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Naval mine
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A naval mine is a self-contained explosive weapon placed in water to damage or destroy surface ships or submarines. Similar to anti-personnel and other land mines, and unlike purpose launched naval depth charges, they are deposited and left to wait until, depending on their fuzing, they are triggered by the approach of or contact with any vessel.
Naval mines can be used offensively, to hamper enemy shipping movements or lock vessels into a harbour; or defensively, to create "safe" zones protecting friendly sea lanes, harbours, and naval assets. Mines allow the minelaying force commander to concentrate warships or defensive assets in mine-free areas giving the adversary three choices: undertake a resource-intensive and time-consuming minesweeping effort, accept the casualties of challenging the minefield, or use the unmined waters where the greatest concentration of enemy firepower will be encountered.[1]
Although international law requires signatory nations to declare mined areas, precise locations remain secret, and non-complying parties might not disclose minelaying. While mines threaten only those who choose to traverse waters that may be mined, the possibility of activating a mine is a powerful disincentive to shipping. In the absence of effective measures to limit each mine's lifespan, the hazard to shipping can remain long after the war in which the mines were laid is over. Unless detonated by a parallel time fuze at the end of their useful life, naval mines need to be found and dismantled after the end of hostilities; an often prolonged, costly, and hazardous task.
Modern mines containing high explosives detonated by complex electronic fuze mechanisms are much more effective than early gunpowder mines requiring physical ignition. Mines may be placed by aircraft, ships, submarines, or individual swimmers and boatmen. Minesweeping is the practice of the removal of explosive naval mines, usually by a specially designed ship called a minesweeper using various measures to either capture or detonate the mines, but sometimes also with an aircraft made for that purpose. There are also mines that release a homing torpedo rather than explode themselves.
Description
[edit]Mines can be laid in many ways: by purpose-built minelayers, refitted ships, submarines, or aircraft—and even by dropping them into a harbour by hand. They can be inexpensive: some variants can cost as little as US $2,000, though more sophisticated mines can cost millions of dollars, be equipped with several kinds of sensors, and deliver a warhead by rocket or torpedo.

Their flexibility and cost-effectiveness make mines attractive to the less powerful belligerent in asymmetric warfare. The cost of producing and laying a mine is usually between 0.5% and 10% of the cost of removing it, and it can take up to 200 times as long to clear a minefield as to lay it. Parts of some World War II naval minefields still exist because they are too extensive and expensive to clear.[2] Some 1940s-era mines may remain dangerous for many years.[3]
Mines have been employed as offensive or defensive weapons in rivers, lakes, estuaries, seas, and oceans, but they can also be used as tools of psychological warfare. Offensive mines are placed in enemy waters, outside harbours, and across important shipping routes to sink both merchant and military vessels. Defensive minefields safeguard key stretches of coast from enemy ships and submarines, forcing them into more easily defended areas, or keeping them away from sensitive ones.
Shipowners are reluctant to send their ships through known minefields. Port authorities may attempt to clear a mined area, but those without effective minesweeping equipment may cease using the area. Transit of a mined area will be attempted only when strategic interests outweigh potential losses. The decision-makers' perception of the minefield is a critical factor. Minefields designed for psychological effect are usually placed on trade routes to stop ships from reaching an enemy nation. They are often spread thinly, to create an impression of minefields existing across large areas. A single mine inserted strategically on a shipping route can stop maritime movements for days while the entire area is swept. A mine's capability to sink ships makes it a credible threat, but minefields work more on the mind than on ships.[4]
International law, specifically the Eighth Hague Convention of 1907, requires nations to declare when they mine an area, to make it easier for civil shipping to avoid the mines. The warnings do not have to be specific; for example, during World War II, Britain declared simply that it had mined the English Channel, North Sea and French coast.[citation needed]
History
[edit]Early use
[edit]Naval mines were first invented by Chinese innovators of Imperial China and were described in thorough detail by the early Ming dynasty artillery officer Jiao Yu, in his 14th-century military treatise known as the Huolongjing.[5] Chinese records tell of naval explosives in the 16th century, used to fight against Japanese pirates (wokou). This kind of naval mine was loaded in a wooden box, sealed with putty. General Qi Jiguang made several timed, drifting explosives, to harass Japanese pirate ships.[6] The Tiangong Kaiwu (The Exploitation of the Works of Nature) treatise, written by Song Yingxing in 1637, describes naval mines with a ripcord pulled by hidden ambushers located on the nearby shore who rotated a steel wheel flint mechanism to produce sparks and ignite the fuze of the naval mine.[7] Although this is the rotating steel wheel's first use in naval mines, Jiao Yu described their use for land mines in the 14th century.[8]
The first plan for a sea mine in the West was by Ralph Rabbards, who presented his design to Queen Elizabeth I of England in 1574.[7] The Dutch inventor Cornelius Drebbel was employed in the Office of Ordnance by King Charles I of England to make weapons, including the failed "floating petard".[9] Weapons of this type were apparently tried by the English at the Siege of La Rochelle in 1627.[10]

American David Bushnell developed the first American naval mine, for use against the British in the American War of Independence.[11] It was a watertight keg filled with gunpowder that was floated toward the enemy, detonated by a sparking mechanism if it struck a ship. It was used on the Delaware River as a drift mine, destroying a small boat near its intended target, a British warship.[12]
The 19th century
[edit]
The 1804 Raid on Boulogne made extensive use of explosive devices designed by inventor Robert Fulton. The 'torpedo-catamaran' was a coffer-like device balanced on two wooden floats and steered by a man with a paddle. Weighted with lead so as to ride low in the water, the operator was further disguised by wearing dark clothes and a black cap.[13] His task was to approach the French ship, hook the torpedo to the anchor cable and, having activated the device by removing a pin, remove the paddles and escape before the torpedo detonated.[14] Also to be deployed were large numbers of casks filled with gunpowder, ballast and combustible balls. They would float in on the tide and on washing up against an enemy's hull, explode.[14] Also included in the force were several fireships, carrying 40 barrels of gunpowder and rigged to explode by a clockwork mechanism.[14]
In 1812, Russian engineer Pavel Shilling exploded an underwater mine using an electrical circuit. In 1842 Samuel Colt used an electric detonator to destroy a moving vessel to demonstrate an underwater mine of his own design to the United States Navy and President John Tyler. However, opposition from former president John Quincy Adams, scuttled the project as "not fair and honest warfare".[15] In 1854, during the unsuccessful attempt of the Anglo-French (101 warships) fleet to seize the Kronstadt fortress, British steamships HMS Merlin (9 June 1855, the first successful mining in Western history), HMS Vulture and HMS Firefly suffered damage due to the underwater explosions of Russian naval mines. Russian naval specialists set more than 1,500 naval mines, or infernal machines, designed by Moritz von Jacobi and by Immanuel Nobel,[16] in the Gulf of Finland during the Crimean War of 1853–1856. The mining of Vulcan led to the world's first minesweeping operation.[17][18] During the next 72 hours, 33 mines were swept.[19]
The Jacobi mine was designed by German-born, Russian engineer Jacobi, in 1853. The mine was tied to the sea bottom by an anchor. A cable connected it to a galvanic cell which powered it from the shore, the power of its explosive charge was equal to 14 kg (31 lb) of black powder. In the summer of 1853, the production of the mine was approved by the Committee for Mines of the Ministry of War of the Russian Empire. In 1854, 60 Jacobi mines were laid in the vicinity of the Forts Pavel and Alexander (Kronstadt), to deter the British Baltic Fleet from attacking them. It gradually phased out its direct competitor the Nobel mine on the insistence of Admiral Fyodor Litke. The Nobel mines were bought from Swedish industrialist Immanuel Nobel who had entered into collusion with the Russian head of navy Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov. Despite their high cost (100 Russian rubles) the Nobel mines proved to be faulty, exploding while being laid, failing to explode or detaching from their wires, and drifting uncontrollably, at least 70 of them were subsequently disarmed by the British. In 1855, 301 more Jacobi mines were laid around Krostadt and Lisy Nos. British ships did not dare to approach them.[20]
In the 19th century, mines were called torpedoes, a name probably conferred by Robert Fulton after the torpedo fish, which gives powerful electric shocks. A spar torpedo was a mine attached to a long pole and detonated when the ship carrying it rammed another one and withdrew a safe distance. The submarine H. L. Hunley used one to sink USS Housatonic on 17 February 1864. A Harvey torpedo was a type of floating mine towed alongside a ship and was briefly in service in the Royal Navy in the 1870s. Other "torpedoes" were attached to ships or propelled themselves. One such weapon called the Whitehead torpedo after its inventor, caused the word "torpedo" to apply to self-propelled underwater missiles as well as to static devices. These mobile devices were also known as "fish torpedoes".
The American Civil War of 1861–1865 also saw the successful use of mines. The first ship sunk by a mine, USS Cairo, foundered in 1862 in the Yazoo River. Rear Admiral David Farragut's famous command during the Battle of Mobile Bay in 1864, "Damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead!"[note 1] refers to a minefield laid at Mobile, Alabama.
After 1865 the United States adopted the mine as its primary weapon for coastal defense. In the decade following 1868, Major Henry Larcom Abbot carried out a lengthy set of experiments to design and test moored mines that could be exploded on contact or be detonated at will as enemy shipping passed near them. This initial development of mines in the United States took place under the purview of the US Army Corps of Engineers, which trained officers and men in their use at the Engineer School of Application at Willets Point, New York (later named Fort Totten). In 1901 underwater minefields became the responsibility of the US Army's Artillery Corps, and in 1907 this was a founding responsibility of the United States Army Coast Artillery Corps.[21]
The Imperial Russian Navy, a pioneer in mine warfare, successfully deployed mines against the Ottoman Navy during both the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).[22]
During the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), the Peruvian Navy, at a time when the Chilean squadron was blockading the Peruvian ports, formed a brigade of torpedo boats under the command of the frigate captain Leopoldo Sánchez Calderón and the Peruvian engineer Manuel Cuadros, who perfected the naval torpedo or mine system to be electrically activated when the cargo weight was lifted. This system was employed on 3 July 1880, in front of the port of Callao, when the gunned transport Loa was sunk while capturing a sloop mined by the Peruvians. A similar fate occurred to the gunboat schooner Covadonga in front of the port of Chancay, on 13 September 1880 when a captured pleasure boat exploded while being hoisted on its side.[23]
During the Battle of Tamsui (1884), in the Keelung Campaign of the Sino-French War, Chinese forces in Taiwan under Liu Mingchuan took measures to reinforce Tamsui against the French; they planted nine torpedo mines in the river and blocked the entrance.[24]
Early 20th century
[edit]During the Boxer Rebellion, Imperial Chinese forces deployed a command-detonated mine field at the mouth of the Hai River before the Dagu forts, to prevent the western Allied forces from sending ships to attack.[25][26]
The next major use of mines was during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. Two mines blew up when the Petropavlovsk struck them near Port Arthur, sending the holed vessel to the bottom and killing the fleet commander, Admiral Stepan Makarov, and most of his crew in the process. The toll inflicted by mines was not confined to the Russians, however. The Japanese Navy lost two battleships, four cruisers, two destroyers and a torpedo-boat to offensively laid mines during the war. Most famously, on 15 May 1904, the Russian minelayer Amur planted a 50-mine minefield off Port Arthur and succeeded in sinking the Japanese battleships Hatsuse and Yashima.
Following the end of the Russo-Japanese War, several nations attempted to have mines banned as weapons of war at the Hague Peace Conference (1907).[22]
Many early mines were fragile and dangerous to handle, as they contained glass containers filled with nitroglycerin or mechanical devices that activated a blast upon tipping. Several mine-laying ships were destroyed when their cargo exploded.[27]
Beginning around the start of the 20th century, submarine mines played a major role in the defense of US harbours against enemy attacks as part of the Endicott and Taft Programs. The mines employed were controlled mines, anchored to the bottoms of the harbours, and detonated under control from large mine casemates onshore.

During World War I, mines were used extensively to defend coasts, coastal shipping, ports and naval bases around the globe. The Germans laid mines in shipping lanes to sink merchant and naval vessels serving Britain. The Allies targeted the German U-boats in the Strait of Dover and the Hebrides. In an attempt to seal up the northern exits of the North Sea, the Allies developed the North Sea Mine Barrage. During a period of five months from June 1918, almost 70,000 mines were laid spanning the North Sea's northern exits. The total number of mines laid in the North Sea, the British East Coast, Straits of Dover, and Heligoland Bight is estimated at 190,000 and the total number during the whole of WWI was 235,000 sea mines.[28] Clearing the barrage after the war took 82 ships and five months, working around the clock.[29] It was also during World War I, that the British hospital ship, HMHS Britannic, became the largest vessel ever sunk by a naval mine[citation needed]. The Britannic was the sister ship of the RMS Titanic, and the RMS Olympic.[30]
World War II
[edit]
During World War II, the U-boat fleet, which dominated much of the battle of the Atlantic, was small at the beginning of the war and much of the early action by German forces involved mining convoy routes and ports around Britain. German submarines also operated in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Caribbean Sea, and along the US coast.
Initially, contact mines (requiring a ship to physically strike a mine to detonate it) were employed, usually tethered at the end of a cable just below the surface of the water. Contact mines usually blew a hole in ships' hulls. By the beginning of World War II, most nations had developed mines that could be dropped from aircraft, some of which floated on the surface, making it possible to lay them in enemy harbours. The use of dredging and nets was effective against this type of mine, but this consumed valuable time and resources and required harbours to be closed.
Later, some ships survived mine blasts, limping into port with buckled plates and broken backs. This appeared to be due to a new type of mine, detecting ships by their proximity to the mine (an influence mine) and detonating at a distance, causing damage with the shock wave of the explosion. Ships that had successfully run the gantlet of the Atlantic crossing were sometimes destroyed entering freshly cleared British harbours. More shipping was being lost than could be replaced, and Churchill ordered the intact recovery of one of these new mines to be of the highest priority.

