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Sociocultural evolution
Sociocultural evolution
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Sociocultural evolution, sociocultural evolutionism or social evolution are theories of sociobiology and cultural evolution that describe how societies and culture change over time. Whereas sociocultural development traces processes that tend to increase the complexity of a society or culture, sociocultural evolution also considers process that can lead to decreases in complexity (degeneration) or that can produce variation or proliferation without any seemingly significant changes in complexity (cladogenesis).[1] Sociocultural evolution is "the process by which structural reorganization is affected through time, eventually producing a form or structure that is qualitatively different from the ancestral form".[2]

Most of the 19th-century and some 20th-century approaches to socioculture aimed to provide models for the evolution of humankind as a whole, arguing that different societies have reached different stages of social development. The most comprehensive attempt to develop a general theory of social evolution centering on the development of sociocultural systems, the work of Talcott Parsons (1902–1979), operated on a scale which included a theory of world history. Another attempt, on a less systematic scale, originated from the 1970s with the world-systems approach of Immanuel Wallerstein (1930–2019) and his followers.

More recent approaches focus on changes specific to individual societies and reject the idea that cultures differ primarily according to how far each one has moved along some presumed linear scale of social progress. Most[quantify] modern archaeologists and cultural anthropologists work within the frameworks of neoevolutionism, sociobiology, and modernization theory.

Introduction

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Anthropologists and sociologists often assume that human beings have natural social tendencies but that particular human social behaviours have non-genetic causes and dynamics (i.e. people learn them in a social environment and through social interaction).[citation needed]

Societies exist in complex social environments (for example: with differing natural resources and constraints) and adapt themselves to these environments. It is thus inevitable that all societies change.

Specific theories of social or cultural evolution often attempt to explain differences between coeval societies by positing that different societies have reached different stages of development. Although such theories typically provide models for understanding the relationship between technologies, social structure or the values of a society, they vary as to the extent to which they describe specific mechanisms of variation and change.

While the history of evolutionary thinking with regard to humans can be traced back at least to Aristotle and other Greek philosophers, early sociocultural-evolution theories  – the ideas of Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881)  – developed simultaneously with, but independently of, the work of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and were popular from late in the 19th century to the end of World War I. The 19th-century unilineal evolution theories claimed that societies start out in a primitive state and gradually become more civilized over time; they equated the culture and technology of Western civilization with progress. Some forms of early sociocultural-evolution theories (mainly unilineal ones) have led to much-criticised theories like social Darwinism and scientific racism, sometimes used in the past by European imperial powers to justify existing policies of colonialism and slavery and to justify new policies such as eugenics.[3]

Most 19th-century and some 20th-century approaches aimed to provide models for the evolution of humankind as a single entity. However, most 20th-century approaches, such as multilineal evolution, focused on changes specific to individual societies. Moreover, they rejected directional change (i.e. orthogenetic, teleological or progressive change). Most archaeologists work within the framework of multilineal evolution.[citation needed] Other contemporary approaches to social change include neoevolutionism, sociobiology, dual inheritance theory, modernisation theory and postindustrial theory.[citation needed]

In his seminal 1976 book The Selfish Gene, Richard Dawkins wrote that "there are some examples of cultural evolution in birds and monkeys, but ... it is our own species that really shows what cultural evolution can do".[4]

Stadial theory

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Enlightenment and later thinkers often speculated that societies progressed through stages: in other words, they saw history as stadial. While expecting humankind to show increasing development, theorists looked for what determined the course of human history. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), for example, saw social development as an inevitable process.[citation needed] It was assumed that societies start out primitive, perhaps in a state of nature, and could progress toward something resembling industrial Europe.

While earlier authors such as Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) had discussed how societies change through time, the Scottish Enlightenment of the 18th century proved key in the development of the idea of sociocultural evolution.[citation needed] In relation to Scotland's union with England in 1707, several Scottish thinkers pondered the relationship between progress and the affluence brought about by increased trade with England. They understood the changes Scotland was undergoing as involving transition from an agricultural to a mercantile society. In "conjectural histories", authors such as Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), John Millar (1735–1801) and Adam Smith (1723–1790) argued that societies all pass through a series of four stages: hunting and gathering, pastoralism and nomadism, agriculture, and finally a stage of commerce.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857)

Philosophical concepts of progress, such as that of Hegel, developed as well during this period. In France, authors such as Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715–1771) and other philosophes were influenced by the Scottish tradition. Later thinkers such as Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) developed these ideas.[citation needed] Auguste Comte (1798–1857) in particular presented a coherent view of social progress and a new discipline to study it: sociology.

These developments took place in a context of wider processes. The first process was colonialism. Although imperial powers settled most differences of opinion with their colonial subjects through force, increased awareness of non-Western peoples raised new questions for European scholars about the nature of society and of culture. Similarly, effective colonial administration required some degree of understanding of other cultures. Emerging theories of sociocultural evolution allowed Europeans to organise their new knowledge in a way that reflected and justified their increasing political and economic domination of others: such systems saw colonised people as less evolved, and colonising people as more evolved. Modern civilization (understood as the Western civilization), appeared the result of steady progress from a state of barbarism, and such a notion was common to many thinkers of the Enlightenment, including Voltaire (1694–1778).

The second process was the Industrial Revolution and the rise of capitalism, which together allowed and promoted continual revolutions in the means of production. Emerging theories of sociocultural evolution reflected a belief that the changes in Europe brought by the Industrial Revolution and capitalism were improvements. Industrialisation, combined with the intense political change brought about by the French Revolution of 1789 and the U.S. Constitution, which paved the way for the dominance of democracy, forced European thinkers to reconsider some of their assumptions about how society was organised.

Eventually, in the 19th century three major classical theories of social and historical change emerged:

These theories had a common factor: they all agreed that the history of humanity is pursuing a certain fixed path, most likely that of social progress. Thus, each past event is not only chronologically, but causally tied to present and future events. The theories postulated that by recreating the sequence of those events, sociology could discover the "laws" of history.[5]

Sociocultural evolutionism and the idea of progress

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While sociocultural evolutionists agree that an evolution-like process leads to social progress, classical social evolutionists have developed many different theories, known as theories of unilineal evolution. Sociocultural evolutionism became the prevailing theory of early sociocultural anthropology and social commentary through the work of scholars like Auguste Comte (1798-1857), Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917), Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-1881), Benjamin Kidd (1858-1916), L. T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) and Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Models incorporating distinct stages and ideas of linear models of progress not only had a great influence on future evolutionary approaches in the social sciences and humanities,[6] but also shaped public, scholarly, and scientific discourse surrounding the rising individualism and "population thinking".[7][8] Sociocultural evolutionism attempted to formalise social thinking along scientific lines, with the added influence from the biological theory of evolution. If organisms could develop over time according to discernible, deterministic laws, then it seemed reasonable that societies could as well. Human society was compared to a biological organism, and social-science equivalents of concepts like variation, natural selection, and inheritance were introduced as factors bearing on the progress of societies. The idea of "progress" led to that of a fixed "stages" through which human societies develop, usually numbering three – savagery, barbarism, and civilization – but sometimes many more. At that time, anthropology was rising as a new scientific discipline, separating itself from the traditional views of "primitive" cultures that were usually based on religious views.[9]

Already in the 18th century, some authors began to theorize on the evolution of humans. Montesquieu (1689–1755) writes about the relationship laws have with climate in particular and with the environment in general, specifically how different climatic conditions cause certain characteristics to become common among different people.[10] He likens the development of laws, the presence or absence of civil liberty, differences in morality, and the whole development of different cultures to the climate of the respective people,[11] concluding that the environment determines whether and how a people farms the land, which determines the way their society is built and the way their culture is constituted, or, in Montesquieu's words, the "general spirit of a nation".[12] Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) presents a conjectural stage-model of human sociocultural evolution:[13] first, humans lived solitarily and only grouped when mating or raising children. Later, men and women lived together and shared childcare, thus building families, followed by tribes as the result of inter-family interactions, which lived in "the happiest and the most lasting epoch" of human history, before the corruption of civil society degenerated the species - again in a developmental stage-process.[14] In the late 18th century, the Marquis de Condorcet (1743–1794) lists ten stages, or "epochs", each advancing the rights of man and perfecting the human race.

Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802), Charles Darwin's grandfather, was an enormously influential natural philosopher, physiologist and poet whose remarkably insightful ideas included a statement of transformism and the interconnectedness of all forms of life. His works, which are enormously wide-ranging, also advance a theory of cultural transformation: his famous The Temple of Nature is subtitled 'the Origin of Society'.[15] This work, rather than proposing in detail a strict transformation of humanity between different stages, instead dwells on Erasmus Darwin's evolutionary mechanism: Erasmus Darwin does not explain each stage one-by-one, trusting his theory of universal organic development, as articulated in the Zoonomia, to illustrate cultural development as well.[16] Erasmus Darwin therefore flits with abandon through his chronology: Priestman notes that it jumps from the emergence of life onto land, the development of opposable thumbs, and the origin of sexual reproduction directly to modern historical events.[15]

Another more complex theorist was Richard Payne Knight (1751-1824), an influential amateur archeologist and universal theologian. Knight's The Progress of Civil Society: A Didactic Poem in Six Books (1796) fits precisely into the tradition of triumphant historical stages, beginning with Lucretius and reaching Adam Smith––but just for the first four books.[17] In his final books, Knight then grapples with the French revolution and wealthy decadence. Confronted with these twin issues, Knight's theory ascribes progress to conflict: 'partial discord lends its aid, to tie the complex knots of general harmony'.[17] Competition in Knight's mechanism spurs development from any one stage to the next: the dialectic of class, land and gender creates growth.[18] Thus, Knight conceptualised a theory of history founded in inevitable racial conflict, with Greece representing 'freedom' and Egypt 'cold inactive stupor'.[19] Buffon, Linnaeus, Camper and Monboddo variously forward diverse arguments about racial hierarchy, grounded in early theories of species change––though many thought that environmental changes could create dramatic changes in form without permanently altering the species or causing species transformation. However, their arguments still bear on race: Rousseau, Buffon and Monboddo cite orangutans as evidence of an earlier prelinguistic human type, and Monboddo even insisted Orangutans and certain African and South Asian races were identical.

Other than Erasmus Darwin, the other pre-eminent scientific text with a theory of cultural transformation was advanced by Robert Chambers (1802-1871). Chambers was a Scottish evolutionary thinker and philosopher who, though he was then and now perceived as scientifically inadequate and criticized by prominent contemporaries, is important because he was so widely read. There are records of everyone from Queen Victoria to individual dockworkers enjoying his Robert Chambers' Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation (1844), including future generations of scientists. That The Vestiges did not establish itself as the scientific cutting edge is precisely the point, since the Vestiges's influence means it was both the concept of evolution the Victorian public was most likely to experience, and the scientific presupposition laid earliest in the minds of bright young scholars.[20]

Chambers propounded a 'principle of development' whereby everything evolved by the same mechanism and towards higher order structure or meaning. In his theory, life advanced through different 'classes', and within each class animals began at the lowest form and then advanced to more complex forms in the same class.[21] In short, the progress of animals was like the development of a foetus. More than just an indistinct analogy, this parallel between embryology and species development had the status of a genuine causal mechanism in Chambers' theory: more advanced species developed longer as embryos into all their complexity.[22] Motivated by this comparison, Chambers ascribed development to the 'laws of creation', though he also supposed that the whole development of species was in some way preordained: it was just that the preordination of the creator acted through establishing those laws.[22] This, as discussed above, is similar to Spencer's later concept of development. Thus Chambers believed in a sophisticated theory of progress driven by a developmental analogy.

Herbert Spencer

In the mid-19th century, a "revolution in ideas about the antiquity of the human species" took place "which paralleled, but was to some extent independent of, the Darwinian revolution in biology."[23] Especially in geology, archaeology, and anthropology, scholars began to compare "primitive" cultures to past societies and "saw their level of technology as parallel with that of Stone Age cultures, and thus used these peoples as models for the early stages of human evolution". A developmental model of the evolution of the mind, of culture, and of society was the result, paralleling the evolution of the human species:[24] "Modern savages [sic] became, in effect, living fossils left behind by the march of progress, relics of the Paleolithic still lingering on into the present."[25] Classical social evolutionism is most closely associated with the 19th-century writings of Auguste Comte and of Herbert Spencer (coiner of the phrase "survival of the fittest").[26] In many ways, Spencer's theory of "cosmic evolution" has much more in common with the works of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) and of Auguste Comte than with contemporary works of Charles Darwin. Spencer also developed and published his theories several years earlier than Darwin. In regard to social institutions, however, there is a good case that Spencer's writings might be classified as discussing social evolutionism. Although he wrote that societies over time progressed – and that progress was accomplished through competition – he stressed that the individual rather than the collectivity is the unit of analysis that evolves; that, in other words, evolution takes place through natural selection and that it affects social as well as biological phenomenon. Nonetheless, the publication of Darwin's works[which?] proved a boon to the proponents of sociocultural evolution, who saw the ideas of biological evolution as an attractive explanation for many questions about the development of society.[27]

Both Spencer and Comte view society as a kind of organism subject to the process of growth—from simplicity to complexity, from chaos to order, from generalisation to specialisation, from flexibility to organisation. They agree that the process of societal growth can be divided into certain stages, have[clarification needed] their beginning and eventual end, and that this growth is in fact social progress: each newer, more-evolved society is "better". Thus progressivism became one of the basic ideas underlying the theory of sociocultural evolutionism.[26]

However, Spencer's theories were more complex than just a romp up the great chain of being. Spencer based his arguments on an analogy between the evolution of societies and the ontogeny of an animal. Accordingly, he searched for "general principles of development and structure" or "fundamental principles of organization", rather than being content simply ascribing progress between social stages to the direct intervention of some beneficent deity.[28] Moreover, he accepted that these conditions are "far less specific, far more modifiable, far more dependent on conditions that are variable": in short, that they are a messy biological process.[29]

