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Cluster munition
Cluster munition
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US Honest John missile warhead cutaway around 1960, showing M134 bomblets filled with Sarin
Half of a surface-to-air missile site in North Vietnam blanketed in exploding bomblets dispersed by a US cluster munition, Vietnam War
A cluster bomb is dropped at the Nightmare Range in South Korea

A cluster munition is a form of air-dropped or ground-launched explosive weapon that releases or ejects smaller submunitions. Commonly, this is a cluster bomb that ejects explosive bomblets that are designed to kill personnel and destroy vehicles. Other cluster munitions are designed to destroy runways or electric power transmission lines.

Because cluster bombs release many small bomblets over a wide area, they pose risks to civilians both during attacks and afterwards. Unexploded bomblets can kill or maim civilians and unintended targets long after a conflict has ended, and are costly to locate and remove. This failure rate ranges from 2 percent to over 40 percent.

Cluster munitions are prohibited for those nations that ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, adopted in Dublin, Ireland, in May 2008. The Convention entered into force and became binding international law upon ratifying states on 1 August 2010, six months after being ratified by 30 states.[1] As of 10 February 2022, a total of 123 states have joined the Convention, as 110 states parties and 13 signatories.[2]

Development

[edit]
SD2 Butterfly Bomb circa 1940. Wings rotate as bomb falls, unscrewing the arming spindle connected to the fuze.

The first significantly operationally used[3] cluster bomb was the German SD-2 or Sprengbombe Dickwandig 2 kg, commonly referred to as the Butterfly Bomb.[4] Cluster munitions were used in World War II to attack both civilian and military targets,[5][6] including on Tokyo and Kyushu.[7][8][9] The technology was developed independently by the United States, Russia and Italy (see Thermos bomb).[citation needed] The US used the 9-kilogram (20 lb) M41 fragmentation bomb wired together in clusters of 6 or 25 with highly sensitive or proximity fuzes.[10][11]

From the 1970s to the 1990s cluster bombs became standard air-dropped munitions for many nations, in a wide variety of types. They have been produced by 34 countries and used in at least 23.[12]

Artillery shells that employ similar principles have existed for decades. They are typically referred to as ICM (Improved Conventional Munitions) shells. The US military slang terms for them are "firecracker" or "popcorn" shells, for the many small explosions they cause in the target area.

Types

[edit]
A US Vietnam era BLU-3 cluster bomblet

A basic cluster bomb consists of a hollow shell and then two to more than 2,000 submunitions or bomblets contained within it. Some types are dispensers that are designed to be retained by the aircraft after releasing their munitions. The submunitions themselves may be fitted with small parachute retarders or streamers to slow their descent (allowing the aircraft to escape the blast area in low-altitude attacks).[13][3]

Modern cluster bombs and submunition dispensers can be multiple-purpose weapons containing a combination of anti-armor, anti-personnel, and anti-materiel munitions. The submunitions themselves may also be multi-purpose, such as combining a shaped charge, to attack armour, with a fragmenting case, to attack infantry, material, and light vehicles. They may also have an incendiary function.

Since the 1990s submunition-based weapons have been designed that deploy smart submunitions, using thermal and visual sensors to locate and attack particular targets, usually armored vehicles. Weapons of this type include the US CBU-97 sensor-fuzed weapon, first used in combat during Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Some munitions specifically intended for anti-tank use can be set to self-destruct if they reach the ground without locating a target, theoretically reducing the risk of unintended civilian deaths and injuries. Although smart submunition weapons are much more expensive than standard cluster bombs, fewer smart submunitions are required to defeat dispersed and mobile targets, partly offsetting their cost. Because they are designed to prevent indiscriminate area effects and unexploded ordnance risks, some smart munitions are excluded from coverage by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[14][15]

Incendiary

[edit]
During the Winter War of 1939–1940, the Soviet Union dropped RRAB-3, nicknamed Molotov bread baskets, which scattered incendiary bomblets, on Finland.

Incendiary cluster bombs are intended to start fires, just like conventional incendiary bombs (firebombs). They contain submunitions of white phosphorus or napalm, and can be combined anti-personnel and anti-tank submunitions to hamper firefighting efforts.[3] In urban areas they have been preceded by the use of conventional explosive bombs to fracture the roofs and walls of buildings to expose their flammable contents. One of the earliest examples is the so-called Molotov bread basket used by the Soviet Union in the Winter War of 1939–40. Incendiary clusters were extensively used by both sides in the strategic bombings of World War II. They caused firestorms and conflagrations in the bombing of Dresden in World War II and the firebombing of Tokyo. Some modern bomb submunitions deliver a highly combustible thermobaric aerosol that results in a high pressure explosion when ignited.[citation needed]

Anti-personnel

[edit]

Anti-personnel cluster bombs use explosive fragmentation to kill troops and destroy soft (unarmored) targets. Along with incendiary cluster bombs, these were among the first types of cluster bombs produced by Nazi Germany during World War II. They were used during the Blitz with delay and booby-trap fusing to hamper firefighting and other damage-control efforts in the target areas. They were also used with a contact fuze when attacking entrenchments. These weapons were widely used during the Vietnam War when many thousands of tons of submunitions were dropped on Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.[16]

Anti-tank

[edit]

Most anti-armor munitions contain shaped charge warheads to pierce the armor of tanks and armored fighting vehicles. In some cases, guidance is used to increase the likelihood of successfully hitting a vehicle. Modern guided submunitions, such as those found in the US CBU-97, can use either a shaped charge or an explosively formed penetrator. Unguided shaped-charge submunitions are designed to be effective against entrenchments that incorporate overhead cover. To simplify supply and increase battlefield effectiveness by allowing a single type of round to be used against nearly any target, submunitions that incorporate both fragmentation and shaped-charge effects are produced.[17]

Anti-electrical

[edit]

An anti-electrical weapon, the CBU-94/B, was first used by the US in the Kosovo War in 1999. These consist of a TMD (Tactical Munitions Dispenser) filled with 202 submunitions. Each submunition contains a small explosive charge that disperses 147 reels of fine conductive fiber of either carbon or aluminum-coated glass. Their purpose is to disrupt and damage electric power transmission systems by producing short circuits in high-voltage power lines and electrical substations. On the initial attack, these knocked out 70% of the electrical power supply in Serbia.

History of use

[edit]

Vietnam War

[edit]

During the Vietnam War, the US used cluster bombs in air strikes against targets in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.[18][19]

Of the 260 million cluster bomblets that rained down on Laos between 1964 and 1973, particularly on Xieng Khouang province, 80 million failed to explode.[20] As of 2009 about 7,000 people have been injured or killed by explosives left from the Vietnam War era in Vietnam's Quảng Trị province alone.[21]

South Lebanon conflict, 1978

[edit]

During the South Lebanon conflict in 1978, the IDF used cluster bombs provided by the United States. According to US President Jimmy Carter, this use of the cluster bombs violated the legal agreement between Israel and the US because the weapons had been provided for defensive purposes against an attack on Israel.[22] Israel also transferred American weapons to Saad Haddad's Lebanese militia, a violation of American law.[22] Carter's administration prepared to notify Congress that American weapons were being used illegally, which would have resulted in military aid to Israel being cut off.[22] The American consul in Jerusalem informed the Israeli government of their plans and, according to Carter, Prime Minister Begin said that the operation was over.[22]

Western Sahara war, 1975–1991

[edit]

During the 16-year-long conflict on the territory of Western Sahara, the Royal Moroccan Army (RMA) dropped cluster bombs.[23]

The RMA used both artillery-fired and air-dropped cluster munitions. BLU-63, M42 and MK118 submunitions were used at multiple locations in Bir Lahlou, Tifarity, Mehaires, Mijek and Awganit.

More than 300 cluster strike areas have been recorded in the MINURSO Mine Action Coordination Center database.

Soviet–Afghan War, 1979–1989

[edit]

During the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets dealt harshly with Mujaheddin rebels and those who supported them, including leveling entire villages to deny safe havens to their enemy and the usage of cluster bombs.[24][page needed]

Falklands War

[edit]

Sea Harriers of the Royal Navy dropped BL755 cluster bombs on Argentinian positions during the Falklands War of 1982.[25]

Grenada, 1983

[edit]

The United States dropped 21 Rockeye cluster bombs during its invasion of Grenada.[26]

Nagorno Karabakh War, 1992–1994, 2016, 2020

[edit]

The armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Nagorno Karabakh in 1992–1994 led to the use of cluster munitions against military and civilian targets in the region.[27] As of 2010, 93 km2 (36 sq mi) remain off-limits due to contamination with unexploded cluster ordnance. HALO Trust has made major contributions to the cleanup effort.[28][29]

During renewed hostilities in April 2016, HALO Trust reported the use of cluster bombs by Azerbaijan, having found cluster munitions in the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Kiçik Qarabəy.[30] Azerbaijan reported that the Armenian forces had used cluster munition against Azerbaijani civilians in the given period.[31]

According to the Cluster Munition Monitor report in 2010, neither Armenia nor Azerbaijan not acceded to become a member of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[32]

Further use of cluster munition was reported during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war.[33][34][35] The Armenian-populated city of Stepanakert came under bombardment throughout the war, beginning on the first day. Human Rights Watch reported that residential neighborhoods in Stepanakert which lacked any identifiable military targets were hit by the Azerbaijani Army with cluster munitions. Human Rights Watch also identified Azerbaijani usage of cluster munitions in Hadrut.[36] Human Rights Watch also reported the use of cluster munitions by the Armenian forces during the months-long bombardment of Tartar, missile attacks on Barda and on Goranboy.[37] Amnesty International also confirmed that the Armenian forces had used cluster munitions in Barda,[38] which resulted in the deaths of 25 Azerbaijani civilians, according to Azerbaijan.[39]

First Chechen War, 1995

[edit]

Yugoslavia, 1999

[edit]
  • Used by the US, the UK and Netherlands.

About 2,000 cluster bombs containing 380,000 sub-munitions were dropped on Yugoslavia during the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, in 1999, of which the Royal Air Force dropped 531 RBL755 cluster bombs.[40][41] Both the Americans and the British utilised cluster bombs.[42]

On 7 May 1999, between the time of 11:30 and 11:40, a NATO attack was carried out with two containers of cluster bombs and fell in the central part Niš:

  • The Pathology building next to the Medical Center of Nis in the south of the city,
  • Next to the building of "Banovina" including the main market, bus station next to the Niš Fortress and "12th February" Health Centre
  • Parking of "Niš Express" near river Nišava River.

Reports claimed that 15 civilians were killed, 8 civilians were seriously injured, 11 civilians had sustained minor injuries, 120 housing units were damaged and 47 were destroyed and that 15 cars were damaged.

Overall during the operation, at least 23 Serb civilians were killed by cluster munitions. At least six Serbs, including three children were killed by bomblets after the operation ended, and up to 23 square kilometres (8.9 sq mi) in six areas remain "cluster contaminated", according to Serbian government, including on Mt. Kopaonik near the slopes of the ski resort. The UK contributed £86,000 to the Serbian Mine Action Centre.[40]

Afghanistan, 2001–2002

[edit]

Iraq, 1991, 2003–2006

[edit]
A US Navy F/A-18C Hornet launches from USS Nimitz to a mission in Southern Iraq. Among other weapons, the plane carries CBU-100 "Rockeye" cluster bombs.
  • Used by the United States and the United Kingdom

1991: During the Gulf War, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom dropped 61,000 cluster bombs, containing 20 million submunitions, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).[45] The US accounted for 57,000 of these droppings. The US Department of Defense estimated that 1.2 to 1.5 million submunitions did not explode. According to human rights organizations, unexploded submunitions have caused over 4,000 civilian casualties, including 1,600 deaths, in Iraq and Kuwait.[46][47]

2003–2006: United States and allies attacked Iraq with 13,000 cluster munitions, containing two million submunitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom, according to the HRW.[48] The majority were DPICMs, or Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions.[49] At multiple times, coalition forces used cluster munitions in residential areas, and the country remains among the most contaminated to this day, bomblets posing a threat to both US military personnel in the area, and local civilians.[50]

When these weapons were fired on Baghdad on 7 April 2003 many of the bomblets failed to explode on impact. Afterward, some of them exploded when touched by civilians. USA Today reported that "the Pentagon presented a misleading picture during the war of the extent to which cluster weapons were being used and of the civilian casualties they were causing." On 26 April, General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the US had caused only one civilian casualty.[51]

Lebanon, 1978, 1982 and 2006

[edit]
Lebanese girl wounded by a cluster bomblet in 2006

During the Israeli-Lebanese conflict in 1982, Israel used cluster munitions, many of them American-made, on targets in southern Lebanon. Israel also used 4.6 million cluster bombs in the 2006 Lebanon War.[52][53][54][55]

Two types of cluster munitions were transferred to Israel from the US The first was the CBU-58 which uses the BLU-63 bomblet. This cluster bomb is no longer in production. The second was the MK-20 Rockeye, produced by Honeywell Incorporated in Minneapolis.[citation needed] The CBU-58 was used by Israel in Lebanon in both 1978 and 1982.[52] The Israeli Defense company Israel Military Industries also manufactures the more up-to-date M-85 cluster bomb.

