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Sea of Azov
Sea of Azov
Sea of Azov
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The Sea of Azov[a] is an inland shelf sea in Eastern Europe connected to the Black Sea by the narrow (about 4 km (2.5 mi)) Strait of Kerch, and sometimes regarded as a northern extension of the Black Sea.[3][4] The sea is bounded by Russia on the east, and by Ukraine on the northwest and southwest (the parts of Ukraine bordering the sea are currently under Russian occupation). It is an important access route for Central Asia, from the Caspian Sea via the Volga–Don Canal.

Key Information

The sea is largely affected by the inflow of the Don, Kuban, and other rivers, which bring sand, silt, and shells, which in turn form numerous bays, limans, and narrow spits. Because of these deposits, the sea bottom is relatively smooth and flat, with the depth gradually increasing toward the middle. Because of the river inflow, water in the sea has low salinity and a high amount of biomass (such as green algae) that affects the water colour. Abundant plankton result in unusually high fish productivity. The sea shores and spits are low; they are rich in vegetation and bird colonies. The Sea of Azov is the shallowest sea in the world, with the depth varying between 0.9 and 14 metres (3 and 46 ft).[1][5][6][7][8] There is a constant outflow of water from the Sea of Azov to the Black Sea.

Names

[edit]

The name is likely to derive from the settlement of an area around Azov, whose name comes from the Kipchak Turkish asak or azaq 'lowlands'.[9] A Russian pseudo-etymology, however, instead derives it from an eponymous Cuman prince named "Azum" or "Asuf", said to have been killed defending his town in 1067.[citation needed] A formerly common spelling of the name in English was the Sea of Azoff.[10]

In antiquity, the sea was known as the Maeotis Swamp (Greek: Μαιῶτις λίμνη,[11] hē Maiōtis límnē; Latin: Palus Maeotis),[12] from the marshlands to its northeast. It remains unclear whether it was named for the nearby Maeotians or viceversa if that name was an exonym, broadly applied to various peoples who happened to live beside it.[13] Other names included Lake Maeotis or Maeotius (Mæotius or Mæotis Lacus);[14] the Maeotian or Maeotic Sea (Mæotium or Mæoticum Æquor);[15] the Cimmerian or Scythican Swamps (Cimmeriae[16] or Scythicæ Paludes);[17] and the Cimmerian or Bosporic Sea (Cimmericum or Bosporicum Mare).[18] The Maeotians themselves were said by Pliny to call the sea Temarunda (alternative spellings Temarenda and Temerinda), meaning "Mother of Waters".[19] [dubious – discuss]

The medieval Russians knew it as the Sea of Surozh after the adjacent city now known as Sudak.[1][20] It was known in Ottoman Turkish as the Balük-Denis ("Fish Sea") from its high productivity.[10]

History

[edit]

Prehistory

[edit]
Main article: Black Sea deluge theory

There are traces of Neolithic settlement in the area now covered by the sea.

In 1997, William Ryan and Walter Pitman of Columbia University published a theory that a massive flood through the Bosporus occurred in ancient times. They claim that the Black and Caspian Seas were vast freshwater lakes, but in about 5600 BC the Mediterranean spilled over a rocky sill at the Bosporus, creating the current link between the Black and Mediterranean Seas. Subsequent work has been done both to support and to discredit this theory, and archaeologists still debate it. This has led some to associate this catastrophe with prehistoric flood myths.[21]

Ancient Greek colonies in the north Black Sea, 8th to 3rd century BC, along with their modern names

Antiquity

[edit]
Main article: Bosporan Kingdom

The Maeotian marshes around the mouth of the Tanais River (the present-day Don) were famous in antiquity, as they served as an important check on the migration of nomadic people from the Eurasian steppelands. The Maeotians themselves lived by fishing and farming, but were avid warriors able to defend themselves against invaders.[22] Misled by its strong currents,[10] ancient geographers had only a vague idea of the extent of the sea, whose fresh water caused them to typically label it a "swamp" or a "lake". Herodotus (5th century BC) judged it as large as the Black Sea, while the Pseudo-Scylax (4th century BC) thought it about half as large.[13]

It was long believed to provide direct communication with the Arctic Ocean.[10] Polybius (2nd century BC) confidently expected that the strait to the Sea of Azov would close in the near future, due to ongoing deposition of sediments from rivers.[23] In the 1st century, Strabo reckoned the distance from the Cimmerian Bosporus (the Strait of Kerch) to the mouth of the Tanais at 2200 stadia, a roughly correct figure,[b] but did not know that its width continuously narrows.[13]

Milesian colonization began in the 7th century BC. The Bosporan Kingdom was named for the Cimmerian Bosporus rather than for the more famous Bosporus at the other end of the Black Sea. Briefly annexed by Pontus from the late 2nd century BC, it stretched along both southern shores of the Sea of Azov from the time of Greek colonization to the end of the Roman Empire, serving as a client kingdom which exported wheat, fish, and slaves in exchange for Greek and Roman manufactures and luxuries. Its later history is uncertain but probably the Huns, after defeating the Alans people who had settled in the region from central Asia, overran it in the late 4th century.[25]

Azov campaigns of 1695–96 and 1736–37

[edit]
Capture of Azov 1696, painting by Robert Ker Porter.
Main article: Azov campaigns

The Sea of Azov was frequently the scene of military conflicts between Russia, pursuing naval expansion to the south, and the major power in the region, Turkey. During the Russo-Turkish War (1686–1700), there were two campaigns in 1695–96 to capture the then Turkish fortress of Azov defended by a garrison of 7,000. The campaigns were headed by Peter I and aimed to gain Russian access to the Sea of Azov and Black Sea. The first campaign began in the spring of 1695. The Russian army consisted of 31 thousand men and 170 cannons and included selected trained regiments and Cossacks. It reached Azov on 27–28 June and besieged it by land by 5 July. After two unsuccessful assaults on 5 August and 25 September, the siege was lifted.[26]

The second campaign involved both ground forces and the Azov fleet, which was built in Moscow Oblast, Voronezh, Bryansk and other regions between winter 1695 and spring 1696. In April 1696, the army of 75,000 headed by Aleksei Shein moved to Azov by land and by ship via the Don River to Taganrog. In early May, they were joined by another fleet led by Peter I. On 27 May, the Russian fleet blocked Azov by sea. On 14 June, the Turkish fleet tried to break the blockade but, after losing two ships, retreated to the sea. After intensive bombardment of the fortress from land and sea, on 17 July the Russian army broke the defense lines and occupied parts of the wall. After heavy fighting, the garrison surrendered on 17 July. After the war, the Russian fleet base was moved to Taganrog and Azov, and 215 ships were built there between 1696 and 1711. In 1711, as a result of the Russo-Turkish War (1710–1711) and the Treaty of the Pruth, Azov was returned to Turkey and the Russian Azov fleet was destroyed.[26][27] The city was recaptured by Russia in 1737 during the Russo-Austrian-Turkish War (1735–1739). However, as a result of the consequent Treaty of Niš, Russia was not allowed to keep the fortress and military fleet.[28]

Crimean War 1853–1856

[edit]
Gravure showing the first attack on Taganrog.
Main articles: Crimean War and Siege of Taganrog

Another major military campaign on the Sea of Azov took place during the Crimean War of 1853–56. A naval and ground campaign pitting the allied navies of Britain and France against Russia took place between May and November 1855. The British and French forces besieged Taganrog, aiming to disrupt Russian supplies to Crimea. Capturing Taganrog would also result in an attack on Rostov, which was a strategic city for Russian support of their Caucasian operations. On 12 May 1855, the allied forces easily captured Kerch and gained access to the Sea of Azov, and on 22 May they attacked Taganrog. The attack failed and was followed by a siege. Despite the vast superiority of the allied forces (about 16,000 soldiers against fewer than 2,000), the city withstood all attempts to capture it, which ended around August 1855 with the retreat of the allied army. Individual coastal attacks continued without success and ceased in October 1855.[29]

21st century

[edit]

In December 2003, Ukraine and the Russian Federation agreed in a treaty to treat the sea and the Kerch Strait as shared internal waters.[30][31]

In September 2018, Ukraine announced the intention to add navy ships and further ground forces along the coast of the Sea of Azov, with the ships based at Berdiansk. The military posturing was exacerbated following the construction of the Crimean Bridge, which is too low to allow passage of Panamax ships into Ukraine's port.[32] Late that September, two Ukrainian vessels departed from the Black Sea port Odesa, passed under the Crimean Bridge, and arrived in Mariupol.[33] Tensions increased further after the Kerch Strait incident in November 2018, when Russia seized three Ukrainian Navy vessels attempting to enter the Sea of Azov.[34]