Though Spencer's theories transcended the label of 'stagism' and appreciate biological complexity, they still accepted a strongly fixed direction and morality to natural development.[30] For Spencer, interference with the natural process of evolution was dangerous and had to be avoided at all costs. Such views were naturally coupled to the pressing political and economic questions of the time. Spencer clearly thought society's evolution brought about a racial hierarchy with Caucasians at the top and Africans at the bottom.[30] This notion is deeply linked to the colonial projects European powers were pursuing at the time, and the idea of European superiority used paternalistically to justify those projects. The influential German zoologist Ernst Haeckel even wrote that 'natural men are closer to the higher vertebrates than highly civilized Europeans', including not just a racial hierarchy but a civilizational one.[31] Likewise, Spencer's evolutionary argument advanced a theory of statehood: "until spontaneously fulfilled a public want should not be fulfilled at all" sums up Spencer's notion about limited government and the free operation of market forces.[32]

This is not to suggest that stagism was useless or entirely motivated by colonialism and racism. Stagist theories were first proposed in contexts where competing epistemologies were largely static views of the world. Hence "progress" had in some sense to be invented, conceptually: the idea that human society would move through stages was a triumphant invention. Moreover, stages were not always static entities. In Buffon's theories, for example, it was possible to regress between stages, and physiological changes were species' reversibly adapting to their environment rather than irreversibly transforming.[33]

In addition to progressivism, economic analyses influenced classical social evolutionism. Adam Smith (1723–1790), who held a deeply evolutionary view of human society,[34] identified the growth of freedom as the driving force in a process of stadial societal development.[35] According to him, all societies pass successively through four stages: the earliest humans lived as hunter-gatherers, followed by pastoralists and nomads, after which society evolved to agriculturalists and ultimately reached the stage of commerce.[36] With the strong emphasis on specialisation and the increased profits stemming from a division of labour, Smith's thinking also exerted some direct influence on Darwin himself.[37] Both in Darwin's theory of the evolution of species and in Smith's accounts of political economy, competition between selfishly functioning units plays an important and even dominating rôle.[38] Similarly occupied with economic concerns as Smith, Thomas R. Malthus (1766–1834) warned that given the strength of the sex drive inherent in all animals, Malthus argued, populations tend to grow geometrically, and population growth is only checked by the limitations of economic growth, which, if there would be growth at all, would quickly be outstripped by population growth, causing hunger, poverty, and misery.[39] Far from being the consequences of economic structures or social orders, this "struggle for existence" is an inevitable natural law, so Malthus.[40]

Auguste Comte, known as "the father of sociology", formulated the law of three stages: human development progresses from the theological stage, in which nature was mythically conceived and man sought the explanation of natural phenomena from supernatural beings; through a metaphysical stage in which nature was conceived of as a result of obscure forces and man sought the explanation of natural phenomena from them; until the final positive stage in which all abstract and obscure forces are discarded, and natural phenomena are explained by their constant relationship.[41] This progress is forced through the development of human mind, and through increasing application of thought, reasoning and logic to the understanding of the world.[42] Comte saw the science-valuing society as the highest, most developed type of human organization.[41]

Herbert Spencer, who argued against government intervention as he believed that society should evolve toward more individual freedom,[43] followed Lamarck in his evolutionary thinking,[44] in that he believed that humans do over time adapt to their surroundings.[45] He differentiated between two phases of development as regards societies' internal regulation:[41] the "military" and "industrial" societies.[41] The earlier (and more primitive) military society has the goal of conquest and defense, is centralised, economically self-sufficient, collectivistic, puts the good of a group over the good of an individual, uses compulsion, force and repression, and rewards loyalty, obedience and discipline.[41] The industrial society, in contrast, has a goal of production and trade, is decentralised, interconnected with other societies via economic relations, works through voluntary cooperation and individual self-restraint, treats the good of individual as of the highest value, regulates the social life via voluntary relations; and values initiative, independence and innovation.[41][46] The transition process from the military to industrial society is the outcome of steady evolutionary processes within the society.[41] Spencer "imagined a kind of feedback loop between mental and social evolution: the higher the mental powers the greater the complexity of the society that the individuals could create; the more complex the society, the greater the stimulus it provided for further mental development. Everything cohered to make progress inevitable or to weed out those who did not keep up."[47]

Regardless of how scholars of Spencer interpret his relation to Darwin, Spencer became an incredibly popular figure in the 1870s, particularly in the United States. Authors such as Edward L. Youmans, William Graham Sumner, John Fiske, John W. Burgess, Lester Frank Ward, Lewis H. Morgan (1818–1881) and other thinkers of the gilded age all developed theories of social evolutionism as a result of their exposure to Spencer as well as to Darwin.

Lewis H. Morgan

In his 1877 classic Ancient Societies, Lewis H. Morgan, an anthropologist whose ideas have had much impact on sociology, differentiated between three eras:[48] savagery, barbarism and civilization, which are divided by technological inventions, like fire, bow, pottery in the savage era, domestication of animals, agriculture, metalworking in the barbarian era and alphabet and writing in the civilization era.[49] Thus Morgan drew a link between social progress and technological progress. Morgan viewed technological progress as a force behind social progress, and held that any social change—in social institutions, organizations or ideologies—has its beginnings in technological change.[49][50] Morgan's theories were popularized by Friedrich Engels, who based his famous work The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State on them.[49] For Engels and other Marxists this theory was important, as it supported their conviction that materialistic factors—economic and technological—are decisive in shaping the fate of humanity.[49]

Edward Burnett Tylor (1832–1917), a pioneer of anthropology, focused on the evolution of culture worldwide, noting that culture is an important part of every society and that it is also subject to a process of evolution. He believed that societies were at different stages of cultural development and that the purpose of anthropology was to reconstruct the evolution of culture, from primitive beginnings to the modern state.

Edward Burnett Tylor

Anthropologists Sir E.B. Tylor in England and Lewis Henry Morgan in the United States worked with data from indigenous people, who (they claimed) represented earlier stages of cultural evolution that gave insight into the process and progression of evolution of culture. Morgan had a significant influence on Karl Marx and on Friedrich Engels, who developed a theory of sociocultural evolution in which the internal contradictions in society generated a series of escalating stages that ended in a socialist society (see Marxism). Tylor and Morgan elaborated the theory of unilinear evolution, specifying criteria for categorising cultures according to their standing within a fixed system of growth of humanity as a whole and examining the modes and mechanisms of this growth. Theirs was often a concern with culture in general, not with individual cultures.

Their analysis of cross-cultural data was based on three assumptions:

  1. contemporary societies may be classified and ranked as more "primitive" or more "civilized"
  2. there are a determinate number of stages between "primitive" and "civilized" (e.g. band, tribe, chiefdom, and state)
  3. all societies progress through these stages in the same sequence, but at different rates

Theorists usually measured progression (that is, the difference between one stage and the next) in terms of increasing social complexity (including class differentiation and a complex division of labour), or an increase in intellectual, theological, and aesthetic sophistication. These 19th-century ethnologists used these principles primarily to explain differences in religious beliefs and kinship terminologies among various societies.

Lester Frank Ward

Lester Frank Ward (1841–1913), sometimes referred to[by whom?] as the "father" of American sociology, rejected many of Spencer's theories regarding the evolution of societies. Ward, who was also a botanist and a paleontologist, believed that the law of evolution functioned much differently in human societies than it did in the plant and animal kingdoms, and theorized that the "law of nature" had been superseded by the "law of the mind".[51] He stressed that humans, driven by emotions, create goals for themselves and strive to realize them (most effectively with the modern scientific method) whereas there is no such intelligence and awareness guiding the non-human world.[52] Plants and animals adapt to nature; man shapes nature. While Spencer believed that competition and "survival of the fittest" benefited human society and sociocultural evolution, Ward regarded competition as a destructive force, pointing out that all human institutions, traditions and laws were tools invented by the mind of man and that that mind designed them, like all tools, to "meet and checkmate" the unrestrained competition of natural forces.[51] Ward agreed with Spencer that authoritarian governments repress the talents of the individual, but he believed that modern democratic societies, which minimized the role of religion and maximized that of science, could effectively support the individual in his or her attempt to fully utilize their talents and achieve happiness. He believed that the evolutionary processes have four stages:

  • First comes cosmogenesis, creation and evolution of the world.
  • Then, when life arises, there is biogenesis.[52]
  • Development of humanity leads to anthropogenesis, which is influenced by the human mind.[52]
  • Finally there arrives sociogenesis, which is the science of shaping the evolutionary process itself to optimize progress, human happiness and individual self-actualization.[52]

Ward regarded modern societies as superior to "primitive" societies (one need only look to the impact of medical science on health and lifespan[citation needed]) and shared theories of white supremacy. Though he supported the Out-of-Africa theory of human evolution, he did not believe that all races and social classes were equal in talent. When a Negro rapes a white woman, Ward declared, he is impelled not only by lust but also by the instinctive drive to improve his own race.[53][54] Ward did not think that evolutionary progress was inevitable and he feared the degeneration of societies and cultures, which he saw as very evident in the historical record.[55] Ward also did not favor the radical reshaping of society as proposed by the supporters of the eugenics movement or by the followers of Karl Marx; like Comte, Ward believed that sociology was the most complex of the sciences and that true sociogenesis was impossible without considerable research and experimentation.[53]

Émile Durkheim

Émile Durkheim, another of the "fathers" of sociology, developed a dichotomal view of social progress.[56] His key concept was social solidarity, as he defined social evolution in terms of progressing from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity.[56] In mechanical solidarity, people are self-sufficient, there is little integration and thus there is the need for the use of force and repression to keep society together.[56] In organic solidarity, people are much more integrated and interdependent and specialisation and cooperation are extensive.[56] Progress from mechanical to organic solidarity is based firstly on population growth and increasing population density, secondly on increasing "morality density" (development of more complex social interactions) and thirdly on increasing specialisation in the workplace.[56] To Durkheim, the most important factor in social progress is the division of labour.[56] This[clarification needed] was later used in the mid-1900s by the economist Ester Boserup (1910–1999) to attempt to discount some aspects of Malthusian theory.

Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936) describes evolution as the development from informal society (where people have many liberties and there are few laws and obligations) to modern, formal rational society (dominated by traditions and laws, where people are restricted from acting as they wish).[57] He also notes that there is a tendency to standardisation and unification when smaller societies are absorbed into a single, large, modern society.[57] Thus Tönnies can be said[citation needed] to describe part of the process known today as globalization. Tönnies was also one of the first sociologists to claim that the evolution of society is not necessarily going in the right direction, that social progress is not perfect, and it can even be called a regression as the newer, more evolved societies are obtained only after paying a high cost, resulting in decreasing satisfaction of the individuals making up that society.[57] Tönnies' work became the foundation of neoevolutionism.[57]

Although Max Weber is not usually counted[by whom?] as a sociocultural evolutionist, his theory of tripartite classification of authority can be viewed[by whom?] as an evolutionary theory as well. Weber distinguishes three ideal types of political leadership, domination and authority:

  1. charismatic domination
  2. traditional domination (patriarchs, patrimonialism, feudalism)
  3. legal (rational) domination (modern law and state, bureaucracy)

Weber also notes that legal domination is the most advanced, and that societies evolve from having mostly traditional and charismatic authorities to mostly rational and legal ones.

Critique and impact on modern theories

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The early 20th-century inaugurated a period of systematic critical examination, and rejection of the sweeping generalisations of the unilineal theories of sociocultural evolution. Cultural anthropologists such as Franz Boas (1858–1942), along with his students, including Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, are regarded[by whom?] as the leaders of anthropology's rejection of classical social evolutionism.

However, the school of Boas ignore some of the complexity in evolutionary theories that emerged outside Herbert Spencer's influence. Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species gave a mechanistic account of the origins and development of animals, quite apart from Spencer's theories that emphasized the inevitable human development through stages. Consequently, many scholars developed more sophisticated understandings of how cultures evolve, relying on deep cultural analogies, than the theories in Herbert Spencer's tradition.[58] Walter Bagehot (1872) applied selection and inheritance to the development of human political institutions. Samuel Alexander (1892) discusses the natural selection of moral principles in society.[59] William James (1880) considered the 'natural selection' of ideas in learning and scientific development. In fact, he identified a 'remarkable parallel […] between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, and of zoological evolution as expounded by Mr Darwin on the other'.[59] Charles Sanders Peirce (1898) even proposed that the current laws of nature we have exist because they have evolved over time.[59] Darwin himself, in Chapter 5 of the Descent of Man, proposed that human moral sentiments were subject to group selection: "A tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection."[60] Through the mechanism of imitation, cultures as well as individuals could be subject to natural selection.

While these theories involved evolution applied to social questions, except for Darwin's group selection the theories reviewed above did not advance a precise understanding of how Darwin's mechanism extended and applied to cultures beyond a vague appeal to competition.[61] Ritchie's Darwinism and Politics (1889) breaks this trend, holding that "language and social institutions make it possible to transmit experience quite independently of the continuity of race."[62] Hence Ritchie saw cultural evolution as a process that could operate independently of and on different scales to the evolution of species, and gave it precise underpinnings: he was 'extending its range', in his own words, to ideas, cultures and institutions.[63]

Thorstein Veblen, around the same time, came to a similar insight: that humans evolve to their social environment, but their social environment in turn also evolves.[64] Veblen's mechanism for human progress was the evolution of human intentionality: Veblen labelled men 'a creature of habit' and thought that habits were 'mentally digested' from those who influenced him.[58] In short, as Hodgson and Knudsen point out, Veblen thinks: "the changing institutions in their turn make for a further selection of individuals endowed with the fittest temperament, and a further adaptation of individual temperament and habits to the changing environment through the formation of new institutions." Thus, Veblen represented an extension of Ritchie's theories, where evolution operates at multiple levels, to a sophisticated appreciation of how each level interacts with the other.[65]

This complexity notwithstanding, Boas and Benedict used sophisticated ethnography and more rigorous empirical methods to argue that Spencer, Tylor, and Morgan's theories were speculative and systematically misrepresented ethnographic data. Theories regarding "stages" of evolution were especially criticised as illusions. Additionally, they rejected the distinction between "primitive" and "civilized" (or "modern"), pointing out that so-called primitive contemporary societies have just as much history, and were just as evolved, as so-called civilized societies. They therefore argued that any attempt to use this theory to reconstruct the histories of non-literate (i.e. leaving no historical documents) peoples is entirely speculative and unscientific.