The British experienced a stroke of luck in November 1939, when a German mine was dropped from an aircraft onto the mudflats off Shoeburyness during low tide. Additionally, the land belonged to the army and a base with men and workshops was at hand. Experts were dispatched from HMS Vernon to investigate the mine. The Royal Navy knew that mines could use magnetic sensors, Britain having developed magnetic mines in World War I, so everyone removed all metal, including their buttons, and made tools of non-magnetic brass.[31] They disarmed the mine and rushed it to the labs at HMS Vernon, where scientists discovered that the mine had a magnetic arming mechanism. A large ferrous object passing through the Earth's magnetic field will concentrate the field through it, due to its magnetic permeability; the mine's detector was designed to trigger as a ship passed over when the Earth's magnetic field was concentrated in the ship and away from the mine. The mine detected this loss of the magnetic field which caused it to detonate. The mechanism had an adjustable sensitivity, calibrated in milligauss.

From this data, known methods were used to clear these mines. Early methods included the use of large electromagnets dragged behind ships or below low-flying aircraft (a number of older bombers like the Vickers Wellington were used for this). Both of these methods had the disadvantage of "sweeping" only a small strip. A better solution was found in the "Double-L Sweep"[32] using electrical cables dragged behind ships that passed large pulses of current through the seawater. This created a large magnetic field and swept the entire area between the two ships. The older methods continued to be used in smaller areas. The Suez Canal continued to be swept by aircraft, for instance.
While these methods were useful for clearing mines from local ports, they were of little or no use for enemy-controlled areas. These were typically visited by warships, and the majority of the fleet then underwent a massive degaussing process, where their hulls had a slight "south" bias induced into them which offset the concentration-effect almost to zero.
Initially, major warships and large troopships had a copper degaussing coil fitted around the perimeter of the hull, energized by the ship's electrical system whenever in suspected magnetic-mined waters. Some of the first to be so fitted were the carrier HMS Ark Royal and the liners RMS Queen Mary and RMS Queen Elizabeth. It was a photo of one of these liners in New York harbour, showing the degaussing coil, which revealed to German Naval Intelligence the fact that the British were using degaussing methods to combat their magnetic mines.[33] This was felt to be impractical for smaller warships and merchant vessels, mainly because the ships lacked the generating capacity to energise such a coil. It was found that "wiping" a current-carrying cable up and down a ship's hull[34] temporarily canceled the ships' magnetic signature sufficiently to nullify the threat. This started in late 1939, and by 1940 merchant vessels and the smaller British warships were largely immune for a few months at a time until they once again built up a field.
The cruiser HMS Belfast is just one example of a ship that was struck by a magnetic mine during this time. On 21 November 1939, a mine broke her keel, which damaged her engine and boiler rooms, as well as injuring 46 men, one later died from his injuries. She was towed to Rosyth for repairs. Incidents like this resulted in many of the boats that sailed to Dunkirk being degaussed in a marathon four-day effort by degaussing stations.[35]

The Allies and Germany deployed acoustic mines in World War II, against which even wooden-hulled ships (in particular minesweepers) remained vulnerable.[36] Japan developed sonic generators to sweep these; the gear was not ready by war's end.[36] The primary method Japan used was small air-delivered bombs. This was profligate and ineffectual; used against acoustic mines at Penang, 200 bombs were needed to detonate just 13 mines.[36]
The Germans developed a pressure-activated mine and planned to deploy it as well, but they saved it for later use when it became clear the British had defeated the magnetic system. The US also deployed these, adding "counters" which would allow a variable number of ships to pass unharmed before detonating.[36] This made them a great deal harder to sweep.[36]
Mining campaigns could have devastating consequences. The US effort against Japan, for instance, closed major ports, such as Hiroshima, for days,[37] and by the end of the Pacific War had cut the amount of freight passing through Kobe–Yokohama by 90%.[37]
When the war ended, more than 25,000 US-laid mines were still in place, and the Navy proved unable to sweep them all, limiting efforts to critical areas.[38] After sweeping for almost a year, in May 1946, the Navy abandoned the effort with 13,000 mines still unswept.[38] Over the next thirty years, more than 500 minesweepers (of a variety of types) were damaged or sunk clearing them.[38]
The US began adding delay counters to their magnetic mines in June 1945.[39]
Cold War era
[edit]
Since World War II, mines have damaged 14 United States Navy ships, whereas air and missile attacks have damaged four. During the Korean War, mines laid by North Korean forces caused 70% of the casualties suffered by US naval vessels and caused 4 sinkings.[40]
During the Iran–Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, the belligerents mined several areas of the Persian Gulf and nearby waters. On 24 July 1987, the supertanker SS Bridgeton was mined by Iran near Farsi Island. On 14 April 1988, USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine in the central Persian Gulf shipping lane, wounding 10 sailors.
In the summer of 1984, magnetic sea mines damaged at least 19 ships in the Red Sea. The US concluded Libya was probably responsible for the minelaying.[41] In response the US, Britain, France, and three other nations[42] launched Operation Intense Look, a minesweeping operation in the Red Sea involving more than 46 ships.[43]
On the orders of the Reagan administration, the CIA mined Nicaragua's Sandino port in 1984 in support of the Contras.[44] A Soviet tanker was among the ships damaged by these mines.[45] In 1986, in the case of Nicaragua v. United States, the International Court of Justice ruled that this mining was a violation of international law.
Post Cold War
[edit]During the Gulf War, Iraqi naval mines severely damaged USS Princeton and USS Tripoli.[46] When the war concluded, eight countries conducted clearance operations.[42]
Houthi forces in the Yemeni Civil War have made frequent use of naval mines, laying over 150 in the Red Sea throughout the conflict.[47]
In the first month of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine accused Russia of deliberately employing drifting mines in the Black Sea area. Around the same time, Turkish and Romanian military diving teams were involved in defusing operations, when stray mines were spotted near the coasts of these countries. London P&I Club issued a warning to freight ships in the area, advising them to "maintain lookouts for mines and pay careful attention to local navigation warnings".[48] Ukrainian forces have mined "from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea which banks the critical city of Odesa."[49]
Types
[edit]
A-underwater, B-bottom, SS-submarine. 1-drifting mine, 2-drifting mine, 3-moored mine (long wire), 4-moored mine (short wire), 5-bottom mines, 6-torpedo mine/CAPTOR mine, 7-rising mine
Naval mines may be classified into three major groups; contact, remote and influence mines.
Contact mines
[edit]The earliest mines were usually of this type. They are still used today, as they are extremely low cost compared to any other anti-ship weapon and are effective, both as a psychological weapon and as a method to sink enemy ships. Contact mines need to be touched by the target before they detonate, limiting the damage to the direct effects of the explosion and usually affecting only the vessel that triggers them.
Early mines had mechanical mechanisms to detonate them, but these were superseded in the 1870s by the "Hertz horn" (or "chemical horn"), which was found to work reliably even after the mine had been in the sea for several years. The mine's upper half is studded with hollow lead protuberances, each containing a glass vial filled with sulfuric acid. When a ship's hull crushes the metal horn, it cracks the vial inside it, allowing the acid to run down a tube and into a lead–acid battery which until then contained no acid electrolyte. This energizes the battery, which detonates the explosive.[50]
Earlier forms of the detonator employed a vial of sulfuric acid surrounded by a mixture of potassium perchlorate and sugar. When the vial was crushed, the acid ignited the perchlorate-sugar mix, and the resulting flame ignited the gunpowder charge.[51]
During the initial period of World War I, the Royal Navy used contact mines in the English Channel and later in large areas of the North Sea to hinder patrols by German submarines. Later, the American antenna mine was widely used because submarines could be at any depth from the surface to the seabed. This type of mine had a copper wire attached to a buoy that floated above the explosive charge which was weighted to the seabed with a steel cable. If a submarine's steel hull touched the copper wire, the slight voltage change caused by contact between two dissimilar metals was amplified[clarification needed] and detonated the explosives.[50]
Limpet mines
[edit]Limpet mines are a special form of contact mine that are manually attached to the target by magnets and remain in place. They are named because of the similarity to the limpet, a mollusk.
Moored contact mines
[edit]
Generally, this type of mine is set to float just below the surface of the water or as deep as five meters. A steel cable connecting the mine to an anchor on the seabed prevents it from drifting away. The explosive and detonating mechanism is contained in a buoyant metal or plastic shell. The depth below the surface at which the mine floats can be set so that only deep draft vessels such as aircraft carriers, battleships or large cargo ships are at risk, saving the mine from being used on a less valuable target. In littoral waters it is important to ensure that the mine does not become visible when the sea level falls at low tide, so the cable length is adjusted to take account of tides. During WWII there were mines that could be moored in 300 m-deep (980 ft) water.
Floating mines typically have a mass of around 200 kg (440 lb), including 80 kg (180 lb) of explosives e.g. TNT, minol or amatol.[52]
Moored contact mines with plummet
[edit]
A special form of moored contact mines are those equipped with a plummet. When the mine is launched (1), the mine with the anchor floats first and the lead plummet sinks from it (2). In doing so, the plummet unwinds a wire, the deep line, which is used to set the depth of the mine below the water surface before it is launched (3). When the deep line has been unwound to a set length, the anchor is flooded and the mine is released from the anchor (4). The anchor begins to sink and the mooring cable unwinds until the plummet reaches the sea floor (5). Triggered by the decreasing tension on the deep line, the mooring cable is clamped. The anchor continues sinking down to the bottom of the sea, pulling the mine below the water surface to a depth equal to the length of the deep line (6). Thus, even without knowing the exact seafloor depth, an exact depth of the mine below the water surface can be set, limited only by the maximum length of the mooring cable.
Drifting contact mines
[edit]Drifting mines were occasionally used during World War I and World War II. However, they were more feared than effective. Sometimes floating mines break from their moorings and become drifting mines; modern mines are designed to deactivate in this event. After several years at sea, the deactivation mechanism might not function as intended and the mines may remain live. Admiral Jellicoe's British fleet did not pursue and destroy the outnumbered German High Seas Fleet when it turned away at the Battle of Jutland because he thought they were leading him into a trap: he believed it possible that the Germans were either leaving floating mines in their wake, or were drawing him towards submarines, although neither of these was the case.
After World War I the drifting contact mine was banned, but was occasionally used during World War II. The drifting mines were much harder to remove than tethered mines after the war, and they caused about the same damage to both sides.[53]
Churchill promoted "Operation Royal Marine" in 1940 and again in 1944 where floating mines were put into the Rhine in France to float down the river, becoming active after a time calculated to be long enough to reach German territory.
Remotely controlled mines
[edit]Frequently used in combination with coastal artillery and hydrophones, controlled mines (or command detonation mines) can be in place in peacetime, which is a huge advantage in blocking important shipping routes. The mines can usually be turned into "normal" mines with a switch (which prevents the enemy from simply capturing the controlling station and deactivating the mines), detonated on a signal or be allowed to detonate on their own. The earliest ones were developed around 1812 by Robert Fulton. The first remotely controlled mines were moored mines used in the American Civil War, detonated electrically from shore. They were considered superior to contact mines because they did not put friendly shipping at risk.[54] The extensive American fortifications program initiated by the Board of Fortifications in 1885 included remotely controlled mines, which were emplaced or in reserve from the 1890s until the end of World War II.[55]
Modern examples usually weigh 200 kg (440 lb), including 80 kg (180 lb) of explosives (TNT or torpex).[citation needed]
Influence mines
[edit]
These mines are triggered by the influence of a ship or submarine, rather than direct contact. Such mines incorporate sensors designed to detect the presence of a vessel and detonate when it comes within the blast range of the warhead. The fuzes on such mines may incorporate one or more of the following sensors: magnetic, passive acoustic or water pressure displacement caused by the proximity of a vessel.[56]
First used during WWI, their use became more general in WWII. The sophistication of influence mine fuzes has increased considerably over the years as first transistors and then microprocessors have been incorporated into designs. Simple magnetic sensors have been superseded by total-field magnetometers. Whereas early magnetic mine fuzes would respond only to changes in a single component of a target vessel's magnetic field, a total field magnetometer responds to changes in the magnitude of the total background field (thus enabling it to better detect even degaussed ships). Similarly, the original broadband hydrophones of 1940s acoustic mines (which operate on the integrated volume of all frequencies) have been replaced by narrow-band sensors which are much more sensitive and selective. Mines can now be programmed to listen for highly specific acoustic signatures (e.g. a gas turbine powerplant or cavitation sounds from a particular design of propeller) and ignore all others. The sophistication of modern electronic mine fuzes incorporating these digital signal processing capabilities makes it much more difficult to detonate the mine with electronic countermeasures because several sensors working together (e.g. magnetic, passive acoustic and water pressure) allow it to ignore signals which are not recognised as being the unique signature of an intended target vessel.[57]
Modern influence mines such as the BAE Stonefish are computerised, with all the programmability this implies, such as the ability to quickly load new acoustic signatures into fuzes, or program them to detect a single, highly distinctive target signature. In this way, a mine with a passive acoustic fuze can be programmed to ignore all friendly vessels and small enemy vessels, only detonating when a very large enemy target passes over it. Alternatively, the mine can be programmed specifically to ignore all surface vessels regardless of size and exclusively target submarines.
Even as far back as WWII it was possible to incorporate a "ship counter" function in mine fuzes. This might set the mine to ignore the first two ships passing over it (which could be minesweepers deliberately trying to trigger mines) but detonate when the third ship passes overhead, which could be a high-value target such as an aircraft carrier or oil tanker. Even though modern mines are generally powered by a long life lithium battery, it is important to conserve power because they may need to remain active for months or even years. For this reason, most influence mines are designed to remain in a semi-dormant state until an unpowered (e.g. deflection of a mu-metal needle) or low-powered sensor detects the possible presence of a vessel, at which point the mine fuze powers up fully and the passive acoustic sensors will begin to operate for some minutes. It is possible to program computerised mines to delay activation for days or weeks after being laid. Similarly, they can be programmed to self-destruct or render themselves safe after a preset period of time. Generally, the more sophisticated the mine design, the more likely it is to have some form of anti-handling device to hinder clearance by divers or remotely piloted submersibles.[57][58]
Moored mines
[edit]The moored mine is the backbone of modern mine systems. They are deployed where water is too deep for bottom mines. They can use several kinds of instruments to detect an enemy, usually a combination of acoustic, magnetic and pressure sensors, or more sophisticated optical shadows or electro potential sensors. These cost many times more than contact mines. Moored mines are effective against most kinds of ships. As they are cheaper than other anti-ship weapons they can be deployed in large numbers, making them useful area denial or "channelizing" weapons. Moored mines usually have lifetimes of more than 10 years, and some almost unlimited. These mines usually weigh 200 kg (440 lb), including 80 kg (180 lb) of explosives (RDX). In excess of 150 kg (330 lb) of explosives the mine becomes inefficient, as it becomes too large to handle and the extra explosives add little to the mine's effectiveness.[citation needed]
Bottom mines
[edit]Bottom mines (sometimes called ground mines) are used when the water is no more than 60 meters (200 feet) deep or when mining for submarines down to around 200 meters (660 feet). They are much harder to detect and sweep, and can carry a much larger warhead than a moored mine. Bottom mines commonly use multiple types of sensors, which are less sensitive to sweeping.[58][59]
These mines usually weigh between 150 and 1,500 kg (330 and 3,300 lb), including between 125 and 1,400 kg (280 and 3,100 lb) of explosives.[60]
Unusual mines
[edit]Several specialized mines have been developed for other purposes than the common minefield.