Hezbollah fired Chinese-manufactured cluster munitions against Israeli civilian targets, using 122 mm rocket launchers during the 2006 war, hitting Kiryat Motzkin, Nahariya, Karmiel, Maghar, and Safsufa. A total of 113 rockets and 4,407 submunitions were fired into Israel during the war.[56][57]

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service, Israel dropped up to four million submunitions on Lebanese soil, of which one million remain unexploded.[58] According to a report prepared by Lionel Beehner for the Council on Foreign Relations, the United States restocked Israel's arsenal of cluster bombs, triggering a State Department investigation to determine whether Israel had violated secret agreements it had signed with the United States on their use.[58]

As Haaretz reported in November 2006, the Israel Defense Forces Chief of Staff Dan Halutz wanted to launch an investigation into the use of cluster bombs during the Lebanon war.[59] Halutz claimed that some cluster bombs had been fired against his direct order, which stated that cluster bombs should be used with extreme caution and not be fired into populated areas. The IDF apparently disobeyed this order.[59]

Human Rights Watch said there was evidence that Israel had used cluster bombs very close to civilian areas and described them as "unacceptably inaccurate and unreliable weapons when used around civilians" and that "they should never be used in populated areas".[60] Human Rights Watch has accused Israel of using cluster munitions in an attack on Bilda, a Lebanese village, on 19 July[61] which killed 1 civilian and injured 12, including 7 children. The Israeli "army defended ... the use of cluster munitions in its offensive with Lebanon, saying that using such munitions was 'legal under international law' and the army employed them 'in accordance with international standards'".[62] Foreign Ministry Spokesman Mark Regev added, "[I]f NATO countries stock these weapons and have used them in recent conflicts – in FR Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq – the world has no reason to point a finger at Israel."[63]

Georgia, 2008

[edit]

Georgia admitted using cluster bombs during the war, according to Human Rights Watch but stressed they were only used against military targets.[64] The Georgian army used LAR-160 multiple rocket launchers to fire MK4 LAR 160 type rockets (with M-85 bomblets) with a range of 45 kilometers the Georgian Minister of Defense (MoD) said.[65]

Human Rights Watch accused the Russian Air Force of using RBK-250 cluster bombs during the conflict.[66] A high-ranking Russian military official denied use of cluster bombs.[67] The Dutch government, after investigating the death of a Dutch citizen, claimed that a cluster munition was propelled by an 9K720 Iskander tactical missile (used by Russia at the time of conflict, and not used by Georgia).[68]

Sri Lanka, 2008/2009

[edit]

In 2009, the US Department of State prepared a report on incidents in Sri Lanka between January and May 2009 that could constitute violations of international humanitarian law or crimes against humanity. This report documented the use of cluster munitions by Sri Lanka’s government forces. Photos and eyewitness accounts described the use of such weapons in several attacks on civilian areas, including an incident on 7 March 2009, in Valayanmadam, where two cluster bombs exploded, causing significant civilian casualties and injuries. The reports suggest that cluster munitions were used in areas declared as safe zones for civilians.[69]

According to Gordon Weiss, who was the spokesperson for the UN in Colombo, the "largest remaining functioning hospital" in the Vanni region of Sri Lanka was bombed.[70] The Sri Lankan military has been accused of bombing the hospital with cluster munitions, but cluster bombs were not used in the bombing of the hospital.[71] The government has denied using cluster munitions, but in 2012 unexploded cluster bombs were found, according to Allan Poston, who was the technical advisor for the UN Development Program’s mine action group in Sri Lanka.[72] An article published by The Guardian in 2016 provided photographic evidence and testimonies from former de-miners and civilians pointing to the use of Russian-made cluster bombs in areas that the government had declared as "no-fire zones."[73]

Libya, 2011

[edit]

It was reported in April 2011 that Colonel Gaddafi's forces had used cluster bombs in the conflict between government forces and rebel forces trying to overthrow Gaddafi's government, during the battle of Misrata[74] These reports were denied by the government, and the Secretary of State of the US,[75] Hillary Clinton said she was "not aware" of the specific use of cluster or other indiscriminate weapons in Misurata even though a New York Times investigation refuted those claims.[76]

Syria, 2012

[edit]

During the Syrian uprising, a few videos of cluster bombs first appeared in 2011, but escalated in frequency near the end of 2012.[77][78] As Human Rights Watch reported on 13 October 2012, "Eliot Higgins, who blogs on military hardware and tactics used in Syria under the pseudonym 'Brown Moses', compiled a list of the videos showing cluster munition remnants in Syria's various governorates."[77][78] The type of bombs have been reported to be RBK-250 cluster bombs with AO-1 SCH bomblets (of Soviet design).[78] Designed by the Soviet Union for use on tank and troop formations, PTAB-2.5M bomblets were used on civilian targets in Mare' in December 2012 by the Syrian government.[79] According to the seventh annual Cluster Munition Report, there is ″compelling evidence″ that Russia has used cluster munitions during their involvement in Syria.[80]

South Sudan, 2013

[edit]

Cluster bombs remnants were discovered by a UN de-mining team in February 2014 on a section of road near the Jonglei state capital, Bor. The strategic town was the scene of heavy fighting, changing hands several times during the South Sudanese Civil War, which erupted in the capital Juba on 15 December 2013 before spreading to other parts of the country. According to UNMAS, the site was contaminated with the remnants of up to eight cluster bombs and an unknown quantity of bomblets.[81]

Ukraine, 2014

[edit]

Human Rights Watch reported that "Ukrainian government forces used cluster munitions in populated areas in Donetsk city in early October 2014." Also "circumstances indicate that anti-government forces might also have been responsible for the use of cluster munitions".[82]

Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen, 2015–2022

[edit]

British-supplied[83] and US-supplied cluster bombs[84] have been used by Saudi Arabian-led military coalition against Houthi militias in Yemen, according to Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.[85][86][87][88]

Saudi Arabia is[when?] not signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[89]

Ethiopia, 2021

[edit]

The New York Times journalist Christiaan Triebert revealed that the Ethiopian Air Force bombings of Samre during the Tigray War are evidenced by multiple photos of the tails of Soviet-era cluster bombs, likely RBK-250.[90]

Ethiopia is not signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[91]

Russian invasion of Ukraine, 2022

[edit]
Iskander-M ballistic missile with cluster warhead wreckage that was shot down over Kramatorsk by the Ukrainian air defenses.

Human Rights Watch reported the use of cluster munitions by the Russian Armed Forces during their invasion of Ukraine. HRMMU reported 16 credible allegations that Russian armed forces used cluster munitions in populated areas, resulting in civilian casualties and other damage.[92]

On 24 February 2022, a Russian 9M79-series Tochka ballistic missile with a 9N123 cluster munition warhead containing 50 9N24 fragmentation submunitions impacted outside a hospital in Vuhledar in Donetsk Oblast, Ukraine. The attack killed four civilians and wounded ten.[93] Further use of cluster munitions, such as the Uragan 9M27K and BM-30 Smerch 9M55K cluster rockets, is being investigated by Bellingcat through a public appeal for evidence on Twitter.[94] According to HRW and Amnesty International, Russian troops used cluster munition during an attack on the city of Okhtyrka on the morning of 25 February 2022.[92] A 220 mm Uragan rocket dropped cluster munitions on a kindergarten in the town. As a result of that, people were killed, including a child.[95] The same day, non-precision guided missiles bearing cluster munitions were deployed against Kharkiv, killing at least nine civilians and injuring 37.[92][96]

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights announced on 30 March 2022 that they had credible reports indicating that Russian armed forces had used cluster munitions in populated areas of Ukraine at least 24 times since the start of the conflict on 24 February.[97][92]

In early March 2022, The New York Times reported the first use of a cluster munition by Ukrainian troops during the invasion near Husarivka farm. It landed close to the Russian army's headquarters. According to the report, nobody died in that strike.[98]

On 28 February 2022, White House press secretary Jen Psaki called Russia's use of cluster munitions a potential "war crime".[99]

On 14 March 2022, an attack with a Tochka-U missile equipped with cluster sub-munitions was reported in the city of Donetsk. HRMMU confirmed at least 15 civilian deaths, and 36 injured in this incident, and at the time of its report was working to corroborate other alleged casualties and whether they were caused by cluster sub-munitions.[92]

On 7 December 2022, it was revealed that Ukraine was seeking access to US stockpiles of cluster munitions, due to a shortage of ammunition for HIMARS type and 155 mm artillery systems. The US has stockpiled its cluster munitions and had been considering the Ukrainian request. Ukraine claimed it would give them an edge over Russian artillery, as well as preventing depletion of other US and Western stocks.[100]

On 6 July 2023, US president Joe Biden approved the provision of DPICM cluster munitions to Ukraine to help Ukrainian forces with the ongoing counteroffensive to liberate Russian-occupied southeastern Ukraine, bypassing US law prohibiting the transfer of cluster munitions with a failure rate greater than one percent.[101] The weapon system could be used in both HIMARS and 155 mm shell projectiles. Defense Department official Laura Cooper said that the munitions "would be useful, especially against dug-in Russian positions on the battlefield."[102] According to the Pentagon, Ukraine will receive an "improved" version of cluster munitions with a failure rate of about 2 percent, while the Russian cluster bombs fail at 40 percent or more.[103] However, according to a report prepared for Congress, experts in cleanup operations "have frequently reported failure rates of 10% to 30%."[104][105] The failure rate of cluster munitions used by Ukraine is reportedly as high as 20 percent.[106] Paul Hannon, of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), said the Biden administration's decision will "contribute to the terrible casualties being suffered by Ukrainian civilians both immediately and for years to come".[23]

On 10 July, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen warned Ukraine of using cluster munitions on Twitter writing: "It would be the greatest danger for Ukrainians for many years or up to a hundred years if cluster bombs are used in Russian-occupied areas in the territory of Ukraine," Sen further cited his country's "painful experience" from the Vietnam War that has killed or maimed tens of thousands of Cambodians.[107]

On the same day, the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) released a study citing the use of cluster munitions from the Vietnam War. United States Army studies from that war showed that it takes approximately 13.6 high explosive shells for each enemy soldier killed. A shell firing DPICMs relied on average only 1.7 shells to kill an enemy soldier. RUSI used an example of a trench, a direct hit by a high explosive round will spread shrapnel "within line of sight of the point of detonation". This also reduces the wear and tear on the barrels of 155 mm artillery weapons systems.[108]

On 16 July 2023, Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed that Russia had "sufficient stockpiles" of its own cluster munitions and threatened to take "reciprocal action" if Ukraine used US-supplied cluster munitions against Russian forces in Ukraine.[109]

On 20 July 2023, The Washington Post reported that Ukrainian forces had begun to use US-supplied cluster munitions against Russian forces in the south-east of the country, according to Ukrainian officials.[110]

Iran–Israel war

[edit]

Amnesty international and Israel have accused Iran of using cluster munitions when it fired multiple ballistic missiles at Israel from June 20 to June 23, 2025.[111][112]

Threat to civilians

[edit]
Monument to victims of the Niš cluster bombing

While all weapons are dangerous, cluster bombs pose a particular threat to civilians for two reasons: they have a wide area of effect, and they consistently leave behind a large number of unexploded bomblets. The unexploded bomblets can remain dangerous for decades after the end of a conflict. For example, while the United States cluster bombing of Laos stopped in 1973, cluster bombs and other unexploded munitions continued to cause over 100 casualties per year to Laotian civilians as of 2009.[113][114]

Cluster munitions are opposed by many individuals and hundreds of groups, such as the Red Cross,[115] the Cluster Munition Coalition and the United Nations, because of the high number of civilians that have fallen victim to the weapon. Since February 2005, Handicap International called for cluster munitions to be prohibited and collected hundreds of thousands of signatures to support its call.[116] 98% of 13,306 recorded cluster munitions casualties that are[when?] registered with Handicap International are civilians, while 27% are children.[117]

The area affected by a single cluster munition, known as its footprint, can be very large; a single unguided M26 MLRS rocket can effectively cover an area of 0.23 km2 (57 acres).[118] In US and most allied services, the M26 has been replaced by the M30 guided missile fired from the MLRS. The M30 has greater range and accuracy but a smaller area of coverage.[citation needed]

Because of the weapon's broad area of effect, they have often been documented as striking both civilian and military objects in the target area. This characteristic of the weapon is particularly problematic for civilians when cluster munitions are used in or near populated areas, as documented in a research report by Human Rights Watch.[119] In some cases, like the Zagreb rocket attack, civilians were deliberately targeted by such weapons.[120]

Unexploded ordnance

[edit]
Unexploded cluster sub-munition, probably a BLU-26 type. Plain of Jars, Laos.

