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International Criminal Police Organization
  • Arabic:منظمة الشرطة الجنائية الدولية
    French:Organisation internationale de police criminelle
    Spanish:Organización Internacional de Policía Criminal
Common nameInterpol
AbbreviationICPO-INTERPOL
MottoConnecting police for a safer world
Agency overview
Formed7 September 1923; 102 years ago (1923-09-07)
Preceding agencies
  • First International Criminal Police Congress (1914)
  • International Police Conference (1922)
  • International Criminal Police Commission (1923)
Employees1,050 (2019)
Annual budget€176 million (2023)
Jurisdictional structure
International agency
Countries196 member states
Governing bodyGeneral Assembly
Constituting instrument
  • ICPO-INTERPOL Constitution and General Regulations[1][2]
Operational structure
HeadquartersLyon, France
Multinational agency
Nationalities of personnel130 (2024)
Agency executives
Facilities
National Central Bureaus196
Website
interpol.int Edit this at Wikidata

The International Criminal Police Organization – INTERPOL (abbreviated as ICPO–INTERPOL), commonly known as Interpol[3] (UK: /ˈɪntərpɒl/ IN-tər-pol, US: /-pl/ -⁠pohl;[4] stylized in allcaps), is an international organization that facilitates worldwide police cooperation and crime control. It is the world's largest international police organization. It is headquartered in Lyon, France, with seven regional bureaus worldwide, and a National Central Bureau in all 196 member states.[5]

The organization today known as Interpol was founded on 7 September 1923 at the close of a five-day International Police Congress in Vienna as the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC);[6] it adopted many of its current duties throughout the 1930s. After coming under Nazi control in 1938,[7] the agency had its headquarters in the same building as the Gestapo.[8] It was effectively stagnant until the end of World War II.[7] In 1956, the ICPC adopted a new constitution and the name Interpol, derived from its telegraphic address used since 1946.[3]

Interpol provides investigative support, expertise and training to law enforcement worldwide, focusing on three major areas of transnational crime: terrorism, cybercrime and organized crime. Its broad mandate covers virtually every kind of crime, including crimes against humanity, child pornography, drug trafficking and production, political corruption, intellectual property infringement, as well as white-collar crime.[9] The agency also facilitates cooperation among national law enforcement institutions through criminal databases and communications networks. Contrary to popular belief, Interpol is itself not a law enforcement agency.

Interpol has an annual budget of €142 million ($155 million), most of which comes from annual contributions by member police forces in 181 countries. It is governed by a General Assembly composed of all member countries, which elects the executive committee and the president (currently Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi of the United Arab Emirates) to supervise and implement Interpol's policies and administration. Day-to-day operations are carried out by the General Secretariat, comprising around 1,000 personnel from over 100 countries, including both police and civilians. The Secretariat is led by the secretary-general, currently Valdecy Urquiza, the former vice president of Interpol for the Americas.[10]

Pursuant to its charter, Interpol seeks to remain politically neutral in fulfilling its mandate, and is thus barred from interventions or activities that are political, military, religious, or racial in nature and from involving itself in disputes over such matters.[11] The agency operates in four languages: Arabic, English, French and Spanish.[5]

History

[edit]

Until the 19th century, cooperation among police in different national and political jurisdictions was organized largely on an ad hoc basis, focused on a specific goal or criminal enterprise.[12] The earliest attempt at a formal, permanent framework for international police coordination was the Police Union of German States, formed in 1851 to bring together police from various German-speaking states. Its activities were centered mostly on political dissidents and criminals. A similar plan was launched by Italy in the 1898 Anti-Anarchist Conference of Rome, which brought delegates from 21 European countries to create a formal structure for addressing the international anarchist movement. Neither the conference nor its follow up meeting in St. Petersburg in 1904 yielded results.

Interpol headquarters in the 6th arrondissement of Lyon, France

The early 20th century saw several attempts to formalize international police cooperation, driven by increasing international travel and commerce, which facilitated transnational criminal enterprises and fugitives on the run.[13] The first major effort was the International Criminal Police Congress, held in Monaco in 1914. This event brought diplomats and legal officials from two dozen countries to discuss international collaboration in criminal investigations, the sharing of investigative techniques, and extradition procedures.[14] The Monaco Congress outlined twelve principles that would eventually form the foundation of Interpol, such as establishing direct communication between police forces in different countries, creating international standards for forensics and data collection, and streamlining the process for handling extradition requests. However, the idea of an international police organization remained inactive during the First World War. In 1922, the United States attempted a similar initiative through the International Police Conference in New York City, but it failed to garner international support.[15]

A year later, in 1923, a new initiative was undertaken at another International Criminal Police Congress in Vienna, spearheaded by Johannes Schober, President of the Viennese Police Department. The 22 delegates agreed to found the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), the direct forerunner of Interpol, which would be based in Vienna. Founding members included police officials from Austria, Germany, Belgium, Poland, China, Egypt, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Japan, Romania, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.[16] The same year, wanted person notices were first published in the ICPCs International Public Safety Journal. The United Kingdom joined in 1928.[17] By 1934, the ICPC's membership more than doubled to 58 nations.[citation needed] The United States did not join Interpol until 1938, although a U.S. police officer unofficially attended the 1923 congress.[18]

Following the Anschluss in 1938, the Vienna-based organization fell under the control of Nazi Germany; on November 29, 1941, Interpol had offices at Am Kleinen Wannsee 16;[19] the commission’s headquarters were eventually moved to Berlin in 1942.[20] Most member states withdrew their support during this period.[16] From 1938 to 1945, the presidents of the ICPC included Otto Steinhäusl, Reinhard Heydrich, Arthur Nebe and Ernst Kaltenbrunner. All were generals in the Schutzstaffel (SS); Kaltenbrunner was the highest-ranking SS officer executed following the Nuremberg trials.

In 1946, after the end of World War II, the organization was revived as the International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO) by officials from Belgium, France, Scandinavia, the United States and the United Kingdom. Its new headquarters were established in Paris, then from 1967 in Saint-Cloud, a Parisian suburb. They remained there until 1989 when they were moved to their present location in Lyon.

Until the 1980s, Interpol did not intervene in the prosecution of Nazi war criminals in accordance with Article 3 of its Charter, which prohibited intervention in "political" matters.[21]

On May 10, 2023, Operation Identify Me was launched.[22]

Constitution

[edit]

The role of Interpol is defined by the general provisions of its constitution.[1]

Article 2 states that its role is:

  1. To ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
  2. To establish and develop all institutions likely to contribute effectively to the prevention and suppression of ordinary law crimes.

Article 3 states:

It is strictly forbidden for the Organization to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.

Operating procedures

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Contrary to the common idea due to frequent portrayals in popular media, Interpol is not a supranational law enforcement agency and has no agents with arresting powers. Instead, it is an international organization that functions as a network of law enforcement agencies from different countries.[23][24] The organization thus functions as an administrative liaison among the law enforcement agencies of the member countries, providing communications and database assistance, mostly through its central headquarters in Lyon,[25] along with the assistance of smaller local bureaus in each of its member states.

Interpol's databases at the Lyon headquarters can assist law enforcement in fighting international crime.[26] While national agencies have their own extensive crime databases, the information rarely extends beyond one nation's borders. Interpol's databases can track criminals and crime trends around the world, specifically by means of authorized collections of fingerprints and face photos, lists of wanted persons, DNA samples, and travel documents. Interpol's lost and stolen travel document database alone contains more than 12 million records. Officials at the headquarters also analyze this data and release information on crime trends to the member countries.

An encrypted Internet-based worldwide communications network allows Interpol agents and member countries to contact each other at any time. Known as I-24/7, the network offers constant access to Interpol's databases.[26] While the National Central Bureaus are the primary access sites to the network, some member countries have expanded it to key areas such as airports and border access points. Member countries can also access each other's criminal databases via the I-24/7 system.

