Hubbry Logo
FatalismFatalismMain
Open search
Fatalism
Community hub
Fatalism
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Fatalism
Fatalism
Fatalism
View on Wikipedia
from Wikipedia

Destiny, painting by T. C. Gotch (1885–1886), Adelaide, Art Gallery of South Australia

Fatalism is a belief[1] and philosophical doctrine[2][3] which considers the entire universe as a deterministic system and stresses the subjugation of all events, actions, and behaviors to fate or destiny, which is commonly associated with the consequent attitude of resignation in the face of future events which are thought to be inevitable and outside of human control.[1][2][3][4]

Definition

[edit]

The term "fatalism" can refer to any of the following ideas:

  • Broadly, any view according to which human beings are powerless to do anything other than what they actually do.[1][2][3][4] Included in this is the belief that all events are decided by fate and are outside human control, hence humans have no power to influence the future or indeed the outcome of their own thoughts and actions.[1][3][4][5]

More specifically:

  • Theological fatalism, according to which free will is incompatible with the existence of an omniscient God who has foreknowledge of all future events.[6] This is very similar to theological determinism.[a]
  • Logical fatalism, according to which propositions about the future which we take to currently be either true or false can only be true or false if future events are already determined.[2]
  • Causal determinism, which is usually treated as distinct from fatalism, on the grounds that it requires only the determination of each successive state in a system by that system's prior state, rather than the final state of a system being predetermined.[2]
  • The view that the appropriate reaction to the inevitability of some future event is acceptance or resignation, rather than resistance. For instance, 19th-century German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche discusses what he calls "Turkish fatalism" (Türkenfatalismus) in his essay The Wanderer and His Shadow (1880),[4] where he makes no distinction between the terms "fate" and "fatalism".[4] This view is closer to everyday use of the word "fatalism" and parallels defeatism.[1][4]

Religion

[edit]

Throughout history, the belief that the entire universe is a deterministic system subject to the will of fate or destiny has been articulated in both Eastern and Western religions, philosophy, music, and literature.[1][2][3][4][5]

The ancient Arabs that inhabited the Arabian Peninsula before the advent of Islam used to profess a widespread belief in fatalism (ḳadar) alongside a fearful consideration for the sky and the stars as divine beings, which they held to be ultimately responsible for every phenomenon that occurs on Earth and for the destiny of humankind.[7] Accordingly, they shaped their entire lives in accordance with their interpretations of astral configurations and phenomena.[7]

In the I Ching and philosophical Taoism, the ebb and flow of favorable and unfavorable conditions suggests the path of least resistance is effortless (see: Wu wei). In the philosophical schools of the Indian Subcontinent, the concept of karma deals with similar philosophical issues to the Western concept of determinism. Karma is understood as a spiritual mechanism which causes the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra).[8] Karma, either positive or negative, accumulates according to an individual's actions throughout their life, and at their death determines the nature of their next life in the cycle of Saṃsāra.[8] Most major religions originating in India hold this belief to some degree, most notably Hinduism,[8] Jainism, Sikhism, and Buddhism.

The views on the interaction of karma and free will are numerous, and diverge from each other greatly. For example, in Sikhism, god's grace, gained through worship, can erase one's karmic debts, a belief which reconciles the principle of karma with a monotheistic god one must freely choose to worship.[9] Jainists believe in a sort of compatibilism, in which the cycle of Saṃsara is a completely mechanistic process, occurring without any divine intervention. The Jains hold an atomic view of reality, in which particles of karma form the fundamental microscopic building material of the universe.

Ājīvika

[edit]

In ancient India, the Ājīvika school of philosophy founded by Makkhali Gosāla (around 500 BCE), otherwise referred to as "Ājīvikism" in Western scholarship,[10] upheld the Niyati ("Fate") doctrine of absolute fatalism or determinism,[10][11][12] which negates the existence of free will and karma, and is therefore considered one of the nāstika or "heterodox" schools of Indian philosophy.[10][11][12] The oldest descriptions of the Ājīvika fatalists and their founder Gosāla can be found both in the Buddhist and Jaina scriptures of ancient India.[10][12] The predetermined fate of all sentient beings and the impossibility to achieve liberation (mokṣa) from the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra) was the major distinctive philosophical and metaphysical doctrine of this heterodox school of Indian philosophy,[10][11][12] annoverated among the other Śramaṇa movements that emerged in India during the Second urbanization (600–200 BCE).[10]

Buddhism

[edit]
Part of a series on
Buddhist philosophy
Traditions
Themes
Pre-modern philosophers
Modern philosophers

icon Religion portal

Philosophy portal
Main articles: Enlightenment in Buddhism and Two truths doctrine
Further information: Four stages of enlightenment, Sotāpanna, and Three marks of existence

Buddhist philosophy contains several concepts which some scholars describe as deterministic to various levels. However, the direct analysis of Buddhist metaphysics through the lens of determinism is difficult, due to the differences between European and Buddhist traditions of thought.[13]

One concept which is argued to support a hard determinism is the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) in the early Buddhist texts, which states that all phenomena (dharma) are necessarily caused by some other phenomenon, which it can be said to be dependent on, like links in a massive, never-ending chain; the basic principle is that all things (dharmas, phenomena, principles) arise in dependence upon other things, which means that they are fundamentally "empty" or devoid of any intrinsic, eternal essence and therefore are impermanent.[13][14] In traditional Buddhist philosophy, this concept is used to explain the functioning of the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra); all thoughts and actions exert a karmic force that attaches to the individual's consciousness, which will manifest through reincarnation and results in future lives.[13] In other words, righteous or unrighteous actions in one life will necessarily cause good or bad responses in another future life or more lives.[15] The early Buddhist texts and later Tibetan Buddhist scriptures associate dependent arising with the fundamental Buddhist doctrines of emptiness (śūnyatā) and non-self (anattā).[13][14]

