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Palestinian political violence
Palestinian political violence
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Palestinian insurgents during the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt during the British Mandate of Palestine
Palestinian fedayeen at a Fatah rally in Beirut, Lebanon in 1979
Hamas' military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, on parade in 2011

Palestinian political violence refers to acts of violence or terrorism committed by Palestinians with the intent to accomplish political goals in the context of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Common objectives of political violence by Palestinian groups include self-determination in, sovereignty over the region of Palestine, and seeking the one-state solution,[1][2] or the recognition of a Palestinian state. This includes the objective of ending the Israeli occupation. Goals also include the release of Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and recognition of the Palestinian right of return.[3][4][5][6][7]

Palestinian groups that have been involved in politically motivated violence include the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Abu Nidal Organization, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hamas.[8] Several of these groups are considered terrorist organizations by the governments of the United States,[9] Canada,[10] the United Kingdom,[11] Japan,[12] New Zealand[13] and the European Union.[14][15]

Attacks have taken place both within Israel and Palestine as well as internationally. They have been directed at both military targets and civilians of many countries. Tactics have included hostage taking, plane hijacking, boat hijacking, stone throwing, improvised explosive device, knife attacks, shooting sprees, attacks with vehicles, car bombs and assassinations. In the 1990s, groups seeking to stop Israeli-Palestinian negotiations began adopting suicide bombings, predominantly targeting civilians, which later peaked during the Second Intifada. In recent decades, violence has also included rocket attacks on Israeli urban centers. The October 7 attacks resulted in massacres and hostage-taking.

Suicide bombings constituted 0.5% of Palestinian attacks against Israelis in the first two years of the Second Intifada; though this percentage accounted for half of the Israelis killed in that period.[16] As of 2022, a majority of Palestinians, 59%, believe armed attacks against Israelis inside Israel are an effective measure to end the occupation, with 56% supporting them.[17]

History

[edit]

Overview and context

[edit]
A Jewish bus equipped with wire screens to protect against rock, glass, and grenade throwing, late 1930s
A demolished farmhouse in Tel Mond, Israel, after a fedayun attack

In protest against the 1917 Balfour Declaration, which proposed a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine, both Muslim and Christian Palestinians began to organize in opposition to Zionism. By the end of Ottoman rule, the Jewish population of Palestine was 56,000[18] or one-sixth of the total population.[19] Hostility to Jewish immigration led to numerous incidents such as the 1920 Nebi Musa riots, the 1921 Jaffa riots, the 1929 Palestine riots and the 1936–39 Arab revolt in Palestine. The Arab revolt was suppressed by British security forces and led to the deaths of approximately 5,000 Palestinians. After the passing of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine in 1947 which called for the establishment of independent Arab and Jewish States, the 1947–48 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine broke out. Following the Israeli Declaration of Independence on May 15, 1948, the 1948 Arab–Israeli War began, involving intervention by neighboring Arab states. Casualties included 6,000 Israelis and, according to the 1958 survey by Arif al-Arif, 13,000 Palestinians.[20] Additionally some 750,000 Palestinians were expelled or fled during the Nakba subsequently becoming refugees.[21]

In the Six-Day War, a further 280,000–360,000 Palestinians became refugees, the West Bank including Jerusalem was captured and occupied from Jordan and Gaza was occupied from Egypt. These occupied Palestinian territories later began to be settled by Jewish and Israeli settlers, while the Palestinians were placed under Israeli military administration. Historically, Palestinian militancy was fragmented into several groups. The Palestine Liberation Organization led, and eventually united, most factions, while conducting military campaigns, varying from airplane hijackings, militant operations, and civil protest. In 1987, the First Intifada, a revolt of predominantly civil resistance, broke out. It led to the Madrid Conference of 1991, and subsequently to the Oslo I Accord. Oslo I produced an interim understanding allowing the new Palestinian National Authority to exercise limited autonomy in 3%, later 17%, of the West Bank, and parts of the Gaza Strip, which were not used or designated for Israeli settlement. Unsatisfied with concessions, Islamist organizations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad adopted the usage of suicide bombings,[22][23] predominantly against Israeli civilians.[24] Frustration over the perceived failure of the peace talks to yield a Palestinian state[25] led to the outbreak of the Second Intifada from September 2000 until 2005, coincident with Israel's unilateral disengagement plan[citation needed]. The rise of Hamas, the use of Palestinian rocketry and Israel's control of Gaza's borders, has led to further chronic violence, culminating in a further two conflicts, the Gaza War of 2008–09 and Operation Pillar of Defense in 2012.[citation needed]

Since 1967, some reports [which?] estimate that some 40% of the male population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip have been arrested or detained in Israeli prisons for political or military reasons.[26]

British Mandate for Palestine (1917–1947)

[edit]

Following the Balfour Declaration in November 1917 which encouraged Jewish migrants to settle in Palestine, violence against the Jews increased in the region. At this time Arabs were the majority, both geographically and demographically compared to the Jewish population. The majority of Arab Palestinians were distributed throughout the highlands of Judea, Samaria and Galilee whereas the Jewish population was scattered in small towns and rural communities. Arabs hostile to the Jewish population adopted a "war of attrition" tactic which was advantageous to the more numerous Arab community.[27]

Many of the deaths were inflicted during short time spans and in a few locations. On a day in April 1920, about 216 Jews were wounded or killed in Jerusalem. By May 1921, around 40 Jews were killed or wounded per day. In August 1929 that number had risen to 80 per day. During the 1929 riots, one percent of the Jewish population of Jerusalem were wounded or killed, in Safed 2 percent, and in Hebron 12 percent.[27] During the 1920–1929 attacks on Jews were organized by local groups and encouraged by local religious leaders. As the Jewish community did not count on the British authorities to protect them, they formed the Haganah which were predominantly defensive in the 1920s.[27] During the Arab Revolt in the 1936–1939 period, violence was coordinated and organized by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and was directed against both Jews and the British. Due to the rising level of Arab violence, the Haganah started to pursue an offensive strategy.[27]

Independence of Israel to establishment of PLO (1949–1964)

[edit]

Throughout the period 1949–56 the Egyptian government opposed the movement of refugees from the Gaza strip into Israel, but following the IDF's Gaza Raid on February 28, 1955, the Egyptian authorities facilitated militant infiltration but still continued to oppose civilian infiltration.[28]

Around 400 Palestinian insurgents were killed by Israeli Security Forces each year in 1951, 1952 and 1953; a similar number and probably far more were killed in 1950. In 1949, 1,000 or more Palestinians were killed. At least 100 Palestinians were killed during 1954–1956. In total upward of 2,700 and possibly as many as 5,000 were killed by the IDF, police, and civilians along Israel's borders between 1949 and 1956. Most of the people in question were refugees attempting to return to their homes, take back possessions that had been left behind during the war and to gather crops from their former fields and orchards inside the new Israeli state.[29] Meron Benivasti states that the fact that the "infiltrators" were for the most part former inhabitants of the land returning for personal, economic and sentimental reasons was suppressed in Israel as it was feared that this may lead to an understanding of their motives and to the justification of their actions.[29]

After Israel's Operation Black Arrow in 1955, in response to massacres in the city of Rehovot, the Palestinian fedayeen were incorporated into an Egyptian unit.[30] John Bagot Glubb, a British general who commanded the Arab Legion, claimed in his 1957 autobiography A Soldier with the Arabs that he convinced the Legion to arm and train the fedayeen for free.[31] Between 1951 and 1956, 400 Israelis were killed and 900 wounded by fedayeen attacks.[32][33]

The Palestine Liberation Organization was founded in 1964. At its first convention in Cairo, hundreds of Palestinians met to "call for the right of self-determination and the upholding of the rights of the Palestinian nation".[34] To achieve these goals, a Palestinian army of liberation was thought to be essential; thus, the Palestinian Liberation Army was established with the support of the Arab states.[34] Fatah, a Palestinian group founded in the late 1950s to organize the armed resistance against Israel, and headed by Yasser Arafat, soon rose to prominence within the PLO. The PLO charter called for "an end to the State of Israel, a return of Palestinians to their homeland, and the establishment of a single democratic state throughout Palestine".[35]

Six-Day War and aftermath

[edit]

Our basic aim is to liberate the land from the Mediterranean Seas to the Jordan River. We are not concerned with what took place in June 1967 or in eliminating the consequences of the June War. The Palestinian revolution's basic concern is the uprooting of the Zionist entity from our land and liberating it.

— Yasser Arafat, 1970[36]

Due to Israel's defeat of Arab armies in the Six-Day War, the Palestinian leadership came to the conclusion that the Arab world was unable to challenge Israel militarily in open warfare. Simultaneously, the Palestinians drew lessons from movements and uprisings in Latin America, North Africa and Southeast Asia which led them to move away from guerilla warfare in rural areas and towards terrorist attacks in urban environments with an international reach. This led to a series of aircraft hijackings, bombings and kidnappings which culminated in the killings of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The military superiority of Israel led Palestinian fighters to employ guerrilla tactics from bases in Jordan and Lebanon.[35]

George Habash, founder of the PFLP, masterminded the hijackings of four Western airliners to Jordan, which led to the Black September conflict.[37]

In the wake of the Six-Day War, confrontations between Palestinian guerrillas in Jordan and government forces became a major problem within the kingdom. By early 1970, at least seven Palestinian guerrilla organizations were active in Jordan, one of the most important being the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by George Habash. Based in the Jordanian refugee camps, the fedayeen developed a virtual state within a state, receiving funds and arms from both the Arab states and Eastern Europe and openly flouting the law of the country. The guerrillas initially focused on attacking Israel, but by late 1968, the main fedayeen activities in Jordan appeared to shift to attempts to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy.[38]

Black September

[edit]

Various clashes between the fedayeen and the army occurred between the years 1968–1970. The situation climaxed in September 1970, when several attempts to assassinate King Hussein failed. On September 7, 1970, in the series of Dawson's Field hijackings, three planes were hijacked by PFLP: a SwissAir and a TWA that were landed in Azraq area and a Pan Am that was landed in Cairo. Then on September 9, a BOAC flight from Bahrain was also hijacked to Zarqa. The PFLP announced that the hijackings were intended "to pay special attention to the Palestinian problem". After all hostages were removed, the planes were dramatically blown up in front of TV cameras.

A bitterly fought 10-day civil war known as Black September ensued, drawing involvement by Syria and Iraq, and sparking troop movements by Israel and the United States Navy. The number of people killed on all sides were estimated as high as 3,500,[38] other sources claiming it to be as high as 20,000.

Battles between Palestinian guerrilla forces and the Jordanian army continued during the closing months of 1970 and the first six months of 1971. In November 1971, members of the Palestinian Black September group, who took their name from the civil war, assassinated Jordanian Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal in Cairo. In December the group made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate the Jordanian ambassador in Britain.[38]

Relocation to Lebanon and Lebanese Civil War

[edit]

In the aftermath of Black September in Jordan, many Palestinians arrived in Lebanon, among them Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). In the early 1970s their presence exacerbated an already tense situation in Lebanon, and in 1975 the Lebanese Civil War broke out. Beginning with street fighting in Beirut between Christian Phalangists and Palestinian militiamen, the war quickly deteriorated into a conflict between two loosely defined factions: the side wishing to preserve the status quo, consisting primarily of Maronite militias, and the side seeking change, which included a variety of militias from leftist organizations and guerrillas from rejectionist Palestinian (nonmainstream PLO) organizations. The Lebanese civil war lasted until 1990 and resulted in an estimated 130,000 to 250,000 civilian fatalities and one million wounded.[citation needed]

Charred remains of the bus hijacked and burnt by Palestinian militants in 1978 in the Coastal Road massacre

After Black September, the PLO and its offshoots waged an international campaign against Israelis. Notable events were the Munich Olympics massacre (1972), the hijacking of several civilian airliners (some were thwarted, see for example: Entebbe Operation), the Savoy Hotel attack, the Zion Square explosive refrigerator and the Coastal Road massacre. During the 1970s and the early 1980s, Israel suffered attacks from PLO bases in Lebanon, such as the Avivim school bus massacre in 1970, the Maalot massacre in 1974 (where Palestinian militants massacred 21 school children) and the Nahariya attack led by Samir Kuntar in 1979, as well as a terrorist bombing by Ziad Abu Ein that killed two Israeli 16-year-olds and left 36 other youths wounded during the Lag BaOmer celebration in Tiberias.[39][40] Following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, called "Operation Peace for Galilee" by the IDF, and the exile of the PLO to Tunis, Israel had a relatively quiet decade.[citation needed]

First Intifada (1987–1993)

[edit]
Palestinians in Qalandiya throw rocks from behind an ambulance during a riot as part of the Nakba protests.

The First Intifada was characterized more by grassroots and non-violent political actions from among the population in the Israeli occupied Palestinian territories.[41] A total of 160 Israelis and 2,162 Palestinians were killed, including 1,000 Palestinians killed by other Palestinians under the accusation of being collaborators.[42] The Intifada lasted five years and ended with the signing of the Oslo Accords.[43] The strategy of non-violence, though widespread among Palestinians, was not always adhered to, and there were youth who threw molotov cocktails and stones, with such violence generally directed against Israeli soldiers and settlers.[44]

There were two attacks that represented new developments in terms of political violence inside Israel in this period. The first Palestinian suicide attack took place on July 6, 1989, when a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad boarded the Tel Aviv Jerusalem bus 405. He walked up to the driver and pulled the wheel to the right, driving the vehicle into a ravine, killing 16 people.[45] The end of the intifada also saw the first use of suicide bombing as a tactic by Palestinian militants. On April 16, 1993, Hamas carried out the Mehola Junction bombing, in which operative Saher Tamam al-Nabulsi detonated his explosives-laden car between two buses. One person, a Palestinian, other than the attacker was killed, and 21 were wounded.[46]

During this period, the Abu Nidal Organization became subsumed by infighting and mass executed hundreds of its members and their families during 1987–1988. The number of executed is estimated at 600 people, mostly Palestinians, across several separate locations in Syria, Lebanon and Libya.[47]

Oslo Accords to Camp David Summit (1993–2000)

[edit]
Bus after 1996 terror bombing in Jerusalem

The years between the intifadas were marked by intense diplomatic activity between Israel and Palestinians, who were represented by the PLO. This led to the signing of the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority. In response, Islamist organizations such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) adopted the tactic of suicide bombings, influenced by Lebanese groups, to derail the peace process, weaken the PLO and polarize Israeli politics.[22][23]

In this period, suicide bombings of Israeli buses and crowded spaces became a regular tactic, particularly by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. [citation needed] Attacks during this period include the Beit Lid massacre, a double-suicide bombing at a crowded junction that killed 21 people and the Dizengoff Center massacre, a suicide bombing outside a Tel Aviv shopping mall that killed 13 people.

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

[edit]
Bus after 2003 terror bombing in Haifa

The Second Intifada (2000–2005) witnessed a significant increase in Palestinian political violence, including many suicide bombings, which predominantly targeted Israeli civilians.[24] According to B'Tselem, as of July 10, 2005, over 400 members of the Israeli Security forces, and 821 Israeli civilians have been killed by Palestinians since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, 553 of whom were killed within the 1949 Armistice lines, mainly by suicide bombings. Targets of attacks included buses, Israeli checkpoint, restaurants, discothèques, shopping malls, a university, and civilian homes.[48][49][50]

Ramallah lynching

[edit]

In October 2000, a Palestinian mob lynched two non-combatant Israel Defense Forces reservists, Vadim Nurzhitz (sometimes spelled as Norzhich) and Yossi Avrahami (or Yosef Avrahami),[51] who had accidentally entered the Palestinian Authority-controlled city of Ramallah in the West Bank. The brutality of the event, captured in a photo of a Palestinian rioter proudly waving his blood-stained hands to the crowd below, sparked international outrage and further intensified the ongoing conflict between Israeli and Palestinian forces.[52][53][54]

Suicide bombings and attacks on civilians

[edit]

A spate of suicide bombings and attacks, aimed mostly at civilians (such as the Dolphinarium discotheque suicide bombing), was launched against Israel and elicited a military response. A suicide bombing dubbed the Passover Massacre (30 Israeli civilians were killed at Park hotel, Netanya) climaxed a bloody month of March 2002, in which more than 130 Israelis, mostly civilians, were killed in attacks. Israel launched Operation Defensive Shield. The operation led to the apprehension of many members of militant groups, as well as their weaponry and equipment. 497 Palestinians and 30 Israelis were killed during Operation Defensive Shield.[55]

In 2004, 31 people were killed and 159 others were wounded in a simultaneous attack against multiple tourist destinations in Egypt.[56] Of the dead, 15 were Egyptians, 12 were from Israel, two from Italy, one from Russia, and one was an Israeli-American. According to the Egyptian government, the bombers were Palestinians led by Iyad Saleh, who had tried to enter Israel to carry out attacks there but were unsuccessful.[57]

2005–2013

[edit]
A kindergarten classroom in the Israeli city of Beer Sheva after being hit by a Grad rocket fired from the Gaza Strip

In the mid-2000s, Hamas started putting greater emphasis on its political characteristics and strengthened its popularity amongst Palestinians. In 2006 Palestinian legislative elections Hamas won a majority in the Palestinian Legislative Council, prompting the United States and many European countries to cut off all funds to Hamas and the Palestinian Authority,[58] insisting that Hamas must recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept previous peace pacts.[59]

After the Israel's unilateral disengagement plan in 2005 and the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, Hamas took control over all the Gaza Strip in June 2007 in a bloody coup. Palestinian militant groups in the Gaza strip increased the firing of Qassam rockets, mortars and Grad missiles on southern Israel. Attacks continued outside the Gaza Strip perimeter, including the attack that resulted in the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit being captured and held in the Gaza Strip for over five years.