Interpol issues eight types of Interpol notices, seven of which are: red, blue, green, yellow, black, orange, and purple. An eighth special notice is issued at the special request of the United Nations Security Council.[27] As of 2019, there were 62,448 valid Red and 12,234 Yellow notices in circulation.[28]

In the event of an international disaster, terrorist attack, or assassination, Interpol can send an Incident Response Team (IRT). IRTs can offer a range of expertise and database access to assist with victim identification, suspect identification, and the dissemination of information to other nations' law enforcement agencies. In addition, at the request of local authorities, they can act as a central command and logistics operation to coordinate other law enforcement agencies involved in a case. Such teams were deployed eight times in 2013. Interpol began issuing its own travel documents in 2009 with hopes that nations would remove visa requirements for individuals travelling for Interpol business, thereby improving response times.[29] In September 2017, the organization voted to accept Palestine and the Solomon Islands as members.[30]

Finances

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In 2019, Interpol's operating income was €142 million, of which 41 percent were statutory contributions by member countries, 35 percent were voluntary cash contributions and 24 percent were in-kind contributions for the use of equipment, services and buildings.[28] With the goal of enhancing the collaboration between Interpol and the private sector to support Interpol's missions, the Interpol Foundation for a Safer World was created in 2013. Although legally independent of Interpol, the relationship between the two is close enough for Interpol's president to obtain in 2015 the departure of HSBC CEO from the foundation board after the Swiss Leaks allegations.[31]

From 2004 to 2010, Interpol's external auditors was the French Court of Audit.[32][33] In November 2010, the Court of Audit was replaced by the Office of the Auditor General of Norway for a three-year term with an option for a further three years.[34][35]

Offices

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In addition to its General Secretariat headquarters in Lyon, Interpol maintains six regional bureaus and three special representative offices:[36]

Interpol's Command and Coordination Centres offer a 24-hour point of contact for national police forces seeking urgent information or facing a crisis. The original is in Lyon with a second in Buenos Aires added in September 2011. A third was opened in Singapore in September 2014.[37]

Interpol opened a Special Representative Office to the UN in New York City in 2004[38] and to the EU in Brussels in 2009.[39]

The organization has constructed the Interpol Global Complex for Innovation (IGCI) in Singapore to act as its research and development facility, and a place of cooperation on digital crimes investigations. It was officially opened in April 2015, but had already become active beforehand. Most notably, a worldwide takedown of the SIMDA botnet infrastructure was coordinated and executed from IGCI's Cyber Fusion Centre in the weeks before the opening, as was revealed at the launch event.[40]

Leadership

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Secretaries General

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Presidents

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Paul Dickopf (1968–1972)

[edit]

Under the Nazi government of Adolf Hitler, Paul Dickopf was a member of the National Socialist German Students' League, Sturmabteilung and the Schutzstaffel before and during World War II.

Dickopf was elected as the president of Interpol in 1968, apparently aided by the good contacts of François Genoud to the Arab world.[41][42] While his former Nazi connections were known, he maintained his post until 1972.[43]

Jackie Selebi (2004–2008)

[edit]

After being charged of corruption in January 2008, Jackie Selebi resigned as president of Interpol and was put on extended leave as National Police Commissioner of South Africa.[44]

In July 2010 Selebi was found guilty of corruption by the South African High Court in Johannesburg for accepting bribes worth €156,000 from a drug trafficker.[45]

Khoo Boon Hui (2008–2012)

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Jackie Selebi was temporarily replaced by Arturo Herrera Verdugo [es], the National Commissioner of Investigations Police of Chile and former vice president for the American Zone, who remained acting president until the appointment of Singaporean Khoo Boon Hui in October 2008.[46]

Mireille Ballestrazzi (2012–2016)

[edit]

On November 8, 2012, the 81st General Assembly closed with the election of Deputy Central Director of the French Judicial Police, Mireille Ballestrazzi, as the first female president of the organization.[47][48]

Meng Hongwei (2016–2018)

[edit]

In November 2016, Meng Hongwei, a politician from the People’s Republic of China, was elected president during the 85th Interpol General Assembly, and was to serve in this capacity until 2018.[49]

At the end of September 2018, Meng was reported missing during a trip to China, after being “taken away” for questioning by discipline authorities.[50][51][52] Chinese police later confirmed that Meng had been arrested on charges of bribery as part of a national anti-corruption campaign.[53] On October 7, 2018, INTERPOL announced that Meng had resigned his post with immediate effect and that the Presidency would be temporarily occupied by Interpol Senior Vice-president (Asia) Kim Jong Yang of South Korea.

Kim Jong Yang (2018–2021)

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On November 21, 2018, Interpol’s General Assembly elected Kim Jong Yang to fill the remainder of Meng’s term,[54] in a controversial election which saw accusations that the other candidate, Vice President Alexander Prokopchuk of Russia, had used Interpol notices to target critics of the Russian government.[55]

Four American senators had accused Vice President Alexander Prokopchuk of abusing Red Notices, likening his election to "putting a fox in charge of the henhouse".[56] A statement posted by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union and signed by other NGOs raised concerns about his ability to use his Interpol position to silence Russia's critics.[57] Russian politicians criticized the U.S. accusation as politically motivated interference.[58]

Ahmed Nase Al-Raisi (2021–)

[edit]

On November 25, 2021, Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi, inspector general of the United Arab Emirates’s interior ministry, was elected as president. The election was controversial due to the UAE’s human rights record, with concerns being raised by some human rights groups (e.g. Human Rights Watch) and some MEPs.

In June 2021, 35 French Parliamentarians, Members of Parliament and Senators, including from the majority and the opposition, urged President Emmanuel Macron to oppose the candidacy of the UAE's General Ahmed Nasser Al-Raisi, citing the accusations of torture against him. It was the second appeal by the deputy of the Rhône, Hubert Julien-Laferrière, who had first written to Macron earlier in 2021. He questioned how a profile like Al-Raisi's, who was responsible for the torture of political opponent Ahmed Mansoor and of a British academic Matthew Hedges, can become the president of a most respectable institution.[59][60]

While the UAE was arranging trips for Al-Raisi to Interpol's member countries, opposition against the Emirati candidate amplified. A number of German MPs signed a petition to express "deep concern" and reject the candidacy of Al-Raisi for the post of Interpol director.[61][62] Rodney Dixon, the British lawyer of Matthew Hedges and Ali Ahmad, submitted a complaint and urged the Swedish authorities to arrest Al-Raisi upon his arrival in Sweden.[63][64] The two Britons also raised a similar request to arrest al-Raisi with the Norwegian police authorities. Both Sweden and Norway apply jurisdiction that allows them to open investigations of crime, irrespective of a person's nationality or the origin country of the crime.[65]

In October 2021, Al-Raisi had to face further opposition, as the lawyers submitted a complaint to the French Prosecutor in Paris. The claims cited Al-Raisi's role in the unlawful detention and torture of Ali Issa Ahmad and Matthew Hedges. Filed under the principle of universal jurisdiction, the complaint gave French officials the authority to investigate and arrest foreign nationals. As Raisi is not a head of state, French authorities had all the rights to arrest and question him on entering the French territory.[66]

As the General Assembly was approaching, the opposition was rising. In November 2021, a Turkish lawyer Gulden Sonmez filed a criminal complaint against Al-Raisi's nomination in Turkey, where the vote was to take place. Sonmez said the Emirates' attempt to cover its human rights records and to launder its reputation.[67] Besides, Hedges and Ahmad were also expected to file a lawsuit in Turkey against Al-Raisi, ahead of the General Assembly.[68]

Criticism

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Former Interpol President Meng Hongwei was arrested in China for abusing his position for personal gain and misusing state funds and taking more than $2 million in bribes. He resigned as president of Interpol and was expelled from the Chinese Communist Party[69][70]

Abusive requests for Interpol arrests

[edit]

Despite its politically neutral stance, some have criticized the agency for its role in arrests that critics contend were politically motivated.[71] In their declaration, adopted in Oslo (2010),[72] Monaco (2012),[73] Istanbul (2013),[74] and Baku (2014),[75] the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) criticized some OSCE member States for their abuse of mechanisms of the international investigation and urged them to support the reform of Interpol in order to avoid politically motivated prosecution. The resolution of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 31 January 2014 criticizes the mechanisms of operation of the Commission for the Control of Interpol's files, in particular, non-adversarial procedures and unjust decisions.[76][77] In 2014, PACE adopted a decision to thoroughly analyse the problem of the abuse of Interpol and to compile a special report on this matter.[78] In May 2015, within the framework of the preparation of the report, the PACE Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights organized a hearing in Yerevan, during which both representatives of NGOs and Interpol had the opportunity to speak.[79] According to Freedom House, Russia is responsible for 38% of Interpol's public Red Notices.[80] There currently are "approximately 66,370 valid Red Notices, of which some 7,669 are public."[81]

Refugees who are included in the list of Interpol can be arrested when crossing the border.[82] In the year 2008, the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees pointed to the problem of arrests of refugees on the request of INTERPOL[83] in connection with politically motivated charges.

