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Battle of Okinawa
Battle of Okinawa
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Battle of Okinawa
Part of the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign of the Pacific War (World War II)

1st Marine Regiment during fighting at Wana Ridge during the Battle of Okinawa, May 1945
Date1 April – 22 June 1945[1]
(2 months and 3 weeks)[2]
Location26°30′N 128°00′E / 26.5°N 128°E / 26.5; 128
Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Ground forces:
United States
Naval forces:
United States
United Kingdom
Australia
 New Zealand
Canada
Empire of Japan Japan
Commanders and leaders
Units involved

Ground units:
Tenth Army

Naval units:
Fifth Fleet

Ground units:
Empire of Japan 32nd Army

Naval units:
Combined Fleet

Strength

United States Navy

United Kingdom Royal Navy

United Kingdom Royal Australian Navy

United Kingdom Royal New Zealand Navy

United Kingdom Royal Canadian Navy

[3]

Ground forces

~541,000 in Tenth Army
~183,000 combat troops[4] rising to ~250,000[5]: 567 

Empire of Japan Imperial Japanese Navy

[6][circular reference][7]

Imperial Japanese Army Air Service

  • 850 kamikazes

[7]

Ground forces

Casualties and losses

United States American personnel:
Battle casualties:
~50,000, including ~12,500 dead[9][10]
Army: 19,929[a]
Navy: 10,007 at Okinawa,[b] 1,294 on USS Franklin[c]
Marines: 19,460[d]
Non-battle casualties: 26,211 to 33,096 (all causes)[17]
British personnel:
Battle casualties:
119 killed
83 wounded
228 aircraft lost
4 fleet carriers damaged in kamikaze strikes [3]

Total casualties: ~76,000 to 84,000
Materiel:
375 tanks damaged, disabled, or destroyed[18]
13 destroyers sunk
15 amphibious ships sunk
8 other ships sunk
386 ships damaged
763 aircraft lost[5]: 573 [19]: 473 
Empire of Japan Japanese personnel:
Battle & non-battle casualties:
94,136 soldiers and sailors dead (all causes)[e]
4,037 dead from Yamato task force[21]
7,401 captured (by 30 June)[22][f]
Total casualties: ~105,000 to 110,000
Materiel:
1 battleship sunk
1 light cruiser sunk
5 destroyers sunk
9 other warships sunk
1,430 aircraft lost[23]
27 tanks destroyed
743–1,712 artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, mortars and anti-aircraft guns lost[19]: 91–92 
40,000–150,000 civilians dead[24][25][g]
Battle of Okinawa is located in Japan
Battle of Okinawa
Location within Japan
Battle of Okinawa is located in Pacific Ocean
Battle of Okinawa
Battle of Okinawa (Pacific Ocean)

The Battle of Okinawa (Japanese: 沖縄戦, Hepburn: Okinawa-sen), codenamed Operation Iceberg,[27]: 17  was a major battle of the Pacific War fought on the island of Okinawa by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps forces against the Imperial Japanese Army.[28][29] The initial invasion of Okinawa on 1 April 1945 was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Theater of World War II.[30][31] The Kerama Islands surrounding Okinawa were preemptively captured on 26 March 1945 by the U.S. Army 77th Infantry Division. The 82-day battle on Okinawa lasted from 1 April 1945 until 22 June 1945. After a long campaign of island hopping, the Allies were planning to use Kadena Air Base on the island as a staging point for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands, 340 mi (550 km) away.

The United States created the Tenth Army, a cross-branch force consisting of the U.S. Army 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions with the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine Divisions, to seize the island. The Tenth Army was unique because it had its own Tactical Air Force (joint Army-Marine command) and was supported by combined naval and amphibious forces. Opposing the Allied forces on the ground was the Japanese Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima's Thirty-Second Army, a mixed force consisting of regular army troops, naval infantry and conscripted local Okinawans. There were about 100,000 Japanese troops on Okinawa at the onset of the invasion. The battle was the longest sustained carrier campaign of the Second World War.[32]

The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, known in Japanese as "tetsu no bōfū".[33][34] The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of Japanese kamikaze attacks and the sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle was the bloodiest and fiercest in the Pacific Ocean Theatre, with some 50,000 Allied and around 100,000 Japanese casualties,[35][19]: 473–474  also including local Okinawans conscripted into the Japanese Army.[24] According to local authorities, at least 149,425 Okinawan people were killed, died by coerced suicide or went missing.[36]

In the naval operations surrounding the battle, both sides lost considerable numbers of ships and aircraft, including the Japanese battleship Yamato. After the battle, Okinawa provided the victorious Allies with a fleet anchorage, troop staging areas, and airfields in close proximity to Japan as they planned to invade the Japanese home islands.

Order of battle

[edit]

Allied

[edit]

In all, the US Army had over 103,000 soldiers (of these, 38,000+ were non-divisional artillery, combat support and HQ troops, with another 9,000 service troops),[37]: 39  over 88,000 Marines and 18,000 Navy personnel (mostly Seabees and medical personnel).[37]: 40  At the start of the Battle of Okinawa, the US Tenth Army had 182,821 personnel under its command.[37]: 40  It was planned that Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. would report to Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner until the amphibious phase was completed, after which he would report directly to Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Total aircraft provided by the US Navy, Marine and Army Air Force exceeded 3,000 over the course of the battle, including fighters, attack aircraft, scout planes, bombers and dive-bombers. The invasion was supported by a fleet consisting of 18 battleships, 27 cruisers, 177 destroyers/destroyer escorts, 39 aircraft carriers (11 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers and 22 escort carriers) and various support and troop transport ships.[38]

The British naval contingent accompanied 251 British naval aircraft and included a British Commonwealth fleet with Australian, New Zealand and Canadian ships and personnel.[39]

Japanese

[edit]

The Japanese land campaign (mainly defensive) was conducted by the 67,000-strong (77,000 according to some sources) regular 32nd Army and some 9,000 Imperial Japanese Navy troops at Oroku Naval Base (only a few hundred of whom had been trained and equipped for ground combat), supported by 39,000 drafted local Ryukyuan people (including 24,000 hastily drafted rear militia called Boeitai and 15,000 non-uniformed laborers). The Japanese had used kamikaze tactics since the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but now for the first time they became a major institutionalized aspect of the Japanese defensive strategy. Between the American landing on 1 April and 25 May, seven major kamikaze attacks were attempted, involving more than 1,500 planes.

The 32nd Army initially consisted of the 9th, 24th and 62nd Divisions and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 9th Division was moved to Taiwan before the invasion, resulting in shuffling of Japanese defensive plans. Primary resistance was to be led in the south by Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Chō and his chief of operations, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. Yahara advocated a defensive strategy, whilst Chō advocated an offensive one.

In the north, Colonel Takehiko Udo was in command. The naval troops were led by Rear Admiral Minoru Ōta. They expected the Americans to land 6–10 divisions against the Japanese garrison of two and a half divisions. The staff calculated that superior quality and numbers of weapons gave each US division five or six times the firepower of a Japanese division. To this, would be added the Americans' abundant naval and air firepower.

Japanese use of children

[edit]
Tekketsu Kinnōtai child soldiers on Okinawa

On Okinawa, the Imperial Japanese Army mobilized 1,780 schoolboys aged 14–17 years into front line service as an Iron and Blood Imperial Corps (Japanese: 鉄血勤皇隊, romanizedTekketsu Kinnōtai), while female Himeyuri students were organized into a nursing unit.[35] This mobilization was conducted by an ordinance of the Ministry of the Army, not by law. The ordinances mobilized the students as volunteer soldiers for form's sake; in reality, the military authorities ordered schools to force almost all students to "volunteer" as soldiers; sometimes they counterfeited the necessary documents. About half of the Tekketsu Kinnōtai were killed, including in suicide bomb attacks against tanks and in guerrilla operations.

Among the 21 male and female secondary schools that made up these student corps, 2,000 students died on the battlefield. Even with the female students acting mainly as nurses to Japanese soldiers, they were still exposed to the harsh conditions of war.[40]

[edit]

There was a hypnotic fascination to the sight so alien to our Western philosophy. We watched each plunging kamikaze with the detached horror of one witnessing a terrible spectacle rather than as the intended victim. We forgot self for the moment as we groped hopelessly for the thought of that other man up there.

— Vice Admiral C.R. Brown, US Navy[41]: 711 

The US Navy's Task Force 58, deployed to the east of Okinawa with a picket group of 6 to 8 destroyers, kept 13 carriers (7 fleet carriers and 6 light carriers) on duty from 23 March to 27 April and a smaller number thereafter. Until 27 April, a minimum of 14 and up to 18 escort carriers were in the area at all times. Until 20 April, British Task Force 57, with 4 large and 6 escort carriers, remained off the Sakishima Islands to protect the southern flank.[19]: 97 

The protracted length of the campaign under stressful conditions forced Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to take the unprecedented step of relieving the principal naval commanders to rest and recuperate. Following the practice of changing the fleet designation with the change of commanders, US naval forces began the campaign as the US 5th Fleet under Admiral Spruance, but ended it as the 3rd Fleet under Admiral Halsey.

Japanese air opposition had been relatively light during the first few days after the landings. However, on 6 April the expected air reaction began with an attack by some 400 Japanese planes from Kyushu.

Similar air attacks continued through April.[42] From 26 March to 30 April, 20 American ships were sunk and 157 damaged by enemy action. By 30 April the Japanese had lost more than 1,100 planes to Allied naval forces alone.[19]: 102 

Between 6 April and 22 June, the Japanese flew 1,465 kamikaze aircraft in large-scale attacks from Kyushu, 185 individual kamikaze sorties from Kyushu, and 250 individual kamikaze sorties from Taiwan, then called Formosa. While US intelligence estimated there were 89 planes on Formosa, the Japanese actually had about 700, dismantled or well camouflaged and dispersed into scattered villages and towns; the US Fifth Air Force disputed Navy claims of kamikaze coming from Formosa.[43][clarification needed]

The ships lost were smaller vessels, particularly the destroyers of the radar pickets, as well as destroyer escorts and landing ships. While no major Allied warship was lost, several fleet carriers were severely damaged. Land-based Shin'yō-class suicide motorboats were also used in the Japanese suicide attacks, although Ushijima had disbanded the majority of the suicide boat battalions before the battle because of expected low effectiveness against a superior enemy. The boat crews were re-formed into three additional infantry battalions.[44]

Operation Ten-Go

[edit]

Operation Ten-Go (Ten-gō sakusen) was the attempted attack by a strike force of ten Japanese surface vessels, led by Yamato and commanded by Admiral Seiichi Itō. This small task force had been ordered to fight through enemy naval forces, then beach Yamato and fight from shore, using her guns as coastal artillery and her crew as naval infantry. The Ten-Go force was spotted by submarines shortly after it left the Japanese home waters and was intercepted by US carrier aircraft.

Under attack from more than 300 aircraft over a two-hour span, the world's largest battleship sank on 7 April 1945 after a one-sided battle, long before she could reach Okinawa. (US torpedo bombers were instructed to aim for only one side to prevent effective counter flooding by the battleship's crew, and to aim for the bow or the stern where armor was believed to be the thinnest.) Of Yamato's screening force, the light cruiser Yahagi and four of the eight destroyers were also sunk. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost some 3,700 sailors, including Admiral Itō, at the cost of ten US aircraft and twelve airmen.

British Pacific Fleet

[edit]

The British Pacific Fleet, taking part as Task Force 57, was assigned the task of neutralizing the Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Islands, which it did successfully from 26 March to 10 April. On 10 April its attention was shifted to airfields in northern Formosa. The force withdrew to San Pedro Bay on 23 April. On 1 May, the British Pacific Fleet returned to action, subduing the airfields as before, this time with naval bombardment as well as aircraft (they only used aircraft during their first mission of destroying airfields in the Sakishima Islands).[45] Several kamikaze attacks caused significant damage, but as the Royal Navy carriers had armored flight decks, they experienced only a brief interruption to their force's operations.[46][47]

Land battle

[edit]
The battleship USS Idaho shelling Okinawa on 1 April 1945

The land battle took place over about 81 days beginning on 1 April 1945. The first Americans ashore were soldiers of the 77th Infantry Division who landed in the Kerama Islands, 15 mi (24 km) west of Okinawa on 26 March. Subsidiary landings followed, and the Kerama group was secured over the next five days. In these preliminary operations, the 77th Infantry Division suffered 27 dead and 81 wounded, while the Japanese dead and captured numbered over 650. On March 28, 1945, 394 civilians on Tokashiki island were forced by Japanese soldiers to kill themselves after the landing of US troops.[48][49] The operation provided a protected anchorage for the fleet and eliminated the threat from suicide boats.[19]: 50–60 

On 31 March, Marines of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed without opposition on Keise Shima, four islets just 8 mi (13 km) west of the Okinawan capital of Naha. A group of 155 mm (6.1 in) "Long Tom" artillery pieces went ashore on the islets to cover operations on Okinawa.[19]: 57 

Northern Okinawa

[edit]
US Marine reinforcements wade ashore to support the beachhead on Okinawa, 1 April 1945.

