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Jihad
Jihad
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Jihad (/ɪˈhɑːd/; Arabic: جِهَاد, romanizedjihād [dʒiˈhaːd]) is an Arabic word that means "exerting", "striving", or "struggling", particularly with a praiseworthy aim.[1][2][3][4] In an Islamic context, it encompasses almost any effort to make personal and social life conform with God's guidance, such as an internal struggle against evil in oneself, efforts to build a good Muslim community (ummah), and struggle to defend Islam.[1][2][5][6] Literally meaning 'struggle', the term is most frequently associated with warfare.[4]

Jihad is classified into inner ("greater") jihad, which involves a struggle against one's own passions and impulses, and outer ("lesser") jihad, which is further subdivided into jihad of the pen/tongue (debate or persuasion) and jihad of the sword (warfare).[5][7]: 13 [8] Much of Muslim opinion considers inner jihad to have primacy over outer jihad. The analysis of a large survey from 2002 reveals considerable nuance in the conceptions of jihad held by Muslims around the world, ranging from righteous living and promoting peace to fighting against the opponents of Islam.[9]

The word jihad appears frequently in the Qur'an referring to both religious and spiritual struggle and to war and physical struggle,[a] often in the idiomatic expression "striving in the path of God (al-jihad fi sabil Allah)",[11][12] conveying a sense of self-exertion.[13]: 54  In the hadiths, jihad refers predominantly to warfare. Greater jihad refers to spiritual and moral struggle, and has traditionally been emphasized in Sufi and Ahmadiyya circles.[5][8][3] The sense of jihad as armed resistance was first used in the context of persecution faced by Muslims when Muhammad was at Mecca, when the community had two choices: further emigration (hijrah) or war.[13]: 30  The Qur'an justifies war in self-defense or in response to aggression towards other Muslims, however the sword verses have historically been interpreted to renounce other verses and justify offensive war against unbelievers, forcibly converting polytheistic pagans during the early Muslim conquests.[14][15]: 46  A set of rules pertaining to jihad were developed, including prohibitions on harming those who are not engaged in combat, on killing animals such as horses, and on unnecessary destruction of enemy property.[16][17]

In the twentieth century, the notion of jihad lost its jurisprudential relevance and instead gave rise to ideological and political discourse.[5][18] While modernist Islamic scholars have emphasized the defensive and non-military aspects of jihad, some Islamists have advanced aggressive interpretations that go beyond the classical texts.[18][19] The term has gained additional attention in recent decades through its use by various insurgent Islamic extremist, militant Islamist, and terrorist individuals and organizations.[5][20][21]: 93 [19] Today, the word jihad is often used without religious connotations, like the English crusade.[1][2]

Etymology and literary origins

[edit]

The term jihad is derived from the Arabic root jahada, meaning "to exert strength and effort, to use all means in order to accomplish a task". In its expanded sense, it can be fighting the enemies of Islam, as well as adhering to religious teachings, enjoining good and forbidding evil.[22] The peaceful sense of "efforts towards the moral uplift of society or towards the spread of Islam" can be known as "jihad of the tongue" or "jihad of the pen", as opposed to "jihad of the sword".[23] It is used as a term in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) mostly in the latter sense, while in Sufism mostly in the sense of fighting the nafs al-ammara, which is the psychological state of succumbing to one's own desires.[22] Spiritual and moral jihad is generally emphasized in pious and mystical circles.[23]

The Hans Wehr Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic defines the term as "fight, battle; jihad, holy war (against the infidels, as a religious duty)".[24] However, given the range of meanings, it is incorrect to equate it simply with "holy war".[23][25] The notion of jihad has its origins in the Islamic idea that the whole humankind will embrace Islam.[26][full citation needed] In the Qur'an and in later Muslim usage, jihad is commonly followed by the expression fi sabil illah, "in the path of God."[27] Muhammad Abdel-Haleem stated that it indicates "the way of truth and justice, including all the teachings it gives on the justifications and the conditions for the conduct of war and peace."[28]

In Modern Standard Arabic, the term jihad is used for a struggle for causes, both religious and secular. It is sometimes used without religious connotation, with a meaning similar to the English word "crusade" (as in "a crusade against drugs").[29] Jihad is used commonly in Arabic countries, in the neutral sense of "a struggle for a noble cause", as a unisex name given to children.[30] Nonetheless, jihad is usually used in the religious sense and its beginnings trace to the Qur'an and the words and actions of Muhammad.[31][32]

Quran

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Jihad is mentioned in four places in the Qur'an as a noun, while its derived verb is used in twenty-four places. Mujahid, the active participle meaning "jihadist", is mentioned in two verses.[22] In some of these mentions (see At-Tawbah 9/41, 44, 81, 86), it is understood that the word jihad directly refers to war, and in others, jihad is used in the sense of "the effort to live in accordance with Allah's will".[22] Qur'anic exhortations to jihad have been interpreted by Islamic scholars both in the combative and non-combative sense.[33] Ahmed al-Dawoody wrote that there seventeen references to or derivatives of jihad occur altogether forty-one times in eleven Meccan texts and thirty Medinan ones, with 28 mentions related to religious belief or spiritual struggle and 13 mentions related to warfare or physical struggle.[10]: 56 

Hadith

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There are also many hadiths (records of the teachings, deeds and sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) about jihad, typically under the headings of kitab al-jihad (book of jihad) or faza'il al-jihad (virtues of jihad) in hadith collections or as the subject of independent works.[22] Of the 199 hadith references to jihad in the Bukhari collection of hadith, all assume that jihad means warfare.[34][35]

Among reported sayings of Muhammad involving jihad are:

The best Jihad is the word of Justice in front of the oppressive sultan.

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan[36][37][38]

and

The Messenger of Allah was asked about the best jihad. He said: "The best jihad is the one in which your horse is slain and your blood is spilled."

— cited by Ibn Nuhaas and narrated by Ibn Habbaan[39]

Ibn Nuhaas cited a hadith from Musnad Ahmad ibn Hanbal, where Muhammad stated that the highest kind jihad is "The person who is killed whilst spilling the last of his blood" (Ahmed 4/144).[40] Muhammad also said, “I cannot find anything” as meritorious as jihad; he further likened jihad to “praying ceaselessly and fasting continuously”.[41]: 70, 145 [42] Muhammad said that “if it were not a hardship for the Muslims, I would never idle behind from a raiding party going out to fight in the path of Allah.... I [would] love to raid in the path of Allah and be killed, to raid again and be killed, and to raid again and be killed”.[41]: 147  Muhammad also said that "Lining up for battle in the path of Allah [jihad] is worthier than 60 years of worship".[41]: 151  Muhammad claimed that any Muslim who refused to fight in jihad “will be tortured like no other sinful human” in hell with confirmation from Qur'an 8:15-16.[41]: 71 [43] In another hadith Muhammad said, “the sword wipes away all sins” and “being killed in the path of Allah washes away impurity”.[44][41]: 183 

According to another hadith,[45] supporting one's parents is an example of jihad.[10]: 76  It has been reported that Muhammad considered performing hajj well to be the best jihad for Muslim women.[46][10]: 58 

The hadith emphasize jihad as one of the means to Paradise. All sins (except debt) would be forgiven for the one who dies in it.[47]: 34–35  Participation in jihad had to be voluntary and intention must be pure, for jihad is only waged for the sake of God not for material wealth.[47]: 34–35  On the contrary, jihad required man to put both his life and wealth at risk.[47]: 34–35  Jihad is ranked as one of the highest good deeds; according to one hadith it is the third-best deed after prayer and being good to one's parents.[47]: 35  One hadith exempts military jihad on men whose parents are alive, as serving one's parents is considered a superior jihad.[47]: 35 

Greater and lesser jihad

[edit]

Tradition distinguishes the "greater jihad" (inner struggle against sinful behavior) from the "lesser jihad" (military sense).[5] Early Islamic thought considered non-violent interpretations of jihad, especially for those Muslims who could not partake in warfare in distant lands.[citation needed] Most classical writings use the term "jihad" in the military sense.[48][49]: 72 The tradition differentiating between the "greater and lesser jihad" is not included in any of the authoritative compilations of Hadith. In consequence, some Islamists dismiss it as not authentic.[50]: 116 

The most commonly cited hadith for "greater jihad" is:[citation needed]

A number of fighters came to Muhammad and he said "You have come from the 'lesser jihad' to the 'greater jihad'." The fighters asked "what is the greater jihad?" Muhammad replied, "It is the struggle against one's passions."[51]

This passage was cited in The History of Baghdad by al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, an 11th-century Islamic scholar.[52][53] This reference gave rise to the practice of distinguishing "greater" and "lesser" jihad.[51] Islamic scholars such as Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani consider the hadith to have a weak chain of transmission.[54]

The concept has had "enormous influence" in Islamic mysticism (Sufism).[55]: 78–79 [56]

Ibn Hazm lists four kinds of jihad fi sabilillah (struggle in the cause of God):

  • Jihad of the heart (jihad bil qalb/nafs) is concerned with combatting the devil and in the attempt to escape his persuasion to evil. This type of jihad was regarded[citation needed] as the greater jihad (al-jihad al-akbar).
  • Jihad by the tongue (jihad bil lisan) (also jihad by the word, jihad al-qalam) is concerned with speaking the truth and spreading the word of Islam with one's tongue.
  • Jihad by the hand (jihad bil yad) refers to choosing to do what is right and to combat injustice and what is wrong with action.
  • Jihad by the sword (jihad bis saif) refers to qital fi sabilillah (armed fighting in the way of God, or holy war), the most common usage by Salafi Muslims and offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood.[57]: 56 

A related hadith tradition that has "found its way into popular Muslim literature",[58] and which has been said to "embody the Muslim mindset" of the Islamic Golden Age (the period from the mid-8th century to mid-13th century following the relocation of the Abbasid capital from Damascus to Baghdad),[59] is:

"The ink of the scholar is more holy than the blood of the martyr."

The belief in the veracity of this hadith was a contributing factor in the efforts by successive caliphs to subsidize translations of "Greek, Hebrew and Syriac science and philosophy texts",[60] and the saying continues to be heavily emphasised in certain Islamic traditions advocating intellectualism over violence, for example in Timbuktu,[61] where it is central to one of two key lessons in the work Tuhfat al-Fudala by 16th-century Berber scholar Ahmed Baba.[62] In general, however, fewer people today are aware of the hadith, which suffers from "a general lack of knowledge", according to Akbar Ahmed.[63]

According to classical Islamic scholars like Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, jihad is against four types of enemies: the lower self (nafs), Satan, the unbelievers, and the hypocrites. The first two types of jihad are purely peaceful spiritual struggles. According to Ibn Qayyim, "Jihad against the lower self precedes jihad against external enemies." Confirming the central importance of the spiritual aspect of jihad, Ibn Taymiyyah wrote:

"Jihad against the lower self and whims is the foundation of jihad against the unbelievers and hypocrites, for a Muslim cannot wage jihad against them unless he has waged jihad against himself and his desires first, before he goes out against them."[64]

Engaging in the greater jihad does not preclude engaging in the lesser jihad. Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani recommended his followers to pursue both the greater and the lesser jihads.[65]

At least one important contemporary Twelver Shia figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian Revolution and the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, wrote a treatise on the "Greater Jihad" (i.e., internal/personal struggle against sin).[66]

Robert W. Schaefer discussed jihad and gazavat in the context of the Caucasus: "Gazavat was the jihad of its day. Gazavat meant putting yourself on the right path (what Muslims refer to as the lesser jihad) as well as expelling the invader (what is referred to as greater jihad)."[clarification needed][67]

Defensive and offensive lesser jihad

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Classical scholars considered various justifications for jihad, including waging it defensively vs offensively. Scholarly opinions carried significant weight with Muslim leaders. Scholars paid more attention to conduct of war (jus in bello) than justification of war (jus ad bellum).[68][69]: 150–151  The decision of when to wage war was often viewed as a political decision best left to political authorities.[70]: 30 [69]: 150–151 

Two justifications for jihad were given: defensive war against external aggression, or an offensive or preemptive attack against an enemy state.[71]: 18–19  According to the majority of jurists, the casus belli (justifications for war) are restricted to aggression against Muslims,[10]: 78–79 [72] and fitnapersecution of Muslims because of their religious belief.[10]: 78–79  They hold that unbelief in itself is not a justification for war. These jurists therefore maintain that only combatants are to be fought; noncombatants such as women, children, clergy, the aged, the insane, farmers, serfs, the blind, and so on are not to be killed in war.[10]: 78–79  Thus, the Hanafī Ibn Najīm stated: "the reason for jihād in our [the Hanafīs] view is kawnuhum harbā ‛alaynā [literally, their being at war against us]."[10]: 78–79 [73] The Hanafī jurists al-Shaybānī state that "although unbelief in God is one of the greatest sins, it is between the individual and his God the Almighty and the punishment for this sin is to be postponed to the dār al-jazā’, (the abode of reckoning, the Hereafter)."[10]: 78–79  Al-Sarakhsī says something similar.[69]: 152  Offensive jihad involved forays into enemy territory either for conquest, thus enlarging the Muslim political order, or to dissuade the enemy from attacking Muslim lands.[74]

Shia and Sunni theories of jihad are similar,[31] except that Shias consider offensive jihad to be valid only under the leadership of the Mahdi, who is currently believed to be in occultation but will return.[75][76] However, defensive jihad is permissible in Shia Islam before the Mahdi's return.[75] In fact, Shia scholars emphasized it was a religious duty for Shia to defend all Muslims (including Sunni Muslims) from outside invaders.[77]: 152 

Rules of warfare

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They might be our enemies but they are human beings. They consist of civil population comprising of women and children; how can one kill, loot and plunder them?

