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Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
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Key Information

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan[b] (born 26 February 1954) is a Turkish politician who has been the president of Turkey since 2014. He previously served as the 25th prime minister from 2003 to 2014 as part of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which he co-founded in 2001. He also served as mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998. Coming from an Islamist background and promoting socially conservative policies, Turkey has experienced increasing authoritarianism, democratic backsliding and suppression of dissent under Erdoğan's rule.[4]

Erdoğan was born in Beyoğlu, Istanbul, and studied at the Aksaray Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences, before working as a consultant and senior manager in the private sector. Becoming active in local politics, he was elected Welfare Party's Beyoğlu district chair in 1984 and Istanbul chair in 1985. Following the 1994 local elections, Erdoğan was elected mayor of Istanbul. In 1998 he was convicted for inciting religious hatred and banned from politics after reciting a poem by Ziya Gökalp that compared mosques to barracks and the faithful to an army. Erdoğan was released from prison in 1999 and formed the AKP, abandoning openly Islamist policies.

Erdoğan led the AKP to a landslide victory in the election for the Grand National Assembly in 2002, and became prime minister after winning a by-election in Siirt in 2003. Erdoğan led the AKP to two more election victories in 2007 and 2011. His tenure consisted of economic recovery from the economic crisis of 2001, the start of EU membership negotiations, and the reduction of military influence on politics. In late 2012, his government began peace negotiations with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) to end the Kurdish–Turkish conflict, negotiations which ended three years later.

In 2014, Erdoğan became the country's first directly elected president. Erdoğan's presidency has been marked by democratic backsliding and a shift towards a more authoritarian style of government. His economic policies have led to high inflation rates and the depreciation of the value of the Turkish lira. He has intervened in the ongoing conflicts in Syria and Libya, launched operations against the Islamic State, Syrian Democratic Forces and Assad's forces leading to the fall of the Assad regime, and has made threats against Greece. He oversaw the transformation of Turkey's parliamentary system into a presidential system, introducing term limits and expanding executive powers, and Turkey's migrant crisis. In May 2022, Erdoğan temporarily blocked Finland and Sweden from joining NATO. Erdoğan responded to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine by closing the Bosphorus to Russian naval reinforcements, brokering a deal between Russia and Ukraine regarding the export of grain, and mediating a prisoner exchange.

Early life and education

[edit]

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born on 26 February 1954 in Kasımpaşa, Beyoğlu to a poor conservative Muslim family.[5][6] Erdoğan's family is originally from Adjara, a region in Georgia.[7] Although Erdoğan was reported to have said in 2003 that he was of Georgian origin and that his origins were in Batumi,[6][8] he later denied this.[6] His parents were Ahmet Erdoğan (1905–1988) and Tenzile Erdoğan (née Mutlu; 1924–2011).[9]

While Erdoğan attended school in Istanbul, his summer holidays were mostly spent in Güneysu, Rize, where his family originates from. Throughout his life he often returned to this spiritual home, and in 2015 he opened a vast mosque on a mountaintop near this village.[10] The family returned to Istanbul when Erdoğan was 13 years old.[11]

As a teenager, Erdoğan's father provided him with a weekly allowance of 2.5 Turkish lira, less than a dollar. With it, Erdoğan bought postcards and resold them on the street. He sold bottles of water to drivers stuck in traffic. Erdoğan also worked as a street vendor selling simit (sesame bread rings), wearing a white gown and selling the simit from a red three-wheel cart with the rolls stacked behind glass.[11] In his youth, Erdoğan played semi-professional football in Camialtıspor FC, a local club.[12][1][13][14] Fenerbahçe wanted him to transfer to the club[clarification needed] but his father prevented it.[15] The stadium of the local football club in the district where he grew up, Kasımpaşa S.K. is named after him.[16][17]

Erdoğan is a member of the Community of İskenderpaşa, a Turkish Sufistic community of Naqshbandi tariqah.[18][19]

Education

[edit]

Erdoğan graduated from Kasımpaşa Piyale Primary School in 1965, and the Istanbul İmam Hatip High School, a religious vocational high school, in 1973.[20] The same educational path was followed by other co-founders of the AK Party.[21] One quarter of the curriculum of İmam Hatip schools involves study of the Quran, the life of the Islamic prophet Muhammad, and the Arabic language. Erdoğan studied the Quran at the İmam Hatip, where his classmates began calling him hoca ("teacher" or "religious official").

Erdoğan attended a meeting of the nationalist student group National Turkish Student Union (Milli Türk Talebe Birliği), who sought to raise a conservative cohort of young people to counter the rising movement of leftists in Turkey. Within the group, Erdoğan was distinguished by his oratorical skills, developing a penchant for public speaking and excelling in front of an audience. He won first place in a poetry-reading competition organized by the Community of Turkish Technical Painters, and began preparing for speeches through reading and research. Erdoğan would later comment on these competitions as "enhancing our courage to speak in front of the masses".[22]

Erdoğan wanted to pursue advanced studies at the Ankara University Faculty of Political Science, commonly known as Mülkiye, but only students with regular high school diplomas were eligible to apply, thereby excluding Imam Hatip graduates. Mülkiye was known for its political science department, which trained many statesmen and politicians in Turkey. Erdoğan was then admitted to Eyüp High School, a regular state school. That he eventually received a high school diploma from this school is a subject of debate.[23][24]

According to his official biography, Erdoğan subsequently studied business administration at the Aksaray School of Economics and Commercial Sciences (Turkish: Aksaray İktisat ve Ticaret Yüksekokulu), now known as Marmara University's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences.[1] Both the authenticity and status of his degree have been the subject of disputes and controversy over whether the diploma is legitimate and ought to be considered sufficient to make him eligible as a candidate for the presidency.[25]

Early political career

[edit]
Prime Minister Erdoğan on 18 March 2008, during the Çanakkale Victory and Martyrs' Remembrance Day ceremony

In 1976, Erdoğan engaged in politics by joining the National Turkish Student Union, an anti-communist action group. In the same year, he became head of the Beyoğlu youth branch of the Islamist National Salvation Party (MSP),[26] and was later promoted to chair of the Istanbul youth branch.[20] He held this position until the 1980 military coup which dissolved all major political parties. He went on to be a consultant and senior executive in the private sector in the aftermath of the coup.

Three years later, in 1983, Erdoğan followed most of Necmettin Erbakan's followers into the newly founded Welfare Party (RP). The new party, like its predecessors subscribed to Erbakan's strain of Islamism, the National view. He became the party's Beyoğlu district chair in 1984, and head of its Istanbul branch in 1985. Erdoğan entered the parliamentary by-elections of 1986 as a candidate in Istanbul's 6th electoral district, but failed to get elected. Three years later, Erdoğan ran for the district mayoralty of Beyoğlu, finishing in second place with 22.8% of the vote.[27]

In the 1991 general election, the Welfare Party more than doubled its share of the vote in Istanbul compared to four years prior, reaching 16.7%. At first, Erdoğan, who led his party's district list, was thought to have been elected to parliament. However, as a product of the open-list proportional representation system adopted during the previous term, after all votes expressing a candidate preference were tabulated, it was instead Mustafa Baş who earned the seat allocated to the Welfare Party. A difference of about 4,000 preferential votes separated the two, with Baş's ~13,000 to Erdoğan's ~9,000.[28]

Mayor of Istanbul (1994–1998)

[edit]

In the local elections of 1994, Erdoğan ran as a candidate for Mayor of Istanbul. He was a young, dark horse candidate in a crowded field. Over the course of the campaign, he was mocked by the mainstream media and treated as a country bumpkin by his opponents.[29] In an upset, he won with 25.19% of the popular vote, making it the first time a mayor of Istanbul got elected from his political party. His win coincided with a wave of Welfare Party victories nationwide, as they won 28 provincial mayoralties - most out of any party - and numerous metropolitan seats, including the capital, Ankara. He said at the time: "Democracy is like a train: when we reach our destination, we get off".[30]

Erdoğan governed pragmatically, focusing on bread-and-butter issues. He aimed to tackle the chronic problems plaguing the metropolis, such as water shortage, pollution – waste collection issues in particular – and severely congested traffic. He undertook an infrastructure overhaul: expanding and modernizing the water grid with hundreds of kilometers of new water pipes being laid, and constructing more than fifty bridges, viaducts, and stretches of highway to mitigate traffic. State-of-the-art recycling facilities were built and air pollution was reduced through a plan to switch to natural gas. He changed the public buses to environmentally friendly ones. He took precautions to prevent corruption, using measures to ensure that municipal funds were used prudently. He paid back a major portion of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality's two-billion-dollar debt and invested four billion dollars in the city.[31] He also opened up City Hall to the people, gave out his e-mail address and established municipal hot lines.[32]

Erdoğan initiated the first roundtable of mayors during the Istanbul conference, which led to a global, organized movement of mayors. A seven-member international jury from the United Nations unanimously awarded Erdoğan the UN-Habitat award.[33]

Imprisonment

[edit]

In December 1997 in Siirt, Erdoğan recited a modified version of the "Soldier's prayer" poem written by Ziya Gökalp, a pan-Turkish activist of the early 20th century.[34] This version included an additional stanza in the beginning, its first two verses reading "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets / The minarets our bayonets and the faithful our soldiers...."[11] Under article 312/2 of the Turkish penal code his recitation was regarded by the judge as an incitement to violence and religious or racial hatred.[35][36][34] In his defense, Erdoğan said that the poem was published in state-approved books.[32] How this version of the poem ended up in a book published by the Turkish Standards Institution remained a topic of discussion.[37]

Erdoğan was given a ten-month prison sentence.[36] He was forced to give up his mayoral position due to his conviction. The conviction also stipulated a political ban, which prevented him from participating in elections.[38] He had appealed for the sentence to be converted to a monetary fine, but it was reduced to four months instead (24 March 1999 to 27 July 1999).[39]

He was transferred to Pınarhisar prison in Kırklareli. The day Erdoğan went to prison, he released an album called This Song Doesn't End Here.[40] The album features a tracklist of seven poems and became the best-selling album of Turkey in 1999, selling over one million copies.[41] After his release, Erdoğan sought refuge in Tetovo, Macedonia with an ethnic Albanian family with whom he stayed with for several months.[42]

In 2013, Erdoğan visited the Pınarhisar prison again for the first time in fourteen years. After the visit, he said "For me, Pınarhisar is a symbol of rebirth, where we prepared the establishment of the Justice and Development Party".[43]

Justice and Development Party

[edit]
Party leader Erdoğan's meeting with Romano Prodi (President of the European Commission) and Günter Verheugen (European Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement) in Brussels, Belgium, 2002

Erdoğan was member of political parties that kept getting banned by the army or judges. Within his Virtue Party, there was a dispute about the appropriate discourse of the party between traditional politicians and pro-reform politicians. The latter envisioned a party that could operate within the limits of the system, and thus not getting banned as its predecessors like National Order Party, National Salvation Party and Welfare Party. They wanted to give the group the character of an ordinary conservative party with its members being Muslim Democrats following the example of the Europe's Christian Democrats.[32]

When the Virtue Party was also banned in 2001, a definitive split took place: the followers of Necmettin Erbakan founded the Felicity Party (SP) and the reformers founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Abdullah Gül and Erdoğan. The pro-reform politicians realized that a strictly Islamic party would never be accepted as a governing party by the state apparatus and they believed that an Islamic party did not appeal to more than about 20 percent of the Turkish electorate. The AK party emphatically placed itself as a broad democratic conservative party with new politicians from the political center (like Ali Babacan and Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu), while respecting Islamic norms and values, but without an explicit religious program. This turned out to be successful as the new party won 34% of the vote in the general elections of 2002. Erdoğan became prime minister in March 2003 after the Gül government ended his political ban.[44]

Premiership

[edit]
Prime Minister Erdoğan during a press conference with Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, at the Office of the Prime Minister (Başbakanlık), in 2014

General elections

[edit]

The elections of 2002 were the first elections in which Erdoğan participated as a party leader. All parties previously elected to parliament failed to win enough votes to re-enter the parliament. The AKP won 34.3% of the national vote and formed the new government. Turkish stocks rose more than 7% on Monday morning. Politicians of the previous generation, such as Ecevit, Bahceli, Yılmaz and Çiller, resigned. The second largest party, the CHP, received 19.4% of the votes. The AKP won a landslide victory in the parliament, taking nearly two-thirds of the seats. Erdoğan could not become Prime Minister as he was still banned from politics by the judiciary for his speech in Siirt. Gül became the Prime Minister instead. In December 2002, the Supreme Election Board canceled the general election results from Siirt due to voting irregularities and scheduled a new election for 9 February 2003. By this time, party leader Erdoğan was able to run for parliament due to a legal change made possible by the opposition Republican People's Party. The AKP duly listed Erdoğan as a candidate for the rescheduled election, which he won, becoming Prime Minister after Gül handed over the post.[45]

On 14 April 2007, an estimated 300,000 people marched in Ankara to protest against the possible candidacy of Erdoğan in the 2007 presidential election, afraid that if elected as president, he would alter the secular nature of the Turkish state.[46] Erdoğan announced on 24 April 2007 that the party had nominated Abdullah Gül as the AKP candidate in the presidential election.[47][48] The protests continued over the next several weeks, with over one million people reported to have turned out at a 29 April rally in Istanbul,[49] tens of thousands at separate protests on 4 May in Manisa and Çanakkale,[50] and one million in İzmir on 13 May.[51]

The stage of the elections of 2007 was set for a fight for legitimacy in the eyes of voters between his government and the CHP. Erdoğan used the event that took place during the ill-fated Presidential elections a few months earlier as a part of the general election campaign of his party. On 22 July 2007, the AKP won an important victory over the opposition, garnering 46.7% of the popular vote. 22 July elections marked only the second time in the Republic of Turkey's history whereby an incumbent governing party won an election by increasing its share of popular support.[52] On 14 March 2008, Turkey's Chief Prosecutor asked the country's Constitutional Court to ban Erdoğan's governing party.[53] The party escaped a ban on 30 July 2008, a year after winning 46.7% of the vote in national elections, although judges did cut the party's public funding by 50%.[54]

In the June 2011 elections, Erdoğan's governing party won 327 seats (49.83% of the popular vote) making Erdoğan the only prime minister in Turkey's history to win three consecutive general elections, each time receiving more votes than the previous election. The second party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), received 135 seats (25.94%), the nationalist MHP received 53 seats (13.01%), and the Independents received 35 seats (6.58%).[55]

A US$100 billion corruption scandal in 2013 led to the arrests of Erdoğan's close allies, and incriminated Erdoğan.[56][57][58]

Referendums

[edit]
Erdoğan in a meeting with the Main Opposition Leader Deniz Baykal of the Republican People's Party (CHP)

After the opposition parties deadlocked the 2007 presidential election by boycotting the parliament, the ruling AKP proposed a constitutional reform package. The reform package was first vetoed by President Ahmet Necdet Sezer. Then he applied to the Turkish constitutional court about the reform package, because the president is unable to veto amendments for the second time. The Turkish constitutional court did not find any problems in the packet and 68.95% of the voters supported the constitutional changes.[59] The reforms consisted of electing the president by popular vote instead of by parliament; reducing the presidential term from seven years to five; allowing the president to stand for re-election for a second term; holding general elections every four years instead of five; and reducing from 367 to 184 the quorum of lawmakers needed for parliamentary decisions.

Reforming the Constitution was one of the main pledges of the AKP during the 2007 election campaign. The main opposition party CHP was not interested in altering the Constitution on a big scale, making it impossible to form a Constitutional Commission (Anayasa Uzlaşma Komisyonu).[60] The amendments lacked the two-thirds majority needed to become law instantly, but secured 336 votes in the 550-seat parliament – enough to put the proposals to a referendum. The reform package included a number of issues such as the right of individuals to appeal to the highest court, the creation of the ombudsman's office; the possibility to negotiate a nationwide labour contract; gender equality; the ability of civilian courts to convict members of the military; the right of civil servants to go on strike; a privacy law; and the structure of the Constitutional Court. The referendum was agreed by a majority of 58%.[61]

Domestic policy

[edit]

Kurdish issue

[edit]

In 2009, Prime Minister Erdoğan's government announced a plan to help end the quarter-century-long Turkey–Kurdistan Workers' Party conflict that had cost more than 40,000 lives. The government's plan, supported by the European Union, intended to allow the Kurdish language to be used in all broadcast media and political campaigns, and restored Kurdish names to cities and towns that had been given Turkish ones.[62] Erdoğan said, "We took a courageous step to resolve chronic issues that constitute an obstacle along Turkey's development, progression and empowerment."[62] Erdoğan passed a partial amnesty to reduce penalties faced by many members of the Kurdish guerrilla movement PKK who had surrendered to the government.[63] On 23 November 2011, during a televised meeting of his party in Ankara, he apologized on behalf of the state for the Dersim massacre, where many Alevis and Zazas were killed.[64] In 2013 the government of Erdoğan began a peace process between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and the Turkish Government,[65] mediated by parliamentarians of the Peoples' Democratic party (HDP).[66]

In 2015, following AKP electoral defeat, the rise of a social democrat, pro-Kurdish rights opposition party, and the minor Ceylanpınar incident, he decided that the peace process was over and supported the revocation of the parliamentary immunity of the HDP parliamentarians.[67] Violent confrontation resumed in 2015–2017, mainly in the South East of Turkey, resulting in higher death tolls and several external operations on the part of the Turkish military. Representatives and elected HDP have been systematically arrested, removed, and replaced in their offices, this tendency being confirmed after the 2016 Turkish coup attempt and the following purges. Six thousand additional deaths occurred in Turkey alone for 2015–2022. Yet, as of 2022 the intensity of the PKK-Turkey conflict did decrease in recent years.[68] In the previous decade, Erdoğan and the AKP government used anti-PKK, martial rhetoric and external operations to raise Turkish nationalist votes before elections.[69][70][71]

Armenian genocide

[edit]

Erdoğan has continued Turkey's policy of Armenian genocide denial.[72] He has said multiple times that Turkey would recognize the mass killings of Armenians during World War I as a genocide only after a thorough investigation by a joint Turkish-Armenian commission consisting of historians, archaeologists, political scientists and other experts.[73][74][75] In 2005, Erdoğan and the main opposition party leader Deniz Baykal wrote a letter to President of Armenia Robert Kocharyan, proposing the creation of a joint Turkish-Armenian commission.[76] Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian rejected the offer because he asserted that the proposal itself was "insincere and not serious". He added: "This issue cannot be considered at historical level with Turks, who themselves politicized the problem."[77][78]

In December 2008, Erdoğan criticized the I Apologize campaign by Turkish intellectuals to recognize the Armenian genocide, saying, "I neither accept nor support this campaign. We did not commit a crime, therefore we do not need to apologise ... It will not have any benefit other than stirring up trouble, disturbing our peace and undoing the steps which have been taken."[79]

In 2011, Erdoğan called the 33-meter-tall (108 ft) Monument to Humanity, a statue dedicated to fostering Armenian and Turkish relations, "freakishly ugly" (Turkish: ucube) and ordered it to be demolished. Erdoğan was subsequently fined by a Turkish judge for insulting the work and the creator was compensated due to the "violation of the freedom of expression".

