided 89% of foreign exchange earning. Crude oil accounts between 92-99% of Iraq's total exports, followed by fruits, aluminum and dates. While import goods include foods, medicine and manufactured products such as ships, automobiles and consumer electronics. Major trade partners of Iraq are the United States, China, India, Greece, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Iraq has strong economic and trade ties with numerous countries, with large investments from China and Saudi Arabia.
History
[edit]Monarchy
[edit]In the early monarchy era, economic institutions developed slowly.[24] The Iraqi economy was largely market-oriented, but based more on feudal and traditions rather than on modern principles. King Faisal, the first king of Iraq, laid foundations for the modern Iraqi state.[24] Under his rule, an oil pipeline was built between Kirkuk and Haifa.[24] Then finance minister Sassoon Eskell was instrumental in forming Iraq's financial system and oil industry.[24]
A development board was established in 1950.[24] The board regulated five-year plans that emphasized three priorities—agriculture, transportation and communication and construction.[24] The agriculture part also included irrigation and flood control.[24] The board was well-received by the commentators for using most of the country's oil income for capital investment and infrastructure development.[24] It also received criticism for over-emphasizing agriculture and ignoring industry and human resources, which would have appealed to two increasingly important constituents—educated elites and workers.[24] Neglecting these groups became one of the minor reasons which provoked the coup in 1958.[24]
Economic growth
[edit]During its modern history, the oil sector has provided about 99.7% of foreign exchange earnings.[25] Agrarian economy underwent rapid development following the 14 July Revolution in 1958. It had become the third-largest economy in the Middle East by 1980. This occurred in part because of the industrialization and infrastructure development initiatives led by Saddam Hussein, which included irrigation projects, railway and highway construction, and rural electrification.[26] In the 1980s, financial problems caused by massive expenditures in the Iran-Iraq War and damage to oil export facilities by Iran's military led the government to implement austerity measures, to borrow heavily, and to later reschedule foreign debt payments.
Nominal GDP grew by 213% in the 1960s, 1325% in the 1970s, 2% in the 1980s, −47% in the 1990s, and 317% in 2000s.[27] Real GDP per capita (measured in $1990 ) increased significantly during the 1950s, 60s and 70s, which can be explained by both higher oil production levels as well as oil prices, which famously peaked in the 1970s due to the OPEC's oil embargo, causing the 1973 oil crisis. In the following two decades, however, GDP per capita in Iraq dropped substantially because of multiple wars, namely the 1980-88 war with Iran, the 1990-1991 Gulf War.[28]

Before the outbreak of the war with Iran in September 1980, the economic outlook was positive. In 1979, oil production reached a level of 560,000 m³ (3.5 million barrels) per day, and oil revenues were 21 billion dollars in 1979 and $27 billion in 1980 due to record oil prices. Iraq had amassed an estimated $35 billion in foreign exchange reserves. It was believed to have one of the best education and health care systems in the Middle East, and thousands of migrant workers from Egypt, Somalia, and the Indian subcontinent were employed in construction projects.[29]

The Iran–Iraq War and the 1980s oil glut depleted Iraq's foreign exchange reserves, devastated its economy and left the country with a foreign debt of more than $40 billion. Iraq suffered economic losses of at least $80 billion from the war.[30] In 1988, the hostilities ended. Oil exports gradually increased with the construction of new pipelines and restoration of damaged facilities, but again underwent a sharp decline after the Persian Gulf War.
A U.S government report in June 2003 states:[31]
In the 1980s, Iraq had one of the Arab world’s most advanced economies. Though buffeted by the strains of the Iran-Iraq war, it had – besides petroleum -- a considerable industrial sector, a relatively well-developed transport system, and comparatively good infrastructure. Iraq had a relatively large middle class, per capita income levels comparable to Venezuela, Trinidad or Korea, one of the best educational systems in the Arab world, a well educated population and generally good standards of medical care.
Sanctions
[edit]Iraq's seizure of Kuwait in August 1990, subsequent international economic sanctions on Iraq, and damage from military action by the international coalition beginning in January 1991, drastically reduced economic activity. The regime exacerbated shortages by supporting large military and internal security forces and by allocating resources to key supporters of the ruling Party. GDP dropped to one-fourth of the country's 1980 GDP and continued to decline under the postwar international sanctions, until receiving aid from the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme in 1997.[32][26]
The implementation of the UN's Oil for Food program in December 1996 helped improve economic conditions. For the first six six-month phases of the program, Iraq was allowed to export increasing amounts of oil in exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods. In December 1999, the UN Security Council authorized Iraq to export as much oil as required to meet humanitarian needs. Per capita, food imports increased substantially, while medical supplies and health care services steadily improved, though per capita economic production and living standards were still well below their prewar level.
Iraq changed its oil reserve currency from the U.S. dollar to the euro in 2000. However, 28% of Iraq's export revenues under the program were deducted to meet UN Compensation Fund and UN administrative expenses. The drop in GDP in 2001 was largely the result of the global economic slowdown and lower oil prices.
Iraq experienced a modest growth by 2000, when the government attempted to make improvements and reorganizations in the economic system. Oil exports gradually increased as new pipelines were constructed and damaged facilities were restored.
After the invasion of Iraq in 2003
[edit]The removal of sanctions on 24 May 2003 and rising oil prices in the mid-to-late 2000s led to a doubling in oil production from a low of 1.3 mbpd during the turbulence of 2003 to a high of 2.6 mbpd in 2011.[33] Furthermore, reduced inflation[34] and violence[35] since 2007 have translated to real increases in living standards for Iraqis. One of the key economic challenges was Iraq's immense foreign debt, estimated at $130 billion.[36] Although some of this debt was derived from normal export contracts that Iraq had failed to pay for, some was a result of military and financial support during Iraq's war with Iran.[37]
The Coalition Provisional Authority made efforts to modernize the economy after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, through privatization and reducing the country's foreign debt. As a result Iraq's economy expanded rapidly during this time, though growth was stunted by the insurgency, civil war, economic mismanagement, and oil shortages caused by outdated technology.[26] Since mid-2009, oil export earnings have returned to levels seen before Operation New Dawn. Government revenues rebounded, along with global oil prices. In 2011, Iraq increased oil exports above their then-current level of 1,900,000 bbl (300,000 m3) per day as a result of new contracts with international oil companies. The export was thought likely to fall short of the 2,400,000 barrels (380,000 m3) per day forecasting in the budget. Iraq's contracts with major oil companies had the potential to greatly expand oil revenues, but Iraq needed to upgrade its oil processing, pipeline, and export infrastructure to enable these deals to reach their potential.
An improved security environment and an initial wave of foreign investment helped to spur economic activity, particularly in the energy, construction, and retail sectors. Broader economic improvement, long-term fiscal health, and sustained increases in the standard of living still depended on the government passing major policy reforms and the continued development of Iraq's massive oil reserves. Although foreign investors viewed Iraq with increasing interest in 2010, most were still hampered by difficulties acquiring land for projects and other regulatory impediments.
The Jubilee Iraq campaign[38] argued that much of these debts were odious (illegitimate). However, as the concept of odious debt is not accepted,[39] trying to deal with the debt on those terms would have embroiled Iraq in legal disputes for years. Iraq decided to deal with its debt more pragmatically and approached the Paris Club of official creditors.
In a December 2006 Newsweek International article, a study by Global Insight in London was reported to show "that Civil war or not, Iraq has an economy, and—mother of all surprises—it's doing remarkably well. Real estate is booming. Construction, retail and wholesale trade sectors are healthy, too, according to [the report]. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce reports 34,000 registered companies in Iraq,[when?] up from 8,000 three years ago. Sales of secondhand cars, televisions and mobile phones have all risen sharply. Estimates vary, but one from Global Insight puts GDP growth at 17 per cent last year and projects 13 per cent for 2006. The World Bank has it lower: at 4 per cent this year. But, given all the attention paid to deteriorating security, the startling fact is that Iraq is growing at all."[40]
Industry
[edit]This section needs additional citations for verification. (November 2023) |
This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. The specific problem is: ”Industry” section seems out of place and potentially irrelevant/redundant. (November 2023) |
Since 1974, after the government took direct control of Iraq’s largest private oil production operations, Mosul Oil and Basra Oil, most of Iraq's manufacturing activity has been closely connected to the oil industry.[citation needed] The major industries in that category have been petroleum refining and the manufacture of chemicals and fertilizers. Before 2003, diversification was hindered by limitations on privatization and the effects of the international sanctions of the 1990s. Since 2003, security problems have blocked efforts to establish new enterprises. The construction industry is an exception; in 2000 cement was the only major industrial product not based on hydrocarbons. The construction industry has profited from the need to rebuild after Iraq's several wars. In the 1990s, the industry benefited from government funding of extensive infrastructure and housing projects and elaborate palace complexes.
Automobile industry
[edit]Iraq has a growing automotive industry, which is mostly concentrated in Baghdad, Babylon and Erbil.[41] According to the prime minister's economic advisor Mazhar Mohammed Salih, there are 9 million registered vehicles in Iraq.[42] Iraq imports approximately 200,000 cars annually from international companies, most notably Iranian, European, Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and American manufacturers.[42] He has emphasized that the presence of production facilities for international companies in Iraq would reduce the percentage of car imports from abroad by approximately 10%.[42]
Al-Sadeq Group manages numerous automotive manufacturing plants across the country, mostly concentrated around the Babylon governorate.[43] The brands include Chery, FAW Group and Renault Trucks, with an upcoming factory for Bestune.[43] The Chery facility in Iraq covers an area of 30,000 square metres (7.4 acres), manufacture passenger cars having annual production capacity of 30,000 cars and employ 750 people directly and 5,000 people directly.[43] It has also activated separate battery, tire, oil and plastic factory, which would act as ancillaries.[43] Al-Sadeq's factory for FAW Group in the Babylon governorate spread across an area of 11,000 square metres (2.7 acres), manufacturing passenger cars with an annual capacity of 25,000 cars.[43] Al-Sadeq also operates an assembly for Renault Trucks in Iraq, which has an assembling capacity of 10 trucks daily.[43] The group has also planned to construct a new plant for Bestune, which would expand its presence in Iraq and create more opportunities in the region.[43]
Primary sectors
[edit]Agriculture
[edit]Agriculture contributes just 3.3% to the gross national product but employs a fifth of the labor force.[44]
Historically, 50 to 60 per cent of Iraq's arable land was under cultivation.[45][self-published source?] Under the UN Oil for Food program, Iraq imported large quantities of grains, meat, poultry, and dairy products. In 1981, the government abolished its collective farming program. During the Gulf War, Iraqi agriculture was disrupted physically and suffered from economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations. Imports were curtailed, petroleum exports were cut off and agricultural production with potential military application was halted. The Iraqi government responded by monopolizing grain and oilseed marketing, imposing production quotas, and instituting a Public Distribution System for basic foodstuffs. By mid-1991, the government supplied a "basket" of foodstuffs that provided about one-third of the caloric daily requirement and cost consumers about five percent of its market value. With subsidies for agricultural inputs diminished, the government's prices failed to cover their costs. Tax on agricultural production reached 20 to 35 percent by the mid-1990s. In October 1991 the Baghdad regime withdrew personnel from the northern region controlled by two Kurdish parties. Kurdistan Region was described as "... a market economy essentially left alone by a fragile governing structure, but heavily influenced by substantial international humanitarian aid flows."[46]
In December 1996, under an "Oil for Food Program" negotiated with the United Nations, Iraq started exporting petroleum and used the proceeds to import foodstuffs. Grain imports averaged $828 million from 1997 to 2001, an increase of over 180 percent from the previous five-year period. Due to foreign competition, Iraqi production declined (29 percent for wheat, 31 percent for barley, and 52 percent for maize). Because the government had neglected the production of forage crops, fruits, vegetables, and livestock other than poultry, those sectors were less buffeted by international affairs. Nevertheless, they were affected by severe drought, an outbreak of screwworm, and an epizootic of foot-and-mouth disease[47] As the Oil for Food Program expanded to cover more agricultural inputs and machinery, the productivity of Iraqi agriculture stabilized around 2002.