Bouquet mine
[edit]The bouquet mine is a single anchor attached to several floating mines. It is designed so that when one mine is swept or detonated, another takes its place. It is a very sensitive construction and lacks reliability.
Anti-sweep mine
[edit]
The anti-sweep mine is a very small mine (40 kg (88 lb) warhead) with as small a floating device as possible. When the wire of a mine sweep hits the anchor wire of the mine, it drags the anchor wire along with it, pulling the mine down into contact with the sweeping wire. That detonates the mine and cuts the sweeping wire. They are very cheap and usually used in combination with other mines in a minefield to make sweeping more difficult. One type is the Mark 23 used by the United States during World War II.
Oscillating mine
[edit]The mine is hydrostatically controlled to maintain a pre-set depth below the water's surface independently of the rise and fall of the tide.
Ascending mine
[edit]The ascending mine is a floating distance mine that may cut its mooring or in some other way float higher when it detects a target. It lets a single floating mine cover a much larger depth range.
Homing mines
[edit]These are mines containing a moving weapon as a warhead, either a torpedo or a rocket.
Rocket mine
[edit]A Russian invention, the rocket mine is a bottom distance mine that fires a homing high-speed rocket (not torpedo) upwards towards the target. It is intended to allow a bottom mine to attack surface ships as well as submarines from a greater depth. One type is the Te-1 rocket propelled mine.
Torpedo mine
[edit]A torpedo mine is a self-propelled variety, able to lie in wait for a target and then pursue it e.g. the Mark 60 CAPTOR. Generally, torpedo mines incorporate computerised acoustic and magnetic fuzes. The US Mark 24 "mine", code-named Fido, was actually an ASW homing torpedo. The mine designation was disinformation to conceal its function.
Mobile mine
[edit]The mine is propelled to its intended position by propulsion equipment such as a torpedo. After reaching its destination, it sinks to the seabed and operates like a standard mine. It differs from the homing mine in that its mobile stage is set before it lies in wait, rather than as part of the attacking phase.
One such design is the Mk 67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine[61] (which is based on a Mark 37 torpedo), capable of traveling as far as 16 km (10 mi) through or into a channel, harbour, shallow water area, and other zones which would normally be inaccessible to craft laying the device. After reaching the target area they sink to the sea bed and act like conventionally laid influence mines.
Nuclear mine
[edit]During the Cold War, a test was conducted with a naval mine fitted with tactical nuclear warheads for the "Baker" shot of Operation Crossroads. This weapon was experimental and never went into production.[62] The Seabed Arms Control Treaty prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed beyond a 12-mile coast zone.
Daisy-chained mine
[edit]This comprises two moored, floating contact mines which are tethered together by a length of steel cable or chain. Typically, each mine is situated approximately 18 m (60 ft) away from its neighbor, and each floats a few meters below the surface of the ocean. When the target ship hits the steel cable, the mines on either side are drawn down the side of the ship's hull, exploding on contact. In this manner it is almost impossible for target ships to pass safely between two individually moored mines. Daisy-chained mines are a very simple concept which was used during World War II. The first prototype of the Daisy-chained mine and the first combat use came in Finland, 1939.[63]
Dummy mine
[edit]Plastic drums filled with sand or concrete are periodically rolled off the side of ships as real mines are laid in large mine-fields. These inexpensive false targets (designed to be of a similar shape and size as genuine mines) are intended to slow down the process of mine clearance: a mine-hunter is forced to investigate each suspicious sonar contact on the sea bed, whether it is real or not. Often a maker of naval mines will provide both training and dummy versions of their mines.[64]
Mine laying
[edit]

Historically several methods were used to lay mines. During WWI and WWII, the Germans used U-boats to lay mines around the UK. In WWII, aircraft came into favour for mine laying with one of the largest examples being the mining of the Japanese sea routes in Operation Starvation.
Laying a minefield is a relatively fast process with specialized ships, which is today the most common method. These minelayers can carry several thousand mines[citation needed] and manoeuvre with high precision. The mines are dropped at predefined intervals into the water behind the ship. Each mine is recorded for later clearing, but it is not unusual for these records to be lost together with the ships. Therefore, many countries demand that all mining operations be planned on land and records kept so that the mines can later be recovered more easily.[65]
Other methods to lay minefields include:
- Converted merchant ships – rolled or slid down ramps
- Aircraft – descent to the water is slowed by a parachute
- Submarines – launched from torpedo tubes or deployed from specialized mine racks on the sides of the submarine
- Combat boats – rolled off the side of the boat
- Camouflaged boats – masquerading as fishing boats
- Dropping from the shore – typically smaller, shallow-water mines
- Attack divers – smaller shallow-water mines
In some cases, mines are automatically activated upon contact with the water. In others, a safety lanyard is pulled (one end attached to the rail of a ship, aircraft or torpedo tube) which starts an automatic timer countdown before the arming process is complete. Typically, the automatic safety-arming process takes some minutes to complete. This allows the people laying the mines sufficient time to move out of its activation and blast zones.[66]
Aerial mining in World War II
[edit]Germany
[edit]In the 1930s, Germany had experimented with the laying of mines by aircraft. It became a crucial element in their overall mining strategy. Aircraft had the advantage of speed, and they would never get caught in their own minefields. German mines held a large 450 kg (1,000 lb) explosive charge. From April to June 1940, the Luftwaffe laid 1,000 mines in British waters. Soviet ports were mined, as was the Arctic convoy route to Murmansk.[67] The Heinkel He 115 could carry two medium or one large mine while the Heinkel He 59, Dornier Do 18, Junkers Ju 88 and Heinkel He 111 could carry more.
Soviet Union
[edit]The USSR was relatively ineffective in its use of naval mines in WWII in comparison with its record in previous wars.[68] Small mines were developed for use in rivers and lakes, and special mines for shallow water. A very large chemical mine was designed to sink through ice with the aid of a melting compound. Special aerial mine designs finally arrived in 1943–1944, the AMD-500 and AMD-1000.[69] Various Soviet Naval Aviation torpedo bombers were pressed into the role of aerial mining in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, including Ilyushin DB-3s, Il-4s and Lend-Lease Douglas Boston IIIs.[70]
United Kingdom
[edit]In September 1939, the UK announced the placement of extensive defensive minefields in waters surrounding the Home Islands. Offensive aerial mining operations began in April 1940 when 38 mines were laid at each of these locations: the Elbe River, the port of Lübeck and the German naval base at Kiel. In the next 20 months, mines delivered by aircraft sank or damaged 164 Axis ships with the loss of 94 aircraft. By comparison, direct aerial attacks on Axis shipping had sunk or damaged 105 vessels at a cost of 373 aircraft lost. The advantage of aerial mining became clear, and the UK prepared for it. A total of 48,000 aerial mines were laid by the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the European Theatre during World War II.[71]
United States
[edit]
As early as 1942, American mining experts such as Naval Ordnance Laboratory scientist Dr. Ellis A. Johnson, CDR USNR, suggested massive aerial mining operations against Japan's "outer zone" (Korea and northern China) as well as the "inner zone", their home islands. First, aerial mines would have to be developed further and manufactured in large numbers. Second, laying the mines would require a sizable air group. The US Army Air Forces had the carrying capacity but considered mining to be the navy's job. The US Navy lacked suitable aircraft. Johnson set about convincing General Curtis LeMay of the efficacy of heavy bombers laying aerial mines.[72]
B-24 Liberators, PBY Catalinas and other bomber aircraft took part in localized mining operations in the Southwest Pacific and the China Burma India (CBI) theaters, beginning with a successful attack on the Yangon River in February 1943. Aerial minelaying operations involved a coalition of British, Australian and American aircrews, with the RAF and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) carrying out 60% of the sorties and the USAAF and US Navy covering 40%. Both British and American mines were used. Japanese merchant shipping suffered tremendous losses, while Japanese mine sweeping forces were spread too thin attending to far-flung ports and extensive coastlines. Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, who directed nearly all RAAF mining operations in CBI, heartily endorsed aerial mining, writing in July 1944 that "aerial mining operations were of the order of 100 times as destructive to the enemy as an equal number of bombing missions against land targets."[73]
A single B-24 dropped three mines into Haiphong harbour in October 1943. One of those mines sank a Japanese freighter. Another B-24 dropped three more mines into the harbour in November, and a second freighter was sunk by a mine. The threat of the remaining mines prevented a convoy of ten ships from entering Haiphong, and six of those ships were sunk by attacks before they reached a safe harbour. The Japanese closed Haiphong to all steel-hulled ships for the remainder of the war after another small ship was sunk by one of the remaining mines, although they may not have realized no more than three mines remained.[4]
Using Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, the US Navy mounted a direct aerial mining attack on enemy shipping in Palau on 30 March 1944 in concert with simultaneous conventional bombing and strafing attacks. The dropping of 78 mines deterred 32 Japanese ships from escaping Koror harbour, and 23 of those immobilized ships were sunk in a subsequent bombing raid.[4] The combined operation sank or damaged 36 ships.[74] Two Avengers were lost, and their crews were recovered.[75] The mines brought port usage to a halt for 20 days. Japanese mine sweeping was unsuccessful; and the Japanese abandoned Palau as a base[73] when their first ship attempting to traverse the swept channel was damaged by a mine detonation.[4]
In March 1945, Operation Starvation began in earnest, using 160 of LeMay's B-29 Superfortress bombers to attack Japan's inner zone. Almost half of the mines were the US-built Mark 25 model, carrying 570 kg (1,250 lb) of explosives and weighing about 900 kg (2,000 lb). Other mines used included the smaller 500 kg (1,000 lb) Mark 26.[73] Fifteen B-29s were lost while 293 Japanese merchant ships were sunk or damaged.[76] Twelve thousand aerial mines were laid, a significant barrier to Japan's access to outside resources. Prince Fumimaro Konoe said after the war that the aerial mining by B-29s had been "equally as effective as the B-29 attacks on Japanese industry at the closing stages of the war when all food supplies and critical material were prevented from reaching the Japanese home islands."[77] The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific War) concluded that it would have been more efficient to combine the United States's effective anti-shipping submarine effort with land- and carrier-based air power to strike harder against merchant shipping and begin a more extensive aerial mining campaign earlier in the war. Survey analysts projected that this would have starved Japan, forcing an earlier end to the war.[78] After the war, Dr. Johnson looked at the Japan inner zone shipping results, comparing the total economic cost of submarine-delivered mines versus air-dropped mines and found that, though 1 in 12 submarine mines connected with the enemy as opposed to 1 in 21 for aircraft mines, the aerial mining operation was about ten times less expensive per enemy ton sunk.[79]
Clearing WWII aerial mines
[edit]Between 600,000 and 1,000,000 naval mines of all types were laid in WWII. Advancing military forces worked to clear mines from newly-taken areas, but extensive minefields remained in place after the war. Air-dropped mines had an additional problem for mine sweeping operations: they were not meticulously charted. In Japan, much of the B-29 mine-laying work had been performed at high altitude, with the drifting on the wind of mines carried by parachute adding a randomizing factor to their placement. Generalized danger areas were identified, with only the quantity of mines given in detail. Mines used in Operation Starvation were supposed to be self-sterilizing, but the circuit did not always work. Clearing the mines from Japanese waters took so many years that the task was eventually given to the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.[80]
For the purpose of clearing all types of naval mines, the Royal Navy employed German crews and minesweepers from June 1945 to January 1948,[81] organised in the German Mine Sweeping Administration (GMSA), which consisted of 27,000 members of the former Kriegsmarine and 300 vessels.[82] Mine clearing was not always successful: a number of ships were damaged or sunk by mines after the war. Two such examples were the liberty ships Pierre Gibault which was scrapped after hitting a mine in a previously cleared area off the Greek island of Kythira in June 1945,[83] and Nathaniel Bacon which hit a minefield off Civitavecchia, Italy in December 1945, caught fire, was beached, and broke in two.[84]
Damage
[edit]The damage that may be caused by a mine depends on the "shock factor value", a combination of the initial strength of the explosion and of the distance between the target and the detonation. When taken in reference to ship hull plating, the term "Hull Shock Factor" (HSF) is used, while keel damage is termed "Keel Shock Factor" (KSF). If the explosion is directly underneath the keel, then HSF is equal to KSF, but explosions that are not directly underneath the ship will have a lower value of KSF.[85]
Direct damage
[edit]Usually only created by contact mines, direct damage is a hole blown in the ship. Among the crew, fragmentation wounds are the most common form of damage. Flooding typically occurs in one or two main watertight compartments, which can sink smaller ships or disable larger ones. Contact mine damage often occurs at or close to the waterline near the bow,[85] but depending on circumstances a ship could be hit anywhere on its outer hull surface (the USS Samuel B. Roberts mine attack being a good example of a contact mine detonating amidships and underneath the ship).