The main landing was made by the XXIV Corps and the III Amphibious Corps on the Hagushi beaches on the western coast of Okinawa on 1 April. The 2nd Marine Division conducted a demonstration off the Minatoga beaches on the southeastern coast to deceive the Japanese about American intentions and delay movement of reserves from there.[19]: 68–74 

Tenth Army swept across the south-central part of the island with relative ease, capturing the Kadena and the Yomitan airbases within hours of the landing.[27]: 67–69 [19]: 74–75  In light of the weak opposition, General Buckner decided to proceed immediately with Phase II of his plan, the seizure of northern Okinawa. The 6th Marine Division headed up the Ishikawa Isthmus and by 7 April had sealed off the Motobu Peninsula.[19]: 138–141 

Six days later on 13 April, the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment, reached Hedo Point at the northernmost tip of the island. By this point, the bulk of the Japanese forces in the north (codenamed Udo Force) were cornered on the Motobu Peninsula. The terrain was mountainous and wooded, with the Japanese defenses concentrated on Mount Yaedake, a twisted mass of rocky ridges and ravines on the center of the peninsula. There was heavy fighting before the Marines finally cleared Yaedake on 18 April.[19]: 141–148  However, this was not the end of ground combat in northern Okinawa. On 24 May, the Japanese mounted Operation Gi-gou: a company of Giretsu Kuteitai commandos were airlifted in a suicide attack on Yomitan. They destroyed 70,000 US gallons (260,000 L) of fuel and nine planes before being killed by the defenders, who lost two men.

Meanwhile, the 77th Infantry Division assaulted Ie Shima, a small island off the western end of the peninsula, on 16 April. In addition to conventional hazards, the 77th Infantry Division encountered kamikaze attacks and even local women armed with spears. There was heavy fighting before the area was declared secured on 21 April and became another airbase for operations against Japan.[19]: 149–183 

Southern Okinawa

[edit]
US Marines pass a dead Japanese soldier in a destroyed village, April 1945.
American soldiers of the 77th Infantry Division listen impassively to radio reports of Victory in Europe Day on 8 May 1945.
Soldiers of the 96th Infantry Division attack Japanese positions on Big Apple Ridge.
US Operations in Southern Okinawa

While the 6th Marine Division cleared northern Okinawa, the US Army 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions wheeled south across the narrow isthmus of Okinawa. The 96th Infantry Division began to encounter fierce resistance in west-central Okinawa from Japanese troops holding fortified positions east of Highway No. 1 and about 5 mi (8 km) northwest of Shuri, from what came to be known as Cactus Ridge.[19]: 104–105  The 7th Infantry Division encountered similarly fierce Japanese opposition from a rocky pinnacle located about 1,000 yd (910 m) southwest of Arakachi (later dubbed "The Pinnacle"). By the night of 8 April, American troops had cleared these and several other strongly fortified positions. They suffered over 1,500 battle casualties in the process while killing or capturing about 4,500 Japanese. Yet the battle had only begun, for it was realized that "these were merely outposts," guarding the Shuri Line.[19]: 105–108 

The next American objective was Kakazu Ridge (26°15′32″N 127°44′13″E / 26.259°N 127.737°E / 26.259; 127.737)(see ja:嘉数の戦い), two hills with a connecting saddle that formed part of Shuri's outer defenses. The Japanese had prepared their positions well and fought tenaciously. The Japanese soldiers hid in fortified caves. American forces often lost personnel before clearing the Japanese out from each cave or other hiding place. The Japanese sent out Okinawans at gunpoint to obtain water and supplies for them, which led to civilian casualties. The American advance was inexorable but resulted in a high number of casualties on both sides.[19]: 110–125  Meanwhile, American forces also faced heavy resistance at the Maeda Ridge, also known as Hacksaw Ridge (see ja:前田の戦い).

As the American assault against Kakazu Ridge stalled, Lieutenant General Ushijima—influenced by General Chō—decided to take the offensive. On the evening of 12 April, the 32nd Army attacked American positions across the entire front. The Japanese attack was heavy, sustained, and well organized. After fierce close combat, the attackers retreated, only to repeat their offensive the following night. A final assault on 14 April was again repulsed. The effort led the 32nd Army's staff to conclude that the Americans were vulnerable to night infiltration tactics but that their superior firepower made any offensive Japanese troop concentrations extremely dangerous, and they reverted to their defensive strategy.[19]: 130–137 

The 27th Infantry Division, which had landed on 9 April, took over on the right, along the west coast of Okinawa. General John R. Hodge now had three divisions in the line, with the 96th in the middle and the 7th to the east, with each division holding a front of only about 1.5 mi (2.4 km). Hodge launched a new offensive on 19 April with a barrage of 324 guns, the largest ever in the Pacific Ocean Theater. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers joined the bombardment, which was followed by 650 Navy and Marine planes attacking the Japanese positions with napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine guns. The Japanese defenses were sited on reverse slopes, where the defenders waited out the artillery barrage and aerial attack in relative safety, emerging from the caves to rain mortar rounds and grenades upon the Americans advancing up the forward slope.[19]: 184–194 

A tank assault to achieve breakthrough by outflanking Kakazu Ridge failed to link up with its infantry support attempting to cross the ridge and therefore failed with the loss of 22 tanks. Although flame tanks cleared many cave defenses, there was no breakthrough, and the XXIV Corps suffered 720 casualties. The losses might have been greater except for the fact that the Japanese had practically all of their infantry reserves tied up farther south, held there by another feint off the Minatoga beaches by the 2nd Marine Division that coincided with the attack.[19]: 196–207 

At the end of April, after Army forces had pushed through the Machinato defensive line,[50] the 1st Marine Division relieved the 27th Infantry Division and the 77th Infantry Division relieved the 96th. When the 6th Marine Division arrived, the III Amphibious Corps took over the right flank and Tenth Army assumed control of the battle.[19]: 265 

Lt. Col. Richard P. Ross Jr., commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines braves sniper fire to place the United States' colors over the parapets of Shuri Castle on 30 May. This flag was first raised over Cape Gloucester and then Peleliu.
A Japanese prisoner of war sits behind barbed wire after he and 306 others were captured within the last 24 hours of the battle by 6th Marine Division.

On 4 May, the 32nd Army launched another counter-offensive. This time, Ushijima attempted to make amphibious assaults on the coasts behind American lines. To support his offensive, the Japanese artillery moved into the open. By doing so, they were able to fire 13,000 rounds in support, but effective American counter-battery fire destroyed dozens of Japanese artillery pieces. The attack failed.[19]: 283–302 

Buckner launched another American attack on 11 May. Ten days of fierce fighting followed. On 13 May, troops of the 96th Infantry Division and 763rd Tank Battalion captured Conical Hill (26°13′N 127°45′E / 26.21°N 127.75°E / 26.21; 127.75). Rising 476 ft (145 m) above the Yonabaru coastal plain, this feature was the eastern anchor of the main Japanese defenses and was defended by about 1,000 Japanese. Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions fought for "Sugar Loaf Hill" (26°13′19″N 127°41′46″E / 26.222°N 127.696°E / 26.222; 127.696). The capture of these two key positions exposed the Japanese around Shuri on both sides. Buckner hoped to envelop Shuri and trap the main Japanese defending force.[19]: 311–359 

By the end of May, monsoon rains which had turned contested hills and roads into a morass exacerbated both the tactical and medical situations. The ground advance began to resemble a World War I battlefield, as troops became mired in mud, and flooded roads greatly inhibited evacuation of wounded to the rear. Troops lived on a field sodden by rain, part garbage dump and part graveyard. Unburied Japanese and American bodies decayed, sank in the mud and became part of a noxious stew. Anyone sliding down the greasy slopes could easily find their pockets full of maggots at the end of the journey.[19]: 364–370 

From 24 to 27 May the 6th Marine Division cautiously occupied the ruins of Naha, the largest city on the island, finding it largely deserted.[19]: 372–377 

On 26 May aerial observers saw large troop movements just below Shuri. On 28 May Marine patrols found recently abandoned positions west of Shuri. By 30 May the consensus among Army and Marine intelligence was that the majority of Japanese forces had withdrawn from the Shuri Line.[19]: 391–392  On 29 May the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5 Marines) occupied high ground 700 yards (640 m) east of Shuri Castle and reported that the castle appeared undefended. At 10:15 Company A, 1/5 Marines occupied the castle.[19]: 395–496 

Shuri Castle had been shelled by the battleship USS Mississippi for three days before this advance.[51] The 32nd Army withdrew to the south and thus the Marines had an easy task of securing Shuri Castle.[51][52] The castle, however, was outside the 1st Marine Division's assigned zone, and only frantic efforts by the commander and staff of the 77th Infantry Division prevented an American airstrike and artillery bombardment which would have resulted in many friendly fire casualties.[19]: 396 

On 29 May a Confederate flag was raised over Shuri Castle,[53] before being removed and replaced by a US flag three days later on orders of General Buckner; himself the son of a Confederate General.[54]

The Japanese retreat, although harassed by artillery fire, was conducted with great skill at night and aided by the monsoon storms. The 32nd Army was able to move nearly 30,000 personnel into its last defense line on the Kiyan Peninsula, which ultimately led to the greatest slaughter on Okinawa in the latter stages of the battle, including the deaths of thousands of civilians. In addition, there were 9,000 IJN troops supported by 1,100 militia, with approximately 4,000 holed up at the underground headquarters on the hillside overlooking the Okinawa Naval Base in the Oroku Peninsula, east of the airfield.[19]: 392–394 

On 4 June, elements of the 6th Marine Division launched an amphibious assault on the peninsula. The 4,000 Japanese sailors, including Admiral Ōta, all committed suicide within the hand-built tunnels of the underground naval headquarters on 13 June.[19]: 427–434  By 17 June, the remnants of Ushijima's shattered 32nd Army were pushed into a small pocket in the far south of the island to the southeast of Itoman.[19]: 455–4661 

On 18 June, General Buckner was killed by Japanese artillery fire while monitoring the progress of his troops from a forward observation post. Buckner was replaced by Major General Roy Geiger. Upon assuming command, Geiger became the only US Marine to command a numbered army of the US Army in combat; he was relieved five days later by General Joseph Stilwell. On 19 June, Brigadier General Claudius Miller Easley, the commander of the 96th Infantry Division, was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire, also while checking on the progress of his troops at the front.[19]: 461 

The last remnants of Japanese resistance ended on 21 June, although some Japanese continued hiding, including the future governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Masahide Ōta.[55] Ushijima and Chō committed suicide by seppuku in their command headquarters on Hill 89 in the closing hours of the battle.[19]: 468–471  Colonel Yahara had asked Ushijima for permission to commit suicide, but the general refused his request, saying: "If you die there will be no one left who knows the truth about the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order from your army commander."[41]: 723  Yahara was the most senior officer to have survived the battle on the island, and he later authored a book titled The Battle for Okinawa. On 22 June Tenth Army held a flag-raising ceremony to mark the end of organized resistance on Okinawa. On 23 June a mopping-up operation commenced, which concluded on 30 June.[19]: 471–473 

On 15 August 1945, Admiral Matome Ugaki was killed while part of a kamikaze raid on Iheyajima island. The official surrender ceremony was held on 7 September, near the Kadena Airfield.

Casualties

[edit]
Two US Coast Guardsmen pay homage to their comrade killed in the Ryukyu Islands.

The Battle of Okinawa was the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War.[56][57] The most complete tally of deaths during the battle is at the Cornerstone of Peace monument at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, which identifies the names of each individual who died at Okinawa in World War II. As of 2023, the monument lists 242,046 names, including 149,634 Okinawans, 77,823 Imperial Japanese soldiers, 14,010 Americans,[36] and smaller numbers of people from South Korea (381), the United Kingdom (82), North Korea (82) and Taiwan (34).[36]

The numbers correspond to recorded deaths during the Battle of Okinawa from the time of the American landings in the Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945 to the signing of the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945, in addition to all Okinawan casualties in the Pacific War in the 15 years from the Manchurian Incident, along with those who died in Okinawa from war-related events in the year before the battle and the year after the surrender.[58] 234,183 names were inscribed by the time of unveiling, and new names are added as necessary.[59][60][61] 40,000 of the Okinawan civilians killed had been drafted or impressed by the Japanese army and are often counted as combat deaths.

