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Apostasy in Islam
Apostasy in Islam
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Apostasy in Islam (Arabic: ردة, romanizedridda or ارتداد, irtidād) is commonly defined as the abandonment of Islam by a Muslim, in thought, word, or through deed.[1] It includes not only explicit renunciations of the Islamic faith by converting to another religion[1][2] or abandoning religion altogether,[1][2][3][4][5] but also blasphemy or heresy by those who consider themselves Muslims,[6] through any action or utterance which implies unbelief, including those who deny a "fundamental tenet or creed" of Islam.[4] An apostate from Islam is known as a murtadd (مرتدّ).[1][2][7][8][9][10]

While Islamic jurisprudence calls for the death penalty of those who refuse to repent of apostasy from Islam,[11] what statements or acts qualify as apostasy, and whether and how they should be punished, are disputed among Muslim scholars,[12][4][13] with liberal Islamic movements rejecting physical punishment for apostasy.[14] The penalty of killing of apostates is in conflict with international human rights norms which provide for the freedom of religions, as demonstrated in human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights provide for the freedom of religion.[15][16][17][18] Until the late 19th century, the majority of Sunni and Shia jurists held the view that for adult men, apostasy from Islam was a crime as well as a sin, punishable by the death penalty,[4][19] but with a number of options for leniency (such as a waiting period to allow time for repentance[4][20][21][22] or enforcement only in cases involving politics),[23][24][25] depending on the era, the legal standards and the school of law. In the late 19th century, the use of legal criminal penalties for apostasy fell into disuse, although civil penalties were still applied.[4]

As of 2021, there were ten Muslim-majority countries where apostasy from Islam was punishable by death,[26] but legal executions are rare.[a] Most punishment is extrajudicial/vigilante,[28][29] and most executions are perpetrated by jihadist and takfiri insurgents (al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, the GIA, and the Taliban).[11][30][31][32] Another thirteen countries have penal or civil penalties for apostates[29] – such as imprisonment, the annulment of their marriages, the loss of their rights of inheritance and the loss of custody of their children.[29]

In the contemporary Muslim world, public support for capital punishment varies from 78% in Afghanistan to less than 1% in Kazakhstan;[b] among Islamic jurists, the majority of them continue to regard apostasy as a crime which should be punishable by death.[20] Those who disagree[12][4][34] argue that its punishment should be less than death and should occur in the afterlife,[35][36][37][38] as human punishment is considered to be inconsistent with Quranic injunctions against compulsion in belief,[39][40] or should apply only in cases of public disobedience and disorder (fitna).[c] Despite potentially grave and life-threatening consequences, Muslims continue to leave the Islamic religion,[1][3] either by becoming irreligious (atheism, agnosticism, etc.)[3] or converting to other religions, mostly to Christianity.[42]

Etymology and terminology

[edit]

Apostasy is called irtidād or ridda (which means "relapse" or "regress") in Islamic literature.[2] An apostate is called murtadd, which means "one who turns back" from Islam.[43] The Oxford Islamic Studies Online defines murtadd as "not just any kāfir (non-believer)" but "a particularly heinous type".[44] Ridda can also refer to "secession" in a political context.[45] A person born to a Muslim father who later rejects Islam is called a murtadd fitri, and a person who converted to Islam and later rejects the religion is called a murtadd milli.[46][47][48] Takfīr (Arabic: تكفير) is the act of one Muslim excommunicating another, declaring them a kāfir, an apostate.[11][30][32] The act which precipitates takfīr is termed mukaffir.[11][30][32]

Scriptural references

[edit]

Definition of apostasy in Islam

[edit]

Scholars of Islam differ as to what constitutes apostasy in that religion and under what circumstances an apostate is subject to the death penalty.

Conditions of apostasy in classical Islam

[edit]

Al-Shafi'i listed three necessary conditions to pass capital punishment on a Muslim for apostasy in his Kitab al-Umm. (In the words of Frank Griffel) these are:

  • "first, the apostate had to once have had faith (which, according to Al-Shafi'i's definition, means publicly professing all tenets of Islam);
  • secondly, there had to follow unbelief (meaning the public declaration of a breaking-away from Islam), (having done these two the Muslim is now an unbeliever but not yet an apostate and thus not eligible for punishment);[f]
  • "third, there had to be the omission or failure to repent after the apostate was asked to do so."[72][71]

Three centuries later, Al-Ghazali wrote that one group, known as "secret apostates" or "permanent unbelievers" (aka zandaqa), should not be given a chance to repent, eliminating Al-Shafi'i's third condition for them although his view was not accepted by his Shafi'i madhhab.[73][71]

Characteristics

[edit]

Describing what qualifies as apostasy or unbelief in Islam, religion scholar Christine Schirrmacher writes:

[...] there is widespread consensus that apostasy undoubtedly exists where the truth of the Koran is denied, where blasphemy is committed against God, Islam, or Muhammad, and where breaking away from the Islamic faith in word or deed occurs. The lasting, willful non-observance of the five pillars of Islam, in particular the duty to pray, clearly count as apostasy for most [Muslim] theologians. Additional distinguishing features are a change of religion, confessing atheism, nullifying the Sharia as well as judging what is allowed to be forbidden and judging what is forbidden to be allowed. Fighting against Muslims and Islam (Arabic: muḥāraba) also counts as unbelief or apostasy;[2]

Kamran Hashemi classifies apostasy or unbelief in Islam into three different "phenomena":[74]

Issues in defining heresy

[edit]
Caricature of the Crimean Tatar educator and intellectual Ismail Gasprinsky (on the right), leader of the Jadid movement, depicted holding the newspaper Terjuman ("The Translator") and the textbook Khoja-i-Sübyan ("The Teacher of Children") in his hand. Two men, respectively Tatar and Azerbaijani Muslim clerics, are threatening him with takfīr and sharīʿah decrees (on the left). From the satirical magazine Molla Nasreddin, N. 17, 28 April 1908, Tbilisi (illustrator: Oskar Schmerling).

While identifying someone who publicly converted to another religion as an apostate was straightforward, determining whether a diversion from orthodox doctrine qualified as heresy, blasphemy, or something permitted by God could be less so. Traditionally, Islamic jurists did not formulate general rules for establishing unbelief, instead, compiled sometimes lengthy lists of statements and actions which in their view implied apostasy or were incompatible with Islamic "theological consensus".[4] Al-Ghazali,[82] for example, devoting "chapters to dealing with takfir and the reasons for which one can be accused of unbelief" in his work Faysal al-Tafriqa bayn al-Islam wa-l-Zandaqa ("The Criterion of Distinction between Islam and Clandestine Unbelief").[83][84]

Some heretical or blasphemous acts or beliefs listed in classical manuals of Islamic jurisprudence and other scholarly works (i.e. works written by Islamic scholars) that allegedly demonstrate apostasy include:

While there are numerous requirements for a Muslim to avoid being an apostate, it is also an act of apostasy, in Shāfiʿī te doctrine and other schools of Islamic jurisprudence, for a Muslim to accuse or describe another devout Muslim of being an unbeliever,[92] based on the hadith where Muhammad is reported to have said: "If a man says to his brother, 'You are an infidel,' then one of them is right."[93][94] Historian Bernard Lewis writes that in "religious polemic" of early Islamic times, it was common for one scholar to accuse another of apostasy, but attempts to bring an alleged apostate to justice (have them executed) were very rare.[95]

The tension between desire to cleanse Islam of heresy and fear of inaccurate takfir is suggested in the writings of some of the leading Islamic scholars. Al-Ghazali "is often credited with having persuaded theologians", in his Fayal al-tafriqa, "that takfir is not a fruitful path and that utmost caution is to taken in applying it", but in other writing, he made sure to condemn as beyond the pale of Islam "philosophers and Ismaili esotericists". Ibn Hazm and Ibn Taymiyyah also "warned against unbridled takfir" while takfiring "specific categories" of theological opponents as "unbelievers".[96] Gilles Kepel writes that "used wrongly or unrestrainedly, this sanction would quickly lead to discord and sedition in the ranks of the faithful. Muslims might resort to mutually excommunicating one another and thus propel the Ummah to complete disaster."[97]

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), for example, takfired all those who opposed its policy of exterminating and enslaving members of the Yazidi religion. According to one source, Jamileh Kadivar, the majority of the "27,947 terrorist deaths" ISIL has been responsible for (as of 2020) have been Muslims it regards "as kafir",[g] as ISIL gives fighting alleged apostates a higher priority than fighting self-professed non-Muslims – Jews, Christians, Hindus, etc.[99] An open letter to ISIL by 126 Islamic scholars includes as one of its points of opposition to ISIL: "It is forbidden in Islam to declare people non-Muslim unless he (or she) openly declares disbelief".[100]

There is general agreement among Muslims that the takfir and mass killings of alleged apostates perpetrated not only by ISIL but also by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's jihadis[81] were wrong, but there is less unanimity in other cases, such as what to do in a situation where self-professed Muslim(s) – post-modernist academic Nasr Abu Zayd or the Ahmadiyya movement – disagree with their accusers on an important doctrinal point. (Ahmadis quote a Muslim journalist, Abdul-Majeed Salik, claiming that, "all great and eminent Muslims" as well as "all the sects in the Muslim world", at sometime in the history of Islam were "considered to be disbelievers, apostates, and outside the pale of Islam, according to one or the other group of religious leaders".)[h] In the case of the Ahmadiyya – who are accused by mainstream Sunni and Shia of denying the basic tenet of the Finality of Prophethood (Ahmadis state they believe Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is a mahdi and a messiah)[102] – the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has declared in Ordinance XX of the Second Amendment to its Constitution, that Ahmadis are non-Muslims and deprived them of religious rights. Several large riots (1953 Lahore riots, 1974 Anti-Ahmadiyya riots) and a bombing (2010 Ahmadiyya mosques massacre) have killed hundreds of Ahmadis in that country. Whether this is unjust takfir or applying sharia to collective apostasy is disputed.[103]

Overlap with blasphemy

[edit]

The three types (conversion, blasphemy and heresy) of apostasy may overlap – for example some "heretics" were alleged not to be actual self-professed Muslims, but (secret) members of another religion, seeking to destroy Islam from within. (Abdullah ibn Mayun al-Qaddah, for example, "fathered the whole complex development of the Ismaili religion and organisation up to Fatimid times," was accused by his different detractors of being (variously) "a Jew, a Bardesanian and most commonly as an Iranian dualist")[104] In Islamic literature, the term "blasphemy" sometimes also overlaps with kufr ("unbelief"), fisq (depravity), isa'ah (insult), and ridda (apostasy).[105][106] Because blasphemy in Islam included rejection of fundamental doctrines,[49] blasphemy has historically been seen as an evidence of rejection of Islam, that is, the religious crime of apostasy. Some jurists believe that blasphemy automatically implies a Muslim has left the fold of Islam.[107] A Muslim may find himself accused of being a blasphemer, and thus an apostate on the basis of one action or utterance.[108][109]

Collective apostasy

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In collective apostasy, a self-proclaimed Islamic group/sect are declared to be heretics/apostates. Groups treated as collective apostates include zindiq, sometimes Sufis, and more recently Ahmadis and Baháʼís (although Baháʼís do not consider themselves Muslims but members of a new religion).[110] As described above, the difference between legitimate Muslim sects and illegitimate apostate groups can be subtle and Muslims have not agreed on where the line dividing them lies. According to Gianluca Parolin, "collective apostasy has always been declared on a case-by-case basis".[110]

Fetri and national apostates

[edit]

Among Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and others in Ja'fari fiqh, a distinction is made between "fetri" or "innate" apostates who grew up Muslim and remained Muslim after puberty until converting to another religion, and "national apostates" – essentially people who grew up non-Muslim and converted to Islam. "National apostates" are given a chance to repent, but "innate apostates are not.[111]

Children raised in apostasy

[edit]

Orthodox apostasy fiqh can be problematic for someone who was raised by a non-Muslim(s) but has an absentee Muslim parent, or was raised by an apostate(s) from Islam. A woman born to a Muslim parent is considered an apostate if she marries a non-Muslim,[112][113] even if her Muslim parent did not raise her and she has always practiced another religion; and even if they know nothing about Islam. A person with an absentee Muslim parent but brought up non-Muslim can also become an apostate simply by practicing the (new) religion of their non-Muslim parent(s) (according to the committee of fatwa scholars at Islamweb.net).[114]

Contemporary issues of defining apostasy

[edit]

In the 19th, 20th and 21 century issues affecting shariʿah on apostasy include modern norms of freedom of religion,[4] the status of members of Baháʼí (considered unbeliever/apostates in Iran) and Ahmadi faiths (considered appostates from Islam in Pakistan and elsewhere),[4] those who "refuse to judge or be judged according to the shariʿah,"[4] and more recently the status of Muslims authorities and governments that do not implement classical shariʿah law in its completeness.

Punishment

[edit]
Execution of a Moroccan Jewess (Sol Hachuel) a painting by Alfred Dehodencq

There are differences of opinion among Islamic scholars about whether, when and especially how apostasy in Islam should be punished.[12][4][43]

From 11th century onwards, apostasy from Islam was forbidden by Islamic law; earlier apostasy law was only applicable if a certain number of witnesses testified that there was apostasy, which for the most part was impractical.[115][116][117] Apostasy was punishable by death and also by civil liabilities such as seizure of property, children, annulment of marriage, loss of inheritance rights.[4] (A subsidiary law, also applied throughout the history of Islam, forbade non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims to leave Islam and join another religion,[118][119][115][116][117] since it meant encouraging Muslims to commit a crime.) With Western colonial influence, starting in the 19th century, the legal code of many Muslim states no longer included apostasy as a capital crime; very much disapproving of this change, Islamic scholars called for vigilante justice of hisbah to execute the offenders (see Apostasy in Islam#Colonial era and after).