Bubble jet effect
[edit]The bubble jet effect occurs when a mine or torpedo detonates in the water a short distance away from the targeted ship. The explosion creates a bubble in the water, and due to the difference in pressure, the bubble will collapse from the bottom. The bubble is buoyant, and so it rises towards the surface. If the bubble reaches the surface as it collapses, it can create a pillar of water that can go over a hundred meters into the air (a "columnar plume"). If conditions are right and the bubble collapses onto the ship's hull, the damage to the ship can be extremely serious; the collapsing bubble forms a high-energy jet similar to a shaped charge that can break a metre-wide hole straight through the ship, flooding one or more compartments, and is capable of breaking smaller ships apart. The crew in the areas hit by the pillar are usually killed instantly. Other damage is usually limited.[85]
The Baengnyeong incident, in which the ROKS Cheonan broke in half and sank off the coast South Korea in 2010, was caused by the bubble jet effect, according to an international investigation.[86][87]
Shock effect
[edit]If the mine detonates at a distance from the ship, the change in water pressure causes the ship to resonate. This is frequently the most deadly type of explosion, if it is strong enough.[citation needed] The whole ship is dangerously shaken and everything on board is tossed around. Engines rip from their beds, cables from their holders, etc.[clarification needed] A badly shaken ship usually sinks quickly, with hundreds, or even thousands[example needed] of small leaks all over the ship and no way to power the pumps. The crew fare no better, as the violent shaking tosses them around.[85] This shaking is powerful enough to cause disabling injury to knees and other joints in the body, particularly if the affected person stands on surfaces connected directly to the hull (such as steel decks).
The resulting gas cavitation and shock-front-differential over the width of the human body is sufficient to stun or kill divers.[88]
Countermeasures
[edit]
Weapons are frequently a few steps ahead of countermeasures, and mines are no exception. In this field the British, with their large seagoing navy, have had the bulk of world experience, and most anti-mine developments, such as degaussing and the double-L sweep, were British inventions. When on operational missions, such as the invasion of Iraq, the US still relies on British and Canadian minesweeping services. The US has worked on some innovative mine-hunting countermeasures, such as the use of military dolphins to detect and flag mines. Mines in nearshore environments remain a particular challenge. They are small and as technology has developed they can have anechoic coatings, be non-metallic, and oddly shaped to resist detection.[89]: 18 Further, oceanic conditions and the sea bottoms of the area of operations can degrade sweeping and hunting efforts.[89]: 18 Mining countermeasures are far more expensive and time-consuming than mining operations, and that gap is only growing with new technologies.[89]: 18
Passive countermeasures
[edit]Ships can be designed to be difficult for mines to detect, to avoid detonating them. This is especially true for minesweepers and mine hunters that work in minefields, where a minimal signature outweighs the need for armour and speed. These ships have hulls of glass fibre or wood instead of steel to avoid magnetic signatures. These ships may use special propulsion systems, with low magnetic electric motors, to reduce magnetic signature, and Voith-Schneider propellers, to limit the acoustic signature. They are built with hulls that produce a minimal pressure signature. These measures create other problems. They are expensive, slow, and vulnerable to enemy fire. Many modern ships have a mine-warning sonar—a simple sonar looking forward and warning the crew if it detects possible mines ahead. It is only effective when the ship is moving slowly.
(See also SQQ-32 Mine-hunting sonar)
A steel-hulled ship can be degaussed (more correctly, de-oerstedted or depermed) using a special degaussing station that contains many large coils and induces a magnetic field in the hull with alternating current to demagnetize the hull. This is a rather problematic solution, as magnetic compasses need recalibration and all metal objects must be kept in exactly the same place. Ships slowly regain their magnetic field as they travel through the Earth's magnetic field, so the process has to be repeated every six months.[90]
A simpler variation of this technique called wiping, was developed by Charles F. Goodeve which saved time and resources.
Between 1941 and 1943 the US Naval Gun factory (a division of the Naval Ordnance Laboratory) in Washington, D.C., built physical models of all US naval ships. Three kinds of steel were used in shipbuilding: mild steel for bulkheads, a mixture of mild steel and high tensile steel for the hull, and special treatment steel for armor plate. The models were placed within coils which could simulate the Earth's magnetic field at any location. The magnetic signatures were measured with degaussing coils. The objective was to reduce the vertical component of the combination of the Earth's field and the ship's field at the usual depth of German mines. From the measurements, coils were placed and coil currents were determined to minimize the chance of detonation for any ship at any heading at any latitude.[91]
Some ships are built with magnetic inductors, large coils placed along the ship to counter the ship's magnetic field. Using magnetic probes in strategic parts of the ship, the strength of the current in the coils can be adjusted to minimize the total magnetic field. This is a heavy and clumsy solution, suited only to small-to-medium-sized ships. Boats typically lack the generators and space for the solution, while the amount of power needed to overcome the magnetic field of a large ship is impractical.[91]
Active countermeasures
[edit]Active countermeasures are ways to clear a path through a minefield or remove it completely. This is one of the most important tasks of any mine warfare flotilla.
Mine sweeping
[edit]

A sweep is either a contact sweep, a wire dragged through the water by one or two ships to cut the mooring wire of floating mines, or a distance sweep that mimics a ship to detonate the mines. The sweeps are dragged by minesweepers, either purpose-built military ships or converted trawlers. Each run covers between one hundred and two hundred metres (330 and 660 ft), and the ships must move slowly in a straight line, making them vulnerable to enemy fire. This was exploited by the Turkish army in the Battle of Gallipoli in 1915, when mobile howitzer batteries prevented the British and French from clearing a way through minefields.
If a contact sweep hits a mine, the wire of the sweep rubs against the mooring wire until it is cut. Sometimes "cutters", explosive devices to cut the mine's wire, are used to lessen the strain on the sweeping wire. Mines cut free are recorded and collected for research or shot with a deck gun.[92]
Minesweepers protect themselves with an oropesa or paravane instead of a second minesweeper. These are torpedo-shaped towed bodies, similar in shape to a Harvey torpedo, that are streamed from the sweeping vessel thus keeping the sweep at a determined depth and position. Some large warships were routinely equipped with paravane sweeps near the bows in case they inadvertently sailed into minefields—the mine would be deflected towards the paravane by the wire instead of towards the ship by its wake. More recently, heavy-lift helicopters have dragged minesweeping sleds, as in the 1991 Persian Gulf War.[93]
The distance sweep mimics the sound and magnetism of a ship and is pulled behind the sweeper. It has floating coils and large underwater drums. It is the only sweep effective against bottom mines.
During WWII, RAF Coastal Command used Vickers Wellington bombers Wellington DW.Mk I fitted with degaussing coils to trigger magnetic mines.[94] In a parallel development the Luftwaffe adapted some Junkers 52/3m aircraft to also carry a coil operated by electricity supplied from an onboard generator. The Luftwaffe called this adaption Minensuch(e) (lit. mine-search).[95] In both cases pilots were required to fly at low altitude (up to about 200 feet above the sea) and at fairly low speeds to be effective.
Modern influence mines are designed to discriminate against false inputs and are, therefore, much harder to sweep. They often contain inherent anti-sweeping mechanisms. For example, they may be programmed to respond to the unique noise of a particular ship-type, its associated magnetic signature and the typical pressure displacement of such a vessel. As a result, a mine-sweeper must accurately mimic the required target signature to trigger detonation. The task is complicated by the fact that an influence mine may have one or more of a hundred different potential target signatures programmed into it.[96]
Another anti-sweeping mechanism is a ship-counter in the mine fuze. When enabled, this allows detonation only after the mine fuze has been triggered a pre-set number of times. To further complicate matters, influence mines may be programmed to arm themselves (or disarm automatically—known as self-sterilization) after a pre-set time. During the pre-set arming delay (which could last days or even weeks) the mine would remain dormant and ignore any target stimulus, whether genuine or false.[96]
When influence mines are laid in an ocean minefield, they may have various combinations of fuze settings configured. For example, some mines (with the acoustic sensor enabled) may become active within three hours of being laid, others (with the acoustic and magnetic sensors enabled) may become active after two weeks but have the ship-counter mechanism set to ignore the first two trigger events, and still others in the same minefield (with the magnetic and pressure sensors enabled) may not become armed until three weeks have passed. Groups of mines within this mine-field may have different target signatures which may or may not overlap. The fuzes on influence mines allow many different permutations, which complicates the clearance process.[96]
Mines with ship-counters, arming delays and highly specific target signatures in mine fuzes can falsely convince a belligerent that a particular area is clear of mines or has been swept effectively because a succession of vessels have already passed through safely.
Minehunting
[edit]
As naval mines have become more sophisticated, and able to discriminate between targets, so they have become more difficult to deal with by conventional sweeping. This has given rise to the practice of minehunting. Minehunting is very different from sweeping, although some minehunters, known as mine countermeasures vessels (MCMVs) can do both tasks. Minehunters use specialized high-frequency sonars and high fidelity sidescaning sonar to locate mines, which are then inspected and destroyed either by divers or ROVs (remote controlled unmanned mini-submarines).[89]: 18 It is slow, but also the most reliable way to remove mines, as it circumvents most anti-minesweeping countermeasures. Minehunting started during the Second World War, but it was only after the war that it became truly effective.
Sea mammals (mainly the bottlenose dolphin) have been trained to hunt and mark mines, most famously by the US Navy Marine Mammal Program. Mine-clearance dolphins were deployed in the Persian Gulf during the Iraq War in 2003. The US Navy claims that these dolphins were effective in helping to clear more than 100 antiship mines and underwater booby traps from Umm Qasr Port.[97]
French naval officer Jacques Yves Cousteau's Undersea Research Group was once involved in minehunting operations: They removed or detonated a variety of German mines, but one particularly defusion-resistant batch—equipped with acutely sensitive pressure, magnetic, and acoustic sensors and wired together so that one explosion would trigger the rest—was simply left undisturbed for years until corrosion would (hopefully) disable the mines.[98]
Mine running
[edit]
A more drastic method is simply to run a ship through the minefield, letting other ships safely follow the same path. An early example of this was Farragut's actions at Mobile Bay during the American Civil War. However, as mine warfare became more developed this method became uneconomical. This method was revived by the German Imperial German Navy during World War I. Left with a surfeit of idle ships due to the Allied blockade, the Germans introduced a ship known as Sperrbrecher ("block breaker"). The type was also used during World War II. Typically an old cargo ship, loaded with cargo that made her less vulnerable to sinking (wood for example), the Sperrbrecher was run ahead of the ship to be protected, detonating any mines that might be in their path. The use of Sperrbrecher obviated the need to continuous and painstaking sweeping, but the cost was high. Over half the 100 or so ships used as Sperrbrecher in WWII were sunk during the war. Alternatively, a shallow draught vessel can be steamed through the minefield at high speed to generate a pressure wave sufficient to trigger mines, with the minesweeper moving fast enough to be sufficiently clear of the pressure wave so that triggered mines do not destroy the ship itself. These techniques are the only way to sweep pressure mines that is publicly known to be employed. The technique can be simply countered by use of a ship-counter, set to allow a certain number of passes before the mine is actually triggered. Modern doctrine calls for ground mines to be hunted rather than swept. A new system is being introduced for sweeping pressure mines, however counters are going to remain a problem.[99][100]
An updated form of this method is the use of small unmanned ROVs (such as the Seehund drone) that simulate the acoustic and magnetic signatures of larger ships and are built to survive exploding mines. Repeated sweeps would be required in case one or more of the mines had its "ship counter" facility enabled i.e. were programmed to ignore the first 2, 3, or even 6 target activations.
Counter-mining
[edit]Another expedient for clearing mines, especially in a hurry, is counter-mining. By this method an explosive is detonated in the area of a known or suspected minefield and the blast either trips off the fuzes or the actual explosive contained within the mine or mines. This latter is known as a sympathetic detonation. Counter-mining is normally used as a last resort or if other equipment is not available. One example was at the entrance to Grand Harbour, Valletta, Malta in WW2 when the British dropped depth charges into the harbour entrance to detonate suspected mines prior to the arrival of an important convoy. It is especially useful against acoustic or pressure mines due to their activation by sound or increases in water pressure.
National arsenals
[edit]US mines
[edit]The United States Navy MK56 ASW mine (the oldest still in use by the United States) was developed in 1966. More advanced mines include the MK60 CAPTOR (short for "encapsulated torpedo"), the MK62 and MK63 Quickstrike and the MK67 SLMM (Submarine Launched Mobile Mine). Today, most US naval mines are delivered by aircraft.
MK67 SLMM Submarine Launched Mobile Mine
The SLMM was developed by the United States as a submarine deployed mine for use in areas inaccessible for other mine deployment techniques or for covert mining of hostile environments. The SLMM is a shallow-water mine and is basically a modified Mark 37 torpedo.
General characteristics
- Type: Submarine-laid bottom mine
- Detection System: Magnetic/seismic/pressure target detection devices (TDDs)
- Dimensions: 0.485 by 4.09 m (19.1 by 161.0 in)
- Depth Range: Shallow water
- Weight: 754 kg (1,662 lb)
- Explosives: 230 kg (510 lb) high explosive
- Date Deployed: 1987

MK65 Quickstrike
The Quickstrike[101] is a family of shallow-water aircraft-laid mines used by the United States, primarily against surface craft. The MK65 is a 910 kg (2,000 lb) dedicated, purpose-built mine. However, other Quickstrike versions (MK62, MK63, and MK64) are converted general-purpose bombs. These latter three mines are actually a single type of electronic fuze fitted to Mk82, Mk83 and Mk84 air-dropped bombs. Because this latter type of Quickstrike fuze only takes up a small amount of storage space compared to a dedicated sea mine, the air-dropped bomb casings have dual purpose i.e. can be fitted with conventional contact fuzes and dropped on land targets, or have a Quickstrike fuze fitted which converts them into sea mines.
General characteristics
- Type: aircraft-laid bottom mine (with descent to water slowed by a parachute or other mechanism)
- Detection System: Magnetic/seismic/pressure target detection devices (TDDs)
- Dimensions: 0.74 by 3.25 m (29 by 128 in)
- Depth Range: Shallow water
- Weight: 1,086 kg (2,394 lb)
- Explosives: Various loads
- Date Deployed: 1983
MK56
General characteristics
- Type: Aircraft laid moored mine
- Detection System: Total field magnetic exploder
- Dimensions: 0.570 by 2.9 m (22.4 by 114.2 in)[citation needed]
- Depth Range: Moderate depths
- Weight: 909 kg (2,004 lb)
- Explosives: 164 kg (362 lb) HBX-3
- Date Deployed: 1966
Royal Navy
[edit]According to a statement made to the UK Parliament in 2002:[102]
...the Royal Navy does not have any mine stocks and has not had since 1992. Notwithstanding this, the United Kingdom retains the capability to lay mines and continues research into mine exploitation. Practice mines, used for exercises, continue to be laid in order to retain the necessary skills.