Another Buddhist concept which many scholars perceive to be deterministic is the doctrine of non-self (anattā).[13] In Buddhism, attaining enlightenment involves one realizing that neither in humans nor any other sentient beings is there a fundamental core of permanent being, identity, or personality which can be called the "soul", and that all sentient beings (including humans) are instead made of several, constantly changing factors which bind them to the eternal cycle of birth, death, and rebirth (saṃsāra).[13][14] Sentient beings are composed of the five aggregates of existence (skandha): matter, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.[13] In the Saṃyutta Nikāya of the Pāli Canon, the historical Buddha is recorded as saying that "just as the word 'chariot' exists on the basis of the aggregation of parts, even so the concept of 'being' exists when the five aggregates are available."[16] The early Buddhist texts outline different ways in which dependent origination is a middle way between different sets of "extreme" views (such as "monist" and "pluralist" ontologies or materialist and dualist views of mind-body relation).[17] In the Kaccānagotta Sutta of the Pāli Canon (SN 12.15, parallel at SA 301), the historical Buddha stated that "this world mostly relies on the dual notions of existence and non-existence" and then explains the right view as follows:[18]

But when you truly see the origin of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of non-existence regarding the world. And when you truly see the cessation of the world with right understanding, you won't have the notion of existence regarding the world.[19]

Some Western scholars argue that the concept of non-self necessarily disproves the ideas of free will and moral responsibility.[13][20] If there is no autonomous self, in this view, and all events are necessarily and unchangeably caused by others, then no type of autonomy can be said to exist, moral or otherwise.[20] However, other scholars disagree, claiming that the Buddhist conception of the universe allows for a form of compatibilism.[13] Buddhism perceives reality occurring on two different levels: the ultimate reality, which can only be truly understood by the enlightened ones, and the illusory or false reality of the material world, which is considered to be "real" or "true" by those who are ignorant about the nature of metaphysical reality; i.e., those who still haven't achieved enlightenment.[13][14] Therefore, Buddhism perceives free will as a notion belonging to the illusory belief in the unchanging self or personhood that pertains to the false reality of the material world, while concepts like non-self and dependent origination belong to the ultimate reality; the transition between the two can be truly understood, Buddhists claim, by one who has attained enlightenment.[13][14][20]

Determinism and predeterminism

[edit]

While the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, fatalism, determinism, and predeterminism are distinct, as each emphasizes a different aspect of the futility of human will or the foreordination of destiny. However, all these doctrines share common ground.

Determinists generally agree that human actions affect the future but that human action is itself determined by a causal chain of prior events. Their view does not accentuate a "submission" to fate or destiny, whereas fatalists stress an acceptance of future events as inevitable. Determinists believe the future is fixed specifically due to causality; fatalists and predeterminists believe that some or all aspects of the future are inescapable but, for fatalists, not necessarily due to causality.[21]

Fatalism is a looser term than determinism. The presence of historical "indeterminisms" or chances, i.e. events that could not be predicted by sole knowledge of other events, is an idea still compatible with fatalism. Necessity (such as a law of nature) will happen just as inevitably as a chance—both can be imagined as sovereign.[2] This idea has roots in Aristotle's work, "De interpretatione".[22]

Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows the entire future infallibly, then no human act is free.[23] The early Islamic philosopher, Al Farabi, makes the case that if God does in fact know all human actions and choices, then Aristotle's original solution to this dilemma stands.[24]

Idle argument

[edit]

One famous ancient argument regarding fatalism was the so-called Idle Argument. It argues that if something is fated, then it would be pointless or futile to make any effort to bring it about. The Idle Argument was described by Origen and Cicero and it went like this:

  • If it is fated for you to recover from this illness, then you will recover whether you call a doctor or not.
  • Likewise, if you are fated not to recover, you will not do so whether you call a doctor or not.
  • But either it is fated that you will recover from this illness, or it is fated that you will not recover.
  • Therefore, it is futile to consult a doctor.[25][26]

The Idle Argument was anticipated by Aristotle in his De Interpretatione chapter 9. The Stoics considered it to be a sophism and the Stoic Chrysippus attempted to refute it by pointing out that consulting the doctor would be as much fated as recovering. He seems to have introduced the idea that in cases like that at issue two events can be co-fated, so that one cannot occur without the other.[27]

Logical fatalism and the argument from bivalence

[edit]

Arguments for logical fatalism go back to antiquity. The argument from bivalence depends not on causation or physical circumstances but rather is based on logical truths and metaphysical necessity. There are numerous versions of this argument, including those by Aristotle[28] and Richard Clyde Taylor.[5]

The key idea of logical fatalism is that there exists necessarily true or false future describing propositions, or statements about what is going to happen in the future, and that there is something metaphysically necessary about the truth value of these statements.[2] So, for example, if it is true today that tomorrow there will be a sea battle, then there cannot fail to be a sea battle tomorrow, since otherwise it would not be true today that such a battle will take place tomorrow.