The other serious problem, also common to explosive weapons is unexploded ordnance (UXO) of cluster bomblets left behind after a strike. These bomblets may be duds or in some cases the weapons are designed to detonate at a later stage. In both cases, the surviving bomblets are live and can explode when handled, making them a serious threat to civilians and military personnel entering the area. In effect, the UXOs can function like land mines.

Even though cluster bombs are designed to explode prior to or on impact, there are always some individual submunitions that do not explode on impact. As of 2000, the US-made MLRS with M26 warhead and M77 submunitions which were supposed to have a 5% failure rate, but studies have shown that some have a much higher rate.[121] The rate in acceptance tests prior to the Gulf War for this type ranged from 2% to 23% for rockets cooled to −25 °F (−32 °C) before testing.[122] The M483A1 DPICM artillery-delivered cluster bombs have a reported failure rate of 14%.[123] In July 2023, the failure rate of Russian cluster bombs during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was reported to be at 40 percent or more.[103]

Given that each cluster bomb can contain hundreds of bomblets and be fired in volleys, even a small failure rate can lead each strike to leave behind hundreds or thousands of UXOs scattered across the strike area. For example, after the 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict, UN experts estimated that as many as one million unexploded bomblets may contaminate the hundreds of cluster munition strike sites in Lebanon.[124]

M77 submunition of type fired against Lebanon in 1986. Each MLRS rocket has 644 M77 packed in the warhead.

In addition, some cluster bomblets, such as the BLU-97/B used in the CBU-87, are brightly colored to increase their visibility and warn off civilians. However, the yellow color, coupled with their small and nonthreatening appearance, is attractive to young children who wrongly believe them to be toys. This problem was exacerbated in the War in Afghanistan (2001–2021), when US forces dropped humanitarian rations from airplanes with similar yellow-colored packaging as the BLU-97/B, yellow being the NATO standard colour for high explosive filler in air weapons. The rations packaging was later changed first to blue and then to clear in the hope of avoiding such hazardous confusion.[citation needed]

As of 1993, the US military was developing new cluster bombs that it claimed could have a much lower (less than 1%) failure rate.[125] Sensor-fused weapons containing a limited number of submunitions that are capable of autonomously engaging armored targets may provide a viable if costly alternative to cluster munitions that will allow multiple target engagement with one shell or bomb while avoiding the civilian deaths and injuries consistently documented from the use of cluster munitions.[citation needed]

In the 1980s the Spanish firm Esperanza y Cia developed a 120 mm caliber mortar bomb that contained 21 anti-armor submunitions. What made the 120 mm "Espin" unique was the electrical impact fusing system which eliminated dangerous duds. The system relied on a capacitor in each submunition that was charged by a wind generator in the nose of the projectile after being fired. If the electrical fuse fails to function on impact, approximately 5 minutes later the capacitor bleeds out, therefore neutralizing the submunition's electronic fuse system.[126]

Civilian deaths

[edit]
  • In Vietnam, people are[when?] still being killed as a result of cluster bombs and other objects left by the US and Vietnamese military forces. Hundreds of people are[when?] killed or injured annually by unexploded ordnance.[127]
  • Some 270 million cluster submunitions were dropped on Laos in the 1960s and 1970s; approximately one third of these submunitions failed to explode and continue to pose a threat today[when?].[128]
  • Within the first year after the end of the Kosovo War, more than 100 civilians died from unexploded bombs and mines. During the war, NATO planes dropped nearly 1,400 cluster bombs in Kosovo. Cluster bombs make up to 40% of mines and unexploded bombs in Kosovo.[129]
  • Israel used cluster bombs in Lebanon in 1978 and in the 1980s. Those weapons used more than two decades ago by Israel continue to affect Lebanon.[130] During the 2006 war in Lebanon, Israel fired large numbers of cluster bombs in Lebanon, containing an estimated more than 4 million cluster submunitions. In the first month following the ceasefire, unexploded cluster munitions killed or injured an average of 3–4 people per day.[131]

Locations

[edit]
Ban Advocates from Afghanistan and Ethiopia demonstrating outside of the Dublin conference

Countries and disputed territories (listed in italic) that have been affected by cluster munitions as of November 2024 include:[132]

As of November 2024, it is unclear Georgia is contaminated. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of the Congo, Croatia, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Norway, Zambia, Uganda, and Thailand completed clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants in previous years.[132]

International legislation

[edit]
Erik Thorstvedt leads a Norwegian parade celebrating the effectuation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 31 July 2010. (Photo: Norsk Folkehjelp)

Cluster bombs fall under the general rules of international humanitarian law, but were not specifically covered by any currently binding international legal instrument until the signature of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008. This international treaty stemmed from an initiative by Stoltenberg's Second Cabinet known as the Oslo Process which was launched in February 2007 to prohibit cluster munitions.[140] More than 100 countries agreed to the text of the resulting Convention on Cluster Munitions in May 2008 which sets out a comprehensive ban on these weapons. This treaty was signed by 94 states in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008. The Oslo Process was launched largely in response to the failure of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) where five years of discussions failed to find an adequate response to these weapons.[141] The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is campaigning for the widespread accession to and ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

A number of sections of the Protocol on explosive remnants of war (Protocol V to the 1980 Convention), 28 November 2003[142] occasionally address some of the problems associated with the use of cluster munitions, in particular Article 9, which mandates States Parties to "take generic preventive measures aimed at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war". In June 2006, Belgium was the first country to issue a ban on the use (carrying), transportation, export, stockpiling, trade and production of cluster munitions,[143] and Austria followed suit on 7 December 2007.[12]

There has been legislative activity on cluster munitions in several countries, including Austria, Australia, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. In some of these countries, ongoing discussions concerning draft legislation banning cluster munitions, along the lines of the legislation adopted in Belgium and Austria will now turn to ratification of the global ban treaty. Norway and Ireland have national legislation prohibiting cluster munitions and were able to deposit their instruments of ratification to the Convention on Cluster Munitions immediately after signing it in Oslo on 3 December 2008.

International treaties

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Nations subscribing to the Wellington Declaration, which led to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Other weapons, such as land mines, have been banned in many countries under specific legal instruments for several years, notably the Ottawa Treaty to ban land mines, and some of the Protocols in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons that also help clearing the lands contaminated by left munitions after the end of conflicts and provides international assistance to the affected populations. However, until the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dublin in May 2008 cluster bombs were not banned by any international treaty and were considered legitimate weapons by some governments.

To increase pressure for governments to come to an international treaty on 13 November 2003, the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) was established with the goal of addressing the impact of cluster munitions on civilians.

International governmental deliberations in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons turned on the broader problem of explosive remnants of war, a problem to which cluster munitions have contributed in a significant way. There were consistent calls from the Cluster Munition Coalition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and a number of UN agencies, joined by approximately 30 governments, for international governmental negotiations to develop specific measures that would address the humanitarian problems cluster munitions pose. This did not prove possible in the conventional multilateral forum. After a reversal in the US position, in 2007 deliberations did begin on cluster munitions within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. There was a concerted effort led by the US to develop a new protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, but this proposal was rejected by over 50 states, together with civil society, ICRC and UN agencies.[144] The discussions ended with no result in November 2011, leaving the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions as the single international standard on the weapons.[145]

In February 2006, Belgium announced its decision to ban the weapon by law. Then Norway announced a national moratorium in June and Austria announced its decision in July to work for an international instrument on the weapon. The international controversy over the use and impact of cluster munitions during the war between Lebanon and Israel in July and August 2006 added weight to the global campaign for a ban treaty.[146]

Ugandan demonstrator at the May 2008 Dublin conference for the Convention on Cluster Munitions

A new flexible multilateral process similar to the process that led to the ban on anti-personnel land mines in 1997 (the Ottawa Treaty) began with an announcement in November 2006[147] in Geneva as well at the same time by the Government of Norway that it would convene an international meeting in early 2007 in Oslo to work towards a new treaty prohibiting cluster munitions. Forty-nine governments attended the meeting in Oslo 22–23 February 2007 in order to reaffirm their commitment to a new international ban on the weapon.

A follow-up meeting in this process was held in Lima in May where around 70 states discussed the outline of a new treaty, Hungary became the latest country to announce a moratorium and Peru launched an initiative to make Latin America a cluster munition free zone.[148]

In addition, the ICRC held an experts meeting on cluster munitions in April 2007 which helped clarify technical, legal, military and humanitarian aspects of the weapon with a view to developing an international response.[149]

Further meetings took place in Vienna on 4–7 December 2007, and in Wellington on 18–22 February 2008 where a declaration in favor of negotiations on a draft convention was adopted by more than 80 countries. In May 2008 after around 120 countries had subscribed to the Wellington Declaration and participated in the Dublin Diplomatic Conference from 19 to 30 May 2008. At the end of this conference, 107 countries agreed to adopt the Convention on Cluster Munitions, that bans cluster munitions and was opened for signature in Oslo on 3–4 December 2008 where it was signed by 94 countries.[150][151][152] In July 2008, United States Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates implemented a policy to eliminate by 2018 all cluster bombs that do not meet new safety standards.[153]

In November 2008, ahead of the signing Conference in Oslo,[154] the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on all European Union governments to sign and ratify the Convention.[155]

On 16 February 2010 Burkina Faso became the 30th state to deposit its instrument of ratification for the Convention on Cluster Munitions. This means that the number of States required for the Convention to enter into force had been reached. The treaty's obligations became legally binding on the 30 ratifying States on 1 August 2010 and subsequently for other ratifying States.[156]

Convention on Cluster Munitions

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Taking effect on 1 August 2010, the Convention on Cluster Munitions[157] bans the stockpiling, use and transfer of virtually all existing cluster bombs and provides for the clearing up of unexploded munitions. It had been signed by 108 countries, of which 38 had ratified it by the affected date, but many of the world's major military powers including the United States, Russia, India, Brazil and China are not signatories to the treaty.[158][159][160][161]

The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010, six months after it was ratified by 30 states. As of 26 September 2018, a total of 120 states had joined the Convention, as 104 States parties and 16 signatories.[162]

For an updated list of countries, see Convention on Cluster Munitions#State parties

United States policy

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USAF B-1 Lancer dropping CBU cluster bombs

According to the US State Department, the US suspended operational use of cluster munitions in 2003,[163] however, Amnesty International published a report that the US used them in Yemen during the 2009 al-Majalah camp attack.[164][165]

US arguments favoring the use of cluster munitions are that their use reduces the number of aircraft and artillery systems needed to support military operations and if they were eliminated, significantly more money would have to be spent on new weapons, ammunition, and logistical resources. Also, militaries would need to increase their use of massed artillery and rocket barrages to get the same coverage, which would destroy or damage more key infrastructures.[163]

The US was initially against any CCW limitation negotiations, but dropped its opposition in June 2007. Cluster munitions have been determined as needed for ensuring the country's national security interests, but measures were taken to address humanitarian concerns of their use, as well as pursuing their original suggested alternative to a total ban of pursuing technological fixes to make the weapons no longer viable after the end of a conflict.[163]

In May 2008, then-Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Stephen Mull stated that the US military relies upon cluster munitions as an important part of their war strategy.[166] Mull emphasized that "US forces simply cannot fight by design or by doctrine without holding out at least the possibility of using cluster munitions."