However, a British company (BAE Systems) does manufacture the Stonefish influence mine for export to friendly countries such as Australia, which has both war stock and training versions of Stonefish,[103][unreliable source?] in addition to stocks of smaller Italian MN103 Manta mines.[64] The computerised fuze on a Stonefish mine contains acoustic, magnetic and water pressure displacement target detection sensors. Stonefish can be deployed by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, surface vessels and submarines. An optional kit is available to allow Stonefish to be air-dropped, comprising an aerodynamic tail-fin section and parachute pack to retard the weapon's descent. The operating depth of Stonefish ranges between 30 and 200 metres. The mine weighs 990 kilograms and contains a 600 kilogram aluminised PBX explosive warhead.
Modern mine warfare
[edit]Mine warfare remains the most cost-effective form of asymmetrical naval warfare. Mines are relatively cheap and being small allows them to be easily deployed. Indeed, with some kinds of mines, trucks and rafts will suffice. At present there are more than 300 different mines available. Some 50 countries currently have mining ability. The number of naval mine producing countries has increased by 75% since 1988. It is also noted that these mines are of an increasing sophistication while even the older type mines present a significant problem. It has been noted that mine warfare may become an issue with terrorist organizations. Mining busy shipping straits and mining shipping harbours remain some of the most serious threats.[89]: 9
See also
[edit]- Bomb disposal
- HMHS Britannic
- Corfu Channel case
- Land mine
- Minesweeper
- Minelayer
- Destroyer minesweeper WWII
- Royal Navy's Admiralty Mining Establishment
- Royal Naval Patrol Service
- Shock factor
- Mine planter (vessel)
- Singer (naval mine)
- Submarine mines in United States harbor defense
- Stonefish influence mine
- Operation Pocket Money (aerial mining campaign against North Vietnam in 1972)
- George Gosse
References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ Farragut's actual wording has been recorded as, "Damn the torpedoes. Four bells, Captain Drayton, go ahead. Jouett, full speed."
Citations
[edit]- ^ McDonald, Wesley (1985). "Mine Warfare: A Pillar of Maritime Strategy". Proceedings. 111 (10). United States Naval Institute: 48.
- ^ Paul O'Mahony (16 June 2009), "Swedish navy locates German WWII mines", The Local Europe AB, archived from the original on 9 March 2016, retrieved 8 March 2016
- ^ "Isle of Wight: WW2 sea mine detonated by Navy". BBC News. 19 May 2019. Archived from the original on 7 November 2020. Retrieved 18 November 2020.
- ^ a b c d Greer, William L.; Bartholomew, James (1986). "The Psychology of Mine Warfare". Proceedings. 112 (2). United States Naval Institute: 58–62.
- ^ Needham, Volume 5, Part 7, 203–205.
- ^ Asiapac Editorial (2007). Origins of Chinese science and technology (3 ed.). Asiapac Books. p. 18. ISBN 978-981-229-376-3.[permanent dead link]
- ^ a b Needham, Volume 5, Part 7, 205.
- ^ Needham, Volume 5, Part 7, 199.
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- ^ Philip. Robert Fulton. p. 161.
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The Crimean War (1854–1856) was the first war to see the successful use of land and sea mines, both of which were the work of Immanuel Nobel.
- ^ Nicholson, Arthur (2015). Very Special Ships: Abdiel Class Fast Minelayers of World War Two. Seaforth Publishing. p. 11. ISBN 9781848322356. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
While nosing about the defences off Kronstadt on 9 June 1855, the British paddle steamer Merlin struck first one and then another mine, giving her the dubious distinction of being the first warship damaged by enemy mines. HMS Firefly came to her assistance after the first explosion, only to strike a mine herself. [...] When HMS Vulcan struck a mine on 20 June, the Royal Navy had had enough, and the next day began carrying out the first minesweeping operation in history, recovering thirty-three 'infernal machines,' the standard British term of the day for sea mines.
- ^ Lambert, Andrew D. (1990). The Crimean War: British Grand Strategy Against Russia, 1853–56. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. (published 2011). pp. 288–289. ISBN 9781409410119. Retrieved 31 January 2016.
On 9 June Merlin, Dragon, Firefly and D'Assas took Penaud and several British captains to examine Cronstadt. While still 2 miles out the two surveying ships were struck by 'infernals'. [...] The fleet left Seskar on the 20th. Vulture, almost the last to arrive, was struck by an infernal. The following day the boats fished up several of the primitive mines, and both Dundas and Seymour inspected them aboard their flagships.
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15 June, it was learned that the mouth of the river was protected by electric mines, that the forts at Taku were.
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- Attribution
This article incorporates text from Publication, Issue 33 Document (United States. War Dept.), by United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division, a publication from 1901, now in the public domain in the United States.
This article incorporates text from Reports on military operations in South Africa and China. July, 1901, by United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division, Stephen L'H. Slocum, Carl Reichmann, Adna Romanga Chaffee, a publication from 1901, now in the public domain in the United States.
This article incorporates text from Reports on military operations in South Africa and China, by Stephan L'H. Slocum, Carl Reichmann, Adna Romanza Chaffee, United States. Adjutant-General's Office. Military Information Division, a publication from 1901, now in the public domain in the United States.
Further reading
[edit]- Hartmann, Gregory K.; Truver, Scott C. (1991). Weapons That Wait: Mine Warfare in the U.S. Navy. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 0-87021-753-4. (Canonical general text about US mine warfare)
- Hewitt, James Terrance (1998). Desert Sailor: A War of Mine. Clementsport: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press. ISBN 1-896551-17-3. (Personal account of mine countermeasures operations in Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War 1991, including the mining of USS Tripoli.)
- Peniston, Bradley (2006). No Higher Honor: Saving the USS Samuel B. Roberts in the Persian Gulf. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-661-5. Archived from the original on 12 July 2006. Retrieved 31 December 2011. (Describes mine damage to a U.S. frigate)
- Wise, Harold Lee (2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987–88. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 978-1-59114-970-5. Archived from the original on 29 August 2009. Retrieved 27 April 2007. (Describes American efforts to combat Iranian mine campaign in the Persian Gulf)
External links
[edit]- Manual for submarine mining (1912) by United States War Department (Document no. 399)
- Technical details of German Second World War sea mines Archived 4 October 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- 'Stonefish' – a British influence mine (archived 6 December 2008)
- Development of Minewarfare Archived 8 September 2019 at the Wayback Machine
- List of various mine types (archived 3 November 2013)
- Description of mines used by the United States Archived 18 December 2014 at the Wayback Machine
- Henry Norton Sulivan: a depiction of early Naval Mine Archived 28 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- Belgian-Netherlands Naval Mine Warfare School, NATO Center of Excellence (archived 12 November 2011)
- W.L.Clowes in 1855 Archived 28 August 2011 at the Wayback Machine
- Popular Science, March 1940, Can Mines Conqueror Sea Power Archived 6 May 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- Popular Science, November 1943, Mine Killers at Work Archived 15 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- "Fighting The Submarine Mine – How Navies Combat A Deadly Sea Weapon" October 1941 Archived 6 May 2023 at the Wayback Machine
- "Mines Are Dirty Tricks" , February 1951 Archived 15 April 2023 at the Wayback Machine updates to above article on naval mines due to Korean War and types and measures against
Naval mine
View on GrokipediaFundamentals
Definition and Operating Principles
A naval mine is a self-contained explosive device placed in the water with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or deterring shipping from an area.[1] These devices are typically deployed in naval mine warfare to achieve area denial, coastal defense, or to restrict enemy naval movements. Mines differ from torpedoes or depth charges in that they are unattended after deployment and rely on passive or sensor-based detection rather than active propulsion or guidance.[8] Naval mines operate on the principle of target detection followed by explosive detonation upon fulfillment of predefined criteria. They are emplaced either as moored mines, suspended from anchors at a set depth to position the device in the path of surface or submerged vessels, or as bottom mines resting directly on the seabed, suitable for shallower waters where they can influence passing ships via proximity effects.[9] Deployment methods include surface vessels, submarines, aircraft, or shore-based systems, allowing for rapid coverage of chokepoints or harbors.[1] The core operating mechanism involves fuzing systems that trigger the mine's warhead. Contact mines detonate upon physical impact with a vessel's hull, relying on mechanical or chemical fuses activated by collision.[1] Influence mines, more advanced, use non-contact sensors to detect a ship's signature: magnetic mines respond to ferrous metal distortions in the Earth's magnetic field; acoustic mines to propeller noise or engine sounds; and pressure mines to hydrodynamic changes from a ship's passage, such as bow or stern waves.[1] [10] Many modern mines combine multiple influence types with ship counters or arming delays to discriminate targets and reduce premature detonation risks.[10] Controlled mines, remotely detonated via command signals, provide operational flexibility but require ongoing monitoring infrastructure.[1]Core Components and Fuzing Mechanisms
A naval mine's core components typically consist of an explosive case that encases the main high-explosive charge, designed to withstand underwater pressures and deployment stresses; common fillings include TNT or more advanced compositions like Composition B for enhanced blast effects.[11] The target detecting device, often integrated as the fuze or sensor array, distinguishes the mine from a mere underwater bomb by enabling selective actuation based on vessel signatures.[3] Additional elements include a power supply, such as batteries for electronic variants to energize sensors, and an arming mechanism that delays activation until safe deployment depth or time, preventing premature detonation during laying.[11] For moored mines, a sinker anchors to the seabed via tether cable, suspending the buoyant case at preset depths up to several hundred feet, while bottom mines rely on negative buoyancy and may incorporate stabilizing fins for aerial delivery.[11][12] Fuzing mechanisms serve to initiate the explosive train—linking the sensor to the detonator—only when predefined target criteria are met, ensuring reliability in harsh marine environments.[3] Contact fuzes, prevalent in early designs, employ mechanical horns filled with acid vials; vessel impact shatters the vial, releasing acid to activate a chemical battery that powers the detonator circuit, as seen in World War I-era moored contact mines.[12] Influence fuzes detect non-physical signatures: magnetic types use search coils or fluxgate magnetometers to sense distortions in Earth's magnetic field from ferrous hulls, often requiring a "double-tap" for confirmation to avoid false triggers from debris; acoustic fuzes incorporate hydrophones tuned to propeller or engine frequencies (e.g., narrow-band for specific turbine types like the LM-2500); pressure fuzes measure hydrodynamic changes via diaphragms or electro-hydraulic sensors exploiting Bernoulli's principle for water displacement; and seismic variants respond to hull-induced vibrations.[11][12][3] Modern fuzes frequently combine modalities (e.g., magnetic-acoustic) with ship counters, clock delays, or sterilizers to extend operational life and selectivity, powered continuously or on-demand to conserve energy.[12][11]Historical Development
Pre-19th Century Origins
The origins of naval mines trace back to rudimentary explosive devices deployed in waterways, though systematic use emerged in the 18th century. Precursor efforts involved incendiary floats rather than true explosives; for example, ancient Greeks in the 7th century BC reportedly employed barrels filled with sulfur, naphtha, and nitre, ignited and directed toward enemy vessels to cause fire damage.[13] These devices lacked the detonative power of later gunpowder-based mines and were more akin to fire ships or pots than submerged explosives. The invention of gunpowder in China during the 9th century AD enabled true explosive applications, initially for land warfare including bombs and buried charges during the Song dynasty (960–1279).[14][15] Naval adaptations followed, with reports of crude floating explosives such as ox bladders filled with gunpowder used by Chinese warlords to target ships centuries before European equivalents.[16] In Europe, early attempts included clockwork-driven explosive vessels in 1585 aimed at destroying a bridge and floating petards launched by the English in 1627 during the Siege of La Rochelle, though these efforts proved unsuccessful against naval targets.[17][13] A pivotal advancement occurred during the American Revolutionary War with David Bushnell's innovations. In 1775, Bushnell, while a student at Yale, experimented with underwater gunpowder detonation, leading to the creation of floating "kegs" by 1777.[1] These wooden barrels, each containing 50–100 pounds of gunpowder fitted with flintlock triggers, were released into the Hudson River and later Delaware River near Philadelphia to drift into British fleets.[1][18] Though none sank ships—several detonated harmlessly or were intercepted—they marked the first deliberate deployment of contact-activated explosive sea mines in naval conflict. Bushnell complemented these with the Turtle, a hand-powered submersible designed in 1775 to attach timed explosives directly to hulls, attempted against HMS Eagle in New York Harbor on September 7, 1776, but thwarted by the ship's copper sheathing.[19][20]19th Century Innovations
In the early 1800s, Robert Fulton advanced naval mine technology by developing anchored and drifting explosive devices, demonstrating their effectiveness in 1805 by sinking a captured Danish vessel off New York using a copper-sheathed powder keg mine detonated by a clockwork fuze.[21] Fulton's designs incorporated submerged delivery via submarine-like vessels and emphasized controlled placement to target enemy fleets, though adoption was limited due to skepticism from naval authorities.[22] These efforts laid groundwork for distinguishing between passive drifting mines and moored variants, prioritizing precision over indiscriminate floating hazards.[13] By the 1840s, Samuel Colt introduced galvanic (battery-powered) electrical mines for harbor defense, using insulated wires connected to shore-based batteries for remote detonation, which improved safety and selectivity compared to purely mechanical fuzes.[23] This innovation enabled command-actuated firing, reducing accidental explosions during deployment and allowing operators to observe and target specific vessels.[23] During the Crimean War (1853–1856), Russian forces deployed basic moored contact mines in the Black Sea, sinking at least two British ships and prompting European navies to invest in defensive countermeasures.[24] The American Civil War (1861–1865) marked a surge in mine deployment and refinement, primarily by Confederate forces facing Union naval superiority; they produced over 2,000 "torpedoes" (mines), sinking or damaging more than 40 Union vessels, including ironclads like USS Cairo in 1862 via a drifting mine.[25] Innovations included frame torpedoes—fixed underwater wooden frames with contact explosives—and electrically detonated bottom mines in channels, pioneered by figures like Matthew Fontaine Maury, who used platinum wires and friction primers for reliable ignition up to 7,000 feet away.[26][27] Gabriel Rains adapted land mines into sea variants with sulfur-tipped contact pins, enhancing detonation certainty upon vessel impact.[25] Late-century progress focused on fuze reliability and mooring stability; in 1868, German engineer Moritz von Hermes (or Hertz) invented the chemical "horn" fuze, a lead projection containing a glass vial of sulfuric acid that, upon bending from contact, released the acid to ignite a battery-powered primer, achieving higher activation rates than prior mechanical systems.[28] This design proliferated in moored contact mines, which used sinkers and chains to suspend buoyant charges at periscope depth (typically 10–20 feet), allowing passage of small craft while threatening larger warships.[24] U.S. Army Major Henry L. Abbot's post-war experiments (1868–1878) refined these moored types, testing over 1,000 charges to optimize buoyancy, depth control, and resistance to currents, influencing defensive strategies in narrow waterways.[29] These advancements shifted mines from opportunistic weapons to systematic barriers, though persistent challenges like uncontrolled drifting and accidental detonation limited offensive use.[29]World War I Applications