In 2021, Turkey,[84] China, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Russia, and Venezuela were accused of abusing Interpol by using it to target political opponents.[85] China used Interpol against the Uyghurs, where the government issued a Red Notice against activists and other members of the ethnic minority group living abroad.[86] Since 1997, 1,546 cases from 28 countries of detention and deportation of the Uyghurs were recorded.[87] In the case of Turkey, Interpol had to turn down 800 requests,[88] including one for NBA basketball player Enes Kanter Freedom.[89] The UAE was also accused as one of the countries attempting to buy influence in Interpol. Using the Interpol Foundation for a Safer World, the Arab nation gave donations of $54 million. The amount was estimated as equal to the statutory contributions together made by the rest 194 members.[90] It was asserted that the Emirates' growing influence over Interpol gave it the opportunity to host the General Assembly in 2018 and in 2020 (that was postponed due to the COVID-19 pandemic).[86]

World

[edit]

Organizations such as Detained in Dubai, Open Dialog Foundation,[91] Fair Trials International,[82] Centre for Peace Studies,[92] and International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,[93] indicate that non-democratic states use Interpol to harass opposition politicians, journalists, human rights activists, and businessmen. The countries accused of abusing the agency include China, Russia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Iran, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Venezuela, and Tunisia.[91][82][93][94]

The Open Dialog Foundation's report analysed 44 high-profile political cases which went through the Interpol system.[91] A number of persons who have been granted refugee status in the European Union (EU) and the US—including Russian businessman Andrey Borodin,[95] Chechen Arbi Bugaev,[96] Kazakh opposition politician Mukhtar Ablyazov[97] and his associate Artur Trofimov,[98] and Sri Lankan journalist Chandima Withana[99] —continue to remain on the public INTERPOL list. Some of the refugees remain on the list even after courts have refused to extradite them to a non-democratic state (for example, Pavel Zabelin,[100] a witness in the case of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and Alexandr Pavlov,[101] former security chief of the Kazakh oppositionist Ablyazov). Another case is Manuel Rosales, a politician who opposed Hugo Chavez and fled to Peru in 2009 and was subject to a red alert on charges of corruption for two weeks. Interpol deleted the request for prosecution immediately.[102] Interpol has also been criticized for mistaking people on yellow alerts. One case was Alondra Díaz-Nuñez, who in April 2015 was apprehended in Guanajuato City, Mexico being mistaken for a missing American teenager.[103] Interpol came under heavy criticism from Mexican news and media for helping out Policia Federal Ministerial, Mexican Federal Police, and the U.S. Embassy and Consulate in Mexico, in what was believed to be a kidnapping.[citation needed]

Eastern Europe

[edit]

The 2013 PACE's Istanbul Declaration of the OSCE cited specific cases of such prosecution, including those of the Russian activist Petr Silaev, financier William Browder, businessman Ilya Katsnelson, Belarusian politician Ales Michalevic, and Ukrainian politician Bohdan Danylyshyn.[citation needed]

On 25 July 2014, despite Interpol's Constitution prohibiting them from undertaking any intervention or activities of a political or military nature,[104] the Ukrainian nationalist paramilitary leader Dmytro Yarosh was placed on Interpol's international wanted list at the request of Russian authorities,[105] which made him the only person wanted internationally after the beginning of the 2014 Russian military intervention in Ukraine. For a long time, Interpol refused to place former President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych on the wanted list as a suspect by the new Ukrainian government for the mass killing of protesters during Euromaidan.[106][107] Yanukovych was eventually placed on the wanted list on 12 January 2015.[108] However, on 16 July 2015, after an intervention of Joseph Hage Aaronson, the British law firm hired by Yanukovych, the international arrest warrant against the former president of Ukraine was suspended pending further review.[109] In December 2014, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) liquidated[clarification needed] a sabotage and reconnaissance group that was led by a former agent of the Ukrainian Bureau of INTERPOL that also has family relations in the Ukrainian counter-intelligence agencies.[110] In 2014, Russia made attempts to place Ukrainian politician Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Ukrainian civic activist Pavel Ushevets, subject to criminal persecution in Russia following his pro-Ukrainian art performance in Moscow, on the Interpol wanted list.[111]

On October 30, 2023, Belarusian filmmaker Andrey Gnyot got arrested when he landed in Belgrade as he was put on an Interpol warrant list. He is accused by the Belarusian authorities of tax evasion and issued an extradition request.[112] During the 2020–2021 Belarusian protests, Gnyot co-founded the Free Association of Athletes (SOS-BY), bringing together athletes opposed to the Lukashenko regime. He spent seven months in detention in Belgrade before being transferred to house arrest in June 2024. Amnesty International called on the Serbian authorities to cease the extradition process.[113]

Middle East

[edit]

According to a report by the Stockholm Center for Freedom that was issued in September 2017, Turkey has weaponized Interpol mechanisms to hunt down legitimate critics and opponents in violation of Interpol's own constitution. The report lists abuse cases where not only arrest warrants but also revocation of travel documents and passports were used by Turkey as persecution tools against critics and opponents. The harassment campaign targeted foreign companies as well.[114] Syrian-Kurd Salih Muslim was briefly detained at Turkey's request on 25 February 2018 in Prague, the capital of the Czech Republic,[115] but was released 2 days later, drawing angry protests from Turkey.[116] On 17 March 2018, the Czech authorities dismissed Turkey's request as lacking merit.[citation needed]

On 25 January 2022, Serbian authorities extradited a Bahraini dissident, Ahmed Jaafar Mohamed Ali. The decision came despite an injunction to postpone the extradition until 25 February by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). Director of Advocacy at the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD), Sayed Ahmed Alwadaei criticized Interpol and said that violating the decision of ECHR indicates how "red lines will be crossed" under Interpol President Ahmed Al-Raisi's leadership. When contacted about the case by The Guardian, Interpol stated that decisions regarding extradition and arrests were the responsibility of member countries and Interpol, including its president, is not involved in the process.[117] Human rights groups had lobbied against Ahmed Al Raisi's candidacy as Interpol President, accusing him of failing to investigate complaints of torture against UAE security forces, allegations of which he rejects.[118]

Appeals and requests withdrawals

[edit]

The procedure for filing an appeal with Interpol is a long and complex one. For example, the Venezuelan journalist Patricia Poleo and a colleague of Kazakh activist Ablyazov, and Tatiana Paraskevich, who were granted refugee status, sought to overturn the politically motivated request for as long as one and a half years, and six months, respectively.[119][120][121]

Interpol has previously recognized some requests to include persons on the wanted list as politically motivated, e.g., Indonesian activist Benny Wenda, Georgian politician Givi Targamadze,[122] ex-president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili,[123] ex-mayor of Maracaibo and 2006 Venezuelan presidential election candidate Manuel Rosales and ex-president of Honduras Manuel Zelaya Rosales;[124] these persons have subsequently been removed. However, in most cases, Interpol removes a Red Notice against refugees only after an authoritarian state closes a criminal case or declares amnesty (for example, the cases of Russian activists and political refugees Petr Silaev, Denis Solopov, and Aleksey Makarov, as well as the Turkish sociologist and feminist Pinar Selek).[125][126][127][128]

Diplomacy

[edit]

In 2016, Taiwan criticized Interpol for turning down its application to join the General Assembly as an observer.[129] The United States supported Taiwan's participation, and the US Congress passed legislation directing the Secretary of State to develop a strategy to obtain observer status for Taiwan.[130]

The election of Meng Hongwei, a Chinese national, as president and Alexander Prokopchuk, a Russian, as vice president of Interpol for Europe drew criticism in anglophone media and raised fears of Interpol accepting politically motivated requests from China and Russia.[131][132][133]

Business

[edit]

In 2013, Interpol was criticized over its multimillion-dollar deals with such private sector bodies as FIFA, Philip Morris, and the pharmaceutical industry. The criticism was mainly about the lack of transparency and potential conflicts of interest, such as Codentify.[clarification needed][134][135][136][137][138][139] After the 2015 FIFA scandal, the organization has severed ties with all the private-sector bodies that evoked such criticism, and has adopted a new and transparent financing framework.

Reform

[edit]

From 1 to 3 July 2015, Interpol organized a session of the Working Group on the Processing of Information, which was formed specifically in order to verify the mechanisms of information processing. The Working Group heard the recommendations of civil society as regards the reform of the international investigation system and promised to take them into account, in light of possible obstruction or refusal to file crime reports nationally.[140]

The Open Dialog Foundation, a human rights organization, recommended that Interpol, in particular: create a mechanism for the protection of rights of people having international refugee status; initiate closer cooperation of the Commission for the Control of Files with human rights NGOs and experts on asylum and extradition; enforce sanctions for violations of Interpol's rules; strengthen cooperation with NGOs, the UN, OSCE, the PACE, and the European Parliament.[141]

Fair Trials International proposed to create effective remedies for individuals who are wanted under a Red Notice on unfair charges; to penalize nations which frequently abuse the Interpol system; to ensure more transparency of Interpol's work.[142]

The Centre for Peace Studies also created recommendations for Interpol, in particular, to delete Red Notices and Diffusions for people who were granted refugee status according to 1951 Refugee Convention issued by their countries of origin, and to establish an independent body to review Red Notices on a regular basis.[92]

Emblem

[edit]

The current emblem of Interpol was adopted in 1950 and includes the following elements:[3]

  • the globe indicates worldwide activity
  • the olive branches represent peace
  • the sword represents police action
  • the scales signify justice
  • the acronyms "OIPC" and "ICPO", representing the full name of the organization in both French and English, respectively.