After the U.S. invasion in March 2003, many Iraqis became dependent on government-subsidized food. The US-funded agricultural reconstruction program thus focused on increased productivity under the aegis of Agricultural Reconstruction and Development Iraq (ARDI).[48] Another program was run by Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) of Bethesda, Maryland. The restoration of Iraq's irrigation systems was largely funded by Bechtel International.
ARDI conducted trials to improve farming practices and crop varieties of winter cereals (wheat and barley), summer cereals (rice, maize, and sorghum), potatoes, and tomatoes. Feed supplements and veterinary treatments were introduced to increase ovulation, conception, and birth weights of livestock. Surveys were conducted of poultry growers and apple farmers. Nurseries were established for date palms and grapes. ARDI had projects promoting trade associations and producers' co-ops and supported extension as an appropriate governmental function. The contract eventually cost over $100 million and lasted through December 2006. Under its Community Action Program, USAID also funded an analysis of markets for sheep and wool. It awarded a contract to the University of Hawaii to revitalize higher education in agriculture. It awarded a contract for $120 million to the Louis Berger Group to promote Iraq's private sector, including agriculture.[49]
Starting in 2006, Provincial Reconstruction Teams were sent in to promote goodwill and sap the insurgency. "PRTs" allowed military commanders to identify local needs and, with few bureaucratic hurdles, to dispense up to $500,000. Civilians from many agencies within the U.S. Department of Agriculture, as well as USAID, served tours on PRTs. Some participants criticized the absence of a national agricultural strategy, or clear direction on the design of projects. Others complained that projects emphasized "American-style, 21st-century agricultural technologies and methodologies..." that were inappropriate for Iraq.[50]
Agricultural production did not rebound from the reconstruction program. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), between 2002 and 2013, the production of wheat increased 11 percent and milled rice 8 percent, but barley had decreased 13 percent and maize 40 percent. Scaled in "international dollars" (2004-2006 base equaling 100) Iraq's per capita food production was 135 in 2002, 96 in 2007, and 94 in 2012. The agricultural sector shed workers. In those same years, production per worker was 117, 106, and 130, respectively.[51]
The international Oil-for-Food program (1997–2003) further reduced farm production by supplying artificially priced foreign foodstuffs. Because of favorable weather conditions, grain production was 22 percent higher than in 2002. Although growth continued in 2004, experts predicted that Iraq would be an importer of agricultural products for the foreseeable future. Long-term plans call for investment in agricultural machinery and materials and more prolific crop varieties—improvements that did not reach Iraq's farmers under the Hussein regime. In 2004, the main crops were wheat, barley, corn, rice, vegetables, dates, and cotton, and the main livestock outputs were cattle and sheep.
The Agricultural Cooperative Bank, capitalized at nearly 1 G$ - by 1984, targets its low-interest, low-collateral loans to private farmers for mechanization, poultry projects, and orchard development. Large modern cattle, dairy, and poultry farms are under construction. Obstacles to agricultural development include labor shortages, inadequate management and maintenance, salinization, urban migration, and dislocations resulting from previous land reform and collectivization programs.
In 2011, an agricultural adviser to the Iraqi government, Layth Mahdi, summarized the forced United States agricultural reconstruction:
Before 2003, Iraq had imported about 30 per cent of its food needs annually. The decline in agricultural production after this period, created the need for importing 90 per cent of the food at a cost estimated at more than $12 billion annually. Due to the sudden shift in the agricultural policy from subsidized assistance to an immediate shift to a free market policy, the outcomes led to a decline in production. The observed outcome resulted in many farmers abandoning the land and agriculture. The impact on natural resources results in an exploited and degraded environment leaving the land destitute and the people impoverished, unemployed [and] experiencing a sense of losing their human dignity.[52]
Importation of foreign workers and increased entry of women into traditionally male labour roles have helped compensate for agricultural and industrial labour shortages exacerbated by the war. A disastrous attempt to drain the southern marshes and introduce irrigated farming to this region merely destroyed a natural food producing area, while concentration of salts and minerals in the soil due to the draining left the land unsuitable for agriculture.[53]
In the Mada'in Qada region east of Baghdad, hundreds of small farmers united to form the Green Mada'in Association for Agricultural Development, an agricultural cooperative that provides its members with drip irrigation and greenhouses as well as access to credit.[54]
In recent years, farmers have been confronted with reduced rainfall and high temperatures. Particularly affected are small scale farmers who, unable to withstand lower water levels, are forced to leave their lands in search of different ways to fulfill their livelihoods.[55]
Forestry, fishing, and mining
[edit]Throughout the twentieth century, human exploration, shifting agriculture, forest fires, and uncontrolled grazing denuded large areas of Iraq's natural forests, which in 2005 were almost exclusively confined to the northeastern highlands. Most of the trees found in that region are not suitable for lumbering. In 2002, a total of 112,000 cubic meters of wood were harvested, nearly half of which was used as fuel.[citation needed]
Despite its notable large rivers, Iraq's fishing industry has remained relatively small and based largely on marine species in the Persian Gulf. In 2001, the approximate yield was 8,000 tons (compared to 18,000/t during the period between 1981-1997) according to official government estimates.[56]
Aside from hydrocarbons, Iraq's mining industry has been confined to extraction of relatively small amounts of phosphates (at Akashat), salt, and sulfur (near Mosul). Since a productive period in the 1970s, the mining industry has been hampered by the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), the sanctions of the 1990s, and the economic collapse of 2003.[57]
Energy
[edit]
Iraq is one of the most oil-rich countries in the world. The country holding the fifth largest proven crude oil reserves,[58]: 5 totaling 147.22 billion barrels at the end of 2017.[59] Most of this oil—4 million barrels per day out of 4.3 million barrels produced daily—is exported, making Iraq the third-largest exporter of oil.[58]: 5 Despite its ongoing civil war, Iraq was able to increase oil production during 2015 and 2016, with production dipping by 3.5 per cent in 2017 due to conflict with the Kurdistan Regional Government and OPEC production limits.[58]: 5 By world standards, production costs for Iraqi oil are relatively low.[60] However, four wars[61]—the 1980–1988 Iraq-Iran War, 1991 Gulf War, the 2003–2011 War in Iraq, and the civil war—and the 1991–2003 UN sanctions have left the industry's infrastructure in poor condition.[58]: 5–6


In the 1970s, Iraq produced over 3.5 million barrels of oil per day.[62] Production began to fall during the Iran-Iraq War, before plummeting 85 per cent after the 1991 invasion of Kuwait.[61][62][63] UN sanctions prevented the export of oil until 1996, and then allowed exports only in exchange for humanitarian aid in the Oil-for-Food Programme.[61] The 2003 lifting of sanctions enabled production—and exports—to restart.[61] Production has since recovered to pre-Gulf War levels, and most of Iraq's oil infrastructure has been repaired, despite persistent sabotage by the Islamic State (ISIL) and others.[64] In 2004, Iraq had eight oil refineries, the largest of which were at Baiji, Basra, and Daura.[63]
Despite its oil wealth, sabotage and technical problems at refineries have forced Iraq to import petroleum, other refined oil products, and electricity from the neighbouring countries, especially Iran.[65] In 2004, for example, Iraq spent $60 million per month for imported gasoline. Sabotage In late 2004 and early 2005, regular sabotage of plants and pipelines reduced export and domestic distribution of oil, particularly to Baghdad.[62] Nationwide fuel shortages and power outages resulted.[63] Persistent ISIL sabotage of pipelines, power plants and power lines, and theft of oil and electricity have also contributed to the July 2018 protests in southern Iraq.[65]
In 2004, plans called for increased domestic utilization of natural gas to replace oil and for use in the petrochemical industry. However, because most of Iraq's gas output is associated with oil, output growth depends on developments in the oil industry.