Germany initiated widespread offensive mining campaigns using U-boats to target Allied shipping lanes and ports, laying more than 43,000 mines that sank 497 merchant vessels totaling 1,044,456 gross register tons.[30] These operations aimed to enforce unrestricted submarine warfare by creating hazardous zones that disrupted supply convoys, with German Type UCI coastal minelaying submarines each capable of deploying 12 mines in shallow waters by 1916.[31] The strategy's causal impact stemmed from mines' low cost and high denial effect, forcing merchant vessels into riskier routes or convoy systems, though it also strained German resources amid Allied countermeasures. The Royal Navy countered with extensive defensive minefields, including barriers around the Heligoland Bight to bottleneck U-boat transits from bases like Wilhelmshaven, thereby elevating risks for German submarines exiting to the Atlantic.[32] British mines ultimately sank 150 enemy warships and auxiliaries, including approximately 35 U-boats, while the service itself suffered losses of 44 warships and 225 auxiliaries to German-laid mines.[33][34] This defensive posture, grounded in empirical assessments of U-boat vulnerabilities to moored contact mines, shifted naval dynamics by compelling Germany to divert surface fleets for mine protection and altering submarine patrol patterns. In June 1918, the United States Navy spearheaded the North Sea Mine Barrage, deploying 70,623 mines—56,611 American and 16,652 British—from the Orkney Islands to the Norwegian coast in a 240-mile arc to seal off U-boat access to open seas.[35] Utilizing Mark 6 mines with antenna fuzing mechanisms and 300 pounds of TNT, the barrage sank or damaged up to 21 German submarines, forcing tactical adaptations like deeper routing and increased surface escort needs that reduced overall U-boat sortie efficiency.[36][37] The operation's success validated large-scale mining as a force multiplier, with empirical data showing it contributed to a late-war decline in U-boat sinkings of Allied tonnage from peaks exceeding 800,000 tons monthly in 1917. Technological advancements included early submarine-based deployment for covert offensive laying and the late-war German introduction of magnetic influence mines, which detonated via ship-induced magnetic fields rather than direct contact, prompting British innovations in degaussing to neutralize them.[38] These developments underscored mines' evolution from static harbor defenses to dynamic tools in open-ocean denial, with verifiable impacts altering blockade enforcement and convoy protection doctrines by war's end on November 11, 1918.[39]World War II Expansions
World War II marked a significant expansion in naval mine technology, with the widespread adoption of influence-actuated mines triggered by magnetic, acoustic, or pressure signatures from passing vessels, building on limited World War I experiments. Germany led early innovations, deploying magnetic mines in September 1939 that exploited ship-induced magnetic field distortions, followed by acoustic variants in 1940 responsive to propeller noise and combined sensors later in the war. Pressure-sensitive "oyster" mines, bottom-laid and detonated by hydrodynamic effects, appeared in 1943. These advances enabled covert, selective targeting, with features like delayed arming (up to 12 days) and variable polarity to evade sweeps.[30][40] German mines, designated by letters such as LMA for airborne magnetic types (300 kg explosive charge) and TMA for submarine-launched moored influence mines (230 kg charge), were deployed via U-boats, surface vessels, and aircraft, sowing fields in British approaches, the Baltic, and Mediterranean. The 1941 Cape Juminda barrage in the Gulf of Finland alone sank 53 ships and killed around 4,000 personnel, while overall German efforts contributed to disrupting Allied convoys and amphibious operations. By war's end, Germany had developed or deployed 96 mine variants, emphasizing offensive mining to compensate for surface fleet limitations.[30][41] Allied countermeasures evolved rapidly, including degaussing to neutralize ship magnetism from 1940, LL (low/loop) magnetic sweeps generating artificial fields, and acoustic hammers to simulate propeller noise. Britain reintroduced its own magnetic mines and adapted captured German designs with Hertz horns for reliability. In Europe, these efforts mitigated early German successes, though mines remained a persistent threat in channels like Dover Strait.[40] Allied mining emphasized strategic denial, particularly through aerial delivery, an innovation amplifying reach without risking ships. In the Pacific, U.S. Army Air Forces B-29s executed Operation Starvation from April 1945, laying approximately 12,000 mines in Japanese home waters and straits like Shimonoseki, crippling merchant traffic by 90% and sinking over 100 vessels despite limited pre-campaign scale. Submarine-laid mines supplemented this, though official tallies credited few due to verification challenges. European Allied efforts focused more on defensive fields, but aerial mining proved decisive in closing enemy ports.[41][42] Globally, naval mines sank 534 ships totaling 1.4 million gross register tons, second only to torpedoes in destructive impact, influencing theaters from the Baltic—where fields decided Russo-German naval outcomes—to Pacific blockades hastening Japan's surrender. This era underscored mines' asymmetry, forcing resource-intensive countermeasures: Allies devoted thousands of vessels and personnel to sweeping, highlighting causal vulnerabilities in naval logistics.[40]Cold War Advancements
During the Cold War, naval mine technology advanced significantly to address submarine-centric threats, with improvements in influence actuation mechanisms enabling greater target discrimination through combined acoustic, magnetic, and pressure sensors. These developments allowed mines to selectively engage enemy vessels while minimizing risks to friendly or neutral shipping, facilitated by early microprocessor-based fuzing systems that analyzed multiple signatures for confirmation.[43] The United States prioritized antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, deploying the Mark 60 CAPTOR mine in 1976 as a deep-water bottom mine encapsulating a Mark 46 torpedo. Development of the CAPTOR began in the late 1960s, with production contracts awarded to Goodyear Aerospace in 1972 at a cost exceeding $100 million by 1974; it used acoustic detection to identify submerged targets and launch the torpedo only upon verifying distinctive submarine signatures, distinguishing it from surface ships or marine life.[44][45][46] The Soviet Union, facing NATO's naval superiority, focused on asymmetric area-denial strategies through mass production of seabed influence mines, such as the MDM series (MDM-1 through MDM-5), which featured acoustic-magnetic fuzing for bottom deployment. The MDM-1, a submarine-laid cylindrical mine with a 533 mm diameter and approximately 1-ton explosive charge, was optimized for covert laying in contested waters, capable of actuation at depths up to several hundred meters.[4] These mines emphasized reliability in harsh environments and integration with submarine operations, reflecting Soviet doctrine prioritizing defensive mining to bottleneck Western fleets in chokepoints like the GIUK gap.[47] Additional U.S. innovations included the Mark 67 submarine-launched mobile mine (SLMM), adapted from the Mark 37 torpedo in the 1960s for propulsion to predetermined locations before settling as a bottom mine, enhancing flexibility in dynamic scenarios. Aerial delivery systems evolved with destructor kits converting bombs into mines, though these lacked the sophistication of dedicated ASW types. Overall, Cold War mines shifted from indiscriminate contact types to precision tools, with over 1,000 CAPTORs stockpiled by the 1980s, underscoring mining's role in deterrence despite its lower priority compared to carrier and submarine programs.[44][43]Post-Cold War and Contemporary Uses
Following the end of the Cold War, naval mines continued to demonstrate their utility as a low-cost, asymmetric tool in littoral conflicts, particularly for weaker navies seeking to deny access to superior adversaries. In the 1991 Gulf War, Iraq deployed approximately 1,290 mines in the northern Arabian Gulf to impede coalition amphibious operations and protect its coastline.[48] On February 18, 1991, the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli struck an Iraqi mine, resulting in a 20-by-30-foot gash in its hull but no fatalities due to rapid damage control measures.[49] Days later, the guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton also hit two mines, sustaining structural damage that required dry-docking for repairs; these incidents underscored mines' potential to disrupt high-value surface combatants despite advanced sensors.[50] Iraqi mining efforts, often conducted nocturnally by small vessels, highlighted the challenges of minefield detection in shallow, cluttered waters, though coalition mine countermeasures ultimately cleared over 80 mines and enabled operations to proceed.[48] In subsequent regional conflicts, mines retained relevance for non-state and state actors alike. During the Yemeni Civil War, Houthi forces, backed by Iran, laid over 150 naval mines in the Red Sea to target Saudi-led coalition shipping and disrupt commercial traffic, employing drifting and bottom-laid variants that complicated international navigation.[51] Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has maintained a stockpile of hundreds to thousands of mines in the Persian Gulf, with heightened deployment risks noted after 2019 amid escalating U.S.-Iran tensions, though direct post-2000 incidents remain limited compared to the 1980s Tanker War.[52] More prominently, in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia has deployed hundreds of rudimentary sea mines in the Black Sea since February 2022 to blockade Ukrainian ports and counter Kyiv's naval drone campaigns, with U.S. and allied reconnaissance detecting over 100 such devices by September 2024.[53] [54] These unmoored or hastily laid mines have drifted unpredictably, endangering civilian shipping and prolonging clearance efforts that could extend years beyond active hostilities.[55] Contemporary naval mine warfare emphasizes advanced, influence-actuated designs integrated with GPS and acoustic discrimination to minimize false activations, reflecting stockpiling by major powers amid great-power competition. Russia possesses around 125,000 mines, China an estimated 50,000–100,000 including sophisticated bottom and encapsulated variants optimized for chokepoints like the Taiwan Strait, while the U.S. maintains fewer than 10,000, prioritizing offensive mining restarts and unmanned counter-mine systems.[56] [57] These developments position mines as a deterrent in potential flashpoints, where their deniability and scalability allow asymmetric actors to impose high clearance costs—often exceeding mine production expenses—on expeditionary forces.[6] Mine countermeasures have evolved with autonomous vehicles and marine mammal-assisted detection, yet persistent vulnerabilities in peer conflicts affirm mines' enduring role in area denial strategies.[58]Classification and Types
Contact Mines
Contact mines represent the earliest and simplest form of naval mines, designed to detonate upon direct physical collision with a target vessel's hull. These devices typically feature protruding horns or similar projections filled with a frangible vial containing a chemical initiator, such as acid; upon impact, the horn deforms, breaking the vial and releasing the initiator to ignite a primer charge, which in turn detonates the main explosive filling.[12] Alternative mechanisms include inertia-based switches that activate from the force of collision, though horn designs predominate for their reliability in underwater conditions.[12] Unlike influence mines, contact types rely solely on mechanical interaction, rendering them insensitive to magnetic, acoustic, or pressure signatures but vulnerable to physical countermeasures.[4] Contact mines are classified primarily by placement: moored variants, which are buoyant and anchored to the seabed by heavy cables to maintain a fixed depth (typically 10-30 feet below the surface for optimal hull contact), and drifting variants, which lack anchors and move freely with currents, posing an unpredictable threat.[1] Moored contact mines, costing approximately US$5,000 each in modern equivalents, allow for patterned fields in chokepoints like harbors or straits, often incorporating anti-sweep features such as explosive charges to destroy trawling gear.[12] Drifting contact mines, by contrast, are cheaper and simpler to deploy but harder to control, increasing risks to neutral or friendly shipping; examples include Iraqi Pattern 1908 mines released during the 1991 Gulf War, which drifted into international waters.[12] Both types are lighter than water to ensure buoyancy but require dense deployment—often hundreds per square mile—for statistical effectiveness, as isolated mines are easily avoided.[4] Historically, contact mines gained prominence during the American Civil War (1861-1865), when Confederate forces systematically deployed moored versions to defend ports, sinking multiple Union vessels including the USS Cairo on December 12, 1862.[1] In World War I, the Allied North Sea Mine Barrage of 1917-1918 laid over 70,000 moored contact mines to restrict German U-boats, crediting the devices with sinking or damaging around 40 submarines despite high costs and sweeping losses.[1] World War II saw expanded use, with U.S. forces aerially deploying over 12,000 mines (predominantly contact types in early campaigns) against Japanese shipping, contributing to the sinking of approximately 650 vessels; overall mine effectiveness reached one ship sunk per 35 laid by war's end.[1][4] Their advantages—low production complexity and assured detonation on contact—were offset by limitations: drifting mines proved more hazardous than effective due to uncontrollability, while moored types demanded vigilant maintenance against corrosion and were neutralized by advances in sweeping and paravane systems.[12] Post-WWII, contact mines persist in limited roles for littoral denial, though superseded by smarter variants in major navies.[4]Influence Mines
Influence mines detonate in response to the electromagnetic, acoustic, or hydrodynamic signatures generated by a passing vessel, without requiring physical contact. These signatures include distortions in the Earth's magnetic field caused by a ship's ferrous hull, propeller cavitation and machinery noise propagating through water, or transient changes in hydrostatic pressure from a ship's displacement. Sensors within the mine's firing mechanism analyze these influences against programmed thresholds or patterns to initiate explosion, enabling selective targeting and reducing false activations from non-threats like waves or marine animals. This design allows influence mines to be laid on the seabed or suspended in the water column, complicating detection and clearance efforts.[1][3] The three principal categories of influence mechanisms are magnetic, acoustic, and pressure types, often integrated in hybrid configurations for improved discrimination. Magnetic mines employ fluxgate or induction coil sensors to detect ferromagnetic anomalies, with early variants tracing to British development of the Mark I magnetic mine deployed in August 1918 during World War I. Acoustic variants use hydrophones to capture sound pressure levels exceeding ambient noise, such as those from diesel engines or turbine whine, while pressure mechanisms rely on diaphragm or strain gauge sensors to register seabed or water column perturbations. Combined magneto-acoustic-pressure (MAP) systems, prevalent since World War II, require simultaneous or sequential signatures to arm and fire, minimizing premature detonation from isolated environmental stimuli.[12][59][41] United States naval influence mines evolved through the Cold War, with the Mk 50 series introducing modular components for aircraft delivery, culminating in the 1,000-pound Mk 52 and 2,000-pound Mk 55 bottom mines capable of magnetic, acoustic, or pressure actuation. The Mark 60 CAPTOR, deployed from 1976, exemplifies advanced acoustic influence technology, encapsulating a torpedo that activates upon detecting specific submerged target signatures, extending lethality against fast-moving submarines. These developments prioritized seabed emplacement for stealth, with arming delays preventing immediate hazards to laying vessels. Influence mines' efficacy stems from their low cost relative to surface combatants—often under $10,000 per unit versus millions for ships—and ability to channel or deny naval forces access to chokepoints, as demonstrated in historical blockades.[60][10]Remotely Controlled and Command-Actuated Mines