The US Army ceased procurement of GMLRS cluster rockets in December 2008 because of a submunition dud rate as high as five percent. Pentagon policy was to have all cluster munitions used after 2018 to have a submunition unexploded ordnance rate of less than one percent. To achieve this, the Army undertook the Alternative Warhead Program (AWP) to assess and recommend technologies to reduce or eliminate cluster munition failures, as some 80 percent of US military cluster weapons reside in Army artillery stockpiles.[163] In July 2012, the US fired at a target area with 36 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) unitary warhead rockets. Analysis indicated that capability gaps existed as cluster munitions require approval by the Combatant Commander which reduced the advantage of responsive precision fire. The same effect could have been made by four Alternative Warhead (AW) GMLRS rockets under development by the AWP to engage the same target set as cluster munitions. Without access to the AW, the operation required using nine times as many rockets, cost nine times as much ($3.6 million compared to $400,000), and took 40 times as long (more than 20 minutes compared to less than 30 seconds) to execute.[167]

Starting with the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8) annual Consolidated Appropriations Act legislation has placed export moratorium language on cluster weapons since then. On 19 May 2011 the Defense Security Cooperation Agency issued a memorandum prohibiting the sale of all but the CBU-97B CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon because the others have been demonstrated to have a unexploded ordnance rate of greater than 1%.[168][169]

On 30 November 2017, the Pentagon put off indefinitely their planned ban on using cluster bombs after 2018, as they had been unable to produce submunitions with failure rates of 1% or less. Since it is unclear how long it might take to achieve that standard, a months-long policy review concluded the deadline should be postponed; deployment of existing cluster weapons is left to commanders' discretion to authorize their use when deemed necessary "until sufficient quantities" of safer versions are developed and fielded.[170][171]

Users

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Countries

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At least 25 countries have used cluster munitions in recent history (since the creation of the United Nations). Countries listed in bold have signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreeing in principle to ban cluster bombs. Countries listed in italic have signed, but not yet ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In addition, at least three countries that no longer exist (the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia[26] and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan[199]) used cluster bombs. In some cases, the responsibility or even the use of cluster munition is denied by the local government.

Non-state armed groups

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Very few violent non-state actors have used cluster munitions and their delivery systems due to the complexity.[200] As of August 2019, cluster munitions have been used in conflicts by non-state actors in at least six countries.[200]

Producers

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At least 31 nations have produced cluster munitions in recent history (since the creation of the United Nations). Many of these nations still have stocks of these munitions.[201][202] Most (but not all) of them are involved in recent wars or long unsolved international conflicts; however most of them did not use the munitions they produced. Countries listed in bold have signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreeing in principle to ban cluster bombs. As of February 2024, countries marked with an Asterisk (*) officially ceased production of cluster munitions; countries marked with two asterisks (**) unofficially ceased production of cluster munitions.

Countries with stocks

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As of June 2025, at least 47 countries have stockpiles of cluster munitions.[201][202] Countries listed in bold have signed and ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreeing in principle that their stockpiles should be destroyed. Countries listed in italic have signed, but not yet ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions; countries marked with an Asterisk (*) are in the process of destroying their stockpiles.

Financiers

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According to BankTrack, an international network of non-governmental organizations specializing in control of financial institutions, many major banks and other financial corporations either directly financed, or provided financial services to companies producing cluster munition in 2005–2012. Among other, BankTrack 2012 report[246] names ABN AMRO, Bank of America, Bank of China, Barclays, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Commerzbank, Commonwealth Bank, Crédit Agricole, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Industrial Bank of China, ING Group, JPMorgan Chase, Korea Development Bank, Lloyds Bank, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, MUFG Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Scotland, Sberbank, Société Générale, UBS and Wells Fargo.

Many of these financial companies are connected to such producers of cluster munitions as Alliant Techsystems, China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, Hanwha, Norinco, Singapore Technologies Engineering, Textron, and others.[247]

According to Pax Christi, a Netherlands-based NGO, in 2009, around 137 financial institutions financed cluster munition production.[248] Out of 137 institutions, 63 were based in the US, another 18 in the EU (the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy etc.), 16 were based in China, 4 in Singapore, 3 in each of: Canada, Japan, Taiwan, 2 in Switzerland, and 4 other countries had 1 financial institution involved.[249]

See also

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Cluster munitions are conventional explosive weapons consisting of a delivery container, such as a , shell, or , that disperses or releases multiple smaller submunitions, known as bomblets, over a wide area to inflict damage on personnel, vehicles, and . These submunitions typically contain high-explosive charges and are designed for area saturation effects, providing forces with versatile options against dispersed, mobile, or concealed targets that unitary munitions may struggle to engage effectively. In controlled testing, cluster munitions have demonstrated significantly higher lethality against armored vehicles compared to precision-guided alternatives, with effectiveness multipliers reported up to 60 times in peacetime evaluations. Employed since and extensively in conflicts including , the Gulf Wars, and more recent operations in , cluster munitions offer in use and logistical simplicity for suppressing large enemy formations or nodes. Their tactical utility stems from first-principles of physics, where fragmenting submunitions maximize kill radii through probabilistic coverage rather than pinpoint accuracy, making them particularly suited to high-intensity against numerically superior or entrenched adversaries. However, submunitions exhibit failure-to-detonate rates varying from 1% in modern U.S. designs to 10-40% in older or combat-stressed systems, resulting in persistent that functions analogously to mines, contaminating battlefields and causing delayed civilian and combatant casualties. The primary controversy surrounding cluster munitions arises from these remnants, which advocacy groups and some international bodies highlight for humanitarian impacts, leading to the 2008 —a ratified by over 100 states that bans their production, stockpiling, transfer, and use, though non-signatories including the , , and continue to maintain and deploy them citing indispensable battlefield roles. U.S. , for instance, restricts exports to munitions with sub-1% dud rates but authorizes domestic use without such limits, reflecting empirical assessments of net value over remnant risks in active theaters. Recent transfers of U.S. cluster munitions to in 2023 underscore ongoing debates, where their deployment against Russian advances has been credited with disrupting advances despite parallel Russian use, illustrating causal trade-offs between immediate operational gains and protracted clearance challenges. Sources critiquing cluster munitions often emanate from NGOs with disarmament agendas, potentially underemphasizing verified combat efficacy data from analyses.

Technical Characteristics

Definition and Mechanism

A cluster munition consists of a non-reusable canister or delivery body containing multiple conventional submunitions, designed to disperse these submunitions over a targeted area to engage personnel and . These weapons are delivered by air-dropped bombs, shells, rockets, or missiles, with the submunitions typically each weighing less than 20 kilograms and functioning independently upon release. Submunitions include anti-personnel types that fragment to injure or kill , anti-armor variants with shaped charges to penetrate vehicles, or combined-effects models addressing both. The operational mechanism begins with delivery to the vicinity of the target, after which a —timed, altitude-based, or impact-initiated—triggers a dispersal charge within the . This charge expels the submunitions, which then scatter ballistically over an area determined by factors such as release altitude, , , and atmospheric conditions, often covering hundreds of square meters. Upon descent, submunitions deploy stabilizing features like parachutes, fins, or vanes to orient for impact, with individual fuzes activating detonation via direct ground contact, proximity to targets, or delayed action to maximize area denial. Engineering designs vary, but common configurations use a cylindrical or spherical container that splits or bursts mid-flight, propelling submunitions outward via gas pressure from a small explosive charge, ensuring even distribution without requiring precision guidance for the parent munition itself. Submunition payloads incorporate high-explosive fillers with fragmentation casings or penetrators, engineered for kinetic and blast effects upon fuze initiation, though inherent duds from manufacturing tolerances or environmental factors can leave unexploded ordnance. This dispersal contrasts with unitary munitions by prioritizing wide-area coverage over pinpoint accuracy, leveraging probabilistic lethality across dispersed targets.

Delivery Systems and Submunitions

Cluster munitions employ diverse delivery systems, including air-dropped bombs, artillery projectiles, rocket artillery, and ballistic missiles, which release submunitions over targeted areas to achieve wide-area effects. Air-delivered variants, such as gravity bombs, are released from fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters and typically open mid-air via radar or barometric fuses to disperse payloads. Ground-launched systems include tube-fired artillery shells, like 155 mm projectiles, and multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), which propel cluster warheads to ranges exceeding 30 kilometers before submunition ejection. Ballistic missiles, such as the Russian Iskander-M, can also carry cluster payloads for longer-range delivery, integrating inertial guidance for precision prior to dispersal. Submunitions, often numbering from dozens to hundreds per container, are smaller explosive devices designed for specific effects upon ground impact or self-activation. Common types include anti-personnel submunitions, which rely on fragmentation or blast to incapacitate over broad swaths; anti-vehicle variants employing shaped charges to penetrate armor; and dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) combining both mechanisms in a single bomblet. For instance, DPICM submunitions in 155 mm shells feature bodies that fragment for antipersonnel lethality while incorporating liners for armor-piercing jets. Most submunitions are unguided and free-falling, stabilized by fins, streamers, or to ensure even distribution across footprints spanning hundreds of meters; impact fuzes trigger , though failure rates can leave duds functioning as de facto mines. Advanced submunitions incorporate sensors or delayed fuzing for enhanced target discrimination, such as seekers in top-attack munitions that detect roofs before striking, though such "smart" types remain limited in proliferation compared to basic free-fall models. Delivery method influences submunition design; air-dropped bomblets prioritize aerodynamic stability for dispersal from high altitudes, while payloads endure higher g-forces, necessitating robust casings. Empirical assessments indicate that submunition density and failure rates—often 5-40% depending on type and conditions—directly affect operational reliability and post-strike hazards.

Reliability Factors and Modern Improvements

The reliability of cluster munitions primarily refers to the proportion of submunitions that fail to detonate upon impact, resulting in (UXO) that poses long-term hazards. Dud rates are influenced by multiple factors, including the type of (mechanical versus electronic), submunition age, delivery altitude and speed, impact angle and surface (e.g., soft versus hard ground), and environmental conditions such as and . Electronic fuzes generally exhibit higher initial detonation rates than mechanical ones due to reduced sensitivity to deformation on impact, though they can be susceptible to electronic failures. Historical field observations indicate dud rates far exceeding manufacturer specifications, often ranging from 10% to 40% depending on the munition and conflict conditions, compared to claimed rates of 1-5%. For instance, U.S. CBU-87 bomblets have been reported by the Department of Defense to have 4-6% failure rates in testing, while assessments in post-conflict zones suggest higher figures due to incomplete arming sequences or environmental interference. In the 2006 conflict, certain Israeli cluster submunitions exhibited failure rates exceeding 40%, attributed to suboptimal release parameters and variability. These discrepancies arise partly from controlled test environments versus real-world dispersal, where submunitions may tumble or bury partially, preventing activation; clearance organizations consistently report elevated rates, though military sources emphasize that aggregate effectiveness remains high despite individual failures. Modern improvements have focused on mitigating dud risks through enhanced fuze designs and mechanisms, particularly since the . Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) like the Israeli M85 incorporate self-destruct timers as a to impact fuzes, intended to detonate uninitiated submunitions after 3-120 seconds via electronic circuitry, theoretically reducing hazardous s to below 1%; however, independent tests by organizations such as Norwegian People's Aid have documented self-destruct failure rates up to 10% in simulated conditions, yielding armed but inert remnants. The U.S. Department of Defense revised its policy in November 2017 to require new cluster munitions to achieve less than 1% failure rates in testing or include self-neutralization within , leading to adoption of sensor-fuzed submunitions like those in the BLU-108/B, which use seekers to detect and strike targets post-dispersal, minimizing ground-lingering UXO. These advancements, including electronic time fuzes with deactivation sequences, have demonstrably lowered reported dud rates in controlled evaluations to under 2% for select systems, though operational data remains limited and contested by field reports emphasizing persistent variability.

