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Battle of Okinawa
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| Battle of Okinawa | |||||||
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| Part of the Volcano and Ryukyu Islands campaign of the Pacific War (World War II) | |||||||
1st Marine Regiment during fighting at Wana Ridge during the Battle of Okinawa, May 1945 | |||||||
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Ground forces: Naval forces: |
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Ground units: Naval units:
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Ground units:
Naval units: | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
~183,000 combat troops[4] rising to ~250,000[5]: 567 |
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| Casualties and losses | |||||||
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Materiel: 375 tanks damaged, disabled, or destroyed[18] 13 destroyers sunk 15 amphibious ships sunk 8 other ships sunk 386 ships damaged 763 aircraft lost[5]: 573 [19]: 473 |
Battle & non-battle casualties: 94,136 soldiers and sailors dead (all causes)[e] 4,037 dead from Yamato task force[21] 7,401 captured (by 30 June)[22][f] Total casualties: ~105,000 to 110,000 Materiel: 1 battleship sunk 1 light cruiser sunk 5 destroyers sunk 9 other warships sunk 1,430 aircraft lost[23] 27 tanks destroyed 743–1,712 artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, mortars and anti-aircraft guns lost[19]: 91–92 | ||||||
| 40,000–150,000 civilians dead[24][25][g] | |||||||
Location within Japan | |||||||
The Battle of Okinawa (Japanese: 沖縄戦, Hepburn: Okinawa-sen), codenamed Operation Iceberg,[27]: 17 was a major battle of the Pacific War fought on the island of Okinawa by the United States Army and United States Marine Corps forces against the Imperial Japanese Army.[28][29] The initial invasion of Okinawa on 1 April 1945 was the largest amphibious assault in the Pacific Theater of World War II.[30][31] The Kerama Islands surrounding Okinawa were preemptively captured on 26 March 1945 by the U.S. Army 77th Infantry Division. The 82-day battle on Okinawa lasted from 1 April 1945 until 22 June 1945. After a long campaign of island hopping, the Allies were planning to use Kadena Air Base on the island as a staging point for Operation Downfall, the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands, 340 mi (550 km) away.
The United States created the Tenth Army, a cross-branch force consisting of the U.S. Army 7th, 27th, 77th and 96th Infantry Divisions with the 1st, 2nd, and 6th Marine Divisions, to seize the island. The Tenth Army was unique because it had its own Tactical Air Force (joint Army-Marine command) and was supported by combined naval and amphibious forces. Opposing the Allied forces on the ground was the Japanese Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima's Thirty-Second Army, a mixed force consisting of regular army troops, naval infantry and conscripted local Okinawans. There were about 100,000 Japanese troops on Okinawa at the onset of the invasion. The battle was the longest sustained carrier campaign of the Second World War.[32]
The battle has been referred to as the "typhoon of steel" in English, known in Japanese as "tetsu no bōfū".[33][34] The nicknames refer to the ferocity of the fighting, the intensity of Japanese kamikaze attacks and the sheer numbers of Allied ships and armored vehicles that assaulted the island. The battle was the bloodiest and fiercest in the Pacific Ocean Theatre, with some 50,000 Allied and around 100,000 Japanese casualties,[35][19]: 473–474 also including local Okinawans conscripted into the Japanese Army.[24] According to local authorities, at least 149,425 Okinawan people were killed, died by coerced suicide or went missing.[36]
In the naval operations surrounding the battle, both sides lost considerable numbers of ships and aircraft, including the Japanese battleship Yamato. After the battle, Okinawa provided the victorious Allies with a fleet anchorage, troop staging areas, and airfields in close proximity to Japan as they planned to invade the Japanese home islands.
Order of battle
[edit]Allied
[edit]In all, the US Army had over 103,000 soldiers (of these, 38,000+ were non-divisional artillery, combat support and HQ troops, with another 9,000 service troops),[37]: 39 over 88,000 Marines and 18,000 Navy personnel (mostly Seabees and medical personnel).[37]: 40 At the start of the Battle of Okinawa, the US Tenth Army had 182,821 personnel under its command.[37]: 40 It was planned that Lieutenant General Simon Bolivar Buckner Jr. would report to Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner until the amphibious phase was completed, after which he would report directly to Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. Total aircraft provided by the US Navy, Marine and Army Air Force exceeded 3,000 over the course of the battle, including fighters, attack aircraft, scout planes, bombers and dive-bombers. The invasion was supported by a fleet consisting of 18 battleships, 27 cruisers, 177 destroyers/destroyer escorts, 39 aircraft carriers (11 fleet carriers, 6 light carriers and 22 escort carriers) and various support and troop transport ships.[38]
The British naval contingent accompanied 251 British naval aircraft and included a British Commonwealth fleet with Australian, New Zealand and Canadian ships and personnel.[39]
Japanese
[edit]The Japanese land campaign (mainly defensive) was conducted by the 67,000-strong (77,000 according to some sources) regular 32nd Army and some 9,000 Imperial Japanese Navy troops at Oroku Naval Base (only a few hundred of whom had been trained and equipped for ground combat), supported by 39,000 drafted local Ryukyuan people (including 24,000 hastily drafted rear militia called Boeitai and 15,000 non-uniformed laborers). The Japanese had used kamikaze tactics since the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but now for the first time they became a major institutionalized aspect of the Japanese defensive strategy. Between the American landing on 1 April and 25 May, seven major kamikaze attacks were attempted, involving more than 1,500 planes.
The 32nd Army initially consisted of the 9th, 24th and 62nd Divisions and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 9th Division was moved to Taiwan before the invasion, resulting in shuffling of Japanese defensive plans. Primary resistance was to be led in the south by Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Isamu Chō and his chief of operations, Colonel Hiromichi Yahara. Yahara advocated a defensive strategy, whilst Chō advocated an offensive one.
In the north, Colonel Takehiko Udo was in command. The naval troops were led by Rear Admiral Minoru Ōta. They expected the Americans to land 6–10 divisions against the Japanese garrison of two and a half divisions. The staff calculated that superior quality and numbers of weapons gave each US division five or six times the firepower of a Japanese division. To this, would be added the Americans' abundant naval and air firepower.
Japanese use of children
[edit]
On Okinawa, the Imperial Japanese Army mobilized 1,780 schoolboys aged 14–17 years into front line service as an Iron and Blood Imperial Corps (Japanese: 鉄血勤皇隊, romanized: Tekketsu Kinnōtai), while female Himeyuri students were organized into a nursing unit.[35] This mobilization was conducted by an ordinance of the Ministry of the Army, not by law. The ordinances mobilized the students as volunteer soldiers for form's sake; in reality, the military authorities ordered schools to force almost all students to "volunteer" as soldiers; sometimes they counterfeited the necessary documents. About half of the Tekketsu Kinnōtai were killed, including in suicide bomb attacks against tanks and in guerrilla operations.
Among the 21 male and female secondary schools that made up these student corps, 2,000 students died on the battlefield. Even with the female students acting mainly as nurses to Japanese soldiers, they were still exposed to the harsh conditions of war.[40]
Naval battle
[edit]There was a hypnotic fascination to the sight so alien to our Western philosophy. We watched each plunging kamikaze with the detached horror of one witnessing a terrible spectacle rather than as the intended victim. We forgot self for the moment as we groped hopelessly for the thought of that other man up there.
— Vice Admiral C.R. Brown, US Navy[41]: 711
The US Navy's Task Force 58, deployed to the east of Okinawa with a picket group of 6 to 8 destroyers, kept 13 carriers (7 fleet carriers and 6 light carriers) on duty from 23 March to 27 April and a smaller number thereafter. Until 27 April, a minimum of 14 and up to 18 escort carriers were in the area at all times. Until 20 April, British Task Force 57, with 4 large and 6 escort carriers, remained off the Sakishima Islands to protect the southern flank.[19]: 97
The protracted length of the campaign under stressful conditions forced Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to take the unprecedented step of relieving the principal naval commanders to rest and recuperate. Following the practice of changing the fleet designation with the change of commanders, US naval forces began the campaign as the US 5th Fleet under Admiral Spruance, but ended it as the 3rd Fleet under Admiral Halsey.
Japanese air opposition had been relatively light during the first few days after the landings. However, on 6 April the expected air reaction began with an attack by some 400 Japanese planes from Kyushu.
Similar air attacks continued through April.[42] From 26 March to 30 April, 20 American ships were sunk and 157 damaged by enemy action. By 30 April the Japanese had lost more than 1,100 planes to Allied naval forces alone.[19]: 102
Between 6 April and 22 June, the Japanese flew 1,465 kamikaze aircraft in large-scale attacks from Kyushu, 185 individual kamikaze sorties from Kyushu, and 250 individual kamikaze sorties from Taiwan, then called Formosa. While US intelligence estimated there were 89 planes on Formosa, the Japanese actually had about 700, dismantled or well camouflaged and dispersed into scattered villages and towns; the US Fifth Air Force disputed Navy claims of kamikaze coming from Formosa.[43][clarification needed]
The ships lost were smaller vessels, particularly the destroyers of the radar pickets, as well as destroyer escorts and landing ships. While no major Allied warship was lost, several fleet carriers were severely damaged. Land-based Shin'yō-class suicide motorboats were also used in the Japanese suicide attacks, although Ushijima had disbanded the majority of the suicide boat battalions before the battle because of expected low effectiveness against a superior enemy. The boat crews were re-formed into three additional infantry battalions.[44]
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The super battleship Yamato explodes after persistent attacks from US aircraft.
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American aircraft carrier USS Bunker Hill burns after being hit by two kamikaze planes within 30 seconds.
Operation Ten-Go
[edit]Operation Ten-Go (Ten-gō sakusen) was the attempted attack by a strike force of ten Japanese surface vessels, led by Yamato and commanded by Admiral Seiichi Itō. This small task force had been ordered to fight through enemy naval forces, then beach Yamato and fight from shore, using her guns as coastal artillery and her crew as naval infantry. The Ten-Go force was spotted by submarines shortly after it left the Japanese home waters and was intercepted by US carrier aircraft.
Under attack from more than 300 aircraft over a two-hour span, the world's largest battleship sank on 7 April 1945 after a one-sided battle, long before she could reach Okinawa. (US torpedo bombers were instructed to aim for only one side to prevent effective counter flooding by the battleship's crew, and to aim for the bow or the stern where armor was believed to be the thinnest.) Of Yamato's screening force, the light cruiser Yahagi and four of the eight destroyers were also sunk. The Imperial Japanese Navy lost some 3,700 sailors, including Admiral Itō, at the cost of ten US aircraft and twelve airmen.
British Pacific Fleet
[edit]The British Pacific Fleet, taking part as Task Force 57, was assigned the task of neutralizing the Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Islands, which it did successfully from 26 March to 10 April. On 10 April its attention was shifted to airfields in northern Formosa. The force withdrew to San Pedro Bay on 23 April. On 1 May, the British Pacific Fleet returned to action, subduing the airfields as before, this time with naval bombardment as well as aircraft (they only used aircraft during their first mission of destroying airfields in the Sakishima Islands).[45] Several kamikaze attacks caused significant damage, but as the Royal Navy carriers had armored flight decks, they experienced only a brief interruption to their force's operations.[46][47]
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Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm Avengers, Seafires and Fireflies on HMS Implacable warm up their engines before taking off.
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HMS Formidable on fire after a kamikaze attack on May 4. The ship was out of action for fifty minutes.
