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Mujahideen
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Mujahideen or mujahidin (Arabic: مُجَاهِدِين, romanizedmujāhidīn), is the plural form of mujahid (Arabic: مُجَاهِد, romanizedmujāhid, lit.'strugglers or strivers, doers of jihād'), an Arabic term that broadly refers to people who engage in jihad (lit.'struggle or striving [for justice, right conduct, Godly rule, etc.]'), interpreted in a jurisprudence of Islam as the fight on behalf of God, religion or the community (ummah).[1][2][3]

The widespread use of the word in English began with reference to the guerrilla-type militant groups led by the Islamist Afghan fighters in the Soviet–Afghan War (see Afghan mujahideen). The term now extends to other jihadist groups in various countries.[2][4]

Early history

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In its roots, the Arabic word mujahideen refers to any person performing jihad.[1][2][3] In its post-classical meaning, jihad refers to an act that is spiritually comparable in reward to promoting Islam during the early 600s CE. These acts could be as simple as sharing a considerable amount of one's income with the poor.

Modern Western definition

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The term continued to be used throughout India for Muslim resistance to British colonial rule.[1] During the Indian Rebellion of 1857, these holy warriors were said to accept any deserting Indian sepoys and recruit them into their ranks. As time went by, the sect grew ever larger until it was not only conducting bandit raids but even controlling areas in Afghanistan.[5]

The first known use of the word mujahideen to refer to insurgent Islamic extremism (what has neologically been called jihadism) was supposedly in the late 19th century, in 1887, by Thomas Patrick Hughes (1838–1911).[3][6]

In Central Asia from 1916 to the 1930s, Islamic guerrillas were opponents of Tsarism and Bolshevism and were referred to by the Soviets as basmachi ('bandits'). These groups called themselves mojahed, describing themselves as standing for Islam.[7][8] Other proto-mujahideen include Usman dan Fodio,[9] Jahangir Khoja,[10] and Muhammad Ahmed Al Mahdi.[11][12][13]

Cold War era

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The name was most closely associated with the mujahideen in Afghanistan,[1] a coalition of guerrilla groups in Afghanistan that opposed the invading Soviet forces and eventually toppled the Afghan communist government during the Afghan War (1978–92). Rival factions thereafter fell out among themselves, precipitating the rise of the Taliban and the opposing Northern Alliance.

Afghanistan

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Afghan mujahideen fighters passing around the Durand Line border in 1985
U.S. President Reagan meeting with Afghan mujahideen at the White House in 1983

Arguably the best-known mujahideen outside the Islamic world are the various, loosely aligned Afghan opposition groups who initially rebelled against the government of the pro-Soviet Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) during the late 1970s. At the DRA's request, the Soviet Union brought forces into the country to aid the government in 1979. The mujahideen fought against Soviet and DRA troops during the Soviet–Afghan War (1979–1989). Afghanistan's resistance movement originated in chaos and, at first, regional warlords waged virtually all of its fighting locally. As warfare became more sophisticated, outside support and regional coordination grew. The basic units of mujahideen organization and action continued to reflect the highly decentralized nature of Afghan society and strong loci of competing mujahideen and Pashtun tribal groups, particularly in isolated areas among the mountains.[14] Eventually, the seven main mujahideen parties allied as the political bloc called Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahideen. The parties were not under a single command and had ideological differences.

Many Muslims from other countries assisted the various mujahideen groups in Afghanistan. Some groups of these veterans became significant players in later conflicts in and around the Muslim world. Osama bin Laden, originally from a wealthy family in Saudi Arabia, was a prominent organizer and financier of an all-Arab Islamist group of foreign volunteers; his Maktab al-Khadamat funnelled money, arms, and Muslim fighters from around the Muslim world into Afghanistan, with the assistance and support of the Saudi and Pakistani governments. These foreign fighters became known as "Afghan Arabs" and their efforts were coordinated by Abdullah Yusuf Azzam.

Although the mujahideen were aided by the Pakistani, American, British, Chinese and Saudi governments, the mujahideen's primary source of funding was private donors and religious charities throughout the Muslim world—particularly in the Persian Gulf. Jason Burke recounts that "as little as 25% of the money for the Afghan jihad was actually supplied directly by states."[15]

Mujahideen forces caused serious casualties to the Soviet forces, and made the war very costly for the Soviet Union. In 1989 the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. In February 1989 the seven Sunni mujahideen factions formed an Afghan Interim Government (AIG) in Peshawar, The Interim Government had been in exile in Pakistan since 1988, led by Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, as an attempt for a united front against the DRA. The AIG became a failure, partly because it could not solve the differences between the factions; partly because of limited public support as it excluded the Iran-backed Shia mujahideen factions, and the exclusion of supporters of ex-King Mohammed Zahir Shah; and the mujahideen's failure in the Battle of Jalalabad in March 1989.[16][17][18][19]

In 1992 the DRA's last president, Mohammad Najibullah, was overthrown and most mujahideen factions signed the Peshawar Accords. The mujahideen could not establish a functional united government, and many of the larger mujahideen groups began to fight each other over power in Kabul.

After several years of devastating fighting, in a small Pashtun village, a mullah named Mohammed Omar organized a new armed movement with the backing of Pakistan. This movement became known as the Taliban ("students" in Pashto), referring to how most Taliban had grown up in refugee camps in Pakistan during the 1980s and were taught in the Saudi-backed Wahhabi madrassas, religious schools known for teaching a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam.

Cyprus

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Even before independence, the Turkish Cypriot community maintained its own paramilitary force (the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, or TMT), trained and equipped by the Turkish Army. In 1967, this force was renamed the Mücahit ("Mujahideen"), and in 1975 the Mücahit was renamed the Turkish Cypriot Security Force. In 1974, Turkey led a land invasion of Northern Cyprus with the aim of protecting the Turkish minority population after a Greek-inspired coup brought a threat of union of the island with Greece. Since then there has been no major fighting on Cyprus and the nation continues to be an independent country, though strongly linked with Turkey militarily and politically.[20][21]

Iran and Iraq

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While more than one group in Iran has called itself mujahideen, the most famous is the People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI; Persian: Mojāhedin-e Khalq), an Islamic organization that advocates for the overthrow of the leadership of the Iranian Republic.[1] The group has taken part in multiple well-known conflicts in the region, and has been at odds with the conservative government of the Islamic Republic of Iran since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Another mujahideen was the Mujahedin-e Islam, an Islamic party led by Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani.[22] It formed part of the Iranian National Front during the time of Mohammed Mosaddeq's oil nationalization, but broke away from Mosaddeq over his allegedly un-Islamic policies.[23]

Myanmar (Burma)

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From 1947 to 1961, local mujahideen fought against Burmese government soldiers in an attempt to have the Mayu peninsula in northern Arakan, Burma (present-day Rakhine State, Myanmar) secede from the country, so it could be annexed by East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh).[24] During the late 1950s and early 1960s, the mujahideen lost most of their momentum and support, resulting in most of them surrendering to government forces.[25][26]

In the 1990s, the well-armed Rohingya Solidarity Organisation was the main perpetrator of attacks on Burmese authorities positioned on the Bangladesh–Myanmar border.[27]

Philippines

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In 1969, political tensions and open hostilities developed between the Government of the Philippines and jihadist rebel groups.[28] The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was established by University of the Philippines professor Nur Misuari to condemn the killings of more than 60 Filipino Muslims and later became an aggressor against the government while the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), a splinter group from the MNLF, was established to seek an Islamic state within the Philippines and is more radical and more aggressive. The conflict is ongoing[when?]; casualty statistics vary for the conflict, with conservative estimates of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program indicating at least 6,015 people were killed in armed conflict between the Government of Philippines and ASG, BIFM, MILF, and MNLF factions between 1989 and 2012.[29] Abu Sayyaf is an Islamic separatist group in the southern Philippines, formed in 1991. The group is known for its kidnappings of Western nationals and Filipinos, for which it has received several large ransom-payments. Some Abu Sayyaf members have studied or worked in Saudi Arabia and developed relations with the mujahideen members while fighting and training in the war against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[30]

1990s

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The 1990s are a transitional period between the Mujahideen outfits forming part of the proxy wars between the Cold War superpowers and the emergence of contemporary jihadism in the wake of the US "War on Terror" and the "Arab Spring".

Al-Qaeda saw its formative period during this time, and jihadism formed part of the picture in regional conflicts of the 1990s, including the Yugoslav Wars, the Somali Civil War, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the First Chechen War, etc.

Yugoslav Wars

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During the Bosnian war 1992–1995, many foreign Muslims came to Bosnia as mujahideen. Muslims around the world who shared mujahideen beliefs and respected the author of Islamic Declaration come to the aid of fellow Muslims. Alija Izetbegovic, author of Islamic Declaration and in his younger days author of poem "To the Jihad" [31] was particularly happy about the presence of Mujahedeens in Bosnia and gave them full support.[32] El Mujahid members claimed that in Bosnia they only have respect for Alija Izetbegovic and the head of the Bosnian Army Third Corps, Sakib Mahmuljin.[33][34] The number of foreign Muslim volunteers in Bosnia was estimated at 4,000 in contemporary newspaper reports.[35] Later research estimated the number to be about 400.[36][better source needed] They came from various places such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq and the Palestinian Territories; to quote the summary of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia judgment:[37]

The evidence shows that foreign volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping Muslims. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. The foreign volunteers differed considerably from the local population, not only because of their physical appearance and the language they spoke, but also because of their fighting methods. The various foreign, Muslim volunteers were primarily organized into an umbrella detachment of the 7th Muslim Brigade, which was a brigade of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, based in Zenica. This independent subdivision colloquially known as El-Mudžahid, was composed exclusively of foreign nationals and not Bosnians (whereas the 7th Muslim Brigade was entirely made up of native Bosnians) and consisted of somewhere between 300 and 1,500 volunteers. Enver Hadžihasanović, Lieutenant Colonel of the Bosnian Army's 3rd Corps, appointed Mahmut Karalić (Commandant), Asim Koričić (Chief of Staff) and Amir Kubura (Assistant Chief for Operational and Curricula) to lead the group.

Some of the mujahideen funnelled arms and money into the country which Bosnia direly needed due to a United Nations-sanctioned arms embargo restricting the import of weapons into all of the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Many of the mujahideen were extremely devout Muslims of the strict Salafi sect, which contrasted sharply with the relatively secular society of Bosnian Muslims. This led to friction between the mujahideen and the Bosnians.

Foreign volunteers in Bosnia have been accused of committing war crimes during the conflict. The ICTY has never issued indictments against mujahideen fighters. Instead, the ICTY indicted some Bosnian Army commanders on the basis of superior criminal responsibility. The ICTY acquitted Amir Kubura and Enver Hadžihasanović of the Bosnian 3rd Corps of all charges related to the incidents involving mujahideen. Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber noted that the relationship between the 3rd Corps and the El Mujahedin detachment was not one of subordination but was instead close to overt hostility since the only way to control the detachment was to attack them as if they were a distinct enemy force.[38]

The ICTY Trial Chamber convicted Rasim Delić, the former chief of the Bosnian Army General Staff. The ICTY found that Delic had effective control over the El Mujahid Detachment. He was sentenced to three years of imprisonment for his failure to prevent or punish the cruel treatment of twelve captured Serb soldiers by the Mujahideen. Delic remained in the Detention Unit while appellate proceedings continued.[39]

Some individuals of the Bosnian Mujahideen, such as Abdelkader Mokhtari, Fateh Kamel, and Karim Said Atmani, gained particular prominence within Bosnia as well as international attention from various foreign governments. They were all North African volunteers with well established links to Islamic Fundamentalist groups before and after the Bosnian War.