In 2011, Erdoğan ordered the tearing-down of the 33-meter-tall (108 ft) Monument to Humanity, a Turkish–Armenian friendship monument in Kars, which was commissioned in 2006 and represented a metaphor of the rapprochement of the two countries after many years of dispute over the events of 1915. Erdoğan justified the removal by stating that the monument was offensively close to the tomb of an 11th-century Islamic scholar, and that its shadow ruined the view of that site, while Kars municipality officials said it was illegally erected in a protected area. However, the former mayor of Kars who approved the original construction of the monument said the municipality was destroying not just a "monument to humanity" but "humanity itself". The demolition was not unopposed; among its detractors were several Turkish artists. Two of them, the painter Bedri Baykam and his associate, Pyramid Art Gallery general coordinator Tugba Kurtulmus, were stabbed after a meeting with other artists at the Istanbul Akatlar cultural center.[80]

On 23 April 2014, Erdoğan's office issued a statement in nine languages (including two dialects of Armenian), offering condolences for the mass killings of Armenians and stating that the events of 1915 had inhumane consequences. The statement described the mass killings as the two nations' shared pain and said: "Having experienced events which had inhumane consequences – such as relocation – during the First World War, (it) should not prevent Turks and Armenians from establishing compassion and mutually humane attitudes among one another."[81]

Pope Francis in April 2015, at a special mass in St. Peter's Basilica marking the centenary of the events, described atrocities against Armenian civilians in 1915–1922 as "the first genocide of the 20th century". In protest, Erdoğan recalled the Turkish ambassador from the Vatican, and summoned the Vatican's ambassador, to express "disappointment" at what he called a discriminatory message. He later stated "we don't carry a stain or a shadow like genocide". US President Barack Obama called for a "full, frank and just acknowledgement of the facts", but again stopped short of labelling it "genocide", despite his campaign promise to do so.[82][83][84]

In April 2021, US President Joe Biden formally recognized the Armenian genocide. Erdoğan condemned the move as "groundless", "unfair" and "destructive", and accused Biden of bowing to "pressure from radical Armenian groups and anti-Turkish circles". He invoked the destruction of Native American peoples by the US to accuse Biden of hypocrisy.[72]

Human rights

[edit]

During Erdoğan's time as Prime Minister, the far-reaching powers of the 1991 Anti-Terror Law were reduced. In 2004, the death penalty was abolished for all circumstances.[85] The Democratic initiative process was initiated, with the goal to improve democratic standards in general and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities in particular. In 2012, the Human Rights and Equality Institution of Turkey and the Ombudsman Institution were established. The UN Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture was ratified. Children are no longer prosecuted under terrorism legislation.[86] The Jewish community were allowed to celebrate Hanukkah publicly for the first time in modern Turkish history in 2015.[87] The Turkish government approved a law in 2008 to return properties confiscated in the past by the state to non-Muslim foundations.[88] It also paved the way for the free allocation of worship places such as synagogues and churches to non-Muslim foundations.[89] However, European officials noted a return to more authoritarian ways after the stalling of Turkey's bid to join the European Union[90] notably on freedom of speech,[91][92][93] freedom of the press[94][95][96] and Kurdish minority rights.[97][98][99][100] Demands by activists for the recognition of LGBTQ rights were publicly rejected by government members.[101][102]

Reporters Without Borders reported a continuous decrease in Freedom of the Press during Erdoğan's later terms, with a rank of around 100 on its Press Freedom Index during his first term and a rank of 153 out of a total of 179 countries in 2021.[103] Freedom House reported a slight recovery in later years and awarded Turkey a Press Freedom Score of 55/100 in 2012 after a low point of 48/100 in 2006.[104][105][106][107]

In 2011, Erdoğan's government made legal reforms to return properties of Christian and Jewish minorities which were seized by the Turkish government in the 1930s.[108] The total value of the properties returned reached $2 billion (USD).[109]

Under Erdoğan, the Turkish government tightened the laws on the sale and consumption of alcohol, banning all advertising and increasing the tax on alcoholic beverages.[110]

Economy

[edit]
Public debt of the six major European countries between 2002 and 2009 as a percentage of GDP
GDP per capita PPP of Turkey compared to other emerging economies

In 2002, Erdoğan inherited a Turkish economy that was beginning to recover from a recession as a result of reforms implemented by Kemal Derviş.[111] Erdoğan supported Finance Minister Ali Babacan in enforcing macro-economic policies. Erdoğan tried to attract more foreign investors to Turkey and lifted many government regulations. The cash-flow into the Turkish economy between 2002 and 2012 caused a growth of 64% in real GDP and a 43% increase in GDP per capita; considerably higher numbers were commonly advertised but these did not account for the inflation of the US dollar between 2002 and 2012.[112] The average annual growth in GDP per capita was 3.6%. The growth in real GDP between 2002 and 2012 was higher than the values from developed countries, but was close to average when developing countries are also taken into account. The ranking of the Turkish economy in terms of GDP moved slightly from 17 to 16 during this decade. A major consequence of the policies between 2002 and 2012 was the widening of the current account deficit from US$600 million to US$58 billion (2013 est.)[113]

Since 1961, Turkey has signed 19 IMF loan accords. Erdoğan's government satisfied the budgetary and market requirements of the two during his administration and received every loan installment, the only time any Turkish government has done so.[114] Erdoğan inherited a debt of $23.5 billion to the IMF, which was reduced to $0.9 billion in 2012. He decided not to sign a new deal. Turkey's debt to the IMF was thus declared to be completely paid and he announced that the IMF could borrow from Turkey.[115] In 2010, five-year credit default swaps for Turkey's sovereign debt were trading at a record low of 1.17%, below those of nine EU member countries and Russia. In 2002, the Turkish Central Bank had $26.5 billion in reserves. This amount reached $92.2 billion in 2011. During Erdoğan's leadership, inflation fell from 32% to 9.0% in 2004. Since then, Turkish inflation has continued to fluctuate around 9% and is still one of the highest inflation rates in the world.[116] The Turkish public debt as a percentage of annual GDP declined from 74% in 2002 to 39% in 2009. In 2012, Turkey had a lower ratio of public debt to GDP than 21 of 27 members of the European Union and a lower budget deficit to GDP ratio than 23 of them.[117]

In 2003, Erdoğan's government pushed through the Labor Act, a comprehensive reform of Turkey's labor laws. The law greatly expanded the rights of employees, establishing a 45-hour workweek and limiting overtime work to 270 hours a year, provided legal protection against discrimination due to sex, religion, or political affiliation, prohibited discrimination between permanent and temporary workers, entitled employees terminated without "valid cause" to compensation, and mandated written contracts for employment arrangements lasting a year or more.[118][119]

Education

[edit]

Erdoğan increased the budget of the Ministry of Education from 7.5 billion lira in 2002 to 34 billion lira in 2011, the highest share of the national budget given to one ministry.[120] Before his prime ministership the military received the highest share of the national budget. Compulsory education was increased from eight years to twelve.[121] In 2003, the Turkish government, together with UNICEF, initiated a campaign called "Come on girls, [let's go] to school!" (Turkish: Haydi Kızlar Okula!). The goal of this campaign was to close the gender gap in primary school enrollment through the provision of a quality basic education for all girls, especially in southeast Turkey.[122]

In 2005, the parliament granted amnesty to students expelled from universities before 2003. The amnesty applied to students dismissed on academic or disciplinary grounds.[123] In 2004, textbooks became free of charge and since 2008 every province in Turkey has its own university.[124] During Erdoğan's Premiership, the number of universities in Turkey nearly doubled, from 98 in 2002 to 186 in October 2012.[125]

The Prime Minister kept his campaign promises by starting the Fatih project in which all state schools, from preschool to high school level, received a total of 620,000 smart boards, while tablet computers were distributed to 17 million students and approximately one million teachers and administrators.[126]

In June 2017 a draft proposal by the ministry of education was approved by Erdoğan, in which the curriculum for schools excluded the teaching of the theory of evolution of Charles Darwin by 2019. From then on the teaching will be postponed and start at undergraduate level.[127]

Infrastructure

[edit]
The 1915 Çanakkale Bridge, the longest suspension bridge in the world, was officially opened by Erdoğan in 2022.[128][129]

Under Erdoğan's government, the number of airports in Turkey increased from 26 to 50 in the period of 10 years.[130] Between the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and 2002, there had been 6,000 km of dual carriageway roads created. Between 2002 and 2011, another 13,500 km of expressway were built. Due to these measures, the number of motor accidents fell by 50 percent.[131] For the first time in Turkish history, high speed railway lines were constructed, and the country's high-speed train service began in 2009.[132] In 8 years, 1,076 km of railway were built and 5,449 km of railway renewed. The construction of Marmaray, an undersea rail tunnel under the Bosphorus strait, started in 2004. It was inaugurated on the 90th anniversary of the Turkish Republic 29 October 2013.[133] The inauguration of the Yavuz Sultan Selim Bridge, the third bridge over the Bosphorus, was on 26 August 2016.[134]

Justice

[edit]
The new Court of Cassation (Yargıtay) building in Ankara was opened in 2021.

In March 2006, the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) held a press conference to publicly protest the obstruction of the appointment of judges to the high courts for over 10 months. The HSYK said Erdoğan wanted to fill the vacant posts with his own appointees. Erdoğan was accused of creating a rift with Turkey's highest court of appeal, the Yargıtay, and high administrative court, the Danıştay. Erdoğan stated that the constitution gave the power to assign these posts to his elected party.[135]

In May 2007, the head of Turkey's High Court asked prosecutors to consider whether Erdoğan should be charged over critical comments regarding the election of Abdullah Gül as president.[135] Erdoğan said the ruling was "a disgrace to the justice system", and criticized the Constitutional Court which had invalidated a presidential vote because a boycott by other parties meant there was no quorum. Prosecutors investigated his earlier comments, including saying it had fired a "bullet at democracy". Tülay Tuğcu, head of the Constitutional Court, condemned Erdoğan for "threats, insults and hostility" towards the justice system.[136]

Civil–military relations

[edit]
Erdoğan during an official visit to Peru, with a member of the Turkish army behind him

The Turkish military has had a record of intervening in politics, having removed elected governments four times in the past. During the Erdoğan government, civil–military relationship moved towards normalization in which the influence of the military in politics was significantly reduced.[137] The ruling Justice and Development Party has often faced off against the military, gaining political power by challenging a pillar of the country's laicistic establishment.

The most significant issue that caused deep fissures between the army and the government was the midnight e-memorandum posted on the military's website objecting to the selection of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül as the ruling party's candidate for the Presidency in 2007. The military argued that the election of Gül, whose wife wears an Islamic headscarf, could undermine the laicistic order of the country. Contrary to expectations, the government responded harshly to former Chief of General Staff Gen. Yaşar Büyükanıt's e-memorandum, stating the military had nothing to do with the selection of the presidential candidate.[138]

Health care

[edit]

After assuming power in 2003, Erdoğan's government embarked on a sweeping reform program of the Turkish healthcare system, called the Health Transformation Program (HTP), to greatly increase the quality of healthcare and protect all citizens from financial risks. Its introduction coincided with the period of sustained economic growth, allowing the Turkish government to put greater investments into the healthcare system. As part of the reforms, the "Green Card" program, which provides health benefits to the poor, was expanded in 2004.[139] The reform program aimed at increasing the ratio of private to state-run healthcare, which, along with long queues in state-run hospitals, resulted in the rise of private medical care in Turkey, forcing state-run hospitals to compete by increasing quality.

In April 2006, Erdoğan unveiled a social security reform package demanded by the International Monetary Fund under a loan deal. The move, which Erdoğan called one of the most radical reforms ever, was passed with fierce opposition. Turkey's three social security bodies were united under one roof, bringing equal health services and retirement benefits for members of all three bodies. The previous system had been criticized for reserving the best healthcare for civil servants and relegating others to wait in long queues. Under the second bill, everyone under the age of 18 years was entitled to free health services, irrespective of whether they pay premiums to any social security organization. The bill also envisages a gradual increase in the retirement age: starting from 2036, the retirement age will increase to 65 by 2048 for both women and men.[140]

In January 2008, the Turkish Parliament adopted a law to prohibit smoking in most public places. Erdoğan is outspokenly anti-smoking.[141]

Foreign policy

[edit]
Countries visited by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as prime minister

Turkish foreign policy during Erdoğan's tenure as prime minister has been associated with the name of Ahmet Davutoğlu. Davutoğlu was the chief foreign policy advisor of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan before he was appointed foreign minister in 2009. The basis of Erdoğan's foreign policy is based on the principle of "don't make enemies, make friends"[142] and the pursuit of "zero problems" with neighboring countries.[143]

Erdoğan is co-founder of United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (AOC). The initiative seeks to galvanize international action against extremism through the forging of international, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue and cooperation.

European Union

[edit]
Erdoğan with President in office of the EU Council and Dutch Prime Minister Balkenende and Turkish FM Gül in Brussels, Belgium (2004)

When Erdoğan came to power, he continued Turkey's long ambition of joining the European Union. Turkey, under Erdoğan, made many strides in its laws that would qualify for EU membership.[144] On 3 October 2005 negotiations began for Turkey's accession to the European Union.[145][146] Erdoğan was named "The European of the Year 2004" by the newspaper European Voice for the reforms in his country in order to accomplish the accession of Turkey to the European Union. He said in a comment that "Turkey's accession shows that Europe is a continent where civilisations reconcile and not clash."[147] On 3 October 2005, the negotiations for Turkey's accession to the EU formally started during Erdoğan's tenure as Prime Minister.[145]

The European Commission generally supports Erdoğan's reforms, but it remains critical of his policies. Negotiations about a possible EU membership came to a standstill in 2009 and 2010, when Turkish ports were closed to Cypriot ships. The Turkish government continues its refusal to recognize EU member state Cyprus.

Greece and Cyprus dispute

[edit]
Erdoğan with Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou

Relations between Greece and Turkey were normalized during Erdoğan's tenure as prime minister. In May 2004, Erdoğan became the first Turkish Prime Minister to visit Greece since 1988, and the first to visit the Turkish minority of Thrace since 1952. In 2007, Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis inaugurated the Greek-Turkish natural gas pipeline giving Caspian gas its first direct Western outlet.[148] Turkey and Greece signed an agreement to create a Combined Joint Operational Unit within the framework of NATO to participate in Peace Support Operations.[149] Erdoğan and his party strongly supported the EU-backed referendum to reunify Cyprus in 2004.[150] Negotiations about a possible EU membership came to a standstill in 2009 and 2010, when Turkish ports were closed to Cypriot ships as a consequence of the economic isolation of the internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the failure of the EU to end the isolation, as it had promised in 2004.[151] The Turkish government continues its refusal to recognize the Republic of Cyprus.[152]

Armenia

[edit]

Armenia is Turkey's only neighbor which Erdoğan has not visited during his premiership. The Turkish-Armenian border has been closed since 1993 because of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Turkey's close ally Azerbaijan.

Diplomatic efforts resulted in the signing of protocols between Turkish and Armenian Foreign Ministers in Switzerland to improve relations between the two countries. One of the points of the agreement was the creation of a joint commission on the issue. The Armenian Constitutional Court decided that the commission contradicts the Armenian constitution. Turkey responded saying that Armenian court's ruling on the protocols is not acceptable, resulting in a suspension of the rectification process by the Turkish side.[153]

Erdoğan has said that Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan should apologize for calling on school children to re-occupy eastern Turkey. When asked by a student at a literature contest ceremony if Armenians will be able to get back their "western territories" along with Mt. Ararat, Sarksyan said, "This is the task of your generation".[154]

Russia

[edit]
High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council with Prime Minister Erdoğan and President Putin

In December 2004, President Putin visited Turkey, making it the first presidential visit in the history of Turkish-Russian relations besides that of the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Nikolai Podgorny in 1972. In November 2005, Putin attended the inauguration of a jointly constructed Blue Stream natural gas pipeline in Turkey. This sequence of top-level visits has brought several important bilateral issues to the forefront. The two countries consider it their strategic goal to achieve "multidimensional co-operation", especially in the fields of energy, transport and the military. Specifically, Russia aims to invest in Turkey's fuel and energy industries, and it also expects to participate in tenders for the modernization of Turkey's military.[155] The relations during this time are described by President Medvedev as "Turkey is one of our most important partners with respect to regional and international issues. We can confidently say that Russian-Turkish relations have advanced to the level of a multidimensional strategic partnership".[156]

In May 2010, Turkey and Russia signed 17 agreements to enhance cooperation in energy and other fields, including pacts to build Turkey's first nuclear power plant and further plans for an oil pipeline from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. The leaders of both countries also signed an agreement on visa-free travel, enabling tourists to get into the other country for free and stay there for up to 30 days.[citation needed]

United States

[edit]
Erdoğan and Barack Obama in White House, 7 December 2009

When Barack Obama became President of United States, he made his first overseas bilateral meeting to Turkey in April 2009.

At a joint news conference in Turkey, Obama said: "I'm trying to make a statement about the importance of Turkey, not just to the United States but to the world. I think that where there's the most promise of building stronger US-Turkish relations is in the recognition that Turkey and the United States can build a model partnership in which a predominantly Christian nation, a predominantly Muslim nation – a Western nation and a nation that straddles two continents," he continued, "that we can create a modern international community that is respectful, that is secure, that is prosperous, that there are not tensions – inevitable tensions between cultures – which I think is extraordinarily important."[157]

Iraq

[edit]

Turkey under Erdoğan was named by the Bush Administration as a part of the "coalition of the willing" that was central to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.[158] On 1 March 2003, a motion allowing Turkish military to participate in the U.S.-led coalition's invasion of Iraq, along with the permission for foreign troops to be stationed in Turkey for this purpose, was overruled by the Turkish Parliament.[159]

After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq and Turkey signed 48 trade agreements on issues including security, energy, and water. The Turkish government attempted to mend relations with Iraqi Kurdistan by opening a Turkish university in Erbil, and a Turkish consulate in Mosul.[160] Erdoğan's government fostered economic and political relations with Irbil, and Turkey began to consider the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq as an ally against Maliki's government.[161]

Israel

[edit]
Erdoğan walks out of the session at the World Economic Forum in 2009, vows never to return.

Erdoğan visited Israel on 1 May 2005, a gesture unusual for a leader of a Muslim majority country.[162] During his trip, Erdoğan visited the Yad Vashem, Israel's official memorial to the victims of the Holocaust.[162] The President of Israel Shimon Peres addressed the Turkish parliament during a visit in 2007, the first time an Israeli leader had addressed the legislature of a predominantly Muslim nation.[163]

Their relationship worsened at the 2009 World Economic Forum conference over Israel's actions during the Gaza War.[164] Erdoğan was interrupted by the moderator while he was responding to Peres. Erdoğan stated: "Mister Peres, you are older than I am. Maybe you are feeling guilty and that is why you are raising your voice. When it comes to killing you know it too well. I remember how you killed the children on beaches..." Upon the moderator's reminder that they needed to adjourn for dinner, Erdoğan left the panel, accusing the moderator of giving Peres more time than all the other panelists combined.[165]

Tensions increased further following the Gaza flotilla raid in May 2010. Erdoğan strongly condemned the raid, describing it as "state terrorism", and demanded an Israeli apology.[166] In February 2013, Erdoğan called Zionism a "crime against humanity", comparing it to Islamophobia, antisemitism, and fascism.[167] He later retracted the statement, saying he had been misinterpreted. He said "everyone should know" that his comments were directed at "Israeli policies", especially as regards to "Gaza and the settlements".[168][169] Erdoğan's statements were criticized by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, among others.[170][171] In August 2013, the Hürriyet reported that Erdoğan had claimed to have evidence of Israel's responsibility for the removal of Morsi from office in Egypt.[172] The Israeli and Egyptian governments dismissed the suggestion.[173]

In response to the 2014 Gaza War, Erdoğan accused Israel of conducting "state terrorism" and a "genocide attempt" against the Palestinians.[174] He also stated that "If Israel continues with this attitude, it will definitely be tried at international courts."[175]

Syria

[edit]
Angela Merkel, Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Emmanuel Macron giving a press conference as part of Syria summit in Istanbul, Turkey

During Erdoğan's term of office, diplomatic relations between Turkey and Syria significantly deteriorated. In 2004, President Bashar al-Assad arrived in Turkey for the first official visit by a Syrian President in 57 years. In late 2004, Erdoğan signed a free trade agreement with Syria. Visa restrictions between the two countries were lifted in 2009, which caused an economic boom in the regions near the Syrian border.[176] However, in 2011 the relationship between the two countries was strained following the outbreak of conflict in Syria. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said he was trying to "cultivate a favorable relationship with whatever government would take the place of Assad".[177] However, he began to support the opposition in Syria, after demonstrations turned violent, creating a serious Syrian refugee problem in Turkey.[178] Erdoğan's policy of providing military training for anti-Damascus fighters has also created conflict with Syria's ally and a neighbour of Turkey, Iran.[179]

Saudi Arabia

[edit]

In August 2006, King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz as-Saud made a visit to Turkey. This was the first visit by a Saudi monarch to Turkey in the last four decades. The monarch made a second visit, on 9 November 2007. Turk-Saudi trade volume has exceeded US$ 3.2 billion in 2006, almost double the figure achieved in 2003. In 2009, this amount reached US$ 5.5 billion and the goal for the year 2010 was US$ 10 billion.[180]

Erdoğan condemned the Saudi-led intervention in Bahrain and characterized the Saudi movement as "a new Karbala". He demanded withdrawal of Saudi forces from Bahrain.[181]

Egypt

[edit]

Erdoğan had made his first official visit to Egypt on 12 September 2011, accompanied by six ministers and 200 businessmen.[182] This visit was made very soon after Turkey had ejected Israeli ambassadors, cutting off all diplomatic relations with Israel because Israel refused to apologize for the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid which killed eight Turkish and one Turco-American.[182]

Erdoğan's visit to Egypt was met with much enthusiasm by Egyptians. CNN reported some Egyptians saying "We consider him as the Islamic leader in the Middle East", while others were appreciative of his role in supporting Gaza.[182] Erdoğan was later honoured in Tahrir Square by members of the Egyptian Revolution Youth Union, and members of the Turkish embassy were presented with a coat of arms in acknowledgment of the Prime Minister's support of the Egyptian Revolution.[183]

Erdoğan stated in a 2011 interview that he supported secularism for Egypt, which generated an angry reaction among Islamic movements, especially the Freedom and Justice Party, which was the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.[183] However, commentators suggest that by forming an alliance with the military junta during Egypt's transition to democracy, Erdoğan may have tipped the balance in favor of an authoritarian government.[183]

Erdoğan condemned the sit-in dispersals conducted by Egyptian police on 14 August 2013 at the Rabaa al-Adawiya and al-Nahda squares, where violent clashes between police officers and pro-Morsi Islamist protesters led to hundreds of deaths, mostly protesters.[184] In July 2014, one year after the removal of Mohamed Morsi from office, Erdoğan described Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi as an "illegitimate tyrant".[185]

Somalia

[edit]
Erdoğan and Somalian President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud opening the new terminal of Aden Abdulle International Airport in Mogadishu, Somalia

Erdoğan's administration maintains strong ties with the Somali government. During the drought of 2011, Erdoğan's government contributed over $201 million to humanitarian relief efforts in the impacted parts of Somalia.[186] Following a greatly improved security situation in Mogadishu in mid-2011, the Turkish government also re-opened its foreign embassy with the intention of more effectively assisting in the post-conflict development process.[187] It was among the first foreign governments to resume formal diplomatic relations with Somalia after the civil war.[188]

In May 2010, the Turkish and Somali governments signed a military training agreement, in keeping with the provisions outlined in the Djibouti Peace Process.[189] Turkish Airlines became the first long-distance international commercial airline in two decades to resume flights to and from Mogadishu's Aden Adde International Airport.[188] Turkey also launched various development and infrastructure projects in Somalia including building several hospitals and helping renovate the National Assembly building.[188]

Protests

[edit]

The 2013 Gezi Park protests were held against the perceived authoritarianism of Erdoğan and his policies, starting from a small sit-in in Istanbul in defense of a city park.[190] After the police's intense reaction with tear gas, the protests grew each day. Faced by the largest mass protest in a decade, Erdoğan made this controversial remark in a televised speech: "The police were there yesterday, they are there today, and they will be there tomorrow". After weeks of clashes in the streets of Istanbul, his government at first apologized to the protestors[191] and called for a plebiscite, but then ordered a crackdown on the protesters.[190][192]

Presidency

[edit]

Erdoğan took the oath of office on 28 August 2014 and became the 12th president of Turkey.[193] He administered the new Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu's oath on 29 August. When asked about his lower-than-expected 51.79% share of the vote, he allegedly responded, "there were even those who did not like the Prophet. I, however, won 52%".[194] Assuming the role of President, Erdoğan was criticized for openly stating that he would not maintain the tradition of presidential neutrality.[195] Erdoğan has also stated his intention to pursue a more active role as president, such as utilizing the President's rarely used cabinet-calling powers.[196] The political opposition has argued that Erdoğan will continue to pursue his own political agenda, controlling the government, while his new Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu would be docile and submissive.[197] Furthermore, the domination of loyal Erdoğan supporters in Davutoğlu's cabinet fuelled speculation that Erdoğan intended to exercise substantial control over the government.[198]

Presidential elections

[edit]
Ballot paper for the 2018 presidential election

On 1 July 2014, Erdoğan was named the AKP's presidential candidate in the Turkish presidential election. His candidacy was announced by the Deputy President of the AKP, Mehmet Ali Şahin.