Military losses

[edit]

American

[edit]
Two wounded American soldiers make their way to a medical aid station on Okinawa, 20 April 1945.
Two US M4 Sherman tanks knocked out by Japanese artillery at Bloody Ridge, 20 April 1945

The Americans suffered some 48,000 casualties, not including some 33,000 non-battle casualties (psychiatric, injuries, illnesses), of whom over 12,000 were killed or missing. Killed in action were 4,907 Navy, 4,675 Army, and 2,938 Marine Corps personnel; while 13,708 marines were wounded.[62]</ref> when excluding naval losses at sea and losses on the surrounding islands (such as Ie Shima), 6,316 killed and over 30,000 wounded occurred on Okinawa proper.[17] Other authors such as John Keegan have come up with higher numbers.[63] The battle caused more than twice the number of American casualties than both the Guadalcanal Campaign and Battle of Iwo Jima combined, with the Japanese kamikaze effort causing the American Navy to suffer more casualties than any previous engagement in the Atlantic or Pacific.[64]

The most famous American casualty was Lieutenant General Buckner, whose decision to attack the Japanese defenses head-on, although extremely costly in American lives, was ultimately successful. Four days from the closing of the campaign, Buckner was killed by Japanese artillery fire, which blew lethal slivers of coral into his body, while inspecting his troops at the front line. He was the highest-ranking US officer to be killed by enemy fire during the Second World War. The day after Buckner was killed, Brigadier General Easley was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire. War correspondent Ernie Pyle was also killed by Japanese machine-gun fire on Ie Shima, a small island just off of northwestern Okinawa.[65]

The last picture of US Army Lt. Gen. Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. (right), taken on 18 June 1945. Later in the day, he was killed by Japanese artillery fire.
The last picture of US Army Brig. Gen. Claudius Miller Easley, taken on 19 June 1945. He was later killed by Japanese machine-gun fire.

Aircraft losses over the three-month period were 768 US planes, including those bombing the Kyushu airfields launching kamikazes. Combat losses were 458, and the other 310 were operational accidents. At sea, 368 Allied ships—including 120 amphibious craft—were damaged while another 36—including 15 amphibious ships and 12 destroyers—were sunk during the Okinawa campaign. The US Navy's dead exceeded its wounded, with 4,907 killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks.[66]

American personnel casualties included thousands of cases of mental breakdown. According to the account of the battle presented in Marine Corps Gazette:

More mental health issues arose from the Battle of Okinawa than any other battle in the Pacific during World War II. The constant bombardment from artillery and mortars coupled with the high casualty rates led to a great deal of personnel coming down with combat fatigue. Additionally, the rains caused mud that prevented tanks from moving and tracks from pulling out the dead, forcing Marines (who pride themselves on burying their dead in a proper and honorable manner) to leave their comrades where they lay. This, coupled with thousands of bodies both friend and foe littering the entire island, created a scent you could nearly taste. Morale was dangerously low by May and the state of discipline on a moral basis had a new low barometer for acceptable behavior. The ruthless atrocities by the Japanese throughout the war had already brought on an altered behavior (deemed so by traditional standards) by many Americans resulting in the desecration of Japanese remains, but the Japanese tactic of using the Okinawan people as human shields brought about a new aspect of terror and torment to the psychological capacity of the Americans.[24]

Medal of Honor recipients from Okinawa are:
Marine Corps

Army

Navy

Allied naval vessels sunk or damaged at Okinawa

[edit]

The following table lists the Allied naval vessels that received damage or were sunk in the Battle of Okinawa between 19 March – 30 July 1945. The table lists a total of 147 damaged ships, five of which were damaged by enemy suicide boats and another five by mines. During the naval battle, which started before the amphibious landings on Okinawa on 1 April, USS Franklin suffered over 800 killed and missing and USS Bunker Hill suffered 396 killed and missing. These were the first and third largest loss of life on damaged or sunken American aircraft carriers during World War II. USS Franklin (hit by two bombs in a level bombing attack by a D4Y Suisei (Judy) on 19 March 1945) and USS Bunker Hill were the only two aircraft carriers that sustained very severe damage from Japanese attacks and as a result were the only aircraft carriers in the Essex class that did not experience any active service after the end of World War II. One source estimated that total Japanese sorties during the entire Okinawa campaign exceeded 3,700, with a large percentage being kamikaze attacks, and that the attackers damaged slightly more than 200 Allied vessels, with 4,900 naval officers and seamen killed and roughly 4,824 wounded or missing.[67] USS Thorton was damaged as the result of a collision with another US ship.

The Japanese air attacks were so intense that Fifth Fleet commander Admiral Spruance's flagships were struck two separate times (USS Indianapolis was hit in March and had to retire for repairs which forced him to transfer to USS New Mexico which was also hit in May). Fast Carrier Task Force commander Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher and his chief of staff Commodore Arleigh Burke were yards away from getting killed or wounded by kamikazes on his flagship USS Bunker Hill, which killed three of Mitscher's staff officers and eleven of his enlisted staff members and also destroyed his flag cabin along with all of his uniforms, personal papers, and possessions. Just three days later Mitscher's new flagship USS Enterprise was also struck by a kamikaze forcing him to have to change his flagship yet again. Both fleet carriers were knocked out for the rest of the war.[68]

*  sunk or had to be scuttled due to irreparable damage. Of those sunk, the majority were relatively smaller ships; these included destroyers of around 300–450 feet. A few small cargo ships were also sunk, several containing munitions which caught fire.

#  scrapped or decommissioned as a result of damage.

Allied Naval vessels sunk or damaged by Japanese forces at Okinawa, primarily kamikazes, 19 March – 30 July 1945[69]
Day Ship Type Cause Killed Wounded
19 Mar 45 USS Wasp Carrier Air attack, bomb through flight, & hangar decks 102 269
19 Mar 45 USS Franklin Carrier Air attack 807 487
20 Mar 45 USS Enterprise[70][71] Carrier Air attack, two near misses from bombs, at the same time of near misses immediately hit by two 5-inch AA shells from U.S. ships 9 28
20 Mar 45 USS Hasley Powell Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze 12 29
24 Mar 45 USS Nevada Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit and knocked out 14-inch guns in turret number 3 11 49
26 Mar 45 * USS Haligan Destroyer Mine, 3 miles SE of Maye Shima, exploded two forward magazines, bow blown off[72] 153 39
26 Mar 45 USS Kimberly Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze 4 57
27 Mar 45 USS Murray Destroyer Air attack, bomb 1 116
27 Mar 45 USS O'Brian Destroyer Air attack, Val kamikaze with bomb 50 76
28 Mar 45 * USS Skylark Small Minesweeper Mine, struck mines twice off Hagushi beaches 5 25
28 Mar 45 USS LSM(R)-188 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze 15 32
29 Mar 45 USS Wyandot Attack Cargo Ship Mine, possibly bomb 0 1
31 Mar 45 USS Indianapolis[h] Cruiser Air attack, kamikaze with bomb through fuel tanks and propeller shafts 9 20
1 Apr 45 USS Adams Destroyer Minelayer Air attack, kamikaze with bombs to fantail 0 0
1 Apr 45 USS Alpine Attack Transport Air attack, bomb and kamikaze 16 27
1 Apr 45 USS Hinsdale Attack Transport Air attack, kamikaze with bombs at waterline 16 39
1 Apr 45 # USS LST-884 Tank Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze, scuttled 6 May 24 21
1 Apr 45 HMS Ulster Destroyer Air attack, near miss bomb, badly damaged 2 1
1 Apr 45 USS West Virginia[73] Battleship Air attack, kamikaze 4 23
2 Apr 45 USS New York Battleship Air attack, kamikaze destroyed search plane on catapult 0 2
2 Apr 45 * USS Dickerson Destroyer Transport Air attack, kamikaze Nick crashed bridge, towed, scuttled[74] 54 23
2 Apr 45 USS Goodhue Attack Transport Air attack, kamikaze aimed at bridge glanced mainmast, hit cargo boom, gun tubs, over side[75] 24 119
2 Apr 45 USS Henrico Attack Transport Air attack, kamikaze w/bombs hit bridge 49 125
2 Apr 45 USS Achernar Attack Cargo Ship Air attack, kamikaze w/bomb hit starboard 5 41
3 Apr 45 USS Wake Island Escort Carrier Air attack, kamikaze blew below waterline 0 0
3 Apr 45 USS Pritchett Destroyer Air attack, 500 lb bomb 0 0
3 Apr 45 USS Foreman Destroyer Air attack, bomb passed through her bottom, exploded below 0 3
3 Apr 45 USS LST-599 Tank Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze through main deck, fires[75] 0 21
3 Apr 45 # USS LCT-876 Landing Craft Tank Air attack 0 2
4 Apr 45 * USS LCI(G)-82[76] Landing Craft, Infantry Suicide boat 8 11
5 Apr 45 USS Nevada Battleship Air attack 25 Mar and 5 April coastal battery 2 16
6 Apr 45 * USS Bush Destroyer Air attack, three kamikaze hits, two between stacks, blew forward engine room, broke in half[77] 94 32
6 Apr 45 * USS Colhoun Destroyer Air attack, four kamikaze hits, bombs blew forward, & aft fire rooms at waterline[77] 35 21
6 Apr 45 USS Howorth Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze struck superstructure, fires put out[78] 9 14
6 Apr 45 USS Hyman Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze Hampton hit torpedo tubes twixt stacks[79] 10 40
6 Apr 45 # USS Leutze Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze blew at fantail, bad flooding[80] 7 34
6 Apr 45 # USS Morris Destroyer Air attack, kate kamikaze portside 0 5
6 Apr 45 USS Mullany Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit depth charges 13 45
6 Apr 45 # USS Newcomb Destroyer Air attack, multiple kamikazes 40 24
6 Apr 45 USS Haynsworth Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze 7 25
6 Apr 45 # USS Witter Destroyer Escort Starboard waterline kamikaze 0 5
6 Apr 45 USS Fieberling Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze near miss 6 6
6 Apr 45 * USS Emmons Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, five kamikaze hits, scuttled 7 April 64 71
6 Apr 45 USS Rodman Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, four kamikaze hits 16 20
6 Apr 45 USS Defense Small Minesweeper Air attack, two kamikaze strikes 0 9
6 Apr 45 * USS LST-447 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze hit close above waterline, bomb blew 5 17
6 Apr 45 * SS Hobbs Victory Cargo Air attack, kamikaze struck port, flames ignited ammunition 15 3
6 Apr 45 * SS Logan Victory Cargo Air attack, kamikaze struck superstructure, flames ignited ammunition 16 11
7 Apr 45 USS Hancock Carrier Air attack, cartwheeling kamikaze 72 82
7 Apr 45 USS Maryland Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit starboard 16 37
7 Apr 45 USS Bennett Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit engine room 3 18
7 Apr 45 USS Wesson Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze starboard 8 23
7 Apr 45 * USS PGM-18 Small Gunboat Mine, powerful explosion 14 14
7 Apr 45 * YMS-103 Small Minesweeper Mine, struck two mines, blowing off her bow and stem rescuing PGM-18[81][82] 5 0
8 Apr 45 USS Gregory Destroyer Air attack, port kamikaze amidships near waterline 0 2
8 Apr 45 USS YMS-92 Small Sweeper Air attack 0 0
9 Apr 45 USS Charles J. Badger Destroyer Suicide boat threw depth charge or mine[83] 0 0
9 Apr 45 USS Sterett Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit starboard at waterline 0 9
9 Apr 45 USS Hopping Destroyer Transport Coastal Battery, damaging hits off Buckner Bay 2 18
11 Apr 45 USS Enterprise Carrier Air attack, two kamikazes hit at the waterline near her hull 1 18
11 Apr 45 USS Kidd Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze 38 55
11 Apr 45 USS Missouri Battleship Air attack, kamikaze 0 0
12 Apr 45 USS Idaho Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit port side anti-torpedo bulge 0 0
12 Apr 45 USS Tennessee Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit signal bridge 25 104
12 Apr 45 * USS Mannert L. Abele Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze 79 35
12 Apr 45 USS Purdy Destroyer Air attack, splashed kamikaze bomb skidded in 13 27
12 Apr 45 USS Cassin Young Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit foremast 1 59
12 Apr 45 USS Zellars Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze crashed port, bomb blew 29 37
12 Apr 45 USS Rall Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze starboard aft, bomb blew 21 38
12 Apr 45 USS Whitehurst Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze with bomb crashed into pilot house 37 37
12 Apr 45 USS Lindsey Destroyer Minelayer Air attack, two kamikaze Val strikes 56 51
12 Apr 45 USS LSM(R)-189 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze 0 4
12 Apr 45 * USS LCS(L)-33 Landing Craft Air attack, kamikaze Val amidships 4 29
12 Apr 45 USS LCS(L)-57 Landing Craft Air attack, three kamikaze strikes 2 6
14 Apr 45 USS Sigsbee Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze damaged port engine 4 74
16 Apr 45 USS Intrepid Carrier Air attack, kamikaze crashed deck, fires put out 10 87
16 Apr 45 USS Bryant Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze to bridge, with explosion 34 33
16 Apr 45 USS Laffey Destroyer Air attack, multiple kamikaze hits 31 72
16 Apr 45 * USS Pringle Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze Val hit abaft stack No. 1, explosion, broke in half 65 110
16 Apr 45 USS Bowers Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze to bridge, bomb hit pilot house 48 56
16 Apr 45 # USS Harding Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, kamikaze struck side near bridge 22 10
16 Apr 45 USS Hobson Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, near miss kamikaze's bomb veered in 4 8
16 Apr 45 USS LCS(L)-116 Landing Craft Air attack, kamikaze hit aft gun mount 12 12
16 Apr 45 USS Missouri Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit stern crane 0 2
18 Apr 45 USS LSM-28 Landing Ship Air attack 0 0
22 Apr 45 USS Isherwood Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze w/bomb crashed gun mount 42 41
22 Apr 45 * USS Swallow Small Sweeper Air attack, bad kamikaze hit flooded her, 3 mins sunk 2 9
22 Apr 45 * USS LCS(L)-15 Landing Craft Air attack 15 11
27 Apr 45 # USS Hutchins Destroyer Suicide boat explosive blew close 0 0
27 Apr 45 # USS Rathburne Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit port bow waterline 0 0
27 Apr 45 * SS Canada Victory Cargo Air attack, kamikaze hit stern, lit ammo, sunk in ten minutes 12 27
28 Apr 45 USS Pinkney Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit aft of superstructure, lit ammo 35 12
28 Apr 45 USS Comfort Hospital Ship Air attack, kamikaze through three decks to surgery 30 48
29 Apr 45 # USS Haggard Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze went through hull, blew engine room 11 40
29 Apr 45 USS Hazelwood Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze zero hit port bridge 46 26
29 Apr 45 # USS LCS(L)-37 Landing Craft Suicide boat 0 4
30 Apr 45 USS Terror Minelayer Air attack, kamikaze blew through main deck 48 123
3 May 45 * USS Little Destroyer Air attack, five kamikaze strikes 30 79
3 May 45 # USS Aaron Ward Destroyer Minelayer Air attack; three kamikaze hits and bomb frags 45 49
3 May 45 USS Macomb Destroyer Minelayer Air attack, kamikaze 7 14
3 May 45 * USS LSM(R)-195 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze hit rockets, sunk 8 16
4 May 45 # USS Sangamon Escort Carrier Air attack, kamikaze & bomb blew through flight deck 46 116
4 May 45 USS Birmingham Light Cruiser Air attack, kamikaze hit forward 51 81
4 May 45 USS Ingraham Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze above port waterline, bomb blew 14 37
4 May 45 HMS Formidable Carrier Air attack, kamikaze & bomb blew through flight deck 8 55
4 May 45 USS Hopkins Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, glancing blow by burning kamikaze 0 1
4 May 45 * USS Luce Destroyer Air attack, first kamikaze bomb hit, second kamikaze struck aft 149 94
4 May 45 * USS Morrison Destroyer Air attack, first kamikaze hit bridge, then three more hits 159 102
4 May 45 USS Shea Destroyer Air attack, Ohka kamikaze through starboard bridge 27 91
4 May 45 USS Carina Cargo Ship Suicide boat ramming caused explosion 0 6
4 May 45 * USS LSM(R)-190 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze set off her rockets 13 18
4 May 45 * USS LSM(R)-194 Landing Ship Air attack 13 23
9 May 45 # USS England Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze dive bomber 35 27
9 May 45 HMS Formidable Carrier Air attack, kamikaze 1 4
9 May 45 # USS Oberrender Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze hit starboard gun mount, bomb through main deck 8 53
11 May 45 USS Bunker Hill[i] Carrier Air attack, three kamikaze hits with bombs through flight deck 396 264
11 May 45 # USS Hugh W. Hadley Destroyer Air attack, aft bomb, an Ohka, and two more kamikazes struck 28 67
11 May 45 # USS Evans Destroyer Air attack, struck by four kamikazes, fires put out 30 29
11 May 45 USS LCS(L)-88 Landing Craft Air attack 7 9
12 May 45 USS New Mexico[j] Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit, bomb 54 119
13 May 45 USS Bache Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit, bomb exploded amidships just above main deck 41 32
13 May 45 USS Bright Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze zero hit fantail, bomb exploded 0 2
14 May 45 USS Enterprise[k] Carrier Air attack, two kamikazes, struck port, & under starboard bow 14 68
17 May 45 USS Douglas H. Fox Destroyer Two kamikaze strikes, one to forward gun mounts, one to fantail 9 35
18 May 45 * USS Longshaw Destroyer Coastal Battery, four hits, one ignited magazine, blew off bow back to bridge[84] 86 97
18 May 45 * USS LST-808 Landing Ship Tank Air attack 11 11
20 May 45 # USS Chase Destroyer Escort Air attack, splashed kamikaze skidded in, bombs opened hull, with flooding 0 35
20 May 45 # USS Thatcher Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze Oscar struck aft of bridge, large hole 14 53
20 May 45 # USS John C. Butler Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze hit to mast and antennas 0 0
25 May 45 USS Stormes Destroyer Air attack, crashed aft torpedo mount, bomb blew large hole, flooded aft 21 6
25 May 45 USS O'Neill Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze 0 16
25 May 45 USS Butler Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, kamikaze bombs exploded under keel 0 15
25 May 45 # USS Spectacle Small Minesweeper Air attack, kamikaze crashed port gun tub causing fires 29 6
25 May 45 * USS Barry Destroyer Transport Air attack, kamikaze badly crashed starboard side, fires, abandoned 0 30
25 May 45 * USS Bates Destroyer Escort Air attack, two kamikaze hits, fires, abandoned, towed, later sank 21 35
25 May 45 USS Roper Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit off Hanagushi, Okinawa 1 10
25 May 45 * LSM-135 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze caused fires, beached, abandoned 11 10
25 May 45 SS William B. Allison (aka USS Inca)