In 2015, former Human Rights Minister and Federation BiH Vice President Mirsad Kebo talked about numerous war crimes committed against Serbs by mujahideen in Bosnia and their links with current and past Muslim officials including former and current presidents of federation and presidents of parliament based on war diaries and other documented evidence. He gave evidence to the BiH federal prosecutor.[40][41][42][43]

North Caucasus

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The term mujahideen has often been used to refer to all separatist fighters in the case of the First and Second Chechen Wars. In this article, it refers to the foreign, non-Caucasian fighters who joined the separatists' cause for the sake of Jihad. They are often called Ansaar (helpers) in related literature dealing with this conflict to prevent confusion with the native fighters.

Foreign mujahideen have played a part in both Chechen wars. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent Chechen declaration of independence, foreign fighters began entering the region and associating themselves with local rebels (most notably Shamil Basayev). Many of the foreign fighters were veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War. The mujahideen also made a significant financial contribution to the separatists' cause; with their access to the immense wealth of Salafist charities like al-Haramein, they soon became an invaluable source of funds for the Chechen resistance, which had few resources of its own.

Most of the mujahideen decided to remain in Chechnya after the withdrawal of Russian forces. In 1999, foreign fighters played an important role in the ill-fated Chechen incursion into Dagestan, where they suffered a decisive defeat and were forced to retreat back into Chechnya. The incursion provided the new Russian government with a pretext for intervention. Russian ground forces invaded Chechnya again in 1999.

The separatists were less successful in the Second Chechen War. Russian officials claimed that the separatists had been defeated as early as 2002. The Russians also succeeded in killing the most prominent mujahideen commanders, most notably Ibn al-Khattab and Abu al-Walid.

Although the region has since been far from stable, separatist activity has decreased, though some foreign fighters remain active in Chechnya. In the last months of 2007, the influence of foreign fighters became apparent again when Dokka Umarov proclaimed the Caucasus Emirate being fought for by the Caucasian Mujahadeen, a pan-Caucasian Islamic state of which Chechnya was to be a province. This move caused a rift in the resistance movement between those supporting the Emirate and those who were in favour of preserving the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria.

Contemporary Jihadism

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The neologism jihadists may correspond to the original Arabic mujahedeen.[44][45]

Indian subcontinent

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In India, an outfit calling itself the Indian Mujahideen came to light in 2008 with multiple large scale terror attacks. On 26 November 2008, a group calling itself the Deccan Mujahideen claimed responsibility for a string of attacks across Mumbai. The Weekly Standard claimed, "Indian intelligence believes the Indian Mujahideen is a front group created by Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami to confuse investigators and cover the tracks of the Students Islamic Movement of India, or SIMI, a radical Islamist movement with aim to establish Islamic rule over India.[46] In the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmiri Muslim separatists opposing Indian rule are often known as mujahideen. The members of the Salafi movement (within Sunni Islam) in the south Indian state of Kerala is known as "Mujahids".[47]

Many militant groups have been involved in the war in North West Pakistan, most notably the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, Al Qaeda, and ISIS Khorasan Province. These groups refer to themselves as the mujahideen in their war against the Pakistani military and the west. Several different militant groups have also taken root in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Most noticeable of these groups are Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), Hizbul Mujahideen and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM).[48] A 1996 report by Human Rights Watch estimated the number of active mujahideen at 3,200.[49]

In Bangladesh, the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen was an Islamist organisation that was officially banned by the government of Bangladesh in February 2005 after attacks on NGOs. It struck back in mid-August when it detonated 500 bombs at 300 locations throughout Bangladesh.[50]

Iraq and Syria

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Iraqi insurgency

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The term mujahideen is sometimes applied to fighters who joined the insurgency after the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[51] Some groups also use the word mujahideen in their names, like Mujahideen Shura Council and Mujahideen Army.

Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq as part of the George W. Bush administration's post 9/11 foreign policy, many foreign Mujahideen joined several Sunni militant groups resisting the U.S. occupation of Iraq. A considerable part of the insurgents did not come from Iraq but instead from many other Arab countries, notably Jordan and Saudi Arabia.[51] Among these recruits was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian national who would go on to assume the leadership of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Syrian civil war

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Various Islamic groups, often referred to as mujahideen and jihadists, have participated in the Syrian civil war. Alawites, the sect to which Syrian President Bashar al-Assad belongs, are considered to be heretics in Sunni Muslim circles. In this sense, radical Sunni jihadist organizations and their affiliates have been anti-Assad. Jihadist leaders and intelligence sources said foreign fighters had begun to enter Syria only in February 2012.[52] In May 2012, Syria's U.N. envoy Bashar Ja'afari declared that dozens of foreign fighters from Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Britain, France elsewhere had been captured or killed, and urged Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey to stop "their sponsorship of the armed rebellion".[53][54] Jihadist leaders and intelligence sources said foreign fighters had begun to enter Syria only in February 2012.[52] In June, it was reported that hundreds of foreign fighters, many linked to al-Qaeda, had gone to Syria to fight against Assad.[55] When asked if the United States would arm the opposition, Hillary Clinton expressed doubts that such weapons would be effective in the toppling of the Syrian government and may even fall into the hands of al-Qaeda or Hamas.[56]

American officials assumed already in 2012 that Qaidat al-Jihad (a.k.a. Al-Qaeda in Iraq) has conducted bomb attacks against Syrian government forces,[57] Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari said that al-Qaeda in Iraq members have gone to Syria, where the militants previously received support and weapons from the Syrian government in order to destabilize the US occupation of Iraq.[58] On 23 April, one of the leaders of Fatah al-Islam, Abdel Ghani Jawhar, was killed during the Battle of Al-Qusayr, after he unintentionally blew himself up while making a bomb.[59] In July 2012, Iraq's foreign minister again warned that members of al-Qaeda in Iraq were seeking refuge in Syria and moving there to fight.[60]

It is believed that al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri condemned Assad.[61]

A member of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades in Lebanon admitted that his group had sent fighters to Syria. On 12 November 2018, the United States closed its financial system to an Iraqi named, Shibl Muhsin 'Ubayd Al-Zaydi and others over concerns that they were sending Iraqi fighters to Syria and financial support to other Hezbollah activities in the region.[62]

Israel

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The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem (MSC) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. Department of State.[63]

On 12 November 2018, the Department of State blacklisted the Al-Mujahidin Brigades (AMB) over its alleged Hezbollah associations, as well as Jawad Nasrallah, son of Lebanon's Iran-backed Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, from using the United States financial system and further naming him a terrorist associated with evidence of his involvement in attacks against Israel in the West Bank.[64] It had been reported in Israel that the AMB was formerly linked to the Fatah rather than the Hamas organization.[65]

Africa

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Nigeria

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Boko Haram has been active in Nigeria since it was founded in 2001. It existed in other forms before 2001. Although it initially limited its operations to northeast Nigeria, it has since expanded to other parts of Nigeria, and to Cameroon, Niger and Chad. Boko Haram seeks to implement sharia law across Nigeria.

Somalia

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Al-Shabaab militants made gains (2009–10) in guerrilla-style attacks

The currently active jihadist groups in Somalia derive from the Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya group active during the 1990s.

In July 2006, a Web-posted message purportedly written by Osama bin Laden urged Somalis to build an Islamic state in the country and warned western states that his al-Qaeda network would fight against them if they intervened there.[66] Foreign fighters began to arrive, though there were official denials of the presence of mujahideen in the country. Even so, the threat of jihad was made openly and repeatedly in the months preceding the Battle of Baidoa.[67] On 23 December 2006, Islamists, for the first time, called upon international fighters to join their cause.[68] The term mujahideen is now openly used by the post-ICU resistance against the Ethiopians and the TFG.

Harakat al-Shabaab Mujahideen is said to have non-Somali foreigners in its ranks, particularly among its leadership.[69] Fighters from the Persian Gulf and international jihadists were called to join the holy war against the Somali government and its Ethiopian allies. Though Somali Islamists did not use suicide bombing tactics before, the foreign elements of al-Shabaab are blamed for several suicide bombings.[70][71] Egypt has a longstanding policy of securing the Nile River flow by destabilizing Ethiopia.[72][73] Similarly, recent media reports said that Egyptian and Arab jihadists were the core members of Al-Shabaab, and were training Somalis in sophisticated weaponry and suicide bombing techniques.[74]

Chinese ban

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In April 2017, the government of China prohibited parents from choosing the name Mujahid as the given name for a child. The list included more than two dozen names (including Muhammad) and was targeted at the 10 million Uyghurs in the western region of Xinjiang as part of the persecution of Uyghurs in China.[75]

See also

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The mujahideen, derived from the term mujāhidīn meaning "those who strive" or "fighters in the path of God" through , refer to Muslim guerrilla warriors engaged in armed struggle against perceived enemies of . In its most prominent historical manifestation, the Afghan mujahideen comprised diverse tribal and ethnic militias—primarily Pashtun, Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara—that resisted the Soviet Union's December 1979 invasion and subsequent occupation of , waging a protracted until the Red Army's withdrawal in 1989. These fighters, organized into seven major Sunni parties based in and various Shia groups, employed terrain-familiar guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, of supply lines, and raids on Soviet convoys and outposts, inflicting unsustainable attrition on the invaders despite lacking conventional military advantages. Bolstered by an estimated $3-6 billion in covert aid from the via —channeled through 's —along with support from , , and others, the mujahideen neutralized Soviet air superiority with supplied man-portable air-defense systems and ultimately compelled the USSR's retreat, a factor in the Soviet empire's collapse amid domestic economic strain and over 15,000 military deaths. Post-withdrawal, however, factional rivalries erupted into among the mujahideen, enabling the Taliban's ascendance by 1996 and the incubation of global jihadist figures like among Arab volunteers who joined the Afghan cause.

Etymology and Definition

Linguistic Origins

The term mujahideen is the anglicized plural form of the mujāhidīn (مُجَاهِدِين), derived from mujāhid (مُجَاهِد), the active (ism fa'il) of the Form VIII verb jāhāda (جَاهَدَ), which means "to strive," "to exert effort," or "to struggle," especially in the path of . This derivation stems from the Semitic triconsonantal root j-h-d (ج-ه-د), connoting intense personal effort or contention, with the verbal noun (جِهَاد) directly translating to "struggle" or "striving" in classical Arabic lexicography. The prefix mu- in mujāhid indicates the agent performing the action, thus denoting "one who strives" or "one who engages in jihad." In Islamic linguistic tradition, mujāhidīn specifically applies to individuals participating in such striving, often with implications when contextualized as defensive or offensive efforts against perceived threats to the , as reflected in early usage predating modern transliterations. The English adoption of mujahidin (and variants like mujahedin) emerged in the mid-20th century, first documented in within South Asian Muslim contexts referring to guerrilla fighters engaged in religious struggles. These variations arise from the challenges of phonetically mapping Arabic's emphatic consonants and diacritics—such as the ḥāʾ (ح) and dād (ض)—onto , leading to inconsistent renderings across scholarly and journalistic sources.

Islamic Concept of Jihad and Defensive Struggle

The Arabic term jihad derives from the root j-h-d, signifying strenuous effort or struggle in the path of . In Islamic scripture, it primarily denotes exertion for religious ends, appearing 41 times in the Qur'an, often in contexts of striving with one's soul, wealth, and life to uphold faith and justice. al-Ankabut 29:69 exemplifies this: "And those who strive for Us—We will surely guide them to Our ways," highlighting personal and communal devotion without inherent martial connotation. The defensive dimension of jihad emerges explicitly in Qur'anic injunctions against unprovoked , as in al-Baqarah 2:190-191: "Fight in the way of those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, does not like transgressors. And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing." Revealed amid Meccan persecution of post-Hijrah in CE, these verses authorize retaliatory combat to repel attacks on , property, and religious practice, prohibiting initiation of hostilities or excess. al-Baqarah 2:193 further limits it: "But if they cease, then there is to be no except against the oppressors," conditioning armed struggle on cessation of threats and restoration of . Islamic classifies defensive —repelling invasion of Muslim lands—as fard 'ayn, an individual obligation on every able-bodied adult Muslim capable of participation, superseding other duties until the threat ends; it contrasts with fard kifayah, a duty for proactive expansion. This ruling, affirmed by consensus across Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools, activates when dar al-Islam faces direct assault, as in historical defenses against Byzantine or Persian incursions during the (632-661 CE). A reported distinguishes the "greater jihad" as internal combat against base desires from the "lesser jihad" of warfare, attributed to the Prophet Muhammad upon returning from battle: "We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad." However, hadith critics classify its chain as weak or inauthentic, limiting its doctrinal weight, while classical jurists prioritized military 's communal imperatives during existential perils. In this framework, mujahideen—plural of mujahid, "one who strives"—specifically denote combatants in defensive , embodying Qur'anic mandates to safeguard against subjugation.