Land battle
[edit]
The land battle took place over about 81 days beginning on 1 April 1945. The first Americans ashore were soldiers of the 77th Infantry Division who landed in the Kerama Islands, 15 mi (24 km) west of Okinawa on 26 March. Subsidiary landings followed, and the Kerama group was secured over the next five days. In these preliminary operations, the 77th Infantry Division suffered 27 dead and 81 wounded, while the Japanese dead and captured numbered over 650. On March 28, 1945, 394 civilians on Tokashiki island were forced by Japanese soldiers to kill themselves after the landing of US troops.[48][49] The operation provided a protected anchorage for the fleet and eliminated the threat from suicide boats.[19]: 50–60
On 31 March, Marines of the Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion landed without opposition on Keise Shima, four islets just 8 mi (13 km) west of the Okinawan capital of Naha. A group of 155 mm (6.1 in) "Long Tom" artillery pieces went ashore on the islets to cover operations on Okinawa.[19]: 57
Northern Okinawa
[edit]
The main landing was made by the XXIV Corps and the III Amphibious Corps on the Hagushi beaches on the western coast of Okinawa on 1 April. The 2nd Marine Division conducted a demonstration off the Minatoga beaches on the southeastern coast to deceive the Japanese about American intentions and delay movement of reserves from there.[19]: 68–74
Tenth Army swept across the south-central part of the island with relative ease, capturing the Kadena and the Yomitan airbases within hours of the landing.[27]: 67–69 [19]: 74–75 In light of the weak opposition, General Buckner decided to proceed immediately with Phase II of his plan, the seizure of northern Okinawa. The 6th Marine Division headed up the Ishikawa Isthmus and by 7 April had sealed off the Motobu Peninsula.[19]: 138–141
Six days later on 13 April, the 2nd Battalion, 22nd Marine Regiment, reached Hedo Point at the northernmost tip of the island. By this point, the bulk of the Japanese forces in the north (codenamed Udo Force) were cornered on the Motobu Peninsula. The terrain was mountainous and wooded, with the Japanese defenses concentrated on Mount Yaedake, a twisted mass of rocky ridges and ravines on the center of the peninsula. There was heavy fighting before the Marines finally cleared Yaedake on 18 April.[19]: 141–148 However, this was not the end of ground combat in northern Okinawa. On 24 May, the Japanese mounted Operation Gi-gou: a company of Giretsu Kuteitai commandos were airlifted in a suicide attack on Yomitan. They destroyed 70,000 US gallons (260,000 L) of fuel and nine planes before being killed by the defenders, who lost two men.
Meanwhile, the 77th Infantry Division assaulted Ie Shima, a small island off the western end of the peninsula, on 16 April. In addition to conventional hazards, the 77th Infantry Division encountered kamikaze attacks and even local women armed with spears. There was heavy fighting before the area was declared secured on 21 April and became another airbase for operations against Japan.[19]: 149–183
Southern Okinawa
[edit]



While the 6th Marine Division cleared northern Okinawa, the US Army 96th and 7th Infantry Divisions wheeled south across the narrow isthmus of Okinawa. The 96th Infantry Division began to encounter fierce resistance in west-central Okinawa from Japanese troops holding fortified positions east of Highway No. 1 and about 5 mi (8 km) northwest of Shuri, from what came to be known as Cactus Ridge.[19]: 104–105 The 7th Infantry Division encountered similarly fierce Japanese opposition from a rocky pinnacle located about 1,000 yd (910 m) southwest of Arakachi (later dubbed "The Pinnacle"). By the night of 8 April, American troops had cleared these and several other strongly fortified positions. They suffered over 1,500 battle casualties in the process while killing or capturing about 4,500 Japanese. Yet the battle had only begun, for it was realized that "these were merely outposts," guarding the Shuri Line.[19]: 105–108
The next American objective was Kakazu Ridge (26°15′32″N 127°44′13″E / 26.259°N 127.737°E)(see ja:嘉数の戦い), two hills with a connecting saddle that formed part of Shuri's outer defenses. The Japanese had prepared their positions well and fought tenaciously. The Japanese soldiers hid in fortified caves. American forces often lost personnel before clearing the Japanese out from each cave or other hiding place. The Japanese sent out Okinawans at gunpoint to obtain water and supplies for them, which led to civilian casualties. The American advance was inexorable but resulted in a high number of casualties on both sides.[19]: 110–125 Meanwhile, American forces also faced heavy resistance at the Maeda Ridge, also known as Hacksaw Ridge (see ja:前田の戦い).
As the American assault against Kakazu Ridge stalled, Lieutenant General Ushijima—influenced by General Chō—decided to take the offensive. On the evening of 12 April, the 32nd Army attacked American positions across the entire front. The Japanese attack was heavy, sustained, and well organized. After fierce close combat, the attackers retreated, only to repeat their offensive the following night. A final assault on 14 April was again repulsed. The effort led the 32nd Army's staff to conclude that the Americans were vulnerable to night infiltration tactics but that their superior firepower made any offensive Japanese troop concentrations extremely dangerous, and they reverted to their defensive strategy.[19]: 130–137
The 27th Infantry Division, which had landed on 9 April, took over on the right, along the west coast of Okinawa. General John R. Hodge now had three divisions in the line, with the 96th in the middle and the 7th to the east, with each division holding a front of only about 1.5 mi (2.4 km). Hodge launched a new offensive on 19 April with a barrage of 324 guns, the largest ever in the Pacific Ocean Theater. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers joined the bombardment, which was followed by 650 Navy and Marine planes attacking the Japanese positions with napalm, rockets, bombs, and machine guns. The Japanese defenses were sited on reverse slopes, where the defenders waited out the artillery barrage and aerial attack in relative safety, emerging from the caves to rain mortar rounds and grenades upon the Americans advancing up the forward slope.[19]: 184–194
A tank assault to achieve breakthrough by outflanking Kakazu Ridge failed to link up with its infantry support attempting to cross the ridge and therefore failed with the loss of 22 tanks. Although flame tanks cleared many cave defenses, there was no breakthrough, and the XXIV Corps suffered 720 casualties. The losses might have been greater except for the fact that the Japanese had practically all of their infantry reserves tied up farther south, held there by another feint off the Minatoga beaches by the 2nd Marine Division that coincided with the attack.[19]: 196–207
At the end of April, after Army forces had pushed through the Machinato defensive line,[50] the 1st Marine Division relieved the 27th Infantry Division and the 77th Infantry Division relieved the 96th. When the 6th Marine Division arrived, the III Amphibious Corps took over the right flank and Tenth Army assumed control of the battle.[19]: 265


On 4 May, the 32nd Army launched another counter-offensive. This time, Ushijima attempted to make amphibious assaults on the coasts behind American lines. To support his offensive, the Japanese artillery moved into the open. By doing so, they were able to fire 13,000 rounds in support, but effective American counter-battery fire destroyed dozens of Japanese artillery pieces. The attack failed.[19]: 283–302
Buckner launched another American attack on 11 May. Ten days of fierce fighting followed. On 13 May, troops of the 96th Infantry Division and 763rd Tank Battalion captured Conical Hill (26°13′N 127°45′E / 26.21°N 127.75°E). Rising 476 ft (145 m) above the Yonabaru coastal plain, this feature was the eastern anchor of the main Japanese defenses and was defended by about 1,000 Japanese. Meanwhile, on the opposite coast, the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions fought for "Sugar Loaf Hill" (26°13′19″N 127°41′46″E / 26.222°N 127.696°E). The capture of these two key positions exposed the Japanese around Shuri on both sides. Buckner hoped to envelop Shuri and trap the main Japanese defending force.[19]: 311–359
By the end of May, monsoon rains which had turned contested hills and roads into a morass exacerbated both the tactical and medical situations. The ground advance began to resemble a World War I battlefield, as troops became mired in mud, and flooded roads greatly inhibited evacuation of wounded to the rear. Troops lived on a field sodden by rain, part garbage dump and part graveyard. Unburied Japanese and American bodies decayed, sank in the mud and became part of a noxious stew. Anyone sliding down the greasy slopes could easily find their pockets full of maggots at the end of the journey.[19]: 364–370
From 24 to 27 May the 6th Marine Division cautiously occupied the ruins of Naha, the largest city on the island, finding it largely deserted.[19]: 372–377
On 26 May aerial observers saw large troop movements just below Shuri. On 28 May Marine patrols found recently abandoned positions west of Shuri. By 30 May the consensus among Army and Marine intelligence was that the majority of Japanese forces had withdrawn from the Shuri Line.[19]: 391–392 On 29 May the 1st Battalion, 5th Marines (1/5 Marines) occupied high ground 700 yards (640 m) east of Shuri Castle and reported that the castle appeared undefended. At 10:15 Company A, 1/5 Marines occupied the castle.[19]: 395–496
Shuri Castle had been shelled by the battleship USS Mississippi for three days before this advance.[51] The 32nd Army withdrew to the south and thus the Marines had an easy task of securing Shuri Castle.[51][52] The castle, however, was outside the 1st Marine Division's assigned zone, and only frantic efforts by the commander and staff of the 77th Infantry Division prevented an American airstrike and artillery bombardment which would have resulted in many friendly fire casualties.[19]: 396
On 29 May a Confederate flag was raised over Shuri Castle,[53] before being removed and replaced by a US flag three days later on orders of General Buckner; himself the son of a Confederate General.[54]
The Japanese retreat, although harassed by artillery fire, was conducted with great skill at night and aided by the monsoon storms. The 32nd Army was able to move nearly 30,000 personnel into its last defense line on the Kiyan Peninsula, which ultimately led to the greatest slaughter on Okinawa in the latter stages of the battle, including the deaths of thousands of civilians. In addition, there were 9,000 IJN troops supported by 1,100 militia, with approximately 4,000 holed up at the underground headquarters on the hillside overlooking the Okinawa Naval Base in the Oroku Peninsula, east of the airfield.[19]: 392–394
On 4 June, elements of the 6th Marine Division launched an amphibious assault on the peninsula. The 4,000 Japanese sailors, including Admiral Ōta, all committed suicide within the hand-built tunnels of the underground naval headquarters on 13 June.[19]: 427–434 By 17 June, the remnants of Ushijima's shattered 32nd Army were pushed into a small pocket in the far south of the island to the southeast of Itoman.[19]: 455–4661
On 18 June, General Buckner was killed by Japanese artillery fire while monitoring the progress of his troops from a forward observation post. Buckner was replaced by Major General Roy Geiger. Upon assuming command, Geiger became the only US Marine to command a numbered army of the US Army in combat; he was relieved five days later by General Joseph Stilwell. On 19 June, Brigadier General Claudius Miller Easley, the commander of the 96th Infantry Division, was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire, also while checking on the progress of his troops at the front.[19]: 461
The last remnants of Japanese resistance ended on 21 June, although some Japanese continued hiding, including the future governor of Okinawa Prefecture, Masahide Ōta.[55] Ushijima and Chō committed suicide by seppuku in their command headquarters on Hill 89 in the closing hours of the battle.[19]: 468–471 Colonel Yahara had asked Ushijima for permission to commit suicide, but the general refused his request, saying: "If you die there will be no one left who knows the truth about the battle of Okinawa. Bear the temporary shame but endure it. This is an order from your army commander."[41]: 723 Yahara was the most senior officer to have survived the battle on the island, and he later authored a book titled The Battle for Okinawa. On 22 June Tenth Army held a flag-raising ceremony to mark the end of organized resistance on Okinawa. On 23 June a mopping-up operation commenced, which concluded on 30 June.[19]: 471–473
On 15 August 1945, Admiral Matome Ugaki was killed while part of a kamikaze raid on Iheyajima island. The official surrender ceremony was held on 7 September, near the Kadena Airfield.
Casualties
[edit]
The Battle of Okinawa was the bloodiest battle of the Pacific War.[56][57] The most complete tally of deaths during the battle is at the Cornerstone of Peace monument at the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, which identifies the names of each individual who died at Okinawa in World War II. As of 2023, the monument lists 242,046 names, including 149,634 Okinawans, 77,823 Imperial Japanese soldiers, 14,010 Americans,[36] and smaller numbers of people from South Korea (381), the United Kingdom (82), North Korea (82) and Taiwan (34).[36]
The numbers correspond to recorded deaths during the Battle of Okinawa from the time of the American landings in the Kerama Islands on 26 March 1945 to the signing of the Japanese surrender on 2 September 1945, in addition to all Okinawan casualties in the Pacific War in the 15 years from the Manchurian Incident, along with those who died in Okinawa from war-related events in the year before the battle and the year after the surrender.[58] 234,183 names were inscribed by the time of unveiling, and new names are added as necessary.[59][60][61] 40,000 of the Okinawan civilians killed had been drafted or impressed by the Japanese army and are often counted as combat deaths.