Hamas has made use of guerrilla tactics in the Gaza Strip and to a lesser degree the West Bank.[60] Hamas has adapted these techniques over the years since its inception. According to a 2006 report by rival Fatah party, Hamas had smuggled "between several hundred and 1,300 tons" of advanced rockets, along with other weaponry, into Gaza. Some Israelis and some Gazans both noted similarities in Hamas's military buildup to that of Hezbollah in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war.[60]

Hamas has used IEDs and anti-tank rockets against the IDF in Gaza. The latter include standard RPG-7 warheads and home-made rockets such as the Al-Bana, Al-Batar and Al-Yasin. The IDF has a difficult, if not impossible time trying to find hidden weapons caches in Palestinian areas – this is due to the high local support base Hamas enjoys.[61]

During the Gaza War (2008–09), Palestinian militant groups fired rockets aimed at civilian targets which struck the cities of Ashdod, Beersheba and Gedera. The military wing of Hamas said that after a week from the start, it had managed to fire 302 rockets, at an average of 44 rockets daily. 102 rockets and 35 mortars were fired by Fatah at Israel. Over 750 rockets and mortars were fired from Gaza into Israel during the conflict wounded 182 civilians, killing 3 people, and causing minor suffering to another 584 people suffering from shock and anxiety. Several rockets landed in schools and one fell close to a kindergarten, all located in residential areas. The UN fact finding mission stated that this constituted a deliberate attack against the civilian population and was unjustifiable in international law.[62][63][64]

In 2012, terror attacks against Israelis in the West Bank increased compared to 2011. The number of terror attacks in the West Bank increased from 320 in 2011 to 578 in 2012.[65] The attacks mainly involved rock throwing, Molotov cocktails, firearms and explosives.[65]

In 2013, Hamas stated that the "kidnapping of IDF soldiers to trade for Palestinian prisoners is at the heart of Palestinian culture".[66]

Israel-Gaza war

[edit]
A blood-stained home floor in the aftermath of the Nahal Oz massacre

On October 7, 2023, Hamas and other Palestinian factions launched an attack, breaching the Gaza–Israel barrier. For months prior to the attack, Hamas had been leading Israeli intelligence to believe that they were not seeking conflict.[67] Hamas fighters proceeded to massacre hundreds of civilians at a music festival and in kibbutz Be'eri and take hostages in Southern Israel back to the Gaza Strip. In total, 1,139 civilians, IDF soldiers and foreign nationals were killed in Israel, making this the deadliest attack by Hamas militants since the foundation of Israel in 1948.[68] The Hamas-led attack marked the beginning of the ongoing Gaza war.

Government involvement

[edit]

In 2011, Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu stated that the incitement promulgated by the Palestinian Authority was destroying Israel's confidence, and he condemned what he regarded as the glorification of the murderers of the Fogel family in Itamar on PA television. The perpetrator of the murders had been described as a "hero" and a "legend" by members of his family, during a weekly program.[69][70]

Isi Leibler wrote in the Jerusalem Post that Mahmoud Abbas and his chief negotiator Saeb Erekat deny Israel's right to exist and promote vicious hatred against Jews, in statements made in Arabic. He claimed that the state-controlled Palestinian media praised the murders committed by Palestinians. Abbas al-Sayed who perpetrated the Passover suicide attack at the Park Hotel in Netanya which killed 30 civilians was described by Abbas as a "hero" and "symbol of the Palestinian Authority".[71]

Following the Itamar massacre and a bombing in Jerusalem, 27 US senators sent a letter requesting the US Secretary of State to identify the administration's steps to end Palestinian incitement to violence against Jews and Israel that they said was occurring within the "Palestinian media, mosques and schools, and even by individuals or institutions affiliated with the Palestinian Authority".[72]

The United Nations body UNESCO stopped funding a children's magazine sponsored by the Palestinian Authority that commended Hitler's killing of Jews. It deplored this publication as contrary to its principles of building tolerance and respect for human rights and human dignity.[73]

Palestinian Media Watch reported that the Palestinian Authority spent more than $5 million a month paying salaries to Palestinians and Israeli Arabs imprisoned in Israel for terror crimes. They also stated that groups in a summer camp for children sponsored by PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad were named after militants: Dalal Mughrabi, who led the Coastal Road Massacre; Salah Khalaf, head of Black September that carried out the Munich massacre; and Abu Ali Mustafa, the general secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine who perpetrated many attacks. Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, donated $25,000 to the families of suicide bombers, and $10,000 to the families of Palestinian civilians killed by the Israeli military.[74][75]

After Israel agreed to hand over the bodies of dead Palestinian suicide bombers and other militants as part of what the Israeli Government described as 'a humanitarian gesture' to PA chairman Mahmoud Abbas to help the peace process, the Palestinian Authority planned a national rally to honour them and to provide full military funerals. The bodies included the suicide bombers that perpetrated the bus bombing in Jerusalem's Shmuel Hanavi neighborhood which killed twenty-three people, many of them children, and the attacker in the Cafe Hillel bombing. Israel will also return the remains of the bombers that committed the bombings on two buses in Beersheba in 2004 killing 16 people, the Stage night club bombing, the attack on the open-air Hadera market as well as the attackers of the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv who killed eight hostages. The Palestinian Authority and Hamas both planned official ceremonies and PA president Abbas attended a ceremony at his Muqataa compound. Prisoners Affairs Minister Qaraqi called on Palestinians for a day of celebration. The rally in honor of the dead will be attended by PA President Mahmoud Abbas, PLO leaders, and families of the dead militants. The dead are considered martyrs by Palestinians, but viewed as terrorists by Israelis.[76][77][78]

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has been accused of incitement to violence, on the basis of a statement he made concerning youths injured in defending the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount from what Palestinians have seen as attempts to alter the status quo. He declared in September 2015: "Every drop of blood spilled in Jerusalem is pure, every shahid will reach paradise, and every injured person will be rewarded by God."[79][80]

Involvement of women and children

[edit]
Bloody child's shoe after Palestinian attack on an Israeli shopping mall

In the 1930s, the emergence of organized youth cadres was rooted in the desire to form a youth paramilitary. It was believed that armed youth might bring an end to British hegemony in the Middle East. Youth were cajoled into violence by Palestinian political figures and newspapers that glorified violence and death. The Palestinian Arab Party sponsored the development of storm troops consisting solely of children and youth. A British report from the period stated that "the growing youth and scout movements must be regarded as the most probable factors for the disturbance of the peace".[81]

As a youngster, Yasir Arafat led neighborhood children in marching and drills, beating those who did not obey. In the 1940s, Arafat's father organized a group of militants in Gaza which included Yasir Arafat and his brothers. The leader, Abu Khalid, a mathematics teacher in Gaza, gave Arafat the name Yasir in honor of the militant Yasir al-Bireh.[82]

Child suicide bombers

[edit]

As part of the Arab–Israeli conflict, especially during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, Palestinian militant groups used children for suicide bombings. Minors were recruited to attack Israeli targets, both military and civilian. This deliberate involvement of children in armed conflict was condemned by international human rights organizations.[83][84]

According to Amnesty International: "Palestinian armed groups have repeatedly shown total disregard for the most fundamental human rights, notably the right to life, by deliberately targeting Israeli civilians and by using Palestinian children in armed attacks. Children are susceptible to recruitment by manipulation or may be driven to join armed groups for a variety of reasons, including a desire to avenge relatives or friends killed by the Israeli army."[85]

Human shields

[edit]

According to the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in 2015,[86] Hamas launched rockets from inside schools to use the retaliatory child deaths for propaganda and deter Israel from attacking Gaza.[87] This tactic is called the human shield.

Involvement of women

[edit]

Women in particular have increasingly associated political violence with expanded citizenship rights due to the perceived failure of nonmilitaristic tactics to achieve political goals, primary amongst these, the achievement of Palestinian autonomy.[88]

The profile of the female Palestinian suicide bombers has been the subject of study by Katherine VanderKaay, who presented her profiling of the subjects at the American Psychological Association's annual meeting. While the first suicide bombing undertaken by a Palestinian took place in 1994, the first female suicide bomber from among Palestinian society did not emerge until January 2002. The bomber was Wafa Idris, a 28-year-old paramedic and a supporter of secularist parties.[89][90]

Violence against civilians

[edit]
Qassam rockets fired at Sderot
Timeline of Israelis and Palestinians killed in the occupied Palestinian territory and Israel from 2008 to October 6, 2023

According to B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 500 Israeli civilians were killed by Palestinians from September 29, 2000, to March 31, 2012, in Israel, and another 254 Israeli civilians were killed in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.[91]

B'tselem reported that the main argument used to justify violence against civilians is that "all means are legitimate in fighting for independence against a foreign occupation". B'Tselem criticized this argument, saying it is completely baseless, and contradicts the fundamental principle of international humanitarian law.

"According to this principle, civilians are to be protected from the consequences of warfare, and any attack must discriminate between civilians and military targets. This principle is part of international customary law; as such, it applies to every state, organization, and person, even those who are not party to any relevant convention."[92]

B'Tselem further noted that Palestinian spokespersons distinguish between attacks inside Israel proper and attacks directed at settlers in the Occupied Territories, stating that since the settlements are illegal and many settlers belong to Israel's security forces, settlers are not entitled to the international law protections granted to civilians. Human rights group B'tselem rejected this argument, and stated:

"The illegality of the settlements has no effect at all on the status of their civilian residents. The settlers constitute a distinctly civilian population, which is entitled to all the protections granted civilians by international law. The Israeli security forces' use of land in the settlements or the membership of some settlers in the Israeli security forces does not affect the status of the other residents living among them, and certainly does not make them proper targets of attack. B'Tselem strongly opposes the attempts to justify attacks against Israeli civilians by using distorted interpretations of international law. Furthermore, B'Tselem demands that the Palestinian Authority do everything within its power to prevent future attacks and to prosecute the individuals involved in past attacks."[92]

Rocket attacks on Israel

[edit]
Rocket attacks fired at Israel from the Gaza Strip, 2001–2021[93]

Palestinian rocket and mortar attacks on Israel from the Gaza Strip have occurred since 2001. Between 2001 and January 2009, over 8,600 rockets had been launched, leading to 28 deaths and several hundred injuries,[94][95] as well as widespread psychological trauma and disruption of daily life.[96]

The weapons, often generically referred to as Qassams, were initially crude and short-range, mainly affecting the Israeli city of Sderot and other communities bordering the Gaza Strip. In 2006, more sophisticated rockets began to be deployed, reaching the larger coastal city of Ashkelon, and by early 2009 major cities Ashdod and Beersheba had been hit by Katyusha and Grad rockets.

Attacks have been carried out by all Palestinian armed groups,[97] and, prior to the 2008–2009 Gaza War, were consistently supported by most Palestinians,[98][99][100][101] although the stated goals have been mixed. The attacks, widely condemned for targeting civilians, have been described as terrorism by United Nations, European Union and Israeli officials, and are defined as war crimes by human rights groups Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

Osher Twito, an Israeli boy crippled by Palestinian rocket fire

Defenses constructed specifically to deal with the weapons include fortifications for schools and bus stops as well as an alarm system named Red Color. Iron Dome, a system to intercept short-range rockets, was developed by Israel and first deployed in the spring of 2011 to protect Beersheba and Ashkelon, but officials and experts warned that it would not be completely effective. Shortly thereafter, it intercepted a Palestinian Grad rocket for the first time.[102]

The attacks were a stated cause of the Gaza blockade, the Gaza War (December 27, 2008 – January 21, 2009) and other Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip, including Operation Rainbow (May 2004), Operation Days of Penitence (2004), the 2006 Israel-Gaza conflict, Operation Autumn Clouds (2006), and Operation Hot Winter (2008). Attacks began in 2001. Since then, nearly 4,800 rockets have hit southern Israel, just over 4,000 of them since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005. The range of the rockets has increased over time. The original Qassam rocket has a range of about 10 km (6.2 mi) but more advanced rockets, including versions of the old Soviet Grad or Katyusha have hit Israeli targets 40 km (25 mi) from Gaza.[94]

Some analysts see the attacks as a shift away from reliance on suicide bombing, which was previously Hamas's main method of attacking Israel, and an adoption of the rocket tactics used by Lebanese militant group Hezbollah.[103]

Stone-throwing

[edit]

Palestinian stone-throwing is a violent political statement which encompasses the practice of throwing stones by hand and using powerful slings variously aimed at Israel security personnel, Israeli civilians, and at both civilian and military vehicles.

Internal violence

[edit]

B'Tselem reports that from September 29, 2000, to March 31, 2012, there were 669 Palestinians killed by Palestinians. Of those, 134 were killed for suspected collaboration with Israel.[48][104]

Concerning the killing of Palestinians by other Palestinians, a January 2003 Humanist magazine article reports:[105]

For over a decade the PA has violated Palestinian human rights and civil liberties by routinely killing civilians—including collaborators, demonstrators, journalists, and others—without charge or fair trial. Of the total number of Palestinian civilians killed during this period by both Israeli and Palestinian security forces, 16 percent were the victims of Palestinian security forces.

... According to Freedom House's annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, Freedom in the World 2001–2002, the chaotic nature of the Intifada along with strong Israeli reprisals has resulted in a deterioration of living conditions for Palestinians in Israeli-administered areas. The survey states:

"Civil liberties declined due to: shooting deaths of Palestinian civilians by Palestinian security personnel; the summary trial and executions of alleged collaborators by the Palestinian Authority (PA); extrajudicial killings of suspected collaborators by militias; and the apparent official encouragement of Palestinian youth to confront Israeli soldiers, thus placing them directly in harm's way."