Erdoğan made a speech after the announcement and used the 'Erdoğan logo' for the first time. The logo was criticized because it was very similar to the logo that U.S. President Barack Obama used in the 2008 presidential election.[199]

Erdoğan was elected as the President of Turkey in the first round of the election with 51.79% of the vote, obviating the need for a run-off by winning over 50%. The joint candidate of the CHP, MHP and 13 other opposition parties, former Organisation of Islamic Co-operation general secretary Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu won 38.44% of the vote. The pro-Kurdish HDP candidate Selahattin Demirtaş won 9.76%.[200]

The 2018 Turkish presidential election took place as part of the 2018 general election, alongside parliamentary elections on the same day. Following the approval of constitutional changes in a referendum held in 2017, the elected President will be both the head of state and head of government of Turkey, taking over the latter role from the to-be-abolished office of the Prime Minister.[201]

Erdoğan declared his candidacy for the People's Alliance (Turkish: Cumhur İttifakı) on 27 April 2018, with support from the MHP.[202] His main opposition, the Republican People's Party, nominated Muharrem İnce, a member of parliament known for his combative opposition and spirited speeches against Erdoğan.[203] In addition to these candidates, Meral Akşener, the founder and leader of the Good Party, Temel Karamollaoğlu, the leader of the Felicity Party, and Doğu Perinçek, the leader of the Patriotic Party, also announced their candidacies and gathered the 100,000 signatures required for nomination. Erdoğan won the election with 52.59% of the popular vote.[204]

In the 2023 presidential election, Erdoğan's candidacy was contested due to his campaign launch in June 2022,[205] with the opposition arguing that a third term would violate the constitution.[206] In the first round of voting, Erdoğan failed to secure the required 50% threshold, leading to a runoff election against the runner-up, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.[207] Erdoğan ultimately won the second round on 28 May 2023, receiving 52.18% of the vote.

On 8 March 2024, he declared that he would retire once his presidential term ended in 2028.[208]

Referendum

[edit]

In April 2017, a constitutional referendum was held, where the voters in Turkey (and Turkish citizens abroad) approved a set of 18 proposed amendments to the Constitution of Turkey.[209] The amendments included the replacement of the existing parliamentary system with a presidential system. The post of Prime Minister would be abolished, and the presidency would become an executive post vested with broad executive powers. The parliament seats would be increased from 550 to 600 and the age of candidacy to the parliament was lowered from 25 to 18. The referendum also called for changes to the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors.[210]

Local elections

[edit]

In the 2019 local elections, the ruling party AKP lost control of Istanbul and Ankara for the first time in 25 years, as well as 5 of Turkey's 6 largest cities. The loss has been widely attributed to Erdoğan's mismanagement of the Turkish economic crisis, rising authoritarianism as well as the alleged government inaction on the Syrian refugee crisis.[211] Soon after the elections, Supreme Electoral Council of Turkey ordered a re-election in Istanbul, cancelling Ekrem İmamoğlu's mayoral certificate. The decision led to a significant decrease of Erdoğan's and AKP's popularity and his party lost the elections again in June with a greater margin.[212][213][214][215] The result was seen as a huge blow to Erdoğan, who had once said that if his party 'lost Istanbul, we would lose Turkey. The opposition's victory was characterised as 'the beginning of the end' for Erdoğan',[216][217][218] with international commentators calling the re-run a huge government miscalculation that led to a potential İmamoğlu candidacy in the next scheduled presidential election.[216][218] It is suspected that the scale of the government's defeat could provoke a cabinet reshuffle and early general elections, currently scheduled for June 2023.[219][220]

The New Zealand and Australian governments and opposition CHP party have criticized Erdoğan after he repeatedly showed video taken by the Christchurch mosque shooter to his supporters at campaign rallies for 31 March local elections and said Australians and New Zealanders who came to Turkey with anti-Muslim sentiments "would be sent back in coffins like their grandfathers" at Gallipoli.[221][222]

Domestic policy

[edit]

Presidential palace

[edit]

Erdoğan has also received criticism for the construction of a new official residence called the Presidential Complex, which takes up approximately 50 acres of Atatürk Forest Farm (AOÇ) in Ankara.[223][224] Since the AOÇ is protected land, several court orders were issued to halt the construction of the new palace, though building work went on nonetheless.[225] The opposition described the move as a clear disregard for the rule of law.[226] The project was subject to heavy criticism and allegations were made; of corruption during the construction process, wildlife destruction and the complete obliteration of the zoo in the AOÇ in order to make way for the new compound.[227] The fact that the palace is technically illegal has led to it being branded as the 'Kaç-Ak Saray', the word kaçak in Turkish meaning 'illegal'.[228]

Ak Saray was originally designed as a new office for the Prime Minister. However, upon assuming the presidency, Erdoğan announced that the palace would become the new Presidential Palace, while the Çankaya Mansion will be used by the Prime Minister instead. The move was seen as a historic change since the Çankaya Mansion had been used as the iconic office of the presidency ever since its inception. The Presidential Complex has almost 1,000 rooms and cost $350 million (€270 million), leading to strong criticism at a time when mining accidents and workers' rights had been dominating the agenda.[229][230]

On 29 October 2014, Erdoğan was due to hold a Republic Day reception in the new palace to commemorate the 91st anniversary of the Republic of Turkey and to officially inaugurate the Presidential Palace. However, after most invited participants announced that they would boycott the event and a mining accident occurred in the district of Ermenek in Karaman, the reception was cancelled.[231]

The media

[edit]
Turkish journalists protesting imprisonment of their colleagues on Human Rights Day, 10 December 2016

President Erdoğan and his government continue to press for court action against the remaining free press in Turkey. The latest newspaper that has been seized is Zaman, in March 2016.[232] After the seizure Morton Abramowitz and Eric Edelman, former U.S. ambassadors to Turkey, condemned President Erdoğan's actions in an opinion piece published by The Washington Post: "Clearly, democracy cannot flourish under Erdoğan now".[233] "The overall pace of reforms in Turkey has not only slowed down but in some key areas, such as freedom of expression and the independence of the judiciary, there has been a regression, which is particularly worrying", rapporteur Kati Piri said in April 2016 after the European Parliament passed its annual progress report on Turkey.[234]

On 22 June 2016, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that he considered himself successful in "destroying" Turkish civil groups "working against the state",[235] a conclusion that had been confirmed some days earlier by Sedat Laçiner, Professor of International Relations and rector of the Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University: "Outlawing unarmed and peaceful opposition, sentencing people to unfair punishment under erroneous terror accusations, will feed genuine terrorism in Erdoğan's Turkey. Guns and violence will become the sole alternative for legally expressing free thought".[236]

After the coup attempt, over 200 journalists were arrested and over 120 media outlets were closed. Cumhuriyet journalists were detained in November 2016 after a long-standing crackdown on the newspaper. Subsequently, Reporters Without Borders called Erdoğan an "enemy of press freedom" and said that he "hides his aggressive dictatorship under a veneer of democracy".[237]

In 2014, Turkey temporarily blocked access to Twitter.[238] In April 2017, Turkey blocked all access to Wikipedia over a content dispute.[239] The Turkish government lifted a two-and-a-half-year ban on Wikipedia on 15 January 2020, restoring access to the online encyclopedia a month after Turkey's top court ruled that blocking Wikipedia was unconstitutional.

On 1 July 2020, in a statement made to his party members, Erdoğan announced that the government would introduce new measures and regulations to control or shut down social media platforms such as YouTube, Twitter and Netflix. Through these new measures, each company would be required to appoint an official representative in the country to respond to legal concerns. The decision came after a number of Twitter users insulted his daughter Esra after she gave birth to her fourth child.[240]

State of emergency and purges

[edit]

On 20 July 2016, President Erdoğan declared the state of emergency, citing the coup d'état attempt as justification.[241] It was first scheduled to last three months. The Turkish parliament approved this measure.[242] The state of emergency was later continuously extended until 2018[243][244] amidst the ongoing purges in Turkey following the 2016 Turkish coup attempt including comprehensive purges of independent media and detention of tens of thousands of Turkish citizens politically opposed to Erdoğan.[245] More than 50,000 people have been arrested and over 160,000 fired from their jobs by March 2018.[246][243]

Turkish journalists Can Dündar and Erdem Gül were arrested for leaking classified information about Turkish support to Islamist fighters in Syria.

In August 2016, Erdoğan began rounding up journalists who had been publishing, or who were about to publish articles questioning corruption within the Erdoğan administration, and incarcerating them.[247] The number of Turkish journalists jailed by Turkey is higher than any other country, including all of those journalists currently jailed in North Korea, Cuba, Russia, and China combined.[248] In the wake of the coup attempt of July 2016 the Erdoğan administration began rounding up tens of thousands of individuals, both from within the government, and from the public sector, and incarcerating them on charges of alleged "terrorism".[249][250][251] As a result of these arrests, many in the international community complained about the lack of proper judicial process in the incarceration of Erdoğan's opposition.[252] 

In April 2017 Erdoğan successfully sponsored legislation effectively making it illegal for the Turkish legislative branch to investigate his executive branch of government.[253] Without the checks and balances of freedom of speech, and the freedom of the Turkish legislature to hold him accountable for his actions, many have likened Turkey's current form of government to a dictatorship with only nominal forms of democracy in practice.[254][255] At the time of Erdoğan's successful passing of the most recent legislation silencing his opposition, United States President Donald Trump called Erdoğan to congratulate him for his "recent referendum victory".[256]

On 29 April 2017 Erdoğan's administration began an internal Internet block of all of the Wikipedia online encyclopedia site via Turkey's domestic Internet filtering system. This blocking action took place after the government had first made a request for Wikipedia to remove what it referred to as "offensive content". In response, Wikipedia co-founder Jimmy Wales replied via a post on Twitter stating, "Access to information is a fundamental human right. Turkish people, I will always stand with you and fight for this right."[257][258]

In January 2016, more than a thousand academics signed a petition criticizing Turkey's military crackdown on ethnic Kurdish towns and neighborhoods in the east of the country, such as Sur (a district of Diyarbakır), Silvan, Nusaybin, Cizre and Silopi, and asking an end to violence.[259] Erdoğan accused those who signed the petition of "terrorist propaganda", calling them "the darkest of people". He called for action by institutions and universities, stating, "Everyone who benefits from this state but is now an enemy of the state must be punished without further delay".[260] Within days, over 30 of the signatories were arrested, many in dawn-time raids on their homes. Although all were quickly released, nearly half were fired from their jobs, eliciting a denunciation from Turkey's Science Academy for such "wrong and disturbing" treatment.[261] Erdoğan vowed that the academics would pay the price for "falling into a pit of treachery".[262]

On 8 July 2018, Erdoğan sacked 18,000 officials for alleged ties to US based cleric Fethullah Gülen, shortly before renewing his term as an executive president. Of those removed, 9000 were police officers with 5000 from the armed forces with the addition of hundreds of academics.[263]

Economic policy

[edit]

Under his presidency, Erdoğan has decreased the independence of the Central Bank and pushed it to pursue a highly unorthodox monetary policy, decreasing interest rates even with high inflation.[264] He has pushed the theory that inflation is caused by high interest rates, an idea universally rejected by economists.[264][265] This, along with other factors such as excessive current account deficit and foreign-currency debt,[266] in combination with Erdoğan's increasing authoritarianism, caused an economic crisis starting from 2018, leading to large depreciation of the Turkish lira and very high inflation.[267][268][269][270] Economist Paul Krugman described the unfolding crisis as "a classic currency-and-debt crisis, of a kind we've seen many times", adding: "At such a time, the quality of leadership suddenly matters a great deal. You need officials who understand what's happening, can devise a response and have enough credibility that markets give them the benefit of the doubt. Some emerging markets have those things, and they are riding out the turmoil fairly well. The Erdoğan regime has none of that".[271]

Foreign policy

[edit]

Europe

[edit]
Foreign trips made by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as President (since 2014). Darker blue indicates more visits; Turkey is shaded in red.

In February 2016, Erdoğan threatened to send the millions of refugees in Turkey to EU member states,[272] saying: "We can open the doors to Greece and Bulgaria anytime and we can put the refugees on buses ... So how will you deal with refugees if you don't get a deal?"[273]

In an interview to the news magazine Der Spiegel, German minister of defence Ursula von der Leyen said on 11 March 2016 that the refugee crisis had made good cooperation between EU and Turkey an "existentially important" issue. "Therefore it is right to advance now negotiations on Turkey's EU accession".[274]

Working dinner between the leaders of Turkey, Germany, France and Russia in Istanbul

In its resolution "The functioning of democratic institutions in Turkey" from 22 June 2016, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe warned that "recent developments in Turkey pertaining to freedom of the media and of expression, erosion of the rule of law and the human rights violations in relation to anti-terrorism security operations in south-east Turkey have ... raised serious questions about the functioning of its democratic institutions".[275][276]

In January 2017, Erdoğan said that the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Cyprus is "out of the question" and Turkey will be in Cyprus "forever".[277]

In September 2020, Erdoğan declared his government's support for Azerbaijan following a major conflict between Armenian and Azeri forces over a disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh.[278] He dismissed demands for a ceasefire.[279] In 2022, Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin planned for Turkey to become an energy hub for all of Europe through the TurkStream and Blue Stream gas pipelines.[280][281] In October 2023 Erdoğan canceled attendance at the third European Political Community (EPC) meeting.[282][283]

Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 3 July 2024
Finnish and Swedish NATO accession
[edit]

In May 2022, Erdoğan voiced his opposition to Finland and Sweden joining NATO, accusing the two countries of tolerating groups which Turkey classifies as terrorist organizations,[284] including the Kurdish militant groups PKK, PYD and YPG and the supporters of Fethullah Gülen.[285] Following a protest in Sweden where a Quran was burned, Erdogan re-iterated that he would not support Sweden's bid to join NATO.[286] President of Finland Sauli Niinistö visited Erdogan in Istanbul and Ankara in March 2023. During the visit, Erdogan confirmed that he supported Finnish NATO membership and declared that the Turkish parliament would confirm Finnish membership before the Turkish Presidential elections in May 2023.[287] On 23 March 2023, the Turkish parliament's foreign relations committee confirmed the Finnish NATO membership application and sent the process to the Turkish Parliament's plenary session.[288] On 1 April 2023, Erdoğan confirmed and signed the Turkish Grand National Assembly's ratification of Finnish NATO membership.[289] This decision sealed Finland's entry to NATO. In June 2023, Erdoğan again voiced his opposition to Sweden joining NATO.[290] Just prior to the NATO summit in Vilnius in July 2023, Erdoğan linked Sweden's accession to NATO membership to Turkey's application for EU membership. Turkey had applied for EU membership in 1999, but talks made little progress since 2016.[291][292] In September 2023, Erdoğan announced that the European Union was well into a rupture in its relations with Turkey and that they would part ways during Turkey's European Union membership process.[293] However, on 23 October 2023, Erdoğan approved Sweden's pending NATO membership bid and sent the accession protocol to the Turkish Parliament for ratification.[294] Two days later, Turkey's parliamentary speaker, Numan Kurtulmuş, sent a bill approving Sweden's NATO membership bid to parliament's foreign affairs committee.[295] The committee discussed the ratification on 16 November 2023, but a decision was deferred,[296] with a request for Sweden to produce a written roadmap to implement its anti-terrorism commitments.[297][298] On 26 December 2023, the Turkish parliament's foreign relations committee confirmed the Swedish NATO membership application and sent the process to the Turkish Parliament's plenary session.[299] On 25 January 2024, Erdoğan formally signed and approved the Turkish parliament's decision to ratify Swedish NATO membership.[300]

Erdoğan and President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen on 12 July 2023

Greece

[edit]

There is a long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece in the Aegean Sea. Erdoğan warned that Greece will pay a "heavy price" if Turkey's gas exploration vessel – in what Turkey said are disputed waters – is attacked.[301] He deemed the readmission of Greece into the military alliance NATO a mistake, claiming they were collaborating with terrorists.[302]

Diaspora
[edit]

In March 2017, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated to the Turks in Europe, "Make not three, but five children. Because you are the future of Europe. That will be the best response to the injustices against you." This has been interpreted as an imperialist call for demographic warfare.[303]

According to The Economist, Erdoğan is the first Turkish leader to take the Turkish diaspora seriously, which has created friction within these diaspora communities and between the Turkish government and several of its European counterparts.[304]

The Balkans

[edit]
Meeting between leaders of Turkey, Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria and Serbia in Istanbul, 10 July 2017

In February 2018, President Erdoğan expressed Turkish support of the Republic of Macedonia's position during negotiations over the Macedonia naming dispute saying that Greece's position is wrong.[305]

In March 2018, President Erdoğan criticized the Kosovan Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj for dismissing his Interior Minister and Intelligence Chief for failing to inform him of an unauthorized and illegal secret operation conducted by the National Intelligence Organization of Turkey on Kosovo's territory that led to the arrest of six people allegedly associated with the Gülen movement.[306][307]

Erdoğan with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev (middle) and Bosnian Presidency Chairman Bakir Izetbegović, 12 July 2018

On 26 November 2019, an earthquake struck the Durrës region of Albania. President Erdoğan expressed his condolences.[308] and citing close Albanian-Turkish relations, he committed Turkey to reconstructing 500 earthquake destroyed homes and other civic structures in Laç, Albania.[309][310][311] In Istanbul, Erdoğan organised and attended a donors conference (8 December) to assist Albania that included Turkish businessmen, investors and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama.[312]

Azerbaijan

[edit]

In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a large-scale military offensive to recapture the Armenian-populated Nagorno-Karabakh. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Erdoğan stated "As everyone now acknowledges, Karabakh is Azerbaijani territory. Imposition of another status [to the region] will never be accepted," and that "[Turkey] support[s] the steps taken by Azerbaijan—with whom we act together with the motto of one nation, two states—to defend its territorial integrity."[313] Erdoğan also met with Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev in the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic.[314]

United Kingdom

[edit]
Erdoğan and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at the 2024 NATO Summit in Washington, D.C.

