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Imperialism
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Imperialism is the maintaining and extending of power over foreign nations, particularly through expansionism, employing both hard power (military and economic power) and soft power (diplomatic power and cultural imperialism). Imperialism focuses on establishing or maintaining hegemony and a more formal empire.[2][3][4]
While related to the concept of colonialism, imperialism is a distinct concept that can apply to other forms of expansion and many forms of government.[5]
Etymology and usage
[edit]The word imperialism was derived from the Latin word imperium,[6] which means 'to command', 'to be sovereign', or simply 'to rule'.[7] It was coined in the 19th century to decry Napoleon III's despotic militarism and his attempts at obtaining political support through foreign military interventions.[8][9] The term became common in the current sense in Great Britain during the 1870s; by the 1880s it was used with a positive connotation.[10] By the end of the 19th century, the term was used to describe the behavior of empires at all times and places.[11] Hannah Arendt and Joseph Schumpeter defined imperialism as expansion for the sake of expansion.[12]
"Imperialism" was and is mainly used to refer to Western and Japanese political and economic dominance, especially in Asia and Africa, in the 19th and 20th centuries. Its precise meaning continues to be debated by scholars. Some writers, such as Edward Said, use the term more broadly to describe any system of domination and subordination organized around an imperial core and a periphery.[13] This definition encompasses both nominal empires and neocolonialism. Imperialism has also been identified in newer phenomena like space development and its governing context.[14]
Versus colonialism
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The term "imperialism" is often conflated with "colonialism"; however, many scholars have argued that each has its own distinct definition. Imperialism and colonialism have been used in order to describe one's influence upon a person or group of people. Robert Young writes that imperialism operates from the centre as a state policy and is developed for ideological as well as financial reasons, while colonialism is simply the development for settlement or commercial intentions; however, colonialism still includes invasion.[16] Colonialism in modern usage also tends to imply a degree of geographic separation between the colony and the imperial power. Particularly, Edward Said distinguishes between imperialism and colonialism by stating: "imperialism involved 'the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory', while colonialism refers to the 'implanting of settlements on a distant territory.'"[17] Contiguous land empires such as the Russian, Chinese or Ottoman have traditionally been excluded from discussions of colonialism, though this is beginning to change, since it is accepted that they also sent populations into the territories they ruled.[17]: 116
Imperialism and colonialism both dictate the political and economic advantage over a land and the indigenous populations they control, yet scholars sometimes find it difficult to illustrate the difference between the two.[18]: 107 Although imperialism and colonialism focus on the suppression of another, if colonialism refers to the process of a country taking physical control of another, imperialism refers to the political and monetary dominance, either formally or informally. Colonialism is seen to be the architect deciding how to start dominating areas and then imperialism can be seen as creating the idea behind conquest cooperating with colonialism. Colonialism is when the imperial nation begins a conquest over an area and then eventually is able to rule over the areas the previous nation had controlled. Colonialism's core meaning is the exploitation of the valuable assets and supplies of the nation that was conquered and the conquering nation then gaining the benefits from the spoils of the war.[18]: 170–75 The meaning of imperialism is to create an empire, by conquering the other state's lands and therefore increasing its own dominance. Colonialism is the builder and preserver of the colonial possessions in an area by a population coming from a foreign region.[18]: 173–76 Colonialism can completely change the existing social structure, physical structure, and economics of an area; it is not unusual that the characteristics of the conquering peoples are inherited by the conquered indigenous populations.[18]: 41
The Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin suggested that "imperialism was the highest form of capitalism", claiming that "imperialism developed after colonialism, and was distinguished from colonialism by monopoly capitalism".[17]: 116
Age of Imperialism
[edit]Imperialism has been present and prominent since the beginning of history,[19][20][21][22][23] and its most intensive phase occurred in the Axial Age.[24] But the concept of the Age of Imperialism refers to the period pre-dating World War I. While the end of the period is commonly fixed in 1914, the date of the beginning varies between 1760 and 1870.[25][26] The latter date makes the Age of Imperialism identical with the New Imperialism. According to Historians Daniel Hedinger and Nadin Heé, the widespread use of the term "Age of Empire" for this specific period reflects a Eurocentric bias in terms of time.[27]
The Age saw European nations, helped by industrialization, intensifying the process of colonizing, influencing, and annexing other parts of the world.[28] In the late 19th century, they were joined by the United States and Japan. Other 19th century episodes included the Scramble for Africa and Great Game.[29]
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In the 1970s British historians John Gallagher (1919–1980) and Ronald Robinson (1920–1999) argued that European leaders rejected the notion that "imperialism" required formal, legal control by one government over a colonial region. Much more important was informal control of independent areas.[30] According to Wm. Roger Louis, "In their view, historians have been mesmerized by formal empire and maps of the world with regions colored red. The bulk of British emigration, trade, and capital went to areas outside the formal British Empire. Key to their thinking is the idea of empire 'informally if possible and formally if necessary.'"[31] Oron Hale says that Gallagher and Robinson looked at the British involvement in Africa where they "found few capitalists, less capital, and not much pressure from the alleged traditional promoters of colonial expansion. Cabinet decisions to annex or not to annex were made, usually on the basis of political or geopolitical considerations."[32]: 6
Looking at the main empires from 1875 to 1914, there was a mixed record in terms of profitability. At first, planners expected that colonies would provide an excellent captive market for manufactured items. Apart from the Indian subcontinent, this was seldom true. By the 1890s, imperialists saw the economic benefit primarily in the production of inexpensive raw materials to feed the domestic manufacturing sector. Overall, Great Britain did very well in terms of profits from India, especially Mughal Bengal, but not from most of the rest of its empire. According to Indian Economist Utsa Patnaik, the scale of the wealth transfer out of India, between 1765 and 1938, was an estimated $45 Trillion.[33] The Netherlands did very well in the East Indies. Germany and Italy got very little trade or raw materials from their empires. France did slightly better. The Belgian Congo was notoriously profitable when it was a capitalistic rubber plantation owned and operated by King Leopold II as a private enterprise. However, scandal after scandal regarding atrocities in the Congo Free State led the international community to force the government of Belgium to take it over in 1908, and it became much less profitable. The Philippines cost the United States much more than expected because of military action against rebels.[32]: 7–10
Because of the resources made available by imperialism, the world's economy grew significantly and became much more interconnected in the decades before World War I, making the many imperial powers rich and prosperous.[34]
Europe's expansion into territorial imperialism was largely focused on economic growth by collecting resources from colonies, in combination with assuming political control by military and political means. The colonization of India in the mid-18th century offers an example of this focus: there, the "British exploited the political weakness of the Mughal state, and, while military activity was important at various times, the economic and administrative incorporation of local elites was also of crucial significance" for the establishment of control over the subcontinent's resources, markets, and manpower.[35] Although a substantial number of colonies had been designed to provide economic profit and to ship resources to home ports in the 17th and 18th centuries, D. K. Fieldhouse suggests that in the 19th and 20th centuries in places such as Africa and Asia, this idea is not necessarily valid:[36]
Modern empires were not artificially constructed economic machines. The second expansion of Europe was a complex historical process in which political, social and emotional forces in Europe and on the periphery were more influential than calculated imperialism. Individual colonies might serve an economic purpose; collectively no empire had any definable function, economic or otherwise. Empires represented only a particular phase in the ever-changing relationship of Europe with the rest of the world: analogies with industrial systems or investment in real estate were simply misleading.[18]: 184
During this time, European merchants had the ability to "roam the high seas and appropriate surpluses from around the world (sometimes peaceably, sometimes violently) and to concentrate them in Europe".[37]

European expansion greatly accelerated in the 19th century. To obtain raw materials, Europe expanded imports from other countries and from the colonies. European industrialists sought raw materials such as dyes, cotton, vegetable oils, and metal ores from overseas. Concurrently, industrialization was quickly making Europe the centre of manufacturing and economic growth, driving resource needs.[38]
Communication became much more advanced during European expansion. With the invention of railroads and telegraphs, it became easier to communicate with other countries and to extend the administrative control of a home nation over its colonies. Steam railroads and steam-driven ocean shipping made possible the fast, cheap transport of massive amounts of goods to and from colonies.[38]
Along with advancements in communication, Europe also continued to advance in military technology. European chemists made new explosives that made artillery much more deadly. By the 1880s, the machine gun had become a reliable battlefield weapon. This technology gave European armies an advantage over their opponents, as armies in less-developed countries were still fighting with arrows, swords, and leather shields (e.g. the Zulus in Southern Africa during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879).[38] Some exceptions of armies that managed to get nearly on par with the European expeditions and standards include the Ethiopian armies at the Battle of Adwa, and the Japanese Imperial Army of Japan, but these still relied heavily on weapons imported from Europe and often on European military advisors.

Theories of imperialism
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Anglophone academic studies often base their theories regarding imperialism on the British Empire. The term imperialism was originally introduced into English in its present sense in the late 1870s by opponents of the allegedly aggressive and ostentatious imperial policies of British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli.[40] Supporters of "imperialism" such as Joseph Chamberlain quickly appropriated the concept. For some, imperialism designated a policy of idealism and philanthropy; others alleged that it was characterized by political self-interest, and a growing number associated it with capitalist greed.
Historians and political theorists have long debated the correlation between capitalism, class, and imperialism. Much of the debate was pioneered by such theorists as John A. Hobson (1858–1940), Joseph Schumpeter (1883–1950), Thorstein Veblen (1857–1929), and Norman Angell (1872–1967). While these non-Marxist writers were at their most prolific before World War I, they remained active in the interwar years. Their combined work informed the study of imperialism and its impact on Europe, and contributed to reflections on the rise of the military-industrial complex in the United States from the 1950s.
In Imperialism: A Study (1902), Hobson developed a highly influential interpretation of imperialism that expanded on his belief that free-enterprise capitalism had a harmful effect on the majority of the population. In Imperialism, he argued that the financing of overseas empires drained money that was needed at home. It was invested abroad because lower wages paid to workers overseas made for higher profits and higher rates of return, compared to domestic wages. So, although domestic wages remained higher, they did not grow nearly as fast as they might otherwise have. Exporting capital, he concluded, put a lid on the growth of domestic wages and the domestic standard of living. Hobson theorized that domestic social reforms could cure the international disease of imperialism by removing its economic foundation, while state intervention through taxation could boost broader consumption, create wealth, and encourage a peaceful, tolerant, multipolar world order.[41][42]
European Marxists picked up Hobson's ideas incorporated them their own theory of imperialism, most notably in Vladimir Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916). Lenin portrayed imperialism as monopoly capitalism at the global stage, resulting in colonial expansion in order to secure capitalist economic growth and profits. Later Marxist theoreticians echo this conception of imperialism as a structural feature of capitalism, which explained the world wars as the battle between imperialists for control of external markets. Lenin's treatise became a standard textbook that flourished until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989–91.[43]

Some theoreticians on the non-Communist left have emphasized the structural or systemic character of "imperialism". Such writers have expanded the period associated with the term so that it now designates neither a policy, nor a short space of decades in the late 19th century, but a world system extending over a period of centuries, often going back to Colonization and, in some accounts, to the Crusades. As the application of the term has expanded, its meaning has shifted along five distinct but often parallel axes: the moral, the economic, the systemic, the cultural, and the temporal. Those changes reflect—among other shifts in sensibility—a growing unease, even great distaste, with the pervasiveness of such power, specifically, Western power.[44][45]
By the 1970s, historians such as David K. Fieldhouse,[45] David Landes, and Oron Hale[32]: 5–6 argued that the Hobsonian conception of imperialism was no longer supported. They advocated that modern imperialism was primarily a political product caused by the national mass hysteria rather than by the capitalists.[46][47] The British experience failed to support it.[clarification needed]
Walter Rodney, in his 1972 How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, proposes the idea that imperialism is a phase of capitalism "in which Western European capitalist countries, the US, and Japan established political, economic, military and cultural hegemony over other parts of the world which were initially at a lower level and therefore could not resist domination."[48] As a result, Imperialism "for many years embraced the whole world – one part being the exploiters and the other the exploited, one part being dominated and the other acting as overlords, one part making policy and the other being dependent."[48]
Justification and issues
[edit]Expansionism
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Imperialism was common in the form of expansionism through vassalage, irredentism, and conquest.[49]
Orientalism and imaginative geography
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Imperial control, territorial and cultural, is justified through discourses about the imperialists' understanding of different spaces.[50] Conceptually, imagined geographies explain the limitations of the imperialist understanding of the societies of the different spaces inhabited by the non–European Other.[50]
In Orientalism (1978), Edward Said said that the West developed the concept of The Orient—an imagined geography of the Eastern world—which functions as an essentializing discourse that represents neither the ethnic diversity nor the social reality of the Eastern world.[51] That by reducing the East into cultural essences, the imperial discourse uses place-based identities to create cultural difference and psychologic distance between "We, the West" and "They, the East" and between "Here, in the West" and "There, in the East".[52]
That cultural differentiation was especially noticeable in the books and paintings of early Oriental studies, the European examinations of the Orient, which misrepresented the East as irrational and backward, the opposite of the rational and progressive West.[50][53] Defining the East as a negative vision of the Western world, as its inferior, not only increased the sense-of-self of the West, but also was a way of ordering the East, and making it known to the West, so that it could be dominated and controlled.[54][55] Therefore, Orientalism was the ideological justification of early Western imperialism—a body of knowledge and ideas that rationalized social, cultural, political, and economic control of other, non-white peoples.[52][17]: 116
Cartography
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One of the main tools used by imperialists was cartography. Cartography is "the art, science and technology of making maps"[56] but this definition is problematic. It implies that maps are objective representations of the world when in reality they serve very political means.[56] For Harley, maps serve as an example of Foucault's power and knowledge concept.