Control of the western shore of the Sea is vital to the economy of Ukraine but it is also of immense strategic importance to Russia, as a land route to Crimea as well as it is for passage by Russian marine traffic.[35]

On December 10, 2021, the Ukrainian Navy announced that Russia had blocked off nearly 70 percent of the Sea of Azov, issuing navigation warnings, ostensibly to conduct artillery fire exercises on the sea ..."near Mariupol, Berdyansk and Henichesk."[36] It raised apprehension regarding a potential Russian invasion since it had begun amassing tens of thousands of troops near the southeast Ukraine border and had begun a propaganda war against the Kyiv government.[36] The Russians seized three Ukrainian military vessel as the boats were trying to cross the strait, and captured 24 sailors who were finally released after months of negotiations.[36]

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces began shelling Mariupol at the start of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[37][38] By May, with the end of the siege of Mariupol, Russia fully captured the city and blocked off Ukraine's access to the sea by controlling the entire north Pryazovia.[39]

Geology and bathymetry

[edit]
Satellite image of Sea of Azov. The shallow Sea of Azov is clearly distinguished from the deeper Black Sea. Numbers: 1. Dnieper River, 2. Kakhovka Reservoir, 3. Molochna River, 4. Molochnyi Lyman, 5. Arabat Spit, 6. Syvash lagoon system, 7. Karkinit Bay, 8. Kalamitsky Bay, 9. Crimea, 10. Fedosiysky Bay, 11. Strait of Kerch, 12. Black Sea, 13. Sea of Azov, 14. Don River (Russia), 15. Taganrog Bay, 16. Yeysk Liman, 17. Beisug Liman

The International Hydrographic Organization defines the limit of the Sea of Azov in the Kertch Strait [sic] as "The limit of the Black Sea", which is itself defined as "A line joining Cape Takil and Cape Panaghia (45°02'N)".[40]

The sea is considered an internal sea of Russia and Ukraine, and its use is governed by an agreement between these countries ratified in 2003.[41] The sea is 360 kilometres (220 mi) long and 180 kilometres (110 mi) wide and has an area of 39,000 square kilometres (15,000 sq mi); it is the smallest sea within the countries of the former Soviet Union.[42] The main rivers flowing into it are the Don and Kuban; they ensure that the waters of the sea have comparatively low salinity and are almost fresh in places, and also bring in huge volumes of silt and sand. Accumulation of sand and shells results in a smooth and low coastline, as well as in numerous spits and sandbanks.[20]

The Sea of Azov is the shallowest sea in the world with an average depth of 7 metres (23 ft) and maximum depth of 14 metres (46 ft);[1] in the bays, where silt has built up, the average depth is about 1 metre (3 ft). The sea bottom is also relatively flat with the depth gradually increasing from the coast to the centre.[43] The Sea of Azov is an internal sea with passage to the Atlantic Ocean going through the Black, Marmara, Aegean and Mediterranean seas. It is connected to the Black Sea by the Strait of Kerch, which at its narrowest has a width of 4 kilometres (2.5 mi) and a maximum depth of 15 metres (49 ft).[1] The narrowness of the Kerch Strait limits the water exchange with the Black Sea. As a result, the salinity of the Sea of Azov is low; in the open sea it is 10–12 on the Practical Salinity Scale (PSS), about one third of the salinity of the oceans; it is even lower (2–7 (PSS)) in the Taganrog Bay at the northeast end of the Sea. The long-term variations of salinity on the PSS are low, and are mostly caused by changes in humidity and precipitation.[44][45]

Although more than 20 rivers flow into the sea, mostly from the north,[43] two of them, the Don and Kuban rivers, account for more than 90% of water inflow. The contribution of the Don is about twice that of the Kuban.[43] The Kuban delta is located at the southeast, on the east side of the Kerch Strait. It is over 100 km long and covers a vast flooded area with numerous channels. Because of the spread, the delta has low contrast in satellite images, and is hardly visible in the map. The Don flows from the north into the large Taganrog Bay. The depth there varies between 2 and 9 metres, while the maximum depth is observed in the middle of the sea.[46]

Typical values of the annual inflow and outflow of water to the sea, averaged over the period from 1923 to 1985, are as follows: river inflow 38.6 km3, precipitation 15.5 km3, evaporation 34.6 km3, inflow from the Black Sea 36–38 km3, outflow 53–55 km3.[47] Thus, about 17 km3 of fresh water is outflowing from the Azov Sea to the Black Sea.[20] The depth of Azov Sea is decreasing, mostly due to the river-induced deposits.[42] Whereas the past hydrological expeditions recorded depths of up to 16 metres, more recent ones could not find places deeper than 13.5–14 metres.[42] This might explain the variation in the maximum depths among different sources. The water level fluctuates by some 20 cm over the year due to the snow melts in spring.[47]

The Taman Peninsula has about 25 mud volcanoes, most of which are active. Their eruptions are usually quiet, spilling out mud, and such gases as methane, carbon dioxide and hydrogen sulfide, but are sometimes violent and resemble regular volcanic eruptions. Some of those volcanoes are under water, near the shores of the peninsula. A major eruption on 6 September 1799, near Golubitskaya stanitsa, lasted about 2 hours and formed a mud island 100 metres in diameter and 2 metres in height; the island was then washed away by the sea. There were similar eruptions in 1862, 1906, 1924, 1950 and 1952.[42]

The current vertical profile of the Sea of Azov exhibits oxygenated surface waters and anoxic bottom waters, with the anoxic waters forming in a layer 0.5 to 4 metres (2–13 ft) in thickness. The occurrence of the anoxic layer is attributed to seasonal eutrophication events associated with increased sedimentary input from the Don and Kuban Rivers. This sedimentary input stimulates biotic activity in the surface layers, in which organisms photosynthesise under aerobic conditions. Once the organisms expire, the dead organic matter sinks to the bottom of the sea where bacteria and microorganisms, using all available oxygen, consume the organic matter, leading to anoxic conditions. Studies have shown that in the Sea of Azov, the exact vertical structure is dependent on wind strength and sea surface temperature, but typically a 'stagnation zone' lies between the oxic and anoxic layers.[48]

Coastal features and major population centres

[edit]
See also: Spits of the Sea of Azov
Major spits of the Sea of Azov: 1. Arabat 2. Fedotov 3. Obitochna 4. Berdyansk 5. Belosaraysk 6. Krivaya 7. Beglitsk 8. Glafirovsk (east) and Yeysk (west) 9. Dolgaya 10. Kamyshevatsk 11. Yasensk 12. Achuevsk 13. Chushka

Many rivers flowing into the Sea of Azov form bays, lagoons and limans. The sand, silt and shells[verification needed] they bring are deposited in the areas of reduced flow, that is the sides of the bays, forming narrow sandbanks called spits. Typical maximum depth in the bays and limans is a few metres. Because of shallow waters and abundant rivers, the spits are remarkably long and numerous in the sea – the Arabat Spit stretches over 112 kilometres (70 mi) and is one of the world's longest spits; three other spits, Fedotov Spit, Achuevsk Spit and Obitochna Spit, are longer than 30 km. Most spits stretch from north to south and their shape can significantly change over just several years.[49][50]

A remarkable feature of the Sea of Azov is the large complex of shallow lagoons called Syvash or "Rotten Sea". Their typical depth is only 0.5–1 metres with a maximum of 3 metres. They cover an area of 2,560 square kilometres (990 sq mi) in the northeastern Crimea which is separated from the sea by the Arabatsk Spit. North of the spit lies the city of Henichesk (population 22,500) and south of it is the Bay of Arabat.[51] Syvash accepts up to 1.5 km3 of Azov water per year. Because of the lagoons' wide extent and shallowness, the water rapidly evaporates, resulting in the high salinity of 170 on the practical salinity scale. For this reason Syvash has long had an important salt-producing industry.[46]

Population centres on the Sea of Azov

North of the Arabat Spit is the Molochnyi Liman with the associated Fedotov Spit (45 km long) which are formed by the Molochna River. Farther north, between the Fedotov Spit and Obytochna Spit (30 km long), lies Obytochny Bay. Further north, between Obytochna Spit and Berdyansk Spit (23 km long), is Berdyansk Bay with two cities, Berdyansk (population 112,000) and Primorsk (population 13,900). Further north again lies Belosaraysk Bay with Belosaraysk Spit, formed by the river Kalmius. The major city in the area is Mariupol (population 491,600). Then, approaching the Taganrog Bay and very close to Taganrog, are the Mius Liman and Krivaya Spit formed by the Mius River.[50]