Military losses
[edit]American
[edit]

The Americans suffered some 48,000 casualties, not including some 33,000 non-battle casualties (psychiatric, injuries, illnesses), of whom over 12,000 were killed or missing. Killed in action were 4,907 Navy, 4,675 Army, and 2,938 Marine Corps personnel; while 13,708 marines were wounded.[62]</ref> when excluding naval losses at sea and losses on the surrounding islands (such as Ie Shima), 6,316 killed and over 30,000 wounded occurred on Okinawa proper.[17] Other authors such as John Keegan have come up with higher numbers.[63] The battle caused more than twice the number of American casualties than both the Guadalcanal Campaign and Battle of Iwo Jima combined, with the Japanese kamikaze effort causing the American Navy to suffer more casualties than any previous engagement in the Atlantic or Pacific.[64]
The most famous American casualty was Lieutenant General Buckner, whose decision to attack the Japanese defenses head-on, although extremely costly in American lives, was ultimately successful. Four days from the closing of the campaign, Buckner was killed by Japanese artillery fire, which blew lethal slivers of coral into his body, while inspecting his troops at the front line. He was the highest-ranking US officer to be killed by enemy fire during the Second World War. The day after Buckner was killed, Brigadier General Easley was killed by Japanese machine-gun fire. War correspondent Ernie Pyle was also killed by Japanese machine-gun fire on Ie Shima, a small island just off of northwestern Okinawa.[65]


Aircraft losses over the three-month period were 768 US planes, including those bombing the Kyushu airfields launching kamikazes. Combat losses were 458, and the other 310 were operational accidents. At sea, 368 Allied ships—including 120 amphibious craft—were damaged while another 36—including 15 amphibious ships and 12 destroyers—were sunk during the Okinawa campaign. The US Navy's dead exceeded its wounded, with 4,907 killed and 4,874 wounded, primarily from kamikaze attacks.[66]
American personnel casualties included thousands of cases of mental breakdown. According to the account of the battle presented in Marine Corps Gazette:
More mental health issues arose from the Battle of Okinawa than any other battle in the Pacific during World War II. The constant bombardment from artillery and mortars coupled with the high casualty rates led to a great deal of personnel coming down with combat fatigue. Additionally, the rains caused mud that prevented tanks from moving and tracks from pulling out the dead, forcing Marines (who pride themselves on burying their dead in a proper and honorable manner) to leave their comrades where they lay. This, coupled with thousands of bodies both friend and foe littering the entire island, created a scent you could nearly taste. Morale was dangerously low by May and the state of discipline on a moral basis had a new low barometer for acceptable behavior. The ruthless atrocities by the Japanese throughout the war had already brought on an altered behavior (deemed so by traditional standards) by many Americans resulting in the desecration of Japanese remains, but the Japanese tactic of using the Okinawan people as human shields brought about a new aspect of terror and torment to the psychological capacity of the Americans.[24]
Medal of Honor recipients from Okinawa are:
Marine Corps
- Richard E. Bush – 16 April
- Henry A. Courtney Jr. – 14–15 May (posth.)
- James L. Day – 14–17 May
- John P. Fardy – 7 May (posth.)
- William A. Foster – 2 May (posth.)
- Harold Gonsalves – 15 April (posth.)
- Dale M. Hansen – 7 May (posth.)
- Louis J. Hauge Jr. – 14 May (posth.)
- Elbert L. Kinser – 4 May (posth.)
- Robert M. McTureous Jr. – 7 June (posth.)
- Albert E. Schwab – 7 May (posth.)
Army
- Beauford T. Anderson – 13 April
- Clarence B. Craft – 31 May
- Desmond Doss – 29 April – 21 May
- Martin O. May – 19–21 April (posth.)
- Seymour W. Terry – 11 May (posth.)
- John W. Meagher – 19 June
- Edward J. Moskala – 9 April (posth.)
- Joseph E. Muller – 15–16 May (posth.)
- Alejandro R. Ruiz – 28 April
Navy
- Robert Eugene Bush – 2 May
- William D. Halyburton Jr. – 10 May (posth.)
- Fred F. Lester – 8 June (posth.)
- Richard M. McCool Jr. – 10–11 June
Allied naval vessels sunk or damaged at Okinawa
[edit]The following table lists the Allied naval vessels that received damage or were sunk in the Battle of Okinawa between 19 March – 30 July 1945. The table lists a total of 147 damaged ships, five of which were damaged by enemy suicide boats and another five by mines. During the naval battle, which started before the amphibious landings on Okinawa on 1 April, USS Franklin suffered over 800 killed and missing and USS Bunker Hill suffered 396 killed and missing. These were the first and third largest loss of life on damaged or sunken American aircraft carriers during World War II. USS Franklin (hit by two bombs in a level bombing attack by a D4Y Suisei (Judy) on 19 March 1945) and USS Bunker Hill were the only two aircraft carriers that sustained very severe damage from Japanese attacks and as a result were the only aircraft carriers in the Essex class that did not experience any active service after the end of World War II. One source estimated that total Japanese sorties during the entire Okinawa campaign exceeded 3,700, with a large percentage being kamikaze attacks, and that the attackers damaged slightly more than 200 Allied vessels, with 4,900 naval officers and seamen killed and roughly 4,824 wounded or missing.[67] USS Thorton was damaged as the result of a collision with another US ship.
The Japanese air attacks were so intense that Fifth Fleet commander Admiral Spruance's flagships were struck two separate times (USS Indianapolis was hit in March and had to retire for repairs which forced him to transfer to USS New Mexico which was also hit in May). Fast Carrier Task Force commander Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher and his chief of staff Commodore Arleigh Burke were yards away from getting killed or wounded by kamikazes on his flagship USS Bunker Hill, which killed three of Mitscher's staff officers and eleven of his enlisted staff members and also destroyed his flag cabin along with all of his uniforms, personal papers, and possessions. Just three days later Mitscher's new flagship USS Enterprise was also struck by a kamikaze forcing him to have to change his flagship yet again. Both fleet carriers were knocked out for the rest of the war.[68]
* sunk or had to be scuttled due to irreparable damage. Of those sunk, the majority were relatively smaller ships; these included destroyers of around 300–450 feet. A few small cargo ships were also sunk, several containing munitions which caught fire.
# scrapped or decommissioned as a result of damage.
| Day | Ship | Type | Cause | Killed | Wounded |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19 Mar 45 | USS Wasp | Carrier | Air attack, bomb through flight, & hangar decks | 102 | 269 |
| 19 Mar 45 | USS Franklin | Carrier | Air attack | 807 | 487 |
| 20 Mar 45 | USS Enterprise[70][71] | Carrier | Air attack, two near misses from bombs, at the same time of near misses immediately hit by two 5-inch AA shells from U.S. ships | 9 | 28 |
| 20 Mar 45 | USS Hasley Powell | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze | 12 | 29 |
| 24 Mar 45 | USS Nevada | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit and knocked out 14-inch guns in turret number 3 | 11 | 49 |
| 26 Mar 45 | * USS Haligan | Destroyer | Mine, 3 miles SE of Maye Shima, exploded two forward magazines, bow blown off[72] | 153 | 39 |
| 26 Mar 45 | USS Kimberly | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze | 4 | 57 |
| 27 Mar 45 | USS Murray | Destroyer | Air attack, bomb | 1 | 116 |
| 27 Mar 45 | USS O'Brian | Destroyer | Air attack, Val kamikaze with bomb | 50 | 76 |
| 28 Mar 45 | * USS Skylark | Small Minesweeper | Mine, struck mines twice off Hagushi beaches | 5 | 25 |
| 28 Mar 45 | USS LSM(R)-188 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze | 15 | 32 |
| 29 Mar 45 | USS Wyandot | Attack Cargo Ship | Mine, possibly bomb | 0 | 1 |
| 31 Mar 45 | USS Indianapolis[h] | Cruiser | Air attack, kamikaze with bomb through fuel tanks and propeller shafts | 9 | 20 |
| 1 Apr 45 | USS Adams | Destroyer Minelayer | Air attack, kamikaze with bombs to fantail | 0 | 0 |
| 1 Apr 45 | USS Alpine | Attack Transport | Air attack, bomb and kamikaze | 16 | 27 |
| 1 Apr 45 | USS Hinsdale | Attack Transport | Air attack, kamikaze with bombs at waterline | 16 | 39 |
| 1 Apr 45 | # USS LST-884 | Tank Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze, scuttled 6 May | 24 | 21 |
| 1 Apr 45 | HMS Ulster | Destroyer | Air attack, near miss bomb, badly damaged | 2 | 1 |
| 1 Apr 45 | USS West Virginia[73] | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze | 4 | 23 |
| 2 Apr 45 | USS New York | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze destroyed search plane on catapult | 0 | 2 |
| 2 Apr 45 | * USS Dickerson | Destroyer Transport | Air attack, kamikaze Nick crashed bridge, towed, scuttled[74] | 54 | 23 |
| 2 Apr 45 | USS Goodhue | Attack Transport | Air attack, kamikaze aimed at bridge glanced mainmast, hit cargo boom, gun tubs, over side[75] | 24 | 119 |
| 2 Apr 45 | USS Henrico | Attack Transport | Air attack, kamikaze w/bombs hit bridge | 49 | 125 |
| 2 Apr 45 | USS Achernar | Attack Cargo Ship | Air attack, kamikaze w/bomb hit starboard | 5 | 41 |
| 3 Apr 45 | USS Wake Island | Escort Carrier | Air attack, kamikaze blew below waterline | 0 | 0 |
| 3 Apr 45 | USS Pritchett | Destroyer | Air attack, 500 lb bomb | 0 | 0 |
| 3 Apr 45 | USS Foreman | Destroyer | Air attack, bomb passed through her bottom, exploded below | 0 | 3 |
| 3 Apr 45 | USS LST-599 | Tank Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze through main deck, fires[75] | 0 | 21 |
| 3 Apr 45 | # USS LCT-876 | Landing Craft Tank | Air attack | 0 | 2 |
| 4 Apr 45 | * USS LCI(G)-82[76] | Landing Craft, Infantry | Suicide boat | 8 | 11 |
| 5 Apr 45 | USS Nevada | Battleship | Air attack 25 Mar and 5 April coastal battery | 2 | 16 |
| 6 Apr 45 | * USS Bush | Destroyer | Air attack, three kamikaze hits, two between stacks, blew forward engine room, broke in half[77] | 94 | 32 |
| 6 Apr 45 | * USS Colhoun | Destroyer | Air attack, four kamikaze hits, bombs blew forward, & aft fire rooms at waterline[77] | 35 | 21 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Howorth | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze struck superstructure, fires put out[78] | 9 | 14 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Hyman | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze Hampton hit torpedo tubes twixt stacks[79] | 10 | 40 |
| 6 Apr 45 | # USS Leutze | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze blew at fantail, bad flooding[80] | 7 | 34 |
| 6 Apr 45 | # USS Morris | Destroyer | Air attack, kate kamikaze portside | 0 | 5 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Mullany | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit depth charges | 13 | 45 |
| 6 Apr 45 | # USS Newcomb | Destroyer | Air attack, multiple kamikazes | 40 | 24 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Haynsworth | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze | 7 | 25 |
| 6 Apr 45 | # USS Witter | Destroyer Escort | Starboard waterline kamikaze | 0 | 5 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Fieberling | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze near miss | 6 | 6 |
| 6 Apr 45 | * USS Emmons | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, five kamikaze hits, scuttled 7 April | 64 | 71 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Rodman | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, four kamikaze hits | 16 | 20 |
| 6 Apr 45 | USS Defense | Small Minesweeper | Air attack, two kamikaze strikes | 0 | 9 |
| 6 Apr 45 | * USS LST-447 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze hit close above waterline, bomb blew | 5 | 17 |
| 6 Apr 45 | * SS Hobbs Victory | Cargo | Air attack, kamikaze struck port, flames ignited ammunition | 15 | 3 |
| 6 Apr 45 | * SS Logan Victory | Cargo | Air attack, kamikaze struck superstructure, flames ignited ammunition | 16 | 11 |
| 7 Apr 45 | USS Hancock | Carrier | Air attack, cartwheeling kamikaze | 72 | 82 |
| 7 Apr 45 | USS Maryland | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit starboard | 16 | 37 |
| 7 Apr 45 | USS Bennett | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit engine room | 3 | 18 |
| 7 Apr 45 | USS Wesson | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze starboard | 8 | 23 |
| 7 Apr 45 | * USS PGM-18 | Small Gunboat | Mine, powerful explosion | 14 | 14 |
| 7 Apr 45 | * YMS-103 | Small Minesweeper | Mine, struck two mines, blowing off her bow and stem rescuing PGM-18[81][82] | 5 | 0 |