Half of Iraq's power plants were destroyed in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, and full recovery never occurred.[66] In mid-2004, Iraq had an estimated 5,000 megawatts of power-generating capacity, compared with 7,500 megawatts of demand.[67] At that time, the transmission system included 17,700 kilometers of line. In 2004, plans called for construction of two new power plants and restoration of existing plants and transmission lines to ease the blackouts and economic hardship caused by this shortfall, but sabotage and looting kept capacity below 6,000 megawatts. The ongoing civil war, sabotage of transmission lines, and government corruption caused the electricity shortage to worsen: by 2010 demand outstripped supply by 6000 megawatts.[67]
Oil continues to dominate Iraq's economy. As of 2018[update], oil is responsible for over 65% of GDP and 90% of total government revenue.[58] Petroleum constitutes 94% of Iraq's exports with a value of $59.73 billion in 2017.[68] The central government hopes to diversify the economy away from oil, and has had some success: non-oil GDP growth, which was below the regional average from 2014 to 2016, pushed above the average in 2017.[58]: 4 Despite this, the percentage of government spending going to non-oil investment has continued to decline since 2013 and now[when?] stands at only 34 per cent.[58]: 4
2009 oil services contracts
[edit]This section needs to be updated. (August 2018) |
Between June 2009 and February 2010 the Ministry of Oil tendered for the award of Service Contracts to develop Iraq's existing oil fields. The results of the tender, which were broadcast live on Iraqi television, are as follows for all major fields awarded but excluding the Kurdistan Region where Production Sharing Contracts have been awarded that are currently being disputed by the Baghdad government. All contracts are awaiting final ratification of the awards by the Iraqi government. Company shares are subject to change as a result of commercial negotiations between parties.
| Field | Company | Home country | Company type | Share in field | Production increase share | Service fee per bbl | Gross revenue at plateau - US bn p.a. | References |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Majnoon | Shell | Public | 45% | 0.7875 | 1.39 | 0.4 | BBC | |
| Petronas | State | 30% | 0.525 | 1.39 | 0.266 | Shell | ||
| Halfaya | CNPC | State | 37.5% | 0.525 | 1.39 | 0.102 | Upstream Archived 12 January 2016 at the Wayback Machine | |
| Petronas | State | 18.75% | 0.099 | 1.4 | 0.051 | Upstream Archived 26 September 2012 at the Wayback Machine | ||
| TotalEnergies | Public | 18.75% | 0.099 | 1.39 | 0.051 | |||
| Rumaila | BP | Public | 37.5% | 0.7125 | 2 | 0.520 | Business Week | |
| CNPC | State | 37.5% | 0.7125 | 1.39 | 0.520 | |||
| Zubair | ENI | Public | 32.81% | 0.328 | 2 | 0.240 | Business Week | |
| Occidental | Public | 23.44% | 0.2344 | 2 | 0.171 | Business Week[dead link] | ||
| KOGAS | State | 18.75% | 0.1875 | 2 | 0.137 | Business Week Archived 7 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine | ||
| West Qurna Field Phase 2 | Lukoil | Russia | Public | 75.00% | 1.3500 | 1.15 | 0.567 | Business Week |
| Equinor | Norway | State | n/a[69] | n/a | n/a | n/a | Equinor Archived 25 January 2012 at the Wayback Machine | |
| Badra | Gazprom | Russia | State | 30% | 0.051 | 5.5 | 0.102 | Business Week |
| Petronas | Malaysia | State | 15% | 0.0255 | 5.5 | 0.051 | Upstream Archived 7 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine | |
| KOGAS | Korea | State | 23% | 0.03825 | 5.5 | 0.077 | Upstream Archived 7 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine | |
| TPAO | Turkey | State | 8% | 0.01275 | 5.5 | 0.026 | ||
| West Qurna Field Phase 1 | Exxon | US | Public | 60% | 1.2276 | 1.9 | 0.851 | Business Week[dead link] |
| Shell | United Kingdom / |
Public | 15% | 0.3069 | 1.9 | 0.213 | Alfred Donovan's blog Archived 29 February 2012 at the Wayback Machine (royaldutchshellplc.com) |
Notes:
- Field shares are as a % of the total. The Iraqi state retains a 25% share in all fields for which service contracts have been awarded.
- Production increase share is the millions of bbls per day that will attract the service fee for the company.
- Gross revenue at plateau is the total payment each company will receive upon reaching their declared target plateau production rate (in between 5 and 8 years, depending on the field), before deduction of any operating costs, in addition to recovery of all development costs as billions of US dollars per annum. The total gross revenue for all companies, after recovery of capital costs, is at plateau production of an additional 9.4 mb/d, 4.34 bn US per annum, at a $70 bbl oil price. The 2010 Iraq govt budget is $60 billion. $300 billion is approximately $10,000 per annum for each Iraqi citizen.
In summary the shares by region in the increased production are:
| Region | Production Share mb/d |
% of total |
|---|---|---|
| Iraq | 1.462 | 25% |
| Asia | 1.9 | 20% |
| UK | 1.81 | 19% |
| US | 1.462 | 16% |
| Russia | 1.402 | 14% |
| Europe (excl UK) | 0.528 | 6% |
Services
[edit]Finance
[edit]
Iraq's financial services have been the subject of post-Saddam reforms. The 17 private banks established during the 1990s were limited to domestic transactions and attracted few private depositors. Those banks and two main state banks were badly damaged by the international embargo of the 1990s. To further privatize and expand the system, in 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority removed restrictions on international bank transactions and freed the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) from government control. In its first year of independent operation, the CBI received credit for limiting Iraq's inflation.[citation needed] In 2004, three foreign banks (HSBC, Standard Chartered, National Bank of Kuwait) were the first to receive licenses to do business in Iraq.[70]
Banking
[edit]Modern-style banking in Iraq roots from the beginning of the 20th century.
Iraq's two state-owned banks are the largest banks in Iraq and have a shared history. In 1988, Rafidain Bank was spun off from Rafidain Bank .
| Banking group | Established | Number of Branches |
Total Assets (Iraqi Dinar billion) |
Share of total banking system assets |
Share of total banking system credit |
Share of total banking system deposits |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rasheed Bank | 1988 | 162 | ||||
| Rafidain Bank | 1941 | 147 |
Private security
[edit]Because of the danger posed by Iraq's ongoing insurgency, the security industry has been a uniquely prosperous part of the services sector. Often run by former US military personnel, in 2005 at least 26 companies offered personal and institutional protection, surveillance, and other forms of security.[71]
Retail
[edit]In the early post-Hussein period, a freewheeling retail trade in all types of commodities straddled the line between legitimate and illegitimate commerce, taking advantage of the lack of income tax and import controls.[72]
-
Dream City Mall
-
Zayoona Mall
-
Babylon Mall
-
A mall in Basra
-
Basra Times Square
Tourism
[edit]The Iraq tourism industry, which in peaceful times has profited from Iraq's many places of cultural interest (earning US$14 million in 2001), has been dormant since 2003. Despite conditions, in 2005 the Iraqi Tourism Board maintained a staff of 2,500 and 14 regional offices.[72] Between 2009 and 2010, 165 tourists from 16 countries entered Iraq to visit historic sites; as of January 2011, a U.S. State Department grant provided $2 million to help preserve Babylon, supporting the re-opening of one of the site's two museums.[73]
Telecommunications
[edit]From 2003 to 2008, mobile phone subscriptions had expanded over hundred-fold to ten million nationwide, according to the Brookings Institution.[74]
Labor force
[edit]This section needs to be updated. (May 2025) |
In 2002, Iraq's labour force was estimated at 6.8 million people.
In 1996, some 66.4 per cent of the labour force worked in services, 17.5 per cent in industry, and 16.1 per cent in agriculture. 2004 estimates of Iraq's unemployment ranged from 30 per cent to 60 per cent.
| Month | Unemployment rate |
|---|---|
| 2003-2005 May | N/A |
| 2003-2006 June | 50-60% |
| 2003-2007 July | N/A |
| 2003-2008 August | 50-60% |
| 2003-2009 September | N/A |
| 2003-2010 October | 40-50% |
| 2003-2011 November | N/A |
| 2003-2012 December | 45-55% |
| January to May 2004 | 30-45% |
| June to November 2004–06 | 30-40% |
| 2004-12 December | 28-40% |
| January to October 2005 | 27-40% |
| November to December 2005 | 25-40% |
| 2006 | 25-40% |
| 2007 | 25-40% |
| 2008 | 25-40% |
| 2009 | 23-38% |
| 2010 | 15.2% |
| 2011 | 15.2% |
| 2012 | 15.3% |
| 2013 | 15.1% |
| 2014 | 15% |
| 2015 | 15.5% |
| 2016 | 16% |
The CPA has referred to a 25% unemployment rate, the Iraqi Ministry of Planning mentioned a 30% unemployment rate, whereas the Iraqi Ministry of Social Affairs claims it to be 48%.[75] Other sources are claiming a 20% unemployment rate and a probably 60% under-employment rate.[77] The actual figure is problematic because of high participation in black-market activities and poor security conditions in many populous areas. In central Iraq, security concerns discouraged the hiring of new workers and the resumption of regular work schedules. At the same time, the return of Iraqis from other countries increased the number of job seekers. In late 2004, most legitimate jobs were in the government, the army, the oil industry, and security-related enterprises.[78] Under Saddam Hussein's reign, many of the highest-paid workers were employed by the greatly overstaffed government, whose overthrow disrupted the input of these people to the economy. In 2004, the U.S. Agency for International Development committed US$1 billion for a worker-training program. In early 2004, the minimum wage was US$72 per month.[citation needed]
External trade
[edit]Iraq is a founding member of OPEC.[79] Petroleum constitutes 99,7% of Iraq's exports with a value of $43,8 billion in 2016.[25]
From the 1990s until 2003, the international trade embargo restricted Iraq's export activity almost exclusively to oil. In 2003, oil accounted for about US$7.4 billion of Iraq's total US$7.6 billion of export value, and statistics for earlier years showed similar proportions. After the end of the trade embargo in 2003 expanded the range of exports, oil continued to occupy the dominant position: in 2004 Iraq's export income doubled (to US$16.5 billion), but oil accounted for all but US$340 million (2 per cent) of the total. In late 2004, sabotage significantly reduced oil output, and experts forecast that output, hence exports, would be below capacity in 2005 as well. In 2004, the chief export markets were the United States (which accounted for nearly half), Italy, France, Jordan, Canada, and the Netherlands. In 2004, the value of Iraq's imports was US$21.7 billion, incurring a trade deficit of about US$5.2 billion. In 2003, the main sources of Iraq's imports were Turkey, Jordan, Vietnam, the United States, Germany, and Britain. Because of Iraq's inactive manufacturing sector, the range of imports was quite large, including food, fuels, medicines, and manufactured goods. By 2010, exports rose to US$50.8 billion and imports rose to US$45.2 billion. Chief 2009 export partners were: U.S., India, Italy, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Netherlands, and Japan. Chief 2009 import partners were: Turkey, Syria, U.S., China, Jordan, Italy, and Germany.[80]
In March 2022, Iran-Iraq trade reached a volume of 10 billion USD, as joint ventures increased significantly but were still limited due to sanctions against Iran. Especially goods originating from Iran were subject to a trade embargo imposed by the United States and the European Union. Iran and Iraq signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on economic cooperation in January 2021.[81]
Notes
[edit]- ^ From 2005 to 2022, Shell had its headquarters in The Hague and its registered office in London. In January 2022, the company moved its headquarters to London.
References
[edit]- ^ "World Economic Outlook Database, April 2019". IMF.org. International Monetary Fund. Archived from the original on 10 October 2020. Retrieved 29 September 2019.
- ^ "World Bank Country and Lending Groups". datahelpdesk.worldbank.org. World Bank. Archived from the original on 28 October 2019. Retrieved 29 September 2019.
- ^ "Iraq Population". worldpopulationreview.com. World Bank. Archived from the original on 13 April 2024. Retrieved 27 January 2024.
- ^ a b c d e f g "World Economic Outlook Database, April 2025 Edition". IMF.org. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 22 April 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k "The World Factbook". CIA.gov. Central Intelligence Agency. Archived from the original on 8 March 2023. Retrieved 3 November 2017.."Socioeconomic Indicators - Iraq | Statista Market Forecast".
