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Enlargement of NATO
Enlargement of NATO
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An animation showing the year and location of counties as they joined the alliance
Chronology of membership of the European portion of NATO

NATO is a military alliance of thirty-two European and North American countries that constitutes a system of collective defense. The process of joining the alliance is governed by Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which allows for the invitation of "other European States" only and by subsequent agreements. Countries wishing to join must meet certain requirements and complete a multi-step process involving political dialogue and military integration. The accession process is overseen by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's governing body. NATO was formed in 1949 with twelve founding members and has added new members ten times. The first additions were Greece and Turkey in 1952. In May 1955, West Germany joined NATO, which was one of the conditions agreed to as part of the end of the country's occupation by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, prompting the Soviet Union to form its own collective security alliance (commonly called the Warsaw Pact) later that month. Following the end of the Franco regime, newly democratic Spain chose to join NATO in 1982.

In 1990, negotiators reached an agreement that a reunified Germany would be in NATO under West Germany's existing membership. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, many former Warsaw Pact and post-Soviet states sought to join NATO. Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became members in 1999, amid much debate within NATO itself. NATO then formalized the process of joining the organization with "Membership Action Plans", which aided the accession of seven Central and Eastern Europe countries shortly before the 2004 Istanbul summit: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Two countries on the Adriatic SeaAlbania and Croatia—joined on 1 April 2009 before the 2009 Strasbourg–Kehl summit. The next member states to join NATO were Montenegro in June 2017, and North Macedonia in March 2020.

Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 after Russian president Vladimir Putin made false claims that NATO military infrastructure was being built up inside Ukraine and that Ukraine's potential membership was a threat. Russia's invasion prompted Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership in May 2022.[1] Finland joined in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024.[2][3][4] Ukraine applied for membership in September 2022 after Russia illegally annexed the country's southeast.[1] Two other states have informed NATO of their membership aspirations: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Georgia.[5] Kosovo also aspires to join.[6] Joining the alliance is a debated topic in several other European countries outside the alliance, including Armenia, Austria, Cyprus, Ireland, Malta, Moldova, and Serbia.[7][8]

Past enlargements

[edit]

Cold War

[edit]
Four men stand behind podiums with their country names of France, Germany, United Kingdom, and United States, in front of a backdrop of the Eiffel Tower.
Negotiations in London and Paris in 1954 ended the allied occupation of West Germany and allowed for its rearmament as a NATO member.

Twelve countries were part of NATO at the time of its founding: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The start of the Cold War between 1947 and 1953 saw an ideological and economic divide between the capitalist states of Western Europe backed by United States with its Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, and the communist states of Eastern Europe, backed by the Soviet Union. As such, opposition to Soviet-style communism became a defining characteristic of the organization and the anti-communist governments of Greece, which had just fought a civil war against a pro-communist army, and Turkey, whose newly-elected Democrat Party were staunchly pro-American, came under internal and external pressure to join the alliance, which both did in February 1952.[9][10]

The US, France, and the UK initially agreed to end its occupation of Germany in May 1952 under the Bonn–Paris conventions on the condition that the new Federal Republic of Germany, commonly called West Germany, would join NATO, because of concerns about allowing a non-aligned West Germany to rearm. The allies also dismissed Soviet proposals of a neutral-but-united Germany as insincere.[11] France, however, delayed the start of the process, in part on the condition that a referendum be held in Saar on its future status, and a revised treaty was signed on 23 October 1954, allowing the North Atlantic Council to formally invite West Germany. Ratification of its membership was completed in May 1955.[12] That month the Soviet Union established its own collective defense alliance, commonly called the Warsaw Pact, in part as a response to West German membership in NATO.[13] In 1966, French president Charles de Gaulle announced the withdrawal of French forces from the integrated military structure of the NATO and ordered the removal of all foreign NATO forces from French territory.[14] In 1974, Greece suspended its NATO membership over the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but rejoined in 1980 with Turkey's cooperation.[15]

Relations between NATO members and Spain under dictator Francisco Franco were strained for many years, in large part because Franco had cooperated with the Axis powers during World War II.[16] Though staunchly anti-communist, Franco reportedly feared in 1955 that a Spanish application for NATO membership might be vetoed by its members at the time.[17] Franco however did sign regular defense agreements with individual members, including the 1953 Pact of Madrid with the United States, which allowed their use of air and naval bases in Spain.[18][19] Following Franco's death in 1975, Spain began a transition to democracy, and came under international pressure to normalize relations with other western democracies. Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez, first elected in 1976, proceeded carefully on relations with NATO because of divisions in his coalition over the US's use of Spanish bases. In February 1981, following a failed coup attempt, Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo became Prime Minister and campaigned strongly for NATO membership, in part to improve civilian control over the military, and Spain's NATO membership was approved in May 1982.[19][20] A Spanish referendum in 1986 confirmed popular support for remaining in NATO.[21]

During the mid-1980s the strength and cohesion of the Warsaw Pact, which had served as the main institution rivaling NATO, began to deteriorate. By 1989 the Soviet Union was unable to stem the democratic and nationalist movements which were rapidly gaining ground. Poland held multiparty elections in June 1989 that ousted the Soviet allied Polish Workers' Party and the peaceful opening of the Berlin Wall that November symbolized the end of the Warsaw Pact as a way of enforcing Soviet control. The fall of the Berlin Wall is recognized to be the end of the Cold War and ushered in a new period for Europe and NATO enlargement.[22]

German reunification

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Eight men in suits stand in a hall facing forward.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher and other negotiators during the first round of talks for the Two Plus Four Treaty

Negotiations to reunite East and West Germany took place throughout 1990, resulting in the signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty in September 1990 and East Germany officially joining the Federal Republic of Germany on 3 October 1990. To secure Soviet approval of a united Germany remaining in NATO, the treaty prohibited foreign troops and nuclear weapons from being stationed in the former East Germany,[23] though an addendum signed by all parties specified that foreign NATO troops could be deployed east of the Cold War line after the Soviet departure at the discretion of the government of a united Germany, permitting NATO's enlargement to the east.[24][25] There is no mention of any other country joining NATO in the September–October 1990 agreements on German reunification.[26] Whether or not representatives from NATO member states informally committed to not enlarge NATO into other parts of Eastern Europe during these and contemporary negotiations with Soviet counterparts has long been a matter of dispute among historians and international relations scholars.[27][28]

With several countries threatening to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet military relinquished control of the organization in March 1991, allowing it to be formally dissolved that July.[29][30] The so-called "parade of sovereignties" declared by republics in the Baltic and Caucasus regions of the Soviet Union and their War of Laws with the government in Moscow further fractured its cohesion. Following the failure of the New Union Treaty, the leadership of the remaining constituent republics of the Soviet Union, starting with Ukraine in August 1991, declared their independence and initiated the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which was completed in December of that year. Russia, led by President Boris Yeltsin, became the most prominent of the independent states.[31] The Westernization trend of many former Soviet allied states led them to privatize their economies and formalize their relationships with NATO countries, the first step for many towards European integration and possible NATO membership.[32][33]

During one of James Baker's 1990 talks with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Baker did suggest that the German reunification negotiations could have resulted in an agreement whereby "there would be no extension of NATO's jurisdiction for forces of NATO one inch to the east,"[34] and historians like Mark Kramer have interpreted it as applying, at least in certain Soviet representatives' understanding, to all of Eastern Europe.[35][36][28] Gorbachev later stated that NATO enlargement was "not discussed at all" in 1990,[37] but, like Yeltsin, described the expansion of NATO past East Germany as "a violation of the spirit of the statements and assurances made to us in 1990."[26][38][39]

This view, that informal assurances were given by diplomats from NATO members to the Soviet Union in 1990, is common in countries like Russia,[28][23] and, according to political scientist Marc Trachtenberg, available evidence suggests that allegations made since by Russian leadership about the existence of such assurances "were by no means baseless."[27][40] Yeltsin was succeeded in 2000 by Vladimir Putin, who further promoted the idea that guarantees about enlargement were made in 1990, including during a 2007 speech in Munich.[41][39] This impression was later used by him as part of his justification for Russia's 2014 actions in Ukraine and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.[42][26]

Visegrád Group

[edit]
Three men in dark suits sit at a table covered in a red tablecloth signing documents, around them stand others in dark suits.
Václav Havel, József Antall, and Lech Wałęsa signed the treaty establishing the Visegrád Group in February 1991.

In February 1991, Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia formed the Visegrád Group to push for European integration under the European Union and NATO, as well as to conduct military reforms in line with NATO standards. Internal NATO reaction to these former Warsaw Pact countries was initially negative, but by the 1991 Rome summit in November, members agreed to a series of goals that could lead to accession, such as market and democratic liberalization, and that NATO should be a partner in these efforts. Debate within the American government as to whether enlargement of NATO was feasible or desirable began during the George H.W. Bush administration.[43] By mid-1992, a consensus emerged within the administration that NATO enlargement was a wise realpolitik measure to strengthen Euro-American hegemony.[43][44] In the absence of NATO enlargement, Bush administration officials worried that the European Union might fill the security vacuum in Central Europe, and thus challenge American post-Cold War influence.[43] There was further debate during the presidency of Bill Clinton between a rapid offer of full membership to several select countries versus a slower, more limited membership to a wide range of states over a longer time span. Victory by the Republican Party, which advocated for aggressive expansion, in the 1994 US congressional election helped sway US policy in favor of wider full-membership enlargement, which the US ultimately pursued in the following years.[45] In 1996, Clinton called for former Warsaw Pact countries and post-Soviet republics to join NATO, and made NATO enlargement a part of his foreign policy.[46]

An older white male in a dark suit speaks at a wide wooden podium.
In December 1997, Russian President Boris Yeltsin described the eastern enlargement of NATO as a threat to Russia.

By August 1993, Polish President Lech Wałęsa was actively campaigning for his country to join NATO, at which time Yeltsin reportedly told him that Russia did not perceive Poland's membership as a threat. Yeltsin however retracted this the following month,[47] writing that enlargement "would violate the spirit of the treaty on the final settlement", which "precludes the option of expanding the NATO zone into the East."[48][38] In 1996, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev indicated his country's opposition to NATO enlargement.[49] Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act in May 1997, which affirms that "NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries". The agreement states that "NATO has expanded and will continue to expand its political functions", and it refers to "new members".[50] Though Yeltsin called NATO enlargement a mistake, he said "the negative consequences of NATO's enlargement will be reduced to the minimum through the NATO–Russia deal". Russia's December 1997 National Security Blueprint described NATO enlargement eastwards as "unacceptable" and a threat to Russian security.[51] Russian military actions, including the First Chechen War, were among the factors driving Central and Eastern European countries, particularly those with memories of similar Soviet offensives, to push for NATO application and ensure their long-term security.[52][53] Political parties reluctant to move on NATO membership were voted out of office, including the Bulgarian Socialist Party in 1997 and Slovak HZDS in 1998.[54] Hungary's interest in joining was confirmed by a November 1997 referendum that returned 85.3% in favor of membership.[55] During this period, wider forums for regional cooperation between NATO and its eastern neighbors were set up, including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (later the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council) and the Partnership for Peace.[56]

While the other Visegrád members were invited to join NATO at its 1997 Madrid summit, Slovakia was excluded based on what several members considered undemocratic actions by nationalist Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar.[57] Romania and Slovenia were both considered for invitation in 1997, and each had the backing of a prominent NATO member, France and Italy respectively, but support for this enlargement was not unanimous between members, nor within individual governments, including in the US Congress.[58] In an open letter to US President Clinton, more than forty foreign policy experts including Bill Bradley, Sam Nunn, Gary Hart, Paul Nitze, and Robert McNamara expressed their concerns about NATO enlargement as both expensive and unnecessary given the lack of a threat from Russia at that time.[59] Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic officially joined NATO in March 1999.[60]

Vilnius Group

[edit]
US President George W. Bush at the NATO Accession Ceremony for Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia

At the 1999 Washington summit NATO issued new guidelines for membership with individualized "Membership Action Plans" for Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, North Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia in order to standardize the process for new members.[61] In May 2000, these countries joined with Croatia to form the Vilnius Group in order to cooperate and lobby for common NATO membership, and by the 2002 Prague summit seven were invited for membership, which took place at the 2004 Istanbul summit.[62] Slovenia had held a referendum on NATO the previous year, with 66% approving of membership.[63]

Russia was particularly upset with the addition of the three Baltic states, the first countries that were part of the Soviet Union to join NATO.[64][62] Russian troops had been stationed in Baltic states as late as 1995,[65] but the goals of European integration and NATO membership were very attractive for the Baltic states.[66] Rapid investments in their own armed forces showed a seriousness in their desire for membership, and participation in NATO-led post-9/11 operations, particularly by Estonia in Afghanistan, won the three countries key support from individuals like US Senator John McCain, French President Jacques Chirac, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder.[65] A 2006 study in the journal Security Studies argued that the NATO enlargements in 1999 and 2004 contributed to democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.[67]

Adriatic Charter

[edit]

Croatia also started a Membership Action Plan at the 2002 summit, but was not included in the 2004 enlargement. In May 2003, it joined with Albania and Macedonia to form the Adriatic Charter to support each other in their pursuit of membership.[68] Croatia's prospect of membership sparked a national debate on whether a referendum on NATO membership needed to be held before joining the organization. Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader ultimately agreed in January 2008, as part of forming a coalition government with the HSS and HSLS parties, not to officially propose one.[69] Albania and Croatia were invited to join NATO at the 2008 Bucharest summit that April, though Slovenia threatened to hold up Croatian membership over their border dispute in the Bay of Piran.[70] Slovenia did ratify Croatia's accession protocol in February 2009,[71] before Croatia and Albania both officially joined NATO just before the 2009 Strasbourg–Kehl summit, with little opposition from Russia.[72]

Montenegro declared independence on 3 June 2006; the new country subsequently joined the Partnership for Peace program at the 2006 Riga summit and then applied for a Membership Action Plan on 5 November 2008,[73] which was granted in December 2009.[74] Montenegro also began full membership with the Adriatic Charter of NATO aspirants in May 2009.[75][76] NATO formally invited Montenegro to join the alliance on 2 December 2015,[77] with negotiations concluding in May 2016;[78] Montenegro joined NATO on 5 June 2017.[79]

Two adult white men in dark suits signing documents on an outdoor table in front of two other men similarly dressed and two flags.
Prime Minister Zoran Zaev supported the 2018 Prespa Agreement, which allowed North Macedonia to complete accession to NATO.