Development History

Early Innovations and World War II

Early development of cluster munitions occurred in the , with German engineers pioneering designs for dispersing submunitions to cover wide areas against dispersed targets. In 1932, munitions experts began adapting fragmentation bombs into cluster configurations by repackaging them into dispensers for aerial delivery, aiming to enhance coverage against troop concentrations and airfields. Prior to full-scale , Soviet forces employed rudimentary cluster incendiary devices during the against in 1939–1940, consisting of cylindrical containers that released dozens of phosphorus-filled bomblets over urban areas, earning the derisive Finnish nickname "Molotov bread baskets" in response to Soviet claims of drops. The German SD-2, or Sprengbombe Dickwandig 2 kg, emerged as the first significant operational cluster submunition, a 2-kilogram anti-personnel bomblet with a serrated cast-iron body designed to fragment upon detonation, encased in a thin magnesium alloy "butterfly" wing for stabilization and dispersal. These were released from AB-series containers carried by , scattering up to 28 bomblets over a football-field-sized area to target personnel and light vehicles with delayed or impact fuzes that often left duds posing long-term hazards. The SD-2 saw initial deployment in May 1943 against the British , causing civilian and military casualties through fragmentation and anti-handling mechanisms that detonated upon disturbance. German production scaled to millions of units, though logistical constraints limited widespread Eastern Front impact despite intended use against Soviet . Soviet innovations paralleled German efforts with the PTAB-2.5 kg anti-tank bomblet, a shaped-charge submunition weighing 2.5 kilograms, dispersed from aircraft-mounted clusters to penetrate armored vehicles by concentrating explosive force on a small area. Introduced in , these were air-dropped against German panzer formations, with each carrier bomb releasing multiple bomblets to saturate columns, demonstrating early adaptation for anti-materiel roles amid the Red Army's push to counter mechanized warfare. Allied forces, including the and , incorporated cluster-like fragmentation dispensers later in the war, notably in Pacific theater bombings of Japanese cities such as and , where submunitions enhanced area denial against entrenched positions and industrial sites. These WWII applications highlighted cluster munitions' tactical value in overwhelming dispersed or mobile targets, though high dud rates—often exceeding 10% for early designs—foreshadowed persistent issues.

Cold War Advancements

During the era, cluster munitions underwent significant advancements driven by the strategic imperative to counter massed armored formations anticipated in potential conflicts between and forces in . The prioritized development of these weapons to saturate enemy avenues of approach with submunitions capable of defeating tanks and , reflecting doctrines like that emphasized deep strikes against mechanized threats. Key innovations included aerodynamic dispensers that enabled efficient external carriage on fighter-bombers and improved submunition designs, such as shaped-charge warheads for armor penetration combined with fragmentation effects for personnel casualties. These enhancements marked a departure from World War II-era crude clusters, incorporating height-of-burst fuzes to optimize dispersal patterns over target areas spanning hundreds of meters. The Soviet Union paralleled these efforts, producing cluster bomb series like the RBK family (e.g., RBK-250, RBK-500), which dispersed anti-tank and anti-personnel bomblets from aerial platforms to achieve similar area-denial effects against NATO counteroffensives. Soviet designs emphasized integration with rocket artillery systems, foreshadowing later multiple-launch rocket systems, and were tested in proxy conflicts such as the 1979-1989 invasion of Afghanistan, where air-dropped and rocket-delivered variants demonstrated operational reliability against dispersed guerrilla forces. Both superpowers stockpiled vast quantities—hundreds of thousands of US artillery shells alone—optimized for high-volume delivery via artillery, rockets, and aircraft to exploit the numerical superiority in conventional forces expected in mutual deterrence scenarios. By the , advancements culminated in munitions like the , introduced in 1986, which featured BLU-97/B bomblets with copper liners for enhanced anti-armor lethality alongside incendiary and fragmentation capabilities, replacing less versatile Vietnam-era predecessors. These refinements improved reliability through better mechanisms, though failure rates remained a persistent challenge, often exceeding 5% in field conditions. Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM), such as those in 155mm shells, further exemplified the era's focus on versatile submunitions that could engage both and personnel over wide footprints. Such developments underscored cluster munitions' role as force multipliers in high-intensity warfare, prioritizing explosive yield and coverage over precision amid the era's emphasis on overwhelming firepower.

Post-Cold War Refinements

Following the end of the in 1991, refinements to cluster munitions emphasized enhanced reliability, reduced (UXO) hazards, and improved target discrimination through sensor-fuzed submunitions, addressing empirical shortcomings of earlier designs that exhibited dud rates of 5-30% in conflicts like . These advancements incorporated mechanisms, multi-mode sensors ( and ), and integration with precision guidance systems, enabling submunitions to autonomously detect and engage armored vehicles from above while minimizing persistent battlefield remnants. Such developments were driven by military requirements for effectiveness against mechanized forces, with failure rates targeted below 1% to comply with evolving doctrinal standards, though international humanitarian campaigns influenced design concessions without eliminating the weapons' area-effect utility. A primary innovation was the sensor-fuzed submunition (SFM), which deploys parachute-retarded or spinning warheads equipped with seekers to identify heat signatures or metallic targets, detonating only upon valid engagement or via timed self-destruction. In the United States, the CBU-97 Sensor Fuzed Weapon, operational by 1997, evolved into the CBU-105 variant in the early 2000s by incorporating a wind-corrected munitions dispenser (WCMD) for GPS/INS-guided accuracy from altitudes up to 20,000 feet. The CBU-105 dispenses 10 "skeets"—cylindrical submunitions with infrared and dual-mode radar sensors—that hover and strike top armor, achieving over 99% reliability and demonstrated efficacy in neutralizing up to 40 vehicles per salvo in simulations. U.S. policy retained SFWs post-2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions due to their low UXO footprint, contrasting with broader stockpiles facing phase-out mandates. European refinements paralleled this trajectory, with the BONUS 155mm round, jointly developed by Sweden's (now ) and France's Nexter from the mid-1990s and qualified around 2000, deploying two SFMs with and sensors for top-attack on armor over a 30x150 meter footprint. The BONUS Mk II, initiated in 2001, upgraded to laser (LADAR) and electronics for GPS-denied environments, enabling operations from standard howitzers with near-total submunition functionality. Similarly, Germany's , refined from late-1980s prototypes by and Diehl into production by the early 2000s, uses dual-sensor submunitions (active and ) in a 155mm carrier shell, effective against armored advances at ranges up to 40 km and recently employed in for precise area denial. These systems, costing $80,000 per SMArt round, prioritize high-value targets but retain cluster dispersion for saturation, underscoring causal trade-offs between discriminate strikes and legacy area coverage. Non-Western states pursued analogous upgrades, such as Russia's integration of cluster warheads into Iskander-M ballistic missiles by the 2010s, though details on sensor enhancements remain less transparent and focused more on volume than reliability. Overall, post-Cold War iterations shifted from mass-dispersal paradigms toward hybrid precision, empirically boosting lethality against transient armored threats—10-fold over Vietnam-era equivalents—while curtailing but not eliminating UXO risks through rather than outright .

Military Applications

Tactical and Strategic Advantages

Cluster munitions provide tactical advantages through their ability to disperse numerous submunitions over a wide area, enabling effective engagement of dispersed or moving targets such as formations, armored columns, or positions that unitary munitions cannot cover efficiently. This area saturation increases the probability of hits against elusive or concealed threats, delivering that disrupts enemy maneuvers and prevents counteractions during assaults or retreats. Historical data from the indicates cluster munitions were eight times more effective at producing casualties than standard high-explosive bombs when targeting personnel in open terrain. On the battlefield, these weapons serve as an economy-of-force option, requiring fewer delivery platforms—such as sorties or tubes—to achieve equivalent or superior effects compared to precision-guided unitary ordnance against massed or area targets. Their versatility allows simultaneous anti-personnel and anti-materiel effects from a single munition, complicating enemy and reducing the volume of needed for sustained operations. Tactically, they excel in scenarios involving rapid area denial, where submunitions can impede enemy advances across fronts like narrow corridors or staging areas, buying time for friendly forces to reposition. Strategically, cluster munitions enhance by enabling commanders to neutralize broad threat concentrations with minimal resource expenditure, preserving high-value assets for other missions. In large-scale conflicts, their deployment can degrade enemy mobility and command structures over extended theaters, as seen in analyses of potential high-intensity warfare where dispersed mechanized forces predominate. This capability supports deeper operational goals, such as isolating battlefields or interdicting supply lines, by creating persistent hazards that force adversaries to divert resources for clearance. Overall, their utility stems from causal mechanics of fragmentation and dispersion, which outperform single-point impacts against probabilistic target distributions inherent in modern dispersed warfare.

Effectiveness Against Personnel and Materiel

Cluster munitions achieve effectiveness against personnel through wide-area dispersal of submunitions equipped with fragmentation or blast warheads, saturating target zones to engage dispersed or troops in the open far more efficiently than unitary munitions of equivalent explosive yield. This area coverage exploits the of , where a single cluster delivery can neutralize threats across hundreds of square meters, as submunitions like the BLU-26 or M77 produce overlapping lethal zones via high-velocity fragments penetrating soft and causing traumatic injuries. Empirical assessments from operations indicate cluster munitions generated casualties at a rate eight times higher than standard high-explosive bombs when normalized by explosive weight, underscoring their utility in suppressing troop concentrations and denying terrain to advancing forces. Against materiel, cluster munitions employ specialized submunitions such as shaped-charge bomblets (e.g., in Rockeye or CBU-87 dispensers) designed to defeat armored vehicles, aircraft on tarmacs, or radar installations by penetrating thin-skinned or even tracked targets with focused explosive force. These weapons excel in scenarios involving clustered equipment, such as airfields or convoys, where the probabilistic hit rate from multiple submunitions compensates for inaccuracies in delivery systems like artillery or unguided bombs, achieving higher overall destruction rates than precision strikes against spread-out assets. Military analyses affirm their role in neutralizing large populations of systems, including anti-aircraft batteries and logistics depots, by combining anti-armor penetration with incendiary effects to disable engines, optics, and electronics across an impacted footprint. The dual-capability design of many cluster variants, integrating anti-personnel fragmentation with anti-materiel shaped charges, enhances versatility in engagements, allowing a single munition to degrade both and elements simultaneously and disrupt enemy maneuverability. This efficiency stems from causal mechanics of explosive dispersion: submunitions activate post-release to maximize terminal effects, outperforming single-point detonations in probabilistic terms against non-point targets. from major militaries, including U.S. assessments, positions cluster munitions as indispensable for rapid area where alternative ordnance lacks comparable .