- ^ "Iraq". data.worldbank.org. World Bank. Archived from the original on 15 November 2022. Retrieved 3 November 2019.
- ^ "GINI index (World Bank estimate) - Iraq". data.worldbank.org. World Bank. Archived from the original on 23 December 2022. Retrieved 3 November 2019.
- ^ "Human Development Index (HDI)". hdr.undp.org. HDRO (Human Development Report Office) United Nations Development Programme. Archived from the original on 26 March 2024. Retrieved 5 June 2025.
- ^ "Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)". hdr.undp.org. HDRO (Human Development Report Office) United Nations Development Programme. Archived from the original on 12 December 2020. Retrieved 11 December 2019.
- ^ "Labor force, total - Iraq". data.worldbank.org. World Bank. Archived from the original on 15 November 2022. Retrieved 3 November 2019.
- ^ "Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (national estimate) - Iraq". data.worldbank.org. World Bank. Archived from the original on 15 November 2022. Retrieved 3 November 2019.
- ^ "التخطيط تعلن انخفاض معدل البطالة إلى 13 بالمئة" (in Arabic). Iraqi News Agency.
- ^ "Info". www.ina.iq. Archived from the original on 19 August 2013. Retrieved 18 February 2023.
- ^ "Iraq Sovereign credit ratings - data, chart". TheGlobalEconomy.com. Archived from the original on 15 November 2022. Retrieved 14 February 2022.
- ^ "Non-oil revenues surge in Iraq, oil dependency falls below 90%". Shafaq News. Retrieved 8 November 2024.
- ^ Garcia, Anthon (22 January 2024). "10 largest economies in MENA". Economy Middle East. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
- ^ Ventura, Luca (18 June 2025). "World's Most Peaceful Country 2024 Global Peace Index". Global Finance Magazine. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
- ^ Al-Samarraie, Jawad (11 January 2025). "Iraq among the top five Arab nations in gold reserves". Iraqi News. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
- ^ "Iraq maintains the 30th rank among the world's top gold holders". Shafaq News. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
- ^ sarahrudge (25 June 2025). "6 Countries with the Largest Crude Oil Reserves in the World". Energy, Oil & Gas magazine. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
- ^ Al-Samarraie, Jawad (21 October 2024). "Iraq ranks 145th globally in innovation for 2025". Iraqi News. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
- ^ "Iraq placed fifth for startup investment in MENA". Shafaq News. Retrieved 22 October 2025.
- ^ "Iraq's economy: Old obstacles and new challenges". ISPI. Retrieved 20 October 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j "Iraq's economy: Past, present, future - Iraq | ReliefWeb". reliefweb.int. 3 June 2003. Retrieved 20 October 2025.
- ^ a b "OPEC : Iraq". www.opec.org. Archived from the original on 29 January 2023. Retrieved 21 March 2018.
- ^ a b c "Iraq - Economy". Encyclopedia Britannica. Archived from the original on 9 October 2023. Retrieved 17 January 2020.
- ^ "World Development Indicators - Google Public Data Explorer". Archived from the original on 16 December 2022. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ Baten, Jörg (2016). A History of the Global Economy. From 1500 to the Present. Cambridge University Press. pp. 231–232. ISBN 9781107507180.
- ^ Chandrasekaran, Rajiv (2007). Imperial life in the emerald city : inside Iraq's green zone. Internet Archive. New York: Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-307-27883-8.
- ^ Christopher Parker & Pete W. Moore. "MER 243 - The War Economy of Iraq". Middle East Research and Information Project. Archived from the original on 12 April 2018.
- ^ Tooze, Adam (24 March 2023). "Chartbook 204: Iraq's economic impasse twenty years after the invasion". Chartbook. Retrieved 20 October 2025.
- ^ "What We Do". Archived from the original on 20 February 2009. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ "Iraq Crude Oil Production by Year". Archived from the original on 14 May 2016. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ "Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)". Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ "» Measuring Iraq Middle East Strategy at Harvard". Archived from the original on 13 September 2015. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ Hinrichsen, Simon (2021). "The Iraq sovereign debt restructuring". Capital Markets Law Journal. 16 (1): 95–114. doi:10.1093/cmlj/kmaa031. ISSN 1750-7227. Archived from the original on 10 February 2023. Retrieved 12 August 2021.
- ^ "Q&A: Iraq's Debt". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 25 January 2018. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
- ^ "Jubilee Iraq". Archived from the original on 6 March 2011. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ Mitu Gulati, Duke University School of Law; Ugo Panizza, The Graduate Institute Geneva and CEPR. The Hausmann-Gorky Effect. Working Paper No. HEIDWP02-2018. Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, International Economics Department.
- ^ Silvia Spring (24 December 2006). "Blood and Money: In what might be called the mother of all surprises, Iraq's economy is growing strong, even booming in places". Newsweek International (In The Daily Beast). Archived from the original on 6 May 2012. Retrieved 21 November 2011.
- ^ ltd, Research and Markets. "Iraq Automotive Market, Size, Share, Outlook and Growth Opportunities 2022-2030". www.researchandmarkets.com. Retrieved 22 October 2025.
- ^ a b c الخيام, فارس. "استراتيجية لتطوير قطاع السيارات الصديقة للبيئة في العراق". الجزيرة نت (in Arabic). Retrieved 22 October 2025.
- ^ a b c d e f g "Cars & Trucks Factories – ALSADEQ GROUP". alsadeq-group.com. Archived from the original on 14 May 2025. Retrieved 22 October 2025.
- ^ "Middle East :: Iraq — The World Factbook - Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov. Archived from the original on 8 March 2023. Retrieved 31 March 2019.
- ^ Iraq Country Study Guide Volume 1 Strategic Information and Developments. Lulu.com. 3 March 2012. ISBN 9781438774633.[self-published source]
- ^ Randy Schnepf, Iraq Agriculture and Food Supply: Background and Issues, (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 7 June 2004) p 37.
- ^ Beer, Sam. The United States' Program for Agriculture in Post-Invasion Iraq Archived 12 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine. 2016.
- ^ "Agriculture Reconstruction and Development Program for Iraq (ARDI)". DAI: International Development. Archived from the original on 30 August 2018. Retrieved 30 August 2018.
- ^ Beer, Sam. The United States' Program for Agriculture in Post-Invasion Iraq Archived 12 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine. 2016.
- ^ Bernard Carreau, ed. "Lessons from USDA in Iraq and Afghanistan," Prism Vol. 1, No. 3, (September 2011): 139.
- ^ "FAOSTAT Country Profiles: Iraq." FAO website Archived 10 November 2016 at the Wayback Machine
- ^ "Agricultural Production: Iraq's Best Chance for Restoring Food Security". Iraq Business News. Archived from the original on 23 October 2018. Retrieved 22 October 2018.
- ^ "TED Case Studies: Marsh Arabs". Trade Environment Database. American University. Archived from the original on 27 June 2010. Retrieved 14 January 2011.
- ^ Habenstreit, Linda C. (10 January 2010). "Co-op playing key role as Iraq rebuilds farm sector". Rural Cooperatives. Archived from the original on 4 March 2010. Retrieved 17 March 2010.
- ^ "Unfarmed Now, Uninhabited When? Agriculture and climate change in Iraq". Oxfam Policy & Practice. Archived from the original on 5 April 2022. Retrieved 12 April 2022.
- ^ "FAO Fishery Country Profile - Republic of Iraq" (PDF). Archived (PDF) from the original on 10 March 2024. Retrieved 10 March 2024.
- ^ "Iraq faces rocky road in mining investment hunt". Reuters. 7 September 2011. Archived from the original on 22 May 2023. Retrieved 22 May 2023.
- ^ a b c d e f g Iraq Economic Monitor: From War to Reconstruction and Economic Recovery (PDF) (Report). World Bank Group. Spring 2018. Archived (PDF) from the original on 16 July 2018. Retrieved 29 August 2018.
- ^ "OPEC : OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves". www.opec.org. Archived from the original on 25 August 2017. Retrieved 31 March 2019.
- ^ WSJ News Graphics (15 April 2016). "Barrel Breakdown". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 31 December 2017. Retrieved 30 August 2018.
- ^ a b c d Calamur, Krishnadev (19 March 2018). "Oil Was Supposed to Rebuild Iraq". The Atlantic. Archived from the original on 29 June 2018. Retrieved 30 August 2018.
- ^ a b c Otterman, Sharon. "IRAQ: Oil | Council on Foreign Relations". www.cfr.org. Retrieved 22 October 2025.
- ^ a b c Kumins, Lawrence (13 April 2005). Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues (PDF) (Report). Congressional Research Service. RS21626. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 September 2018. Retrieved 29 August 2018.
- ^ Xhemaj, Valdrin (8 July 2016). "Iraq: what happened to the oil after the war?". The Conversation. Archived from the original on 30 August 2018. Retrieved 30 August 2018.
- ^ a b Coles, Isabel; Nabhan, Ali (21 July 2018). "Oil-Rich Iraq Can't Keep the Lights On". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 30 August 2018. Retrieved 30 August 2018.
- ^ "VI: The Air Campaign". CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR. Washington, DC: US Congress. April 1992.
- ^ a b Luay Al-Khatteeb & Harry Istepanian (March 2015). Turn a Light On: Electricity Sector Reform in Iraq (PDF) (Report). Brookings Institution. Archived (PDF) from the original on 28 July 2018. Retrieved 29 August 2018.
- ^ OPEC (2018). "Iraq facts and figures". www.opec.org. Archived from the original on 21 June 2019. Retrieved 29 July 2018.
- ^ "Iraq approves Statoil sale of oil field stake to Lukoil". Reuters. af.reuters.com. 7 March 2012. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 7 March 2012.
- ^ "Iraq licenses first foreign banks". Al Jazeera. 31 January 2004. Archived from the original on 12 January 2023. Retrieved 12 January 2023.
- ^ "Security Contractors in Iraq". archive.globalpolicy.org. Archived from the original on 8 May 2024. Retrieved 22 January 2024.
- ^ a b "Iraq Economy Iraqi Economy, business opportunities in Iraq". Global Tenders. Archived from the original on 8 May 2024. Retrieved 22 January 2024.
- ^ Neild, Barry; Tawfeeq, Mohammed (13 January 2011). "Iraq tourism hangs in balance at Babylon". Inside the Middle East. CNN. Archived from the original on 25 September 2013. Retrieved 14 January 2011.
- ^ ABC News (18 March 2008). "Page 2: Iraq, 5 Years On: Key Facts and Figures - ABC News". ABC News. Archived from the original on 2 April 2015. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ a b Campbell, Jason H.; Michael E. O'Hanlon (12 February 2009). "Iraq Index - Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq" (PDF). Report. Brookings Institution. Archived (PDF) from the original on 25 February 2009. Retrieved 22 February 2009.