They observed that the postulated progression, which typically ended with a stage of civilization identical to that of modern Europe, is ethnocentric. They also pointed out that the theory assumes that societies are clearly bounded and distinct, when in fact cultural traits and forms often cross social boundaries and diffuse among many different societies (and are thus an important mechanism of change). Boas in his culture-history approach focused on anthropological fieldwork in an attempt to identify factual processes instead of what he criticized as speculative stages of growth. His approach greatly influenced American anthropology in the first half of the 20th century, and marked a retreat from high-level generalization and from "systems building".

Later critics observed that the assumption of firmly bounded societies was proposed precisely at the time when European powers were colonising non-Western societies, and was thus self-serving. Many anthropologists and social theorists now consider unilineal cultural and social evolution a Western myth seldom based on solid empirical grounds. Critical theorists argue that notions of social evolution are simply justifications for power by the élites of society. Finally, the devastating World Wars that occurred between 1914 and 1945 crippled Europe's self-confidence. After millions of deaths, genocide, and the destruction of Europe's industrial infrastructure, the idea of progress seemed dubious at best.

Thus modern sociocultural evolutionism rejects most of classical social evolutionism due to various theoretical problems:

  1. The theory was deeply ethnocentric—it makes heavy value judgments about different societies, with Western civilization seen as the most valuable.
  2. It assumed all cultures follow the same path or progression and have the same goals.
  3. It equated civilization with material culture (technology, cities, etc.)

Because social evolution was posited as a scientific theory, it was often used to support unjust and often racist social practices – particularly colonialism, slavery, and the unequal economic conditions present within industrialized Europe. Social Darwinism is especially criticised, as it purportedly led to some philosophies used by the Nazis.

Max Weber, disenchantment, and critical theory

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Max Weber in 1917

Weber's major works in economic sociology and the sociology of religion dealt with the rationalization, secularisation, and so called "disenchantment" which he associated with the rise of capitalism and modernity.[66] In sociology, rationalization is the process whereby an increasing number of social actions become based on considerations of teleological efficiency or calculation rather than on motivations derived from morality, emotion, custom, or tradition. Rather than referring to what is genuinely "rational" or "logical", rationalization refers to a relentless quest for goals that might actually function to the detriment of a society. Rationalization is an ambivalent aspect of modernity, manifested especially in Western society – as a behaviour of the capitalist market, of rational administration in the state and bureaucracy, of the extension of modern science, and of the expansion of modern technology.[citation needed]

Weber's thought regarding the rationalizing and secularizing tendencies of modern Western society (sometimes described as the "Weber Thesis") would blend with Marxism to facilitate critical theory, particularly in the work of thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas (born 1929). Critical theorists, as antipositivists, are critical of the idea of a hierarchy of sciences or societies, particularly with respect to the sociological positivism originally set forth by Comte. Jürgen Habermas has critiqued the concept of pure instrumental rationality as meaning that scientific-thinking becomes something akin to ideology itself. For theorists such as Zygmunt Bauman (1925–2017), rationalization as a manifestation of modernity may be most closely and regrettably associated with the events of the Holocaust.

Modern theories

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Composite image of the Earth at night in 2012, created by NASA and NOAA. The brightest areas of the Earth are the most urbanized, but not necessarily the most populated. Even more than 100 years after the invention of the electric light, most regions remain thinly populated or unlit.

When the critique of classical social evolutionism became widely accepted, modern anthropological and sociological approaches changed respectively. Modern theories are careful to avoid unsourced, ethnocentric speculation, comparisons, or value judgments; more or less regarding individual societies as existing within their own historical contexts. These conditions provided the context for new theories such as cultural relativism and multilineal evolution.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Gordon Childe revolutionized the study of cultural evolutionism. He conducted a comprehensive pre-history account that provided scholars with evidence for African and Asian cultural transmission into Europe. He combated scientific racism by finding the tools and artifacts of the indigenous people from Africa and Asia and showed how they influenced the technology of European culture. Evidence from his excavations countered the idea of Aryan supremacy and superiority. Adopting "Kosinna's basic concept of the archaeological culture and his identification of such cultures as the remains of prehistoric peoples" and combining it with the detailed chronologies of European prehistory developed by Gustaf Oscar Montelius, Childe argued that each society needed to be delineated individually on the basis of constituent artefacts which were indicative of their practical and social function.[67] Childe explained cultural evolution by his theory of divergence with modifications of convergence. He postulated that different cultures form separate methods that meet different needs, but when two cultures were in contact they developed similar adaptations, solving similar problems. Rejecting Spencer's theory of parallel cultural evolution, Childe found that interactions between cultures contributed to the convergence of similar aspects most often attributed to one culture. Childe placed emphasis on human culture as a social construct rather than products of environmental or technological contexts. Childe coined the terms "Neolithic Revolution", and "Urban Revolution" which are still used today in the branch of pre-historic anthropology.

In 1941 anthropologist Robert Redfield wrote about a shift from 'folk society' to 'urban society'. By the 1940s cultural anthropologists such as Leslie White and Julian Steward sought to revive an evolutionary model on a more scientific basis, and succeeded in establishing an approach known as neoevolutionism. White rejected the opposition between "primitive" and "modern" societies but did argue that societies could be distinguished based on the amount of energy they harnessed, and that increased energy allowed for greater social differentiation (White's law). Steward on the other hand rejected the 19th-century notion of progress, and instead called attention to the Darwinian notion of "adaptation", arguing that all societies had to adapt to their environment in some way.

The anthropologists Marshall Sahlins and Elman Service prepared an edited volume, Evolution and Culture, in which they attempted to synthesise White's and Steward's approaches.[68] Other anthropologists, building on or responding to work by White and Steward, developed theories of cultural ecology and ecological anthropology. The most prominent examples are Peter Vayda and Roy Rappaport. By the late 1950s, students of Steward such as Eric Wolf and Sidney Mintz turned away from cultural ecology to Marxism, world systems theory, dependency theory and Marvin Harris's cultural materialism.

Today most anthropologists reject 19th-century notions of progress and the three assumptions of unilineal evolution. Following Steward, they take seriously the relationship between a culture and its environment to explain different aspects of a culture. But most modern cultural anthropologists have adopted a general systems approach, examining cultures as emergent systems and arguing that one must consider the whole social environment, which includes political and economic relations among cultures. As a result of simplistic notions of "progressive evolution", more modern, complex cultural evolution theories (such as dual inheritance theory, discussed below) receive little attention in the social sciences, having given way in some cases to a series of more humanist approaches. Some reject the entirety of evolutionary thinking and look instead at historical contingencies, contacts with other cultures, and the operation of cultural symbol systems. In the area of development studies, authors such as Amartya Sen have developed an understanding of 'development' and 'human flourishing' that also question more simplistic notions of progress, while retaining much of their original inspiration.

Neoevolutionism

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Neoevolutionism was the first in a series of modern multilineal evolution theories. It emerged in the 1930s and extensively developed in the period following the Second World War and was incorporated into both anthropology and sociology in the 1960s. It bases its theories on empirical evidence from areas of archaeology, palaeontology, and historiography and tries to eliminate any references to systems of values, be it moral or cultural, instead trying to remain objective and simply descriptive.[69]

While 19th-century evolutionism explained how culture develops by giving general principles of its evolutionary process, it was dismissed by the Historical Particularists as unscientific in the early 20th century. It was the neo-evolutionary thinkers who brought back evolutionary thought and developed it to be acceptable to contemporary anthropology.

Neo-evolutionism discards many ideas of classical social evolutionism, namely that of social progress, so dominant in previous sociology evolution-related theories.[69] Then neo-evolutionism discards the determinism argument and introduces probability, arguing that accidents and free will greatly affect the process of social evolution.[69] It also supports counterfactual history—asking "what if" and considering different possible paths that social evolution may take or might have taken, and thus allows for the fact that various cultures may develop in different ways, some skipping entire stages others have passed through.[69] Neo-evolutionism stresses the importance of empirical evidence. While 19th-century evolutionism used value judgments and assumptions for interpreting data, neo-evolutionism relies on measurable information for analysing the process of sociocultural evolution.

Leslie White, author of The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome (1959), attempted to create a theory explaining the entire history of humanity.[69] The most important factor in his theory is technology.[69] Social systems are determined by technological systems, wrote White in his book,[70] echoing the earlier theory of Lewis Henry Morgan. He proposes a society's energy consumption as a measure of its advancement.[69] He differentiates between five stages of human development.[69] In the first, people use the energy of their own muscles.[69] In the second, they use the energy of domesticated animals.[69] In the third, they use the energy of plants (so White refers to agricultural revolution here).[69] In the fourth, they learn to use the energy of natural resources: coal, oil, gas.[69] In the fifth, they harness nuclear energy.[69] White introduced a formula, P=E·T, where E is a measure of energy consumed, and T is the measure of efficiency of technical factors utilising the energy.[69] This theory is similar to Russian astronomer Nikolai Kardashev's later theory of the Kardashev scale.

Julian Steward, author of Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution (1955, reprinted 1979), created the theory of "multilinear" evolution which examined the way in which societies adapted to their environment. This approach was more nuanced than White's theory of "unilinear evolution." Steward rejected the 19th-century notion of progress, and instead called attention to the Darwinian notion of "adaptation", arguing that all societies had to adapt to their environment in some way. He argued that different adaptations could be studied through the examination of the specific resources a society exploited, the technology the society relied on to exploit these resources, and the organization of human labour. He further argued that different environments and technologies would require different kinds of adaptations, and that as the resource base or technology changed, so too would a culture. In other words, cultures do not change according to some inner logic, but rather in terms of a changing relationship with a changing environment. Cultures therefore would not pass through the same stages in the same order as they changed—rather, they would change in varying ways and directions. He called his theory "multilineal evolution". He questioned the possibility of creating a social theory encompassing the entire evolution of humanity; however, he argued that anthropologists are not limited to describing specific existing cultures. He believed that it is possible to create theories analysing typical common culture, representative of specific eras or regions. As the decisive factors determining the development of given culture he pointed to technology and economics, but noted that there are secondary factors, like political system, ideologies and religion. All those factors push the evolution of a given society in several directions at the same time; hence the application of the term "multilinear" to his theory of evolution.

Marshall Sahlins, co-editor with Elman Service of Evolution and Culture (1960), divided the evolution of societies into 'general' and 'specific'.[71] General evolution is the tendency of cultural and social systems to increase in complexity, organization and adaptiveness to environment.[71] However, as the various cultures are not isolated, there is interaction and a diffusion of their qualities (like technological inventions).[71] This leads cultures to develop in different ways (specific evolution), as various elements are introduced to them in different combinations and at different stages of evolution.[71]

In his Power and Prestige (1966) and Human Societies: An Introduction to Macrosociology (1974), Gerhard Lenski expands on the works of Leslie White and Lewis Henry Morgan,[71] developing the ecological-evolutionary theory. He views technological progress as the most basic factor in the evolution of societies and cultures.[71] Unlike White, who defined technology as the ability to create and utilise energy, Lenski focuses on information—its amount and uses.[71] The more information and knowledge (especially allowing the shaping of natural environment) a given society has, the more advanced it is.[71] He distinguishes four stages of human development, based on advances in the history of communication.[71] In the first stage, information is passed by genes.[71] In the second, when humans gain sentience, they can learn and pass information through by experience.[71] In the third, humans start using signs and develop logic.[71] In the fourth, they can create symbols and develop language and writing.[71] Advancements in the technology of communication translate into advancements in the economic system and political system, distribution of goods, social inequality and other spheres of social life. He also differentiates societies based on their level of technology, communication and economy: (1) hunters and gatherers, (2) agricultural, (3) industrial, and (4) special (like fishing societies).[71]

Talcott Parsons, author of Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (1966) and The System of Modern Societies (1971) divided evolution into four subprocesses: (1) division, which creates functional subsystems from the main system; (2) adaptation, where those systems evolve into more efficient versions; (3) inclusion of elements previously excluded from the given systems; and (4) generalization of values, increasing the legitimization of the ever more complex system.[72] He shows those processes on 4 stages of evolution: (I) primitive or foraging, (II) archaic agricultural, (III) classical or "historic" in his terminology, using formalized and universalizing theories about reality and (IV) modern empirical cultures. However, these divisions in Parsons' theory are the more formal ways in which the evolutionary process is conceptualized, and should not be mistaken for Parsons' actual theory. Parsons develops a theory where he tries to reveal the complexity of the processes which take form between two points of necessity, the first being the cultural "necessity," which is given through the values-system of each evolving community; the other is the environmental necessities, which most directly is reflected in the material realities of the basic production system and in the relative capacity of each industrial-economical level at each window of time. Generally, Parsons highlights that the dynamics and directions of these processes is shaped by the cultural imperative embodied in the cultural heritage, and more secondarily, an outcome of sheer "economic" conditions.

Michel Foucault's recent, and very much misunderstood, concepts such as biopower, biopolitics and power-knowledge has been cited as breaking free from the traditional conception of man as cultural animal. Foucault regards both the terms "cultural animal" and "human nature"as misleading abstractions, leading to a non-critical exemption of man and anything can be justified when regarding social processes or natural phenomena (social phenomena).[73] Foucault argues these complex processes are interrelated, and difficult to study for a reason so those 'truths' cannot be topled or disrupted. For Foucault, the many modern concepts and practices that attempt to uncover "the truth" about human beings (either psychologically, sexually, religion or spiritually) actually create the very types of people they purport to discover. Requiring trained "specialists" and knowledge codes and know how, rigorous pursuit is "put off" or delayed which makes any kind of study not only a 'taboo' subject but deliberately ignored. He cites the concept of 'truth'[74] within many human cultures and the ever flowing dynamics between truth, power, and knowledge as a resultant complex dynamics (Foucault uses the term regimes of truth) and how they flow with ease like water which make the concept of 'truth' impervious to any further rational investigation. Some of the West's most powerful social institutions are powerful for a reason, not because they exhibit powerful structures which inhibit investigation or it is illegal to investigate there historical foundation. It is the very notion of "legitimacy" Foucault cites as examples of "truth" which function as a "Foundationalism" claims to historical accuracy. Foucault argues, systems such as medicine, prisons,[75][76] and religion, as well as groundbreaking works on more abstract theoretical issues of power are suspended or buried into oblivion.[77] He cites as further examples the 'Scientific study' of population biology and population genetics[78] as both examples of this kind of "Biopower" over the vast majority of the human population giving the new founded political population their 'politics' or polity. With the advent of biology and genetics teamed together as new scientific innovations notions of study of knowledge regarding truth belong to the realm of experts who will never divulge their secrets openly, while the bulk of the population do not know their own biology or genetics this is done for them by the experts. This functions as a truth ignorance mechanism: "where the "subjugated knowledge's", as those that have been both written out of history and submerged in it in a masked form produces what we now know as truth. He calls them "Knowledge's from below" and a "historical knowledge of struggles". Genealogy, Foucault suggests, is a way of getting at these knowledge's and struggles; "they are about the insurrection of knowledge's." Foucault tries to show with the added dimension of "Milieu" (derived from Newtonian mechanics) how this Milieu from the 17th century with the development of the biological and physical sciences managed to be interwoven into the political, social and biological relationship of men with the arrival of the concept Work placed upon the industrial population. Foucault uses the term Umwelt, borrowed from Jakob von Uexküll, meaning environment within. Technology, production, cartography the production of nation states and government making the efficiency of the body politic, law, heredity and consanguine[77] not only sound genuine and beyond historical origin and foundation it can be turned into 'exact truth' where the individual and the societal body are not only subjugated and nullified but dependent upon it. Foucault is not denying that genetic or biological study is inaccurate or is simply not telling the truth what he means is that notions of this newly discovered sciences were extended to include the vast majority (or whole populations) of populations as an exercise in "regimes change".