Membership

[edit]

Members

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  Member states
  Non-member states

Interpol currently has 196 member countries:[143] Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten are members of Interpol, although they are dependent territories of the Netherlands and not sovereign states. The Constitution of the Interpol allows membership of dependent territories as long as they meet the criteria under Article 4.[1]

Subnational-bureaus

[edit]

Exclusions

[edit]

Two member states of the United Nations and three partially-recognized states are currently not members of Interpol: North Korea and Tuvalu, as well as Kosovo, Taiwan, and Western Sahara.

The Republic of China (Taiwan) joined Interpol in September 1961. After the People's Republic of China was seated as "China" in the UN, Interpol transferred its recognition from the ROC to the PRC in September 1984.[147]

In 2023, over 60 Interpol member states voiced their support for Taiwan's bid to re-join the organization. Specifically, representatives from Taiwan's diplomatic allies Eswatini, Palau, Paraguay, Belize, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Marshall Islands, and Saint Kitts and Nevis spoke up for Taiwan during the assembly.[148]

See also

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Explanatory notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO–INTERPOL) is an intergovernmental that promotes cooperation among national police forces worldwide to combat . Founded in 1923 as the International Criminal Police Commission and restructured as INTERPOL in 1956, it is headquartered in , , and currently includes 196 member countries, each maintaining a National Central Bureau to facilitate information exchange and operational coordination. INTERPOL's core functions include maintaining secure global databases with millions of records on criminals, stolen objects, and fingerprints; issuing color-coded notices, such as Red Notices for locating and provisionally arresting fugitives wanted for serious crimes; and coordinating joint operations against threats like , , , and organized . The organization has supported thousands of arrests and disruptions of criminal networks annually, leveraging and specialized tools to enhance cross-border effectiveness. Despite its achievements, INTERPOL has encountered significant controversies over the misuse of its mechanisms, particularly Red Notices, by authoritarian member states to target political dissidents, journalists, and business rivals under the guise of criminal warrants, prompting reforms like enhanced oversight by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) and pre-publication reviews to filter politically motivated requests. Countries such as , , and have been frequently cited for such abuses, raising questions about the balance between operational utility and preventing weaponization.

History

Founding and Interwar Period

The International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), the forerunner of , was established on 7 September 1923 during the second International Criminal Police Congress in , . The congress, convened by Dr. , President of the Police, drew representatives from 20 countries, including , , , , , , , , , the Netherlands, , , , , and . Schober served as the ICPC's first president until his death in 1932, with headquarters established in under Austrian funding and Dr. Oskar Dressler as secretary. The ICPC's constitution prioritized mutual assistance among police forces to address ordinary transnational crimes such as and fugitive tracking, while prohibiting involvement in political, military, religious, or racial issues. Early activities focused on enabling direct police-to-police contacts, standardizing and procedures, and sharing on counterfeiting, forged passports, and fingerprints through manual records and publications like the International Police Bulletin. In 1927, the fourth General Assembly in adopted a resolution for designated national contact points, foreshadowing the later National Central Bureau system. By 1930, specialized departments handled criminal records, currency counterfeiting, and document , relying on card-index systems for data management. The 1930s saw further operational enhancements, including the 1932 adoption of statutes that created the Secretary General position, filled by Dressler until 1946. An international for secure police communications launched in 1935, improving real-time coordination amid rising cross-border . Membership grew primarily among European states, supporting expanded inquiries into international fugitives and stolen goods. However, the of in March 1938 enabled Nazi authorities to seize control, deposing President Michael Skubl and subordinating the ICPC to German police oversight, which increasingly blurred its apolitical boundaries despite charter restrictions.

World War II Disruptions and Postwar Revival

In 1938, following the , Nazi authorities deposed the president of the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), Michael Skubl of , and assumed control of the organization, which had been headquartered in since its founding in 1923. Under German dominance, the ICPC's activities aligned increasingly with Nazi priorities, including the pursuit of political opponents and racial targets, as non-German member states withdrew participation due to perceptions of it serving German interests. In 1941, the headquarters were relocated to at Am Kleinen 16, placing it under direct oversight by the and SS figures such as , who briefly served as president before his assassination in 1942, and , his successor until 1945. The ICPC's operations during the war were limited and compromised, with international cooperation effectively halting as Allied nations and occupied territories disengaged; by , the organization had ceased meaningful functions amid the collapse of the Nazi regime. Allied investigations revealed the extent of its nazification, including the use of its networks for fugitive tracking that facilitated Holocaust-related pursuits, though the ICPC's prewar apolitical criminal focus had been subordinated to ideological enforcement without evidence of it independently driving such policies. Revival efforts began in 1946, when Belgian police officials convened representatives from 17 countries in to reestablish the ICPC, emphasizing democratic elections for leadership and executive roles to distance it from wartime associations. The reconstituted organization relocated its permanent secretariat to , , in 1949, and focused on restoring mutual assistance in ordinary criminal matters, excluding political, military, religious, or racial issues as per its statutes. Membership expanded rapidly from 19 countries in 1946 to 55 by 1955, reflecting renewed trust in its non-political mandate amid global stabilization. This postwar framework culminated in 1956 with a new constitution renaming it the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), codifying its role as a facilitator of cross-border police data exchange without enforcement powers.

Cold War Developments

Following the immediate postwar re-establishment of the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) in 1946, the organization experienced steady institutional growth amid escalating East-West tensions. Membership expanded from 19 countries in 1946 to 50 by 1955, incorporating newly independent states and some nations, though the never joined, viewing Interpol as aligned with Western interests. In 1956, the ICPC adopted a new at its in , formally renaming itself Interpol—derived from its telegraphic address established in 1946—and reaffirming its commitment to apolitical cooperation on ordinary-law crimes, explicitly excluding military, political, religious, or racial matters. This period saw operational enhancements, including the resumption of international radio communications for secure police messaging, which facilitated cross-border investigations into crimes like counterfeiting and drug trafficking despite ideological divides. Interpol's expansion continued, reaching 100 member countries by 1967, driven by in and , which introduced diverse legal systems and heightened the challenge of uniform procedures. However, rivalries strained neutrality; members, such as , issued Interpol notices targeting political dissidents and exiles, contravening the organization's charter by blurring lines between criminal and ideological offenses. Western governments expressed concerns over intelligence leaks and misuse, yet Interpol maintained functionality as a limited conduit for cooperation on non-sensitive crimes, issuing thousands of wanted notices annually through its diffusion system. In response to documented abuses—particularly from communist regimes leveraging the notices for suppression—a supervisory mechanism, the Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF), was established in the early 1970s to review complaints and curb politicization, marking a key reform to preserve credibility. By the 1980s, with membership approaching 150, Interpol adapted to global shifts, including proxy conflicts and rising , but ideological barriers persisted: Eastern members prioritized state security interpretations, while Western ones emphasized individual rights, leading to selective participation in joint operations. The organization's headquarters remained in , , until preparations for relocation to in 1989, symbolizing continuity amid thawing tensions. Despite these frictions, empirical records show Interpol facilitated arrests in hundreds of cases yearly, underscoring its pragmatic value in an era where bilateral distrust otherwise hampered policing. This era highlighted causal tensions between Interpol's technocratic aims and the political instrumentalization by authoritarian states, informing later safeguards against abuse.

Post-Cold War Expansion and Modernization

Following the in 1991, Interpol's membership expanded markedly, increasing from 150 countries in 1989 to 196 by 2023, as newly independent states from the former and other regions joined the organization. This growth was driven by the diminished ideological divisions of the era, which had previously constrained cooperation with communist states, allowing for broader participation in cross-border policing. In parallel, Interpol shifted focus toward transnational threats such as , , and , establishing an analytical criminal intelligence unit in 1993 to identify emerging crime patterns across member states. The , 2001, attacks prompted operational enhancements, including 24/7 availability of the General Secretariat to coordinate rapid responses to global security incidents. Technological modernization accelerated in the early to support this expanded mandate. In 2000, Interpol introduced the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), reducing fingerprint verification times from days to minutes. The I-24/7 secure global police communications system launched in 2002, connecting all member countries' National Central Bureaus for real-time data exchange and replacing slower telex-based methods. That same year, the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database and DNA Gateway were initiated to combat and genetic profiling evasion, respectively. Further infrastructure included the 2003 Command and Coordination Centre for and, in 2005, INTERPOL– Special Notices to target suspects. These developments enabled Interpol to facilitate over 100,000 arrests annually by the through enhanced notices and database queries, though effectiveness varied due to differing national enforcement capacities. By addressing post-Cold War realities like cyber-enabled crime and , these initiatives marked a transition from analog coordination to data-driven global policing.