Pre-20th Century Historical Precedents

Early Islamic Conquests and Resistance

Following the Hijra migration to Medina in 622 CE, early Muslims under Prophet faced existential threats from Meccan forces seeking to eradicate the new faith, framing their military engagements as defensive to safeguard . The in March 624 CE marked a pivotal victory, where roughly 300 Muslim combatants routed a Meccan army of nearly 1,000, despite being outnumbered and underequipped, boosting morale and establishing as a mechanism for communal survival. Subsequent clashes, including the in 625 CE—where Muslims initially prevailed but suffered reversals due to tactical errors—and the in 627 CE, which repelled a coalition siege through fortifications and alliances, underscored persistent resistance against superior numbers intent on suppressing . These encounters, rooted in Qur'anic injunctions to combat aggressors while prohibiting initiation of hostilities, positioned the participants as mujahidun striving to defend religious practice amid persecution. Upon Muhammad's death in 632 CE, Caliph confronted the (632–633 CE), a series of campaigns against Arabian tribes that apostatized, refused zakat payments, or challenged central authority, blending religious imperatives to uphold with political efforts to unify the peninsula under Medina's rule. Forces under commanders like suppressed rebellions, such as those led by false prophets like at Yamama, restoring allegiance and preventing fragmentation of the nascent Islamic polity. These internal struggles reinforced the mujahideen archetype as enforcers of fidelity to core tenets, including fiscal obligations tied to communal welfare, against centrifugal tribal loyalties. With Arabia consolidated, Caliph (r. 634–644 CE) redirected energies outward, launching conquests against the exhausted Byzantine and Sassanid empires amid their mutual exhaustion from prior wars. The Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 CE delivered a crushing defeat to Byzantine armies, despite comparable force sizes, enabling rapid seizure of and the by 638 CE as local populations, weary of imperial taxes and religious , offered limited resistance. Paralleling this, the Battle of Qadisiyyah in 637 CE toppled Sassanid defenses, culminating in the capture of and Persia by 651 CE. These offensives, propelled by incentives like spoils, for slaves, and eschatological rewards for martyrdom, evolved from primarily defensive postures to expansive endeavors, amassing tribal warriors into disciplined armies that exploited imperial vulnerabilities for Islamic ascendancy.

19th-Century Anti-Colonial Movements

In the , (1797–1871) led a sustained against Russian imperial expansion from 1834 to 1859, unifying disparate Muslim tribes including Avars, , and Dagestanis under an governed by law. Shamil's forces, comprising irregular guerrilla fighters termed mujahideen, inflicted significant casualties on Russian troops through ambushes, fortified mountain defenses, and , reportedly killing or wounding over 100,000 Russian soldiers during the . Despite numerical and technological disadvantages—Russian armies numbered up to 200,000 at peak mobilization—the mujahideen held control of much of the rugged terrain until 1859, when overwhelming Russian reinforcements under Prince Aleksandr Baryatinsky captured Shamil's stronghold at Gunib, leading to his surrender and exile. This resistance stemmed from Russian encroachment on Muslim khanates and principalities, which Shamil framed as a defensive struggle to preserve Islamic sovereignty against Christian imperialism, drawing on Sufi influences for morale and organization. In , Emir Abd al-Qadir (1808–1883) mobilized mujahideen-style tribal warriors in a defensive against French colonization following the 1830 invasion of . Proclaimed amir in 1832, Abd al-Qadir consolidated control over western by 1834, establishing administrative reforms, foundries for production, and a mobile force that repelled French advances, notably defeating General Camille Alphonse Trezel's column of 2,500 troops at Macta in 1835 with fewer than 1,000 fighters. His campaigns emphasized religious legitimacy, with issuing fatwas supporting against the French "infidels," enabling him to field up to 10,000 combatants by the early 1840s despite French numerical superiority exceeding 100,000 troops. French scorched-earth policies and reinforcements under eventually eroded his base, culminating in Abd al-Qadir's surrender in 1847 after the Treaty of Tafna's collapse, though his forces had delayed full pacification for over a decade. Further instances occurred in British India, where isolated mujahideen groups waged localized jihads against colonial rule. Titu Mir (1782–1831), influenced by reformist Faraizi teachings, led Bengali Muslim peasants in 1831, constructing a bamboo fortress at Narkelbaria and repelling British assaults with 2,000–3,000 fighters armed with spears and muskets, viewing the conflict as resistance to Hindu landlord oppression under British protection. During the 1857 Indian Rebellion, Maulana Fazl-e-Haqq Khairabadi (1797–1861) issued a fatwa from Delhi declaring jihad against the British East India Company, rallying mujahideen to join the uprising that saw Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah II nominally lead Muslim forces in battles like the Siege of Delhi, where irregular holy warriors contributed to initial successes before British reconquest in September 1857 inflicted 1,000–2,000 rebel casualties. These efforts, though fragmented and ultimately suppressed, reflected a pattern of invoking jihad to counter colonial land seizures, taxation, and cultural impositions, with fighters prioritizing religious duty over coordinated strategy. In , jihads with mujahideen elements preceded direct European conquest but anticipated anti-colonial resistance, such as al-Hajj Umar Tal's (c. 1797–1864) Toucouleur Empire expansion from the 1840s, which clashed with French forces encroaching from by 1857, mobilizing up to 20,000 warriors under Islamic banners before his death in 1864. Similarly, the , established via Usman dan Fodio's early 19th-century , fielded mujahideen against British incursions culminating in the 1903 Battle of Kano, where 2,500 caliphal cavalry were routed by machine-gun-equipped forces. These movements underscore how 19th-century mujahideen often operated in decentralized, faith-driven networks, leveraging terrain and against technologically advanced empires, though systemic disunity and resource disparities typically led to subjugation.

Cold War Era Engagements

Soviet-Afghan War

The Soviet-Afghan War commenced on December 27, 1979, when Soviet forces numbering around 30,000 troops, alongside elements of the Afghan army, executed Operation Storm-333, assassinating President at the in and installing as the new leader of the (PDPA). This intervention aimed to stabilize the faltering communist regime established by the in April 1978, which had provoked widespread rural revolts due to aggressive land reforms, forced collectivization, and suppression of Islamic practices. The invasion escalated an ongoing civil conflict into a full-scale within the framework, with the deploying up to 115,000 troops at peak strength to combat insurgent forces. The Mujahideen, a loose coalition of Afghan guerrilla fighters drawn from diverse ethnic groups including , , , and , mounted fierce resistance against Soviet occupation troops and the PDPA government. Operating from rugged mountainous terrain and cross-border sanctuaries in and , they employed , ambushes, and , inflicting asymmetric attrition on superior Soviet conventional forces. Soviet countermeasures, including aerial bombardment, chemical weapons use, and scorched-earth policies, devastated rural infrastructure and displaced over 5 million as refugees, while causing an estimated 1-2 million Afghan deaths, predominantly civilians. Mujahideen casualties exceeded 75,000 fighters killed, with Soviet losses totaling approximately 15,000 dead and 53,000 wounded over the decade-long conflict. External support proved decisive for Mujahideen sustainability. The , through the CIA's —launched in July 1979 with initial non-lethal aid but expanded post-invasion to over $3 billion in military assistance by 1989—channeled weapons, training, and funds primarily via Pakistan's (ISI). matched U.S. contributions dollar-for-dollar, while supplied arms and provided logistical bases for an estimated 4 million refugees. The introduction of U.S.-made man-portable air-defense systems in 1986 significantly neutralized Soviet air superiority, contributing to intensified negotiations. These factors, combined with mounting Soviet domestic discontent and economic strain, culminated in the Accords signed on April 14, 1988, mandating Soviet withdrawal completed by February 15, 1989. Despite achieving tactical withdrawals, the Mujahideen failed to dislodge the PDPA immediately after Soviet exit, leading to continued fighting until Najibullah's government fell in 1992. The war's legacy included the of fighters through Islamist ideologies promoted by Pakistani and backers, laying groundwork for subsequent Afghan civil strife, though primary causation stemmed from Soviet imperial overreach and PDPA ideological incompatibility with Afghan tribal and religious norms rather than solely foreign intervention.

Formation of Afghan Mujahideen Alliances

Following the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, disparate Afghan resistance groups, comprising tribal militias, Islamist factions, and defectors from the Afghan army, began coalescing to oppose the occupation and the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan government. Initial resistance efforts were fragmented, drawing from pre-existing insurgencies against the communist regime established after the 1978 Saur Revolution, but the invasion prompted a surge in mobilization, with armed groups launching jihad against Soviet forces as early as early 1980. By mid-1979, even prior to the full invasion, the United States had initiated covert non-lethal aid to these insurgents through Pakistan, escalating to lethal weapons after December 1979 to counter Soviet advances. The influx of over 3 million into by the early 1980s provided a base for resistance organization, with 's (ISI) playing a pivotal role in coordinating and unifying the groups to facilitate external aid distribution. Soon after the invasion, invited mujahideen leaders to to meet, strategize, and form structured alliances, recognizing the need for a streamlined command to manage operations and resources amid internal rivalries. This effort culminated in the formalization of the "Peshawar Seven," a coalition of seven major Sunni mujahideen parties by 1980, which became the primary recipients of international support and gained global prominence due to 's hosting of refugees and rebels. The Peshawar Seven included ideologically diverse but predominantly Islamist groups: Jamiat-i Islami led by (Tajik-dominated), Hezb-i Islami under (radical Pashtun faction favored by ISI), Hezb-i Islami of Yunus Khalis, Ittehad-i Islami headed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami of Muhammad Nabi Mohammedi, Jabha-i Najat-i Milli led by , and Mahaz-i Milli under Pir Ahmad Gailani. While the alliance enabled coordinated , such as ambushes and documented in mujahideen operational accounts, deep ethnic, ideological, and personal divisions persisted, with ISI's distribution of arms often biasing toward Pashtun and fundamentalist parties like Hekmatyar's, exacerbating factionalism. matched U.S. funding contributions, channeling resources through similar pipelines to promote unity among the groups, though private donations also flowed directly to favored commanders. Under the U.S. CIA's , launched in 1979 and expanded under President Reagan, approximately $3 billion in aid—including small arms, anti-aircraft weapons like missiles from 1986—was funneled exclusively through the ISI to the Peshawar Seven starting in 1980, avoiding direct contact to maintain deniability. This structure reinforced the alliances' operational capacity but prioritized political reliability over military effectiveness, as ISI selected recipients based on alignment with Pakistani interests in installing a friendly Pashtun-led government post-withdrawal. Despite these efforts, the alliances remained pragmatic constructs for survival and funding rather than a monolithic force, setting the stage for post-Soviet infighting.