Comparative Analysis with Alternative Munitions

Cluster munitions differ from unitary high-explosive (HE) munitions primarily in their area-effect capability, dispersing multiple submunitions to engage dispersed or mobile targets over a wider , whereas unitary munitions deliver a single explosive payload concentrated at a point. Empirical assessments indicate that cluster munitions can achieve 2 to 5 times the effectiveness of unitary weapons against soft targets like personnel, based on modeling of blast and fragmentation patterns, though this multiplier varies with target density and . In historical data from the , cluster munitions produced casualties at a rate eight times higher than standard HE bombs per , attributed to broader coverage against troop concentrations in open areas. Unitary munitions, by contrast, excel against hardened or fixed structures but require multiple strikes—often 10 or more—to match the suppressive effect of a single cluster delivery against maneuvering forces, increasing logistical demands and exposure risks for delivery platforms. Compared to precision-guided munitions (PGMs), cluster munitions offer cost advantages for non-point targets, with unit prices typically under $1,000 versus $20,000–$100,000 for PGMs like JDAMs or guided rounds, enabling sustained fire against massed or vehicle convoys without depleting precision stockpiles. PGMs provide superior accuracy ( often under 5 meters) for minimizing unintended damage in urban or collateral-sensitive environments, but their point-focused effects limit utility against area threats, necessitating volleys that can exceed the coverage of one cluster munition equivalent to dozens of unguided projectiles. In scenarios like or anti-armor against dispersed formations, clusters maintain an edge in volume of fire per platform sortie, though modern sensor-fused PGMs (e.g., BONUS or rounds) attempt to replicate submunition lethality with self-guiding warheads, achieving comparable target kill rates at higher per-unit costs. Against standard artillery shells like the M107 HE round, cluster variants such as dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) demonstrate 5 to 15 times greater lethality against personnel, dispersing 88 submunitions over 200–300 meters versus the single-fragmentation radius of 30–50 meters for HE, reducing required rounds for area suppression by factors of 10 or more in open terrain. This efficiency stems from probabilistic coverage of hidden or evading targets, where HE barrages demand saturation volumes prone to evasion; however, clusters' higher failure rates (5–30% ) contrast with near-100% detonation reliability of unitary shells, posing persistent hazards absent in alternatives. Overall, while alternatives like improved PGMs or unitary MLRS warheads mitigate some risks through guidance and reliability, clusters retain tactical primacy for resource-constrained forces facing numerically superior, dispersed adversaries, as evidenced by their deployment in conflicts like (2022–2025) to counter advances where precision assets were insufficient.
AspectCluster MunitionsUnitary HE MunitionsPrecision-Guided Munitions (PGMs)
Area CoverageWide (e.g., 200–500m footprint per delivery)Point-focused (30–50m radius)Variable, but typically point (5–10m CEP)
Lethality vs Personnel5–15x HE baseline; effective vs dispersedBaseline; requires volume fireHigh per hit, but fewer for area targets
Cost per Equivalent EffectLow ($<1,000/unit for area)Moderate; multiples neededHigh ($20k+); efficient for points
Reliability/Duds5–30% failure rateNear 100% detonationHigh, with guidance mitigating misses
Best Use CaseMassed troops, vehicles in openStructures, point targetsHigh-value, collateral-sensitive strikes

Historical Uses

Vietnam War and Southeast Asia

United States Air Force operations during the (1965–1973) marked one of the earliest and most extensive uses of cluster munitions in modern conflict, primarily to disrupt North Vietnamese logistics along the and target dispersed enemy forces in , , and . These weapons were dispensed from aircraft such as the F-105 Thunderchief and A-1 Skyraider, releasing submunitions over wide areas to deny terrain, destroy vehicles, and inflict casualties on troop concentrations. Key types included the CBU-2/A, which deployed 360 BLU-3 "" bomblets per unit—each containing 250 steel fragmentation pellets designed for anti-personnel effects—and the , releasing up to 665 BLU-24/B bomblets optimized for area saturation against unarmored targets like trucks and . Deployed in operations such as and Steel Tiger in , cluster munitions complemented high-explosive bombs in over 580,000 sorties, contributing to the 2.1 million tons of ordnance dropped on alone between 1964 and 1973. In , approximately 80,000 cluster munitions containing 26 million submunitions were used, mainly in eastern provinces bordering to interdict supply routes. Overall, U.S. forces expended around 800,000 cluster bombs across , prioritizing their scatter pattern to counter the enemy's use of cover and mobility. Military assessments noted cluster munitions' tactical value in suppressing anti-aircraft sites, such as SA-2 missile batteries, and halting convoys, with bomblets' fragmentation proving lethal against exposed personnel despite challenges from terrain and weather. However, failure rates of 20–30% left millions of unexploded submunitions, complicating clearance and contributing to ongoing hazards; in , these remnants have caused over 20,000 casualties since 1973. Use in targeted infrastructure, while in , they supported , though less prolifically than in neighboring countries due to denser population and terrain differences.

Middle East Conflicts (1970s-2000s)

employed air-dropped cluster munitions against non-state armed group training camps near during the 1973 . In the 1978 Operation Litani incursion into , i forces utilized cluster bombs supplied by the , prompting subsequent restrictions on their use near civilian areas. During the , extensively deployed U.S.-origin cluster munitions, including against Palestinian Liberation Organization positions and advancing forces, such as an strike using cluster ammunition on Battalion 931 in open armored personnel carriers. This usage, often in populated regions, led to and a U.S. decision in July 1982 to suspend further shipments of cluster bombs to . In the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, both belligerents employed cluster munitions, resulting in widespread contamination, particularly in Iran's where they were used extensively. Iraqi forces, equipped with Soviet-supplied systems, and Iranian air operations incorporating cluster bombs contributed to lingering hazards along border areas. The 1991 Gulf War saw coalition forces, led by the with support from and the , deploy approximately 61,000 cluster bombs containing around 20 million submunitions against Iraqi military targets in and during the aerial campaign. These included Vietnam-era munitions like the BLU-97/B bomblets, which were used in large numbers but left significant dud rates, exacerbating post-conflict clearance challenges. In Israel's 1996 against in , artillery barrages incorporated dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) shells, a type of cluster munition that disperses submunitions for anti-personnel and anti-armor effects, as evidenced in incidents like the shelling.

Soviet-Afghan War and Caucasus Wars

During the Soviet-Afghan War from December 1979 to February 1989, Soviet forces employed air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions against fighters, supply lines, and populated areas to deny terrain and disrupt guerrilla operations. These weapons, including scatterable PFM-1 "butterfly" mines dispersed from aircraft, helicopters, and mortars, were used extensively across rural and mountainous regions, contributing to high dud rates that left persistent hazards. As of 2019, such remnants continued to cause civilian casualties, with at least one documented child fatality from a Soviet-era cluster bomblet in eastern Afghanistan's hills. In the (1994–1996), Russian forces utilized cluster munitions in assaults on Chechen separatist positions, notably during the 1995 Shali cluster bomb attack and strikes on villages like Samashki, where such weapons killed at least 55 civilians on January 3, 1995, amid efforts to dislodge fighters embedded in civilian areas. These deployments targeted urban and rural strongholds but resulted in significant due to the munitions' wide dispersal patterns and failure to fully explode on impact. The Second Chechen War (1999–2009) saw intensified Russian use of cluster bombs, including Su-24 airstrikes on the village of Elistanzhi in October 1999, which dispersed submunitions and killed approximately 35 civilians while aiming to sever Chechen supply routes. In , the Chechen capital, Russian forces incorporated cluster munitions into bombardment campaigns that leveled much of the city, employing them alongside artillery and missiles to achieve area denial against fortified insurgent positions, though high rates exacerbated post-conflict hazards for reconstruction and civilian movement.

Gulf Wars and Iraq Conflicts

During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, coalition forces led by the , along with the and , deployed cluster munitions on a large scale against Iraqi military targets in and . An estimated 61,000 cluster bombs were used, releasing approximately 20 million submunitions primarily for anti-armor effects and area suppression against Iraqi armored divisions, artillery positions, and troop concentrations. These munitions, including air-dropped CBU-87 and similar variants, were effective in rapidly degrading Iraq's units and command infrastructure during the air campaign from January to February 1991, contributing to the coalition's air superiority and ground advance. However, submunition failure rates of 2-5% resulted in widespread , causing at least 80 U.S. and allied casualties from duds during operations. Post-conflict remnants from these cluster strikes contaminated vast areas, leading to long-term hazards. Estimates indicate 5,500 to 8,000 from cluster munition remnants in since 1991, predominantly civilians affected during reconstruction and civilian activities in former battle zones. Iraqi forces did not deploy cluster munitions against troops in significant numbers during this conflict, with remnants primarily attributable to coalition use. Cleanup efforts by U.S. and international teams focused on high-threat areas, but incomplete clearance left persistent risks, as submunitions' design for scatter and delayed detonation prioritized military utility over post-strike predictability. In the , U.S. and British forces again employed cluster munitions, firing nearly 13,000 units containing 1.8 to 2 million submunitions via aircraft, , and multiple-launch rocket systems like the M26 . Deployments targeted Iraqi air defenses, armored vehicles, and paramilitary concentrations, including in urban settings near during the April advance, where they suppressed resistance and disrupted command nodes effectively against dispersed irregular forces. Ground-launched variants, such as those from MLRS systems, were noted in strikes on positions, demonstrating utility in asymmetric engagements where precise targeting of fleeting targets was challenging. Yet, high failure rates—exacerbated by urban dispersal—created immediate post-strike dangers, with unexploded submunitions contributing to civilian injuries in contaminated zones amid the ensuing . No verified instances exist of Iraqi government forces using cluster munitions offensively against coalition troops in 2003, though post-invasion militias occasionally encountered or repurposed remnants. The U.S. ceased large-scale cluster use after the initial invasion phase, shifting to precision-guided alternatives, but legacy contamination from both 1991 and 2003 strikes persisted, complicating stabilization efforts and yielding ongoing clearance challenges reported by Iraqi authorities into the . Military assessments highlighted cluster munitions' role in minimizing coalition casualties through area coverage, though dud-induced friendly losses underscored reliability limitations inherent to the technology's mass-dispersion mechanism.

Recent Deployments (2010s-2025)

In 2011, during the Libyan Civil War, forces loyal to deployed cluster munitions, including bombs, against rebel-held areas such as , with attacks documented on April 14 targeting residential zones and causing civilian casualties. Later instances in included use by Libyan National Army-affiliated forces in Tripoli in December 2019, striking residential areas with DPICM cluster munitions. From 2015 to 2017, the Saudi Arabia-led coalition intervening in Yemen's civil war employed cluster munitions, including U.S.-made CBU-105 and Brazilian-made BLG-109, in strikes near civilian areas such as and Hajjah, resulting in unexploded submunitions that injured children and others. In Syria's ongoing civil war, the Syrian government, supported by , repeatedly used cluster munitions from the 2010s onward, including bombs in attacks on province in September 2018 and November 2022 strikes on displaced persons camps using 9N210/9N235 submunitions, as well as October 2023 attacks on Termanin with PTAB-2.5KO submunitions. During the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, forces used Israeli-made cluster munitions with M095 DPICM submunitions in populated areas of , while Armenian forces employed Smerch rockets carrying 9N235 cluster submunitions against Azerbaijani positions, both contributing to risks despite the weapons' area-saturation effects on targets. In Russia's invasion of beginning February 2022, Russian forces extensively deployed cluster munitions, including Iskander-M missiles with 9N235 submunitions in strikes on and other cities, causing over 1,200 documented civilian casualties by mid-2025; began using U.S.-supplied cluster munitions in summer 2023 and continued through 2024-2025, primarily against advancing Russian troop concentrations in and oblasts, with both sides' employment highlighting the munitions' utility in denying large areas to and armor amid high-intensity .

Impacts and Risks

Unexploded Ordnance and Failure Rates

Cluster munitions generate (UXO) when submunitions fail to detonate upon impact, leaving hazardous remnants that function similarly to persistent landmines. These duds retain potential and can be triggered by later disturbance, contributing to long-term in affected areas. Failure occurs due to factors such as suboptimal impact angles, soil conditions, weather, and fuze reliability, which prevent arming or initiation sequences from completing. Empirical failure rates for cluster submunitions vary significantly by , era, and deployment , with manufacturer testing often reporting lower figures than field observations. United States Department of Defense assessments from lot acceptance and stockpile reliability testing indicate dud rates of 2% to 6% for many submunitions in pre-2004 stockpiles. In contrast, demining organizations and conflict aftermath surveys frequently document higher rates, ranging from 10% to 40%, as submunitions age or encounter variable terrains. For instance, in from Vietnam War-era bombings, estimates suggest 10% to 30% failure rates among millions of dropped bomblets, resulting in 9 million to 27 million UXO remnants. Older cluster munitions, particularly Soviet and early Western models lacking mechanisms, exhibit elevated dud rates due to mechanical fuzes sensitive to environmental variables. In the 2006 Lebanon conflict, assessments of Israeli M85 submunitions reported field failure rates up to 10%, though manufacturer claims hovered around 2-5%; clearance teams observed higher incidences, attributing discrepancies to real-world dispersal dynamics. Russian systems used in recent Ukraine operations have been associated with 30-40% failure estimates by observers, exacerbating UXO density in populated zones. US policy since 2001 mandates submunitions produced after November 2004 achieve failure rates below 1%, with a DoD goal to phase out older stocks by 2018, yet transfers of legacy systems persist, raising reliability concerns. These UXO pose causal risks through delayed detonation, with failure rates compounding over large-area strikes: a single cluster dispersing 100 submunitions at 10% failure leaves 10 duds per unit, scaling massively in saturation campaigns. While technological improvements like multi-mode fuzes reduce rates in controlled tests, empirical data from , , and indicate persistent challenges in achieving sub-1% reliability under combat conditions, underscoring inherent design trade-offs between wide-area coverage and precision. Independent analyses question low-end claims, noting that even "improved" munitions yield hazardous remnants when aggregated across thousands of deliveries.