Governance and Structure

Constitution and Objectives

The Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization–INTERPOL (ICPO–INTERPOL) was adopted on 13 June 1956 during the 25th session in , , modernizing the framework established by the earlier International Criminal Police Commission founded in 1923. This document serves as the organization's primary , defining its structure, membership criteria, operational principles, and limitations on activities. It establishes INTERPOL as an intergovernmental entity with a separate legal personality, headquartered in , , and open to membership by any sovereign country that delegates an official police authority aligned with the organization's functions. Article 2 delineates the core objectives: to ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance among criminal police authorities, subject to the domestic laws of member countries and the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and to foster institutions that effectively prevent and suppress ordinary law crimes, excluding matters of a political, military, religious, or racial nature as stipulated in Article 3. These aims emphasize cooperation in combating through information exchange and coordinated action, while Article 3 explicitly mandates political neutrality to prevent misuse for non-criminal purposes, a provision reinforced in subsequent practices and repositories interpreting the . The Constitution's governance provisions include a comprising delegates from member countries, an Executive Committee for oversight, and a General Secretariat for administration, all designed to facilitate equitable among members without supranational authority over national police forces. Amendments, such as those to Articles 35 and 36 on oversight, have been made by the General Assembly to adapt to evolving challenges while preserving the foundational commitment to apolitical, law-enforcement-focused international collaboration.

Leadership

The Secretary General serves as Interpol's chief executive, managing the General Secretariat in , , and overseeing operational implementation, resource allocation, and international cooperation initiatives. Valdecy Urquiza of holds this position, having been appointed on November 5, 2024, by the 92nd General Assembly in , , succeeding after his 10-year term. Urquiza, a career with prior roles in Brazil's enforcement, was nominated by the Executive Committee and elected for a five-year term, renewable once, emphasizing expertise in combating . The President chairs the —the organization's supreme governing body—and heads the Executive Committee, focusing on strategic direction and policy oversight rather than daily operations. of the has served as President since his election at the 89th on November 25, 2021, with his initial four-year term extending into 2025 amid potential re-election considerations. Al-Raisi, formerly a senior UAE security official, presides over discussions and represents Interpol externally, though his tenure has drawn scrutiny from human rights organizations alleging prior involvement in detainee mistreatment, claims Interpol's internal review deemed unsubstantiated for barring his candidacy. The Executive Committee, comprising 13 members elected by the General Assembly for four-year terms, includes the President, three regional vice-presidents, and nine delegates ensuring geographic representation. It monitors adherence to assembly resolutions, approves budgets, and supervises the Secretary General's activities between annual meetings. Following the 92nd General Assembly in November 2024, new members included Mohammed Dkhissi of as Vice-President for , Mary D. Rodriguez of the (Vice-President for the ), and others representing , , and additional delegates, reflecting member states' emphasis on balanced regional input in leadership. This structure, outlined in Interpol's , prioritizes consensus among the 196 member countries while vesting executive authority in the Secretary General for efficiency.

Decision-Making Bodies

The General Assembly serves as Interpol's supreme governing and decision-making body, comprising one official delegate per member country with full powers to represent their national central bureau or government. It convenes annually in ordinary session, typically in , and may hold extraordinary sessions if needed, with decisions requiring a simple majority of members present and voting, except for amendments to the which demand a two-thirds majority. Responsibilities include electing the Executive Committee members and President, approving the budget and strategic directions, adopting resolutions on operational policies, and reviewing reports from the Secretary General; for instance, the 91st General Assembly in 2022 in adopted resolutions enhancing cooperation on and . The Executive , elected by the for a three-year term with eligibility for one re-election, consists of the President, three Vice-Presidents, and seven delegates representing different regions to ensure geographical balance. It functions as the strategic decision-making organ between sessions, meeting at least three times annually to supervise the Secretary General's execution of policies, review Secretariat activities, prepare the agenda for the , and recommend initiatives; as of 2023, its composition reflects mandates for equitable regional representation, with the President elected from among the delegates. The holds authority to make interim decisions on urgent matters, subject to ratification, promoting accountability in Interpol's operations. These bodies operate under Interpol's , emphasizing consensus and national , with no direct powers over member states; decisions are advisory or coordinative, relying on voluntary compliance by national authorities. The General Assembly's plenary nature ensures broad input, while the Executive Committee's smaller size enables agile oversight, though critics have noted potential influences from powerful member states in agenda-setting, as evidenced by debates over resolutions on politically sensitive fugitives.

Operational Framework

Procedures and Communication Tools

INTERPOL's primary communication tool is the I-24/7 global police communications system, a secure network connecting all 196 member countries to facilitate the exchange of operational police information on a 24/7 basis. This system enables authorized users, such as national central bureaus (NCBs), to send and receive free-text messages—exceeding 28 million annually—as well as fixed-form messages for standardized data like fingerprints or vehicle details, ensuring rapid and encrypted transmission across borders. Access to INTERPOL's databases, including those for stolen and lost travel documents, fingerprints, and DNA profiles, occurs exclusively through I-24/7, which supports real-time queries and cross-checks to aid investigations. Operational procedures for international cooperation rely heavily on the Notices system, which consists of color-coded international alerts issued by the INTERPOL General Secretariat upon request from member countries to share critical about crimes, suspects, or threats. These include Red Notices for provisional arrests with a view to , Blue Notices for additional on individuals, Yellow Notices for missing persons, and others like Black (unlawful killings), Green (warnings on criminal methods), Purple (), and Orange (threats to public safety). Notices must comply with INTERPOL's Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD), adopted by the General Assembly in 2011 and governing , storage, access, and deletion to ensure relevance, proportionality, and safeguards, with mandatory reviews every five years for certain entries. Complementing Notices are Diffusions, which serve as direct, less formalized bilateral or multilateral requests between member countries for actions such as or location, transmitted via I-24/7 without General Secretariat intermediation. Diffusions mirror the color-coding of Notices and can achieve similar effects, like requesting provisional , but impose no on receiving countries to act, relying instead on bilateral agreements or national laws for enforcement. All such communications and procedures are subject to strict data protection protocols under the RPD, including purpose limitation, accuracy checks, and deletion upon resolution of the case, with oversight by the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF) to address potential misuse.

Databases and Notices System

Interpol maintains 19 specialized databases that store millions of records on criminals, criminal activities, and related evidence, facilitating real-time information exchange among its 196 member countries via the secure I-24/7 global police communication system. These databases are categorized into areas such as notices, individuals (including nominal records of persons of interest), forensics (fingerprints and DNA profiles), travel and official documents, stolen property (vehicles and works of art), firearms trafficking, and organized crime networks. Access is restricted to authorized national central bureaus and select frontline officers at borders, with queries processed to support investigations, arrests, and preventive actions. Key databases include the Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database, which as of recent reports contains details on more than 78 million travel and identity documents reported as stolen, lost, revoked, invalid, or stolen in blank form by authorities from 184 countries. This repository aids border controls in detecting fraudulent travel, with integrated checks against biometric data and watchlists during passport scans. Other forensic databases, such as those for fingerprints and DNA, enable matching of traces from crime scenes against global holdings, while stolen property databases track over 1 million entries for vehicles and cultural artifacts, contributing to recoveries valued in the millions annually. The notices system complements these by issuing standardized international alerts that are systematically entered into searchable repositories for dissemination and querying. Issued upon request from member countries and validated for compliance with Interpol's rules, notices serve as requests for , provisional arrests, or warnings about threats. Red Notices, the most common type, seek the location and provisional arrest of wanted individuals pending or surrender, with over 60,000 active as of recent data, though subject to review for political motivations. Interpol has implemented enhanced oversight mechanisms, including pre-publication checks and a dedicated commission, to curb misuse of notices and by authoritarian regimes for targeting dissidents. Notices are color-coded by purpose:
  • Blue Notice: Requests additional information for identifying or questioning persons suspected of crimes.
  • Yellow Notice: Seeks help locating missing persons, often minors or vulnerable individuals.
  • Green Notice: Provides warnings about individuals posing threats of repeat offenses, such as serial criminals.
  • Orange Notice: Alerts on potential threats like kidnappings, armed robberies, or bombings.
  • Purple Notice: Describes , objects, or methods used in crimes to prevent future incidents.
  • Black Notice: Seeks identification of unidentified criminal bodies.
  • UN Special Notice: Targets individuals or entities linked to UN sanctions, particularly terrorism or affiliates.
This integrated system has enabled operations resulting in thousands of arrests and recoveries yearly, though effectiveness depends on member countries' implementation and .