Key Military Campaigns and Soviet Withdrawal

The Afghan Mujahideen conducted asymmetric against Soviet forces, emphasizing ambushes, hit-and-run attacks, and improvised explosive devices along supply routes, which inflicted steady attrition on Soviet convoys and isolated garrisons. Major campaigns centered in rugged terrains like the , where Ahmad Shah Massoud's fighters repelled repeated Soviet offensives from 1980 to 1985, including a large-scale 1984 operation that scorched villages but failed to secure lasting control due to Mujahideen mobility and local support. In , Jalaluddin Haqqani's network targeted fortified bases such as , launching assaults in 1983 and 1986 that destroyed Soviet outposts through coordinated infantry and rocket attacks, compelling resource-intensive Soviet reinforcements. The introduction of U.S.-supplied man-portable air-defense systems in 1986 markedly degraded Soviet air superiority, downing over 250 helicopters and by 1989 and forcing tactical shifts like reduced low-altitude operations and convoy vulnerability. These campaigns, combined with foreign aid exceeding $3 billion annually from the U.S. by the mid-1980s, sustained Mujahideen operations and escalated Soviet casualties to approximately 15,000 killed, eroding morale and domestic support amid economic strain. Soviet leader , recognizing the war's futility by 1986, initiated withdrawal planning, culminating in the Geneva Accords signed on April 14, 1988, which scheduled a phased pullout completed on February 15, 1989, without neutralizing the Mujahideen or stabilizing the communist regime. The retreat exposed vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by the subsequent Mujahideen assault on in March 1989, though internal divisions hampered decisive victory.

Role of Foreign Fighters and Arab Volunteers

Foreign fighters, primarily Muslim volunteers from countries and other regions, began arriving in and in significant numbers following the Soviet invasion on December 27, 1979, drawn by calls for against the atheist invaders. These volunteers, often referred to as "" despite including non-Arabs, were motivated by religious ideology rather than direct ties to Afghan ethnic groups, providing ideological reinforcement to the local mujahideen. Estimates of their total numbers vary widely due to poor record-keeping and , but credible analyses suggest between 10,000 and 25,000 volunteers participated over the decade-long conflict, with only a fraction—perhaps 3,000 to 5,000—engaging in direct combat roles, while many served in , medical aid, or . Key organizational efforts were led by Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam and Saudi financier , who co-founded Maktab al-Khidamat lil-Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK, or Afghan Services Bureau) in 1984 to recruit, train, and supply Arab volunteers from , . MAK raised funds from private Arab donors, including Saudi royals and charities, channeling an estimated $20-25 million annually by the mid-1980s for guesthouses, weapons purchases, and training camps independent of the main Afghan mujahideen alliances like the Peshawar Seven. Bin Laden, arriving in 1980 with family wealth, personally financed Arab-only camps near and , emphasizing self-reliance and Arab-led operations to avoid dependence on Pakistani ISI-distributed U.S. aid, which primarily bolstered Afghan factions. In combat, Arab volunteers often operated in small, ideologically driven units, contributing to ambushes and defensive stands but lacking the local knowledge that made Afghan mujahideen effective in . A notable engagement was the in from May 25 to June 1987, where bin Laden's 50-100 Arab fighters, alongside Afghan allies, repelled a Soviet-Afghan government assault involving 200-300 troops and , using fortified caves and RPGs; this victory boosted Arab recruitment and bin Laden's reputation as a jihadist leader, though it inflicted limited strategic damage on Soviet forces. Overall, foreign fighters' military contributions were marginal compared to the 1-2 million Afghan mujahideen and U.S.-supplied missiles, which downed over 250 Soviet helicopters after 1986; their primary impact was psychological, sustaining mujahideen morale amid high casualties (Soviet estimates of 15,000 dead) and fostering a transnational jihadist network. The influx of Arab volunteers, funded largely outside CIA channels, introduced Salafi-Wahhabi influences that clashed with Afghan traditionalism, sowing seeds for post-withdrawal fragmentation; many survivors, hardened by and trained in explosives and , returned home or formed groups like in 1988, shifting focus from anti-Soviet defense to global anti-Western campaigns. Soviet withdrawal on February 15, 1989, was driven more by domestic economic strain and 14,500 confirmed deaths than foreign fighter pressure, but the jihad's success radicalized participants, enabling exports of militancy to , Bosnia, and .

Other Regional Conflicts

In addition to the Soviet-Afghan War, mujahideen or similarly designated Muslim fighters engaged in other regional conflicts during the period, often framing their actions as defensive against perceived threats to Islamic communities. These involvements included resistance by Turkish Cypriot militias against Greek Cypriot paramilitaries in and the participation of Iranian opposition groups in the Iran-Iraq War, though direct links to broader Afghan mujahideen networks remained limited.

Involvement in Cyprus EOKA B and Muslim Militias

Turkish Cypriot Muslim militias, invoked in local discourse as mujahideen, formed defensive units to counter aggression from the Greek Cypriot organization, which from 1971 promoted (union with Greece) through armed campaigns targeting Turkish Cypriot populations. Intercommunal violence escalated after 1963, with conducting attacks that prompted the creation of groups like the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) in 1958, whose fighters protected enclaves amid ethnic clashes that displaced thousands by 1974. These militias operated guerrilla-style, emphasizing religious solidarity against what they viewed as existential threats, culminating in Turkey's military intervention on July 20, 1974, which secured and ended widespread operations.

Support in Iran-Iraq War and Burmese Rohingya

The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group blending Islamist and Marxist ideologies, relocated to in 1986 and provided direct military support to Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran- War (1980–1988), including cross-border raids and a 1988 offensive that briefly captured the Iranian town of Majnoon. The MEK, numbering several thousand fighters, targeted Iranian Guards, aligning with Iraq to overthrow the post-1979 Iranian government they opposed, though their role was opportunistic rather than ideologically aligned with Sunni mujahideen networks. In parallel, Rohingya Muslim insurgents in (Myanmar) formed groups like the Rohingya Patriotic Front in 1974, launching guerrilla attacks against Burmese forces in through the 1980s, amid military campaigns that displaced over 200,000 by 1978; these fighters occasionally invoked mujahideen rhetoric in their resistance to Buddhist-majority rule, though without significant foreign mujahideen influx during the era.

Involvement in Cyprus EOKA B and Muslim Militias

The Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT), a group formed in by Turkish Cypriot leader and Turkish military officer Daniş Karabelen, was established to protect Turkish Cypriot communities from attacks by the Greek Cypriot organization during its campaign for enosis (union with ). By the early , following the 1963-1964 intercommunal violence—known as "Bloody Christmas" on December 21, 1963, which killed over 360 Turkish Cypriots and displaced thousands into enclaves—the TMT had grown to approximately 6,000-8,000 fighters, organizing defenses, arms smuggling, and retaliatory operations against Greek Cypriot assaults. In 1967, amid escalating tensions and the group's shift toward more formalized resistance structures, the TMT was renamed Mücahitler (Mujahideen), reflecting an ideological framing of the struggle as a defensive against perceived existential threats from Greek Cypriot nationalism. These mujahideen units, often numbering in the thousands across enclaves like and , conducted guerrilla tactics including ambushes, fortifications, and intelligence operations to counter , the successor to formed in 1971 by General . EOKA B, seeking to provoke partition or , carried out over 1,000 attacks on between 1971 and 1974, including bombings and assassinations that killed hundreds; mujahideen responses included defensive patrols and counterstrikes, such as the resistance at Erenköy in August 1964, where 80 Turkish fighters held off superior Greek Cypriot forces for weeks until Turkish air support arrived. The mujahideen played a critical role in sustaining under siege, smuggling supplies via "ghost towns" and underground networks while enduring blockades that restricted food and medicine, leading to and over 500 civilian deaths from 1964 to 1974. Turkish government support, including training in mainland , bolstered their capabilities, though operations remained irregular and localized. Following the July 1974 Turkish intervention—prompted by B-linked coup and massacres—the Mücahitler integrated into formal structures, renaming as the Turkish Cypriot Security Force in 1976, marking the end of their mujahideen phase. This episode exemplifies early Cold War-era Muslim militias framing ethnic defense in religious terms, distinct from later transnational but rooted in communal survival against irredentist violence.

Support in Iran-Iraq War and Burmese Rohingya

The People's Mujahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), an exiled Iranian opposition group, received sanctuary in Iraq following the 1979 and actively supported Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) by conducting cross-border raids and sabotage operations against Iranian military and civilian targets. With an estimated force of several thousand fighters, the MEK launched offensives such as Operation Fury in and Operation Great Harvest in 1988, coordinating with Iraqi units to divert Iranian resources from main fronts. This alliance provided with a proxy irregular force amid conventional stalemates, though the MEK's Marxist-Islamist ideology diverged from traditional Sunni mujahideen networks, limiting broader Arab volunteer integration; Iraqi records indicate minimal additional Sunni mujahideen participation compared to state-backed Arab contingents from and . In parallel, Rohingya Muslim insurgents in western revived mujahideen-style resistance against Burmese military rule during the era, building on earlier post-independence efforts by the Mujahid Party (formed 1947) to annex the Mayu Peninsula to through guerrilla campaigns until their suppression in the mid-1950s. The Rohingya Patriotic Front (RPF), established in 1974 under , mobilized fighters for autonomy in amid escalating citizenship denials and demographic restrictions under Ne Win's regime, splintering into factions including the by 1982, which conducted ambushes and bombings with training from Libyan and Bangladeshi sources. RSO operations peaked in the late , prompting Burmese counteroffensives like (1978) and Naga Min (1988–1991) that displaced tens of thousands, though the group's limited arms and internal divisions constrained territorial gains. These efforts reflected localized jihadist framing against perceived Buddhist-majority oppression, distinct from transnational networks but echoing anti-colonial mujahideen precedents.

Post-Cold War Fragmentation

Afghan Civil War and Taliban Rise

Following the fall of the Soviet-backed Najibullah regime on April 28, 1992, mujahideen factions that had previously united against the communists rapidly fragmented along ethnic, ideological, and personal lines, plunging into civil war. The Peshawar Accords of April 25, 1992, aimed to establish a power-sharing under President of , with commanding defenses in , but Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami refused participation and launched rocket attacks on the capital starting in May 1992, killing hundreds of civilians. Other groups, including Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittihad-e Islami and the Hazara Shiite Hezb-e Wahdat led by , vied for control, resulting in ethnic clashes such as the May 31, 1992, assassination of Wahdat leaders and subsequent fighting in west . The civil war intensified through 1993-1994, with Hekmatyar's forces, backed by Pakistani intelligence, besieging alongside allied militias, while Massoud's Tajik-dominated troops repelled assaults but resorted to indiscriminate shelling and blockades that exacerbated and displacement. Atrocities proliferated across factions: Ittihad-e Islami conducted mass killings of Hazara civilians in 1993, including summary executions and forced displacements; Hezb-e Wahdat retaliated with targeted attacks on ; and all parties engaged in , , and , contributing to an estimated 50,000-100,000 deaths in alone by 1995, alongside widespread infrastructure destruction. This warlordism, fueled by external patrons— favoring Pashtun groups like Hezb-e Islami, supporting Shiite militias, and others arming proxies—eroded mujahideen legitimacy, as local populations suffered banditry, arbitrary taxation, and without effective governance. The resulting anarchy created conditions for the 's rise, a predominantly Pashtun movement formed in 1994 in by Mohammed Omar, comprising madrassa students and disillusioned ex-mujahideen veterans seeking to impose strict law and end corruption. Initial Taliban actions targeted abuses, such as disarming a Kandahar commander accused of in late 1994, attracting recruits amid public exhaustion with mujahideen infighting. With covert Pakistani support via arms and —shifting from faltering Pashtun mujahideen factions to secure trade routes and influence—the Taliban swiftly conquered southern provinces, capturing in November 1994, in September 1995, and advancing northward. By September 27, 1996, Taliban forces overran Kabul, executing former President Najibullah (who had been under UN protection since 1992) and dissolving the Rabbani government, thereby supplanting fragmented mujahideen alliances with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. While some mujahideen commanders defected to the Taliban for power or ideology, core northern factions under Massoud formed the United Islamic Front (Northern Alliance), sustaining resistance and highlighting the mujahideen legacy's division into Taliban collaborators and opponents, perpetuating conflict rather than unity.