- ^ "Reconstructing Iraq", International Crisis Group, Report, 2 September 2004, p. 16, footnote 157.
- ^ McCaffrey, Barry R. (4 November 2008). "Memorandum for Colonel Michael Meese, Professor and Head Dept of Social Sciences" (PDF). Memo. Air Force Association. Archived from the original (PDF) on 27 February 2009. Retrieved 22 February 2009.
- ^ "Iraq Living Conditions Survey 2004". UNDP in Iraq. United Nations Development Programme. Archived from the original on 4 November 2005.
- ^ "OPEC : Member Countries". www.opec.org. Archived from the original on 7 January 2020. Retrieved 21 March 2018.
- ^ "Iraq". U.S. Department of State. Archived from the original on 21 January 2017. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
- ^ "Iran-Iraq trade expected to reach $10b by late March" Archived 25 March 2023 at the Wayback Machine tehrantimes Accessed 25 March 2023.
External links
[edit]- Iraq Inter-Agency Information & Analysis Unit Reports, Maps and Assessments of Iraq from the UN Inter-Agency Information & Analysis Unit
- Map of Iraq's oil and gas infrastructure Archived 5 September 2012 at the Wayback Machine
Economy of Iraq
View on GrokipediaHistorical Overview
Pre-Ba'athist Economy
The economy of Iraq prior to the Ba'ath Party's consolidation of power in 1968 relied predominantly on agriculture, which employed the majority of the workforce and formed the basis of output during the monarchical period from 1932 to 1958. Key activities centered on rain-fed and irrigated cultivation of grains such as wheat and barley, date production in southern regions, and livestock herding, though productivity was constrained by outdated irrigation systems, soil salinity, and a feudal land tenure structure dominated by large tribal estates.[11][12] Economic policies emphasized traditional market mechanisms with limited state intervention, focusing on basic infrastructure to support agrarian needs rather than broad industrialization.[12] The advent of oil transformed fiscal capacities, beginning with a concession granted to the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1925, followed by the discovery of commercially viable reserves near Kirkuk in 1927. Exports commenced in 1934 through pipelines to Mediterranean ports in Haifa and Tripoli, reaching an average of 4 million tons annually before World War II disruptions.[11] By the 1950s, rising oil royalties—sharing profits with foreign consortia like the Iraq Petroleum Company—provided the government with substantial revenues, enabling investments in flood control, irrigation rehabilitation, and transportation networks via the Development Board established in 1950.[12] These funds supported modest economic diversification, though non-oil sectors remained underdeveloped, with manufacturing exhibiting around 10% annual growth in the late 1950s but accounting for a minor GDP share.[11] The 1958 overthrow of the monarchy initiated shifts toward greater state involvement, including agrarian reforms that capped private landholdings at 1,000 dunums for irrigated plots or 2,000 for rain-fed areas, aiming to redistribute excess holdings and boost peasant productivity.[12] Approximately 1.7 million hectares were expropriated by the mid-1960s under these measures, though implementation faced resistance from landowners and incomplete compensation issues, marking a transition from feudal dominance without yet imposing full socialist controls.[11] Overall, pre-Ba'athist growth hinged on oil windfalls amid persistent rural underinvestment, setting the stage for subsequent centralization.[13]Ba'athist Era and State Control
The Ba'ath Party assumed power in Iraq through a coup on July 17, 1968, establishing a regime that emphasized Arab socialism and centralized economic control as core tenets of its ideology. Under this framework, the government pursued aggressive nationalization policies to consolidate state dominance over key sectors, viewing private enterprise and foreign influence as obstacles to national sovereignty. The economy transitioned toward a command structure where the state directed resource allocation, production targets, and investment priorities through five-year plans, prioritizing heavy industry, infrastructure, and public welfare programs funded primarily by oil exports.[14][12] A pivotal assertion of state control occurred with the nationalization of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) on June 1, 1972, when the regime seized full ownership of foreign-held oil assets, overriding concessions granted decades earlier to British, American, French, and Dutch firms. This move, executed amid rising global oil prices following the 1973 OPEC embargo, shifted control to the state-owned Iraq National Oil Company (INOC), enabling direct management of production and revenues. Oil income surged as a result, rising from approximately 219 million Iraqi dinars in 1972 to over 1.7 billion dinars by 1974, which the government channeled into expanding state enterprises and subsidizing basic goods, housing, and education to foster regime loyalty and social stability.[15][16] The Ba'athist model entrenched a mixed yet predominantly state-directed economy, with public sector employment absorbing the majority of the workforce—estimated at over 70% by the late 1970s—while private initiative was curtailed through regulations, price controls, and expropriations. Agricultural reforms, including land redistribution from large estates to smallholders starting in 1970, aimed to boost output under state oversight but often led to inefficiencies due to bureaucratic mismanagement and lack of market incentives. Industrialization efforts focused on import-substitution via state monopolies in cement, steel, and petrochemicals, supported by revenues that peaked at around 26 billion U.S. dollars annually by 1980, though underlying distortions such as over-reliance on hydrocarbons and suppressed competition sowed seeds of vulnerability.[12][17][13] Saddam Hussein's consolidation of power in 1979 intensified state control, with economic policy serving military buildup and patronage networks, yet the pre-war decade witnessed real per capita income growth averaging 5-7% annually, driven by oil windfalls rather than structural reforms. Under Saddam, the economy peaked in the 1970s–early 1980s with oil-driven booms, with nominal GDP per capita exceeding $3,000 at times, though non-oil sectors stagnated.[18] Corruption permeated the system, as regime elites extracted rents from state contracts and smuggling, undermining allocative efficiency despite nominal expansions in literacy and healthcare access. This top-down approach, while delivering short-term gains, prioritized political imperatives over sustainable development, rendering the economy brittle to external shocks.[14][19]Wars, Sanctions, and Collapse (1980-2003)
The Iran-Iraq War from September 1980 to August 1988 imposed massive economic burdens on Iraq, diverting resources to military spending and disrupting oil production, which fell from 3.4 million barrels per day in 1980 to under 1 million barrels per day by 1981 due to infrastructure attacks and export constraints.[20] Non-oil GDP declined by an estimated 33% over the conflict period, while overall war costs, including debt servicing at $3 billion annually by the late 1980s, left the economy weakened and reliant on foreign borrowing.[21][22] Iraq accumulated approximately $80 billion in external debt by 1988, with over half extended as loans from Gulf states like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to finance the war effort.[23][24] Post-war reconstruction demands exacerbated fiscal pressures, prompting Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, which invoked United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 imposing comprehensive economic sanctions that same month.[25] The ensuing Gulf War in January-February 1991 saw coalition airstrikes devastate infrastructure, slashing oil production by 85% and contracting GDP by nearly two-thirds that year, with annual growth plunging from 57.8% in 1990 to -64% in 1991.[26][27] Exports dropped 97% and imports 90% within a year of sanctions, compounding war damage and triggering hyperinflation alongside a loss exceeding two-thirds of pre-sanctions GDP.[28][29][30] The sanctions regime, aimed at pressuring regime compliance on weapons inspections and reparations, inflicted cumulative costs equivalent to roughly six years of Iraq's pre-war GDP through foregone oil revenues, while regime policies including resource diversion and smuggling sustained elite control amid widespread deprivation.[31][30] By the mid-1990s, over half the population of approximately 20 million lived below the poverty line, with public services collapsing and caloric intake halving for many households.[32] The United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, approved in 1995 and operational from 1996 to 2003, allowed phased oil exports up to $1 billion every 90 days (later expanded) to procure humanitarian goods, yielding over $67 billion in revenues by 2002 but enabling $10.1 billion in illicit income through underpricing and kickbacks under lax oversight.[33][34] Despite mitigating some acute shortages, the program failed to reverse systemic collapse, as corruption siphoned funds and non-oil sectors atrophied, leaving per capita GDP at levels far below 1980 figures by 2003, with nominal GDP per capita having fallen to about $500–$1,000 due to wars, sanctions, and oil export restrictions.[35][36][18] Total external debt swelled to $120-130 billion, underscoring the era's fiscal insolvency.[37]Post-2003 Reconstruction and Stabilization
Following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and the establishment of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), initial economic reconstruction focused on liberalizing the state-dominated economy through orders privatizing dozens of state-owned enterprises, reducing trade barriers, and facilitating foreign direct investment.[38] These measures aimed to shift from Ba'athist-era central planning toward market-oriented policies, with the CPA allocating initial funds from seized Iraqi assets and oil revenues via the Development Fund for Iraq, which totaled about $20 billion by mid-2004.[39] However, implementation was constrained by the absence of a sovereign Iraqi government until June 2004 and ongoing looting of infrastructure, which damaged an estimated 80% of economic facilities in the invasion's immediate aftermath.[40] Reconstruction financing escalated with international commitments, including $33 billion pledged at the October 2003 Madrid Conference and U.S. appropriations exceeding $60 billion through 2012, alongside Iraqi oil-funded budgets that rose from $5.2 billion in 2005 to $25.6 billion by 2010; overall spending reached $220 billion from 2003 to 2012.[40] The oil sector, accounting for over 90% of exports and government revenue, experienced an initial production collapse from pre-invasion levels of about 2.5 million barrels per day to under 2 million due to sabotage and neglect, but recovered to pre-war output by 2004 amid rising global prices that boosted export revenues to $8 billion in 2003 alone.[41][40] By 2009-2010, licensing rounds awarded service contracts to international firms, spurring output toward 4.5 million barrels per day by 2015, though revenues remained volatile and disproportionately benefited public spending over private investment.[40] Persistent security challenges, including over 400 attacks on oil infrastructure from 2003 to 2007 and civilian casualties exceeding 180,000 by 2017, disrupted project execution and deterred non-oil investment, with budget utilization rates hovering at 40-60% through 2013.[40] Corruption compounded these issues, with $8 billion unaccounted for from the Development Fund for Iraq and Iraq ranking 161 out of 167 on Transparency International's 2015 index, eroding institutional capacity and diverting funds from essential services.[40] Nominal GDP expanded threefold by 2008, largely from oil price surges (reaching over $100 per barrel) rather than volume increases or diversification, yielding anemic real growth relative to post-sanctions potential and leaving unemployment high at around 10-15% amid public sector dominance.[42] Stabilization gained traction after the 2007 U.S. military surge reduced violence, enabling capital formation to accelerate from 2008 and oil production to surpass 1980s-1990s peaks post-2010.[42][43] Despite this, non-oil private sector growth stagnated due to weak property rights, bureaucratic hurdles, and overreliance on state employment, which absorbed 42% of the workforce by 2015, perpetuating fiscal vulnerabilities exposed by oil price crashes like that of 2014.[40] International assessments, including from the IMF, noted regularized wage payments by August 2003 as an early fiscal win, but emphasized the need for structural reforms to mitigate conflict-induced inefficiencies and build resilience beyond hydrocarbon dependence. However, on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, GDP per capita remains only slightly higher than in 2003, reflecting limited real per capita gains despite post-invasion oil recovery and GDP growth averaging 2–5% annually in recent years; nominal GDP per capita is projected at around $5,800 in 2026 per IMF estimates.[44][45]Macroeconomic Framework