With an area of about 5,600 square kilometres (2,200 sq mi), Taganrog Bay is the largest bay of the Sea of Azov. It is located in the north-eastern part of the Sea and is bounded by the Belosaraysk and Dolgaya Spits. The Don flows into it from the north-east. On its shores stand the two principal cities of the Sea of Azov, Taganrog (population 257,600) and Azov (population 83,200). South-east of the bay is Yeysk Liman. It lies entirely on the continent, entering the Taganrog Bay through the Yeysk and Glafirovsk Spits, and is the mouth of the Yeya River. Yeysk Spit is part of Yeysk city, which has a population of 87,500. It extends into the prominent Yeysk peninsula, which is tipped in the north-west by the Dolgaya Spit. South of it, also enclosed by the continent, lies Beisug Liman, which is restricted by the Yasensk Spit and is fed by the Beysug River. South-west of the liman, the 31 km long Achuevsk Spit runs along the coastline. Between the Achuevsk spit and Beisug Liman stands Primorsko-Akhtarsk with 32,165 inhabitants.[49][50]

A spit in the Sea of Azov

In the south, the Sea of Azov is connected to the Black Sea via the Strait of Kerch, which is bordered to the west by the Kerch peninsula of the Crimea and to the east by the Russian Taman peninsula in Krasnodar Krai. The city of Kerch (population 151,300) is located on the Kerch peninsula, and the Taman peninsula contains the delta of the Kuban, a major Russian river. The strait is 41 kilometres long and 4 to 15 kilometres wide. Its narrowest part lies on the Sea of Azov side, restricted by the Chushka Spit which faces southwards in consequence of the outflow from the Azov to the Black Sea.[52]

The Strait of Kerch is spanned by the Crimean Bridge, which was opened in May 2018. This is a major geopolitical issue since shipping vessels over a certain size can not pass under the span.[53] Since then Russia has been accused of interdicting shipping through the Kerch Strait.[54]

Hydrology

[edit]
Azov Sea shore, with sea cliffs.
Bays etc
Rivers
and others

Climate

[edit]
Beach in Shchyolkino in Crimea

The sea is relatively small and nearly surrounded by land. Therefore, its climate is continental with cold winters and hot and dry summers. In autumn and winter, the weather is affected by the Siberian Anticyclone which brings cold and dry air from Siberia with winds of 4–7 m/s, sometimes up to 15 m/s. Those winds may lower the winter temperatures from the usual −1 to −5 °C to below −30 °C. The mean mid-summer temperatures are 23–25 °C with a maximum of about 40 °C.[46] Winds are weaker in summer, typically 3–5 m/s.[43] Precipitation varies between 312 and 528 mm/year and is 1.5–2 times larger in summer than in winter.[20]

Average water temperatures are 0–1 °C in winter (2–3 °C in the Kerch Strait) and 24–25 °C in summer, with a maximum of about 28 °C on the open sea and above 30 °C near the shores. During the summer, the sea surface is usually slightly warmer than the air.[43] Because of the shallow character of the sea, the temperature usually lowers by only about 1 °C with depth, but in cold winters, the difference can reach 5–7 °C.[43][55]

The winds cause frequent storms, with the waves reaching 6 metres in the Taganrog Bay, 2–4 metres near the southern shores, and 1 metre in the Kerch Strait. In the open sea, their height is usually 1–2 metres, sometimes up to 3 metres. Winds also induce frequent seiches – standing waves with an amplitude of 20–50 cm and lasting from minutes to hours. Another consequence of the winds is water currents. The prevailing current is a counterclockwise swirl due to the westerly and south-westerly winds. Their speed is typically less than 10 cm/s, but can reach 60–70 cm/s for 15–20 m/s winds. In the bays, the flow is largely controlled by the inflow of the rivers and is directed away from the shore.[47] In the Kerch Strait, the flow is normally toward the Black Sea due to the predominance of northern winds and the water inflow from the rivers; its average speed is 10–20 cm/s, reaching 30–40 cm in the narrowest parts.[56] Although the sea is not subject to tidal variation, there are seasonal changes in the observed sea level of up to 10–20 inches (250–510 mm), caused by seasonal variations in river outflows.[57]

An icebreaker on the Sea of Azov.

The shallowness and low salinity of the sea make it vulnerable to freezing during the winter. Fast ice bands ranging from 7 km in the north to 1.5 km in the south can occur temporarily at any time from late December to mid-March. Several ships were trapped in ice in 2012 when it froze over.[58] The ice thickness reaches 30–40 centimetres (12–16 in) in most parts of the sea and 60–80 cm in the Taganrog Bay.[56] The ice is often unstable and piles up to the height of several metres. Before the introduction of icebreakers, navigation was halted in the winter.[55]

Flora and fauna

[edit]

Historically, the sea has had rich marine life, both in variety, with over 80 fish and 300 invertebrate species identified, and in numbers. Consequently, fishing has long been a major activity in the area. The annual catch of recent years was 300,000 tonnes, about half of which are valuable species (sturgeon, pike-perch, bream, sea-roach, etc.).[59] This was partly due to extremely high biological productivity of the sea, which was stimulated by the strong supply of nutrients from numerous rivers feeding the sea, low water salinity, ample heating due to shallow waters and long vegetation period. However, diversity and numbers have been reduced by artificial reduction of river flow (construction of dams), over-fishing and water-intense large-scale cultivation of cotton, causing increasing levels of pollution. Fish hauls have rapidly decreased and in particular anchovy fisheries have collapsed.[1][59][60][61]

Plankton and benthos

[edit]
Green algae (and other plankton species) are mostly responsible for the colour of the Sea of Azov waters.

Because of the shallow waters, the development of aquatic life in the Sea of Azov is more characteristic of a lagoon, and the plankton patterns are rather similar in the open sea and near the shores. Despite its shallowness, the water has low transparency, so bottom plants are poorly developed and most algae are of planktonic type. The sea is characterised by high concentrations of organic matter and long blooming periods. Another specific feature of the sea is the variable salinity – low in the large bays and higher in the open sea, especially near the Kerch Strait. Therefore, the plankton species are distributed inhomogeneously in the Sea of Azov. Although many additional species are brought in from the saltier Black Sea, most of them cannot adjust to the variable salinity of the Sea of Azov, except for the euryhaline species.[62] About 600 species of planktonic algae are known in the Sea of Azov.[59] The number of species is dominated by diatoms and green algae; blue-green algae and pyrophites are significant, and euglena and yellow-green algae form only 5% of the species. Green algae are mostly responsible for the colour of the sea in the satellite images (see photos above).[62]

Regarding zooplankton, the fresh waters of the Tanganrog Bay are inhabited by cladocera, copepoda and rotifers, such as Brachionus plicatilis, Keratella curdata and Asplanchna. Western part of the sea, which is more saline, hosts three forms of Acartia clausi, as well as Centropages ponticus, meroplankton and larvae of gastropoda, bivalvia and polychaete.[63]

Benthos species reside mostly at the sea bottom and include worms, crustaceans, bottom protists, coelenterata, and mollusks. Mollusks account for 60–98% of the invertebrate biomass at the Sea of Azov bottom.[63]

Sturgeons are among the major and most valuable commercial fish species of the Sea of Azov.[59]

Fish

[edit]

There are 183 ichthyofauna species from 112 genera and 55 families in the Sea of Azov region. Among them, there are 50 rare and 19 endangered species, and the sturgeon Acipenser nudiventris is probably extinct in the region.[64]

The fauna of the freshwater Taganrog Bay is much poorer – it consists of 55 species from 36 genera and 16 families; among them, three species are rare and 6 are endangered.[65]

Flora

[edit]
Lotus.

The shores of the Sea of Azov contain numerous estuaries and marshes and are dominated by reeds, sedges, Typha and Sparganium. Typical submerged plants are Charales, pond weed, hornworts and water lilies. Also common is sacred lotus.[42] The number of species is large; for example, the Belosaraysk and Berdyansk spits alone contain more than 200 each. Some spits are declared national nature reserves, such as Beglitsk,[66] Belosaraysk,[67] Krivaya[67] and Berdyansk Spits.[50][68][69]

Fauna

[edit]
Great cormorants and seagulls on the Belosaraysk Spit.