In May 2018, British Prime Minister Theresa May welcomed Erdoğan to the United Kingdom for a three-day state visit. Erdoğan declared that the United Kingdom is "an ally and a strategic partner, but also a real friend. The cooperation we have is well beyond any mechanism that we have established with other partners."[315]

Israel

[edit]
Erdoğan during a state visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Turkey, 9 March 2022

Relations between Turkey and Israel began to normalize after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu officially apologized for the killing of the nine Turkish activists during the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid.[316] However, in response to the 2014 Gaza War, Erdoğan accused Israel of being "more barbaric than Hitler",[317] and conducting "state terrorism" and a "genocide attempt" against the Palestinians.[318]

In December 2017, President Erdoğan issued a warning to Donald Trump, after the U.S. President acknowledged Jerusalem as Israel's capital.[319] Erdoğan stated, "Jerusalem is a red line for Muslims", indicating that naming Jerusalem as Israel's capital would alienate Palestinians and other Muslims from the city, undermining hopes at a future capital of a Palestinian State.[320] Erdoğan called Israel a "terrorist state".[321] Naftali Bennett dismissed the threats, claiming "Erdoğan does not miss an opportunity to attack Israel".[320]

In April 2019, Erdoğan said the West Bank belongs to Palestinians, after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said he would annex Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories if he is re-elected.[322]

Erdoğan condemned the Israel–UAE peace agreement, stating that Turkey was considering suspending or cutting off diplomatic relations with the United Arab Emirates in retaliation.[323]

Erdoğan at the Gaza peace summit in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 13 October 2025

The relations shifted back to normality since 2021, when the two countries started improving relations.[324] In March 2022, Israeli president Isaac Herzog visited Turkey, meeting Erdoğan.[325] The two countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations in August 2022.[326]

Erdoğan condemned the Israeli attacks in the Gaza strip during the Gaza war, saying they are a violation of human rights, which led to accusations of hypocrisy as Turkey itself severely bombed Kurdish areas at the same time, including many civilian targets.[327] Erdoğan said that Israel's bombing and blockade of the Gaza Strip in retaliation for Hamas's attack was a disproportionate response amounting to a "massacre."[328] On 25 October 2023, Erdoğan said that Hamas was not a terrorist organisation but a liberation group fighting to protect Palestinian lands and people.[329] On 15 November 2023, he condemned Israel as a "terrorist state" and accused it of committing genocide against the Palestinians.[330]

In June 2025, Erdoğan condemned Israeli strikes on Iran as "state terrorism".[331]

Syrian Civil War

[edit]
Erdoğan meeting US President Barack Obama during the 2014 Wales summit in Newport, Wales

Diplomatic relations between Turkey and Syria significantly deteriorated due to the Syrian civil war. Initially, while tens of thousand of Syrian refugees already crossed the border to Turkey, Turkish officials tried to convince Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to make significant reforms to alleviate the conflict and calm down the protests.[332] The last of such meetings happened on 9 August 2011, during a seven-hour meeting between Assad and Turkey's Ahmet Davutoğlu, giving the latter the title of 'the last European leader who visited Assad'.[333]

Turkey got involved in a violent conflict with Islamic State (IS) as part of the spillover of the Syrian civil war. IS executed a series of attacks against Turkish soldiers and civilians. In an ISIS-video, where two Turkish soldiers were burned alive, Turkish President Erdoğan was verbally attacked by ISIS and threatened with the destruction of Turkey.[334] Turkey joined the international military intervention against the Islamic State in 2015. The Turkish Armed Forces' Operation Euphrates Shield was aimed at IS, and areas around Jarabulus and al-Bab were conquered from IS.[335] In January 2018, the Turkish military and its allies Syrian National Army and Sham Legion began Operation Olive Branch in Afrin in Northern Syria, against the Kurdish armed group YPG.[336][337] In October 2019, the United States gave the go-ahead to the 2019 Turkish offensive into north-eastern Syria, despite recently agreeing to a Northern Syria Buffer Zone. US troops in northern Syria were withdrawn from the border to avoid interference with the Turkish operation.[338] After the U.S. pullout, Turkey proceeded to attack the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria.[339] Rejecting criticism of the invasion, Erdoğan claimed that NATO and European Union countries "sided with terrorists, and all of them attacked us".[340] Erdoğan then filed a criminal complaint against French magazine Le Point after it accused him of conducting ethnic cleansing in the area.[341][342] With Erdogan's control of the media fanning local nationalism,[343] a poll by Metropoll Research found that 79% of Turkish respondents expressed support for the operation.[344]

China

[edit]
Erdoğan, Chinese President Xi Jinping and other leaders at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit on 16 September 2022

Bilateral trade between Turkey and China increased from $1 billion a year in 2002 to $27 billion annually in 2017.[345] Erdoğan has stated that Turkey might consider joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation instead of the European Union.[346]

In 2009, Erdoğan accused China of "genocide" against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[347] In 2019, the Turkish Foreign Ministry issued a statement condemning what it described as China's "reintroduction of concentration camps in the 21st century" and "a great cause of shame for humanity".[348][349] Later that year, while visiting China, Erdoğan said that there were those who "exploited" the Uyghur issue to strain relations between China and Turkey.[350] Since then the Turkish government has largely toned down its criticisms of China's treatment of Uyghurs, and cracked down on Uyghur activists at China's behest, and has expanded deportations of Uyghurs to China.[351][352][353]

Japan

[edit]
Erdoğan meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2018)

Qatar blockade

[edit]

In June 2017 during a speech, Erdoğan called the isolation of Qatar as "inhumane and against Islamic values" and that "victimising Qatar through smear campaigns serves no purpose".[354]

Myanmar

[edit]

In September 2017, Erdoğan condemned the persecution of Muslims in Myanmar and accused Myanmar of "genocide" against the Muslim minority.[355]

United States

[edit]
Erdoğan and US President Donald Trump at the White House in November 2019
Erdoğan in a meeting with US President Joe Biden, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavusoğlu and US Secretary of State Blinken, October 2021

Over time, Turkey began to look for ways to buy its own missile defense system and also to use that procurement to build up its own capacity to manufacture and sell an air and missile defense system. Turkey got serious about acquiring a missile defense system early in the first Obama administration when it opened a competition between the Raytheon Patriot PAC 2 system and systems from Europe, Russia, and even China.[356]

Taking advantage of the new low in US-Turkish relations, Putin saw his chance to use an S-400 sale to Turkey, so in July 2017, he offered the air defense system to Turkey. In the months that followed, the United States warned Turkey that a S-400 purchase jeopardized Turkey's F-35 purchase. Integration of the Russian system into the NATO air defense net was also out of the question. Administration officials, including Mark Esper, warned that Turkey had to choose between the S-400 and the F-35, that they could not have both.

The S-400 deliveries to Turkey began on 12 July. On 16 July, Trump mentioned to reporters that withholding the F-35 from Turkey was unfair. Said the president, "So what happens is we have a situation where Turkey is very good with us, very good, and we are now telling Turkey that because you have really been forced to buy another missile system, we're not going to sell you the F-35 fighter jets".[357]

The U.S. Congress made clear on a bipartisan basis that it expected the president to sanction Turkey for buying Russian equipment.[358] Out of the F-35, Turkey considered buying Russian fifth-generation jet fighter Su-57.

On 1 August 2018, the U.S. Department of Treasury sanctioned two senior Turkish government ministers who were involved in the detention of American pastor Andrew Brunson.[359] Erdoğan said that U.S. behavior would force Turkey to look for new friends and allies.[360] The U.S.–Turkey tensions appeared to be the most serious diplomatic crisis between the NATO allies in years.[361][362]

Erdoğan and Biden at the 50th G7 summit in Italy, 14 June 2024

Trump's former national security adviser John Bolton claimed that President Donald Trump told Erdoğan he would 'take care' of the investigation against Turkey's state-owned bank Halkbank, accused of bank fraud charges and laundering up to $20 billion on behalf of Iranian entities.[363] Turkey criticized Bolton's book, saying it included misleading accounts of conversations between Trump and Erdoğan.[364]

In August 2020, the former vice president and presidential candidate Joe Biden called for a new U.S. approach to the "autocrat" President Erdoğan and support for Turkish opposition parties.[365][366] In September 2020, Biden demanded that Erdoğan "stay out" of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia, in which Turkey supported the Azeris.[367]

Meanwhile, Erdoğan wants to realize the Zangezur corridor land route in the southern Caucasus,[368] a geopolitical corridor from Europe through Central Asia, all the way to China.[369]

Venezuela

[edit]

Relations with Venezuela were strengthened with recent developments and high level mutual visits. The first official visit between the two countries at presidential level was in October 2017 when Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro visited Turkey. In December 2018, Erdoğan visited Venezuela for the first time and expressed his will to build strong relations with Venezuela and expressed hope that high-level visits "will increasingly continue".[370]

Reuters reported that in 2018 23 tons of mined gold were taken from Venezuela to Istanbul.[371] In the first nine months of 2018, Venezuela's gold exports to Turkey rose from zero in the previous year to US$900 million.[372]

During the Venezuelan presidential crisis, Erdoğan voiced solidarity with Venezuela's President Nicolás Maduro and criticized U.S. sanctions against Venezuela, saying that "political problems cannot be resolved by punishing an entire nation."[373][374]

Following the 2019 Venezuelan uprising attempt, Erdoğan condemned the actions of lawmaker Juan Guaidó, tweeting "Those who are in an effort to appoint a postmodern colonial governor to Venezuela, where the President was appointed by elections and where the people rule, should know that only democratic elections can determine how a country is governed".[375][376]

Ukraine and Russian invasion of Ukraine

[edit]
Signing of the grain export deal between Turkey, Ukraine, Russia and the UN in Istanbul, 2022
Erdoğan with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and UN Secretary-General António Guterres in Lviv, Ukraine, on 18 August 2022

In 2016, Erdoğan told his Ukrainian counterpart Petro Poroshenko that Turkey would not recognize the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation; calling it "Crimea's occupation".[377]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Erdoğan functioned as a mediator and peace broker.[378][379] On 10 March 2022, Turkey hosted a trilateral meeting with Ukraine and Russia on the margins of Antalya Diplomacy Forum, making it the first high-level talks since the invasion.[380] Following the peace talks in Istanbul on 29 March 2022, Russia decided to leave areas around Kyiv and Chernihiv.[381] On 22 July 2022, together with United Nations, Turkey brokered a deal between Russia and Ukraine about clearing the way for the export of grain from Ukrainian ports, following the 2022 food crises.[382][383] On 21 September 2022, a record-high of 215 Ukrainian soldiers, including fighters who led the defence of the Azovstal Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol, had been released in a prisoner exchange with Russia after mediation by Turkish President Erdoğan.[384] As part of the agreement, the freed captives stay in Turkey until the war is over.[385]

While Turkey has closed the Bosphorus to Russian naval reinforcements, enforced United Nations sanctions[386] and supplied Ukraine with military equipment such as Bayraktar TB2 drones and BMC Kirpi vehicles, it didn't participate in certain sanctions like closing the Turkish airspace for Russian civilians and continued the dialogue with Russian President Vladimir Putin.[387] Erdoğan reiterated his stance on Crimea in 2022 saying that international law requires that Russia must return Crimea to Ukraine.[388]

On 18 February 2025, Erdoğan stated that Turkey would be the "ideal host for possible talks between Russia, Ukraine and the USA," arguing that Turkey is seen as a "reliable mediator" by both Russia and Ukraine.[389]

Events

[edit]

Coup d'état attempt

[edit]

On 15 July 2016, a coup d'état was attempted by the military, with aims to remove Erdoğan from government. By the next day, Erdoğan's government managed to reassert effective control in the country.[390] Reportedly, no government official was arrested or harmed, which, among other factors, raised the suspicion of a false flag event staged by the government itself.[391][392]

The Turkish parliament was bombed by jets during the failed coup of 2016.

Erdoğan, as well as other government officials, has blamed an exiled cleric, and a former ally of Erdoğan, Fethullah Gülen, for staging the coup attempt.[393] Süleyman Soylu, Minister of Labor in Erdoğan's government, accused the US of planning a coup to oust Erdoğan.[394]

Erdoğan, as well as other high-ranking Turkish government officials, has issued repeated demands to the US to extradite Gülen.[395][396]

Following the coup attempt, there has been a significant deterioration in Turkey-US relations. European and other world leaders have expressed their concerns over the situation in Turkey, with many of them warning Erdoğan not to use the coup attempt as an excuse to crack down on his opponents.[397]

The rise of ISIS and the collapse of the Kurdish peace process had led to a sharp rise in terror incidents in Turkey until 2016. Erdoğan was accused by his critics of having a 'soft corner' for ISIS.[398] However, after the attempted coup, Erdoğan ordered the Turkish military into Syria to combat ISIS and Kurdish militant groups.[399] Erdoğan's critics have decried purges in the education system and judiciary as undermining the rule of law[400] however Erdoğan supporters argue this is a necessary measure as Gulen-linked schools cheated on entrance exams, requiring a purge in the education system and of the Gulen followers who then entered the judiciary.[401][402]

Erdoğan's plan is "to reconstitute Turkey as a presidential system. The plan would create a centralized system that would enable him to better tackle Turkey's internal and external threats. One of the main hurdles allegedly standing in his way is Fethullah Gulen's movement ..."[403] In the aftermath of the 2016 Turkish coup d'état attempt, a groundswell of national unity and consensus emerged for cracking down on the coup plotters with a National Unity rally held in Turkey that included Islamists, secularists, liberals and nationalists.[404][405] Erdoğan has used this consensus to remove Gulen's followers from the bureaucracy, curtail their role in NGOs, Turkey's Ministry of Religious Affairs and the Turkish military, with 149 Generals discharged.[406] In a foreign policy shift Erdoğan ordered the Turkish Armed Forces into battle in Syria and has liberated towns from IS control.[407] As relations with Europe soured over in the aftermath of the attempted coup, Erdoğan developed alternative relationships with Russia,[408][409] Saudi Arabia[410] and a "strategic partnership" with Pakistan,[411][412] with plans to cultivate relations through free trade agreements and deepening military relations for mutual co-operation with Turkey's regional allies.[413][414][415]

2023 earthquake

[edit]

On 6 February 2023, a catastrophic earthquake struck south-central Turkey and northwestern Syria,[416] killing more than 50,000 people in Turkey during his administration.[417] The high death toll was exacerbated by collapsed buildings, many constructed under lax regulations. Post-1999 earthquake reforms introduced stricter codes, but enforcement was weak. Erdoğan's government issued "amnesties" legalizing substandard buildings for fines, a policy he boasted about in 2019 speeches in Kahramanmaraş and Hatay, claiming to have "solved" housing issues for thousands.[418][419]

Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), centralized under Erdoğan's control since a 2017 constitutional change, faced intense scrutiny for its slow and disorganized response. AFAD, led by a theologian with no prior disaster relief experience, was criticized for sidelining NGOs, military, and experienced rescue groups like AKUT, requiring all efforts to be approved centrally.[420][421]

Ideology and public image

[edit]

Early during his premiership, Erdoğan was praised as a role model for emerging Middle Eastern nations due to several reform packages initiated by his government which expanded religious freedoms and minority rights as part of accession negotiations with the European Union.[422] However, his government underwent several crises including the Sledgehammer coup and the Ergenekon trials, corruption scandals, accusations of media intimidation, as well as the pursuit of an increasingly polarizing political agenda; the opposition accused the government of inciting political hatred throughout the country.[423] He has also been described as having "long championed Islamist causes".[424]

Erdoğanism

[edit]

The term Erdoğanism first emerged shortly after Erdoğan's 2011 general election victory, where it was predominantly described as the AKP's liberal economic and conservative democratic ideals fused with Erdoğan's demagoguery and cult of personality.[425]

Ottomanism

[edit]
Erdoğan meeting Palestinian president Abbas in Erdoğan's Presidential Palace

As President, Erdoğan has overseen a revival of Ottoman tradition,[426][427][101] greeting Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas with an Ottoman-style ceremony in the new presidential palace, with guards dressed in costumes representing founders of 16 Great Turkish Empires in history.[428] While Prime Minister of Turkey, Erdoğan's AKP made references to the Ottoman era during election campaigns, such as calling their supporters 'grandsons of Ottomans' (Osmanlı torunu).[429] This proved controversial, since it was perceived to be an open attack against the republican nature of modern Turkey founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In 2015, Erdoğan made a statement in which he endorsed the old Ottoman term külliye to refer to university campuses rather than the standard Turkish word kampüs.[430]

Many critics have thus accused Erdoğan of wanting to become an Ottoman sultan and abandon the secular and democratic credentials of the Republic.[431][432][433][434] When pressed on this issue in January 2015, Erdoğan denied these claims and said that he would aim to be more like Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom rather than like an Ottoman sultan.[435]

In July 2020, after the Council of State annulled the Cabinet's 1934 decision to establish the Hagia Sophia as museum and revoking the monument's status, Erdoğan ordered its reclassification as a mosque.[436][437] The 1934 decree was ruled to be unlawful under both Ottoman and Turkish law as Hagia Sophia's waqf, endowed by Sultan Mehmed II, had designated the site a mosque; proponents of the decision argued the Hagia Sophia was the personal property of the sultan.[438] This redesignation is controversial, invoking condemnation from the Turkish opposition, UNESCO, the World Council of Churches, the Holy See, and many other international leaders.[439][440][441] In August 2020, he also signed the order that transferred the administration of the Chora Church to the Directorate of Religious Affairs to open it for worship as a mosque.[442] Initially converted to a mosque by the Ottomans, the building had then been designated as a museum by the government since 1934.[443][426]

In August 2020, Erdoğan gave a speech saying that "in our civilization, conquest is not occupation or looting. It is establishing the dominance of the justice that Allah commanded in the region. First of all, our nation removed the oppression from the areas that it conquered. It established justice. This is why our civilization is one of conquest. Turkey will take what is its right in the Mediterranean Sea, in the Aegean Sea, and in the Black Sea."[444][426] In October 2020, he made a statement before the Grand National Assembly that "Jerusalem is ours", referring to the period of Ottoman rule over the city and the rebuilding of its Old City by Suleiman the Magnificent.[445]

In October 2023 the first church built with government backing in Turkey's 100-year history as a post-Ottoman state was inaugurated.[446][447][448]

Authoritarianism

[edit]

Erdoğan has been the de facto leader of Turkey since 2002.[c][449][450][451] In the more recent years of Erdoğan's rule, Turkey has experienced increasing authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and corruption,[452][453][454] as well as expansionism, censorship, and banning of parties or dissent.[455][456][457][458][459] In response to criticism, Erdoğan made a speech in May 2014 denouncing allegations of dictatorship, saying that the leader of the opposition, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who was there at the speech, would not be able to "roam the streets" freely if he were a dictator.[460] Kılıçdaroğlu responded that political tensions would cease to exist if Erdoğan stopped making his polarizing speeches for three days.[461] One observer said it was a measure of the state of Turkish democracy that Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu could openly threaten, on 20 December 2015, that, if his party did not win the election, Turkish Kurds would endure a repeat of the era of the "white Toros".[462]

In April 2014, the President of the Constitutional Court, Haşim Kılıç, accused Erdoğan of damaging the credibility of the judiciary, labelling Erdoğan's attempts to increase political control over the courts as 'desperate'.[463] During the chaotic 2007 presidential election, the military issued an E-memorandum warning the government to keep within the boundaries of secularism when choosing a candidate. Regardless, Erdoğan's close relations with Fethullah Gülen and his Cemaat Movement allowed his government to maintain a degree of influence within the judiciary through Gülen's supporters in high judicial and bureaucratic offices.[464][465] Shortly after, an alleged coup plot codenamed Sledgehammer became public and resulted in the imprisonment of 300 military officers including İbrahim Fırtına, Çetin Doğan and Engin Alan. Several opposition politicians, journalists and military officers also went on trial for allegedly being part of an ultra-nationalist organization called Ergenekon.

Erdoğan's supporters outside the White House in Washington, D.C., 16 May 2017

Both cases were marred by irregularities and were condemned as a joint attempt by Erdoğan and Gülen to curb opposition to the AKP.[466] The original Sledgehammer document containing the coup plans, allegedly written in 2003, was found to have been written using Microsoft Word 2007.[467] Despite both domestic and international calls for these irregularities to be addressed in order to guarantee a fair trial, Erdoğan instead praised his government for bringing the coup plots to light.[468] When Gülen publicly withdrew support and openly attacked Erdoğan in late 2013, several imprisoned military officers and journalists were released, with the government admitting that the judicial proceedings were unfair.[469]

When Gülen withdrew support from the AKP government in late 2013, a government corruption scandal broke out, leading to the arrest of several family members of cabinet ministers. Erdoğan accused Gülen of co-ordinating a "parallel state" within the judiciary in an attempt to topple him from power. He then removed or reassigned several judicial officials in an attempt to remove Gülen's supporters from office. Erdoğan's 'purge' was widely questioned and criticized by the European Union.[470] In early 2014, a new law was passed by parliament giving the government greater control over the judiciary, which sparked public protest throughout the country. International organizations perceived the law to be a danger to the separation of powers.[471]

Several judicial officials removed from their posts said that they had been removed due to their secularist credentials. The political opposition accused Erdoğan of not only attempting to remove Gülen supporters, but supporters of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's principles as well, in order to pave the way for increased politicization of the judiciary. Several family members of Erdoğan's ministers who had been arrested as a result of the 2013 corruption scandal were released, and a judicial order to question Erdoğan's son Bilal Erdoğan was annulled.[472] Controversy erupted when it emerged that many of the newly appointed judicial officials were actually AKP supporters.[473] İslam Çiçek, a judge who ejected the cases of five ministers' relatives accused of corruption, was accused of being an AKP supporter and an official investigation was launched into his political affiliations.[474] On 1 September 2014, the courts dissolved the cases of 96 suspects, which included Bilal Erdoğan.[475]

On 25 September 2025, during a bilateral visit, Erdoğan was described by US president Donald Trump as "highly opinionated" and "a tough one," adding, "Usually, I don’t like opinionated people, but I always like this one." Trump also remarked that Erdoğan "knows about rigged elections better than anybody," drawing attention due to longstanding criticisms of Erdoğan's leadership style, which has been perceived by critics as increasingly autocratic.[476][477][478]

Suppression of dissent

[edit]
An NTV news van covered in anti-AKP protest graffiti in response to their initial lack of coverage of the Gezi Park protests in 2013

Erdoğan has been criticized for his politicization of the media, especially after the 2013 protests. The opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) alleged that over 1,863 journalists lost their jobs due to their anti-government views in 12 years of AKP rule.[479] Opposition politicians have also alleged that intimidation in the media is due to the government's attempt to restructure the ownership of private media corporations. Journalists from the Cihan News Agency and the Gülenist Zaman newspaper were repeatedly barred from attending government press conferences or asking questions.[480] Several opposition journalists such as Soner Yalçın were controversially arrested as part of the Ergenekon trials and Sledgehammer coup investigation.[481] Veli Ağbaba, a CHP politician, has called the AKP the 'biggest media boss in Turkey'.[479]

In 2015, 74 US senators sent a letter to US Secretary of State, John Kerry, to state their concern over what they saw as deviations from the basic principles of democracy in Turkey and oppressions of Erdoğan over media.[482]

Notable cases of media censorship occurred during the 2013 anti-government protests, when the mainstream media did not broadcast any news regarding the demonstrations for three days after they began. The lack of media coverage was symbolised by CNN International covering the protests while CNN Türk broadcast a documentary about penguins at the same time.[483] The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) controversially issued a fine to pro-opposition news channels including Halk TV and Ulusal Kanal for their coverage of the protests, accusing them of broadcasting footage that could be morally, physically and mentally destabilizing to children.[484] Erdoğan was criticized for not responding to the accusations of media intimidation, and caused international outrage after telling a female journalist (Amberin Zaman of The Economist) to know her place and calling her a 'shameless militant' during his 2014 presidential election campaign.[485] While the 2014 presidential election was not subject to substantial electoral fraud, Erdoğan was again criticized for receiving disproportionate media attention in comparison to his rivals. The British newspaper The Times commented that between 2 and 4 July, the state-owned media channel TRT gave 204 minutes of coverage to Erdoğan's campaign and less than a total of 3 minutes to both his rivals.[486]

Opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ had been arrested on terrorism charges.