Macedonia joined the Partnership for Peace in 1995, and commenced its Membership Action Plan in 1999, at the same time as Albania. At the 2008 Bucharest summit, Greece blocked a proposed invitation because it believed that the official name it was using at the time, "Republic of Macedonia," implied territorial aspirations toward its own region of Greek Macedonia. NATO nations agreed that the country would receive an invitation upon resolution of the Macedonia naming dispute.[80] Macedonia sued Greece at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over Greece's veto of Macedonia's NATO membership. Macedonia was part of the Vilnius Group, and had formed the Adriatic Charter with Croatia and Albania in 2003 to better coordinate NATO accession.[81]

In June 2017, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev signaled he would consider alternative names for the country in order to strike a compromise with Greece, settle the naming dispute and lift Greek objections to Macedonia joining the alliance. The naming dispute was resolved with the Prespa Agreement in June 2018 under which the country adopted the name North Macedonia, which was supported by a referendum in September 2018. NATO invited North Macedonia to begin membership talks on 11 July 2018;[82] formal accession talks began on 18 October 2018.[83] NATO's members signed North Macedonia's accession protocol on 6 February 2019.[84] Most countries ratified the accession treaty in 2019, with Spain ratifying its accession protocol in March 2020.[85] The Sobranie also ratified the treaty unanimously on 11 February 2020,[86] before North Macedonia became a NATO member state on 27 March 2020.[87][88]

Finland and Sweden

[edit]
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin in Helsinki, 25 October 2021
Two women in dark blue coats stand behind a podium looking to the left.
Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson held talks in March 2022 with her Finnish counterpart Sanna Marin about potential NATO memberships for both countries.

In 1949, Sweden chose not to join NATO and declared a security policy aiming for non-alignment in peace and neutrality in war.[89] This position was maintained without much discussion during the Cold War. During this time, Finland's relationship with NATO and the Soviet Union followed the Paasikivi–Kekkonen doctrine, whereby the country joined neither the Western nor Eastern blocs. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, both countries joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994 and provided peacekeeping forces to various NATO missions, including Kosovo (KFOR) and Afghanistan (ISAF) in the early 2000s.[90][91][92][93]

Russia's annexation of Crimea from Ukraine in 2014 and subsequent full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 led both countries to revisit their security and defence policies. Opinion polls in both countries shortly after the 2022 invasion for the first time showed clear majorities supported joining NATO.[94][95][96][97] The major political parties in both also re-evaluated their positions on NATO membership, with many moving to either support membership or drop long-standing opposition. On 15 May 2022, Finland's Prime Minister Marin and President Niinistö together announced that Finland would apply for NATO membership,[98] while Swedish Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson announced that Sweden would do the same the following day.[99] Formal applications for membership were jointly submitted by both countries on 18 May 2022.[100]

Turkey, however, opposed the start of accession negotiations for Finland and Sweden over multiple issues, most notably their claim that Finland and Sweden supported the Kurdish groups like the PKK, PYD, and YPG, which Turkey views as terrorists,[101] and the followers of Fethullah Gülen, whom Turkey accused of orchestrating the unsuccessful 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt.[102][103] Accession negotiations only began following the signing of a tripartite memorandum between Finland, Sweden, and Turkey during the NATO summit in Madrid in June 2022.[104][105] That memorandum allowed for formal invitations and for the ratification process to begin the following month,[106] and by that October, only Hungary and Turkey had not approved the pair's applications.

Negotiations between the countries continued, and in February 2023, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced that he now had a positive view of Finland's membership, but still a negative view of Sweden's.[107] After the Hungarian and Turkish parliaments both approved Finland's application in March, Finland became a member of the alliance on 4 April 2023, the 74th anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty being signed.[108] Turkey and Sweden finally came to an understanding in early 2024, allowing Sweden to become the 32nd member of the alliance on 7 March 2024.[109]

According to the Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu, Finland's accession to NATO significantly increased the risk of a wider conflict in Europe. The move doubled the length of the border that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shares with Russia.[110][111] Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, has consistently dismissed Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO,[112] stating it poses "no threat to Russia".[113]

Summary table and map

[edit]
Date Round Country A map of Europe with twelve colors that refer to the year different countries joined the alliance.
18 February 1952
First
Greece
Turkey
9 May 1955
Second
West Germany
30 May 1982
Third
Spain
3 October 1990
German reunification
12 March 1999
Fourth
Czech Republic
Hungary
Poland
29 March 2004
Fifth
Bulgaria
Estonia
Latvia
Lithuania
Romania
Slovakia
Slovenia
1 April 2009
Sixth
Albania
Croatia
5 June 2017
Seventh
Montenegro
27 March 2020
Eighth
North Macedonia
4 April 2023
Ninth
Finland
7 March 2024
Tenth
Sweden

Criteria and process

[edit]

Article 10 and the Open Door Policy

[edit]

The North Atlantic Treaty is the basis of the organization, and, as such, any changes including new membership requires ratification by all current signers of the treaty. The treaty's Article 10 describes how non-member states may join NATO:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.[114]

Article 10 poses two general limits to non-member states. First, only European states are eligible for new membership, and second, these states not only need the approval of all the existing member states, but every member state can put some criteria forward that have to be attained. In practice, NATO formulates a common set of criteria. However, for instance, Greece blocked the Republic of Macedonia's accession to NATO for many years because it disagreed with the use of the name Macedonia. Turkey similarly opposes the participation of the Republic of Cyprus with NATO institutions as long as the Cyprus dispute is not resolved.[115]

Since the 1991 Rome summit, when the delegations of its member states officially offered cooperation with Europe's newly democratic states, NATO has addressed and further defined the expectations and procedure for adding new members. The 1994 Brussels Declaration reaffirmed the principles in Article 10 and led to the "Study on NATO Enlargement". Published in September 1995, the study outlined the "how and why" of possible enlargement in Europe,[116] highlighting three principles from the 1949 treaty for members to have: "democracy, individual liberty, and rule of law".[117]

As NATO Secretary General Willy Claes noted, the 1995 study did not specify the "who or when,"[118] though it discussed how the then newly formed Partnership for Peace and North Atlantic Cooperation Council could assist in the enlargement process,[119] and noted that on-going territorial disputes could be an issue for whether a country was invited.[120] At the 1997 Madrid summit, the heads of state of NATO issued the "Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation" which invited three Central European countries to join the alliance, out of the twelve that had at that point requested to join, laying out a path for others to follow.[116] The text of Article 10 was the origin for the April 1999 statement of a "NATO open door policy".[121]

In practice, diplomats and officials have stated that having no territorial disputes is a prerequisite to joining NATO, as a member with such a dispute would be automatically considered under attack by the occupying entity. However, West Germany joined NATO in 1955 despite having territorial disputes with East Germany and other states until the early 1970s.[122][123]

Membership Action Plan

[edit]

The biggest step in the formalization of the process for inviting new members came at the 1999 Washington summit when the Membership Action Plan (MAP) mechanism was approved as a stage for the current members to regularly review the formal applications of aspiring members. A country's participation in MAP entails the annual presentation of reports concerning its progress on five different measures:[124]

  • Willingness to settle international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means, commitment to the rule of law and human rights, and democratic control of armed forces
  • Ability to contribute to the organization's defense and missions
  • Devotion of sufficient resources to armed forces to be able to meet the commitments of membership
  • Security of sensitive information, and safeguards ensuring it
  • Compatibility of domestic legislation with NATO cooperation

NATO provides feedback as well as technical advice to each country and evaluates its progress on an individual basis.[125] Once members agree that a country meets the requirements, NATO can issue that country an invitation to begin accession talks.[126] The final accession process, once invited, involves five steps leading up to the signing of the accession protocols and the acceptance and ratification of those protocols by the governments of the current NATO members.[127]

In November 2002, NATO invited seven countries to join it via the MAP: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.[128] All seven invitees joined in March 2004, which was observed at a flag-raising ceremony on 2 April. After that date, NATO numbered 26 allies.[129] Other former MAP participants were Albania and Croatia between May 2002 and April 2009, Montenegro between December 2009 and June 2017, and North Macedonia between April 1999 and March 2020, when it joined NATO. As of 2025, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country participating in a MAP.[130]

Intensified dialogue

[edit]

Intensified Dialogue was first introduced in April 2005 at an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Vilnius, Lithuania, as a response to Ukrainian aspirations for NATO membership and related reforms taking place under President Viktor Yushchenko, and which followed the November 22, 2002, signing of the NATO–Ukraine Action Plan under his predecessor, Leonid Kuchma.[125] This formula, which includes discussion of a "full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership ... had its roots in the 1997 Madrid summit", where the participants had agreed "to continue the Alliance's intensified dialogs with those nations that aspire to NATO membership or that otherwise wish to pursue a dialog with NATO on membership questions".[131]

In September 2006, Georgia became the second to be offered the Intensified Dialogue status, following a rapid change in foreign policy under President Mikhail Saakashvili[132] and what it perceived as a demonstration of military readiness during the 2006 Kodori crisis.[133] Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia similarly received offers at the April 2008 Bucharest summit.[134] While its neighbors both requested and accepted the dialog program, Serbia's offer was presented to guarantee the possibility of future ties with the alliance.[135]

Aspiring members

[edit]
Map of Europe with countries in six different colors based on their affiliation with NATO

As of January 2025, three states have formally expressed their desire to join NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina is the only country with a Membership Action Plan, which together with Georgia, were named NATO "aspirant countries" at the North Atlantic Council meeting on 7 December 2011.[136] During the 2008 NATO summit held in Bucharest and against the urging of United States President George W. Bush, Georgia's and Ukraine's accessions into NATO were blocked by Nicolas Sarkozy-led France, and by Angela Merkel-led Germany, which based its decision upon Germany maintaining its dependence upon hydrocarbons from Vladimir Putin-led Russia.[137][138][139][140][141] Ukraine was recognized as an aspirant country after the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, and formally applied for membership in 2022 following its invasion by Russia.

NATO aspirant countries[142]
Country[5] Partnership for Peace[143] Individualized Action Plan[144] Intensified Dialogue Membership Action Plan[145] Application Accession protocol
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina[146] 2006–12 December 2006 2008-01IPAP September 2008 2008-04 April 2008[147] 2010-04 December 2018[148][Note 2]
Georgia (country) Georgia[150] 1994-03 March 1994 2004–10IPAP October 2004 2006–09 September 2006[151]
Ukraine Ukraine 1994-02 February 1994 2002–11 Action Plan November 2002[Note 3] 2005-04 April 2005[153] [Note 4] 30 September 2022[155]
  1. ^ Membership Action Plan and Individual Partnership Action Plan countries are also Partnership for Peace members. States acceding to NATO replace Partnership for Peace membership with formal entry into the Alliance.
  2. ^ Originally invited to join the MAP in April 2010 under the condition that no Annual National Programme would be launched until one of the conditions for the OHR closure – the transfer of control of immovable defence property to the central Bosnian authorities from the two regional political entities – was fulfilled.[149] Condition waived in 2018.
  3. ^ NATO–Ukraine Action Plan adopted on 22 November 2002. This is not considered by NATO to be an IPAP.[152]
  4. ^ NATO agreed that a MAP would not be required.[154]

Bosnia and Herzegovina

[edit]
A woman in a dark suit speaks behind a wooden lectern, while three men in military uniforms, and one woman, stand to her sides.
Marina Pendeš, Minister of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, speaking at NATO's headquarters in Sarajevo in 2018

The 1995 NATO bombing of Bosnia and Herzegovina targeted the Bosnian Serb Army and together with international pressure led to the resolution of the Bosnian War and the signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995. Since then, NATO has led the Implementation Force and Stabilization Force, and other peacekeeping efforts in the country. Bosnia and Herzegovina joined the Partnership for Peace in 2006, and signed an agreement on security cooperation in March 2007.[156] Bosnia and Herzegovina began further cooperation with NATO within its Individual Partnership Action Plan in January 2008.[146] The country then started the process of Intensified Dialogue at the 2008 Bucharest summit.[147] The country was invited to join the Adriatic Charter of NATO aspirants in September 2008.[157]

The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina within Bosnia and Herzegovina has expressed willingness to join NATO, however, it faces consistent political pressure from Republika Srpska, the other political entity in the country, alongside its partners in Russia. On 2 October 2009, Haris Silajdžić, the Bosniak Member of the Presidency, announced official application for Membership Action Plan. On 22 April 2010, NATO agreed to launch the Membership Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with certain conditions attached.[149] Turkey is thought to be the biggest supporter of Bosnian membership, and heavily influenced the decision.[158]

The conditions of the MAP, however, stipulated that no Annual National Programme[clarification needed] could be launched until 63 military facilities are transferred from Bosnia's political divisions to the central government, which is one of the conditions for the OHR closure.[159][160] The leadership of the Republika Srpska has opposed this transfer as a loss of autonomy.[161] All movable property, including all weapons and other army equipment, is fully registered as the property of the country starting 1 January 2006.[162] A ruling of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 August 2017 decided that a disputed military facility in Han Pijesak is to be registered as property of Bosnia and Herzegovina.[163] Despite the fact that all immovable property is not fully registered, NATO approved the activation of the Membership Action Plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and called on Bosnia to submit an Annual National Programme on 5 December 2018.[148]