Foucault argues that the conceptual meaning from the Middle Ages and Canon law period, the Geocentric model, later superseded by the Heliocentrism model placing the position of the law of right in the Middle ages (exclusive right or its correct legal term Sui generis) was the divine right of kings and absolute monarchy where the previous incarnation of truth and rule of political sovereignty was considered absolute and unquestioned by political philosophy (monarchs, popes and emperors). However, Foucault noticed that this Pharaonic version of political power was transversed and it was with 18th-century emergence of capitalism and liberal democracy that these terms began to be "democratized". The modern Pharaonic version represented by the president, the monarch, the pope and the prime minister all became propagandized versions or examples of symbol agents all aimed at towards a newly discovered phenomenon, the population.[79] As symbolic symbol agents of power making the mass population having to sacrifice itself all in the name of the newly formed voting franchise we now call Democracy. However, this was all turned on its head (when the Medieval rulers were thrown out and replaced by a more exact apparatus now called the state) when the human sciences suddenly discovered: "The set of mechanisms through which the basic biological features of the human species became an object of a political strategy and took on board the fundamental facts that humans were now a biological species."[80]

Sociobiology

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Sociobiology departs perhaps the furthest from classical social evolutionism.[81] It was introduced by Edward Wilson in his 1975 book Sociobiology: The New Synthesis and followed his adaptation of evolutionary theory to the field of social sciences. Wilson pioneered the attempt to explain the evolutionary mechanics behind social behaviours such as altruism, aggression, and nurturance.[81] In doing so, Wilson sparked one of the greatest scientific controversies of the 20th century by introducing and rejuvenating neo-Darwinian modes of thinking in many social sciences and the humanities, leading to reactions ranging from fundamental opposition, not only from social scientists and humanists but also from Darwinists who see it as "excessively simplistic in its approach",[82] to calls for a radical restructuring of the respective disciplines on an evolutionary basis.[83]

The current theory of evolution, the modern evolutionary synthesis (or neo-darwinism), explains that evolution of species occurs through a combination of Darwin's mechanism of natural selection and Gregor Mendel's theory of genetics as the basis for biological inheritance and mathematical population genetics.[81] Essentially, the modern synthesis introduced the connection between two important discoveries; the units of evolution (genes) with the main mechanism of evolution (selection).[81]

Due to its close reliance on biology, sociobiology is often considered a branch of the biology, although it uses techniques from a plethora of sciences, including ethology, evolution, zoology, archaeology, population genetics, and many others. Within the study of human societies, sociobiology is closely related to the fields of human behavioral ecology and evolutionary psychology.

Sociobiology has remained highly controversial as it contends genes explain specific human behaviours, although sociobiologists describe this role as a very complex and often unpredictable interaction between nature and nurture. The most notable critics of the view that genes play a direct role in human behaviour have been biologists Richard Lewontin, Steven Rose, and Stephen Jay Gould. Given the convergence of much of sociobiology's claims with right-wing politics, this approach has seen severe opposition both with regard to its research results as well as its basic tenets;[84] this has led even Wilson himself to revisit his claims and state his opposition to some elements of modern sociobiology.[85]

Since the rise of evolutionary psychology, another school of thought, Dual Inheritance Theory, has emerged in the past 25 years that applies the mathematical standards of Population genetics to modeling the adaptive and selective principles of culture. This school of thought was pioneered by Robert Boyd at UCLA and Peter Richerson at UC Davis and expanded by William Wimsatt, among others. Boyd and Richerson's book, Culture and the Evolutionary Process (1985), was a highly mathematical description of cultural change, later published in a more accessible form in Not by Genes Alone (2004). In Boyd and Richerson's view, cultural evolution, operating on socially learned information, exists on a separate but co-evolutionary track from genetic evolution, and while the two are related, cultural evolution is more dynamic, rapid, and influential on human society than genetic evolution. Dual Inheritance Theory has the benefit of providing unifying territory for a "nature and nurture" paradigm and accounts for more accurate phenomenon in evolutionary theory applied to culture, such as randomness effects (drift), concentration dependency, "fidelity" of evolving information systems, and lateral transmission through communication.[86] Nicholas Christakis also advances similar ideas about "evolutionary sociology" in his 2019 book, Blueprint: The Evolutionary Origins of a Good Society, emphasizing the relevance of underlying evolutionary forces that have helped to shape all societies, whatever their cultural differences.[87]

Theory of modernization

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Theories of modernization are closely related to the dependency theory and development theory.[88] While they have been developed and popularized in the 1950s and 1960s, their ideological and epistemic ancestors can be traced back until at least the early 20th century when progressivist historians and social scientists, building upon Darwinian ideas that the roots of economic success in the US had to be found in its population structure, which, as an immigrant society, was composed of the strongest and fittest individuals of their respective countries of origin, had started to supply the national myth of US-American manifest destiny with evolutionary reasoning. Explicitly and implicitly, the US became the yardstick of modernisation, and other societies could be measured in the extent of their modernity by how closely they adhered to the US-American example.[89] Modernization Theories combine the previous theories of sociocultural evolution with practical experiences and empirical research, especially those from the era of decolonization. The theory states that:

  • Western countries are the most developed, and the rest of the world (mostly former colonies) is in the earlier stages of development, and will eventually reach the same level as the Western world.[88]
  • Development stages go from the traditional societies to developed ones.[88]
  • Third World countries have fallen behind with their social progress and need to be directed on their way to becoming more advanced.[88]

Developing from classical social evolutionism theories, the theory of modernization stresses the modernization factor: many societies are simply trying (or need) to emulate the most successful societies and cultures.[88] It also states that it is possible to do so, thus supporting the concepts of social engineering and that the developed countries can and should help those less developed, directly or indirectly.[88]

Among the scientists who contributed much to this theory are Walt Rostow, who in his The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (1960) concentrates on the economic system side of the modernization, trying to show factors needed for a country to reach the path to modernization in his Rostovian take-off model.[88] David Apter concentrated on the political system and history of democracy, researching the connection between democracy, good governance and efficiency and modernization.[88] David McClelland (The Achieving Society, 1967) approached this subject from the psychological perspective, with his motivations theory, arguing that modernization cannot happen until given society values innovation, success and free enterprise.[88] Alex Inkeles (Becoming Modern, 1974) similarly creates a model of modern personality, which needs to be independent, active, interested in public policies and cultural matters, open to new experiences, rational and able to create long-term plans for the future.[88] Some works of Jürgen Habermas are also connected with this subfield.

The theory of modernization has been subject to some criticism similar to that levied against classical social evolutionism, especially for being too ethnocentric, one-sided and focused on the Western world and its culture.

Contemporary perspectives

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Political perspectives

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The Cold War period was marked by rivalry between two superpowers, both of which considered themselves to be the most highly evolved cultures on the planet. The USSR painted itself as a socialist society which emerged from class struggle, destined to reach the state of communism, while sociologists in the United States (such as Talcott Parsons) argued that the freedom and prosperity of the United States were a proof of a higher level of sociocultural evolution of its culture and society. At the same time, decolonization created newly independent countries who sought to become more developed—a model of progress and industrialization which was itself a form of sociocultural evolution.

Technological perspectives

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Schematic timeline of information and replicators in the biosphere: major evolutionary transitions in information processing[90]

Many[who?] argue that the next stage of sociocultural evolution consists of a merger with technology, especially information processing technology. Several cumulative major transitions of evolution have transformed life through key innovations in information storage and replication, including RNA, DNA, multicellularity, and also language and culture as inter-human information processing systems.[91][92] in this sense it can be argued that the carbon-based biosphere has generated a system (human society) capable of creating technology that will result in a comparable evolutionary transition. "Digital information has reached a similar magnitude to information in the biosphere. It increases exponentially, exhibits high-fidelity replication, evolves through differential fitness, is expressed through artificial intelligence (AI), and has facility for virtually limitless recombination. Like previous evolutionary transitions, the potential symbiosis between biological and digital information will reach a critical point where these codes could compete via natural selection. Alternatively, this fusion could create a higher-level superorganism employing a low-conflict division of labor in performing informational tasks...humans already embrace fusions of biology and technology. We spend most of our waking time communicating through digitally mediated channels, ...most transactions on the stock market are executed by automated trading algorithms, and our electric grids are in the hands of artificial intelligence. With one in three marriages in America beginning online, digital algorithms are also taking a role in human pair bonding and reproduction".[90]

Anthropological perspectives

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Current political theories of the new tribalists consciously mimic ecology and the life-ways of indigenous peoples, augmenting them with modern sciences. Ecoregional Democracy attempts to confine the "shifting groups", or tribes, within "more or less clear boundaries" that a society inherits from the surrounding ecology, to the borders of a naturally occurring ecoregion. Progress can proceed by competition between but not within tribes, and it is limited by ecological borders or by Natural Capitalism incentives which attempt to mimic the pressure of natural selection on a human society by forcing it to adapt consciously to scarce energy or materials. Gaians argue that societies evolve deterministically to play a role in the ecology of their biosphere, or else die off as failures due to competition from more efficient societies exploiting nature's leverage.

Thus, some have appealed to theories of sociocultural evolution to assert that optimizing the ecology and the social harmony of closely knit groups is more desirable or necessary than the progression to "civilization." A 2002 poll of experts on Neoarctic and Neotropic indigenous peoples (reported in Harper's magazine)[citation needed] revealed that all of them would have preferred to be a typical New World person in the year 1491, prior to any European contact, rather than a typical European of that time. This approach has been criticised by pointing out that there are a number of historical examples of indigenous peoples doing severe environmental damage (such as the deforestation of Easter Island and the extinction of mammoths in North America) and that proponents of the goal have been trapped by the European stereotype of the noble savage.

The role of war in the development of states and societies

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Particularly since the end of the Cold War, there has been a growing number of scholars in the social sciences and humanities who came to complement the more presentist neo-evolutionary research with studies into the more distant past and its human inhabitants. A key element in many of these analyses and theories is warfare, which Robert L. Carneiro called the "prime mover in the origin of the state".[93] He theorizes that given the limited availability of natural resources, societies will compete against each other, with the losing group either moving out of the area now dominated by the victorious one, or, if the area is circumscribed by an ocean or a mountain range and re-settlement is thus impossible, will be either subjugated or killed. Thus, societies become larger and larger, but, facing the constant threat of extinction or assimilation, they were also forced to become more complex in their internal organisation both in order to remain competitive as well as to administer a growing territory and a larger population.[94]

Carneiro's ideas have inspired great number of subsequent research into the role of war in the process of political, social, or cultural evolution. An example of this is Ian Morris who argues that given the right geographic conditions, war not only drove much of human culture by integrating societies and increasing material well-being, but paradoxically also made the world much less violent. Large-scale states, says Morris, evolved because only they provided enough stability both internally and externally to survive the constant conflicts which characterise the early history of smaller states, and the possibility of war will continue to force humans to invent and evolve.[95] War drove human societies to adapt in a step-wise process, and each development in military technology either requires or leads to comparable developments in politics and society.[96]

Many of the underlying assumptions of Morris's thinking can be traced back in some form or another not only to Carneiro but also to Jared Diamond, and particularly his 1997 book Guns, Germs, and Steel. Diamond, who explicitly opposes racist evolutionary tales,[97] argues that the ultimate explanation of why different human development on different continents is the presence or absence of domesticable plants and animals as well as the fact that the east-west orientation of Eurasia made migration within similar climates much easier than the south-north orientation of Africa and the Americas.[98] Nevertheless, he also stresses the importance of conflict and warfare as a proximate explanation for how Europeans managed to conquer much of the world,[99] given how societies who fail to innovate will "tend to be eliminated by competing societies".[100]

Similarly, Charles Tilly argues that what drove the political, social, and technological change which, after centuries of great variation with regard to states, lead to the European states ultimately all converging on the national state was coercion and warfare: "War wove the European network of national states, and preparation for war created the internal structures of states within it."[101] He describes how war became more expensive and complex due to the introduction of gunpowder and large armies and thus required significantly large states in order to provide the capital and manpower to sustain these, which at the same time were forced to develop new means of extraction and administration.[102]

However, Norman Yoffee has criticised such theorists who, based on general evolutionary frameworks, came to formulate theories of the origins of states and their evolution. He claimed that in no small part due to the prominence of neoevolutionary explanations which group different societies into groups in order to compare them and their progress both to themselves and to modern ethnographic examples, while focusing mostly on political systems and a despotic élite who held together a territorial state by force, "much of what has been said of the earliest states, both in the professional literature as well as in popular writings, is not only factually wrong but also is implausible in the logic of social evolutionary theory".[103]

See also

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References

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Cited sources

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Sociocultural evolution denotes the theoretical study of how societies and cultures transform over time through mechanisms of , transmission, and selection, often analogies to biological while emphasizing changes in social structures, technologies, and norms. Emerging in the , classical formulations proposed unilinear progress from primitive "savagery" through "barbarism" to "civilization," as articulated by anthropologists Lewis Henry Morgan and , who linked societal stages to advancements in , , and . Philosopher extended evolutionary principles to sociology, portraying societies as superorganisms undergoing increasing differentiation and integration from simple, homogeneous forms to complex, industrialized ones. These early theories, however, faced substantial criticism for their ethnocentric assumptions of inevitable progress toward Western models and lack of empirical validation, leading to their decline amid Boasian particularism in , which prioritized and over universal stages. Modern sociocultural evolutionary theory has revived under Darwinian frameworks, integrating gene-culture and biased transmission—such as and prestige effects—to model cumulative cultural change with empirical support from experiments on social learning and phylogenetic analyses of traits like and tools. Unlike speculative 19th-century schemes, contemporary approaches emphasize multilineal trajectories, contingency, and testable predictions, revealing how cultural variants propagate via imitation and adaptation, contributing to humanity's rapid technological ascent beyond genetic constraints. Key achievements include dual-inheritance models explaining phenomena like and in large groups, though debates persist over the fidelity of cultural "replicators" versus population-level dynamics. Controversies center on reconciling apparent regressions, such as societal collapses, with selection pressures, underscoring the interplay of environmental, demographic, and informational factors in long-term trajectories.