Estuaries and spits of the sea are rich in birds, mostly waterfowl, such as wild geese, ducks and seagulls. Colonies of cormorants and pelicans are common. Also frequently observed are swans, herons, sandpipers and many birds of prey. Mammals include foxes, wild cats, hares, hedgehogs, weasels, martens and wild boar.[69] Muskrats were introduced to the area in the early 20th century and are hunted for their fur.[42]

Migrating and invading species

[edit]
Rapana venosa from the Black Sea.

Some ichthyofauna species, such as anchovy, garfish, Black Sea whiting and pickerel, visit the Sea of Azov from the Black Sea for spawning. This was especially frequent in 1975–77 when the salinity of the southern Sea of Azov was unusually high, and additional species were seen such as bluefish, turbot, chuco, spurdog, Black Sea salmon, mackerel and even corkwing wrasse, rock hopper, bullhead and eelpout. Unlike the Black Sea plankton which does not adapt well to the low salinity of the Sea of Azov and concentrates near the Kerch Strait, fishes and invertebrates of the Black Sea adjust well. They are often stronger than the native species, are used to the relatively low temperatures of the Black Sea and survive winter in the Sea of Azov well.[70]

Balanus improvisus is the first benthos species which spread from the Black Sea in the early 20th century and settled in the Sea of Azov. Its current density[clarification needed] is 7 kg/m2. From 1956, Rapana venosa is observed in the Sea of Azov, but it could not adjust to low salinity and therefore is limited to the neighborhood of the Kerch Strait. Several Sea of Azov mollusks, such as shipworm (Teredo navalis), soft-shell clam (Mya arernaria), Mediterranean mussel (Mytilus galloprovincialis) and Anadara inaequivalvis, originate from the Black Sea. Another example of invading species is the Dutch crab Rhithropanopeus harrisii which is observed both in saline and freshwater parts.[70]

Formerly three types of dolphins, short-beaked common dolphin, common bottlenose dolphin and harbour porpoise, regularly visited the Sea of Azov from the Black Sea although the common dolphin usually avoided the basin and Kerch Strait due to low salinity.[71] One sub-species of harbour porpoise, Phocoena phocoena relicta, used to live in the Sea of Azov and was therefore called "Azov dolphin" (азовка, azovka) in the Soviet Union. Nowadays, dolphins are rarely observed in the Sea of Azov. This is attributed to shallowing of the sea, increasing navigation activities, pollution, and reduction in the fish population.[72][73]

Various species of pinnipeds and belugas[74] were introduced into Black Sea by mankind and later escaped either by accidental or purported causes. Of these, grey seal has been recorded within Kerch Strait and Sea of Azov.[75] Mediterranean monk seals became extinct in the Black Sea in 1997,[76] and the historic presence of large whales such as minke whales in the Black Sea is recorded,[77][78] although it is unclear whether these mammals historically occurred in the Azov basin.

Economy and ecology

[edit]

For centuries, the Sea of Azov has been an important waterway for the transport of goods and passengers. The first modern ironworks in Imperial Russia were located upstream on the Kalmius River at Donetsk, originally named Hughesovka (Russian: Юзовка). It was also important for the transportation of iron ores from the mines of the Kerch peninsula to the processing plant of Azovstal in Mariupol (formerly Zhdanov), Ukraine; this activity stopped after the closure of the mines in the 1990s.[79] Navigation increased after the construction in 1952 of the Volga–Don Canal which connected the Sea of Azov with the Volga River – the most important riverine transport route in the central Russia – thus connecting major cities such as Moscow, Volgograd and Astrakhan.[42] Currently, the major ports are in Taganrog, Mariupol, Yeysk and Berdyansk.[20][80]

Increasing navigation rates have resulted in more pollution and even in ecological disasters. On 11 November 2007, a strong storm sank four ships in the Kerch Strait, in the Russian Port of Kavkaz. The ships were the Russian bulk carriers Volnogorsk; Nakhichevan; and Kovel, and the Georgian Haji Izmail with a Turkish crew. Six other ships were driven from their anchors and grounded. The tanker Volgoneft-139 was broken in two, and the tanker Volgoneft-123 was damaged. As a result, about 1,300 tons of fuel oil and about 6,800 tons of sulfur entered the sea.[81][82]

Another traditional activity in the sea is fishing. The Sea of Azov used to be the most productive fishing area in the Soviet Union: typical annual fish catches of 300,000 tonnes converted to 80 kg per hectare of surface. (The corresponding numbers are 2 kg in the Black Sea and 0.5 kilograms (1.1 lb) in the Mediterranean Sea.)[citation needed] The catch has decreased in the 21st century, with more emphasis now on fish farming, especially of sturgeon.

Traditionally much of the coastline has been a zone of health resorts.[43]

The irrigation system of the Taman Peninsula, supplied by the extended delta of the Kuban River, is favorable for agriculture and the region is famous for its vines. The area of the Syvash lagoons and Arabat Spit was traditionally a centre of a salt-producing industry. The Arabat Spit alone produced about 24,000 tonnes/year in the 19th century.[42][51]

Notes

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References

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Sea of Azov

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The Sea of Azov is the world's shallowest sea, featuring an average depth of 7 meters and a maximum depth of 14 meters, and spanning approximately 37,600 square kilometers. Connected to the through the , it is bordered by the to the east and to the west, with its waters fed primarily by the Don and rivers. Historically significant as a and site of military campaigns, the sea supports vital fisheries for species like sturgeon and is crucial for regional shipping, particularly grain exports from Ukrainian ports such as . Since the 2014 of and the 2022 invasion, has established de facto dominance over the Sea of Azov, controlling access via the Kerch Bridge and conducting naval operations that restrict Ukrainian maritime activities, despite a 2003 designating it as shared .

Etymology

Origins and Historical Designations

In antiquity, the body of water now known as the Sea of Azov was designated by ancient Greek sources as the Maeotis or Lake Maeotis (Greek: Μαιῶτις λίμνη; Latin: Palus Maeotis), reflecting its perception as a shallow, marshy extension of the Black Sea (Pontus Euxinus). This nomenclature, attested in texts from the 1st century BCE onward, derived from the Maeotians (Μαιῶται), indigenous tribes inhabiting the northern and eastern shores, and emphasized the region's liminal, swamp-like character rather than its marine extent. The modern designation "Sea of Azov" traces to the Turkic-Kipchak term Azak, denoting a fortified trading settlement established at the Don River's mouth by the 13th century under Cuman (Kipchak) nomadic influences, later reinforced during Mongol dominance. This toponym, likely signifying "lowland" or "gulf" in Kipchak Turkic dialects prevalent among nomads from the 11th century, extended to the adjacent sea as maritime nomenclature evolved with regional control shifts. Ottoman Turkish records from the onward rendered the name as Azak Denizi, aligning with the empire's administration of the Azak fortress and coastal eyalets, while pre-Mongol Slavic designations in Old Rus' chronicles included Surozhskoe more, evoking nearby Genoese trading outposts like Surozh (modern ). By the 18th century, post-Russian conquest, standardized forms emerged as Azovskoye more in Russian and Azovs'ke more in Ukrainian, preserving the Turkic root without nationalistic reinterpretation.

Physical Geography

Location and Boundaries

The Sea of Azov constitutes the northernmost extension of the , forming a shallow inland basin in . It is delimited to the south by the , a narrow approximately 3 km wide at its narrowest point, which connects it to the proper. Geographically, the sea is bounded by Russia's to the east and to the northeast, and by Ukraine's , , and to the west and north. This configuration isolates the Sea of Azov from broader oceanic influences, rendering it an enclosed marginal sea reliant on limited exchange through the strait. Spanning roughly 45°12' to 47°10' N and 35°20' to 39°30' E , the Sea of Azov covers a surface area of approximately 37,000 km². Its dimensions measure about 340 km in length and 135 km in width, emphasizing its compact, lagoon-like character compared to open marine environments. The basin receives primary freshwater inflows from the Don and rivers, which contribute to its low and euhaline status, further distinguishing it as an rather than an oceanic extension. These hydrological inputs, combined with minimal deep-water circulation via the , underpin its semi-enclosed dynamics.