To better illustrate this idea, Bassett focuses his analysis of the role of 19th-century maps during the "Scramble for Africa".[57] He states that maps "contributed to empire by promoting, assisting, and legitimizing the extension of French and British power into West Africa".[57] During his analysis of 19th-century cartographic techniques, he highlights the use of blank space to denote unknown or unexplored territory.[57] This provided incentives for imperial and colonial powers to obtain "information to fill in blank spaces on contemporary maps".[57]
Although cartographic processes advanced through imperialism, further analysis of their progress reveals many biases linked to eurocentrism. According to Bassett, "[n]ineteenth-century explorers commonly requested Africans to sketch maps of unknown areas on the ground. Many of those maps were highly regarded for their accuracy"[57] but were not printed in Europe unless Europeans verified them.
Cultural imperialism
[edit]The concept of cultural imperialism refers to the cultural influence of one dominant culture over others, i.e. a form of soft power, which changes the moral, cultural, and societal worldview of the subordinate culture. This means more than just "foreign" music, television or film becoming popular with young people; rather that a populace changes its own expectations of life, desiring for their own country to become more like the foreign country depicted. For example, depictions of opulent American lifestyles in the soap opera Dallas during the Cold War changed the expectations of Romanians; a more recent example is the influence of smuggled South Korean drama-series in North Korea. The importance of soft power is not lost on authoritarian regimes, which may oppose such influence with bans on foreign popular culture, control of the internet and of unauthorized satellite dishes, etc. Nor is such a usage of culture recent – as part of Roman imperialism, local elites would be exposed to the benefits and luxuries of Roman culture and lifestyle, with the aim that they would then become willing participants.
Imperialism has been subject to moral or immoral censure by its critics[which?], and thus the term "imperialism" is frequently used in international propaganda as a pejorative for expansionist and aggressive foreign policy.[58]
Religious imperialism
[edit]Aspects of imperialism motivated by religious supremacism can be described as religious imperialism.[59]
Psychological imperialism
[edit]An empire mentality may build on and bolster views contrasting "primitive" and "advanced" peoples and cultures, thus justifying and encouraging imperialist practices among participants.[60] Associated psychological tropes include the White Man's Burden and the idea of civilizing mission (French: mission civilatrice).
Social imperialism
[edit]The political concept social imperialism is a Marxist expression first used in the early 20th century by Lenin as "socialist in words, imperialist in deeds" describing the Fabian Society and other socialist organizations.[61] Later, in a split with the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong criticized its leaders as social imperialists.[62]
Social Darwinism
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Stephen Howe has summarized his view on the beneficial effects of the colonial empires:
At least some of the great modern empires—the British, French, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and even the Ottoman—have virtues that have been too readily forgotten. They provided stability, security, and legal order for their subjects. They constrained, and at their best, tried to transcend, the potentially savage ethnic or religious antagonisms among the peoples. And the aristocracies which ruled most of them were often far more liberal, humane, and cosmopolitan than their supposedly ever more democratic successors.[63][64]
A controversial aspect of imperialism is the defense and justification of empire-building based on seemingly rational grounds. In ancient China, Tianxia denoted the lands, space, and area divinely appointed to the Emperor by universal and well-defined principles of order. The center of this land was directly apportioned to the Imperial court, forming the center of a world view that centered on the Imperial court and went concentrically outward to major and minor officials and then the common citizens, tributary states, and finally ending with the fringe "barbarians". Tianxia's idea of hierarchy gave Chinese a privileged position and was justified through the promise of order and peace.
The purportedly scientific nature of "Social Darwinism" and a theory of races formed a supposedly rational justification for imperialism. Under this doctrine, the French politician Jules Ferry could declare in 1883 that "Superior races have a right, because they have a duty. They have the duty to civilize the inferior races."[65] J. A. Hobson identifies this justification on general grounds as: "It is desirable that the earth should be peopled, governed, and developed, as far as possible, by the races which can do this work best, i.e. by the races of highest 'social efficiency'".[66] The Royal Geographical Society of London and other geographical societies in Europe had great influence and were able to fund travelers who would come back with tales of their discoveries. These societies also served as a space for travellers to share these stories.[17]: 117 Political geographers such as Friedrich Ratzel of Germany and Halford Mackinder of Britain also supported imperialism.[17]: 117 Ratzel believed expansion was necessary for a state's survival and this argument dominated the discipline of geopolitics for decades.[17]: 117 British imperialism in some sparsely-inhabited regions applied a principle now termed Terra nullius (Latin expression which stems from Roman law meaning 'no man's land'). The British settlement in Australia in the 18th century was arguably premised on terra nullius, as its settlers considered it unused by its original inhabitants. The rhetoric of colonizers being racially superior appears still to have its impact. For example, throughout Latin America "whiteness" is still prized today and various forms of blanqueamiento (whitening) are common.
Imperial peripheries benefited from economic efficiency improved through the building of roads, other infrastructure and introduction of new technologies. Herbert Lüthy notes that ex-colonial peoples themselves show no desire to undo the basic effects of this process. Hence moral self-criticism in respect of the colonial past is out of place.[67]
Environmental determinism
[edit]The concept of environmental determinism served as a moral justification for the domination of certain territories and peoples. The environmental determinist school of thought held that the environment in which certain people lived determined those persons' behaviours; and thus validated their domination. Some geographic scholars under colonizing empires divided the world into climatic zones. These scholars believed that Northern Europe and the Mid-Atlantic temperate climate produced a hard-working, moral, and upstanding human being. In contrast, tropical climates allegedly yielded lazy attitudes, sexual promiscuity, exotic culture, and moral degeneracy. The tropical peoples were believed to be "less civilized" and in need of European guidance,[17]: 117 therefore justifying colonial control as a civilizing mission. For instance, American geographer Ellen Churchill Semple argued that even though human beings originated in the tropics they were only able to become fully human in the temperate zone.[68]: 11 Across the three major waves of European colonialism (the first in the Americas, the second in Asia and the last in Africa), environmental determinism served to place categorically indigenous people in a racial hierarchy. Tropicality can be paralleled with Edward Said's Orientalism as the west's construction of the east as the "other".[68]: 7 According to Said, orientalism allowed Europe to establish itself as the superior and the norm, which justified its dominance over the essentialized Orient.[69]: 329 Orientalism is a view of a people based on their geographical location.[70]
By empire
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Belgian
[edit]British
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England
[edit]England's imperialist ambitions can be seen as early as the 16th century as the Tudor conquest of Ireland began in the 1530s. In 1599 the British East India Company was established and was chartered by Queen Elizabeth in the following year.[18]: 174 With the establishment of trading posts in India, the British were able to maintain strength relative to other empires such as the Portuguese who already had set up trading posts in India.[18]: 174
Scotland
[edit]Between 1621 and 1699, the Kingdom of Scotland authorised several colonies in the Americas. Most of these colonies were either closed down or collapsed quickly for various reasons.
United Kingdom
[edit]Under the Acts of Union 1707, the English and Scottish kingdoms were merged, and their colonies collectively became subject to Great Britain (also known as the United Kingdom). The empire Great Britain would go on to found was the largest empire that the world has ever seen both in terms of landmass and population. Its power, both military and economic, remained unmatched for a few decades.
In 1767, the Anglo-Mysore Wars and other political activity caused exploitation of the East India Company causing the plundering of the local economy, almost bringing the company into bankruptcy.[71] By the year 1670 Britain's imperialist ambitions were well off as she had colonies in Virginia, Massachusetts, Bermuda, Honduras, Antigua, Barbados, Jamaica and Nova Scotia.[71] Due to the vast imperialist ambitions of European countries, Britain had several clashes with France. This competition was evident in the colonization of what is now known as Canada. John Cabot claimed Newfoundland for the British while the French established colonies along the St. Lawrence River and claiming it as "New France".[72] Britain continued to expand by colonizing countries such as New Zealand and Australia, both of which were not empty land as they had their own locals and cultures.[18]: 175 Britain's nationalistic movements were evident with the creation of the commonwealth countries where there was a shared nature of national identity.[18]: 147
Following the proto-industrialization, the "First" British Empire was based on mercantilism, and involved colonies and holdings primarily in North America, the Caribbean, and India. Its growth was reversed by the loss of the American colonies in 1776. Britain made compensating gains in India, Australia, and in constructing an informal economic empire through control of trade and finance in Latin America after the independence of Spanish and Portuguese colonies in about 1820.[73] By the 1840s, the United Kingdom had adopted a highly successful policy of free trade that gave it dominance in the trade of much of the world.[74] After losing its first Empire to the Americans, Britain then turned its attention towards Asia, Africa, and the Pacific. Following the defeat of Napoleonic France in 1815, the United Kingdom enjoyed a century of almost unchallenged dominance and expanded its imperial holdings around the globe. Unchallenged at sea, British dominance was later described as Pax Britannica ("British Peace"), a period of relative peace in Europe and the world (1815–1914) during which the British Empire became the global hegemon and adopted the role of global policeman. However, this peace was mostly a perceived one from Europe, and the period was still an almost uninterrupted series of colonial wars and disputes. The British Conquest of India, its intervention against Mehemet Ali, the Anglo-Burmese Wars, the Crimean War, the Opium Wars and the Scramble for Africa to name the most notable conflicts mobilised ample military means to press Britain's lead in the global conquest Europe led across the century.[75][76][77][78]
In the early 19th century, the Industrial Revolution began to transform Britain; by the time of the Great Exhibition in 1851 the country was described as the "workshop of the world".[79] The British Empire expanded to include India, large parts of Africa and many other territories throughout the world. Alongside the formal control it exerted over its own colonies, British dominance of much of world trade meant that it effectively controlled the economies of many regions, such as Asia and Latin America.[80][81] Domestically, political attitudes favoured free trade and laissez-faire policies and a gradual widening of the voting franchise. During this century, the population increased at a dramatic rate, accompanied by rapid urbanisation, causing significant social and economic stresses.[82] To seek new markets and sources of raw materials, the Conservative Party under Disraeli launched a period of imperialist expansion in Egypt, South Africa, and elsewhere. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand became self-governing dominions.[83][84]

A resurgence came in the late 19th century with the Scramble for Africa and major additions in Asia and the Middle East. The British spirit of imperialism was expressed by Joseph Chamberlain and Lord Rosebury, and implemented in Africa by Cecil Rhodes. The pseudo-sciences of Social Darwinism and theories of race formed an ideological underpinning and legitimation during this time. Other influential spokesmen included Lord Cromer, Lord Curzon, General Kitchener, Lord Milner, and the writer Rudyard Kipling.[85] After the First Boer War, the South African Republic and Orange Free State were recognised by the United Kingdom but eventually re-annexed after the Second Boer War. But British power was fading, as the reunited German state founded by the Kingdom of Prussia posed a growing threat to Britain's dominance. As of 1913, the United Kingdom was the world's fourth economy, behind the U.S., Russia and Germany.
Irish War of Independence in 1919–1921 led to the сreation of the Irish Free State. But the United Kingdom gained control of former German and Ottoman colonies with the League of Nations mandate. The United Kingdom now had a practically continuous line of controlled territories from Egypt to Burma and another one from Cairo to Cape Town. However, this period was also one of emergence of independence movements based on nationalism and new experiences the colonists had gained in the war.
World War II decisively weakened Britain's position in the world, especially financially. Decolonization movements arose nearly everywhere in the Empire, resulting in Indian independence and partition in 1947, the self-governing dominions break away from the empire in 1949, and the establishment of independent states in the 1950s. British imperialism showed its frailty in Egypt during the Suez Crisis in 1956. However, with the United States and Soviet Union emerging from World War II as the sole superpowers, Britain's role as a worldwide power declined significantly and rapidly.[86]
Caliphate
[edit]The Early Muslim conquests and the pan-islamic Caliphate have been described as religious imperialism motivated by Islamic supremacism.[59][87]
Canada
[edit]In Canada, the "imperialism" (and the related term "colonialism") has had a variety of contradictory meanings since the 19th century. In the late 19th and early 20th, to be an "imperialist" meant thinking of Canada as a part of the British nation not a separate nation.[88] The older words for the same concepts were "loyalism" or "unionism", which continued to be used as well. In mid-twentieth century Canada, the words "imperialism" and "colonialism" were used in English Canadian discourse to instead portray Canada as a victim of economic and cultural penetration by the United States.[89] In twentieth century French-Canadian discourse the "imperialists" were all the Anglo-Saxon countries including Canada who were oppressing French-speakers and the province of Quebec. By the early 21st century, "colonialism" was used to highlight supposed anti-indigenous attitudes and actions of Canada inherited from the British period.
China
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China was home to some of the world's oldest empires. Due to its long history of imperialist expansion, China has been seen by its neighboring countries as a threat due to its large population, giant economy, large military force as well as its territorial evolution throughout history. Starting with the unification of China under the Qin dynasty, later Chinese dynasties continued to follow its form of expansions.[90]
The most successful Chinese imperial dynasties in terms of territorial expansion were the Han, Tang, Yuan, and Qing dynasties.