GDP Trends and Sectoral Composition
Iraq's nominal GDP reached $250.84 billion in 2023, reflecting a decline from $286.64 billion in 2022 amid falling global oil prices, before recovering to an estimated $279.64 billion in 2024.[46] [47] Real GDP growth has exhibited extreme volatility since 2003, driven primarily by oil production and prices rather than broad-based economic activity; following an initial contraction post-invasion due to war damage and institutional collapse, growth surged from a depressed base in the mid-2000s, but recurrent shocks—including the 2008 financial crisis, ISIS territorial control (2014–2017), and the 2020 oil price crash exacerbated by COVID-19—have caused repeated downturns, such as -2.94% in 2023 after +8.9% in 2022.[48] [1] Over the post-ISIS recovery period (2017–2023), real GDP growth has averaged 2–5% annually. Recent contractions, including -2.3% in 2024 per some forecasts, stem from OPEC+ production cuts limiting output to around 3–4 million barrels per day, underscoring the economy's vulnerability to exogenous factors over endogenous reforms.[49] Sectorally, Iraq's economy remains overwhelmingly extractive, with oil accounting for approximately 42% of GDP on average over the past decade—rising to 61% of real GDP in 2022—and comprising the bulk of the industrial sector, which contributes 40–51% overall.[1] [50] [51] Agriculture represents just 3–5%, constrained by chronic water shortages, salinization, outdated irrigation, and conflict-disrupted land use, yielding limited output in grains, dates, and livestock despite fertile potential in the Tigris-Euphrates basin.[51] Services account for 45–55%, dominated by public sector employment, informal trade, and basic transport linked to oil logistics, but hampered by corruption, regulatory barriers, and low private sector participation.[51] Non-oil GDP, encompassing agriculture, manufacturing, and services, has shown sporadic resilience—growing 13.8% in 2023 amid post-COVID rebound—but decelerated to an estimated 2.5% in 2024 due to curtailed public investment, energy shortages, and structural inefficiencies like overstaffed state enterprises and weak property rights enforcement, with IMF projections indicating non-oil growth moderating to around 2–3% through 2026.[4] [4] This limited expansion highlights persistent oil dependency (over 90% of revenues) and challenges such as corruption, unemployment, and infrastructure deficits; despite nominal GDP per capita recovering to estimated levels around $5,800 by 2026 from pre-2003 lows of $500–$1,000, on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, GDP per capita remains only slightly higher than in 2003, reflecting minimal real per capita gains since the invasion.[52] This disparity perpetuates "Dutch disease" effects, where oil windfalls crowd out diversification, leaving non-oil sectors underdeveloped and employment opportunities skewed toward subsistence or government jobs, with unemployment exceeding 15% in recent years.[53] Efforts to broaden the base, such as private sector incentives under the 2023 tripartite budget framework, have yielded marginal gains, but persistent governance issues limit sustained progress.[1]Fiscal and Monetary Policies
Iraq's fiscal policy remains predominantly shaped by its heavy reliance on oil export revenues, which constituted approximately 90 percent of government income in recent years. The 2023-2025 triennial budget, enacted in a expansionary framework, projected total expenditures of around 211.9 trillion Iraqi dinars (IQD) for 2024 alone, against anticipated revenues of 147.8 trillion IQD, resulting in substantial deficits financed through domestic borrowing and drawdowns from central bank reserves.[54] [55] Non-oil revenues, including taxes and customs duties, have stagnated at low levels, with import duties falling from 1.27 trillion IQD in the first five months of 2024 to 574 billion IQD in the same period of 2025, underscoring limited progress in revenue diversification despite policy intentions.[56] The budget's oil price breakeven escalated to about $84 per barrel in 2024 from $54 in prior years, driven by expanded spending on public salaries, pensions, and subsidies, which absorb over 70 percent of operational outlays, while public investment contracted amid fiscal constraints.[4] Fiscal balances showed a modest surplus of 0.2 percent of GDP in 2024, improving from a 3.3 percent deficit in 2023 due to tighter expenditure controls, though projections indicate deterioration to 7.5 percent of GDP in 2025 amid rising outlays and volatile oil prices.[57] [4] Deficits are primarily addressed through issuance of treasury bills and central bank instruments, with domestic debt reaching 91 trillion IQD by mid-2025, complemented by external obligations below $13 billion; overall public debt hovered at 43-50 percent of GDP, levels deemed manageable by the Central Bank of Iraq but vulnerable to oil revenue shocks.[58] [59] [60] Monetary policy, overseen by the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), prioritizes exchange rate stability and price control through a conventional peg of the Iraqi dinar to the U.S. dollar at 1,320 IQD per USD, established in February 2023 following a 2020 devaluation of 22.7 percent from 1,190 IQD. [58] The CBI employs tools such as policy rate adjustments—raised to 7.5 percent in 2023 to combat liquidity—and reserve requirement ratios, varied between expansionary reductions for lending support and contractions to curb inflation, alongside issuance of short-term bills to absorb excess liquidity.[61] [62] Inflation has reached historic lows, reflecting effective monetary circulation management, though persistent dollarization and informal markets pose transmission challenges.[63] Recent measures include promoting dinar-denominated transactions to reduce dollar reliance and plans to redenominate the currency by removing zeros, aimed at enhancing stability without altering the peg.[64] [65] Fiscal-monetary coordination remains strained, with government deficits pressuring reserves, prompting IMF recommendations for strengthened liquidity mopping and financial sector reforms to improve policy effectiveness.[62]Inflation, Debt, and Fiscal Deficits
Iraq's inflation rates have moderated in recent years following periods of higher volatility tied to oil revenue fluctuations and supply chain disruptions. The annual consumer price inflation rate averaged 5.0% in 2022, declining to 4.4% in 2023 and further to 2.6% in 2024, reflecting tighter monetary policy by the Central Bank of Iraq and stabilized food imports.[66] By the second quarter of 2025, inflation dropped to 0.8%, a 76% decrease from 3.3% in the prior year's corresponding period, with some months recording mild deflation, such as -0.3% in September 2025.[66][67] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates headline inflation at 3.6% for 2024, down from 5.3% in 2023, projecting a gradual rise to 3.5% in 2025 amid potential wage pressures and currency dynamics, though core inflation excluding volatiles remains subdued around 1.5%.[68] Public debt levels have stayed moderate relative to GDP, supported by oil windfalls but vulnerable to expenditure overruns. The debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 42.1% in 2023, increasing to approximately 46.5% in 2024 due to deficit financing and partial budget execution.[69] The Central Bank of Iraq maintains that the ratio remains below 43% as of mid-2025, classifying it as sustainable and within international thresholds of 60% for emerging markets, with external debt comprising about 20% of total obligations held by multilateral lenders like the IMF and World Bank.[70][2] The World Bank projects the ratio at 46.3% for 2024, cautioning that unchecked fiscal expansion could elevate risks if oil prices fall below budgeted assumptions of $70 per barrel.[71] Fiscal deficits have widened amid ambitious public spending programs exceeding non-oil revenue growth, exacerbating reliance on oil exports which account for over 90% of government income. Iraq recorded a budget surplus of 8.1% of GDP in 2022 due to high oil prices, but this flipped to a deficit of 1.1-2.0% in 2023 and expanded to 4.1-8.0% in 2024, with actual shortfalls totaling around 9.3 trillion Iraqi dinars ($7.1 billion) against initial projections of 63 trillion dinars.[72][73] The IMF forecasts a 7.6% deficit for 2024, driven by expenditures of 211.9 trillion dinars against revenues of 147.8 trillion, financed partly by borrowing and deferred investments, recommending reforms to curb subsidies and boost tax collection to mitigate medium-term vulnerabilities.[74][54] For 2025, deficits are projected at 4.2% of GDP, with risks from geopolitical tensions and delayed diversification efforts amplifying fiscal rigidity.[75]| Year | Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP) | Primary Source |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | +8.1 | Countryeconomy.com[72] |
| 2023 | -1.1 to -2.0 | IMF/Fitch[73][74] |
| 2024 | -4.1 to -8.0 | Trading Economics/Fitch/IMF[75][73][74] |
| 2025 | -4.2 | Trading Economics[75] |
Resource-Based Sectors
Oil and Natural Gas Dominance
Iraq possesses the world's fifth-largest proven crude oil reserves, estimated at 145 billion barrels as of 2024, accounting for approximately 8.7% of global totals.[76] These reserves, concentrated primarily in the southern Basra fields such as Rumaila, West Qurna, and Zubair, alongside northern fields in the Kurdistan region, underpin the country's extractive sector.[77] Iraq's oil production averaged around 4 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2024, exceeding its OPEC+ quota of 4.0 million bpd, with exports reaching 3.38 million bpd in August 2025.[77] [78] As an OPEC founding member since 1960, Iraq adheres to production quotas to stabilize global prices but has advocated for increases to reflect its spare capacity, targeting up to 6 million bpd in future expansions.[79] Crude oil exports generated nearly $99 billion in 2024, comprising over 99% of Iraq's total export earnings and 91% of federal revenues, while contributing 42-45.6% to gross domestic product (GDP).[80] [1] [81] Revenues from these exports are managed by the state-owned State Oil Marketing Organization (SOMO), which handles sales primarily from southern fields and intermittently from Kurdish fields via agreements. Proceeds are deposited into federal government accounts, primarily the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Iraq, then allocated through the national budget, with major uses including public sector salaries and pensions (the largest expense), subsidies, social welfare, infrastructure, and allocations for producing governorates. A disputed share goes to the Kurdistan Regional Government, but ongoing disputes have led to intermittent halts in Kurdish exports and negotiations over central control via SOMO. Corruption and mismanagement remain challenges, with portions of funds lost to inefficiency or illicit diversion, though officially revenues support the federal budget.[77] [82] This dominance exposes the economy to oil price volatility; for instance, revenues fluctuate with Brent crude benchmarks, necessitating budget oil price assumptions that rose to $84 per barrel in 2024 from $54 previously.[4] China imported 72% of Iraq's crude exports in 2024, followed by India and other Asian markets, reinforcing export dependence on a narrow buyer base.[77] State-owned enterprises like the Iraq National Oil Company manage fields under service contracts with international firms such as ExxonMobil, BP, and Chinese national oil companies, which provide capital for enhanced recovery amid aging infrastructure.[77] Natural gas resources, largely associated with oil fields, hold significant potential but remain underdeveloped relative to oil. Iraq's domestic gas production met about 49.5% of its supply needs in 2023, with total output around 45,438 terajoules, supplemented by imports from Iran under long-term contracts extending to 2029.[83] High flaring rates persist, with 1.6% reduction in 2024 but emissions still at 35.1 million tons of CO2 equivalent, as associated gas from southern fields is often vented due to insufficient processing capacity.[84] The Khor Mor field in Kurdistan, Iraq's largest non-associated gas site, plans a 50% output boost to 750 million standard cubic feet per day following early-phase completions in 2025, aiming to curb imports and power electricity generation.[85] Despite reserves estimated in the hundreds of trillion cubic feet, gas contributes minimally to exports or revenues compared to oil, with development hindered by pipeline constraints, investment shortfalls, and regional disputes between federal and Kurdish authorities.[77] This underutilization perpetuates Iraq's reliance on imported gas for 40-50% of energy needs, underscoring oil's singular economic primacy.[86]Agriculture and Water Resource Challenges