| 8 Apr 45 | USS Gregory | Destroyer | Air attack, port kamikaze amidships near waterline | 0 | 2 |
| 8 Apr 45 | USS YMS-92 | Small Sweeper | Air attack | 0 | 0 |
| 9 Apr 45 | USS Charles J. Badger | Destroyer | Suicide boat threw depth charge or mine[83] | 0 | 0 |
| 9 Apr 45 | USS Sterett | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit starboard at waterline | 0 | 9 |
| 9 Apr 45 | USS Hopping | Destroyer Transport | Coastal Battery, damaging hits off Buckner Bay | 2 | 18 |
| 11 Apr 45 | USS Enterprise | Carrier | Air attack, two kamikazes hit at the waterline near her hull | 1 | 18 |
| 11 Apr 45 | USS Kidd | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze | 38 | 55 |
| 11 Apr 45 | USS Missouri | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze | 0 | 0 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Idaho | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit port side anti-torpedo bulge | 0 | 0 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Tennessee | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit signal bridge | 25 | 104 |
| 12 Apr 45 | * USS Mannert L. Abele | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze | 79 | 35 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Purdy | Destroyer | Air attack, splashed kamikaze bomb skidded in | 13 | 27 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Cassin Young | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit foremast | 1 | 59 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Zellars | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze crashed port, bomb blew | 29 | 37 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Rall | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze starboard aft, bomb blew | 21 | 38 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Whitehurst | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze with bomb crashed into pilot house | 37 | 37 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS Lindsey | Destroyer Minelayer | Air attack, two kamikaze Val strikes | 56 | 51 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS LSM(R)-189 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze | 0 | 4 |
| 12 Apr 45 | * USS LCS(L)-33 | Landing Craft | Air attack, kamikaze Val amidships | 4 | 29 |
| 12 Apr 45 | USS LCS(L)-57 | Landing Craft | Air attack, three kamikaze strikes | 2 | 6 |
| 14 Apr 45 | USS Sigsbee | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze damaged port engine | 4 | 74 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS Intrepid | Carrier | Air attack, kamikaze crashed deck, fires put out | 10 | 87 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS Bryant | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze to bridge, with explosion | 34 | 33 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS Laffey | Destroyer | Air attack, multiple kamikaze hits | 31 | 72 |
| 16 Apr 45 | * USS Pringle | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze Val hit abaft stack No. 1, explosion, broke in half | 65 | 110 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS Bowers | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze to bridge, bomb hit pilot house | 48 | 56 |
| 16 Apr 45 | # USS Harding | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, kamikaze struck side near bridge | 22 | 10 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS Hobson | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, near miss kamikaze's bomb veered in | 4 | 8 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS LCS(L)-116 | Landing Craft | Air attack, kamikaze hit aft gun mount | 12 | 12 |
| 16 Apr 45 | USS Missouri | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit stern crane | 0 | 2 |
| 18 Apr 45 | USS LSM-28 | Landing Ship | Air attack | 0 | 0 |
| 22 Apr 45 | USS Isherwood | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze w/bomb crashed gun mount | 42 | 41 |
| 22 Apr 45 | * USS Swallow | Small Sweeper | Air attack, bad kamikaze hit flooded her, 3 mins sunk | 2 | 9 |
| 22 Apr 45 | * USS LCS(L)-15 | Landing Craft | Air attack | 15 | 11 |
| 27 Apr 45 | # USS Hutchins | Destroyer | Suicide boat explosive blew close | 0 | 0 |
| 27 Apr 45 | # USS Rathburne | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit port bow waterline | 0 | 0 |
| 27 Apr 45 | * SS Canada Victory | Cargo | Air attack, kamikaze hit stern, lit ammo, sunk in ten minutes | 12 | 27 |
| 28 Apr 45 | USS Pinkney | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit aft of superstructure, lit ammo | 35 | 12 |
| 28 Apr 45 | USS Comfort | Hospital Ship | Air attack, kamikaze through three decks to surgery | 30 | 48 |
| 29 Apr 45 | # USS Haggard | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze went through hull, blew engine room | 11 | 40 |
| 29 Apr 45 | USS Hazelwood | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze zero hit port bridge | 46 | 26 |
| 29 Apr 45 | # USS LCS(L)-37 | Landing Craft | Suicide boat | 0 | 4 |
| 30 Apr 45 | USS Terror | Minelayer | Air attack, kamikaze blew through main deck | 48 | 123 |
| 3 May 45 | * USS Little | Destroyer | Air attack, five kamikaze strikes | 30 | 79 |
| 3 May 45 | # USS Aaron Ward | Destroyer Minelayer | Air attack; three kamikaze hits and bomb frags | 45 | 49 |
| 3 May 45 | USS Macomb | Destroyer Minelayer | Air attack, kamikaze | 7 | 14 |
| 3 May 45 | * USS LSM(R)-195 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze hit rockets, sunk | 8 | 16 |
| 4 May 45 | # USS Sangamon | Escort Carrier | Air attack, kamikaze & bomb blew through flight deck | 46 | 116 |
| 4 May 45 | USS Birmingham | Light Cruiser | Air attack, kamikaze hit forward | 51 | 81 |
| 4 May 45 | USS Ingraham | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze above port waterline, bomb blew | 14 | 37 |
| 4 May 45 | HMS Formidable | Carrier | Air attack, kamikaze & bomb blew through flight deck | 8 | 55 |
| 4 May 45 | USS Hopkins | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, glancing blow by burning kamikaze | 0 | 1 |
| 4 May 45 | * USS Luce | Destroyer | Air attack, first kamikaze bomb hit, second kamikaze struck aft | 149 | 94 |
| 4 May 45 | * USS Morrison | Destroyer | Air attack, first kamikaze hit bridge, then three more hits | 159 | 102 |
| 4 May 45 | USS Shea | Destroyer | Air attack, Ohka kamikaze through starboard bridge | 27 | 91 |
| 4 May 45 | USS Carina | Cargo Ship | Suicide boat ramming caused explosion | 0 | 6 |
| 4 May 45 | * USS LSM(R)-190 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze set off her rockets | 13 | 18 |
| 4 May 45 | * USS LSM(R)-194 | Landing Ship | Air attack | 13 | 23 |
| 9 May 45 | # USS England | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze dive bomber | 35 | 27 |
| 9 May 45 | HMS Formidable | Carrier | Air attack, kamikaze | 1 | 4 |
| 9 May 45 | # USS Oberrender | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze hit starboard gun mount, bomb through main deck | 8 | 53 |
| 11 May 45 | USS Bunker Hill[i] | Carrier | Air attack, three kamikaze hits with bombs through flight deck | 396 | 264 |
| 11 May 45 | # USS Hugh W. Hadley | Destroyer | Air attack, aft bomb, an Ohka, and two more kamikazes struck | 28 | 67 |
| 11 May 45 | # USS Evans | Destroyer | Air attack, struck by four kamikazes, fires put out | 30 | 29 |
| 11 May 45 | USS LCS(L)-88 | Landing Craft | Air attack | 7 | 9 |
| 12 May 45 | USS New Mexico[j] | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit, bomb | 54 | 119 |
| 13 May 45 | USS Bache | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit, bomb exploded amidships just above main deck | 41 | 32 |
| 13 May 45 | USS Bright | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze zero hit fantail, bomb exploded | 0 | 2 |
| 14 May 45 | USS Enterprise[k] | Carrier | Air attack, two kamikazes, struck port, & under starboard bow | 14 | 68 |
| 17 May 45 | USS Douglas H. Fox | Destroyer | Two kamikaze strikes, one to forward gun mounts, one to fantail | 9 | 35 |
| 18 May 45 | * USS Longshaw | Destroyer | Coastal Battery, four hits, one ignited magazine, blew off bow back to bridge[84] | 86 | 97 |
| 18 May 45 | * USS LST-808 | Landing Ship Tank | Air attack | 11 | 11 |
| 20 May 45 | # USS Chase | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, splashed kamikaze skidded in, bombs opened hull, with flooding | 0 | 35 |
| 20 May 45 | # USS Thatcher | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze Oscar struck aft of bridge, large hole | 14 | 53 |
| 20 May 45 | # USS John C. Butler | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze hit to mast and antennas | 0 | 0 |
| 25 May 45 | USS Stormes | Destroyer | Air attack, crashed aft torpedo mount, bomb blew large hole, flooded aft | 21 | 6 |
| 25 May 45 | USS O'Neill | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze | 0 | 16 |
| 25 May 45 | USS Butler | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, kamikaze bombs exploded under keel | 0 | 15 |
| 25 May 45 | # USS Spectacle | Small Minesweeper | Air attack, kamikaze crashed port gun tub causing fires | 29 | 6 |
| 25 May 45 | * USS Barry | Destroyer Transport | Air attack, kamikaze badly crashed starboard side, fires, abandoned | 0 | 30 |
| 25 May 45 | * USS Bates | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, two kamikaze hits, fires, abandoned, towed, later sank | 21 | 35 |
| 25 May 45 | USS Roper | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit off Hanagushi, Okinawa | 1 | 10 |
| 25 May 45 | * LSM-135 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze caused fires, beached, abandoned | 11 | 10 |
| 25 May 45 | SS William B. Allison (aka USS Inca) | Cargo Ship, Liberty Ship | Air attack, Aerial Torpedo off Nakagusuku Wan | 8 | 2 |
| 27 May 45 | USS Braine | Destroyer | Air attack, two kamikazes, first hit bridge, and second hit amidships | 66 | 78 |
| 27 May 45 | # USS Forrest | Destroyer Minesweeper | Air attack, kamikaze crashed starboard side waterline | 5 | 13 |
| 27 May 45 | USS Rednour | Transport | Air attack, two kamikazes hits, one made ten foot hole in main deck | 3 | 13 |
| 27 May 45 | USS Loy | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, kamikaze near miss sprayed fragments | 3 | 15 |
| 27 May 45 | LCS(L)-119 | Landing Craft | Air attack | 12 | 6 |
| 28 May 45 | * USS Drexler | Destroyer | Air attack, first kamikaze Frances hit topside, second Francis with bombs crashed into superstructure | 158 | 51 |
| 28 May 45 | USS Sandoval | Attack Transport | Air attack, kamikaze hit portside of wheelhouse | 8 | 26 |
| 28 May 45 | SS Brown Victory | Cargo | Air attack, kamikaze hit | 4 | 16 |
| 28 May 45 | SS Josiah Snelling[86] | Cargo | Air attack, kamikaze hit | 0 | 11 |
| 28 May 45 | SS Mary A. Livermore | Cargo | Air attack, kamikaze hit on starboard | 10 | 4 |
| 29 May 45 | USS Shubrick | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze bomb hit starboard causing hole, exploding depth charge | 32 | 28 |
| 3 June 45 | # USS LCI-90 | Landing Craft Infantry | Air attack, kamikaze | 1 | 7 |
| 5 Jun 45 | USS Louisville | Cruiser | Air attack, kamikaze hit quad 40mm AA gun mount and number 1 smoke stack | 8 | 45 |
| 5 Jun 45 | USS Mississippi[87] | Battleship | Air attack, kamikaze hit | 1 | 2 |
| 6 June 45 | # USS J. William Ditter | Destroyer Minelayer | Air attack, first kamikaze glanced, second hit port near main deck | 10 | 27 |
| 6 Jun 45 | USS Harry F. Bauer | Destroyer Minelayer | Air attack, kamikaze hit superstructure | 0 | 0 |
| 7 June 45 | USS Natoma Bay | Escort carrier | Air attack, kamikaze hit flight deck | 1 | 4 |
| 10 Jun 45 | * USS William D. Porter | Destroyer | Air attack, splashed kamikaze Val's bomb exploded close underwater | 0 | 61 |
| 11 Jun 45 | USS LCS(L)-122 | Landing Craft | Air attack kamikaze hit conning tower base, bomb fragments caused fires[88] | 11 | 29 |
| 16 Jun 45 | * USS Twiggs | Destroyer | Air attack, splashed kamikaze and bomb blew in hull plating, with structural damage | 126 | 34 |
| 21 Jun 45 | USS Halloran | Destroyer Escort | Air attack, splashed kamikaze's bomb struck | 3 | 24 |
| 21 Jun 45 | USS Curtiss | Seaplane Tender | Air attack, kamikaze and bomb ripped two holes in hull and blew | 41 | 28 |
| 21 Jun 45 | * USS LSM-59 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze strike while towing USS Barry, sank in four minutes | 2 | 8 |
| 22 Jun 45 | USS LSM-213 | Landing Ship | Air attack, kamikaze strike at Kimmu Wan, hull damage[89] | 3 | 10 |
| 22 Jun 45 | USS LST-534 | Landing Ship Tank | Air attack, while offloading on Nagagusuku Wan, kamikaze hit bow doors, tank deck[89] | 3 | 35 |
| 29 Jul 45 | * USS Callaghan | Destroyer | Air attack, bi-plane kamikaze hit, its bomb blew aft engine room, sunk | 47 | 73 |
| 30 Jul 45 | USS Cassin Young | Destroyer | Air attack, kamikaze hit forward, earlier hit 12 April | 22 | 45 |
| Total | 4582 | 6043 | |||
Japanese losses
[edit]The US military estimates that 110,071 Japanese soldiers were killed during the battle. This total includes conscripted Okinawan civilians.