— Ali ibn Abi Talib, Najh al-Balagha[77]: 155 

Rules prohibit attacking or molesting non-combatants, including women, children under the age of puberty, elderly men, people with disabilities and those who are sick.[78]: 33–35 [10]: 78  Diplomats, merchants and peasants are similarly immune from being attacked.[78]: 33–35 [10]: 134  Monks are presumed to be non-combatants and thus have immunity; places of worship should not be attacked.[78]: 33–35  Even if the enemy disregarded the immunity of noncombatants, Muslims could not respond in kind.[65] However, these categories lose their immunity should they participate in fighting, planning, or supplying the enemy.[78]: 33–35  Some jurists argued that immunity was more related to noncombatant status than being in a certain demographic class. For example, Muhaqqiq al-Hilli opined that only old men are only immune from being killed if they neither fight, nor take a role in military decision making.[clarification needed][77]: 154 

Up until the Crusades, Muslim jurists disallowed the use of mangonels because the weapon killed indiscriminately with the potential of harming noncombatants. During the Crusades this ruling was reversed out of military need.[79]: 55–56  Jurists grappled with the question of attacking an enemy that used women, children or Muslims as human shields. Most jurists held that it was permissible to attack the enemy in cases of military necessity, but steps should be taken to direct the attack towards combatants to avoid the human shield.[10]: 117  Abu Hanifa argued that if Muslims stopped combat for fear of killing noncombatants, then such a rule would make fighting impossible, as every city had civilians.[65] Mutilating the enemy dead is prohibited.[80]: 101 

Two rulings on destruction of enemy property conflict. In one military battle, Prophet Muhammad ordered the destruction of an enemy's palm trees as a means of ending a siege without bloodshed.[citation needed] By contrast, Abu Bakr prohibited destruction of trees, buildings and livestock.[10]: 126–128  Most jurists did not allow unnecessary destruction of enemy property,[65] but allowed it in cases of military necessity, such as destroying buildings in which the enemy is taking shelter.[10]: 126–128  Some jurists allowed destruction if it would weaken the enemy or win the war.[10]: 126–128  Many jurists cautioned against "unnecessary devastation", not just out of humanitarian concerns, but practical ones: it is more useful to capture an enemy's property than to destroy it.[78]: 39  Islamic scholars prohibited killing animals, unless due to military necessity (such as killing horses in battle). This is because, unlike property, animals feel pain.[10]: 126–128 

History

[edit]

In pre-Islamic Arabia, Bedouins raided enemy tribes and settlements to collect spoils. According to some scholars (such as James Turner Johnson), while Islamic leaders "instilled into the hearts of the warriors the belief" in jihad "holy war" and ghaza (raids), the "fundamental structure" of this Bedouin warfare "remained, ... raiding to collect booty".[81] According to Jonathan Berkey, the Qur'an's statements in support of jihad may have originally been directed against Muhammad's local enemies, the pagans of Mecca or the Jews of Medina, but these same statements could be redirected once new enemies appeared.[82] According to scholar Majid Khadduri, it was the shift in focus to the conquest and spoils collecting of non-Bedouin unbelievers and away from traditional inter-Bedouin tribal raids, that may have made it possible for Islam to expand and to avoid self-destruction.[83]: 60 

Classical

[edit]

According to Al-Baqara 256 "there is no compulsion in religion".[84] The primary aim of jihad as warfare is not the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam by force, but rather the expansion and defense of the Islamic state.[85][86] There could be truces before this was achieved, but no permanent peace.[87]: 9–10  One who died "on the path of God" was a martyr (shahid), whose sins were remitted and who secured "immediate entry to paradise".[76]

According with Bernard Lewis, "from an early date Muslim law laid down" jihad in the military sense as "one of the principal obligations" of both "the head of the Muslim state", who declared jihad, and the Muslim community.[87] According to legal historian Sadakat Kadri, Islamic jurists first developed classical doctrine of jihad "towards the end of the eighth century", using the doctrine of naskh (that God gradually improved His revelations over the course of Muhammed's mission). They subordinated Qur'anic verses emphasizing harmony to the more "confrontational" verses of Muhammad's later years and linked verses on exertion (jihad) to those of fighting (qital).[55]: 1501  Muslims jurists of the eighth century divided the world into three divisions, dar al-Islam/dar al-‛adl/dar al-salam (house of Islam/house of justice/house of peace), dar al-harb/dar al-jawr (house of war/house of injustice, oppression), and dar al-sulh/dar al-‛ahd/dār al-muwada‛ah (house of peace/house of covenant/house of reconciliation).[88][89] The eighth century jurist Sufyan al-Thawri (d. 778) headed what Khadduri called a pacifist school, which maintained that jihad was only a defensive war.[90]: 36ff [10]: 90  He stated that the jurists who held this position, among whom he refers to Hanafi jurists al-Awza‛i (d. 774) and Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), and other early jurists, "stressed that tolerance should be shown unbelievers, especially scripturaries and advised the Imam to prosecute war only when the inhabitants of the dar al-harb came into conflict with Islam."[10]: 80 [91]: 58  The duty of Jihad was a collective one (fard al-kifaya). It was to be directed only by the caliph who might delay it when convenient, negotiating truces for up to ten years at a time.[55]: 150–51  Within classical Islamic jurisprudence, during the first few centuries after the prophet's death,[92] jihad consisted of wars against unbelievers, apostated, and was the only form of permissible warfare.[57]: 74–80  Bernard Lewis stated that fighting rebels and bandits was legitimate, though not a form of jihad,[93] and that while the classical perception and presentation of jihad was warfare in the field against a foreign enemy, internal jihad "against an infidel renegade, or otherwise illegitimate regime was not unknown."[94])

However, some argue martyrdom is never automatic, because it is God's province to judge who is worthy of that designation.[95]: 222–223 

Classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence often contained a section called Book of Jihad, with rules governing the conduct of war covered at great length. Such rules include treatment of nonbelligerents, women, children (also cultivated or residential areas),[96]: 205–08 [7]: 3  and division of spoils.[7]: 99  Such rules offered protection for civilians.[97] Spoils include Ghanimah (spoils obtained by actual fighting), and fai (obtained without fighting i.e. when the enemy surrenders or flees).[98]

The first documentation of the law of jihad was written by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i and Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani. (It grew out of debates that surfaced following Muhammad's death.[31]) Although some Islamic scholars have differed on the implementation of Jihad, the consensus amongst them is that jihad always includes armed struggle against persecution and oppression.[99]

Both Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim asserted that Muhammad never initiated hostilities and that all the wars he engaged in were primarily defensive. He never forced non-Muslims to Islam and upheld the truces with non-Muslims so long as they did not violate them. Ibn Taymiyya's views on Jihad are explained in his treatise titled Qāʿidah mukhtaṣarah fī qitāl al-kuffār wa muhādanatuhum wa taḥrīm qatlahum li mujarrad kufrihim. (An abridged rule on fighting the unbelievers and making truces with them, and the prohibition of killing them merely because of their unbelief). According to Ibn Taymiyya, human blood is inviolable by default, except "by right of justice". Although Ibn Taymiyya authorised offensive Jihad (Jihad al-Talab) against enemies who threaten Muslims or obstruct their citizens from freely accepting Islam, unbelief (Kufr) by itself is not a justification for violence, whether against individuals or stated. According to Ibn Taymīyah, jihad is a legitimate reaction to military aggression by unbelievers and not merely due to religious differences. Ibn Taymiyya wrote:

"As for the transgressor who does not fight, there are no texts in which Allah commands him to be fought. Rather, the unbelievers are only fought on the condition that they wage war, as is practiced by the majority of scholars and is evident in the Book and Sunnah."[64][100]: 265 

As important as jihad was, it is not considered one of the "pillars of Islam". According to one scholar (Majid Khadduri, this is because the five pillars are individual obligations, but jihad is a "collective obligation" of the Muslim community meant to be carried out by the Islamic state. This was the belief of "all jurists, with almost no exception", but did not apply to defense of the Muslim community from a sudden attack, in which case jihad was an "individual obligation" of all believers, including women and children.[101]: 60 

Scholars had previously claimed it was the responsibility of a centralized government to organize jihad. But this changed as the authority of the Abbasid caliph weakened.[102] Al-Mawardi allowed local governors to wage jihad on the caliph's behalf. This decentralization of jihad became especially pressing after the Crusades. Ali ibn Tahir al-Sulami argued that all Muslims were responsible for waging wars of self-defense.[102] Al-Sulami encouraged Muslim rulers from distant lands to assist Muslims who were under attack.[102]

Classical Shia doctrine maintained defensive jihad was always permissible, but offensive jihad required the presence of the Imam. An exception to this, during medieval times, was when the first Fatimid caliph Abdallah al-Mahdi Billah claimed to be the representative of the Imam and claimed the right to launch offensive jihad.[77]: 157 

After the Mongol invasions, Shia scholar Muhaqqiq al-Hilli claimed that defensive war was not just permissible but praiseworthy, even obligatory. If a Muslim could not take part in the defense then he should, at least, send material support. This remained the case even if the Muslims were ruled by an unjust ruler.[77]: 153 

Early Muslim conquests

[edit]
Age of the Caliphs
  Expansion under Muhammad, 622–632/A.H. 1–11
  Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661/A.H. 11–40
  Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750/A.H. 40–129

In the early era that inspired classical Islam (Rashidun Caliphate) and lasted less than a century, jihad spread the realm of Islam to include millions of subjects, and an area extending "from the borders of India and China to the Pyrenees and the Atlantic".[87]: 4  The role of religion in these early conquests is debated. Medieval Arabic authors claimed the conquests were commanded by God, and presented them as orderly and disciplined, under the command of the caliph.[7]: 60–61  Many modern historians question whether hunger and desertification, rather than jihad, was a motivating force in the conquests. Historian William Montgomery Watt argued, "Most of the participants in the [early Islamic] expeditions probably thought of nothing more than booty ... There was no thought of spreading the religion of Islam."[10]: 87  Similarly, Edward J. Jurji argues that the motivations of the Arab conquests were certainly not "the propagation of Islam....Military advantage, economic desires, [and] the attempt to strengthen the hand of the state and enhance its sovereignty...are some of the determining factors."[10]: 76  Some recent explanations cite both material and religious causes in the conquests.[7]: 62–63 

Post-classical usage

[edit]

According to some authors,[who?] the more spiritual definitions of jihad developed sometime after the 150 years of jihad wars and Muslim territorial expansion, and particularly after the Mongol invaders sacked Baghdad and overthrew the Abbasid Caliphate.[citation needed] Historian Hamilton Gibb stated, "in the historic [Muslim] Community the concept of jihad had gradually weakened and at length it had been largely reinterpreted in terms of Sufi ethics."[103]: 117  notes that "despite the theoretical importance of the idea of jihad in classical Islamic juristic thought", by the time of the Abbasids, the concept was no longer central to statecraft.[81]

Rudolph Peters wrote that with the stagnation of Islamic expansionism, the concept of jihad became internalized as a moral or spiritual struggle.[50]: 187, note 52  Earlier classical works on fiqh emphasized jihad as war for God's religion, Peters claimed. Later Islamic scholars like Ibn al-Amir al-San'ani, Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida, Ubaidullah Sindhi, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Shibli Nomani, etc. emphasized the defensive aspect of jihad, distinguishing between defensive jihad (jihad al-daf) and offensive jihad (jihad al-talab or jihad of choice). They refuted the notion of consensus that jihad al-talab was a communal obligation (fard kifaya). In support of this view, these scholars referred to the works of classical scholars such as Al-Jassas and Ibn Taymiyyah. According to Ibn Taymiyya, the reason for jihad against non-Muslims is not their disbelief, but the threat they pose to Muslims. Citing Ibn Taymiyya, scholars including Rashid Rida, Al San'ani, and Qaradawi argued that unbelievers need not be fought unless they pose a threat to Muslims. Thus, jihad is obligatory only as defensive warfare to respond to aggression or "perfidy" against the Muslim community, and that the "normal and desired state" between Islamic and non-Islamic territories was one of "peaceful coexistence". This was similar to the Western "Just war" concept.[100]: 71, 72, 227, 228, 263–265, 286, 315 [50]: 150  Similarly 18th-century scholar Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab defined jihad as a defensive military action to protect the Muslim community, and emphasized its defensive aspect in synchrony with later 20th century Islamic writers.[104]: 230, 235, 241  Today, some Muslim authors only recognize as legitimate wars fought for the purpose of territorial defense as well as wars fought for the defense of religious freedom.[50]: 125 

Ibn Taymiyyah's hallmark themes included the permissibility of overthrowing a ruler who is classified as an unbeliever due to a failure to adhere to Islamic law, the absolute division of the world into dar al-kufr and dar al-Islam, labeling anyone not adhering to one's particular interpretation of Islam as an unbeliever, and the call for warfare against Non-Muslims, particularly Jews and Christians.[105]: 256

Ibn Taymiyyah recognized "the possibility of a jihad against `heretical` and `deviant` Muslims within dar al-Islam. He identified as heretical and deviant Muslims anyone who propagated innovations (bida') contrary to the Qur'an and Sunna ... legitimated jihad against anyone who refused to abide by Islamic law or revolted against the true Muslim authorities." He used a broad definition of what constituted aggression or rebellion against Muslims, which would make jihad "not only permissible but necessary."[105]: 252 Ibn Taymiyyah paid careful attention to the questions of martyrdom and the benefits of jihad: "It is in jihad that one can live and die in ultimate happiness, both in this world and in the Hereafter. Abandoning it means losing entirely or partially both kinds of happiness."[50]: 48

Bernard Lewis stated that while most Islamic theologians in the classical period (750–1258 CE) understood jihad to be a military endeavor,[49]: 72 after Islamic conquest stagnated and the caliphate divided into smaller stated, "irresistible and permanent jihad came to an end". As jihad became unfeasible it was "postponed from historic to messianic time."[106] Even when the Ottoman Empire carried on a new holy war of expansion in the seventeenth century, "the war was not universally pursued". They made no attempt to recover Spain or Sicily.[107][better source needed]

By the 1500s, it had become accepted that the permanent state of relations between dar al-Islam and dar al-harb was that of peace.[citation needed]

Shah Ismail of the Safavid dynasty tried to claim the right to wage offensive jihad, particularly against the Ottomans. However, Shia ulama did not permit that, maintaining the classical position that the true Imam could wage such a war. During the Qajar period, Shia ulama adopted the position that the Shah was responsible for national security. They authorized the Perso-Russian wars in the 19th century as jihad.[77]: 158–159 