There are two main forms of responses to logical fatalism.[29] The first response is concerned with logical fatalism's reliance on the principle of bivalence, which says that a proposition is necessarily either true or false. If one wants to reject logical fatalism, one move to take is to reject that this principle applies to future describing propositions. Aristotle is famously attributed as making this move, though there are views that he does not.[2][30] This response works well with an A-theory of time, which says that time is fundamentally tensed, and events can be classified as past, present, and perhaps, future.[31] A-theory supports views of time that say that the future does not yet exist, like presentism. Relating to logical fatalism, If the future is considered to be undetermined, meaning that the truth value of a statement can only be determined once the event occurs, then the principle of bivalence can be rejected.[32] However, the B-theory of time sees the past and future as being just as real as the present. On a B-theory of time, future facts do exist, and therefore the solution to reject the principle of bivalence on the grounds of undetermined future propositions does not work.[2]

The second response can be attributed to William of Ockham, and is often called the Ockhamist Response.[29][33] This response, essentially, challenges the idea that we cannot affect the past truth of future describing propositions.[29] The truth value of propositions describing the future, then, may not be as metaphysically necessary as we think.[2][33]

The argument for logical fatalism and its responses relate closely to the problem of future contingents. There are responses to this problem that allow one to also overcome logical fatalism. The third truth value view says that future contingents can have a third value which is beyond truth or falsity.[34] The all-false view says that all future contingents are false.[34]

Criticism

[edit]

Semantic equivocation

[edit]

One criticism comes from the novelist David Foster Wallace, who in a 1985 paper "Richard Taylor's Fatalism and the Semantics of Physical Modality" suggests that Richard Taylor reached his conclusion of fatalism only because his argument involved two different and inconsistent notions of impossibility.[35] Wallace did not reject fatalism per se, as he wrote in his closing passage, "if Taylor and the fatalists want to force upon us a metaphysical conclusion, they must do metaphysics, not semantics. And this seems entirely appropriate."[35] Willem deVries and Jay Garfield, both of whom were advisers on Wallace's thesis, expressed regret that Wallace never published his argument.[35] In 2010, the thesis was, however, published posthumously as Time, Fate, and Language: An Essay on Free Will.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Fatalism

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
Fatalism is the philosophical doctrine asserting that all events are fated or predetermined, rendering human actions incapable of altering the inevitable course of future occurrences, in contrast to which emphasizes causal chains rather than fixed necessity. This view implies a profound resignation to destiny, where individuals perceive no genuine power over outcomes, as the future is as unchangeable as the past. The concept of fatalism has deep historical roots, tracing back to ancient Greek philosophy, particularly Aristotle's discussion in De Interpretatione (chapter 9), where he examines the logical implications of future-tense statements, such as whether a sea battle will occur tomorrow, arguing that their truth values entail inevitability. This early formulation, known as the "sea-battle argument," laid the groundwork for ongoing debates about whether truths about the future constrain human agency. Over centuries, fatalism influenced Stoic thought, medieval theologians like William of Ockham, whose ideas on divine foreknowledge inspired later distinctions between "hard" and "soft" facts, and modern philosophers such as Richard Taylor, who revived logical arguments for its validity. Fatalism manifests in several distinct types, primarily logical and theological. Logical fatalism posits that since every proposition about the future is either true or false (per the ), future events are already settled and unavoidable, independent of causal mechanisms. Theological fatalism, conversely, arises from the belief in an omniscient deity whose foreknowledge fixes all events, creating an incompatibility with libertarian , as God's prior knowledge of an action precludes alternative possibilities. A third variant, sometimes called causal or metaphysical fatalism, overlaps with but emphasizes an overarching necessity beyond mere causation, though it is often critiqued for conflating inevitability with predetermination. Philosophically, fatalism poses significant challenges to concepts of and , suggesting that deliberation and choice are illusory since outcomes remain fixed regardless of intent. Critics, including himself, have proposed solutions like denying truth values to future contingents or restricting divine to avoid necessity, yet the persists in contemporary discussions of time, truth, and agency. Beyond philosophy, fatalism appears in cultural and psychological contexts, such as attitudes toward or trauma, where it manifests as a in uncontrollable external forces shaping destiny.

Core Concepts

Definition

Fatalism is a philosophical asserting that all events are fixed in advance and inevitable, rendering actions powerless to alter their outcomes, regardless of effort or . This view posits that the is unchangeable, leading to a of toward what is deemed predestined. The term "fatalism" derives from the Latin fatalis, meaning "fated" or "destined," which stems from fatum ("that which is spoken" by the gods, or destiny), and traces its conceptual roots to the notion of moira (portion or fate allotted by the gods). In this framework, events possess an inherent inevitability that contrasts sharply with contingency, where outcomes could vary based on choices or circumstances; for instance, while is often cited as a paradigmatic fatalistic inevitability—unavoidable for all humans despite medical or lifestyle interventions—historical events like the occurrence of a predicted catastrophe are similarly viewed as unalterable once fated. Philosophers distinguish varieties of fatalism, including hard fatalism, which maintains total inevitability where no aspect of events or paths can be influenced, and soft fatalism, which allows for variability in the means or processes leading to an unavoidable end result. Unlike , which explains events through causal chains from prior conditions, fatalism specifically underscores the futility of intervention without requiring such causal explanations. Fatalism is often confused with , but the two concepts diverge significantly in their implications for human agency. asserts that every event, including human actions, is causally necessitated by preceding states of the universe and the laws of nature, forming an unbroken chain where choices are determined yet integral to outcomes. In contrast, fatalism posits that specific future events are fixed and inevitable, rendering human efforts irrelevant to altering them, regardless of causal mechanisms. This distinction highlights fatalism's emphasis on unchangeable endpoints over the interconnected causal processes central to . Predeterminism, a variant of , maintains that all events are fixed in advance by prior conditions or a divine plan, often implying a complete preordained sequence from the universe's outset. , however, focuses on the practical unavoidability of certain outcomes without necessarily requiring an explanatory prior causation or divine agent; it can arise from logical, metaphysical, or even probabilistic considerations alone. Thus, while embeds inevitability within a comprehensive causal framework, fatalism prioritizes the futility of intervention, independent of how the fixed future is established. Predestination, primarily a theological , involves divine foreordination of events, particularly or , by a personal who decrees outcomes in accordance with and . Unlike predestination's reliance on a rational, intentional causer, fatalism can be entirely secular, attributing inevitability to impersonal forces, logical truths, or chance without moral purpose. , in his discussion of future contingents, exemplified this boundary by rejecting fatalistic necessity for events like sea battles, arguing that while some things are necessary in the present, future possibilities remain open to choice and accident, distinguishing fate's apparent fixity from absolute necessity. Regarding free will, fatalism typically undermines its efficacy by suggesting that predetermined outcomes nullify the impact of voluntary actions, aligning with incompatibilist views that equate such inevitability with the absence of genuine alternatives. Incompatibilists argue that if fatalistic fixedness holds, —understood as the ability to do otherwise—is illusory, as efforts cannot avert the destined result.