In contemporary times, the majority of Muslim legal scholars still regard apostasy from Islam as a crime deserving the death penalty, according to Abdul Rashied Omar,[20] while Javaid Rehman and other scholars[12][4][34] regard this view as being fundamentally contradictory and inconsistent with the right to "freedom of religion" as expressed in the Quranic injunctions Quran 88:21-88:22[39] and Quran 2:256 ("there is no compulsion in religion"),[27] and a relic of the early Islamic community, in a time when apostasy from Islam was treated either as an act of desertion or treason.[40]

Still others support a "centrist or moderate position" of executing only those whose apostasy is "unambiguously provable" such as if two just Muslim eyewitnesses testify; and/or reserving the death penalty for those who make their apostacy public. According to Christine Schirrmacher, "a majority of theologians" embrace this stance.[120]

Who qualifies for judgement for the crime of apostasy

[edit]

As mentioned above, there are numerous doctrinal fine points outlined in fiqh manuals whose violation should render a (self-proclaimed) Muslim an apostate, but there are also hurdles and exacting requirements that spare violators of doctrine a conviction for apostasy in classical fiqh.

One motive for caution is that it is an act of apostasy (in Shafi'i and other fiqh) for a Muslim to accuse or describe another innocent Muslim of being an unbeliever,[92] based on the hadith where Muhammad is reported to have said: "If a man says to his brother, 'You are an infidel,' then one of them is right."[121][122]

According to sharia, to be found guilty the accused must at the time of apostasizing be exercising free will (that is did not convert to or from Islam under duress),[123][124] an adult, and of sound mind,[4] and have refused to repent when given a period of time to do so (not all schools include this last requirement). Some of these requirements have served as "loopholes" to exonerate apostates (apostasy charges against Abdul Rahman, were dropped on the grounds he was "mentally unfit").[125]

Death penalty

[edit]

In classical Islamic jurisprudence

[edit]

Traditional Sunnī and Shīʿa Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and their respective schools (maḏāhib) agree on some issues – that male apostates should be executed, and that most but not all perpetrators should not be given a chance to repent; among the excluded are those who practice sorcery (subhar), treacherous heretics (zanādiqa), and "recidivists".[4] They disagree on issues such as whether women can be executed,[126][127][128] whether apostasy is a violation of "the rights of God",[4][129] whether apostates who were born Muslims may be spared if they repent,[4] whether conviction requires the accused be a practicing Muslim,[4] or whether it is enough to simply intend to commit apostasy rather than actually doing it.[4]

  • Ḥanafī school – recommends three days of imprisonment before the execution, although the delay before killing the apostates is not mandatory. Apostasy from Islam is not considered a hudud crime.[130] Unlike in other schools, it is not obligatory to call on the apostate to repent.[4] Apostate males are to be killed, while apostate females are to be held in solitary confinement and beaten every three days till they recant and return to Islam.[131] Apostasy from Islam is not sufficient grounds for execution in the Ḥanafī school. Apostates must also be guilty of causing aggravated robbery or grand larceny (ḥirābah).[132]
  • Mālikī school – allows up to ten days for recantation, after which the apostates must be killed. Apostasy from Islam is considered a hudud crime.[130] Both male and female apostates deserve the death penalty for leaving Islam, according to the traditional view of the Mālikī school.[128] Unlike other schools, the apostates must have a history of being "good" (i.e., practicing) Muslims.[4]
  • Shāfiʿī school – waiting period of three days is required to allow the apostates time to repent and return to Islam. Failing repentance, death penalty is the recommended form of punishment for both male and female apostates for leaving Islam.[128] Apostasy from Islam is not considered a hudud crime.[130]
  • Ḥanbalī school – a waiting period not necessary, but may be granted. Apostasy from Islam is considered a hudud crime.[130] Death penalty is the traditional form of punishment for both male and female apostates for leaving Islam.[128]
  • Jaʿfari or Imāmī school – Male apostates must be executed, while female apostates must be held in solitary confinement until they repent and return to Islam.[128][131] Apostasy from Islam is considered a hudud crime.[130] The "mere intention of unbelief" without expression, also qualifies as apostasy.[4] Unlike the other schools, repentance will not save a defendant from execution, unless they are "national apostates" who were not born Muslims but converted to Islam before apostasizing, although it is disputed by some Muslim scholars. "Innate" apostates, who grew up Muslims and remained Muslim after puberty and until converting to another religion, should be executed.[4][111]

Vigilante application

[edit]

In contemporary situations where apostates, (or alleged apostates), have ended up being killed, it is usually not be through the formal criminal justice system, especially when "a country's law does not punish apostasy." It is not uncommon in some countries for "vigilante" Muslims to kill or attempt to kill apostates or alleged apostates (or force them to flee the country).[16] In at least one case, the high-profile execution of Mahmud Muhammad Taha, the victim was legally executed and the government made clear he was being executed for apostasy, but the technical "legal basis" for his killing was another crime or crimes,[16] namely "heresy, opposing the application of Islamic law, disturbing public security, provoking opposition against the government, and re-establishing a banned political party."[133] When post-modernist professor Nasr Abu Zayd was found to be an apostate by an Egyptian court, it meant only an involuntary divorce from his wife (who did not want to divorce), but it put the proverbial target on his back and he fled to Europe.[16][134]

Civil liabilities

[edit]

In Islam, apostasy has traditionally had both criminal and civil penalties. In the late 19th century, when the use of criminal penalties for apostasy fell into disuse, civil penalties were still applied.[4] The punishment for the criminal penalties such as murder includes death or prison, while [4][135] In all madhhabs of Islam, the civil penalties include:

(a) the property of the apostate is seized and distributed to his or her Muslim relatives;
(b) his or her marriage annulled (faskh) (as in the case of Nasr Abu Zayd);
(1) if they were not married at the time of apostasy they could not get married[136]
(c) any children removed and considered ward of the Islamic state.[4]
(d) In case the entire family has left Islam, or there are no surviving Muslim relatives recognized by Sharia, the apostate's inheritance rights are lost and property is liquidated by the Islamic state (part of fay, الْفيء).
(e) In case the apostate is not executed – such as in case of women apostates in Hanafi school – the person also loses all inheritance rights.[37][38][not specific enough to verify] Hanafi Sunni school of jurisprudence allows waiting till execution, before children and property are seized; other schools do not consider this wait as mandatory but mandates time for repentance.[4]
Social liabilities

The conversion of a Muslim to another faith is often considered a "disgrace" and "scandal" as well as a sin,[137] so in addition to penal and civil penalties, loss of employment,[137] ostracism and proclamations by family members that they are "dead", is not at all "unusual".[138] For those who wish to remain in the Muslim community but who are considered unbelievers by other Muslims, there are also "serious forms of ostracism". These include the refusal of other Muslims to pray together with or behind a person accused of kufr, the denial of the prayer for the dead and burial in a Muslim cemetery, boycott of whatever books they have written, etc.[139]

Supporters and opponents of death penalty

[edit]
Support among contemporary preachers and scholars
Legal opinion on apostasy by the Fatwa committee at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, concerning the case of a man who converted to Christianity: "Since he left Islam, he will be invited to express his regret. If he does not regret, he will be killed according to rights and obligations of the Islamic law." The Fatwa also mentions that the same applies to his children if they entered Islam and left it after they reach maturity.[140]

"The vast majority of Muslim scholars both past as well as present" consider apostasy "a crime deserving the death penalty", according to Abdul Rashided Omar, writing circa 2007.[20] Some notable contemporary proponents include:

Opposing the death penalty for apostasy

Rationale, arguments, criticism for and against killing apostates

[edit]

The question of whether apostates should be killed, has been "a matter for contentious dispute throughout Islamic history".[171]

For the death penalty

Throughout Islamic history the Muslim community, scholars, and schools of fiqh have agreed that scripture prescribes this penalty; scripture must take precedence over reason or modern norms of human rights, as Islam is the one true religion; "no compulsion in religion" (Q.2:256) does not apply to this punishment; apostasy is "spiritual and cultural" treason; it hardly ever happens and so is not worth talking about.

  • Abul A'la Maududi said that among early Muslims, among the schools of fiqh both Sunni and Shia, among scholars of shari'ah "of every century ... available on record", there is unanimous agreement that the punishment for apostate is death, and that "no room whatever remains to suggest" that this penalty has not "been continuously and uninterruptedly operative" through Islamic history; evidence from early texts that Muhammad called for apostates to be killed, and that companions of the Prophet and early caliphs ordered beheadings and crucifixions of apostates and has never been declared invalid over the course of the history of Islamic theology (Christine Schirrmacher).[137]
    • "Many hadiths", not just "one or two", call for the killing of apostates (Yusuf al-Qaradawi).[172][173]
    • Verse Q.2:217 – "hindering ˹others˺ from the Path of Allah, rejecting Him, and expelling the worshippers from the Sacred Mosque is ˹a˺ greater ˹sin˺ in the sight of Allah" – indicates the punishment for apostasy from Islam is death (Mohammad Iqbal Siddiqi),[174] Quranic verses in general "appear to justify coercion and severe punishment" for apostates (Dale F. Eickelman).[50]
    • If this doctrine is called into question, what's next? Ritual prayer (salat)? Fasting (sawm)? Even Muhammad's mission? (Abul A'la Maududi).[175]
  • It "does not merit discussion" because [the advocates maintain] apostasy from Islam is so rare (Ali Kettani),[176] (Mahmud Brelvi);[177][178] before the modern era, there was virtually no apostasy from Islam (Syed Barakat Ahmad).[179]
    • The punishment is "rarely invoked" because there are numerous qualifications or ways for the apostate to avoid death (to be found guilty they must openly reject Islam, have made their decision without coercion, be aware of the nature of their statements, be an adult, be completely sane, refused to repent, etc.) (Religious Tolerance website).[180]
    • The verse only forbids compulsion to believe "things that are wrong", when it comes to accepting the truth, compulsion is allowed (Peters and Vries explaining a traditional view).[i]
    • Others maintain that verse Q.2:256 has been "abrogated", i.e. according to classical Quranic scholars it has been overruled/cancelled by verses of Quran revealed later, (in other words, compulsion was not allowed in the very earliest days of Islam but this was changed by divine revelation a few years later) (Peters and Vries explaining traditional view).[182]
    • Because "the social order of every Moslem society is Islam", apostasy constitutes "an offense" against that social order, "that may lead in the end to the destruction of this order" (Muhammad Muhiy al-Din al-Masiri).[183]
    • Apostasy is usually "a psychological pretext for rebellion against worship, traditions and laws and even against the foundations of the state", and so "is often synonymous with the crime of high treason ... " (Muhammad al-Ghazali).[184]
Against death penalty

Arguments against the death penalty include: that some scholars throughout Islamic history have opposed that punishment for apostasy; that it constitutes a form of compulsion in faith, which the Quran explicitly forbids in Q.2.256 and other verses, and that these override any other scriptural arguments; and especially that the death penalty in hadith and applied by Muhammad was for treasonous/seditious behavior, not for a change in personal belief.