[85]

Cargo Ship, Liberty Ship Air attack, Aerial Torpedo off Nakagusuku Wan 8 2
27 May 45 USS Braine Destroyer Air attack, two kamikazes, first hit bridge, and second hit amidships 66 78
27 May 45 # USS Forrest Destroyer Minesweeper Air attack, kamikaze crashed starboard side waterline 5 13
27 May 45 USS Rednour Transport Air attack, two kamikazes hits, one made ten foot hole in main deck 3 13
27 May 45 USS Loy Destroyer Escort Air attack, kamikaze near miss sprayed fragments 3 15
27 May 45 LCS(L)-119 Landing Craft Air attack 12 6
28 May 45 * USS Drexler Destroyer Air attack, first kamikaze Frances hit topside, second Francis with bombs crashed into superstructure 158 51
28 May 45 USS Sandoval Attack Transport Air attack, kamikaze hit portside of wheelhouse 8 26
28 May 45 SS Brown Victory Cargo Air attack, kamikaze hit 4 16
28 May 45 SS Josiah Snelling[86] Cargo Air attack, kamikaze hit 0 11
28 May 45 SS Mary A. Livermore Cargo Air attack, kamikaze hit on starboard 10 4
29 May 45 USS Shubrick Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze bomb hit starboard causing hole, exploding depth charge 32 28
3 June 45 # USS LCI-90 Landing Craft Infantry Air attack, kamikaze 1 7
5 Jun 45 USS Louisville Cruiser Air attack, kamikaze hit quad 40mm AA gun mount and number 1 smoke stack 8 45
5 Jun 45 USS Mississippi[87] Battleship Air attack, kamikaze hit 1 2
6 June 45 # USS J. William Ditter Destroyer Minelayer Air attack, first kamikaze glanced, second hit port near main deck 10 27
6 Jun 45 USS Harry F. Bauer Destroyer Minelayer Air attack, kamikaze hit superstructure 0 0
7 June 45 USS Natoma Bay Escort carrier Air attack, kamikaze hit flight deck 1 4
10 Jun 45 * USS William D. Porter Destroyer Air attack, splashed kamikaze Val's bomb exploded close underwater 0 61
11 Jun 45 USS LCS(L)-122 Landing Craft Air attack kamikaze hit conning tower base, bomb fragments caused fires[88] 11 29
16 Jun 45 * USS Twiggs Destroyer Air attack, splashed kamikaze and bomb blew in hull plating, with structural damage 126 34
21 Jun 45 USS Halloran Destroyer Escort Air attack, splashed kamikaze's bomb struck 3 24
21 Jun 45 USS Curtiss Seaplane Tender Air attack, kamikaze and bomb ripped two holes in hull and blew 41 28
21 Jun 45 * USS LSM-59 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze strike while towing USS Barry, sank in four minutes 2 8
22 Jun 45 USS LSM-213 Landing Ship Air attack, kamikaze strike at Kimmu Wan, hull damage[89] 3 10
22 Jun 45 USS LST-534 Landing Ship Tank Air attack, while offloading on Nagagusuku Wan, kamikaze hit bow doors, tank deck[89] 3 35
29 Jul 45 * USS Callaghan Destroyer Air attack, bi-plane kamikaze hit, its bomb blew aft engine room, sunk 47 73
30 Jul 45 USS Cassin Young Destroyer Air attack, kamikaze hit forward, earlier hit 12 April 22 45
Total 4582 6043

Japanese losses

[edit]

The US military estimates that 110,071 Japanese soldiers were killed during the battle. This total includes conscripted Okinawan civilians.

A group of Japanese prisoners taken in June 1945

A total of 7,401 Japanese regulars and 3,400 Okinawan conscripts surrendered or were captured during the battle of Okinawa. Additional Japanese and renegade Okinawans were captured or surrendered over the next few months, bringing the total to 16,346.[19]: 489  This was the first battle in the Pacific War in which thousands of Japanese soldiers surrendered or were captured. Many of the prisoners were native Okinawans who had been pressed into service shortly before the battle and were less imbued with the Imperial Japanese Army's no-surrender doctrine.[35] When the American forces occupied the island, many Japanese soldiers put on Okinawan clothing to avoid capture, and some Okinawans would come to the Americans' aid by offering to identify these mainland Japanese.

The Japanese lost 16 combat vessels, including the super battleship Yamato. Early claims of Japanese aircraft losses put the total at 7,800,[19]: 474  however later examination of Japanese records revealed that Japanese aircraft losses at Okinawa were far below often-repeated US estimates for the campaign.[23] The number of conventional and kamikaze aircraft actually lost or expended by the 3rd, 5th, and 10th Air Fleets, combined with about 500 lost or expended by the Imperial Army at Okinawa, was roughly 1,430.[23] The Allies destroyed 27 Japanese tanks and 743 artillery pieces (including mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns), some of them eliminated by the naval and air bombardments but most knocked out by American counter-battery fire.

Civilian losses, suicides, and atrocities

[edit]
A US Marine Corps Stinson Sentinel observation plane flies over the razed Naha, capital of Okinawa, in May 1945.

Some of the other islands that saw major battles in World War II, such as Iwo Jima, were uninhabited or had been evacuated. Okinawa, by contrast, had a large indigenous civilian population; US Army records from the planning phase of the operation made the assumption that Okinawa was home to about 300,000 civilians. The official US Tenth Army count for the 82-day campaign is a total of 142,058 recovered enemy bodies (including those civilians pressed into service by the Imperial Japanese Army), with the deduction made that about 42,000 were non-uniformed civilians who had been killed in the crossfire. Okinawa Prefecture's estimate is over 100,000 losses.[90]

During the battle, American forces found it difficult to distinguish civilians from soldiers. It became common for them to shoot at Okinawan houses, as one infantryman wrote:

There was some return fire from a few of the houses, but the others were probably occupied by civilians—and we didn't care. It was a terrible thing not to distinguish between the enemy and women and children. Americans always had great compassion, especially for children. Now we fired indiscriminately.[91]

Two US Marines share a foxhole with an Okinawan war orphan in April 1945.

In its history of the war, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum[90] presents Okinawa as being caught between Japan and the United States. During the battle, the Imperial Japanese Army showed indifference to Okinawans' safety, and its soldiers used civilians as human shields or outright killed them. The Japanese military also confiscated food from the Okinawans and executed those who hid it, leading to mass starvation, and forced civilians out of their shelters. Japanese soldiers also killed about 1,000 people who spoke in the Okinawan language to suppress spying.[92] The museum writes that "some were blown apart by [artillery] shells, some finding themselves in a hopeless situation were driven to suicide, some died of starvation, some succumbed to malaria, while others fell victim to the retreating Japanese troops."[90]

With the impending Japanese defeat, civilians often committed mass suicide, urged on by the Japanese soldiers who told locals that victorious American soldiers would go on a rampage of killing and raping. Ryūkyū Shimpō, one of the two major Okinawan newspapers, wrote in 2007: "There are many Okinawans who have testified that the Japanese Army directed them to commit suicide. There are also people who have testified that they were handed grenades by Japanese soldiers" to blow themselves up.[93] Thousands of civilians, having been induced by Japanese propaganda to believe that American soldiers were barbarians who committed horrible atrocities, killed their families and themselves to avoid capture at the hands of the Americans. Some of them threw themselves and their family members from the southern cliffs where the Peace Museum now resides.[94]

Okinawans "were often surprised at the comparatively humane treatment they received from the American enemy".[95][96] Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power by Mark Selden states that the Americans "did not pursue a policy of torture, rape, and murder of civilians as Japanese military officials had warned".[97] American Military Intelligence Corps[98] combat translators such as Teruto Tsubota managed to convince many civilians not to kill themselves.[99] Survivors of the mass suicides blamed also the indoctrination of their education system of the time, in which the Okinawans were taught to become "more Japanese than the Japanese" and were expected to prove it.[100]

Overcoming the civilian resistance on Okinawa was aided by US propaganda leaflets, one of which is being read by a prisoner awaiting transport.