Denmark
[edit]Denmark–Norway (Denmark after 1814) possessed overseas colonies from 1536 until 1953. At its apex there were colonies on four continents: Europe, North America, Africa and Asia. In the 17th century, following territorial losses on the Scandinavian Peninsula, Denmark-Norway began to develop colonies, forts, and trading posts in West Africa, the Caribbean, and the Indian subcontinent. Christian IV first initiated the policy of expanding Denmark-Norway's overseas trade, as part of the mercantilist wave that was sweeping Europe. Denmark-Norway's first colony was established at Tranquebar on India's southern coast in 1620. Admiral Ove Gjedde led the expedition that established the colony. After 1814, when Norway was ceded to Sweden, Denmark retained what remained of Norway's great medieval colonial holdings. One by one the smaller colonies were lost or sold. Tranquebar was sold to the British in 1845. The United States purchased the Danish West Indies in 1917. Iceland became independent in 1944. Today, the only remaining vestiges are two originally Norwegian colonies that are currently within the Danish Realm, the Faroe Islands and Greenland; the Faroes were a Danish county until 1948, while Greenland's colonial status ceased in 1953. They are now autonomous territories.[91]
Dutch
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The most notable example of Dutch imperialism is regarding Indonesia.
Egypt
[edit]France
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During the 16th century, the French colonization of the Americas began with the creation of New France. It was followed by French East India Company's trading posts in Africa and Asia in the 17th century. France had its "First colonial empire" from 1534 until 1814, including New France (Canada, Acadia, Newfoundland and Louisiana), French West Indies (Saint-Domingue, Guadeloupe, Martinique), French Guiana, Senegal (Gorée), Mascarene Islands (Mauritius Island, Réunion) and French India.
Its "Second colonial empire" began with the seizure of Algiers in 1830 and came for the most part to an end with the granting of independence to Algeria in 1962.[94] The French imperial history was marked by numerous wars, large and small, and also by significant help to France itself from the colonials in the world wars.[95] France took control of Algeria in 1830 but began in earnest to rebuild its worldwide empire after 1850, concentrating chiefly in North and West Africa (French North Africa, French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa), as well as South-East Asia (French Indochina), with other conquests in the South Pacific (New Caledonia, French Polynesia). France also twice attempted to make Mexico a colony in 1838–39 and in 1861–67 (see Pastry War and Second French intervention in Mexico).

French Republicans, at first hostile to empire, only became supportive when Germany started to build her own colonial empire. As it developed, the new empire took on roles of trade with France, supplying raw materials and purchasing manufactured items, as well as lending prestige to the motherland and spreading French civilization and language as well as Catholicism. It also provided crucial manpower in both World Wars.[96] It became a moral justification to lift the world up to French standards by bringing Christianity and French culture. In 1884 the leading exponent of colonialism, Jules Ferry declared France had a civilising mission: "The higher races have a right over the lower races, they have a duty to civilize the inferior".[97] Full citizenship rights – assimilation – were offered, although in reality assimilation was always on the distant horizon.[98] Contrasting from Britain, France sent small numbers of settlers to its colonies, with the only notable exception of Algeria, where French settlers nevertheless always remained a small minority.
The French colonial empire of extended over 11,500,000 km2 (4,400,000 sq mi) at its height in the 1920s and had a population of 110 million people on the eve of World War II.[99][100]
In World War II, Charles de Gaulle and the Free French used the overseas colonies as bases from which they fought to liberate France. However, after 1945 anti-colonial movements began to challenge the Empire. France fought and lost a bitter war in Vietnam in the 1950s. Whereas they won the war in Algeria, de Gaulle decided to grant Algeria independence anyway in 1962. French settlers and many local supporters relocated to France. Nearly all of France's colonies gained independence by 1960, but France retained significant financial and diplomatic influence. It has repeatedly sent troops to assist its former colonies in Africa in suppressing insurrections and coups d'état.[101]
Education policy
[edit]French colonial officials, influenced by the revolutionary ideal of equality, standardized schools, curricula, and teaching methods as much as possible. They did not establish colonial school systems with the idea of furthering the ambitions of the local people, but rather simply exported the systems and methods in vogue in the mother nation.[102] Having a moderately trained lower bureaucracy was of great use to colonial officials.[103] The emerging French-educated indigenous elite saw little value in educating rural peoples.[104] After 1946 the policy was to bring the best students to Paris for advanced training. The result was to immerse the next generation of leaders in the growing anti-colonial diaspora centered in Paris. Impressionistic colonials could mingle with studious scholars or radical revolutionaries or so everything in between. Ho Chi Minh and other young radicals in Paris formed the French Communist party in 1920.[105]
Tunisia was exceptional. The colony was administered by Paul Cambon, who built an educational system for colonists and indigenous people alike that was closely modeled on mainland France. He emphasized female and vocational education. By independence, the quality of Tunisian education nearly equalled that in France.[106]
African nationalists rejected such a public education system, which they perceived as an attempt to retard African development and maintain colonial superiority. One of the first demands of the emerging nationalist movement after World War II was the introduction of full metropolitan-style education in French West Africa with its promise of equality with Europeans.[107][108]
In Algeria, the debate was polarized. The French set up schools based on the scientific method and French culture. The Pied-Noir (Catholic migrants from Europe) welcomed this. Those goals were rejected by the Moslem Arabs, who prized mental agility and their distinctive religious tradition. The Arabs refused to become patriotic and cultured Frenchmen and a unified educational system was impossible until the Pied-Noir and their Arab allies went into exile after 1962.[109]
In South Vietnam from 1955 to 1975 there were two competing powers in education, as the French continued their work and the Americans moved in. They sharply disagreed on goals. The French educators sought to preserving French culture among the Vietnamese elites and relied on the Mission Culturelle – the heir of the colonial Direction of Education – and its prestigious high schools. The Americans looked at the great mass of people and sought to make South Vietnam a nation strong enough to stop communism. The Americans had far more money, as USAID coordinated and funded the activities of expert teams, and particularly of academic missions. The French deeply resented the American invasion of their historical zone of cultural imperialism.[110]
Germany
[edit]German expansion into Slavic lands begins in the 12th–13th-century (see Drang Nach Osten). The concept of Drang Nach Osten was a core element of German nationalism and a major element of Nazi ideology. However, the German involvement in the seizure of overseas territories was negligible until the end of the 19th century. Prussia unified the other states into the second German Empire in 1871. Its Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck (1862–90), long opposed colonial acquisitions, arguing that the burden of obtaining, maintaining, and defending such possessions would outweigh any potential benefits. He felt that colonies did not pay for themselves, that the German bureaucratic system would not work well in the tropics and the diplomatic disputes over colonies would distract Germany from its central interest, Europe itself.[112]
However, public opinion and elite opinion in Germany demanded colonies for reasons of international prestige, so Bismarck was forced to oblige. In 1883–84 Germany began to build a colonial empire in Africa and the South Pacific.[113][114] The establishment of the German colonial empire started with German New Guinea in 1884.[115] Within 25 years, German South West Africa had committed the Herero and Namaqua genocide in modern-day Namibia, the first genocide of the 20th century.
German colonies included the present territories of in Africa: Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, Namibia, Cameroon, Ghana and Togo; in Oceania: New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Marshall Islands, Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands and Samoa; and in Asia: Qingdao, Yantai and the Jiaozhou Bay. The Treaty of Versailles made them mandates under the control the Allied victors.[116] Germany also lost the portions of its Eastern territories that had Polish majorities to independent Poland as a result of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The Eastern territories inhabited by a German majority since the Middle Ages were torn from Germany and became part of both Poland and the USSR as a result of the territorial reorganization established by the Potsdam Conference of the Allied powers in 1945.
Inca
[edit]Italy
[edit]The Italian Empire (Impero italiano) comprised the overseas possessions of the Kingdom of Italy primarily in northeast Africa. It began with the purchase in 1869 of Assab Bay on the Red Sea by an Italian navigation company which intended to establish a coaling station at the time the Suez Canal was being opened to navigation.[120] This was taken over by the Italian government in 1882, becoming modern Italy's first overseas territory.[121] By the start of the First World War in 1914, Italy had acquired in Africa the colony of Eritrea on the Red Sea coast, a large protectorate and later colony in Somalia, and authority in formerly Ottoman Tripolitania and Cyrenaica (gained after the Italo-Turkish War) which were later unified in the colony of Libya.
Outside Africa, Italy possessed the Dodecanese Islands off the coast of Turkey (following the Italo-Turkish War) and a small concession in Tianjin in China following the Boxer War of 1900. During the First World War, Italy occupied southern Albania to prevent it from falling to Austria-Hungary. In 1917, it established a protectorate over Albania, which remained in place until 1920.[122] The Fascist government that came to power with Benito Mussolini in 1922 sought to increase the size of the Italian empire and to satisfy the claims of Italian irredentists.
After its second invasion of Ethiopia in 1936, Italy occupied Ethiopia until 1941. In 1939, Italy invaded Albania and incorporated it into the Fascist state. During the Second World War (1939–1945), Italy occupied British Somaliland, parts of south-eastern France, western Egypt and most of Greece, but then lost those conquests and its African colonies, including Ethiopia, to the invading allied forces by 1943. It was forced in the peace treaty of 1947 to relinquish sovereignty over all its colonies. It was granted a trust to administer former Italian Somaliland under United Nations supervision in 1950. When Somalia became independent in 1960, Italy's eight-decade experiment with colonialism ended.[123][124][page needed]
Japan
[edit]

For over 200 years, Japan maintained a feudal society during a period of relative isolation from the rest of the world. However, in the 1850s, military pressure from the United States and other world powers coerced Japan to open itself to the global market, resulting in an end to the country's isolation. A period of conflicts and political revolutions followed due to socioeconomic uncertainty, ending in 1868 with the reunification of political power under the Japanese Emperor during the Meiji Restoration. This sparked a period of rapid industrialization driven in part by a Japanese desire for self-sufficiency. By the early 1900s, Japan was a naval power that could hold its own against an established European power as it defeated Russia.[125]
Despite its rising population and increasingly industrialized economy, Japan lacked significant natural resources. As a result, the country turned to imperialism and expansionism in part as a means of compensating for these shortcomings, adopting the national motto "Fukoku kyōhei" (富国強兵, "Enrich the state, strengthen the military").[126]
And Japan was eager to take every opportunity. In 1869 they took advantage of the defeat of the rebels of the Republic of Ezo to formally incorporate the island of Hokkaido into the Japanese Empire. For centuries, Japan viewed the Ryukyu Islands as one of its provinces. In 1871 the Mudan incident happened: Taiwanese aborigines murdered 54 Ryūkyūan sailors that became shipwrecked. At that time the Ryukyu Islands were claimed by both Qing China and Japan, and the Japanese interpreted the incident as an attack on their citizens. They took steps to bring the islands in their jurisdiction: in 1872 the Japanese Ryukyu Domain was declared, and in 1874 a retaliatory incursion to Taiwan was sent, which was a success. The success of this expedition emboldened the Japanese: not even the Americans could defeat the Taiwanese in the Formosa Expedition of 1867. Very few gave it much thought at the time, but this was the first move in the Japanese expansionism series. Japan occupied Taiwan for the rest of 1874 and then left owing to Chinese pressures, but in 1879 it finally annexed the Ryukyu Islands. In 1875 Qing China sent a 300-men force to subdue the Taiwanese, but unlike the Japanese the Chinese were routed, ambushed and 250 of their men were killed; the failure of this expedition exposed once more the failure of Qing China to exert effective control in Taiwan, and acted as another incentive for the Japanese to annex Taiwan. Eventually, the spoils for winning the First Sino-Japanese War in 1894 included Taiwan.[127]
In 1875 Japan took its first operation against Joseon Korea, another territory that for centuries it coveted; the Ganghwa Island incident made Korea open to international trade. Korea was annexed in 1910. As a result of winning the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan took part of Sakhalin Island from Russia. Precisely, the victory against the Russian Empire shook the world: never before had an Asian nation defeated a European power[dubious – discuss], and in Japan it was seen as a feat. Japan's victory against Russia would act as an antecedent for Asian countries in the fight against the Western powers for Decolonization. During World War I, Japan took German-leased territories in China's Shandong Province, as well as the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, and kept the islands as League of nations mandates. At first, Japan was in good standing with the victorious Allied powers of World War I, but different discrepancies and dissatisfaction with the rewards of the treaties cooled the relations with them, for example American pressure forced it to return the Shandong area. By the '30s, economic depression, urgency of resources and a growing distrust in the Allied powers made Japan lean to a hardened militaristic stance. Through the decade, it would grow closer to Germany and Italy, forming together the Axis alliance. In 1931 Japan took Manchuria from China. International reactions condemned this move, but Japan's already strong skepticism against Allied nations meant that it nevertheless carried on.[128]

During the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan's military invaded central China. Also, in 1938–1939 Japan made an attempt to seize the territory of Soviet Russia and Mongolia, but suffered a serious defeats (see Battle of Lake Khasan, Battles of Khalkhin Gol). By now, relations with the Allied powers were at the bottom, and an international boycott against Japan to deprive it of natural resources was enforced. A military move to gain access to them was deemed necessary, and so Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, bringing the United States to World War II. Using its superior technological advances in naval aviation and its modern doctrines of amphibious and naval warfare, Japan achieved one of the fastest maritime expansions in history. By 1942 Japan had conquered much of East Asia and the Pacific, including the east of China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Burma (Myanmar), Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, part of New Guinea and many islands of the Pacific Ocean. Just as Japan's late industrialization success and victory against the Russian Empire was seen as an example among underdeveloped Asia-Pacific nations, the Japanese took advantage of this and promoted among its conquered the goal to jointly create an anti-European "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". This plan helped the Japanese gain support from native populations during its conquests[citation needed] especially in Indonesia.[citation needed] However, the United States had a vastly stronger military and industrial base and defeated Japan, stripping it of conquests and returning its settlers back to Japan.[129]
Mongol
[edit]Mughal
[edit]Nomadic empires
[edit]
Ottoman
[edit]
The Ottoman Empire was an imperial state that lasted from 1299 to 1922. In 1453, Mehmed the Conqueror captured Constantinople and made it his capital. During the 16th and 17th centuries, in particular at the height of its power under the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire was a powerful multinational, multilingual empire, which invaded and colonized much of Southeast Europe, Western Asia, the Caucasus, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa. Its repeated invasions, and brutal treatment of Slavs led to the Great Migrations of the Serbs to escape persecution. At the beginning of the 17th century the empire contained 32 provinces and numerous vassal states. Some of these were later absorbed into the empire, while others were granted various types of autonomy during the course of centuries.[133]
Following a long period of military setbacks against European powers, the Ottoman Empire gradually declined, losing control of much of its territory in Europe and Africa.