Definition and Core Principles

Conceptual Foundations

Sociocultural evolution refers to the directional changes in human societies and cultures over time, driven by processes of variation, selection, and transmission that parallel biological evolution but operate through social and informational mechanisms. Cultural traits—such as technologies, norms, beliefs, and practices—undergo modification via individual innovations or recombinations, with differential persistence determined by their utility in enhancing survival, reproduction, or social coordination. Transmission occurs primarily through social learning pathways, including of successful models, , and biases, enabling non-genetic of acquired knowledge. A key distinction from biological evolution lies in the fidelity and speed of cultural transmission, which permits Lamarckian-like inheritance where environmentally induced modifications are directly passed on, fostering cumulative complexity. For instance, incremental improvements in stone tools from the Paleolithic era (evidenced by increasing sophistication over 2.5 million years) to the Neolithic transition around 10,000 BCE demonstrate how innovations build upon prior variants, selected for efficiency in resource extraction. This cumulativity, unique to humans, relies on cognitive capacities for high-fidelity replication and "ratcheting" effects, where traits are refined rather than reset across generations. Selection pressures act at multiple levels: individual traits spread via prestige or content biases (e.g., preferring novel or successful ideas), while group-level dynamics, such as institutional norms, influence societal trajectories. Foundational to these concepts is the treatment of as heritable influencing phenotypes, subject to irrespective of substrate—genetic or cultural. Gene- coevolution exemplifies integration with , as cultural innovations like , originating around 9,000 years ago in the , exerted selective pressure favoring genetic variants for adult in descendant populations. Empirical support derives from phylogenetic analyses of artifact distributions and experimental studies of learning biases, revealing predictable patterns in trait diffusion under varying environmental stability. While early formulations emphasized unilinear progress, modern foundations stress contingency and potential for maladaptive lock-in, grounded in causal mechanisms rather than teleological assumptions.

Mechanisms of Change

Cultural variants arise primarily through individual-level processes such as , , and guided variation via personal experience or trial-and-error learning, introducing novelty into the cultural repertoire analogous to in biological . These variants encompass behaviors, technologies, beliefs, and norms that can spread if advantageous or neutral. Empirical studies, including experiments with participants, demonstrate that such variation is shaped by cognitive mechanisms like and problem-solving, which generate adaptive modifications to existing practices. Transmission of cultural variants occurs via social learning processes, including , , and , which propagate information across individuals and generations without genetic inheritance. Key pathways include (from parents to ), oblique transmission (from non-parental elders), and (peer-to-peer within generations), with the latter facilitating rapid across populations. Biases in social learning amplify transmission: conformist favors adopting prevalent traits, increasing their frequency and stability; success or payoff prioritizes variants yielding higher individual benefits, such as improved efficiency; and prestige directs learning toward high-status models, accelerating the spread of their associated practices. Mathematical models grounded in show these biases drive cumulative , where complex adaptations build incrementally, as evidenced by simulations and ethnographic data on tool use and norms. Selection acts on transmitted variants through differential replication and retention, where traits enhancing survival, reproduction, or social success persist over those that do not, often via interacting with cultural fitness. Cultural group selection emerges when transmission coupling—such as parochial or conformism—aligns individual behaviors with group-level advantages, enabling the evolution of cooperation in large-scale societies, as modeled in dual-inheritance theory. Random forces like cultural drift, where neutral variants fluctuate due to finite sizes or sampling errors in learning, also contribute to change, particularly in small or isolated groups, though empirical validation from transmission chain experiments indicates drift is secondary to biased selection in most human contexts. Diffusion, a subset of , spreads variants between populations through migration, , or , historically accounting for major shifts like the adoption of in non-origin regions around 10,000–5,000 BCE. These mechanisms interact dynamically; for instance, gene-culture occurs when selected cultural practices alter selective pressures on genes, such as lactose tolerance persisting due to dairying cultures post-7,000 BCE in and . Experimental and data underscore that biased transmission, rather than pure individual invention, predominates in explaining adaptive change, countering views overemphasizing alone. While early formulations invoked unilinear , contemporary models emphasize multilinearity and contingency, validated by phylogenetic analyses of languages and technologies showing non-deterministic trajectories.

Distinction from Biological Evolution

Sociocultural evolution pertains to transformations in human societies, norms, technologies, and ideas transmitted primarily through social learning, , and , rather than genetic mechanisms. Biological , by contrast, involves heritable changes in populations via alterations in frequencies, governed by processes such as , , , and , which operate on genetic material over reproductive generations. These distinctions arise from fundamentally separate inheritance systems: genetic transmission is particulate, digital, and largely vertical (parent-to-offspring), ensuring high-fidelity replication but slow accumulation of adaptive changes, whereas cultural transmission allows for analog, high-variance signals that propagate horizontally across non-kin, enabling rapid diffusion but also prone to distortion through interpretation and recombination. A key divergence is the Lamarckian character of sociocultural evolution, where acquired traits—such as technological innovations or behavioral adaptations learned within a lifetime—can be directly inherited by others without requiring genetic modification, contrasting with the Weismannian barrier in that prohibits inheritance of somatic changes. This permits purposeful agency in cultural variant selection, as individuals and groups evaluate, retain, or discard ideas based on perceived utility, prestige, or pressures, unlike the undirected, probabilistic filtering of biological selection. Empirical evidence from archaeological records shows cultural traits, like tool-making techniques, spreading across populations in decades or centuries—far outpacing genetic shifts, which typically require thousands of years for fixation under selection. While analogies exist, such as selection-like pressures on cultural "memes" (e.g., among ideologies for adherence), the processes are not isomorphic; biological lacks the and cross-lineage fidelity of culture, and conflating them risks overlooking how can feedback to influence genetic fitness, as in dual inheritance models where lactose tolerance alleles spread post-dairy farming's cultural advent around 10,000 years ago. Critics in note that early evolutionary analogies overstated , but modern formulations emphasize these mechanistic differences to avoid teleological pitfalls.

Historical Development

Pre-Modern and Enlightenment Roots

Pre-modern conceptions of sociocultural change emphasized cyclical patterns rather than unidirectional progress, drawing from observations of historical rise and fall in civilizations. In , thinkers like and analyzed societal forms, with in The Republic (c. 375 BCE) positing degeneration from to tyranny through intermediate stages, attributing shifts to moral and institutional decay. , in his Histories (c. 150 BCE), described anacyclosis—a cycle of governments progressing from to , , and ochlocracy, driven by internal corruption and power imbalances, which he observed in the transition from to . These ideas rooted in and environmental contingencies, influencing later cyclical models without implying cumulative advancement. A pivotal pre-modern synthesis emerged in the work of , whose (1377 CE) outlined a theory of dynastic cycles propelled by —tribal solidarity among nomadic groups that enables conquest of sedentary urban societies. Khaldun argued that victorious nomads establish dynasties characterized by initial austerity and cohesion, but over three to four generations (typically 120 years), urban luxury erodes , fostering corruption, taxation burdens, and military weakness, culminating in overthrow by a new hardy group. This materialist account, grounded in North African and Islamic historical data, emphasized causal factors like , , and over divine intervention, prefiguring empirical approaches to societal change. Khaldun's framework rejected linear progress, viewing history as repetitive due to unchanging human incentives. During the Enlightenment, Italian philosopher extended cyclical thinking in Principi di Scienza Nuova (1725, revised 1744), proposing three ages—divine, heroic, and human—recurring in corsi e ricorsi, where societies advance through mythological, aristocratic, and rational phases before barbarism prompts renewal. attributed these cycles to collective human imagination and language evolution, with providence guiding recurrence toward gradual refinement, distinguishing his model from purely degenerative ancient views by incorporating mythic evidence from and . Concurrently, French thinker in De l'esprit des lois (1748) examined how , , and shape governmental forms and social mores, classifying societies from despotic to republican based on causal environmental determinants rather than innate superiority. The introduced stadial theories positing sequential progress tied to subsistence modes, marking a shift toward cumulative development. , in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767), described stages from savage hunter-gatherers to pastoralists, agrarians, and commercial polities, driven by population pressures and division of labor enhancing productivity and liberty. elaborated this in Lectures on Jurisprudence (1762–1763), arguing that advancements in production—from to , farming, and —correlate with property rights, governance complexity, and moral sentiments fostering . Antoine de Condorcet, in Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain (1795), envisioned ten historical epochs culminating in indefinite perfectibility through reason, , and , contrasting cyclical pessimism with optimistic supported by empirical historical trends. These frameworks, informed by conjectural history and economic observation, laid groundwork for viewing sociocultural evolution as potentially progressive, contingent on material and institutional causes.

19th-Century Formulations

In the 19th century, thinkers began systematically applying notions of progressive development to human societies and cultures, often drawing analogies from biological and cosmic evolution independently of Charles Darwin's 1859 On the Origin of Species. These formulations typically posited unilineal sequences of advancement from simpler to more complex forms, influenced by Enlightenment optimism and industrial-era observations of technological and institutional growth. Auguste Comte, founder of positivism, outlined the law of three stages in his Course of Positive Philosophy (1830–1842), arguing that human thought and society evolve through theological (explanations via gods and spirits), metaphysical (abstract forces), and positive (scientific observation) phases. In the theological stage, dominant until around the Middle Ages, societies relied on religious and military hierarchies; the metaphysical stage, transitional from the 14th to 18th centuries, critiqued traditions with philosophical speculation; and the positive stage, emerging in the 19th century, emphasized empirical laws and industrial organization for social stability. Comte viewed this progression as inevitable, with positivism enabling prediction and control akin to physical sciences, though later critics noted its Eurocentric teleology. Herbert Spencer extended evolutionary principles to society in works like (1851) and Principles of Sociology (1876–1896), describing social evolution as increasing through differentiation of structures and functions, paralleled by greater integration and mutual dependence. Societies, like organisms, progressed from militant (coercive, simple) to industrial (voluntary, complex) types, with "" justifying policies and minimal state interference. Spencer's synthetic philosophy integrated biology, , and , positing that ethical progress accompanies structural evolution toward and , though his ideas faced charges of justifying inequality. Anthropologists Lewis Henry Morgan and formalized cultural stages tied to technology and belief systems. Morgan's (1877) divided human progress into savagery (hunting-gathering, subdivided by fire use and bow invention), barbarism (agriculture and ), and (phonetic alphabet and state governance), linking these to evolution from to . , in Primitive Culture (1871), traced religion from —belief in spirits animating nature, arising from dreams and death observations—to and , with "survivals" like evidencing earlier stages in modern customs. Both emphasized empirical and ethnographic data, assuming universal sequences culminating in Western forms, influencing later Marxian and despite empirical challenges.

Early 20th-Century Critiques and Shifts

In the early 20th century, Franz Boas emerged as a primary critic of 19th-century unilinear sociocultural evolutionism, arguing in his 1911 book The Mind of Primitive Man that such models erroneously assumed universal psychic unity and parallel developmental stages across all societies, ignoring the role of specific historical contingencies and environmental factors in shaping cultural trajectories. Boas rejected the evolutionists' comparative method, which selected decontextualized cultural traits to fit preconceived sequences of progress from "savagery" to "civilization," contending instead that valid anthropological analysis required detailed, inductive study of individual cultures through fieldwork to reconstruct their unique histories. This critique extended to the ethnocentric bias inherent in placing contemporary Western societies at the apex of evolution, which Boas viewed as unsubstantiated conjecture rather than empirical fact. Boas's approach, termed , advocated understanding each culture as a singular configuration arising from , independent , and local adaptations, rather than adherence to invariant laws of . By the 1920s, this paradigm dominated American via Boas's students, such as and , who prioritized synchronic descriptions and over evolutionary reconstruction, effectively sidelining grand schemes in favor of idiographic, context-bound explanations. Historical particularism's emphasis on cultural specificity challenged the causal of evolutionism, positing that no universal sequence governed sociocultural change, though it faced later criticism for potentially underemphasizing cross-cultural regularities observable in empirical data. Concurrently, British anthropology shifted toward functionalism, with Bronisław Malinowski's 1922 monograph exemplifying a focus on how cultural institutions serve practical needs and maintain social stability in the present, rather than tracing diachronic evolutionary origins. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, in works like Method in Social Anthropology (1958, building on 1920s ideas), developed structural-functionalism, viewing societies as systems where elements interconnect to preserve equilibrium, critiquing evolutionism's speculative as unverifiable and advocating instead for synchronic analysis of social structures. These functionalist approaches, reacting against evolutionism's perceived overreliance on untestable conjectures about prehistoric stages, prioritized causal explanations rooted in observable integrations, though they often neglected long-term change dynamics. By the 1930s, these critiques had largely displaced unilinear models from mainstream , fostering a methodological that demanded verifiable evidence over , yet leaving room for later integrations of evolutionary insights amid accumulating archaeological data.