A February 2017 poll showed that 59% of the country supports NATO membership, but results were very divided depending on ethnic groups. While 84% of those who identified as Bosniak or Croat supported NATO membership, only 9% of those who identified as Serb did.[164] Bosnian chances of joining NATO may depend on Serbia's attitude towards the alliance, since the leadership of Republika Srpska might be reluctant to go against Serbian interests.[165] In October 2017, the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska passed a nonbinding resolution opposing NATO membership for Bosnia and Herzegovina.[166] On 2 March 2022, Vjosa Osmani, the President of Kosovo, called on NATO to speed up the membership process for Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Osmani also criticized Aleksandar Vučić, the President of Serbia, accusing him of using Milorad Dodik to "destroy the unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina".[167]

Georgia

[edit]
Representatives of NATO Allied Land Command and the Georgian Defense Forces after signing a letter of co-operation, 2019

Georgia moved quickly following the Rose Revolution in 2003 to seek closer ties with NATO[168] (although the previous administration had also indicated that it desired NATO membership a year before the revolution took place[169]). Georgia's northern neighbor, Russia, opposed the closer ties, including those expressed at the 2008 Bucharest summit, where NATO members promised that Georgia would eventually join the organization.[170] Complications in the relationship between NATO and Georgia includes the presence of Russian military forces in internationally recognized Georgian territory as a result of multiple recent conflicts, like the 2008 Russo-Georgian War over the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which are home to a large number of citizens of Russia. On 3 December 2008, NATO's 26 foreign ministers voted to reject a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia, arguing that it would antagonize Russia and that Georgia needed to enact more reforms.[171] On 21 November 2011, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev while addressing soldiers in Vladikavkaz near the Georgian border stated that Russia's 2008 invasion had prevented any further NATO enlargement into the former Soviet sphere.[170]

A nonbinding referendum in 2008 resulted in 77 percent of voters supporting NATO accession.[172] In May 2013, Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili stated that his goal was to get a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for his country from NATO in 2014.[173] In June 2014, diplomats from NATO suggested that while a MAP was unlikely, a package of "reinforced cooperation" agreements was a possible compromise.[174] Anders Fogh Rasmussen confirmed that this could include the building of military capabilities and armed forces training.[175]

In September 2019, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that "NATO approaching our borders is a threat to Russia."[176] He was quoted as saying that if NATO accepts Georgian membership with the article on collective defense covering only Tbilisi-administered territory (i.e., excluding the Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which are currently an unrecognized breakaway republics supported by Russia), "we will not start a war, but such conduct will undermine our relations with NATO and with countries who are eager to enter the alliance."[177]

On 29 September 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called on Georgia to use every opportunity to move closer to the Alliance and speed up preparations for membership. Stoltenberg stressed that earlier that year, the Allies agreed to further strengthen the NATO-Georgia partnership, and that NATO welcomed the progress made by Georgia in carrying out reforms, modernizing its armed forces and strengthening democracy.[178] Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, who took office in 2018, has conceded that NATO membership might not be possible while Russia occupies Georgian territory, and has sought to focus on European Union membership,[179] for which Georgia submitted its application in May 2022.[180]

Ukraine

[edit]
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg with Ukrainian president Petro Poroshenko, July 2017

Ukraine's relationship with NATO has been politically divisive, and is part of a larger debate over Ukraine's ties to both the European Union and Russia. Ukraine established ties to the alliance with a NATO–Ukraine Action Plan in November 2002,[152][181] joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in February 2005,[182] then entered into the Intensified Dialogue program with NATO in April 2005.[183]

The position of Russian leaders on Ukraine-NATO relations has changed over time. In 2002, Russia's president Vladimir Putin declared no objections to Ukraine's growing relations with the Alliance, saying it was a matter for Ukraine and NATO.[184] In 2005, Putin said that if Ukraine joined NATO, "we will respect their choice, because it is their sovereign right to decide their own defence policy, and this will not worsen relations between our countries".[185] Ahead of the 2008 Bucharest summit, Ukraine applied for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), the first step in joining NATO. At the summit, Putin called Ukrainian membership "a direct threat". NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer declared that Ukraine would someday join, but would not yet be offered a Membership Action Plan.[186][187]

When Viktor Yanukovych became Ukraine's president in 2010, he said that Ukraine would remain a "European, non-aligned state",[188][189] and remain a member of NATO's outreach program.[190] In June 2010 the Ukrainian parliament voted to drop the goal of NATO membership, in a bill drafted by Yanukovych.[191] This affirmed Ukraine's neutral status and forbade its membership in any military bloc, but allowed for co-operation.[192]

Unmarked Russian troops during the Russian annexation of Crimea. Russian attacks on Ukraine in 2014 caused Ukraine to renew its bid for NATO membership.

In the February 2014 Ukrainian Revolution, Ukraine's parliament voted to remove Yanukovych. Soon after, while Ukraine was still a neutral country,[193][194] Russia occupied and annexed Crimea. The following month, new Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk said Ukraine was not seeking NATO membership.[195] In August 2014, the Russian military invaded eastern Ukraine to support its separatist proxies. Because of this,[196] Yatsenyuk announced the resumption of the NATO membership bid,[197] and in December 2014, Ukraine's parliament voted to drop non-aligned status.[198] NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said membership was still an option.[199] Support for membership rose to 64 percent in government-held Ukraine according to a July 2015 poll,[200] and polls showed that the rise in support for NATO was linked to Russia's ongoing military intervention.[201]

In 2017, as Russian-backed forces continued to occupy parts of the country, Ukraine's parliament voted to make NATO integration a foreign policy priority,[202] and President Petro Poroshenko announced he would negotiate a Membership Action Plan.[203] Ukraine was acknowledged as an aspiring member by March 2018.[204] In September 2018, Ukraine's parliament voted to include the goal of NATO membership in the constitution.[205]

During 2021, there were massive Russian military build-ups near Ukraine's borders. In April 2021, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said that NATO membership is the only way to end Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine.[206] Russia sent an ultimatum to NATO, demanding that Ukraine and other former Soviet states be barred from ever joining.[207] Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg replied that this was a matter between Ukraine and NATO, adding that "Russia has no right to establish a sphere of influence to try to control their neighbors".[208]

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Kyiv, 3 October 2024

Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022. In his speech announcing the invasion, Putin falsely claimed that NATO military infrastructure was being built up inside Ukraine, threatening Russia.[209] Russia's invasion drove Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership. Putin said their membership wasn't a problem for Russia, but Ukraine's membership is a "completely different thing" because of "territorial disputes".[210] Peter Dickinson of the Atlantic Council wrote that Putin's "dislike of NATO enlargement is real enough, but it has nothing to do with legitimate national security concerns. Instead, Putin objects to NATO because it prevents him from bullying Russia's neighbours".[112]

Since the invasion, calls for Ukrainian NATO membership have grown.[211] On 30 September 2022, Ukraine submitted an application for NATO membership, after Russia proclaimed it had annexed the southeast.[155] According to Politico, NATO members are reluctant to discuss Ukraine's entry because of Putin's "hypersensitivity" on the issue.[212] At the 2023 Vilnius NATO summit it was decided that Ukraine would no longer be required to participate in a Membership Action Plan before joining the alliance.[154]

Membership debates

[edit]

The Soviet Union was the primary ideological adversary for NATO during the Cold War. Following its dissolution, several states which had maintained neutrality during the Cold War or were post-Soviet states increased their ties with Western institutions; a number of them requested to join NATO. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine reignited debate surrounding NATO membership in several countries.

Austria, Ireland, Switzerland, and Malta have maintained their Cold War–era neutrality. All are now members of the Partnership for Peace, and all except Switzerland are now members of the European Union.[213] The defence ministry of Switzerland, which has a long-standing policy of neutrality, initiated a report in May 2022 analyzing various military options, including increased cooperation and joint military exercises with NATO. That month, a poll indicated 33% of Swiss supported NATO membership for Switzerland, and 56% supported increased ties with NATO.[214] Cyprus is also a member state of the European Union, but it is the only one that is neither a full member state nor participates in the Partnership for Peace. Any treaty concerning Cyprus' participation in NATO would likely be blocked by Turkey because of the Cyprus dispute.[215]

Russia, Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are all members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a post-Soviet alternative military alliance. Azerbaijan was a member of the CSTO but has committed to a policy of neutrality since 1999.[216] In 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin floated the idea of Russia potentially joining NATO.[217] However these prospects went nowhere, and Putin began developing anti-NATO sentiment and espousing hostile views towards NATO from the early 2000s.[218] In 2009, Russian envoy Dmitry Rogozin did not rule out joining NATO at some point, but stated that Russia was currently more interested in leading a coalition as a great power.[219]

Austria

[edit]
Four soldiers in green military attire walk in a line in front of a green military vehicle holding guns.
Austria's neutrality is enshrined in law and treaty, but it participates in peacekeeping missions like Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Austria was occupied by the four victorious Allied powers following World War II under the Allied Control Council, similar to Germany. During negotiations to end the occupation, which were ongoing at the same time as Germany's, the Soviet Union insisted that the reunified country adopt the model of Swiss neutrality. The US feared that this would encourage West Germany to accept similar Soviet proposals for neutrality as a condition for German reunification.[220] Shortly after West Germany's accession to NATO, the parties agreed to the Austrian State Treaty in May 1955, which was largely based on the Moscow Memorandum signed the previous month between Austria and the Soviet Union. While the treaty itself did not commit Austria to neutrality, this was subsequently enshrined into Austria's constitution that October with the Declaration of Neutrality. The Declaration prohibits Austria from joining a military alliance, from hosting foreign military bases within its borders, and from participating in a war.[221]

Membership of Austria in the European Union (or its predecessor organizations) was controversial because of the Austrian commitment to neutrality. Austria only joined in 1995, together with Sweden and Finland, which had also declared their neutrality in the Cold War. Austria joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1995, and participates in NATO's Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. The Austrian military also participates in the United Nations peacekeeping operations and has deployments in several countries as of 2022, including Kosovo, Lebanon, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where it has led the EUFOR mission there since 2009.[221] Individual politicians from the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) have supported NATO membership as part of European integration, including the Chancellor from 2000 to 2007, Wolfgang Schüssel and his defense minister, Werner Fasslabend.[222]

The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, and subsequent NATO membership of Finland and Sweden, did lead to additional calls to re-open the issue of neutrality, including from Andreas Khol, the 2016 ÖVP presidential nominee.[223][224][225][226] However, only the NEOS party, which then held 15 of the 183 seats in the National Council, supported a May 2022 open letter asking the government to review its commitment to neutrality,[227][228] and Chancellor Karl Nehammer, of the ÖVP, has rejected the idea.[229] Membership is not widely popular with the Austrian public. A March 2023 survey found only 21% in favor, with 61% against, a small increase of both 7% in favor and 7% unsure, compared to the last survey 10 months prior.[230][231]

Cyprus

[edit]
Two men dressed in dark suits shake hands in front of the black door to 10 Downing Street.
Nikos Christodoulides, President of Cyprus, meeting in 2024 with his counterpart, Keir Starmer, of the United Kingdom, which controls two military bases on the island.

Prior to gaining its independence in 1960, Cyprus was a crown colony of the United Kingdom and as such the UK's NATO membership also applied to British Cyprus. The Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus remained under British control as a British Overseas Territory following independence.[232] Neighbouring Greece and Turkey competed for influence in the newly independent Cyprus, with intercommunal rivalries and movements for union with Greece or partition and partial union with Turkey. The first President of the independent Republic of Cyprus (1960–1977), Archbishop of Cyprus Makarios III, adopted a policy of non-alignment and took part in the 1961 founding meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade.