In the 18th century, the Durrani Empire under the reigns of Ahmad Shah Durrani and his son and successor, Timur Shah Durrani, had declared jihads against Sikh Misls in the Punjab region, often to consolidate territory and continue Afghan their region, efforts under Ahmad Shah failed, while Timur Shah had succeeded.[108]

Colonialism and modernism

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The Fulani jihad states of West Africa, c. 1830

When Europeans began to colonize the Muslim world, jihad was one of the first responses.[7]: 157–158  Emir Abdelkader organized a jihad in Algeria against French domination, tapping into existing Sufi networks.[7]: 157–158  Other wars were often declared to be jihad: the Senussi religious order declared jihad against Italian control of Libya in 1912, and the "Mahdi" in Sudan declared jihad against the United Kingdom and Egypt in 1881.[76] Rashid Rida and Muhammad Abduh argued that peaceful coexistence should be the normal state between Muslim and non-Muslim stated, citing verses in the Qur'an that allowed war only in self-defense.[2] However, this view left open jihad against colonialism, which was seen as an attack on Muslims.[2]

Syed Ahmad Khan argued that jihad was limited to cases of oppression, and since the British Raj allowed freedom of religion, jihad against the British was unnecessary.[7]: 159–160  Instead, Khan formulated jihad as recovering past Muslim scientific progress to modernize the Muslim world.[7]: 159–160  A concept that played a role in anti-colonial jihad (or lack thereof) was the belief in Mahdi.[citation needed] According to Islamic eschatology, a messianic figure named Mahdi will one day appear and restore justice on earth. This belief sometimes discouraged Muslims from conducting jihad, instead inducing them to wait. Such messages were circulated in Algeria to undermine Emir Abdelkader's jihad against the French.[citation needed] Alternatively, this belief could be a powerful mobilizing force when someone proclaimed to be the Mahdi. Mahdist rebellions happened in India (1810), Egypt (1865) and Sudan (1881).[citation needed]

Charging Mahdist army during the Battle of Omdurman in 1898

With the Islamic revival, a new "fundamentalist" movement arose, with different interpretations of Islam that increased emphasis on jihad. The Wahhabi movement that spread across the Arabian peninsula starting in the 18th century emphasized jihad as armed struggle.[109] The Fula jihads in West Africa during the 18th and 19th centuries led to the establishment of various states, most notably the Sokoto Caliphate. None of these movements were victorious.[87] The Sokoto Caliphate lasted for a century until it was conquered by the British and incorporated into Colonial Nigeria in 1903.[110]

Ottoman Jihad in World War One

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Ottoman soldiers with Ottoman Shahada Regimental Standard at Kanlisirt, Gallipoli campaign in 1915

When the Ottoman caliph called for a "Great Jihad" Muslims against Allied powers during World War I, hopes and fears emerged that non-Turkish Muslims would side with Ottoman Turkey, but the appeal did not unite the Muslim world,[106][107]: 24  and Muslims did not turn on their non-Muslim commanders in the Allied forces.[111] (The war led to the end of the caliphate as the Ottoman Empire allied with the war's losers and surrendered. Post-war capitulations were overturned by secularist Mustafa Kemal, who later abolished the caliphate.)[55]: 157 

Prior to the Iranian revolution in 1922, Shiite cleric Mehdi Al-Khalissi issued a fatwa prohibiting Iraqis from participating in the Iraqi elections, as the Iraqi government had been established by foreign powers. He later played a role in the Iraqi revolt of 1920.[112] Between 1918 and 1919 in the Shia holy city of Najaf the League of the Islamic Awakening was established by religious scholars, tribal chiefs, and landlords who assassinated a British officer in the hopes of sparking a similar rebellion in Karbala.[citation needed]

During the revolt, Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Shirazi, father of Mohammad al-Husayni al-Shirazi and grandfather of Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi, declared British rule impermissible and called for jihad against European occupations in the Middle East.[113]

Post-colonialism

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Islamism played an increasing role in the Muslim world in the 20th century, especially following the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s.[114] One of the first Islamist groups, the Muslim Brotherhood, emphasized physical struggle and martyrdom in its creed: "God is our objective; the Qur'an is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; struggle (jihad) is our way; and death for the sake of God is the highest of our aspirations."[115][116] Hassan al-Banna emphasized jihad of the sword, and called on Egyptians to jihad against the British Empire, [117]: 150, 155  (the first influential scholar since the 1857 India uprising to do so).[55]: 158  The group called for jihad against Israel in the 1940s,[118] and its Palestinian branch, Hamas, called for jihad against Israel during the First Intifada.[119][120][121]

Modern Muslim thought had been focused on when to go to war (jus ad bellum), not paying much attention on conduct during war (jus in bello). This was because most Muslim theorists viewed international humanitarian law as consistent with Islamic requirements. However, Muslims later discussed conduct during war in response to terrorist groups who targeted civilians.[122]: [https://books.google.com/books?id=1jcCwXo3CCgC&pg=PA14 

According to Rudolph F. Peters and Natana J. DeLong-Bas, the new "fundamentalist" movement brought a reinterpretation of Islam and their own writings on jihad. These writings tended to be less involved with the different of schools of Islamic law, or in solutions for all potential situations. "They emphasize more the moral justifications and the underlying ethical values of the rules, than the detailed elaboration of those rules." They also tended to ignore the distinction between Greater and Lesser jihad because it distracted Muslims "from the development of the combative spirit they believe is required to rid the Islamic world of Western influences".[105]: 240–41[50]: 127

Contemporary Islamic fundamentalists were often influenced by the ideas of Ibn Taymiyyah, and Egyptian journalist Sayyid Qutb.

Sayyid Qutb, Islamist author and influential leader of the Muslim Brotherhood

Qutb preached in his book Milestones that jihad, “is not a temporary phase but a permanent war ... Jihad for freedom cannot cease until the Satanic forces are put to an end and the religion is purified for God in toto.”[123]: 125–26 [105]: 264  Qutb focused on martyrdom and jihad, adding the theme of treachery and enmity towards Islam of Christians and especially Jews. If non-Muslims were waging a "war against Islam", jihad against them was defensive, not offensive. He insisted that Christians and Jews were mushrikeen (not monotheists) because (he alleged) they gave their priests or rabbis "authority to make laws, obeying laws which were made by them [and] not permitted by God" and "obedience to laws and judgments is a sort of worship".[123][124]

Later ideologue, Muhammad abd-al-Salam Faraj, departed from some of Qutb's teachings. While Qutb felt that jihad was a proclamation of "liberation for humanity" (in which humanity has the free choice between Islam and unbelief), Faraj saw jihad as a mean of conquering the world and reestablishing the caliphate.[79]: 107–108  Faraj legitimized lying, attacking by night (even accidentally killing innocents), and destroying trees of the infidel.[125][79]: 190, 192  His ideas influenced Egyptian Islamist extremist groups,[126]: 9  and Ayman al-Zawahiri, later the leader of al-Qaeda.[126]: 11 

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and although it was predominantly Sunni, Afghanistan's Shiite population took arms against the Communist government and allied Soviet forces and the nation's Sunnis and were collectively referred to as the Afghan Mujahideen. Shiite jihadists in Afghanistan were known as the Tehran Eight and received support from the Iranian government in fighting the Communist Afghan government and allied Soviet forces in Afghanistan.[127][128]

Terrorism

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Many Muslims, including scholars like al-Qaradawi and Sayyid Tantawi, denounced Islamic terrorist attacks against civilians, seeing them as contrary to rules of jihad that prohibit targeting noncombatants.[102] After the September 11 attacks in 2001, the United States blamed Saudi Arabian Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in Afghanistan, triggering bin Laden, who in turn on October 7 issued a televised message, declaring "Allah had blessed a vanguard group of Muslims, the spearhead of Islam, to destroy America." American and British forces were deployed around Afghanistan, and Mullah Mohammad Omar, also the Commander to the Faithful of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, in turn called the world's Muslims to join him in jihad.[129]: 2 

Abdullah Azzam

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In the 1980s Abdullah Azzam advocated waging jihad against the "unbelievers".[130] Azzam issued a fatwa calling for jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, declaring it an obligation for all able-bodied Muslims to repel invaders. His fatwa was endorsed by others, including Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz.[131] Azzam saw Afghanistan as the beginning of jihad to repel unbelievers from many countries—the southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia, Bosnia, the Philippines, Kashmir, Somalia, Eritrea, Spain, and especially his home country of Palestine.[132]: 130 The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan is said to have "amplified the jihadist tendency from a fringe phenomenon to a major force in the Muslim world."[133]: 174  Many fighters returned to their home countries to continue jihad, participating in insurgencies and later creating a "transnational jihadist stream."[133]: 156–57 

Azzam also argued for a broader interpretation of who it was permissible to kill, which may have influenced students such as bin Laden.[107] He argued, based on his interpretation of the hadith, that it is a sin to not wage offensive jihad against the unbelievers in non-Muslim lands, continuing until only those who submit to Islam remain; expelling unbelievers from Muslim lands, contrastingly, is defensive jihad.[134] In February 1998, bin Laden put a "Declaration of the World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders" in the Al-Quds al-Arabi newspaper.[135] He later organised the September 11 attacks against the United States.

Shia

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In Shia Islam, jihad is one of the ten Practices of the Religion[136] (though not one of the five pillars). Traditionally, Twelver Shi'a doctrine differed from that of Sunni Islam on the concept of jihad, with jihad seen as a "lesser priority" in Shia theology and "armed activism" by Shias "limited to a person's immediate geography".[137]

Because of their history of oppression, Shias also associated jihad with certain passionate features, notably in the remembrance of Ashura. Mahmoud M. Ayoub says:

In Islamic tradition jihad or the struggle in the way of God, whether as armed struggle, or any form of opposition of the wrong, is generally regarded as one of the essential requirements of a person's faith as a Muslim. Shi'î tradition carried this requirement a step further, making jihad one of the pillars or foundations (arkan) of religion. If, therefore, Husayn's struggle against the Umayyad regime must be regarded as an act of jihad, then, In the mind of devotees, the participation of the community in his suffering and its ascent to the truth of his message must also be regarded as an extension of the holy struggle of the Imam himself. The hadith from which we took the title of this chapter stated this point very clearly. Ja'far al-Sadiq is said to have declared to al-Mufaddal, one of his closest disciples, 'The sigh of the sorrowful for the wrong done us is an act of praise (tasbih) [of God], his sorrow for us is an act of worship, and his keeping of our secret is a struggle (jihad) in the way of God'; the Imâm then added, 'This hadith should be inscribed in letters of gold'.[138]: 142 

and

Hence, the concept of jihad (holy struggle) gained a deeper and more personal meaning. Whether through weeping, the composition and recitation of poetry, showing compassion and doing good to the poor or carrying arms, the Shi'i Muslim saw himself helping the Imam in his struggle against the wrong (zulm) and gaining for himself the same merit (thawab) of those who actually fought and died for him. The ta'ziyah, in its broader sense the sharing of the entire life of the suffering family of Muhammad, has become for the Shi'i community the true meaning of compassion.[138]: 148 

In the Syrian civil war, Shia and Sunni fighters waged jihad against each other.[139] In Yemen, the Houthi Movement used appeals to jihad as part of their ideology as well as their recruitment.[140]

Islamic jurisprudence

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Observers have noted the evolution in the rules of jihad—from the original "classical" doctrine to that of 21st century Salafi jihadism.[55]: 172  According to legal historian Sadarat Kadri,[55]: 172  during the last few centuries, incremental changes in Islamic legal doctrine (developed by Islamists who otherwise condemn any bid‘ah (innovation) in religion), "normalized" what was once "unthinkable".[55]: 172  "The very idea that Muslims might blow themselves up for God was unheard of before 1983, and it was not until the early 1990s that anyone anywhere had justified killing innocent Muslims who were not on a battlefield."[55]: 175 

The first or the "classical" doctrine of jihad which was developed towards the end of the 8th century, emphasized the jihad of the sword (jihad bil-saif) rather than the "jihad of the heart",[49]: 72 but it contained many legal restrictions developed from interpretations of the Quran and the Hadith, such as detailed rules involving "the initiation, the conduct, the termination" of jihad, the treatment of prisoners, the distribution of booty, etc. Absent a sudden attack on the Muslim community, jihad was not a "personal obligation" (fard ayn); instead it was a "collective one" (fard al-kifaya),[101] which had to be discharged "in the way of God" (fi sabil Allah),[55]: 150  and could only be launched by the caliph, "whose discretion over its conduct was all but absolute."[55]: 150–51  (This was designed in part to avoid incidents like the Kharijia's jihad against and killing of Caliph Ali, once they deemed that he was no longer a Muslim). Martyrdom resulting from an attack on the enemy with no concern for your own safety was praiseworthy, but dying by your own hand (as opposed to the enemy's) merited a special place in Hell.[141] The collective obligation to jihad is sometimes simplified as "offensive jihad" in Western texts.[142]

Islamic theologian Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir has been identified as the key theorist and ideologue behind modern jihadist violence.[143] His theological and legal justifications influenced Abu Musab al-Zarqawi of al-Qaeda as well as jihadi terrorist groups, including ISIS.[143] Zarqawi used a manuscript of al-Muhajir's ideas at AQI training camps that were later deployed by ISIS, referred to as The Jurisprudence of Jihad or The Jurisprudence of Blood.[143][144][145]

The book has been described as rationalising "the murder of non-combatants" by Mark Towsend, citing Salah al-Ansari of Quilliam, who noted: "There is a startling lack of study and concern regarding this abhorrent and dangerous text The Jurisprudence of Blood in almost all Western and Arab scholarship".[144] Charlie Winter of The Atlantic describes it as a "theological playbook used to justify the group's abhorrent acts".[143] He stated:

Ranging from ruminations on the merits of beheading, torturing, or burning prisoners to thoughts on assassination, siege warfare, and the use of biological weapons, Muhajir's intellectual legacy is a crucial component of the literary corpus of ISIS—and, indeed, whatever comes after it—a way to render practically anything permissible, provided, that is, it can be spun as beneficial to the jihad. [...] According to Muhajir, committing suicide to kill people is not only a theologically sound act, but a commendable one, too, something to be cherished and celebrated regardless of its outcome. [...] neither Zarqawi nor his inheritors have looked back, liberally using Muhajir's work to normalize the use of suicide tactics in the time since, such that they have become the single most important military and terrorist method—defensive or offensive—used by ISIS today. The way that Muhajir theorized it was simple—he offered up a theological fix that allows any who desire it to sidestep the Koranic injunctions against suicide.[143]

Psychologist Chris E. Stout claimed that jihadists regard their actions as "for the greater good"; that they are in a "weakened in the earth" situation that renders terrorism a valid resort.[145]

Usage

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The term 'jihad' has accrued both violent and non-violent meanings. According to John Esposito, it can simply mean striving to live a moral and virtuous life, spreading and defending Islam as well as fighting injustice and oppression, among other things.[146]: 26  The relative importance of the two forms of jihad is a matter of controversy. Rudoph Peters wrote that, in the contemporary world, traditionalist Muslims understand jihad from classical works on fiqh; modernist Muslims regard jihad as a just war in international law and emphasize its defensive aspects; and fundamentalists view it as an expansion of Islam and realization of Islamic ideals.[50]: 150  David Cook wrote that Muslims understood jihad in a military sense, in both classical and contemporary texts. Cook located the idea that jihad is primarily non-violent in Sufi texts and the Western scholars who study them, or from Muslim apologists.[79]: 165–166  Gallup stated that its surveys show that the concept of jihad among Muslims "is considerably more nuanced than the single sense in which Western commentators invariably invoke the term".[9]

Muslim public opinion

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A Gallup poll asked Muslims in eight countries to define jihad. In Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and Morocco, the most frequent response was to "duty toward God", a "divine duty", or a "worship of God", with no military connotations. In Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, many of the responses includes "sacrificing one's life for the sake of Islam/God/a just cause" or "fighting against the opponents of Islam".[9] Other common meanings of "jihad" in the Muslim world include "a commitment to hard work", "promoting peace", and "living the principles of Islam".[9][147]: 20ff  The terminology was also applied to the fight for women's liberation.[148]

Other struggles

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Shia Muslim scholar Mahmoud M. Ayoud stated, "The goal of true jihad is to attain a harmony between Islam (submission), iman (faith), and ihsan (righteous living)." Jihad is a process encompassing both individual and social reform, this is called jihad fi sabil Allah ("struggle in the way of God"), and can be undertaken following the Qur'an (jihad bi-al-qur'an).[149] According to Ayoud the greatest jihad is the struggle of every Muslim against social, moral, and political evils. However, depending on social and political circumstances, jihad may be regarded as a sixth fundamental obligation (farid) incumbent on the entire Muslim community (ummah) when their integrity is in danger, in this case jihad becomes an "absolute obligation" (fard 'ayn), or when social and religious reform is gravely hampered. Otherwise it is a "limited obligation" (fard kifayah), incumbent upon those who are directly involved. These rules apply to armed struggle or "jihad of the sword".[149]

In modern times, Pakistani scholar and professor Fazlur Rahman Malik used the term to describe the struggle to establish a "just moral-social order",[150]: 63–64  while President Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia used it to describe the struggle for economic development in that country.[50]: 116–17 

According to the BBC, a third meaning of jihad is the struggle to build a good society.[151] In a commentary of the hadith Sahih Muslim, entitled al-Minhaj, the medieval Islamic scholar Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi stated, "one of the collective duties of the community as a whole (fard kifaya) is to lodge a valid protest, to solve problems of religion, to have knowledge of Divine Law, to command what is right and forbid wrong conduct".[152]

Scholar Natana J. DeLong-Bas lists a number of types of "jihad" that have been proposed by Muslims:

  • educational jihad (jihad al-tarbiyyah);
  • missionary jihad or calling the people to Islam (jihad al-da'wah)[105]: 240–41

Other "types" mentioned include:

  • "Intellectual" jihad (similar to missionary jihad).[153]
  • "Economic" jihad (doing good involving money such as spending within one's means, helping the "poor and the downtrodden")[153] Bourguiba used jihad to describe the struggle for economic development.[53] Iran has a Ministry of Jihad for Agriculture.[19]: 240 
  • Jihad Al-Nikah, or sexual jihad, "refers to women joining the jihad by offering sex to fighters to boost their morale".[154] The term originated from a fatwa believed to have been fabricated by the Syrian government to discredit its opponents, and the prevalence of this phenomenon has been disputed.[155][156]

Usage by some non-Muslims

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  • The United States Department of Justice used various ad hoc definitions of jihad in indictments of individuals involved in terrorist activities:
    • "As used in this First Superseding Indictment, jihad is the Arabic word meaning 'holy war'. In this context, jihad refers to the use of violence, including paramilitary action against persons, governments deemed to be enemies of the fundamentalist version of Islam."[157]
    • "As used in this Superseding Indictment, 'violent jihad' or 'jihad' include planning, preparing for, and engaging in, acts of physical violence, including murder, maiming, kidnapping, and hostage-taking."[158] in the indictment against several individuals including José Padilla.
  • Karen Armstrong: "Fighting and warfare might sometimes be necessary, but it was only a minor part of the whole jihad or struggle".[159]
  • Maxime Rodinson: "Jihad is a propagandistic device which, as need be, resorts to armed struggle—two ingredients common to many ideological movements".[160]: 351 
  • Benjamin R. Barber used the term jihad to point out the resistant movement by fundamentalist ethnic groups who want to protect their traditions, heritage and identity from globalization (which he refers to as 'McWorld').[161]: 53–65 

Other groups

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Ahmadiyya

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In Ahmadiyya Islam, jihad is primarily one's personal inner struggle and should not be used violently for political motives. Violence is only to be used to protect religion and one's own life in extreme situations of persecution.[162]

Quranist

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Quranists do not believe that the word jihad means holy war. They believe it means to struggle, or to strive. They believe it can incorporate both military and non-military aspects. When it refers to the military aspect, it is understood primarily to be defensive warfare.[163][164]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Jihad (: جهاد, jihād [dʒiˈhaːd]) is an Islamic religious concept denoting strenuous effort or struggle in the path of , with primary scriptural usage referring to endeavors to defend the Muslim , combat unbelief, and extend Islamic . The term derives from the root j-h-d, implying exertion against opposition, and appears in verbal forms approximately 41 times in the , predominantly in contexts such as al-Tawbah (9), which urges fighting polytheists and hypocrites until religion is for alone. Prophetic traditions in canonical collections like further elevate jihad as a supreme act of devotion, promising paradise to martyrs slain therein and describing it as the peak of alongside . Historically, jihad fueled the explosive growth of early , enabling conquests from Arabia to Persia, Byzantium's fringes, , and Iberia within decades of Muhammad's death in 632 CE, establishing that enforced Islamic law over diverse populations through subjugation or . Classical jurists across major schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali) codified jihad as encompassing defensive retaliation and proactive offensives under caliphal command to invite or compel submission to , subject to rules like avoiding harm to non-combatants yet prioritizing expansion of the abode of (dar al-Islam). While spiritual self-struggle (mujahada al-nafs) exists in , the doctrinal emphasis on armed jihad persists in orthodox texts, informing both medieval empire-building and modern ideologies that reject secular nation-states in favor of transnational . Controversies arise from interpretive divergences, with defensive-only advocates often downplaying offensive precedents amid post-colonial sensitivities, yet empirical patterns of Islamic expansion and contemporary jihadist manifestos affirm continuity with foundational imperatives.

Etymology and Scriptural Foundations

Linguistic Origins

The term jihād (جِهَاد) derives from the triconsonantal j-h-d (ج-ه-د), denoting exertion, effort, or striving against difficulty. The primary jāhada (جَاهَدَ) conveys "to strive," "to struggle," or "to ," with the jihād functioning as its verbal form to indicate the act of such striving or contention. This appears in lexicons as applicable to diverse contexts of human endeavor, including physical labor, intellectual pursuit, or opposition to adversity, independent of religious or specificity. Pre-Islamic usage of the root j-h-d is attested in and reflecting themes of perseverance and rivalry, such as tribal contests or personal hardships, though direct nominal instances of jihād in non-Islamic texts remain limited in surviving records. The semantic breadth of the root—encompassing both non-violent toil and combative resistance—predates its systematization in Islamic doctrine, where it later acquired layered interpretive dimensions without altering its core linguistic denotation of strenuous effort. In Semitic linguistics, cognates exist in related languages like Hebrew (yāgâ, to labor or toil), underscoring a proto-Semitic heritage tied to concepts of toil or affliction, though jihād crystallized distinctly within the Arabian Peninsula's dialectal framework by the CE.

Quranic References

The Quran employs the term jihad, rooted in the verb jahada meaning "to strive" or "to exert effort," in contexts ranging from personal spiritual struggle to collective military endeavor in the path of . While some verses emphasize striving through and , others explicitly link jihad to combat against unbelievers, particularly in Medinan revelations following the Hijra in 622 CE, where armed conflict arose amid persecution and tribal warfare. These references form the scriptural basis for Islamic doctrines on warfare, with interpretations varying between defensive restraint and expansionist imperatives, often debated among scholars but grounded in the text's imperative language. The Quran also addresses doubt, hesitation, and fear regarding fighting or jihad, criticizing hypocrites and those reluctant to engage. Surah At-Tawbah (9:38) questions believers who become heavy to the earth when called to strive in Allah's cause, preferring worldly life over it. Surah An-Nisa (4:77) describes those previously restrained from fighting but who later, when combat was ordained, feared people more than Allah. Surah Al-Ahzab (33:12-13) records hypocrites doubting the defense of Medina and seeking exemption from battle. A foundational defensive mandate appears in Surah Al-Baqarah (2:190-193), enjoining: "Fight in the way of those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, does not like transgressors. And kill them wherever you overtake them and expel them from wherever they have expelled you, and fitnah is worse than killing... But if they cease, then indeed, is Forgiving and Merciful." This passage, revealed circa 623-624 CE amid conflicts with Meccan pagans, permits retaliation but prohibits aggression beyond necessity, though subsequent verses expand permissions. Surah At-Tawbah (9:5), known as the "" and dated to 631 CE after the , commands: "And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way." This abrogates earlier truces with treaty-breaking tribes, authorizing offensive action against idolaters unless they convert or submit, a verse frequently invoked in classical for initiating hostilities; verses 9:1-4 exempt polytheists who honored their treaties, while 9:6 mandates granting asylum to any polytheist seeking it so that they may hear the word of Allah, then conveying them to their place of safety even if they reject it. Further, Surah (9:29) directs: "Fight those who do not believe in or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the Scripture—[fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled." Revealed in preparation for the Tabuk expedition in 630 CE against Byzantine threats, it targets and ("") for subjugation via tribute, establishing a doctrinal precedent for against non-Muslims unwilling to embrace fully. Rewards for jihad are promised in Surah At-Tawbah (9:111): "Indeed, has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of , so they kill and are killed." This transactional motif, echoing earlier Meccan emphases on martyrdom, incentivizes participation by linking combat to eternal paradise, a theme reiterated across like Al-Anfal (8:72) tying jihad to divine favor. Surah 9 overall contains the highest concentration of jihad references, underscoring its martial connotations in late prophetic contexts. Non-violent jihad appears in Surah Al-Furqan (25:52): "So do not obey the disbelievers, and strive against them with it [the Quran] a great striving," advocating intellectual confrontation via revelation. Yet, military verses predominate in quantity and doctrinal weight, with jihad often synonymous with qital (fighting) in tafsirs, as in Surah Al-Hajj (22:78) urging: "And strive for Allah with the striving due to Him." These texts, compiled in the Quran by circa 632-650 CE, prioritize causal defense against fitnah (persecution) while enabling proactive dominance, shaping historical Islamic expansions without textual mandates for universal peace absent submission.

Hadith Corpus

The Hadith corpus, consisting of reported sayings, actions, and tacit approvals attributed to Muhammad, serves as the primary interpretive source for Quranic injunctions on jihad, with military dimensions emphasized in the most rigorously authenticated collections. Sahih al-Bukhari, compiled by Muhammad ibn Ismail al-Bukhari (d. 870 CE), includes a dedicated book on "Fighting for the Cause of Allah (Jihad)" containing over 100 narrations, many detailing expeditions, rewards for combatants, and strategic conduct in warfare. Similarly, Sahih Muslim, assembled by Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj (d. 875 CE), features a section on "Jihad and Expedition" with reports underscoring obligation and eschatological incentives, such as the Prophet stating, "Whoever dies without having fought [in the way of Allah] or having resolved to fight dies upon a branch of hypocrisy." These collections, deemed sahih (authentic) by Sunni consensus due to their stringent chains of transmission (isnad), prioritize armed struggle as a communal duty (fard kifaya) under caliphal authority, often linking it to expansion and defense against polytheists. Central hadiths in these corpora frame jihad as imperative warfare until submission to Islamic . A paradigmatic narration in reports Abu Huraira: "The Messenger of Allah said: I have been commanded to fight against the people until they testify that there is no god but and that is the Messenger of Allah." This is corroborated in , where the Prophet declares fighting obligatory "though it be something you dislike," echoing Quranic themes but specifying tactical application, such as prohibiting flight from battle except to regroup. Rewards are hierarchically detailed: martyrs (shuhada) receive immediate paradise, with one hadith in Bukhari stating the Prophet's assurance to fighters that "a place in Paradise the width of a whip is better than the world and whatever is in it." Gender-differentiated roles appear, as when Umm Atiyya inquired about women's participation, and the Prophet affirmed their support roles while deeming the equivalent "best jihad" for women. Later compilations like and expand on juridical aspects, including rules for captives and spoils (ghanimah), but maintain fidelity to the Sahihain's martial primacy. Narrations promoting preemptive or offensive jihad, such as invading Dar al-Harb (non-Muslim lands) without prior aggression if strategically viable, derive from expedition reports (maghazi), where Muhammad's campaigns against Meccan polytheists and Jewish tribes model expansionist doctrine. Eschatological urgency permeates, with hadiths warning of divine displeasure for shirking , as in Bukhari's report: "Paradise is under the shades of swords," attributed to the participants. The purported distinction of a "greater jihad" as internal spiritual struggle against the (self), contrasted with "lesser jihad" as warfare, originates from a absent from Bukhari and Muslim, recorded in secondary sources like al-Tabarani's al-Mu'jam al-Kabir. This , where allegedly said upon returning from Tabuk, "We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad," has been graded da'if (weak) by hadith critics like and due to incomplete chains and late attribution, undermining its doctrinal weight against the corpus's overwhelming martial emphasis. Empirical analysis of authenticated texts reveals jihad's semantic core as exertion in , with spiritual metaphors secondary and non-obligatory, as evidenced by the absence of pacifist reinterpretations in early juristic applications.