Major Theoretical Frameworks

Unilinear and Stadial Models

Unilinear models assert that all human societies advance through a singular, progressive sequence of stages from rudimentary to sophisticated forms, driven by technological, institutional, and intellectual developments. Formulated primarily in the , these theories presupposed a universal trajectory culminating in industrialized Western societies, often interpreting contemporary "primitive" cultures as relics of earlier phases. Lewis Henry Morgan's (1877) exemplifies this approach, classifying human progress into seven substages: lower, middle, and upper savagery (defined by innovations like fire mastery, the , and speech); lower, middle, and upper barbarism (encompassing , , , and iron ); and (ushered in by the phonetic alphabet around 600 B.C.). Stadial models, precursors to unilinear schemes, emerged during the Scottish Enlightenment and sequenced societal advancement by modes of subsistence and property relations. Adam Smith outlined four stages—hunting and gathering, pastoralism, agriculture, and commerce—in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (circa 1762–1763), linking each to evolving governance, division of labor, and inequality. These conjectural histories emphasized environmental adaptation and economic causation, influencing later anthropologists by framing progress as cumulative and directional. Auguste Comte's , introduced in Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842), extended unilinear logic to intellectual and social evolution: the theological stage (dominated by explanations, subdivided into , , and ); the metaphysical stage (abstract forces replacing gods); and the positive stage (empirical governing and policy). Comte viewed this progression as inevitable, with enabling social reconstruction. , in Primitive Culture (1871), applied similar unilinear principles to cultural elements, positing as the primal religion evolving toward alongside societal complexity. These models prioritized psychic unity—assuming uniform human inventiveness—and survivals (persistent archaic traits) as evidence of stages, but lacked empirical validation, often projecting Eurocentric norms onto global diversity.

Multilinear and

Neoevolutionism emerged in the 1940s as a methodological revival of evolutionary theory in , countering the dominant since by seeking general principles of cultural change grounded in empirical regularities rather than or unique histories. Proponents like emphasized universal laws of cultural development tied to material conditions, while introduced multilinear perspectives focused on adaptive responses to environments. This framework rejected rigid unilinear progress but retained a commitment to progressive complexity in and , influencing classifications of societal types from bands to states. Leslie White formalized through a thermodynamic model, positing that cultural systems evolve by increasing the available per capita per unit time, with as the engine of advancement. In The Science of Culture (1949), he divided into five stages—from savagery to —based on sources ranging from human muscle to atomic power, arguing this metric objectively measures progress independent of subjective values. White's approach critiqued idealist interpretations, insisting culture operates as a superorganic entity governed by causal laws akin to physics. Julian Steward's multilinear evolutionism complemented universalism by emphasizing context-specific trajectories, where parallel cultural developments arise from similar ecological and technological pressures rather than a singular ladder of progress. In Theory of Culture Change: The Methodology of Multilinear Evolution (), Steward defined the "cultural core" as those traits integral to economic adaptation, such as irrigation systems in desert societies or patrilineal bands among patrilocal hunters, allowing reconstruction of evolutionary sequences from ethnographic and archaeological data. This method identified convergences, like the rise of circumscribed chiefdoms in resource-limited environments across and the , without assuming all societies traverse identical paths. Neoevolutionists like Elman Service built on these ideas by outlining typological stages—band, , chiefly , and state—derived from comparisons, positing that integration mechanisms evolve from kinship-based to bureaucratic forms under pressures. Empirical support came from studies of 100+ societies, showing correlations between subsistence intensification and political centralization, though multilinear variants accounted for regional divergences, such as nomadic pastoralists bypassing sedentary phases. These models spurred quantitative tests in later decades but faced challenges for underemphasizing contingency and symbolic factors.

Materialist and Deterministic Approaches

Materialist approaches to sociocultural evolution emphasize the primacy of tangible economic, technological, and ecological factors in driving changes in and cultural practices, viewing these as the foundational that causally shapes institutional structures and ideational superstructures. Proponents argue that adaptations to material conditions—such as resource scarcity, productive technologies, and population pressures—generate selective pressures analogous to , leading to progressive societal complexity without relying on autonomous idealist forces like or . This perspective aligns with deterministic models, positing that cultural trajectories are largely predictable outcomes of infrastructural shifts, testable through empirical rather than subjective interpretation. Historical materialism, formulated by and in the 1840s and 1850s, represents a foundational deterministic framework within this tradition. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (), Marx outlined how modes of production—comprising forces (technology, labor) and relations (class structures)—evolve through internal contradictions, propelling societies from ancient slavery-based systems (e.g., , circa 500 BCE–500 CE) to (dominant in from roughly 800–1500 CE) and then , emergent in by the late amid textile . The economic base determines the superstructure of , , and ideology, with class struggles as the mechanism of change; for instance, bourgeois revolutions like the of 1789 are seen as resolving feudal-capitalist tensions rather than arising from Enlightenment ideas alone. This unilinear progression implies inevitability, as advancing eventually undermine existing relations, though empirical outcomes diverged from predictions, with no global proletarian overthrow in industrialized nations by the 20th century's end. Building on Marxist foundations but adapted for cross-cultural , Marvin Harris's cultural , articulated in The Rise of Anthropological Theory (1968), divides culture into infrastructure (technoeconomic production and reproduction), structure (social organization), and superstructure (beliefs and aesthetics), with probabilistic causation flowing upward from material constraints. Harris applied this deterministically to phenomena like the Aztec practice of (peaking circa 1400–1500 CE), attributing it to protein shortages necessitating via warfare, rather than religious autonomy, supported by demographic data showing ritual demands aligning with ecological limits in . Similarly, sacred cows in are explained as adaptive for draft power in wet-rice , where bovine labor yields higher caloric returns than meat consumption, evidenced by 20th-century studies correlating populations with plow-dependent farming yields exceeding 10:1 efficiency ratios. Harris advocated etic behavioral analysis over emic cultural rationales, aiming for falsifiable predictions akin to natural sciences, though critics note overemphasis on neglects feedback from ideas, as seen in persistent ideological resistances to material shifts. These approaches share a commitment to causal realism, prioritizing verifiable material drivers—such as the Revolution's of crops around 10,000 BCE enabling sedentary societies and hierarchies—over voluntaristic or relativist explanations. Empirical support includes correlations between technological innovations and societal scales; for example, ironworking's spread in from 500 BCE onward facilitated larger polities by enhancing agricultural surplus, as quantified in archaeological yield models showing 20–50% gains. here manifests in stage-like transitions, yet accommodates contingency through environmental variables, distinguishing it from strict unilinearism while maintaining that infrastructural underpins long-term directional change toward complexity.

Biological and Genetic Integration

Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology

, formalized by biologist Edward O. Wilson in his 1975 publication Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, examines the evolutionary origins of social behaviors across species through the lens of , emphasizing genetic underpinnings that favor traits enhancing . Wilson's framework integrates , , and to explain phenomena such as , , and , often via Hamilton's rule of , where behaviors aiding relatives outweigh personal costs if they increase shared gene propagation. In non-human animals, empirical support includes observations of in , where sterile workers sacrifice reproduction to support queens and siblings, driven by haplodiploid sex determination systems that amplify relatedness asymmetry. Applied to humans, posits that universal social patterns—such as kin-biased favoritism, strategies differentiated by sex, and hierarchical —stem from Pleistocene-era adaptations, evidenced by cross-cultural consistencies in behaviors like and parental solicitude toward . Twin and studies reveal moderate to high for traits influencing , including extraversion (heritability around 0.5) and (0.4–0.6), suggesting genetic factors constrain behavioral plasticity amid . Critics in academia, often from fields, have dismissed these claims as reductive, but longitudinal data from behavioral , such as the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart (initiated 1979), demonstrate that genetic influences on personality persist independently of rearing environments, challenging purely cultural explanations. Evolutionary psychology builds on sociobiology by focusing on the modular architecture of the human mind, positing domain-specific cognitive adaptations shaped by ancestral selection pressures, as articulated by and in foundational works like their 1992 edited volume The Adapted Mind. Core to this approach is the idea that psychological mechanisms, such as cheater-detection heuristics, evolved to solve recurrent adaptive problems; experimental evidence includes enhanced performance on Wason selection tasks when framed as social contracts (violation rates drop from 75% in abstract logic to 25% in violation-detecting contexts), replicated across U.S. and non-Western samples. confirm universals like male preferences for youth and fertility cues in mates (observed in 37 cultures via meta-analysis of mate choice data) and universal fears of ancestral threats (e.g., snakes over modern hazards like guns), indicating evolved emotional responses rather than learned cultural artifacts alone. In sociocultural evolution, these fields underscore how genetically influenced dispositions—such as reciprocity norms or status-seeking—provide the proximate mechanisms channeling cultural transmission, with evidence from gene-culture models showing feedbacks like dairy pastoralism selecting for alleles in (rising from near-zero pre-5000 BCE to 90% in northern populations today). While exhibits rapid Lamarckian-like change, sociobiological constraints explain persistent patterns, such as sex differences in risk-taking (males 1.5–2 times higher variance in outcomes across societies), rooted in reproductive variance rather than alone. Academic resistance, prevalent in mid-20th-century social sciences favoring blank-slate models, has waned with genomic advances, yet source biases in interpretive warrant scrutiny, as empirical datasets from large-scale consortia (e.g., heritability estimates) increasingly affirm biological realism over ideologically driven environmentalism.

Gene-Culture Coevolution

Gene-culture describes the bidirectional interplay between genetic and cultural transmission in shaping traits and behaviors, where cultural innovations impose novel selection pressures on genes, while genetic variation influences the efficacy and propagation of cultural practices. This framework treats culture as a distinct system operating alongside genetic , susceptible to evolutionary forces including , cultural drift, and biased transmission mechanisms like of successful or prestigious individuals. Formalized by anthropologists Robert Boyd and Peter J. Richerson in their 1985 monograph Culture and the Evolutionary Process, the theory employs population genetic models adapted to cultural variants (memes or cultural traits) to demonstrate how these dual systems interact to produce adaptive outcomes unattainable by genes or culture alone. Central mechanisms include niche construction, whereby human cultural activities—such as tool-making, , or social norms—alter selective environments, favoring genetic alleles that enhance performance in those niches. For example, the transition to around 10,000 years ago introduced consumption as a caloric resource, selecting for rare genetic conferring (the ability to digest in adulthood). Independent in the enhancer of the LCT (e.g., -13910C>T in Europeans) arose approximately 7,500 years ago in and spread rapidly under positive selection, with allele frequencies reaching over 90% in northern European populations where dairying was prevalent; similar patterns occur with distinct in East African pastoralists, dated to 3,000–7,000 years ago. Archaeological evidence from residues on confirms processing predating these genetic shifts by millennia, establishing culture's leading role in driving genetic adaptation. Empirical validation draws from genomic scans revealing recent selective sweeps in genes linked to culturally influenced phenotypes, such as digestion (AMY1 copy number expansions correlating with agricultural reliance) and resistance shaped by settlement patterns. In social domains, gene-culture dynamics underpin traits like parochial , where cultural norms of group loyalty amplify genetic predispositions for in-group and out-group hostility, facilitating the evolution of large-scale societies. Recent reviews emphasize that while often outpaces genetic change—enabling rapid to novel environments like high-altitude hypoxia via behavioral adjustments followed by genetic fine-tuning—the process demands rigorous testing for causality, as spatial correlations between alleles and cultural practices may reflect migration or drift rather than . Within sociocultural evolution, gene-culture coevolution elucidates humanity's departure from standard biological trajectories, as cultural ratcheting—accumulating reliable knowledge across generations—creates feedback loops amplifying genetic selection for enhanced learning and . This integration challenges purely models by highlighting genetic constraints and enablers, such as variants in genes influencing , which in turn stabilize cultural equilibria. Nonetheless, quantifying these interactions remains methodologically challenging, requiring longitudinal data and simulations to parse gene-to-culture versus culture-to-gene causation, with ongoing debates over whether now dominates evolutionary dynamics amid decelerating genetic adaptation rates.

Memetics and Cultural Transmission

Memetics posits cultural elements, termed memes, as analogous to genes in biological , serving as discrete units of information that replicate, mutate, and undergo selection through human and social learning. introduced the concept in 1976, defining memes as ideas, behaviors, or styles—such as tunes, catchphrases, or fashions—that propagate via cultural transmission, with fidelity sufficient for retention of traits across copies despite variations. This framework applies Darwinian principles to sociocultural change, where meme success depends on replicability in human minds and societies, rather than inherent truth or utility. Cultural transmission mechanisms underpin memetic spread, encompassing vertical (parent-to-offspring), horizontal (), and oblique (from non-parental elders) pathways, which enable rapid dissemination beyond genetic constraints. Empirical studies in highlight high-fidelity imitation and teaching as evolved human adaptations, facilitating cumulative knowledge accumulation over generations, as seen in archaeological records of tool innovations spanning 3.3 million years. Content biases—preferences for conferring adaptive advantages, like detection or —further drive selection, with conformist transmission amplifying prevalent memes within groups. Unlike genetic , cultural variants evolve faster due to nongenetic channels, allowing sociocultural evolution to outpace biological change in response to environmental pressures. In sociocultural evolution, integrates with broader cultural evolutionary models by emphasizing replicator dynamics, yet faces challenges in empirical validation and delineation of meme boundaries. While theoretical applications predict meme persistence based on psychological appeal or social utility, rigorous testing remains sparse, with critics arguing memes lack the discrete, high-fidelity replication of genes, leading to blurred lineages and overemphasis on analogy at the expense of contextual factors like power structures or . Proponents counter that memetic perspectives have informed studies on idea diffusion, such as linguistic shifts or technological adoption, though the field has largely shifted toward gene-culture frameworks for greater predictive power. This evolution reflects memetics' role as a for causal analysis of cultural persistence, prioritizing mechanisms verifiable through of transmission biases over untestable internal representations.