Remotely controlled and command-actuated naval mines differ from autonomous variants by requiring an external signal—typically electrical, acoustic, or radio-based—to trigger detonation, enabling operators to select targets and minimize unintended explosions or risks to non-hostile vessels. These systems often involve moored or bottom-laid explosives linked to a command station, where human oversight determines firing based on observed threats, such as through visual or radar surveillance. This manual intervention enhances precision in defensive scenarios, like harbor protection, but demands reliable communication links vulnerable to disruption.[4][12] The earliest examples emerged during the American Civil War (1861–1865), when Confederate forces deployed moored "torpedo" mines—precursors to modern naval mines—electrically detonated via insulated cables from shore stations, sinking at least eight Union vessels including the USS Cairo on December 12, 1862, near Vicksburg. These were superior to purely contact-based designs, as mooring line contacts rarely caused premature blasts, and operators could withhold detonation for friendly traffic. By the late 19th century, the U.S. Board of Fortifications expanded such systems in coastal defenses, emplacing thousands of cable-controlled mines observable from fortified positions.[12][1] In World War I, remotely controlled mines saw limited but tactical use, such as German acoustic-influence prototypes off the Belgian coast in 1918, which could incorporate command overrides though primarily influence-actuated. World War II marked peak reliance on command systems for static defenses; nations like the U.S. and Britain maintained shore-controlled fields with cables up to several kilometers long, allowing real-time decisions via telegraphic circuits—offensive variants targeted enemy fleets, while defensive ones guarded ports. For instance, U.S. harbor defenses at Pearl Harbor and San Francisco featured electrically fired mines, though many remained untriggered due to the Pacific theater's mobility. Post-war evaluations credited these systems with deterring invasions, despite vulnerabilities to cable severance by enemy sweeps.[1][12][61] Cold War developments shifted toward modular, potentially wireless command links to counter submarine threats in chokepoints, with U.S. programs exploring acoustic telemetry for bottom mines, enabling fields to be "switched" on or off remotely without physical cables—reducing setup time from days to hours. By the 1980s, systems like experimental networked mines integrated sensors with command-actuation, allowing selective firing via encoded signals to avoid countermeasure saturation. Contemporary iterations, informed by conflicts like the 1980s Iran-Iraq Tanker War where drifting command-detonated mines disrupted shipping, emphasize stealthy, reprogrammable designs; however, proliferation risks remain high due to dual-use commercial tech enabling non-state actors to adapt similar controls. These mines' efficacy hinges on operator training and signal security, with historical data showing command delays contributing to escapes in 20–30% of engagements during WWII defensive operations.[4][6][62]Exotic and Specialized Variants
Encapsulated torpedo mines, such as the U.S. Navy's Mark 60 CAPTOR, exemplify a specialized anti-submarine variant for deep-water operations. Introduced in 1973, the CAPTOR deploys a Mark 46 lightweight torpedo housed within a seabed-moored canister that discriminates targets using acoustic signatures to avoid surface vessels. Upon detection of a submarine, the torpedo is released and homes in autonomously, extending the mine's effective range and lethality beyond static explosives. This system was the primary U.S. deep-water anti-submarine mine through the Cold War, deployable by ships, submarines, or aircraft.[44][45] Rising mines constitute another exotic category, engineered to ascend from deep seabed positions toward targets upon activation, enhancing surprise and effectiveness against surface ships. These devices, often buoyancy-controlled or rocket-propelled, lie dormant until triggered by influence sensors, then rapidly surface to detonate beneath or alongside vessels, amplifying hydrodynamic damage. The Chinese EM-55 variant, for instance, features a 290-pound warhead and operates from depths of 160 to 660 feet, propelled by rockets for swift ascent. Such mines complicate countermeasures by altering attack profiles unpredictably.[63] Mobile and homing mines further specialize naval mine warfare by incorporating propulsion for repositioning or target pursuit post-deployment. Submarine-launched mobile mines (SLMM), like the U.S. Mk 67, exit torpedo tubes and navigate to pre-programmed sites using inertial guidance before assuming a bottom-lying posture with influence actuation. Homing variants add active pursuit capabilities, blurring lines between mines and torpedoes while maintaining stealthy, unattended deployment. These adaptations, tested extensively in U.S. programs since the 1970s, prioritize area denial in contested waters but demand advanced sensors to minimize false activations.[64][65]Deployment Methods
Surface and Submarine Laying
, attenuating to hundreds of megapascals at greater ranges, with the wave's impulse determined by both peak pressure and positive phase duration.[83] This primary blast induces localized structural failure through direct compressive loading, causing steel plates to dish inward by up to 25 mm under scaled tests simulating mine standoffs, while brittle components like viewing ports may shatter.[83] For contact mines, the effect amplifies via point-blank energy transfer, where the explosive's brisance fractures the hull and propels fragments inward, compounded by the mine's thin casing which minimizes fragmentation but maximizes blast focus.[81] In non-contact scenarios, the shock wave's concussive force triggers hull whipping—a flexural response where the ship's bow and stern oscillate out of phase with the amidships, risking girder breakage if the impulse exceeds the structure's dynamic yield strength.[84] Empirical data from scaled underwater tests confirm that primary shock accounts for approximately one-third of the total explosive energy transfer, dominating damage before subsequent bubble dynamics intervene.[84] Damage severity scales with charge weight (W) and standoff distance (R) via metrics like the Keel Shock Factor (KSF = W^{1/3}/R), where values exceeding 0.5 often yield catastrophic hull breach in unarmored vessels; for instance, a 500 kg TNT equivalent at 5 m standoff can generate impulses sufficient to disable propulsion systems through shaft misalignment.[83] [81] Water's incompressibility amplifies transmission compared to air bursts, with attenuation primarily from geometric spreading and absorption, though hull curvature and compartmentalization mitigate effects by reflecting or dissipating wave energy.[85] These effects underscore the mine's design emphasis on precise charge positioning to maximize shock coupling, as deviations reduce peak pressures by over 50% beyond optimal influence ranges.[83]Secondary Hydrodynamic and Shock Effects
The detonation of a naval mine underwater generates a primary shock wave that propagates through the water at velocities typically exceeding 1,500 m/s, delivering peak overpressures capable of causing localized hull rupture and plastic deformation upon striking a ship's structure.[86] This shock-induced loading triggers a flexural whipping response across the hull girder, where the vessel behaves as a dynamic beam under transient pressure impulses, potentially leading to frame distortion and bulkhead failure even at standoff distances of several ship lengths.[87] Empirical models indicate that shock wave energy constitutes about 53% of the total explosive yield, with attenuation governed by spherical spreading and water absorption, though near-field effects remain severe due to water's high density and incompressibility compared to air.[88] Subsequent to the initial shock, the explosive gas bubble—formed from detonation products and containing roughly 47% of the energy—undergoes pulsation cycles, expanding to maximum radii scaling with charge weight (e.g., up to 20-30 meters for a 500 kg TNT equivalent) before collapsing under hydrostatic pressure.[88] This collapse produces secondary shock waves and a cavitation-induced water jet, accelerated upward by buoyancy (Bjerknes effect), which can impinge on the keel if the bubble migrates beneath the hull, exerting asymmetric hydrodynamic uplift forces that promote sagging damage or outright structural severance in slender warships.[89] Bubble adsorption and pressure differentials further amplify hogging moments at the ends of the hull, compounding fatigue from repeated or sequential mine detonations in minefields.[90] Hydrodynamic afterflows from bubble migration and jetting contribute to drag-like loads and flow separation around the hull, exacerbating local scouring or propeller disruption, while the interplay of shock and bubble phases can increase overall deformation by factors exceeding 100% relative to shock alone in coupled fluid-structure simulations.[91] These effects are particularly pronounced in shallow waters, where surface reflection doubles shock impulses and confines bubble pulsation, as observed in historical analyses of mine warfare damage patterns.[86]Countermeasures and Defenses
Detection Technologies
Detection of naval mines employs diverse technologies to identify submerged threats, including acoustic, magnetic, electromagnetic, optical, and biological methods, often integrated with unmanned vehicles for safe operation. These systems aim to distinguish mines from natural seabed features through signal processing and classification algorithms, though challenges persist in cluttered littoral environments where false positives from debris can exceed 90% in some surveys.[6] Acoustic detection predominates via sonar systems, which transmit sound waves to create images of underwater objects. Mine-hunting sonars like the AN/AQS-20C combine high-resolution imaging sonar with laser line-scan for real-time bottom and volume search, enabling classification of moored and bottom mines at depths up to 200 meters.[92] Hull-mounted systems such as the HMS-12M provide long-range detection with resolutions sufficient for target identification, operating in frequencies optimized for shallow waters while resisting shock damage.[93] Synthetic aperture sonar enhances resolution by simulating larger apertures through vehicle motion, improving detection of low-profile mines buried in sediment.[1] Magnetic detection targets the ferrous components in many mines using gradiometers and magnetometers towed by ships or unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Real-time tracking gradiometers (RTG) measure magnetic field gradients to localize metallic anomalies, effective against non-acoustic mines but limited by environmental noise from geological formations.[94] Lightweight laser magnetic gradiometers (LLMG) extend this to airborne or submarine platforms, detecting signatures at ranges up to several hundred meters depending on mine size.[95] Electromagnetic induction sensors, like those in the HydroPACT 440, induce currents in conductive mine casings for passive detection, proving useful for unexploded ordnance in subsea surveys.[96] Optical and laser-based systems supplement acoustics in clear waters. The Airborne Laser Mine Detection System (ALMDS), integrated on MH-60S helicopters, uses blue-green lasers and streak-tube receivers to detect floating and near-surface mines during rapid area sweeps, achieving detection rates over 80% in tested conditions.[97] Electro-optic imagers on UUVs provide visual confirmation post-initial detection, though turbidity restricts their range to tens of meters.[98] Unmanned platforms enhance detection by reducing risk to personnel. UUVs equipped with multi-sensor suites, such as those in the Littoral Combat Ship's Remote Minehunting module, autonomously survey areas using sonar and video for mine classification.[99] Recent developments incorporate AI for automated target recognition, as in InfoBeyond's MineDL system, which processes sensor data to localize mines with reduced operator intervention.[100] Drone swarms, including surface and underwater variants, enable persistent coverage, with European programs like France-UK collaborations deploying fully autonomous systems for end-to-end mine hunting.[101] Biological detection leverages trained marine mammals, particularly bottlenose dolphins, whose echolocation surpasses mechanical sonar in discriminating man-made objects from biologics in complex shallows. The U.S. Navy's Marine Mammal Program, operational since the 1960s, deploys dolphins to mark mine locations with buoys, achieving higher reliability in high-clutter areas than early robotic alternatives, though transition to unmanned systems continues.[102][103] Sea lions supplement with whisker-based detection for moored threats.[104]Neutralization Techniques
Neutralization techniques for naval mines focus on rendering detected or suspected mines inert, typically following detection and classification in mine countermeasures operations. These methods prioritize minimizing risk to personnel and vessels, employing mechanical, explosive, and remote disposal approaches. Traditional techniques include minesweeping, where ships tow cables or devices to sever moorings or trigger influence-actuated mines, as practiced since World War I with steel wire drags through minefields.[105] Modern variants use acoustic, magnetic, or pressure generators to simulate ship signatures and detonate mines at safe distances.[106] Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams conduct direct neutralization by divers or remotely operated vehicles attaching demolition charges to mines for controlled detonation. U.S. Navy EOD units, often deployed from ships or shore, identify and dispose of mines using precision diving and countermining tactics, as demonstrated in exercises like Sea Breeze 2025 involving live mine operations.[107] [108] Unmanned systems enhance safety; for instance, the Barracuda Mine Neutralization System deploys semi-autonomous devices to target moored and bottom mines, tested in 2025 exercises.[109] Airborne neutralization systems, such as the AN/ASQ-235 Archerfish launched from MH-60S helicopters, deliver warheads to destroy surface and moored mines after sonar identification, providing rapid organic capability without exposing surface assets.[110] Marine mammals, including dolphins trained by the U.S. Navy Marine Mammal Program, assist in locating and marking mines for subsequent neutralization, reducing human exposure in shallow waters.[111] Emerging remotely operated unmanned vehicles (ROUVs) enable neutralization from standoff distances, redefining operations by keeping personnel outside danger areas.[112]Evolving Counter-Mine Strategies
Following World War II, naval mine countermeasures primarily relied on manned wooden-hulled sweepers using mechanical paravanes and acoustic hammers to trigger or cut mine moorings, a method proven effective but labor-intensive during operations like clearing 80,000 square miles of the North Sea by Allied forces in 1945-1946.[5] Post-war demobilization reduced U.S. mine warfare assets from over 500 vessels to minimal forces, shifting focus to reactionary tactics amid budget constraints.[5] The advent of acoustic and magnetic influence mines in the mid-20th century rendered traditional sweeping obsolete, prompting evolution toward detection-centric strategies employing sonar and magnetometers for precise mine localization before neutralization via divers or cutters.[113] By the 1970s, airborne systems like the U.S. Navy's MH-53E Sea Dragon helicopters towing mine-hunting sleds integrated side-scan sonar and video for standoff detection, reducing exposure in shallow waters.[58] Modern strategies emphasize unmanned and autonomous systems to minimize human risk against smart, sensor-fuzed mines, with the U.S. Navy deploying Mine Countermeasures Unmanned Surface Vehicles (MCM USVs)—semi-autonomous, diesel-powered craft equipped with towed sonar arrays—capable of 24-hour endurance for broad-area searches since their introduction in the 2010s.[114] Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) have been retrofitted with modular MCM packages, including unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) like the AN/AQS-20 sonar and Knifefish UUV for mine-hunting up to 300 meters depth, operational in the Persian Gulf by 2025.[115] Emerging multi-domain approaches integrate airborne drones, surface USVs, and sub-surface UUVs in "toolbox" configurations for layered clearance, as demonstrated in NATO exercises, enabling rapid adaptation to contested environments without dedicated sweepers.[116] Reusable neutralization platforms, such as those tested in the U.S. Navy's Integrated Undersea Autonomy exercises in 2025, allow UUVs to engage mines via explosives or cutters remotely, enhancing efficiency in high-threat scenarios like potential Taiwan Strait operations.[109] This shift prioritizes speed, scalability, and standoff capability, countering mine proliferation by adversaries through persistent, low-signature surveillance and precision strikes.[6]Strategic Impact and Effectiveness