Civilian Casualties: Data and Contextual Factors

Cluster munitions have inflicted substantial civilian casualties, both during attacks and through unexploded submunitions functioning as persistent hazards post-conflict. Data from monitoring organizations indicate that from 2010 to 2023, approximately 23,000 verified casualties occurred globally from cluster munitions, with estimates suggesting the true figure exceeds 56,000 when accounting for underreporting; of these, unexploded remnants caused over 18,000 casualties compared to about 4,600 from direct strikes. In recent years, civilian victims comprised nearly all recorded cases, with children accounting for 42% of remnant-related injuries in 2024. These figures, primarily drawn from advocacy-led monitoring, may emphasize long-term effects to support prohibition efforts, though empirical evidence from demining operations confirms ongoing risks in contaminated areas. In Southeast Asia, U.S. aerial campaigns during the Vietnam War era (1964–1973) dispersed over 270 million cluster submunitions across Laos alone, leaving an estimated 80 million unexploded items that have caused around 50,000 casualties since 1973, including over 20,000 deaths, mostly among civilian farmers and children foraging or working in fields. Similar legacies persist in Cambodia and Vietnam, where unexploded ordnance continues to kill or maim dozens annually, with children particularly vulnerable due to the bomblets' toy-like appearance and widespread scatter in rural, populated regions. These long-term impacts stem from submunition failure rates of 5–30%, turning strike zones into de facto minefields that hinder agriculture and development for decades. The 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict saw deploy cluster munitions containing up to 4 million submunitions in , resulting in 192 civilian casualties from by early 2008 (20 killed, 172 wounded), with most incidents occurring as civilians returned to clear or inhabit contaminated villages. By mid-2007, explosions of remnants had killed 24 civilians and injured 183, exacerbating displacement and economic disruption in affected areas. Contextual factors included late-war usage against entrenched positions in civilian zones, compounded by high dud rates and inadequate post-strike clearance, leading to indiscriminate post-ceasefire hazards. In Yemen's civil war (2015–present), Saudi-led airstrikes using U.S.-supplied cluster munitions wounded in multiple governorates, with documented cases of submunitions detonating near homes and markets, causing immediate injuries and leaving duds in residential areas. verified at least a dozen casualties from such attacks in 2016, highlighting risks from employment over populated Houthi-held territories where combatants embed among non-combatants. Since Russia's 2022 invasion of , cluster munitions have caused over 1,200 casualties, with strikes affecting urban and rural areas alike; both belligerents employed them, though attribution varies by source, often amid accusations of targeting infrastructure. In 2023–2024, such weapons contributed to hundreds of verified incidents, including in populated regions like and , where dispersed submunitions increased collateral risks compared to unitary explosives. Factors amplifying harm include urban combat environments, where military targets intermix with populations, and remnant duds (up to 40% failure in some types) that endanger reconstruction and movement long-term. Reports from UN-affiliated monitors note a rise in child victims, underscoring causal links between area-effect delivery and post-conflict persistence in contested zones.

Environmental and Long-Term Effects

Cluster munitions leave behind unexploded submunitions that contaminate soil and terrain, rendering large areas unusable for agriculture, habitation, or development for decades. In , where over 270 million submunitions were dropped during the era (1964–1973), approximately 80 million failed to detonate, contaminating about 25% of the country's land and causing ongoing denial of access to farmland and forests. This persistent contamination disrupts ecosystems by limiting vegetation regrowth and animal movement, while inhibiting soil recovery processes essential for . Unexploded cluster bomblets release toxins into the environment through corrosion and leakage, including heavy metals from casings (such as iron, copper, and aluminum) and explosive residues like TNT derivatives that leach into and . Field analyses in explosive-contaminated regions show elevated levels of these pollutants, which accumulate in sediments and bioaccumulate in food chains, affecting and potentially human health via contaminated water sources. Submunition failure rates, reported by clearance experts as high as 30% despite manufacturer claims of 2–5%, exacerbate this by increasing the volume of deteriorating ordnance over time. In following the conflict, cluster munitions contaminated roughly 90% of farmland, leading to long-term degradation and reduced crop yields due to restricted access and fear of . Similar patterns in and demonstrate how remnants pollute water tables and harm aquatic ecosystems, with hydrocarbons and metals from submunitions detected in post-conflict samples. These effects compound over generations, as natural degradation of explosives is slow in varied climates, and clearance operations themselves risk further dispersion of contaminants if not precisely managed. Long-term ecological recovery remains hindered by the wide dispersal pattern of submunitions, which scatter over areas up to 30,000 square meters per strike, creating patchy but pervasive hazards that fragment habitats. In , over 50 years post-bombing, contamination continues to elevate risks of and dominance in uncleared zones, while persists from inhibited foraging and nesting. Economic analyses link this to sustained underutilization of , with clearance costs exceeding billions in affected nations, underscoring the causal chain from initial deployment to enduring environmental impairment.

Controversies and Debates

Indiscriminate Weapon Claims vs. Military Necessity

![Cluster bombs blanketing a SA-2 missile site during Vietnam War operations][float-right]
Critics, including organizations such as Human Rights Watch and the International Committee of the Red Cross, argue that cluster munitions are inherently indiscriminate due to their wide-area dispersal of submunitions, which complicates adherence to the international humanitarian law principle of distinction between combatants and civilians. These groups highlight unexploded ordnance (UXO) rates, estimated at 5-40% depending on the system, that function as persistent anti-personnel hazards post-conflict, contributing to civilian casualties long after strikes. However, such assessments often emphasize humanitarian impacts while downplaying contextual military applications, reflecting advocacy priorities rather than balanced empirical evaluation of alternatives like sustained artillery barrages, which carry similar risks but lack equivalent efficiency against dispersed targets.
In contrast, military analysts contend that cluster munitions fulfill legitimate necessities in scenarios involving concentrated enemy forces, such as assaults, armored columns, or batteries, where single-precision strikes prove insufficient or uneconomical. For instance, during the Russia-Ukraine , U.S.-supplied cluster munitions enabled Ukrainian forces to deliver over large areas, neutralizing Russian troop movements and counter-battery targets with fewer munitions than conventional rounds, thereby conserving scarce resources amid shortages. This utility aligns with proportionality under , where anticipated civilian harm—minimal in active combat zones with evacuated or sparse populations—does not outweigh the concrete military advantage of denying enemy maneuverability. Dud rates for modern Western systems, improved via self-destruct mechanisms and electronic fuzing, fall below 6%, contrasting with older designs or Russian variants exceeding 20%, underscoring that indiscriminateness stems more from misuse or outdated technology than inherent design flaws. Empirical data from conflicts like the 1991 and recent Ukrainian operations demonstrate that targeted cluster strikes against verified military objectives, such as surface-to-air sites or trench lines, achieve high effectiveness without disproportionate civilian effects when delivery precision (e.g., via GPS-guided dispensers) minimizes scatter beyond intended zones. Proponents, including U.S. reviews, assert that banning such weapons would handicap forces facing numerically superior adversaries, as no equivalent single munition matches their cost-effectiveness for area denial—e.g., one cluster round equating to dozens of unitary bombs in coverage. While NGO-driven narratives amplify post-strike UXO risks, often drawing from high-dud legacies in or , they overlook mitigation via improved submunition reliability and the causal reality that enemy positioning in civilian areas, not the weapon itself, drives incidental harm in asymmetric contexts. Thus, claims of blanket indiscriminateness fail under first-principles scrutiny, as the weapon's effects remain controllable and proportionate in lawful employment against valid military aims.

Ethical and Proportionality Arguments

Cluster munitions elicit ethical debates centered on their potential for indiscriminate harm versus their role in achieving decisive outcomes. Critics contend that the weapons' submunitions, which scatter over wide areas, inherently risk excessive civilian casualties and long-term hazards from (UXO), contravening principles of distinction and humanity in (IHL). Proponents counter that ethical assessments must weigh context-specific , arguing that blanket prohibitions overlook scenarios where cluster munitions provide proportionate advantages against massed enemy forces, such as armored columns or troop concentrations, without viable unitary alternatives offering equivalent coverage efficiency. Under IHL, particularly Additional Protocol I to the , proportionality requires that anticipated civilian harm not be excessive relative to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. For cluster munitions, immediate strike effects can satisfy this if targeted at legitimate military objectives like dispersed or hubs, as their area-saturation capability neutralizes threats more efficiently than multiple precision-guided unitary bombs, which demand greater munitions expenditure and logistical strain. However, the persistent UXO risk—failure rates varying from 2-40% depending on munition age and type—complicates assessments, as post-conflict civilian encounters can render initial proportionality judgments retrospectively disproportionate, especially in populated or agricultural areas. Ethically, opponents, including organizations, frame cluster munitions as morally culpable due to documented impacts, such as in Lebanon's 2006 conflict where UXO from Israeli strikes killed or injured over 200 s in the year following cessation of hostilities, arguing this foreseeability demands categorical rejection akin to antipersonnel landmines. This view posits a deontological stance prioritizing over utilitarian wartime gains, influenced by advocacy-driven interpretations that emphasize long-term societal costs over tactical efficacy. In contrast, defense analysts assert a consequentialist ethic: in high-intensity conflicts like Ukraine's defense against Russian advances since 2022, cluster munitions' denial of terrain to invading forces—evident in halting mechanized assaults—preserves more lives overall by shortening wars, with modern variants (e.g., U.S. DPICM submunitions under 3% failure rate) mitigating UXO through self-destruct mechanisms, rendering them ethically defensible when alternatives like barrages would cause comparable or greater immediate . The debate underscores causal trade-offs: while UXO imposes asymmetric burdens on weaker parties post-victory, prohibiting cluster munitions cedes advantages to aggressors in peer conflicts, potentially prolonging engagements and escalating total casualties, as seen in analyses of and uses where area effects expedited enemy defeat without disproportionate peacetime legacies relative to scale. Empirical data from U.S. tests indicate that guided unitary replacements cover only 20-50% of cluster equivalents' effective radius against fleeting targets, supporting claims of necessity absent technological substitutes matching cost and volume. Thus, ethical proportionality hinges not on the weapon's form but on operational restraint, target validation, and failure-rate minimization, challenging absolutist bans that ignore these variables.

Effectiveness of Area-Denial in Asymmetric vs. Symmetric Warfare

In symmetric warfare, characterized by large-scale maneuvers between conventional forces with massed troop concentrations and mechanized units, cluster munitions have demonstrated high effectiveness for area denial by saturating broad zones with submunitions to disrupt advances, logistics, and assembly areas. During the 1991 , U.S. forces employed cluster bomb units (CBUs) such as the CBU-87, dispersing thousands of BLU-97 bomblets over Iraqi armored divisions and airfields, which neutralized soft-skinned vehicles, , and parked across footprints exceeding 1,000 meters by 400 meters per munition. This capability proved decisive in halting Iraqi counteroffensives and enabling coalition breakthroughs, with military assessments indicating clusters were up to 60 times more effective than unitary munitions against dispersed vehicle targets in testing scenarios akin to open-desert engagements. The weapons' design aligns with the causal dynamics of symmetric conflicts, where enemies rely on predictable concentrations vulnerable to probabilistic fragmentation effects over precision strikes alone. In contrast, asymmetric warfare—featuring dispersed, mobile non-state actors or insurgents who avoid massing to evade superior firepower—reduces the relative utility of cluster munitions for sustained area denial, as submunitions primarily affect fixed or transient concentrations that guerrillas can bypass using terrain, night movements, or civilian blending. In the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), Soviet RBK-500 clusters targeted mujahideen supply routes and camps but failed to prevent guerrilla resurgence, with insurgents adapting by decentralizing operations and exploiting unexploded ordnance (UXO) failure rates of 5–30% that littered areas without reliably impeding hit-and-run tactics. Similarly, U.S. deployment of over 232 cluster strikes in Afghanistan from October 2001 to March 2002, including MK-118 tail kits on BLU-97s, aimed to deny Taliban positions but correlated with persistent insurgent mobility rather than territorial control, as fighters dispersed into villages and mountains where submunitions' static denial zones proved circumventable. Empirical data from such campaigns show clusters' area coverage becomes a liability when adversaries prioritize evasion over confrontation, amplifying UXO hazards to pursuing conventional forces and locals without proportionally degrading guerrilla logistics. The divergence stems from inherent mismatches: symmetric foes expose predictable densities exploitable by clusters' wide lethal radii (up to 50 meters per bomblet), yielding high kill probabilities against unarmored elements, whereas asymmetric actors' low-density, adaptive maneuvers favor precision-guided alternatives that minimize legacies and collateral risks, which can alienate populations and sustain enemy recruitment. Military analyses, drawing from stockpiling rationales, affirm clusters' niche in peer competitions against massed threats but question their decisiveness in irregular contexts where long-term denial erodes due to 10–40% failure rates and the need for ground clearance operations.