By 1810 Egypt was effectively independent. In 1821–1829 the Greeks in the Greek War of Independence were assisted by Russia, Britain and France. In 1815 to 1914 the Ottoman Empire could exist only in the conditions of acute rivalry of the great powers, with Britain its main supporter, especially in the Crimean War 1853–1856, against Russia. After Ottoman defeat in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878), Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro gained independence and Britain took colonial control of Cyprus, while Bosnia and Herzegovina were occupied and annexed by Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1908.
The empire allied with Germany in World War I, aiming to recover lost territories, but dissolved following its decisive defeat. The Turkish national movement, supported by Soviet Russia, achieved victory in the course of the Turkish War of Independence, and the parties signed and ratified the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and 1924. The Republic of Turkey was established.[134]
Persia
[edit]Portugal
[edit]
Rome
[edit]
The Roman Empire was the post-Republican period of ancient Rome. As a polity, it included large territorial holdings around the Mediterranean Sea in Europe, North Africa, and Western Asia, ruled by emperors.
Russia
[edit]Russian Empire
[edit]
By the 18th century, the Russian Empire extended its control to the Pacific, peacefully forming a common border with the Qing Empire and Empire of Japan. This took place in a large number of military invasions of the lands east, west, and south of it. The Polish–Russian War of 1792 took place after Polish nobility from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth wrote the Constitution of 3 May 1791. The war resulted in eastern Poland being conquered by Imperial Russia as a colony until 1918. The southern campaigns involved a series of Russo-Persian Wars, which began with the Persian Expedition of 1796, resulting in the acquisition of Georgia as a protectorate. Between 1800 and 1864, Imperial armies invaded south in the Russian conquest of the Caucasus, the Murid War, and the Russo-Circassian War. This last conflict led to the ethnic cleansing of Circassians from their lands. The Russian conquest of Siberia over the Khanate of Sibir took place in the 16th and 17th centuries, and resulted in the slaughter of various indigenous tribes by Russians, including the Daur, the Koryaks, the Itelmens, Mansi people and the Chukchi. The Russian colonization of Central and Eastern Europe and Siberia and treatment of the resident indigenous peoples has been compared to European colonization of the Americas, with similar negative impacts on the indigenous Siberians as upon the indigenous peoples of the Americas. The extermination of indigenous Siberian tribes was so complete that a relatively small population of only 180,000 are said to exist today. The Russian Empire exploited and suppressed Cossacks hosts during this period, before turning them into the special military estate Sosloviye in the late 18th century. Cossacks were then used in Imperial Russian campaigns against other tribes.[142]
The acquisition of Ukraine by Russia commenced in 1654 with the Pereiaslav Agreement. Georgia's accession to Russia in 1783 was marked by the Treaty of Georgievsk.
Soviet Union
[edit]
Soviet territories that were never part of Imperial Russia: Tuva, East Prussia, western Ukraine, Kuril Islands
Imperial territories that did not become part of the Soviet Union
Soviet sphere of influence: Warsaw Pact, Mongolia
Soviet military occupation: northern Iran, Manchuria, northern Korea, Xinjiang, Afghanistan
Bolshevik leaders had effectively reestablished a polity with roughly the same extent as that empire by 1921, however with an internationalist ideology: Lenin in particular asserted the right to limited self-determination for national minorities within the new territory.[143] Beginning in 1923, the policy of "Indigenization" [korenizatsiya] was intended to support non-Russians develop their national cultures within a socialist framework. Never formally revoked, it stopped being implemented after 1932[citation needed]. After World War II, the Soviet Union installed socialist regimes modeled on those it had installed in 1919–20 in the old Russian Empire, in areas its forces occupied in Eastern Europe.[144] The Soviet Union and later the People's Republic of China supported revolutionary and communist movements in foreign nations and colonies to advance their own interests, but were not always successful.[145] The USSR provided great assistance to Kuomintang in 1926–1928 in the formation of a unified Chinese government (see Northern Expedition). Although then relations with the USSR deteriorated, but the USSR was the only world power that provided military assistance to China against Japanese aggression in 1937–1941 (see Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact). The victory of the Chinese Communists in the civil war of 1946–1949 relied on the great help of the USSR (see Chinese Civil War).
Although the Soviet Union declared itself anti-imperialist, critics argue that it exhibited traits common to historic empires.[146][147][148] Some scholars hold that the Soviet Union was a hybrid entity containing elements common to both multinational empires and nation-states. Some also argued that the USSR practiced colonialism as did other imperial powers and was carrying on the old Russian tradition of expansion and control.[148] Mao Zedong once argued that the Soviet Union had itself become an imperialist power while maintaining a socialist façade. Moreover, the ideas of imperialism were widely spread in action on the higher levels of government. Josip Broz Tito and Milovan Djilas have referred to the Stalinist USSR's foreign policies, such as the occupation and economic exploitations of Eastern Europe and its aggressive and hostile policy towards Yugoslavia as Soviet imperialism.[149][150] Some Marxists within the Russian Empire and later the USSR, like Sultan Galiev and Vasyl Shakhrai, considered the Soviet regime a renewed version of the Russian imperialism and colonialism.[151] The crushing of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and Soviet–Afghan War have been cited as examples.[152][153][154]
Russia under Putin
[edit]
Since the 2010s, Russia under Vladimir Putin has been described as neo-imperialist.[156] Russia occupies parts of neighboring countries and has engaged in expansionism, most notably with the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia, the 2014 annexation of Crimea, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of its southeast. Russia has also established domination over Belarus.[157] Four months into the invasion of Ukraine, Putin compared himself to Russian emperor Peter the Great. He said that Tsar Peter had returned "Russian land" to the empire, and that "it is now also our responsibility to return (Russian) land".[158] Kseniya Oksamytna wrote that in Russia media, the invasion was accompanied by discourses of Russian "supremacy". She says that this likely fuelled war crimes against Ukrainians and that "the behavior of Russian forces bore all hallmarks of imperial violence".[159] The Putin regime has revived imperial ideas such as the "Russian world"[160] and the ideology of Eurasianism.[161] It has used disinformation and the Russian diaspora to undermine the sovereignty of other countries.[162] Russia is also accused of neo-colonialism in Africa, mainly through the activities of the Wagner Group and Africa Corps.[163][164]
Spain
[edit]
Spanish imperialism in the colonial era corresponds with the rise and decline of the Spanish Empire, conventionally recognized as emerging in 1402 with the conquest of the Canary Islands. Following the successes of exploratory maritime voyages conducted during the Age of Discovery, Spain committed considerable financial and military resources towards developing a robust navy capable of conducting large-scale, transatlantic expeditionary operations in order to establish and solidify a firm imperial presence across large portions of North America, South America, and the geographic regions comprising the Caribbean basin. Concomitant with Spanish endorsement and sponsorship of transatlantic expeditionary voyages was the deployment of Conquistadors, which further expanded Spanish imperial boundaries through the acquisition and development of territories and colonies.[165]
Imperialism in the Caribbean basin
[edit]
In congruence with the colonialist activities of competing European imperial powers throughout the 15th – 19th centuries, the Spanish were equally engrossed in extending geopolitical power. The Caribbean basin functioned as a key geographic focal point for advancing Spanish imperialism. Similar to the strategic prioritization Spain placed towards achieving victory in the conquests of the Aztec Empire and Inca Empire, Spain placed equal strategic emphasis on expanding the nation's imperial footprint within the Caribbean basin.
Echoing the prevailing ideological perspectives regarding colonialism and imperialism embraced by Spain's European rivals during the colonial era, including the English, French, and the Dutch, the Spanish used colonialism as a means of expanding imperial geopolitical borders and securing the defense of maritime trade routes in the Caribbean basin.
While leveraging colonialism in the same geographic operating theater as its imperial rivals, Spain maintained distinct imperial objectives and instituted a unique form of colonialism in support of its imperial agenda. Spain placed significant strategic emphasis on the acquisition, extraction, and exportation of precious metals (primarily gold and silver). A second objective was the evangelization of subjugated indigenous populations residing in mineral-rich and strategically favorable locations. Notable examples of these indigenous groups include the Taίno populations inhabiting Puerto Rico and segments of Cuba. Compulsory labor and slavery were widely institutionalized across Spanish-occupied territories and colonies, with an initial emphasis on directing labor towards mining activity and related methods of procuring semi-precious metals. The emergence of the Encomienda system during the 16th–17th centuries in occupied colonies within the Caribbean basin reflects a gradual shift in imperial prioritization, increasingly focusing on large-scale production and exportation of agricultural commodities.
Scholarly debate and controversy
[edit]The scope and scale of Spanish participation in imperialism within the Caribbean basin remains a subject of scholarly debate among historians. A fundamental source of contention stems from the inadvertent conflation of theoretical conceptions of imperialism and colonialism. Furthermore, significant variation exists in the definition and interpretation of these terms as expounded by historians, anthropologists, philosophers, and political scientists.
Among historians, there is substantial support in favor of approaching imperialism as a conceptual theory emerging during the 18th–19th centuries, particularly within Britain, propagated by key exponents such as Joseph Chamberlain and Benjamin Disraeli. In accordance with this theoretical perspective, the activities of the Spanish in the Caribbean are not components of a preeminent, ideologically driven form of imperialism. Rather, these activities are more accurately classified as representing a form of colonialism.
Further divergence among historians can be attributed to varying theoretical perspectives regarding imperialism that are proposed by emerging academic schools of thought. Noteworthy examples include cultural imperialism, whereby proponents such as John Downing and Annabelle Sreberny-Modammadi define imperialism as "...the conquest and control of one country by a more powerful one."[166] Cultural imperialism signifies the dimensions of the process that go beyond economic exploitation or military force." Moreover, colonialism is understood as "...the form of imperialism in which the government of the colony is run directly by foreigners."[167]
In spite of diverging perspectives and the absence of a unilateral scholarly consensus regarding imperialism among historians, within the context of Spanish expansion in the Caribbean basin during the colonial era, imperialism can be interpreted as an overarching ideological agenda that is perpetuated through the institution of colonialism. In this context, colonialism functions as an instrument designed to achieve specific imperialist objectives.
Sweden
[edit]United States
[edit]
Made up of former colonies itself, the early United States expressed its opposition to imperialism, at least in a form distinct from its own Manifest Destiny, through policies such as the Monroe Doctrine. However the US may have unsuccessfully attempted to capture Canada in the War of 1812. The United States achieved very significant territorial concessions from Mexico during the Mexican–American War. Beginning in the late 19th and early 20th century, policies such as Theodore Roosevelt's interventionism in Central America and Woodrow Wilson's mission to "make the world safe for democracy"[168] changed all this. They were often backed by military force, but were more often affected from behind the scenes. This is consistent with the general notion of hegemony and imperium of historical empires.[169][170] In 1898, Americans who opposed imperialism created the Anti-Imperialist League to oppose the US annexation of the Philippines and Cuba. One year later, a war erupted in the Philippines causing business, labor and government leaders in the US to condemn America's occupation in the Philippines as they also denounced them for causing the deaths of many Filipinos.[171] American foreign policy was denounced as a "racket" by Smedley Butler, a former American general who had become a spokesman for the far left.[172]
At the start of World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt was opposed to European colonialism, especially in India. He pulled back when Britain's Winston Churchill demanded that victory in the war be the first priority. Roosevelt expected that the United Nations would take up the problem of decolonization.[173]
Some have described the internal strife between various people groups as a form of imperialism or colonialism. This internal form is distinct from informal U.S. imperialism in the form of political and financial hegemony.[174] It also showed difference in the United States' formation of "colonies" abroad.[174] Through the treatment of its indigenous peoples during westward expansion, the United States took on the form of an imperial power prior to any attempts at external imperialism. This internal form of empire has been referred to as "internal colonialism".[175] Participation in the African slave trade and the subsequent treatment of its 12 to 15 million Africans is viewed by some to be a more modern extension of America's "internal colonialism".[176] However, this internal colonialism faced resistance, as external colonialism did, but the anti-colonial presence was far less prominent due to the nearly complete dominance that the United States was able to assert over both indigenous peoples and African-Americans.[177] In a lecture on April 16, 2003, Edward Said described modern imperialism in the United States as an aggressive means of attack towards the contemporary Orient stating that "due to their backward living, lack of democracy and the violation of women's rights. The western world forgets during this process of converting the other that enlightenment and democracy are concepts that not all will agree upon".[178]
Anti-imperialism
[edit]Anti-imperialism gained a wide currency after the Second World War and at the onset of the Cold War as political movements in colonies of European powers promoted national sovereignty. Some anti-imperialist groups who opposed the United States supported the power of the Soviet Union, such as in Guevarism, while in Maoism this was criticized as social imperialism.
Pan-Africanism is a movement across Africa and the world that came as a result of imperial ideas splitting apart African nations and pitting them against each other. The Pan-African movement instead tried to reverse those ideas by uniting Africans and creating a sense of brotherhood among all African people.[179] The Pan-African movement helped with the eventual end of Colonialism in Africa.