Core Concepts and Distinctions

Armed Struggle as Central Meaning

In classical Islamic jurisprudence, jihad primarily denotes armed struggle or warfare waged in obedience to divine command, aimed at unbelievers, establishing Islamic rule, or defending the against perceived threats. Derived from the triliteral j-h-d, signifying intense exertion or striving, the term's application in core Islamic texts centers on physical rather than abstract personal effort, as reflected in the 's repeated imperatives for fighting. For example, 9:29 instructs believers to "fight those who do not believe in or in the Last Day and who do not consider unlawful what and His Messenger have made unlawful and who do not adopt the of truth from those who were given the Scripture—[fight] until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled." This verse, part of Surah At-Tawbah revealed circa 631 CE during the Tabuk expedition, exemplifies jihad as offensive military action to subjugate non-Muslims under Islamic governance. Quranic usage reinforces this martial primacy: of roughly 41 instances of jihad and its derivatives, the preponderance—particularly the eight in At-Tawbah—contextualize it as organized fighting against polytheists, hypocrites, and scriptuaries reluctant to submit. 2:216 states, "Fighting has been enjoined upon you while it is hateful to you," linking qital (combat) directly to jihad's obligatory nature, while 2:190-193 permits defensive initiation but escalates to broader confrontation: "Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress." These Medinan revelations, post-Hijrah in 622 CE, mark jihad's evolution from restrained to a collective duty (fard kifayah) for expansion, as implemented in the Prophet Muhammad's 27 recorded military expeditions (ghazawat), nine involving direct combat. Fiqh manuals codify jihad as "war against non-Muslims," per the Shafi'i compendium Reliance of the Traveller (compiled circa 14th century CE by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri), which details rules for mobilization, enslavement of captives, and division of spoils to propagate Islam. Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali schools similarly prioritize it as a head-of-state obligation for territorial dominance, with scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) arguing its perpetual necessity until global submission to Sharia. This doctrinal emphasis drove the early caliphates' conquests, amassing an empire from Spain to India by 750 CE through jihad-framed campaigns that yielded over 2.2 million square miles in the first century alone. Counterclaims elevating spiritual self-struggle as the "greater jihad" (jihad al-akbar) rely on a hadith wherein the Prophet, returning from battle, declares the internal fight superior—a narration absent from canonical collections like Sahih Bukhari or Muslim, graded da'if (weak) due to断 chain discontinuities and unknown transmitters. Hadith critics, including Al-Albani, deem it fabricated or exaggerated, unfit for establishing core rulings, underscoring that authentic sources prioritize martial jihad as the religion's vanguard mechanism for supremacy. While personal moral striving (mujahada al-nafs) exists analogously, it lacks the institutionalized, rewarded status of armed jihad, which promises martyrdom (shahada) and paradise for participants per Quran 9:111: "Indeed, Allah has purchased from the believers their lives and their properties [in exchange] for that they will have Paradise. They fight in the cause of Allah, so they kill and are killed." This framework, unadulterated by later reinterpretations, positions armed struggle as jihad's doctrinal nucleus, informing governance from the Rashidun era onward.

Greater Jihad Narrative and Its Authenticity

The "greater jihad" narrative posits an internal, spiritual struggle against one's base desires or ego (jihad al-nafs) as superior to the "lesser jihad" of armed combat, framing the former as the more meritorious form of exertion in . This distinction gained prominence in Sufi traditions and later apologetic interpretations, often invoked to emphasize personal moral reform over martial endeavors. However, the narrative's authenticity is contested, resting primarily on a single narration attributed to the Prophet Muhammad: upon returning from the Battle of Tabuk in 630 CE, he reportedly stated, "We have returned from the lesser jihad to the greater jihad," referring to battling the soul. This hadith lacks a reliable chain of transmission (isnad) and is classified as da'if (weak) by classical scholars such as al-Bayhaqi (d. 1066 CE), who noted its defective narration in al-Zuhd al-Kabir. Ibn al-Jawzi (d. 1201 CE) and al-Khatib al-Baghdadi (d. 1071 CE) further deemed it unreliable due to breaks in the chain and narrators of questionable integrity. Modern hadith critics, including Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999 CE), reinforced this verdict, labeling it mawdu' (fabricated) or severely weakened, absent from the canonical sahih collections like those of al-Bukhari and Muslim. No equivalent hierarchy appears in the Quran, which deploys jihad approximately 41 times, predominantly in contexts of military striving against unbelievers or hypocrites, such as in Surah al-Tawbah (9:24) prioritizing expenditure in God's cause, including warfare, over familial ties. While spiritual self-discipline is affirmed in authentic hadiths—such as the Prophet's praise for believers who control anger (Sahih al-Bukhari 6114)—no sound prophetic saying elevates it above physical jihad, which early sources like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) describe as the pinnacle of striving when fulfilling defensive or expansionary obligations. The narrative's elevation may trace to post-prophetic developments, possibly Al-Ghazali (d. 1111 CE) in Ihya Ulum al-Din, who alluded to internal jihad amid Sufi mysticism, diverging from the martial primacy in foundational conquest-era texts. Critics argue its modern amplification serves to reconcile Islamic doctrine with pacifist ideals, overshadowing scriptural emphases on armed struggle as a communal duty, though spiritual effort remains integral but not hierarchically "greater."

Interrelation of Spiritual and Martial Dimensions

In classical Islamic and , jihad encompasses both spiritual striving (jihad al-nafs, or struggle against one's base desires and ego) and exertion in warfare against unbelievers, with the latter often regarded as the primary and most exalted application of the term in primary sources. The Qur'an employs "jihad" approximately 41 times, frequently in contexts linking personal effort with collective military action, such as in Surah at-Tawbah 9:41, which commands believers to "strive with your wealth and your lives in the way of ," interpreted by exegetes like (d. 923 CE) as encompassing armed combat alongside financial support. This scriptural usage underscores striving (jihad) as a unified where internal purification enables external action, rather than a strict separating the two. The popular distinction framing spiritual jihad as "greater" and military as "lesser" derives from a widely circulated reporting the Prophet Muhammad stating upon returning from battle, "We have returned from the lesser jihad [of fighting] to the greater jihad [against the self]," but this narration lacks a verifiable chain of transmission and is classified as da'if (weak) or fabricated by hadith scholars including and , who note its absence from authentic collections like or .and_Daif(Weak)_Hadiths) Classical authorities such as Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) prioritized military jihad as the pinnacle of devotion when obligatory, arguing it manifests the believer's total submission () to divine command, while spiritual struggle serves as its indispensable foundation without supplanting it. The interrelation manifests causally: martial jihad demands prior and ongoing spiritual discipline to ensure purity of intention (), prohibiting worldly motives like plunder or vengeance, as stipulated in fiqh texts like Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri's Reliance of the Traveller (d. 1368 CE), which voids rewards for combatants succumbing to ego-driven sins during warfare. Sufi traditions, drawing from figures like (d. 1111 CE), extended jihad al-nafs to ascetic practices aiding resilience in battle, viewing self-conquest as training for enduring combat hardships, yet even here, military application remained the ultimate test of under threat to . This integration reflects causal realism in doctrine: unchecked spiritual failings undermine martial efficacy, as undisciplined fighters risk divine displeasure and strategic failure, per analyses of early conquests where prophetic emphasis on (God-consciousness) preceded victories. Empirical patterns in historical jihad campaigns, such as the 7th-century , illustrate this linkage: participants underwent spiritual exhortations against fear and greed before engagements, yielding high morale and cohesion that propelled expansions, as documented in Ibn Ishaq's Sirat Rasul Allah (d. 767 CE). Modern apologetic emphases on spiritual jihad as paramount, often detached from martial contexts, diverge from classical consensus, potentially reflecting post-colonial reinterpretations rather than unadulterated scriptural or juridical primacy.

Types of Armed Jihad

Defensive Jihad Obligations

In Islamic , defensive jihad refers to the armed defense against direct toward Muslim territories, populations, or the faith itself, distinguishing it from offensive variants by its reactive nature triggered solely by an enemy's initiation of hostilities. This obligation arises when non-Muslims invade dar al-Islam (Muslim abode) or attack Muslims, compelling capable believers to repel the threat to preserve religious practice and communal security. Classical jurists across Sunni schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—unanimously classify such defense as fard al-ayn, an individual duty incumbent on every able-bodied adult Muslim in the affected region, akin to the personal obligations of or fasting, without requiring a central authority's declaration. If participation proves insufficient to repel the invaders, the duty extends as fard al-kifayah (communal obligation) to the broader Muslim community until the threat is neutralized. Quranic verses underpin this mandate, such as Al-Baqarah 2:190, which instructs: "Fight in the way of those who fight you but do not transgress," limiting combat to proportionate response against active combatants while prohibiting excess. The obligation activates immediately upon verifiable aggression, such as territorial incursion or persecution hindering Islamic observance, and lapses once the enemy withdraws or the danger subsides, ensuring it remains strictly tied to rather than expansion. Jurists like Ibn Taymiyyah emphasized that failure to defend equates to in extremis, as it abandons the faith's foundational security, though exemptions apply to the ill, elderly, or those whose absence would cause greater harm, such as guardians of dependents. Women and slaves, typically excluded from offensive jihad, share this defensive duty under classical , permitted to fight alongside men if directly threatened, reflecting the universal imperative to safeguard . This consensus stems from early exegeses interpreting prophetic precedents, where mobilized against Meccan aggressors post-Hijrah, framing defense as a core survival mechanism rather than optional piety. Modern rulings, such as those from the International Islamic Fiqh Academy in 2015, reaffirm these parameters, cautioning against conflating defensive jihad with absent clear invasion, to prevent doctrinal abuse.

Offensive Jihad in Doctrine

In classical Sunni , offensive jihad—known as jihad al-talab or the jihad of initiative—entails campaigns launched by Muslim authorities against non-Muslim lands not posing an active threat, with the aim of expanding Islamic governance and subjugating populations to either embrace or submit to its authority through mechanisms like the poll tax. This form contrasts with defensive jihad by its proactive nature, drawing doctrinal support from Quranic verses such as 9:29, which mandates fighting "those who do not believe in ... until they give the jizya willingly while they are humbled." Jurists interpreted such commands as authorizing expansion to enforce Islamic supremacy where preaching alone proved insufficient, provided the campaign adheres to the ruler's directive and community capability. Across the four major Sunni schools (madhhabs), offensive jihad constitutes a communal (fard al-kifayah), binding the ummah collectively to muster sufficient forces for its execution; once adequately performed, the duty lifts from non-participants. In the Shafi'i tradition, as codified in Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri's Umdat al-Salik (), jihad is explicitly "to war against non-Muslims... to establish the religion," with the caliph obligated to target persisting non-Muslim communities—such as , , and Zoroastrians—until they convert or pay tribute, underscoring the expansionist rationale. Hanafi, Maliki, and Hanbali scholars concurred on this classification, viewing it as a perpetual duty absent extenuating factors like truce agreements or military infeasibility, though the Hanbali Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328) emphasized its primacy in elevating "the word of " globally when defensive needs were absent. Doctrinal prerequisites include the legitimate authority of an or caliph to declare and lead the effort, ensuring unified command and avoidance of internal discord; without such leadership, individual initiatives risk invalidation as (). Success metrics focused on territorial and of dhimma contracts on vanquished peoples, permitting enslavement of combatants and seizure of spoils (ghanimah) as incentives, per narrations like 1767, which detail apportionment under prophetic precedent. While some jurists permitted suspension during truces (), the underlying imperative persisted as a marker of Islamic vigor, with to pursue it signaling communal of divine command. Shia , by contrast, subordinates offensive jihad to the infallible imam's discretion, often deferring it until messianic return, though Twelver texts echo Sunni expansionist goals under rightful rule.

Juridical Rules of Conduct in Warfare

Islamic juridical rules governing conduct in jihad warfare, as articulated in classical texts across major Sunni schools, mandate targeting only armed combatants while prohibiting harm to non-combatants such as women, children, the elderly, and clergy unless they actively participate in hostilities. This distinction originates from prophetic instructions, including the directive at the in 629 CE to avoid killing women and children, reinforced in manuals like Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri's (d. 1368 CE), which states it is impermissible to kill such groups absent direct combat involvement. Exceptions arise in cases of or enemy reciprocity, such as retaliatory mutilation if the adversary employs it first, though baseline prohibitions persist. Prohibitions extend to methods of warfare, barring of corpses, treachery, and excessive destruction; a attributed to states, "Do not mutilate, do not be treacherous, do not steal from the booty," as transmitted in and other collections. Jurists like al-Shaybani (d. 805 CE) in Kitab al-Siyar further restrict burning, flooding, or poisoning water sources unless reciprocated, aiming to limit unnecessary cruelty while permitting effective combat. Property and crops may not be destroyed gratuitously, though seizure as spoils (ghanimah) is allowed post-victory, with one-fifth allocated to the state and the remainder distributed among fighters per Quranic prescription in Surah al-Anfal 8:41. Misappropriation of spoils constitutes a grave sin, punishable under . Prisoners of war () receive regulated treatment, including provision of food, clothing, and shelter equivalent to that of Muslim fighters; after the in 624 CE, distributed his share of spoils to clothe captives. Disposition options include for those posing ongoing threats, , exchange for Muslim prisoners, gratuitous release (fida'), or enslavement, with the latter historically permitting integration into Muslim society but requiring humane conduct barring or . Truces () are permissible for up to ten years if strategically beneficial, as practiced by with the Hudaybiyyah treaty in 628 CE, but must not compromise core jihad obligations. These rules, while framed as humane restraints in literature, apply asymmetrically in offensive jihad contexts, where the caliph or holds authority to declare war and enforce compliance, with violations incurring divine and legal penalties but enforcement varying historically due to interpretive flexibility among jurists. Classical sources like those of the Hanafi and Shafi'i schools emphasize adherence to prophetical precedent over modern humanitarian overlays, though Shia jurisprudence introduces nuances such as greater emphasis on imamic authority for initiations.