Historical Origins

In Ancient Thought

In , the concept of fatalism emerged prominently through discussions of necessity and future events. , in Chapter 9 of , addressed the problem of future contingents, using the example of a potential sea battle to argue against deterministic implications. He posited that if a statement about a future event, such as "There will be a sea battle tomorrow," were already true or false in the present, it would render the event necessary, leading to fatalism where human actions lack contingency. To counter this, suggested that such propositions about future contingents neither affirm nor deny definitively at present, preserving the possibility of alternative outcomes and avoiding the necessity that all truths imply inevitability. The Stoics developed a more affirmative view of fate, integrating it into their cosmology as heimarmenē, a rational chain of causes governing the universe under . , a key Stoic thinker, described fate not as blind necessity but as an interconnected sequence where every event follows logically from prior causes, yet compatible with human agency through assent to impressions. This framework emphasized living in harmony with the cosmic order, viewing resistance to fate as futile. In opposition, the Epicureans rejected such to safeguard , introducing the concept of atomic swerves—random deviations in the motion of atoms that introduce indeterminacy into the material world, preventing a rigid causal chain that would necessitate all outcomes. Roman philosophy adapted these Greek ideas, with exploring the tension between fate and in his treatise De Fato. critiqued strict Stoic while sympathizing with its providential aspects, arguing that fate operates through secondary causes like human volition, allowing for without full predetermination. This balance is echoed in , particularly in ' Oedipus Rex, where the protagonist's doomed quest to evade a —killing his father and marrying his mother—illustrates tragic inevitability, as his efforts inadvertently fulfill the oracle's decree, highlighting fate's inexorable grip despite apparent choice. In Eastern traditions, early presented a dualistic framework contrasting fate with human choice, emphasizing in the cosmic battle between good () and evil (Angra Mainyu). Zoroaster's teachings in the Gathas stress that individuals possess to align with truth and , countering any fatalistic resignation by portraying destiny as shaped through deliberate ethical decisions rather than unalterable decree. This perspective underscores a tension where cosmic forces predetermine the ultimate victory of good, yet personal actions determine one's role in that outcome.

In Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy

In the early medieval period, addressed the tension between divine foreknowledge and human freedom in his Consolation of Philosophy, arguing that God's eternal perspective transcends temporal sequence, viewing all events simultaneously without imposing necessity on future contingents. This Boethian solution to theological fatalism influenced subsequent thinkers by positing divine eternity as a means to preserve providence without . Medieval Islamic philosophy further developed these ideas, with (Ibn Sina) positing that divine foreknowledge entails necessity through the causal chain from the Necessary Existent (), viewing all events as metaphysically necessary via complete causes, though future contingents appear epistemically contingent due to incomplete knowledge of causes. (Ibn Rushd), critiquing aspects of Avicenna's , maintained that 's knowledge of particulars is unchanging and universal, avoiding fatalism by distinguishing divine intellect from temporal causation, thus reconciling necessity with human agency in Aristotelian terms. Thomas Aquinas synthesized these influences in Christian theology, distinguishing fate as the order of secondary causes under divine providence, which governs all things without negating free will or contingency. In the Summa Theologica, Aquinas argued that providence directs events to their ends through instrumental causes, including human choices, thereby rejecting pagan fatalism while affirming God's sovereign knowledge. During the Renaissance and early modern era, Baruch Spinoza advanced a pantheistic determinism in his Ethics, where God or Nature operates through strict necessity, rendering all outcomes inevitable extensions of divine substance, a view interpreted as fatalistic due to the absence of contingency or free will. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, in contrast, proposed pre-established harmony in his Monadology, wherein God synchronizes independent monads from creation, implying fixed outcomes across substances without direct interaction or causal fatalism. Key debates in this period centered on Boethius's versus temporal foreknowledge, extending into scholastic discussions on whether divine prescience compels events, with Aquinas and others affirming to counter fatalistic implications. By the 17th and 18th centuries, philosophy shifted toward secular fatalism, as seen in Enlightenment critiques where thinkers like emphasized mechanistic necessity in nature over providential design, fostering a view of inexorable historical and natural forces independent of . This philosophical evolution impacted culture, notably in literature, where Shakespeare's tragic heroes, such as and , confront inexorable fate as a blend of personal flaw and cosmic inevitability, reflecting early modern anxieties about amid .