Witnesses and historians claim that American and Japanese soldiers raped Okinawan women during the battle. Rape by Japanese troops reportedly "became common" in June, after it became clear that the Imperial Japanese Army had been defeated.[35][19]: 462  Marine Corps officials in Okinawa and Washington have said that they knew of no rapes by American personnel in Okinawa at the end of the war.[101] There are, however, numerous credible testimony accounts which note that a large number of rapes were committed by American forces during the battle. This includes stories of rape after trading sexual favors or even marrying Americans,[102] such as the alleged incident in the village of Katsuyama, where civilians said they had formed a vigilante group to ambush and kill three black American soldiers whom they claimed would frequently rape the local girls there.[103]

MEXT textbook controversy

[edit]

There is ongoing disagreement between Okinawa's local government and Japan's national government over the role of the Japanese military in civilian mass suicides during the battle. In March 2007, the national Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) advised textbook publishers to reword descriptions that the embattled Imperial Japanese Army forced civilians to kill themselves in the war to avoid being taken prisoner. MEXT preferred descriptions that just say that civilians received hand grenades from the Japanese military. This move sparked widespread protests among Okinawans. In June 2007, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly adopted a resolution stating, "We strongly call on the (national) government to retract the instruction and to immediately restore the description in the textbooks so the truth of the Battle of Okinawa will be handed down correctly and a tragic war will never happen again."[104][105]

On 29 September 2007, about 110,000 people held the biggest political rally in the history of Okinawa to demand that MEXT retract its order to textbook publishers regarding revising the account of the civilian suicides. The resolution states, "It is an undeniable fact that the 'multiple suicides' would not have occurred without the involvement of the Japanese military and any deletion of or revision to (the descriptions) is a denial and distortion of the many testimonies by those people who survived the incidents."[106] In December 2007, MEXT partially admitted the role of the Japanese military in civilian mass suicides.[107] The ministry's Textbook Authorization Council allowed the publishers to reinstate the reference that civilians "were forced into mass suicides by the Japanese military", on condition it is placed in sufficient context. The council report states, "It can be said that from the viewpoint of the Okinawa residents, they were forced into the mass suicides."[108] That was not enough for the survivors who said it is important for children today to know what really happened.[109]

The Nobel Prize-winning author Kenzaburō Ōe wrote a booklet that states that the mass suicide order was given by the military during the battle.[110] He was sued by revisionists, including a wartime commander during the battle, who disputed this and wanted to stop publication of the booklet. At a court hearing, Ōe testified "Mass suicides were forced on Okinawa islanders under Japan's hierarchical social structure that ran through the state of Japan, the Japanese armed forces and local garrisons."[111] In March 2008, the Osaka Prefecture Court ruled in favor of Ōe, stating, "It can be said the military was deeply involved in the mass suicides." The court recognized the military's involvement in the mass suicides and murder-suicides, citing the testimony about the distribution of grenades for suicide by soldiers and the fact that mass suicides were not recorded on islands where the military was not stationed.[112]

In 2012, Korean-Japanese director Pak Su-nam announced her work on the documentary Nuchigafu (Okinawan for "only if one is alive") collecting living survivors' accounts to show "the truth of history to many people", alleging that "there were two types of orders for 'honorable deaths'—one for residents to kill each other and the other for the military to kill all residents".[113] In March 2013, Japanese textbook publisher Shimizu Shoin was permitted by MEXT to publish the statements that "Orders from Japanese soldiers led to Okinawans committing group suicide" and "The [Japanese] army caused many tragedies in Okinawa, killing local civilians and forcing them to commit mass suicide."[114]

Aftermath

[edit]
The Cornerstone of Peace Memorial with names of all military and civilians from all countries who died in the Battle of Okinawa
Marines celebrate Victory over Japan Day on Okinawa, August 1945

Military historian and journalist Hanson W. Baldwin stated about scale and ferocity of the battle, especially for American forces, that:[115]

The battle for Okinawa can be described only in the grim superlatives of war. In size, scope and ferocity, it dwarfed the Battle of Britain. Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle of planes against planes, of ships against planes. Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many ships; never before in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time in so small an area: probably never before in any three months of the war had the enemy suffered so hugely, and the final toll of American casualties was the highest experienced in any campaign against the Japanese. There have been larger land battles, more protracted air campaigns, but Okinawa was the largest combined operation, a “no quarter” struggle fought on, under and over the sea and land.

According to historian George Feifer, Okinawa was the "site of the largest land-sea-air battle in history" and that the battle was the "last major one before the start of the atomic age".[116] At least 90% of the buildings on the island were destroyed, along with countless historical documents, artifacts, and cultural treasures, and the tropical landscape was turned into "a vast field of mud, lead, decay and maggots".[117] The military value of Okinawa was significant, as Okinawa provided a fleet anchorage, troop staging areas, and airfields in proximity to Japan. The US cleared the surrounding waters of mines in Operation Zebra, occupied Okinawa, and set up the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, a form of military government, after the battle.[118] In 2011, one official of the prefectural government told David Hearst of The Guardian:

You have the Battle of Britain, in which your airmen protected the British people. We had the Battle of Okinawa, in which the exact opposite happened. The Japanese army not only starved the Okinawans but used them as human shields. That dark history is still present today – and Japan and the US should study it before they decide what to do with next.[119]

Effect on the wider war

[edit]

Because the next major event following the Battle of Okinawa was the total surrender of Japan, the effect of this battle is more difficult to consider. Because Japan surrendered when it did, the anticipated series of battles and the invasion of the Japanese homeland never occurred, and all military strategies on both sides which presupposed this apparently-inevitable next development were immediately rendered moot.

Some military historians believe that the Okinawa campaign led directly to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a means of avoiding the planned ground invasion of the Japanese mainland. This view is explained by Victor Davis Hanson in his book Ripples of Battle:

... because the Japanese on Okinawa ... were so fierce in their defense (even when cut off and without supplies), and because casualties were so appalling, many American strategists looked for an alternative means to subdue mainland Japan, other than a direct invasion. This means presented itself, with the advent of atomic bombs, which worked admirably in convincing the Japanese to sue for peace [unconditionally], without American casualties.

Meanwhile, many parties continue to debate the broader question of "why Japan surrendered", attributing the surrender to a number of possible reasons including: the atomic bombings,[120][121][122] the Soviet invasion of Manchuria,[123][124] and Japan's depleted resources.[125][page needed][126]

Memorial

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In 1995, the Okinawa government erected a memorial monument named the Cornerstone of Peace in Mabuni, the site of the last fighting in southeastern Okinawa.[127] The memorial lists all the known names of those who died in the battle, civilian and military, Japanese and foreign. As of 2024, the monument lists 242,225 names.[128][129]

Modern US base

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Significant US forces remain garrisoned on Okinawa as the United States Forces Japan, which the Japanese government sees as an important guarantee of regional stability,[130] and Kadena remains the largest US air base in Asia. Local residents have long protested against the size and presence of the base.[131]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Battle of Okinawa, codenamed Operation Iceberg, was the final and bloodiest campaign of the Pacific Theater in , commencing with a massive amphibious by forces on April 1, 1945, and concluding on June 22, 1945, after Tenth Army under Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner Jr. overcame entrenched Imperial Japanese Thirty-Second Army defenses commanded by Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima. Involving over 180,000 U.S. ground troops supported by Admiral Raymond Spruance's Fifth Fleet—comprising more than 1,300 warships and 1,600 aircraft—the operation aimed to capture the ' main island as a staging base for the planned invasion of 's home islands, facing approximately 76,000 Japanese regulars plus militia who employed from fortified caves and reverse-slope defenses in the island's rugged southern terrain. Japanese naval and air forces launched intense attacks, sinking 36 U.S. ships and damaging 368 others, while Typhoon Connie in June further hampered operations, yet U.S. firepower and infantry persistence eventually isolated and destroyed the main Japanese pockets. The battle exacted unprecedented casualties, with U.S. forces suffering 49,151 total losses including 12,520 killed—among them Buckner, struck by artillery on June 18—and heavy naval personnel deaths from suicide attacks; Japanese military deaths reached about 110,000, with fewer than 8,000 surrendering, while Okinawan civilian fatalities numbered 100,000 to 150,000 amid crossfire, starvation, and coerced suicides under Japanese directives. This staggering toll, exceeding prior Pacific island battles in scale, underscored the fanatical Japanese resistance anticipated for an of the mainland, contributing causally to Allied leaders' decision to employ atomic bombs to avert even greater projected losses.

Background and Strategic Context

Geopolitical Objectives and Island-Hopping Campaign

The ' island-hopping strategy in the Pacific Theater, formalized after the Campaign's conclusion in February 1943, prioritized the selective seizure of strategically vital islands to establish forward bases for air and naval power projection, while neutralizing or isolating bypassed Japanese strongholds through blockade and bombardment. This approach, directed by Admiral from , diverged from a linear advance by exploiting Japan's overextended defenses, minimizing Allied casualties relative to direct assaults on every fortified position, and progressively closing the distance to the Japanese home islands from over 2,000 miles in 1942 to under 400 miles by 1945. Key captures included (November 1943), the (January–February 1944), Saipan and (June–July 1944), (September 1944), and (February–March 1945), each providing airfields that extended the range of carrier strikes and land-based bombers while isolating garrisons totaling over 100,000 troops on bypassed atolls. Okinawa, the largest of the at 463 square miles and situated 340 miles (550 km) southwest of , represented the campaign's culmination, as its capture would position Allied forces within striking distance for the anticipated invasion of Japan under . Operation Iceberg's primary geopolitical objectives, outlined in Joint Chiefs of Staff directives by late 1944, focused on securing Okinawa to deny a defensive buffer and establish it as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for sustained operations against the mainland. The island's central location offered sheltered anchorages at Buckner Bay (later renamed after Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner Jr.) for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, comprising over 1,300 ships and 368,000 personnel, enabling refueling and repairs closer to combat zones than previous bases like Ulithi Atoll. Critically, intact airfields at Kadena and Yontan—each capable of handling over 100 heavy bombers—would support P-51 fighters escorting B-29 raids from the Marianas, targeting 's urban-industrial centers with greater precision and frequency, as prior unescorted missions suffered up to 14% losses from fighters and flak. This positioning also facilitated preliminary strikes on for Operation Olympic, the first phase of Downfall scheduled for November 1945, involving 14 divisions and projecting overwhelming firepower to compel 's surrender without relying solely on naval blockade or atomic weapons still under development. By neutralizing Okinawa's defenses, estimated at 100,000 troops under , the operation aimed to interdict Japan's residual maritime lifelines to , though these had been largely severed by Allied submarine campaigns sinking 55% of Japan's merchant tonnage by ; the deeper intent was to demonstrate inexorable Allied advance, eroding Japanese and logistical resilience for a decisive homeland assault. Unlike earlier hops emphasizing rapid airfield seizure, Okinawa's objectives incorporated long-term occupation, with plans for 150,000 permanent U.S. personnel and to sustain a multi-year campaign if needed, reflecting a shift from peripheral isolation to direct threat against Japan's core.

Japanese Defensive Strategy and Preparations

The Imperial Japanese Army's 32nd Army, commanded by Lieutenant General , was established in March 1944 to defend Okinawa as part of Japan's broader effort to fortify the against anticipated Allied invasions. Under the influence of Chief of Staff Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, Ushijima adopted an attrition-based strategy emphasizing defense in depth rather than contesting beach landings directly, aiming to draw U.S. forces into prepared inland positions in southern Okinawa to inflict maximum casualties and delay operations toward the Japanese home islands. This approach rejected earlier proposals for decisive counterattacks on the shores, recognizing the superiority of Allied naval and air firepower, and instead prioritized prolonged resistance leveraging the island's rugged terrain. Preparations accelerated throughout 1944, with the 32nd Army amassing approximately 110,000 troops by late that year, including elements from and 62nd Divisions, the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, naval and air units repurposed for ground defense, and local Okinawan militias conscripted into auxiliary roles. Fortifications focused on the southern third of the island, where engineering units and laborers—often using hand tools due to limited heavy equipment—excavated an extensive network of tunnels, bunkers, and command centers totaling hundreds of kilometers, designed to withstand prolonged bombardment and enable reverse-slope defenses. Key strongpoints were anchored around and a series of interconnected high ridges, such as those forming natural barriers with mutually supporting cave positions for , machine guns, and . Ushijima's plan integrated ground defenses with anticipated kamikaze operations to disrupt Allied naval support, though ground preparations emphasized self-sufficiency through stockpiled supplies in underground depots and booby-trapped approaches to channel attackers into kill zones. By early 1945, these measures had transformed southern Okinawa into a fortified , with positions camouflaged and reinforced to exploit the landscape's natural caves, minimizing exposure to pre-invasion naval gunfire expected to commence around the anticipated landing date of April 1. This strategy, while criticized post-war for its rigid confrontation of Allied strengths without sufficient maneuver or deception, reflected a realistic assessment of Japan's dwindling resources and the need to exact a psychological toll on invaders.