  • How can it be claimed that there was a consensus among scholars or community (ijma) from the beginning of Islam in favor of capital punishment when a number of companions of Muhammad and early Islamic scholars (Ibn al-Humam, al-Marghinani, Ibn Abbas, Sarakhsi, Ibrahim al-Nakh'i) opposed the execution of murtadd? (Mirza Tahir Ahmad)[185]
    • In addition there have been a number of prominent ulema (though a minority) over the centuries who argued against the death penalty for apostasy in some way, such as ...
      • The Maliki jurist Abu al-Walid al-Baji (d. 474 AH) held that apostasy was liable only to a discretionary punishment (known as ta'zir) and so might not require execution.[163]
      • The Hanafi jurist Al-Sarakhsi (d. 483 AH/ 1090 CE)[186][187] and Imam Ibnul Humam (d. 681 AH/ 1388 CE)[188] and Abd al-Rahman al-Awza'i (707–774 CE),[189] all distinguished between non-seditious religious apostasy on the one hand and treason on the other, with execution reserved for treason.
      • Ibrahim al-Nakhaʿī (50 AH/670 – 95/96 AH/717 CE) and Sufyan al-Thawri (97 AH/716 CE – 161 AH/778 CE) as well as the Hanafi jurist Sarakhsi (d. 1090), believed that an apostate should be asked to repent indefinitely (which would be incompatible with being sentenced to death).[163][190]
  • There are problems with the scriptural basis for sharia commanding the execution of apostates.
    • Quran (see Quran above)
      • Compulsion in faith is "explicitly" forbidden by the Quran ('Abd al-Muta'ali al-Sa'idi);[191] Quranic statements on freedom of religion – 'There is no compulsion in religion. The right path has been distinguished from error' (Q.2:256) (and also 'Whoever wants, let him believe, and whoever wants, let him disbelieve,' (Q.18:29) – are "absolute and universal" statement(s) (Jonathan A.C. Brown),[57] (Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa),[164] "general, overriding principle(s)" (Khaled Abou El Fadl)[192] of Islam, and not abrogated by hadith or the Sword Verse (Q.9:5), and there can be little doubt capital punishment for apostasy is incompatible with this principle – after all, if someone has the threat of death hanging over their head in a matter of faith, it cannot be said that there is "no compulsion or coercion" in their belief (Tariq Ramadan).[193]
      • Neither verse Q.2:217, (Mirza Tahir Ahmad),[194] nor any other Quranic verse say anything to indicate an apostate should be punished in the temporal world, aka dunyā (S. A. Rahman),[195] (W. Heffening),[196] (Wael Hallaq),[197][55] (Grand Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri);[168] the verses only indicate that dangerous, aggressive apostates should be killed (Mahmud Shaltut)[163] (e.g. "If they do not withdraw from you, and offer you peace, and restrain their hands, take them and kill them wherever ye come upon them" Q.4:90), (Peters and Vries describing argument of Islamic Modernists).[198][199]
      • Another verse condemning apostasy – Q.4:137, "Those who believe then disbelieve, then believe again, then disbelieve and then increase in their disbelief – God will never forgive them nor guide them to the path" – makes no sense if apostasy is punished by death, because killing apostates "would not permit repeated conversion from and to Islam" (Louay M. Safi),[60] (Sisters in Islam).[200]
    • Hadith and Sunnah (see hadith above)
      • "According to most established juristic schools, a hadith can limit the application of a general Qur'anic statement, but can never negate it", so the hadith calling for execution cannot abrogate the "There is no compulsion in religion" verse (Q.2:256) (Louay M. Safi).[j]
      • The Prophet Muhammad did not call for the deaths of contemporaries who left Islam (Mohamed Ghilan)[201] – for example, apostates like "Hishâm and 'Ayyash", or converts to Christianity, such as "Ubaydallah ibn Jahsh" – and since what The Prophet did is by definition part of the Sunnah of Islam, this indicates "that one who changes her/his religion should not be killed" (Tariq Ramadan).[193]
      • another reason not to use the hadith(s) stating "whoever changes his religion kill him" as the basis for law is that it is not among the class of hadith eligible to be used as the basis for "legal rulings binding upon all Muslims for all times" (Muhammad al-Shawkani (1759–1834 CE));[201] as their authenticity is not certain (Wael Hallaq);[197] the hadith are in a category relying "on only one authority (khadar al-ahad) and were not widely known amongst the Companions of the Prophet," and so ought not abrogate Quranic verses of tolerance (Peters and Vries describing argument of Islamic Modernists).[202]
      • The hadith(s) "calling for apostates to be killed" are actually referring to "what can be considered in modern terms political treason", not change in personal belief (Mohamed Ghilan),[201] (Adil Salahi),[k] or collective conspiracy and treason against the government (Enayatullah Subhani),[204] (Mahmud Shaltut);[l] and in fact, translating the Islamic term ridda as simply "apostasy" – a standard practice – is really an error, as ridda should be defined as "the public act of political secession from the Muslim community" (Jonathan Brown).[205]
  • The punishment or lack for apostasy should reflect the circumstances of the Muslim community which is very different now then when the death penalty was established;
    • Unlike some other sharia laws, those on how to deal with apostates from Islam are not set in stone but should be adjusted according to circumstances based on what best serves the interests of society. In the past, the death penalty for leaving Islam "protected the integrity of the Muslim community", but today this goal is no longer met by punishing apostasy (Jonathan Brown).[205]
    • The "premise and reasoning underlying the sunna rule of death penalty for apostasy were valid in the historical context" where 'disbelief is equated with high treason' because citizenship was 'based on belief in Islam', but doesn't apply today (Abdullahi An-Na'im, et al.);[206][207] the prescription of death penalty for apostasy found in hadith was aimed at prevention of aggression against Muslims and sedition against the state (Mahmud Shaltut);[163] it's a man-made rule enacted in the early Islamic community to prevent and punish the equivalent of desertion or treason (John Esposito);[40] it is probable that the punishment was prescribed by Muhammad during early Islam to combat political conspiracies against Islam and Muslims, those who desert Islam out of malice and enmity towards the Muslim community, and is not intended for those who simply change their belief, converting to another religion after investigation and research (Ayatollah Hussein-Ali Montazeri).[168]
    • The concept of apostasy as treason is not so much part of Islam, as part of the pre-modern era when classical Islamic fiqh was developed, and when "every religion was a 'religion of the sword'" (Reza Aslan);[208] and every religion "underpinned the political and social order within ... the states they established" (Jonathan Brown);[205] "This was also an era in which religion and the state were one unified entity. ... no Jew, Christian, Zoroastrian, or Muslim of this time would have considered his or her religion to be rooted in the personal confessional experiences of individuals. ... Your religion was your ethnicity, your culture, and your social identity... your religion was your citizenship."[208]
      • For example, the Holy Roman Empire had its officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Christianity; the Sasanian Empire had its officially sanctioned and legally enforced version of Zoroastrianism; in China at that time, Buddhist rulers fought Taoist rulers for political ascendancy (Reza Aslan);[208] Jews who abandoned the God of Israel to worship other deities "were condemned to stoning" (Jonathan Brown).[205]
    • Transcending tribalism with religious (Islamic) unity could mean prevention of civil war in Muhammad's era, so to violate religious unity meant violating civil peace (Mohamed Ghilan).[201]
    • Capital punishment for apostasy is a time-bound command, applying only to those Arabs who denied the truth even after having Muhammad himself explain and clarify it to them (Javed Ahmad Ghamidi).[209]
    • Now the only reason to kill an apostate is to eliminate the danger of war, not because of their disbelief (Al-Kamal ibn al-Humam 861 AH/1457 CE);[188] these days, the number of apostates is small, and does not politically threaten the Islamic community (Christine Schirrmacher describing the "liberal" position on apostasy);[120] it should be enforced only if apostasy becomes a mechanism of public disobedience and disorder (fitna) (Ahmet Albayrak).[41]
  • In Islamic history, laws calling for severe penalties against apostasy (and blasphemy) have not been used to protect Islam, but "almost exclusively" to either eliminate "political dissidents" or target "vulnerable religious minorities" (Javaid Rehman),[210] which is hardly something worthy of imitating.
  • Executing apostates is a violation of the human right to freedom of religion, and somewhat hypocritical for a religion that enthusiastically encourages non-Muslims to apostatize from their current faith and convert to Islam (Non-Muslims and liberal Muslims).

Middle way

[edit]

At least some conservative jurists and preachers have attempted to reconcile following the traditional doctrine of death for apostasy while addressing the principle of freedom of religion. Some of whom argue apostasy should have a lesser penalty than death.[35][36][37][38]

At a 2009-human rights conference at Mofid University in Qom, Iran, Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, stated that "if an individual doubts Islam, he does not become the subject of punishment, but if the doubt is openly expressed, this is not permissible." As one observer (Sadakat Kadri) noted, this "freedom" has the advantage that "state officials could not punish an unmanifested belief even if they wanted to".[211]

Zakir Naik, the Indian Islamic televangelist and preacher[152] takes a less strict line (mentioned above), stating that only those Muslims who "propagate the non-Islamic faith and speak against Islam" after converting from Islam should be put to death.[157][155]

While not speaking to the issue of executing apostates, Dar al-Ifta al-Misriyyah, an Egyptian Islamic advisory, justiciary and governmental body, issued a fatwa in the case of an Egyptian Christian convert to Islam but "sought to return to Christianity", stating: "Those who embraced Islam voluntarily and without coercion cannot later deviate from the public order of society by revealing their act of apostasy because such behavior would discourage other people from embracing Islam." (The Egyptian court followed the fatwa.)[212]

In practice: historical impact

[edit]

From the Middle Ages to the early modern period

[edit]

The charge of apostasy has often been used by religious authorities to condemn and punish skeptics, dissidents, and minorities in their communities.[53] From the earliest times of the history of Islam, the crime of apostasy and execution for apostasy has driven major events in the development of the Islamic religion. For example, the Ridda wars (civil wars of apostasy) shook the Muslim community in 632–633 AD, immediately after the death of Muhammad.[53][213] Later, sectarian wars caused the split between the two major sects of Islam: Sunnis and Shias, and numerous deaths on both sides.[214][215] Sunni and Shia sects of Islam have long accused each other of apostasy.[216]

The charge of apostasy dates back to the early history of Islam with the emergence of the Kharijites in the 7th century CE.[217] The original schism between Kharijites, Sunnis, and Shias among Muslims was disputed over the political and religious succession to the guidance of the Muslim community (Ummah) after the death of Muhammad.[217] From their essentially political position, the Kharijites developed extreme religious doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shia Muslims.[217] Shias believe ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib is the true successor to Muhammad, while Sunnis consider Abu Bakr to hold that position. The Kharijites broke away from both the Shias and the Sunnis during the First Fitna (the first Islamic Civil War);[217] they were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfīr (excommunication), whereby they declared both Sunni and Shia Muslims to be either infidels (kuffār) or false Muslims (munāfiḳūn), and therefore deemed them worthy of death for their perceived apostasy (ridda).[217][218][219]

Roderick is venerated in Christianity as one of the Martyrs of Córdoba

Christian populations living in the lands invaded by the Arab Muslim armies between the 7th and 10th centuries AD suffered religious persecution and violence multiple times at the hands of Arab Muslim officials and rulers,[220][221][222][223][224][225] including Christian converts to Islam who reportedly reverted to Christianity following their apostasy from the Islamic religion.[220][221][222][223][224][225] Many were executed under the Islamic death penalty for defending their Christian faith through dramatic acts of resistance such as refusing to convert to Islam, repudiation of the Islamic religion, and subsequent reconversion to Christianity, as well as blasphemy towards Muslim beliefs.[220][221][222][223][225] Between 850 and 859 CE, the Martyrs of Córdoba were executed under the rule of Abd al-Rahman II and Muhammad I in the Emirate of Córdoba for capital violations of Islamic law, including blasphemy towards Muslim beliefs and apostasy from Islam.[220][221][222][223][225]

Historian David Cook writes that "it is only with the 'Abbasi caliphs al-Mu'taṣim (218–28 AH/833–42 CE) and al-Mutawakkil (233–47 /847–61) that we find detailed accounts" of apostates and what was done with them. Prior to that, in the Umayyad and early Abbasid periods, measures to defend Islam from apostasy "appear to have mostly remained limited to intellectual debates".[226] He also states that "the most common category of apostates" – at least of apostates who converted to another religion – "from the very first days of Islam" were "Christians and Jews who converted to Islam and after some time" reconverted back to their former faith.[227]

Some sources emphasize that executions of apostates have been "rare in Islamic history".[27] According to historian Bernard Lewis, in "religious polemic" in the "early times" of Islam, "charges of apostasy were not unusual", but the accused were seldom prosecuted, and "some even held high offices in the Muslim state". Later, "as the rules and penalties of the Muslim law were systematized and more regularly enforced, charges of apostasy became rarer."[95] When action was taken against an alleged apostate, it was much more likely to be "quarantine" than execution, unless the innovation was "extreme, persistent and aggressive".[95] Another source, legal historian Sadakat Kadri, argues execution was rare because "it was widely believed" that any accused apostate "who repented by articulating the shahada [...] had to be forgiven" and their punishment delayed until after Judgement Day. This principle was upheld "even in extreme situations", such as when an offender adopted Islam "only for fear of death" and their sincerity seemed highly implausible. It was based on the hadith that Muhammad had upbraided a follower for killing a raider who had uttered the shahada.[m]

The New Encyclopedia of Islam also states that after the early period, with some notable exceptions, the practice in Islam regarding atheism or various forms of heresy, grew more tolerant as long as it was a private matter. However heresy and atheism expressed in public may well be considered a scandal and a menace to a society; in some societies they are punishable, at least to the extent the perpetrator is silenced. In particular, blasphemy against God and insulting Muhammad are major crimes.[230]

In contrast, historian David Cook maintains the issue of apostasy and punishment for it was not uncommon in Islamic history. However, he also states that prior to 11th century execution seems rare. He gives an example of a Jew who had converted to Islam and used the threat of reverting to Judaism in order to gain better treatment and privilege.[231]

Zindīq (often a "blanket phrase" for "intellectuals" under suspicion of having abandoned Islam", or for freethinkers, atheists or heretics who conceal their religion),[232] experienced a wave of persecutions from 779 to 786. A history of those times states:[230]

"Tolerance is laudable", the Spiller (the Caliph Abu al-Abbās) had once said, "except in matters dangerous to religious beliefs, or to the Sovereign's dignity."[230] Al-Mahdi (d. 169/785) persecuted Freethinkers, and executed them in large numbers. He was the first Caliph to order a composition of polemical works in refutation of Freethinkers and other heretics; and for years he tried to exterminate them absolutely, hunting them down throughout all provinces and putting accused persons to death on mere suspicion.[230]

The famous Sufi mystic of 10th-century Iraq, Mansur Al-Hallaj was officially executed for possessing a heretical document suggesting hajj pilgrimage was not required of a pure Muslim (i.e. killed for heresy which made him an apostate), but it is thought he would have been spared execution except that the Caliph at the time Al-Muqtadir wished to discredit "certain figures who had associated themselves" with al-Hallaj.[233] (Previously al-Hallaj had been punished for talking about being at one with God by being shaved, pilloried and beaten with the flat of a sword. He was not executed because the Shafi'ite judge had ruled that his words were not "proof of disbelief.")[233]

In 12th-century Iran, al-Suhrawardi along with followers of Ismaili sect of Islam were killed on charges of being apostates;[53] in 14th-century Syria, Ibn Taymiyyah declared Central Asian Turko-Mongol Muslims as apostates due to the invasion of Ghazan Khan;[234] in 17th-century India, Dara Shikoh and other sons of Shah Jahan were captured and executed on charges of apostasy from Islam by his brother Aurangzeb although historians agree it was more political than a religious execution.[235]

Colonial era and after

[edit]

From around 1800 up until 1970, there were only a few cases of executions of apostates in the Muslim world, including the strangling of a woman in Ottoman Egypt (sometime between 1825 and 1835), and the beheading of an Armenian youth in the Ottoman Empire in 1843.[4] Western powers campaigned intensely for a prohibition on the execution of apostates in the Ottoman Empire.[4] British envoy to the court of Sultan Abdulmejid I (1839–1861), Stratford Canning, led diplomatic representatives from Austria, Russia, Prussia, and France in a "tug of war" with the Ottoman government.[236] In the end (following the execution of the Armenian), the Sublime Porte agreed to allow "complete freedom of Christian missionaries" to try to convert Muslims in the Empire.[4] The death sentence for apostasy from Islam was abolished by the Edict of Toleration, and substituted with other forms of punishment by the Ottoman government in 1844. The implementation of this ban was resisted by religious officials and proved difficult.[237][238] A series of edicts followed during the Ottoman Reformist period, such as the 1856 Reform Edict.