Fatalism in Religions

In Indian Traditions

In Indian philosophical and religious traditions, fatalism manifests prominently through the school, an ancient heterodox sect founded by around the 6th century BCE. The espoused the doctrine of niyati, or absolute , asserting that all events, actions, and experiences are inexorably preordained by cosmic fate, rendering human effort, karma, and entirely futile. This view explicitly rejected the efficacy of karma as a causal force, positing instead that beings undergo a fixed cycle of transmigration across 8,400,000 great eons until inevitable purification through alone, without any possibility of acceleration via ethical conduct or ascetic practices. Buddhism, emerging contemporaneously, mounted a direct critique of such fatalistic doctrines in its foundational texts, particularly the Samaññaphala Sutta (DN 2) of the , where refutes Makkhali Gosala's teachings during a discourse with King Ajātasattu. Gosala's position is portrayed as denying causality in moral defilement and purification, claiming that beings are inherently depraved or pure without influence from actions, which the Buddha counters by affirming dependent origination and the role of intentional deeds in shaping outcomes. In Buddhism, this rejection extends to distinguishing kamma (volitional action) from fatalism: kamma operates as a of moral causation where past actions condition the present, but present choices actively determine the future, preserving ethical responsibility and the potential for liberation through the rather than passive resignation to destiny. Jainism and Hinduism also engage with fatalistic ideas, though typically in tension with their core emphasis on karma. The concept of daivavāda, or the supremacy of divine fate, appears in Hindu epics like the , where characters such as Karṇa and Yudhiṣṭhira debate whether outcomes stem from inexorable destiny (daiva) ordained by gods or from human exertion (puruṣakāra). Here, daivavāda underscores fate as the fruition of accumulated karma from prior lives, potentially overriding current efforts, yet the epic consistently contrasts this with the empowering doctrine of karma, which holds that righteous actions can mitigate or alter fateful consequences, as exemplified in Kṛṣṇa's counsel in the (embedded within the ). In Jainism, similar notions of predestined karma (niyati or daiva) bind the soul through subtle karmic matter, but texts like the Tattvārtha Sūtra stress that ascetic discipline and right knowledge can purify these bonds, rejecting pure fatalism in favor of gradual emancipation via personal endeavor. The historical dissemination of fatalistic thought in India is illustrated by its encounter with state policy under Emperor Aśoka (r. 268–232 BCE), whose rock and pillar edicts, inscribed after his conversion to Buddhism, implicitly repudiate extreme fatalism by advocating vigorous moral effort (dhammānusāthi) and interfaith tolerance while promoting active pursuit of ethical conduct over passive acceptance of fate. Aśoka's patronage of diverse sects, including limited support for Ājīvikas via cave donations (as in the Barābar inscriptions), coexisted with his broader endorsement of Buddhist principles that denounce determinism, as seen in edicts urging self-control, non-violence, and welfare activities to foster societal progress—directly countering niyati's inertia. Later accounts in texts like the Aśokāvadāna depict Aśoka suppressing Ājīvika communities, reflecting a royal rejection of their doctrines in favor of action-oriented dharma.

In Abrahamic Faiths

In , the concept of , often intertwined with notions of , is reflected in scriptural texts such as the Book of Ecclesiastes, which describes an appointed order to human affairs: "To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven" (Ecclesiastes 3:1). This passage suggests that events like birth and death occur according to a divine timetable beyond human control, emphasizing God's sovereignty over time and outcomes. Talmudic scholars, building on these ideas, engaged in debates reconciling divine foreknowledge with human agency, as encapsulated in Rabbi Akiva's statement in : "All is foreseen, yet is given," indicating that while God oversees all, individuals retain . Ancient Jewish sects, as reported by , further illustrated this tension; affirmed that fate determines all things except human choices in good and evil, rejected fate entirely in favor of , and leaned toward a stronger deterministic view where nothing occurs without divine causation. In , early theological developments on appear in Augustine of Hippo's City of God, where he explores the origins of wills, arguing that God's eternal knowledge and will govern the destinies of rational beings, including angels and humans, without implying coercion but through . Augustine posits that human arises from a free but defective will, yet ultimate depends on God's predestining , as he elaborates that "what He has predestined to life, He has given such things" in the earthly city contrasted with the heavenly. Later, in the era, John Calvin's doctrine of double predestination—outlined in his —extended this to assert that God eternally decrees some to and others to , not based on foreseen merit but sovereign will, a view critics have labeled a fatalistic extreme for seemingly negating human effort. Calvin maintains this decree upholds God's glory, as "He compacted with himself what he willed to become of each man," though he distinguishes it from pagan fatalism by affirming moral accountability. In Islam, the doctrine of qadar (divine decree) underscores God's predetermination of all events, as articulated in Quranic verses such as "No disaster strikes upon the earth or among yourselves except that it is in a register before We bring it into being—indeed that, for Allah, is easy" (Quran 57:22), affirming Allah's omniscience and preordainment of fate. The Ash'arite school, a dominant Sunni theological tradition, reconciles qadar with human responsibility through the concept of kasb (acquisition), whereby God creates all actions, but humans "acquire" them via their intentions, thus preserving moral agency without impinging on divine omnipotence. In opposition, the Mu'tazilite school rejected such determinism as fatalistic, insisting on absolute human free will to uphold divine justice, arguing that God delegates power to humans for their deeds, as evil cannot originate from a perfect Creator. This scriptural emphasis on providence is exemplified in the Biblical story of Joseph (Genesis 37–50), where apparent misfortunes—betrayal by brothers and enslavement—serve God's overarching plan to preserve life during famine, as Joseph declares, "You intended to harm me, but God intended it for good" (Genesis 50:20), illustrating divine orchestration over human actions.