Tactical Advantages in Naval Warfare
Naval mines offer tactical advantages by enabling area denial, restricting enemy access to vital coastal zones, ports, and anchorages without necessitating continuous engagement.[117] This capability forces adversaries to divert resources toward mine countermeasures, thereby amplifying the defensive posture of the deploying force.[118] Mines' persistence allows them to control nearshore areas and disrupt seaborne logistics over extended periods, exploiting the asymmetry between low deployment costs and high clearance expenses.[4] As force multipliers, naval mines are among the most economical weapons in a navy's arsenal, with small size facilitating covert deployment by submarines, aircraft, or surface vessels.[117] Their low unit cost—often orders of magnitude less than modern warships—enables even minor naval powers to impose significant operational constraints on superior fleets, compelling enemies to either risk losses or reroute through less favorable paths.[119] In littoral environments, this cost-effectiveness supports sea denial strategies, where mines can quarantine enemy forces or block chokepoints, as demonstrated in historical operations where mining halted shipping through critical straits.[7] The element of surprise inherent in minefields enhances their tactical utility, as undetectable placement allows mines to lie dormant until activated by specific targets, bypassing the need for real-time targeting systems.[4] This unpredictability induces psychological caution among enemy commanders, often leading to self-imposed avoidance of mined areas and thereby achieving effects disproportionate to the mines' numbers.[6] Combined with modern sensors, mines can selectively engage high-value units, further magnifying disruption while minimizing collateral risks in defensive scenarios.[118]Empirical Outcomes in Major Conflicts
In World War I, the Allied North Sea Mine Barrage, initiated in March 1918, deployed approximately 56,611 mines across a 240-mile area to restrict German U-boat operations, resulting in the confirmed sinking of at least five submarines and probable damage to others, though exact figures remain debated due to incomplete records; this effort compelled German naval forces to operate in riskier southern routes, contributing to a decline in U-boat effectiveness late in the war.[36] Mines proved particularly lethal in confined European waters, outperforming other antisubmarine measures in shallow straits by exploiting acoustic and pressure vulnerabilities.[4] During World War II, Axis powers laid over 225,000 offensive mines, sinking or damaging 1,117 enemy vessels, including merchant ships and warships, while Allied mining operations, such as U.S. submarine-laid fields in the Pacific, accounted for roughly 15% of Japanese shipping losses—over 1 million tons—demonstrating mines' asymmetric potency against superior navies despite countermeasures like sweeping.[120] Defensive minefields further inflicted heavy tolls, with mines responsible for a substantial portion of naval attrition; for instance, German fields in the English Channel and Baltic disrupted Allied landings and convoys, though exact casualty breakdowns vary by theater due to overlapping threats from torpedoes and aircraft.[5] In the Korean War (1950–1953), North Korean mines, primarily Soviet-supplied World War II-era types, inflicted 70% of all U.S. Navy personnel casualties and sank the four U.S. warships lost in combat, including the destroyer USS Hobson (collateral) and minesweepers; the prolonged clearance of Wonsan Harbor in October 1950, requiring 87 days and exposing ships to shore batteries, delayed amphibious operations and highlighted mines' capacity to deny access to defended ports with minimal defender resources.[5][121] The U.S. mining of North Vietnamese ports during Operation Pocket Money in May 1972 targeted Haiphong Harbor with 4,944 Mark 52 and Mark 55 mines, sinking or damaging over 20 vessels—including three Soviet merchant ships—and reducing resupply tonnage by 97% within months, forcing reliance on land routes and contributing to stalled North Vietnamese advances, though clearance via Operation End Sweep (1973) required extensive multinational efforts post-ceasefire.[122] In the Iran–Iraq War's Tanker Phase (1984–1988), Iranian forces, using speedboats and submarines, laid approximately 150 mines in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz, damaging dozens of neutral tankers and warships; a M-08 contact mine struck the U.S.-flagged tanker SS Bridgeton on July 24, 1987, and another nearly sank the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) on April 14, 1988, ripping a 25-foot gash and injuring 10 sailors, prompting Operation Praying Mantis—the largest U.S. naval surface engagement since World War II—which destroyed key Iranian assets but underscored mines' role in escalating asymmetric attrition against convoy protections.[79][62] During the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi mines—over 1,000 laid, including moored contact and bottom-influence types—damaged the amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LPH-10 on February 18, creating a 20-by-30-foot hull breach with four minor injuries, and the cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59 later that day via a M-39 influence mine, causing fires, flooding, and $90 million in repairs but no fatalities; these incidents, despite prior sweeping, delayed mine countermeasures and amphibious rehearsals, illustrating persistent vulnerabilities in contested littorals even against technologically inferior adversaries.[49][123]Role in Asymmetric and Deterrent Scenarios
Naval mines play a pivotal role in asymmetric warfare by allowing resource-constrained actors to challenge technologically superior navies through area denial and high-impact strikes at low cost. A single mine, often costing mere thousands of dollars, can disable or sink vessels worth billions, creating disproportionate risk for blue-water fleets operating in contested littorals.[124][117] Post-World War II, mines have damaged or sunk four times more U.S. Navy ships than all other weapons combined, underscoring their empirical effectiveness against advanced forces.[125] In the Iran-Iraq War's Tanker War phase (1980-1988), Iran employed mines asymmetrically to disrupt oil tanker traffic and counter U.S. and Iraqi naval superiority in the Persian Gulf. Iranian forces, using small boats and vessels like the Iran Ajr, laid contact and moored mines in international waters, including the Strait of Hormuz; on July 24, 1987, the supertanker SS Bridgeton struck one such mine while under U.S. escort, sustaining hull damage but continuing transit.[126][127] More critically, on April 14, 1988, an Iranian mine severely damaged the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts, requiring extensive repairs and highlighting vulnerabilities in escorted convoys.[128] These actions forced adversaries to divert resources to mine countermeasures, amplifying Iran's defensive posture despite naval inferiority.[129] Similarly, in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, both belligerents deployed naval mines in the Black Sea to contest maritime dominance, with Russia sowing hundreds to enforce a de facto blockade and deny Ukrainian port access. Ukrainian forces countered with their own mining to protect coastal approaches and disrupt Russian amphibious threats, though drifting mines complicated navigation and endangered civilian shipping.[53] By late 2024, over 100 mines had been located and neutralized by U.S. and allied efforts, yet the persistent hazard prolonged clearance operations and deterred unrestricted naval movement.[54] This conflict illustrates mines' utility for a weaker defender in hybrid scenarios, where they degrade attacker logistics without direct fleet engagement.[55] For deterrence, naval mines impose credible threats of economic and operational disruption, compelling potential aggressors to weigh high clearance costs against uncertain gains. Small states or island nations, such as Taiwan, can integrate mines into "porcupine" strategies to channel invading fleets into kill zones or inflict attrition on amphibious forces; simulations suggest mines could sink or damage dozens of Chinese vessels during a cross-strait assault, raising invasion risks.[130] By denying access to chokepoints like straits or ports, mines quarantine adversaries and extend supply lines, as seen in historical blockades where mining halted traffic through vital routes.[7][4] This passive yet potent capability enhances strategic depth for asymmetric powers, often preventing escalation through implied costs rather than active confrontation.[131][124]Controversies and Criticisms
Legal Frameworks and International Law
The primary international legal framework governing naval mines is the 1907 Hague Convention (VIII) relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, which prohibits the use of unanchored contact mines unless they are constructed to become harmless within one hour of being laid, requires moored mines to be constructed to render them harmless if they break free, mandates notification of minefield locations to ensure safe passage for neutral vessels, and forbids laying mines off enemy coasts or ports solely to intercept commercial shipping.[132][133] At the conclusion of hostilities, parties must endeavor to remove or neutralize laid mines; failure to do so requires continued notification.[134] Although drafted for early 20th-century contact mines, the convention's principles—emphasizing discrimination, notification, and post-conflict clearance—inform customary international law applicable to modern mine types, including influence and bottom mines, which were not contemplated at the time.[135] In armed conflict, naval mine use must adhere to broader laws of armed conflict (LOAC), including the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, as codified in the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, which interprets Hague VIII alongside customary rules to require that mines target military objectives while minimizing risks to civilians, neutral shipping, and the marine environment.[136][137] Uncontrolled or drifting mines that endanger non-military vessels violate these norms, as seen in critiques of deployments during the Russia-Ukraine conflict where unmoored mines disrupted Black Sea commercial navigation, potentially breaching obligations to protect neutral and civilian passage.[138] No treaty outright prohibits naval mines, distinguishing them from anti-personnel landmines restricted under the 1997 Ottawa Convention or amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), which excludes sea mines.[135] Peacetime deployment faces stricter limits under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes (Article 88) and prohibits interference with innocent passage through territorial seas or transit passage in straits, rendering proactive mine-laying in international waters generally unlawful absent immediate self-defense threats.[9][138] Defensive mining in territorial waters may be permissible under sovereignty rights, but requires justification to avoid unjustified navigation hazards.[139] Efforts to expand prohibitions, such as through CCW protocols, have not succeeded for naval mines due to their perceived discriminate utility in naval warfare when equipped with self-neutralization or targeting mechanisms.[140]Indiscriminate Effects and Humanitarian Concerns
Naval mines exhibit indiscriminate characteristics because they often lack mechanisms to selectively target military vessels, thereby endangering civilian shipping, fishing operations, and neutral maritime traffic in contested waters.[9] International humanitarian law prohibits such indiscriminate attacks, mandating that minefields be directed solely at military objectives while adhering to principles of distinction and proportionality.[135] Drifting or unanchored mines, in particular, exacerbate this risk by propagating beyond controlled areas, as evidenced by historical precedents where post-World War I mine remnants inflicted widespread damage on commercial fleets before systematic clearance efforts.[53] Post-conflict legacies amplify humanitarian vulnerabilities, with persistent mines obstructing recovery by contaminating ports, straits, and coastal zones critical for trade and sustenance. In the Black Sea amid the Russia-Ukraine conflict initiated in 2022, stray mines have reportedly caused civilian fatalities and vessel strikes, including incidents involving non-combatant craft.[53] Clearance operations demand substantial resources and time—often years—leaving economic corridors disrupted and local populations exposed to ongoing hazards, such as those faced by fishermen or aid vessels.[137] The 1907 Hague Convention VIII addresses these issues by banning free-floating contact mines and requiring belligerents to neutralize or remove moored mines upon cessation of hostilities, with non-compliance potentially violating customary law.[138] These effects extend to broader socio-economic repercussions, including stalled humanitarian aid delivery and heightened perils for coastal communities dependent on marine resources, prompting advocacy from organizations like Geneva Call for enhanced restraints on minelaying to curb civilian endangerment.[135] Absent a comprehensive treaty akin to the Ottawa Convention for landmines, reliance on existing IHL frameworks underscores the tension between military utility and the imperative to minimize protracted human suffering.[139]Proliferation and Modern Risks
Naval mines have proliferated extensively since the mid-1980s, with over 50 countries now possessing stockpiles and mining capabilities, including about 30 nations with indigenous production capacity.[4][141] Major powers like Russia hold an estimated 250,000 mines, China more than 100,000, Iran 5,000 to 6,000, and North Korea substantial numbers acquired from foreign suppliers.[51][142] This spread enables weaker states and non-state actors to challenge superior navies asymmetrically, as mines are inexpensive to produce and deploy yet difficult and time-consuming to clear.[58] In contemporary conflicts, mines amplify risks to global maritime trade and military operations. Russia's deployment of mines in the Black Sea after its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has created persistent hazards, including drifting devices that endanger shipping lanes and complicate Ukrainian drone and missile strikes against Russian vessels.[143][144] Iran's repeated threats to mine the Strait of Hormuz—through which approximately 20% of worldwide oil passes—underscore economic vulnerabilities; in July 2025, U.S. officials reported Iranian forces loading mines aboard ships in anticipation of potential strait closure amid escalating regional tensions.[142][145] Such actions could halt a fifth of global oil flows within a week, per assessments, due to the strait's narrow chokepoint geography and the challenges of rapid mine clearance.[142] Emerging great-power rivalries heighten these dangers. China's vast mine inventory positions it to employ mining in a Taiwan Strait scenario, potentially delaying U.S. carrier strike group transits by seeding dense fields that demand extensive countermeasures.[146][147] North Korea's arsenal, bolstered by acquisitions from Russia and China, adds volatility to Northeast Asian waters, where mines could target South Korean and Japanese shipping in crisis.[62] Overall, proliferation favors defensive denial strategies for revisionist states, imposing asymmetric costs on interveners: a single advanced mine can disable multimillion-dollar warships, while clearance operations require specialized assets vulnerable to further attacks.[58][141]