This was also the time that Islamic modernists like Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) argued that to be executed, it was not enough to be an apostate, the perpetrator had to pose a real threat to public safety.[171] Islamic scholars like Muhammad Rashid Rida (d. 1935) and Muhammad al-Ghazzali (d. 1996), on the other hand, asserted that public, explicit apostasy automatically threatened public order, and hence should be punishable by death.[239] These scholars reconciled the Qur'anic verse "There is no compulsion in religion" by arguing that freedom of religion in Islam doesn't extend for Muslims who seek to change their religion.[239] Other authors like 'Abd al-Muta'ali al-Sa'idi, S. A. Rahman, etc. assert that capital punishment for apostasy is contradictory to freedom of religion and need to be banished.[239]

Greek Christians in 1922, fleeing from their homes in Kharput and moving to Trebizond. In the 1910s and 1920s, the Armenian, Greek, and Assyrian genocides were perpetrated by the Ottoman Empire and its successor state, the Republic of Turkey.[248]

Despite these edicts on apostasy, there was constant pressure on non-Muslims to convert to Islam, and apostates from Islam continued to be persecuted, punished and threatened with execution, particularly in eastern and Levant parts of the then Ottoman Empire.[237] The Edict of Toleration ultimately failed when Sultan Abdul Hamid II assumed power, re-asserted pan-Islamism with sharia as Ottoman state philosophy, and initiated the Hamidian massacres and late Ottoman genocides in 1894 against Christians,[249] particularly the genocides of Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, and crypto-Christian apostates from Islam in Turkey.[250][251][252][253]

In the colonial era, the death penalty for apostasy was abolished in Islamic countries that had come under Western rule or in places, such as the Ottoman Empire, Western powers could apply enough pressure to abolish it.[4] Writing in the mid-1970s, Rudolph Peters and Gert J. J. De Vries stated that "apostasy no longer falls under criminal law"[4] in the Muslim world, but that some Muslims (such as 'Adb al-Qadir 'Awdah) were preaching that "the killing of an apostate" had "become a duty of individual Moslems" (rather than a less important collective duty in hisbah doctrine) and giving advice on how to plead in court after being arrested for such a murder to avoid punishment.[254]

Some (Louay M. Safi), have argued that this situation, with the adoption of "European legal codes ... enforced by state elites without any public debate", created an identification of tolerance with foreign/alien control in the mind of the Muslim public, and rigid literalist interpretations (such as the execution of apostates), with authenticity and legitimacy. Autocratic rulers "often align themselves with traditional religious scholars" to deflect grassroots discontent, which took the form of angry pious traditionalists.[60]

In practice in the recent past

[edit]

While as of 2004 apostasy from Islam is a capital offence in only eight majority-Muslim states,[255] in other states that do not directly execute apostates, apostate killing is sometimes facilitated through extrajudicial killings performed by the apostate's family, particularly if the apostate is vocal.[n] In some countries, it is not uncommon for "vigilante" Muslims to kill or attempt to kill apostates or alleged apostates, in the belief they are enforcing sharia law that the government has failed to.

Penalties for apostasy in Muslim-majority countries as of 2020.[255] Many other Muslim countries impose a prison term for apostasy or they prosecute it under blasphemy or other laws.[257]

Background

[edit]

More than 20 Muslim-majority states have laws that punish apostasy by Muslims to be a crime some de facto other de jure.[255] As of 2014, apostasy was a capital offense in Afghanistan, Brunei, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.[255] Executions for religious conversion have been infrequent in recent times, with four cases reported since 1985: one in Sudan in 1985; two in Iran, in 1989 and 1998; and one in Saudi Arabia in 1992.[255][27] In Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen apostasy laws have been used to charge persons for acts other than conversion.[255] In addition, some predominantly Islamic countries without laws specifically addressing apostasy have prosecuted individuals or minorities for apostasy using broadly defined blasphemy laws.[258] In many nations, the Hisbah doctrine of Islam has traditionally allowed any Muslim to accuse another Muslim or ex-Muslim for beliefs that may harm Islamic society, i.e. violate the norms of sharia (Islamic law). This principle has been used in countries such as Egypt, Pakistan and others to bring blasphemy charges against apostates.[259][260]

The source of most violence or threats of violence against apostate has come from outside of state judicial systems in the Muslim world in recent years, either from extralegal acts by government authorities or from other individuals or groups operating unrestricted by the government.[261][page needed] There has also been social persecution for Muslims converting to Christianity. For example, the Christian organisation Barnabas Fund reports:

The field of apostasy and blasphemy and related "crimes" is thus obviously a complex syndrome within all Muslim societies which touches a raw nerve and always arouses great emotional outbursts against the perceived acts of treason, betrayal and attacks on Islam and its honour. While there are a few brave dissenting voices within Muslim societies, the threat of the application of the apostasy and blasphemy laws against any who criticize its application is an efficient weapon used to intimidate opponents, silence criticism, punish rivals, reject innovations and reform, and keep non-Muslim communities in their place.[262][unreliable source?]

Similar views are expressed by the non-theistic International Humanist and Ethical Union.[263] Author Mohsin Hamid points out that the logic of widely accepted claim that anyone helping an apostate is themselves an apostate, is a powerful weapon in spreading fear among those who oppose the killings (in at least the country of Pakistan). It means that a doctor who agrees to treat an apostate wounded by attacker(s), or a police officer who has agreed to protect that doctor after they have been threatened is also an apostate – "and on and on".[264]

Contemporary reformist/liberal Muslims such as Quranist Ahmed Subhy Mansour,[265] Edip Yuksel, and Mohammed Shahrour have suffered from accusations of apostasy and demands to execute them, issued by Islamic clerics such as Mahmoud Ashur, Mustafa Al-Shak'a, Mohammed Ra'fat Othman and Yusif Al-Badri.[266]

Apostate communities

[edit]
Christian apostates from Islam

Regarding Muslim converts to Christianity, Duane Alexander Miller (2016) identified two different categories:

  1. 'Muslims followers of Jesus Christ', 'Jesus Muslims' or 'Messianic Muslims' (analogous to Messianic Jews), who continue to self-identify as 'Muslims', or at least say Islam is (part of) their 'culture' rather than religion, but "understand themselves to be following Jesus as he is portrayed in the Bible".
  2. 'Christians from a Muslim background' (abbreviated CMBs), also known as 'ex-Muslim Christians', who have completely abandoned Islam in favour of Christianity.

Miller introduced the term 'Muslim-background believers' (MBBs) to encompass both groups, adding that the latter group are generally regarded as apostates from Islam, but orthodox Muslims' opinions on the former group is more mixed (either that 'Muslim followers of Jesus' are 'heterodox Muslims', 'heretical Muslims' or 'crypto-Christian liars').[267]

Atheist apostates from Islam

Writing in 2015, Ahmed Benchemsi argued that while Westerners have great difficulty even conceiving of the existence of an Arab atheist, "a generational dynamic" is underway with "large numbers" of young people brought up as Muslims "tilting away from ... rote religiosity" after having "personal doubts" about the "illogicalities" of the Quran and Sunnah.[268] Immigrant apostates from Islam in Western countries "converting" to Atheism have often gathered for comfort in groups such as Women in Secularism, Ex-Muslims of North America, Council of Ex-Muslims of Britain,[269] sharing tales of the tension and anxieties of "leaving a close-knit belief-based community" and confronting "parental disappointment", "rejection by friends and relatives", and charges of "trying to assimilate into a Western culture that despises them", often using terminology first uttered by the LGBT community – "'coming out,' and leaving 'the closet'".[269] Atheists in the Muslim world maintain a lower profile, but according to the Editor-in-chief of FreeArabs.com:

When I recently searched Facebook in both Arabic and English, combining the word 'atheist' with names of different Arab countries I turned up over 250 pages or groups, with memberships ranging from a few individuals to more than 11,000. And these numbers only pertain to Arab atheists (or Arabs concerned with the topic of atheism) who are committed enough to leave a trace online.[268]

Public opinion

[edit]

A survey based on face-to-face interviews conducted in 80 languages by the Pew Research Center between 2008 and 2012 among thousands of Muslims in many countries, found varied views on the death penalty for those who leave Islam to become an atheist or to convert to another religion.[33] In some countries (especially in Central Asia, Southeast Europe, and Turkey), support for the death penalty for apostasy was confined to a tiny fringe; in other countries (especially in the Arab world and South Asia) majorities and large minorities support the death penalty.

In the survey, Muslims who favored making Sharia the law of the land were asked for their views on the death penalty for apostasy from Islam.[33] The results are summarized in the table below. (Note that values for Group C have been derived from the values for the other two groups and are not part of the Pew report.)[33]

Middle East and North Africa
Country Group A: % Muslims support sharia Group B: Support death for apostasy as a % of Group A Group C: Group B as % of all Muslims
Egypt 74 86 63.6
Palestine 89 66 58.7
Jordan 71 82 58.2
Iraq 91 42 38.2
Tunisia 56 29 16.2
Lebanon 29 46 13.3
South and Southeast Asia
Country Group A: % Muslims support sharia Group B: Support death for apostasy as a % of Group A Group C: Group B as % of all Muslims
Afghanistan 99 79 78.2
Pakistan 84 76 63.8
Malaysia 86 62 53.3
Bangladesh 82 44 36.1
Thailand 77 27 20.8
Indonesia 72 18 13.0
Southeast Europe and Central Asia
Country Group A: % Muslims support sharia Group B: Support death for apostasy as a % of Group A Group C: Group B as % of all Muslims
Russia 42 15 6.3
Tajikistan 27 22 5.9
Kyrgyzstan 35 14 4.9
Bosnia 15 15 2.3
Kosovo 20 11 2.2
Turkey 12 17 2.0
Albania 12 8 1.0
Kazakhstan 10 4 0.4
Visualisation of the total % of Muslims per country who support the death penalty for apostasy according to the 2013 Pew report's values.

Overall, the figures in the 2012 survey suggest that the percentage of Muslims in the countries surveyed who approve the death penalty for Muslims who leave Islam to become an atheist or convert to another religion varies widely, from 0.4% (in Kazakhstan) to 78.2% (in Afghanistan).[33] The Governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait) did not permit Pew Research to survey nationwide public opinion on apostasy in 2010 or 2012. The survey also did not include China, India, Syria, or West African countries such as Nigeria.

By country

[edit]

The situation for apostates from Islam varies markedly between Muslim-minority and Muslim-majority regions. In Muslim-minority countries "any violence against those who abandon Islam is already illegal". But in Muslim-majority countries, violence is sometimes "institutionalised", and (at least in 2007) "hundreds and thousands of closet apostates" live in fear of violence and are compelled to live lives of "extreme duplicity and mental stress."[270]

Universal Declaration of Human Rights

[edit]

Laws prohibiting religious conversion run contrary[271] to Article 18 of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states the following:

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.[272]

Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Syria voted in favor of the Declaration.[272] The governments of other Muslim-majority countries have responded by criticizing the Declaration as an attempt by the non-Muslim world to impose their values on Muslims, with a presumption of cultural superiority,[273][274] and by issuing the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam – a joint declaration of the member states of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference made in 1990 in Cairo, Egypt.[275][276] The Cairo Declaration differs from the Universal Declaration in affirming Sharia as the sole source of rights, and in limits of equality and behavior[277][page needed][278][279] in religion, gender, sexuality, etc.[276][280] Islamic scholars such as Muhammad Rashid Rida in Tafsir al-Minar, argue that the "freedom to apostatize", is different from freedom of religion on the grounds that apostasy from Islam infringes on the freedom of others and the respect due the religion of Islam.[4]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Apostasy in Islam, termed riddah in Arabic, denotes the deliberate renunciation of the Islamic faith by an individual who professes or was raised as a Muslim. In classical , encompassing the four Sunni madhhabs and major Shia traditions, apostasy qualifies as a offense meriting for unrepentant adult male apostates following a probationary period for reconsideration, with women typically facing instead. This prescription originates not from explicit Quranic mandates, which emphasize no coercion in religion (Quran 2:256), but from narrations attributing to the Prophet Muhammad the directive "Whoever changes his religion, kill him." Historically, the penalty underscored apostasy's perception as akin to treason amid the nascent Muslim polity's fragility, exemplified by the immediately succeeding Muhammad's death in 632 CE, wherein suppressed tribal secessions framed as religious defection to reassert central authority. Enforcement has manifested variably across eras and regions, from medieval executions to Ottoman-era leniency, reflecting contextual adaptations despite doctrinal consistency. In the modern context, thirteen Muslim-majority countries retain apostasy as a statutory capital crime, though actual executions remain infrequent outside conflict zones like those under Islamist insurgencies. Empirical surveys reveal persistent doctrinal adherence, as a 2013 study documented majorities favoring death for apostasy in nations such as (86%), (82%), and (76%), underscoring a gap between liberal reformist interpretations—often amplified in Western academia—and prevalent orthodox sentiments. Controversies persist, with advocates decrying the penalty as incompatible with international norms, while traditionalists defend it as essential to preserving communal integrity against secular erosion.

Terminology and Conceptual Foundations

Etymology and Key Terms

The primary Arabic term for apostasy in Islamic jurisprudence is riddah (ردة), derived from the triliteral root r-d-d (ر-د-د), which denotes returning, turning back, or reverting to a prior state. This etymology underscores the conceptual reversal from Islamic faith to disbelief or another religion after prior acceptance of Islam, often likened to retreating from a covenant or path. A synonymous term, irtidad (ارتداد), stems from the verb irtadda (to turn back or withdraw), similarly evoking or from the . In technical usage across texts, riddah frequently specifies reversion to unbelief (kufr), while irtidad may extend to adoption of an alternative faith, though the terms are often interchangeable. The agent of apostasy is designated murtadd (مرتد), formed from the same root as riddah, meaning "one who has turned back" or renounced deliberately via explicit statement, action, or inner conviction. Classical definitions, as in works by jurists like those cited in Shafi'i and Hanbali traditions, limit murtadd to Muslims who publicly or manifestly abandon the , excluding doubt or ignorance unless culminating in rejection. Subcategories include murtadd fitri (innate apostate, born Muslim) and murtadd milli (convert apostate), reflecting the gravity of betraying one's communal or inherited bond to .