Insurgencies in Yugoslavia and North Caucasus

During the (1992–1995), foreign mujahideen, mainly Arab veterans from the Soviet-Afghan War, arrived to support Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) forces against Bosnian Serb armies, viewing the conflict as a against Christian forces. Estimates place the number of these volunteers at 1,000 to 4,000 over the war's duration, though active combatants peaked at around 300–500, facilitated by networks despite a UN . They integrated into the Army of the (ARBiH) as the El Mudžahid detachment, officially formed in 1993 under Iranian auspices, conducting operations like ambushes and the capture of Vozuca in September 1995, which temporarily expanded Bosniak control in central Bosnia. The mujahideen units emphasized strict Islamist discipline, imposing on controlled areas and recruiting local converts, but their tactical contributions were limited compared to ARBiH regulars, often relying on fanaticism over conventional training. They committed documented atrocities, including beheadings and mutilations of Serb and Croat prisoners, as evidenced in International Criminal Tribunal for the former (ICTY) cases such as Prosecutor v. Hadžić, where evidence confirmed executions and desecrations by foreign fighters. Post-war, many returned home or linked to networks, while survivors faced ; ICTY trials convicted several Bosnian commanders for failing to control these units, highlighting their semi-autonomous status and ideological divergence from secular Bosniak . In the , mujahideen involvement escalated during the Chechen Wars against , transitioning the conflicts from ethnic separatism toward transnational jihadism. The (1994–1996) saw minimal foreign participation initially, with dozens of Arab and Jordanian-Chechen fighters providing training in urban guerrilla tactics, but their influence grew interwar as Afghan alumni like (born Samir Saleh Abdullah al-Suwaylim) arrived in 1995, establishing bases and importing Wahhabi ideology. Khattab's small group, numbering under 100, advised Chechen field commanders on ambushes and IEDs, contributing to Russian setbacks in despite overall marginal combat role. The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) amplified mujahideen impact, with Khattab leading the Arab Mujahideen in Chechnya during the August 1999 Dagestan incursion alongside Shamil Basayev, aiming to ignite a broader Islamist emirate; Russian estimates cited 300–500 foreign fighters at peak, funded via Gulf donors and al-Qaeda ties. They pioneered suicide bombings in the region, such as the 2000–2001 attacks killing dozens of Russian troops, and radicalized locals by framing resistance as global jihad, eroding nationalist support for figures like Aslan Maskhadov. Khattab's assassination by Russian FSB in March 2002 via poisoned letter fragmented the group, but remnants fueled insurgencies in Dagestan and Ingushetia, sustaining low-level violence into the 2010s through ideological exports rather than mass mobilization. This shift imposed causal costs, alienating moderate Chechens and enabling Russian counterinsurgency under Ramzan Kadyrov, who suppressed Wahhabi elements by 2010.

Integration into Global Jihad Networks

The foundations of emerged from the networks of Arab volunteers who joined the Afghan mujahideen during the Soviet- in the 1980s. , arriving in around 1980, collaborated with Abdullah Azzam to organize these fighters, establishing the al-Islamiya (MAK), or Services Office, in 1984 to recruit, fund, and logistically support foreign mujahideen from countries including , , and . This organization facilitated the influx of thousands of transnational jihadists, creating an early infrastructure for cross-border militant coordination that extended beyond the Afghan theater. Al- was formally initiated in August 1988 during a meeting of Arab mujahideen leaders in , , where bin Laden proposed forming a vanguard group to continue jihadist efforts post-Soviet withdrawal; the name "al-," meaning "the base," initially referred to a database of experienced fighters compiled by MAK. Following the Soviet retreat in February 1989 and Azzam's assassination in November 1989—attributed by some to internal rivalries or intelligence operations—bin Laden assumed control, redirecting resources toward offensive global jihad rather than defensive local struggles. By 1990, Al- had established training camps in and , drawing veterans from the anti-Soviet campaigns and forging ideological ties with Islamist groups disillusioned by post-war Afghan factionalism. Transnational links solidified in the early 1990s as provided financial aid, training, and ideological guidance to mujahideen-inspired networks in regions like Bosnia, where Arab fighters supported Muslim forces against Serb militias, and the , aiding Chechen insurgents against . Bin Laden's personal fortune and donations from Gulf donors enabled these connections, with operatives facilitating the transfer of Afghan-trained fighters to conflicts in Algeria's and Yemen's unrest, emphasizing a unified ummah-wide resistance to perceived Western and secular threats. These efforts transformed localized mujahideen victories into a blueprint for decentralized, borderless , though internal debates over targeting civilians and apostate regimes persisted among affiliates. By mid-decade, mergers with groups like further embedded in global militant circuits, prioritizing attacks on U.S. interests as a catalyst for broader mobilization.

1990s-2000s Expansion in Central Asia and Philippines

In , the post-Soviet facilitated the growth of jihadist networks drawing from Afghan mujahideen veterans and ideologies. The (IMU), established in 1998 by Tohir Yuldashev and , emerged as a key group seeking to overthrow the Uzbek government under and impose law, with early activities centered in the spanning , , and . The IMU received support from Taliban-controlled and , including training and funding, and conducted armed incursions into in 1999 and 2000, kidnapping hostages and clashing with security forces in operations that killed dozens. These efforts built on the Tajik Civil War (1992–1997), where the , incorporating the Islamic Renaissance Party, allied with Afghan mujahideen factions like those led by to combat pro-government forces, resulting in an estimated 20,000–150,000 deaths and the exile or integration of thousands of Central Asian fighters trained in Afghan camps. Ideological precursors like , active since the mid-1990s in underground networks across , , and , provided non-violent recruitment and propaganda that indirectly bolstered groups like the IMU by advocating for a through eventual , though it eschewed immediate violence. By the early , the IMU had expanded operations into northern , fighting alongside the against U.S.-led forces post-9/11, with estimates of several hundred Uzbek fighters integrated into al-Qaeda-linked structures; however, U.S. and Uzbek counterterrorism operations, including the 2001 death of Namangani, disrupted their momentum. These movements reflected a spillover of Afghan jihadist tactics and Salafi-jihadist ideology, adapted to local grievances over secular authoritarianism, though their limited popular support—stemming from perceptions of foreign influence and extremism—constrained broader expansion. In the Philippines, mujahideen-inspired networks expanded through Moro separatist factions influenced by Afghan training and linkages. The Group (ASG), founded around 1991 by Abdurajak Janjalani after his exposure to Islamist ideologies in and ties to Afghan veterans, splintered from the to pursue a more radical separatist agenda in and the , conducting kidnappings and bombings that escalated in the late 1990s. By the 2000s, ASG received operational support from , including funding and bomb-making expertise, enabling high-profile attacks like the 2004 SuperFerry 14 bombing that killed 116 people and the 2000 Sipadan-Lamitan kidnappings of Western tourists for ransom. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an Indonesia-based group formed in the early 1990s with connections, utilized Philippine territory for expansion, establishing training camps in with (MILF) tolerance to train hundreds of Southeast Asian recruits in mujahideen-style guerrilla tactics, explosives, and from 1996 onward. These camps, such as those in Abubakar near Lantawan, facilitated JI's transnational ambitions for a Southeast Asian , with Philippine authorities raiding facilities in that uncovered plots targeting U.S. assets; JI's influence waned after arrests of key figures like Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi in , but it underscored the Afghan mujahideen model's export via returning fighters and remittances. Joint U.S.-Philippine operations under Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines from reduced ASG and JI capabilities, shrinking ASG to under 200 fighters by mid-decade through targeted killings and surrenders.

Contemporary Regional Activities

South Asia and Indian Subcontinent

In the contemporary period, mujahideen-affiliated groups in South Asia and the Indian subcontinent have sustained low-level insurgencies and terrorist operations, primarily targeting perceived secular or non-Muslim governance structures to advance Islamist objectives. These activities, often linked to transnational jihadist ideologies, include Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) operations in Kashmir aimed at challenging Indian control, Jama'at ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) plots to impose sharia in Bangladesh, and residual cells of Indian Mujahideen (IM) conducting bombings within India. Such groups receive ideological inspiration from global networks like al-Qaeda and ISIS, though local grievances over territorial disputes and minority status drive recruitment.

Kashmir Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Operations

Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), formed in 1989 as an indigenous Islamist faction within the , seeks and 's accession to through armed against Indian . The group, which relies on local Kashmiri recruits supplemented by foreign fighters, has received extensive Pakistani support, including training in over 90 camps located in and Pakistan-administered Kashmir. Designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. State Department on August 17, 2017, HM employs guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and targeted killings of officials and civilians perceived as collaborators. Despite intensified Indian measures, including post-2019 revocation of Article 370, HM maintains operational capacity, with cadres involved in sporadic attacks amid ongoing skirmishes.

Bangladesh Jama'at ul-Mujahideen Activities

Jama'at ul-Mujahideen (JMB), established in 1998 by operatives trained in Afghan camps, pursues the violent overthrow of Bangladesh's to establish an Islamic under law. The executed a nationwide campaign of 459 coordinated low-yield bomb blasts on August 17, 2005, across 63 districts, striking offices, courts, and non-Muslim religious sites to coerce policy changes. Following the 2007 execution of its founding leaders, JMB fragmented into cells, with the Neo-JMB variant pledging allegiance to and orchestrating attacks like the 2016 cafe siege. Bangladesh's security forces have dismantled much of JMB's infrastructure through arrests and operations, yielding no major transnational incidents by 2023, though recruitment via madrasas and online propaganda persists. The group was proscribed in in May 2019 over fears of cross-border .

Kashmir Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Operations

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (), the largest militant group operating in Indian-administered , emerged as a key player in the Islamist against Indian control, advocating for the region's accession to through armed struggle. Formed amid the escalation of separatist violence in the late , HM consolidated various factions under a unified command structure, emphasizing jihadist ideology over secular nationalism. Its operations have primarily targeted Indian security forces, government officials, and perceived collaborators, employing guerrilla tactics such as ambushes, improvised explosive devices, and assassinations to undermine Indian authority in the . HM was established in September 1989 in the , with Master Ahsan Dar as its initial chief, who was arrested by Indian security forces in December 1989. The group quickly absorbed defectors from other outfits, growing to an estimated strength of several thousand fighters by the early 1990s, bolstered by training camps and logistical support from Pakistan's (ISI). Under leaders like , who has commanded from since the 1990s, HM conducted high-profile attacks, including the 1990 killing of personnel and ambushes on army convoys that resulted in dozens of Indian troop casualties annually during the insurgency's peak from 1990 to 1996. -based operations facilitated infiltration across the , with HM militants crossing into to launch strikes, such as the 1993 kidnapping of Western tourists to pressure for prisoner releases. By the mid-1990s, dominated the , claiming responsibility for over 1,200 attacks between 1990 and 2000, contributing to more than 10,000 deaths in Kashmir-related violence during that decade, including security personnel and civilians. Notable operations included the 2000 Chittisinghpora massacre of 36 Sikh villagers, initially linked to but later contested amid allegations of staged involvement to derail peace talks. The group's reliance on for funding, arms, and recruits—estimated at millions of dollars annually through networks and ISI channels—sustained its campaigns, though internal rifts emerged, such as the 2003 split leading to the formation of more radical factions like . Indian efforts, including operations that neutralized over 2,000 cadres by 2010, gradually eroded its presence, forcing a shift toward with overground worker networks for recruitment and logistics. In the 2020s, HM's operational capacity has diminished due to intensified Indian and actions, such as the 2019 abrogation of Article 370, which prompted a surge in targeted killings of commanders, reducing active militants to fewer than 100 by 2023. Recent activities include sporadic ambushes and narco-terrorism financing, with leaders like Salahuddin facing charges in cross-border drug smuggling cases yielding crores in illicit funds. Following Indian strikes like Operation Sindoor in 2025, HM has relocated training bases from Pakistan-occupied to , continuing low-level infiltration and propaganda via to radicalize local youth. The U.S. designation of HM as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2017 underscores its transnational threat, with ongoing seizures of assets linked to operatives highlighting persistent Pakistan-backed networks despite tactical setbacks.