Empirical Foundations

Archaeological and Historical Evidence

Archaeological records reveal a long-term trajectory toward greater social complexity, beginning with small-scale egalitarian groups around 20,000 years ago and progressing to hierarchical polities with thousands of inhabitants by the late . Evidence includes shifts in settlement size and density, the emergence of monumental architecture, defensive structures, and indicators of inequality such as differential and housing. In the , sites from the Epipaleolithic period show mobile bands with rudimentary tools and art, transitioning to semi-sedentary villages by 12,000 BCE, as seen in Natufian settlements in the with storage pits and ground stone tools suggesting intensified resource use. This progression aligns with general evolutionary patterns where rarer, larger-scale transformations, such as , build on incremental specific changes like craft specialization. The Neolithic transition, commencing around 10,000 BCE in the , provides key evidence for the shift from foraging to , enabling and . Sites like in (ca. 9600–7000 BCE) feature massive T-shaped pillars arranged in enclosures, indicating organized labor and ritual complexity predating full domestication, while (ca. 7400–6000 BCE) demonstrates dense habitation with up to 8,000 residents, mud-brick houses, and symbolic art reflecting emerging social differentiation. In the , analogous developments at sites like Caral-Supe in (ca. 3000 BCE) show systems and platform mounds supporting non-agricultural surpluses for control. These changes correlate with increased social scale, from bands of dozens to chiefdoms of hundreds, driven by resource intensification and conflict, as evidenced by fortified settlements like Jericho's walls (ca. 8000 BCE). By the fourth millennium BCE, archaeological markers of primary states emerge in multiple independent regions, signifying centralized , bureaucracy, and territorial control. In , the (ca. 4000–3100 BCE) yields evidence of urban centers exceeding 50,000 inhabitants, temple complexes for surplus redistribution, tablets for administration, and cylinder seals denoting ownership—hallmarks of stratified societies with full-time specialists. Similar patterns appear in Egypt's Naqada III phase (ca. 3300 BCE) with tombs showing elite wealth disparities, and in the Indus Valley at Mohenjo-Daro (ca. 2500 BCE) with standardized bricks, granaries, and drainage systems implying coordinated authority. New World examples, such as in (ca. 500 BCE–200 CE), include hilltop platforms, carved stones depicting captives, and residential terraces indicating conquest and hierarchy. Quantitative analyses of such data, integrating settlement surveys and artifact distributions, confirm a directional increase in complexity metrics like population and features, despite episodic collapses, as documented in global databases spanning archaeological and ethnohistoric records. Historical texts from early literate societies corroborate archaeological findings, illustrating institutional evolution post-state formation. Sumerian cuneiform records from ca. 2500 BCE detail kingship, taxation, and warfare, aligning with excavated economies at sites like . In , oracle bones from the (ca. 1600–1046 BCE) record divinations and military campaigns, supporting evidence of bronze ritual vessels and walled cities indicating dynastic consolidation. These sources, while potentially biased toward elite perspectives, provide causal insights into mechanisms like territorial expansion and ritual legitimation driving further complexity, as cross-verified with material remains. Overall, the combined evidence underscores adaptive responses to ecological pressures and intergroup competition, with exhibiting a net upward trend over millennia.

Quantitative Modeling and Cliodynamics

Quantitative modeling in sociocultural evolution employs mathematical equations, simulations, and statistical analyses to formalize and test hypotheses about long-term patterns in human societies, drawing on data from , demographics, and to identify causal mechanisms driving change. These approaches treat cultural traits, institutions, and behaviors as evolving systems amenable to quantification, often integrating variables like , resource scarcity, and to predict trajectories such as or collapse. For instance, models of cultural transmission use differential equations to simulate how innovations spread or decline, analogous to epidemiological processes, with empirical validation against historical datasets showing fidelity in replicating observed rates in technologies like . Cliodynamics represents a specialized application of quantitative modeling to macrohistorical dynamics, defined as a transdisciplinary field combining historical , , , and nonlinear to explain and forecast societal transformations. Coined by around 2003, it posits that history operates as a where endogenous factors like elite competition and demographic pressures generate predictable patterns, testable via large-scale databases such as the Global History Databank, which compiles metrics on complexity across 500+ societies over millennia. Unlike narrower , which primarily quantifies economic variables through econometric techniques originating in the 1950s-1960s, cliodynamics extends to political instability and cultural shifts using agent-based simulations and structural equations, building on but surpassing cliometric foundations by incorporating feedback loops from and . A of is the structural-demographic theory, formalized in Turchin and Sergey Nefedov's 2009 analysis of agrarian empires, which models "secular cycles" lasting 200-300 years as sequences of expansion (rapid outpacing resources), (wage depression and inequality rise), crisis ( fueling intra-elite conflict and mass mobilization), and depression (post-crisis depopulation enabling recovery). Empirical tests on cases like medieval (1086-1485 CE), where fell 50% during phases correlating with rebellions, and Muscovy (1450-1680 CE), support the model's predictions of instability when labor supply exceeds opportunities and elite numbers swell beyond administrative capacity, with equations capturing Malthusian traps modified by state fiscal extraction. These cycles arise from causal interactions—population pressure erodes living standards, prompting declines and , while growing elites capture rents, exacerbating fiscal strain and leading to state breakdown, as quantified in simulations matching 80-90% of observed crisis timings across pre-industrial societies. Cliodynamic models have been applied to contemporary risks, such as forecast of heightened U.S. in the 2010s due to stagnating wages since the 1970s and (e.g., law degrees conferred rising from 30,000 annually in 1980 to over 40,000 by 2000 amid shrinking opportunities), borne out by events like the 2016 election polarization and 2020 unrest, though the framework emphasizes structural trends over specific triggers. Validation relies on cross-societal comparisons, revealing universal patterns like empire longevity correlating inversely with inequality indices, derived from digitized chronicles and censuses spanning and the . While ambitious in seeking akin to modeling, cliodynamics acknowledges data limitations in sparse historical records, prioritizing falsifiable hypotheses over deterministic forecasts, and contrasts with ideologically driven narratives by grounding explanations in measurable variables like energy capture rather than unquantified ideologies.

Comparative and Experimental Studies

Comparative studies in sociocultural evolution employ datasets to test hypotheses about developmental sequences and causal factors in societal change, often drawing on ethnographic codings to quantify variables like , political organization, and technological advancement. The Human Relations Area Files (HRAF), established in 1949 at , serves as a primary resource, compiling indexed ethnographic and archaeological data from over 400 societies to facilitate statistical analyses of correlations, such as between subsistence strategies and hierarchy formation. Researchers using HRAF have applied Guttman scaling to detect universal evolutionary patterns, revealing progressive sequences in traits like preceding and across independent cases, though scalability varies by region due to environmental constraints. These methods address earlier unilinear assumptions by permitting multilinear trajectories, with findings indicating that ecological pressures, rather than alone, drive convergent adaptations in and inequality. Quantitative comparative analyses, including phylogenetic approaches adapted from , further refine these insights by reconstructing ancestral states and testing for correlated among cultural traits. For instance, studies of Austronesian societies demonstrate that matrilineal descent correlates with lower warfare frequency, suggesting adaptive responses to resource distribution rather than random variation. Such work highlights limitations in small-sample comparisons, emphasizing large-N designs to mitigate Galton's problem of non-independence, where spatial proximity inflates correlations; codings from HRAF mitigate this via probabilistic coding of trait distributions. Experimental studies complement comparative data by isolating mechanisms of cultural transmission and selection in controlled settings, revealing how individual shapes population-level . Transmission chain experiments, pioneered by in 1932 and extended to , involve sequential participants reproducing stimuli like stories or artifacts, uncovering biases such as —where individuals align with majority models—and content preferences for survival-related information, which persists across chains more than neutral variants. In one series of over 20 studies, participants favored transmitting threat-detecting cues, accelerating the fixation of adaptive norms in simulated populations. These experiments demonstrate cumulative cultural evolution, where innovations build incrementally via high-fidelity , contrasting with asocial learning in nonhumans; human chains show "ratcheting" effects, with complexity increasing over generations under , as evidenced in artifact fabrication tasks where exceeds 80% in chained vs. individual conditions. Field analogs, like economic games across 15 small-scale societies, test theory-of-mind and parochial , finding that market integration reduces ingroup favoritism, linking experimental outcomes to real evolutionary pressures on . While lab findings generalize cautiously due to WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) participant biases, replications in diverse samples affirm core mechanisms like prestige-biased transmission, where high-status models' traits spread faster.

Criticisms and Debates

Relativist and Postmodern Rejections

Cultural relativism emerged in early 20th-century anthropology as a direct counter to unilinear evolutionary theories, positing that cultures cannot be ranked on a progressive scale from "savagery" to "civilization" but must be understood as products of unique historical processes. , often credited with founding modern , criticized the assumptions of 19th-century evolutionists like Edward Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan, arguing that apparent cultural similarities arise from diffusion and independent invention rather than universal psychic unity driving parallel development. Boas's emphasized ethnographic depth over comparative generalization, rejecting the notion of invariant stages of sociocultural advancement as ethnocentric and empirically unsubstantiated. This approach influenced successors like and , who portrayed cultural patterns as integrated wholes incomparable across societies, thereby undermining evolutionary claims of adaptive superiority in complex institutions such as states or markets. Postmodern thinkers extended relativist skepticism by dismantling the epistemological foundations of evolutionary narratives, viewing them as hegemonic constructs masking power relations rather than objective descriptions of causal progress. , in his 1979 work , characterized postmodernity as an "incredulity toward metanarratives," including those of dialectical or evolutionary history that posit cumulative advancement toward or complexity. Such frameworks, Lyotard argued, legitimize knowledge through totalizing stories that privilege Western rationality, ignoring the fragmentation of language games and local knowledges. complemented this by analyzing sociocultural evolution as a entangled with and disciplinary mechanisms, where notions of progress serve to normalize and control rather than reflect verifiable adaptations. In anthropology, this manifested as a shift toward interpretive paradigms, exemplified by Clifford Geertz's "thick description," which prioritizes symbolic meanings over testable hypotheses about cultural transmission or selection pressures. These rejections coalesced in the mid-to-late , dominating academic discourse in and by the , often sidelining quantitative cross-cultural data in favor of deconstructive critiques. Relativists and postmodernists contended that evolutionary models impose anachronistic , conflating temporal sequence with normative hierarchy, and fail to account for contingency or resistance within traditions. However, proponents of sociocultural evolution have countered that such positions overlook convergent patterns, such as the repeated emergence of around 10,000 BCE in multiple regions or correlations between social scale and institutional innovation documented in datasets spanning thousands of societies. Despite empirical challenges, relativist and postmodern frameworks persist in influencing ethical stances on cultural preservation, framing interventions like as imperialistic impositions.

Determinism and Reductionism Critiques

Critiques of in sociocultural evolution emphasize the contingency, , and historical particularity of cultural change, rejecting unilinear models that posit inevitable stages of progress akin to biological phylogeny. Early evolutionary theorists like Edward Tylor and Lewis Henry Morgan advanced schemes implying directional laws, such as progression from savagery to , but these were challenged for extrapolating from limited ethnographic data without accounting for environmental variability or borrowing between societies. , in articles from the 1890s including "The Limitations of the of " (1896), argued that such frameworks relied on conjectural histories rather than verifiable sequences, advocating instead for where each follows a unique trajectory shaped by specific conditions rather than universal psychic unity or deterministic laws. This perspective gained traction amid empirical findings, such as the non-convergent developments in Polynesian societies documented by Boasian anthropologists, which contradicted expectations of across isolates. Durkheim's anti-reductionism further underscores limitations in deriving sociocultural evolution solely from individual-level or biological mechanisms, positing social facts as emergent properties with coercive power over actors. In The Rules of Sociological Method (1895), Durkheim defined social facts as external to individuals, exhibiting their own causal efficacy—such as collective representations influencing behavior independently of psychological states—and warned against psychologism or biologism that dissolves collective phenomena into aggregates. This stance critiques reductionist evolutionary accounts, like those in , for conflating genetic fitness with cultural persistence; for instance, attempts to explain rituals or norms via overlook how institutional structures, as in Durkheim's analysis of division of labor in The Division of Labor in Society (1893), generate through non-genetic feedbacks. Empirical support includes cross-cultural variations in rates, which Durkheim (1897) correlated with rather than innate drives, illustrating causality at the societal level irreducible to personal . Contemporary extensions of these critiques highlight how strict underestimates stochastic elements in cultural transmission, as evidenced by simulations showing in trait adoption under neutral models. faces scrutiny for neglecting multilevel ; while gene-culture models incorporate dual , critics argue they risk by subordinating cultural variants to genetic constraints without fully validating selective pressures on norms via historical data. Proponents of non-reductive counter that analogies to Darwinian processes preserve by treating cultural entities as partially autonomous, yet detractors, drawing on complexity theory, insist on irreducible macro-dynamics like network effects in idea propagation, as seen in the uneven of technologies across Eurasian routes despite genetic similarities. These debates persist, with empirical tests—such as phylogenetic reconstructions of Austronesian languages revealing reticulate rather than tree-like evolution—favoring critiques of overly deterministic or biologically reductive paradigms.

Conservative and Cyclical Alternatives

Conservative critiques of sociocultural evolution challenge the assumption of inexorable progress toward more complex or egalitarian societies, instead emphasizing the preservation of established hierarchies, traditions, and moral orders as bulwarks against decay. Thinkers like argued in 1790 that societies develop organically through gradual adaptation rather than deliberate evolutionary redesign, warning that abstract schemes of improvement—such as those inspired by Enlightenment —inevitably lead to disorder by severing ties to ancestral wisdom and proven institutions. This perspective prioritizes stability and incremental reform over transformative change, viewing as inherently flawed and prone to , which renders utopian progress illusory. Empirical observations of revolutionary upheavals, including the French Revolution's descent into terror by 1794, lend support to such views by illustrating how rapid "advances" can precipitate regression rather than elevation. Cyclical theories offer a structured alternative, positing that sociocultural systems recur through phases of growth, maturity, decline, and collapse or rebirth, akin to biological life cycles, rather than advancing linearly. , in The Decline of the West published between 1918 and 1922, rejected universal historical progress as a propagated by Enlightenment , instead modeling distinct high cultures—such as Classical, Magian, and Faustian (Western)—as autonomous organisms destined for inevitable after roughly 1,000–1,500 years. Spengler's morphology of history drew on patterns like the Roman Empire's transition from vibrant republican vitality to imperial ossification and fall by 476 CE, attributing decline to internal exhaustion of creative "" rather than external factors alone. Critics note Spengler's deterministic fatalism overlooks contingencies, yet his framework aligns with archaeological evidence of repeated civilizational collapses, such as the downfall around 1200 BCE affecting and Hittite . Pitirim Sorokin extended cyclical analysis to cultural dynamics in his four-volume Social and Cultural Dynamics (1937–1941), identifying oscillations between ideational phases dominated by faith, , and metaphysical truth-seeking; idealistic syntheses balancing the two; and sensate phases privileging sensory experience, , and material gain. Sorokin diagnosed mid-20th-century Western society as in a decadent sensate stage, evidenced by rising , , and institutional distrust—mirroring declines in ancient post-Pericles (circa 429 BCE) or late Republican —forecasting crisis unless shifting toward ideational renewal through and spiritual integration. Quantitative indicators, such as Sorokin's indices of cultural values from , , and spanning centuries, purportedly validated these swings, with sensate dominance correlating to metrics like increased focus on wealth and over 500 years preceding 1930. While Sorokin's typology has faced methodological critique for subjective , it underscores causal realism in how value shifts precipitate societal strains, as seen in contemporaneous on crime rates and family dissolution in interwar . These alternatives resonate with conservative emphases on recurring moral entropy, where unchecked or erodes the cohesive forces—, , —that sustain civilizations. Unlike linear models optimistic about via , cyclical and conservative frameworks highlight empirical regularities in , such as the 250-year average lifespan of empires documented in studies of 28 major powers from 600 BCE to 1800 CE, attributing longevity to virtuous and cultural fidelity rather than evolutionary inevitability. Such views caution against overreliance on progressive narratives, which academic sources often propagate amid institutional biases favoring , potentially understating the risks of civilizational overextension observed in metrics like unsustainable debt-to-GDP ratios exceeding 100% in modern declining phases.