Distinctions from Heresy, Blasphemy, and Takfir

Apostasy, or riddah, in classical Islamic constitutes the complete and voluntary abandonment of by a professing Muslim, typically through explicit declaration, conversion to another , or actions incompatible with , such as worshipping idols, thereby reverting the individual to the of a kafir (unbeliever). This differs from (ilhad or deviant sectarian beliefs like those of the zindiq), which involves erroneous doctrines or innovations () within the Islamic framework without fully rejecting core tenets such as (divine unity) or Muhammad's prophethood; heretics may still affirm nominal Muslim identity and face lesser penalties like or social ostracism rather than automatic execution, though persistent denial of fundamentals could escalate to apostasy charges per jurists like . Blasphemy (sabb, reviling , the , or ) is distinct as an act of verbal or gestural insult to the sacred, but it often overlaps with when interpreted as demonstrative kufr (disbelief); Hanafi jurists treated unrepented blasphemy against the as explicit riddah warranting death without repentance period, while Shafi'i and Maliki schools similarly equated it to for adults, imposing irrespective of intent if post-puberty. In contrast to standalone heresy, blasphemy's punitive severity stems from its perceived equivalence to public rejection of , though some jurists allowed for inadvertent cases, distinguishing it from irrevocable riddah. Takfir, the formal accusation or declaration of a Muslim as a kafir, serves as the jurisprudential process to identify and prosecute apostasy, requiring strict proof like self-admission or two witnesses to the act of riddah, but it is not synonymous with apostasy itself—riddah denotes the substantive transgression, while is the authoritative judgment that activates consequences like loss of marital rights or execution. Classical scholars such as Ibn Taymiyyah cautioned against indiscriminate to avoid fitna (discord), limiting it to clear cases unlike the broader application sometimes seen in disputes; misuse of takfir for political blurred lines with collective riddah (apostate wars), but individual apostasy remained tied to personal faith rejection rather than mere labeling.

Scriptural and Traditional Sources

Quranic References to Apostasy

The Quran addresses apostasy—defined as the abandonment of Islamic faith after prior belief (iman)—primarily through warnings of divine disapproval, spiritual consequences in the hereafter, and occasional references to social or combative responses in specific contexts, without explicitly prescribing a fixed earthly penalty such as execution for the act alone. Verses on the topic often appear amid discussions of , warfare, or theological integrity, emphasizing that ultimate judgment belongs to while underscoring the gravity of reverting to disbelief. A foundational verse, Al-Baqarah 2:217, responds to queries about fighting during by equating apostasy with a greater sin than : "And whoever of you reverts from his [to disbelief] and dies while he is a disbeliever—for those, their deeds have become worthless in this world and the Hereafter, and those are the companions of the Fire; they will abide therein eternally." This highlights apostasy's nullification of prior merits and eternal damnation, framing it as self-destructive rather than warranting immediate human intervention. Complementing this, Al-Baqarah 2:256 asserts, "There is no compulsion in . The right course has become clear from the wrong," which traditional exegeses interpret as prohibiting forced adherence, though not absolving apostates from divine . Surah Ali Imran 3:86-91 elaborates on irreversible apostasy: "How shall Allah guide a people who disbelieved after their belief and had witnessed that the Messenger is true and clear signs had come to them? ... Indeed, does not forgive association with Him, but He forgives what is less than that for whom He wills." These ayahs deny guidance to those who apostatize post-conviction, promising Hellfire as abode, with exceptions for before death, but no mention of temporal sanctions. Similarly, Surah 4:137 notes repeated cycles of belief and disbelief: "Indeed, those who believed then disbelieved, then believed then disbelieved, and then increased in disbelief—never will Allah forgive them, nor will He guide them to a way," indicating compounded spiritual peril without earthly enforcement directives. Surah An-Nisa 4:89 addresses hypocrites urging Muslims to apostatize: "They wish you would disbelieve as they disbelieved so you would be alike. So do not take from among them allies until they emigrate for the cause of . But if they turn away, then seize them and kill them wherever you find them and take not from among them any ally or helper." While some jurists historically link this to combative apostasy amid belligerency—interpreting "turn away" (tawallaw) as active opposition—contextual analysis ties it to wartime rather than private disbelief, as the preceding verses discuss alliances with disbelievers during conflict. Surah 5:54 warns believers: "O you who have believed, whoever of you should revert from his religion— will bring forth [in place of them] a people He will love and who will love Him," portraying as inviting divine replacement of the community, with implied social but no procedural . Further, 16:106 excuses coerced verbal apostasy if the heart remains : "Whoever disbelieves in after his belief... except for one who is forced [to renounce his religion] while his heart is secure in ," distinguishing insincere from willful abandonment and reinforcing internal conviction over external profession. 18:29 reinforces volition: "And say, 'The truth is from your Lord, so whoever wills—let him believe; and whoever wills—let him disbelieve,'" aligning with broader Quranic themes of free choice and posthumous reckoning, as echoed in Muhammad 47:25: "Those who returned to disbelief after guidance was made clear to them— has enticed them." Collectively, these references prioritize eschatological consequences—loss of guidance, denial, and infernal abode—over codified worldly penalties, leaving interpretive room for later traditions to expand on enforcement.

Hadith Evidence and Prophetic Precedents

The most explicit evidence for capital punishment of apostasy appears in , where narrated that the Prophet Muhammad stated, "Whoever changed his Islamic religion, then kill him." This narration is classified as sahih (authentic) by traditional scholars due to its chain of transmission through reliable narrators, including Ikrima and , a companion and early exegete. A parallel report in (hadith 2534) and Sunan an-Nasa'i (hadith 4059) attributes the same directive to the Prophet, reinforcing its attribution across major collections. Supporting in Sahih al-Bukhari's dedicated chapter on dealing with apostates describe procedural aspects, such as offering before execution. For instance, a recounts the ordering the killing of apostates who refused to recant after a grace period, emphasizing that the penalty applies to those who actively renounce Islam without . These texts form the basis for classical juristic consensus (ijma') on as a hadd (fixed) offense warranting death, distinct from mere doubt or temporary lapse. Prophetic precedents during Muhammad's lifetime (circa 610–632 CE) typically intertwined apostasy with belligerence or treason, rather than isolated doctrinal shift. Historical accounts in and record the authorizing military action against tribes that apostatized and allied with Meccan polytheists, such as during the Expedition of Hudaybiyyah (628 CE), where defectors faced lethal force as combatants. A specific incident involved two men who professed , then apostatized and killed a Muslim; the ordered their execution upon capture, citing their betrayal as justification under the apostasy ruling. No verified cases exist of execution solely for private renunciation without accompanying sedition, aligning with qualifiers that distinguish passive disbelief from public riddah (rebellion). Traditional sources like Ibn Hisham's Sirat Rasul Allah (d. 833 CE) document at least three companions who briefly apostatized amid but were not executed if they repented promptly, illustrating application of mercy provisions. These narrations, compiled in the by scholars like al-Bukhari (d. 870 CE), draw from oral chains traced to the Prophet's era, though modern critics question contextual wartime emphasis over timeless intent. Nonetheless, their authenticity is upheld in Sunni orthodoxy, informing subsequent caliphal enforcement, such as Abu Bakr's Riddah Wars (632–633 CE) against mass apostasy. In Sunni perspective, the narration in of Ali burning zanadiqa (heretics) is generally accepted as authentic due to its chain; it is viewed as Ali's ijtihad against extreme heresy by ghulat who deified him, though Ibn Abbas criticized it for conflicting with the Prophetic hadith prohibiting punishment by fire. Shia traditions echo similar via Imam Ali's executions of apostates per Prophetic example.

Jurisprudential Definitions

Classical Conditions and Criteria for Apostasy

In classical Islamic jurisprudence (), apostasy, known as riddah or irtidad, is defined as the deliberate renunciation of Islam by an individual who was previously a Muslim, manifested through explicit words, actions, or beliefs that unequivocally constitute unbelief (kufr). This requires a clear intent to reject core tenets of the faith, distinguishing it from ambiguity, doubt (shakk), or erroneous interpretation (ta'wil), which do not qualify unless they cross into outright denial. Preconditions for establishing apostasy include the apostate's prior valid adherence to , attainment of (bulugh), soundness of mind ('aql), and absence of (ikrah). Children, the insane, or those acting under duress—such as threats to life or severe harm—are exempt, as jurists across major schools emphasize that rulings apply only to accountable adults capable of rational choice. For instance, Hanafi and Shafi'i texts stipulate that the act must stem from , referencing ic allowances for verbal denial under compulsion while preserving inner faith (Quran 16:106). Apostasy manifests in three primary forms: verbal (qawli), practical (fi'li), or doctrinal (i'tiqadi). Verbal apostasy involves statements explicitly negating fundamentals, such as denying God's oneness (tawhid), Muhammad's prophethood, the Quran's divine origin, or the obligation of prayer (salah). Examples include declaring "I disbelieve in Allah" or "Jesus is divine and Muhammad is not a prophet." Practical apostasy encompasses deeds like prostrating before an idol, ritually defiling the Quran, or persistently abandoning prayer without valid excuse. Doctrinal apostasy arises from adopting beliefs incompatible with Islam, such as affirming polytheism (shirk) or rejecting resurrection, provided the belief is openly affirmed and unambiguous. Jurists require the expression to be public and overt, as private convictions alone do not trigger legal consequences, per the principle that Sharia governs observable actions. Across Sunni schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—the criteria remain largely consistent, with minor variances in evidentiary thresholds; for example, Hanafis may probe intent more rigorously to avoid misjudging interpretive errors as denial, while Malikis emphasize contextual rebellion. Shia jurisprudence aligns similarly, focusing on explicit rejection of usul al-din (roots of religion). In all cases, mere theological disagreement or innovation (bid'ah) does not suffice unless it entails kufr; historical jurists like al-Shafi'i stressed evidentiary clarity to prevent abuse.

Variations Across Sunni and Shia Schools

In classical Sunni , the four major schools (madhabs)—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—unanimously prescribe death as the punishment for adult male apostates who refuse to repent after a specified period, typically three days, though they diverge on procedural details and the treatment of female apostates. The , founded by (d. 767 CE), mandates execution for men but confines women to imprisonment with periodic beating until repentance or natural death, emphasizing that female apostasy does not warrant due to interpretations prioritizing non-lethal coercion. In contrast, the , per (d. 795 CE), applies the death penalty to both male and female apostates after three days for , viewing apostasy as an unequivocal breach warranting equal severity regardless of gender. The Shafi'i madhab, established by (d. 820 CE), similarly enforces death for both genders but distinguishes from apostasy, allowing repentance for the former while treating persistent apostasy as irremediable against the community. Hanbali jurisprudence, from (d. 855 CE), aligns closely with Shafi'i and Maliki in prescribing execution for apostates of either sex post-repentance window, with stringent conditions like public declaration of apostasy to confirm intent. Shia jurisprudence, primarily the Ja'fari school named after (d. 765 CE), shares the Sunni consensus on death for male apostates but introduces distinctions absent in Sunni madhabs, classifying apostasy as fitri (innate, for those born Muslim) or milli (adoptive, for converts), with fitri treated more severely as a profound betrayal of upbringing in faith. For fitri male apostates refusing , execution follows after investigation; females face life imprisonment rather than death, mirroring Hanafi leniency but justified through Imami emphasizing gender-based exemptions. Milli apostates receive an extended period, often months, before potential execution for men, reflecting a procedural flexibility not uniformly present in Sunni schools. Both traditions require judicial confirmation of apostasy via explicit acts or statements, excluding doubt-induced lapses, and prioritize tawba () to avert punishment, though Shia sources occasionally cite prophetic narrations allowing familial intervention in enforcement. These variations stem from differing emphases on authenticity and analogical reasoning (): Sunni schools rely more on consensus (ijma') and companion practices for uniformity, while Shia prioritize Imami traditions, leading to nuanced gradations in . No school excuses based solely on private belief without manifestation, underscoring its dual religious and socio-political dimensions as disruption to the ummah's covenant.

Scope: Individual vs. Collective Apostasy

In Islamic jurisprudence, apostasy (irtidād or ridda) is primarily framed as an individual act whereby a Muslim explicitly renounces the faith through declaration, action, or implicit belief, such as denying core tenets like the prophethood of Muhammad. Classical fiqh texts across the Sunni schools (Hanafi, Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, Ḥanbalī) and Twelver Shīʿa prescribe capital punishment for adult male apostates who do not repent after an opportunity period, usually three days (or up to a month in some Ḥanbalī views), drawing from the hadith "Whoever changes his religion, kill him," narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (9.84.57). This penalty applies even without accompanying treason, as the act undermines the communal covenant (ʿahd) of Islam and risks corrupting the ummah's doctrinal integrity, treated as a ḥadd offense (divinely mandated) by most schools, though Ḥanafīs classify it under siypāsa (discretionary policy) to safeguard public order. Female apostates face variations: execution in Mālikī, Shāfiʿī, and Ḥanbalī views, but lifelong imprisonment until repentance in Ḥanafī and some Shīʿa rulings, based on interpretive hadiths exempting women from combat-related penalties. Collective apostasy, by contrast, involves groups, tribes, or communities renouncing Islam en masse, often entailing political disloyalty such as withholding zakāt or challenging central authority, as occurred in the (11–12 AH / 632–633 CE) following the Prophet Muhammad's death. Under Caliph Abū Bakr, these campaigns targeted Arabian tribes that apostatized, refused tribute, or rallied behind false prophets like ibn Ḥabīb, framing the conflict as both religious defection and rebellion (baghy) against the ummah's unity, resulting in military suppression rather than individualized trials. Jurists like al-Sarakhsī (d. 1090 CE) in Ḥanafī justified such responses under siypāsa sharʿiyya, allowing rulers to combat existential threats to the Islamic polity, distinguishing it from solitary apostasy by its scale and potential for societal disruption. If collective apostasy lacks overt rebellion, captured members are typically adjudicated as individuals under standard irtidād rules, though historical precedents prioritized restoring allegiance over doctrinal purity alone. The scope diverges in application: individual cases emphasize personal accountability and repentance to preserve faith's exclusivity within the ummah, with procedural safeguards like verifying intent and excluding doubt-induced lapses. Collective instances, rooted in early caliphal praxis, prioritize state security, conflating ridda with (khurūj ʿalā al-jamāʿa), as pure belief abandonment by a group without action remains theoretically punishable but practically preempted to avert fitna (civil strife). This framework reflects fiqh's balance of individual against collective welfare, with no Qurʾānic verse explicitly mandating death for either, relying instead on prophetic and analogical reasoning (qiyās).