In Other Religious Contexts

In , the concept of fate was embodied by deities such as , the god who personified destiny and determined an individual's lifespan and fortune from birth, often depicted as an inescapable force guiding human affairs. Accompanying were , who assigned prosperity or misfortune, and Meskhenet, who decreed and occupation, collectively underscoring a predeterministic where personal agency was subordinate to divine allocation. This fatalistic framework intertwined with Ma'at, the principle of cosmic order, truth, and balance, which ensured that all events, including afterlife judgments, maintained an inevitable harmony; the weighing of the heart against Ma'at's feather in the revealed whether one's life aligned with this order, leading to unalterable outcomes of eternal life or annihilation. Norse mythology presents a stark fatalistic tradition through the Norns—Urd, Verdandi, and —who resided at the Well of Urd beneath and wove the threads of fate () for all beings, including gods, rendering destinies immutable and beyond alteration. Their weaving symbolized the inexorable progression of events, where even the gods' efforts could not defy the predetermined course, as exemplified by , the apocalyptic battle foretold in the as an unavoidable doom that would culminate in the world's destruction and renewal. This emphasis on inescapable fate permeated , portraying human and divine actions as threads already spun, with no recourse against the Norns' decree. In , an African tradition, fatalism manifests through the orishas—divine spirits who govern natural forces and human lives—and the concept of ori, the personal head or inner destiny chosen by the soul before incarnation, which dictates one's life path, successes, and challenges. The concept of ori has been interpreted by some scholars as implying elements of fatalism, functioning as a destined blueprint ordained by Olodumare, the supreme deity, though others emphasize human agency through rituals like divination via that can reveal and influence its effects. Similarly, the , a foundational Mandinka oral tradition from , embodies fatalism through prophetic visions from soothsayers and griots that foretell the hero's physical afflictions, exile, and ultimate triumph as king of , illustrating how communal destiny unfolds inexorably despite human interventions. Modern syncretic traditions like Rastafarianism incorporate elements of divine by reinterpreting biblical prophecies of , suffering, and redemption within the context of colonial oppression, viewing the and systemic injustices as part of a divinely ordained "Babylonian captivity" that (God) has planned to test and ultimately liberate the righteous. This perspective draws from narratives of divine sovereignty over history, framing colonial domination as an inevitable phase leading to to (Africa), where livity—righteous living—aligns believers with this cosmic timeline without altering its course.

Key Philosophical Arguments

Theological Fatalism

Theological fatalism posits that divine omniscience, particularly infallible foreknowledge of future human actions, renders those actions necessary and thus incompatible with human free will. The core argument proceeds as follows: if God knows with certainty that a person will perform a specific action at a future time, then that action must occur as foreknown, since divine knowledge cannot be false; consequently, the action is necessitated by God's prior knowledge, eliminating the possibility of alternative choices and undermining libertarian free will. This reasoning traces back to ancient concerns but gained prominence in Christian philosophy through figures like Boethius, who in The Consolation of Philosophy framed the dilemma as a tension between divine eternity and temporal human agency. A key variant is the foreknowledge paradox, which highlights the apparent causal fixity imposed by : even if 's knowledge does not actively cause the action, its infallibility ensures the action's inevitability, akin to how past truths constrain the present. Defenses against this often invoke 's timelessness, as articulated by , who argued that exists in an eternal present, perceiving all moments simultaneously without "fore" knowledge in a temporal sense—thus, divine awareness does not precede or determine human choices but coexists with them in eternity. Alvin Plantinga extended similar ideas in his , proposing that a timeless avoids the fatalistic implications of foreknowledge by knowing free actions as they occur within the divine perspective, preserving contingency without contradiction. These responses maintain that entails no necessity beyond what agents freely choose, linking theological fatalism to broader doctrines in Abrahamic traditions, where divine sovereignty is reconciled with human responsibility. The implications of theological fatalism extend to challenges against and : if outcomes are fixed by divine foreknowledge, prayers appear futile as supplicants cannot alter what God already knows, and moral accountability seems illusory since agents could not have acted otherwise. In Islamic theology, these issues fueled debates among Mu'tazilites, who prioritized human to uphold divine , and Ash'arites, who affirmed God's comprehensive knowledge (including future acts) while arguing it does not coerce choices, as divine encompasses possibilities without predetermining them. For instance, Ash'arite thinkers like al-Ash'ari maintained that God's eternal knowledge of human actions affirms their reality without implying fatalistic necessity, thereby safeguarding in the face of .