Geology and Bathymetry

The Sea of Azov lies within a tectonic depression known as the , which experienced during the Neogene-Quaternary periods, facilitating the accumulation of sediments and the establishment of its shallow configuration. This , combined with eustatic sea-level rise, enabled the transgression that inundated the basin following the around 12,000 years ago. The modern reflects this history, with an average depth of 7 meters and a maximum depth of 14 meters near the connecting it to the . The seabed features a nearly flat , with the uppermost 2 meters of marine deposits formed primarily during the late New-Azov transgression phase, overlaying older lagoonal and sediments. Sedimentary infill is dominated by terrigenous silts, clays, and sands transported by the Don and rivers, which contribute over 90% of the sea's fluvial discharge and sustain high suspended loads exceeding 50 g/m³ in nearshore zones. This riverine input promotes delta progradation, particularly at the Gulf and , while fostering persistent that restricts light penetration and influences bottom distribution patterns. The basin's uniform shallowness limits deep-water exchange with the Black Sea and favors anti-cyclonic wind-driven gyres, as evidenced by circulation models tied to the low sill depth of approximately 5 meters at the Kerch Strait.

Hydrology and Water Dynamics

The Sea of Azov maintains a water balance dominated by riverine inflows, primarily from the Don River at a long-term average discharge of 27.8 km³/year and the Kuban River at 11.1 km³/year, which together constitute about 95% of total continental runoff into the basin. These inputs mix with Black Sea waters entering via the Kerch Strait, while outflow through the same strait averages around 17 km³/year under typical conditions, modulated by wind-driven exchanges. The sea's total water volume of 290 km³ results in a residence time of approximately 2–3 years for riverine waters, reflecting rapid turnover despite the basin's shallowness and limited depth. Salinity in the Sea of Azov averages 13 parts per thousand (ppt), with spatial variations from near-freshwater levels (<5 ppt) in the northern Taganrog Bay to higher values (up to 17 ppt) in the central and eastern sectors influenced by intrusions. Recent trends show an acceleration in , reaching 15–17 ppt in parts of the basin by 2023, driven chiefly by reduced river discharges from upstream reservoirs and damming—such as the Tsimlyansk Reservoir on the Don—which retain water for and , thereby curtailing downstream flow more than episodic dry conditions alone. This anthropogenic regulation overrides variability in , as evidenced by hydrological models attributing over 70% of the 2022–2023 spike to runoff deficits from impoundments rather than dominance. Water circulation features anti-cyclonic gyres in the central sea under prevailing westerly winds, with counter-clockwise eddies near the , primarily propelled by rather than baroclinic density gradients from salinity contrasts, which exert secondary influence due to the basin's uniformity. Northeasterly winds enhance outflows to the , while southerlies promote inflows, creating surge levels up to 1–2 meters that redistribute fresher surface waters southward. Eutrophication-induced anoxic events periodically affect bottom layers, particularly in enclosed bays like , where nutrient enrichment from agricultural s—transported via Don and discharges—triggers blooms, followed by organic decay that depletes dissolved oxygen below 2 mg/L during summer stratification. These episodes, documented since the mid-20th century, correlate directly with peak applications in the rivers' catchments, exacerbating hypoxia independent of shifts.

Climate Patterns

The Sea of Azov experiences a temperate dominated by seasonal extremes driven by its enclosed position within the Eurasian landmass, resulting in cold winters and warm summers without significant maritime moderation. Long-term meteorological records from coastal stations indicate average air temperatures of approximately -2°C in and 25°C in , reflecting the influence of Siberian air masses in winter and continental heating in summer. Annual averages 400-600 mm, predominantly falling during autumn due to the passage of Mediterranean cyclones, while evaporation exceeds 900 mm yearly, contributing to the sea's brackish hydrology. Wind patterns feature persistent northerly to northeasterly flows, which generate seiches—oscillating water level variations—and storm surges reaching 2-3 meters in shallow coastal zones, particularly in the Taganrog Bay. These winds, often exceeding 10-15 m/s during winter, induce compensatory currents and enhance mixing in the . Ice formation occurs annually from to March or April, with coverage spanning 2-4 months and fast extent averaging 1,800 km² based on 2000-2020 data; maximum seasonal coverage can reach 67% of the sea surface under severe conditions. Empirical data over decades reveal stable patterns, with modest surface increases of about 1.1°C per century at northern sites, largely correlated with regional and reduced from development rather than amplified global trends; such observations counter narratives of heightened variability by underscoring consistent continental forcings.

Biodiversity and Ecology

Aquatic Flora and Plankton

The phytoplankton assemblage in the Sea of Azov features a seasonal dominance of and dinoflagellates, particularly during early spring blooms that exhibit elevated biomass relative to other periods. These blooms form the primary basis of the pelagic , with diatom contributions peaking in spring due to favorable availability and conditions. Dinoflagellates, including species like , have shown increasing prevalence in blooms, potentially shifting from traditional diatom-led dynamics amid changing environmental factors. Benthic flora includes macrophytes such as , which forms extensive meadows in shallow bays like Taman Bay, supporting detrital nutrient cycling through decomposition. Associated benthic algae contribute to in coastal zones, though their distribution is patchy and influenced by substrate stability. These vegetation types cover portions of the in sheltered areas, facilitating microbial processes in nutrient remineralization. Eutrophication in the Sea of Azov is exacerbated by riverine nutrient inputs, notably from the Don River, where nitrogen-to-phosphorus (N:P) ratios range from 5.0 to 6.6, often favoring phytoplankton proliferation under phosphorus-replete conditions. Elevated phosphate and nitrate concentrations, particularly in the Gulf of Taganrog, correlate with bloom intensities and chlorophyll-a levels indicative of heightened primary production. Such dynamics underscore the role of fluvial biogenic loads in sustaining planktonic biomass while altering community structure.

Benthic Communities and Fish Stocks

The benthic communities of the Sea of Azov are characterized by a diverse array of macrozoobenthos, with surveys in the southwestern region identifying 46 species, including 15 polychaetes, 12 mollusks, and 13 crustaceans. These thrive in the sea's soft, organic-rich sediments, which receive substantial detrital inputs from major river systems like the Don and , supporting relatively high biomasses despite the brackish conditions. Polychaetes dominate numerically, often comprising the bulk of the community alongside bivalve mollusks such as those preyed upon by invasive predators like Rapana venosa, while crustaceans contribute to the trophic base for higher predators. Commercial fish stocks in the Sea of Azov historically yielded over 100,000 tons annually in the mid-20th century, driven by species such as the anchovy (Engraulis encrasicolus), kilka (Clupeonella delicatula, a herring relative), and redlip mullet (Liza haematocheila). Catches declined sharply post-1990s, falling to levels below 50,000 tons per year by the early 2000s, primarily due to overfishing, illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) activities, and habitat alterations from upstream damming that reduced nutrient inflows and spawning grounds. Recent stock assessments indicate stabilization and modest recovery, with annual landings reaching 45,000–50,000 tons by the , reflecting lower fishing mortality rates following regulatory interventions, though ongoing geopolitical disruptions since 2014 have hampered monitoring and enforcement. Harvest data from key like and mullet underscore sustainable potential under controlled exploitation, countering narratives of irreversible depletion by highlighting rebounds in less-pressured areas. The dominance of small pelagic in catches— and kilka often accounting for over 50%—points to resilience tied to primary productivity, with recovery feasible absent excessive anthropogenic pressures.

Terrestrial and Avian Fauna

The coastal zones and adjacent wetlands of the Sea of Azov host over 100 species of birds, with significant concentrations in protected areas such as the Azov-Sivash National Nature Park. Species including Dalmatian pelicans (Pelecanus crispus) and greater flamingos (Phoenicopterus roseus) frequent the hypersaline Sivash lagoons, where flamingo nesting was first documented in Ukraine in 2017. Breeding colonies of shorebirds and colonial waterbirds, such as and terns, establish on elongated sand spits like the Arabat Arrow, supporting reproductive populations amid the steppe-coastal interface. The region forms a critical node in Afro-Eurasian migratory flyways, channeling Europe-Asia routes through Ramsar-designated . Synchronous censuses, including post-breeding counts from 2004 to 2015, enumerated approximately 5.5 million individuals across 133 species, with 40 Red Data Book wetland birds among them. Mid-winter surveys in Ramsar sites, such as those conducted in January 2016, recorded 41 waterbird species totaling thousands of individuals. Terrestrial reptiles adapted to the arid coastal steppes include the steppe viper (Vipera renardi), a venomous species listed as vulnerable in Ukraine's Red Data Book, inhabiting dry grasslands and shrublands near the shorelines. Populations of meadow lizards (Darevskia praticola) have been documented along the Azov seashore, particularly on the . Among mammals, introduced muskrats (Ondatra zibethicus) occupy deltaic marshes, contributing to wetland ecosystem dynamics, though specific Azov counts remain limited in surveyed data. (Saiga tatarica), native to broader Eurasian steppes, occur historically in the vicinity but are not confirmed as regular coastal delta inhabitants in contemporary records.