Erdoğan also tightened controls over the Internet, signing into law a bill which allows the government to block websites without prior court order on 12 September 2014.[487] His government blocked Twitter and YouTube in late March 2014 following the release of a recording of a conversation between him and his son Bilal, where Erdoğan allegedly warned his family to 'nullify' all cash reserves at their home amid the 2013 corruption scandal.[488] Erdoğan has undertaken a media campaign that attempts to portray the presidential family as frugal and simple-living; their palace electricity-bill is estimated at $500,000 per month.[489]

In 2016, a waiter was arrested for insulting Erdoğan by allegedly saying "If Erdoğan comes here, I will not even serve tea to him.".[490]

In November 2016, the Turkish government[245] blocked access to social media in all of Turkey[491] as well as sought to completely block Internet access for the citizens in the southeast of the country.[492] Since the 2016 coup attempt, authorities arrested or imprisoned more than 90,000 Turkish citizens.[493]

Lawsuits

[edit]

In February 2015, a 13-year-old was charged by a prosecutor after allegedly insulting Erdoğan on Facebook.[494][495] Between 2016[496] and 2023 there were trials for insulting the president for having compared Erdogan to Gollum, a fictional character of J. R. R. Tolkien's Lord of the Rings.[497] In May 2016, former Miss Turkey model Merve Büyüksaraç was sentenced to more than a year in prison for allegedly insulting the president.[498][499][500] Between 2014 and 2019, 128,872 investigations were launched for insulting the president and prosecutors opened 27,717 criminal cases.[501]

In 2009, Turkish sculptor Mehmet Aksoy created the Statue of Humanity in Kars to promote reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia. When visiting the city in 2011, Erdoğan deemed the statue a "freak", and months later it was demolished.[502] Aksoy sued Erdoğan for "moral indemnities", although his lawyer said that his statement was a critique rather than an insult. In March 2015, a judge ordered Erdoğan to pay 10,000 liras.[503]

Ziya Gökalp

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In 2019, Erdoğan once again publicly recited Ziya Gökalp's Soldier's Prayer poem, as he had done in 1997. According to Hans-Lukas Kieser, these recitations betray Erdoğan's desire to create Gökalp's pre-1923 ideal, that is, "a modern, leader-led Islamic-Turkish state extending beyond the boundaries of the Treaty of Lausanne".[504]

Women

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In 2021, Erdoğan withdrew Turkey from the Council of Europe's Istanbul Convention on violence against women and has attacked groups that defend women.[505][506]

Views on minorities

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LGBT

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In 2002, Erdoğan said that "homosexuals must be legally protected within the framework of their rights and freedoms. From time to time, we do not find the treatment they get on some television screens humane", he said.[507][508][509] However, in 2017 Erdoğan has said that empowering LGBT people in Turkey was "against the values of our nation".[510]

In 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Turkey's top Muslim scholar and President of Religious Affairs, Ali Erbaş, said in a Friday Ramadan announcement that the country condemns homosexuality because it "brings illness", insinuating that same sex relations were responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic.[511] Recep Tayyip Erdoğan backed Erbaş, saying that what Erbaş "said was totally right."[512] Starting from 2023, Erdoğan began openly speaking against LGBT people, openly saying that his Coalition "are against the LGBT", and accusing the Turkish opposition of being LGBT.[513]

In 2023, Erdogan blamed LGBTQ+ people for "undermining family values" in Turkey and called his political opponents "gays" in a derogatory manner. Third-party sources criticized this; seeing it as a bid to distract the public from the ruling party's failings—particularly on the country's economy; according to these sources, by targeting Turkey's minority groups, he rallied his base amid the country's ongoing economic troubles to raise the prospects of winning the 2023 general elections in his country, which were seen as critical for his nearly 20-year rule.[514][515][516] At a campaign rally in the same year Erdoğan stated, "We are against the LGBT".[506]

Jews

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While Erdoğan has declared several times that he is against antisemitism,[517][518][519] he has been accused of invoking antisemitic stereotypes in public statements.[520][521]

Personal life

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Erdoğan (center) with his spouse Emine (center-right), granddaughter Canan Aybüke (center-left), and son-in-law Selçuk Bayraktar (left) at Teknofest festival in Azerbaijan (2022)

Erdoğan married Emine Erdoğan (née Gülbaran; b. 1955, Siirt) on 4 July 1978.[522] They have two sons, Ahmet Burak (b. 1979) and Necmettin Bilal (b. 1981), and two daughters, Esra (b. 1983) and Sümeyye (b. 1985).[522] His father, Ahmet Erdoğan, died in 1988 and his mother, Tenzile Erdoğan, died in 2011 at the age of 87.[523]

Erdoğan has a brother, Mustafa (b. 1958), and a sister, Vesile (b. 1965).[524] From his father's first marriage to Havuli Erdoğan (d. 1980), he had two half-brothers: Mehmet (1926–1988) and Hasan (1929–2006).[525]

Electoral history

[edit]
Year Office Type Party Main opponent Party Votes for Erdoğan or his party Result
Total % P. ±%
1984 Member of Parliament National RP Hüsnü Doğan ANAP 31,247 8.57 5th N/A Lost
1989 Mayor of Beyoğlu Local RP Hüseyin Aslan SHP 21,706 22.83 2nd +17.71 Lost
1991 Member of Parliament National RP Bahattin Yücel ANAP 70,555 20.01 5th +12.69 Lost
1994 Mayor of Istanbul Local RP İlhan Kesici ANAP 973,704 25.19 1st +14.74 Won
2002 Member of Parliament National AK Party Deniz Baykal CHP 10,808,229 34.28 1st +34.28 Won
2004 Party leader Local AK Party Deniz Baykal CHP 13,448,587 41.67 1st +41.67 Won
2007 Member of Parliament National AK Party Deniz Baykal CHP 16,327,291 46.58 1st +12.30 Won
2009 Party leader Local AK Party Deniz Baykal CHP 15,353,553 38.39 1st -3.28 Won
2011 Member of Parliament National AK Party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu CHP 21,399,082 49.83 1st +3.25 Won
2014 Party leader Local AK Party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu CHP 17,802,976 42.87 1st +4.48 Won
2014 President National Ind. Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu Ind. 21,000,143 51.79 1st N/A Won
2018 National AK Party Muharrem İnce CHP 26,330,823 52.59 1st +0.80 Won
2019 Party leader Local AK Party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu CHP 19,766,640 42.55 1st -0.32 Won
2023 President National AK Party Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu CHP 27,725,131 52.16 1st -0.43 Won
2024 Party leader Local AK Party Özgür Özel CHP 16,339,771 35.49 2nd -7.06 Lost

Honors, awards and recognitions

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Erdoğan has received numerous national and international awards and honors throughout his political career. These awards and honors reflect his contributions to international relations, cultural dialogue and humanitarian efforts.[citation needed] Internationally, he has been recognized with awards such as the Medal "In Commemoration of the 1000th Anniversary of Kazan" from Russia, the Nishan-e-Pakistan from Pakistan, and the Order of the Republic from Moldova. He has also been awarded the Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold from Belgium, the Grand Cordon of the National Order of the Ivory Coast and the Grand Cross of the National Order of Merit from Guinea.

Domestically, Erdoğan has received accolades including the Outstanding Service award from the Turkish Red Crescent and the Dialogue Between Cultures Award from the President of Tatarstan. Additionally, he has been awarded the King Faisal International Prize for "service to Islam" and the United Nations–HABITAT award in memorial of Rafik Hariri.

Bibliography

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (born 26 February 1954 in Istanbul's neighborhood to a working-class family) is a Turkish politician who has served as the 12th President of Turkey since 2014, becoming the first directly elected president. He studied economics at , entered politics with the Islamist , previously held the position of Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014, and was Mayor of Istanbul from 1994 to 1998. Coming from an Islamist political background, he co-founded the in 2001 after a political ban following a 1998 conviction for inciting religious hatred by reciting a poem, which led to a brief prison term. As Prime Minister from 2003 to 2014, Erdoğan led the AKP to landslide victories in the 2002, 2007, and 2011 elections. His government implemented economic reforms that spurred recovery from the 2001 crisis, maintained relative stability during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, reduced inflation, and expanded infrastructure, lifting millions from poverty and funding projects including bridges, airports, and high-speed rail networks; it also began in 2005, curtailed military involvement in politics through the and Balyoz trials, and initiated peace talks with the in 2012 to address the , though these collapsed in 2015. The of 2013, initially over urban redevelopment plans, expanded into nationwide demonstrations involving government responses including police actions to disperse crowds. However, subsequent years have seen economic turbulence, with inflation peaking over 80% in late 2022 attributed to unconventional monetary policies, alongside domestic controversies involving the centralization of executive authority following a 2017 constitutional referendum and the , which prompted purges exceeding 100,000 officials as well as restrictions on judicial independence, media outlets, and opposition parties like the ; these included the annulment and rerun of the 2019 Istanbul mayoral election, won by opposition candidate , whose March 2025 arrest on corruption charges and diploma revocation—effectively disqualifying him from the 2028 presidential race—sparked widespread protests amid ongoing political tensions under Erdoğan's presidency. In foreign policy, Erdoğan has pursued a multi-vector approach, including military interventions in against and and in , contributing to the fall of the in 2024 via support for opposition groups; mediation of the 2022 and prisoner exchanges; management of the through the 2016 ; initial blocking then approval of and 's accession bids in 2022-2024 due to security concerns; and balanced engagements with , , and to assert Turkey's regional influence.

Early Life and Education

Childhood and Family Influences

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was born on February 26, 1954, in the neighborhood of Istanbul to Ahmet Erdoğan, a coast guard officer and later ferry captain, and Tenzile Erdoğan, in a family of modest means originating from the Black Sea province of . As the eldest of five children, Erdoğan experienced a childhood marked by economic hardship and traditional values in a conservative Muslim household. The family initially resided in , where Erdoğan spent his early years amid the region's rural and maritime environment, influenced by his father's naval profession and the area's strong communal ties. In 1967, at age 13, his father relocated the family to Istanbul's working-class district seeking improved economic prospects, exposing Erdoğan to urban poverty and fostering resilience through manual labor, including selling lemonade and sesame buns on the streets to support the household. Family dynamics played a pivotal role in shaping his character, with his father enforcing strict discipline reflective of traditional paternal authority, while his mother provided spiritual guidance through daily prayers and religious observance, instilling piety and moral fortitude. This parental emphasis on religious education led to Erdoğan's enrollment in an , where Islamist principles began to inform his worldview amid Turkey's secular Kemalist framework. The blend of paternal rigor and maternal devotion, coupled with the family's migration from provincial conservatism to urban challenges, cultivated Erdoğan's early sense of determination and faith-driven purpose.

Formal Schooling and Islamist Awakening

Erdoğan attended Kasımpaşa Piyale Primary School in Istanbul's neighborhood, graduating in 1965. He subsequently enrolled in Istanbul's , a state-run religious vocational high school designed to train imams and preachers, completing his studies there in 1973. These schools emphasized Quranic recitation, Islamic jurisprudence, and Arabic alongside secular subjects, fostering an environment conducive to religious conservatism amid Turkey's secular framework. During his high school years at the İmam Hatip, Erdoğan began engaging with Islamist political circles, influenced by the (National Outlook) movement led by , which advocated for an Islamic alternative to Western secularism and promoted anti-Western, economically autarkic policies rooted in Islamic principles. His father's decision to enroll him in such a school reflected familial religious priorities, and Erdoğan later credited the institution with instilling discipline and piety, though critics argue it prioritized indoctrination over broad academic preparation. As a teenager in the late 1960s, he joined the youth wing of the (National Salvation Party), Erbakan's political vehicle, participating in street activism and socio-political activities that blended religious fervor with nationalist rhetoric. Erdoğan pursued higher education at what became 's Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences (formerly the Istanbul İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi); according to his official biography, he earned a diploma in 1981 after evening classes that allowed him to balance studies with part-time work selling simit on Istanbul streets. While at university, his Islamist commitments deepened; he honed oratorical skills in student circles aligned with , reciting poetry by that glorified Islamic revivalism and critiqued secular modernity, marking a pivotal phase in his ideological formation. This period solidified his view of politics as a vehicle for moral and religious renewal, contrasting with Turkey's elite-driven secularism. By graduation, Erdoğan had transitioned from youthful activism to organized Islamist networking, laying groundwork for his later political roles within Erbakan's orbit.

University diploma controversy

Erdoğan's official biography states that he graduated from 's Economic and Commercial Sciences Faculty in 1981, following his education at the Aksaray Academy of Economic and Commercial Sciences, which merged into Marmara University. Critics argue that the faculty did not exist under that name until 1982. Allegations disputing the degree's existence or validity first emerged prominently before the 2014 presidential election, raised by opposition figures, and gained traction in 2016 through social media campaigns such as YaDiplomaYaİstifa demanding proof or resignation, with the issue resurfacing ahead of the 2018 and 2023 elections amid doubts over newly released documents due to inconsistencies in signatures and department names. Legal challenges questioning eligibility include a 2016 appeal to the to annul his presidency and a 2024 petition to the , which was rejected. These disputes are directly relevant to Article 101 of the , which mandates that presidential candidates must have completed higher education, potentially affecting Erdoğan's eligibility since his 2014 election. In response, Marmara University issued statements in 2016 affirming his graduation, and copies of his diploma were released, though critics point to anomalies such as mismatched department names and unverified signatures. Politically, the controversy has fueled opposition campaigns and led to changes in election board requirements by 2018, no longer mandating diploma copies for candidates. Despite legal rejections, doubts persist, influencing public discourse on governance legitimacy.

Political Ascendancy Pre-AKP

Entry into Islamist Politics

Erdoğan's initial foray into politics aligned with the movement, an Islamist ideological framework developed by emphasizing pan-Islamist principles, economic self-sufficiency through heavy industry, and opposition to Western secular influences and Zionism. In the early 1970s, as a young man in Istanbul's Kasımpaşa neighborhood, he encountered Erbakan's manifesto and gravitated toward organized Islamist activism, joining the youth wing of the (Milli Selamet Partisi, MSP), which Erbakan had founded on October 11, 1972, as the political vehicle for Milli Görüş. The MSP positioned itself as an alternative to secular Kemalist parties, advocating for Islamic governance models while participating in coalition governments during Turkey's unstable 1970s. By 1976, Erdoğan, then in his early twenties, had advanced to lead the MSP's youth branch in the Beyoğlu district, which encompassed his native Kasımpaşa and served as a hub for grassroots Islamist mobilization. This role involved organizing youth activities, including affiliations with the ("Raiders"), a militant youth group tied to the MSP that promoted Islamist outreach and resistance against leftist influences. His involvement reflected a broader surge in political Islam during the period, fueled by economic turmoil, Cold War dynamics, and reactions to secular authoritarianism under prior regimes. Erdoğan's early commitment to Milli Görüş solidified his mentorship under Erbakan, who viewed youth cadres as essential for embedding Islamist values in Turkish society. The disrupted these activities, dissolving the MSP and imposing a three-year ban on political organizing, which forced Erdoğan and other Milli Görüş adherents underground. Upon partial civilian restoration in 1983, Erbakan reestablished the movement through the (Refah Partisi), a direct successor maintaining Milli Görüş tenets while adapting to the post-coup constitutional framework. Erdoğan promptly rejoined, securing election as the party's district chairman in 1984, marking his transition from youth activism to formal leadership in Islamist municipal politics. This position provided a platform for building local networks, distributing aid to conservative constituencies, and critiquing the secular elite's dominance, setting the stage for his subsequent electoral successes.

Istanbul Mayoralty (1994–1998)

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected Mayor of on March 27, 1994, as the candidate of the Islamist , securing approximately 25% of the vote amid a fragmented opposition that prevented any single rival from gaining a majority. His victory reflected widespread dissatisfaction with the incumbent administration's failures in service delivery, including chronic water shortages, inadequate waste collection, and mounting municipal debt. Erdoğan's administration prioritized pragmatic infrastructure improvements over ideological initiatives, addressing inherited deficits through targeted projects. He expanded water supply networks to previously unserved districts via new pipelines and reservoirs, reducing rationing that had affected millions; by 1997, daily water production increased from around 1.5 million cubic meters to over 2 million cubic meters. Waste management was overhauled with modern collection fleets and landfill expansions, curbing open dumping that had plagued outskirts like . Public transportation saw enhancements, including bus fleet modernization and route optimizations serving the city's then-7 million residents, while natural gas distribution lines were extended to thousands of households, replacing costlier alternatives like coal and electricity for heating. These efforts stemmed from fiscal discipline, with Erdoğan negotiating debt restructurings and cutting non-essential spending, though successors disputed the net debt position, claiming a residual burden of about $1.5 million upon handover. Governance emphasized efficiency and citizen engagement, with Erdoğan personally overseeing emergency response teams that reduced fire and ambulance wait times, earning public approval ratings above 60% in polls by 1997 despite secularist critiques of his Welfare Party ties. Controversies arose from perceived Islamist leanings, including bans on alcohol in municipal facilities and promotion of religious education, which alienated Kemalist elites but bolstered support among conservative voters. Tensions peaked on December 12, 1997, when Erdoğan recited a poem by during a speech in , containing lines likening mosques to barracks, minarets to bayonets, and worshippers to soldiers advancing—verses from a standard nationalist text but interpreted as inciting religious enmity under Turkey's secular laws. A state security court convicted him on April 21, 1998, of provoking hatred on religious grounds, imposing a 10-month prison sentence, of which he served four months, and a political ban. Appeals failed by September 1998, prompting his resignation on November 6, 1998, after which assumed the office; Erdoğan began serving time in March 1999. The case, amid the military's February 28, 1997, against Islamists, highlighted enforcement disparities, as similar recitations by others went unpunished, reflecting institutional resistance to rising conservative politics.

Imprisonment and Ideological Refinement (1999–2003)

In December 1997, while speaking at a campaign rally in Siirt, Erdoğan recited lines from a poem by the early 20th-century Turkish nationalist thinker , stating: "The mosques are our barracks, the domes our helmets, the minarets our bayonets, and the faithful our soldiers." These verses, part of Gökalp's work promoting pan-Turkish identity, were prosecuted under Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code for inciting religious hatred and enmity between classes. The indictment highlighted the poem's rallying call to Islam as a threat to secular order, leading to Erdoğan's trial despite his defense that the text was cultural heritage rather than original advocacy. In April 1998, a court convicted Erdoğan of provoking hatred, imposing a 10-month prison sentence and a lifetime ban from political office, forcing his resignation as Istanbul mayor on grounds of ineligibility. He appealed unsuccessfully, entering Pınarhisar Prison on March 26, 1999, where he served approximately four months amid reports of austere conditions shared with a fellow inmate. On the day of incarceration, Erdoğan released a spoken-word poetry album titled This Song Doesn't End Here, framing his detention as political persecution and garnering public sympathy from conservative and Islamist sympathizers who viewed the secular Kemalist establishment as intolerant of religious expression. Released on July 24, 1999, after remission for good behavior, Erdoğan emerged politically sidelined but with heightened national visibility, as the episode contrasted his populist appeal against the judiciary's secular enforcement. The imprisonment prompted a pragmatic recalibration of his approach: previously aligned with the overtly Islamist (RP), he distanced himself from radical rhetoric that invited state backlash, emphasizing instead conservative democratic principles, economic liberalization, and compatibility with EU norms to broaden electoral viability. This refinement manifested in the 2001 founding of the (AKP), which positioned itself as a center-right alternative to both Kemalist secularism and fringe Islamism, prioritizing governance reforms over ideological confrontation. The ban persisted until a 2002 constitutional amendment restored his eligibility, underscoring how the ordeal catalyzed a strategic moderation rooted in lessons from RP's dissolution and his personal legal vulnerability.

Formation of AKP and Path to Premiership

Founding the Justice and Development Party

Following the Turkish Constitutional Court's dissolution of the on June 22, 2001, for violations of secularism principles, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and a reformist faction from the Islamist "National Outlook" tradition initiated the formation of a new political entity. This group, dissatisfied with 's rigid ideological stance in prior parties like the and its successor, sought to craft a broader conservative platform compatible with Turkey's secular constitution and EU accession aspirations. Erdoğan's leadership was central, despite his ongoing political ban stemming from a 1998 conviction, as he mobilized allies to register the (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi; AKP) on August 14, 2001. The AKP's founding manifesto emphasized "conservative democracy," prioritizing market-oriented economic policies, anti-corruption measures, human rights improvements, and civilian-military balance, while downplaying sharia-based governance to attract centrist and secular voters alienated by Kemalist establishment rigidity. Prominent co-founders included , who handled initial public-facing roles as de facto leader; , a key parliamentary figure; and , contributing to the party's organizational structure from ex-Virtue Party networks. The party's 2001 launch congress in Ankara formalized these elements, drawing around 100 founding members focused on pragmatic governance over doctrinal purity. Erdoğan's post-imprisonment refinement—having served four months in 1999 for reciting a poem deemed to incite religious hatred—shaped the AKP's adaptive ideology, blending Islamic ethical roots with liberal economic and democratic rhetoric to navigate Turkey's polarized landscape. This strategic pivot enabled rapid organizational growth, with the party securing official recognition and preparing for the 2002 elections, where Erdoğan's ban would be lifted via parliamentary amendment after a supportive by-election win. The founding reflected causal pressures from repeated closures of Islamist predecessors, pushing toward a model prioritizing electoral viability and institutional reform over confrontation with secular elites.