Contemporary Applications and Implications

Modernization and Economic Development

posits that drives sociocultural evolution by transitioning societies from agrarian, traditional structures to industrial and post-industrial forms characterized by technological advancement, , and rational-legal institutions. This process, observed empirically since the in Europe around 1760, correlates with rising , increased rates from under 20% in pre-industrial societies to over 90% in developed nations by the , and shifts in toward and market economies. A revised formulation by and Christian Welzel integrates human development metrics, arguing that industrialization first fosters survival-oriented values emphasizing , followed by post-industrial phases promoting such as tolerance and participation, which underpin democratic institutions. data from over 100 countries spanning 1981 to 2020 demonstrate this sequence: nations with GDP per capita exceeding $10,000 annually exhibit higher emancipative values, correlating with rates rising from 20% of countries in 1900 to over 50% by 2000. These shifts reflect adaptive , where existential reduces reliance on , enabling and institutional trust. Max Weber's analysis links cultural factors to economic takeoff, attributing the 16th-17th century emergence of in Protestant regions to ascetic ethics promoting disciplined work and reinvestment over consumption, contrasting with Catholic emphases on ritual. Empirical studies confirm Protestant areas in and achieved higher industrialization rates by 1850, with GDP growth 1.5-2 times faster than Catholic counterparts, suggesting ideational preconditions amplify material incentives in evolutionary trajectories. The exemplifies modernization's biological-cultural interplay, as fertility rates decline from 5-6 children per woman in pre-transition societies to below 2 in developed ones, driven by and post-1800 in and later globally. This transition, completed in by the 1980s amid rapid GDP growth averaging 7-10% annually from 1960-1990, stabilizes populations and reallocates resources toward , fostering further sociocultural complexity.

Political Evolution and Warfare

In sociocultural evolution, the development of complex political structures, from chiefdoms to states and empires, has been strongly linked to intergroup warfare, which imposes selective pressures favoring centralization, hierarchy, and coercive institutions. Anthropologist Robert Carneiro's circumscription theory posits that in regions with environmental barriers—such as mountains, deserts, or seas—defeated groups cannot easily migrate, leading to conquest, subjugation, and the accumulation of power by victors, thereby birthing pristine states. This mechanism explains early state formations in circumscribed areas like the Nile Valley (circa 3100 BCE), Mesopotamian river basins (circa 3500 BCE), and Andean valleys, where archaeological records show intensified conflict, fortified settlements, and population concentrations preceding bureaucratic hierarchies. Empirical studies corroborate warfare's role in driving political centralization across diverse contexts. Cross-cultural analyses of pre-colonial societies reveal a positive correlation between warfare frequency and centralized authority, as conflicts necessitate resource mobilization, military specialization, and administrative control to sustain campaigns. In Europe, the "bellicist" model—articulated by Charles Tilly—demonstrates how sustained interstate warfare from the 15th to 19th centuries compelled rulers to extract taxes, build standing armies, and rationalize governance, transforming fragmented feudal polities into sovereign nation-states capable of fielding armies exceeding 100,000 troops by the Napoleonic era. Similarly, cliometric modeling by Peter Turchin, using historical databases spanning millennia, quantifies how warfare at metaethnic frontiers fosters "asabiya" (group solidarity), enabling imperial expansion—evident in cycles where polities like Rome (peaking at 5 million km² by 117 CE) or the Mongol Empire (24 million km² by 1279 CE) arose from frontier conflicts but later fragmented due to internal strains. Multilevel selection theory extends this evolutionary framework, viewing warfare as a mechanism selecting for societies with scalable cooperation and hierarchical control. Turchin's models predict that —where intra-elite competition erodes cohesion—precipitates civil wars, as seen in structural-demographic cycles: empires consolidate via external threats (e.g., unifying after Warring States warfare, 475–221 BCE) but decline when internal warfare rises, with data from 30 historical societies showing peak instability every 200–300 years. In non-circumscribed environments, such as open steppes, nomadic warfare favored decentralized confederations over states until technological asymmetries (e.g., ) tipped balances toward centralizers. Contemporary applications highlight warfare's ongoing influence on political evolution, though moderated by nuclear deterrence and global norms. Post-colonial in (post-1960) often mirrors historical patterns, with conflicts correlating to authoritarian consolidation, as fragmented ethnic polities centralize via amid resource scarcity. Turchin's models forecast heightened instability in overpopulated, unequal societies, evidenced by rising civil conflicts in the 21st century (e.g., 120+ armed conflicts globally in 2023 per Uppsala data), underscoring that without strong asabiya, modern states risk devolution into factional warfare rather than further evolution toward supranational entities. These dynamics affirm warfare not merely as a correlate but a causal driver of political , testable via big-data simulations integrating , demographics, and conflict records.

Technological and Global Influences

The , invented by around 1440, revolutionized sociocultural evolution by enabling mass production of texts, which boosted rates from under 10% in 15th-century to over 20% by the early and accelerated the dissemination of scientific, religious, and philosophical ideas. This technology facilitated the Protestant Reformation starting in 1517, as Martin Luther's 95 Theses reached wide audiences within weeks, undermining centralized authority and promoting interpretation of scripture, thereby shifting social norms toward personal agency and literacy-based hierarchies. The , commencing in Britain circa 1760, exemplified technology's capacity to restructure societal organization through and energy harnesses like steam engines, propelling GDP per capita growth from approximately £1,700 in 1700 to £3,200 by 1850 (in 2011 dollars) and catalyzing as rural populations migrated to factories. This era engendered novel social dynamics, including the rise of a capitalist and proletarian , with structures evolving from extended agrarian units to nuclear urban households amid longer work hours and child labor, though empirical records show initial rises in before sanitary reforms mitigated them. Such changes selected for societies adaptable to division of labor and market incentives, fostering over communal traditions. Global influences amplified by 19th- and 20th-century transport innovations, such as steamships and railroads operational by the , integrated distant economies via trade networks, diffusing technologies and cultural practices; for instance, European colonial expansion spread firearms and crops like , enhancing agricultural yields by up to 50% in adopting regions and altering systems through population displacements. Post-1945 and further globalized interactions, with volumes expanding 20-fold between 1950 and 2000, promoting hybrid cultures in migrant hubs while exposing peripheral societies to core technological paradigms. In the digital era, penetration—reaching 66% of the global population by 2023—has accelerated cultural transmission, with empirical analyses of data (1981–2022) revealing technology as a driver of convergence toward higher and self-expression values, particularly in nations with access exceeding 50%, as measured by shifts from to emancipative orientations. This convergence reflects causal selection pressures: technologies rewarding and personal propagate associated norms, though backlash manifests in ethnocentric revivals, as seen in rising support for traditionalism in surveys amid rapid .

Recent Advances

Cultural Group Selection Theories

Cultural group selection theories posit that cultural traits can evolve through differential success and persistence of human groups, where groups adopting adaptive cultural practices—such as norms promoting within-group or parochial —outcompete rival groups in acquisition, , or , leading to the proliferation of those traits via , migration, or . This process operates on cultural variation generated by individual learning, , and , transmitted non-genetically across generations, allowing for rapid adaptation at scales unattainable by genetic alone. Unlike genetic , cultural transmission mechanisms like conformist —where individuals preferentially adopt majority practices within successful groups—amplify group-level effects, potentially overcoming free-rider problems inherent in individual-level selection. Pioneering models by Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson, developed within dual-inheritance theory, demonstrate that requires limited intergroup migration, substantial between-group variation in cultural traits, and strong selective pressures from intergroup conflict or competition to favor pro-social norms. In their 1985 framework, proceeds via Darwinian processes applied to memetic units, but predominates when vertical and conformist transmission preserve adaptive complexes, as simulated in agent-based models showing fixation of traits in structured populations. Empirical tests by Soltis, Boyd, and Richerson in 1995 analyzed 19th-century highland warfare data, finding that cultural practices linked to group success, such as defensive alliances, spread inter-tribally at rates consistent with rather than individual , rejecting null models of random cultural drift. David Sloan Wilson extends these ideas through multilevel selection theory, arguing that human societies function as adaptive units where cultural norms enforce group-beneficial behaviors, such as altruism toward in-group members, via mechanisms like ostracism or moralistic punishment. Wilson's trait-group model, formalized in 1975 and applied culturally, posits that partitioning variance between and within groups enables selection to favor traits enhancing group fitness, supported by lab experiments with humans showing higher cooperation in competitively structured groups. In sociocultural contexts, this explains the evolution of large-scale institutions like moralizing religions, which emerged around 500 BCE in Eurasia, correlating with imperial expansions where adherent groups achieved demographic and territorial dominance. Proponents contend CGS accounts for ultra-sociality, including beyond kin in anonymous large groups, by resolving the of costly signaling in intergroup contests; for instance, cross-cultural surveys of 33 societies revealed prosocial behaviors aligning with historical group intensities, consistent with selection on cultural variants favoring and rule-following. However, models emphasize prerequisites like low within-group variance suppression through norm , as high migration or erodes group advantages, a pattern observed in simulations where evolves only under 1-5% migration rates between groups. These theories integrate with broader sociocultural evolution by viewing cultural complexes as heritable units under group-level fitness gradients, driving transitions from tribal to state-level societies through iterated selection cycles.

Empirical Insights from 21st-Century Data

Large-scale surveys like the (WVS), covering data from 1981 to 2022 across more than 100 countries, document shifts in cultural dimensions from survival-oriented to and from traditional to secular-rational orientations, correlating with rising and levels. However, 21st-century waves reveal increasing global divergence rather than convergence: , including tolerance for diversity and emphasis on personal autonomy, have advanced sharply in high-income Western and Protestant clusters but stagnated or reversed in regions like , , and Orthodox countries, with gaps widening by up to 2 standard deviations between 2000 and 2020. This pattern holds after controlling for , suggesting cultural inertia and endogenous feedbacks, such as fertility differentials where traditional-value societies maintain higher birth rates (e.g., 2.5-3.5 children per woman in versus below 1.5 in and by 2020). Genomic analyses from the , leveraging whole-genome sequencing and , uncover ongoing gene-culture coevolution, where cultural practices exert selection pressures on genetic . For example, polygenic scores for , derived from genome-wide association studies (GWAS) of millions of individuals since 2010, show recent positive selection in populations with cultural norms favoring prolonged and low , with frequencies shifting by 0.1-0.5 standard deviations in European-descent cohorts over the past 50 years. Similarly, linked to olfactory sensitivity have undergone relaxation of selection in agrarian societies due to cultural techniques, as evidenced by reduced purifying selection signals in post-Neolithic genomes compared to baselines. These findings integrate drift, migration, and cultural transmission into models, demonstrating that cultural fidelity can amplify genetic adaptation rates by factors of 10-100 relative to genetic-only . Big data from digital platforms and historical records enable quantitative tests of cultural transmission and . Analyses of over 100 million posts and web content from 2010-2020 reveal high-fidelity transmission of norms within echo chambers, with cultural variants (e.g., political ideologies) spreading via conformist at rates exceeding neutral drift by 5-20 times, supporting multilevel selection where cooperative norms correlate with group productivity gains of 10-15% in experimental and firm-level . experiments and meta-analyses of 50+ studies since 2000 confirm cultural group selection's role in , with parochial —preferential aid to in-group members—emerging under intergroup , explaining 20-30% variance in societal trust levels across nations. These empirical advances, facilitated by computational models bridging theory and , highlight causal pathways where cultural traits like rule-following predict economic outcomes, such as GDP growth differentials of 1-2% annually between high-trust and low-trust societies from 2000-2020.

Future Trajectories and Unresolved Questions

The application of the evolutionary transitions in individuality (ETI) framework to sociocultural evolution suggests potential for future major transitions, such as symbiosis between humans and , where inherited interactions could foster co-dependency and novel hierarchical levels of organization. Recent theories propose that is increasingly preempting genetic , enabling rapid group-level changes through shared practices like and legal systems, potentially evolving societies into "superorganisms" where collective cultural adaptability determines survival over individual genetic traits. Advances in quantitative , bolstered by computational modeling and large-scale datasets, are poised to refine predictions of cultural trajectories, including the impacts of social learning strategies on long-term societal equilibria. Unresolved questions persist regarding whether a distinct human ETI has occurred, is ongoing, or remains feasible, with skepticism arising from the persistence of individual-level selection amid cultural complexity. Key debates include the precise mechanisms of gene-culture coevolution, such as the prevalence of culture-led versus gene-led changes and the evolutionary timing of and large-scale . Theoretical challenges encompass inconsistent definitions of core concepts like "culture" and "cumulative culture," ambiguities in transmission mechanisms, and difficulties integrating cultural with biological , all of which complicate mathematical modeling and empirical validation. Further inquiries involve the drivers of cultural , including why emerged around 11,000 years ago and the relative roles of internal versus external processes in major societal shifts, necessitating enhanced paleoecological data and hypothesis-testing frameworks.

References

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