A total of 7,401 Japanese regulars and 3,400 Okinawan conscripts surrendered or were captured during the battle of Okinawa. Additional Japanese and renegade Okinawans were captured or surrendered over the next few months, bringing the total to 16,346.[19]: 489 This was the first battle in the Pacific War in which thousands of Japanese soldiers surrendered or were captured. Many of the prisoners were native Okinawans who had been pressed into service shortly before the battle and were less imbued with the Imperial Japanese Army's no-surrender doctrine.[35] When the American forces occupied the island, many Japanese soldiers put on Okinawan clothing to avoid capture, and some Okinawans would come to the Americans' aid by offering to identify these mainland Japanese.
The Japanese lost 16 combat vessels, including the super battleship Yamato. Early claims of Japanese aircraft losses put the total at 7,800,[19]: 474 however later examination of Japanese records revealed that Japanese aircraft losses at Okinawa were far below often-repeated US estimates for the campaign.[23] The number of conventional and kamikaze aircraft actually lost or expended by the 3rd, 5th, and 10th Air Fleets, combined with about 500 lost or expended by the Imperial Army at Okinawa, was roughly 1,430.[23] The Allies destroyed 27 Japanese tanks and 743 artillery pieces (including mortars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns), some of them eliminated by the naval and air bombardments but most knocked out by American counter-battery fire.
Civilian losses, suicides, and atrocities
[edit]
Some of the other islands that saw major battles in World War II, such as Iwo Jima, were uninhabited or had been evacuated. Okinawa, by contrast, had a large indigenous civilian population; US Army records from the planning phase of the operation made the assumption that Okinawa was home to about 300,000 civilians. The official US Tenth Army count for the 82-day campaign is a total of 142,058 recovered enemy bodies (including those civilians pressed into service by the Imperial Japanese Army), with the deduction made that about 42,000 were non-uniformed civilians who had been killed in the crossfire. Okinawa Prefecture's estimate is over 100,000 losses.[90]
During the battle, American forces found it difficult to distinguish civilians from soldiers. It became common for them to shoot at Okinawan houses, as one infantryman wrote:
There was some return fire from a few of the houses, but the others were probably occupied by civilians—and we didn't care. It was a terrible thing not to distinguish between the enemy and women and children. Americans always had great compassion, especially for children. Now we fired indiscriminately.[91]

In its history of the war, the Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum[90] presents Okinawa as being caught between Japan and the United States. During the battle, the Imperial Japanese Army showed indifference to Okinawans' safety, and its soldiers used civilians as human shields or outright killed them. The Japanese military also confiscated food from the Okinawans and executed those who hid it, leading to mass starvation, and forced civilians out of their shelters. Japanese soldiers also killed about 1,000 people who spoke in the Okinawan language to suppress spying.[92] The museum writes that "some were blown apart by [artillery] shells, some finding themselves in a hopeless situation were driven to suicide, some died of starvation, some succumbed to malaria, while others fell victim to the retreating Japanese troops."[90]
With the impending Japanese defeat, civilians often committed mass suicide, urged on by the Japanese soldiers who told locals that victorious American soldiers would go on a rampage of killing and raping. Ryūkyū Shimpō, one of the two major Okinawan newspapers, wrote in 2007: "There are many Okinawans who have testified that the Japanese Army directed them to commit suicide. There are also people who have testified that they were handed grenades by Japanese soldiers" to blow themselves up.[93] Thousands of civilians, having been induced by Japanese propaganda to believe that American soldiers were barbarians who committed horrible atrocities, killed their families and themselves to avoid capture at the hands of the Americans. Some of them threw themselves and their family members from the southern cliffs where the Peace Museum now resides.[94]
Okinawans "were often surprised at the comparatively humane treatment they received from the American enemy".[95][96] Islands of Discontent: Okinawan Responses to Japanese and American Power by Mark Selden states that the Americans "did not pursue a policy of torture, rape, and murder of civilians as Japanese military officials had warned".[97] American Military Intelligence Corps[98] combat translators such as Teruto Tsubota managed to convince many civilians not to kill themselves.[99] Survivors of the mass suicides blamed also the indoctrination of their education system of the time, in which the Okinawans were taught to become "more Japanese than the Japanese" and were expected to prove it.[100]

Witnesses and historians claim that American and Japanese soldiers raped Okinawan women during the battle. Rape by Japanese troops reportedly "became common" in June, after it became clear that the Imperial Japanese Army had been defeated.[35][19]: 462 Marine Corps officials in Okinawa and Washington have said that they knew of no rapes by American personnel in Okinawa at the end of the war.[101] There are, however, numerous credible testimony accounts which note that a large number of rapes were committed by American forces during the battle. This includes stories of rape after trading sexual favors or even marrying Americans,[102] such as the alleged incident in the village of Katsuyama, where civilians said they had formed a vigilante group to ambush and kill three black American soldiers whom they claimed would frequently rape the local girls there.[103]
MEXT textbook controversy
[edit]There is ongoing disagreement between Okinawa's local government and Japan's national government over the role of the Japanese military in civilian mass suicides during the battle. In March 2007, the national Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) advised textbook publishers to reword descriptions that the embattled Imperial Japanese Army forced civilians to kill themselves in the war to avoid being taken prisoner. MEXT preferred descriptions that just say that civilians received hand grenades from the Japanese military. This move sparked widespread protests among Okinawans. In June 2007, the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly adopted a resolution stating, "We strongly call on the (national) government to retract the instruction and to immediately restore the description in the textbooks so the truth of the Battle of Okinawa will be handed down correctly and a tragic war will never happen again."[104][105]
On 29 September 2007, about 110,000 people held the biggest political rally in the history of Okinawa to demand that MEXT retract its order to textbook publishers regarding revising the account of the civilian suicides. The resolution states, "It is an undeniable fact that the 'multiple suicides' would not have occurred without the involvement of the Japanese military and any deletion of or revision to (the descriptions) is a denial and distortion of the many testimonies by those people who survived the incidents."[106] In December 2007, MEXT partially admitted the role of the Japanese military in civilian mass suicides.[107] The ministry's Textbook Authorization Council allowed the publishers to reinstate the reference that civilians "were forced into mass suicides by the Japanese military", on condition it is placed in sufficient context. The council report states, "It can be said that from the viewpoint of the Okinawa residents, they were forced into the mass suicides."[108] That was not enough for the survivors who said it is important for children today to know what really happened.[109]
The Nobel Prize-winning author Kenzaburō Ōe wrote a booklet that states that the mass suicide order was given by the military during the battle.[110] He was sued by revisionists, including a wartime commander during the battle, who disputed this and wanted to stop publication of the booklet. At a court hearing, Ōe testified "Mass suicides were forced on Okinawa islanders under Japan's hierarchical social structure that ran through the state of Japan, the Japanese armed forces and local garrisons."[111] In March 2008, the Osaka Prefecture Court ruled in favor of Ōe, stating, "It can be said the military was deeply involved in the mass suicides." The court recognized the military's involvement in the mass suicides and murder-suicides, citing the testimony about the distribution of grenades for suicide by soldiers and the fact that mass suicides were not recorded on islands where the military was not stationed.[112]
In 2012, Korean-Japanese director Pak Su-nam announced her work on the documentary Nuchigafu (Okinawan for "only if one is alive") collecting living survivors' accounts to show "the truth of history to many people", alleging that "there were two types of orders for 'honorable deaths'—one for residents to kill each other and the other for the military to kill all residents".[113] In March 2013, Japanese textbook publisher Shimizu Shoin was permitted by MEXT to publish the statements that "Orders from Japanese soldiers led to Okinawans committing group suicide" and "The [Japanese] army caused many tragedies in Okinawa, killing local civilians and forcing them to commit mass suicide."[114]
Aftermath
[edit]

Military historian and journalist Hanson W. Baldwin stated about scale and ferocity of the battle, especially for American forces, that:[115]
The battle for Okinawa can be described only in the grim superlatives of war. In size, scope and ferocity, it dwarfed the Battle of Britain. Never before had there been, probably never again will there be, such a vicious sprawling struggle of planes against planes, of ships against planes. Never before, in so short a space, had the Navy lost so many ships; never before in land fighting had so much American blood been shed in so short a time in so small an area: probably never before in any three months of the war had the enemy suffered so hugely, and the final toll of American casualties was the highest experienced in any campaign against the Japanese. There have been larger land battles, more protracted air campaigns, but Okinawa was the largest combined operation, a “no quarter” struggle fought on, under and over the sea and land.
According to historian George Feifer, Okinawa was the "site of the largest land-sea-air battle in history" and that the battle was the "last major one before the start of the atomic age".[116] At least 90% of the buildings on the island were destroyed, along with countless historical documents, artifacts, and cultural treasures, and the tropical landscape was turned into "a vast field of mud, lead, decay and maggots".[117] The military value of Okinawa was significant, as Okinawa provided a fleet anchorage, troop staging areas, and airfields in proximity to Japan. The US cleared the surrounding waters of mines in Operation Zebra, occupied Okinawa, and set up the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, a form of military government, after the battle.[118] In 2011, one official of the prefectural government told David Hearst of The Guardian:
You have the Battle of Britain, in which your airmen protected the British people. We had the Battle of Okinawa, in which the exact opposite happened. The Japanese army not only starved the Okinawans but used them as human shields. That dark history is still present today – and Japan and the US should study it before they decide what to do with next.[119]
Effect on the wider war
[edit]Because the next major event following the Battle of Okinawa was the total surrender of Japan, the effect of this battle is more difficult to consider. Because Japan surrendered when it did, the anticipated series of battles and the invasion of the Japanese homeland never occurred, and all military strategies on both sides which presupposed this apparently-inevitable next development were immediately rendered moot.