The 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus and ongoing dispute, in which Turkey continues to occupy Northern Cyprus, complicates Cyprus' relations with NATO. Any treaty concerning Cyprus' participation in NATO, either as a full member, PfP or Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, would likely be vetoed by Turkey, a full member of NATO, until the dispute is resolved.[215] NATO membership for a reunified Cyprus has been proposed as a solution to the question of security guarantees, given that all three of the current guarantors under the Treaty of Guarantee (1960) (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom) are already NATO members.[233]

The Parliament of Cyprus voted in February 2011 to apply for membership in the PfP program, but President Demetris Christofias vetoed the decision, arguing that it would hamper his attempts to negotiate an end to the Cyprus dispute and demilitarize the island.[234][235] Nicos Anastasiades, who was elected President in 2013, stated that he intended to apply for membership in the PfP program soon after taking over.[236] His foreign minister Nikos Christodoulides later dismissed Cypriot membership of NATO or Partnership for Peace, preferring to keep Cyprus' foreign and defence affairs within the framework of the EU, i.e. the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).[237] In May 2022, defence minister Charalambos Petrides confirmed that the country would not apply to NATO despite the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[238]

After the 2023 presidential election, Anastasiades' foreign minister Christodoulides succeeded him as President. In November 2024, Christodoulides reversed his previous stance and revealed a plan to deepen Cyprus' relations with NATO and eventually join as a full member. Under the first phase of the plan, Cyprus would seek to join preparatory organisations linked to NATO, which would require progress in resolving the Cyprus dispute with NATO member Turkey and improvements to EU–Turkey relations. Practical steps of the plan include securing a longer-term exemption from the U.S. arms embargo, expanding joint military training opportunities for the Cypriot National Guard at U.S. military academies, and modernisation of Cyprus' defence infrastructure to meet NATO standards.[239][240] Christodoulides stated that "the U.S. response has been very positive" and that these steps "will ensure that, once all conditions are met, Cyprus can join NATO".[241][242]

Ireland

[edit]
Male and female soldiers wearing camouflage marching behind the Irish tri-color flag.
Ireland currently does not seek to join NATO, but does work to improve the Defence Forces' interoperability with NATO.[243]

Ireland was neutral during World War II, though the country cooperated with Allied intelligence and permitted the Allies use of Irish airways and ports. Ireland continued its policy of military neutrality during the Cold War, and before soldiers in the Irish military, the Defence Forces, can be sent abroad, Irish law requires approval from the government, the Dáil Éireann, and the United Nations, which has been referred to as a "triple lock" on Irish neutrality since the early 2000s.[244] Ireland supplied a small number of troops to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (2001–2014) and supports the ongoing NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR).[245][246]

Ireland joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in 1999,[247] and participates in the alliance's PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). This aims to increase the interoperability of the Defence Forces with NATO member states and bring them into line with accepted international standards so as to successfully deploy with other professional military forces on peacekeeping operations overseas.[248] The country most recently renewed their agreement with NATO regarding interoperability in February 2024, with the issues of cybersecurity and the security of underseas communication cables in Irish waters being added as additional areas of cooperation.[249]

While there are a number of individual politicians who support Ireland joining NATO, mainly within the center-right Fine Gael party,[250][251] no major political party in Ireland currently supports full accession to NATO, a reflection on public opinion in the country.[252] Though its stance was softened during the 2024 election campaign,[253] the republican party Sinn Féin has long supported both withdrawal from PfP and passage of a constitutional amendment to prohibit the country from joining a military alliance like NATO. The Dáil Éireann has considered and defeated such an amendment in April 2019 and in November 2023.[254][255] While Taoiseach Micheál Martin said in 2022 that Ireland would not need to hold a referendum in order to join NATO, Irish constitutional lawyers have pointed to the precedent set by the 1987 case Crotty v. An Taoiseach as suggesting it would be necessary, and that any attempt to join NATO without a referendum would likely be legally challenged in the country's courts in a similar way.[256] Former Taoiseach Leo Varadkar has also highlighted the possibility that a United Ireland would likely have to reconsider defense arrangements, namely those with NATO, as the six counties of Northern Ireland are currently part of the alliance.[257]

Polling did show a rise in support for joining NATO following the February 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, as a March 2022 poll reported 48% supporting NATO membership and 39% opposing it,[258] while one in August 2022 found 52% in favor of joining and 48% opposed.[259] By June 2023, however, the numbers had returned to prior levels, with around 34% in favour and 38% opposed.[260] Former Secretary General of NATO Anders Fogh Rasmussen said during a visit to the country in 2013 that the "door is open" for Ireland to join NATO at any time.[261]

Kosovo

[edit]
Three men and one woman in suits stand on a red carpet in front of two blue flags.
Kosovo President Hashim Thaçi meeting with US Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison at NATO Headquarters in 2017

According to Minister of Foreign Affairs Enver Hoxhaj, integration with NATO is a priority for Kosovo, which declared independence from Serbia in 2008.[262] Kosovo submitted an application to join the PfP program in July 2012,[263] and Hoxhaj stated in 2014 that the country's goal is to be a NATO member by 2022.[264] In December 2018, Kosovar Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj stated that Kosovo will apply for NATO membership after the formation of the Kosovo Armed Forces.[265] Kosovo's lack of recognition by four NATO member statesGreece, Romania, Spain, and Slovakia—could impede its accession.[266][263] United Nations membership, which Kosovo does not have, is considered to be necessary for NATO membership.[267]

In February 2022, during the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Minister of Defense Armend Mehaj requested a permanent US military base in the country and an accelerated accession process to the organization, citing an "immediate need to guarantee peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans".[6] On 3 March 2022, a resolution was passed by Kosovo's Parliament requesting that the government "take all necessary steps to join NATO, European Union, Council of Europe and other international organizations".[268]

Malta

[edit]
A sea-side cliff topped by a small white, spherical structure.
During the Cold War, NATO used radar facilities in Malta, which, like other non-NATO member European states, has generally cooperative relations with the organization.[269]

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, the Mediterranean island of Malta was a dependent territory of the United Kingdom, one of the treaty's original signatories. As such, the Crown Colony of Malta shared the UK's international memberships, including NATO. Between 1952 and 1965, the headquarters of the Allied Forces Mediterranean was based in the town of Floriana, just outside Malta's capital of Valletta. When Malta gained independence in 1964, prime minister George Borg Olivier wanted the country to join NATO. Olivier was concerned that the presence of the NATO headquarters in Malta, without the security guarantees that NATO membership entailed, made the country a potential target. However, according to a memorandum he prepared at the time he was discouraged from formally submitting a membership application by Deputy Secretary General of NATO James A. Roberts. It was believed that some NATO members, including the United Kingdom, were opposed to Maltese NATO membership. As a result Olivier considered alternatives, such as seeking associate membership or unilateral security guarantees from NATO, or closing the NATO headquarters in Malta in retaliation.[270][271][272] Ultimately, Olivier supported the alliance and signed a defense agreement with the UK for use of Maltese military facilities in exchange for around £2 million a year.[273][274]

This friendly policy changed in 1971, when Dom Mintoff, of the Labour Party, was elected as prime minister. Mintoff supported neutrality as his foreign policy,[275] and the position was later enshrined into the country's constitution in 1974 as an amendment to Article 1.[276] The country joined the Non-Aligned Movement in 1979, at the same time when the British Royal Navy left its base at the Malta Dockyard. In 1995, under Prime Minister Eddie Fenech Adami of the Nationalist Party, Malta joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council multilateral defense forum and NATO's Partnership for Peace program. When the Labour Party regained power the following year, however, it withdrew Malta from both organizations. Though the Nationalists resumed the majority in parliament in 1998, Malta didn't rejoin the EAPC and PfP programs again until 2008, after the country had joined the European Union in 2004. Since re-joining, Malta has been building its relations with NATO and getting involved in wider projects including the PfP Planning and Review Process and the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program.[277][278]

NATO membership is not supported by any of the country's political parties, including neither the governing Labour Party nor the opposition Nationalist Party. NATO's secretary-general Jens Stoltenberg has stated that the alliance fully respects Malta's position of neutrality, and put no pressure for the country to join the alliance.[277] Polling done by the island-nation's Ministry of Foreign Affairs found in February 2022 that 63% of those surveyed supported the island's neutrality, and only 6% opposed the policy, with 14% undecided.[279] A Eurobarometer survey in May 2022 found that 75% of Maltese would however support greater military cooperation within the European Union.[280]

Moldova

[edit]
Two older European men in suits and ties stand in front of flags.
Former Defense Minister Anatol Șalaru (left) attending a NATO meeting in Warsaw in 2016

Moldova gained independence in 1991 following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The country's current constitution was adopted in 1994, and forbids the country from joining a military alliance, but some politicians, such as former Moldovan Minister of Defence Vitalie Marinuța, have suggested joining NATO as part of a larger European integration. Moldova joined NATO's Partnership for Peace in 1994, and initiated an Individual Partnership Action Plan in 2010.[281] Moldova also participates in NATO's peacekeeping force in Kosovo.[282] Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea by Russia, NATO officials warned that Russia might seek to annex Transnistria, a breakaway Moldovan region.[283] This separatist issue could preclude Moldova from joining NATO.[281]

The current Prime Minister of Moldova, Dorin Recean, supports European Union membership, but not NATO membership.[284] Moldova's President Maia Sandu stated in January 2023 that there was "serious discussion" about joining "a larger alliance", though she didn't specifically name NATO.[282] The second largest alliance in the parliament of Moldova, the Electoral Bloc of Communists and Socialists, strongly opposes NATO membership.[285] A poll in December 2018 found that, if given the choice in a referendum, 22% of Moldovans would vote in favor of joining NATO, while 32% would vote against it and 21% would be unsure.[286] Some Moldovan politicians, including former Prime Minister Iurie Leancă, have also supported the idea of unifying with neighboring Romania, with which Moldova shares a language and much of its history, and a poll in April 2021 found that 43.9% of those surveyed supported that idea. Romania is a current member of both NATO and the European Union.[287]

Serbia

[edit]
A sidewalk with the words "SERBIA YES NATO NO YANKEE GO HOME!" spray painted in red.
Anti-NATO graffiti on a bridge in Novi Sad

Yugoslavia's communist government sided with the Eastern Bloc at the beginning of the Cold War, but pursued a policy of neutrality following the Tito–Stalin split in 1948 after an initial indirect alignment with NATO via the Balkan Pact.[288] It was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Since that country's dissolution most of its successor states have joined NATO, but the largest of them, Serbia, has maintained neutrality.

The NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992 against Bosnia-Serbian forces and the NATO bombing of targets in Serbia (then part of FR Yugoslavia) during the Kosovo War in 1999 resulted in strained relations between Serbia and NATO.[289] After the overthrow of President Slobodan Milošević Serbia wanted to improve its relations with NATO, though membership in the military alliance remained highly controversial among political parties and society.[290][291] In the years under Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić the country (then Serbia and Montenegro) did not rule out joining NATO, but after Đinđić's assassination in 2003 Serbia increasingly started preferring a course of military neutrality.[292][293] Serbia's Parliament passed a resolution in 2007 which declared Serbia's military neutrality until such time as a referendum could be held on the issue.[294] Relations with NATO were further strained following Kosovo's declaration of independence in 2008, while it was a protectorate of the United Nations with security support from NATO.

Serbia was invited to and joined NATO's Partnership for Peace program during the 2006 Riga summit, and in 2008 was invited to enter the intensified dialog program whenever the country was ready.[135] On 1 October 2008, Serbian Defence Minister Dragan Šutanovac signed the Information Exchange Agreement with NATO, one of the prerequisites for fuller membership in the Partnership for Peace program.[295] In April 2011 Serbia's request for an IPAP was approved by NATO,[296] and Serbia submitted a draft IPAP in May 2013.[297] The agreement was finalized on 15 January 2015.[298] Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, in office since 2017, reiterated in March 2022 that his government was not interested in NATO membership.[299] A poll that month suggested that 82% of Serbians opposed joining NATO, while only 10% supported the idea.[300] The minor Serbian Renewal Movement, which has two seats in the National Assembly, and the Liberal Democratic Party, which currently has none, remain the most vocal political parties in favor of NATO membership.[301] The Democratic Party abandoned its pro-NATO attitude, claiming the Partnership for Peace is enough.

Serbia maintains close relations with Russia, which are due to their shared stances on the Kosovo issue and popular affinity for Russia. Serbia and Belarus are the only European states that refused to impose sanctions on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine.[302][303][304]

Other proposals

[edit]

Some individuals have proposed expanding NATO outside of Europe, although doing so would require amending Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which specifically limits new membership to "any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."[305]

Christopher Sands of the Hudson Institute proposed Mexican membership of NATO in order to enhance NATO cooperation with Mexico and develop a "North American pillar" for regional security,[306] while Christopher Skaluba and Gabriela Doyle of the Atlantic Council promoted the idea as way to support democracy in Latin America.[307] In June 2013, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos stated his hope that Colombia's cooperation with NATO could result in NATO membership, though his Foreign Minister, Juan Carlos Pinzon, quickly clarified that Colombia is not actively seeking NATO membership.[308] In June 2018, Qatar expressed its wish to join NATO,[309] but its application was rejected by NATO.[310] In March 2019, US President Donald Trump made Brazil a major non-NATO ally, and expressed support for the eventual accession of Brazil into NATO.[311] France's Foreign Ministry responded to this by reiterating the limitations of Article 10 on new membership, and suggested that Brazil could instead seek to become a global partner of NATO, like Colombia.[312]

Several other current NATO global partners have been proposed as candidates for full membership. In 2006, Ivo Daalder, later the US Ambassador to NATO, proposed a "global NATO" that would incorporate democratic states from around the world, including Asia-Pacific partners Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, collectively known as the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4),[313][314] who all signed on as global partners in the 2010s, as well as Brazil, South Africa, and India.[305] In 2007, then-US presidential candidate Rudy Giuliani suggested including Singapore and Israel, among others.[315] In 2020, Trump stated that Middle Eastern countries should be admitted to NATO.[316] Because of its close ties to Europe, Cape Verde has been suggested as a future member and the government of Cape Verde suggested an interest in joining as recently as 2019.[317][318]

Internal enlargement is the process of new member states arising from the break-up of or secession from an existing member state. There have been and are a number of active separatist movements within member states. After a long history of opposition to NATO, the separatist Scottish National Party agreed at its conference in 2012 that it wished for Scotland to retain its NATO membership were it to become independent from the United Kingdom.[319] In 2014, in the run up to the self-determination referendum, the Generalitat de Catalunya published a memo suggesting an independent Catalonia would want to keep all of Spain's current foreign relationships, including NATO, though other nations, namely Belgium, have questioned whether quick membership for breakaway regions could encourage secessionist movements elsewhere.[320]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The enlargement of NATO refers to the progressive expansion of the Organization from its original 12 founding members in 1949 to 32 sovereign states as of October 2024, achieved through 10 distinct accession rounds that incorporated nations across . This process, governed by Article 10 of the , which invites any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic," has unfolded in phases: initial additions of and in 1952, in 1955, and in 1982; post- integrations beginning with the , , and in 1999, followed by seven Central and Eastern European states in 2004; subsequent entries of and in 2009, in 2017, in 2020, in 2023, and in 2024. Enlargement has been driven by the strategic imperative to extend collective defense guarantees under Article 5 to emerging democracies seeking protection from potential revanchist threats, particularly after the Soviet Union's 1991 collapse, thereby fostering regional stability and integrating former countries into Western security structures. Proponents attribute to it the consolidation of democratic governance and economic prosperity in , with showing reduced interstate conflict and enhanced deterrence capabilities among new members. However, the process has sparked significant , as has consistently protested it as an aggressive violating informal 1990 assurances against eastward expansion—assurances disputed by as non-binding and unrecorded in treaties—culminating in heightened tensions that Moscow cited as a partial rationale for its 2022 military intervention in . Despite such objections, enlargement reflects sovereign choices by applicant states prioritizing alliance security over Russian spheres of influence, underscoring causal dynamics where perceived vulnerabilities in post-communist transitions prompted voluntary alignments with 's mutual defense framework.