Representatives at the 1900 Pan African Conference demanded moderate reforms for colonial African nations.[180] The conference also discussed African populations in the Caribbean and the United States and their rights. A total of six Pan-African conferences that were held, and these allowed the African people to have a voice in ending colonial rule.
See also
[edit]- Analysis of Western European colonialism and colonization
- Fourteen Points esp. V and XII in 1918
- Historic recurrence
- Historiography of the British Empire
- Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism 1917 book by Lenin
- International relations (1648–1814)
- International relations (1814–1919)
- International relations (1919–1939)
- Iron law of oligarchy
- List of empires
- Mercantilism
- Might Makes Right
- Political history of the world
- Postcolonialism
- Right of conquest
- Scramble for Africa, in the late 19th century
Notes
[edit]- ^ Also known as the Incan Empire, or Inka Empire.
- ^ ممالک محروسهٔ ایران, Mamâlek-e Mahruse-ye Irân
- ^ /ˈsæfəvɪd, ˈsɑː-/
- ^ شاهنشاهی صفوی, Šāhanšāhi-ye Safavi
References
[edit]- ^ S. Gertrude Millin, Rhodes, London: 1933, p. 138
- ^ "Imperialism". www.britannica.com. Retrieved 20 March 2023.
state policy, practice, or advocacy of extending power and dominion, especially by direct territorial acquisition or by gaining political and economic control of other areas. Because it always involves the use of power, whether military or economic or some subtler form, imperialism has often been considered morally reprehensible, and the term is frequently employed in international propaganda to denounce and discredit an opponent's foreign policy.
- ^ "imperialism". Retrieved 22 February 2019.
... the policy of extending the rule or authority of an empire or nation over foreign countries, or of acquiring and holding colonies and dependencies ...
- ^ Ashcroft, Bill; Griffiths, Gareth; Tiffin, Helen; Ashcroft, Bill (2007). Post-colonial studies: the key concepts. London: Routledge. p. 111. ISBN 978-0-203-93347-3. OCLC 244320058.
In its most general sense, imperialism refers to the formation of an empire, and, as such, has been an aspect of all periods of history in which one nation has extended its domination over one or several neighbouring nations.
- ^ "Imperialism | Definition, History, Examples, & Facts | Britannica". Britannica.com. 4 July 2023. Retrieved 25 August 2023.
- ^ Lewis, Charlton T. "imperium (inp-)". Charlton T. Lewis, an Elementary Latin Dictionary, imperium (Inp-). An Elementary Latin Dictionary. Tufts University. Retrieved 11 September 2016.
- ^ Howe, 13
- ^ Magnusson, Lars (1991). Teorier om imperialism (in Swedish). Tidens Förl. p. 19. ISBN 978-91-550-3830-4.
- ^ Steinmetz, George, (2014). "Empires, Imperial States, and Colonial Societies," Concise Encyclopedia of Comparative Sociology, ed. Sasaki, Masamichi, (Leiden & Boston: Brill), p 59, http://www-personal.umich.edu/~geostein/docs/Steinmetz%202014%20Empires%20imperial%20states%20and%20colonies.pdf
- ^ Kumar, Krishan (2017). Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), p 16, ISBN 978-1400884919 https://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s10967.pdf
- ^ Sasaki 2014, p 59.
- ^ Knorr, Klaus (1952). Schumpeter, Joseph A.; Arendt, Hannah (eds.). "Theories of Imperialism". World Politics. 4 (3): 402–431. doi:10.2307/2009130. ISSN 0043-8871. JSTOR 2009130. S2CID 145320143.
- ^ Edward W. Said. Culture and Imperialism. Vintage Publishers, 1994. p. 9.
- ^ Alan Marshall (February 1995). "Development and imperialism in space". Space Policy. 11 (1): 41–52. Bibcode:1995SpPol..11...41M. doi:10.1016/0265-9646(95)93233-B. Retrieved 28 June 2020.
- ^ Clapp, C H (1912). "Southern Vancouver Island". Canada. Geological Survey. Memoirno. 13. Ottawa. doi:10.4095/100487. hdl:2027/nyp.33433090753066.
{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires|journal=(help) - ^ Young, Robert (2015). Empire, colony, postcolony. John Wiley & Sons. p. 54. ISBN 978-1-4051-9355-9. OCLC 907133189.
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- Streusand, Douglas E. (2011). Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals. Westview Press. ISBN 978-0-8133-1359-7.
Further reading
[edit]- Abernethy, David P. The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1425–1980 (Yale UP, 2000), political science approach. online review
- Ankerl, Guy. Coexisting Contemporary Civilizations: Arabo-Muslim, Bharatai, Chinese, and Western, Geneva, INU Press, 2000, ISBN 2881550045.
- Bayly, C.A. ed. Atlas of the British Empire (1989). survey by scholars; heavily illustrated
- Brendon, Piers. "A Moral Audit of the British Empire". History Today, (Oct 2007), Vol. 57 Issue 10, pp. 44–47
- Brendon, Piers. The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, 1781–1997 (2008), ISBN 978-0307270283, wide-ranging survey
- Bickers, Robert and Christian Henriot, New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842–1953, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, ISBN 0719056047
- Blanken, Leo. Rational Empires: Institutional Incentives and Imperial Expansion, University Of Chicago Press, 2012
- Bush, Barbara. Imperialism and Postcolonialism (History: Concepts, Theories and Practice), Longmans, 2006, ISBN 0582505836
- Comer, Earl of. Ancient and Modern Imperialism, John Murray, 1910.
- Cotterell, Arthur. Western Power in Asia: Its Slow Rise and Swift Fall, 1415 – 1999 (2009) popular history excerpts
- Dabhoiwala, Fara, "Imperial Delusions" (review of Priya Satia, Time's Monster: How History Makes History, Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2020, 363 pp.; Mahmood Mamdani, Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities, Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2020, 401 pp.; and Adom Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-Determination, Princeton University Press, 2021 [?], 271 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVIII, no. 11 (1 July 2021), pp. 59–62.
- Darwin, John. After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–2000, (Penguin Books, 2008), 576 pp
- Darwin, John. The Empire Project (2011) 811pp free viewing
- Davies, Stephen (2008). "Imperialism". In Hamowy, Ronald (ed.). The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism. pp. 237–39. doi:10.4135/9781412965811.n146. ISBN 978-1-4129-6580-4. LCCN 2008009151. OCLC 750831024.
- Doniger, Wendy, "The Rise and Fall of Warhorses" (review of David Chaffetz, Raiders, Rulers, and Traders: The Horse and the Rise of Empires, Norton, 2024, 424 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXXII, no. 6 (10 April 2025), pp. 17–19. "Unlike cows, horses, whose teeth are quite dull, pull up grass by the roots rather than biting off the blades, or they nibble it right down to the ground, thus quickly destroying the land, which may require some years to recover.... [H]orses in the wild... range constantly to find new territory... [T]he horse came to symbolize conquest through its own natural imperialism. The steppes bred nomadic horses and nomadic hordes.... Men waged war to get other people's horses so that they could wage war. Horsepower... remained the basic unit of power for centuries.... But the horse-breeding people of the steppes never succeeded in conquering the part of the world west of the Carpathians and the Alps, nor civilizations.... where sea power... was decisive." (p. 17.)
- Fay, Richard B. and Daniel Gaido (ed. and trans.), Discovering Imperialism: Social Democracy to World War I. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2012.
- Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin Books, 2004, ISBN 0141007540
- Gotteland, Mathieu. What Is Informal Imperialism? Archived 19 December 2024 at the Wayback Machine, The Middle Ground Journal (2017).
- Michael Hardt and Toni Negri, Empire, Harvard University Press, 2000, ISBN 0674006712
- Hickel, Jason; Dorninger, Christian; Wieland, Hanspeter; Suwandi, Intan (2022). "Imperialist appropriation in the world economy: Drain from the global South through unequal exchange, 1990–2015". Global Environmental Change. 73 102467. Bibcode:2022GEC....7302467H. doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102467. S2CID 246855421.
- E.J. Hobsbawm, The Age of Empire, 1875–1914, Abacus Books, 1989, ISBN 0349105987
- E.J. Hobsbawm, On Empire: America, War, and Global Supremacy, Pantheon Books, 2008, ISBN 0375425373
- J.A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study, Cosimo Classics, 2005, ISBN 1596052503
- Hodge, Carl Cavanagh. Encyclopedia of the Age of Imperialism, 1800–1914 (2 vol. 2007), online
- Howe, Stephen Howe, ed., The New Imperial Histories Reader (2009) online review.
- James, Paul; Nairn, Tom (2006). Globalization and Violence, Vol. 1: Globalizing Empires, Old and New. Sage Publications.
- Kumar, Krishan. Visions of Empire: How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World (2017).
- Gabriel Kuhn, Oppressor and Oppressed Nations: Sketching a Taxonomy of Imperialism, Kersplebedeb, June 2017.
- Lawrence, Adria K. Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism: Anti-Colonial Protest in the French Empire (Cambridge UP, 2013) online reviews
- Jackson Lears, "Imperial Exceptionalism" (review of Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Empire in Retreat: The Past, Present, and Future of the United States, Yale University Press, 2018, ISBN 978-0300210002, 459 pp.; and David C. Hendrickson, Republic in Peril: American Empire and the Liberal Tradition, Oxford University Press, 2017, ISBN 978-0190660383, 287 pp.), The New York Review of Books, vol. LXVI, no. 2 (February 7, 2019), pp. 8–10. Bulmer-Thomas writes: "Imperial retreat is not the same as national decline, as many other countries can attest. Indeed, imperial retreat can strengthen the nation-state just as imperial expansion can weaken it." (NYRB, cited on p. 10.)
- Merriman, Roger Bigelow. The Rise of the Spanish Empire in the Old World and in the New (4 vol 1918–1933) online.
- Monypenny, William Flavelle (1905). . The Empire and the century. John Murray. pp. 5–28.
- Moon, Parker T. Imperialism and world politics (1926); 583 pp; Wide-ranging historical survey; online
- Ness, Immanuel and Zak Cope, eds. The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism (2 vol 2015), 1456 pp
- Page, Melvin E. et al. eds. Colonialism: An International Social, Cultural, and Political Encyclopedia (2 vol 2003)
- Thomas Pakenham. The Scramble for Africa: White Man's Conquest of the Dark Continent from 1876 to 1912 (1992), ISBN 978-0380719990
- Poddar, Prem, and Lars Jensen, eds., A historical companion to postcolonial literatures: Continental Europe and Its Empires (Edinburgh UP, 2008) excerpt also entire text online
- Rothermund, Dietmar. Memories of Post-Imperial Nations: The Aftermath of Decolonization, 1945–2013 (2015), ISBN 1107102294; Compares the impact on Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Portugal, Italy and Japan
- Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, Vintage Books, 1998, ISBN 0099967502
- Simms, Brendan. Three victories and a defeat: the rise and fall of the first British Empire (Hachette UK, 2008). to 1783.
- Smith, Simon C. British Imperialism 1750–1970, Cambridge University Press, 1998, ISBN 052159930X
- Stuchtey, Benedikt. Colonialism and Imperialism, 1450–1950, European History Online, Mainz: Institute of European History, 2011.
- Thornton, A.P. (1980). Imperialism in the Twentieth Century. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN 978-0-8166-0993-2.
- U.S. Tariff Commission. Colonial tariff policies (1922), worldwide; 922 pp
- Vandervort, Bruce. Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830―1914 (Indiana UP, 2009)
- Winslow, E. M. (1931). "Marxian, Liberal, and Sociological Theories of Imperialism". Journal of Political Economy. 39 (6): 713–758. doi:10.1086/254283. JSTOR 1823170. S2CID 143859209.
- Xypolia, Ilia (August 2016). "Divide et Impera: Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of British Imperialism". Critique. 44 (3): 221–231. doi:10.1080/03017605.2016.1199629. hdl:2164/9956. S2CID 148118309.
Primary sources
- V. I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, International Publishers, New York, 1997, ISBN 0717800989
- Rosa Luxemburg, The Accumulation of Capital: A Contribution to an Economic Explanation of Imperialism
External links
[edit]- Imperialism Entry in The Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th ed., Columbia University Press.