Prescribed Punishments in Islamic Law

Capital Punishment: Consensus and Exceptions

In classical Islamic , the four major Sunni schools of thought—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—as well as Twelver Shia , hold a consensus (ijma') that an adult, sane male Muslim who commits explicit (riddah) and refuses to repent after due invitation faces by execution, typically by the sword. This ruling stems from such as the Prophet Muhammad's directive: "Whoever changes his religion, kill him," narrated in (9:84:57) and (16:4152), interpreted by jurists as applying to individual threatening communal order. The execution is not immediate; all schools mandate a period (ta'wil al-nafs or istitaabah) to allow the apostate to recant, ranging from three days (per the majority, including Malikis and Shafi'is) to three months (Hanafis, if doubts exist). Failure to repent after this interval triggers the penalty, with procedural requirements like (judge) oversight and public announcement to verify the apostasy's explicit nature (e.g., verbal denial of core tenets like God's oneness). Exceptions temper the consensus: minors, the insane, or those coerced into apparent apostasy (e.g., under duress) incur no , as capacity (ahliyyah) is prerequisite. For female apostates, Hanafis and Hanbalis prescribe and flogging until repentance or death, rather than execution, to preserve potential for reform; Shafi'is and Malikis generally align with male penalties but allow judicial discretion. Implicit apostasy (e.g., neglect of without denial) may warrant lesser ta'zir (discretionary) penalties instead. Shia sources, like Al-Mabsut by Sarakhsi (Hanafi) influencing broader tradition, similarly exempt those recanting under interrogation. Minority historical views, such as those of early Mutazilites or isolated scholars like Abu al-Hudhayl, questioned the death penalty's applicability absent treason, but these were rejected by the dominant ijma' by the . Modern reformist interpretations, often from Western-influenced academics, argue the penalty targets wartime rebellion () rather than private belief change, citing Quranic silence on temporal execution (e.g., 2:256 "no compulsion in religion"), but classical jurists dismissed this as abrogated by prophetic precedent.

Lesser Penalties and Civil Disabilities

In classical Islamic across major Sunni schools, lesser criminal penalties for (ridda) short of execution typically involve confinement or , particularly for female apostates, as an alternative to immediate capital punishment. The prescribes for women until , providing a period for without execution, while males face death after a three-day if unrepentant. Maliki and Shafi'i jurists generally apply the death penalty to both genders but incorporate procedural delays, such as confinement during the phase (often three days), to assess sincerity before finalizing punishment. These measures derive from texts like the Hedaya (Hanafi) and Minhaj al-Talibin (Shafi'i), emphasizing communal protection over immediate lethality in non-combat contexts. Shia similarly allows for pending , though consensus on gender distinctions varies. Civil disabilities impose extensive legal and social incapacitation on apostates, effectively severing ties to the Muslim community. contracts are automatically annulled upon declaration of apostasy, rendering the union void and prohibiting remarriage to without reconversion; non-Muslim spouses of apostates may seek dissolution, but children are reassigned to Muslim guardianship to preserve Islamic upbringing. rights are forfeited bilaterally: apostates cannot inherit from Muslim relatives, nor can inherit from them, with property often confiscated by the state (Bait al-Mal) or redistributed to Muslim heirs under Hanafi and Maliki rulings. Legal testimony by apostates is deemed invalid in courts, barring them from witnessing against and excluding them from public office or judicial roles. Additional disabilities include restrictions on property management and social status, such as prohibitions on holding administrative positions or engaging in contracts benefiting , reflecting the apostate's classification as inferior to even dhimmis (protected non-Muslims). These consequences persist until restores full rights, underscoring fiqh's view of apostasy as a breach of communal covenant rather than mere personal belief. In practice, such disabilities have historically deterred public , with informal enforcement like family disinheritance or amplifying formal sanctions across regions.

Repentance Periods and Procedural Requirements

In classical Islamic , the accused apostate is granted a repentance period, known as istitaabah, during which they may recant their apostasy and return to , thereby nullifying the offense and avoiding . This procedural safeguard reflects the emphasis on verifying the sincerity and finality of the apostasy, distinguishing it from doubt, , or temporary lapses. Recantation during or after this period typically erases the crime, as apostasy is viewed as a public breach rather than an irrevocable private sin. The majority of Sunni scholars prescribe a of three days or three opportunities to repent, during which the apostate is detained and exhorted to reconsider. This duration, supported by jurists such as and , aims to resolve any underlying doubts and facilitate return to faith before execution for male apostates. Shia jurisprudence similarly mandates opportunities for , aligning with the Sunni consensus on offering tawba prior to final judgment. Exceptions apply for apostasy combined with or warfare against the Muslim community, where some scholars, including Ibn Taymiyyah, permit immediate execution without a repentance window due to the immediate threat posed. Variations exist across Sunni schools of law regarding the exact duration and application:
SchoolRepentance PeriodNotes on Females and Recantation
HanafiRecommended; up to one month or two months in some opinions, with indefinite possible for repeat cases per Ibn Hazm's citation of early views.Females imprisoned indefinitely until rather than executed; accepted without limit if sincere.
MalikiUp to ten days for .Both males and females subject to death if unrepentant; strict on finality post-period.
Shafi'iThree days, emphasizing immediate exhortation to .Death for unrepentant males; females imprisoned until death or in some rulings, though majority aligns with execution.
HanbaliThree days preferred, per Ibn Qudamah; aligns with majority but allows scholarly discretion for doubt resolution.Execution for unrepentant; accepted if before enforcement.
Procedural requirements mandate a judicial process overseen by a qualified or , prohibiting vigilante action, which is itself punishable. Apostasy must be established through explicit public words, acts, or signs indicating rejection of core Islamic tenets, committed by an adult of sound mind, free from duress, intoxication, or error— with Hanafis additionally requiring sobriety. The accused is interrogated to confirm intent, offered religious counsel, and asked to repent verbally or through reaffirmation of faith, such as reciting the . If repentance occurs, the case is dismissed; persistence leads to enforcement by state authority, often after witnesses verify the apostasy. These steps underscore caution, as false accusations or hasty judgments undermine communal trust.

Historical Enforcement

Early Islamic Era (7th-10th Centuries)

The principle of capital punishment for apostasy was articulated in hadiths attributed to , such as the narration in stating, "Whoever changes his religion, kill him," yet historical accounts from the Prophet's lifetime (c. 610–632 CE) record no executions solely for individual renunciation of Islam. Cases involving death, such as those of opponents like or , were linked to , poetry inciting hostility, or violation of treaties rather than private disbelief. This absence of enforcement for mere apostasy aligns with Quranic verses emphasizing no compulsion in (e.g., 2:256), though later jurists interpreted hadiths as mandating death to preserve community cohesion amid existential threats. Following Muhammad's death in 632 CE, widespread apostasy erupted across Arabian tribes, compounded by refusal to remit zakat to Medina and adherence to self-proclaimed prophets like Musaylima al-Kadhdhab, Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid, and Aswad al-Ansi. Caliph Abu Bakr (r. 632–634 CE) responded with the Ridda Wars (632–633 CE), deploying armies under commanders including Khalid ibn al-Walid to suppress these movements, framing them as irtidad (apostasy) threatening the ummah's unity. Key battles, such as the Battle of Yamama (633 CE) where Musaylima was slain and an estimated 1,200–7,000 of his followers perished alongside 1,200 Muslim warriors, reconquered central Arabia and reimposed Islamic authority. These campaigns, involving up to 11,000–12,000 Muslim troops across multiple fronts, resulted in tens of thousands of deaths overall and solidified the caliphate's control, treating collective apostasy as tantamount to rebellion warranting lethal force. Under the and Umayyad caliphates (632–750 CE), apostasy enforcement remained tied to political stability, with irtidad often prosecuted as against the caliph as God's . Public executions for apostasy occurred, as documented in Umayyad-era practices where death penalties were applied to those renouncing Islam in ways undermining state authority, though individual cases were infrequent compared to tribal suppressions. Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644 CE) reportedly executed apostates who combined disbelief with proselytizing against Islam, per narrations in classical histories, but distinctions blurred between apostasy, , and during fitnas (). In the early Abbasid era (750–10th centuries), enforcement intensified against zandaqa—freethinking or crypto-apostasy, often ascribed to Manichaeans, atheists, or rationalist poets—viewed as subversive to orthodox doctrine. Caliph (r. 775–785 CE) initiated mihna-like inquisitions, executing dozens of accused zindiks (heretics) via burning or beheading after trials by jurists like , with estimates of 20–50 deaths in alone during his reign. Such punishments, justified under apostasy rulings in emerging texts like those of (d. 767 CE), targeted intellectual dissent amid sectarian tensions, though procedural repentance opportunities were sometimes offered; by the 9th–10th centuries under (r. 813–833 CE) and successors, enforcement waned as rationalism () influenced policy, shifting focus to theological debates over outright executions. Overall, early enforcement prioritized communal over individual belief, with apostasy rarely isolated from broader threats like or ideological .

Medieval and Early Modern Periods (11th-18th Centuries)

In the medieval period following the classical era, apostasy (ridda) continued to be viewed under Islamic as warranting for adult male apostates who did not repent after a , though enforcement remained inconsistent and often intertwined with accusations of or rather than isolated belief change. Under the Seljuk Turks (11th-12th centuries), who patronized orthodox Sunni scholarship, jurists like reinforced the death penalty in works such as Ihya Ulum al-Din, arguing it preserved communal order, yet historical records indicate few standalone executions, with punishments more commonly applied in cases of public proselytizing against or during political upheavals like the Isma'ili challenges. In the Ayyubid and sultanates of and (12th-16th centuries), apostasy trials occasionally surfaced amid Crusader interactions or Mongol invasions, where conversions to were treated as ; for instance, rulers executed suspected apostates among captive soldiers, but these were framed as wartime betrayals rather than doctrinal lapses alone. The early modern era saw similar patterns across expansive empires, where legal prescription persisted but practical enforcement prioritized state stability over doctrinal purity. In the (14th-18th centuries, peaking in the 16th-17th), Hanafi jurists issued fatwas mandating execution for unrepentant , as seen in mid-16th-century Rumeli court records documenting probes, yet comprehensive reviews identify only a handful of verified executions empire-wide before the , often involving public agitators or converts who renounced to evade taxes or join Christian communities. Ottoman shaykh al-islams consistently affirmed the penalty in responsa, but sultans like (r. 1520-1566) tempered application to avoid alienating diverse subjects, reflecting a pragmatic approach where private disbelief was overlooked unless it disrupted the millet system. In Safavid Persia (16th-18th centuries), the imposition of as state doctrine led to heightened scrutiny of Sunni or irreligious deviations, with Shah Abbas I (r. 1588-1629) overseeing executions of apostates from diplomatic missions who converted abroad, such as three Safavid envoys who embraced Catholicism in around 1600, viewed as threats to imperial legitimacy. Enforcement here was more vigilant than in Sunni realms due to sectarian consolidation, yet remained selective, targeting elites or public figures to deter mass conversions amid Zoroastrian or Armenian influences, with lesser penalties like imprisonment for commoners. The in (16th-18th centuries) exhibited variability: (r. 1556-1605) de-emphasized punishments in his sulh-i kul policy, rarely prosecuting apostasy despite its status as a capital offense under Hanafi law, while (r. 1658-1707) reinvigorated orthodoxy, issuing edicts against conversions but recording no widespread executions, as apostasy was seldom isolated from rebellion or blasphemy charges. Across these polities, empirical evidence from court archives and chronicles suggests executions numbered in the low dozens over centuries, underscoring that while the penalty was doctrinally fixed, its invocation served political ends more than systematic theological policing.

Ottoman Reforms and Colonial Interruptions (19th-20th Centuries)

In the reform period initiated by the 1839 Gülhane Edict, the began centralizing and modernizing its legal system, gradually curtailing the application of traditional penalties for apostasy to align with European diplomatic pressures and internal stability goals. A pivotal shift occurred in 1843–1844 amid Anglo-Ottoman negotiations, where executions of two converts from —one Armenian and one Greek—prompted the to issue an edict effectively abolishing the death penalty for apostasy, framing it as a matter of personal conscience rather than state-enforced religious . This 1844 extended protections against coerced reconversions and emphasized equality under , though civil disabilities like loss of persisted in practice. The 1856 Hatt-i Hümayun decree further entrenched these changes by proclaiming full legal equality for all Ottoman subjects irrespective of religion, implicitly undermining Sharia-based apostasy sanctions and reducing state executions to near zero by the late 19th century, as enforcement shifted toward administrative rather than penal measures. While classical Hanafi still viewed apostasy as a capital offense in theory, Ottoman secularizing codes like the 1869 Ottoman Penal Code prioritized public order over religious penalties, leading to apostasy cases being handled as civil disputes or ignored unless tied to . By the early , official policy explicitly rejected executions for apostasy alone, reflecting a pragmatic decoupling from strict to preserve imperial cohesion amid nationalist unrest. European colonial administrations in Muslim territories similarly disrupted traditional apostasy enforcement during the 19th and early 20th centuries, often prioritizing missionary protections and secular governance over local Sharia courts. In British India, colonial authorities superseded Islamic personal law in criminal matters via acts like the 1860 Indian Penal Code, which omitted apostasy as a punishable offense, allowing converts to Christianity to retain property and legal standing without facing death or imprisonment under Sharia. French colonial policy in North Africa and the Levant naturalized apostates as subjects under civil codes, shielding them from fatwas or vigilante reprisals and treating conversions as private acts exempt from Islamic penal jurisdiction. In the Dutch East Indies, protections for Christian converts rendered apostasy laws a "dead letter" by the early 20th century, with colonial edicts preventing enforcement of hudud penalties and facilitating land reforms that ignored Sharia inheritance forfeitures for apostates. These interruptions fostered a temporary decline in formal prosecutions across colonized regions, though underlying societal taboos persisted, often manifesting in social ostracism rather than state action; post-colonial revivals in the mid-20th century, such as Pakistan's blasphemy laws channeling apostasy concerns, illustrate how colonial suspensions delayed but did not eradicate traditional impulses. Academic analyses note that colonial —preserving for family matters while imposing secular criminal codes—created hybrid systems where apostasy's civil effects lingered, but capital enforcement was effectively halted until independence movements reinstated elements.