Logical Fatalism

Logical fatalism posits that the future is inevitably fixed due to the logical necessity of truth values for statements about future events, independent of causal or divine factors. This doctrine arises primarily from the principle of bivalence, which asserts that every proposition has exactly one of two truth values: true or false. Applied to future contingents—statements about events that may or may not occur—it implies that such propositions must already possess determinate truth values in the present, rendering the events they describe unavoidable. The argument's classical formulation appears in Aristotle's De Interpretatione (Chapter 9), where he discusses the proposition "There will be a sea battle tomorrow." Under bivalence, this statement is either true or false now; if true, the battle is inevitable, and if false, its negation ("There will not be a sea battle tomorrow") is true, making the absence of the battle inevitable. Aristotle illustrates this with the example: "A sea-fight must either take place tomorrow or not, but it is not necessary that it should take place tomorrow, neither is it necessary that it should not take place." He rejects the fatalist conclusion by denying bivalence for future contingents, arguing that assigning truth values prematurely eliminates contingency. The logical structure rests on two key premises: (1) bivalence holds for all propositions, including those about the future; and (2) if a future-directed proposition is true at present, the event it describes is necessary (since what is true cannot fail to obtain). This entails that all future events are determined now, eliminating genuine alternatives. Diodorus Cronus later refined this into the "Master Argument," a demonstrating the inconsistency of denying fatalism. The argument, as reported by , challenges the conjunction of three propositions: (1) every past truth is necessary (the past cannot be altered); (2) an impossibility cannot follow from a possibility; and (3) there exists something possible that neither is nor will be true (e.g., a statement like "You will answer the door tomorrow" when you will not). Accepting (1) and (2) forces the rejection of (3), implying that all possibilities are actualized—nothing contingent remains possible—which yields fatalism. Critiques, such as those targeting the modal definitions in (2) and (3), highlight ambiguities in "possibility," but the argument underscores how enforces necessity on the future. In modern philosophy, Jan Łukasiewicz proposed three-valued logic as a direct response, introducing a third truth value—"indeterminate" or "possible" (often denoted as 1/2)—for future contingents to preserve contingency without violating logic. In this system, statements like "There will be a sea battle tomorrow" receive the indeterminate value until the event occurs, at which point it resolves to true or false; this avoids predetermining outcomes and blocks the fatalist inference from bivalence. Łukasiewicz's approach, developed in the early 20th century, influences supervaluationist and gap theories in semantics, emphasizing that future truths need not imply present necessity. The implications of logical fatalism extend to undermining the concept of contingency in human affairs, particularly rendering it incompatible with free will. If future actions are logically fixed by current truth values, agents cannot genuinely choose otherwise, as alternatives are illusory from the outset. This incompatibilist stance parallels but differs from causal determinism, focusing instead on semantic inevitability.

Idle Argument

The Idle Argument, also known as the Lazy Argument (Greek: argos logos), emerged in Hellenistic philosophy as a critique of fatalism, highlighting the supposed futility of human effort when outcomes are predetermined. Although sometimes loosely associated with earlier dialecticians like Diodorus Cronus, it is primarily known through its presentation by opponents of Stoicism and is fully articulated in Cicero's De Fato (ca. 44 BCE), where it is used to challenge deterministic views. The core formulation runs as follows: If it is fated for a person to recover from an illness, they will recover whether or not they summon a physician; if fated not to recover, they will not, regardless of summoning one. Therefore, summoning the physician is pointless in either case, rendering all action idle. This dilemma presents two horns: abstaining from effort promotes and neglect of duties, while exerting effort leads to futility since fated results obtain independently of one's actions. Stoic philosophers, notably (c. 280–206 BCE), countered by distinguishing between simple (absolute) propositions about outcomes and conditional propositions linking fate to actions. They maintained that fate operates through interconnected causes, such that recovery might be fated conditionally upon consulting the physician—e.g., "it is fated that you will recover if and because you summon the doctor"—thus preserving the necessity and efficacy of effort without contradicting . The Idle Argument exerted lasting influence, shaping Cicero's analysis of fate and action in De Fato and informing subsequent Western debates on , where it underscored tensions between inevitability and agency—distinct from logical fatalism's focus on truth values by emphasizing practical consequences for behavior.

Criticisms and Responses

Major Objections

One major objection to fatalism centers on semantic equivocation in its foundational assumptions, particularly regarding the principle of bivalence—the idea that every is either true or false. In De Interpretatione chapter 9, critiques the application of bivalence to statements about future contingent events, such as whether a sea battle will occur tomorrow. He argues that assigning truth values to such propositions prematurely would imply that the is already fixed, leading to absurd fatalistic consequences like the inevitability of the event regardless of human action; instead, bivalence applies only to past and present matters, leaving future contingents neither definitively true nor false until they occur. This view has influenced modern theories of an open , exemplified by A.N. Prior's development of tense logic, which incorporates temporal operators (e.g., "it will be" and "it has been") to model time as branching and indeterminate, thereby rejecting fatalism's rigid timeline without denying logical consistency. Another key criticism distinguishes between causal necessity and mere logical necessity, challenging fatalism's conflation of foreknowledge with causation. , in his analysis of necessity, contends that the perception of causal connections arises from habitual associations in the mind rather than any inherent force in events themselves; thus, divine or predictive foreknowledge of an event does not causally determine it, as the foreknowledge depends on the event's occurrence rather than imposing it. This breaks the fatalistic chain by showing that logical entailment from true propositions about the future (e.g., " knows X will happen") does not equate to causal inevitability, allowing for contingency without contradiction. Empirical counterexamples further undermine fatalism by highlighting indeterminacy and contingency in reality. introduces genuine indeterminacy through phenomena like and superposition, where outcomes at the subatomic level are probabilistic rather than predetermined, challenging the notion of a fixed future trajectory that fatalism presupposes. On a , historical contingencies—such as the averted nuclear crisis during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, where diplomatic decisions could have led to vastly different outcomes—illustrate how events depend on unresolved possibilities, not inexorable fate. Ethically, fatalism faces objections for fostering passivity and undermining agency, as belief in an unalterable destiny may discourage action and . This potential for resignation is evident in cultural attitudes where fatalistic views lead to inaction amid suffering; however, offers an affirmative twist with his concept of ("love of fate"), which reinterprets inevitability not as defeatist surrender but as joyful affirmation of life's totality, including hardships, to cultivate greatness and active engagement.