Historical Enlargements

Founding and Early Expansions (1949-1960s)

The , establishing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was signed on April 4, 1949, in , by representatives of twelve founding member states: , , , , , , , the , , , the , and the . The treaty entered into force on August 24, 1949, after ratification by the required number of signatories, creating a collective defense alliance under Article 5, which stipulated that an armed attack against one member would be considered an attack against all. This formation occurred amid rising tensions with the , including the 1948 , which underscored Western fears of communist expansionism and the need for a unified transatlantic response to deter Soviet aggression in . NATO's initial membership focused on Western European democracies and North American powers with historical ties to the region, prioritizing along the North Atlantic to counter potential Soviet incursions. The alliance's creation reflected U.S. policy to integrate a recovering economically and militarily, as articulated in the and , aiming to prevent the spread of by fostering stability and mutual defense rather than unilateral U.S. intervention. Early operations emphasized of forces and buildup, such as airfields and communications, to enable rapid reinforcement against a perceived Soviet conventional superiority in ground troops. The first enlargement occurred on February 18, 1952, when and acceded to , expanding the alliance to fourteen members and bolstering its southeastern flank. Both nations had recently emerged from internal conflicts— from its against communist insurgents and from maintaining neutrality in but facing Soviet territorial demands—making their inclusion strategic for securing the and approaches against Soviet influence. This move addressed vulnerabilities exposed by the Korean War's demonstration of communist expansionism beyond Europe, enabling to project power into strategic chokepoints like the . On May 6, 1955, the Federal Republic of Germany () joined as the fifteenth member, following the Paris Agreements of October 23, 1954, which restored its sovereignty and permitted limited rearmament under Allied oversight. 's integration was driven by the need to harness its industrial and manpower potential for Western defense, as the alliance confronted Soviet military buildup, including the formation of the days earlier on May 14, 1955. This accession anchored in the Western bloc, mitigating fears of neutralism or , and facilitated its contribution of forces to NATO's central front, though it provoked Soviet protests over perceived . No further enlargements took place through the 1960s, as NATO consolidated its structure amid and internal debates over nuclear strategy.

Cold War Period Additions (1970s-1980s)

The sole enlargement of NATO during the 1970s and 1980s occurred with Spain's accession on 30 May 1982, making it the alliance's 16th member state. This addition followed a period of relative stasis in membership growth since West Germany's entry in 1955, amid the détente phase of the Cold War. Spain's integration bolstered NATO's southern flank by providing strategic territory in the western Mediterranean, including potential basing options and enhanced maritime control against Soviet naval presence in the region. Spain's pursuit of NATO membership stemmed from its post-Franco transition to democracy after General Francisco Franco's death on 20 November 1975. Under King and Prime Minister , the government sought alignment with Western democratic institutions to consolidate reforms and secure external support against internal instability. Formal negotiations with commenced in the late 1970s, culminating in an invitation extended on 10 December 1981. Spain's parliament, the , approved membership on 29 October 1981, and the was signed on 29 May 1982. Accession proceeded despite significant domestic opposition, particularly from leftist groups wary of entanglement and alignment with the . Spain initially acceded without full integration into NATO's command structure, reflecting compromises during negotiations to address sovereignty concerns over foreign bases, a legacy of earlier bilateral U.S.-Spain defense pacts from 1953. Full integration occurred later in 1999. Strategically, Spain's entry added approximately 200,000 troops and naval assets to the alliance, enhancing deterrence in the Iberian-Mediterranean theater amid ongoing Soviet in the Third World. No other states joined during this era, as Eastern European countries remained under control and neutral states like maintained non-alignment policies enshrined in post-World War II treaties.

Post-Cold War Waves (1990s-2000s)

Following the dissolution of the in 1991 and the later that year, several Central and Eastern European states pursued membership to secure their independence and democratic transitions amid uncertainties over Russian intentions. responded by launching the program in January 1994, which facilitated military cooperation and reforms as a preparatory framework for potential enlargement without immediate commitments. A formal Study on Enlargement, published on September 28, 1995, outlined criteria including democratic governance, civilian control of military, and resolution of disputes, emphasizing that enlargement would strengthen rather than provoke neighbors. The initial post-Cold War wave materialized at the July 1997 Madrid Summit, where NATO invited the , , and to begin accession talks due to their progress in meeting standards and regional significance as former members. Accession protocols were signed in December 1997, followed by ratification by existing members, culminating in formal entry on March 12, 1999, expanding NATO from 16 to 19 members. These states cited deterrence against potential aggression and integration into Western structures as primary motivations, with Poland emphasizing its historical vulnerabilities. Russian officials, including President , voiced opposition, arguing it undermined post-Cold War understandings, though NATO maintained no binding assurances against expansion had been given and proceeded based on Article 10's . Building on this, the 1999 Washington Summit introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP) to guide aspirants through tailored reforms. The next major wave followed the November 2002 Summit, inviting , , , , , , and —nine countries initially under consideration, with and deferred—reflecting their alignment with democratic and military benchmarks . These nations deposited instruments of accession on March 29, 2004, increasing membership to 26 and incorporating former Soviet republics (, , ) for the first time, aimed at stabilizing the and southeastern flanks. Motivations centered on collective defense guarantees under Article 5, with empirical improvements in defense spending and cited as enablers; again protested, viewing Baltic inclusion as a red line, yet the process affirmed sovereign aspirations over external objections. These enlargements correlated with enhanced regional stability, as joined states experienced sustained and , though critics like argued they risked provoking by expanding a perceived —claims NATO rebutted by pointing to voluntary applications and the absence of aggression until 2014. Accession required unanimous ally approval and substantial domestic reforms, including Slovakia's resolution of governance issues post-1998 elections to qualify. By the mid-2000s, these waves had shifted NATO's geographic focus eastward, prioritizing Euro-Atlantic integration over Cold War-era .

Baltic and Southeastern Expansions (2004-2010s)

On March 29, 2004, NATO underwent its largest single enlargement to date when seven nations—, , , , , , and —deposited their instruments of accession, formally joining the . This wave extended NATO's collective defense commitments under Article 5 to the , which share borders with and had been Soviet republics until 1991, thereby providing these nations with security guarantees against potential revanchist threats from . The inclusion of and addressed instability in Southeastern by integrating former members into Western security structures, while and represented the stabilization of post-Yugoslav and post-communist transitions. Russia voiced strong opposition to the incorporation of the , viewing their accession as a direct encroachment on its , though Moscow's protests remained largely rhetorical without military response. Proponents of the expansion argued it reinforced and deterred aggression by anchoring these states to Euro-Atlantic institutions, with rapid military reforms in the new members demonstrating their commitment to alliance standards. The move fulfilled aspirations voiced by these countries since the early , driven by historical experiences of Soviet domination and a desire for protection amid uncertainties in Russian foreign policy under President . In 2009, further expanded into Southeastern Europe with the accession of and on , following ceremonies at the Strasbourg-Kehl summit where they deposited accession instruments. , a small Adriatic nation with strategic positioning near the , and , emerging from the , sought membership to bolster internal stability and contribute to regional security, including countering and ethnic tensions. This enlargement aimed to consolidate 's presence in the Western , promoting interoperability through prior Membership Action Plans and addressing gaps left by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. No additional Baltic or Southeastern accessions occurred through the 2010s, as focus shifted to intensified dialogues with aspirants like , though the 2004 and 2009 waves solidified 's footprint along Russia's western frontier and in the volatile southeast.

Recent Nordic Accessions (2020s)

Finland and , long adherents to policies of military non-alignment and neutrality, abandoned these traditions following Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, which heightened perceptions of direct threats to their security from Russian aggression. formally applied for membership on May 17, 2022, followed by on May 18, 2022, marking a rapid shift driven by favoring alliance membership for deterrence against potential Russian expansionism. leaders invited both countries to join at the Summit on June 29-30, 2022, initiating accession protocols. Finland's accession proceeded swiftly, with all 30 existing NATO members ratifying its protocol by March 2023; Finland deposited its instrument of accession on April 4, 2023, becoming the alliance's 31st member and extending NATO's land border with Russia by 1,340 kilometers, the longest such frontier. This membership enhanced NATO's defensive posture in the Baltic Sea region and High North, providing collective defense guarantees under Article 5 to a nation with a conscript-based force of approximately 280,000 reservists trained for high-intensity conflict. Sweden's process faced delays primarily from Turkey, which conditioned ratification on Sweden's stricter measures against Kurdish militant groups like the PKK and curbs on anti-Turkish protests including Quran burnings, and from Hungary, citing bilateral tensions over Swedish criticisms of its democratic standards. Turkey approved on January 23, 2024, and Hungary on February 26, 2024, allowing Sweden to deposit its instrument on March 7, 2024, as the 32nd member. These Nordic accessions significantly bolstered NATO's northern flank, closing a strategic gap in the Baltic and areas, improving , and enabling seamless multinational operations across the region, including Finland's integration into NATO's enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups. Russia's pre-accession threats of retaliation proved hollow, underscoring the voluntary of the enlargements as responses to empirical deteriorations rather than provocation. Both countries contributed modern capabilities, such as Sweden's expertise and Finland's reserves, while adapting domestic laws to align with standards on sharing and .

Summary of Membership Growth

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization () was founded on April 4, 1949, with 12 original members: , , , , , , , the , , , the , and the . These nations established the Alliance to provide collective defense against potential Soviet aggression in following . NATO's membership has grown through 10 enlargement rounds, increasing from 12 to 32 countries by March 7, 2024, when became the latest member. Early expansions during the added two members in 1952 ( and ), one in 1955 (), and one in 1982 (), bringing the total to 16 by the end of the decade. These additions aimed to bolster NATO's southern and central European flanks amid ongoing tensions with the . Post-Cold War enlargements accelerated, reflecting the integration of former states seeking security guarantees after the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991. In 1999, three countries joined: the , , and . The largest wave occurred in 2004 with seven additions: , , , , , , and . Subsequent rounds included and in 2009, in 2017, in 2020, on April 4, 2023, and on March 7, 2024. The table below outlines the key phases of NATO's membership growth: This progression demonstrates NATO's adaptation to shifting geopolitical realities, with post-1990 expansions comprising 16 of the 20 added members, primarily from Central, Eastern, and . Each accession required unanimous approval by existing members and by national parliaments, ensuring alignment with standards.

Article 10 and the Open Door Policy

Article 10 of the , signed on April 4, 1949, establishes the legal basis for enlargement by stipulating that "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic to accede to this Treaty." This provision requires consensus among all existing members for any invitation, with accession occurring upon the invited state's deposit of an instrument with the government, accepting the treaty's terms as originally concluded. The article limits eligibility to European states, emphasizing their ability to align with NATO's core objectives of collective defense, democratic values, and regional security enhancement. The Policy embodies Article 10's intent, affirming that remains open to any qualifying European nation seeking membership through voluntary application and fulfillment of the treaty's s. Formally articulated as a founding principle since the treaty's inception, the policy has facilitated all subsequent enlargements, from the addition of and in 1952 to the Nordic accessions in 2023 and 2024, with decisions invariably requiring full member unanimity to ensure strategic cohesion. It underscores 's non-expansionist stance, as invitations respond to aspirant countries' initiatives rather than Alliance-driven territorial ambitions, countering narratives of aggressive eastward "expansion" propagated by adversaries like , which lack evidence of any binding pre-1990s assurances against voluntary alignments. In practice, the policy integrates substantive criteria derived from Article 10, including adherence to democratic governance, market economies, resolution of territorial disputes, and military compatibility, evaluated through processes like Membership Action Plans for aspiring states. Reaffirmed in key documents such as the 2022 Strategic Concept, it commits to upholding Article 10 without imposing membership on unwilling nations or closing doors to those meeting standards, thereby promoting Euro-Atlantic stability via sovereign choices rather than coercion. This framework has enabled 's growth from 12 founding members to 32 by 2024, with each wave—such as the 1999 inclusion of , , and the —validating the policy's role in integrating former states post-Cold War without violating the treaty's consensual nature.

Membership Criteria and Accession Processes

NATO membership is governed by Article 10 of the , which stipulates that the is open to any "European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic," with accession requiring unanimous agreement among existing members. This provision establishes a baseline of eligibility focused on geographic location in , alignment with treaty principles such as and collective defense under Article 5, and the capacity to enhance rather than dilute security. No exhaustive, legally binding checklist exists, as emphasized in NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement, which notes that invitations are assessed case-by-case to ensure new members strengthen the without compromising its core capabilities. Key criteria for prospective members, drawn from the 1995 Study and subsequent practices, include a functioning democratic with civilian control over the , a market-oriented economy, respect for , commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes, good relations with neighbors, and the ability to contribute militarily to collective defense through reforms like with forces. Aspirants must demonstrate progress toward these standards, often via programs like Intensified Dialogue or the Membership Action Plan (), which provide tailored feedback on political, economic, defense, and reforms without guaranteeing invitation. Failure to meet these—such as persistent , unresolved territorial disputes, or inadequate defense spending—has delayed accessions, as seen in cases where countries remain in MAP despite years of effort. The accession process unfolds in stages, beginning with a country's formal expression of interest, followed by political dialogue to evaluate readiness. Upon consensus among all 32 members to extend an invitation—typically at a — the invitee confirms acceptance of NATO's obligations and commitments. Accession protocols are then negotiated and signed by Allied foreign ministers, amending the to include the new member; these require by each member's domestic , after which instruments of ratification are deposited with the U.S. government. Membership takes effect 30 days after the last ratification is deposited, ensuring full integration into command structures and Article 5 guarantees. This consensus-driven mechanism, rooted in NATO's decision-making tradition, prevents any single member from blocking enlargement but has occasionally stalled progress amid internal disagreements.