Internal Palestinian violence has been called an Intrafada, a play on "intifada".[106][107]

Palestinian attitudes

[edit]

The PLO officially "declared its rejection and condemnation of terrorism in all its forms" in 1988.[108]

1995–2000

[edit]

A study conducted by Mkhaimer Abusada of Al-Azhar University explored attitudes towards the use of political violence. Four questions were posed on the subject of political violence to over a thousand respondents randomly selected from localities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The first question was: "Do you support the continuing resort of some Palestinian factions to armed operations against Israeli targets in Gaza and Jericho?" Overall, 56% of respondents responded negatively. Those affiliated with leftist groups showed the highest levels of support for armed attacks against Israelis (74%), while those affiliated with parties supporting the peace process showed the lowest levels (24%). The Islamic opposition was split, with slightly over half in favor, and slightly less than half opposed.[109]

In September 1995, survey participants were asked whether they supported, opposed or had no opinion with regard to "armed attacks against Israeli army targets", "armed attacks against Israeli settlers", and "armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets". The majority supported the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Support crossed all party lines and groups, and was highest among the Islamic opposition (91% and 84%) and the leftists (90% and 89%), though a significant majority of those who supported the peace process also supported armed attacks on military targets and settlers (69% and 73%). To explain the apparent paradox in the latter position, Abusada quotes Shikaki (1996) who "contends that Palestinian support for the use of armed attacks against Israeli military targets and settlers does not indicate 'opposition to the peace process but Palestinian insistence that the process entails an end to occupation and settlements.'"[109] Palestinian support for armed attacks against Israeli civilian targets in Israel was 20% overall, with support being highest among those affiliated with the Islamic opposition (42%) and the leftists (32%), and lowest among supporters of the peace process (12%) and the National Independents (10%).[109]

2000–04

[edit]

A July 2001 poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PSR) found that 58 percent of Palestinians supported armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel and 92 percent supported armed confrontations against the Israeli army in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.[110] A May 2002 poll by the center found that support for bombings of civilians inside Israel dropped to 52%, but support for armed attacks against Israeli settlers remained "very high" at 89 percent. Support for armed attacks against soldiers stood at 92 percent.[111] A poll after the 2003 Maxim restaurant suicide bombing, in which 20 Israelis were killed, concluded that 75 percent of Palestinians supported the attack, with support higher "in the Gaza Strip (82%) compared to the West Bank (70%), in refugee camps (84%) compared to towns and villages (69%), among women (79%) compared to men (71%), among the young (78%) compared to the old (66%), among students (81%) compared to professionals (33%), and among supporters of Hamas (92%) compared to supporters of Fateh (69%)".[112]

The firing of rockets from Beit Hanoun into Israel was acceptable to about three-quarters of the Palestinian public in the occupied territories, and was higher in the West Bank (78%) compared to the Gaza Strip (71%), among students (83%) compared to merchants (63%), and among supporters of Hamas (86%) compared to supporters of Fatah (73%). While firing rockets from Beit Hanoun was supported by a majority of Palestinians (75%), 59% of the residents of Beit Hanoun rejected this practice. 83% of Palestinians favored a mutual cessation of violence.[113]

A report by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, a Palestinian organization, showing trends based on polls conducted since 1997, indicated that Palestinian support for military operations against Israeli targets stood at 34–40 percent in 1997–1999, climbed to 65–85 percent in 2000–2004, and dropped back to 41 percent at the end of 2004. "Military operations" were defined as including shootings, car bombs and mortar rocket attacks, but not suicide bombings.[114] A 2005 poll by the center indicated that 53 percent of Palestinians supported "the continuation of [the] Al-Aqsa Intifada, 50 percent supported "suicide bombings against Israeli civilians", and 36 percent supported "the resumption of military operations against Israeli targets".[115]

A 2004 study by Victoroff et al. was conducted on a group of 52 boys, all 14 years old, from the al-Shati camp in Gaza. Forty-three percent of the boys reported that a family member had been wounded or killed by the IDF, and half lived in households where the father's employment was lost following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. "Sympathy for terrorism" was found to be correlated with depression and anxiety scores, as well as with the level of "perceived oppression", and "emotional distress". Of those who felt subject to unjust treatment, 77 percent expressed sympathy for political violence.[116]

2005–2012

[edit]
Jerusalem, July 2, 2008. A Palestinian man drives a front-end loader into several vehicles in Jerusalem, killing three before being shot dead.

A March 2008 report by Palestinian Center for Policy & Survey Research (PSR) noted that the level of support for armed attack against Israeli civilians inside Israel increased significantly with 67% supporting and 31% opposed, compared to support by 40% in 2005 and 55% in 2006. A February 2008 suicide bombing that killed one Israeli woman in Dimona was supported by 77% and opposed by 19%. An overwhelming majority of 84 percent supported the March 2008 Mercaz HaRav massacre, in which a Palestinian gunman killed eight students and wounded eleven in a Jerusalem school. Support for the attack was 91 percent in the Gaza Strip compared to 79 percent in the West Bank. Similar suicide attacks in 2005 had been less widely supported, with 29% support for a suicide attack that took place in Tel Aviv, and 37% support for another one in Beersheba.[117]

The 2009 Hamas political violence took place in the Gaza Strip during and after the 2009 Gaza War. A series of violent acts, ranging from physical assaults, torture, and executions of Palestinians suspected of collaboration with the Israel Defense Forces, as well as members of the Fatah political party, occurred. According to Human Rights Watch, at least 32 people were killed by these attacks: 18 during the conflict and 14 afterward, and several dozen more were maimed, many by shots to the legs.[118][119]

In 2012, the number of militant attacks in the West Bank rose from 320 in 2011 to 578 in 2012, including 282 in Jerusalem alone compared to 191 in 2011. According to an annual Shin Bet report, the increase was due in part to a 68% rise of attacks using molotov cocktails. The number of attacks involving firearms and explosives grew by 42%, from 26 to 37.[120]

Casualties

[edit]

Palestinian deaths by other Palestinians since 1982.

Conflict Killed
Operation Pillar of Defense 8[121]
Gaza War 75[citation needed]
Internal violence 2007–present 600[122]
Battle of Gaza (2007) 130[citation needed]
Second Intifada 714[123]
First Intifada 1,100[citation needed]
War of the Camps

Groups

[edit]

PLO

[edit]

Fatah associates

[edit]
  • Tanzim (founded 1995)
    • Means "organization" in Arabic
    • Loosely organized Fatah militia
    • Led by Marwan Barghouti until his arrest in 2002.
  • Force 17 (early 1970s–2007)
    • Elite unit of the PLO once under Yasser Arafat's direct guidance.
    • Acts as a versatile unit for combat and intelligence-gathering.
    • Dismantled in 2007 and incorporated into the Palestinian Presidential Guard.
  • Fatah Special Operations Group (Fatah-SOG)
    • Founded in the early 1970s by Col. Abdullah Abd al-Hamid Labib
    • Also known as the Martyrs of Tel Al Za'atar, Hawari, and Amn Araissi.
    • Recently inactive (as of 2004)
  • Ahmed Abu Reish Brigade
    • Extremist offshoot of Fatah.
    • Was involved in the July 17, 2004, kidnappings in the Gaza Strip.
    • Possibly linked to the Popular Resistance Committees
    • Led by Ahmed Abu Reish
  • Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
    • Responsible for many suicide bombings and shootings of Israeli civilians
    • Responsible for executing suspected conspirators and leaders of opposition against Arafat
    • Funded by Fatah and the Palestinian Authority[citation needed]
    • Offshoot of this group, Fatah Hawks, has carried out guerrilla attacks against Israeli military personnel in the Gaza Strip.
  • Black September Organization (1970–1973)
    • Began as a small cell of Fatah men determined to take revenge upon King Hussein and the Jordanian army for Black September in Jordan. Recruits from the PFLP, as-Sa'iqa, and other groups also joined.
    • Carried out Munich massacre.
    • Carried out Attack on the Saudi embassy in Khartoum
    • In 1973 two members of the Black September attacked, with sub-machine guns and grenades, at the passenger lounge at Ellinikon International Airport in Athens, Greece. Three civilians have been killed and 55 have been wounded. After the attack the gunmen took hostages, for more than two hours, before surrendering to the Greek police. Most of the casualties and injured were Greeks and Americans.[131]

Splinter

[edit]

Al-Qaeda associates

[edit]
  • Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam)
    • Also known as the Tawhid and Jihad Brigades and al-Qaeda in Palestine
    • The group are an armed Gaza clan named Doghmush who are affiliated with al-Qaeda and Abu Qatada
  • Abdullah Azzam Brigades
  • Jund Ansar Allah (2008–)
    • al-Qaeda-affiliated group in the Gaza Strip, founded in November 2008 by Abdel Latif Moussa
    • In August 2009, the group proclaimed the creation of an Islamic emirate in Gaza and led an armed rebellion against Hamas.
    • The group's leader Abdel Latif Moussa was killed during that rebellion.
  • Fatah al-Islam (2006–)
  • Jund al-Sham (1999–2008)
    • Radical Islamist group set up by Palestinians and Syrians which operated in different areas of the Middle East.
    • The group's leader Abu Youssef Sharqieh was captured by Lebanese forces during the 2007 conflict in Palestinian refugee camps.
    • The group was disbanded in 2008 as its members joined Lebanese al-Qaeda affiliated group Osbat al-Ansar.
  • Jaljalat (2006–)
    • A Hamas-splinter organisation founded in 2006 by Mahmoud Taleb, a former al-Qassam Brigades commander, after he opposed Hamas joining the 2006 elections
    • The group is affiliated with both Jund Ansar Allah and al-Qaeda
  • Jahafil Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad fi Filastin (2008–)

Sabireen Movement

[edit]

The Sabireen Movement's leadership converted to Shia Islam in 2014. It is at odds with Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and supports Hezbollah, Iran and Syria.

Notable attacks

[edit]

In Israel and Palestine

[edit]
Year Main article Location Perpetrator Fatalities
1953 Yehud attack Yehud 3 civilians
1954 Ma'ale Akrabim massacre Scorpions Pass, Route 227 11 civilians
1956 Shafrir synagogue shooting Kfar Chabad 6 civilians
1956 Ein Ofarim killings near Hatzeva 3 civilians
1956 Negev desert road ambush Highway 25, Southern District 5 civilians
1970 Avivim school bus bombing Avivim PFLP-GC 12 civilians
1971 Murder of the Aroyo children Gaza Strip 2 civilians
1972 Lod Airport massacre Lod Airport Japanese Red Army and PFLP-EO 24 civilians
1974 Kiryat Shmona massacre Kiryat Shmona PFLP-GC 18 civilians
1974 Ma'alot massacre Ma'alot-Tarshiha DFLP 31 civilians
1974 Nahariya attack Nahariya Fatah 3 civilians, 1 soldier
1974 Beit She'an attack Beit She'an DFLP 4 civilians
1975 Savoy Hotel attack Tel Aviv PLO 8 civilians, 3 soldiers
1975 Kfar Yuval hostage crisis Kfar Yuval Arab Liberation Front 3 civilians
1975 Zion Square refrigerator bombing Zion Square, Jerusalem PLO 15 civilians
1978 Coastal Road massacre Coastal Highway, near Tel Aviv Fatah and PLO 38 civilians, 1 soldier
1979 Nahariya attack Nahariya PLF 4 civilians
1980 Misgav Am hostage crisis Misgav Am Arab Liberation Front 3 civilians
1983 Murder of Danny Katz Northern District 1 civilian
1984 Bus 300 affair near Deir al-Balah, Gaza Strip PFLP 1 civilian
1987 Night of the Gliders near Kiryat Shmona PFLP-GC 6 soldiers
1988 Mothers' bus attack near Aroer PLO 3 civilians
1989 Killing of Binyamin Meisner Nablus, West Bank 1 soldier
1989 Killing of Avi Sasportas and Ilan Saadon Southern District Hamas 2 civilians
1989 Tel Aviv–Jerusalem bus attack near Kiryat Yearim 16 civilians
1992 Night of the Pitchforks IDF training base near Gal'ed 3 soldiers
1992 Murder of Helena Rapp Bat Yam 1 civilian
1993 Mehola Junction bombing Mehola, West Bank Hamas 1 civilian
1993 Abduction and killing of Yaron Chen Ramallah, West Bank Hamas 1 soldier
1994 Afula bus suicide bombing Afula Hamas and PIJ 8 civilians
1994 Hadera bus station suicide bombing Hadera Hamas 5 civilians
1994 Dizengoff Street bus bombing Tel Aviv Hamas 22 civilians
1994 Netzarim Junction bicycle bombing Netzarim Junction, Gaza Strip PIJ 3 soldiers
1994 Afula axe attack Afula Hamas 1 soldier
1995 Beit Lid suicide bombing Beit Lid Junction PIJ 22 soldiers, 1 civilian
1995 Kfar Darom bus attack near Kfar Darom, Gaza Strip PIJ 1 civilian, 7 soldiers
1995 Ramat Gan bus bombing Tel Aviv Hamas 6 civilians
1995 Ramat Eshkol bus bombing Jerusalem Hamas 5 civilians, 1 police officer
1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings Jerusalem Hamas 17 civilians, 9 soldiers
1996 Dizengoff Center suicide bombing Tel Aviv Hamas 12 civilians, 1 soldier
1996 Murder of Yaron and Efrat Ungar Route 383 near Gefen Al-Qassam Brigades 2 civilians
1997 Café Apropo bombing Tel Aviv Hamas 3 civilians
1997 Mahane Yehuda Market bombings Jerusalem Hamas 16 civilians
1997 Ben Yehuda Street bombing Jerusalem Hamas 5 civilians
2000 Ramallah lynching Ramallah, West Bank 2 soldiers
2001 Murder of Ofir Rahum Ramallah, West Bank 1 civilian
2001 Azor attack Azor Hamas 7 soldiers, 1 civilian
2001 Netanya bombing Netanya Hamas 3 civilians
2001 Murder of Shalhevet Pass Hebron, West Bank Tanzim 1 civilian
2001 HaSharon Mall suicide bombing Netanya Hamas 6 civilians
2001 Dolphinarium discotheque massacre Tel Aviv Hamas 21 civilians
2001 Sbarro restaurant suicide bombing Jerusalem Hamas 16 civilians
2001 Binyamina train station suicide bombing Binyamina-Giv'at Ada PIJ 2 soldiers
2001 Nahariya train station suicide bombing Nahariya Hamas 3 civilians
2001 Assassination of Rehavam Ze'evi Jerusalem PFLP 1 civilian
2001 Camp 80 junction bus 823 attack near Pardes Hanna-Karkur Fatah and PIJ 3 civilians
2001 Ben Yehuda Street bombing Jerusalem Hamas 11 civilians
2001 Haifa bus 16 suicide bombing Haifa Hamas 15 civilians
2002 Hadera attack Hadera Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 6 civilians
2002 Jaffa Street bombing Jerusalem Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 1 civilian
2002 Karnei Shomron Mall suicide bombing Karnei Shomron, West Bank PFLP 3 civilians
2002 Yeshivat Beit Yisrael bombing Jerusalem Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 10 civilians
2002 Seafood Market attack Tel Aviv Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 2 civilians, 1 police officer
2002 Atzmona attack Atzmona, Gaza Strip Hamas 5 civilians
2002 Café Moment bombing Jerusalem Hamas 11 civilians
2002 Matzuva attack Matzuva PIJ 5 civilians, 1 soldier
2002 King George Street bombing Jerusalem Hamas 3 civilians
2002 Passover massacre Netanya Hamas 30 civilians
2002 Kiryat HaYovel supermarket bombing Jerusalem Hamas 2 civilians
2002 Matza restaurant suicide bombing Haifa Hamas 16 civilians
2002 Yagur Junction bombing Highway 70, east of Haifa Hamas 6 soldiers, 2 civilians
2002 Mahane Yehuda Market bombing Jerusalem Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 6 civilians
2002 Rishon LeZion bombing Rishon LeZion Hamas 16 civilians
2002 Netanya Market bombing Netanya Hamas and PFLP 3 civilians
2002 Megiddo Junction bus bombing Megiddo Junction PIJ 13 soldiers, 4 civilians
2002 Herzliya bombing Herzliya Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 1 civilian
2002 Patt Junction bus bombing Jerusalem Hamas 19 civilians
2002 Itamar attack Itamar, West Bank PFLP 5 civilians
2002 Immanuel bus attack Immanuel, West Bank DFLP and Fatah 9 civilians
2002 Neve Shaanan Street bombing Tel Aviv PIJ 5 civilians
2002 Hebrew University bombing Jerusalem Hamas 9 civilians
2002 Meron Junction Bus 361 attack Meron Junction, near Safed Hamas 6 civilians, 3 soldiers
2002 Kissufim tank ambush Kissufim 2 soldiers
2002 Allenby Street bus bombing Tel Aviv Hamas 6 civilians
2002 Karkur junction suicide bombing Karkur PIJ 7 civilians, 7 soldiers
2002 Sonol gas station bombing Ariel, West Bank Hamas 3 soldiers
2002 Metzer attack Metzer Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 5 civilians
2002 Hebron ambush Hebron, West Bank PIJ 12 soldiers
2002 Kiryat Menachem bus bombing Jerusalem Hamas 11 civilians
2002 Beit She'an attack Beit She'an Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 6 civilians
2002 Yeshivat Otniel shooting Otniel, West Bank PIJ 4 civilians
2003 Tel Aviv central bus station massacre Tel Aviv 23 civilians
2003 Haifa bus 37 suicide bombing Haifa Hamas 17 civilians
2003 Mike's Place suicide bombing Tel Aviv Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 3 civilians
2003 French Hill suicide bombings East Jerusalem Hamas 7 civilians
2003 Afula mall bombing Afula PIJ and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 3 civilians
2003 Davidka Square bus bombing Jerusalem Hamas 17 civilians
2003 Murder of Oleg Shaichat near Kafr Kana "Free People of the Galilee" 1 soldier
2003 Shmuel HaNavi bus bombing Jerusalem Hamas 23 civilians
2003 Tzrifin bus stop attack Tzrifin Hamas 9 soldiers
2003 Café Hillel bombing Jerusalem 7 civilians
2003 Maxim restaurant suicide bombing Haifa PIJ 21 civilians
2003 Geha Interchange bus stop bombing Geha Interchange PFLP 3 soldiers, 1 civilian
2004 Erez Crossing bombing Erez Crossing Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 4 civilians
2004 Gaza Street bus bombing Jerusalem Hamas and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 11 civilians
2004 Liberty Bell Park bus bombing Jerusalem Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 8 civilians
2004 Ashdod Port bombings Ashdod Hamas and Fatah 10 civilians
2004 Murder of the Hatuel family Kissufim 5 civilians
2004 Beersheba bus bombings Beersheba Hamas 16 civilians
2004 Carmel Market bombing Tel Aviv PFLP 3 civilian
2004 IDF outpost bombing attac IDF outpost near the Philadelphi Route Hamas and Fatah
2005 Karni border crossing attack Karni Crossing Hamas, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the Popular Resistance Committees 6 civilians
2005 Stage Club bombing Tel Aviv PIJ 5 civilians
2005 HaSharon Mall suicide bombing Netanya PIJ 5 civilians
2005 Hadera Market bombing Hadera PIJ 7 civilians
2005 HaSharon Mall suicide bombing Netanya PIJ 5 civilians
2005 2nd Rosh Ha'ir restaurant bombing Tel Aviv PIJ 11 civilians
2005 Kidnapping and murder of Sasson Nuriel East Jerusalem Hamas 1 civilian
2006 Kedumim bombing Kedumim, West Bank Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 4 civilians
2006 Gaza cross-border raid near Kerem Shalom Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Popular Resistance Committees and the Army of Islam 2 soldiers
2006 Murder of Eliyahu Asheri West Bank Popular Resistance Committees 1 civilian
2007 Eilat bombing Eilat Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and PIJ 3 civilians
2007 Nahal Telem shooting Nahal Telem, West Bank 2 soldiers
2008 Dimona suicide bombing Dimona Hamas 1 civilian
2008 Jerusalem yeshiva attack Jerusalem 8 civilians
2008 Jerusalem bulldozer attack Jerusalem 3 civilians
2009 Bat Ayin axe attack Bat Ayin, West Bank 1 civilian
2009 Killing of Rabbi Meir Hai Highway 57, near Shavei Shomron, West Bank Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades 1 civilian
2010 Tapuah Junction stabbing Kfar Tapuach, West Bank 1 soldier
2010 West Bank shooting attack near Kiryat Arba, West Bank Hamas 4 civilians
2010 Murders of Neta Sorek and Kristine Luken Beit Jamal and Beit Shemesh 2 civilians
2011 Itamar attack Itamar, West Bank 5 civilians
2011 Sha'ar HaNegev school bus attack Negev 1 civilian
2011 Jerusalem bus stop bombing Jerusalem Hamas 2 civilians
2011 Murder of Asher and Yonatan Palmer Kiryat Arba, West Bank 2 civilians
2013 Tapuah Junction stabbing Kfar Tapuach, West Bank 1 civilian
2014 Murder of Shelly Dadon Migdal HaEmek 1 civilian
2014 Gush Etzion kidnapping and murder Gush Etzion, West Bank Hamas 3 civilians
2014 Jerusalem tractor attack Jerusalem 1 civilian
2014 October Jerusalem vehicular attack East Jerusalem 2 civilians
2014 November Jerusalem vehicular attack Jerusalem 3 civilians
2014 Killing of Sergeant Almog Shiloni Tel Aviv 1 civilian
2014 Murder of Dalia Lemkus Alon Shvut, West Bank 1 civilian
2014 Jerusalem synagogue attack Jerusalem 6 civilians
2015 Shvut Rachel shooting Allon Road, West Bank 1 civilian
2015 Murder of Eitam and Na'ama Henkin near Beit Furik, West Bank Hamas 2 civilians
2015 Lions' Gate stabbings Jerusalem 2 civilians
2015 Beersheba bus station shooting Beersheba 1 civilian
2015 Gush Etzion Junction attack Gush Etzion Junction, West Bank 3 civilians
2016 January Tel Aviv shooting Tel Aviv 3 civilians
2016 Tel Aviv stabbings Tel Aviv 1 civilian
2016 June Tel Aviv shooting Tel Aviv 4 civilians
2016 Murder of Hallel Yaffa Ariel Kiryat Arba, West Bank 1 civilian
2016 Jerusalem shooting East Jerusalem 2 civilians
2017 Jerusalem truck attack Jerusalem 4 soldiers
2017 Jerusalem Light Rail stabbing Jerusalem 1 civilian
2017 June Jerusalem attack Jerusalem 4 police officers
2017 Temple Mount shooting Jerusalem Islamic Movement in Israel 2 police officers
2017 Har Adar shooting Har Adar, West Bank 3 security guards
2018 Murder of Itamar Ben Gal Ariel, West Bank 1 civilian
2018 Barkan Industrial Park shooting Barkan Industrial Park, West Bank 2 civilians
2019 Samaria combined attack Samaria, West Bank 1 civilian, 1 soldier
2019 Murder of Dvir Sorek Migdal Oz, West Bank 1 civilian
2022 Beersheba attack Beersheba 4 civilians
2022 Bnei Brak shootings Bnei Brak 5 civilians
2023 Hamra junction shootings Highway 57, West Bank Al-Qassam Brigades 3 civilians
2023 Tel Aviv car-ramming off Kaufmann Street in Tel Aviv, Israel suspected 1 civilian
2023 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel Gaza Strip Envelope Hamas 797 civilians, 379 soldiers