Allied Planning for Operation Iceberg

Planning for Operation Iceberg commenced in September 1944 under the direction of Admiral , Commander in Chief of the , as part of the broader Allied strategy to isolate and prepare for a potential of the home islands. The operation targeted Okinawa, the largest of the , to establish forward air bases, anchorages, and staging areas within striking distance of , thereby enabling strategic bombing campaigns, tightening the naval blockade, and supporting —the planned 1945-1946 of . This choice reflected a shift from earlier proposals like Operation Causeway (Formosa) toward greater operational flexibility in the Ryukyus, prioritizing the island's relatively flat terrain suitable for airfields amid Japan's expected fierce resistance on more fortified positions. The activated the U.S. Tenth Army headquarters specifically for land operations, placing Simon B. Buckner Jr. in command of ground forces comprising the XXIV Army Corps and III Amphibious Corps, totaling eight divisions from both Army and Marine units. Naval support fell under the Fifth Fleet, led by Admiral aboard , with Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher commanding 58; this assembly included over 1,600 warships and craft manned by approximately 350,000 personnel, marking the largest amphibious operation in the Pacific Theater. Planning emphasized joint integration across echelons—from field army to corps and division levels—drawing on lessons from prior island campaigns to synchronize amphibious landings, , and logistics under Island Command for sustainment. Anticipating prolonged combat against entrenched Japanese defenses, planners projected high casualties—up to 30,000 total with 6,600 fatalities—and 41,000 non-battle injuries from within 60 days, prompting detailed medical preparations including 4,500 hospital beds (expandable to 8,000), stockpiles managed by the , and Navy hospital ships for evacuation. Preparatory phases involved seizing outlying islets for and support, naval gunfire rehearsals, and operations such as a by the to mislead Japanese dispositions. The six-month planning cycle addressed logistical complexities, including neutralization of Formosa airfields by Southwest Pacific forces and rapid airfield construction post-landing (targeted by L+11 days), while validating emerging joint doctrine for multi-service operations. Despite separate Army and Marine medical chains, coordination via Tenth Army Frederick Westervelt ensured auxiliary surgical teams and support for potential civilian .

Belligerents and Forces

Allied Forces Composition and Command

The U.S. Fifth Fleet, under Admiral , provided overall command for Operation Iceberg, the Allied invasion of Okinawa beginning on April 1, 1945. Spruance coordinated naval, air, and ground elements to secure the island as a staging base for operations against the Japanese mainland. The fleet's amphibious component, 51 (Joint Expeditionary Force), was led by Vice Admiral , who directed the landing operations involving over 1,600 ships and approximately 350,000 naval personnel. 58, the fast carrier force under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, supplied air cover and conducted strikes against Japanese positions, comprising multiple carrier groups with battleships, cruisers, and destroyers for escort. The contributed as 57, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, focusing on neutralizing Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto to interdict potential reinforcements to Okinawa; this force included four aircraft carriers (HMS Illustrious, Victorious, Indomitable, and Formidable), the battleship HMS King George V, and supporting vessels. Ground operations fell under the U.S. Tenth Army, commanded by Simon B. Buckner Jr., which integrated Army and Marine Corps units for the assault on Okinawa's rugged terrain. Buckner reported to Spruance but maintained operational control over land forces, marking the Tenth Army's first major combat action as a joint field headquarters encompassing divisions, , engineers, and support elements. The army's initial assault strength totaled about 183,000 personnel, later reinforced to over 250,000, including roughly 102,000 soldiers, 88,000 , and 18,000 Navy personnel such as Seabees and medical teams. Organizationally, it comprised XXIV Corps (under John R. Hodge), with the 7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisions for the southern and central thrusts, and III Amphibious Corps (initially under Roy S. Geiger, USMC), featuring the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions for northern operations. Buckner's command emphasized coordinated advances supported by naval gunfire and tactical air strikes from fleet carriers, though inter-service tensions arose over the pace of operations amid heavy Japanese resistance. Following Buckner's death by fire on June 18, 1945, Geiger assumed temporary command of Tenth Army until General Joseph W. Stilwell's arrival on June 23, ensuring continuity until the island's capture on June 22. Minimal contributions came from other Allied nations, such as Australian and ships in screening roles, but the effort remained predominantly American with British naval augmentation.

Japanese Forces and Fortifications

The Japanese defense of Okinawa was orchestrated by the 32nd Army under Lieutenant General , who commanded from a fortified beneath . The army's total strength reached approximately 99,000 personnel by April 1945, including 66,600 troops, 8,800 from the , and 24,000 conscripted Okinawan civilians organized into auxiliary units such as Boeitai militias and student corps. Main combat formations consisted of the 24th Division (a triangular organization suited for ), the 62nd Division (linear structure with 10 battalions emphasizing counter-guerrilla tactics), and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade (reconstituted with reduced infantry elements), supplemented by the 27th operating at strength and elements of the Okinawa Naval Base Force. Artillery assets, centralized under the 5th Artillery Command, were relatively abundant for late-war Pacific defenses, including 52 150mm howitzers, 12 150mm guns, and 96 field pieces, enabling sustained from concealed positions. Tanks and anti-tank guns were limited, with the 27th fielding few medium tanks by battle's outset. Fortifications were concentrated in southern Okinawa, spanning a defensive zone 3 to 12 miles wide and 16 miles long, designed for attrition through reverse-slope defenses that minimized exposure to naval and air bombardment. The network included over 60 miles of tunnels and interconnected caves, many naturally occurring but reinforced with , logs, coral, and earth; these featured multi-level strongpoints, such as Hill 145 with 21 interconnected caves, and vertical shafts for access and ventilation. Pillboxes were camouflaged with roofs and integrated into communication trenches supported by arches, while major complexes like the 32nd Army's Shuri extended 1,300 feet underground. These positions, honeycombed into escarpments and hills like Yaeju-Dake and Yuza-Dake, prioritized survivability and close-quarters counterattacks over open-field engagements.

Integration of Okinawan Civilians and Child Soldiers

The Japanese 32nd , under Lieutenant General , systematically incorporated Okinawan civilians into its defensive preparations and operations during the Battle of Okinawa, beginning in early , to supplement its approximately 77,000 regular troops with local labor and auxiliary forces. Virtually every able-bodied male Okinawan of military age—estimated at tens of thousands—was conscripted into units such as the Boeitai () or labor battalions, initially for non-combat tasks like constructing fortifications, digging tunnels, and transporting supplies across the island's rugged terrain. These conscripts, often unarmed or lightly equipped with rudimentary tools, numbered around 20,000 to 30,000 by the invasion's outset on April 1, , and were gradually integrated into combat roles as ammunition and manpower dwindled, including manning defensive positions and conducting banzai charges. Child soldiers, primarily teenage boys aged 14 to 17, were mobilized en masse from local schools under ordinances issued by the , forming specialized units like the Tekketsu Kinnōtai (Blood and Iron Corps for the Emperor and the Country), which comprised approximately 1,800 students from institutions such as the Okinawa Normal School and Naha Commercial School. These youths, divided into platoons for tasks including ammunition carrying, reconnaissance, and frontline defense, were often armed with rifles, grenades, or bamboo spears and deployed as human mine detectors or in suicide attacks, suffering near-total attrition with fewer than half surviving the campaign. Female students, aged 15 to 19, were similarly drafted into the Himeyuri Butai (Lily Corps), serving as nurses and aides in field hospitals near , where they endured artillery barrages and were abandoned or killed by retreating Japanese troops, resulting in over 200 deaths among the roughly 240 members. This integration reflected the 32nd Army's attrition-based , which prioritized holding southern Okinawa at all costs, but it exacerbated civilian suffering through coercive measures, including equating surrender with dishonor and instances of Japanese soldiers executing locals suspected of to prevent leaks to U.S. forces. While some Okinawan conscripts fought out of indoctrinated or , many were coerced without formal , leading to high rates and contributing to the overall death toll exceeding 100,000, including those forced into . Post-battle accounts from survivors highlight the units' expendable role, with child soldiers often treated as disposable by Japanese commanders focused on delaying Allied advances.

Course of the Battle

Amphibious Landings and Northern Campaign

The amphibious assault on Okinawa commenced on 1 (L-Day) with H-Hour set at 0830, as elements of the U.S. Tenth —comprising the XXIV (7th and 96th Divisions) for the central and the III Amphibious (1st and 6th Marine Divisions) for the northern advance—landed across the Hagushi beaches on the island's western coast. Preceded by naval gunfire from 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, and other vessels among a supporting fleet of over 1,300 ships, as well as air strikes beginning at 0530, the initial waves of amphibious tractors and encountered negligible ground resistance, limited to sporadic mortar and fire. A diversionary feint occurred off the southeastern coast near Minatoga, but the main effort at Hagushi proceeded unhindered, with over 16,000 assault troops from two battalion landing teams per division ashore in the first hour. By nightfall, approximately 60,000 U.S. troops and significant equipment had established a extending 15,000 yards wide and up to 5,000 yards deep inland, capturing the strategically vital Kadena and Yontan airfields intact by 1130. Initial casualties ashore were minimal, though pre-landing strikes damaged several ships, including LST-884 (24 killed, 21 wounded) and APA-120 Hinsdale (16 killed, 39 wounded). With the beachhead secured, the III Amphibious Corps shifted to the northern campaign, directing the 6th Marine Division westward along the coast toward Bay and the eastward inland across rugged terrain. Japanese forces in the north, numbering fewer than 5,000 including irregular militias under the 32nd Army's peripheral commands, offered only sporadic opposition through guerrilla ambushes, cave strongpoints, and booby-trapped ridges rather than cohesive defenses. This reflected Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima's strategic concentration of the bulk of his 77,000-man army in fortified southern positions around Shuri, leaving the north lightly held to delay rather than repel the invasion. Marine advances progressed rapidly despite the challenging topography of hills, escarpments, and dense undergrowth, neutralizing isolated pockets with flamethrowers, demolitions, and assaults; the 6th Division, for instance, faced little beyond snipers for the first ten days. By mid-April, III Amphibious Corps forces had overrun most of northern Okinawa, reaching the island's northern tip and adjacent islets, though systematic clearing of caves and ravines extended into late April to eliminate holdouts. Casualties remained lower in this sector than in the south, with Marine losses totaling 2,938 killed or missing and over 13,000 wounded across the full campaign, a disparity attributable to the north's weaker enemy dispositions and terrain favoring mobile operations over attrition.