Role of Membership Action Plans and Intensified Dialogue

Intensified Dialogue serves as an initial, non-binding stage in 's enlargement process, allowing aspiring member states to engage in detailed discussions with the Alliance about their reform aspirations, domestic political processes, and alignment with standards. Introduced as a preparatory mechanism in the late and formalized further in subsequent summits, it enables countries to address key membership requirements—such as democratic , civilian control of the military, and market economies—without committing to a formal application. This dialogue facilitates transparency and mutual understanding, helping assess a candidate's readiness while providing tailored feedback on necessary adjustments. For instance, entered Intensified Dialogue in 2005 following an informal meeting of foreign ministers in , , which focused on accelerating cooperation amid its post-Orange Revolution aspirations. The , launched at the 1999 Washington Summit, represents a more structured and intensive phase, offering individualized programs of advice, assistance, and practical support to countries invited by 's . Divided into five core areas—political and economic issues, defense and military reform, security sector restructuring, and legal compatibility with norms—MAP requires aspirants to submit annual progress reports and implement specific action plans under oversight. Its primary role is to bridge gaps in capabilities, ensuring that new members can contribute effectively to collective defense under Article 5, while fostering internal consensus among existing Allies on each candidate's viability. Nine countries initially received MAP invitations in 1999: , , , , , , , , and (then Macedonia). Together, Intensified Dialogue and MAP form a graduated pathway that emphasizes verifiable progress over mere declarations of intent, mitigating risks of premature enlargement that could strain Alliance cohesion. Countries typically transition from Intensified Dialogue to MAP upon demonstrating sufficient commitment, as seen with and , which received MAP in 2002 and 2003, respectively, before graduating and acceding in 2009. , for example, was granted MAP in April 2010 after years of dialogue, though its progress has been hampered by unresolved internal ethnic divisions. This framework has been credited with driving substantive reforms, such as military modernization in the , but critics within NATO have noted that MAP's requirements can prolong accession for politically stable candidates, as evidenced by Montenegro's 12-year MAP tenure from 2008 to 2020 before joining in 2017. By prioritizing empirical benchmarks over geopolitical expediency, these tools underscore NATO's insistence on mutual benefit in enlargement decisions.

Strategic Rationale and Geopolitical Motivations

Providing Security Guarantees to Sovereign States

NATO's core mechanism for providing security guarantees operates through Article 5 of the , which stipulates that an armed attack against one or more Allies shall be considered an attack against them all, obligating collective response. This provision extends unequivocally to new members upon accession, transforming sovereign states' voluntary alignment into a binding commitment backed by the alliance's combined military capabilities, including the nuclear deterrent primarily provided by the . Enlargement thus enables smaller or historically vulnerable nations to deter potential aggressors by leveraging the alliance's credibility, as no member has faced successful territorial aggression since the treaty's inception in 1949, with Article 5 invoked once after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the . Post-Cold War enlargements in 1999 and 2004 were driven by Eastern European states' explicit pursuit of these guarantees amid fears of Russian instability and , rooted in memories of Soviet domination from 1945 to 1991. Countries like Poland, , and the , which joined in 1999, cited protection against potential coercion or invasion as paramount, viewing membership as essential insurance following the Warsaw Pact's dissolution and Russia's 1990s turmoil, including the Chechen wars and economic collapse. The —Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—acceded in 2004 precisely to secure Article 5 protections against their larger neighbor, given ethnic Russian minorities and historical annexation in 1940; their leaders emphasized that neutrality offered no viable defense against revanchist threats. These sovereign decisions reflected first-hand assessments of regional power dynamics, prioritizing alliance integration over isolation. Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, underscored the guarantees' value, prompting and —longtime neutrals—to apply for membership in May 2022, with joining on April 4, 2023, and on March 7, 2024. Finnish officials, sharing an 830-mile border with , described as the only credible deterrent post-invasion, abandoning decades of military non-alignment after public support surged from 20-30% to over 80%. Swedish leaders echoed this, framing accession as a direct response to heightened threats, enhancing Nordic security through collective defense rather than bilateral arrangements. Empirical patterns reinforce deterrence: aggressions like 's 2008 war in Georgia and 2014 annexation of targeted non-members, while 's eastern flank has remained intact, attributing stability to the alliance's forward presence and rapid reinforcement capabilities established post-2014. This voluntary framework under Article 10 upholds sovereign agency, allowing states to calibrate alignment based on threat perceptions without imposing membership.

Deterring Aggression and Promoting Regional Stability

NATO enlargement has extended the Alliance's collective defense commitments under Article 5 to new members, thereby deterring potential aggressors by raising the prospective costs of military action against sovereign states aligned with the transatlantic community. This mechanism operates on the principle that an attack on one member invokes a response from all, creating a unified front that historically has prevented direct territorial aggression against territory since the Alliance's founding in 1949. Empirical patterns support this deterrence effect: has conducted hybrid and conventional operations against non-members such as Georgia in August 2008 and in 2014 and 2022, but has refrained from invading members despite tensions, including in the which acceded in March 2004. In the Baltic region, enlargement prompted Russia to test boundaries through airspace violations and naval incidents post-2004, yet these did not escalate to kinetic aggression, contrasting with incursions in non-NATO spaces. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO responded by deploying multinational Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in 2017, each comprising around 1,000 troops from framework nations and allies, which has since been scaled to brigade level under the 2022 Madrid Summit decisions. These deployments, combined with exercises like Steadfast Defender in 2024 involving over 90,000 personnel, have reinforced credible deterrence along the eastern flank, with Russian leadership acknowledging the risks of confronting the full Alliance. Analysts note that NATO membership itself serves as the strongest bulwark, as evidenced by the absence of sustained territorial challenges to members amid Russia's revanchist actions elsewhere. Beyond deterrence, enlargement has fostered regional stability by anchoring former states and Balkan nations to democratic norms, civilian control of militaries, and cooperative security frameworks, reducing intra-regional conflicts. In , the 1999 accession of , , and the correlated with sustained economic growth and diminished ethnic tensions, as these states adopted NATO's standards for minority rights and border resolution, exemplified by the Group's evolution into a platform for joint infrastructure and defense coordination. The 2004 wave, incorporating the Baltics and others, further stabilized the region by integrating them into Euro-Atlantic structures, leading to verifiable declines in military coups and authoritarian compared to non-aligned neighbors. In the , NATO's 1999 intervention in and subsequent enlargements of in 2009 and in 2017 acted as stabilizers by incentivizing reforms that curbed irredentist violence and promoted cross-border reconciliation, such as the Ohrid Agreement in (2001) tied to its Membership Action Plan. These processes have empirically lowered interstate dispute rates, with no major recurring post-accession waves, attributing stability to the Alliance's emphasis on resolved territorial claims and training that builds trust among former adversaries. Overall, enlargement's voluntary nature aligns sovereign choices with , yielding a more pacific east of the original through institutionalized restraint rather than unilateral power vacuums.

Countering Russian Imperialism Through Voluntary Alignment

NATO enlargement enables sovereign states in Russia's periphery to voluntarily accede to the alliance, thereby erecting collective defense barriers against Moscow's historical pattern of territorial expansion and influence restoration. Countries formerly under Soviet control, such as Poland, , and the , initiated membership bids in 1993 through the framework, driven by empirical memories of occupation and a rational assessment of revanchist risks following the USSR's dissolution. This alignment leverages Article 5's mutual defense commitment to deter aggression, as evidenced by the absence of direct military incursions into NATO territory post-enlargement, contrasting with Russia's interventions in non-members like Georgia in 2008 and in 2014. The , , and —exemplify this voluntary strategy, joining on March 29, 2004, after rapid democratization and military reforms motivated by proximity to and unresolved ethnic tensions involving Russian minorities. These nations, independent only since 1991, prioritized to neutralize threats of reincorporation, a fear substantiated by Russia's 2014 annexation of and hybrid operations in . Empirical data from accession referendums and parliamentary votes in these states reflect overwhelming public support, with figures exceeding 80% in and , underscoring genuine sovereign choice rather than external imposition. Such integrations have fortified regional resilience, compelling to recalibrate expansionist amid heightened costs of confrontation with a unified 32-member as of 2024. Further expansions, including , , and in 2004, and and in 2009, extended this deterrent umbrella to southeastern , where Ottoman and Soviet legacies amplified vulnerabilities to Russian leverage via energy dependencies and frozen conflicts. Russia's full-scale invasion of on February 24, 2022, catalyzed Finland's accession on April 4, 2023, with 94% parliamentary approval, and Sweden's on March 7, 2024, demonstrating how acute threats accelerate voluntary alignment without altering NATO's defensive posture. This process counters by incentivizing and , as seen in enhanced battlegroups deployed to eastern flanks since 2017, which have prevented escalation while preserving . Critics alleging provocation overlook that enlargement responds to, rather than initiates, Russian actions, with no formal barring it and declassified records showing no binding non-expansion pledges to Gorbachev.

Current Aspiring Members

Ukraine's Pursuit of Membership

Ukraine joined NATO's program in January 1994, marking its initial post-Soviet engagement with the alliance as one of the first former Soviet states to do so. This cooperation deepened over the following decade, but maintained a policy of non-alignment until significant geopolitical shifts. At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO Allies agreed that "will become members of ," affirming its Euro-Atlantic aspirations without issuing a Membership Action Plan due to internal alliance divisions, particularly opposition from and . Russia's annexation of in 2014 and support for separatists in prompted to abandon its non-bloc status through parliamentary legislation in December 2014, accelerating its pursuit of membership as a deterrent against further aggression. In June 2017, 's parliament adopted a designating membership as a strategic foreign and objective. This culminated in February 2019, when President signed a embedding and accession as irreversible goals, with the preamble and articles on explicitly committing to full-fledged membership. In June 2020, recognized as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, enhancing interoperability through joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and defense capacity-building, alongside partners like and Georgia. Russia's full-scale invasion in February 2022 intensified 's efforts; on September 30, 2022, President submitted a formal application for accelerated accession in response to Russia's illegal annexations of Ukrainian territories. has reaffirmed the 2008 Bucharest commitment, stating 's membership path is "irreversible," but has not extended an invitation or Membership Action Plan, citing the ongoing war and the need for reforms in democratic institutions, , and anti-corruption measures. As of October 2025, NATO continues to provide unprecedented , training over 1 million Ukrainian personnel since 2022, and coordinates security assistance, while emphasizing that membership decisions require consensus among all 32 Allies and cannot occur amid active conflict due to Article 5 implications. Ukraine's pursuit reflects a strategic imperative for collective defense guarantees, with public support exceeding 80% in polls post-invasion, though alliance members prioritize ending the war and ensuring Ukraine's territorial integrity before formal enlargement steps.

Georgia's NATO Aspirations

Georgia expressed its Euro-Atlantic aspirations shortly after independence, joining NATO's program on February 14, 1994, which facilitated initial military cooperation and reforms. Following the in November 2003, Georgia intensified its alignment, opening an in 2004 and contributing troops to NATO-led operations in and , with over 20,000 personnel deployed cumulatively by 2020. These steps underscored Tbilisi's strategic imperative to secure collective defense guarantees against persistent Russian threats, including support for separatist regions. At the April 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO allies declared that "Georgia will become a member of ," contingent on fulfilling reforms, though a Membership Action Plan was deferred amid divisions, particularly from and citing Russian opposition. This commitment followed Georgia's request for accelerated accession amid escalating tensions with Russia-backed enclaves in . Five months later, on August 7-8, 2008, invaded Georgia in response to Tbilisi's attempt to reassert control over , resulting in Moscow's occupation of approximately 20% of Georgian territory, including formal recognition of the breakaway regions as independent. responded by suspending practical cooperation with and establishing the NATO-Georgia Commission on September 15, 2008, to bolster Tbilisi's resilience without invoking Article 5 due to the alliance's non-membership status. To advance and self-defense, launched the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP) at the 2014 Wales Summit, comprising over 15 initiatives in areas like strategic transport, cyber defense, and joint training, with annual updates including the 2020 refresh adding resilience measures. Facilities such as the Joint Training and Evaluation Centre in , operational since 2015, have trained thousands of Georgian forces, enhancing capabilities demonstrated in multinational exercises like Noble Partner. Georgia has met many political and military benchmarks, including democratic elections and defense spending exceeding 2% of GDP since 2018, though remains a barrier, as full Article 5 coverage would extend to occupied areas. NATO has reaffirmed the Bucharest decision at every summit since, including the 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly upholding Georgia's path alongside , amid Russia's full-scale invasion of the latter highlighting the urgency of enlargement for deterrence. However, progress stalled post-2020 under the coalition, led informally by billionaire , whose policies—such as the 2023 foreign agents law and delayed EU reforms—drew Western sanctions and protests, signaling a pivot toward to avoid escalation. Public support for remains high at around 70-80% in polls, constitutionally enshrined since 2018, but ruling party rhetoric has softened, prioritizing "strategic patience" over immediate pursuit, complicating Tbilisi's trajectory as of 2025. Russia's ongoing occupation, with forces numbering over 7,000 in violation of the 2008 , continues to undermine Georgia's and NATO eligibility, reinforcing empirical evidence that alignment deters rather than provokes aggression.