Historical Evolution

Formative Period and Conquests (7th-8th Centuries)

The concept of jihad as armed struggle crystallized during 's leadership in following the Hijra in 622 CE, when revelations in the authorized defensive fighting against persecutors and later permitted offensive actions to secure 's dominance. directed or participated in approximately 86 military expeditions, including raids (sariyyah) and major battles, against Meccan polytheists, Jewish tribes, and groups, framing these as struggles for the faith. Key engagements included the in March 624 CE, where 313 defeated a Meccan force of about 1,000, interpreted as divine validation of jihad; the in 625 CE, a setback for ; the in 627 CE, repelling a coalition siege; and the bloodless in 630 CE, after which consolidated control over Arabia through further campaigns. Quranic verses such as those in Surah 9 (revealed circa 631 CE) commanded fighting polytheists until prevailed, providing scriptural impetus for expansion beyond mere defense. Following Muhammad's death on June 8, 632 CE, the first caliph faced widespread (ridda) as tribes withheld or reverted to pre-Islamic beliefs, prompting the from 632 to 633 CE to reassert central authority and enforce Islamic unity through military coercion. dispatched armies under commanders like , suppressing rebels in regions such as Yamama, , and , resulting in the reunification of the under Muslim rule by mid-633 CE and establishing the precedent for jihad as a tool for political consolidation. These campaigns, though internal, involved tens of thousands of combatants and set the stage for external conquests by channeling tribal energies outward. Under the second caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE), jihad evolved into large-scale offensive conquests against the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, motivated by religious duty to propagate and seize spoils. Muslim forces captured in 635 CE, defeated Byzantines at Yarmouk in 636 CE, and took in 638 CE, securing the ; in , victory at Qadisiyyah in 636 CE led to the fall of in 637 CE and progressive dismantling of Sassanid Persia by 651 CE, incorporating territories spanning modern and . Egypt fell to between 639 and 642 CE, with surrendering in 641 CE, yielding control over the Nile Valley. These campaigns, involving armies of 20,000–40,000, expanded the caliphate's domain by over 2.2 million square kilometers in under a decade, with jihad doctrine promising martyrdom and paradise incentivizing fighters while imposing on non-Muslims. The third caliph ibn Affan (r. 644–656 CE) extended these efforts, completing the conquest of Persia, annexing and , and initiating advances into and the , though internal strife later fragmented unity. The (661–750 CE), succeeding the , propelled jihadist expansions into North Africa, subduing Berber resistance by 705 CE under , establishing as a province. In 711 CE, crossed into Iberia with 7,000–12,000 troops, defeating Visigothic King at Guadalete and conquering most of the peninsula by 718 CE, reaching as far as before halting. These 7th–8th century conquests, totaling an empire from Iberia to , were doctrinally rooted in jihad as perpetual striving against unbelief, blending religious zeal with tribal raiding traditions, though logistical strains and local accommodations tempered unrelenting warfare.

Classical and Medieval Expansions

Following the formative conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries, Islamic expansions in the classical and medieval periods involved dynasties invoking jihad to extend territories into new regions, often blending religious motivation with economic and political aims. The (750–1258 CE), centered in , shifted focus toward consolidation but supported military campaigns into and against the , with governors and Turkic mercenaries conducting raids framed under jihad obligations. These efforts stabilized frontiers while incorporating Persian and Turkish elements into Islamic warfare. Independent dynasties emerged, expanding aggressively under jihad pretexts. The Ghaznavid Empire, under Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (r. 998–1030 CE), launched 17 invasions into northern between 1001 and 1026 CE, explicitly motivated by jihad to raid lands, plunder wealth, and destroy Hindu temples, including the in 1025 CE, which yielded vast treasures. Mahmud's campaigns established Muslim footholds in , setting precedents for later Indo-Islamic rule through repeated frontier warfare justified as offensive jihad. The Seljuk Turks (1037–1194 CE), Sunni converts, proclaimed jihad while conquering Persia, Mesopotamia, and Anatolia, decisively defeating Byzantine forces at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071 CE, which facilitated Turkic settlement and Islamization of Anatolia over subsequent decades. Their expansions countered Byzantine and Fatimid threats, with rulers like Tughril Beg (r. 1037–1063 CE) restoring Abbasid authority while pursuing imperial growth. Concurrently, the Fatimid Caliphate (909–1171 CE), a Shia dynasty, expanded from North Africa into Egypt by 969 CE and attempted conquests in Syria and Palestine, employing naval and land forces in intra-Muslim and external jihads. Medieval expansions included responses to external incursions, reframed as jihad to reclaim and extend domains. (Salah ad-Din, r. 1174–1193 CE) unified and under the , propagating jihad against , culminating in the victory at the on July 4, 1187 CE, and the recapture of on October 2, 1187 CE, expelling Latin Christians from key Levantine territories. This defensive jihad evolved into offensive reclamation, inspiring Muslim unity and further campaigns, though Third Crusade counterattacks limited full expulsion. In Iberia, Almoravid (c. 1086–1147 CE) and Almohad (1121–1269 CE) dynasties from North reinforced Muslim rule via jihad against Christian advances, temporarily halting advances after the in 1086 CE but ultimately succumbing to sustained Christian offensives by 1212 CE at Las Navas de Tolosa. These phases illustrate jihad's role in both initiating conquests and mobilizing against reversals, driving territorial fluctuations across and .

Imperial and Revivalist Phases (Ottoman to 19th Century)

The Ottoman Empire's formative expansion from the late 13th century drew heavily on the ghazi tradition, wherein Turkic warriors conducted raids and conquests against Christian Byzantine territories as a form of lesser jihad, seeking both material gain and religious merit. Early leaders, including (r. 1299–1326), embodied this ethos, fostering a frontier state oriented toward perpetual holy warfare that facilitated territorial gains in and the . Sultans like (r. 1421–1444, 1446–1451) explicitly invoked ghazi ideology to legitimize campaigns, marking a shift toward centralized dynastic rule while retaining jihad rhetoric for mobilization against European powers. As the empire imperialized, jihad doctrine adapted to sustain expansion, with Mehmed II's 1453 conquest of framed as a jihad fulfilling prophetic , after which he assumed the caliphal mantle to assert religious authority over Muslim subjects. Subsequent sultans, such as (r. 1512–1520), integrated territories in 1517, bolstering claims to universal Islamic leadership and justifying offensives against Safavid Persia as defensive jihad against Shi'ism. By the , however, Ottoman jihad invocations waned amid military stagnation, with reliance shifting to pragmatic alliances rather than ideological fervor, though the sultan-caliph's role preserved nominal jihad legitimacy into the . In the , as Ottoman power declined under European pressures, decentralized revivalist movements across Muslim regions reasserted jihad as a tool for doctrinal purification and anti-colonial resistance, often critiquing imperial laxity. , a Fulani scholar, initiated a jihad in 1804 against in present-day northern , decrying syncretic practices as and establishing the by 1809 as a reformed Islamic polity spanning over 500,000 square kilometers. The caliphate enforced through scholarly emirs, expanded via subsidiary jihads, and endured until British forces dismantled it in 1903, influencing subsequent West African Islamist governance. Complementing Sokoto's model, the Wahhabi-Saudi alliance revived militant jihad in Arabia; Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab's 18th-century pact with Muhammad ibn Saud framed campaigns as tawhid-enforcing struggle, capturing and by 1806 before Ottoman-Egyptian suppression in 1818. A second Saudi state emerged in 1824, sustaining jihadist raids until 1891, emphasizing literalist reform over imperial accommodation. In , Muhammad proclaimed himself in 1881, rallying tribes for jihad against Turco-Egyptian rule, culminating in the 1885 capture of and establishment of a theocratic state that repelled Anglo-Egyptian forces until its 1898 defeat at . These movements, while varying in success, underscored jihad's role in reviving puritanical amid imperial erosion, prioritizing internal reform and external defiance over centralized empire-building.

20th-Century Modernism and Anti-Colonial Campaigns

In the early , Islamic revivalists and modernists reframed jihad doctrines to address Western imperialism, emphasizing defensive armed struggle as a religious imperative against colonial occupation while adapting classical to and pan-Islamic solidarity. (1865–1935), a key Salafi thinker, interpreted jihad primarily as a reaction to external aggression, applying Quranic to repel incursions and restore Muslim . His writings urged to counter European dominance through unified resistance, influencing subsequent anti-colonial ideologues. Hassan al-Banna (1906–1949), founder of the in 1928, elevated jihad as both spiritual and militant obligation, explicitly promoting it as a tool to expel British forces from and dismantle colonial influences. Al-Banna's doctrine integrated anti-colonial activism with Islamist revival, viewing occupation as jahiliyya warranting violent opposition, which the Brotherhood applied in operations against British targets in the 1940s. This approach marked a modernist shift, prioritizing organized societal preparation for jihad over sporadic revolts, though it prioritized ideological purity amid tactical compromises. Libya's resistance against Italian colonization exemplified jihad's invocation in sustained guerrilla campaigns. Omar al-Mukhtar (1858–1931), a Senussi leader, declared jihad in 1912 following Ottoman withdrawal, coordinating ambushes and hit-and-run tactics via the Supreme Council for Jihad Operations against 100,000–200,000 Italian troops. Mukhtar's 20-year insurgency inflicted over 4,000 Italian casualties but ended with his capture in 1931; hanged at age 73, he rejected surrender, stating preference for martyrdom. This campaign blended Sufi orders with modernist calls for unity, sustaining resistance despite technological inferiority. In British India, jihad framed multiple uprisings, from the (1919–1924), which rallied 18 million Muslims against post-World War I threats to the , issuing clerical fatwas for holy war against colonial rule. Leaders like the mobilized non-cooperation with jihad rhetoric, though alliance with Hindu nationalists diluted armed focus. Complementing this, Hajji Sahib of Turangzai (1858–1937) led Pashtun tribal jihads in the North-West Frontier, launching raids in 1915–1917 and 1930s revolts, drawing 10,000 fighters to expel British forces under religious banners. These efforts, rooted in Deobandi scholarship, emphasized frontier defense as fard ayn, yielding temporary gains like the 1919 armistice but failing against aerial bombings and internal divisions. Afghanistan's 1919 featured King Amanullah Khan's formal jihad declaration, mobilizing 70,000 troops and tribesmen to invade British India, capturing key passes before aerial counterattacks forced retreat. This offensive jihad secured via the Treaty of on August 8, 1919, validating modernist arguments for state-led resistance over passive reform. Across and , such campaigns—totaling dozens per [web:6]—highlighted jihad's utility in , fostering ideological continuity despite defeats, as colonial retreats post-1945 often credited persistent religious mobilization. However, modernist framings sometimes masked causal factors like economic grievances, with jihad serving as unifying rhetoric amid fragmented responses.

Post-1979 Global Jihadism

The Soviet invasion of on December 24, 1979, marked a pivotal catalyst for modern global , transforming local resistance into an international mobilization of Muslim fighters against a perceived . Afghan mujahideen, bolstered by financial and from the (over $3 billion via CIA's ), , and Pakistan's , attracted thousands of foreign volunteers, including approximately 20,000-35,000 Arab jihadists coordinated through networks like Abdullah Azzam's . This "" cohort, ideologically influenced by Salafi-jihadist interpretations emphasizing defensive jihad against non-Muslim occupation, gained combat experience and forged transnational ties, with the 1989 Soviet withdrawal framed as a divine victory that emboldened aspirations for broader Islamist revival. The conflict's aftermath saw returning fighters export jihadist tactics and networks, shifting focus from national liberation to global confrontation with Western powers. Osama bin Laden, a Saudi financier who arrived in in 1980 and established training camps, formalized in August 1988 as a vanguard organization to sustain perpetual jihad against apostate regimes and Western influences, initially targeting Soviet remnants before pivoting post-1990 to anti-U.S. operations. 's 1996 declaring war on America escalated with attacks like the (6 deaths), 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in and (224 deaths), the 2000 USS Cole attack (17 deaths), and culminating in the September 11, 2001, assaults (2,977 deaths), which killed more people than all prior Islamist attacks combined since 1979. The U.S.-led (2001) and (2003) dispersed 's core but spurred affiliates like (AQAP, est. 2009), (AQIM, rebranded 2007), and al-Shabaab in , enabling decentralized operations across , , and . By the , these networks conducted over 1,000 attacks annually in regions like the , prioritizing local insurgencies while inspiring lone-actor plots in the West. The (ISIS), evolving from founded by in 2004 amid post-invasion chaos, ruptured from in 2014 and declared a across and , controlling up to 100,000 square kilometers and attracting 30,000-40,000 foreign fighters from 80+ countries at its peak. ISIS's apocalyptic Salafi-jihadism, emphasizing territorial conquest and brutal enforcement of , differentiated it from al-Qaeda's phased approach, leading to high-profile attacks like the 2015 Paris assaults (130 deaths) and global affiliates such as (pledged allegiance 2015, rebranded ISWAP) and ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K, active in /). Military campaigns reduced ISIS's by 2019, but affiliates persisted, with ISIS-linked groups responsible for 69,641 deaths globally from 1979-2024, second only to the . As of 2025, jihadist threats endure through ISIS provinces in Africa (e.g., , where deaths rose 4% outside ) and Asia, with ISIS-K conducting operations like the March 2024 concert hall attack (144 deaths), amid competition and adaptation despite territorial losses.