International attacks

[edit]
Year Country Events
1968 Greece El Al Flight 253 attack
1968 USA Assassination of Robert F. Kennedy
1970  Switzerland Swissair Flight 330
1970 Germany 1970 Munich bus attack
1972 Germany Munich massacre
1972 Yemen Lufthansa Flight 649
1972 Thailand Bangkok Israeli embassy hostage crisis
1973 Greece Hellinikon Airport attack
1973 USA NYC bomb plot
1973 Japan Hijacking of Japan Air Lines Flight 404
1973 Italy, Greece, Syria, Kuwait Rome airport attacks and Hijacking of Lufthansa Flight 303
1973 Sudan Attack on the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum
1974 Mediterranean Sea TWA Flight 841 crashing
1974 Kuwait Japanese Embassy attack
1975 France 1975 Orly Airport attacks
1976 Greece, Uganda Hijacking of Air France Flight 139
1976 Turkey Yeşilköy airport attack
1977 France, Italy, Cyprus, Bahrain, UAE, Yemen, Somalia Lufthansa Flight 181
1978 France 1978 Orly Airport attack
1978 UK London bus attack
1980 France Paris synagogue bombing
1981 Belgium Antwerp bombing
1985 Italy, Austria Rome and Vienna airport attacks
1985 Egypt Achille Lauro hijacking
1985 Cyprus Larnaca yacht killings
1985 Malta EgyptAir Flight 648
1990 Egypt 1990 Cairo bus attack
1994 Argentina AMIA bombing
2002 Kenya 2002 Mombasa attacks
2004 Egypt 2004 Sinai bombings

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Palestinian political violence denotes the systematic employment of , guerrilla raids, riots, and indiscriminate attacks by and affiliated militant groups against Jewish communities, Israeli civilians, and , originating in the of the British and persisting through subsequent decades in pursuit of irredentist territorial claims and opposition to Jewish self-determination. These actions, often characterized by deliberate targeting of non-combatants, have included ambushes, bombings, stabbings, vehicular rammings, operations, and mass rocket fire, resulting in over 1,000 Israeli fatalities during the alone (2000–2005) and approximately 1,200 deaths in the -orchestrated incursion on , 2023. Key perpetrators range from irregular bands in the , which launched cross-border incursions from Gaza and killing dozens of Israelis annually, to organized entities like the (PLO) and its successors such as and , whose tactics extended to international hijackings and urban assaults. The phenomenon traces its roots to communal clashes in the 1920s and escalated during the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, where Palestinian insurgents murdered over 500 in ambushes and massacres amid broader rejection of partition proposals and Jewish statehood. Post-1948, operations from Egyptian-controlled Gaza inflicted scores of civilian casualties through infiltration and sabotage until suppressed by Israeli reprisals in the mid-1950s. Subsequent waves, including the PLO's aviation hijackings and the Second Intifada's suicide bombing campaign—which claimed 773 Israeli civilian lives—demonstrated a pattern of escalation tied to political negotiations or territorial concessions, often glorified in Palestinian society as resistance. Hamas's governance of Gaza since 2007 has institutionalized rocket barrages, with over 20,000 projectiles fired at Israeli population centers since 2001, causing dozens of direct deaths and widespread despite rudimentary accuracy. The assault, involving coordinated massacres, rapes, and abductions across southern , marked the deadliest single day for since , underscoring the enduring role of ideological rejectionism in fueling such violence over pragmatic state-building. Despite intermittent ceasefires and international designations of groups like as terrorist organizations by the and others, the violence persists amid internal Palestinian divisions and external funding streams, with empirical patterns revealing a causal link between in and media and recurrent outbreaks targeting soft . This record contrasts with asymmetrical Israeli responses, which, while causing Palestinian casualties, are framed in doctrines prioritizing deterrence against existential threats rather than territorial expansion.

Overview

Definition and Scope

Palestinian political violence encompasses organized acts of aggression perpetrated by Palestinian individuals, militias, or groups—such as , , and Fatah-affiliated factions—against Israeli civilians and security forces, motivated by the goal of eradicating Jewish sovereignty in the region. These actions systematically prioritize targets through methods including bombings, indiscriminate rocket and mortar barrages, stabbing campaigns, vehicular assaults, and shootings, which violate the principle of distinction in by deliberately endangering or killing uninvolved populations to maximize psychological impact and coerce territorial or political concessions. Such patterns empirically demonstrate intent beyond military objectives, as evidenced by the deployment of unguided projectiles incapable of precise targeting, with over 20,000 rockets launched from Gaza toward Israeli communities since 2005, frequently striking residential areas and schools. This violence is distinct from intra-Palestinian criminality, interpersonal disputes, or Israeli counterterrorism operations, as it is ideologically framed as confrontation with the Israeli state and features coordinated planning, public glorification of perpetrators, and persistence across generations, originating in the amid Arab opposition to Jewish national revival under the British Mandate. For example, during the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Palestinian groups conducted around 138 suicide bombings, killing over 500 civilians in public spaces like buses and cafes, underscoring a tactical emphasis on civilian casualties to disrupt daily life and undermine 's legitimacy. The scope extends to politically motivated internal violence, such as summary executions of suspected collaborators or rivals by Palestinian authorities, which serve to enforce ideological conformity and deter cooperation with , as seen in Hamas's extrajudicial killings of members and informants in Gaza. Excluded are apolitical crimes or defensive responses, focusing solely on assaults tied to the broader conflict over 's existence.

Ideological Foundations

The ideological foundations of Palestinian political violence are rooted in Arab nationalist and Islamist doctrines that prioritize the elimination of Jewish sovereignty in the territory of Mandatory Palestine over territorial compromise or coexistence. The Palestinian National Charter, adopted by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1968, explicitly frames Zionism as a "racist" and "colonial" enterprise incompatible with Arab rights, declaring armed struggle the sole means to "liberate" all of Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, thereby negating Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state. Article 19 of the charter asserts that "Zionism is a colonial and racist system that is invariably imperialist in its nature," while Article 22 rejects any partition or recognition of Israel, viewing it as an illegitimate entity imposed by external powers. This eliminationist stance reflects a causal rejection of Jewish self-determination, positing Palestinian Arab identity as indivisible from the entire land claim, with violence as the mechanism for reversal. In 1996, following the , the PLO amended its charter to nullify provisions "contrary" to peace commitments, such as those denying 's right to exist, but implementation has been partial and contested, with leaders continuing to invoke pre-Oslo rhetoric that subordinates historical ties to the land. For instance, platforms and officials have persisted in framing presence as an occupation without rights, echoing the charter's original antisemitic undertones by portraying as a perpetual to Arab-Islamic patrimony. Parallel to this nationalist strain, Islamist ideology, as articulated in the Covenant of 1988, elevates as a religious duty to obliterate , invoking Quranic supremacy over the land and incorporating antisemitic tropes, such as prophecies of Muslims killing en masse on the Day of Judgment. The covenant's preamble declares that " will exist and will continue to exist until will obliterate it," subordinating any territorial claim to eternal Islamic dominion and rejecting as un-Islamic apostasy. These foundations manifest in cultural motifs glorifying martyrdom (shahada) and violence against Jews as redemptive acts, embedded in education systems under both PLO/Fatah and Hamas influence. Palestinian Authority textbooks, analyzed in recent studies, systematically praise jihad, depict Jews as enemies deserving elimination, and celebrate "martyrs" who die attacking Israeli civilians, fostering a generational commitment to conflict over . This rejectionism is empirically evidenced by the Arab leadership's dismissal of pragmatic partition offers, such as the 1947 UN plan—which allocated 56% of Mandate Palestine to a despite Arabs comprising two-thirds of the —which was rejected to avert any Jewish sovereignty, precipitating war. Similarly, at the , declined Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak's proposal conceding over 90% of the , Gaza, and parts of without a viable counteroffer, prioritizing maximalist demands including that would demographically end the . Such patterns underscore an ideological prioritization of Israel's destruction, sustained by primary doctrines that view compromise as existential betrayal rather than viable resolution. The designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, citing its involvement in bombings and attacks targeting civilians, with similar designations for (PIJ) in 1997 and the for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) earlier in the decade under predecessor authorities. The added to its list of terrorist entities in 2003, focusing on its military wing's responsibility for suicide bombings and rocket attacks, though the designation faced procedural challenges leading to temporary annulment in 2014 before reinstatement in 2017 following appeals and evidence of ongoing violence; the EU has maintained sanctions against PIJ and PFLP since the early 2000s. classifies , PIJ, PFLP, and other factions such as Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) as terrorist organizations under domestic law, based on their charters advocating destruction of through armed struggle and documented patterns of civilian-targeted operations since the 1970s. United Nations bodies have condemned specific Palestinian acts, such as suicide bombings, as without formally designating organizations, as evidenced by multiple Security Council resolutions like 1435 (2002) demanding cessation of such attacks and Secretary-General statements denouncing them as "morally repugnant" and harmful to Palestinian interests. The (ICJ), in advisory opinions, has acknowledged attacks by Palestinian armed groups like those on , 2023, while emphasizing obligations under (IHL) but framing broader contexts around occupation rather than endorsing the acts themselves; however, the ICJ has not issued rulings classifying Palestinian violence as legitimate resistance, prioritizing instead state responsibilities. Palestinian advocates often counter these designations by invoking rights under UN resolutions like 37/43 (1982), arguing attacks constitute resistance to occupation, yet this framing overlooks IHL prohibitions, as UN experts and resolutions consistently distinguish condemnable from lawful combat. Under the and customary IHL, Palestinian groups' deliberate targeting of civilians—via suicide bombings, indiscriminate rockets, and stabbings—constitutes war crimes, violating Common Article 3's protections against violence to life and person, as well as Additional Protocol I's Article 51 ban on acts causing superfluous or indiscriminate effects. Empirical evidence from attacks like the 1990s-2000s bombings, which killed hundreds of non-combatants without , mismatches claims of lawful resistance, as IHL permits resistance by occupied peoples only if directed at military objectives and distinguishing combatants from civilians; failure to do so aligns with definitions in instruments like UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), which criminalizes intent to cause or serious to civilians for political aims. Sources from UN and bodies, while sometimes critiqued for contextualizing violence within occupation narratives, affirm these violations through fact-finding reports, underscoring that "one person's terrorist" rhetoric does not alter legal distinctions rooted in protecting non-combatants.