Invasive Species and Environmental Pressures

The comb jelly Mnemiopsis leidyi, introduced to the Black Sea via ship ballast water in the early 1980s and subsequently spreading to the Sea of Azov, proliferated rapidly due to abundant zooplankton prey and lack of predators, leading to predation on fish eggs, larvae, and plankton that supported pelagic fisheries. This invasion contributed to a collapse in Azov anchovy stocks by over 90% during the late 1980s and early 1990s, exacerbating pressures from overfishing and pollution, with total pelagic fish catches dropping sharply. The predatory whelk Rapana venosa, introduced to the Black Sea in the 1940s and expanding into the Azov by the 1950s, has targeted native bivalve populations, altering benthic community structures through selective predation on mussels and clams. Subsequent biological controls demonstrated ecosystem resilience; the predator Beroe ovata, introduced to the in the late 1990s, reduced M. leidyi abundances by consuming up to 50% of its biomass, enabling partial recovery of and fish stocks, including , by the early . Cooler water regimes in 1991–1993 further limited M. leidyi growth, aiding rebound without full reliance on the introduced predator. (Dreissena bugensis) populations, native to the Ponto-Caspian region including the , have shown proliferation in response to and hydrological shifts, filtering and potentially displacing native benthic species, though their impacts remain modulated by salinity fluctuations. Industrial pollution introduces heavy metals such as mercury from regional coal mining and former refineries, with elevated concentrations in sediments near the Don and Kuban river inflows, accumulating in benthic organisms and bioaccumulating in fish. Iron, chromium, and cadmium levels peak in aerosols and waters adjacent to metallurgical centers like Mariupol, deriving from emissions and runoff, contributing to toxic burdens in the Taganrog Gulf. Salinization has accelerated since the early 2000s due to reduced freshwater inflows from upstream damming on the Don River and climate-driven decreases in precipitation, raising average salinity from 11–13 ppt to peaks of 15–17 ppt by 2015–2016, stressing euryhaline species adapted to brackish conditions. The ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2022 has intensified pressures through oil spills and from damaged tankers in the , with incidents dispersing hydrocarbons across waters, killing marine mammals including over 100 dolphins and porpoises by mid-2023 via and habitat fouling. Wreck sites from naval engagements have released denser pollutants, forming persistent slicks that threaten benthic recovery, while unregulated exacerbates baseline without coordinated . Despite these stressors, empirical data indicate bounded impacts rather than irreversible collapse, as post-invasion fisheries rebounds underscore adaptive capacities in shallow, high-turnover systems like the .

Coastal Human Geography

Major Settlements and Ports

, located on the northern shore in , , is a primary city with a population of approximately 245,600 as of 2022. Its port facilities manage , bulk goods, containers, passengers, and fishing operations. , situated on the Yeysk Spit in , , supports a population of about 81,000 and operates as a combined and resort hub. Mariupol, on the Ukrainian coast in Donetsk Oblast, hosted around 450,000 residents prior to 2022 and functioned as the Sea of Azov's largest port, primarily exporting grain and industrial products like . Berdyansk, in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, , had a pre-2022 population of roughly 110,000 and served as a regional seaport handling diverse maritime traffic. Since 2022, Russian control over and Berdyansk has shifted port accessibility along conflict lines, with reported expansions aiming for a combined annual capacity of 5.9 million tons. Kerch, at the strait linking the Sea of Azov to the , features port infrastructure and the 2018 , facilitating ferry services and enhanced regional connectivity prior to navigational restrictions.

Infrastructure and Development

The Kerch Strait Bridge, a 19-kilometer road-rail crossing, opened to vehicular traffic on May 15, 2018, with the railway section commencing operations on December 27, 2019, facilitating direct land connectivity between Russia's and across the Sea of Azov. The structure supports a daily capacity of 40,000 vehicles and rail trains up to 7,100 tons, enhancing regional transport integration by linking the Azov coast to broader Russian networks. The Volga-Don Canal, operational since May 31, 1952, spans 101 kilometers and connects the Volga River basin to the Don River, providing a navigable link to the Sea of Azov and enabling inland waterway transport for bulk goods across European Russia. This Soviet-era infrastructure, incorporating 45 kilometers of reservoirs and rivers, supports vessels up to 5,000 tons, integrating the Azov with the Caspian Sea via the Volga. Post-2014 infrastructure initiatives on the Russian Azov coast have emphasized expansions and networks, including at Temryuk, Taman, and Kavkaz to accommodate larger vessels and increased cargo handling. Federal plans outline construction of 460 kilometers of new and upgrades to Azov Sea by 2029, prioritizing connectivity along the Krasnodar and Rostov regions to bolster logistical hubs. Energy infrastructure features the "Azov Ring" interconnection, linking power systems of Russia's Rostov region and annexed territories around the Sea of Azov, including , to unify distribution and support industrial loads on the eastern and southern coasts since the mid-2010s. Transneft-operated pipelines in the broader southern network transport oil from Azov-adjacent fields, though specific trunk lines directly skirting the sea remain limited compared to routes.

Historical Development

Prehistoric and Ancient Periods

Archaeological evidence reveals settlements in the northeastern region of the Sea of Azov, characterized by migratory processes of early neolithisation around the 6th millennium BCE, with sites such as Rakushechnyi Yar indicating multi-layered occupations tied to riverine and coastal adaptations. These early communities exploited the shallow coastal environments and deltaic zones of rivers like the Don for and initial , reflecting a transition from economies influenced by broader Pontic dynamics. From the 7th century BCE, nomads of Eastern Iranian origin dominated the steppes north of the , including the Azov littoral, establishing a pastoral economy reliant on , , and raids across the shallow sea's periphery. Their burials, often containing weapons, horse gear, and gold artifacts, attest to control over trade routes linking the sea to inland resources, with environmental adaptations including seasonal migrations to leverage the Azov's extensive shallows for and transport. By the BCE, Sarmatian tribes, successors to the , expanded into the Azov region, maintaining nomadic confederations that bordered the sea's coasts and interacted with emerging sedentary outposts through and conflict. Greek colonization intensified in the 3rd century BCE, with the establishing control over southern shores, founding the emporium of near the Don River's mouth as a multicultural trade hub blending Hellenic merchants, local nomads, and Sarmatian elements. , operational from circa 300 BCE, facilitated exports of grain from fertile steppes, salted fish from the productive shallows, and slaves captured by nomads, adapting to the sea's low depth—averaging 7 meters—for shallow-draft vessels and coastal fisheries that supported the kingdom's economic prosperity. The Bosporan rulers extended influence along both coasts, integrating Greek urban planning with nomadic alliances to exploit the sea's role as a conduit for commerce until Sarmatian pressures and internal declines eroded holdings by the CE.

Medieval and Early Modern Eras

During the 13th century, following the Mongol invasions that subjugated the Pontic-Caspian steppe by the 1240s, the Golden Horde exerted dominance over the Sea of Azov region, facilitating trade networks that linked Europe to Central Asia via overland routes converging at the Don River estuary. Genoese merchants, granted privileges by Horde khans such as Möngke Temür in the 1260s, established the colony of Tana near modern Azov as a key emporium for furs, slaves, grains, and silks, serving as an easternmost outpost amid nomadic pastoral economies. Venetian competitors also operated there from around 1312, fostering a multicultural hub under Mongol suzerainty that balanced tribute payments with commercial autonomy, though tensions arose from piracy and Horde internal strife. Tana's prosperity waned with the Golden Horde's fragmentation after the 1350s Black Death and subsequent civil wars, culminating in Timur's sack of the colony in 1395, which disrupted Azov trade routes and shifted power to nomadic confederations like the Nogai Horde. By the early 15th century, Genoese presence persisted intermittently until the Ottoman Empire's expansion into the Black Sea periphery; in 1475, following the conquest of Genoese Crimea, Ottoman forces under Gedik Ahmed Pasha seized Tana-Azak, fortifying it as Azov Fortress to secure northern approaches and assert suzerainty over Turkic tribes, integrating the area into a defensive-sanctioned trade system amid slave-raiding economies. This Ottoman control, nominal over vassal khanates, prioritized naval patrols against piracy while exploiting the sea's shallows for grain exports, though nomadic incursions tested alliances. In the , the rise of Don Cossack communities along the river's lower reaches introduced persistent raiding pressures, with semi-autonomous hosts launching opportunistic attacks on Ottoman shipping and coastal settlements around by the 1550s, countering Turkic slave raids and disrupting suzerain trade dominance through lightweight chaika boats suited to the shallow waters. These incursions, driven by frontier autonomy rather than state directives, reflected causal imbalances in power—Ottoman garrisons strained by vast frontiers yielded to Cossack mobility, fostering shifting pacts where local beys occasionally tolerated for , until escalated naval responses in the late 1500s underscored the sea's role as a contested buffer.