- Imperialism, by Emile Perreau-Saussine
Imperialism
View on GrokipediaThroughout history, empires from antiquity—such as the Roman and Ottoman—to the era of European overseas expansion in the 19th and early 20th centuries exemplified this dynamic, often propelled by competition for resources, markets, and geopolitical dominance.[3]
Central features encompass territorial control, resource extraction, and the overlay of the imperium's legal and administrative systems, which could entail both coercive exploitation and the dissemination of infrastructure, trade networks, and governance norms.[4]
While fraught with conflicts, genocides, and economic drain in extractive contexts, rigorous econometric analyses reveal that imperial legacies, particularly from Britain, fostered enduring institutional enhancements—such as property rights and rule of law—that propelled higher income levels and growth in low-mortality settler regions like Canada and Australia, with annual per capita GDP increases exceeding 1.5% from 1820 to 1950.[4][5][6]
In contrast, high-density extraction zones like India exhibited muted growth at 0.12% annually, underscoring how imperial outcomes hinged on demographic pressures, investment patterns, and institutional inclusivity rather than uniform predation.[4]
Definition and Conceptual Foundations
Etymology and Evolution of the Term
The term imperialism derives from the Latin imperium, denoting command, supreme authority, or the right to rule, a concept central to Roman governance and expansion.[7] This etymological root emphasized the extension of sovereign power over subordinate entities, initially without pejorative connotations.[8] In English, the suffix -ism was appended to imperial—itself from late 14th-century French and Latin origins meaning "having commanding power"—to form imperialism by 1826, signifying advocacy for empire-building or devotion to imperial policies, often invoked in discussions of Napoleonic or ancient Roman precedents.[7] [9] Early modern usages, traceable to at least 1684 in some senses referring to imperial rule akin to classical empires, remained neutral or descriptive of monarchical or absolutist systems.[8] By the mid-19th century, around 1858, the term gained prominence in British contexts to characterize Pax Britannica, portraying empire as a stabilizing force of global order rather than mere aggression.[10] This period marked its shift toward denoting active policies of territorial acquisition and influence, distinct from mere possession of colonies, as European powers formalized doctrines of expansion.[11] The term's connotations evolved markedly in the late 19th and early 20th centuries amid critiques of unchecked expansion. Economists like John A. Hobson, in his 1902 work Imperialism: A Study, reframed it as a symptom of underconsumption and financier-driven overreach, influencing subsequent analyses.[11] V.I. Lenin further theorized it in 1916–1917 as the "highest stage of capitalism," linking monopolistic finance to colonial rivalry and war, a view that popularized its use as an indictment of systemic exploitation.[12] Post-World War II decolonization amplified its negative valence, transforming imperialism into a rhetorical tool for denouncing perceived neocolonial dominance, often detached from its original descriptive intent and applied broadly to economic or cultural influences.[13] This evolution reflects not only linguistic adaptation but also ideological contestation, with leftist frameworks emphasizing coercion over mutual benefits observed in some historical exchanges.[14]Distinctions from Related Concepts
Imperialism, defined as the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending a state's power and dominion over foreign territories through territorial acquisition, military conquest, or political control, differs from colonialism primarily in scope and mechanism. Colonialism entails the direct establishment and settlement of populations from the metropole in overseas territories, often involving the displacement or subjugation of Indigenous peoples to facilitate resource extraction and cultural imposition.[15][16] In contrast, imperialism can operate without significant settler migration, relying instead on indirect rule, economic dominance, or administrative oversight, as seen in British influence over informal protectorates in the 19th century.[17] This distinction highlights imperialism's broader applicability to both settled and unsettled dominions, whereas colonialism presupposes physical occupation and demographic transformation.[18] Expansionism represents a related but narrower concept, referring to a state's drive for territorial growth through annexation or migration, often contiguous and motivated by security, resources, or ideology, without the hierarchical control over subjugated foreign populations inherent in imperialism. For instance, the United States' westward expansion in the 19th century exemplified expansionism via Manifest Destiny, absorbing adjacent lands primarily through settlement rather than establishing an overarching imperial structure with tribute or vassal states.[19] Imperialism, by comparison, typically involves non-contiguous overseas dominions and a formalized asymmetry of power, such as the Roman Empire's provincial governance or Britain's global holdings post-1815.[20] Hegemony, often invoked in international relations theory, denotes influence achieved through consent, cultural persuasion, or economic interdependence rather than coercive territorial control, distinguishing it from imperialism's reliance on hard power like military occupation or unequal treaties. Gramscian hegemony, for example, emphasizes ideological leadership within a bloc of states, as in post-World War II American alliances, whereas imperialism historically featured explicit subjugation, such as the Opium Wars' imposition of extraterritoriality on China in 1842 and 1860.[17] Neo-imperialism extends this contrast into modernity, describing subtle forms of dominance via multinational corporations, aid conditionalities, or financial leverage post-decolonization, without formal colonies—evident in critiques of structural adjustment programs by the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s and 1990s in Africa and Latin America.[21][22] Thus, while imperialism and its variants share roots in power projection, they diverge in directness, settlement patterns, and coercive intensity, with overlapping usage in historical texts reflecting evolving analytical needs rather than rigid boundaries.[23]Core Characteristics and Typologies
Imperialism entails the extension of a dominant polity's authority over foreign territories and populations, establishing asymmetrical power relations that permit the extraction of economic, strategic, or prestige benefits. This process typically relies on superior military capabilities, diplomatic leverage, or economic interdependence to enforce compliance, resulting in diminished sovereignty for the subordinated entities.[1] Core to imperialism is the monopolization of governance decisions by the imperial center, often suppressing local institutions and redirecting resources toward the metropole's interests, as observed in historical patterns of tribute extraction and unequal trade arrangements.[24] Unlike transient alliances or mutual trade, imperialism imposes enduring hierarchies, frequently justified through ideologies of civilizational superiority or security imperatives, though empirical analysis reveals motivations rooted in resource scarcity and competitive state survival.[25] It manifests in both direct territorial control and subtler forms of influence, with the former involving administrative integration and the latter leveraging dependency without formal annexation.[26] Typologies of imperialism classify it by mechanisms of control and spatial orientation. Formal imperialism features outright annexation and centralized administration, as in the Roman Empire's provincial system or Britain's direct rule over India from 1858 onward, where viceroys enforced metropolitan laws and policies.[19] Informal variants, conversely, exert dominance through protectorates or spheres of influence, preserving nominal local autonomy while dictating foreign relations and economic access; Britain's Niger Protectorate, formalized in 1900, exemplifies the former, with British oversight of defense amid indigenous governance.[27] Spheres of influence represent a minimalist typology, wherein imperial powers secure exclusive economic or strategic privileges via treaties, eschewing administrative burdens; European delineation of such zones in late Qing China, post-Opium Wars, allowed resource extraction without governance costs.[27] Distinctions also arise between settler-oriented imperialism, involving population transplantation and land reconfiguration, and extractive models focused on remote domination, the latter prioritizing sovereign command over on-site transformation.[26] These categories, while overlapping, highlight causal variances in sustainability and resistance, with formal structures often incurring higher administrative expenses but yielding tighter control.[19]Historical Development
Ancient and Classical Empires
The Akkadian Empire, founded by Sargon of Akkad circa 2334–2279 BCE, marked an early form of imperialism through the conquest and unification of Sumerian city-states in southern Mesopotamia, extending control northward to areas in modern Syria and imposing Akkadian as a lingua franca for administration.[28] This multi-ethnic polity relied on military innovation, including standing armies, to subdue rivals and centralize tribute collection, though it collapsed around 2150 BCE amid rebellions and climate-induced famine.[28] Subsequent Mesopotamian empires built on this model, with the Neo-Assyrian Empire (circa 911–609 BCE) exemplifying systematic imperialism via relentless campaigns that incorporated territories from Egypt to the Zagros Mountains, covering over 1.4 million square kilometers at its peak.[29] Assyrian rulers like Tiglath-Pileser III (745–727 BCE) implemented provincial governance, mass deportations of conquered populations to disrupt resistance, and heavy tribute extraction to fund iron-equipped armies and monumental architecture, fostering economic integration but at the cost of widespread resentment that contributed to its fall to Babylonian and Median forces.[29] The Achaemenid Persian Empire, established by Cyrus II in 550 BCE after overthrowing the Median kingdom, expanded through conquests of Lydia (546 BCE), Babylon (539 BCE), and Egypt under Cambyses II (525 BCE), eventually spanning 5.5 million square kilometers from the Balkans to the Indus Valley. Darius I's satrapy system divided the realm into 20–30 provinces governed by appointed officials, supported by the Royal Road for communication and a policy of religious tolerance to minimize revolts, enabling efficient taxation and military mobilization via the Immortals elite corps. This administrative pragmatism sustained the empire until its defeat by Alexander III of Macedon at Gaugamela in 331 BCE. Alexander's campaigns from 334 BCE onward dismantled the Achaemenid structure, conquering Persia, Egypt, Mesopotamia, and reaching the Punjab by 326 BCE, forging an empire of roughly 5.2 million square kilometers that facilitated Hellenistic cultural diffusion through founded cities like Alexandria. His phalanx-based tactics and integration of Persian administrators emphasized personal loyalty over ethnic hierarchy, but the empire fragmented upon his death in 323 BCE into successor kingdoms like the Seleucids and Ptolemies, highlighting the fragility of conquest without enduring institutions.[30] In the Mediterranean, Roman imperialism transitioned from republican expansion—securing Italy by 264 BCE, defeating Carthage in the Punic Wars (264–146 BCE), and annexing Greece (146 BCE)—to imperial consolidation under Augustus (27 BCE–14 CE), with further gains in Gaul, Spain, and Britain.[31] By Trajan's reign (98–117 CE), the empire encompassed 5 million square kilometers across three continents, governed via legions for security, client kings for buffers, and infrastructure like roads and aqueducts for resource flow, though overextension strained finances and provoked revolts.[31] Parallel developments occurred in Asia: the Maurya Empire in India, founded by Chandragupta circa 321 BCE, unified the northwest post-Alexander and expanded under Ashoka (268–232 BCE), whose conquest of Kalinga circa 260 BCE—resulting in over 100,000 deaths and 150,000 deportations—prompted a shift to dhamma-based governance promoting non-violence and welfare across a domain from Afghanistan to Bengal.[32] In China, the Qin dynasty under Ying Zheng (Qin Shi Huang) completed unification in 221 BCE by subduing the Warring States through Legalist reforms, standardized systems, and campaigns against Xiongnu nomads, initiating imperial bureaucracy that prioritized conscript labor for defenses like early Great Wall segments. These empires underscore imperialism's reliance on superior logistics and coercion for territorial control, with longevity tied to adaptive administration rather than conquest alone.Medieval and Nomadic Expansions
The medieval period (roughly 500–1500 CE) featured imperialism through rapid conquests by centralized caliphates and decentralized nomadic hordes, often leveraging religious ideology, superior mobility, and exploitation of fragmented rivals to impose tribute systems, administrative control, and cultural hegemony over vast territories. These expansions contrasted with ancient models by emphasizing ideological unification—such as Islamic proselytization or Mongol universal rule—while relying on cavalry tactics and coerced loyalty from subjugated elites, resulting in empires that facilitated long-distance trade but at the cost of massive demographic disruptions, including millions killed in campaigns. Empirical records, including contemporary chronicles like those of al-Tabari for Islamic conquests and Persian and Chinese annals for Mongol invasions, document these as deliberate strategies of domination rather than mere migrations, with rulers extracting resources via jizya taxes or yam postal networks to sustain further aggression. The Rashidun Caliphate (632–661 CE), succeeding the Prophet Muhammad's death, orchestrated conquests totaling over 6 million square kilometers within three decades, defeating Byzantine forces at Yarmouk (636 CE) to seize Syria and Palestine, and Sassanid armies at Qadisiyyah (636–637 CE) and Nahavand (642 CE) to annex Mesopotamia and Persia by 651 CE; Egypt fell by 642 CE under Amr ibn al-As. These victories stemmed causally from Arab tribal cohesion under caliphal authority, Byzantine-Sassanid exhaustion from mutual wars (602–628 CE), and incentives like equal stipends for warriors regardless of origin, enabling incorporation of non-Arab auxiliaries. The Umayyad successors (661–750 CE) extended this to 11.1 million square kilometers, conquering North Africa by 709 CE (reaching Visigothic Spain at Guadalete in 711 CE under Tariq ibn Ziyad) and the Indus Valley by 713 CE, imposing Arabic administration, coinage reforms, and dhimmi status on non-Muslims for fiscal extraction, though revolts like the Berber Revolt (740 CE) highlighted limits of overextension. Nomadic expansions peaked with the Mongols, who under Genghis Khan (proclaimed 1206 CE) unified fractious steppe tribes via merit-based legions and decimal organization, conquering the Xi Xia (1209 CE), Jin Dynasty China (1211–1234 CE), and Khwarezm Empire (1219–1221 CE), killing up to 15% of conquered populations to deter resistance—e.g., 1.7 million at Nishapur (1221 CE) per Persian historian Juvayni. By 1258 CE, Hulagu Khan sacked Baghdad, extinguishing the Abbasid Caliphate and massacring 200,000–800,000 residents, while Batu Khan's Golden Horde subjugated Kievan Rus' (1237–1240 CE), extracting tribute from Moscow until 1480 CE; the empire peaked at 24 million square kilometers under Kublai Khan (1271–1279 CE), integrating Chinese bureaucracy with nomadic oversight for Silk Road monopolies, though ecological strains like overgrazing contributed to fragmentation post-1368 CE. Turkic nomads paralleled this: the Seljuks overran Persia (1037 CE onward) and crushed Byzantines at Manzikert (1071 CE), securing Anatolia via ghazi frontier warfare, with sultans like Alp Arslan enforcing iqta land grants for loyalty. European medieval expansions included Norse Viking ventures (793–1066 CE), where longship raids evolved into settlements driven by overpopulation and chieftain ambitions, establishing the Danelaw in England (post-865 CE Great Heathen Army), Normandy (911 CE treaty), and Iceland/Greenland colonies by 930/985 CE; Leif Erikson's Vinland reach (c. 1000 CE) marked transatlantic probing, per sagas like the Saga of the Greenlanders, though unsustainable due to climate and Native resistance. The Ottoman beylik (c. 1299 CE), blending Turkic nomadic roots with ghazi ideology, expanded under Osman I and successors, capturing Adrianople (1361 CE) and subjugating the Balkans via devshirme levies, culminating in Mehmed II's 1453 CE siege of Constantinople using massive cannonry—over 53 days with 80,000 troops breaching Theodosian Walls—yielding control of eastern trade routes and a millet system for multi-ethnic governance. These cases illustrate imperialism's causal drivers: technological edges (e.g., composite bows, stirrups) and ideological narratives legitimizing violence, yielding benefits like Pax Mongolica trade booms but empirically tied to genocidal scales, with Mongol campaigns alone causing 40–60 million deaths per demographic reconstructions.Early Modern and Mercantilist Imperialism