International Regulation

Pre-Convention Efforts and Treaties

International efforts to address the humanitarian impacts of cluster munitions prior to the 2008 centered on the (CCW), established in 1980 to restrict weapons deemed excessively injurious or indiscriminate. Discussions within the CCW framework on explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded cluster submunitions, commenced in 2001 during meetings of states parties and experts, highlighting post-conflict clearance challenges from conflicts such as those in and the . These talks emphasized technical measures like improved reliability rather than outright prohibitions, reflecting divisions among major producers and users who prioritized military utility over comprehensive bans. On 28 November 2003, CCW states parties adopted Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, which entered into force on 29 November 2006 after by 20 states. Protocol V mandates generic preventive measures to minimize ERW risks, post-conflict obligations for clearance, marking, fencing, and monitoring of affected areas under a high contracting party's control, victim assistance, and national reporting on . It explicitly includes cluster submunitions as ERW but applies only to remnants after attacks, not to the production, stockpiling, transfer, or use of cluster munitions themselves, thereby failing to prevent the initial deployment that generates such remnants. As of 2007, Protocol V had been ratified by 52 states, though adherence varied due to its non-binding preventive aspects and focus on aftermath mitigation rather than causation. From 2005 to 2007, the CCW convened a dedicated Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on cluster munitions, holding multiple sessions to explore restrictions such as dud rate limits below 1% and mechanisms. Proposals ranged from enhanced safety standards to area restrictions, but consensus eluded negotiators; ban advocates, including NGOs, argued these were insufficient to address indiscriminate effects, while states like the advocated for targeted improvements compatible with operational needs. In June 2007, the CCW's Third Review Conference decided to pursue a new protocol on cluster munitions, but persistent disagreements—over scope, definitions, and verification—stalled progress, prompting parallel initiatives outside the CCW. Non-governmental organizations, including and the International Committee of the Red Cross, intensified advocacy in the early 2000s, documenting civilian casualties from legacy contamination in , , and to underscore failure rates often exceeding 10-30% in field conditions. The Cluster Munition Coalition, formed in October 2006, coordinated global campaigns for a categorical ban, citing of disproportionate post-attack harm. Nationally, a handful of states implemented unilateral prohibitions ahead of international consensus; for instance, countries participating in CCW talks began enacting domestic laws restricting production and transfer, though these were limited in scope and enforcement compared to later obligations. These pre-convention measures, while advancing awareness, did not yield binding multilateral restrictions on cluster munitions, leaving their use unregulated in most jurisdictions.

Convention on Cluster Munitions: Provisions and Ratifications

The was adopted on 30 May 2008 in , , following negotiations led by the Cluster Munition Coalition and opened for signature in , , on 3 December 2008. It entered into force on 1 August 2010, after receiving the required 30 instruments of ratification, accession, or succession. The defines cluster munitions as conventional munitions designed to disperse or release submunitions, each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and explicitly excludes certain munitions like directed energy weapons, mines, or those with self-destructing submunitions meeting specific reliability criteria (at least 98% reliability rate in tests). Under Article 1, states parties undertake never to use, develop, produce, acquire, , retain, or transfer cluster munitions to anyone, nor to encourage, induce, or assist others in any prohibited activities. Article 3 mandates the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions within eight years of the treaty's entry into force for that state party, with possible extensions granted by meetings of states parties; states may retain limited quantities solely for training in detection, clearance, and destruction techniques. Article 4 requires the clearance of all cluster munition-contaminated areas under a state party's jurisdiction or control within 10 years, subject to extensions, and promotes risk reduction education under Article 5, including marking, fencing, monitoring, and public awareness campaigns. Victim assistance provisions in Article 6 obligate states to provide medical care, rehabilitation, and psychological support for cluster munition victims, enhanced by international cooperation and assistance outlined in Article 6 and national implementation measures. Transparency reporting under Article 7 requires annual submissions on destruction, retention, transfers, and assistance programs, while Article 21 allows for with non-states parties during joint operations, provided no assistance is given to prohibited activities. As of October 2025, 111 states are parties to the convention, having ratified or acceded to it, with 12 additional signatories that have not yet ratified. Regional adherence varies: 36 African states are parties, 25 in the , 17 in , 29 in and , and 4 in the . Notable recent developments include Lithuania's withdrawal, effective 6 March 2025, citing security concerns amid regional threats, followed by Vanuatu's accession in late 2025, which restored the party count after the drop. Major non-parties include the , , , , , , and several Gulf states, which together account for significant global production, stockpiling, and use of cluster munitions but have not joined due to differing assessments of the weapons' military utility. The convention's secretariat, hosted by the in , facilitates implementation, with annual meetings of states parties reviewing compliance and progress on deadlines.

Non-Signatory Policies and Rationales

The has not acceded to the , maintaining that such munitions provide a vital military capability for defeating massed armored formations, troop concentrations, and area targets where precision-guided unitary weapons would be less efficient or more costly. U.S. Department of Defense policy, revised in 2017, prohibits the acquisition, release, or transfer of cluster munitions with a exceeding 1% if alternatives exist, aiming to reduce post-conflict hazards through improved submunition reliability; however, presidential waivers under the 1992 Conventional Munitions Transfer Policy have enabled transfers of higher-failure-rate systems, including dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) to in July 2023 amid shortages. This approach reflects a prioritization of operational effectiveness over obligations, with officials arguing that forgoing cluster munitions would unilaterally disarm U.S. and allied forces against adversaries like and that retain them. Russia, a non-signatory and active producer, regards cluster munitions as legitimate conventional arms integral to modern and systems, incompatible with Convention restrictions due to their proven utility in suppressing enemy advances and . Russian forces have deployed cluster munitions extensively since the February 2022 invasion of , including Smerch and Uragan variants, to counter Ukrainian counteroffensives and deny terrain, with rejecting ban advocacy as it would constrain responses to numerically superior or dispersed threats. China, India, Pakistan, and Israel similarly abstain from the Convention, continuing production and stockpiling while emphasizing cluster munitions' role in asymmetric deterrence and high-intensity conflicts against potential peer adversaries. acknowledges humanitarian risks but prioritizes ongoing development of advanced variants for area saturation, viewing bans as impractical given regional tensions; and , as nuclear-armed neighbors with contested borders, retain them for rapid area denial against armored incursions; employs precision-guided cluster systems defensively, arguing their necessity for survival against mass assaults as demonstrated in conflicts with in 2006. These policies underscore a consensus among non-signatories that cluster munitions' cost-effectiveness and coverage advantages—delivering hundreds of submunitions over wide areas—outweigh dud-related drawbacks when mitigated by self-destruct mechanisms or targeted employment, avoiding self-imposed limitations that could cede tactical edges.

Producers and Users

State Producers and Export Controls

As of 2025, 17 states produce cluster munitions or reserve the right to do so, none of which are parties to the ; these include , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , and the . Among these, the maintains one of the largest production capacities, manufacturing systems such as the CBU-105 sensor-fuzed weapon, while produces rocket and bomb-dispensed variants like the Smerch and Tornado-G systems, and develops and air-delivered types including Type 83 rockets. New production was documented in 2024 in , , , , and . Export controls on cluster munitions differ sharply by state party status to the , which entered into force on 1 August 2010 and prohibits transfers under Article 1(c). Of the 112 states parties as of September 2025, all enforce domestic bans on exports, with compliance verified through Article 7 transparency reports; for instance, former exporters like the destroyed stockpiles and ceased transfers upon ratification in 2010. Non-signatories among producers generally lack treaty-based prohibitions, though some impose unilateral restrictions. The , via a 2008 Department of Defense policy, committed to ceasing production and transfer of cluster munitions with submunition failure rates exceeding 1% after fiscal year 2018, prioritizing "technologically improved" variants; however, this policy was effectively waived in July 2023 when the U.S. transferred dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) with higher failure rates to under exceptions, bypassing standard export rules. Russia exercises no formal export controls aligned with international norms and has historically transferred cluster munitions to at least 20 countries, including , , , , , and , with systems like the RBK series and KMG-U dispenser documented in recipient inventories. China's export practices remain opaque due to state secrecy, but evidence of Chinese-origin submunitions—such as PTAB-2.5KO and Type 66 antitank bomblets—in unexploded remnants from conflicts in , , and indicates transfers to unspecified recipients, potentially including non-state actors, without publicly disclosed reliability or end-use restrictions. and , both major producers, have exported variants like the M85 and Rockeye to allies, subject only to bilateral agreements rather than multilateral controls. Among other producers, and continue limited manufacturing for domestic use with sporadic exports prior to enhanced EU-aligned scrutiny, while North Korea's production supports transfers to , as evidenced by DPRK-manufactured munitions used in in 2025. These policies reflect producers' prioritization of military utility over humanitarian concerns raised by failure rates averaging 5–40% in older systems.

Stockpiling Nations

The maintains one of the world's largest stockpiles of cluster munitions, with a 2004 Department of Defense report detailing approximately 5.5 million cluster munitions across 17 types, containing nearly 700 million submunitions. As a non-signatory to the , the U.S. has not committed to destruction, retaining them for potential defensive needs despite a 2008 policy limiting future use to munitions with less than 1% failure rates after 2018. Transfers to in 2023 and 2024, including via third countries like , have drawn scrutiny but align with U.S. policy permitting exports to non-parties. Russia, another non-signatory, possesses a substantial arsenal of cluster munitions, including air-dropped bombs, shells, and rockets, which it has employed extensively in since 2022, resulting in documented civilian casualties and area contamination. Exact sizes remain classified, but Russia's reliance on them in ongoing conflicts indicates retained production capacity and reserves, supplemented by imports such as North Korean systems reported in 2025. Official statements emphasize their military utility against massed forces, rejecting international bans as incompatible with national security. China acknowledges stockpiling cluster munitions as part of its military inventory, produced by state firms like North Industries Corporation, though quantities are not publicly disclosed. As a non-party to the convention, has cited ongoing research into "improved" variants to mitigate risks, while exporting to allies; its arsenal supports area-denial strategies in potential high-intensity conflicts. Other non-signatories with confirmed stockpiles include , , , , and , where cluster munitions form integral components of , , and aerial systems for countering armored or threats. , for instance, retains operational stocks despite domestic debates on reliability, while and maintain them amid regional tensions. These nations prioritize tactical advantages in asymmetric or border warfare over humanitarian concerns raised by treaty advocates. Limited transparency hinders precise quantification, but global estimates suggest non-signatories hold the majority of remaining stockpiles worldwide.

Non-State Armed Groups

Non-state armed groups have employed cluster munitions on limited occasions, constrained by the weapons' technical requirements for production, storage, and delivery systems such as artillery or rocket launchers. utilized Chinese-made Type-81 122mm cluster rockets during the against , marking the first confirmed global use of this variant. Each rocket dispersed 39 submunitions—either Type-90 or equivalent models—releasing hundreds of 3.5mm steel spheres over an area. launched 113 such rockets, totaling 4,407 submunitions, targeting northern locations including Mghar on July 25, 2006 (where one landed between homes, injuring three ), Safsufa on July 15, Karmiel, Kiryat Motzkin, and . These strikes caused one death and 12 injuries in , with unexploded submunitions persisting as hazards in zones due to the weapon's inaccuracy and dud rates. The () deployed cluster munitions in Syria's province, firing Grad rockets adapted with cluster warheads on July 12 and August 14, 2014, toward Kurdish Units (YPG) positions. Video evidence and remnant analysis confirmed the use, highlighting ISIS's adaptation of captured or improvised munitions for area saturation in contested urban and rural fronts. Such applications by non-state actors underscore the proliferation risks from state-supplied or battlefield-recovered stockpiles, though operational scale remains below state-level capabilities.

References

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