Bosnia and Herzegovina's Status

joined NATO's programme on December 14, 2006, marking its initial step toward deeper cooperation with the Alliance following the 1995 that ended the . This participation facilitated reforms in defense restructuring, civilian control of the military, and interoperability with standards, though progress has been uneven due to the country's decentralized structure under two entities—the and —requiring consensus for key decisions. At the April 2010 NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in , , received an invitation to join the (MAP), a key preparatory mechanism for aspiring members involving political, economic, military, and legal reforms tailored to requirements. However, activation of the MAP was conditioned on fulfilling prerequisites, notably the complete registration of immovable defense property in a centralized state , a process stalled by opposition from authorities who viewed it as undermining entity autonomy. This impasse, persisting since 2010, reflects broader internal divisions exacerbated by ethnic veto mechanisms embedded in the Dayton framework, which enable leaders like to block reforms aligned with Euro-Atlantic integration. Republika Srpska's resistance, often aligned with Serbian and Russian interests, has cited concerns over 's Article 5 collective defense commitment conflicting with regional dynamics, including Serbia's non-alignment and Russia's opposition to Balkan expansion. Despite periodic advancements, such as partial defense property resolutions in 2012 and renewed reform pledges in 2022, full consensus remains elusive, preventing MAP activation and full accession candidacy. maintains aspirant status, with emphasizing that membership requires unanimous entity-level support and resolution of state-level dysfunctions to ensure credible defense contributions. Recent developments include NATO's February 2023 Defence Initiative package, targeting military modernization, cyber defense, and , alongside the July 2024 establishment of a Political Support Cell to bolster amid regional instability. In October 2024, NATO and adopted an for 2025–2028, focusing on stability in through enhanced interoperability and resilience against hybrid threats. As of October 2025, remains the sole European aspirant with a conditional MAP invitation but no activation, with NATO underscoring that internal political unity and reform implementation are prerequisites for progress toward membership.

Membership Debates and Proposals

Neutral States: Austria, Ireland, and Malta

, , and uphold longstanding policies of military neutrality, which constitutionally or traditionally bar participation in military alliances like , despite intensified security debates following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. These states engage with through the (PfP) program, enabling cooperation on defense reforms, , and interoperability without invoking collective defense obligations under Article 5. While public and elite discussions have questioned the viability of neutrality amid evolving threats, no formal membership applications have been pursued, reflecting sovereign commitments to non-alignment rooted in historical contexts such as settlements and post-colonial independence. Austria's neutrality is enshrined in its 1955 State Treaty, mandating permanent non-alignment in military conflicts as a condition for regaining sovereignty after World War II occupations by Allied powers, including the Soviet Union. This policy has endured through EU accession in 1995, with Austria opting out of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy's mutual assistance clause. Post-2022, debates escalated as some political figures, including Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg in July 2025, signaled openness to discussing NATO membership, arguing the "world has changed" due to Russian aggression. However, Chancellor Christian Stocker reaffirmed in 2025 that NATO accession remains off the agenda, prioritizing EU defense enhancements. Public opinion opposes joining, with a 2023 Gallup poll showing 61% against and only 21% in favor, though elites increasingly view neutrality as potentially obsolete against hybrid threats. Austria's PfP involvement since 1995 facilitates joint exercises and intelligence sharing, but constitutional amendments would be required for full membership, facing resistance from parties like the Social Democrats and Greens. Ireland's military neutrality, a pillar since independence in 1922, emphasizes non-participation in wars and avoidance of permanent military alliances, allowing peacekeeping under UN auspices but rejecting NATO's integrated command structure. This stance persisted through EU membership in 1973, with Ireland invoking neutrality to abstain from EU defense initiatives requiring alignment. The 2022 Ukraine crisis prompted renewed scrutiny, including government reviews of defense capabilities, yet officials clarified in 2025 that enhanced NATO ties do not signal membership intent. Proponents argue NATO accession could secure Irish waters against submarine threats and support Irish unity by removing neutrality as a Northern Ireland flashpoint, but polls indicate limited support, with 49% opposed and 19% favorable as of 2025. A 2025 survey showed a narrow 52-48 split favoring NATO or an EU army over status quo isolation, though Ireland's modest military—lacking significant power projection—poses practical barriers to accession. Critics, including neutrality advocates, warn that alliance membership could erode Ireland's UN mediation role and expose it to distant conflicts. Ireland participates in PfP since 1999 and Individual Partnership Cooperation Programs, focusing on cyber defense and maritime security without compromising non-alignment. Malta declared constitutional neutrality in 1979, committing to non-alignment and rejecting foreign military bases as part of its post-independence , influenced by dynamics and eviction of British forces in 1979. Upon EU entry in 2004, Malta affirmed this status, opting out of in defense while engaging selectively in EU missions. NATO relations emphasize respect for Malta's neutrality, with cooperation limited to the PfP framework since 1995 and a 2024 Individually Tailored Partnership Programme covering counter-terrorism and disaster response. Unlike and , Malta faces minimal domestic debate on NATO membership, prioritizing Mediterranean stability through non-alignment amid its strategic location. No proposals for accession emerged between 2022 and 2025, as neutrality aligns with Malta's small-state strategy of avoiding entanglement in great-power rivalries. Malta's armed forces, focused on territorial defense, lack the scale for NATO contributions, reinforcing reliance on partnerships over full alliance integration.

Balkan Complexities: Serbia, Kosovo, and Cyprus

maintains a policy of military non-alignment, explicitly rejecting membership despite participating in limited cooperation through the (PfP) program since 2006. This stance traces to the 1999 -led Operation Allied Force, which targeted Yugoslav forces during the conflict, resulting in civilian casualties estimated at 489-528 by and fostering enduring resentment. In February 2023, President Aleksandar Vučić stated that is pursuing European Union integration but "does not want to join ," reflecting broad domestic opposition influenced by historical grievances and closer ties to , including arms purchases and refusal to impose sanctions over the 2022 invasion. 's Individual with , renewed periodically, focuses on practical security reforms like demining and disaster response but stops short of Membership Action Plan (MAP) pursuits, prioritizing resolution of the dispute as a for any Western alignment shift. Kosovo's NATO aspirations, formalized in its 2008 declaration of independence from Serbia, encounter structural barriers due to incomplete international recognition and intra-alliance divisions. Only 97 of 193 UN members recognize Kosovo, excluding Serbia and , while four NATO states—, , , and —withhold recognition over concerns that it could embolden domestic separatist movements like or . NATO sustains the (KFOR) mission, deployed since June 1999 under UN Security Council Resolution 1244, with approximately 4,450 troops from 27 nations as of October 2024 enforcing demilitarization and protecting minorities amid recurrent tensions, including the May 2023 Banjska clash that killed one Serbian policeman and injured NATO personnel. Progress toward a MAP requires normalization with Serbia via EU-mediated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue, stalled since 2021 over issues like license plate reciprocity and Serb parallel institutions in northern Kosovo; without a comprehensive agreement, experts assess NATO integration as improbable, as it would exacerbate Serbia's veto in regional bodies and risk alienating non-recognizing allies. Cyprus's potential NATO engagement is constrained by the island's partition since Turkey's 1974 invasion, which controls 36% of territory via the unrecognized Turkish Republic of (TRNC), hosting around 40,000 Turkish troops. The Republic of Cyprus, a 2004 EU member adhering to neutrality until recent shifts, has explored enhanced ties, including U.S. defense cooperation agreements in 2018 and 2020, but full membership faces veto threats from , a founder since 1952, which views Cypriot accession as legitimizing the Greek Cypriot government over the north. Greece-Turkey frictions, including maritime disputes in the , compound this, as Cyprus lacks the unified sovereignty required for alliance protocols, mirroring how its EU status blocks 's deeper integration. Alternative paths like individualized partnerships exist, but Turkish opposition—evident in Ankara's November 2024 condemnation of Cypriot overtures—renders enlargement untenable absent a UN-brokered bizonal settlement, which failed in Crans- talks in 2017. These cases illustrate cascading effects: Serbia's Kosovo claims block Pristina's path, while Cyprus's division exploits NATO's consensus rule, where one member's objections halt consensus, perpetuating a fragmented Balkan security landscape despite NATO's post-Cold War expansions elsewhere.

Other Regional Proposals: Moldova and Beyond

Moldova established formal ties with through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and joined the program in 1994, marking 30 years of participation by 2024. Cooperation has emphasized defense reforms, cybersecurity, and disaster response, with intensified efforts following Russia's 2014 annexation of and full-scale invasion of in 2022. has provided non-lethal assistance, including and equipment, while respecting Moldova's constitutional commitment to permanent neutrality under Article 11, which prohibits membership in military alliances. In September 2023, Deputy Secretary General reaffirmed support for Moldova's sovereignty amid hybrid threats from , without advancing membership discussions. Despite elite-level suggestions, such as President Maia Sandu's January 2023 comment that Moldova might consider joining "a larger " for security, no formal has been pursued. A July 2025 poll indicated two-thirds of Moldovans oppose accession, reflecting persistent low public support influenced by historical Soviet ties and campaigns. Constitutional neutrality remains entrenched, with a 2024 successfully embedding EU integration goals but failing to amend neutrality provisions amid pro-Russian opposition. Key obstacles include the unresolved , where approximately 1,500 Russian troops have been stationed since the 1992 ceasefire, enabling Moscow's leverage and complicating . has repeatedly called for their withdrawal, viewing the presence as a destabilizing factor, yet Moldova's government prioritizes EU alignment over membership due to domestic divisions and vulnerability to Russian economic coercion. Beyond Moldova, NATO enlargement proposals remain limited in adjacent regions, with emphasis on partnerships rather than accession. In the , has deepened ties since 2020, participating in NATO exercises and receiving advisory support amid its rift with following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, but no membership application exists due to tensions with NATO ally and 's competing interests. maintains Individual Partnership Action Plans since 2006, contributing to in and , yet prioritizes and bilateral ties over full integration, as argued in analyses favoring its strategic Caspian position without formal bids. In , countries like and engage through the and Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programmes, focusing on and border security, but constitutional neutrality and reliance on Russian-led structures preclude enlargement ambitions. These arrangements reflect NATO's pragmatic approach to regional stability without extending the open-door policy to areas lacking consensus or facing entrenched geopolitical barriers.

Controversies and Criticisms

Russian Narratives of Provocation and Broken Promises

Russian officials have long asserted that NATO's eastward enlargement violated informal assurances given to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during negotiations on German reunification in 1990, portraying the alliance's expansion as an act of deliberate provocation that encroached on Russia's sphere of influence. On February 9, 1990, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker verbally assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand "one inch eastward" beyond a unified Germany, a statement echoed in declassified memoranda from meetings involving leaders like German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and U.S. President George H.W. Bush. These assurances, however, were context-specific to East Germany, lacked any formal treaty language in the subsequent Two Plus Four Agreement signed on September 12, 1990, and did not extend binding commitments to future sovereign states beyond the former German Democratic Republic. Under President , Russia initially accommodated NATO's overtures despite public reservations, signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act on May 27, 1997, which established a consultative framework amid the alliance's first post-Cold War enlargement inviting Poland, , and the . Yeltsin described NATO expansion negatively in a Paris speech that day, acknowledging it as a "mistake" while praising NATO's diplomatic engagement, though declassified records reveal he privately viewed the act as a "forced step" necessitated by 's weakened position. This period saw no military response from , as 's economy contracted by over 40% in the and its military capabilities diminished sharply, undermining claims of immediate existential threat from voluntary alignments by Eastern European democracies seeking protection from potential Russian resurgence. The narrative intensified under President Vladimir Putin, who in his February 2007 Munich Security Conference speech labeled NATO enlargement a "serious provocation" that eroded strategic stability and trust between Russia and the West. Putin has repeatedly invoked the alleged broken promises in justifying military actions, including the 2014 annexation of Crimea and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, framing enlargement—particularly the 2008 Bucharest Summit's declaration of eventual membership for Ukraine and Georgia—as an aggressive encirclement threatening Russia's security. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has echoed this, asserting in State Department briefings that NATO's "relentless expansion" violated 1990 understandings and provoked defensive responses. Yet empirical evidence counters the provocation thesis: NATO's post-1999 enlargements correlated with democratic consolidation in new members, reduced interstate conflicts in Central Europe, and no forward deployment of substantial combat forces eastward until Russia's 2014 aggression, suggesting the narrative rationalizes imperial aims rather than reacts to causal threats. Critics of the Russian position, including Gorbachev himself in 2014 interviews, affirm no formal pledge barred enlargement, as post-dissolution of the USSR in 1991 exercised their right to choose alliances absent any legal prohibition. Declassified U.S. and allied documents confirm discussions rejected broader membership for Warsaw Pact states in 1990 but imposed no veto on future applications, with enlargement driven by applicant nations' fears of Russian evidenced by events like the 1994 Budapest Memorandum's unheeded security assurances to . This perspective aligns with first-principles analysis: voluntary defensive pacts among neighbors stabilize regions against autocratic neighbors, as Russia's conventional military inferiority in the 1990s precluded any realistic "attack" scenario, rendering provocation claims ahistorical pretext for dominance.