Some military historians believe that the Okinawa campaign led directly to the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a means of avoiding the planned ground invasion of the Japanese mainland. This view is explained by Victor Davis Hanson in his book Ripples of Battle:
... because the Japanese on Okinawa ... were so fierce in their defense (even when cut off and without supplies), and because casualties were so appalling, many American strategists looked for an alternative means to subdue mainland Japan, other than a direct invasion. This means presented itself, with the advent of atomic bombs, which worked admirably in convincing the Japanese to sue for peace [unconditionally], without American casualties.
Meanwhile, many parties continue to debate the broader question of "why Japan surrendered", attributing the surrender to a number of possible reasons including: the atomic bombings,[120][121][122] the Soviet invasion of Manchuria,[123][124] and Japan's depleted resources.[125][page needed][126]
Memorial
[edit]In 1995, the Okinawa government erected a memorial monument named the Cornerstone of Peace in Mabuni, the site of the last fighting in southeastern Okinawa.[127] The memorial lists all the known names of those who died in the battle, civilian and military, Japanese and foreign. As of 2024, the monument lists 242,225 names.[128][129]
Modern US base
[edit]Significant US forces remain garrisoned on Okinawa as the United States Forces Japan, which the Japanese government sees as an important guarantee of regional stability,[130] and Kadena remains the largest US air base in Asia. Local residents have long protested against the size and presence of the base.[131]
See also
[edit]- Himeyuri students
- Chiran Peace Museum for Kamikaze Pilots
- History of the Ryukyus
- Josef R. Sheetz
- Rape during the occupation of Japan
- Suicide in Japan
- Okinawa Memorial Day
- Naval Base Okinawa
- Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
- Camp Hansen
- Torii Station
- Camp Schwab
- Camp Foster
- Camp Kinser
- Giretsu Kuteitai
- Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum
Notes
[edit]- ^ 3,672 killed in action, 16,027 wounded (of whom 995 died), 58 captured (of whom 37 died), 172 missing (of whom 14 were declared dead as of 31 December 1946).[11] The number for wounded only includes those who were hospitalized. Tenth Army's after action report lists a somewhat higher total of 22,564, including 4,549 killed or died of wounds, 18,010 wounded or injured, and 95 missing.[12]
- ^ 3,803 killed, 219 died of wounds, 5,985 surviving wounded.[13]
- ^ 807 killed, 487 wounded.[14] Richard B. Frank points out that the Navy's Medical History excludes losses suffered on Franklin from its total for Okinawa; they are instead recorded under "Bombardment of Kyushu Island and Japan." This largely accounts for the discrepancy with the more commonly cited total of 4,907.[15]
- ^ 2,846 killed, 530 died of wounds, 67 missing, presumed dead, and 16,017 wounded. Due to the methodology of casualty accounting practices in World War II, a significant number of those who died of wounds were double counted as wounded in action.[16]
- ^ 65,908 from outside Okinawa, 28,228 from Okinawa. Okinawa number includes civilians drafted into military units.[20]
- ^ Excludes 3,339 laborers and 15 civilian combatants. By the end of November, this total increased to 16,346 across all categories.
- ^ Hayashi (cited above) lists, in addition to the 28,228 Okinawan military personnel – many of whom were poorly trained and equipped civilians – 55,246 other civilians who directly aided the military in some way and 38,754 others who died. Historian Masayasu Oshiro criticizes the last figure as low, writing that it excludes deaths from starvation and malaria. Oshiro believes 150,000 total Okinawan dead, including the 28,000 directly attached to the military, is a more accurate number.[26]
- ^ flagship of Admiral Raymond Spruance
- ^ flagship of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher
- ^ flagship of Admiral Raymond Spruance
- ^ flagship of Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher
References
[edit]Citations
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Sources
[edit]
This article incorporates public domain material from websites or documents of the United States Army Center of Military History.
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{{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help) - Fisch, Arnold G. Jr. (2004). Ryukyus. World War II Campaign Brochures. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History. ISBN 0160480329. CMH Pub 72-35. Archived from the original on 5 January 2012. Retrieved 14 June 2010.
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External links
[edit]- Dyer, George Carroll (1956). "The Amphibians Came to Conquer: The Story of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner". United States Government Printing Office. Archived from the original on 21 May 2011. Retrieved 5 May 2011.
- Huber, Thomas M. (May 1990). "Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April–June 1945". Leavenworth Papers. United States Army Command and General Staff College. Archived from the original on 16 December 2006. Retrieved 20 November 2006.
- A film clip "footage from the National Archives.By Sgt. Rhodes" is available for viewing at the Internet Archive
- A film clip "Landings On Okinawa, 1945/04/09 (1945)" is available for viewing at the Internet Archive
- A film clip "Argentine Admitted To World Parley, 1945/05/03 (1945)" is available for viewing at the Internet Archive
- A film clip "Final Days of Struggle in Okinawa, 1945/07/05 (1945)" is available for viewing at the Internet Archive
- US military on the Battle of Okinawa Archived 26 September 2009 at the Wayback Machine
- New Zealand account with reference to Operation Iceberg
- Cornerstone of Peace
- Okinawa Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum
- The Peace Learning Archive in OKINAWA
- A photographic record of aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable, 1944–45, including Operation Iceberg, the attack on the Sakashimas
- WWII: Battle of Okinawa Archived 10 May 2010 at the Wayback Machine – slideshow by Life magazine
- Operation Iceberg Operational Documents Archived 26 August 2009 at the Wayback Machine Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS
- Oral history interview with Mike Busha, a member of the 6th Marine Division during the Battle of Okinawa Archived 14 December 2012 at archive.today from the Veterans History Project at Central Connecticut State University
- Oral history interview with Albert D'Amico, a Navy Veteran who was aboard LST 278 during the landing at Okinawa Archived 12 December 2012 at archive.today from the Veterans History Project at Central Connecticut State University
- Booknotes interview with Robert Leckie on Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II, September 3, 1995.
Battle of Okinawa
View on GrokipediaBackground and Strategic Context
Geopolitical Objectives and Island-Hopping Campaign
The United States' island-hopping strategy in the Pacific Theater, formalized after the Guadalcanal Campaign's conclusion in February 1943, prioritized the selective seizure of strategically vital islands to establish forward bases for air and naval power projection, while neutralizing or isolating bypassed Japanese strongholds through blockade and bombardment.[7] This approach, directed by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz from Pearl Harbor, diverged from a linear advance by exploiting Japan's overextended defenses, minimizing Allied casualties relative to direct assaults on every fortified position, and progressively closing the distance to the Japanese home islands from over 2,000 miles in 1942 to under 400 miles by 1945.[8] Key captures included Tarawa (November 1943), the Marshall Islands (January–February 1944), Saipan and Guam (June–July 1944), Peleliu (September 1944), and Iwo Jima (February–March 1945), each providing airfields that extended the range of carrier strikes and land-based bombers while isolating garrisons totaling over 100,000 troops on bypassed atolls.[1] Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands at 463 square miles and situated 340 miles (550 km) southwest of Kyushu, represented the campaign's culmination, as its capture would position Allied forces within striking distance for the anticipated invasion of Japan under Operation Downfall.[9] Operation Iceberg's primary geopolitical objectives, outlined in Joint Chiefs of Staff directives by late 1944, focused on securing Okinawa to deny Japan a defensive buffer and establish it as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" for sustained operations against the mainland.[10] The island's central location offered sheltered anchorages at Buckner Bay (later renamed after Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner Jr.) for the U.S. Fifth Fleet, comprising over 1,300 ships and 368,000 personnel, enabling refueling and repairs closer to combat zones than previous bases like Ulithi Atoll.[4] Critically, intact airfields at Kadena and Yontan—each capable of handling over 100 heavy bombers—would support P-51 Mustang fighters escorting B-29 raids from the Marianas, targeting Japan's urban-industrial centers with greater precision and frequency, as prior unescorted missions suffered up to 14% losses from fighters and flak.[2] This positioning also facilitated preliminary strikes on Kyushu for Operation Olympic, the first phase of Downfall scheduled for November 1945, involving 14 divisions and projecting overwhelming firepower to compel Japan's surrender without relying solely on naval blockade or atomic weapons still under development.[11] By neutralizing Okinawa's defenses, estimated at 100,000 troops under Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, the operation aimed to interdict Japan's residual maritime lifelines to Southeast Asia, though these had been largely severed by Allied submarine campaigns sinking 55% of Japan's merchant tonnage by March 1945; the deeper intent was to demonstrate inexorable Allied advance, eroding Japanese morale and logistical resilience for a decisive homeland assault.[9] Unlike earlier hops emphasizing rapid airfield seizure, Okinawa's objectives incorporated long-term occupation, with plans for 150,000 permanent U.S. personnel and infrastructure to sustain a multi-year campaign if needed, reflecting a shift from peripheral isolation to direct threat against Japan's core.Japanese Defensive Strategy and Preparations
The Imperial Japanese Army's 32nd Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, was established in March 1944 to defend Okinawa as part of Japan's broader effort to fortify the Ryukyu Islands against anticipated Allied invasions.[12] Under the influence of Chief of Staff Colonel Hiromichi Yahara, Ushijima adopted an attrition-based strategy emphasizing defense in depth rather than contesting beach landings directly, aiming to draw U.S. forces into prepared inland positions in southern Okinawa to inflict maximum casualties and delay operations toward the Japanese home islands.[12] This approach rejected earlier proposals for decisive counterattacks on the shores, recognizing the superiority of Allied naval and air firepower, and instead prioritized prolonged resistance leveraging the island's rugged terrain.[13] Preparations accelerated throughout 1944, with the 32nd Army amassing approximately 110,000 troops by late that year, including elements from the 24th and 62nd Divisions, the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, naval and air units repurposed for ground defense, and local Okinawan militias conscripted into auxiliary roles.[12] Fortifications focused on the southern third of the island, where engineering units and laborers—often using hand tools due to limited heavy equipment—excavated an extensive network of tunnels, bunkers, and command centers totaling hundreds of kilometers, designed to withstand prolonged bombardment and enable reverse-slope defenses.[14] Key strongpoints were anchored around Shuri Castle and a series of interconnected high ridges, such as those forming natural barriers with mutually supporting cave positions for artillery, machine guns, and infantry.[2] Ushijima's plan integrated ground defenses with anticipated kamikaze operations to disrupt Allied naval support, though ground preparations emphasized self-sufficiency through stockpiled supplies in underground depots and booby-trapped approaches to channel attackers into kill zones.[12] By early 1945, these measures had transformed southern Okinawa into a fortified redoubt, with positions camouflaged and reinforced to exploit the karst landscape's natural caves, minimizing exposure to pre-invasion naval gunfire expected to commence around the anticipated landing date of April 1.[14] This strategy, while criticized post-war for its rigid confrontation of Allied strengths without sufficient maneuver or deception, reflected a realistic assessment of Japan's dwindling resources and the need to exact a psychological toll on invaders.[13]Allied Planning for Operation Iceberg