Bangladesh Jama'at ul-Mujahideen Activities

Jama'at ul-Mujahideen (JMB) emerged in the late as an offshoot of Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami , with roots tracing to Afghan-trained militants returning after the Soviet-Afghan War, aiming to establish an governed by law through violent against the secular Bangladeshi government. The group, led initially by and Siddique ul-Islam (known as ), rejected democratic processes and targeted perceived apostates, including judges, intellectuals, and NGO workers, enforcing strict Islamist edicts in rural strongholds like northern . Its ideology aligned with Deobandi-influenced Salafi-jihadism, emphasizing (declaring Muslims as unbelievers) and global aspirations, though primarily focused on domestic overthrow rather than transnational operations initially. The group's most prominent operation occurred on August 17, 2005, when it detonated nearly 500 low-yield bombs at over 300 sites across 63 of Bangladesh's 64 within a 30-minute span, accompanied by leaflets demanding implementation and the withdrawal of Indian influence; the blasts killed two civilians and injured dozens, but achieved widespread psychological terror. Prior activities included assassinations, such as the 2003 killings of two judges in Jhalakati and the 2004 murder of British worker in Dinajpur, alongside attacks on NGOs accused of promoting un-Islamic values and rackets to fund operations. JMB maintained training camps in remote areas, smuggling explosives from and , and recruited from madrasas, with estimates of several thousand operatives at its peak before the 2005 crackdown. Bangladeshi authorities responded with mass arrests following the 2005 attacks, leading to the execution of Rahman and on March 30, 2007, after trials convicting over 100 members; this dismantled the core leadership and infrastructure, reducing overt violence significantly. Remnants splintered, with the Neo-Jama'at ul-Mujahideen faction emerging around , pledging allegiance to and conducting targeted killings of bloggers and foreigners, including the 2015 murders of Italian aid workers and the 2016 siege in that killed 29 people, though publicly claimed responsibility. By the 2020s, JMB and its offshoots maintained low-level recruitment and plotting, but reported minimal terrorist incidents due to sustained operations, with the group listed as a proscribed entity by multiple governments including and . Despite suppression, analysts note persistent underground networks capable of resurgence amid political instability.

Middle East Conflicts

Following the U.S.-led invasion of on March 20, 2003, which dismantled Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, foreign Sunni ists—often termed mujahideen—joined local insurgents in combating coalition forces, the interim Iraqi government, and Shiite militias. These fighters, inspired by Salafi-ist ideology and facilitated by networks from the Afghan era, prioritized high-impact terrorist tactics such as suicide bombings and (IED) attacks over sustained . Their involvement exacerbated sectarian divisions, with attacks targeting civilians and , contributing to over 100,000 civilian deaths by 2011. In , the 2011 Arab Spring protests against Bashar al-Assad's regime evolved into a multifaceted by mid-2012, drawing an influx of foreign mujahideen to jihadist factions aligned against the Alawite-led government. Groups like Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) and the (ISIS) leveraged online and smuggling routes to recruit globally, with foreign fighters comprising a disproportionate share of operatives and commanders despite being outnumbered by local rebels. This foreign contingent fueled territorial gains but also internal fractures, including JN's 2013-2014 split from ISIS, resulting in inter-jihadist violence that weakened the broader anti-Assad .

Iraq Insurgency Post-2003

The insurgency coalesced in mid-2003 around disparate elements, including former regime loyalists and foreign jihadists entering via porous borders from and . An estimated 4,000 to 5,000 foreign fighters arrived during the conflict's height (circa 2004-2008), many veterans of prior jihads or new recruits radicalized by Al-Qaeda's narrative of defending against Western occupation. These mujahideen gravitated to (AQI), formally announced on October 15, 2004, under , who pledged allegiance to and emphasized attacks on Shiites as apostates to provoke civil war. AQI's foreign-dominated leadership orchestrated signature atrocities, including the August 2003 bombing of the UN headquarters in (killing 22) and the 2006 Samarra mosque bombing that ignited widespread sectarian reprisals. Foreign fighters, prized for their willingness to conduct operations—accounting for nearly all such attacks in —provided tactical expertise but alienated local Sunnis through brutality, such as beheadings publicized online. U.S. and Iraqi surges, combined with Sunni tribal awakenings from 2006, diminished AQI's influence; Zarqawi was killed in a U.S. on June 7, 2006, near . AQI remnants rebranded as the in 2006, laying groundwork for ISIS's 2014 resurgence, though foreign mujahideen numbers had declined sharply by the U.S. withdrawal in December 2011.

Syrian Rebels and Anti-Assad Factions

Jabhat al-Nusra emerged in January 2012 as an offshoot of AQI, dispatched by its leadership to exploit Syria's chaos; it publicly affirmed ties in February 2013, attracting mujahideen through promises of emirate-building against Assad's "Rafidite" (Shiite) regime. Foreign fighters, dubbed , bolstered JN's capabilities in battles like the capture of in 2015, providing specialized skills in IEDs and sniping while comprising up to 20% of its ranks in some estimates. Parallel to JN, —breaking from in 2013—drew the bulk of foreign mujahideen, with approximately 30,000 total foreigners joining jihadist groups across and by late 2015, enabling rapid conquests like (June 2013) and (June 2014). These fighters executed mass executions, enslavement of (over 5,000 abducted in August 2014), and global attacks, but their overrepresentation in command roles sparked tensions with locals. Rivalries culminated in clashes, such as JN-ISIS fighting in (2014), fragmenting the jihadist front; JN rebranded as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in July 2016 to localize and sever overt links, evolving into Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) by 2017, which retained foreign elements amid ongoing anti-Assad operations. By 2019, coalition airstrikes and Russian intervention had confined surviving mujahideen networks to pockets like , where HTS governs amid sporadic Turkish-backed offensives.

Iraq Insurgency Post-2003

Following the U.S.-led of on March 20, 2003, which toppled Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime by April 9, a multifaceted emerged, incorporating mujahideen elements drawn from transnational ist networks. Foreign fighters, often veterans of Afghan or other conflicts, framed the conflict as a defensive against Western occupation and Shi'a ascendancy, integrating with local Sunni insurgents to conduct asymmetric attacks. These mujahideen prioritized spectacular violence to deter cooperation with coalition forces and the interim Iraqi government, while exploiting Sunni grievances over and marginalization. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian jihadist who had trained in during the anti-Soviet war, established in by mid-2003, directing operations from strongholds in and . His group targeted U.S. troops, recruits, and Shi'a civilians through beheadings, ambushes, and bombings, aiming to ignite sectarian civil war; a February 2004 letter attributed to Zarqawi outlined this strategy of provoking Shi'a retaliation to unify Sunnis against perceived apostates. On October 17, 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance () to , rebranding as (AQI), which formalized its role as the local affiliate of the global network and attracted further foreign recruits via propaganda emphasizing as the central front in . AQI and affiliated mujahideen groups drew an estimated 1,000 to 2,000 foreign fighters at peak involvement from to 2006, primarily , , North Africans, and Europeans, who comprised a disproportionate share of operatives despite being a minority of insurgents overall. Tactics emphasized improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which inflicted over 60% of U.S. casualties by 2006, and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), with AQI responsible for roughly 1,000 attacks between and 2008, often using non-Iraqi bombers for high-casualty strikes on markets, mosques, and recruitment centers. These methods, refined from Afghan precedents, aimed to erode coalition morale and Iraqi will, while AQI enforced brutal governance in controlled areas like Anbar province, including public executions and punishments under Salafist interpretations of . Violence peaked in 2006 amid sectarian reprisals, with AQI bombings killing thousands, including the February 22 mosque attack that escalated Shi'a-Sunni clashes; Zarqawi's death in a U.S. on June 7, 2006, disrupted leadership but did not dismantle the network. The 2007 U.S. troop surge and Sunni Awakening militias, comprising former insurgents alienated by AQI's extremism, marginalized mujahideen operations, reducing foreign fighter inflows and attack frequency by 2008. AQI remnants reorganized as the , sustaining low-level insurgency until resurgence post-2011 U.S. withdrawal, though mujahideen framing persisted in recruitment narratives.

Syrian Rebels and Anti-Assad Factions

The anti-Assad in , sparked by widespread protests in March 2011, incorporated numerous mujahideen elements as Islamist factions proliferated amid the regime's crackdown, framing the conflict as a against a secular Alawite-led . By mid-2012, jihadist groups had gained prominence through superior organization, funding from Gulf donors, and appeal to foreign volunteers, often outpacing nominally secular (FSA) units in territorial control and combat effectiveness. A 2013 analysis by a British defense consultancy estimated that nearly half of Syria's opposition fighters aligned with extremist groups, including Salafi-jihadists who prioritized establishing Islamic rule over . These mujahideen drew ideological inspiration from transnational networks like , employing tactics such as suicide bombings and ambushes honed in prior conflicts like and . Jabhat al-Nusra, founded in late 2011 by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani under in Iraq's direction, emerged as a core mujahideen faction, announcing its presence publicly in January 2012 with a video claiming prior attacks. The group, which pledged allegiance to leader , amassed thousands of fighters by 2013, capturing key oil fields and conducting high-profile operations like the July 2012 Damascus bombings that killed regime officials. The U.S. designated al-Nusra a foreign terrorist organization on December 11, 2012, citing its ties and role in over 600 attacks. Other mujahideen formations included the Mujahideen Army of , established in April 2014 as a of thousands of fighters controlling rural areas west of , focusing on anti-regime . Foreign mujahideen from the , particularly organized into units like Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar, numbered in the hundreds by 2014, contributing specialized skills from prior insurgencies while splintering over ideological disputes. Foreign fighters bolstered these factions, with estimates reaching 11,000 by December 2013, including steep increases from , the , and ; most gravitated to jihadist groups rather than FSA moderates due to shared Salafi ideology and resources. By 2014, Salafist and jihadist groups like al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria () dominated the insurgency's military capabilities, controlling up to 70% of rebel-held territory in eastern despite comprising a minority of overall factions estimated at over 1,200 groups with 100,000 fighters. Infighting erupted in 2013 when split from al-Nusra over and , leading to clashes that weakened unified anti-Assad efforts but highlighted mujahideen commitment to global goals over local alliances. In 2017, al-Nusra rebranded as Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), merging with other Islamists to consolidate province control, retaining Salafi-jihadist roots while adopting pragmatic to manage aid and reduce transnational attacks. HTS, still designated a terrorist entity by the U.S. until potential revocation discussions in 2025, commanded 10,000-15,000 fighters by 2019, enforcing courts and suppressing rivals like remnants. This evolution reflected mujahideen adaptation to sustained warfare, with HTS leading major offensives, including the November-December 2024 advance on and that toppled Assad, involving coordinated rebel assaults under Turkish influence but rooted in jihadist command structures. Despite surface moderation, HTS leadership, including al-Jawlani, maintained ideological ties to mujahideen networks, prioritizing Islamic over Western-backed pluralism.

Africa and Southeast Asia

In , mujahideen-aligned groups have pursued sustained insurgencies in and , employing guerrilla tactics and terrorism to challenge secular governments and foreign interventions while advancing Salafi-jihadist objectives. These efforts, often linked to networks, emphasize establishing Islamic emirates and rejecting Western influence, with operations causing thousands of casualties and displacing populations. In , mujahideen activities remain limited to small cells, such as Indonesia's , which conducts beheadings and bombings in amid pledges to the .