Iraq's agriculture sector, which contributes approximately 3.4% to GDP in 2024 despite employing a significant portion of the rural workforce, faces severe constraints from chronic water shortages and environmental degradation.[87][88] The sector relies heavily on irrigation from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which historically supported Mesopotamia's fertility, but current flows have declined sharply due to upstream damming and climatic shifts, limiting cultivation to about 5 million hectares out of 9.5 million potentially arable.[89] This has resulted in annual losses of nearly 400,000 acres of farmland to desertification and salinization, driven by inadequate water for leaching salts from soil.[90] Upstream hydroelectric and irrigation dams constructed by Turkey and Iran have substantially reduced river inflows to Iraq, with Turkey controlling much of the Tigris via projects like the Ilisu Dam and the Euphrates through the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP), while Iran dams tributaries of the Tigris.[91][92] These developments, initiated since the 1960s without binding riparian agreements, have cut Euphrates flows by up to 40% in dry years and Tigris levels by similar margins, as Turkey and Iran prioritize domestic needs over downstream allocations.[93] Iraq's internal water management exacerbates the issue, with outdated infrastructure from Ba'athist-era canals suffering neglect, inefficient allocation due to corruption, and over-extraction for upstream provinces, leading to a projected 20% freshwater reduction by 2050 even without further upstream interference.[94][91] The 2024 drought, one of the worst since records began in 1933, slashed seasonal harvests by forcing half of farming households to reduce cultivated land or irrigation volumes amid extreme temperatures and prolonged dry spells.[95][96] Wheat production, a staple crop, reached an estimated 5.2 million tonnes nationally (excluding Kurdistan), reflecting declines from prior years due to water rationing and soil degradation.[97] These pressures have heightened food insecurity, displaced rural populations, and strained imports, underscoring the causal link between diminished river flows—primarily from geopolitical dam-building—and agricultural viability, compounded by domestic policy failures in modernization and transboundary diplomacy.[88][98]Mining and Non-Oil Extractives
Iraq holds extensive non-oil mineral reserves, including approximately 10 billion tonnes of phosphates primarily in the Western Desert, the world's largest native sulfur deposits, 8 billion tonnes of limestone concentrated in Anbar Province, substantial gypsum in Nineveh and other regions, as well as silica sand, bauxite, clay minerals, sedimentary iron, and rock salt.[99][100][101] These resources offer potential for economic diversification beyond hydrocarbons, yet extraction remains minimal due to historical underinvestment and post-conflict disruptions. Iraqi phosphorite deposits rank second globally after Morocco, while sulfur reserves could support large-scale industrial applications if developed.[100][102] The mining sector's contribution to GDP stood at just 0.1% in 2021, reflecting limited production capacity and a focus on basic extractives rather than value-added processing.[103] In 2022, total minerals production reached 230 million metric tons, an increase from 210 million metric tons the prior year, largely comprising construction aggregates like limestone and gypsum used in domestic cement manufacturing.[104] Iraq produced gypsum and cement in 2020–2021 but conducted no significant mining of metals, phosphates, or sulfur during this period, with output constrained to non-metallic minerals for local construction needs.[101] Phosphate and sulfur extraction, despite vast reserves, has been negligible since the 1980s due to technological gaps and market disruptions from wars and sanctions. Development faces multifaceted challenges, including persistent security threats from terrorism and instability, inadequate infrastructure, regulatory opacity, and corruption risks that deter foreign investment.[99][105] The sector's neglect stems from oil dominance, which has crowded out non-hydrocarbon industries, compounded by bureaucratic hurdles and limited geological mapping in unsecured areas.[106] Recent government initiatives aim to address these issues, with explorations launched in October 2024 for limestone in Anbar to bolster cement production and gypsum in Nineveh for industrial uses, signaling intent to harness minerals for diversification.[107] Iraq's 2024–2028 national development plan includes mining expansion targets, though implementation hinges on resolving federal-Kurdish resource disputes and improving the investment climate.[108] Without sustained reforms, the sector's growth potential remains unrealized, perpetuating economic vulnerability to oil price volatility.Industrial and Service Sectors
Manufacturing and Infrastructure Development
Iraq's manufacturing sector remains underdeveloped, contributing approximately 4.09% to GDP in 2024, with output reaching $8.95 billion in 2023, reflecting a 24.19% increase from the prior year driven by public sector enterprises.[109][110] Key industries include cement production, petrochemicals, fertilizers such as urea and ammonia, food processing, textiles, and construction materials, with public sector manufacturing valued at around $1 billion in 2023.[111][112][113] In June 2025, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani announced initiatives toward industrial self-sufficiency, emphasizing expansion in non-oil outputs like fuel oil and chemicals amid efforts to reduce import reliance.[113] However, the sector faces persistent challenges from decades of conflict, sanctions, supply disruptions, corruption, inadequate financing, and skills shortages, limiting capacity utilization and private investment.[114][115] Infrastructure development in Iraq lags due to war damage, including ISIS-era destruction of electricity grids causing up to 40% power losses, deteriorated roads, and underdeveloped ports, necessitating extensive reconstruction.[116][117] Post-2017 ISIS defeat, efforts have focused on emergency recovery, with World Bank financing supporting road safety on Expressway No. 1, a 1,200 km corridor vital for connectivity.[1] In June 2025, a $930 million World Bank project launched to modernize railways linking Umm Qasr Port in the south to Baghdad and the Jordanian border at Treibil, aiming to enhance trade, reduce logistics costs, and integrate with regional networks.[118] Electricity and transport sectors continue to prioritize rehabilitation, though financing constraints, political instability, and uneven investment in liberated areas hinder progress, as noted in IMF assessments of non-oil growth moderation in 2024.[62][119] These initiatives, while promising, require sustained reforms to address systemic bottlenecks like nonperforming loans in state banks and weak institutional support.[120]Financial and Banking Systems
The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI), established under the 2004 Central Bank Law, serves as the primary monetary authority, tasked with preserving the stability of the Iraqi dinar, controlling inflation, and managing liquidity in the financial system. Its functions include setting monetary policy tools such as the policy interest rate, which was raised to 7.5% in 2023 alongside an increase in the mandatory reserve ratio to 18%, and issuing central bank bills to absorb excess liquidity and finance fiscal deficits.[61] While the CBI operates with formal independence from government interference in monetary decisions, political pressures have occasionally influenced its operations, particularly in foreign exchange management and support for state-owned enterprises.[121] Iraq's banking sector is dominated by seven state-owned banks (SOBs), which hold the majority of assets and are heavily involved in financing government operations and public sector salaries, while approximately 70 private banks, including Islamic institutions, handle a smaller share of deposits and lending but often function more as currency exchange outlets due to limited credit extension capabilities.[105] Private sector credit remains stifled at around 10% of GDP, reflecting structural barriers to lending and high reliance on cash transactions amid widespread dollarization.[55] The sector includes branches of about 20 foreign banks, though their impact is marginal given regulatory hurdles and security concerns.[122] Regulatory reforms, supported by international bodies like the IMF and World Bank, focus on restructuring SOBs to address chronic undercapitalization and non-performing loans (NPLs), which have ballooned due to politically connected lending and weak recovery mechanisms; for instance, over $8 billion in loans to businessmen and contractors remain unrepaid after two decades, with only 1% recovered.[4] [123] In 2025, the government engaged Ernst & Young to overhaul six SOBs, including the Industrial Bank, as part of a broader program involving KPMG for governance improvements and digital transformation to enhance transparency and financial inclusion.[124] [125] The CBI has advanced anti-money laundering measures since 2015, establishing a dedicated council, though enforcement gaps persist amid endemic corruption in public sector finance.[126] [127] Persistent challenges include governance deficits exploited by politically affiliated private banks, leading to risks of foreign influence in reforms, and low financial intermediation that hampers non-oil growth.[128] [129] IMF assessments emphasize the need for comprehensive NPL resolution and capital recapitalization to foster private lending, warning that without these, the sector's inefficiencies will continue constraining economic diversification.[4]Telecommunications, Retail, and Emerging Services
Iraq's telecommunications sector has expanded significantly amid post-conflict recovery, with the mobile network operator market projected to reach USD 2.88 billion in 2025 and grow at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 3.47% to USD 3.41 billion by 2030, driven by rising smartphone adoption and network upgrades.[130] Mobile penetration stands at approximately 80% of the population, with 45.7 million mobile connections reported in 2024 out of a total of 47.68 million telecommunication connections.[131][132] Internet penetration reached 82.9% by the end of 2024, up from 44.3% in 2019, supported by government commitments to digital infrastructure expansion.[133] The sector is dominated by three major operators: Zain Iraq, holding 41.9% of subscribers and generating USD 1.1 billion in revenue in 2024 with 11% year-over-year growth; Asiacell with 39.2% market share; and Korek Telecom with 18.9%.[130][132] These firms have invested in 4G/LTE rollouts and partnerships, such as Zain's network modernization with Nokia, though challenges persist from regulatory hurdles and uneven infrastructure coverage outside urban areas.[130] The retail sector in Iraq remains largely informal and fragmented, characterized by traditional markets (suqs) and small-scale vendors, but modern retail is growing at a projected CAGR of 6.7% from 2024 to 2030, fueled by urbanization, rising consumer spending, and e-commerce penetration.[134][135] This expansion is linked to increased smartphone usage enabling online grocery and retail delivery, though the sector faces structural barriers including supply chain disruptions, high informality rates exceeding 60% of economic activity, and security-related logistics issues in non-stable regions.[136] Foreign retail chains have entered via franchises in Baghdad and Erbil, but penetration is limited by bureaucratic investment obstacles and reliance on imported goods, which expose the market to currency fluctuations and border delays.[3] Emerging services, particularly in the digital economy, are gaining traction through regulatory reforms aimed at reducing cash dependency and fostering fintech integration. In 2024, the Central Bank of Iraq issued Digital Payment Regulation No. 2, replacing outdated laws to enable electronic payment services, digital banks, and blockchain applications, with guidelines for licensing digital banks issued in March.[137][138] This framework supports a shift toward digital finance, bolstered by initiatives like the $30 million EQIQ fund for tech startups, which completed deployments following its 2023 first close.[139] The launch of the MENA Fintech Association in Iraq in 2025 further promotes local financial growth by enhancing transparency and inclusion, though adoption lags due to low financial literacy and persistent infrastructure gaps in rural areas.[140] These developments represent initial steps toward service-sector diversification, but their economic impact remains modest relative to oil dominance, with fintech capital inflows in the broader MENA region accelerating in 2023-2024 without Iraq-specific dominance.[141]Labor and Human Capital