Historical Context

Roots in Early 20th Century (1920s–1947)

Palestinian political violence emerged in the 1920s under the British Mandate as organized anti-Zionist riots targeting Jewish communities, spurred by Arab leaders' incitement against increasing Jewish and land purchases. The in , occurring during , resulted in 5 Jewish deaths and over 200 injuries amid attacks on Jewish neighborhoods. These events were fueled by rumors of Jewish threats to Muslim holy sites and broader opposition to Zionist settlement, which had brought economic development through legal land acquisition and demographic growth from fleeing European pogroms. The British Palin Commission inquiry attributed the violence to Arab apprehensions over Zionist aims displacing local control, though empirical patterns showed premeditated assaults on unarmed civilians rather than defensive responses. In 1921, the Jaffa riots escalated this pattern, with Arab mobs killing 47 Jews, including women and children, in attacks that spread to nearby Jewish settlements like Metula and Hadera. The Haycraft Commission report confirmed the riots originated from Arab-initiated violence in Jaffa, triggered by inter-communal clashes but rapidly turning into widespread pogroms against Jewish residents and property. By 1929, riots in Hebron and Safed culminated in massacres, with 67 Jews slaughtered in Hebron—many hacked to death in their homes—and additional dozens killed in Safed, totaling 133 Jewish fatalities across Palestine. These incidents, incited by Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini's dissemination of false claims about Jewish desecration of the Al-Aqsa Mosque, demonstrated a recurring tactic of exploiting religious fervor to justify civilian-targeted killings amid Jewish community's economic successes in agriculture and urban development. The 1936–1939 marked a sustained campaign of violence, including ambushes, bombings, and assassinations, killing approximately 415–500 Jews alongside attacks on British forces. Led by figures like al-Husseini, who fled to exile but directed operations, the revolt involved indiscriminate tactics such as roadside bombings of civilian buses, reflecting strategic rejection of Jewish state-building achievements rather than grievances over dispossession, as Jews owned under 7% of land by 1936 through voluntary transactions. Al-Husseini's overtures to , including a 1941 meeting with Hitler and wartime propaganda broadcasts urging anti-Jewish extermination, aligned the revolt's ideological opposition to with Axis anti-Semitism, prioritizing total elimination of Jewish presence over negotiation. Cumulatively, these pre-1948 episodes claimed around 600 Jewish lives, establishing patterns of politically motivated violence against non-combatants as a response to Zionist progress, which British suppression curtailed but did not eradicate. The Arab Higher Committee's rejection of the 1947 UN Partition Plan, which proposed viable Arab and Jewish states despite Arabs comprising two-thirds of the population but rejecting coexistence, foreshadowed immediate , rooted in irredentist claims denying Jewish . This stance, led by al-Husseini from exile, perpetuated the Mandate-era logic of violence as the primary means to counter Jewish immigration's transformative effects on Palestine's demographics and economy.

Arab-Israeli War and Fedayeen Raids (1948–1967)

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War began following the rejection by Arab states of the Partition Plan (Resolution 181), which proposed separate Jewish and Arab states in , prompting an invasion by armies from , , , , and on May 15, 1948, the day after Israel's declaration of independence. The conflict ended with armistice agreements in 1949, establishing the Green Line borders, Israeli control over about 78% of the territory, and the displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians, who became refugees primarily in the under Egyptian administration and the under Jordanian rule. Arab leaders' pre-war rhetoric, including calls for the destruction of the , contributed to the flight of Palestinian Arabs during the fighting, as documented in contemporary accounts and orders from officials urging evacuation to facilitate military operations. In the years after the armistices, cross-border infiltrations from Gaza and the escalated, initially involving theft and revenge killings but evolving into organized raids by the early 1950s, with Arab states employing as proxies to harass without risking full-scale war. , controlling Gaza, sponsored and trained units for and attacks, while promoted raids through Jordanian territory. These operations, often launched from refugee camps, targeted Israeli civilians and military outposts, with tactics including ambushes, mine-laying, and shootings; Israeli records indicate over 1,600 armistice violations by alone between 1949 and 1954, resulting in at least 124 Israeli deaths. According to Israeli sources, actions between 1951 and 1956 killed around 400 Israelis and wounded 900, primarily civilians. Israel responded with reprisal operations to deter further incursions, such as the 1953 Qibya raid following a attack that killed a mother and her two children, which resulted in 69 Jordanian deaths but highlighted the cycle of escalation driven by initial cross-border aggression. Mixed Armistice Commission reports documented thousands of infiltration incidents, predominantly initiated from Arab territories, though the commissions also criticized Israeli retaliations. groups received training in and , focusing on guerrilla sabotage, laying the groundwork for later Palestinian militant organizations, though activities declined after the 1956 Sinai Campaign, which temporarily neutralized Egyptian-backed operations in Gaza. By the mid-1960s, Syrian encouragement revived raids from the and , contributing to heightened tensions preceding the 1967 war.

PLO Formation and Guerrilla Warfare (1964–1987)

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established on June 2, 1964, at the first Arab League summit in Cairo, where leaders of 13 Arab states committed to coordinating Palestinian efforts toward the "liberation of Palestine" from Israeli control. The organization initially operated under Arab state oversight but gained autonomy after Israel's 1967 Six-Day War victory, which exposed the ineffectiveness of conventional Arab armies and prompted Palestinians to prioritize independent action. Fatah, cofounded by in 1959 and centered on armed struggle as the path to reclaiming , emerged as the PLO's dominant faction; Arafat was elected chairman in , steering the group toward fedayeen raids and sabotage operations against Israeli targets. Early Fatah attacks, such as the January 1965 bombing of Israel's National Water Carrier, signaled this shift, though they inflicted limited damage while drawing Israeli reprisals against host countries like . Post-1967, the PLO escalated to international terrorism, exemplified by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's (PFLP) hijackings of multiple Western airliners in September 1970, including the Dawson's Field operation where four planes were forced to land in to publicize the cause and secure releases. These acts provoked 's King Hussein to launch a military crackdown in September 1970—termed by —expelling PLO forces from the kingdom by July 1971 after clashes that killed thousands. In retaliation, the , a offshoot, executed high-profile attacks, including the September 5, 1972, assault on the Munich Olympics, where eight militants killed 11 Israeli athletes and a German policeman. Relocated to southern Lebanon after the Jordan expulsion, the PLO built a quasi-state infrastructure with 15,000–18,000 fighters, launching cross-border rocket and infiltration raids that terrorized northern Israeli communities and destabilized . Notable operations included the March , where militants hijacked a bus, killing 38 Israeli civilians, including 13 children. PLO entanglement in Lebanon's intensified, as fighters usurped government functions, conducted kidnappings, and massacred civilians in Christian enclaves like Damour in January 1976, where hundreds were killed in reprisal for prior Phalangist actions. Between July 1981 and June 1982, despite a nominal , PLO factions perpetrated 270 attacks into , killing 29 and wounding over 300. Israel's June 1982 invasion, Operation Peace for Galilee, aimed to dismantle these bases, forcing PLO evacuation from under international supervision. During the invasion's aftermath, on September 16–18, 1982, Phalangist militias—motivated by revenge for PLO-enabled atrocities like Damour—entered the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in West , sites of lingering PLO presence, and slaughtered 700–3,500 Palestinian and Shia civilians in an episode of unchecked intra-Lebanese amid the broader . Over 1964–1987, PLO guerrilla tactics—encompassing thousands of border incursions, ambushes, and spectacular hijackings—failed to secure territorial concessions or military leverage, as Israel's superior defenses and counteroffensives repeatedly displaced the from Arab host territories without yielding Palestinian statehood gains; instead, the strategy perpetuated cycles of retaliation that highlighted Palestinian vulnerabilities while garnering sympathy through amplified narratives of dispossession.

First Intifada and Rise of Hamas (1987–1993)

The erupted on December 9, 1987, in Gaza's after an Israeli truck struck a parked vehicle, killing four laborers in what was widely viewed by as a retaliatory act amid accumulating grievances over occupation policies. What began as spontaneous riots and demonstrations quickly evolved into coordinated resistance, primarily involving youth hurling stones at Israeli patrols and checkpoints, a tactic symbolizing David-versus-Goliath asymmetry and gaining extensive media attention for its visual impact. Organized under the PLO-affiliated Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), the protests incorporated economic boycotts of Israeli goods, commercial strikes, and tax resistance, mobilizing broad segments of Palestinian society, particularly children and adolescents who faced live ammunition in response. As the uprising intensified, tactics shifted from symbolic stone-throwing to more lethal methods, including Molotov cocktails, knives, and sporadic gunfire from makeshift cells, though nonviolent elements like underground education networks persisted to counter school closures. Over the six years, these actions resulted in approximately 160 Israeli deaths—comprising civilians inside and security forces in the territories—and over 1,400 Israeli injuries, while Israeli forces killed more than 1,000 . Internal Palestinian enforcement against perceived collaborators proved equally deadly, with estimates of 950 to 1,100 executed by fellow militants for suspected cooperation with Israeli authorities, often through mob justice or vigilante squads, highlighting the uprising's coercive internal dynamics. Concurrently, the Islamist group Hamas emerged in late 1987 as a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, capitalizing on the Intifada's chaos to challenge the PLO's dominance by framing resistance in religious rather than secular nationalist terms. Hamas's founding charter, published in August 1988, rejected any territorial compromise with Israel, advocated jihad to reclaim all of historic Palestine as an Islamic waqf, and incorporated antisemitic elements such as fabricated quotes from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and a hadith prophesying the extermination of Jews. By opposing the PLO's perceived moderation and building parallel networks of mosques, schools, and charities in Gaza, Hamas attracted supporters disillusioned with Fatah's leadership, conducting early kidnappings and attacks that escalated violence even as UNLU leaflets initially urged restraint against civilians. This ideological rift foreshadowed Hamas's refusal to endorse emerging peace initiatives, positioning it as a hardline alternative amid the Intifada's toll.

Oslo Accords and Escalation (1993–2000)

The , initialed in 1993 and formally signed on September 13, 1993, between and the (PLO), outlined mutual recognition and established a Palestinian Authority (PA) to administer civil affairs in designated areas of the and starting in 1994, with phased Israeli redeployments intended to build toward final-status negotiations. Despite these autonomy gains, rejected the accords as a surrender of jihadist claims to all of historic and responded with escalated suicide bombings to derail implementation, framing attacks as defensive retaliation for Israeli actions like arrests of militants during redeployments. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) and also participated in bombings, targeting civilian buses and markets in Israeli cities as a direct challenge to the peace framework. A major wave of attacks occurred in 1996 following the November 1995 assassination of Israeli Prime Minister and amid interim governance under ; between February 25 and March 4, and Islamic Jihad suicide bombers struck Jerusalem buses and a mall, killing 61 Israelis—mostly civilians—and injuring over 100, the deadliest such campaign to date and a factor in Benjamin Netanyahu's May 1996 election victory on a platform prioritizing security over further concessions. These operations, often in retaliation for targeted killings of bomb-makers, nonetheless timed to exploit political vulnerabilities and erode Israeli public support for , with over a dozen suicide attacks recorded in the mid-1990s overall, claiming hundreds of lives. Netanyahu halted some redeployments and demanded stricter PA action against militants, but attacks persisted, including further bombings in 1997-1999, undermining interim agreements like the 1997 Hebron Protocol and 1998 . At the July 2000 Camp David summit convened by U.S. President Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak proposed Palestinian sovereignty over 91% of the West Bank (with territorial swaps for the rest), full control of Gaza, limited refugee returns, and shared administration of Jerusalem's holy sites—terms U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross described as exceeding prior understandings and leaving only marginal gaps on security and refugees; PA Chairman Yasser Arafat rejected the offer without presenting a comprehensive counterproposal, insisting on full right of return for refugees and undivided East Jerusalem sovereignty. Follow-up Taba talks in January 2001 yielded no agreement, with Arafat prioritizing maximalist demands amid internal pressures from rejectionist factions. A July 2000 poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found 60% of Palestinians favored emulating Hezbollah's armed resistance or initiating violent confrontations if negotiations failed, reflecting rising endorsement of force over compromise despite PA governance. The PA's role exacerbated escalation, as it failed to dismantle militant infrastructures in controlled areas and engaged in incitement via state media and education that portrayed Israelis as existential enemies deserving martyrdom, per congressional testimonies documenting PA glorification of violence against children and civilians during the 1990s. Arafat's public equivocation—praising "martyrs" while nominally condemning attacks—signaled tacit endorsement, allowing groups like to operate from PA territories and hoard weapons, which sabotaged trust and primed further conflict despite Israeli withdrawals transferring control over 40% of population centers by 2000. This pattern demonstrated how rejectionist ideology and institutional encouragement of violence undermined Oslo's autonomy provisions, fostering a cycle where attacks surged not in spite of but alongside Palestinian self-rule.

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

The , also known as the Intifada, erupted in late September 2000 following the collapse of summit negotiations, with initial riots triggered by Ariel Sharon's visit to the on September 28. Despite claims of spontaneity, evidence from Palestinian Authority (PA) officials and intercepted communications indicates premeditated planning by PA Chairman and leaders as early as July 2000, aimed at derailing peace talks and mobilizing violence. 's militia, operating under PA auspices, played a central role from the outset, coordinating armed attacks and shootings in the and Gaza, which escalated into a coordinated campaign of rather than grassroots protests. The violence primarily manifested as suicide bombings and shootings targeting Israeli civilians within pre-1967 borders, resulting in 1,083 Israeli deaths, of which 741 were civilians (including 124 minors), comprising approximately 68% of fatalities inflicted by Palestinian actors. This disproportionate focus on non-combatants contrasted with Israeli operations, which targeted militants amid urban combat, and underscored the Intifada's tactical emphasis on mass-casualty attacks to instill fear and disrupt daily life. Notable incidents included the June 1, 2001, Dolphinarium discotheque bombing in , where a suicide bomber killed 21 civilians—mostly teenagers—and wounded over 100 outside a beachfront club. The campaign peaked in 2002 with the March 27 at Netanya's Park Hotel, a suicide bombing during a Seder meal that killed 30 civilians and injured 140, prompting Israel's to dismantle terror infrastructure in PA-controlled areas. Israel's construction of the security barrier, beginning in 2002, significantly curtailed infiltration, reducing successful suicide bombings originating from the northern by over 90% within fenced sectors by mid-2004, as barriers, checkpoints, and intelligence operations severed supply lines for bombers and explosives. PA complicity persisted, with glorifying "martyrs" and units claiming responsibility for attacks, though official denials framed the uprising as organic resistance; internal PA admissions later contradicted this, revealing orchestrated escalation to pressure politically. By 2005, the waned amid these countermeasures and internal Palestinian divisions, having inflicted profound societal trauma on while failing to achieve strategic gains for the PA.

Gaza Disengagement and Hamas Takeover (2005–2022)

In August 2005, Israel completed its unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip, evacuating all 21 Jewish settlements, removing approximately 8,500 civilian residents, and withdrawing military forces from the territory. The move aimed to reduce friction and improve security by ending direct Israeli presence, but it was not reciprocated by Palestinian acceptance of borders or cessation of hostilities. Immediately following the withdrawal, Palestinian militant groups, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, escalated rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli communities near the Gaza border, firing hundreds of projectiles in the ensuing months. In January 2006, Hamas secured a parliamentary majority in elections, winning 74 of 132 seats and defeating the incumbent party, amid widespread voter dissatisfaction with corruption and stalled peace efforts. The victory, observed as generally free and fair by monitors including former U.S. President Jimmy Carter's team, triggered an international aid boycott due to 's charter rejecting Israel's existence and endorsing violence. Tensions between and boiled over in June 2007 during the Battle of Gaza, where forces routed Fatah-aligned security elements in six days of street fighting, killing over 160 , executing rivals, and seizing full control of the Strip. This coup entrenched a territorial split, with dominating the under President while governed Gaza independently, thwarting sustained unity governments despite multiple failed reconciliation pacts. Hamas's rule facilitated Gaza's transformation into a launchpad for , including the construction of an extensive subterranean network estimated at hundreds of kilometers for smuggling arms and staging cross-border raids. Iranian support played a key role, with weapons such as rockets and anti-tank missiles smuggled via Egyptian Sinai and other routes, enabling longer-range strikes despite Israeli and Egyptian blockades. Rocket barrages intensified, prompting Israeli responses: Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009) followed over 3,000 projectiles fired since the disengagement; Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012) targeted rebuilt arsenals after a breakdown; and Operation Protective Edge (July–August 2014) addressed incursions and thousands of rockets launched in preceding years. These cycles demonstrated Hamas's prioritization of militarization over governance or , with Gaza's exceeding 40% and deteriorating amid diverted resources to armament.