2002 Electoral Breakthrough and Early Governance

The (AKP), founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and allies in 2001, achieved a decisive victory in the Turkish general election held on November 3, 2002, securing 34.3% of the popular vote and 363 seats in the 550-seat Grand National Assembly. This outcome marked the first time since 1987 that a single party gained an absolute majority, reflecting widespread disillusionment with the incumbent coalition of centrist and secular parties amid economic turmoil following the 2001 financial crisis. Erdoğan's political ban, stemming from a 1998 conviction for reciting a poem deemed incendiary, prevented him from assuming leadership immediately; thus, , an AKP co-founder, was appointed prime minister on November 18, 2002, to form the 58th government. Parliament amended the constitution to lift the ban, enabling Erdoğan to contest and win a by-election in Siirt province on March 9, 2003. He was subsequently sworn in as prime minister on March 14, 2003, ushering in the first Erdoğan cabinet. Early governance under Erdoğan emphasized macroeconomic stabilization, adhering to programs initiated post-2001 crisis, which included banking sector reforms and privatization drives to curb inflation and restore investor confidence. The administration pursued integration, enacting harmonization packages in 2003 that abolished the death penalty, improved minority rights, and reduced military influence in politics, earning initial praise for democratizing reforms. These measures contributed to economic recovery, with GDP growth resuming and foreign direct investment increasing, though critics noted persistent challenges like unemployment and rural-urban disparities.

Prime Ministerial Tenure (2003–2014)

Economic Liberalization and Growth Miracle

Following the 2001 financial crisis, the government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan committed to implementing the International Monetary Fund's stabilization program, which emphasized fiscal discipline, structural adjustments, and banking sector overhaul. Key reforms included the recapitalization and restructuring of insolvent banks through the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, enhanced supervisory powers for the independent Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency established in 2000, and stricter capital adequacy standards aligned with , which restored sector stability and reduced non-performing loans from over 20% in 2002 to under 5% by 2005. These measures, building on pre-AKP initiatives but rigorously enforced amid political stability, laid the groundwork for renewed investor confidence. Economic liberalization accelerated through accelerated privatization of state-owned enterprises, yielding proceeds that supported fiscal consolidation while attracting foreign direct investment. Between 2002 and 2010, privatization revenues contributed significantly to budget surpluses, with cumulative foreign direct investment inflows reaching substantial levels, including peaks of $20.2 billion in 2007 alone, driven by sales in telecom, energy, and ports sectors. Trade liberalization and customs union with the since 1995 further boosted exports, which grew at double-digit annual rates, fostering an export-led recovery. Inflation, which stood at 44.9% in 2002, declined sharply to 25.3% in 2003 and averaged around 8% annually from 2004 to 2010, enabling real wage gains and consumer spending. This era marked Turkey's "growth miracle," with real GDP expanding at an average annual rate of 6.8% from 2002 to 2007, including surges of 9.4% in 2004 and 8.4% in 2005, outpacing many emerging markets and doubling per capita income in real terms by the late 2000s. Productivity gains from structural shifts toward manufacturing and services, combined with low global interest rates facilitating capital inflows, underpinned this boom, which reduced poverty from 30% to under 15% of the population between 2002 and 2010. Public debt as a share of GDP fell from 74% in 2002 to 40% by 2008, reflecting prudent macroeconomic management. However, the model's reliance on short-term external financing and domestic credit expansion sowed seeds for vulnerabilities exposed in the 2008 global downturn, though quick recovery in 2010-2011 with 8.5% and 11.1% growth reaffirmed early resilience.
YearGDP Growth (%)Inflation (%)FDI Inflows (USD billion)
20026.444.91.0
20035.325.31.7
20049.410.62.8
20058.48.210.0
20066.99.620.2
20074.78.819.9
20080.810.419.8
2009-4.66.38.6
20108.58.69.0
Data compiled from World Bank and official statistics; FDI figures approximate cumulative trends.

Domestic Reforms: Democratization and Kurdish Initiative

Upon assuming office in November 2002, the government under Prime Minister Erdoğan accelerated democratization reforms initially pursued for accession, including amendments that abolished the death penalty in August 2004, except for terrorism-related cases during a transitional period, and eliminated state security courts by 2004, which had previously handled political offenses with limited due process. These measures, part of six harmonization packages between 2002 and 2004, also reduced the military's political influence by reallocating functions toward advisory roles and increasing civilian oversight of defense spending. Further constitutional changes in 2004 granted international human rights treaties direct applicability in Turkish courts, enhancing protections against torture and arbitrary detention, though implementation faced challenges due to entrenched state practices. The AKP's early push for EU alignment, formalized by the start of accession negotiations in October 2005, drove additional reforms such as expanding freedoms of expression and association, with over 30,000 political prisoners released by 2004 through retrials under revised evidence standards. These efforts contrasted with prior Kemalist regimes' resistance to such changes, positioning Erdoğan as a reformer who leveraged EU criteria to curb secularist institutions' dominance, though critics from military and judicial elites argued the reforms undermined national security. A 2010 constitutional referendum, approved by 58% of voters on September 12, further democratized the judiciary by allowing civilian election of Constitutional Court judges and easing military trials in civilian courts, addressing grievances from the 1980 coup era. Parallel to broader democratization, Erdoğan initiated the Kurdish Initiative, or Democratic Opening, in July 2009 to address longstanding ethnic tensions and the insurgency, which had claimed over 40,000 lives since 1984. The process included launching Turkey's state-run Kurdish-language television channel on January 1, 2009, permitting limited Kurdish broadcasts, and introducing elective Kurdish language courses in universities and schools by 2012, building on prior cultural rights expansions. High-level talks with PKK figures, facilitated indirectly via intermediaries, aimed at disarmament incentives and local autonomy discussions, but faltered after the October 2009 Habur border crossing, where 34 PKK members returned without immediate arrest, sparking nationalist backlash and protests that portrayed the government as conciliatory toward terrorism. The Initiative's collapse by 2010, amid renewed PKK attacks killing dozens of soldiers, highlighted causal tensions between reformist intent and security imperatives, with Erdoğan suspending dialogue while maintaining select cultural measures; subsequent violence escalated, underscoring the limits of unilateral concessions without reciprocal PKK demobilization or broader constitutional buy-in from opposition parties. Despite setbacks, these efforts marked a departure from denialist policies, fostering tentative democratic space for Kurdish identity expression, though entrenched biases in state institutions and media scrutiny from secular outlets often framed them as concessions rather than rights-based progress.

Infrastructure and Social Welfare Expansions

During Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's premiership, the Turkish government pursued extensive infrastructure development, emphasizing transportation networks and urban housing to support economic growth and urbanization. The length of divided highways quadrupled from 6,040 kilometers in 2002 to approximately 23,831 kilometers by 2016, with substantial expansions occurring between 2003 and 2014 through intensive construction programs that added thousands of kilometers annually. The project, initiated in 2004, connected Istanbul's European and Asian sides via an undersea rail tunnel completed in 2008, with full commuter service commencing on October 29, 2013, spanning 76.3 kilometers and incorporating 38 stations to alleviate traffic congestion and enhance regional connectivity. Mass housing initiatives under the accelerated dramatically post-2002, with the 2003 Emergency Action Plan targeting 250,000 units over five years to address urban deficits; by the end of the decade, TOKİ had shifted from producing fewer than 50,000 units prior to 2003 to contributing 5-10% of national housing supply, primarily low- and middle-income developments integrated with infrastructure like roads and utilities. These projects, often financed through public-private partnerships, facilitated slum clearance and resettlement, though critics noted environmental and displacement concerns not offset by independent impact assessments in official records. On social welfare, the (AKP) administration expanded assistance programs, increasing expenditures from 0.57% of GDP in 2003 to 1.31% by 2014, funding conditional cash transfers, fuel aid, and integrated systems like the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundations for targeted poverty alleviation. The Health Transformation Program, launched in 2003, introduced universal health insurance coverage, expanding access to services and reducing out-of-pocket expenses; private hospital numbers rose from 271 in 2002 to over 500 by mid-decade, correlating with improved preventive care and infant mortality declines, though reliance on public funding raised sustainability questions amid growing deficits. These efforts contributed to empirical poverty reductions, with extreme poverty (below $1.25/day) falling from 13% in 2002 to 5% by 2011, driven by growth and transfers but vulnerable to critiques of dependency on state largesse without structural labor reforms. Overall, infrastructure and welfare expansions bolstered AKP electoral support among lower-income groups, as evidenced by satisfaction surveys, yet entailed rising public debt and fiscal pressures not fully mitigated by revenue gains.

Early Foreign Policy: EU Alignment and Regional Engagement

Upon assuming the premiership in March 2003, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's (AKP) government emphasized alignment with the as a cornerstone of its foreign policy, viewing accession as a means to bolster domestic legitimacy and enact political reforms. The administration accelerated legislative harmonization to meet the , passing multiple reform packages between 2003 and 2004 that addressed human rights, minority rights, and judicial independence, building on pre-AKP efforts but with renewed vigor. These measures contributed to the European Council's December 17, 2004, decision to initiate accession negotiations, contingent on Turkey's recognition of and implementation of reforms. Formal EU accession talks commenced on October 3, 2005, marking a milestone under Erdoğan's leadership, with Foreign Minister leading initial chapters on science and research. The process initially progressed amid optimism, as Turkey extended its customs union to all EU members, including , though this sparked domestic debate over concessions. Erdoğan's government framed EU integration as essential for economic modernization and democratization, attracting foreign investment and aligning Turkey with Western institutions, despite emerging hurdles like opposition from and to full membership. Parallel to EU pursuits, Erdoğan's early foreign policy shifted toward proactive regional engagement, departing from Turkey's prior securitized approach to neighbors by prioritizing economic interdependence and diplomacy under the emerging "zero problems with neighbors" framework, later formalized by incoming Foreign Minister . This involved mending ties with Middle Eastern states, including high-level visits to and to foster trade and resolve border disputes, resulting in a tripling of bilateral trade volumes with Syria by 2007. The policy sought to position Turkey as a regional hub, leveraging cultural affinities and soft power to expand influence without military confrontation, as evidenced by joint cabinet meetings with Syria in 2003 and mediation efforts in . Regional initiatives extended to improved relations with and Arab states, where Erdoğan's administration promoted energy pipelines and investment deals, contrasting with the secular Kemalist tradition of distance from Islamist governments. For instance, trade with Iran surged from $1 billion in 2002 to over $4 billion by 2007, underpinned by pragmatic diplomacy amid U.S. pressures over Iran's nuclear program. This multidimensional engagement aimed at economic gains—regional exports rose 20% annually in the mid-2000s—while avoiding entanglement in sectarian conflicts, though it drew criticism from secular elites for tilting away from -centric alliances.

Gezi Protests and Internal Polarization (2013)

The Gezi Park protests originated on May 28, 2013, when a small group of environmental activists occupied 's to oppose municipal plans to demolish the green space for an urban redevelopment project, including a replica of Ottoman-era barracks and a shopping mall. The initial demonstration, involving around 50 protesters, escalated on May 30 when police used tear gas and rubber bullets to evict occupants during a court-approved clearance operation, drawing broader public outrage over perceived heavy-handed tactics. By May 31, clashes intensified as thousands joined in solidarity, transforming the sit-in into widespread anti-government demonstrations criticizing Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's policies on urban development, secularism, and perceived authoritarianism. The protests rapidly expanded beyond , spreading to at least 80 of Turkey's 81 provinces by early June 2013, with participants from diverse ideologies—including secularists, environmentalists, , and even some conservatives—united under demands for democratic freedoms, an end to police violence, and Erdoğan's resignation. Erdoğan responded dismissively, labeling demonstrators as "çapulcular" (looters or marauders) and foreign-influenced extremists rather than legitimate citizens, while defending the Gezi project as reflecting the elected government's mandate from prior urban planning referenda. On June 13, he issued a "final warning" from , urging parents to retrieve their children from the protests and insisting that and Gezi Park did not belong to "occupiers," framing the unrest as a minority challenge to national stability rather than a grassroots movement. The government deployed riot police nationwide, employing tear gas, water cannons, and plastic bullets, which protesters and observers described as disproportionate, though officials maintained actions targeted vandals and maintained public order. Police operations resulted in significant casualties, with documenting at least five deaths by late August 2013 and strong evidence implicating excessive force in three cases, alongside thousands of injuries from tear gas inhalation, beatings, and projectiles. Broader estimates from medical reports and human rights monitors cited over 8,000 injuries, including 63 in critical condition, though government accounts attributed many to protester violence or unrelated causes, leading to internal investigations that convicted some officers but faced criticism for leniency. Arrests numbered in the thousands, with tactics like park clearances on June 15 in prompting further clashes, but the core occupation ended without major concessions, as Erdoğan rejected negotiations beyond judicial review of the development plan. The events exacerbated internal polarization, solidifying Erdoğan's support among his conservative, rural, and pious base—who viewed the protests as elite urban disruption orchestrated by external forces—while alienating urban middle classes and fostering a "Gezi generation" of youth disillusioned with governance. This divide manifested in Erdoğan's rhetoric portraying protesters as threats to Islamic values and economic progress, enabling AKP to rally voters by emphasizing stability over pluralism, though the unrest exposed fractures in Turkey's secular-conservative fault lines without shifting immediate electoral power. Long-term, the protests inspired civic activism but invited government reprisals, including later prosecutions framing organizers as coup plotters, further entrenching mutual distrust between the ruling party and opposition segments.

Corruption Probes and Power Consolidation

On 17 December 2013, Turkish authorities launched a series of high-profile raids as part of a graft investigation, detaining the sons of three cabinet ministers—Barış Güler (son of Interior Minister Muammer Güler), Kaan Çağlayan (son of Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan), and Sümeyye Bayraktar (daughter of Environment and Urbanization Minister Erdoğan Bayraktar)—along with prominent businessman , accused of facilitating bribery and money laundering tied to public tenders and gold-for-gas trades with Iran to evade sanctions. The probes, led by prosecutors linked to the (Hizmet), extended to , the prime minister's son, who was questioned but not formally detained; leaked audio recordings purportedly captured him instructing aides to dispose of undeclared cash at home, totaling millions in euros and other currencies. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan immediately condemned the operation as a "dirty plot" and "judicial coup" by a "parallel state" infiltrated by Gülenists within the police and judiciary, whom he accused of fabricating evidence to destabilize his government amid prior tensions with the movement over influence in state institutions. By 25 December 2013, the three implicated ministers resigned en masse, denying wrongdoing and citing political pressure, prompting Erdoğan to reshuffle roughly half his cabinet with loyalists, including appointing new figures to key economic and interior posts. In response, the government purged over 350 police officers in Ankara alone by early January 2014, reassigned thousands more nationwide, and dismissed or prosecuted prosecutors involved, framing these moves as essential to rooting out infiltration rather than obstructing justice. The scandal accelerated Erdoğan's centralization of authority, with parliament passing emergency laws in early 2014 restricting wiretaps, expanding government oversight of judicial appointments, and limiting probes into public officials without prior approval, measures critics described as shielding allies but which Erdoğan defended as safeguards against abuse by embedded networks. These reforms neutralized Gülenist influence in law enforcement and courts, enabling tighter executive control over investigations and reducing internal dissent, as evidenced by the movement's later designation as the terrorist organization post-. Despite international scrutiny— including U.S. indictments confirming elements of the Iran sanctions evasion scheme involving Zarrab—the probes failed to derail Erdoğan's trajectory, with the securing 43% of the vote in the March 2014 local elections, outperforming expectations amid voter polarization. This episode marked a pivot from coalition-style governance to authoritarian consolidation, prioritizing loyalty over institutional independence.

Transition to Presidency and 2016 Turning Point

2014 Presidential Election and System Shift

The 2014 Turkish presidential election on 10 August marked the inaugural direct popular vote for the office, a change enacted through the 2010 constitutional referendum that amended the selection process from parliamentary appointment to universal suffrage if consensus failed in the assembly. This shift, approved by 58% of voters in the referendum on 12 September 2010, extended the presidential term to five years with a two-term limit and lowered the election age to 18, reflecting the 's long-term push to align the presidency with popular mandate amid prior gridlock under coalition governments. The election occurred against a backdrop of political turbulence, including the and graft investigations targeting AKP figures, which Erdoğan framed as external plots to undermine his leadership. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who had served as prime minister since 2003, resigned on 25 August 2014 to comply with constitutional ineligibility rules barring active government officials from candidacy, paving the way for 's appointment as premier. Running as the AKP nominee, Erdoğan campaigned on transforming Turkey into a stronger executive presidency, arguing the existing parliamentary model fostered instability and inefficiency, a position he had advocated since the AKP's failed 2011-2013 constitutional reform bids that sought broader powers but stalled short of the required supermajority. Opposing him was , a consensus candidate uniting the secular and with 38% support, and of the pro-Kurdish , who garnered Kurdish and leftist votes at around 10%. Voter turnout reached 73.7%, with Erdoğan clinching 52% of valid votes—approximately 21.8 million—securing an outright win without a second round. Erdoğan's inauguration on 28 August 2014 at the parliament in Ankara formalized his transition to the presidency, where he immediately signaled an "active" role beyond the traditionally ceremonial duties outlined in the 1982 constitution, including public endorsements of AKP policies and criticisms of opposition figures. This de facto expansion tested constitutional boundaries, as Erdoğan continued influencing cabinet selections and legislative agendas through Davutoğlu, whom he had mentored, effectively blurring lines between branches despite the presidency's nominal impartiality requirement. The victory, while consolidating AKP dominance after its 49.8% parliamentary share in 2011, drew opposition claims of media bias and vote irregularities in conservative strongholds, though the validated results without annulling any districts. The election catalyzed an incremental system shift toward executive presidentialism, as Erdoğan leveraged his popular legitimacy to advocate for constitutional overhaul, culminating in the 2017 referendum that abolished the prime ministership and vested legislative, appointive, and veto powers directly in the president. Prior to 2014, presidents like had operated within parliamentary constraints, but Erdoğan's model emphasized unilateral executive authority to resolve "tutelage" from unelected institutions like the military, a rationale rooted in AKP's critique of pre-2002 secularist dominance. Critics, including CHP leaders, contended this eroded checks and balances, fostering personalization of power, while supporters viewed it as democratizing reform aligning with Turkey's unitary state needs. By late 2014, Erdoğan's interventions in foreign policy and security decisions underscored the presidency's evolving centrality, setting precedents for the post-2017 framework despite lacking formal amendments at the time.

2017 Referendum: Executive Powers Expansion

The 2017 Turkish constitutional referendum, held on April 16, 2017, sought approval for 18 amendments drafted primarily by the in alliance with the , aiming to transition Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential system of government. Proponents, including President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, argued the changes would streamline decision-making and avert the instability exposed by the failed July 2016 coup attempt, enabling a stronger executive to counter threats from military and bureaucratic elements. The amendments abolished the prime ministership, vested executive authority in the president—who would be directly elected for up to two five-year terms—empowered the president to appoint and dismiss ministers, vice presidents, and high-level bureaucrats without parliamentary approval, issue decrees with force of law in areas not regulated by statute, declare states of emergency unilaterally, dissolve parliament after consultation, and influence judicial appointments by nominating members to the Constitutional Court and Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Erdoğan played a central role in advocating for the "Yes" vote, conducting over 20 rallies nationwide and framing the referendum as essential for national security and economic progress amid post-coup purges and terrorism concerns, while opposition parties such as the and campaigned for "No," warning of a slide toward one-man rule and erosion of checks and balances. The campaign period, officially from March 2017 but with Erdoğan actively promoting it earlier, featured unequal media access, with state broadcaster TRT dedicating 91% of airtime to "Yes" arguments versus 9% for "No," alongside restrictions on opposition gatherings and arrests of critics under anti-terror laws. International observers from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) reported the process occurred on an "unlevel playing field," citing pervasive pro-government media dominance, suppression of dissent, and misuse of public resources for campaigning, though they noted the vote itself was technically administered without widespread interference on polling day. Voting irregularities emerged when the decided late on April 16 to accept unstamped ballots and envelopes as valid, a reversal from prior rulings, which opposition figures claimed inflated "Yes" results in key districts; this prompted demands for annulment, though courts upheld the outcome. Official results showed 51.41% voting "Yes" (25.2 million votes) against 48.59% "No" (23.7 million), with turnout at 85.54% among 55.3 million eligible voters, yielding a narrow margin concentrated in rural and conservative regions like central Anatolia, while urban centers such as Istanbul and Ankara and southeastern Kurdish-majority areas favored "No." Erdoğan declared victory hours after polls closed, hailing it as a mandate for systemic overhaul, though the slim win highlighted deepening societal divides, with "Yes" support drawing from AKP loyalists seeking executive efficiency and "No" from secular, liberal, and minority groups fearing democratic backsliding. The approved changes took effect following the 2018 general elections, formalizing expanded executive authority and allowing Erdoğan to seek re-election, but critics, including ODIHR, contended the reforms concentrated power excessively, potentially undermining parliamentary oversight and judicial independence—a view echoed in Western analyses often skeptical of Erdoğan's governance model, though Turkish supporters emphasized empirical needs for rapid post-coup stabilization over abstract institutional norms. Empirical data post-referendum showed no immediate reversal of polarization, with subsequent elections reflecting continued AKP dominance amid economic and security challenges.

2016 Coup Attempt: Response, Purges, and Security Reforms

On July 15, 2016, a faction within the Turkish military launched a coup attempt against the government, deploying tanks in major cities, bombing the parliament in , and attempting to assassinate President Erdoğan during his stay in . The plotters seized key locations including bridges in and the state broadcaster , declaring a military takeover, but faced immediate resistance from loyal security forces and civilians. Erdoğan, having narrowly escaped the assassination bid, urged the public via a FaceTime interview on to take to the streets and resist the coup, framing it as a defense of democracy against traitors. This call mobilized tens of thousands of citizens who confronted armored vehicles and soldiers, with mosques broadcasting the imam's appeals for resistance; by July 16 morning, the coup had collapsed, resulting in 249 deaths, including 36 alleged plotters. Erdoğan immediately attributed the attempt to the , designated as the Fethullahist Terrorist Organization (), citing evidence of its infiltration into state institutions, though Gülen denied involvement and some Western intelligence assessments questioned direct orchestration while acknowledging sympathizer participation. In response, Erdoğan declared a state of emergency on July 20, 2016, extended seven times until July 2018, enabling decree powers to bypass parliament for security measures. Purges targeted suspected FETÖ affiliates across institutions: over 8,000 military personnel were initially detained, including 118 generals and admirals, with 81% of top officers eventually dismissed; approximately 2,700 judges and prosecutors were removed from the bench; and by April 2017, at least 47,155 individuals had been arrested nationwide, expanding to over 113,000 by 2025, encompassing civil servants, academics, and police. These actions, justified by the government as eliminating a parallel state structure, drew international criticism for due process violations, though trials like the 2020 sentencing of 337 officers to life for coup plotting proceeded on evidence of coordination. Security reforms restructured the military to enhance civilian oversight and loyalty: the Supreme Military Council (YAŞ) gained expanded presidential influence in promotions; the General Staff was subordinated more directly to the Defense Ministry; and new intelligence-sharing protocols integrated the military with civilian agencies under presidential purview, aiming to prevent future insurrections by diversifying command and purging infiltrated cadres. These changes, including the creation of specialized anti-coup units, consolidated executive control over defense, transforming the armed forces into a more politicized yet operationally active entity aligned with government priorities.