Imperial Russian and Ottoman Conflicts

The Azov campaigns of 1695–1696 marked Tsar Peter I's initial bid for Russian access to the Sea of Azov amid the Russo-Turkish War of 1686–1700. In spring 1695, a Russian force of approximately 31,000 troops and 170 guns marched on the Ottoman fortress of Azov at the Don River's mouth but failed to capture it due to insufficient naval support for resupply and blockade. For the 1696 campaign, Peter constructed a fleet of over 2,000 vessels, including galleys and prams with shallow drafts adapted to the sea's average depth of 7 meters, enabling effective siege logistics from the Don and supporting a land assault that compelled Ottoman surrender on July 29. This victory temporarily opened Azov as a Russian base, though the fortress was relinquished in 1711 under the Treaty of Pruth following Swedish intervention in the Great Northern War. The Russo-Turkish War of 1735–1739 saw renewed Russian efforts to control , recaptured by the under General on June 16, 1736, after Ottoman forces abandoned the unfortified site amid broader Crimean raids. Russian operations again leveraged the sea's shallowness, deploying riverine flotillas of flat-bottomed boats for troop transport and supply across the Don-Azov nexus, bypassing Ottoman deep-water superiority in the Black Sea. The 1739 permitted to retain as a trading port without fortifications, reflecting logistical constraints that favored land-based access over permanent naval dominance. Under Catherine II, the 1768–1774 Russo-Turkish War solidified Russian hold on the Sea of Azov's northern shores through decisive campaigns, including the destruction of Ottoman fleets and fortifications along the coast. The sea's shallow profile constrained large Ottoman galleons, allowing Russian galley squadrons—drawing 1.5–2 meters—to dominate inland waters and support amphibious advances, such as the 1771 occupation of the . The , signed July 21, 1774, ceded the northern Azov littoral to Russia, granted Black Sea navigation rights, and established a over the , whose vassal status to the Ottomans had previously blocked Russian expansion. These gains shifted control dynamics, enabling fortified ports like and facilitating grain exports via the sea's accessible shallows.

Soviet Era and World Wars

During , the Sea of Azov remained largely insulated from major naval engagements as an internal waterway of the , though coastal areas supported defensive preparations amid broader operations against Ottoman forces. In , German Army Group South launched the Sea of Azov Offensive on September 12, 1941, as part of the advance into , encircling Soviet forces and reaching the sea's shores by late September, which facilitated Axis logistics and supply routes across the shallow waters.) The region experienced occupation from 1941 to 1943, with German forces exploiting coastal Bulgarian villages in the northern Azov area for administrative control and resource extraction, while Soviet counteroffensives, including the Sea of Azov Defensive Operation in September–October 1941, aimed unsuccessfully to disrupt the Axis bridgehead. By early 1943, advancing units reclaimed key Azov ports like , integrating the sea into broader Soviet liberation efforts in the Donbass. Under Soviet rule from the onward, the Sea of Azov became integral to industrialization drives, with the adjacent Donets Basin—centered on and —relying on Azov ports for and , enhancing regional economic linkage to southern waterways. Fishing was collectivized into state-managed kolkhozes (collective farms), transforming artisanal practices into industrialized operations that made the Azov the Soviet Union's most productive fishery by the mid-20th century, yielding high catches of species like sturgeon through coordinated brigades and mechanized fleets. Postwar reconstruction included major hydraulic engineering, notably the Tsimlyansk Reservoir's construction from 1950 to 1952 on the Don River, which regulated flows via the Volga-Don Shipping Canal but sharply reduced peak discharges, sediment delivery, and freshwater influx to the Azov, initiating long-term salinization and hydrological shifts by curtailing seasonal floods essential for estuarine ecosystems. This damming, completed amid Stalin-era priorities for power generation and navigation, amplified environmental pressures from upstream industrialization, altering the sea's shallow dynamics without immediate mitigation measures.

Post-Soviet Period to Present

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991, Russia and Ukraine inherited shared bordering territory along the Sea of Azov, with both states initially maintaining access and navigation rights as successor entities to the USSR's internal waters regime, though the sea's status transitioned to a bipartite arrangement without immediate delimitation disputes. This cooperative framework was codified in the Treaty between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, signed on December 24, 2003, by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Leonid Kuchma and ratified by both parliaments in 2004. The treaty designated the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait as historically internal waters of both nations, permitting unrestricted navigation for their commercial vessels while requiring mutual consent for foreign warships, and called for state border delimitation within the sea. Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014, following a disputed , granted de facto control over the 's eastern approaches and Crimean ports like , enabling systematic inspections, delays, and blockades of Ukrainian-flagged vessels transiting to Azov ports such as and Berdyansk, which reduced Ukrainian shipping volumes by up to 80% in subsequent years. These measures intensified maritime tensions, culminating in the clash on November 25, , when three Ukrainian naval vessels—a and two small armored boats—attempted routine passage from in the Black Sea to Azov ports; Russian ships rammed the lead tug, fired live rounds wounding three Ukrainian sailors, and seized all vessels along with 24 crew members, who were detained on charges of illegal border crossing. The incident prompted to declare and heightened NATO-Russia frictions, with Russia justifying the action as enforcement against unauthorized military transit under the 2003 treaty. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, involved rapid advances seizing Azov coastal cities including Berdyansk (March 18), (May 20 after siege), and (March 1), placing over 80% of the sea's shoreline under Russian occupation and severing Ukraine's direct maritime access. Russian forces blockaded the , suspended navigation for non-Russian or non-allied vessels, and repurposed captured Ukrainian ports for military logistics, with troop concentrations exceeding 20,000 in the region by mid-2022. Both nations denounced the 2003 treaty—Ukraine's in February 2023 and Russia's in June 2023—after which unilaterally declared the Sea of Azov its in December 2023, enforcing closures to unauthorized traffic amid ongoing combat operations. As of October 2025, Russian authorities maintain dominance, restricting navigation to approved Russian or proxy vessels while Ukrainian counteroffensives have not restored coastal access, resulting in persistent suspension of commercial transit and elevated risks from mines and strikes.

Economic Utilization

Fisheries and Aquaculture

The Sea of Azov's fisheries traditionally targeted species such as Black Sea roach (Rutilus rutilus heckelii), gobies, pike-perch (Sander lucioperca), and introduced mullets, with annual catches fluctuating between 25,000 and 103,000 tonnes in the Azov-Black Sea basin from 2001 to 2018, primarily by Russian vessels. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which granted control over key fishing zones previously comprising about 70% of Ukraine's Azov territory, Russian fisheries dominated operations, enforcing quotas that limited Ukrainian access and shifted harvest shares toward Russia. Ukrainian catches in the Azov alone reached 16,000 tonnes in 2019, down 25% from 2018, reflecting pre-war trends influenced by hydrological alterations like reduced river runoff from dams, which increased salinity and disadvantaged low-salinity tolerant species such as roach. Long-term declines in stocks, evident since the , stemmed primarily from , illegal unreported and unregulated (IUU) activities, and environmental shifts rather than excessive regulation, as management measures like species-specific bans on pike-perch and roach harvesting failed to curb depletion due to gaps. The 2022 Russian invasion suspended Ukrainian entirely in the Azov, reducing catches to zero by 2023 and exacerbating losses, though these acute disruptions overlaid chronic issues like dam-induced freshwater reductions that predated the conflict. Aquaculture efforts focus on species like so-iuy mullet (Planiliza haematocheilus), introduced in the 1970s and adapted for pen rearing, alongside limited shrimp and sturgeon farming, but production remains modest amid salinity fluctuations that hinder optimal growth conditions. Challenges include war-related disruptions to Black Sea export routes, which previously supported fishery values, and ongoing regulatory hurdles that prioritize conservation bans over sustainable intensification, potentially impeding recovery compared to environmental or conflict factors. Overall, while the 2022 conflict halted operations, empirical data indicate that stock declines were more causally linked to pre-existing overexploitation and hydrological engineering than to overregulation alone.