October 7, 2023 Attacks and Ongoing War (2023–Present)

On , 2023, -led militants, including members of and other groups, breached the Gaza- border in a coordinated multi-front involving thousands of rockets, ground incursions by approximately 3,000 fighters, and paragliders, resulting in the deaths of about 1,200 and foreign nationals, predominantly civilians, and the abduction of 251 hostages to Gaza. The attacks targeted military bases, kibbutzim, and the Nova music festival near , where over 360 were killed, with evidence of systematic atrocities including mass killings, rapes, and mutilations documented in survivor testimonies and forensic reports. Captured Hamas documents, including directives from Gaza leader Yahya Sinwar dated as early as August 2022, reveal years of premeditated planning for the operation, intended to derail Israel-Saudi normalization, overwhelm defenses, and provoke a broader regional conflict, with explicit instructions for psychological impact through filming atrocities and multi-arena escalation involving Hezbollah and Iran-backed proxies. These plans, recovered by Israeli forces, outlined taking hostages for leverage and anticipated Israeli retaliation, aligning with Hamas's ideological goal of eradicating Israel rather than territorial concessions. In response, declared war and launched Operation Swords of Iron, involving airstrikes, a ground invasion of Gaza starting October 27, 2023, and targeted operations to dismantle Hamas's military and governance structures, eliminating over 17,000 militants by mid-2025 according to IDF assessments, while destroying rocket production sites, tunnels, and command centers. Despite claims of fully dismantling Hamas's northern Gaza framework by early 2024, the group has partially rebuilt capabilities through guerrilla tactics, though its overall military effectiveness remains severely degraded per intelligence evaluations. Hostage negotiations yielded partial releases, including a U.S.-brokered deal in October 2025 exchanging the remaining 20 living captives and bodies of deceased for Palestinian prisoners, but violated subsequent ceasefires with rocket barrages and ambushes, such as killing two IDF soldiers in shortly after the truce, prompting Israeli retaliatory strikes. As of October 2025, fewer than 50 remain unaccounted for, with accused of using them as human shields in tunnels. Gaza casualty figures reported by the Hamas-controlled Health Ministry exceed 45,000 deaths as of late 2025, but these are disputed due to lack of independent verification, inclusion of natural deaths and unconfirmed combatants, and incentives for to pressure internationally; IDF data indicates approximately 83% of verified targets were militants, with total fighter losses nearing 20,000, suggesting a significant combatant-to- skewed by Hamas's embedding in civilian areas. Independent analyses, such as from the Washington , highlight methodological flaws in ministry counts, including double-counting and omission of armed fatalities. Violence persists beyond Gaza, with Hamas and allies launching intermittent rocket salvos into Israel—over 19 civilian deaths from such attacks in the war's first months—and a surge in West Bank stabbing and shooting incidents targeting Israelis, totaling hundreds of attacks since October 2023, often claimed by Hamas-affiliated cells. Ceasefire violations, including Hamas's planned assaults on aid convoys and border provocations, underscore the group's refusal to demilitarize, prolonging the conflict despite Israeli offers for truce extensions tied to hostage returns and governance reforms.

Key Actors

Secular Nationalist Groups (PLO/Fatah)

The (PLO), founded in 1964 as an umbrella for secular nationalist Palestinian groups, encompassed factions like , established in 1959 by to conduct raids against from bases in , , and following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. 's early evolution from cross-border incursions emphasized armed struggle as the path to liberating , drawing on post-1948 refugee militancy rather than broader Arab state armies. Under Arafat's chairmanship from 1969, the PLO balanced militant operations with emerging diplomatic efforts, exemplified by the 1970 conflict in , where bases were dismantled after clashes with Jordanian forces, leading to relocation to and the creation of the eponymous for covert attacks. This duality persisted through the 1980s, as the PLO pursued international recognition while maintaining guerrilla wings, culminating in the 1993 , where the PLO formally renounced , recognized Israel's right to exist, and established the Palestinian Authority (PA) for limited self-rule in parts of the and Gaza. Despite these commitments, Fatah-affiliated militants retained operational capacity, transitioning from exile-based to PA-linked networks that blurred lines between official security forces and irregular violence. The (AAMB), emerging in 2000 as an armed extension of Fatah's militia during Intifada, conducted operations defying PA diplomatic overtures and was designated a foreign terrorist organization by the in March 2002 for its role in attacks on civilians and security personnel. The has sanctioned specific AAMB factions and leaders for terrorist involvement, reflecting designations applied to select military arms while the broader organization engages in governance. Post-Arafat, under Mahmoud Abbas's leadership since 2005, hawkish figures like —imprisoned since 2002 for orchestrating attacks—and Mohammad Dahlan, a former Gaza security chief with roots in Fatah's youth militant Hawks, have challenged PA moderation, sustaining internal tensions between diplomacy and militancy. Fatah splinters, such as the (ANO), which broke away in 1974 under Sabri al-Banna to pursue independent operations rejecting PLO diplomacy, further illustrate the fragmentation of secular nationalist violence, with ANO conducting high-profile attacks until the 1980s. Similarly, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist PLO constituent founded in 1967, has persisted as a splinter faction prioritizing revolutionary violence over negotiated settlements, maintaining small-scale militant activities into the 2020s. These dynamics underscore 's enduring role in Palestinian political violence, where PA institutional cover has not fully supplanted the legacy.

Islamist Militants (Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad)

, founded in 1987 as an offshoot of the during the , and (PIJ), established in 1981 by Fathi Shikaki, represent the primary Islamist militant factions perpetrating political violence against . Both groups espouse jihadist ideologies rooted in Sunni , rejecting 's existence and advocating armed struggle to establish an across historic , from the to the . provides principal backing, supplying weapons, training, and funding to sustain their militant operations, while hosts Hamas leaders and facilitates financial support that indirectly bolsters jihadist activities. Hamas's foundational 1988 charter explicitly mandates as its path, framing the conflict as a religious duty to obliterate and quoting a calling for the killing of in the end times. The document, which remains unrevised in its core tenets, declares an Islamic consecrated for future Muslim generations, incompatible with Jewish . A 2017 policy document softened antisemitic rhetoric by distinguishing the struggle against rather than and accepting a provisional Palestinian state on 1967 borders as a formula for national consensus, but it neither revoked the 1988 charter nor abandoned the goal of ultimate Islamic governance over all of Palestine. Hamas secured victory in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, capturing 74 of 132 seats, amid widespread disillusionment with Fatah's and perceived weakness; its platform emphasized resistance and reform without renouncing violence. In Gaza after seizing control in 2007, Hamas integrates social welfare services—schools, clinics, and aid distribution—to build popular support alongside its military wing, the Brigades, which conducts rocket attacks, tunnel infiltrations, and other assaults blending governance with terror infrastructure. PIJ, eschewing political participation unlike , maintains a purely structure focused on perpetual against , viewing any compromise or negotiations as . Its ideology, influenced by global jihadist thinkers like and Abdullah Azzam, prioritizes armed struggle over state-building or elections, operating as Iran's most reliable proxy for launching rockets and cross-border raids from Gaza. PIJ consistently opposes the Palestinian Authority (PA), denouncing its security coordination with as collaboration and clashing with PA forces in the and Gaza. Following the October 7, 2023, attacks orchestrated by , the group suffered significant leadership decapitation: political chief was assassinated on July 31, 2024, in via explosive device, and Gaza commander was killed on October 17, 2024, in during an Israeli operation. These losses, while disrupting command, have not altered the groups' unreconciled charters or commitment to jihadist violence.

Other Factions and Splinter Groups

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), established in 1967 by as a Marxist-Leninist organization, emerged as a splinter from the and rejected in favor of class struggle and anti-imperialism. The group pioneered aircraft hijackings as a tactic, notably participating in the 1970 alongside allies like the , which involved seizing multiple planes and holding hostages to demand prisoner releases. Designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. in 1997, the PFLP has conducted assassinations, bombings, and shootings, including the 2001 killing of Israeli Tourism Minister , while maintaining a small but persistent presence in Palestinian politics. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), formed in 1969 as a split from the PFLP led by , adopted a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology and emphasized mass mobilization alongside armed struggle. It carried out attacks such as the 1974 , where DFLP gunmen killed 22 Israeli schoolchildren and three adults after infiltrating a school. During the Second Intifada, the DFLP conducted limited shooting attacks and bombings, primarily in Gaza, but its overall activity has remained marginal compared to larger factions. Harakat al-Sabireen, founded in 2014 as a splinter from , focuses on rocket fire and explosive devices against Israeli targets, with operations including a 2015 rocket barrage and an IED attack on an army patrol. Ideologically aligned with Iranian-backed resistance, it represents a niche emphasis on persistent, low-level militancy rather than mass mobilization. In the , decentralized cells like the in and have formed since 2022, drawing from multiple factions including PFLP and PIJ affiliates to conduct ambushes and clashes with Israeli forces. These groups, numbering in the dozens to low hundreds, coordinated sporadically with Gaza militants during escalations in 2023, firing small arms and explosives before facing crackdowns, such as the Israeli operation in that dismantled key networks by mid-2025. Salafi-jihadi elements with sympathies exist marginally in Gaza but have limited recruitment success among , prioritizing local nationalism over global .

Tactics and Methods

Direct Attacks on Civilians (Stabbings, Shootings, Lynchings)

One emblematic instance of mob violence occurred on October 12, 2000, during the early phase of the , when a Palestinian crowd stormed a in and lynched two Israeli reserve soldiers, Vadim Norzhich and Yosef Avrahami, who had inadvertently entered the area. The attackers beat the victims to death, mutilated their bodies, and displayed bloodied hands triumphantly from a window, an event captured on video and broadcast widely, symbolizing unchecked mob brutality against non-combatants. Following the construction of the Israeli security barrier after the Second Intifada, which curtailed organized infiltrations and suicide bombings, Palestinian violence shifted toward low-tech, opportunistic "lone wolf" attacks, including stabbings and shootings targeting civilians within Israel proper. A notable escalation came in the 2015–2016 wave, dubbed the "knife intifada" by observers, where assailants, often young and acting individually or in pairs, carried out dozens of stabbing and shooting incidents, resulting in at least 30 Israeli civilians and security personnel killed and over 400 wounded. These attacks frequently involved knives or improvised weapons, with perpetrators motivated by calls for "individual initiative" jihad from Islamist groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, as evidenced by subsequent glorification in Palestinian media and payments under the Palestinian Authority's martyr stipend system. Drive-by shootings, another form of direct civilian targeting, persisted sporadically, often involving gunmen firing on vehicles, buses, or pedestrians from passing cars in the or near borders. Examples include the June 8, 2001, attack near Mehola Junction, where Palestinian gunmen killed five Israeli civilians in a roadside , and similar ambushes during the era that claimed dozens more lives in familial or communal settings. Such incidents displayed a pattern of exploiting vulnerability, with attackers prioritizing soft targets like families traveling during —such as the October 2015 stabbing of a Jewish couple in Jerusalem's Old City—or public spaces like markets and bus stops, underscoring an ideological emphasis on inflicting terror through personal confrontation rather than coordinated operations.

Suicide Bombings and Vehicular Assaults

![Hamas suicide bombing in Jerusalem](./assets/HAMAS_suicide_bombing_in_Jerusalem_on_25_February_DoSPublication10321DoS_Publication_10321 Suicide bombings emerged as a hallmark tactic of Palestinian militant groups during the Second Intifada, with 151 such attacks launched against Israeli targets from September 2000 to August 2005, primarily by and . These operations targeted areas, including buses, markets, and restaurants, resulting in over 1,000 Israeli deaths, the majority . Bus bombings were particularly routine, exploiting crowded ; for instance, multiple incidents in 2002 alone, such as the Haifa Bus 37 bombing on March 2 that killed 16, underscored the tactic's aim to maximize casualties in confined spaces. A peak occurred in 2002, exemplified by the on March 27 in Netanya's Park Hotel, where a bomber detonated explosives during a Seder dinner, killing 30 civilians and injuring 140. This attack, claimed as retaliation for Israeli military operations, highlighted the deliberate targeting of to amplify psychological impact. While most bombers were adults, rare documented cases involved minors; in August 2003, a 17-year-old carried out a bombing near Ariel settlement for , killing one Israeli. Such instances drew condemnation from human rights groups for exploiting youth. The construction of Israel's security barrier, beginning in 2002, contributed to a sharp decline in successful suicide bombings, reducing attempts from the northern to zero by 2004 through physical separation and checkpoints. Post-2005, bombings became infrequent, with fewer than 10 annually by the late , shifting militant focus to other methods. Vehicular assaults, involving ramming crowds with cars, trucks, or tractors, gained prominence as a low-tech alternative, requiring minimal preparation and evading some security measures. These attacks surged during the 2015-2016 "knife ," with dozens documented, often by lone actors inspired by Islamist calls for accessible . Notable examples include the July 2, 2008 tractor attack, where an Arab-Israeli driver killed three Israelis before being stopped, and the January 15, 2024 ramming, which killed one and wounded 17 using multiple vehicles. Such tactics persisted into the , with over 50 incidents since 2015 causing dozens of fatalities, though bolstered policing and barriers mitigated larger-scale success.

Rocket, Drone, and Missile Barrages

Palestinian militant groups, primarily and in Gaza, along with in , have conducted repeated barrages of unguided rockets, mortars, drones, and missiles targeting Israeli civilian areas since the early 2000s, with over 20,000 projectiles launched from Gaza alone since 2005. These attacks are inherently indiscriminate due to the weapons' inaccuracy and lack of guidance systems, often aimed at population centers without distinction between military and civilian targets. Launches frequently originate from densely populated civilian zones in Gaza, including near schools, hospitals, and humanitarian facilities, a tactic that embeds military operations within civilian infrastructure and complicates Israeli defensive responses. The arsenal has evolved significantly from rudimentary homemade Qassam rockets, first deployed by in October 2001 with ranges of 3-10 kilometers and payloads of 5-10 kilograms of explosives, to more sophisticated Iranian-supplied systems like the and Syrian M-302, extending ranges beyond 70 kilometers and incorporating larger warheads. This progression reflects external support, particularly from , which has provided funding, components, and technical expertise to enhance production and smuggling via tunnels. Early barrages were sporadic and limited in scope, but by the late , groups integrated imported Grad and Katyusha rockets, enabling broader strikes on cities like and . Major escalation cycles occurred during Israeli operations against rocket fire, including Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009), where Gaza militants fired over 800 rockets; Operation Pillar of Defense (November 2012), with approximately 1,500 projectiles; and Operation Protective Edge (July–August 2014), exceeding 4,500 launches. These patterns repeated in 2021's Operation Guardian of the Walls, with more than 4,300 rockets fired over 11 days. Israel's system, operational since March 2011, has intercepted over 5,000 threats with a success rate exceeding 90%, selectively engaging incoming projectiles projected to hit populated areas and thereby mitigating the barrages' impact. Drones emerged as a complementary tactic, with deploying commercial and modified unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for , sensor disruption, and explosive strikes, notably during the , 2023, assault where dozens targeted border equipment to facilitate ground incursions. escalated multi-front barrages from starting October 8, 2023, firing thousands of rockets, anti-tank missiles, and drones into northern over the following months, including intensified salvos of up to 250 projectiles in single days. Despite these efforts, the strategy has failed to deter Israeli military actions or achieve territorial concessions, instead prompting targeted responses that degrade launch capabilities without yielding strategic gains for the militants.

Use of Human Shields, Women, and Children

Palestinian militant groups, particularly , have been documented embedding military infrastructure within densely populated civilian areas in Gaza, including s constructed beneath hospitals and schools, thereby utilizing civilians as human shields in violation of (IHL). For instance, investigations revealed a network under , where stored weapons and maintained command operations, exploiting the facility's protected status to deter strikes. Similarly, s adjacent to schools and hospitals have been mapped, with over 500 kilometers of such networks reported, facilitating fighter movement while increasing risks to surrounding non-combatants. This practice contravenes Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I to the , which prohibits the use of human shields to render military objectives immune from attack. The (IDF) have issued advance warnings to Gaza civilians prior to strikes on such targets, including phone calls, leaflets, and "roof-knocking" munitions, yet has actively discouraged evacuations, instructing residents to remain and thereby inflating figures for purposes. During the 2014 Gaza conflict, a review found that in most cases of Palestinian deaths, individuals ignored IDF warnings to evacuate designated areas. In the 2023-ongoing war, operatives reportedly prevented civilians from fleeing combat zones, compelling them to act as shields around military assets like rocket launch sites. Such tactics not only violate IHL's prohibition on forcing civilians into harm's way but also exploit the resulting casualties to accuse of disproportionate force. Hamas and allied groups like have recruited and trained children for combat roles, constituting the use of child soldiers in contravention of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. reports verified over 8,000 grave violations against Palestinian children in 2023, including recruitment by , which operates summer camps and programs indoctrinating minors in weapons handling and ideological militancy from ages as young as six. These children have been deployed to support operations, such as acting as spotters or carrying explosives, exacerbating civilian-military entanglement. Women have occasionally participated in Palestinian suicide bombings, though instances remain rare compared to male perpetrators, often framed symbolically to challenge gender norms within militant ideology. The first such attack occurred on January 27, 2002, when detonated explosives on Jerusalem's Street, killing one and injuring over 100. Subsequent cases, including in 2003, targeted civilian areas, with groups like claiming responsibility to amplify psychological impact. These acts violate IHL by deliberately targeting civilians and underscore the instrumentalization of non-combatants, including women and children, to advance objectives.