Early modern imperialism emerged in the late 15th century as European states, particularly Portugal and Spain, pursued overseas expansion to secure economic advantages under mercantilist principles, which prioritized national wealth accumulation via bullion inflows, trade surpluses, and colonial monopolies. Mercantilism viewed colonies as sources of raw materials and captive markets to bolster the metropolitan economy, with state intervention enforcing navigation laws and chartered companies to exclude rivals. This era's imperialism contrasted with prior feudal expansions by leveraging maritime technology, such as caravels and astrolabes, enabling direct access to global resources and establishing permanent settlements.[33][34] Portugal led initial efforts, capturing Ceuta in Morocco in 1415 under Prince Henry the Navigator, initiating African coastal exploration for gold and slaves, followed by Vasco da Gama's 1498 voyage to India establishing a sea route for spice trade. By 1500, Portuguese fleets controlled key Indian Ocean chokepoints, extracting tribute and establishing trading posts from Goa to Malacca, yielding annual pepper imports of over 1,000 tons by the early 16th century. Spain, inspired by these successes, sponsored Christopher Columbus's 1492 westward voyage, leading to American landfalls and subsequent conquests: Hernán Cortés subdued the Aztec Empire in Mexico by 1521, securing vast silver deposits, while Francisco Pizarro conquered the Inca in Peru by 1533, with Potosí mines producing 8 million kilograms of silver between 1545 and 1800, fueling European monetary expansion. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, mediated by the Pope, divided non-European spheres between the Iberians, formalizing their imperial claims.[35][36] Northern European powers challenged Iberian dominance in the 17th century through joint-stock companies embodying mercantilist state-private partnerships. The Dutch United East India Company (VOC), chartered in 1602 with a 21-year monopoly, amassed a fleet of 150 merchant ships and 40 warships by 1670, capturing Portuguese assets like Malacca in 1641 and establishing Batavia (Jakarta) as a headquarters, generating profits averaging 18% annually in its first decade through spice monopolies enforced by military force. Britain responded with the Navigation Acts of 1651, mandating that colonial goods be shipped only in English vessels and barring foreign intermediaries, aimed at undermining Dutch carrying trade and directing colonial staples like tobacco—exports reaching 30,000 hogsheads yearly from Virginia by 1700—exclusively to British markets. The English East India Company, founded in 1600, secured footholds in India, importing calicoes and tea while exporting bullion.[37][38] France pursued mercantilist imperialism under Jean-Baptiste Colbert's direction from 1661, creating royal companies for Canada (fur trade) and the Caribbean (sugar plantations yielding 50,000 tons annually by 1700 from Saint-Domingue alone), with state subsidies and tariffs protecting domestic industries like textiles. These efforts integrated colonies into a triangulated economy: American silver and sugar financed Asian imports, enhancing naval power—France's fleet grew to 120 ships of the line by 1690—and state revenues, though inefficiencies and wars limited gains compared to Dutch efficiency. Overall, mercantilist imperialism transferred technologies like firearms and plows to colonies while extracting resources that multiplied European GDP per capita by factors of 1.5-2 from 1500 to 1800, though at the cost of Indigenous depopulation via disease and conquest, reducing American populations from 50-100 million to 5-10 million by 1650.[39][40]High Imperialism and the Scramble for Territories
High Imperialism, often termed New Imperialism, encompassed the surge in European territorial conquests from 1870 to 1914, marked by formal political control over extensive regions in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific.[41] This period followed the relative stagnation of colonial expansion after the mid-18th century, propelled by the Second Industrial Revolution's demand for raw materials such as rubber, palm oil, and minerals, alongside outlets for surplus European capital and manufactured goods. Strategic imperatives, including naval basing and denial of territory to rivals, intertwined with nationalist competition among powers like Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium, while technological advances—steamships, breech-loading rifles, and quinine prophylaxis against malaria—facilitated penetration of interiors previously resistant to European incursion.[42] The Scramble for Africa exemplified this dynamic, transforming European holdings from roughly 10% of the continent in 1870 to nearly 90% by 1914 through rapid annexations often disregarding indigenous polities.[43] Initial triggers included British occupation of Egypt in 1882 for Suez Canal security and French advances in the Sahara, escalating into overlapping claims that prompted Otto von Bismarck to convene the Berlin Conference from November 1884 to February 1885.[44] Attended by representatives of 14 states but excluding African voices, the conference's General Act codified rules for the Congo Basin and West African coasts, mandating notification of new occupations and the principle of effective occupation—requiring actual administrative presence rather than mere flags or treaties—to legitimize claims.[45] [46] Post-Berlin, partition accelerated: Belgium's King Leopold II secured the Congo Free State (later annexed as Belgian Congo in 1908) via the International African Association, encompassing 2.3 million square kilometers through exploitative concessions yielding ivory and rubber.[44] Britain consolidated Egypt-Sudan, Nigeria (amalgamated 1914), and East African Protectorate (Kenya-Uganda), while France claimed vast equatorial territories including Algeria's extension into the Sahara and modern Mali, Niger, and Chad.[42] Germany entered late, acquiring Togoland, Kamerun, German South West Africa (Namibia), and East Africa (Tanzania), often via military suppression like the Herero and Nama genocide of 1904-1908. Portugal retained Angola and Mozambique under Anglo-Portuguese treaties, and Italy seized Eritrea and Libya, though defeated at Adowa in 1896 by Ethiopia.[44] Conflicts such as the Fashoda Incident (1898), where French and British forces nearly clashed on the Nile, and the Anglo-Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-1902) underscored rivalries, with Britain annexing Boer republics to secure South African gold and diamonds.[46] Beyond Africa, High Imperialism extended to Asia and Oceania: France completed Indochina by 1885, Britain annexed Upper Burma in 1886, and joint Anglo-German-Spanish agreements partitioned Pacific spheres, with Germany taking New Guinea and Samoa by 1899.[41] In China, unequal treaties post-Opium Wars evolved into spheres of influence, as formalized by the 1898-1900 concessions amid the Open Door policy advocacy. These acquisitions, totaling over 20 million square kilometers in Africa alone, heightened inter-European tensions, contributing to alliance systems and armaments races prelude to 1914.[42] Empirical assessments reveal mixed economic returns—colonies supplied 5-10% of metropolitan investment by 1913—but strategic prestige and resource access, such as Britain's 40% share of global trade tied to empire, validated expansion for policymakers.[41]Theoretical Frameworks
Economic Interpretations
Economic interpretations of imperialism emphasize the pursuit of material gain as the primary driver, viewing territorial expansion as a mechanism for securing resources, markets, and investment opportunities to sustain domestic economic systems. In the mercantilist era from the 16th to 18th centuries, European powers acquired colonies to amass bullion through favorable trade balances, exporting manufactured goods in exchange for raw materials while restricting colonial trade to the metropole via navigation acts and monopolies.[47] This approach treated empires as zero-sum games where national wealth equated to accumulated precious metals, with policies like the British Navigation Acts of 1651 enforcing exclusive use of imperial shipping to bolster merchant fleets and exclude competitors.[48] Empirical evidence from the period shows colonies contributed modestly to metropolitan GDP—estimated at less than 5% for Britain by 1775—yet justified expansion through control over commodities like sugar and tobacco, which generated monopoly rents exceeding free-market alternatives.[49] In the late 19th century, liberal economist John A. Hobson advanced an underconsumption thesis in his 1902 work Imperialism: A Study, arguing that imperialism arose from maldistribution of income in advanced capitalist economies, where over-saving by elites produced surplus capital unable to find profitable domestic outlets due to insufficient mass purchasing power.[50] Hobson contended that financiers and speculators lobbied for state-backed overseas ventures to export capital and secure protected markets, though data from British investments indicated imperialism yielded low returns—averaging 3-4% on tropical colonies versus 6-8% on temperate ones—suggesting it enriched elites at national expense without alleviating underconsumption.[51] This view influenced anti-imperialist critiques, positing imperialism as a deviation from free trade rather than its extension, with Hobson's analysis drawing on British fiscal records showing colonial expenditures often outpacing revenues by factors of two to one in Africa.[52] Vladimir Lenin synthesized and radicalized Hobson's framework in Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (1916), defining imperialism as monopoly capitalism's final phase characterized by finance capital's dominance, capital export over goods export, and international cartels dividing global markets.[53] Lenin cited statistics like Britain's 1910 foreign investments totaling £3.7 billion—four times domestic capital stock—and the formation of 40-60 international cartels by 1910 as evidence of economic concentration compelling territorial grabs to safeguard returns amid falling domestic profit rates.[54] However, empirical critiques highlight inconsistencies: pre-capitalist empires like Rome exhibited similar expansion without monopolies, and post-1945 decolonization saw sustained capital flows without formal imperialism, undermining claims of inevitable linkage; studies of 1870-1914 European investments reveal only 10-15% directed to formal colonies, with most to independent states like Argentina yielding higher profits.[54][55] These interpretations, while influential in explaining "high imperialism," overlook non-economic factors and overstate profitability, as aggregate returns from empires often lagged behind alternative investments, per analyses of balance-of-payments data.[56]Geopolitical and Realist Perspectives
In international relations theory, realist perspectives frame imperialism as a rational strategy for states to enhance security, deter threats, and maintain relative power in an anarchic system where survival depends on self-help. Classical realists, such as Hans Morgenthau, analyzed imperialism as driven by the fundamental human lust for power, identifying three primary inducements: the appetite for political power itself, the pursuit of unlimited objectives that exceed available means, and ideological motivations that rationalize expansion. Morgenthau outlined three goals—security through buffer territories, economic advantages via markets and resources, and prestige—and three methods: military conquest, economic penetration, and ideological influence, emphasizing that unchecked imperialism risks overextension and self-defeating wars, as seen in historical cases like Napoleon's campaigns.[57][58] Structural realists diverge on the imperatives of expansion. Defensive realists, exemplified by Kenneth Waltz, argue that imperialism is generally inefficient because conquest triggers balancing coalitions and internal strains, with states prioritizing status quo security over risky territorial gains; empirical data from post-1945 decolonization shows empires dissolving as costs—such as Vietnam for France (1954) and Algeria (1962)—outweighed benefits amid nuclear deterrence reducing conquest incentives.[59] In contrast, John Mearsheimer's offensive realism posits that great powers inherently seek regional hegemony to maximize security, viewing imperialism as a tool for eliminating rival threats through forward positioning, though constrained by geography and logistics; for instance, the U.S. post-1898 expansions into the Philippines secured Pacific flanks against potential European or Asian rivals, aligning with bids for unchallenged dominance.[60][61] Geopolitical realism complements these views by stressing control over tangible spaces for power projection. Alfred Thayer Mahan's 1890 treatise The Influence of Sea Power Upon History argued that naval supremacy and coaling stations enabled imperial reach, influencing Britain's maintenance of Gibraltar (captured 1713) and Singapore (1819) to safeguard trade routes comprising 25% of global shipping by 1900. Similarly, Halford Mackinder's 1904 Heartland theory warned that Eurasian continental dominance could control world islands, prompting imperial responses like Russia's 19th-century advances into Central Asia for buffers against Britain, amassing 5.5 million square miles by 1914. Realists like Stephen Krasner counter accusations that their framework endorses imperialism, noting it prescribes restraint—evident in U.S. realist advice against Vietnam escalation (1965–1973)—as power maximization favors alliances over direct rule when feasible.[59] These perspectives prioritize causal factors like relative capabilities and threat perceptions over ideological or moral justifications, with historical patterns substantiating that imperial declines, such as Britain's post-1945, stemmed from unsustainable overcommitments rather than normative shifts alone.[62]Cultural, Ideological, and Psychological Dimensions
Imperialism's ideological foundations rested on notions of a civilizing mission, positing that European powers held a duty to uplift "inferior" societies through governance, education, and moral reform. This rationale, prominent in the 19th century, drew from Enlightenment ideas of progress intertwined with Social Darwinism, framing expansion as an evolutionary imperative to disseminate superior cultural and technological advancements.[63][64] Rudyard Kipling's 1899 poem "The White Man's Burden" encapsulated this ethos, urging Western nations to shoulder the "burden" of guiding reluctant "savage" peoples toward civilization, despite ingratitude and hardship.[65] Such ideologies masked underlying motives of power consolidation but also aligned with tangible efforts like missionary activities, which established schools and hospitals across colonies. Empirical evidence indicates these initiatives raised literacy rates; for instance, in British India, mission schools contributed to a tripling of literacy from 1881 to 1947, fostering administrative elites who later led independence movements.[66] Critics, however, contend that this "civilizing" narrative justified cultural erasure, as European languages and curricula supplanted Indigenous knowledge systems, evident in the suppression of local dialects in African colonies under French assimilation policies.[67] Yet, post-colonial persistence of English as a lingua franca in South Asia and Africa underscores enduring cultural transfers that facilitated global integration, countering claims of wholesale imposition without adaptation.[68] Psychologically, imperialism appealed to elites through a sense of racial and cultural superiority, reinforced by pseudo-scientific theories ranking civilizations hierarchically, which motivated adventurers and administrators seeking validation of national prowess.[69] This mindset fostered a "colonial consciousness" among rulers, characterized by paternalism and detachment, as analyzed in studies of British India where administrators viewed governance as a burdensome yet ennobling duty.[70] For the colonized, prolonged subjugation engendered internalized inferiority, though resistance movements, such as India's Swadeshi campaign of 1905, demonstrated psychological resilience and cultural revival as countermeasures.[71] Balanced assessments reveal that while exploitative, imperial encounters spurred hybrid identities, as seen in creolized cultures of the Caribbean, blending European and African elements into resilient social fabrics.[72]Justifications and Empirical Benefits