Jurisprudential Analysis

Sunni Fiqh Perspectives

In Sunni , jihad encompasses armed exertion against non-Muslims to defend the or extend Islamic governance, with rulings derived from Quranic injunctions, , and consensus (ijma') as interpreted by the four major schools: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. Defensive jihad—triggered by invasion of Muslim territory or direct threats to the community—imposes an individual obligation (fard 'ayn) on every capable adult male Muslim, bypassing the need for scholarly deliberation or caliphal order, as it mirrors the urgency of personal duties like under duress. This obligation extends to women and non-combatants in extremis if they can contribute without violating other prohibitions, reflecting the schools' shared emphasis on collective survival over interpretive latitude. Offensive jihad, by contrast, seeks to dismantle barriers to Islamic propagation, subdue polytheist or resistant polities, and incorporate lands into dar al-Islam, constituting a communal obligation (fard kifaya) dischargeable if a sufficient cadre participates under legitimate . The qualifies this by requiring explicit caliphal summons and probabilistic prospect of victory, rendering it non-binding absent such conditions, whereas the , formalized by Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi'i (d. 820 CE), explicitly endorses offensive campaigns against non-Muslim states as a means to enforce or conversion incentives, provided no truce (sulh) exists. Maliki and Hanbali jurists align closely with Shafi'i on permissibility but impose stricter prerequisites, such as ensuring no internal Muslim discord precedes mobilization, viewing unchecked offensives as risking fitna (civil strife). Across the madhhabs, prerequisites for jihad include sincere intention (niyyah) for God's sake, avoidance of prohibited acts like mutilation or environmental devastation, and proportionality in force, with consensus prohibiting targeting non-combatants such as women, children, clergy, or the elderly unless they actively fight. Hanbali texts, influencing later rigorist strains, stress perpetual renewal of offensive jihad absent a binding peace, but all schools subordinate it to the ruler's ijtihad, critiquing unauthorized vigilantism as bid'ah (innovation). These perspectives, rooted in texts like al-Mawardi's al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah (d. 1058 CE) for Shafi'is and al-Sarakhsi's al-Mabsut (d. 1090 CE) for Hanafis, prioritize causal efficacy—victory through disciplined adherence—over unqualified zeal, though modern applications often diverge amid absent caliphates. Disagreements persist on lesser jihad's scope relative to greater (spiritual) struggle, with Hanafis historically downplaying martial primacy in peacetime, yet all affirm its eschatological merit, promising elevated paradise ranks for martyrs (shuhada). Empirical historical application, from Umayyad expansions (661–750 CE) to Ottoman campaigns, validates 's doctrinal intent for territorial consolidation, though jurists like Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) in Hanbali tradition adapted rules for asymmetric defenses against , emphasizing reconquest over stasis. This framework underscores Sunni 's realism: jihad as instrumentally rational for preservation, contingent on verifiable threats or opportunities, rather than perpetual mandate absent capacity.

Shia Doctrinal Variations

In Twelver Shia , the predominant branch of , jihad is categorized into defensive (jihad al-daf') and offensive (jihad al-ibtida'i or al-tulidi) forms, with the latter requiring explicit permission from the infallible to legitimize expansion or preemptive strikes against non-Muslim territories. Defensive jihad, by contrast, is obligatory upon all able-bodied (fard al-ayn) when Muslim lands face invasion, and can be authorized by qualified jurists (mujtahids) or political leaders without awaiting the Imam's directive, reflecting the immediate imperative to repel aggression. This doctrinal restraint stems from the belief in the Imams' exclusive divine authority for initiating hostilities, as derived from hadiths attributing such decisions to the Prophet and the . Since the Greater of the Twelfth in 941 CE, offensive jihad has been effectively suspended in classical Shia , as jurists lack the infallible mandate to declare it independently, leading to a historical emphasis on quietism and defensive postures amid Sunni-majority rule. Prominent jurists like Allamah al-Hilli (d. 1325 CE) and (d. 1980 CE) affirmed that without the Imam's presence, proactive warfare for territorial gain or conversion is impermissible, prioritizing preservation of Shia communities over . Exceptions exist in minority views, such as those of Muhammad Hasan al-Shirazi (d. 1895 CE), who permitted offensive actions under severe communal threat, but these remain non-binding and contested. A significant doctrinal innovation emerged in the with Ruhollah Khomeini's theory of Wilayat al-Faqih, which vests comprehensive authority—including jihad declarations—in the supreme jurist during the , enabling offensive or jihad to export Islamic governance, as seen in Iran's 1979 constitution framing defense against perceived global threats as perpetual jihad. Khomeini explicitly called for jihad against oppressors beyond mere defense, influencing , though this diverges from traditionalist Shia scholars like Ali al-Sistani, who in 2003 fatwas restricted Iraq's jihad to defensive resistance against coalition forces without endorsing offensive initiatives absent Imam's return. These variations highlight ongoing intra-Shia debates, where interpretations prioritize ideological struggle (jihad al-nafs extended to political realms) over classical textual literalism.

Prerequisites for Legitimate Jihad Declarations

In classical Sunni , the declaration of legitimate offensive jihad—undertaken to expand the domain of or propagate the faith—requires the explicit authorization of a recognized Islamic , such as the caliph () or a legitimate exercising over a Muslim . This prerequisite stems from the principle that only a centralized can assess the strategic necessity, mobilize resources, and ensure adherence to rules of engagement, preventing anarchic or individualistic ventures that could harm . The four Sunni madhhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali) uniformly hold that without such a proclamation, participation in offensive jihad lacks validity, as evidenced in foundational texts like al-Shaybani's Kitab al-Siyar for the and al-Shafi'i's al-Umm, which emphasize the 's role in initiating expeditions. Defensive jihad, by contrast, does not necessitate a formal from central ; it becomes a collective obligation ( kifaya) on the Muslim community and, under dire circumstances like territorial invasion, an individual duty ( ayn) on every able-bodied adult male, triggered automatically by aggression against dar al-Islam. Jurists across the schools, including in al-Muwatta and Ibn Hanbal's followers, stipulate that the threat must be verifiable—such as enemy forces breaching borders or endangering lives and worship—rather than speculative, with historical examples like the Mongol invasions of the 13th century invoked to illustrate immediate communal response without awaiting a caliph's . This distinction underscores causal realism in : defensive actions prioritize survival and repulsion, while offensive ones demand structured governance to mitigate risks of fitna (civil strife). Further prerequisites for any jihad declaration include a pure (niyya) solely for upholding God's commands, as per Qur'an 9:111, and the absence of undue hardship on the Muslim populace, ensuring the campaign's benefits outweigh potential harms per the principle of (). Classical scholars like required consultation () with advisors and military readiness, prohibiting initiation if the ummah faces internal weakness or superior enemy forces that could lead to catastrophic defeat, as seen in prohibitions against premature expeditions during the early Abbasid era. In the post-Ottoman context, after the caliphate's abolition on March 3, 1924, many jurists, including those from al-Azhar, have argued that these authority conditions render offensive jihad declarations illegitimate absent a unified , rendering non-state actors' claims—such as those by 20th-century groups—juridically deficient despite their self-proclaimed adherence.

Contemporary Manifestations

Ideological Revivals and Key Thinkers

In the late 20th century, jihadist ideology experienced significant revival through reinterpretations emphasizing offensive struggle against perceived apostate Muslim regimes and Western powers, diverging from classical defensive paradigms. This shift gained momentum during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), where jihad was framed as a collective and individual duty to establish Islamic governance, drawing on Salafi-jihadist thought that prioritizes returning to early Islamic practices via militant means. Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), an Egyptian Islamist executed by the Nasser regime, profoundly influenced this revival with concepts like jahiliyyah—modern societies' ignorance akin to pre-Islamic —and hakimiyyah, God's sole , necessitating as revolutionary against un-Islamic rulers. His 1964 Milestones advocated a vanguard of believers to wage independently of state authority, inspiring ideologies that declare Muslim governments apostate and justify attacks on them. Qutb's ideas, disseminated via the and later global networks, underpin Salafi-jihadist groups' rejection of secular nationalism. Abdullah Azzam (1941-1989), a Palestinian and Afghan jihad organizer, further propelled the revival by globalizing participation, declaring defensive jihad in Afghanistan an individual obligation (fard ayn) for all able Muslims, mobilizing over 20,000 foreign fighters. His writings, such as Join the Caravan, emphasized armed struggle over preaching, influencing the Arab and laying groundwork for transnational networks, though he opposed indiscriminate attacks on civilians. Azzam's assassination in 1989 Peshawar did not halt his doctrinal legacy. Osama bin Laden (1957-2011) extended these ideas into global jihad, issuing fatwas in 1996 and 1998 calling for attacks on U.S. forces and civilians as retaliation for presence in and support for , framing it as defensive yet expanding to offensive strikes worldwide. Building on Qutb's and Azzam's mobilization, bin Laden's envisioned a vanguard uniting jihadists to collapse "far enemy" powers, enabling near enemy collapses, as seen in post-9/11 operations. His strategy prioritized spectacular attacks to inspire broader uprising, sustaining Salafi-jihadist momentum despite leadership losses. These thinkers' syntheses—Qutb's revolutionary theology, Azzam's practical mobilization, and bin Laden's strategic —revitalized jihad as a totalizing , influencing groups like , which amplified to include rival jihadists. Empirical data from declassified documents and fighter testimonies confirm their texts' circulation in training camps, fostering a persistent doctrinal core amid tactical evolutions.

Jihad in Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare

In contemporary jihadist movements, the doctrine of jihad has been adapted to endorse and tactics by non-state actors seeking to challenge militarily superior opponents, often framing such actions as defensive or offensive religious imperatives against perceived aggressors like Western powers and apostate regimes. , founded by , exemplified this through its 1998 fatwa declaring jihad against Americans and their allies, citing U.S. military presence in and support for as justifications for killing civilians and soldiers alike. This ideology culminated in the , 2001, attacks, where 19 operatives hijacked commercial airliners to strike symbols of U.S. economic and military power, killing 2,977 people and injuring over 6,000, as part of a strategy to provoke broader conflict and rally global Muslim support. Such operations rely on asymmetric methods—exploiting civilian vulnerabilities and media amplification—to impose high costs on stronger foes without conventional battles. The (ISIS), emerging from , intensified this approach by blending territorial with spectacular , declaring a in 2014 and employing suicide bombings, beheadings, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to terrorize enemies and populations. Post-2017 territorial losses, ISIS shifted to protracted in and , using vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), ambushes, and lone-actor attacks to sustain attrition against coalition forces. sanctifies these tactics as martyrdom operations (istishhad), promising paradise for attackers and framing civilian targeting as permissible collateral in pursuit of enforcement or expulsion of infidels. Affiliates like and al-Shabaab have replicated this, with suicide attacks comprising 3.7% of Islamist operations from 2013 to 2024, despite their outsized lethality. Empirical data underscores the scale: from to April 2024, Islamist terrorist attacks—predominantly motivated by jihadist Salafi —totaled 66,872 worldwide, causing 249,941 deaths, with over 90% occurring after 2000 and concentrated in Muslim-majority regions via firearms (40%) and explosives (39%). Groups like (69,641 deaths attributed) and the (71,965 deaths) dominate, using decentralized cells and online propaganda to inspire low-tech attacks that evade state defenses, as seen in the 2023 Hamas assault on killing 1,195. These methods exploit asymmetries in resources, aiming not for military victory but psychological and political erosion, though they have incurred massive blowback, including the degradation of 's proto-state by 2019.

Active Groups and Recent Operations (to 2025)

As of 2025, the Islamic State (ISIS) remains one of the most active jihadist networks, operating through decentralized provinces rather than territorial control in its core areas of Iraq and Syria, where it has conducted sporadic attacks and maintained underground cells following the loss of its caliphate in 2019. Affiliates like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) in Afghanistan have emerged as particularly lethal, responsible for high-profile assaults including bombings in Moscow in March 2024 and attacks on Taliban forces, positioning ISKP as a global threat despite Taliban counterterrorism efforts. In Africa, ISIS branches such as Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP, formerly Boko Haram's ISIS affiliate) continue insurgent operations in Nigeria and neighboring states, leveraging food insecurity for recruitment and control, while U.S. forces targeted ISIS-Somalia leadership in the Golis Mountains in August 2025. Coalition operations in Iraq and Syria from December 2024 to January 2025 defeated ISIS cells, underscoring persistent low-level threats. Al-Qaeda maintains an enduring presence through affiliates, issuing calls for attacks on Western targets in 2024-2025 propaganda, with groups like Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the conducting high-attack volumes in . (AQAP) and Al-Shabaab in persist in , the latter facing U.S. airstrikes west of in June-July 2025 and near Badhan in September 2025, which killed fighters and disrupted operations alongside Somali forces. These activities reflect Al-Qaeda's focus on regional entrenchment over spectacular global strikes, contrasting with ISIS's more expansive ambitions. The Taliban, governing since August 2021, engages in defensive jihad against rivals like ISKP while suppressing internal dissent, but faces challenges from Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which escalated cross-border attacks in 2024-2025, reclaiming territory in Pakistan's regions. , framed in jihadist terms against , sustained operations post its , 2023, assault that killed 1,200 and took 251 hostages, launching rockets in September 2025 and ambushing Israeli soldiers in Gaza amid ongoing conflict. and Al-Shabaab continue localized campaigns, with exploiting areas in Nigeria-Cameroon for raids in 2025, contributing to instability where jihadist deaths remain elevated outside .
GroupPrimary RegionsKey 2024-2025 Activities
ISIS & AffiliatesIraq/Syria, Afghanistan (ISKP), AfricaCell defeats by coalitions; ISKP bombings; leadership strikes in Somalia
Al-Qaeda Affiliates (e.g., JNIM, Al-Shabaab)Sahel, SomaliaPropaganda calls for attacks; high-volume assaults; U.S. airstrikes disrupting safe havens
Taliban/TTPAfghanistan, Pakistan borderGovernance vs. anti-ISKP ops; TTP territorial gains and raids
HamasGaza/IsraelRocket launches, soldier ambushes post-2023 attack
Boko Haram/ISWAPNigeria, West AfricaBorder raids, insurgency leveraging scarcity