Somali Al-Shabaab Campaigns

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, meaning "Movement of Striving Youth," splintered from the in 2006 amid Ethiopia's invasion of , rapidly expanding control over southern regions by 2008. The group formalized allegiance to in February 2012, aligning with transnational while prioritizing an encompassing Somali territories. Designated a U.S. Foreign Terrorist Organization in 2008, al-Shabaab has executed over 155 suicide attacks using 216 bombers between 2006 and 2017, resulting in 2,218 deaths. Key operations include the killing 76 Ugandans, the 2013 Westgate Mall siege in claiming 67 lives, and the 2020 Camp Simba assault that killed one U.S. . In contemporary phases, al-Shabaab ambushed Ethiopian troops on September 17, 2023, and seized Mahaas on July 27, 2025, after government retreats, despite losing a third of held territory in 2023 offensives that reportedly killed 1,650 militants since August 2023. Tactics blend , improvised explosives, and propaganda exploiting foreign troop presences, sustaining influence in southern strongholds amid humanitarian crises displacing millions.

Nigerian Boko Haram Affiliates

Boko Haram, founded in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf to impose and expel Western education, evolved from local extremism to seek support post-2009, receiving training and materials from AQIM as confirmed by UN reports in 2014. A key affiliate, (Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis ), split in 2012 under Khalid al-Barnawi, aligning explicitly with AQIM to target Western expatriates and state assets while criticizing intra-Muslim violence. , functioning as al-Qaeda's Nigerian franchise, conducted kidnappings like those of Chris McManus and Franco Lamolinara in 2011 and ambushes, aspiring to oust secular governance. Tactics across affiliates include suicide bombings, such as the 2011 UN attack linked to al-Qaeda-trained operatives, and asymmetric assaults honed via training camps. Though pledged to the in 2015, forming Wilayat , Ansaru's resurgence in northwest underscores persistent al-Qaeda-oriented mujahideen efforts amid factional feuds.

Somali Al-Shabaab Campaigns

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen emerged in 2006 as the militant youth wing of the (ICU), rapidly escalating its operations following the Ethiopian invasion of in December 2006, which ousted the ICU from . Al-Shabaab framed its resistance as against Ethiopian "occupiers" and the U.S.-backed Transitional Federal Government (TFG), conducting guerrilla attacks, ambushes, and suicide bombings that inflicted heavy casualties on Ethiopian forces and their allies. By , the group had regained control over much of southern , establishing administrative structures including courts and taxation systems in captured territories. From 2009 to 2011, Al-Shabaab waged a protracted urban campaign for , holding significant portions of the capital and launching assaults that strained TFG and Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) defenses, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths from and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). AMISOM reinforcements enabled government forces to expel Al-Shabaab from in August 2011, marking a shift from conventional to for the group. In October 2012, Kenyan-led AMISOM operations dislodged Al-Shabaab from the key port city of , its economic hub, prompting a pivot to , including vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) and raids on supply lines. Post-2012, Al-Shabaab sustained its insurgency through targeted operations against (SNA) bases and AMISOM/ATMIS convoys, such as the May 2023 looting of an ATMIS base in Buulo Mareer, which yielded heavy weapons redeployed in attacks on sites like on June 25, 2023. Despite Somali government offensives from mid-2022 that reclaimed over 200 settlements in Hirshabelle and regions by April 2023—killing approximately 1,650 militants—Al-Shabaab regrouped, launching counteroffensives including the capture of the government outpost in Mahaas on July 27, 2025, in the Hiraan region. The group maintains strongholds in rural central and southern , leveraging IEDs as the primary cause of SNA casualties and controlling riverine areas along the Jubba and Shabelle for mobility and revenue.

Nigerian Boko Haram Affiliates

, formally Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (JAS), originated in , , around 2000 under Muhammad Yusuf, who drew inspiration from Osama bin Laden's global ist model to reject Western , secular , and advocate strict governance. Following Yusuf's killing by Nigerian security forces in July 2009 amid clashes, assumed leadership, escalating the group from localized protests to full-scale by declaring against the Nigerian state as an apostate regime allied with Western powers. The group's transnational ties strengthened through operational links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), including training in Mali from 2012 to 2013 that improved bomb-making, small arms use, and guerrilla tactics. In March 2015, Shekau pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, rebranding as Wilayat Gharb Afriqqiya (IS West Africa Province) and briefly controlling over 8,000 square kilometers in northeastern Nigeria until territorial losses in late 2015. Internal ideological rifts over Shekau's indiscriminate takfiri violence—declaring Muslim civilians legitimate targets—prompted a 2016 split, birthing the more disciplined Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) under Abu Musab al-Barnawi, which prioritized attacks on military and foreign entities while attempting local governance to build support. A key affiliate, (Jama'atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis ), splintered from in February 2012 under Khalid al-Barnawi, aligning explicitly with AQIM to focus on anti-Western operations like expatriate kidnappings for and , while criticizing Shekau's excessive casualties among . 's tactics emphasized precision strikes, such as the December 2012 ambush killing 11 South African troops and the February 2013 of seven expatriates, before going dormant post-2013; it resurfaced in January 2017 with renewed attacks. These factions operate primarily in Borno State's Sambisa Forest and Basin, employing including suicide bombings (e.g., the August 2011 UN headquarters attack in killing 24), vehicle-borne IEDs, ambushes on convoys, and mass kidnappings like the April 2014 Chibok schoolgirls abduction of 276. Cross-border raids into , , and sustain logistics and recruitment, with ISWAP demonstrating adaptability by integrating captured heavy weapons and exploiting local grievances over and to frame their as defensive against Nigerian "infidels." JAS under Shekau persists with brutal enforcement of , using female and child bombers, while ISWAP's selective approach has allowed territorial gains amid Nigerian military setbacks.

Central Asia and Uyghur Militancy

The (IMU), founded in 1998 by Tohir Yuldashev and , emerged as a primary mujahideen force in , initially seeking to overthrow 's secular government and establish an governed by law. Drawing ideological inspiration from and models, the IMU conducted guerrilla incursions into and from during the 1999-2000 conflicts, kidnapping hostages and clashing with government forces in the , resulting in dozens of deaths and the displacement of thousands. Allied with the Afghan , IMU fighters received training in Osama bin Laden's camps and participated in battles against U.S.-led coalition forces after 2001, with Namangani killed in a U.S. in November 2001 and Yuldashev in a 2009 drone strike in . A splinter group, the (IJU), formed in 2002 under Najmiddin Jalolov, continued Central Asian mujahideen operations with a focus on suicide bombings and attacks coordinated with the in and , including plots targeting Western embassies in . These groups, comprising , , and other Turkic fighters, numbered in the low thousands at their peak and emphasized transnational jihad, pledging allegiance to while conducting cross-border raids that destabilized the region until the mid-2010s, when many splintered toward ISIS-Khorasan. Their activities reflected a shift from local insurgency to global jihadist networks, fueled by post-Soviet religious revival and resentment toward authoritarian regimes suppressing Islamist expression. Uyghur militancy, centered on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), also known as the (TIP), intertwined with Central Asian dynamics through shared training grounds in and , where the group was established in the late 1990s by to pursue an independent in China's region. ETIM fighters, estimated at several hundred, trained alongside IMU and in Taliban-controlled areas, conducting limited attacks in such as the 2008 Kashgar vehicle bombing that killed 16 Chinese police officers using tactics learned abroad. Designated a terrorist organization by the UN in 2002 and the U.S. in 2002, ETIM/TIP maintained a presence in , prompting U.S. airstrikes on its training camps in 2018, though analysts note its operational capacity in China remained marginal compared to broader Uyghur separatist grievances. By the 2010s, thousands of had joined TIP in , fighting alongside groups like Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham against the Assad regime, gaining combat experience in and propaganda production aimed at recruiting from . Post-2021 Taliban takeover in , TIP remnants relocated there, posing renewed threats to Central Asian states via potential incursions, as evidenced by 2025 reports of militants shifting from to Afghan bases near and borders. Despite Taliban assurances to , Uyghur mujahideen persistence highlights ongoing tensions, with TIP emphasizing ethno-nationalist over global ambitions, distinguishing it from broader Salafist groups while allying opportunistically with affiliates.

Tactics, Ideology, and Organization

Guerrilla Warfare Techniques

Mujahideen groups utilized decentralized, mobile operations in small units to exploit terrain advantages and avoid decisive battles against better-equipped adversaries. In during the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989, fighters relied on native knowledge of mountainous landscapes for concealment and rapid movement, conducting hit-and-run attacks rather than holding fixed positions. This approach neutralized Soviet firepower superiority by denying large-scale engagements. Ambushes formed a core tactic, with Mujahideen positioning at night along supply routes and escape paths, then striking patrols or convoys before withdrawing. Mines and improvised explosives targeted and foot soldiers on roads and trails, inflicting attrition without sustained combat exposure. Raids on outposts involved coordinated shelling and assaults, often timed to disrupt Soviet or reinforcements via helicopter. In other theaters, such as with Al-Shabaab affiliates, similar guerrilla methods emphasized surprise assaults and mobility in rural and urban fringes, adapting to arid terrain for ambushes on government and forces. Cross-border maneuvers allowed resupply and evasion, mirroring Afghan border exploits with . Groups like in employed tactical shifts to guerrilla raiding and improvised devices after conventional setbacks, focusing on isolated targets to erode state control. These techniques prioritized endurance over immediate victory, sustaining insurgencies through asymmetric attrition.

Ideological Spectrum: Nationalism to Salafist Jihadism

The Mujahideen movements exhibited significant ideological variation, ranging from defensive, nationalist-oriented struggles rooted in ethnic, tribal, or territorial defense to puritanical Salafist emphasizing transnational religious purification and offensive holy war. This spectrum arose primarily in contexts like the Soviet-Afghan (1979–1989), where local fighters often prioritized expelling invaders to restore , while ideological imports from volunteers and funding streams introduced stricter Salafi interpretations rejecting local customs in favor of a return to early Islamic practices. The diversity reflected tensions between pragmatic alliances against common foes and uncompromising visions of Islamic governance, with nationalist strains proving more adaptable to post-conflict politics but vulnerable to radical infiltration. At the nationalist end, many Mujahideen factions integrated Islamic rhetoric with ethnic or regional loyalties, viewing as a localized defense of homeland against occupation rather than a vehicle for global ideological overhaul. In , traditionalist groups within the Peshawar Seven alliance, such as the led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani, drew on Pashtun tribal networks and Sufi traditions, advocating restoration of monarchy-like structures under mild Islamic oversight while tolerating customary practices like shrine veneration. Similarly, under and emphasized Tajik-Panjsheri resistance, framing the fight as national liberation with Islamist elements but prioritizing anti-Soviet unity over doctrinal purity; Massoud's forces, for instance, cooperated with non-Pashtun militias and later formed the against the in 1996, demonstrating nationalist pragmatism over sectarian absolutism. These groups received support from Pakistan's (ISI) for their utility in proxy warfare, amassing around 100,000 fighters by 1988, but their localized focus limited appeal to transnational radicals. Toward the Salafist jihadist pole, factions pursued societal transformation through rigid enforcement of sharia, influenced by Wahhabi funding from Saudi Arabia—estimated at $3–4 billion via private donors from 1980–1990—and ideologues like Abdullah Azzam, who mobilized 20,000–35,000 Arab volunteers for what began as defensive jihad but evolved into calls for perpetual struggle against "unbelievers." Fundamentalist parties like Hezb-e Islami under Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, rooted in Muslim Brotherhood-inspired activism from Egyptian and Pakistani exiles, rejected tribalism and Sufism as bid'ah (innovation), aiming for a centralized theocracy; Hekmatyar's group, receiving 15–20% of U.S.-funneled Stinger missiles via ISI, clashed internally with traditionalists, killing hundreds in factional fighting by 1987. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's Ittehad-e Islami, heavily Saudi-backed, imported Salafi puritanism, training cadres who later formed Al-Qaeda affiliates; this strain's globalist bent, evident in bin Laden's 1988 founding of Al-Qaeda from Arab Afghan veterans, prioritized ummah-wide caliphate over national borders, contributing to post-1989 civil war escalation and the Taliban's 1994 rise. Such ideologies, while militarily effective—inflicting 15,000 Soviet deaths—fostered internal divisions, as Salafists viewed nationalists as insufficiently pious, undermining unified governance after the Soviet withdrawal on February 15, 1989.