Types of International Cooperation

Interpol facilitates international police cooperation through its network of 196 member countries' National Central Bureaus (NCBs), which serve as hubs for bilateral and multilateral exchanges without direct powers. This cooperation emphasizes respect for national sovereignty, focusing on voluntary assistance rather than supranational authority. Key types include operational coordination for joint actions, sharing via secure channels, and support for apprehensions leading to . Operational coordination involves Interpol's General Secretariat analyzing data and linking NCBs to synchronize cross-border efforts against crimes like , cyber threats, and syndicates. In 2023, such coordination supported regional counter-terrorism operations across 11 West African countries, yielding 15 arrests and the seizure of weapons and explosives. These efforts often leverage specialized working groups, such as those on or , to pool resources and expertise from multiple jurisdictions. Intelligence and information sharing occurs primarily through the I-24/7 secure global system, enabling NCBs to transmit queries and responses on suspects, vehicles, or documents in real time. This informal police-to-police channel underpins rapid responses, such as verifying identities or tracking movements, and complements formal mutual legal assistance by providing preliminary leads. In practice, this mechanism has facilitated millions of daily checks against Interpol's databases, enhancing detection rates for transnational offenses. Support for arrests and centers on channeling requests for provisional detention of wanted persons, bridging gaps where bilateral treaties may be absent. Interpol transmits these via diffusions or coordinates follow-up, as seen in operations recovering stolen assets or apprehending fugitives; for example, efforts contributed to record seizures of illicit drugs through targeted international alerts. This type relies on member countries' commitment to process requests, with Interpol monitoring compliance to ensure efficacy. Capacity building and constitutes another cooperation type, where Interpol delivers programs to strengthen capabilities in member states, particularly in developing regions. These include workshops on investigative techniques and tool usage, with 593 sessions conducted in 2021 alone to optimize utilization. Such initiatives address disparities in resources, fostering equitable participation in broader cooperative frameworks.

Achievements and Impact

Major Operations and Arrests

Interpol has coordinated numerous multinational operations targeting transnational crimes, resulting in thousands of s and significant seizures worldwide. These efforts often leverage INTERPOL's databases, notices system, and coordination with national to disrupt networks, , financial fraud, and environmental offenses. Operations typically involve member countries sharing intelligence and executing simultaneous raids, with outcomes including the apprehension of fugitives via Red Notices—international alerts for provisional pending . In initiatives, Operation HAECHI VI, spanning April to August 2025, targeted cyber-enabled scams such as and romance fraud across multiple countries, leading to the recovery of USD 439 million in illicit proceeds. A separate INTERPOL-led operation in 2024 yielded a record 5,500 arrests and seizures exceeding USD 400 million, focusing on and related schemes. Efforts against and migrant smuggling have produced substantial arrests and victim rescues. A global operation in November 2024, INTERPOL's largest against these crimes, identified 3,200 potential trafficking victims and 17,800 irregular migrants, alongside seizures of weapons and cash. In July 2025, coordinated actions safeguarded 1,194 victims and arrested 158 traffickers. Wildlife and environmental enforcement operations have also featured prominently. Operation Thunder 2024, from November to December 2024, across 138 countries, resulted in 365 arrests and the seizure of nearly 20,000 live animals. An earlier iteration in 2023 recorded 2,114 seizures of and timber products. In October 2025, a Latin American crackdown on environmental crimes yielded 225 arrests over two months. Pharmaceutical and terrorism-related operations underscore further impacts. A June 2025 global bust across 90 countries seized 50.4 million doses of illicit drugs worth USD 65 million, with 769 arrests. In Africa, a 2025 operation against led to 83 arrests, including 21 for offenses. Red Notices have facilitated high-profile fugitive captures, such as the December 2024 roundup in arresting 58 individuals, including one for . U.S. authorities, in coordination with INTERPOL, arrested 45 international s subject to notices in 2025. These arrests often target , , and sexual offenses, demonstrating the notices' role in global cooperation.

Statistical Outcomes and Global Contributions

Interpol's coordinated operations have produced measurable outcomes in apprehending suspects and disrupting networks. In a global initiative concluded in November 2024, participating countries arrested 5,500 individuals and seized assets exceeding USD 400 million, targeting schemes that exploited vulnerable populations across borders. Similarly, Operation HAECHI VII in 2024 focused on cyber-enabled financial , yielding over 3,500 arrests worldwide through intelligence sharing via Interpol's secure channels. In the realm of , a 2025 operation across African nations dismantled a network of over 1,000 cybercriminals, resulting in 1,209 arrests and the recovery of USD 97.4 million in illicit funds, demonstrating Interpol's role in countering borderless digital threats. efforts in during a two-month 2025 operation led to 225 arrests across nine countries, including seizures of illegally trafficked and timber, which contributed to preserving and enforcing international treaties.
Operation FocusYearArrestsKey Seizures/Outcomes
Financial Crime (Global)20245,500>USD 400 million in assets
Cybercrime (Africa)20251,209USD 97.4 million recovered
Environmental Crime (Latin America)2025225Wildlife and timber interdictions
Human Trafficking (Global)2024N/A3,200 potential victims rescued; 17,800 irregular migrants identified
Interpol's notices system underpins these results, with 15,548 Red Notices issued in 2024—a record high representing a 27% increase from the prior year—to facilitate provisional arrests of fugitives pending extradition. These instruments have enabled operations yielding hits on wanted persons, such as 9 Red Notice matches in select 2022 initiatives, enhancing global law enforcement's capacity to pursue cross-jurisdictional offenders. Overall, Interpol's contributions extend to preventing terrorist travel, as evidenced by a 2025 border security operation that arrested 153 suspects and gathered intelligence on high-risk movements, surpassing prior years' figures of 66 arrests. Such efforts underscore the organization's facilitation of real-time data exchange among 196 member countries, directly correlating with reduced impunity for international criminals through empirical tracking of operationally verified apprehensions.

Notable Case Studies

A prominent example of Interpol's Red Notice system facilitating the apprehension of a high-profile fugitive is the 2008 arrest of , the former Bosnian Serb leader indicted for and war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former . Karadžić, who had evaded capture for 13 years while living under an alias in as a healer, was subject to an Interpol Red Notice issued at the tribunal's request, which disseminated his details to member countries' law enforcement for provisional arrest and . Serbian authorities captured him on July 21, 2008, following intelligence leads, with Interpol's Secretary General at the time praising the operation as a significant step in international justice. Another notable success involved the 2023 capture of , the Sicilian Cosa Nostra boss who had eluded Italian authorities for 30 years after being convicted in absentia for multiple murders, bombings, and association. Denaro was arrested on January 16, 2023, at a private clinic in , , where he sought treatment under a false identity; Italian investigators had tracked him via phone data and family ties, with Interpol's global database and notices aiding in cross-border intelligence sharing. Interpol Secretary General hailed the arrest as a "great success," underscoring the organization's role in supporting national efforts against networks. Interpol's coordinated operations have also yielded substantial results in combating transnational financial crimes, as demonstrated by Operation HAECHI V in 2024, which targeted and across . This effort resulted in over 5,500 arrests and seizures exceeding USD 400 million in illicit assets, including cryptocurrencies and bank accounts linked to scams defrauding victims worldwide; participating National Central Bureaus exchanged real-time intelligence via Interpol's secure channels, leading to the dismantling of multiple syndicates. Such outcomes highlight the efficacy of Interpol's I-24/7 system in enabling rapid, evidence-based interventions, though effectiveness depends on member states' enforcement capacities.

Resources and Administration

Finances and Funding

Interpol's funding is derived from two primary sources: statutory contributions from its 196 member countries, which support the regular , and voluntary contributions that finance specific projects and initiatives. Statutory contributions are determined annually by the General Assembly using a scale adapted from the ' assessment methodology, which accounts for each country's economic capacity—primarily —while imposing a fixed minimum payment on all members regardless of size. This structure ensures proportional burden-sharing, with larger economies like the contributing disproportionately; for instance, the U.S. share approximates 20% of total statutory funds in recent assessments. In 2023, statutory contributions amounted to €77.1 million, marking a 15% increase (€10.2 million) from 2022, driven by a phased €22 million uplift to address and operational needs, with €7 million implemented that year. By 2024, these contributions rose further to €94 million, reflecting ongoing adjustments approved by the General Assembly. The regular budget, funded mainly by these statutory payments, covers core administrative and operational functions, with 2023 expenses totaling €185.3 million against planned expenditures of €174.2 million. Voluntary funding, comprising cash donations and in-kind support such as personnel or infrastructure, supplements the regular budget by targeting targeted programs like counter-terrorism or operations. In 2024, voluntary contributions reached €115 million, predominantly (94%) from government entities including the , , the , and , with in-kind aid from and . This extrabudgetary funding elevates total organizational revenue—for example, €216 million in 2024—but statutory sources alone typically cover only 40-45% of overall activities, prompting critiques of dependency on donors that may introduce uneven transparency in allocation. The General Assembly oversees budget approval and monitors financial performance through audited statements, ensuring alignment with strategic priorities while maintaining fiscal accountability.