Strategic and Security Rationales
Imperial powers historically pursued expansion to secure borders, deny strategic territories to rivals, and establish defensible frontiers, often framing these actions as essential for national survival amid great-power competition. In ancient Rome, conquests beyond the Italian peninsula created buffer zones against barbarian threats; Julius Caesar's campaigns in Gaul from 58 to 50 BCE incorporated the region to fortify the Rhine as a natural barrier, preventing Germanic migrations that could destabilize core provinces and enabling legionary redeployments for internal security.[73] Similarly, the annexation of client kingdoms in the Near East under Augustus around 30 BCE established the Euphrates as a forward defense line against Parthian incursions, with fortified limes systems integrating local auxiliaries to extend Roman deterrence without overextending legions.[74] Maritime empires emphasized control of chokepoints and naval bases to protect trade arteries and expeditionary capabilities. Britain's seizure of Gibraltar in 1704, formalized by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, secured the Mediterranean's western gateway, allowing dominance over sea lanes to Egypt and India while denying French or Spanish fleets unchallenged access; this position facilitated the Royal Navy's projection of power, as evidenced by its role in containing Napoleonic threats in 1805.[75] The 1882 occupation of Egypt stemmed directly from vulnerabilities exposed during the 1881-1882 Arabi Revolt, which threatened the Suez Canal—opened in 1869 and partially owned by Britain since 1875—vital for slashing India troop transit from six months around the Cape to about one month, thereby countering Russian advances in Afghanistan during the Great Game rivalry from 1830 to 1907.[76][77] Such rationales extended to continental powers, where geographic buffers mitigated invasion risks. Russia's 19th-century push into Central Asia, annexing khanates like Bukhara by 1868, aimed to preempt British encirclement from India while creating steppe cordons against nomadic raiders, enhancing St. Petersburg's defensive depth amid Ottoman and Persian instabilities.[78] Empirical outcomes supported these imperatives: British retention of Suez until 1956 enabled rapid reinforcements during World War I, sustaining campaigns in Mesopotamia and Palestine against Ottoman forces, while Roman provincial integrations correlated with two centuries of relative internal peace under the Pax Romana from 27 BCE to 180 CE, underscoring how forward positioning reduced homeland vulnerabilities.[79] These security gains, however, often intertwined with economic motives, though primary archival rationales from imperial policymakers prioritized geopolitical containment over extraction alone.[80]Civilizational and Moral Imperatives
European imperial powers in the 19th and early 20th centuries frequently justified territorial expansion through the concept of a civilizing mission, portraying imperialism as a moral obligation to elevate non-European societies from perceived barbarism to modernity.[81] This rationale, encapsulated in Rudyard Kipling's 1899 poem "The White Man's Burden," urged Western nations to shoulder the selfless duty of guiding "new-caught, sullen peoples" toward enlightenment, despite ingratitude and hardship, influencing debates on U.S. annexation of the Philippines following the Spanish-American War.[65] Theodore Roosevelt expressed similar support for imperialism in his April 1899 speech "The Strenuous Life," advocating vigorous national action, including expansion abroad, as essential to avoid decline and fulfill moral duties of strength and leadership.[82] Similarly, France's mission civilisatrice under the Third Republic framed colonial rule as an extension of republican universalism, aiming to assimilate subjects through French language, law, and culture while reconciling imperial difference with Enlightenment ideals.[83] Proponents argued that imperialism fulfilled ethical imperatives by disseminating Christianity, rational governance, and economic progress, often summarized as the "three Cs" of civilization, Christianity, and commerce.[81] Missionaries and administrators viewed non-Christian practices as heathenism warranting intervention, while commerce promised mutual prosperity through resource development and trade, as seen in the post-1807 shift from slave trading to resource extraction in Africa.[81] In practice, colonial administrations suppressed local tyrannies, abolished slavery, and established public health systems, with voluntary participation—such as millions attending colonial schools and hospitals—indicating perceived legitimacy among subjects.[84] Empirical outcomes supported claims of civilizational advancement in several domains. Under Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau, rice production quadrupled and life expectancy increased by 0.73 years annually, outpacing post-independence gains of 0.3 years.[84] Across African colonies, colonial periods saw rises in stature, life expectancy, literacy, and educational attainment from low baselines, alongside institutional reforms like modern armies and infrastructure that stabilized anarchic regions.[85][84] These developments, including expanded female rights and employment, underscored imperialism's role in enhancing human welfare, countering narratives that overlook such legacies in favor of post-colonial failures.[84]Economic Development and Institutional Transfers
Imperial powers during the era of high imperialism transferred various institutions to their colonies, including legal frameworks, property rights regimes, and administrative bureaucracies, which in many cases laid foundations for long-term economic development by promoting rule of law, contract enforcement, and market-oriented governance.[86] Empirical analysis indicates that these institutional legacies explain a substantial portion—up to 75%—of the cross-country variation in per capita income as of the late 20th century, with colonies receiving "inclusive" institutions (those protecting property rights and limiting executive power) exhibiting higher growth trajectories compared to those under extractive systems focused on resource plunder.[87] For instance, European settler mortality rates during the colonial period served as an instrument for institutional quality: low-mortality environments, such as in Australia and New Zealand, prompted the export of robust property rights and judicial independence from Britain, correlating with GDP per capita exceeding $30,000 by 1995, versus under $1,000 in high-mortality extractive cases like much of sub-Saharan Africa.[86] In the British Empire, the transplantation of common law systems provided superior investor protections and adaptability to local conditions, fostering entrepreneurship and financial intermediation that accelerated industrialization in colonies like India and Hong Kong.[88] Districts in India under direct British administration from 1858 to 1947, benefiting from centralized revenue collection and legal uniformity, registered 0.5–1% higher annual growth in economic activity (measured via satellite night lights from 1992–2013) than indirectly ruled princely states, attributable to enduring effects of impartial bureaucracy and property titling.[89] Similarly, Hong Kong's adoption of British commercial codes and an independent judiciary post-1842 enabled it to evolve from a fishing village into a global financial hub, with real GDP per capita rising from approximately $400 in 1960 to over $25,000 by 1997, driven by secure contract enforcement that attracted foreign investment exceeding 30% of GDP annually in the 1980s.[88] French and other continental European empires, by contrast, often imposed civil law codes emphasizing state hierarchy over individual rights, yielding mixed developmental outcomes; while Algeria saw some infrastructural gains under French rule from 1830, its post-independence GDP growth lagged behind British-influenced North African territories due to weaker property protections.[90] Higher salaries for colonial governors in well-resourced administrations, as in parts of the Dutch East Indies after 1900, correlated with institutionalized anti-corruption measures and land reforms that boosted agricultural productivity by 20–30% in affected regions, demonstrating how administrative transfers could mitigate rent-seeking and enhance human capital accumulation.[91] These institutional effects persisted beyond decolonization, with former colonies inheriting English legal origins outperforming French or Spanish counterparts in financial depth and private credit provision, as measured by ratios to GDP in the World Bank's 2000s datasets.[88] Critics of these transfers, often drawing from dependency theory, argue they primarily served metropolitan interests, yet econometric evidence underscores causal links to development where institutions curbed elite capture and enabled broad-based investment; for example, reversion experiments replacing actual institutions with settler-mortality predictions confirm that institutional quality alone accounts for over 4-fold differences in income levels across ex-colonies.[87] In summary, while not uniform, the empirical record supports that imperialism's institutional endowments—particularly those emphasizing checks on power and economic freedoms—have been a key driver of differential post-colonial prosperity, outweighing initial extraction in longevity and scope.[86][89]Health, Technology, and Infrastructure Advancements
Imperial powers constructed extensive transportation and communication infrastructures in their colonies, which enhanced connectivity and economic activity. In British India, the railway system expanded from its inception in 1853 to over 41,000 miles by 1947, enabling efficient movement of goods, troops, and people while integrating remote regions into national markets.[92] Similarly, irrigation projects such as the Upper Ganges Canal, completed in 1854, irrigated approximately 1.5 million acres of farmland, boosting agricultural productivity and mitigating drought impacts in northern India.[93] In Africa, European colonizers developed road networks and ports; for instance, the Belgian administration in the Congo constructed over 80,000 miles of roads by the mid-20th century, facilitating resource extraction but also internal trade and access to markets.[94] Technological transfers included the adoption of steam-powered machinery, telegraphy, and modern engineering practices. The British introduced the telegraph in India in 1851, creating a network spanning 250,000 miles by 1900 that revolutionized administrative control and information flow across the subcontinent.[93] In French West Africa, colonial engineers implemented hydraulic technologies for urban water supply and sanitation systems in cities like Dakar, drawing from metropolitan expertise to address tropical diseases.[95] These innovations often prioritized imperial logistics, yet they laid foundations for enduring technical capabilities, such as standardized rail gauges and electrical grids in settler colonies like Algeria, where French investment in hydroelectric dams by the 1930s powered industrial growth.[96] Health advancements stemmed from the importation of Western medical practices, including vaccination programs and institutional healthcare. British authorities initiated smallpox vaccination in India as early as 1802, conducting mass campaigns that reduced incidence in urban areas and contributed to broader disease control efforts across Asia and Africa under colonial oversight.[97] In regions of direct British rule in India, health outcomes improved notably, with studies showing lower infant mortality and higher life expectancy in directly administered districts compared to princely states, particularly benefiting non-tribal populations by the early 20th century.[98] Colonial Africa saw similar gains; in the Belgian Congo, public health initiatives by independence in 1960 had elevated average life expectancy and reduced morbidity from endemic diseases through hospital construction and sanitary reforms, despite uneven coverage.[94] Empirical analyses indicate that higher European settler presence in colonies correlated with sustained increases in life expectancy and declines in fertility and infant mortality rates, attributable to imported epidemiological knowledge and infrastructure like quarantine stations.[99] In sub-Saharan Africa, life expectancy began rising during the 1930s and 1940s under colonial administrations, driven by anti-malarial campaigns and nutritional interventions.[100]Criticisms, Exploitation, and Human Costs
Economic Drain and Resource Extraction Narratives
Critics of imperialism have long advanced narratives portraying colonial rule as a mechanism of systematic economic drain, whereby wealth generated in colonies was siphoned to metropolitan centers without commensurate reinvestment, thereby stunting indigenous development. Dadabhai Naoroji, in his 1901 work Poverty and Un-British Rule in India, formalized the "drain theory" by estimating that Britain extracted £20–30 million annually from India during the late 19th century—roughly one-third of India's revenue—through unrequited exports, home charges for British administration (including interest on loans and military pensions), and private remittances by European officials and traders.[101][102] Naoroji supported these figures with trade balance data and budget analyses, arguing that the absence of equivalent imports or productive spending in India perpetuated poverty and famine vulnerability, as evidenced by per capita income stagnation amid Britain's industrial gains.[101] These drain claims extended to broader resource extraction models, where colonies functioned as peripheral suppliers of primary commodities—such as Indian cotton, African minerals, and Latin American guano—to imperial industries, often enforced via monopolistic trade policies and coerced labor. In British India, critics like Romesh Chunder Dutt in Economic History of India (1902) documented deindustrialization, with India's global textile manufacturing share plummeting from 25% in 1750 to under 2% by 1900, attributed to discriminatory tariffs favoring Lancashire imports while raw exports flowed out cheaply.[103] In Africa, narratives highlight extractive excesses like the Congo Free State's rubber regime under Leopold II (1885–1908), where forced labor quotas yielded an estimated 10 million tons of rubber and ivory, generating personal profits equivalent to $1.1 billion in 2020 dollars for Belgium, yet leaving local economies devoid of infrastructure or diversification.[104] Dependency theorists, building on these accounts, posited that such imbalances created enduring "unequal exchange," locking peripheries into underdevelopment by suppressing local capital accumulation and technological transfer.[105] Empirical scrutiny of these narratives reveals methodological limitations and contextual oversights, particularly in attributing causality to drain amid pre-existing economic stagnation and post-colonial policy failures. Naoroji's estimates, while grounded in official records, conflated fiscal transfers with net economic flows, ignoring British capital inflows for railways (over 67,000 km by 1947) and irrigation that boosted agricultural output by 20–30% in Punjab and elsewhere, potentially yielding returns exceeding repatriated profits.[106] Quantitative studies estimate the Indian drain at 1–2% of British GDP annually pre-1914, insufficient to explain Britain's growth, which derived primarily from domestic innovation and trade with non-colonial partners; moreover, India's GDP per capita grew modestly at 0.5% yearly under British rule, contrasting sharper declines in Mughal-era fragmentation.[107][108] In Africa, while extractive colonialism correlated with localized inequality—e.g., mining enclaves showing 10–15% lower development legacies—cross-national regressions indicate institutions and geography as stronger predictors of post-independence underperformance than extraction volume alone.[90][104] Proponents' works, often from nationalist or Marxist perspectives, exhibit selection bias by emphasizing outflows while downplaying market access benefits, such as India's export tripling from 1870–1913, which integrated it into global commerce despite unequal terms.[106]| Key Drain Components (British India, ca. 1870–1900) | Estimated Annual Value (£ million) | Proportion of India's Revenue (%) |
|---|---|---|
| Home Charges (admin, debt interest) | 10–15 | 10–15 |
| Pensions and Remittances | 5–10 | 5–10 |
| Unrequited Goods Exports | 5–10 | 5–10 |
| Total Drain | 20–30 | ~33 |