Central and Southern Land Engagements

Following the unopposed landings at Hagushi beaches on April 1, 1945, XXIV Corps under Major General advanced rapidly southward and inland, securing Kadena and Yontan airfields by April 7 with minimal opposition, as the Japanese 32nd Army conserved strength for defenses further south. The initial phase encountered scattered resistance, but by April 8, American forces reached the outer perimeter of the Shuri Line, a fortified network of ridges, caves, and reverse-slope positions manned by approximately 76,000 Japanese troops under . The first significant land battle erupted at Kakazu Ridge on , when the 96th Division's 383rd Regiment assaulted the 400-meter-long feature defended by elements of the Japanese 94th Division, including cave complexes and interlocking machine-gun positions that inflicted heavy casualties through enfilading fire. Over four days of fighting until , U.S. troops captured the ridge's western nose after intense close-quarters combat involving flamethrowers and demolitions, suffering over 300 killed and 900 wounded against Japanese losses estimated at 500. Adjacent engagements included the 7th Division's assaults on the Horseshoe and Hills, where tomb-reinforced bunkers and ravines channeled attackers into kill zones, stalling advances amid mounting attrition. A coordinated offensive launched on by XXIV Corps divisions—96th, 7th, and 27th —aimed to breach the Machinato and Takaesu lines protecting Shuri but faltered against entrenched positions, with gains measured in yards and casualties exceeding 1,000 daily due to , mortars, and snipers exploiting the terrain. Heavy rains from late April turned the into a quagmire, complicating and support, while Japanese forces employed networks for resupply and counterattacks. In early May, the 77th Division relieved the exhausted 27th, continuing probes against the Dakeshi and Wana ridges, where teams and naval gunfire proved critical in reducing fortified tombs. Central to the southern push, the —attached to XXIV Corps from May 7—assaulted the Horseshoe-Sugar Loaf-Half Moon complex west of Shuri starting May 12, enduring three days of brutal fighting against the Japanese 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, with Marine casualties reaching 2,662 killed or wounded in amid reverse slopes and wire obstacles. Simultaneously, the 6th Marine Division flanked eastward, capturing the Chocolate Drop hill after repeated attacks, which unhinged the western Shuri defenses. These actions, supported by over 1,500 artillery rounds per day and carrier airstrikes, forced Japanese withdrawals by May 21, though at the cost of exposing troops to from hidden guns. The fall of Shuri on May 29 followed the 7th Infantry Division's seizure of key eastern ridges like and on May 24-25, collapsing the main defensive line after 40 days of attritional warfare that inflicted 20,000 Japanese casualties while U.S. forces suffered 7,613 killed and 32,000 wounded in the southern sector. Ushijima's subsequent retreat to the Kiyamu Peninsula devolved into fragmented pockets, with XXIV Corps divisions conducting sweeps through cave systems using demolitions and systematic reduction, ending organized resistance on June 22, 1945, though isolated holdouts persisted. The engagements highlighted the effectiveness of Japanese subterranean fortifications against conventional assaults, necessitating innovations in flame weaponry and tactics. The , under Admiral , orchestrated the naval operations supporting Operation Iceberg, deploying over 1,300 ships including 18 aircraft carriers, 12 battleships, 24 cruisers, and numerous destroyers and amphibious vessels to facilitate the April 1, 1945, landings on Okinawa. Task Force 58, commanded by Marc A. Mitscher, provided the core carrier-based air power, conducting intensive pre-invasion strikes from March 23 onward against Japanese airfields, shipping, and defenses across , the Ryukus, and Formosa to achieve local air superiority. Naval from battleships and cruisers bombarded coastal fortifications and inland targets, delivering thousands of tons of shells daily in the initial phases to suppress enemy artillery and beach defenses. Complementing these efforts, the (BPF), redesignated Task Force 57 and commanded by Vice Admiral , joined operations in late March 1945 as the largest formation ever deployed to the Pacific, comprising four armored fleet carriers (HMS Victorious, Illustrious, Indomitable, and Formidable), two battleships (King George V and Howe), eight cruisers, and fifteen destroyers. Operating semi-independently from the main U.S. fleet to conserve American resources, TF 57 focused on neutralizing Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto islands, approximately 200 miles southwest of Okinawa, to interdict potential reinforcements and staging from Formosa and secure the invasion's southern flank. During Operation Iceberg I (March 26 to April 9, 1945), BPF aircraft flew over 2,500 sorties, destroying runways, hangars, and aircraft on Miyako and Ishigaki islands while minimizing losses through effective damage-control measures inherent to British carrier designs. TF 57 withdrew briefly in early April for logistical replenishment amid fuel constraints from extended operations and U.S.-supplied aviation fuel compatibility issues, resuming strikes in Operation Iceberg II from May 3 to 25, 1945, with renewed attacks on Sakishima airfields that further degraded Japanese aerial capabilities. These missions, involving Hellcat and Corsair fighters alongside Firefly and Avenger strike aircraft, inflicted significant attrition on Japanese aviation infrastructure, though the BPF endured operational strains from high sortie rates and the need for underway replenishment in contested waters. Overall, TF 57's contributions, including the suppression of over a dozen airfields and interception of potential raiders, bolstered the Fifth Fleet's defensive perimeter without diverting U.S. carriers from primary tasks, demonstrating effective Allied interoperability despite initial command frictions over operational control. The BPF's armored-deck carriers proved resilient in sustaining operations, logging 62 days at sea before refitting, and their role underscored Britain's commitment to the Pacific theater following European victories.

Operation Ten-Go and Yamato's Final Mission

Operation Ten-Go, initiated on April 6, 1945, represented the 's final major surface action of , dispatching the superbattleship Yamato and a small escort force on a deliberate to Okinawa without air cover or sufficient fuel for return. The operation's primary objective was for the flotilla to reach the waters off Okinawa, beach Yamato as an improvised shore battery, and provide to Japanese ground forces resisting the Allied invasion, while inflicting attrition on U.S. naval assets through ramming or gunnery if possible. Japanese planners, facing severe shortages of and aircraft, accepted the near-certainty of the force's destruction en route, viewing the sortie as a symbolic gesture to bolster naval prestige amid the Army's dominance in resource allocation and to demonstrate resolve to Emperor Hirohito. Vice Admiral Seiichi Itō commanded the operation from Yamato's bridge, with the flotilla comprising Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi (serving as flagship initially under Captain before shifting), and eight destroyers: Asashimo, Hamakaze, Isokaze, Suzutsuki, Yukikaze, Fuyutsuki, , and Hatsushimo. Departing from Tokuyama and passing through the Bungo Strait around 15:20 on April 6, the ships proceeded southwest at 22 knots toward Okinawa, approximately 300 nautical miles distant, with Yamato carrying only enough fuel for a one-way trip and ammunition loads optimized for anti-ship engagements. U.S. , including intercepts from the Ultra program, detected the sortie early, alerting Marc Mitscher's 58, which mobilized aircraft from 11 fast carriers including , , and Bunker Hill. The U.S. response unfolded on April 7 around 10:00, when approximately 280 aircraft from the first wave struck the Japanese formation east of Okinawa, targeting Yamato with bombs and torpedoes amid heavy anti-aircraft fire that downed several attackers. A second wave of over 100 planes followed by 12:00, concentrating torpedoes on Yamato's port side, which caused flooding and a severe list; the ship absorbed at least 10 torpedo hits and 7 bomb penetrations, leading to magazine explosions and capsizing at 14:23 with a massive plume visible for miles. Among the escorts, Yahagi sank after multiple hits, while four destroyers—Hamakaze, Isokaze, Asashimo, and Kasumi—were lost; the surviving Suzutsuki, Fuyutsuki, and Yukikaze limped back to Japan heavily damaged. Japanese losses totaled approximately 3,665 personnel killed, including 2,498 of Yamato's 2,747 crew, marking one of the war's heaviest single-ship disasters; U.S. losses were limited to 10 destroyed and 10 killed during the attacks. The operation achieved no strategic impact on the Okinawa campaign, as Yamato never reached engagement range with Allied surface units, underscoring the obsolescence of battleships against carrier-based air power and the futility of Japan's resource-starved late-war offensives.

Kamikaze Attacks and Air Campaign

The Japanese initiated organized attacks against Allied naval forces off Okinawa on April 6, 1945, coinciding with the sortie of the battleship Yamato in Operation Ten-Go, marking the beginning of the most intense suicide air campaign of the . Over the following 82 days of the battle, Japanese forces launched approximately 1,500 aircraft in ten major coordinated waves from bases in and Formosa, with only about one in six penetrating Allied defenses to strike targets. These attacks, involving modified fighters and bombers packed with explosives, targeted the U.S. Fifth Fleet's destroyers and amphibious support ships, inflicting significant attrition despite Allied air superiority. The April 6-7 assault exemplified the scale and ferocity, with over 700 Japanese aircraft committed, including 355 s, resulting in the sinking of five U.S. vessels and damage to dozens more, while Allied fighters and antiaircraft fire downed around 300 attackers. Overall, strikes sank 36 Allied ships—including 10 destroyers and several amphibious transports—and damaged 368 others, with impacts on carriers, cruisers, and battleships disrupting and forcing repairs that strained fleet operations. U.S. Navy casualties from these attacks totaled 4,907 killed and 4,824 wounded, accounting for roughly 40% of American deaths in the campaign and representing the heaviest single loss of life at sea for the U.S. in . Japanese losses exceeded 3,700 aircraft, depleted by fuel shortages, pilot inexperience, and relentless Allied interception, rendering conventional air operations negligible. Allied countermeasures emphasized layered defense, including radar-equipped destroyer pickets positioned 50-100 miles from the fleet to provide early warning, combat air patrols from escort carriers, and proximity-fused antiaircraft shells that proved devastating against low-flying kamikazes. These tactics, honed from earlier experiences, intercepted most incoming waves, though the volume of attacks—peaking in mid-April and May—overwhelmed some sectors, as seen in the sinking of picket s like USS Bush on April 6. By late May, Allied forces captured airfields like Kadena and Yontan, enabling Marine and Army Air Force squadrons to stage P-47 Thunderbolts and other fighters for direct intercepts, further neutralizing the threat. Complementing defensive efforts, the Allied air campaign provided critical to ground forces, with from 58 conducting over 140,000 sorties that dropped 17,000 tons of bombs on Japanese cave networks, reverse-slope defenses, and supply lines in southern Okinawa. These operations, coordinated with naval gunfire, targeted fortified positions around Shuri and the southern escarpments, where Japanese troops relied on tunnel systems for concealment, though dense terrain and weather limited precision bombing efficacy. B-29 Superfortresses from the Marianas temporarily shifted to high-level strikes on airfields to preempt launches, disrupting Japanese staging but diverting resources from the ongoing firebombing of mainland cities. Japanese air defenses, reduced to sporadic antiaircraft fire from Okinawa's limited artillery, offered minimal resistance, allowing Allied aviation to achieve unchallenged dominance that facilitated the eventual ground advance.

Casualties and Atrocities

Allied Military Losses

The Tenth Army, comprising primarily Marine and divisions, suffered 49,151 total during the Battle of Okinawa from April 1 to June 22, 1945, marking the highest casualty rate of any Pacific campaign at 35 percent of the committed force. Of these, 12,520 personnel were killed or , including 7,613 from ground forces and 4,907 from the U.S. Navy, the latter figure driven largely by strikes on the supporting fleet. Ground force losses broke down as follows: the III Amphibious Corps () recorded 2,938 killed or missing and 13,708 wounded, while the XXIV Corps sustained 4,412 killed and 17,689 wounded, with intense fighting in southern Okinawa's Shuri Line defenses contributing to the majority of these figures. Naval personnel faced disproportionate risks from over 3,700 Japanese aircraft sorties, including 1,900 kamikazes, resulting in 4,907 deaths alongside severe damage to 368 ships and the sinking of 36 vessels, though these material losses amplified personnel vulnerabilities through exposure to repeated attacks. Contributions from other Allied nations, including the with Australian, , and Canadian naval elements, incurred comparatively light personnel losses, with British aircraft casualties totaling 160 from combat and accidents but no comprehensive figures for fatalities exceeding a few dozen . Ground commitments from forces were absent, limiting their exposure to Okinawa's brutal engagements.
Service BranchKilled/MissingWoundedTotal Casualties
U.S. Army4,41217,68922,101
U.S. Marines2,93813,70816,646
U.S. 4,907~5,000 (est.)~9,907
Total U.S.12,25736,39748,654
Note: Navy wounded estimates derived from overall totals; exact breakdowns vary slightly across records due to post-battle revisions.

Japanese Military Losses

The Japanese 32nd Army, the primary ground force defending Okinawa under Lieutenant General , suffered near-total annihilation during the campaign from April 1 to June 22, 1945. U.S. forces counted 110,071 Japanese dead through grave registration, a figure that includes an unknown proportion of Okinawan conscripts and integrated into regular units as combat auxiliaries, though it excludes purely civilian deaths. The army's initial strength stood at approximately 77,000 personnel, augmented by local levies to exceed 100,000 combatants overall, with losses driven by prolonged attrition in fortified cave networks, banzai charges, and systematic reduction by and flamethrowers. Only 7,401 military prisoners were taken, underscoring the rigid no-surrender enforced by Japanese command, which prioritized ritual or hopeless assaults over capitulation. Naval losses compounded the toll, particularly in Operation Ten-Go on April 7, 1945, when the battleship Yamato, cruiser Yahagi, and four destroyers were sunk by U.S. carrier aircraft, resulting in roughly 3,665 sailors killed out of 4,450 embarked—Yamato alone lost 2,467 of her 2,747 crew. Broader Imperial Japanese Navy efforts around Okinawa saw additional surface and submarine units expended in failed interception attempts, contributing several thousand more fatalities amid the destruction of over a dozen warships. Aerial forces incurred heavy attrition through conventional strikes and organized kamikaze operations, with approximately 1,900 special attack sorties launched from bases, nearly all resulting in pilot deaths upon impact with Allied shipping. Total aircraft losses exceeded 3,000, including non-suicide missions, reflecting the depletion of Japan's remaining air reserves in desperate bids to disrupt the fleet. Combined across branches, Japanese military fatalities surpassed 120,000, with capture rates below 10% of engaged forces, as verified by postwar accounting that highlights discrepancies from incomplete body recovery and inclusion of drafted locals.