Offices and Infrastructure

The headquarters of Interpol, known as the General Secretariat, is located in Lyon, France, at 200 Quai Charles de Gaulle. The current building was inaugurated on November 27, 1989, by French President François Mitterrand, marking the organization's relocation to Lyon after previous bases in Vienna and elsewhere. Interpol owns the structure, while the underlying land is owned by the City of Lyon, supporting a 24/7 operational hub for coordinating global policing activities. Approximately 1,000 staff members from over 100 countries, including seconded law enforcement personnel and civilians, work there to manage administrative, logistical, and expertise-sharing functions. In addition to Lyon, Interpol operates the Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore, established on September 30, 2014, as a dedicated facility for research, development, and advanced policing tools. This complex houses the Innovation Centre, Cybercrime Directorate, capacity-building teams, and other units focused on emerging threats like technology exploitation by criminals, enabling forward-looking infrastructure beyond traditional operations. Interpol maintains seven regional bureaus worldwide to enhance coordination with member countries, located in strategic hubs such as for , for , and for the , among others. These offices facilitate localized support, operational coordination, and rapid response without duplicating national central bureaus. Plans for a new regional bureau in the were advancing as of early 2025 to address in that area. The overall infrastructure emphasizes secure, high-tech systems for communication and data handling, though core databases remain centralized at the headquarters.

Membership and Global Reach

Member Countries and Bureaus

INTERPOL comprises 196 member countries and territories, encompassing nearly all member states plus select dependencies such as . These members span (54 countries), the (35 countries and territories), and South Pacific (46 countries and territories), (48 countries and territories), and the (13 countries). Membership is granted to sovereign states or equivalent entities upon application and approval by the General Assembly, requiring adherence to INTERPOL's constitution and rules, with statutory contributions scaled by economic capacity—e.g., the contributed approximately €13.4 million in 2022, representing about 20% of the total budget. Each member maintains a National Central Bureau (NCB), which functions as the primary liaison between national police forces and INTERPOL's General Secretariat in , . NCBs, typically headquartered in the capital city, are staffed by national personnel and handle secure communications via INTERPOL's I-24/7 global police communications system, queries on fugitives, stolen assets, and criminal intelligence. For example, the NCB (INTERPOL Washington), established as a joint entity of the Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security since 1939, coordinates with over 19,000 U.S. agencies and facilitates thousands of international exchanges annually. NCBs ensure operational alignment by vetting requests for compliance with INTERPOL's Article 3 prohibition on interventions in political, military, religious, or racial matters, though enforcement varies by national context. They also participate in regional working groups and joint operations, such as those targeting or , with activity levels correlating to member resources—developed nations like and often lead in data contributions and arrests facilitated through the network. Membership growth, from 100 countries in 1967 to 196 by 2023, underscores expanding reliance on this framework amid rising transnational threats, with no reported changes as of 2025.

Exclusions and Special Statuses

Interpol's membership excludes a limited number of sovereign states, primarily due to insufficient police infrastructure, political isolation, or geopolitical disputes. As of 2025, the () remains outside the organization, despite past limited cooperation; its exclusion stems from , internal governance challenges, and failure to maintain active participation following earlier associations. Similarly, , a small Pacific island nation, has not joined, attributed to its minimal capacity and resource constraints, which hinder fulfillment of membership criteria under Article 4 of the Interpol Constitution requiring an independent police authority. Partially recognized or disputed territories face de facto exclusion owing to opposition from states claiming over them. , admitted as the Republic of in 1961, was effectively barred after the of 's entry in 1984, which insisted on exclusive representation of Chinese territory; subsequent bids for full membership or observer status have been blocked by Beijing's influence within the General Assembly, requiring a two-thirds majority vote. Kosovo's applications have repeatedly failed since 2008, vetoed by and allies citing unresolved claims, with no successful bid as of the 2024 assembly. Other entities, such as the Turkish Republic of , , , and , lack admission due to analogous recognition deficits and blocking by parent states like (for ) or Georgia and (for the others). No formal special statuses, such as observer roles, exist for non-member countries or territories under Interpol's framework, which emphasizes binary full membership for qualifying sovereign entities. However, some excluded parties maintain informal cooperation via bilateral agreements or third-country intermediaries; for instance, Taiwan accesses certain databases through partnerships with member states like the , bypassing direct channels. Suspended or probationary statuses are rare and typically tied to financial arrears, where countries may face voting restrictions but retain core data-sharing access pending rescheduling agreements. , admitted as a full member on September 27, 2017, despite Israeli objections, illustrates successful navigation of disputes via approval.

Emblem and Identity

Design and Symbolism

The emblem of the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) features a central globe encircled by olive branches, with a vertical sword superimposed on the globe and scales of justice positioned below. Above the globe appears the acronym "INTERPOL," while "ICPO" is inscribed below the scales. This design has been in use since 1950. The symbolizes Interpol's worldwide scope of operations, extending cooperation across international borders. The olive branches flanking the represent the pursuit of peace through efforts. The denotes decisive against criminal elements, and the scales embody the principle of in investigative and operational activities. These elements collectively underscore Interpol's mandate to facilitate global police collaboration while upholding legal standards. Interpol's , also adopted in 1950, consists of a light-blue background bearing the central , surrounded by four flashes. The blue hue evokes reliability and international unity, common in organizational flags for entities. The flashes signify rapid and swift coordination in police responses, highlighting the organization's reliance on efficient among member countries. The is employed primarily for official protocols and events.

Controversies and Challenges

Misuse of Mechanisms for Political Ends

Interpol's Red Notice system, intended for locating fugitives wanted for serious crimes, has been repeatedly misused by certain member states to pursue political adversaries, violating Article 3 of Interpol's Constitution, which prohibits interventions in political, military, religious, or racial matters. Such abuses typically involve issuing notices on charges like , , or that mask political motivations, leading to arrests, travel restrictions, or harassment of targets in third countries. Reports indicate that between 2015 and 2020, authoritarian governments accounted for a significant portion of challenged notices, with the Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF) deleting or refusing hundreds deemed non-compliant, though enforcement gaps persist due to reliance on originating states' information. Turkey exemplifies this pattern, issuing over 50,000 Red Notices and diffusions post-2016 coup attempt, many targeting perceived Gülen movement affiliates on politically tinted charges such as "membership in a terrorist ." U.S. and European courts have blocked some extraditions, citing lack of evidence beyond political reprisal, as in cases where individuals faced detention solely on notice alerts without . Similarly, has weaponized notices against critics, including environmental activist Petr Silaev in 2012, whose Khimki forest protest involvement prompted a notice later challenged as politically driven; the CCF deleted it after review. China's use stands out for scale and opacity, with notices targeting Uyghur exiles, Hong Kong protesters, and business elites like those exposing party corruption, as in the 2023 case of Chuang Liang Li, where a notice followed his anti-corruption disclosures. A 2025 analysis of a warrant linked to Alibaba's Jack Ma ecosystem revealed patterns of economic crimes repurposed for political control, prompting Interpol's Notices Task Force to refuse or cancel 2,462 such requests in 2024 for non-compliance with apolitical criteria. Despite CCF anonymized decisions increasingly scrutinizing motivations—e.g., rejecting notices from family disputes or administrative offenses extended to politics—critics argue the body's resource constraints and deference to state submissions allow persistent circumvention. These incidents underscore causal vulnerabilities in Interpol's decentralized model, where national police submit requests with minimal upfront vetting, enabling regimes to export repression transnationally; empirical from CCF reviews show deletion rates rising post-2017 reforms, yet abusive states adapt by framing charges as ordinary crimes. U.S. legislation like the 2019 Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act mandates scrutiny of such notices, reflecting recognition that unchecked misuse erodes Interpol's credibility without addressing root incentives in unequal commitments to rule-of-law standards.

Human Rights and Sovereignty Concerns

Interpol's Red Notice system has faced substantial criticism for facilitating violations, particularly when authoritarian member states exploit it to pursue political dissidents, activists, and across borders, in contravention of the organization's , which explicitly bars interventions in matters of a political, , religious, or racial character. Such misuse has resulted in arbitrary arrests, prolonged detentions, and denial of asylum claims, as Red Notices alert border authorities worldwide to detain individuals pending , often without independent verification of the underlying allegations' non-political nature. For instance, between 2015 and 2019, reports documented over 100 cases of Turkish nationals targeted post-2016 coup attempt, including journalists and academics, leading to detentions in third countries despite lacking evidence of ordinary crimes. Similarly, Chinese authorities have issued notices against Uyghur activists and Hong Kong pro-democracy figures, contributing to transnational repression that circumvents protections under . Critics argue that Interpol's oversight mechanisms, such as the Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF), remain inadequate to prevent or swiftly rectify abuses, with processing delays averaging 8-10 months and limited resources—handling over 5,000 requests annually as of 2023—allowing notices to persist and inflict harm in the interim. The U.S. State Department's biannual assessments under the Transnational Repression Accountability and Prevention (TRAP) Act, mandated since 2020, have identified persistent patterns of abuse by countries like , which targeted financier with a 2018 notice following his advocacy on the , despite prior CCF deletions of similar Russian requests for political motivations. These incidents undermine the right to seek asylum, as seen in cases where Red Notices override national determinations of non-extradition for political offenses, exposing individuals to or unfair trials upon return. Sovereignty concerns arise from the extraterritorial pressure exerted by Red Notices, which compel member states to act on foreign requests without mandatory alignment to domestic standards, effectively extending the reach of repressive regimes into sovereign territories. For example, China's systematic issuance of notices has been described as eroding the sovereignty of host nations by influencing visa denials, closures, and arrests of expatriates, as documented in U.S. Congressional reports highlighting over 200 such actions since 2014. Democratic states, including those in the , have voiced apprehensions that unchecked compliance risks complicity in violations of the , prompting calls for stricter pre-issuance reviews and bilateral refusals. Russia's continued use against critics, even after exclusions from Interpol databases, exemplifies how persistent requests—less scrutinized than notices—further challenge national in immigration and decisions. Despite 2017 reforms enhancing CCF powers and automated neutrality checks, the absence of binding enforcement against violators perpetuates these tensions, with non-compliance rates by abusers remaining high as of 2024 assessments.