Presidential Governance (2018–Present)

2018 and 2023 Re-elections Amid Crises

Erdoğan secured re-election as president in the snap presidential election held on June 24, 2018, obtaining 52.59% of the vote against 's 30.64%, with the election prompted by the opposition's push for early polls amid economic pressures including a depreciating Turkish lira and rising inflation exceeding 10% annually. The vote occurred under a new executive presidential system ratified in 2017, marking the first direct presidential election since the constitutional change, with the alliance also gaining a parliamentary majority through simultaneous legislative elections where the AKP received 42.56% and its ally the 11.10%. International observers, including the , noted restrictions on media freedom and uneven playing fields favoring incumbents, though the process was deemed technically efficient; domestically, the opposition alleged irregularities but courts upheld the results. The 2018 contest unfolded against a backdrop of post-2016 coup attempt stabilization efforts, including widespread purges in the military and judiciary that consolidated executive control, alongside currency volatility triggered by U.S. sanctions over detained American pastor Andrew Brunson and broader investor flight from Turkey's unorthodox monetary policies. Despite these strains, Erdoğan's campaign emphasized national security achievements against terrorism and Syrian border threats, resonating with conservative and nationalist voters wary of secular opposition figures, while economic discontent failed to coalesce into a unified anti-AKP front due to fragmented opposition dynamics. Post-election, the lira's further devaluation underscored ongoing vulnerabilities, yet Erdoğan's victory entrenched his leadership amid these pressures. In the 2023 presidential election, Erdoğan won a runoff on May 28 with 52.18% against 's 47.82%, following a first round on May 14 where Erdoğan led with 49.52% to Kılıçdaroğlu's 44.88%, necessitated by no candidate surpassing 50%. The election transpired amid severe crises, including devastating earthquakes on February 6, 2023, killing over 50,000 and displacing millions in southeastern Turkey, which drew criticism for slow government response and building code lapses under prior AKP administrations. Compounding this, Turkey faced hyperinflation peaking at 85.5% in October 2022 per official data—though independent estimates suggested higher—and a cost-of-living squeeze from Erdoğan's resistance to conventional interest rate hikes, favoring low-rate policies to spur growth despite expert warnings of inflationary spirals. Erdoğan's resilience stemmed from portraying the opposition as insufficiently nationalist on issues like Syrian refugees and Greek maritime disputes, bolstered by MHP alliance support and state media dominance, while Kılıçdaroğlu's six-party struggled with internal divisions and failure to capitalize on earthquake mismanagement critiques. The Supreme Election Council certified the results despite opposition fraud claims, including over voting irregularities, but rejected annulment requests, affirming Erdoğan's third term amid these compounded crises. Economic indicators showed GDP growth of 5.5% in 2022 but at the expense of currency erosion, with post-election orthodoxy shifts under new finance minister signaling potential policy pivots.

Economic Management: Orthodoxy, Inflation, and Resilience

Following the 2001 financial crisis, Erdoğan's (AKP) government from 2002 initially pursued orthodox monetary and fiscal policies, inheriting -supported reforms that stabilized the economy. Inflation declined sharply from 54.4% in 2001 to 9.7% by 2004, while annual GDP growth averaged 6.8% between 2003 and 2007, driven by privatization, banking sector cleanup, and foreign investment inflows. Public debt to GDP fell from 74% in 2002 to around 40% by 2010, reflecting fiscal discipline and export-led expansion. By the mid-2010s, however, Erdoğan increasingly rejected central bank independence, advocating a heterodox view that high interest rates cause inflation rather than curb it, leading to repeated dismissals of governors and suppression of rate hikes despite rising pressures. This culminated in the 2018 lira crisis, where the currency depreciated over 40% against the dollar amid capital outflows, policy uncertainty, and U.S. tariff tensions, pushing inflation to 20.3% and triggering a recession with GDP contracting 2.6% in 2019. The government's response involved unconventional measures like liability dollarization and credit controls, but avoided sustained tightening, exacerbating currency volatility and imported inflation. Post-2023 re-election, Erdoğan appointed market-friendly Finance Minister and Central Bank Governor , marking a pragmatic shift toward orthodoxy with aggressive rate hikes from 8.5% to 50% by mid-2024, alongside fiscal consolidation. Inflation peaked at 85.5% in late 2022 before easing to 68.5% in March 2024 and further to around 35% by mid-2025, supported by tighter policy and base effects, though core pressures persist from wage indexation and fiscal spending. Despite turbulence, economic resilience is evident in sustained growth of 4.5% in 2023 and 3.2% in 2024, low public debt at 24.7% of GDP in 2024, and robust external buffers from tourism and remittances, allowing room for stimulus without immediate default risk. Critics from Western media often attribute woes solely to Erdoğan's interventions, overlooking structural factors like energy import dependence and global tightening, while data underscores the economy's adaptability under pressure.

2023 Earthquake Response: Criticisms and Achievements

The , striking on February 6 with magnitudes of 7.8 and 7.5 centered near Kahramanmaraş, caused 53,537 confirmed deaths in Turkey amid widespread building collapses, exacerbating the disaster's toll due to substandard construction in affected provinces. Erdoğan's administration declared a state of emergency on February 8, mobilizing search-and-rescue teams and coordinating international aid, though critics highlighted initial delays in deploying heavy machinery and coordinating local responders, attributing these to bureaucratic centralization and inadequate pre-disaster stockpiling of equipment. The government acknowledged early shortcomings during Erdoğan's site visits, where he conceded coordination lapses, but opposition figures and residents reported aid arriving too late in remote areas, with some survivors waiting days for basic supplies amid freezing conditions. Criticisms intensified over structural failures, as over 3,450 buildings collapsed, many due to non-compliance with seismic codes enforced laxly under prior -led urban amnesty programs that retroactively legalized substandard constructions for electoral gain, a policy defended by officials as necessary for informal housing but blamed by engineers for amplifying casualties. Centralized governance under Erdoğan's executive system was faulted for eroding local disaster agencies' autonomy, leading to slower on-ground responses compared to more decentralized models elsewhere, though defenders argued the quake's scale—displacing 2.7 million—overwhelmed any system. Additional backlash arose from media restrictions and arrests of journalists reporting on response gaps, perceived as stifling accountability, while public protests in affected cities decried corruption in construction permits as a causal factor in preventable deaths. On achievements, the government facilitated rapid influx of international assistance, with pledges from over 100 countries totaling billions, including $1.78 billion from the for recovery and 7 billion euros from -led donors, enabling distribution of aid to approximately 4 million people through partnerships. Erdoğan's administration launched a comprehensive relief package on March 6, encompassing debt relief, housing subsidies, and a $104 billion reconstruction estimate, constructing temporary shelters for hundreds of thousands and initiating permanent rebuilding, with officials reporting over 400,000 housing units addressed by early 2025 despite ongoing delays in some zones. These efforts, coupled with domestic mobilization via NGOs and municipalities, mitigated famine and disease risks in the 18 million affected, contributing to Erdoğan's narrow re-election victory in May 2023, where voters in unaffected regions credited the scale of federal intervention over isolated lapses. Recovery persistence two years on underscores logistical feats amid fiscal strain, though incomplete timelines reflect enduring challenges in enforcement and funding allocation.

2024 Local Elections: Opposition Gains and AKP Setbacks

The 2024 Turkish local elections, held on March 31, 2024, across all 81 provinces, marked a significant reversal for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's (AKP), with the main opposition (CHP) securing its strongest performance since 1977. Nationally, the CHP garnered approximately 37.8% of the vote for municipal council seats, edging out the AKP's 35.5%, the first time the opposition led the ruling party in vote share in over two decades. This outcome reflected widespread voter dissatisfaction amid high inflation exceeding 70%, economic stagnation, and lingering effects from the 2023 earthquakes, rather than a unified opposition strategy. In major urban centers, the CHP retained and expanded control, decisively defeating AKP candidates. In Istanbul, incumbent CHP Mayor won re-election with 50.9% of the vote against the AKP's Murat Kurum's 40.1%, a margin of over 1 million votes and more than 10 percentage points, solidifying the city's opposition stronghold despite Erdoğan's intense campaign efforts. Similarly, in Ankara, CHP Mayor secured around 60% of the vote, retaining the capital with a commanding lead. The CHP also captured traditional AKP bastions like Bursa and Antalya, alongside Izmir, Adana, and Balıkesir, capturing at least 13 of the 30 metropolitan municipalities while the AKP held onto 17, including southeastern strongholds such as Gaziantep. Emerging parties like the siphoned conservative votes, contributing to AKP losses in areas like Şanlıurfa. Erdoğan conceded the results publicly, describing the elections as a "turning point" and acknowledging that his party had "lost altitude," pledging to "fix" any mistakes in response to the electorate's message. Despite these setbacks, the AKP retained a national parliamentary majority and Erdoğan's presidential term extends to 2028, limiting immediate threats to centralized power; however, the losses highlighted vulnerabilities in urban and conservative voter bases, potentially complicating future national campaigns amid ongoing economic pressures.

Media, Judiciary, and Institutional Dynamics

Under Erdoğan's governance, media ownership has concentrated among entities aligned with the ruling , with pro-government groups controlling approximately 90% of national media outlets, including major newspapers, television channels, and online platforms. This shift accelerated after the , when over 150 media outlets were shuttered via emergency decrees, and assets of critical broadcasters like were seized and transferred to trustees linked to AKP supporters, such as the . Such consolidation has enabled selective advertising allocation by state institutions, favoring compliant outlets while starving independents of revenue. Turkey's press freedom standing reflects this dynamic, ranking 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index and dropping to 159th in 2025, with scores indicating severe political and economic pressures on journalists. In 2024, authorities sentenced 58 journalists to a cumulative 135 years in prison, detained 112, and arrested 26, often on charges of "terrorism" or "insulting the president" stemming from critical reporting on corruption or policy failures. While the government attributes such actions to national security threats from Gülenist networks infiltrated in media post-2016, independent monitors document self-censorship as a pervasive outcome, with editors avoiding AKP critiques to evade regulatory penalties from the . Internet restrictions compound this, including blocks on social media during elections and lengthy sentences for online dissent, as noted in 's 2024 assessment scoring Turkey 10/100 for internet freedom. The judiciary underwent parallel transformations, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt, which the government blamed on 's movement allegedly embedding loyalists in courts. Over 4,362 judges and prosecutors—roughly 40% of the total—were dismissed via decree, replaced by appointees vetted for loyalty, leading to a precipitous drop in Turkey's World Justice Project Rule of Law Index to historic lows by 2025. The 2017 constitutional reforms restructured the , empowering the president to directly appoint six of 13 members and parliament (AKP-dominated until 2024) to select the rest, a change the Venice Commission in 2024 deemed places the board under "complete executive control," eroding judicial autonomy. Critics, including the , have ruled many post-purge detentions arbitrary, yet domestic courts increasingly convict opposition figures—such as Istanbul Mayor in 2022 on politically motivated charges—while acquitting AKP allies. The AKP defends these measures as essential to purge infiltrators and streamline justice, pointing to the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy unveiled by Erdoğan on January 23, 2025, which promises faster trials but lacks mechanisms to restore independence. Institutionally, these shifts have centralized authority in the executive, diminishing counterweights like parliamentary oversight and independent regulators. The 2017 referendum expanded presidential decree powers, allowing Erdoğan to bypass courts on administrative matters, while HSK dominance facilitates prosecutions aligned with government priorities, such as anti-corruption cases targeting rivals but shielding AKP insiders. Freedom House's 2024 report rates Turkey "Not Free," citing fused executive-judicial functions that prioritize stability over pluralism, though Erdoğan allies argue this resilience prevented chaos akin to pre-AKP instability. By 2025, this framework sustains AKP influence amid opposition gains, with courts upholding electoral objections selectively and media amplifying official narratives during crises like the 2023 earthquakes.

Foreign Policy Orientation

Balancing NATO, Russia, and Middle East Powers

Erdoğan's foreign policy has emphasized a multi-vector approach, maintaining Turkey's membership while deepening economic and strategic ties with and pursuing pragmatic engagements with Middle Eastern powers to assert regional influence independent of Western alignment. This balancing act intensified after the 2016 coup attempt, prioritizing national sovereignty over alliance conformity, as evidenced by Turkey's refusal to fully align with sanctions on following the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Tensions with peaked with Turkey's 2017 agreement and 2019 delivery of 's air defense systems, valued at $2.5 billion, prompting U.S. expulsion of Turkey from the program and imposition of sanctions in December 2020. Erdoğan defended the purchase as essential for air defense gaps unmet by allies, rejecting U.S. alternatives and insisting on operational integration without Russian technicians. Despite these frictions, Turkey ratified Finland's accession in March 2023 and Sweden's in January 2024 after securing concessions on counter-terrorism cooperation against affiliates and lifting arms embargoes. Relations with have expanded economically, with the pipeline, agreed in 2016 and operationalized in January 2020, delivering over 21 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to Turkey in 2024, comprising a significant portion of its energy imports. This interdependence persisted amid military divergences, such as clashes with Russian-backed forces in Syria's Idlib in 2020, yet fostered high-level cooperation through the Turkish-Russian High-Level Cooperation Council. In the Ukraine conflict, Turkey mediated the in July 2022, facilitating over 30 million tons of exports before its lapse in July 2023, while supplying to Ukraine and hosting early Russia-Ukraine talks in Istanbul in March 2022 without endorsing Western sanctions. Engagements with Middle Eastern powers reflect a shift from ideological confrontations to economic normalization, exemplified by Erdoğan's 2023-2025 Gulf tours yielding over two dozen agreements with , , , , and on trade, investment, and maritime cooperation. Ties with strengthened via military basing and financial support during the 2017-2021 Gulf blockade, while reconciliations with post-2018 Khashoggi incident and addressed past disputes, aligning against shared concerns like 's regional influence. Relations with remain pragmatic, focused on trade and coordination despite sectarian divergences and occasional border tensions. This recalibration enhances Turkey's leverage in post-Assad and dynamics, positioning it as a counterweight without full rupture from .

Syria and Kurdish Conflicts: Interventions and Strategies

Turkey's military interventions in Syria under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were driven by security imperatives, including combating the () and preventing the consolidation of a -linked Kurdish entity along its southern border, which Ankara views as an existential threat due to the 's operational and ideological ties to the terrorist organization. The , designated a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, and the European Union, has waged an insurgency against Turkey since 1984, killing over 40,000 people, with its Syrian affiliate exploiting the civil war to establish de facto control in northern Syria. Erdoğan's strategy emphasized cross-border operations to dismantle -held territories, create buffer zones for refugee repatriation, and support non-Kurdish Syrian opposition forces, while navigating alliances with partners despite U.S. support for the against . The first major intervention, Operation Euphrates Shield, launched on August 24, 2016, involved approximately 8,000 Turkish troops and allied () fighters targeting positions and advances west of the Euphrates River. By March 2017, the operation had liberated key areas including Jarablus, al-Bab, and Dabiq from control, disrupting jihadist supply lines into Turkey and blocking territorial contiguity. This was followed by Operation Olive Branch on January 20, 2018, which cleared forces from the Afrin region, capturing the city of Afrin by March 18, 2018, after displacing an estimated 100,000-200,000 civilians and neutralizing over 4,000 fighters according to Turkish reports. These actions established Turkish-controlled enclaves facilitating the resettlement of Syrian refugees, with over 300,000 returns recorded in northern Syria by 2020. Operation Peace Spring, initiated on October 9, 2019, targeted / positions east of the Euphrates following a U.S. troop withdrawal signal, advancing 30 kilometers into Syrian territory to secure a 120-kilometer border stretch from Ras al-Ayn to Tal Abyad. The offensive, involving artillery, airstrikes, and ground incursions, resulted in the capture of 11 towns and the surrender of over 4,500 fighters, though it drew international condemnation for humanitarian impacts, including the displacement of 200,000 people. Erdoğan's rationale centered on neutralizing / infrastructure, with Turkish officials citing the capture of weapons stockpiles originally supplied by the U.S. to fight as evidence of the groups' intertwined threats. Parallel to these offensives, Turkey's broader strategy incorporated diplomatic mechanisms like the Astana process (initiated 2017 with and ) to delineate de-escalation zones in Idlib, where Turkish forces maintained observation posts to counter Assad regime advances and jihadist spillover, though clashes escalated in early 2020 leading to Operation Spring of Peace. Against Kurdish threats, Erdoğan pursued a "disarm or be buried" posture, demanding dissolution and disarmament as preconditions for regional stability, informed by intelligence on cross-border attacks that killed hundreds of Turkish security personnel annually in the 2010s. This approach yielded mixed results: territorial gains reduced / operational depth, but persistent U.S. arming of the —totaling over $1 billion in aid by 2019—strained ties and prolonged low-intensity conflicts via Turkish drone strikes and proxy engagements. The refugee dimension underpinned these strategies, as Syria's war displaced over 3.6 million Syrians to Turkey by 2019, prompting Erdoğan to frame interventions as enabling voluntary returns through secure zones equipped with infrastructure like hospitals and schools. Empirical data from Turkish authorities indicate that controlled areas in Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring zones hosted resettlement projects, correlating with repatriations exceeding 500,000 by mid-2020, though critics from Western sources alleged demographic engineering favoring Arab populations over Kurds. Erdoğan's calculus prioritized causal deterrence of terrorism over international optics, with operations empirically degrading recruitment and attack frequency in Turkey by 30-50% post-2016 according to security analyses.

Israel-Palestine, Gulf Relations, and Ottoman Echoes

Erdoğan's foreign policy toward Israel has featured sharp rhetorical condemnations intertwined with periods of pragmatic engagement. Following the 2010 , in which Israeli forces intercepted a Turkish-led aid convoy to resulting in nine Turkish deaths, relations deteriorated, leading to a temporary downgrade of ties until a 2016 normalization agreement that included compensation payments. Despite such frictions, bilateral trade volumes grew significantly, reaching approximately $7 billion annually by 2022, reflecting economic incentives overriding ideological clashes. Tensions escalated after the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel and the ensuing Gaza conflict, with Erdoğan labeling Israel's response a "policy of mass murder" on September 23, 2025, and canceling a planned visit to Israel on October 25, 2023, citing its "inhumane" actions. Turkey positioned itself as a vocal advocate for Palestinians, providing humanitarian aid to Gaza since October 2023 and mediating cease-fire efforts, though Erdoğan's domestic political calculus—bolstering support among conservative voters—has been cited by analysts as influencing the intensity of his anti-Israel stance. Relations with Gulf states under Erdoğan have oscillated between alliance and rivalry, driven by ideological divergences and economic necessities. Turkey forged a close partnership with , particularly during the 2017-2021 Gulf blockade imposed by , , and others, deploying Turkish troops to Qatar under a 2014 defense agreement and receiving $9.9 billion in Qatari investments by 2023, the highest from any GCC country. Ties with soured after the 2018 assassination of journalist in Istanbul's consulate, which Turkish officials attributed to Crown Prince , prompting years of diplomatic freeze until reconciliation in 2022, facilitated by shared interests in containing Iranian influence and boosting trade. With the , initial strains arose from Ankara's support for the —viewed by Abu Dhabi as a threat—and backing rival factions in , but normalization accelerated post-2021, culminating in Erdoğan's visits yielding over two dozen deals on trade and energy during a 2023-2025 tour focused on Gaza cease-fires and investments. These shifts underscore a pragmatic pivot, with Turkey-Gulf trade surging to $20 billion by 2023, amid Erdoğan's efforts to diversify from Western dependencies. Erdoğan's Middle East engagements evoke Ottoman-era legacies through a blend of pan-Islamist rhetoric and assertive regional leadership, often termed by observers, emphasizing Turkey's historical custodianship over Muslim lands. His speeches frequently reference Ottoman achievements, positioning modern Turkey as a counterweight to Western and Israeli influence, as seen in Gaza advocacy framing Ankara as the primary challenger to Tel Aviv in the Muslim world. This approach manifests in interventions like military bases in Qatar and mediation in Palestinian affairs, aiming to revive Turkish sway in former Ottoman territories from the Levant to the Gulf, though critics argue it overextends resources and alienates non-aligned partners. Despite ideological flourishes, causal factors include energy security—such as Gulf investments funding Turkey's post-2023 earthquake reconstruction—and geopolitical balancing against rivals like Iran and , revealing a realism beneath the historical nostalgia.