Maritime Trade and Shipping

The primary commodities transported via Sea of Azov ports include grain and from and Berdyansk on the Ukrainian side, alongside from on the Russian side. Pre-2022, these ports collectively handled approximately 20-25 million tons of annually, underscoring through shared routes to the . Shallow depths averaging 7 meters limit vessel drafts to a maximum of about 5 meters, restricting operations to smaller bulk carriers and requiring careful navigation of dredged channels. All shipping depends on the , where the bridge imposes additional constraints on vessel length (under 160 meters) and (under 33 meters). After Russia's February 2022 invasion, capture of Ukrainian Azov ports enabled Russian administration of trade routes, with blockades eliminating Ukrainian access and prompting rerouting to hubs like and Taman. Russian Azov-Don basin ports saw cargo volumes drop 32.7% in 2022 versus 2021, though occupied facilities have since exported seized Ukrainian grain and minerals, including over 300,000 tons of grain via Berdyansk. Ukrainian exports have pivoted to River alternatives and western ports, diminishing Azov reliance.

Resource Extraction and Industry

The lagoons, a hypersaline system in the northwestern Sea of Azov, support salt extraction through evaporation pans, a practice scaled industrially during the Soviet era with legacies in Crimean operations. Historical output from adjacent saltworks reached 24,000 tonnes annually in the , while Soviet development expanded capacity across multiple sites, though precise peak production volumes are sparsely documented beyond reserve estimates exceeding 200 million tonnes of extractable salts. Offshore natural gas fields in the Sea of Azov, explored primarily under Soviet geological surveys, include Ukraine's Skhidno-Kazantypske deposit with of 10 billion cubic meters, discovered by state firm . Pre-2014 Ukrainian production from Azov and Black Sea assets contributed modestly to national totals, with yielding 1.651 billion cubic meters of gas in 2013 to meet regional demand. Shoreline industries tied to Azov resources feature heavy manufacturing, notably the in , constructed in 1933 as a Soviet flagship facility producing up to 6 million tonnes of steel yearly pre-war via coking coal and processing linked to regional extraction. Russian ports like host chemical plants handling fertilizers and industrial compounds, exporting via Azov waterways alongside steel from facilities. Russia's 2022 disrupted joint Ukrainian-Russian ventures, destroying Azovstal infrastructure during the siege and shifting steel output under Russian administration with reduced capacity. Gas operations consolidated under Russian entities post-seizure, halting prior collaborations and prompting 2025 announcements of new Azov drilling to exploit contested fields.

Geopolitical and Strategic Dimensions

The primary legal framework governing the Sea of Azov and is the Between the Russian Federation and on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait, signed on December 24, 2003, by Presidents and and ratified by both states' parliaments in April 2004. Article 1 declares the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait as "historically of the Russian Federation and ," delimited along the state border between the two countries, thereby establishing them as shared internal waters rather than subject to the regime under Article 38 of the (UNCLOS). This bilateral arrangement prioritizes joint cooperation on navigation, fishing, and , granting to vessels flying the flags of and while requiring prior agreement for third-state vessels; it also authorizes mutual inspections of ships bound to or from Azov ports. Prior to 2014, the treaty facilitated practical cooperation, including coordinated navigation regimes and border demarcation efforts, with both states treating the waters as internal for their exclusive use absent external claims. Following Russia's annexation of Crimea in March 2014—unrecognized by Ukraine and most international actors—Russia asserted expanded control, invoking the treaty's historic internal waters clause to justify unilateral inspections and restrictions on Ukrainian-flagged vessels, while claiming the Kerch Strait as part of a historic bay enclosed by Crimea's Tuzla Island and the Russian Taman Peninsula. Ukraine contested these actions as violations of the treaty's equality principle, arguing that the annexation altered the shared status without mutual consent and that UNCLOS provisions on innocent passage in straits (Article 37) should apply to the Kerch Strait connecting to the Black Sea. Ukraine initiated proceedings against Russia under UNCLOS Annex VII in July 2016 at the (PCA), alleging breaches of coastal state rights in the Black Sea, Sea of Azov, and , including discriminatory inspections post-2014 that impeded Ukrainian navigation. In a February 2020 on preliminary objections, the tribunal rejected Russia's argument that the 2003 exclusively governed and thus precluded UNCLOS jurisdiction, affirming that disputes over treaty interpretation could involve UNCLOS where applicable, though it upheld Russia's objection on sea boundary delimitation due to prior declarations under UNCLOS Article 298. Separately, in the 2018 involving detained Ukrainian vessels, the International Tribunal for the (ITLOS) issued provisional measures in May 2019 ordering Russia to release the ships and crew, but did not rule on the merits of the waters' status, emphasizing urgency without prejudice to claims; Russia non-participated and did not comply fully. These outcomes remain non-enforced empirically, as Russia maintains the bilateral treaty's primacy and historic title overrides UNCLOS transit norms, while Ukraine seeks broader adjudication.

Territorial Claims and Disputes

The Sea of Azov and have been subject to overlapping territorial claims rooted in historical Russian imperial and Soviet-era control, contrasted with Ukraine's assertions of following in 1991. Russia maintains that the sea constitutes historically inherited from the and , where it exercised predominant administration over surrounding territories, including the establishment of key ports like in 1698 and Sevastopol's strategic extensions. This perspective views post-Soviet arrangements as extensions of prior continuity rather than concessions, emphasizing possession through military and infrastructural dominance, such as the 2018 completion of the linking to the Russian mainland. In 2003, Russia and Ukraine signed a bilateral treaty designating the Sea of Azov and Kerch Strait as shared internal waters, permitting free navigation for vessels of both states and requiring mutual consent for foreign ships. Russia interprets this agreement as affirming joint but subordinate usage under its historical primacy, particularly after annexing Crimea in 2014, which it claims grants exclusive control over the strait as proprietary waters. Ukrainian officials, however, argue the treaty was negotiated under Russian pressure amid threats to territorial integrity, rendering it invalid or at least violated by unilateral Russian actions like ship inspections and blockades starting in 2018. Ukraine asserts full sovereign rights over its Azov coastline and demands recognition of the as an international waterway under the , enabling without Russian veto. This claim aligns with post-1991 border delineations inherited from Soviet administrative lines, bolstered by Ukraine's 2016 initiation of arbitration at the challenging Russian encroachments. International bodies and most states reject Russia's 2014 annexation and subsequent assertions, viewing them as breaches of Ukraine's per UN resolutions, yet these positions lack enforcement mechanisms. Empirically, Russian military advances since February 2022 have established control over the sea's entirety through land connections to annexed regions in , , and oblasts, encircling Ukrainian access and enabling unrestricted naval operations without third-party intervention. This possession-based reality overrides legalistic disputes, as no naval coalition has contested Russian dominance, rendering free passage demands unenforceable absent superior force. The 2003 treaty persists on paper but functions asymmetrically, with regulating all transit, as demonstrated by the seizure of Ukrainian vessels and ongoing port isolations.

Military Conflicts and Control Dynamics

On November 25, 2018, Russian coast guard vessels intercepted three Ukrainian naval ships—a and two gunboats—attempting to transit the from the to the Sea of Azov, ramming the tugboat Yani Kapu and firing on the vessels, resulting in three wounded Ukrainian sailors, of the ships, and detention of 24 crew members. This confrontation escalated tensions, with blocking the strait and asserting dominance over Azov Sea access, effectively restricting Ukrainian maritime operations in the region. Following the full-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, Russian forces rapidly advanced to encircle the Sea of Azov coastline, capturing key Ukrainian-held ports such as Berdyansk in early March and besieging , which fell by May 20 after sustained and urban combat that destroyed much of the city. This land-based neutralized Ukrainian naval presence in the Azov, transforming the sea into a Russian operational zone by mid-2022, with minimal Ukrainian counter-sea actions until later drone innovations. Ukrainian forces have conducted targeted drone strikes against Russian naval assets in the , including an August 28, 2025, attack using aerial drones that damaged a Russian carrying cruise , marking the first confirmed such strike on a in the sea. Despite these operations, which inflicted localized losses, Russian air and naval superiority persists, supported by relocated elements and shore-based defenses, preventing Ukrainian reclamation of waters. By October 2025, Russian control enables sustained logistics to fronts via ports like and Berdyansk, facilitating ammunition and reinforcement flows to occupied eastern territories amid ongoing advances in . Western , including anti-ship systems and drones, has bolstered Ukrainian asymmetric strikes but failed to disrupt Russian dominance, as aid prioritization on land offensives and delays in maritime capabilities limited sea theater impacts.

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