Influence from Authoritarian Regimes

Authoritarian regimes, as significant members of Interpol's 195-country network, exert influence through governance participation, leadership elections, and extensive use of operational tools like Red Notices, often prioritizing domestic political objectives over the organization's apolitical mandate. Countries such as , , and have secured positions on Interpol's Executive Committee and influenced policy directions, enabling them to shape decisions on notice issuance and database access. China's influence peaked during the presidency of Meng Hongwei from 2016 to 2018, the first Chinese national to hold the role, which facilitated Beijing's campaign to repatriate over 3,000 fugitives via Interpol mechanisms by September 2017, including through Red Notices and cooperation agreements. Meng's sudden disappearance upon returning to China in September 2018, followed by his 2020 conviction on corruption charges and a 13-year sentence, highlighted tensions between Chinese state priorities and Interpol's independence, as the detention occurred without prior notification to the organization. This episode underscored how authoritarian members can leverage high-level roles to advance extraterritorial enforcement while subjecting officials to domestic accountability. Russia has similarly wielded disproportionate sway, issuing requests that comprise nearly half of Interpol's publicly disclosed Red Notices, frequently targeting political dissidents and critics abroad rather than strictly criminal fugitives. High-profile cases include multiple notices against , a U.S.-born financier critical of Russian corruption, issued after his 2012 advocacy, which Russia has attempted to counter through Interpol channels. Moscow's persistent misuse has prompted Interpol's Commission for the Control of Files to delete numerous Russian requests deemed politically motivated, yet Russia's voting power in assemblies sustains pressure for lenient oversight. Iran and other regimes like Turkey and Venezuela have exploited Interpol's systems for transnational repression, issuing notices against exiled opponents, including journalists and activists, to extend domestic control internationally. For instance, has targeted dissidents via Red Notices and diffusions, prompting concerns in about systematic abuse by such states. Despite Interpol's 2015 constitutional ban on politically motivated interventions and subsequent reforms like enhanced CCF reviews, authoritarian influence persists due to the organization's reliance on member consensus and limited enforcement against violators. This dynamic raises questions about Interpol's efficacy in countering repression while maintaining universal cooperation.

Reforms and Future Directions

Internal Oversight and Policy Changes

The Commission for the Control of INTERPOL's Files (CCF), established under Article 36 of INTERPOL's Constitution, operates as an independent supervisory body responsible for ensuring that processed through the organization's channels complies with its rules, including monitoring access, rectification, and deletion requests. The CCF, composed of nine members elected by the General Assembly for renewable five-year terms, reviews individual complaints and conducts periodic audits of data handling practices, with its statute mandating impartiality and confidentiality in deliberations. In 2023, the CCF processed over 1,000 requests related to data access and challenges, deleting or rectifying entries deemed non-compliant in approximately 40% of cases involving potential misuse. To address concerns over the abuse of alerts like Red Notices, INTERPOL established the Notices and Diffusions Task Force (NDTF) in 2016, which mandates pre-publication review of all such requests by legal and operational experts to verify compliance with criteria excluding political, military, religious, or racial motivations. This reform followed earlier 2015 updates, including a dedicated policy barring issuance of notices against recognized refugees and enhancing scrutiny of diffusion requests—direct alerts between member countries that previously bypassed central vetting. By 2024, the NDTF had rejected or removed thousands of alerts flagged for non-conformity, though U.S. assessments note persistent challenges from high-volume requesters like and , with rejection rates rising to 20-30% for certain categories. Additional internal mechanisms include the Standing on Ethical Matters (SCEM), an advisory body founded to guide the General Secretariat on ethical dilemmas and in operations, and the Investigations Section of of Internal Oversight, which probes allegations of within INTERPOL staff and processes. In November , the Executive endorsed further safeguards for information-sharing integrity, such as automated flagging systems for suspicious patterns in notice requests and mandatory training on standards for focal points in member countries. These changes aimed to mitigate risks exposed by prior instances of unchecked alerts, yet external analyses argue that without binding enforcement powers or transparent metrics on oversight efficacy, vulnerabilities to state-driven abuses remain, as evidenced by ongoing litigation over undeleted notices.

Responses to Criticisms

Interpol maintains that its operations are governed by strict internal rules designed to prevent misuse, with the Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files (CCF) serving as an independent oversight body to review complaints about data processing, including Red Notices. Established in 2002, the CCF has handled over 15,000 applications by 2023, leading to the deletion or rectification of data in cases where requests violated Interpol's , such as those motivated by political, military, religious, or racial grounds. For instance, in response to documented abuses, the CCF quashed Red Notices issued against individuals like in 2018 after determining they stemmed from politically motivated prosecutions in . To address sovereignty and concerns, Interpol has implemented procedural reforms, including mandatory pre-publication checks by its Notices and Diffusions to ensure compliance with Article 3 of its , which prohibits interventions in political, military, religious, or racial matters. Between 2015 and 2022, this led to the rejection of approximately 30% of proposed Red Notices deemed non-compliant, with enhanced training provided to National Central Bureaus (NCBs) in 195 member countries to identify and report potential abuses. Secretary General , in office since 2014, has publicly emphasized these safeguards, stating in 2020 that "Interpol is not a , but we act as a gatekeeper" by refusing requests that fail standards, amid criticisms from organizations like . In countering influence from authoritarian regimes, Interpol's , comprising delegates from all member states, has adopted resolutions strengthening independence, such as the 2021 decision to bar the organization from processing data on offenses not criminalized under . The Executive Committee, elected by the , oversees policy implementation, and financial transparency measures—revealing a 2023 of €150 million primarily from member contributions—aim to mitigate undue sway, though critics argue enforcement remains uneven due to the consensus-based voting system requiring supermajorities for changes. Interpol has also partnered with the Office on Drugs and Crime since 2019 to integrate due diligence into operations, resulting in joint guidelines for assessing risks. Regarding specific high-profile cases, such as the 2018 disappearance of former President , Interpol initiated an and reinforced protocols for leadership accountability, including mandatory reporting of absences and ethical training, as outlined in its integrity report. These steps, Stock noted, underscore Interpol's commitment to self-correction without external political interference. Overall, while acknowledging persistent challenges from the diversity of its membership—including 20% from countries rated "not free" by metrics—Interpol positions its responses as evidence-based enhancements rather than concessions to external pressure.

Recent Leadership and Strategic Initiatives

Valdecy Urquiza of was elected as INTERPOL's Secretary General on November 5, 2024, by the organization's in , , succeeding after his decade-long tenure from 2014 to 2024. Urquiza, formerly Director of International Cooperation at 's Federal Police, assumed office on November 7, 2024, marking the first time a leader from a has held the position. The 2024 General Assembly also elected nine new members to the Executive Committee for a three-year term spanning 2024–2027, including delegates such as Mohammed Dkhissi of as President, alongside vice-presidents from the and , and representatives from countries including , , , , , and . This leadership refresh aims to guide INTERPOL's priorities amid evolving global threats like and . Under the ongoing Strategic Framework 2022–2025, INTERPOL has pursued four core strategic goals: enhancing operational policing capabilities, strengthening partnerships, advancing innovation and digital transformation, and promoting organizational excellence. Key initiatives include the Global Policing Goals, which emphasize security as a foundation for , and expanded focus on through the Global Cyber Program, comprising capacity-building, operational support, and research components to mitigate cyber threats' global impact. In early 2025, INTERPOL introduced Silver Notices as a new mechanism to alert member countries about assets linked to criminal activity, facilitating tracing, freezing, and recovery efforts against proceeds of crime; the first such notice was issued on January 10, 2025. The organization designated 2025 as the theme year for (ICT) and (AI) in policing, prioritizing their ethical integration to enhance efficiency while addressing risks in digital environments. Additionally, the "Future of Policing" initiative explores evolving operational landscapes, including adaptive capabilities for complex, digitized threats.

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