Recent Engagements: Post-Assad Syria, Ukraine, and US Ties (2024–2025)

Following the collapse of 's regime on December 8, 2024, when rebels seized Damascus and forced Assad to flee, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan positioned Turkey to influence 's transition, viewing the event as validation of Ankara's longstanding opposition to Assad. Erdoğan had previously attempted normalization with Assad in 2024, but post-fall, Turkey supported the new leadership through high-level intelligence visits and aimed to facilitate refugee returns, counter Kurdish autonomy in northeast , and promote economic reintegration. Bilateral trade surged, with Turkey's exports to rising 36.7% in the first four months of 2025 compared to the prior year, and total trade reaching $1.9 billion in the first seven months of 2025 versus $2.6 billion for all of 2024. Turkey's interventions reflect priorities of securing borders against Kurdish groups like the and fostering a stable Sunni-led governance aligned with Ankara's interests, though risks of overreach persist amid competing influences from and . In , Erdoğan maintained Turkey's balancing act between obligations and relations with , supplying Bayraktar drones to Kyiv while abstaining from direct military involvement and facilitating talks like the 2022 grain deal and a 2024 US-Russian prisoner exchange. By November 2024, Erdoğan advocated for negotiated peace, predicting an easier resolution under a solution-oriented US approach post-Trump election, and in spring 2025, he reiterated mediation offers while signaling potential Turkish peacekeeping deployment. This policy underscores Turkey's strategic autonomy, leveraging its position to influence outcomes without full alignment to Western sanctions or Russian aggression. US-Turkey ties warmed significantly in 2024–2025 under the , with Erdoğan visiting the White House in September 2025—his first in six years—signaling an end to Biden-era strains and fostering a personal rapport. Discussions advanced on F-16 sales and S-400 resolution options, while energy diversification reduced Turkey's Russian gas reliance by up to 36% through 2028 via new suppliers, enhancing economic cooperation. Erdoğan's ties to evolved into an asset, aiding Trump's initiatives and elevating Turkey's regional role, though this unsettled and Arab rivals. Overall, the affinity between Erdoğan and Trump enabled a reset, prioritizing pragmatic deals over ideological divides.

Ideology, Views, and Public Perception

Core Principles: Conservative Democracy and Turkish Exceptionalism

Erdoğan's , founded in 2001 under his leadership, defines as an ideology that reconciles democratic governance with the preservation of Turkey's traditional moral, familial, and religious values, particularly those drawn from Islamic heritage. This approach explicitly distances the AKP from political Islamism, positioning itself instead as a "conservative democratic" movement that integrates Muslim democratic principles with market-oriented reforms and anti-elitist populism. Erdoğan has articulated this as a response to the perceived cultural alienation under prior secular Kemalist regimes, advocating for policies that strengthen family units, promote religious observance in public life, and embed national identity within democratic institutions without subordinating the latter to theocracy. In practice, conservative democracy under Erdoğan emphasizes endogenous change that safeguards core societal structures—such as traditional gender roles and communal ethics—while enabling modernization, as evidenced by the AKP's early legislative pushes for EU-aligned reforms alongside expansions in religious education and headscarf freedoms starting in 2002. Critics from Western-oriented outlets often frame this as a veiled Islamist agenda, but AKP documents and Erdoğan's speeches consistently frame it as a bulwark against both radical secularism and extremism, prioritizing stability through value-conserving governance. This ideology gained electoral traction by appealing to Turkey's conservative majority, securing the AKP's 34.3% vote share in the 2002 parliamentary elections and enabling Erdoğan's rise to prime minister. forms a complementary pillar in Erdoğan's thought, positing Turkey not merely as a nation-state but as a civilizational actor with a unique geopolitical and historical destiny, straddling Eurasian and Islamic worlds while transcending strict Western liberal models. This principle, echoed in Erdoğan's "Century of Turkey" vision articulated since the 2010s, underscores Turkey's self-perceived role as a mediator and leader in Muslim-majority contexts, drawing on Ottoman-era multilateralism and rejecting narratives of perpetual Western dependency. It manifests domestically in assertions of cultural sovereignty, such as resisting impositions from supranational bodies like the , and internationally in policies that prioritize Turkish interests over universalist ideologies. Erdoğan's exceptionalist outlook reconciles apparent policy contradictions—such as membership alongside overtures to —by emphasizing Turkey's innate capacity for independent synthesis, a stance rooted in historical self-narratives of resilience from the Seljuk to republican eras. This framework has informed constitutional shifts, including the that centralized executive power to embody national will more directly, framed as an exceptional adaptation to Turkey's volatile security environment rather than democratic backsliding. While some academic analyses, often from institutions with pro-Western leanings, decry it as revisionist, Erdoğan's proponents cite empirical gains in regional influence, such as Turkey's mediation in in 2022, as validation of this exceptional path.

Economic Nationalism vs. Global Integration

Erdoğan's economic agenda in the early era emphasized integration with global markets through privatization, deregulation, and pursuit of accession, which facilitated foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and export expansion. From 2002 to 2011, Turkey's exports grew from $36 billion to $134 billion annually, driven by incentives for sectors like automotive and textiles, while FDI peaked at $20.2 billion in 2007 amid favorable global conditions and domestic reforms. This outward orientation aligned with neoliberal principles, enabling real GDP growth averaging over 6% yearly in the 2000s and reducing poverty from 30% to under 10% of the population by 2015 through job creation in export-oriented industries. However, reliance on short-term capital inflows exposed vulnerabilities, as current account deficits widened to 6-8% of GDP by the late 2000s, financed by hot money rather than sustainable productivity gains. Subsequent policy evolution under Erdoğan incorporated stronger nationalist elements, prioritizing self-sufficiency to counter external shocks and perceived dependencies. In defense, import substitution strategies achieved localization rates exceeding 70% for key systems by 2023, exemplified by domestic production of drones and armored vehicles that reduced reliance on foreign suppliers and boosted exports to $5.5 billion in 2022. Energy policies similarly stressed diversification and domestic exploration, with Erdoğan advocating reduced dependence on single suppliers to enhance national security, including investments in Black Sea gas fields yielding 540 billion cubic meters of reserves discovered by 2020. These measures reflected a causal prioritization of strategic autonomy amid geopolitical tensions, such as sanctions risks from NATO allies, over unfettered globalism; agricultural self-sufficiency targets and industrial policies further aimed to curb chronic trade deficits, which stood at 11.8% of GDP in goods by 2022. Yet, this inward tilt strained fiscal discipline, as unorthodox monetary policies—insisting on low interest rates despite inflation—eroded investor confidence, devaluing the lira by over 80% against the dollar from 2018 to 2023 and fueling imported inflation. The tension between nationalism and integration persists in Erdoğan's vision of a "Century of Türkiye," blending export promotion with protectionist buffers like tariffs on non-essential imports and support for national champions. While global trade ties endured—evident in free trade agreements with 20+ partners and participation in forums like the —domestic interventions often clashed with international norms, contributing to FDI volatility and growth deceleration to 3-4% annually post-2018. Post-2023 electoral adjustments, including orthodox appointments like Finance Minister , signaled pragmatic re-engagement with global markets to tame inflation above 60% in 2022, yet core nationalist priorities in critical sectors remain entrenched, reflecting Erdoğan's belief that external integration must serve sovereignty rather than dilute it. This hybrid approach has sustained resilience against shocks but at the cost of institutional credibility, as evidenced by credit rating downgrades and emigration of skilled labor amid economic instability.

Stance on Minorities, Secularism, and Social Issues

Erdoğan has articulated a vision of secularism distinct from the strict laicism of , emphasizing a state equidistant from all religious beliefs rather than one enforcing separation of religion from public life. In a 2016 speech, he described secularism as ensuring the state's equal distance to people of all faiths, rejecting militant interpretations that suppress religious expression. This stance facilitated policies such as the lifting of the headscarf ban in state institutions on October 8, 2013, which allowed female civil servants to wear the Islamic headscarf, framing it as a democratic reform to end prior discrimination against observant Muslims. Critics, including opposition figures and secular nationalists, argue these measures erode Turkey's foundational secular principles, pointing to increased religious rhetoric in governance and proposals for constitutional changes that could further integrate Islamic elements, though Erdoğan has repeatedly affirmed that such reforms would not undermine the secular republic. Regarding minorities, Erdoğan's approach has been pragmatic and fluctuating, often tied to political expediency rather than consistent rights expansion. On Kurds, comprising about 15-20% of Turkey's population, he initiated the 2013-2015 "solution process" involving ceasefires with the and negotiations aimed at ending decades of conflict, but the truce collapsed amid mutual accusations of violations, leading to renewed military operations. More recently, in 2024-2025, indirect talks resumed following ceasefire declarations and calls for disarmament, with Erdoğan signaling legislative steps while maintaining pressure on pro-Kurdish mayors through dismissals and replacements, as seen in November 2024 actions against -affiliated officials accused of ties. For , a heterodox Shia-derived group estimated at 10-15% of the population, policies have included limited outreach like cemetery recognitions but faced accusations of marginalization, with Erdoğan associating Alevism closely with Sunni Islam in speeches and resisting separate worship spaces or official recognition as a distinct faith, prompting claims from Alevi leaders of reinforced Sunni dominance. Relations with Christian and Armenian minorities remain strained, marked by sporadic property restitutions but persistent reports of demographic engineering and denialism on historical events like the 1915 , with Erdoğan's government prioritizing national unity over minority autonomies. In July 2025, an ally proposed vice presidencies for Kurds and Alevis as inclusion gestures, reflecting tactical appeals amid electoral dynamics. On social issues, Erdoğan promotes conservative family structures rooted in Islamic principles, opposing liberal reforms as threats to societal cohesion. He has vocally rejected LGBT rights, declaring "we are against LGBT" in multiple 2023 campaign speeches and framing the movement as a "battering ram" against family sanctity during the January 2025 launch of the "Year of the Family," which emphasizes pro-natal policies amid Turkey's declining birth rates. Abortion access, legalized in 1983 up to 10 weeks, faced tightening under his tenure, with Erdoğan labeling it "murder" in 2012 and supporting restrictions, though full bans stalled due to backlash; efforts to limit it further align with his great replacement rhetoric urging higher birth rates among Turks. Alcohol policies include 2013 restrictions on sales after 10 p.m. and advertising bans, justified as protecting youth and public morals. Turkey's 2021 withdrawal from the on preventing violence against women was defended by Erdoğan as incompatible with national values favoring traditional gender roles over perceived Western gender ideology. These positions resonate with his base but draw international criticism for curtailing personal freedoms.

Debates on Authoritarianism: Stability vs. Democratic Erosion

Critics of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule argue that his consolidation of executive power has accelerated democratic erosion, evidenced by the systematic weakening of institutional checks. Following the April 2017 constitutional referendum, which passed with 51.4% approval and shifted Turkey to a presidential system, opponents alleged procedural irregularities including ballot stuffing and unequal media access. The referendum expanded presidential authority over judicial appointments and decree powers, reducing parliamentary oversight. Post-referendum, Erdoğan's () further centralized control, with reports indicating partisan influence over the judiciary via the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Indices from organizations like , which rank Turkey as "not free" due to electoral process flaws and civil liberties restrictions, underscore this view, though such assessments often emanate from Western institutions potentially predisposed against non-liberal governance models. A pivotal catalyst was the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, which killed 251 civilians and injured over 2,200, blamed on the . In response, emergency decrees led to purges affecting over 80,000 civil servants, including 100+ generals and admirals, alongside the closure of media outlets and NGOs. While aimed at rooting out infiltrators, these measures decimated opposition voices; by 2024, over 90% of media was state-aligned or pro-government, with journalists facing prosecution under anti-terror laws. The 2023 presidential election, where Erdoğan secured 52.2% in the runoff amid earthquake recovery and economic strain, drew fairness critiques for opposition leader disqualifications and media dominance, yet international observers noted competitive elements despite imbalances. Defenders emphasize stability gains outweighing these costs, citing pre-AKP instability from recurrent military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, 1997). Under Erdoğan, GDP per capita tripled by the mid-2010s, elevating Turkey to upper-middle-income status, with national income reaching $1.37 trillion by 2025—a sixfold increase in dollar terms over 22 years. Purges post-2016 neutralized coup threats, bolstering regime resilience, while military operations in Syria and against militants enhanced border security. Electoral successes, including 2023's narrow win reflecting 41% approval amid polarization, affirm popular sovereignty rather than pure authoritarianism. This perspective posits that institutional centralization countered fragmented elites and external subversion, fostering continuity absent in prior eras, even as it curtailed pluralism. The tension manifests in Turkey's "competitive authoritarianism," where elections persist but incumbency advantages erode contestation. Empirical data shows reduced coup risks and sustained growth phases, yet persistent high inflation (peaking post-2018) and opposition arrests, like Istanbul mayor 's in 2025, fuel erosion narratives. Analysts debate causality: whether authoritarian tactics enabled stability or vice versa, with evidence suggesting Erdoğan's adaptive populism—balancing conservative bases against economic deliverables—sustains rule amid societal divides.

Supporter Narratives: Sovereignty and Anti-Elitism

Supporters of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan often frame his leadership as a bulwark against erosion of Turkish sovereignty, portraying him as a resolute figure who prioritizes national interests over subservience to Western alliances or global institutions. They cite his defiance of United States pressure in acquiring Russia's air defense systems in 2019, which led to Turkey's temporary exclusion from the program, as evidence of prioritizing strategic autonomy amid perceived unreliability. This narrative extends to his balancing act between NATO commitments and relations with Russia, including energy deals and mediation in conflicts like Ukraine, which backers view as enhancing Turkey's leverage rather than isolation. Erdoğan's rhetoric warning of "foreign powers" plotting Turkey's destabilization resonates with this base, reinforcing perceptions of him as a guardian against neo-imperialist encroachments that allegedly seek to dictate domestic policies on issues like migration and defense. Anti-elitism forms a core pillar of pro-Erdoğan discourse, positioning him as the emancipator of Turkey's conservative, pious majority—often termed the "black Turks"—from the dominance of a secular, urban "white Turk" establishment rooted in Kemalist traditions. Supporters highlight the 's (AKP) 2002 electoral triumph, securing 34.3% of the vote amid an economic crisis that discredited prior coalitions, as a populist uprising against a repressive elite accused of marginalizing religious expression and rural voices through military interventions and judicial overreach. Erdoğan's early tenure, including reforms curbing military influence via EU accession talks paradoxically repurposed for domestic empowerment, is lauded for democratizing access to power and fostering economic growth that lifted GDP per capita from approximately $3,600 in 2002 to over $10,000 by 2013, benefiting working-class constituencies previously sidelined. This appeal intensified post-2013 , where backers recast opposition as elitist agitation funded externally, contrasting Erdoğan's grassroots mobilization with the perceived cosmopolitan detachment of adversaries. These narratives intertwine sovereignty and anti-elitism in a vision of Erdoğan as a "tough, macho savior" against both internal oligarchs and external overlords, evident in framing that equates criticism of his rule with threats to national unity. Supporters invoke his survival of the 2016 coup attempt—thwarted with civilian resistance that bolstered his 52.6% presidential win in 2018—as vindication of popular will over elite-orchestrated subversion, allegedly tied to Gülenist networks with Western ties. Economic nationalism under Erdoğan, such as infrastructure megaprojects like the opened in 2022 spanning the , symbolizes self-reliance and rejection of dependency on foreign capital or IMF-style impositions that plagued pre-AKP eras. While detractors decry this as authoritarian consolidation, adherents maintain it reflects causal realism: elite capture historically bred instability, whereas Erdoğan's approach has sustained electoral majorities, with AKP garnering 42.6% in 2023 parliamentary polls despite headwinds.

Personal Life and Legacy

Family, Health, and Private Conduct

Erdoğan married Emine Gülbaran on July 4, 1978, after meeting her during his university years; she was born on February 16, 1955, in Üsküdar, Istanbul, to a family originally from Siirt with Black Sea roots. The couple has four children: sons Ahmet Burak Erdoğan (born 1979) and Necmeddin Bilal Erdoğan (born 1981), and daughters Esra Albayrak (born 1983) and Sümeyye Bayraktar (born 1985). Esra is married to , who served as treasury and finance minister from 2018 to 2020, while Sümeyye is married to , a drone engineer and head of Baykar Technology. As of January 2024, Erdoğan has at least nine grandchildren, including children from Esra and Bilal's families. has engaged in social initiatives, co-founding the Idealist Women's Association in her youth and later focusing on women's roles, zero waste campaigns, and family-oriented policies. Erdoğan's health has been subject to recurring speculation, including unverified claims of epilepsy dating to a 2006 incident where he was reportedly locked in an armored vehicle, colon cancer in the 2010s, and more recent rumors of cardiac issues or general decline. A leaked report in October 2024 alleged severe health problems with potential geopolitical implications, while opposition-linked sources and foreign outlets like Foreign Policy amplified concerns in early 2025 about his stamina amid political challenges. Turkish authorities, including the Disinformation Center, dismissed June 2025 claims of poor health as unfounded and insulting, attributing any visible fatigue to a stomach issue in prior episodes. Erdoğan publicly appeared vigorous, delivering a speech at the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 2025, countering narratives of incapacity. These rumors often originate from adversarial media or exile networks, contrasting with state-affiliated reports emphasizing his resilience, though independent verification remains limited due to restricted medical disclosures. Erdoğan's private conduct reflects a devout Sunni Muslim background from a modest, religious family in Istanbul's Kasımpaşa district, where he developed habits of discipline and piety, including early involvement in soccer and Islamist youth groups. He has advocated traditional family structures publicly, stating in 2016 that women prioritizing careers over motherhood deny their femininity and become "half persons," aligning with his emphasis on at least three children per family to counter demographic decline. Despite his high office, he maintains a relatively low-profile personal life, with family members rarely in the public eye except for official roles; no major verified scandals of personal misconduct, such as infidelity or extravagance, have surfaced, though critics allege nepotism via children's business ties. His routine includes religious observance and family-centric values, as evidenced by policies promoting maternity and criticizing globalization's family erosions.

Electoral History Summary

Erdoğan's political ascent began with his election as Mayor of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on 27 March 1994, where he campaigned on a platform emphasizing public services and anti-corruption as the candidate of the , defeating the incumbent from the . His administration focused on infrastructure improvements, such as expanding natural gas access and public transport, but ended prematurely in 1998 after a conviction for reciting a poem deemed to incite religious hatred, resulting in a prison sentence and a decade-long ban from politics. Following the establishment of the (AKP) in August 2001 under his leadership, the party secured a decisive victory in the 3 November 2002 general election, obtaining 34 percent of the national vote and 363 of 550 parliamentary seats despite Erdoğan's ineligibility to run due to the ban. This outcome ended decades of fragmented coalition governments. A constitutional amendment lifted the ban, allowing Erdoğan to contest and win a by-election in on 9 March 2003 with over 84 percent of the vote, after which he resigned his mayoral post and was appointed Prime Minister on 14 March 2003. Under Erdoğan's premiership, the AKP retained parliamentary majorities in the 2007 and 2011 general elections, with vote shares of approximately 47 percent and 50 percent, respectively, enabling policy continuity on economic liberalization and EU accession efforts. A 2010 constitutional referendum, supported by the AKP, passed with 58 percent approval, expanding judicial reforms and civil liberties. Following the 2017 referendum that transitioned Turkey to a presidential system—approved by 51.4 percent—Erdoğan contested and won the first direct presidential election on 10 August 2014 in a single round, receiving over 50 percent of the vote against joint opposition candidate and independent . Erdoğan secured re-election as president on 24 June 2018 amid snap polls coinciding with parliamentary elections, again surpassing 50 percent in the first round against and , consolidating executive powers under the new system. In the 2023 elections, he garnered 49.5 percent in the first round on 14 May, necessitating a runoff on 28 May against , which he won with 52.2 percent, extending his tenure despite economic challenges including high inflation. These results reflect sustained rural and conservative support for AKP policies on security and infrastructure, though urban areas and opposition strongholds have shown increasing resistance in local contests.

Honors, Publications, and Enduring Influence

Erdoğan has received several international honors recognizing his political and urban development achievements. In March 2010, he was awarded the inaugural for his initiatives as Mayor of Istanbul (1994–1998), which included slum clearance and urban renewal projects that transformed the city's infrastructure. In July 2023, the United Arab Emirates conferred the , its highest civilian honor, upon him during a state visit, acknowledging bilateral ties and regional cooperation. Other recognitions include the Supreme Degree of the from Uzbekistan for contributions to Islamic heritage preservation, and the in June 2025 from the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's youth forum for leadership in youth empowerment and global Muslim advocacy. He also holds honorary doctorates, such as one from the International University of Sarajevo in May 2018 for societal contributions. Erdoğan's publications primarily consist of policy-oriented works and earlier literary efforts. His notable book, (Turkish: Daha Adil Bir Dünya Mümkün), published in September 2021 and translated into seven languages, critiques global inequities, refugee crises, and unilateralism while advocating multilateral reforms and Turkey's justice-driven foreign policy. Collections of his speeches and statements, such as Recep Tayyip Erdogan: Selected Statements and Speeches, compile addresses on governance and international relations. Prior to politics, Erdoğan authored poems influenced by Islamic themes, including one recited in 1997 that led to his imprisonment for inciting religious hatred, though he argued it appeared in state-approved textbooks. Erdoğan's enduring influence stems from his two-decade consolidation of power, marking him as Turkey's longest-serving leader since Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and reshaping state institutions toward executive dominance. Domestically, his governments from 2003 onward drove economic expansion through privatization and infrastructure megaprojects, elevating Turkey's global standing before later currency crises; this model of conservative economic nationalism has inspired populist governance in Muslim-majority states. His shifted Turkey to a presidential system, centralizing authority and curtailing military tutelage, though critics attribute democratic erosion to judicial purges post-2016 coup attempt. Ideologically, Erdoğan has integrated Ottoman revivalism with Kemalist nationalism, expanding Islam's public role—such as through mosque constructions and Hagia Sophia's reconversion in 2020—while maintaining secular legal frameworks, thereby redefining Turkish identity amid secularist opposition. In foreign policy, his assertive interventions in Syria, Libya, and the Caucasus have positioned Turkey as a regional broker, balancing NATO ties with Russian energy deals and influencing Sunni political movements akin to the . This pragmatic realism endures as a template for illiberal democracy, evident in sustained voter support among conservative bases despite economic volatility.

References

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