Empirical Muslim Public Opinion Data

A 2013 Pew Research Center survey of over 38,000 Muslims across 39 countries found widespread rejection of suicide bombings and against civilians in the name of , with medians of 72% to 89% in most regions stating such acts are never justified. However, substantial minorities in certain conflict-affected areas endorsed suicide bombing as often or sometimes justified to defend , including 40% in territories, 39% in , 29% in , and 15% in . These views correlated with support for as official law, which reached medians of 99% in , 84% in , and 74% in the Middle East-North Africa region, though implementation details varied. Support for corporal punishments under , such as amputations for theft (median 81% in ) and death for (median 78% in , 56% in MENA), indicated tolerance for coercive enforcement in some populations, potentially aligning with expansive interpretations of jihad. A separate 2013 Pew analysis across seven Muslim-majority countries showed medians of 67% expressing unfavorable views of and 73% concern over , yet 13% in and 27% in territories held favorable opinions of , a group employing jihadist tactics. Arab Barometer surveys from 2013-2018 in 12 Arab countries revealed low overt support for , with fewer than 10% in most nations viewing its methods favorably, though online news consumption predicted higher sympathy, suggesting media influence on . In a U.S. poll by for Security Policy of 900 , 25% agreed that violence against civilians is justified to defend , and 51% believed should override U.S. , highlighting persistent minorities amenable to jihadist rationales even in Western contexts. Post-2014 data indicated declining explicit support for groups like amid territorial losses, but persisted in pockets; for instance, an ICCT of global surveys estimated 5-15% of in surveyed MENA populations expressed indirect endorsement of jihadist aims against perceived enemies. Variations by demographics showed younger respondents and those prioritizing over more likely to justify defensive , underscoring jihad's appeal in identity-driven conflicts.
Country/Region% Saying Suicide Bombing Often/Sometimes Justified (2013 )% Favoring Sharia as Law of Land (2013 )
Palestinian Territories40%89%
39%99%
29%74%
13%84%
6%72%
3%12%

Debates, Criticisms, and Consequences

Authenticity and Interpretation Disputes

Disputes over the authenticity of key hadiths have centered on the popular narrative distinguishing a "greater jihad" as the spiritual struggle against one's ego from a "lesser jihad" as armed combat. This originates from a reported statement attributed to Muhammad upon returning from the Battle of Tabuk in 630 CE, declaring the return from the lesser to the greater jihad, but the hadith's chain of narrators includes breaks and weak transmitters, classifying it as da'if (weak) or even fabricated by rigorous standards of hadith criticism in collections like Sahih al-Bukhari and Sahih Muslim, which omit it. Traditional scholars, including Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE), prioritized military exertion as the pinnacle of jihad based on Quranic imperatives and authenticated prophetic traditions, viewing inner struggle (jihad al-nafs) as preparatory but subordinate, a position reinforced by the absence of the greater-lesser dichotomy in foundational texts. The doctrine of abrogation (naskh), where later Quranic revelations supersede earlier ones, fuels ongoing interpretation debates regarding jihad's scope. Traditional exegetes like (d. 923 CE) and (d. 1373 CE) applied naskh to argue that Medinan verses, such as the ( 9:5) revealed around 631 CE, override over 120 Meccan verses advocating tolerance or no compulsion in religion (e.g., 2:256), establishing fighting non-believers until submission as the final ruling. Modern reformists, often influenced by contextualist or pacifist lenses amid 20th-century , contest the breadth of abrogation, claiming verses like 9:5 apply solely to 7th-century Arabian polytheists breaking treaties, not perpetual mandate, though this minimizes the verse's explicit call to slay idolaters wherever found post-sacred months. Critics of such revisions note their divergence from classical consensus, potentially driven by post-colonial pressures rather than textual primacy. Further contention arises over jihad's defensive versus offensive character, rooted in varying readings of verses like 9:29, which commands fighting until they pay in humiliation—a directive four classical Sunni schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali) historically interpreted as authorizing expansionary warfare under caliphal authority, as evidenced by the conquests from 632–661 CE spanning Persia to . Defensive-only advocates, prevalent in contemporary fatwas from institutions like Al-Azhar since the , restrict jihad to repelling invasion, citing verses like 2:190 ("fight in the way of those who fight you but do not transgress"), yet this overlooks authenticated hadiths enjoining striving against disbelievers generally (e.g., 19:4294) and ignores texts permitting preemptive strikes against threats. These interpretive rifts often reflect source selection biases, with academic and media outlets favoring pacifist views from reformist scholars while sidelining salafi or traditionalist analyses that align jihad with imperial history.

Strategic and Tactical Outcomes

The early military jihads under the Rashidun Caliphate (632–661 CE) achieved rapid strategic successes, expanding Islamic control from the Arabian Peninsula to encompass much of the Byzantine and Sasanian territories, including Syria, Egypt, Persia, and parts of North Africa, through decisive battles such as Yarmouk (636 CE) and Qadisiyyah (636–637 CE). These outcomes stemmed from tactical advantages like high morale driven by religious motivation, effective use of light cavalry for mobility, and exploitation of exhausted empires weakened by prolonged wars, enabling conquests that more than doubled the caliphate's territory within two decades. However, these gains sowed internal divisions, contributing to civil strife (fitna) shortly after, which fragmented unity and limited long-term consolidation. In medieval contexts, jihads against the (1095–1291 CE) yielded mixed tactical results, with initial Christian gains reversed through unified Muslim efforts under leaders like , who recaptured in 1187 CE at Hattin, leveraging superior numbers, terrain knowledge, and jihad appeals to mobilize forces. Strategically, these counter-crusades restored much of the to Muslim rule by 1291 CE, fostering an Islamic superstate under Ayyubid and dynasties, though at the cost of heavy casualties and temporary losses of key cities. Later Ottoman expansions framed as ghaza (raids akin to jihad) secured , the , and (1453 CE), but by , the Ottoman jihad declaration against Allied powers failed to incite widespread revolt, accelerating imperial collapse amid military defeats and Arab revolts. Nineteenth-century Fulani jihads in , led by , established the (1804–1903 CE), controlling vast Hausa territories through guerrilla tactics and ideological appeals against corrupt rulers, resulting in a theocratic state that endured until European colonization. Tactically, these movements succeeded via decentralized networks and adaptation to local alliances, but strategically, they faced overextension and internal schisms, ultimately succumbing to British and French forces by the early twentieth century. In contemporary , jihadist groups have demonstrated tactical proficiency in insurgencies, as seen in the Afghan expelling Soviet forces by 1989 CE through ambushes and foreign support, paving the way for rule from 1996–2001 and resurgence in 2021 CE after U.S. withdrawal. Similarly, achieved temporary strategic gains, declaring a in 2014 CE over 100,000 square kilometers in and via blitzkrieg-style offensives exploiting state vacuums, but suffered territorial defeat by 2019 CE due to international coalitions and internal overreach. affiliates persist through , disrupting states in and , yet fail strategically to establish enduring governance, often amplifying chaos without achieving caliphal visions. Empirical analyses indicate jihadist durability in "long jihad" cycles of boom and bust, succeeding tactically against conventional armies via and adaptability but faltering strategically from political failures, decapitation, and rivalries. Overall, while jihads have periodically expanded influence and inspired movements, sustained outcomes reveal patterns of initial momentum eroded by disunity, external pressures, and inability to transition from conquest to stable rule.

Human and Societal Costs

Jihadist violence has inflicted substantial human costs, primarily through direct fatalities and injuries. From 2007 to 2023, terrorist attacks—overwhelmingly perpetrated by jihadist groups such as the (ISIS), Al-Shabaab, , and their affiliates—resulted in more than 145,000 deaths worldwide, with the majority occurring in Muslim-majority countries in , the , and . In 2023 alone, global terrorism deaths reached 8,352, a 22% increase from the prior year, driven by groups like (1,636 deaths), JNIM (1,099 deaths), and Al-Shabaab (499 deaths), reflecting heightened lethality at 2.5 deaths per attack. Specific campaigns, such as 's territorial control in and from 2014 to 2017, caused tens of thousands of deaths via executions, bombings, and combat, while 's insurgency in has killed tens of thousands since 2009, often targeting civilians and security forces. Injuries outnumber fatalities, with survivors frequently suffering permanent disabilities, including amputations, , and chronic conditions, amplifying long-term medical burdens. Displacement represents another profound human toll, uprooting millions and exacerbating humanitarian crises. The ISIS offensive in 2014 displaced over 3 million internally in , peaking at 3.4 million by early 2015, as families fled territorial conquests and atrocities. Boko Haram's activities have forced more than 2 million displacements in Nigeria's northeast, creating vast IDP camps plagued by disease and food insecurity. In and , jihadist conflicts under groups like and the have contributed to over 12 million displaced persons, including refugees straining neighboring states and . These movements often involve separation of families, loss of livelihoods, and exposure to secondary , with women and children disproportionately affected through abductions, forced marriages, and into combat. Societal costs extend to economic devastation and psychological erosion. Terrorism from 2000 to 2018 imposed a global economic burden of approximately $855 billion, encompassing direct damages, lost , and heightened spending, with jihadist incidents comprising the bulk due to their scale and . In affected regions like the , where jihadist groups caused nearly half of 2023's terrorism deaths (around 4,000), communities face collapsed , trade disruptions, and governance vacuums, perpetuating cycles of and . Psychologically, survivors and witnesses endure widespread trauma, including , depression, and intergenerational fear, which undermine social trust and cohesion even in non-Muslim societies exposed to attacks like those in and the West. These impacts, often borne heaviest by Muslim populations as primary victims, highlight jihad's causal role in destabilizing both perpetrator and target societies through sustained violence and fear.

Extended and Non-Military Usages

Personal and Social Struggles

In Islamic theology, jihad al-nafs—the struggle against one's own —constitutes the primary form of personal jihad, encompassing efforts to subdue egoistic impulses, temptations, and moral failings in pursuit of spiritual discipline and divine obedience. This internal draws from Quranic injunctions to strive in God's path, such as in Surah Al-Ankabut (29:69), which promises guidance to those who exert themselves sincerely, interpreted by classical scholars like as encompassing self-purification over external combat. Practices include rigorous adherence to (), beyond obligations, and meditative self-examination to combat traits like or , as outlined in Sufi traditions emphasizing inner conquest as foundational to . A widely cited but disputed hadith underpins the prioritization of this personal dimension, recounting the Prophet Muhammad declaring, after a , that the "greater jihad" lies in struggling against one's inner self, contrasting it with the "lesser jihad" of warfare. scholars classify this narration as weak (da'if) due to its incomplete chain of transmission, rendering it non-binding in , though it persists in popular discourse and mystical literature to elevate non-violent striving. Empirical psychological studies frame such personal jihad as a mechanism for religious struggles, where adherents report reduced distress through intentional self-reform, aligning with broader of accountability (taklif). Social struggles extend this paradigm to collective non-violent endeavors, such as combating societal vices like usury, corruption, or illiteracy through advocacy, almsgiving (zakat), and knowledge dissemination (jihad against ignorance). Prophetic traditions endorse these as meritorious exertions, with hadiths urging striving in truth and patience amid communal trials, as in Sahih Muslim's report on perseverance equating to jihad. In practice, historical examples include 19th-century reform movements in West Africa, where Fulani scholars like Usman dan Fodio invoked social jihad for ethical governance and anti-slavery reforms without initial warfare, though these often escalated. Modern applications appear in charitable networks, where organizations channel funds for poverty alleviation as a form of societal jihad, reporting aid to over 10 million beneficiaries annually by groups like Islamic Relief, grounded in Quranic mandates for welfare striving. These non-military usages, while doctrinally affirmed, face interpretive tensions; classical jurists like Ibn Taymiyyah subordinated personal efforts to communal defense when threats arise, cautioning against isolating inner jihad amid external perils. Surveys of Muslim attitudes, such as Pew Research's 2013 global poll, indicate 81% of respondents in countries like and view jihad primarily as personal devotion rather than , reflecting widespread endorsement of these struggles despite varying emphases across sects.

Adoption by Non-Islamic Contexts

In political theory, the term "jihad" has been repurposed outside Islamic doctrine to denote broader forces of cultural fragmentation and resistance to modernization. In his 1995 book , American political scientist Benjamin R. Barber contrasted ""—representing the integrative, consumerist dynamics of global capitalism—with "jihad," which he defined as retribalizing tendencies driven by ethnic, religious, and nationalist particularism, including but not confined to Islamist movements. Barber argued that these jihad-like impulses, evident in conflicts from the to , undermine democratic by prioritizing local identities over universal institutions, a framework that gained renewed attention after the September 11, 2001, attacks as analysts applied it to tensions between and . The notion of "civilian jihad" illustrates another non-Islamic extrapolation, framing nonviolent political action as a form of struggle analogous to the Islamic "greater jihad" of internal and societal self-improvement. Coined by Iraqi-British economist Khalid Kishtainy in the mid-20th century, it describes tactics such as boycotts, strikes, and civil disobedience to achieve governance reforms, initially in reference to Arab contexts but later analyzed in Western studies of democratization. Maria J. Stephan's 2009 edited volume Civilian Jihad extends this to Middle Eastern cases while drawing explicit parallels to non-Muslim examples, including the U.S. civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr., where nonviolent resistance mirrored jihad's emphasis on disciplined moral exertion against oppression, with 196 documented nonviolent campaigns worldwide between 1900 and 2006 achieving success rates over twice that of violent ones. Such appropriations, however, typically omit the defensive or expansionist military dimensions of jihad in classical Islamic fiqh, prioritizing ethical striving over armed conflict. In secular Western usage, "jihad" has entered colloquial parlance since at least the late to signify relentless personal or collective efforts, detached from religious imperatives. Examples include corporate rhetoric, such as "price jihad" in competitive markets, or activist campaigns framing or initiatives as societal jihads, as seen in U.S. political invoking "jihad against " or addiction recovery narratives styled as individual jihads. This metaphorical shift, accelerated by media coverage of , has led to over 1,000 English-language references to non-religious "jihad" in major outlets by 2010, often equating it to any high-stakes endeavor, though critics note this dilutes the term's doctrinal specificity and risks conflating benign striving with militancy.

References

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