Governmental and Institutional Roles

Palestinian Authority Policies (Incitement, Pay-for-Slay)

The Palestinian Authority (PA) maintains a "pay-for-slay" policy, formally structured through its Martyrs' Fund and Ministry of Prisoners' Affairs, which disburses monthly stipends to families of Palestinians convicted of terrorism against Israelis, as well as to families of those killed during such attacks. These payments increase based on the severity of the offense, the duration of imprisonment, and the attacker's family size, often exceeding standard PA social welfare allotments by several times and serving as a primary income source for recipients. Prior to U.S. aid restrictions enacted under the Taylor Force Act in 2018–2019, these allocations absorbed approximately 7% of the PA's annual budget, equivalent to hundreds of millions of dollars yearly, with funds derived partly from international donors including the European Union. The policy explicitly incentivizes violence by treating attackers as "martyrs" eligible for lifelong family support, thereby embedding financial rewards into the cycle of political violence. This framework extends to institutional incitement, where PA-controlled and normalize and exalt attacks on . PA textbooks, used in schools across the and Gaza under PA oversight, frequently glorify suicide bombings and , depicting against as heroic and omitting recognition of on maps, which fosters and prepares students for conflict rather than coexistence. For instance, curricula praise historical figures involved in attacks and instruct youth to aspire to "die as a ," embedding to as a core educational value despite international scrutiny. PA President has reinforced this through public statements; in a June 2025 interview, he described the , 2023, Hamas-led assault on —which killed over 1,200 civilians—as achieving "important goals" for , framing mass in aspirational terms. These practices directly contravene the PA's obligations under the 1995 , which required both parties to "take all measures necessary" to prevent , , and hostile , including legal actions against such activities. Article XXII of the agreement mandates refraining from to , yet the PA has systematically failed compliance by sustaining pay-for-slay payments and propagating anti-Israel narratives in official media and , actions that undermine the accords' foundational commitment to mutual non-. This non-compliance perpetuates a causal loop wherein financial incentives and cultural glorification sustain recruitment for attacks, eroding prospects for negotiated peace while drawing partial funding from global aid meant for development.

Hamas Governance in Gaza

Hamas assumed de facto control of Gaza in June 2007 following a violent takeover from forces, during which its militants executed several officials and security personnel, including the summary killing of top commander Samih al-Madhoun. The operation involved arbitrary arrests, torture of detainees, and expulsion of rivals, consolidating 's authority through extrajudicial measures rather than shared governance. This coup ended the brief unity government formed after 's 2006 electoral victory, establishing a separate administrative apparatus in Gaza disconnected from the Palestinian Authority in the . Under Hamas's rule, governance has operated as an Islamist regime emphasizing enforcement of principles, with restrictions on personal freedoms exceeding those in the Palestinian Basic Law, including curbs on women's dress, mixed-gender activities, and non-Islamic media content. Hamas's charter and practices frame political authority within an Islamic framework prioritizing against , subordinating civilian administration to military objectives such as rocket production and . Social welfare programs, including and employment in Hamas-linked enterprises, have functioned partly as mechanisms for recruitment into its military wing, the Brigades, fostering dependency amid chronic unemployment rates exceeding 45% pre-2023. Economic management has centered on resource allocation favoring military infrastructure over civilian development, with billions in international aid—estimated at over $4 billion from Qatar alone since 2012—diverted toward an extensive tunnel network spanning 200-300 miles for smuggling weapons and staging attacks, rather than housing or sanitation. U.S. oversight reports highlight high risks of aid diversion to Hamas and other militants, including misuse for tunnel fortification and rocket manufacturing facilities, despite denials from some European auditors lacking on-ground verification. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Hamas maintained quarantine measures but prioritized extortionate demands on Israel for medical supplies while sustaining military preparations, including tunnel maintenance, over bolstering fragile health infrastructure that had only 36 ventilators for 2 million residents. By October 2025, following the , 2023, attacks and ensuing war, Gaza's infrastructure under has collapsed, with 94% of healthcare facilities non-functional, widespread building demolitions exceeding 60% in northern areas, and a security vacuum enabling remnants—up to 25,000 fighters—to retain 80% of tunnels despite Israeli efforts. This devastation stems from 's pre-war emphasis on offensive capabilities, including localized production sites, which consumed and materials equivalent to thousands of homes, leaving civilian sectors vulnerable to retaliatory strikes. fragilities persist, with leveraging aid inflows for regrouping amid ruined structures.

Internal Security Forces' Involvement

The Palestinian Authority's (PA) security forces, including the National Security Forces and intelligence apparatuses, have shown substantial overlap with Fatah-affiliated militant groups such as and the , particularly during the Second Intifada (2000–2005). , established in 1995 as Fatah's paramilitary arm to counter Islamist rivals, drew recruits from activists and was integrated into the PA's security structures post-Oslo Accords, with many operatives holding dual roles as salaried PA personnel and militants. This integration blurred distinctions between official law enforcement and terrorism, as evidenced by at least 30 National Security Forces soldiers in conducting attacks on Israeli targets while receiving PA salaries. Specific incidents highlight direct participation by PA security members in violence against Israeli civilians and soldiers. On October 12, 2000, PA police in detained, beat, stabbed, and lynched two Israeli soldiers who entered the territory in plain clothes, an act broadcast on PA television and celebrated by officials. PA personnel from units like military intelligence and naval forces executed attacks, including Maher Fares' cell planting explosives on a Tel Aviv bus on December 28, 2000 (nine Israelis wounded), Ibrahim Hasouna's shooting at a seafood market on March 5, 2002 (three Israelis killed), and Said Ramadan's suicide bombing in on January 22, 2002 (two Israelis killed). cells led by figures like Nasser Aweis, who received funding via PA channels, orchestrated seven suicide bombings (15 Israelis killed, over 200 wounded), often in coordination with PA security elements. Joint operations, such as the -PIJ suicide bombing at bus station on November 27, 2001 (two killed, 50 wounded), further demonstrated collaboration between PA-linked militants and other factions. In Gaza, under Hamas governance since its 2007 takeover, internal security forces exhibit even greater fusion with the , Hamas' military wing. The Executive Force, Hamas' paramilitary police precursor, merged with civilian policing structures, incorporating Qassam operatives who participated in both internal crackdowns—such as executing Fatah security members during factional clashes—and external attacks on Israel. This overlap persisted in operations like the 2007 Gaza coup, where Qassam Brigades and Executive Force jointly ousted PA loyalists, killing over 160 in targeted executions and street battles. Hamas has since maintained Qassam personnel in security roles, enabling seamless shifts between governance enforcement and militant activities, as seen in coordinated barrages and incursions. Recent analyses document ongoing involvement, with PA-affiliated forces in the (and analogous Hamas structures in Gaza) linked to attacks, including 80 PA security members implicated in since October 2023 and 16 killed mid-attack on in 2024.

Societal Dimensions

Public Support and Attitudes from Polls

Polls from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR), a Ramallah-based organization known for its regular surveys of Palestinian , have documented persistent levels of support for against Israelis, often reaching majorities during periods of heightened conflict. During the Second (2000–2005), PCPSR findings indicated that a majority of respondents endorsed suicide bombings and other armed attacks on Israeli civilians, with approval rates frequently surpassing 60% in the early 2000s as a perceived response to Israeli operations and settlement expansion. This support reflected a broader preference for "armed struggle" over negotiations, peaking amid tactical successes but eroding during phases of operational setbacks. Support for such violence has shown cyclical patterns, declining with perceived failures or heavy retaliatory costs but rebounding with provocative events or propaganda narratives. For example, PCPSR polls in the mid-2000s recorded drops to around 50% approval for bombings following Israeli measures that disrupted networks, yet levels remained above 40% even in lulls, underscoring entrenched attitudes linking violence to national goals. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy has corroborated these trends through analyses of PCPSR data, noting that positive views of groups like —often tied to their violent actions—hovered at 50–60% in Gaza and the prior to major escalations. Following the , 2023, Hamas-led attack on , initial PCPSR polls captured widespread endorsement, with 72% of overall deeming the operation "correct" in December 2023—83% in the and 57% in Gaza—amid perceptions of strategic gains like prisoner releases and heightened global attention. By mid-2024, support had declined to about two-thirds due to war-related hardships and military defeats, yet a continued to back the attack's aims, with PCPSR's July 2024 survey showing 64% overall approval despite Gaza's devastation. This persistence aligns with PCPSR's May 2025 findings of further erosion but sustained majorities favoring "resistance" over diplomatic paths. Generational divides in these polls highlight youth , with younger (ages 18–29) consistently exhibiting 10–20 percentage points higher support for than older cohorts, per PCPSR breakdowns, attributable to prolonged exposure to conflict narratives emphasizing martyrdom and rejectionism over compromise. PCPSR director Khalil Shikaki has attributed this to a shift where younger respondents view armed confrontation as more efficacious than past generations' reliance on peace processes, which they perceive as yielding territorial losses without reciprocity. Overall, these attitudes demonstrate how reinforces a causal feedback loop, where poll-measured support sustains even as tactical outcomes vary.

Role of Education, Media, and Culture in Promoting Violence

Palestinian Authority (PA) textbooks used in schools under its control systematically omit recognition of as a state, depict its territory as entirely Palestinian, and deny historical Jewish connections to sites such as the , referring to it solely as the compound. These materials glorify violence against Israelis, portraying it as heroic resistance or martyrdom, with maps erasing and exercises encouraging students to view armed struggle as a path to liberation. Independent monitors have documented over 400 instances of such content in PA curricula from 2013 to 2023, including praise for and demonization of , fostering narratives that justify attacks on civilians as legitimate. In Gaza, Hamas-administered education reinforces these themes through textbooks and school activities that venerate terrorist figures as and integrate jihadist ideology into lessons, with schools named after bombers and curricula emphasizing armed conflict over peaceful resolution. schools, operating in both regions, have incorporated PA and Hamas materials containing incitement, such as glorification of violence and antisemitic tropes, despite international standards against such content; audits revealed persistent issues post-2017 reforms. This educational framework entrenches generational acceptance of by framing it as a religious and national duty from primary grades onward. Palestinian media outlets, including PA-controlled television and Hamas's , broadcast programs that glorify martyrdom and suicide bombings, particularly targeting children through animated characters akin to who urge viewers to "kill " and aspire to . Shows like on depict child protagonists aspiring to become fighters or bombers, with episodes from 2007 to 2014 showing re-enactments of attacks and songs praising explosive belts as paths to paradise. PA broadcasts similarly honor "martyrs" in news segments and children's programming, correlating with heightened youth involvement in violent acts during periods of intensified airing, as noted in content analyses. These broadcasts normalize violence by integrating it into entertainment, reducing psychological barriers to participation. Cultural initiatives, such as summer camps run by and , train thousands of children annually in weapons handling, mock raids, and ideological , with participants as young as 10 learning to fire rifles, launch simulated missiles, and chant anti-Israel slogans. In 2021, defended these camps as preparation for "resistance," enrolling over 100,000 Gaza youth in programs that blend military drills with jihadist teachings, explicitly aiming to cultivate future combatants. Such activities, documented through video footage and participant reports, embed combat skills and violent narratives early, contributing to a cycle where exposed youth exhibit higher readiness for confrontations, as evidenced by recruitment patterns from camp alumni into militant groups. Collectively, these educational, media, and cultural mechanisms sustain by systematically delegitimizing , exalting perpetrators of attacks as heroes, and conditioning successive generations to prioritize confrontation over coexistence, with content persistence despite donor-funded reforms indicating institutional prioritization of .

Intra-Palestinian Violence (Factional Clashes, Collaborator Killings)

Intra-Palestinian violence has manifested primarily through factional rivalries between groups like and , as well as targeted killings of individuals suspected of collaborating with . These acts, often extrajudicial and mob-driven, have claimed hundreds of lives, highlighting the prioritization of internal power consolidation and ideological purity over unified governance or resistance efforts. Empirical data indicate that such violence peaked during periods of heightened political tension, with death tolls in some instances rivaling or exceeding contemporaneous fatalities from Israeli-Palestinian clashes, underscoring a pattern of intra-group coercion rather than external threat alone. The most intense factional clashes occurred during the 2006-2007 Fatah-Hamas conflict, culminating in Hamas's violent seizure of Gaza in June 2007. Fighting displaced Fatah-aligned Palestinian Authority security forces, with Hamas executing dozens of Fatah loyalists, including summary killings and . Estimates place total fatalities at 350 to over 600, including 165 Fatah fighters, 83 Hamas militants, and 98 civilians caught in crossfire or targeted for perceived disloyalty. The Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights documented over 600 deaths from January 2006 to May 2007 alone, many from ambushes, assassinations, and street battles in and refugee camps. This schism formalized the de facto division of Palestinian territories, with Fatah retaining control in the under the Palestinian Authority. Sporadic clashes persist, particularly in the , where Palestinian Authority forces under have targeted affiliates and independent militants to suppress rivals. Since 2007, these encounters have killed dozens annually in some years, often framed as counter-terrorism but serving factional interests. For instance, in 2021, renewed - tensions amid Gaza-Israel fighting led to arrests and shootings in the , exacerbating internal fragmentation. , in Gaza, has used such violence to maintain monopoly on force, executing opponents under pretexts of security threats. Recent reports from 2023-2025 detail -led killings in Gaza, including public executions of alleged criminals and dissidents to reassert control post-October 7, 2023, amid wartime chaos. Killings of suspected collaborators—Palestinians accused of aiding Israeli intelligence—represent another systemic form of intra-group violence, enforced by vigilante squads affiliated with factions like or . During the (1987-1993), such executions totaled around 800, involving torture, stabbings, and lynchings, often without evidence or , as documented in human rights investigations. The reported 22 in the uprising's first year and 131 in the second, with escalation driven by paranoia over informants undermining operations. In the Second Intifada (2000-2005), dozens more were killed similarly, though numbers declined relative to the first due to fragmented authority. has recurrently invoked collaboration charges for executions, as in 2015 when 23 were summarily killed during the Gaza conflict for alleged spying or score-settling, and again post-2023 with waves targeting perceived internal threats. These acts, frequently publicized via videos to deter others, reveal causal dynamics where ideological enforcement supersedes legal norms, eroding institutional legitimacy. Honor killings, while rooted in tribal customs, occasionally intersect with political violence when used to eliminate rivals under familial pretexts. Palestinian territories record 20-30 such murders yearly, predominantly of women for alleged sexual impropriety, with lenient sentencing reflecting societal tolerance. In politically charged cases, accusations have masked factional vendettas, amplifying intra-group strife. U.S. State Department reports noted three in 2023, but underreporting persists due to family cover-ups and authority complicity. Overall, cumulative intra-Palestinian deaths since the late number in the thousands, with factional and collaborator killings comprising the bulk, often exceeding Israeli-inflicted casualties in low-intensity intervals like the mid-1990s. This pattern causally weakens claims of cohesive national governance, as resources and legitimacy are diverted to internal purges.