Planning for Operation Iceberg commenced in September 1944 under the direction of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Ocean Areas, as part of the broader Allied strategy to isolate Japan and prepare for a potential invasion of the home islands.[15][16] The operation targeted Okinawa, the largest of the Ryukyu Islands, to establish forward air bases, anchorages, and staging areas within striking distance of Kyushu, thereby enabling strategic bombing campaigns, tightening the naval blockade, and supporting Operation Downfall—the planned 1945-1946 invasion of Japan.[9][1] This choice reflected a shift from earlier proposals like Operation Causeway (Formosa) toward greater operational flexibility in the Ryukyus, prioritizing the island's relatively flat terrain suitable for airfields amid Japan's expected fierce resistance on more fortified positions.[17] The Joint Chiefs of Staff activated the U.S. Tenth Army headquarters specifically for land operations, placing Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner Jr. in command of ground forces comprising the XXIV Army Corps and III Amphibious Corps, totaling eight divisions from both Army and Marine units.[18][9] Naval support fell under the Fifth Fleet, led by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance aboard USS Indianapolis, with Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher commanding Fast Carrier Task Force 58; this assembly included over 1,600 warships and craft manned by approximately 350,000 personnel, marking the largest amphibious operation in the Pacific Theater.[1] Planning emphasized joint integration across echelons—from field army to corps and division levels—drawing on lessons from prior island campaigns to synchronize amphibious landings, close air support, and logistics under Island Command for sustainment.[15][18] Anticipating prolonged combat against entrenched Japanese defenses, planners projected high casualties—up to 30,000 total with 6,600 fatalities—and 41,000 non-battle injuries from disease within 60 days, prompting detailed medical preparations including 4,500 hospital beds (expandable to 8,000), blood plasma stockpiles managed by the Army, and Navy hospital ships for evacuation.[18] Preparatory phases involved seizing outlying islets for radar and artillery support, naval gunfire rehearsals, and deception operations such as a feint by the 2nd Marine Division to mislead Japanese dispositions.[9] The six-month planning cycle addressed logistical complexities, including neutralization of Formosa airfields by Southwest Pacific forces and rapid airfield construction post-landing (targeted by L+11 days), while validating emerging joint doctrine for multi-service operations.[18][15] Despite separate Army and Marine medical chains, coordination via Tenth Army Surgeon Colonel Frederick Westervelt ensured auxiliary surgical teams and civil affairs support for potential civilian casualties.[18]Belligerents and Forces
Allied Forces Composition and Command
The U.S. Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, provided overall command for Operation Iceberg, the Allied invasion of Okinawa beginning on April 1, 1945. Spruance coordinated naval, air, and ground elements to secure the island as a staging base for operations against the Japanese mainland. The fleet's amphibious component, Task Force 51 (Joint Expeditionary Force), was led by Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner, who directed the landing operations involving over 1,600 ships and approximately 350,000 naval personnel. Task Force 58, the fast carrier force under Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, supplied air cover and conducted strikes against Japanese positions, comprising multiple carrier groups with battleships, cruisers, and destroyers for escort. The British Pacific Fleet contributed as Task Force 57, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, focusing on neutralizing Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto to interdict potential reinforcements to Okinawa; this force included four aircraft carriers (HMS Illustrious, Victorious, Indomitable, and Formidable), the battleship HMS King George V, and supporting vessels. Ground operations fell under the U.S. Tenth Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Simon B. Buckner Jr., which integrated Army and Marine Corps units for the assault on Okinawa's rugged terrain. Buckner reported to Spruance but maintained operational control over land forces, marking the Tenth Army's first major combat action as a joint field headquarters encompassing infantry divisions, artillery, engineers, and support elements. The army's initial assault strength totaled about 183,000 personnel, later reinforced to over 250,000, including roughly 102,000 soldiers, 88,000 Marines, and 18,000 Navy personnel such as Seabees and medical teams. Organizationally, it comprised XXIV Corps (under Major General John R. Hodge), with the 7th, 27th, 77th, and 96th Infantry Divisions for the southern and central thrusts, and III Amphibious Corps (initially under Major General Roy S. Geiger, USMC), featuring the 1st and 6th Marine Divisions for northern operations. Buckner's command emphasized coordinated infantry advances supported by naval gunfire and tactical air strikes from fleet carriers, though inter-service tensions arose over the pace of operations amid heavy Japanese resistance. Following Buckner's death by artillery fire on June 18, 1945, Geiger assumed temporary command of Tenth Army until General Joseph W. Stilwell's arrival on June 23, ensuring continuity until the island's capture on June 22. Minimal contributions came from other Allied nations, such as Australian and New Zealand ships in screening roles, but the effort remained predominantly American with British naval augmentation.Japanese Forces and Fortifications
The Japanese defense of Okinawa was orchestrated by the 32nd Army under Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, who commanded from a fortified headquarters beneath Shuri Castle.[19][20] The army's total strength reached approximately 99,000 personnel by April 1945, including 66,600 Imperial Japanese Army troops, 8,800 from the Imperial Japanese Navy, and 24,000 conscripted Okinawan civilians organized into auxiliary units such as Boeitai militias and student corps.[20] Main combat formations consisted of the 24th Infantry Division (a triangular organization suited for maneuver warfare), the 62nd Infantry Division (linear structure with 10 battalions emphasizing counter-guerrilla tactics), and the 44th Independent Mixed Brigade (reconstituted with reduced infantry elements), supplemented by the 27th Tank Regiment operating at battalion strength and elements of the Okinawa Naval Base Force.[12][20] Artillery assets, centralized under the 5th Artillery Command, were relatively abundant for late-war Pacific defenses, including 52 150mm howitzers, 12 150mm guns, and 96 field pieces, enabling sustained counter-battery fire from concealed positions.[21] Tanks and anti-tank guns were limited, with the 27th Regiment fielding few medium tanks by battle's outset.[20] Fortifications were concentrated in southern Okinawa, spanning a defensive zone 3 to 12 miles wide and 16 miles long, designed for attrition through reverse-slope defenses that minimized exposure to naval and air bombardment.[14] The network included over 60 miles of tunnels and interconnected caves, many naturally occurring but reinforced with concrete, logs, coral, and earth; these featured multi-level strongpoints, such as Hill 145 with 21 interconnected caves, and vertical shafts for access and ventilation.[14] Pillboxes were camouflaged with sod roofs and integrated into communication trenches supported by bamboo arches, while major complexes like the 32nd Army's Shuri headquarters extended 1,300 feet underground.[14][20] These positions, honeycombed into escarpments and hills like Yaeju-Dake and Yuza-Dake, prioritized survivability and close-quarters counterattacks over open-field engagements.[14][20]Integration of Okinawan Civilians and Child Soldiers
The Japanese 32nd Army, under Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima, systematically incorporated Okinawan civilians into its defensive preparations and operations during the Battle of Okinawa, beginning in early 1945, to supplement its approximately 77,000 regular troops with local labor and auxiliary forces.[20] Virtually every able-bodied male Okinawan of military age—estimated at tens of thousands—was conscripted into units such as the Boeitai (Home Guard) or labor battalions, initially for non-combat tasks like constructing fortifications, digging tunnels, and transporting supplies across the island's rugged terrain.[22] These conscripts, often unarmed or lightly equipped with rudimentary tools, numbered around 20,000 to 30,000 by the invasion's outset on April 1, 1945, and were gradually integrated into combat roles as ammunition and manpower dwindled, including manning defensive positions and conducting banzai charges.[23] [5] Child soldiers, primarily teenage boys aged 14 to 17, were mobilized en masse from local schools under ordinances issued by the Imperial Japanese Army, forming specialized units like the Tekketsu Kinnōtai (Blood and Iron Corps for the Emperor and the Country), which comprised approximately 1,800 students from institutions such as the Okinawa Normal School and Naha Commercial School.[24] These youths, divided into platoons for tasks including ammunition carrying, reconnaissance, and frontline defense, were often armed with rifles, grenades, or bamboo spears and deployed as human mine detectors or in suicide attacks, suffering near-total attrition with fewer than half surviving the campaign.[25] [26] Female students, aged 15 to 19, were similarly drafted into the Himeyuri Butai (Lily Corps), serving as nurses and aides in field hospitals near Shuri Castle, where they endured artillery barrages and were abandoned or killed by retreating Japanese troops, resulting in over 200 deaths among the roughly 240 members.[27] This integration reflected the 32nd Army's attrition-based strategy, which prioritized holding southern Okinawa at all costs, but it exacerbated civilian suffering through coercive measures, including propaganda equating surrender with dishonor and instances of Japanese soldiers executing locals suspected of collaboration to prevent intelligence leaks to U.S. forces.[28] While some Okinawan conscripts fought out of indoctrinated loyalty or fear, many were coerced without formal training, leading to high desertion rates and contributing to the overall civilian death toll exceeding 100,000, including those forced into combat.[24] Post-battle accounts from survivors highlight the units' expendable role, with child soldiers often treated as disposable by Japanese commanders focused on delaying Allied advances.[29]Course of the Battle
Amphibious Landings and Northern Campaign
The amphibious assault on Okinawa commenced on 1 April 1945 (L-Day) with H-Hour set at 0830, as elements of the U.S. Tenth Army—comprising the XXIV Corps (7th and 96th Infantry Divisions) for the central beachhead and the III Amphibious Corps (1st and 6th Marine Divisions) for the northern advance—landed across the Hagushi beaches on the island's western coast.[30] Preceded by naval gunfire from 10 battleships, 9 cruisers, and other vessels among a supporting fleet of over 1,300 ships, as well as air strikes beginning at 0530, the initial waves of amphibious tractors and landing craft encountered negligible ground resistance, limited to sporadic mortar and artillery fire.[30][31] A diversionary feint occurred off the southeastern coast near Minatoga, but the main effort at Hagushi proceeded unhindered, with over 16,000 assault troops from two battalion landing teams per division ashore in the first hour.[30] By nightfall, approximately 60,000 U.S. troops and significant equipment had established a beachhead extending 15,000 yards wide and up to 5,000 yards deep inland, capturing the strategically vital Kadena and Yontan airfields intact by 1130.[30][32] Initial casualties ashore were minimal, though pre-landing kamikaze strikes damaged several ships, including LST-884 (24 killed, 21 wounded) and APA-120 Hinsdale (16 killed, 39 wounded).[31] With the beachhead secured, the III Amphibious Corps shifted to the northern campaign, directing the 6th Marine Division westward along the coast toward Naha Bay and the 1st Marine Division eastward inland across rugged terrain.[33] Japanese forces in the north, numbering fewer than 5,000 including irregular militias under the 32nd Army's peripheral commands, offered only sporadic opposition through guerrilla ambushes, cave strongpoints, and booby-trapped ridges rather than cohesive defenses.[34] This reflected Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima's strategic concentration of the bulk of his 77,000-man army in fortified southern positions around Shuri, leaving the north lightly held to delay rather than repel the invasion.[34] Marine advances progressed rapidly despite the challenging topography of hills, escarpments, and dense undergrowth, neutralizing isolated pockets with flamethrowers, demolitions, and infantry assaults; the 6th Division, for instance, faced little beyond snipers for the first ten days.[35] By mid-April, III Amphibious Corps forces had overrun most of northern Okinawa, reaching the island's northern tip and adjacent islets, though systematic clearing of caves and ravines extended into late April to eliminate holdouts.[33][35] Casualties remained lower in this sector than in the south, with Marine losses totaling 2,938 killed or missing and over 13,000 wounded across the full campaign, a disparity attributable to the north's weaker enemy dispositions and terrain favoring mobile operations over attrition.[36]Central and Southern Land Engagements