International Support, Betrayal, and Designations

Western and Pakistani Aid During Cold War

The Soviet Union's invasion of on December 27, 1979, prompted the to launch , the CIA's largest covert program to date, aimed at arming and financing the Afghan Mujahideen to counter Soviet expansion during the . Initial U.S. support began even before the full invasion, with a July 3, 1979, presidential finding authorizing up to $695,000 for non-lethal aid to insurgents through third parties. Under President , aid escalated post-invasion to include military supplies, but it was President who dramatically increased funding starting in 1981, viewing the Mujahideen as "freedom fighters" essential to bleeding the . U.S. assistance, totaling approximately $3 billion in arms, training, and logistics over the decade from 1980 to 1989, was funneled primarily through to maintain deniability and leverage regional allies. A pivotal escalation occurred in 1986 when the Reagan administration approved the supply of man-portable air-defense systems to the Mujahideen, with deliveries beginning that fall; these shoulder-fired missiles downed over 270 Soviet aircraft, significantly degrading air superiority and contributing to the decision for withdrawal. The aid included rifles, recoilless rifles, and anti-tank weapons sourced from , , and , coordinated via CIA stations in . Pakistan, under General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq who seized power in a 1977 coup, played a central role by hosting over 3 million , establishing training camps, and using its (ISI) directorate to distribute foreign aid to favored Mujahideen factions. Zia-ul-Haq framed the resistance as a religious , aligning it with his domestic Islamization policies, and committed Pakistani territory for cross-border operations while receiving U.S. economic and —totaling about $3.2 billion from 1982 to 1987—to offset risks of Soviet retaliation. The ISI trained tens of thousands of fighters and prioritized groups like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e-Islami, exerting influence over strategy despite tensions with U.S. preferences for broader distribution. This partnership enabled the Mujahideen to sustain , though it also sowed seeds for post-war factionalism due to uneven aid allocation.

Post-9/11 Shifts and Terrorist Listings

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks, U.S. policy toward mujahideen-linked entities pivoted sharply from Cold War-era support against Soviet forces to aggressive measures, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan under on October 7, 2001, to dismantle and oust the regime that harbored it. This shift targeted networks emerging from the 1980s mujahideen ecosystem, as many former fighters or their factions had integrated into or allied with the and , conducting operations against U.S. and coalition forces post-invasion. , issued by President on September 23, 2001, authorized asset freezes and financial disruptions against terrorists and supporters, broadly applied to mujahideen-derived groups facilitating global jihadist activities. Prominent designations included (HIG), a major mujahideen faction led by that received extensive U.S. aid in the 1980s but later opposed the post-Taliban government and U.S. presence; listed HIG as a terrorist entity on December 29, 2006, under its Anti-Terrorism Act, citing its role in attacks on civilians and coalition targets. The U.S. designated HIG leader Hekmatyar under EO 13224 in 2003 for providing sanctuary to , with the group facing further sanctions for rocket attacks on and U.S. bases. Similarly, the , rooted in Jalaluddin Haqqani's mujahideen command during the Soviet war (which indirectly benefited from CIA-supplied missiles), was sanctioned under EO 13224 in 2008 and formally designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the U.S. State Department in October 2012 via the Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act, due to high-profile assaults like the 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in and the 2011 Kabul Intercontinental Hotel attack. Internationally, the expanded Resolution 1267 sanctions in late 2001 to encompass and associates, many former mujahideen, freezing assets and imposing travel bans to curb their operational capacity. Groups like Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), a Pakistan-based outfit with Afghan mujahideen ties and links, faced intensified scrutiny; already an FTO since 1998, its emir Fazle-ur-Rahman Khalil was added to U.S. terrorist lists in September 2014 for training camps in Afghanistan's eastern provinces. These measures reflected a consensus that historical anti-communist credentials no longer exempted entities from if they perpetrated or enabled , prioritizing disruption of insurgent financing and logistics over past alliances.

Chinese Policies Against ETIM and Bans

The Chinese government designates the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as a terrorist organization, attributing to it a series of attacks in since the , including bombings and assaults that killed hundreds. This classification aligns with the UN Security Council's listing of ETIM under its al-Qaida sanctions regime on October 25, 2002, following evidence of its ties to Usama bin Laden's network and training activities outside . Domestically, bans ETIM membership, financing, propaganda dissemination, and logistical support, with violations punishable under laws as terrorist acts. Enacted on December 27, 2015, and effective January 1, 2016, China's Counter-Terrorism Law establishes a unified framework for targeting groups like ETIM, authorizing intelligence-led operations, asset seizures, and restrictions on communications or travel for suspected affiliates. The law mandates reporting of terrorist activities and empowers authorities to disrupt ETIM's recruitment and ideological spread, framing such efforts as essential to preventing and jihadist violence. In , policies intensified with the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-extremification, effective April 1, 2017, which criminalizes ETIM-associated extremism as acts undermining social order, including organizing clandestine groups, inciting religious hatred, or promoting "" and "" ideologies. The regulation bans specific behaviors deemed extremist precursors to ETIM-style militancy, such as possessing unauthorized religious texts, enforcing veiling or , or rejecting modern education in favor of religious , with penalties ranging from to criminal prosecution. These measures underpin the creation of vocational education and training centers in , where authorities claim to have deradicalized over a million individuals exposed to ETIM , correlating the program with zero reported terrorist incidents in the region since 2017. maintains international pressure against ETIM, protesting the U.S. delisting of the group in November 2020 due to purported inactivity, arguing that its successor, the , continues operations in and with thousands of fighters. Despite criticisms from Western governments and organizations alleging overreach into cultural suppression, Chinese policy prioritizes empirical suppression of ETIM-linked threats, evidenced by pre-2017 attack data and foreign militant affiliations.

Achievements, Criticisms, and Legacy

Contributions to Anti-Communist Victories

The Afghan Mujahideen played a pivotal role in resisting the Soviet Union's invasion of , which began on December 27, 1979, when Soviet forces intervened to prop up the communist government in . Comprising diverse Islamist guerrilla groups, the fighters employed , ambushes, and against Soviet convoys and outposts, exploiting 's rugged to prolong the conflict and impose unsustainable attrition. This resistance inflicted approximately 15,000 Soviet military deaths over the decade-long occupation, alongside wounding or incapacitating tens of thousands more, eroding troop morale and domestic support within the USSR. Bolstered by , the CIA's covert program initiated under President and expanded under , the Mujahideen received an estimated $3-6 billion in U.S. military aid, including advanced weaponry funneled through Pakistan's ISI. The 1986 introduction of man-portable air-defense systems marked a turning point, enabling fighters to down over 100 Soviet aircraft and helicopters in the war's final years, compelling Soviet aviators to operate at higher altitudes and reducing their effectiveness. Combined with Saudi and Pakistani contributions, this external support transformed the insurgents from lightly armed locals into a force capable of denying Soviet control over rural areas, where up to 80% of the population resided. The cumulative strain of the war, costing the around 15 billion rubles by 1986 alone in direct military expenditures, exacerbated and political disillusionment, contributing significantly—though not solely—to the USSR's dissolution in 1991. Soviet forces withdrew on February 15, 1989, under the Accords, marking a rare retreat without battlefield conquest and emboldening anti-communist movements globally by demonstrating the vulnerability of Soviet expeditionary forces. While internal Soviet reforms under and broader systemic failures were primary drivers of collapse, the Afghan quagmire accelerated elite consensus against further interventions, as evidenced by heightened media scrutiny of casualties starting in 1983. This victory underscored the efficacy of against conventional armies in ideologically motivated insurgencies.

Atrocities, Internal Divisions, and Abuses

Following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 and the collapse of the Najibullah regime in April 1992, the mujahideen fractured into rival factions divided by , , and personal ambitions, precipitating a devastating civil war that lasted until the takeover in 1996. Principal groups included the Pashtun Islamist Hezb-e Islami under , the Tajik-dominated led by and , the Wahhabi-influenced Ittihad-e Islami of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the Shia Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat commanded by , and the Uzbek Junbish-i Milli of . These divisions, rooted in competition for power and resources rather than unified jihadist goals, turned former allies against each other, transforming and other cities into battlegrounds. Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, controlling positions south of , unleashed indiscriminate and barrages on the city from 1992 to 1996, destroying historic neighborhoods and targeting civilian districts such as Microraion and areas near . This shelling alone killed approximately 50,000 people, the vast majority civilians, and injured tens of thousands more, while displacing up to 500,000 residents by mid-1992. A particularly intense offensive in August 1992 resulted in 1,800 to 2,500 deaths within weeks, including strikes on hospitals that hit children's wards and operating theaters. Other factions perpetrated massacres, rapes, and abductions amid the chaos. In the February 1993 Afshar campaign in west , and Ittihad-e Islami forces under Massoud and Sayyaf conducted house-to-house killings of Hazara civilians, summary executions of Hezb-e Wahdat prisoners, and widespread looting of over 5,000 homes, with reports of mutilated bodies including decapitations and severed limbs. Ittihad commanders admitted to personally executing dozens, such as Shir Aqa's acknowledged killings of 40-50 individuals. Hezb-e Wahdat reciprocated with mass rapes and killings of and , while Ittihad forces gang-raped Hazara women in shelters as a tool of ethnic . Junbish-i Milli troops committed multiple rapes in Kabul's Shah Shahid district in 1993. Human rights abuses extended to systematic , forced labor, and ethnic targeting, fueling sectarian cycles of revenge. Factions like Hezb-e Wahdat executed at least 3,000 prisoners in Mazar-i Sharif in May 1997 after an ambush, while Jamiat forces summarily killed political rivals at Lejdeh Prison. Abductions numbered in the thousands, with many victims tortured or disappeared, particularly by Ittihad and by Wahdat. These acts, often unpunished due to commanders' , entrenched divisions and eroded any moral authority claimed from the anti-Soviet struggle.

Geopolitical Impact and Debates on Freedom Fighters vs. Terrorists

The mujahideen imposed severe costs on the , contributing to its military withdrawal from on February 15, 1989, after a decade-long occupation that resulted in approximately 15,000 Soviet fatalities and economic expenditures exceeding $50 billion. This quagmire exacerbated internal Soviet economic stagnation and political disillusionment, accelerating reforms under and playing a catalytic role in the USSR's collapse in December 1991. United States assistance via , initiated in 1979 and escalating under President Reagan to provide $630 million annually by 1987, equipped mujahideen with anti-aircraft missiles and other arms, disrupting Soviet aerial dominance and prolonging resistance. The program's success demonstrated the efficacy of proxy warfare in asymmetric conflicts, influencing subsequent U.S. strategies but also fostering networks later exploited by Islamist extremists. Post-Soviet withdrawal, mujahideen factionalism triggered a from 1989 to 1996, enabling the Taliban's ascent—many of whose leaders were former mujahideen—and al-Qaeda's entrenchment, as , a mujahideen financier and fighter, established training camps that facilitated the 9/11 attacks. The mujahideen evoked polarized designations, initially hailed as "freedom fighters" by Western policymakers for countering Soviet expansionism; President Reagan hosted their leaders in the in 1983 and proclaimed their struggle akin to America's founding revolution in a 1982 Afghanistan Day address. This framing aligned with the Reagan Doctrine's support for anti-communist insurgents globally. Post-9/11, scrutiny intensified on radical mujahideen offshoots, with groups like designated as terrorist organizations by the U.S. State Department in 2017 for attacks on civilians and infrastructure. Successor entities such as the and , emergent from mujahideen ranks, faced universal terrorist listings under UN and national frameworks, underscoring debates over whether the mujahideen's anti-Soviet inherently bred global or if Western aid and abandonment post-1989 amplified jihadist ideologies. Analysts note that while nationalist mujahideen factions sought Afghan sovereignty, Salafist-jihadist elements pursued transnational ambitions, blurring lines between liberation and terror in geopolitical assessments.

References

  1. https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/mujahid
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