Countries with Death Penalty Provisions

As of 2024, ten Muslim-majority countries explicitly provide for the death penalty for from in their legal systems, primarily through Sharia-based penal codes or constitutional applications of Islamic law. These provisions reflect traditional interpretations of (ridda) as a capital offense in classical schools, such as Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali, though actual enforcement remains rare in most cases due to procedural hurdles, moratoriums, or international pressure. The countries include , Brunei Darussalam, , Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. In , following the Taliban's 2021 takeover, apostasy is punishable by death under enforced Hanafi Sharia without codified statutes but via judicial fiat. Brunei's 2019 Sharia Penal Code prescribes stoning for apostasy, though a moratorium on hudud penalties has been in place since implementation. 's 1991 Islamic Penal Code (amended 2013) mandates death for "enmity against God" including apostasy, with public executions documented in cases like that of Hashem Aghajari's 2002 trial (later commuted). Malaysia applies the penalty at the state level via courts for Muslim citizens, with laws in and states allowing death for , though federal law prevents executions and limits to fines or imprisonment. The ' 2014 Penal Code and constitution deem a punishable by death under Hanbali-influenced , with no recorded executions but mandatory conversion attempts. Mauritania's 1984 Sharia-based code explicitly sets death for unrepentant after a three-day , as upheld in the 2014 conviction of blogger Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed (sentence not carried out). Qatar's Sharia application in personal status and penal matters includes death for apostasy, though unrecorded in practice and subject to emir's pardon. Saudi Arabia's uncodified Sharia system, per royal decrees and fatwas, prescribes beheading for apostasy, as affirmed in cases like that of Yemeni national Abd al-Karim al-Nafisi's reported sentencing. The UAE's federal Sharia courts and 2021 penal code revisions retain death for apostasy in theory, aligned with Maliki school, but prioritize rehabilitation. Yemen's 1994 Penal Code and tribal Sharia enforce death for apostasy, with executions in Houthi-controlled areas post-2015 civil war.
CountryLegal BasisEnforcement Notes
Taliban-enforced Hanafi ShariaJudicial application since 2021; no formal code but active threat.
2019 Sharia Penal Code (hudud)Moratorium on executions; theoretical stoning.
IranIslamic Penal Code (Articles 220-223)Executions rare; often tied to propaganda charges.
MalaysiaState Sharia enactments (e.g., )No federal executions; detention for counseling common.
2014 Penal Code and ConstitutionNo executions; repentance enforced.
1980 Constitution and Sharia CodeConvictions occur; international appeals often commute.
Sharia in Penal CodeRare prosecutions; royal discretion.
Uncoded Sharia and royal ordersSentences issued; executions for related offenses.
UAEFederal Sharia and Penal CodeTheoretical; focuses on deterrence.
1994 Penal Code and ShariaEnforced in unstable regions; vigilante risks high.
Additional territories, such as northern Nigerian states under (e.g., 12 states since 2000) and Somalia's Al-Shabaab-controlled areas, apply death provisions extrajudicially or via regional courts, though federal frameworks may contradict. These reflect broader enforcement challenges, where often intersects with or security charges.

Countries with or Other Penalties

In several Muslim-majority countries, is penalized through under provisions targeting , ridicule of religion, or acts that undermine Islamic doctrine, rather than . These laws often overlap with blasphemy statutes, leading to prosecutions of individuals publicly renouncing or expressing doubt in its tenets. Additional non-criminal penalties frequently include civil disabilities such as the automatic nullification of marriages, loss of rights, denial of to apostate parents, and restrictions on legal or public office. Enforcement varies, with some cases resulting in short-term detention for rehabilitation or counseling alongside incarceration. Algeria's Penal Code Article 144 bis (added in 2001) imposes 1 to 5 years' imprisonment and a fine of 500 to 1,000 Algerian dinars on anyone who, through speech, writing, or other means, "incites, encourages, or propagates in an organized manner acts targeting a change of the of a Muslim or shaking the of a Muslim." This provision has been applied to expressions interpreted as apostasy or proselytization away from , though explicit renunciation alone is not criminalized under civil law. In , no penal code article directly criminalizes , but Article 98(f) provides for 6 months to 5 years' imprisonment for using religion to "disturb public order" or promote sectarian strife, frequently invoked against alleged apostates via charges. Courts have upheld as grounds for civil penalties, including denial of conversion recognition, marriage dissolution, and disinheritance under Sharia-derived principles. For instance, in 2016, writer Fatima Naoot received a 6-month suspended sentence under this article for social media comments questioning Islamic rituals, deemed insulting to religion. Jordan's Penal Code Article 278 penalizes with 1 to 3 years' imprisonment any act or statement "liable to shake the faith of Muslims or undermine their religious feelings," applied in apostasy-related blasphemy cases. While no standalone apostasy offense exists, courts enforce civil ramifications, such as automatic for apostate spouses and forfeiture of parental rights. A 2010 case against poet Samhan for alleged apostasy via writings resulted in charges under similar provisions, though he avoided conviction. Malaysia enforces apostasy penalties primarily through state Sharia courts, where 11 of 13 states criminalize declaration of apostasy (murtad) with up to 3 years' imprisonment, fines up to RM5,000 (about $1,100 USD), and compulsory rehabilitation or counseling periods of 6 to 36 months. States like , Melaka, , and specify jail terms or fines explicitly; persistent refusal to repent can lead to indefinite detention in faith rehabilitation centers. Federal courts have ruled against unilateral exits from without approval, as in the 2007 case denying her conversion. Oman's Penal Code Article 209 punishes "whoever attributes to himself a other than " or denies any pillar of with imprisonment from 10 days to 3 years, or a fine of 100 to 500 Omani rials (about $260 to $1,300 USD). Article 269 further imposes up to 3 years for or acts offending religious sentiments, encompassing public . Civil effects under Personal Statute Law include marriage invalidation and exclusion for apostates. No executions or major cases are recorded, but social pressure deters open renunciation.
CountryPrimary PenaltyKey Provision(s)Additional Notes
1-5 years imprisonment + finePenal Code Art. 144 bisTargets propagation shaking Muslim faith
6 months-5 years (via blasphemy)Penal Code Art. 98(f)Civil: disinheritance, marriage nullity
1-3 years imprisonmentPenal Code Art. 278Civil: automatic divorce, custody loss
MalaysiaUp to 3 years + fine/rehabState Sharia enactmentsRehabilitation detention possible
10 days-3 years or finePenal Code Arts. 209, 269Applies to denial of Islamic tenets

Countries Without Formal Enforcement

In several Muslim-majority countries, apostasy from carries no formal legal penalties, typically owing to secular constitutions that prioritize and conscience over religious . These nations often emerged from colonial, communist, or reformist histories that decoupled state law from classical interpretations on ridda (apostasy). While legal protections exist, societal norms rooted in traditional Islamic teachings can still impose informal sanctions, such as familial or community backlash, though these lack state enforcement. exemplifies this category, with its 1924 constitution establishing (laiklik) and Article 24 guaranteeing freedom of religious belief without state interference. The Turkish Penal Code contains no provisions criminalizing , and court rulings consistently uphold the right to renounce , as affirmed in cases involving Turkish citizens. No recorded state prosecutions for have occurred since the republic's founding. Similarly, , under its 1998 constitution (Article 10), mandates state neutrality on religion and prohibits any compulsion in belief; is neither defined nor penalized in law, reflecting the country's post-communist secular framework where over 50% of the population identifies as Muslim but rates exceed 10%. Indonesia, the world's largest Muslim-majority nation, lacks any national criminalization of apostasy under its 1945 constitution (Article 29), which enshrines belief in one while permitting freedom to practice or abandon religion. The national Criminal Code does not recognize ridda as an offense, though province applies limited bylaws that could indirectly affect converts; federal supremacy ensures no death or imprisonment penalties apply nationwide, with zero documented federal cases. Central Asian states like follow suit, with the 1995 constitution (Article 22) explicitly protecting the right to profess any religion or none, and no apostasy clauses in the criminal code; post-Soviet has led to state oversight of religious groups but no punishments for personal renunciation. Comparable frameworks exist in , , and , where Soviet-era influenced enduring legal neutrality on faith changes.
CountryLegal FrameworkKey Notes
Secular constitution; no penal code provisionECtHR protections; societal conservatism persists but unenforced by state.
Pancasila-based freedom of belief; national code silent on apostasyAceh exceptions limited; proselytism to Muslims restricted but conversion from Islam allowed.
Neutral state per constitution; no religious crimesHigh ; Muslim population nominal in practice.
Post-Soviet ; freedom of conscience guaranteedRegistration required for groups, but individual apostasy unregulated.
Tunisia provides another case, where the 2014 constitution (Article 6) affirms freedom of belief without stipulating penalties for , and Article 6 of the penal code bans accusations; post-2011 reforms emphasized , rendering classical apostasy rulings inapplicable. and Bosnia-Herzegovina similarly maintain secular penal systems without apostasy offenses, prioritizing ethnic and civic identities over religious orthodoxy. In these contexts, formal non-enforcement correlates with lower reported apostasy incidents, potentially due to cultural homogeneity or of dissenters rather than legal deterrence.

Recent Practices and Cases

State Executions and Trials (2000-Present)

In , apostasy remains punishable by death under interpretations applied by the judiciary, though no executions solely for this offense have occurred since 1990. Notable trials include that of Hashem Aghajari, a university professor sentenced to death in 2002 for alleged after criticizing clerical authority in a speech; the sentence was reduced to five years imprisonment following appeals and domestic protests. Similarly, Christian pastor faced repeated charges starting in 2009 for converting from and proselytizing; he received a death sentence in 2010, which was upheld but later suspended amid international pressure, leading to his temporary release in 2012, rearrest in 2018 on related charges, and eventual pardon. These cases highlight procedural allowances for repentance or appeals, often invoked to avoid final execution. In , the 2006 trial of Abdul Rahman drew global attention: charged with apostasy for converting to over a decade earlier, he faced execution under but was released after the court cited insufficient evidence of sanity and potential foreign influence, allowing him to flee to . Following the Taliban's 2021 takeover, apostasy laws were reaffirmed with death penalties prescribed, but no verified state executions have been documented as of 2025; instead, fear of prosecution has driven underground conversions and exiles. Sudan's 2014 case against Meriam Ibrahim exemplified high-profile enforcement: convicted of apostasy for identifying as Christian despite her Muslim father's heritage, she was sentenced to death by hanging while pregnant, alongside 100 lashes for adultery; the appeals court overturned the verdict citing her upbringing in Christianity, and she was released after international advocacy, departing for the United States. Sudan abolished the death penalty for apostasy in 2020 as part of penal code reforms. In Saudi Arabia, courts have issued death sentences for apostasy, such as that of poet Ashraf Fayadh in 2015 for verses and statements deemed blasphemous; initially condemned to death, the penalty was commuted to eight years imprisonment and 800 lashes after an appeal. No confirmed executions purely for apostasy have followed since 2000, with charges often bundled under broader hudud offenses like sorcery or terrorism. Elsewhere, enforcement remains sporadic: In , Islamist militias under al-Shabaab executed politician Abdirahman Ahmed in 2009 following a court conviction for linked to collaborating with transitional government forces, though this occurred amid contested state authority. Overall, while over ten Muslim-majority countries retain apostasy death penalties, post-2000 state executions number fewer than five verifiably, with trials frequently yielding non-capital outcomes due to evidentiary hurdles, repentance provisions, or external interventions.

Vigilante Violence and Extrajudicial Actions

In regions where is stigmatized under Islamic norms but state enforcement is inconsistent or absent, groups, militant Islamists, and family members have perpetrated extrajudicial violence against suspected apostates, often citing religious duty to enforce penalties independently. These incidents, documented across , the , and parts of , typically involve mob lynchings, targeted assassinations, or familial honor-based attacks, with perpetrators facing minimal repercussions due to communal sympathy or official inaction. Empirical reports indicate such violence surged in the amid rising Islamist mobilization, though precise global tallies remain elusive owing to underreporting and conflation with cases, which overlap when apostasy manifests as public . Pakistan exemplifies mob-driven extrajudicial enforcement, where accusations of or have prompted over 70 murders since 1990, frequently in response to online expressions of doubt or reformist views challenging orthodox . The 2017 lynching of 23-year-old journalism student Mashal Khan at Abdul Wali Khan University in illustrates this pattern: accused of via posts questioning religious practices, Khan was stripped, beaten with rods, shot, and incinerated by a mob of over 100 students and staff on April 13, 2017; subsequent investigations cleared him of , attributing the killing to ideological opposition rather than evidence of sacrilege, yet only partial convictions followed amid public defenses of the mob. Similar incidents persist, with Islamist networks exploiting laws to incite crowds against perceived defectors from faith. In , Islamist extremists have conducted machete attacks on atheist writers and bloggers deemed apostates for promoting or critiquing Islamic , with at least a dozen such killings between 2013 and 2016 linked to groups like Ansar al-Islam and Neo-JMB. , a Bangladeshi-American engineer and author of books like The Virus of Faith advocating over religious , was hacked to death alongside his wife (who survived with severe injuries) by assailants on February 26, 2015, near Dhaka's ; the attack followed fatwas branding him an apostate, and in 2021, a court sentenced five militants to death based on confessions tying the to his advocacy. These vigilante operations, often unpunished initially due to sympathizers in , reflect a causal link to transnational jihadist ideologies enforcing doctrinal purity outside state channels. Familial and community-level violence constitutes another extrajudicial vector, particularly in conservative tribal areas or among networks, where apostasy triggers "honor" retribution to preserve collective religious standing. Surveys of in reveal that 68.8% fear lethal violence from relatives, with documented cases of beatings, forced confinement, or killings rationalized as preventing communal shame under Sharia-influenced customs. In , Taliban-affiliated militants have extrajudicially executed at least five converts to since the mid-2010s, including beatings and shootings by vigilantes enforcing apostasy taboos in rural provinces. Such patterns underscore how decentralized enforcement sustains apostasy's deterrent effect, even absent codified laws, through social mechanisms rooted in interpretations of prophetic traditions mandating communal vigilance against defection.