Following the unopposed landings at Hagushi beaches on April 1, 1945, XXIV Corps under Major General John R. Hodge advanced rapidly southward and inland, securing Kadena and Yontan airfields by April 7 with minimal opposition, as the Japanese 32nd Army conserved strength for defenses further south. The initial phase encountered scattered resistance, but by April 8, American forces reached the outer perimeter of the Shuri Line, a fortified network of ridges, caves, and reverse-slope positions manned by approximately 76,000 Japanese troops under Lieutenant General Mitsuru Ushijima. The first significant land battle erupted at Kakazu Ridge on April 9, when the 96th Infantry Division's 383rd Regiment assaulted the 400-meter-long feature defended by elements of the Japanese 94th Division, including cave complexes and interlocking machine-gun positions that inflicted heavy casualties through enfilading fire.[37] Over four days of fighting until April 12, U.S. troops captured the ridge's western nose after intense close-quarters combat involving flamethrowers and demolitions, suffering over 300 killed and 900 wounded against Japanese losses estimated at 500.[38] Adjacent engagements included the 7th Infantry Division's assaults on the Horseshoe and Cactus Hills, where tomb-reinforced bunkers and ravines channeled attackers into kill zones, stalling advances amid mounting attrition.[37] A coordinated offensive launched on April 19 by XXIV Corps divisions—96th, 7th, and 27th Infantry—aimed to breach the Machinato and Takaesu lines protecting Shuri but faltered against entrenched positions, with gains measured in yards and casualties exceeding 1,000 daily due to artillery, mortars, and snipers exploiting the karst terrain.[5] Heavy monsoon rains from late April turned the battlefield into a quagmire, complicating logistics and tank support, while Japanese forces employed tunnel networks for resupply and counterattacks. In early May, the 77th Infantry Division relieved the exhausted 27th, continuing probes against the Dakeshi and Wana ridges, where flamethrower teams and naval gunfire proved critical in reducing fortified tombs. Central to the southern push, the 1st Marine Division—attached to XXIV Corps from May 7—assaulted the Horseshoe-Sugar Loaf-Half Moon complex west of Shuri starting May 12, enduring three days of brutal fighting against the Japanese 15th Independent Mixed Regiment, with Marine casualties reaching 2,662 killed or wounded in hand-to-hand combat amid reverse slopes and wire obstacles.[39] Simultaneously, the 6th Marine Division flanked eastward, capturing the Chocolate Drop hill after repeated attacks, which unhinged the western Shuri defenses. These actions, supported by over 1,500 artillery rounds per day and carrier airstrikes, forced Japanese withdrawals by May 21, though at the cost of exposing troops to counter-battery fire from hidden guns.[40] The fall of Shuri on May 29 followed the 7th Infantry Division's seizure of key eastern ridges like Skyline and Conical Hill on May 24-25, collapsing the main defensive line after 40 days of attritional warfare that inflicted 20,000 Japanese casualties while U.S. forces suffered 7,613 killed and 32,000 wounded in the southern sector. Ushijima's subsequent retreat to the Kiyamu Peninsula devolved into fragmented pockets, with XXIV Corps divisions conducting sweeps through cave systems using demolitions and systematic reduction, ending organized resistance on June 22, 1945, though isolated holdouts persisted. The engagements highlighted the effectiveness of Japanese subterranean fortifications against conventional assaults, necessitating innovations in flame weaponry and combined arms tactics.[41]Naval Operations and British Pacific Fleet Role
The United States Fifth Fleet, under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, orchestrated the naval operations supporting Operation Iceberg, deploying over 1,300 ships including 18 aircraft carriers, 12 battleships, 24 cruisers, and numerous destroyers and amphibious vessels to facilitate the April 1, 1945, landings on Okinawa.[1] Task Force 58, commanded by Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher, provided the core carrier-based air power, conducting intensive pre-invasion strikes from March 23 onward against Japanese airfields, shipping, and defenses across Kyushu, the Ryukus, and Formosa to achieve local air superiority.[4] Naval gunfire support from battleships and cruisers bombarded coastal fortifications and inland targets, delivering thousands of tons of shells daily in the initial phases to suppress enemy artillery and beach defenses.[42] Complementing these efforts, the British Pacific Fleet (BPF), redesignated Task Force 57 and commanded by Vice Admiral Philip Vian, joined operations in late March 1945 as the largest Royal Navy formation ever deployed to the Pacific, comprising four armored fleet carriers (HMS Victorious, Illustrious, Indomitable, and Formidable), two battleships (King George V and Howe), eight cruisers, and fifteen destroyers.[43] Operating semi-independently from the main U.S. fleet to conserve American resources, TF 57 focused on neutralizing Japanese airfields in the Sakishima Gunto islands, approximately 200 miles southwest of Okinawa, to interdict potential reinforcements and staging from Formosa and secure the invasion's southern flank.[44] During Operation Iceberg I (March 26 to April 9, 1945), BPF aircraft flew over 2,500 sorties, destroying runways, hangars, and aircraft on Miyako and Ishigaki islands while minimizing losses through effective damage-control measures inherent to British carrier designs.[45] TF 57 withdrew briefly in early April for logistical replenishment amid fuel constraints from extended operations and U.S.-supplied aviation fuel compatibility issues, resuming strikes in Operation Iceberg II from May 3 to 25, 1945, with renewed attacks on Sakishima airfields that further degraded Japanese aerial capabilities.[46] These missions, involving Hellcat and Corsair fighters alongside Firefly and Avenger strike aircraft, inflicted significant attrition on Japanese aviation infrastructure, though the BPF endured operational strains from high sortie rates and the need for underway replenishment in contested waters.[47] Overall, TF 57's contributions, including the suppression of over a dozen airfields and interception of potential raiders, bolstered the Fifth Fleet's defensive perimeter without diverting U.S. carriers from primary tasks, demonstrating effective Allied interoperability despite initial command frictions over operational control.[48] The BPF's armored-deck carriers proved resilient in sustaining operations, logging 62 days at sea before refitting, and their role underscored Britain's commitment to the Pacific theater following European victories.[46]Operation Ten-Go and Yamato's Final Mission
Operation Ten-Go, initiated on April 6, 1945, represented the Imperial Japanese Navy's final major surface action of World War II, dispatching the superbattleship Yamato and a small escort force on a deliberate suicide mission to Okinawa without air cover or sufficient fuel for return.[49] The operation's primary objective was for the flotilla to reach the waters off Okinawa, beach Yamato as an improvised shore battery, and provide fire support to Japanese ground forces resisting the Allied invasion, while inflicting attrition on U.S. naval assets through ramming or gunnery if possible.[50] Japanese planners, facing severe shortages of aviation fuel and aircraft, accepted the near-certainty of the force's destruction en route, viewing the sortie as a symbolic gesture to bolster naval prestige amid the Army's dominance in resource allocation and to demonstrate resolve to Emperor Hirohito.[51] Vice Admiral Seiichi Itō commanded the operation from Yamato's bridge, with the flotilla comprising Yamato, the light cruiser Yahagi (serving as flagship initially under Captain Tameichi Hara before shifting), and eight destroyers: Asashimo, Hamakaze, Isokaze, Suzutsuki, Yukikaze, Fuyutsuki, Kasumi, and Hatsushimo.[49] Departing from Tokuyama and passing through the Bungo Strait around 15:20 on April 6, the ships proceeded southwest at 22 knots toward Okinawa, approximately 300 nautical miles distant, with Yamato carrying only enough fuel for a one-way trip and ammunition loads optimized for anti-ship engagements.[52] U.S. signals intelligence, including intercepts from the Ultra program, detected the sortie early, alerting Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher's Task Force 58, which mobilized aircraft from 11 fast carriers including Essex, Hornet, and Bunker Hill.[53] The U.S. response unfolded on April 7 around 10:00, when approximately 280 aircraft from the first wave struck the Japanese formation east of Okinawa, targeting Yamato with bombs and torpedoes amid heavy anti-aircraft fire that downed several attackers.[54] A second wave of over 100 planes followed by 12:00, concentrating torpedoes on Yamato's port side, which caused flooding and a severe list; the ship absorbed at least 10 torpedo hits and 7 bomb penetrations, leading to magazine explosions and capsizing at 14:23 with a massive plume visible for miles.[55] Among the escorts, Yahagi sank after multiple hits, while four destroyers—Hamakaze, Isokaze, Asashimo, and Kasumi—were lost; the surviving Suzutsuki, Fuyutsuki, and Yukikaze limped back to Japan heavily damaged.[49] Japanese losses totaled approximately 3,665 personnel killed, including 2,498 of Yamato's 2,747 crew, marking one of the war's heaviest single-ship disasters; U.S. losses were limited to 10 aircraft destroyed and 10 aircrew killed during the attacks.[55] The operation achieved no strategic impact on the Okinawa campaign, as Yamato never reached engagement range with Allied surface units, underscoring the obsolescence of battleships against carrier-based air power and the futility of Japan's resource-starved late-war offensives.[51]Kamikaze Attacks and Air Campaign
The Japanese initiated organized kamikaze attacks against Allied naval forces off Okinawa on April 6, 1945, coinciding with the sortie of the battleship Yamato in Operation Ten-Go, marking the beginning of the most intense suicide air campaign of the Pacific War.[4] Over the following 82 days of the battle, Japanese forces launched approximately 1,500 kamikaze aircraft in ten major coordinated waves from bases in Kyushu and Formosa, with only about one in six penetrating Allied defenses to strike targets.[4] These attacks, involving modified fighters and bombers packed with explosives, targeted the U.S. Fifth Fleet's radar picket destroyers and amphibious support ships, inflicting significant attrition despite Allied air superiority.[56] The April 6-7 assault exemplified the scale and ferocity, with over 700 Japanese aircraft committed, including 355 kamikazes, resulting in the sinking of five U.S. vessels and damage to dozens more, while Allied fighters and antiaircraft fire downed around 300 attackers.[57] Overall, kamikaze strikes sank 36 Allied ships—including 10 destroyers and several amphibious transports—and damaged 368 others, with impacts on carriers, cruisers, and battleships disrupting logistics and forcing repairs that strained fleet operations.[58] U.S. Navy casualties from these attacks totaled 4,907 killed and 4,824 wounded, accounting for roughly 40% of American deaths in the campaign and representing the heaviest single loss of life at sea for the U.S. in World War II.[5] Japanese losses exceeded 3,700 aircraft, depleted by fuel shortages, pilot inexperience, and relentless Allied interception, rendering conventional air operations negligible.[59] Allied countermeasures emphasized layered defense, including radar-equipped destroyer pickets positioned 50-100 miles from the fleet to provide early warning, combat air patrols from escort carriers, and proximity-fused antiaircraft shells that proved devastating against low-flying kamikazes.[60] These tactics, honed from earlier Leyte Gulf experiences, intercepted most incoming waves, though the volume of attacks—peaking in mid-April and May—overwhelmed some sectors, as seen in the sinking of picket destroyers like USS Bush on April 6.[60] By late May, Allied forces captured airfields like Kadena and Yontan, enabling Marine and Army Air Force squadrons to stage P-47 Thunderbolts and other fighters for direct intercepts, further neutralizing the threat.[2] Complementing defensive efforts, the Allied air campaign provided critical close air support to ground forces, with carrier-based aircraft from Task Force 58 conducting over 140,000 sorties that dropped 17,000 tons of bombs on Japanese cave networks, reverse-slope defenses, and supply lines in southern Okinawa.[1] These operations, coordinated with naval gunfire, targeted fortified positions around Shuri and the southern escarpments, where Japanese troops relied on tunnel systems for concealment, though dense terrain and weather limited precision bombing efficacy.[2] B-29 Superfortresses from the Marianas temporarily shifted to high-level strikes on Kyushu airfields to preempt kamikaze launches, disrupting Japanese staging but diverting resources from the ongoing firebombing of mainland cities.[61] Japanese air defenses, reduced to sporadic antiaircraft fire from Okinawa's limited artillery, offered minimal resistance, allowing Allied aviation to achieve unchallenged dominance that facilitated the eventual ground advance.[10]Casualties and Atrocities
Allied Military Losses
The United States Tenth Army, comprising primarily Marine and Army divisions, suffered 49,151 total casualties during the Battle of Okinawa from April 1 to June 22, 1945, marking the highest casualty rate of any Pacific campaign at 35 percent of the committed force.[5][1] Of these, 12,520 personnel were killed or missing in action, including 7,613 from ground forces and 4,907 from the U.S. Navy, the latter figure driven largely by kamikaze strikes on the supporting fleet.[62][63] Ground force losses broke down as follows: the III Amphibious Corps (Marines) recorded 2,938 killed or missing and 13,708 wounded, while the XXIV Army Corps sustained 4,412 killed and 17,689 wounded, with intense fighting in southern Okinawa's Shuri Line defenses contributing to the majority of these figures.[5][63] Naval personnel faced disproportionate risks from over 3,700 Japanese aircraft sorties, including 1,900 kamikazes, resulting in 4,907 deaths alongside severe damage to 368 ships and the sinking of 36 vessels, though these material losses amplified personnel vulnerabilities through exposure to repeated attacks.[1][62] Contributions from other Allied nations, including the British Pacific Fleet with Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian naval elements, incurred comparatively light personnel losses, with British aircraft casualties totaling 160 from combat and accidents but no comprehensive figures for fatalities exceeding a few dozen aircrew.[46] Ground commitments from Commonwealth forces were absent, limiting their exposure to Okinawa's brutal infantry engagements.[64]| Service Branch | Killed/Missing | Wounded | Total Casualties |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.S. Army | 4,412 | 17,689 | 22,101 |
| U.S. Marines | 2,938 | 13,708 | 16,646 |
| U.S. Navy | 4,907 | ~5,000 (est.) | ~9,907 |
| Total U.S. | 12,257 | 36,397 | 48,654 |