Internal Western Debates on Expansion Costs and Risks

Prominent Western diplomats and strategists expressed concerns that NATO enlargement would impose significant financial burdens and strategic vulnerabilities. In a 1997 New York Times op-ed, , architect of the U.S. policy against the , warned that expanding eastward would constitute "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era," predicting it would inflame , militarism, and anti-Western sentiments, potentially reviving Cold War-like divisions across Europe. Kennan's critique, echoed by other realists, highlighted the risk of alienating without commensurate security gains, arguing that the alliance's defensive posture would extend unnecessarily toward former adversaries, complicating deterrence and increasing the likelihood of miscalculation in crises. Financial estimates for integrating new members fueled debates over fiscal sustainability, with projections varying widely due to infrastructure upgrades, military modernization, and troop relocations. A 1997 U.S. report assessed total costs at $27–35 billion over a decade, with the U.S. bearing approximately $1.5 billion, primarily for enhancing command structures and forward deployments in . Critics contended these figures understated long-term expenses, including potential U.S. subsidies for poorer entrants' defense reforms, with alternative analyses estimating up to $125 billion overall, much of it falling on American taxpayers amid domestic budgetary pressures. Such costs were seen as diverting resources from core U.S. priorities, like engagements, and straining alliance cohesion if new members failed to meet spending targets. Strategic risks centered on overextension and entanglement in regional conflicts, diluting NATO's focus and consensus mechanisms. analysis in 1997 noted that enlargement could weaken the alliance's ability to achieve internal agreement, heighten demands on U.S. forces for peripheral defenses, and inadvertently destabilize non-members like by creating security vacuums. A U.S. Army War College study questioned whether the benefits justified the hazards, arguing expansion might provoke revanchist responses from while exposing NATO to asymmetric threats in the east, without bolstering overall European stability. Detractors, including some in the administration's internal deliberations, feared it would entangle the U.S. in ethnic disputes or , raising the specter of Article 5 invocations over border skirmishes. U.S. congressional hearings in the late amplified these concerns, with debating the policy's merits amid testimony on Russian opposition and alliance dilution. During 1997 Senate Foreign Relations Committee sessions, opponents argued expansion risked fracturing U.S.- cooperation on and , potentially costing billions in lost diplomatic leverage. The 1998 ratification debates for , Hungary, and the Czech Republic saw reservations about uncompensated U.S. burden-sharing, with critics estimating indirect costs from heightened readiness postures exceeding initial projections. Despite ultimate approval, these discussions underscored persistent Western apprehensions that enlargement prioritized symbolic gains over prudent , potentially eroding public support for the alliance.

Empirical Achievements: Enhanced Deterrence and Democratic Consolidation

NATO enlargement has demonstrably enhanced deterrence by extending the alliance's collective defense commitments under Article 5 to former and Soviet republic territories, stabilizing where inter-state conflicts had persisted historically. Since the first post-Cold War accessions in 1999—incorporating the , , and —no member has experienced territorial invasion or sustained military aggression from , contrasting sharply with non-members such as Georgia in 2008 and in 2014 and 2022. This pattern aligns with , as Russia's restraint toward states, including the Baltic republics bordering its territory, reflects the perceived costs of invoking alliance-wide response, evidenced by Russia's avoidance of direct confrontation despite territorial proximities and historical claims. Post-enlargement military postures, including NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups deployed in , , , and since 2017, have further reinforced this deterrent effect without provoking escalation, maintaining zero instances of armed incursions into alliance territory. Empirical assessments indicate that enlargement contributed to resolving regional disputes and fostering cooperative security arrangements among new members, reducing the risk of localized conflicts that plagued the region in the early 1990s, such as ethnic tensions in the prior to stabilizations tied to integration. On , NATO's accession criteria—mandating stable democratic institutions, , civilian military control, and resolution of ethnic conflicts as outlined in the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement—compelled aspiring members to implement reforms that entrenched post-communist transitions. New members like and the transitioned from partial to full democratic status, with political rights and civil liberties scores improving to 1 (on a 1-7 scale, where 1 is best) by accession and largely sustained thereafter, outperforming non-NATO post-communist peers such as (7/7) and (mixed but volatile). Quantitative analyses confirm a positive , with NATO candidacy incentivizing institutional safeguards against authoritarian reversion, as seen in the 2004 wave countries where democratizing trends reduced nationalist frictions and stabilized governance. While some new members experienced democratic in the —evident in Hungary's score declining to 3/7 for political rights by 2023—the initial enlargement phase achieved net gains in consolidation relative to baseline communist-era , with alliance oversight and peer pressures aiding resilience against reversals compared to excluded states. This causal link is supported by comparative studies showing membership's role in embedding democratic norms amid territorial threats from revisionist neighbors, fostering long-term political stability.

Rebuttals to Expansion-Caused-Conflict Theses

Critics of enlargement, including Russian officials, have claimed that Western leaders promised Soviet leader in 1990 not to expand the alliance eastward beyond a unified , and that subsequent enlargements violated this assurance, provoking Russian aggression. However, declassified documents from U.S., German, and other archives indicate that discussions focused on non-deployment of forces in the former German Democratic Republic during a transitional period, with no binding or formal commitment prohibiting future enlargement to other . himself stated in that no such promise existed in writing or as an international agreement. While some oral assurances were made to alleviate immediate Soviet concerns amid , these were not codified, and 's founding allows any European state to apply for membership by choice. Enlargement proceeded through voluntary applications from Central and Eastern European states seeking security guarantees against potential following the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, reflecting their right under to choose alliances without external veto. From 1999 to 2004, waves including Poland, , the , and the joined amid broad Russian acquiescence under President , who signed the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act establishing cooperative mechanisms. No military incidents or escalations occurred contemporaneously with these accessions, undermining causal claims linking expansion to immediate conflict. Russia's economic recovery and military modernization in the early 2000s, rather than NATO moves, enabled subsequent assertiveness under , whose 2007 speech criticized U.S. dominance but did not cite enlargement as a until after his own interventions. Russian military actions demonstrate a pattern of aggression against non-NATO neighbors predating or decoupled from alliance prospects. In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia—whose NATO Membership Action Plan was aspirational but unrealized—occupying 20% of its territory in response to Tbilisi's attempt to reassert control over , establishing a for recognizing breakaway entities to block integration with the West. Similarly, Russia's of and support for separatists in occurred after Ukraine's Revolution of Dignity ousted pro-Russian President , driven by Kyiv's pivot toward European association rather than imminent NATO accession, as Ukraine's constitution did not prioritize membership until 2019. These interventions align with Putin's articulated view of as within Russia's "sphere of privileged interests," not reactive defenses against NATO. Empirical outcomes refute the provocation thesis: NATO's eastern members experienced , economic growth averaging 4-6% annually in the 2000s, and zero interstate conflicts among them, contrasting with instability in non-aligned like and , where Russian influence persisted. Studies attribute this stability to enlargement's deterrence effects, which locked in reforms and reduced revanchist risks without deploying permanent combat troops eastward until after 2014. Russia's full-scale invasion of in February 2022—despite and no NATO membership path for —further illustrates that expansion serves as a post-hoc justification for imperial aims, as evidenced by Putin's essays denying Ukrainian sovereignty and invoking historical . Subsequent applications from and , finalized in 2023 and 2024, directly responded to the invasion, expanding NATO's border with by over 800 miles without eliciting preemptive Russian action, inverting the causal arrow.

Impacts and Future Outlook

Effects on European and Global Security Architecture

NATO enlargement has transformed the European security landscape by extending collective defense guarantees to 20 additional members since 1999, creating a contiguous alliance border from the to the and consolidating post-Cold War divisions. This process integrated former Soviet satellites and republics, such as , , and the in 1999, and the in 2004, into a framework that prioritizes democratic stability and mutual defense under Article 5, reducing the risk of interstate conflict in . Empirical data indicate no armed conflicts between NATO members post-enlargement, contrasting with pre-1999 instability in the region, including the . The inclusion of Nordic states Finland in 2023 and Sweden in 2024, prompted by Russia's 2022 invasion of , fortified NATO's northern flank, adding over 1,300 kilometers of border with and enhancing deterrence against potential hybrid threats. This expansion has empirically strengthened alliance cohesion, with new members contributing to enhanced forward presence battlegroups in the Baltics and , where multinational forces deter aggression without provoking it, as evidenced by Russia's restraint toward NATO territory despite rhetoric. Critics alleging provocation overlook that Russian military actions targeted non-members—Georgia in 2008 and in 2014—prior to further enlargements, suggesting internal rather than causal response to NATO growth. Globally, NATO's enlargement has positioned the alliance as a cornerstone of transatlantic security, influencing partnerships beyond , such as with , , and through enhanced dialogues on shared challenges like cybersecurity and . By absorbing European states into a U.S.-led structure, enlargement has distributed deterrence burdens while maintaining U.S. strategic primacy, countering perceptions of ; however, it has strained relations with non-aligned powers like and , who view it as , though declassified records confirm no binding Western promises against expansion. This architecture complements other institutions like the EU's , fostering a layered global order where NATO's Article 5 credibility deters revisionist powers empirically, as no adversary has tested it since 1949.

Economic and Military Burden-Sharing Challenges

NATO enlargement has intensified debates over burden-sharing, as the addition of economically diverse members—particularly from —expanded the alliance's collective defense obligations without immediate proportional increases in contributions from newer entrants. Prior to Russia's 2014 annexation of , many European allies, including prospective and recent members like and , allocated less than 1% of GDP to defense, relying heavily on U.S. forces for deterrence and expeditionary capabilities. This asymmetry prompted U.S. policymakers to argue that enlargement risked exacerbating free-riding, where wealthier members subsidize poorer ones' security without reciprocal investments in modern forces. For instance, the 1997-1999 enlargement of , , and the incurred estimated direct costs of $10-27 billion over a decade for and integration, largely borne by existing members through common funding mechanisms. Militarily, integration challenges arose from varying capabilities among new members, necessitating extensive U.S.-led training, equipment standardization, and upgrades that strained alliance resources. Eastern European entrants often inherited outdated Soviet-era equipment, requiring billions in modernization; for example, the ' post-2004 accession demanded rapid buildup of air policing and brigade-sized units, supported by U.S. rotational deployments rather than equivalent host-nation contributions initially. Critics, including U.S. defense analysts, contend this diluted overall readiness, as enlargement extended Article 5 guarantees to vulnerable frontiers without commensurate force generation, leading to over-reliance on American expeditionary assets in operations like , where European contingents underperformed relative to their populations. Empirical analyses of burden-sharing from 1950-2024 highlight persistent inequality in defense outlays, with Gini coefficients indicating uneven distribution even after enlargements, as newer members prioritized economic recovery over military spending. Recent data shows progress but underscores ongoing challenges: while all 32 members are projected to meet the 2% GDP guideline in 2025—up from three in 2014—only a minority, including several post-enlargement states like (4.48% in 2024) and the Baltics, exceed it substantially, leaving the U.S. at 3.38% and covering roughly two-thirds of total alliance expenditures. Balkan and newcomers, such as and , continue to hover near the minimum, complicating equitable burden distribution amid heightened threats. Economically, this has fueled calls for "burden-shifting" toward European capabilities, as U.S. commitments elsewhere, including the , limit transatlantic reinforcements. Proponents of stricter sharing argue that without deeper investments in enablers like and cyber defense, enlargement's security benefits risk being undermined by capability gaps, potentially eroding deterrence credibility.

Prospects Amid Ongoing Geopolitical Shifts

Ukraine's aspiration for membership, formalized in legislation adopted by its parliament on June 8, 2017, has gained renewed momentum amid Russia's full-scale invasion launched on February 24, 2022, which underscored the alliance's role in deterring aggression. At the Summit on July 11-12, 2023, allies removed the Membership Action Plan (MAP) requirement for , affirming that it would join upon meeting conditions without additional steps, thereby establishing an irreversible path to membership. This decision reflected a consensus that Russian threats necessitated bolstering Eastern Flank security, with empirical evidence from post-2004 enlargements showing no causal link between expansion and Moscow's , as Russia's actions preceded formal invitations in cases like Georgia's 2008 war. The Washington Summit on July 9-11, 2024, reaffirmed this trajectory, establishing the NATO Security Assistance and Training for (NSATU) to coordinate aid and pledging long-term security assistance exceeding EUR 35 billion by 2025, while emphasizing interoperability reforms as prerequisites for accession. However, prospects remain contingent on resolving the ongoing conflict, with no fixed timeline; Ukrainian forces' demonstrated resilience in halting Russian advances has strengthened alliance resolve, but domestic political hurdles in NATO members like and , which delayed consensus, highlight implementation risks. As of 2025, NATO Secretary General has reiterated support for Ukraine's path despite U.S. leadership transitions post-2024 elections, where incoming administrations have expressed varying enthusiasm for further enlargement. Georgia, committed to membership via its 2008 NATO aspirations and the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package initiated in 2014, faces stalled progress due to 20% territorial occupation by Russian forces since the 2008 war, yet the Vilnius Summit extended annual packages to enhance capabilities against hybrid threats. Bosnia and Herzegovina, the sole current MAP holder since April 2010, grapples with internal divisions, particularly Bosnian Serb separatism, limiting consensus on reforms needed for invitation, though NATO maintains an open door policy under Article 10. Emerging interests from Armenia, following its 2023-2024 setbacks in Nagorno-Karabakh, include informal overtures for partnership amid disillusionment with Russian security guarantees, but formal candidacy remains nascent without MAP or consensus. Broader geopolitical shifts, including China's alignment with Russia and hybrid threats to the Western Balkans, have prompted to prioritize merit-based enlargement for stability, with empirical data from Finland's April 4, 2023, and Sweden's March 7, 2024, accessions demonstrating rapid integration bolsters deterrence without escalating conflicts. Critics within Western institutions argue expansion strains resources, but alliance commitments at summits indicate sustained momentum, tempered by requirements for democratic reforms and burden-sharing, as Russia's battlefield setbacks in empirically validate 's adaptive posture over accommodationist alternatives.

References

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