Apostate Communities and Exile Patterns

Apostate communities, consisting of individuals who publicly renounce , have predominantly formed in Western countries where legal protections allow open expression of dissent. These groups provide mutual support, , and platforms for raising awareness about the challenges faced by , including social ostracism and threats from families or authorities in their countries of origin. The , established in June 2007, was created to break the cultural taboo against leaving , offer psychological and social support through monthly meetings and women's groups, and campaign against religious privileges via conferences and public events. Similarly, the , a non-profit , conducts , hosts events, and produces resources like documentaries to foster acceptance of religious dissent and combat discrimination toward apostates. Ex-Muslims International, a coalition incorporating these and other entities such as the Central Council of Ex-Muslims in (founded 2007), coordinates global efforts to protect rights to apostasy and through joint campaigns. Exile patterns among apostates reveal a causal link between apostasy laws or societal enforcement in Muslim-majority countries and migration to secular democracies. Individuals from nations enforcing or tolerating harsh penalties—such as , , , and —frequently seek asylum abroad, citing credible fears of death, imprisonment, or extrajudicial harm under interpretations that prescribe execution for ridda (). For example, in 2023, Saudi siblings who renounced Islam fled to , highlighting family-level that escalates to state involvement in such cases. International refugee law recognizes apostasy as a basis for protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention when tied to well-founded fear of , though claims often face scrutiny over proof of genuine belief change versus opportunistic motives. Quantitative data on apostasy-specific exiles remains limited due to underreporting—many apostates conceal their status to avoid detection—and conflation with broader flows from conflict zones. However, patterns indicate thousands annually apply for asylum in and on religious freedom grounds, with origins skewed toward high-enforcement states; European agencies processed elevated claims from Afghan and Iranian applicants post-2021 Taliban resurgence, where apostasy equates to punishable by death. In the UK, advocacy groups document ongoing cases where apostates from , , and receive grants after demonstrating risks like fatwas or community . Successful exiles often integrate into communities but report persistent trauma, with support networks aiding resettlement while highlighting systemic biases in host countries' credibility assessments that disproportionately affect non-Western claimants.

Societal Attitudes and Empirical Evidence

Public Opinion Polls on Apostasy Punishments

![Pew Research Center map of Muslim beliefs on death penalty for leaving Islam, 2013](./assets/Muslim_beliefs_on_death_penalty_for_leaving_Islam_(Pew_Research_Center_2013) A comprehensive 2013 survey by the , conducted between 2008 and 2012 across 39 countries with Muslim populations totaling over 38,000 respondents, assessed attitudes toward applying the death penalty to those who leave to convert to another faith. The question was posed to Muslims who favored making the official law of the land, revealing substantial regional variations in support. In , a median of 76% endorsed the punishment, while in the Middle East-North Africa region, the median was 56%; support was lower in (median 27%), (13%), and Southern and (13%).
Country/TerritoryPercentage Supporting Death Penalty for Apostasy
79%
86%
82%
76%
Palestinian territories66%
62%
44%
27%
18%
22%
4%
8%
In six of the 20 countries where the question was asked due to sufficient sharia support, majorities backed the death penalty, with particularly high levels in (86%), (82%), and (79%). Lower endorsement appeared in countries like (4%) and (8%), reflecting cultural and historical differences in interpreting Islamic law. These findings indicate that while support correlates with stronger advocacy for sharia implementation, it is not uniform across the Muslim world. Subsequent surveys have been limited, with no comparable global polls identified post-2013 specifically on this issue. Local studies, such as a 2025 empirical investigation in , suggest varying awareness and interpretations of religious freedom in Islam but do not directly quantify support for apostasy punishments among broader Muslim populations. The persistence of these attitudes underscores ongoing debates about scriptural interpretations and modern standards.

Support Among Muslim Populations and Elites

A 2013 Pew Research Center survey across 20 countries with significant Muslim populations revealed widespread support for imposing the death penalty on those who leave to convert to another faith, particularly among respondents who favored making the official law of the land. In the Middle East-North Africa region, support exceeded 60% in most surveyed countries, while in it was similarly high. Levels were notably lower in , Southern and , and outside .
CountryPercentage Favoring Death Penalty for Apostasy
Egypt86%
Jordan82%
Palestinian territories66%
Afghanistan79%
Pakistan76%
Bangladesh44%
Malaysia62%
Indonesia18%
Turkey (not listed but known low ~17%) wait, from data: Thailand 27%, Tajikistan 22%, etc.
Support among Muslim religious elites aligns with traditional jurisprudence, where the four major Sunni schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—prescribe capital punishment for male apostates following a repentance period, viewing apostasy as a threat to communal order akin to treason. Scholars such as Yusuf al-Qaradawi have argued that abolishing the apostasy penalty would have led to Islam's non-existence, emphasizing its role in preserving the faith's integrity. Al-Azhar University, the preeminent Sunni institution, has affirmed that open apostasy warrants execution under Sharia as stipulated. The majority of classical and many contemporary jurists maintain this position, with dissenters in the minority and often conditioning punishment on public declaration or associated sedition. No comprehensive recent surveys of elite opinion exist, but fatwas from authoritative bodies like IslamQA continue to endorse the penalty after opportunities for tawba (repentance).

Ex-Muslim Movements and Testimonies

Ex-Muslim movements have emerged primarily in Western countries, providing support networks, advocacy for secular rights, and platforms for public testimonies against the social and legal pressures associated with leaving . These groups often emphasize the personal risks of , including family , threats of violence, and in some cases, fatwas or legal in countries of origin. Organizations like the (CEMB), founded in June 2007, campaign to end and blasphemy laws, defend universal , and break the taboo surrounding ex-Muslims by hosting events, publishing manifestos, and offering solidarity to those facing backlash. Similarly, (EXMNA), established in the early 2010s by figures including , focuses on normalizing religious dissent through advocacy, public events, awareness projects like mini-documentaries on apostate experiences, and support for individuals escaping or familial abuse. Broader coalitions, such as Ex-Muslims International, unite these and other groups across regions to promote the right to apostasy via global campaigns and events, grounding their efforts in freedom of expression and . Testimonies from prominent underscore common themes of intellectual disillusionment with Islamic doctrines, ethical concerns over scriptural prescriptions, and experiences of coercion. For instance, , a Somali-born apostate, detailed in her writings her rejection of Islam due to its treatment of women and violence, leading to death threats that necessitated relocation and security measures. Ibn Warraq's 2003 anthology Leaving Islam: Apostates Speak Out compiles essays from diverse ex-Muslims citing historical inconsistencies, moral incompatibilities, and lack of evidence for core beliefs as reasons for departure. Online figures like Ridvan Aydemir (Apostate Prophet) share video testimonies critiquing apostasy penalties and doctrinal issues, amassing audiences while operating anonymously due to safety concerns. Empirical data indicate growing apostasy rates in diaspora communities, with a 2017 Pew Research Center survey finding that 23% of U.S. adults raised Muslim no longer identify with the faith, often citing disbelief in teachings or dissatisfaction with community practices. These movements report increased inquiries and memberships amid rising and access to critical resources online, though precise global numbers remain elusive due to stigma and underreporting. frequently face or honor-based violence, prompting groups to provide relocation aid and legal advocacy, as seen in EXMNA's assistance for a Somali apostate fleeing Kenyan conversion camps. Despite biases in mainstream reporting that may downplay such testimonies to avoid offending Muslim sensibilities, these accounts align with patterns of religious switching observed in longitudinal studies, where net losses from equalize gains via conversion in stable populations.

Debates and Perspectives

Traditional Arguments For Harsh Penalties

In classical Sunni , the four major schools—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali—endorse the death penalty for adult male apostates who persist in disbelief after a for repentance, typically ranging from three days to several months depending on the . This ruling stems from authentic hadiths attributed to , including the directive narrated by : "Whoever changes his religion, kill him," recorded in Sunan an-Nasa'i and corroborated in as part of cases justifying shedding Muslim blood. Scholars invoke ijma' (consensus) among the Prophet's companions and subsequent jurists as confirmatory evidence, viewing apostasy not merely as a private theological shift but as a public declaration nullifying one's allegiance to the divine covenant and . A primary argument frames apostasy as akin to or (fitnah), undermining the cohesion of the Islamic polity where religion and state are fused under . Traditionalists contend that an apostate's rejection of Islam erodes communal trust, potentially inciting rebellion or aiding enemies, as seen in the (632–633 CE) under Caliph , where tribes renouncing Islam and zakat obligations were subdued militarily to restore order. Jurists like Ibn Humam (d. 1457 CE) emphasized execution as a deterrent to avert "the evil of war" from internal discord, arguing that unchecked apostasy spreads doubt, weakens faith propagation, and jeopardizes the ummah's survival against historical threats like Byzantine or Persian incursions. This rationale draws partial analogy to penalties for crimes like (brigandage), prioritizing collective security over individual autonomy in a theocratic framework. Further justification rests on the perceived existential threat to Islam's doctrinal integrity, with apostasy viewed as a gateway to broader (fasad fi al-ard). Medieval scholars such as (d. 820 CE) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 1328 CE) maintained that public recantation invites emulation, eroding the (God-consciousness) essential to societal piety and governance; thus, harsh penalties safeguard orthodoxy against deviation, much as quarantine prevents contagion. While the prescribes no explicit worldly punishment—focusing instead on otherworldly consequences, as in Surah al-Baqarah 2:217—the sunnah's specificity overrides this silence, per usul al-fiqh principles elevating prophetic practice for governance. Variations exist, such as Hanafi leniency toward female apostates ( until repentance) versus death in other schools, but the overarching intent remains retributive and prophylactic: to affirm Islam's unassailable sovereignty over adherents.

Reformist Challenges and Alternative Interpretations

Reformist Muslim scholars challenge the traditional consensus on for by emphasizing the Quran's apparent silence on any earthly penalty for mere abandonment of faith, arguing instead that relevant verses affirm freedom of belief without coercion. Quranic passages such as 2:256 ("There is no compulsion in religion") and 18:29 ("Let him who will believe, and let him who will disbelieve") are cited to support the view that constitutes a personal matter between the individual and , with consequences deferred to the rather than enforced by human authorities. These interpreters contend that prescribing execution, such as the report in Sahih Bukhari attributed to ("Whoever changes his religion, kill him"), reflect contextual wartime measures against or , not timeless rulings on private disbelief, and thus lack the Quran's binding authority when they conflict. A core alternative interpretation distinguishes between individual apostasy (riddah fardiyya), which warrants no temporal punishment, and collective sedition or warfare against the Muslim polity (riddah harbiyya), historically linked to the under Caliph in 632–633 CE, where tribes renounced Islam amid political secession rather than doctrinal shift alone. Reformists like argue that hudud penalties for apostasy derive from non-Quranic sources and contradict Islamic principles of mercy, advocating ijtihad to prioritize Quranic equity over rigid fiqh traditions that conflate belief with loyalty. Similarly, Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im posits in his 2008 analysis that enforcing apostasy laws inherently violates Quranic allowances for repeated disbelief within communities (e.g., 4:137), rendering them incompatible with a pluralistic and necessitating a secular constitutional framework to protect conscience. Sudanese thinker Mahmoud Muhammad Taha, executed for apostasy in 1985, exemplified radical reform by proposing a dual-stage revelation: Meccan verses as universal and abrogating Medinan ones contextually, thereby nullifying punitive applications of that impede personal liberty and equality. Indian reformist Sultan Shahin echoes this by urging theological overhaul to eliminate apostasy as a capital offense, viewing it as a post-prophetic construct fueling rather than Quranic intent, and calling for state-level to foster pluralism amid empirical evidence of its abuse in vigilante justice. These positions, often articulated in academic works, remain marginal against orthodox madhabs, where scholars like those of the conditionally uphold execution but allow repentance periods, yet reformists counter that such traditions prioritize political stability over scriptural fidelity, risking hypocrisy by deterring genuine faith. Despite endorsements from figures like , who deem any apostasy penalty anti-Quranic, these challenges frequently invite accusations of heresy from establishment ulema, underscoring tensions between static and adaptive reasoning.

Critiques from Secular, Human Rights, and First-Principles Standpoints

From a perspective, apostasy laws in conflict with Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of (1948), which affirms "freedom to change his religion or belief" as integral to thought, , and . Similarly, Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) protects this freedom, subject only to narrowly defined limitations for public safety or morals, which courts have ruled do not justify criminalizing personal belief change. As of 2021, 23 countries maintained apostasy laws, with death penalties prescribed in 13—predominantly Muslim-majority states like , , , and —leading to executions, imprisonments, and coerced recantations that undermine these protections. experts have repeatedly condemned such laws, as in the 2012 case of Iranian pastor , sentenced to death for apostasy despite international outcry, highlighting systemic coercion over voluntary faith. Secular critiques, advanced by organizations like and the , portray apostasy punishments as tools of ideological control that endanger individuals and stifle open inquiry. These groups document how laws enable state-sanctioned killings—such as in and —while fostering vigilante violence and family , arguing that true conviction arises from evidence, not threat, and that enforcement reveals underlying doctrinal fragility. In their view, such penalties prioritize communal over individual , perpetuating cycles of fear documented in ex-Muslim testimonies of flight and asylum-seeking. First-principles reasoning rejects apostasy penalties as disproportionate to any demonstrable harm, aligning with John Stuart Mill's that state intervention justifies coercion only to prevent injury to others, not to regulate private convictions. Mere abandonment of faith inflicts no tangible damage—unlike or —rendering death or imprisonment retributively unjust, as belief is involuntary and unchosen at inception, per causal chains of evidence and experience. Punishments fail causally to produce authentic adherence, instead breeding or superficial compliance, which erodes societal trust and intellectual progress more than the apostasy itself. This approach privileges empirical outcomes: voluntary systems, absent coercion, better test ideas' viability, avoiding the stagnation observed in enforcement-heavy regimes.

References

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