Workforce Demographics and Participation
Iraq's workforce reflects a young and predominantly male demographic, shaped by the country's population structure where the median age is 20.8 years and approximately 60% of the population is under 25, creating a significant youth bulge that pressures labor market absorption. The total labor force numbered around 11.7 million in 2023, with participation rates remaining low relative to global averages due to structural, cultural, and security-related barriers.[142] The 2021 Iraq Labour Force Survey, the most comprehensive national data available, reported an overall labor force participation rate (LFPR) of 39.5% for individuals aged 15 and above, encompassing those employed or actively seeking work. Male participation dominated at 68.0%, while female participation was markedly lower at 10.6%, resulting in women comprising just 13.9% of the total labor force in recent estimates. This gender disparity persists despite higher educational attainment among younger women, attributable to conservative social norms rooted in Iraq's majority Muslim society, family caregiving duties, and a scarcity of employment options compatible with traditional gender roles, such as segregated or flexible work environments. Security instability and employer preferences for male hires in a conflict-affected economy further exacerbate these constraints.[143][144][143] Age demographics highlight a low youth LFPR of 26.5% for ages 15-24, compared to 45.8% for adults aged 25 and older, signaling underutilization of the demographic dividend amid high inactivity rates—particularly a 36.7% NEET (not in employment, education, or training) rate among youth. Participation rises progressively with age: 17.2% for 15-19 year-olds, 36.9% for 20-24, and exceeding 50% from 25-39 onward, reflecting delayed entry due to education, family obligations, and limited job creation outside public sector and informal roles. Urban areas exhibit slightly higher LFPR at 40.3% versus 37.3% in rural zones, driven by better access to services and non-agricultural opportunities, though rural populations face additional hurdles from water scarcity and agricultural decline.[143][143]| Category | LFPR (%) |
|---|---|
| Total (15+) | 39.5 |
| Male | 68.0 |
| Female | 10.6 |
| Youth (15-24) | 26.5 |
| Urban | 40.3 |
| Rural | 37.3 |
Unemployment, Skills Gaps, and Migration
Iraq's unemployment rate stood at 15.5% in 2024, marking a slight increase from 15.4% in 2023, according to modeled estimates from the International Labour Organization via the World Bank.[145] This figure reflects a persistent elevation above the global average of approximately 6.8%, driven by structural factors including overreliance on public sector employment and limited private sector absorption capacity.[146] Youth unemployment remains particularly acute, with around 70% of individuals aged 15-29 engaged in informal or underemployed roles as of early 2025, exacerbating social pressures amid a demographic bulge of working-age youth.[147] Gender disparities compound the issue, as female labor force participation hovers below 15%, constrained by cultural norms and inadequate support for workforce entry. Skills gaps in Iraq's labor market stem primarily from a disconnect between educational outputs and economic demands, particularly in non-oil sectors where private enterprises struggle to find qualified workers. An IMF assessment identifies this mismatch as a key driver of underemployment, with vocational training programs often failing to align with industry needs in manufacturing, services, and emerging green economy roles.[148] For instance, surveys of top occupations reveal widespread deficiencies in technical competencies, such as digital skills—where 60% of youth lacked basic proficiencies for employability in 2022—and specialized training for private sector roles.[149][150] This gap is acute in governorates like Ninewa, Kirkuk, and Anbar, where post-conflict recovery demands skilled labor in construction and agribusiness, yet educational systems prioritize theoretical knowledge over practical, market-relevant abilities.[151] Consequently, public sector jobs, which absorb over 40% of formal employment, attract graduates unqualified for competitive private opportunities, perpetuating inefficiency and rent-seeking behaviors. Emigration, often termed brain drain, has intensified these challenges by depleting Iraq of skilled professionals, with push factors including economic instability, insecurity, and limited career advancement opportunities. Estimates indicate that hundreds of thousands of educated Iraqis have migrated since 2003, particularly in fields like healthcare, engineering, and IT, leading to reduced domestic productivity and innovation capacity. This outflow lowers wages and overall economic output in origin sectors, as skilled labor contributes disproportionately to growth; studies suggest that such migration can diminish GDP per capita by hindering knowledge transfer and institutional development.[152] Remittances from the diaspora provide some offset, totaling around $2-3 billion annually in recent years, but fail to compensate for the loss of human capital needed for diversification away from oil rents. Efforts to mitigate this, such as aligning education with sustainable development goals to enhance retention, remain nascent amid ongoing governance hurdles.[153]Education's Role in Economic Potential
Iraq's education system, encompassing primary, secondary, and tertiary levels, is essential for developing human capital to support economic diversification beyond oil dependency, given the country's demographic dividend of a predominantly young population where over 60% are under 25 years of age.[154] Effective education could address skills gaps in emerging sectors like manufacturing and services, enabling higher productivity and innovation, as human capital deficiencies currently constrain non-oil growth potential.[155] The World Bank's Human Capital Index scores Iraq at 0.41, meaning a child born today reaches only 41% of their potential productivity as an adult, largely due to suboptimal education quality amid fragility and conflict legacies.[156] Adult literacy has improved to 88% in 2024, with illiteracy dropping to 15%, driven by post-conflict recovery efforts, though rural-urban disparities persist, with urban literacy exceeding 80% compared to lower rural rates.[157][158] Enrollment rates in basic education remain high, nearing universal access in primary levels, but quality issues—such as overcrowded classrooms, inadequate infrastructure, and teacher shortages—affect learning outcomes, with an estimated 2 million children out of school as of 2024.[159] These challenges stem from decades of war damage and underinvestment, limiting the system's ability to produce graduates equipped for a knowledge-based economy.[156] Public spending on education reached 4.71% of GDP in recent years, supporting infrastructure projects that have benefited over 135,000 students through World Bank-backed initiatives focused on access and quality.[160][161] However, this allocation falls short of fully remedying skills mismatches, as tertiary education often fails to align curricula with labor market demands in non-oil industries.[162] Empirical analyses indicate that sustainable education investments enhance economic resilience, with each additional year of schooling potentially boosting GDP per capita by up to 10%.[163][164] The National Education Strategy for 2022-2031 prioritizes upgrading higher education components, enhancing applied skills for local and regional markets, and integrating vocational training to build a workforce capable of sustaining diversification.[162] Without accelerated reforms to combat brain drain and improve outcomes, Iraq risks perpetuating rentier dynamics, as low human capital perpetuates vulnerability to oil price volatility and hampers private sector expansion.[154] Recent progress, including UNICEF-supported early learning standards, signals potential, but sustained fiscal commitment is required to translate demographic advantages into long-term growth.[165]Trade, Investment, and External Relations
Export Dependencies and Import Patterns
Iraq's exports remain overwhelmingly dominated by petroleum products, with crude oil accounting for approximately 86% of total export value in 2023, reaching $92.4 billion out of $107 billion in goods shipped abroad.[166] Refined petroleum added another $10.3 billion, while non-oil exports such as petroleum coke, gold, and petroleum gas constituted less than 3% combined, underscoring a profound dependency on hydrocarbon extraction that exposes the economy to global oil price volatility and production disruptions.[166] In 2024, oil export revenues totaled around $96.08 billion from an average of 3.372 million barrels per day, representing 91% of federal budget revenues and highlighting the rentier state's vulnerability to OPEC quotas and geopolitical tensions in export routes like the Strait of Hormuz.[167][168] Export destinations are concentrated among Asian and Western buyers, with China receiving 33.2% of shipments in 2023, followed by India at 27.8%, the United States at 8.3%, Greece at 5.3%, and the United Arab Emirates.[167] This pattern reflects demand from refiners in emerging markets, but it amplifies risks from shifts in buyer preferences or sanctions, as evidenced by U.S. imports from Iraq dropping to $7.5 billion in 2024 amid fluctuating crude demand.[169] Non-oil exports, including limited agricultural goods like dates and fruits, fail to offset the oil-centric structure, perpetuating underdiversification despite government rhetoric on economic reform.[170] Imports, financed largely by oil proceeds, exhibit a persistent trade deficit, with goods inflows totaling around $65 billion in the first half of 2024 alone, driven by necessities absent in domestic production.[171] Key categories include machinery, vehicles, electrical equipment, and foodstuffs, as Iraq's underdeveloped agriculture and industry necessitate foreign sourcing for basics like wheat and refined fuels—though refinery upgrades aim to curtail the latter by early 2026, potentially reducing dependency on imported gasoline and diesel.[172] Imports surged 158.1% in the first quarter of 2024 compared to 2023, reflecting post-recovery demand amid infrastructure rebuilding, but quarterly figures moderated to $17.5 billion by Q2 2025.[173][174] Primary import sources are China and Turkey, which dominated inflows in 2024 through affordable manufactured goods and construction materials, respectively, followed by India, South Korea, and the United States for electronics, vehicles, and agricultural products like rice.[175][3] This reliance on a handful of suppliers fosters vulnerability to supply chain interruptions, currency fluctuations against the dinar, and smuggling via porous borders, which undermines formal trade patterns and exacerbates fiscal strain in a non-oil sector contributing minimally to GDP.[171] Overall, the import profile mirrors Iraq's import-substitution failures, where oil windfalls subsidize consumption without fostering self-sufficiency, sustaining a current account surplus only through hydrocarbon surpluses.[176]| Top Export Partners (2023 Shares) | Percentage |
|---|---|
| China | 33.2% |
| India | 27.8% |
| United States | 8.3% |
| Greece | 5.3% |
| United Arab Emirates | ~4% |
| Major Import Categories (Ongoing Patterns) | Examples |
|---|---|
| Machinery and Equipment | Vehicles, industrial tools |
| Consumer Goods | Electronics, textiles |
| Foodstuffs | Wheat, rice, refined products |
| Chemicals and Metals | Fertilizers, steel |