Okinawan Civilian Deaths, Suicides, and Japanese-Perpetrated Atrocities

During the Battle of Okinawa from to , 1945, approximately 142,000 Okinawan civilians perished, representing about one-third of the island's pre-war civilian population of roughly 450,000. These deaths resulted from a combination of Allied bombardment and ground , starvation and amid disrupted food supplies, and direct actions by Japanese forces, including coerced mass suicides and targeted killings. Japanese treated Okinawans with suspicion, viewing them as potential collaborators with advancing U.S. forces due to cultural and linguistic differences, which exacerbated civilian vulnerability as soldiers confiscated food, livestock, and shelter while herding non-combatants into zones as human shields. A significant portion of civilian fatalities involved mass suicides, often compelled by Japanese troops through direct orders, distribution of grenades, and psychological pressure rooted in imperial propaganda. Propaganda disseminated by the Japanese portrayed U.S. soldiers as perpetrators of systematic , , and , convincing many Okinawans that death by or mutual killing was preferable to capture; this fear was amplified by fabricated atrocity stories and commands from officers like those on Ie Shima, where entire villages were urged to to avoid "dishonor." Eyewitness accounts document soldiers handing grenades to families with instructions to pull the pins together, or bayoneting those who hesitated, as in incidents near ' caves where troops enforced group deaths to prevent surrender. testimonies from survivors, including those collected in Okinawan oral histories, confirm that in areas without direct military coercion, surrender rates to U.S. forces were far higher, underscoring the role of Japanese enforcement in suicide clusters. Japanese-perpetrated atrocities extended beyond suicides to include systematic executions of civilians deemed disloyal or burdensome. Soldiers frequently killed Okinawans attempting to flee combat zones or approach U.S. lines for food and safety, using bayonets, rifles, or grenades; for instance, families hiding in caves were massacred when suspected of espionage, with troops sealing entrances or igniting fumes to suffocate groups. In southern Okinawa, retreating Imperial Army units executed villagers en masse to eliminate witnesses or potential guides for invaders, contributing to tens of thousands of non-combatant deaths independent of Allied fire. These acts stemmed from a racist hierarchy within the Japanese military that demeaned Okinawans as ethnically inferior "Ryukyuans" rather than true Japanese, justifying their sacrifice for the empire's defense. U.S. military records and survivor affidavits from the period corroborate that Japanese forces bore primary responsibility for such targeted civilian killings, distinct from incidental battle losses.

Historical Debates on Casualty Attribution and Japanese Denialism

Historians estimate that between 100,000 and 150,000 Okinawan civilians perished during the Battle of Okinawa, representing approximately one-third of the island's pre-war , with debates centering on the relative contributions of Allied bombardment, crossfire, starvation, and deliberate actions by Japanese forces. While U.S. naval and fire undoubtedly inflicted civilian losses amid the intense close-quarters combat, particularly in southern cave complexes where Japanese defenders intermingled with refugees, primary attribution falls to Japanese that trapped civilians as human shields, distributed hand grenades for self-destruction, and enforced a no-surrender policy through executions of those attempting to flee or . suicides, often involving entire families using these grenades or , occurred predominantly in zones under direct Japanese control, such as Zamami and Tokashiki islands, where survivor accounts describe soldiers compelling civilians to kill themselves or one another to prevent capture and intelligence leaks to U.S. forces. Eyewitness testimonies underscore Japanese coercion: on Zamami, local historian Yoshikazu Miyazato documented 180 suicides among 404 civilian deaths, linking them to explicit orders, while survivor Sumie Oshiro recounted soldiers providing dual s—one for enemies, one for —amid exaggerating U.S. atrocities like mass . Similar patterns emerged on Ie Shima and other outlying areas, where Japanese troops bayoneted or shot civilians advocating surrender, as reported by figures like Rev. Shigeaki Kinjo, who was forced to participate in familial killings. These accounts align with forensic evidence, such as remnants traced to army-issued stockpiles at outposts coinciding with suicide sites, contradicting claims that deaths stemmed solely from autonomous or Allied indiscriminate fire. Conservative estimates attribute at least 20-30% of civilian fatalities directly to suicides or Japanese-inflicted killings, though broader causal chains—including -fueled despair and denial of evacuation routes—amplify culpability beyond battlefield collateral. Japanese denialism manifests in post-war historical revisionism, particularly efforts to portray civilian suicides as voluntary acts driven by dread of American barbarity rather than imperial army directives, a advanced by conservative scholars and enshrined in government-approved education. In , Japan's Education Ministry mandated textbook alterations, excising phrases like "soldiers ordered mass suicides" in favor of vague attributions to " " or enemy fears, citing insufficient proof of despite survivor affidavits and localized patterns absent in U.S.-controlled sectors. Prime Minister publicly endorsed this stance, rejecting military complicity in Okinawa suicides akin to his administration's minimization of "" exploitation, framing such revisions as patriotic corrections against "masochistic" views. Okinawan responses have included mass protests—over 110,000 rallied in Ginowan in 2007, the largest since reversion—and legal challenges affirming coercion, such as the 2008 Osaka District Court ruling upholding Nobel laureate Kenzaburo Oe's Okinawa Notes, which detailed army persuasion on Zamami and Tokashiki based on distributed explosives and command proximity. The verdict dismissed libel suits by former officers, citing overlapping evidence of military sites with suicide clusters, yet denial persists in mainland narratives, fueling tensions over Okinawa's disproportionate wartime sacrifices and U.S. base burdens. This revisionism overlooks empirical indicators, like suicides' confinement to Japanese-held areas and grenade forensics, prioritizing national self-image over causal accountability.

Aftermath and Strategic Impact

Immediate Surrender and Island Control

On June 22, 1945, organized Japanese resistance on Okinawa effectively ended following the ritual suicides of Lieutenant General , commander of the Japanese 32nd Army, and Major General , his chief of staff, in their command cave on Hill 89 near Mabuni. Ushijima's death marked the collapse of coordinated defenses, as remaining troops, demoralized and without leadership, ceased large-scale combat operations. U.S. Tenth Army, under Simon B. Buckner Jr. (killed earlier on June 18), declared Okinawa secure on the same date, with guns falling silent by in most sectors. Mop-up operations continued against scattered pockets, capturing approximately 7,400 Japanese soldiers in the immediate aftermath, though some holdouts persisted into July and beyond. No formal surrender ceremony occurred for the island garrison, as Japanese military culture emphasized death over capitulation, leading to the suicides of senior officers rather than unconditional yield. With Japanese forces neutralized, U.S. troops assumed administrative control, establishing a to manage the devastated island and its surviving population of roughly 150,000 Okinawan civilians. Initial efforts focused on clearing , providing amid and , and securing the terrain for forward bases, transforming Okinawa into a key for planned operations against the Japanese mainland. By late June, engineering units began airfield expansions and port repairs, solidifying Allied dominance over the chain.

Influence on Decision for Atomic Bombings and Operation Downfall Avoidance

The ferocity of Japanese resistance during the Battle of Okinawa, which ended on June 22, 1945, inflicted heavy losses on U.S. forces, with approximately 12,500 killed and over 38,000 wounded among ground troops, yielding a casualty rate of roughly 35 percent. attacks alone accounted for nearly 40 percent of American deaths, sinking over 25 ships and damaging more than 150 others, while Japanese defenders integrated civilians into combat roles and employed scorched-earth tactics, foreshadowing the expected intensity of homeland defense. These outcomes exceeded pre-battle projections and highlighted the risks of amphibious assaults against fanatical opposition, prompting U.S. planners to reassess the viability of , the two-phase invasion of (Operation Olympic) and (Operation Coronet) scheduled for November 1945 and March 1946, respectively. Post-Okinawa analyses drove upward revisions in casualty forecasts for Downfall, with estimates ranging from 250,000 to over 1 million American casualties based on the 767,000 troops allocated for the initial phase alone, where a 35 percent rate could yield 268,000 losses. projections, informed by Okinawa's lessons, emphasized the potential for massive swarms—up to 10,000 aircraft—and civilian militias swelling Japanese ranks to millions, amplifying attrition beyond Pacific precedents like or . Such figures underscored the operation's prohibitive human and logistical costs, shifting strategic calculus toward alternatives that could shatter Japanese will without direct assault. This grim appraisal directly shaped President Truman's authorization of atomic bombings on (August 6, 1945) and (August 9, 1945), viewed as a means to force and avert Downfall's carnage, with Okinawa's fresh toll cited in deliberations as evidence of 's infeasibility. Military leaders, including Admiral Chester Nimitz, later affirmed that the bombs' deployment—enabled by the Manhattan Project's success—spared lives by compelling Japan's capitulation on August 15, 1945, prior to Soviet entry complicating postwar arrangements. While some postwar analyses debate the bombs' necessity relative to Soviet invasion threats, the empirical data from Okinawa's 82-day attritional grind provided causal impetus for prioritizing nuclear demonstration over protracted conventional or amphibious escalation.

Long-Term Military and Psychological Legacy

The Battle of Okinawa, concluding on June 22, 1945, provided U.S. planners with a grim preview of the expected resistance during , the planned invasion of Japan's home islands, with casualty estimates for the initial phase alone reaching up to 500,000 American troops based on Okinawa's scale of attrition. This extrapolated to potentially one million U.S. deaths across the full campaign, factoring in fanatical defenses, tactics, and civilian involvement, directly informing President Truman's authorization of atomic bombings on and to compel surrender without amphibious assault. Militarily, Okinawa's capture secured a forward base network critical for post-war operations, hosting U.S. forces that supported the (1950–1953), (1955–1975), and subsequent conflicts, with airfields expanded from wartime infrastructure to sustain B-29 bombers and later jets. Under U.S. administration until reversion to in 1972, the islands retained disproportionate basing—about 70% of U.S. facilities in concentrated there—due to their proximity to potential threats like and , underscoring enduring strategic value in the . The battle's emphasis on integrated joint operations, including naval gunfire support amid swarms that sank 36 ships, yielded doctrinal lessons for that persisted into planning. Psychologically, the campaign inflicted widespread battle fatigue on U.S. forces, with noncombat evacuations—primarily from exhaustion, mud, and relentless close-quarters fighting—comprising a significant portion of casualties, as documented in Marine Corps after-action reports and veteran memoirs like those of , who described pervasive horror from Japanese banzai charges and ritual suicides. This reinforced American perceptions of Japanese troops' willingness for total self-destruction, eroding illusions of negotiated peace and cementing resolve for unconditional victory, though it also fostered long-term veteran trauma akin to early PTSD recognition. From the Japanese viewpoint, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara's defensive strategy prolonged the fight but exposed the futility of attrition against superior firepower, contributing to post-war disillusionment with militarism while glorifying sacrifice in some narratives as noble defiance. Okinawan survivors' accounts highlight coerced suicides and dual by Japanese forces, shaping regional resentment toward imperial legacies and ongoing U.S. basing burdens.

Memorialization and Post-War Commemorations

The Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Park, located on Mabuni Hill in Itoman City, serves as the primary site for commemorating the Battle of Okinawa, encompassing memorials, museums, and annual ceremonies dedicated to the fallen from all sides. Designated as a park in 1972, it includes the , erected in 1995 to mark the battle's 50th anniversary, which inscribes the names of approximately 250,000 individuals who perished, comprising 14,010 Americans and 227,636 Japanese military personnel and Okinawan civilians. The adjacent Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, opened in April 2000, exhibits artifacts, photographs, and survivor testimonies detailing the battle's prelude, conduct, and aftermath, with a focus on civilian hardships and the push for postwar peace. Specialized memorials highlight specific groups affected by the battle. The Himeyuri Peace Museum, situated near Ihara in Itoman within Okinawa Senseki Quasi-National Park, honors the Himeyuri Student Corps—comprising 240 high school girls and 18 teachers from two girls' schools mobilized as nurses and laborers in underground field hospitals—which suffered over 100 deaths from combat, cave collapses, and starvation during the final weeks of fighting in 1945. The museum, established to preserve their experiences, features relics from the Himeyuri Cave and promotes anti-war education through exhibits on the corps' mobilization and abandonment by Japanese forces. Okinawa Memorial Day, observed annually on June 23—a public holiday designated by prefectural ordinance since 1961—commemorates the battle's effective end, marked by the ritual suicide of Japanese 32nd Army commander in his Mabuni headquarters. The central ceremony at Peace Memorial Park, held at 11:50 a.m., involves wreaths laid by prefectural officials, prayers for the dead, and calls for peace, attended by Okinawan residents, Japanese dignitaries, and U.S. representatives. U.S. participation in these events, including joint services with Japanese hosts, reflects bilateral efforts to honor American losses exceeding 12,500 killed and 38,000 wounded, alongside veteran reunions and dedications like the 7th Infantry Division recognizing its soldiers' sacrifices. Recent commemorations, such as the 80th anniversary in 2025, have incorporated technological aids like 3D maps of casualty sites to enhance reflection on the battle's toll.

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