International Aspects

Foreign Funding and Support (Iran, Qatar, Others)

has provided extensive financial, military, and technical support to Palestinian militant groups, particularly and (PIJ), with U.S. State Department disclosures indicating approximately $100 million annually to these organizations as of 2018. This aid includes cash transfers, smuggling of rocket components such as and guidance systems, and training for operatives in and via proxies like , enabling sustained production of short- and medium-range projectiles despite Gaza's . Iranian officials have publicly affirmed this backing as part of a strategy to confront through proxy militias, with documents seized in Gaza revealing at least $220 million in direct transfers to between 2014 and 2020. Qatar has delivered more than $1.8 billion in financial assistance to Gaza since seized control in , framed as humanitarian support for salaries, fuel, and reconstruction but frequently diverted to maintain 's administrative and military apparatus. Between 2012 and 2021, this included $1.49 billion in cash payments, often transported in suitcases with Israeli approval to avert humanitarian collapse and preserve deterrence equilibria, though portions funded dual-use projects like for attack tunnels and launch sites. Qatari leaders, hosting 's political bureau in since 2012, have positioned the as a mediator while sustaining the group's operational resilience amid isolation. Prior to the 1993 Oslo Accords, Syria offered bases and training facilities for groups in the 1960s and 1970s, facilitating raids and ideological alignment with Ba'athist pan-Arabism, while , controlling Gaza from 1948 to 1967, permitted militant incursions into from the territory as part of Nasser-era support for . These state-sponsored havens allowed operations to persist despite Israeli reprisals, laying groundwork for later institutionalized violence. The Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (), while not a deliberate funder, has enabled indirect support through systemic infiltration by ; UN investigations confirmed nine Gaza staffers' involvement in the , 2023, attacks, with Israeli intelligence estimating 1,200 UNRWA employees hold or PIJ affiliations, potentially diverting aid resources to militant networks. Such foreign inflows have collectively sustained Palestinian political violence by financing armament, governance, and recruitment, circumventing isolation and economic constraints imposed post-2007.

Global Terrorist Designations and Responses

Numerous countries and international bodies have designated Palestinian militant organizations, particularly and (PIJ), as terrorist entities, enabling measures such as asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on material support. The designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in 1997 under the Immigration and Nationality Act, subjecting it to comprehensive sanctions that criminalize provision of funds or resources. The listed 's military wing in 2001 and the entire organization in 2003, imposing restrictive measures including financial sanctions renewed periodically. Similar designations apply in , , Japan, and the , where and PIJ face proscription as terrorist groups, limiting operational funding and international travel by leaders. In contrast, the has not designated as a terrorist organization, despite repeated calls from member states like the to do so following attacks such as , 2023. This equivocation reflects procedural hurdles requiring consensus and political divisions, with UN resolutions often condemning specific acts of without naming perpetrator groups explicitly. Post-September 11, 2001, global counterterrorism efforts intensified intelligence sharing among allies, including between the United States and Israel, facilitating disruption of plots linked to Palestinian groups through joint operations and financial tracking. The U.S. Treasury, in coordination with partners, imposed targeted sanctions on Hamas financiers and operatives, such as in October 2023 when assets of key figures were frozen to curb reconstruction of attack infrastructure. These measures have constrained Hamas's financial networks, though evasion via cryptocurrencies and informal transfers persists, demonstrating partial efficacy in elevating operational costs without fully halting capabilities. Diplomatic initiatives like the 2020 , normalizing relations between and several Arab states including the UAE and , underscored an alternative to violence-driven negotiations by prioritizing mutual security interests over Palestinian militancy demands. This framework sidelined armed resistance as a coercive tool, as signatories advanced economic and defense ties with amid ongoing threats from groups like , revealing the limited strategic gains from . Legal responses include (ICC) arrest warrants issued in November 2024 for leaders such as , citing war crimes and from the , paralleling warrants for Israeli officials in a balanced but contentious probe into the State of Palestine situation. Such actions aim to deter , though enforcement challenges in non-cooperative jurisdictions limit immediate impact on group operations. Boycotts and sanctions regimes, including those targeting -linked entities, have failed to eradicate threats, as evidenced by sustained rocket fire and incursions, but have incrementally isolated perpetrators from global financial systems.

Notable Attacks Abroad

The occurred on September 5, 1972, during the Summer Olympics in , , when eight members of the , a Fatah-linked militant group, infiltrated the Olympic Village, killed two athletes in initial clashes, and took nine others hostage to demand the release of 234 Palestinian prisoners held in and . A failed West German police rescue operation at airfield resulted in the deaths of all nine remaining hostages, one German policeman, and five of the attackers, with three terrorists captured and later exchanged. On June 27, 1976, two members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—External Operations (PFLP-EO) and two from the German Revolutionary Cells, in coordination with the , hijacked Flight 139 shortly after takeoff from , diverting it to , , where Ugandan dictator provided support to the hijackers; the group separated non-Israeli passengers and demanded the release of 40 Palestinian and pro-Palestinian prisoners held in multiple countries, including 13 in Israel. Israeli commandos executed Operation Entebbe on July 4, 1976, landing covertly and storming the terminal, killing all seven hijackers and approximately 45 Ugandan soldiers while rescuing 102 of the 106 hostages, though three hostages died in the crossfire and one was later murdered by Ugandan authorities. The hijacking of the Italian cruise ship on October 7, 1985, by four members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a PLO splinter group led by (), took place in the off , where the attackers seized control, held over 400 passengers and crew hostage, and demanded the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody along with those held in other nations. During the standoff, the hijackers shot and killed , a 69-year-old wheelchair-bound American tourist of Jewish descent, dumping his body and wheelchair overboard; the hijackers surrendered to Egyptian authorities after negotiations, but and a PLF operative escaped, prompting U.S. forces to intercept an Egyptian airliner carrying them to . These operations exemplified the international dimension of Palestinian militant activities in the and , often involving aircraft hijackings, hostage-taking, and targeted killings to amplify media attention and coerce changes, with support from state actors like or logistical bases in and the . Following the Cold War's end and the PLO's 1988 recognition of alongside the 1993 , such extraterritorial attacks waned, as groups redirected efforts toward within and the territories amid intensified international counterterrorism cooperation and reduced external patronage.

Human Cost and Casualties

Breakdown of Israeli Victims

Palestinian political violence against dates to the Mandate-era riots and has resulted in over 3,000 fatalities through the present, predominantly civilians rather than security personnel. These deaths include victims from stabbing attacks, shootings, bombings, and vehicular assaults, often occurring in civilian settings such as homes, buses, and markets. The Second (2000–2005) accounted for approximately 1,000 Israeli deaths, with civilians comprising about 70%, including over 130 minors under age 18. Many incidents targeted families and occurred during holidays, such as the March 27, 2002, suicide bombing at Netanya's Park Hotel during , killing 30 civilians, predominantly elderly attendees. Since September 2000, official records document 1,527 fatalities from such violence prior to October 2023, underscoring the civilian predominance in non-combat settings. The October 7, 2023, incursion marked the single deadliest day, with 1,200 Israelis killed—over 800 civilians, including 36 children—and entire families eradicated in communities like Kibbutz Be'eri (over 100 residents slain) and . This assault, involving massacres at a and border villages, amplified demographic losses, with 40 families losing multiple members, some completely. Indiscriminate rocket fire from Gaza has directly killed fewer than 100 since 2001 but imposed severe psychological burdens, particularly in border areas; studies indicate elevated PTSD, anxiety, and reduced wellbeing during escalation periods, with residents reporting sustained trauma from thousands of projectiles. Overall, minors represent at least 10% of post-2000 victims, highlighting the violence's toll on demographics beyond immediate fatalities.

Palestinian Combatant vs. Civilian Losses

The , operated under control, reported approximately 67,173 Palestinian deaths in Gaza as of , 2025, without distinguishing between combatants and civilians. These figures have faced scrutiny for including natural deaths, unverified cases under rubble, and potential duplicates, with quietly removing over 3,400 previously listed fatalities in updated reports by March 2025. Independent verification remains impossible due to restricted access for international observers and the ministry's reliance on -affiliated hospitals for data collection. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) estimates indicate that between 17,000 and 20,000 Palestinian combatants, primarily from and , have been killed since October 7, 2023, based on intelligence assessments of targeted operations and battlefield confirmations. has sporadically acknowledged militant losses, with early admissions of around 6,000 fighters killed, though official statements rarely provide comprehensive breakdowns and often classify combatants as civilians to amplify international criticism. This suggests a combatant-to-civilian death ratio closer to 1:2 or lower when accounting for verified militant casualties against total reported deaths, contrasting with tallies that treat nearly all fatalities as non-combatant. Hamas's documented practice of embedding military infrastructure—such as command centers, launch sites, and tunnels—within densely populated civilian areas has contributed to elevated losses during Israeli strikes, as fighters exploit proximity to shield operations. Pre-war targeted operations against militants, including those in the , add to cumulative combatant deaths but are excluded from Gaza-specific tallies, further complicating holistic assessments. Intra-Palestinian violence, such as factional clashes, has also inflated totals without attribution to external combat, underscoring the opacity of casualty categorization in Hamas-governed reporting.

Long-Term Impacts on Both Societies

Persistent exposure to Palestinian political violence has fostered Israeli societal resilience through advancements in defensive technologies, such as the system, which has intercepted over 90% of targeted short-range rockets since its 2011 deployment, thereby mitigating civilian casualties and enabling continued economic activity amid threats. Despite such innovations, the economic toll includes opportunity costs from mobilization and security expenditures, though Israel's GDP demonstrated resilience with steady growth post-October 7, 2023, attacks, contrasting pre-war forecasts of contraction. has surged as a long-term strain, with over 125,000 departing between early 2022 and mid-2024, outpacing and linked to heightened insecurity from ongoing conflicts. In Palestinian society, decades of violence have entrenched and aid dependency, with 80% of Gaza residents relying on international assistance prior to the 2023 escalation and per capita income plummeting 28% in Gaza that year alone. The UNRWA's policy of hereditary refugee status has perpetuated dependency across generations, expanding the registered refugee population to over 5 million despite opportunities for integration elsewhere, fostering lost generations mired in camps and cycles of . This dynamic has foregone potential peace dividends, as sustained violence erodes trust, empowers extremists, and undermines prospects for statehood by prioritizing confrontation over negotiation. Both societies grapple with pervasive mental health sequelae, including (PTSD), which nearly doubled in following the , 2023, attacks, affecting broad demographics beyond direct victims. In Gaza, pre-war surveys indicated PTSD prevalence exceeding 50% among children, exacerbated by chronic exposure to conflict and conditions, contributing to intergenerational trauma without resolution pathways. These impacts underscore a mutual sclerosis, where violence sustains insecurity and dependency, precluding the economic and social normalization that negotiated peace could yield.

Strategic Outcomes and Peace Process

Failures of Violence in Achieving Goals

The rejection of the 1947 Partition Plan by Arab leaders, which proposed independent Jewish and Arab states alongside an internationalized , precipitated the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This conflict resulted in the absence of a Palestinian Arab state; the proposed Arab territories were instead occupied by in the and in the until 1967. Subsequent Palestinian-led violence, including the from 1987 to 1993, yielded temporary diplomatic recognition through the but failed to secure enduring territorial sovereignty. The accords established limited Palestinian self-rule, yet the ensuing , erupting in September 2000 after the rejection of Israeli offers at the Summit—including control over 91-95% of the , Gaza, and parts of —reversed these gains by derailing negotiations and entrenching Israeli security measures. The violence from 2000 to 2005 inflicted over 3,000 Palestinian and 1,000 Israeli deaths without advancing statehood, instead solidifying divisions and . In Gaza, Israel's 2005 unilateral withdrawal transferred control to Palestinian Authority governance, but Hamas's 2006 electoral victory and violent 2007 takeover of the territory from , coupled with refusal to renounce violence or recognize as stipulated by international conditions, prompted a that isolated the enclave. This self-escalated isolation, amid ongoing rocket fire exceeding 20,000 projectiles since 2001, has yielded no territorial expansion or sovereignty, with Gaza remaining under divided rule and recurrent conflict cycles. Public opinion surveys reflect the inefficacy of violence; Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research polls consistently show majority support for a alongside periodic endorsement of armed resistance, yet sustained violence correlates with declining optimism for statehood realization—dropping from 57% favoring negotiations in 2008 to lower thresholds amid escalations, underscoring violence's failure to coerce concessions or build viable institutions.

Israeli Countermeasures and Their Efficacy

The Israeli security barrier, construction of which began in in response to the Second Intifada's wave of suicide bombings, has demonstrably curtailed terrorist infiltrations from the . Prior to its erection, Palestinian militants conducted over 130 suicide attacks in 2002 alone, killing hundreds of Israeli civilians; by 2005, following completion of key segments, successful suicide bombings originating from the West Bank plummeted by more than 90%, with near-total prevention of such crossings in fenced areas. This efficacy stems from physical separation combined with checkpoints and patrols, which empirical data attributes to a sharp decline in overall West Bank-sourced attacks, though smuggling tunnels and vehicular assaults occasionally persist. Military operations in Gaza, including Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009) and Operation Protective Edge (July–August 2014), have achieved temporary but substantial halts in rocket barrages by destroying launch sites, stockpiles, and smuggling tunnels. Rocket fire from Gaza dropped by over 95% immediately following Cast Lead, from thousands annually to minimal levels for years, before gradual resumption; similarly, Protective Edge reduced launches from peaks of 4,500 in 2014 to under 100 by 2015, with ground incursions proving decisive in degrading capabilities where air strikes alone fell short. These outcomes reflect causal disruption of Hamas's operational tempo, though rearmament via external suppliers like necessitates periodic repetition. Targeted killings of high-value militants, conducted via precision and strikes since the 2000s, have disrupted planning cycles and reduced attack frequencies, with multivariate analyses of the Al-Aqsa Intifada era showing 20–30% drops in subsequent violence for 1–3 months post-strike, particularly against groups like and . Following the October 7, 2023, assault, eliminated over a dozen senior leaders, including in October 2024, decapitating command chains and hindering coordinated rebuilding, though organizational resilience via compartmentalization limits long-term eradication. These operations prioritize minimal collateral through real-time , balancing deterrence gains against risks of , with data indicating net reductions in attack volume outweighing reprisal spikes. Collectively, these countermeasures—barrier, operations, and targeted actions—have driven a broader 90%+ decline in successful Palestinian terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians since the peak, from thousands of incidents in the early 2000s to dozens annually by the , per Israeli assessments. persists despite intelligence lapses like , as restored operational dominance post-2023 has suppressed follow-on threats, underscoring deterrence through sustained capacity degradation over negotiation-dependent restraint.

Debates on Resistance vs. Terrorism Framing

The debate over framing Palestinian political violence as legitimate resistance or centers on interpretations of , historical context, and strategic intent. Proponents of the resistance framing argue that acts against Israeli military targets in occupied territories constitute lawful armed struggle under the , which apply to situations of occupation and where non-state actors challenge a superior military power. This view posits that targeting combatants in response to occupation aligns with the right to and distinguishes such actions from terrorism, defined in international discourse as violence intended to spread fear among civilians rather than military objectives. Opponents counter that much Palestinian violence, including suicide bombings and rocket attacks on civilian areas, violates the principle of distinction in by deliberately targeting non-combatants, thereby qualifying as irrespective of occupation claims. Historical evidence undermines the occupation-centric narrative, as Arab-Palestinian attacks on Jewish communities predated Israel's 1967 territorial gains, including raids from Gaza in the 1950s that killed over 400 Israelis and the 1936-1939 , which targeted British and Jewish civilians with bombings and massacres. Organizational charters reinforce this, with Hamas's 1988 covenant explicitly calling for Israel's destruction through and the killing of , framing violence as religiously motivated eradication rather than defensive resistance. Such ideological commitments, persisting in revised documents, prioritize civilian terror over lawful combat, disqualifying the resistance label under definitions emphasizing peacetime or indiscriminate attacks. Media coverage often amplifies casualty asymmetry—highlighting higher Palestinian deaths without contextualizing initiatory intent or status—fostering a resistance that overlooks terrorism's definitional focus on targeting. Studies of Western outlets reveal systematic underemphasis on terms like "" for Palestinian-initiated attacks on Israeli compared to Israeli operations, attributable in part to institutional biases in favoring structural oppression frames over agency in aggressor actions. This selective framing, prevalent in outlets with left-leaning editorial slants, correlates with underreporting of preemptive or retaliatory contexts, despite empirical data showing Palestinian groups' repeated initiation of cycles via indiscriminate rocketry and stabbings. Empirically, non-violent diplomatic paths have yielded superior outcomes for Palestinian interests than sustained violence, as evidenced by the , where the UAE's 2020 normalization with generated over $1 trillion in projected economic activity, millions of jobs, and without concessions on occupation, contrasting violence's track record of entrenching Israeli security measures and isolation for perpetrators. These accords demonstrate causal realism: incentives and mutual prosperity advance state-like gains more effectively than terror tactics, which historically provoke countermeasures and diplomatic marginalization rather than territorial or sovereign advances.

References

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