Compatibilist Alternatives

Compatibilism, as a philosophical position, seeks to reconcile the apparent inevitability suggested by fatalistic doctrines with the preservation of human free will and moral responsibility. Pioneered by Thomas Hobbes, compatibilism posits that free will consists in the absence of external impediments to action, allowing individuals to act according to their desires even within a determined universe. Hobbes argued in Leviathan that liberty is compatible with necessity because actions are free insofar as they proceed from the agent's internal motivations without coercion. Similarly, David Hume developed this view by defining liberty as the power to act or forbear in accordance with the will, emphasizing that necessity arises from constant conjunctions in nature rather than undermining agency. Hume contended that human actions follow predictable patterns akin to physical laws, yet this does not negate freedom, as deliberation and choice remain integral to voluntary behavior. Some compatibilist approaches further refine this reconciliation by maintaining that while certain outcomes may be inevitable, the means or paths to those outcomes remain open to agent influence, allowing for conditional analyses of : an agent can do otherwise if, under relevant circumstances, they were to choose differently. Although critiqued such analyses in his work on , arguing they fail to capture genuine alternative possibilities, compatibilists like R.E. Hobart and adapted the conditional framework to affirm that freedom involves the hypothetical capacity for alternative actions absent determining constraints. In this view, fatalistic inevitability pertains only to ends, not the deliberative processes leading to them, thereby preserving agency. Contemporary compatibilist approaches extend these ideas, often integrating to explain how agency emerges despite deterministic or fatalistic elements. , in his evolutionary compatibilism, argues that human freedom evolves through , enabling avoidance of predictable harms even in a causally closed world. argues that evolutionary processes equip organisms with competencies that mimic free choice, countering fatalistic resignation by emphasizing adaptive decision-making over predetermined doom. In contrast, offers an alternative by rejecting altogether through agent causation, positing that agents as substances directly initiate undetermined actions, thereby evading fatalism's constraints on the future. Proponents like Robert Kane maintain that such at key decision points allows for genuine control, distinguishing libertarian views from compatibilist accommodations of necessity. These compatibilist alternatives carry practical implications that encourage proactive engagement rather than passive acceptance of fate. By framing inevitability as compatible with effortful action, they promote in uncertain contexts, as seen in where rational agents maximize expected utility within causal chains. For instance, even foreseeing probable outcomes does not preclude strategic choices, such as in models where determined players still pursue optimal paths to influence results. This perspective counters fatalistic inertia, fostering moral and practical responsibility by highlighting how individual agency contributes to unfolding events.

References

  1. https://philpapers.org/browse/fatalism
  2. https://philarchive.org/archive/TAYF
  3. https://philpapers.org/rec/ARIOI
  4. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265795357_Fatalism_Determinism_and_Free_Will_as_the_Axiomatic_Foundations_of_Rival_Moral_World_Views
  5. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC6735334/
  6. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fatalism/
  7. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fatalism
  8. https://www.etymonline.com/word/fatalist
  9. https://www.britannica.com/topic/fatalism
  10. https://www.oed.com/dictionary/fatalism_n
  11. https://study.com/academy/lesson/fatalism-ideas-types-examples.html
  12. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/determinism-causal/
  13. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
  14. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-ancient/
  15. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/incompatibilism-arguments/
  16. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/
  17. https://philarchive.org/rec/CARFAF-5
  18. https://iep.utm.edu/fut-cont/
  19. https://www.uvm.edu/~jbailly/courses/196Stoicism/notes/stoicFate.html
  20. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/cicero/de_fato_english.html
  21. https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/16/7/824
  22. https://web.viu.ca/johnstoi/introser/oedipus.htm
  23. https://philosophy.institute/religions-of-the-world/fate-free-will-zoroastrianism/
  24. https://www.avesta.org/antia/Philosophical_Justification_of_the_Concept_of_Free_Will_as_Taught_by_Zarathushtra.pdf
  25. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/14328/14328-h/14328-h.htm
  26. https://www.ccel.org/ccel/boethius/consolation.html
  27. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11346382/
  28. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26199485
  29. https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1116.htm
  30. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3800/3800-h/3800-h.htm
  31. https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/leibniz.htm
  32. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/651614
  33. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341669745_TREATMENT_OF_FATE_IN_SHAKESPEAREAN_AND_CLASSICAL_GREEK_TRAGEDIES_A_COMPARISON
  34. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html
  35. https://so06.tci-thaijo.org/index.php/Jiabu/article/view/219911
  36. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306268382_Karma_Theory_Determinism_Fatalism_and_Freedom_of_Will
  37. https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/dhammika/wheel386.html
  38. https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3230754/
  39. https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/providence
  40. https://www.newadvent.org/fathers/120112.htm
  41. https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/themelios/article/tensions-in-calvins-idea-of-predestination/
  42. https://yaqeeninstitute.org/read/paper/predestination-vs-free-will-in-islam-understanding-allahs-qadr
  43. https://dhspriory.org/kenny/Theol/T21.htm
  44. https://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/vol3-no2/introduction-ilm-al-kalam-murtadha-mutahhari/mutazilah
  45. https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/what-joseph-story-really-about/
  46. https://www.touregypt.net/featurestories/fate.htm
  47. https://ancientegyptonline.co.uk/shai/
  48. https://www.jstor.org/stable/41651173
  49. https://norse-mythology.org/concepts/destiny-wyrd-urd/
  50. https://blogs.goucher.edu/verge/files/2016/01/Blatter.pdf
  51. https://philarchive.org/archive/EVABAT-4
  52. https://aporia.byu.edu/pdfs/bylund-the_problem_of_theological_fatalism.pdf
  53. https://www.reasonablefaith.org/podcasts/defenders-podcast-series-3/s3-doctrine-of-god-attributes-of-god/doctrine-of-god-part-14
  54. https://isamveri.org/pdfdrg/D03380/2008_1_2/2008_1_2_YAVUZZ.pdf
  55. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333224013_The_Quranic_View_of_Omniscience_and_Human_Freedom
  56. http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/interpretation.1.1.html
  57. https://philpapers.org/rec/GROWAS-2
  58. https://philarchive.org/archive/PASDCA-4
  59. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20010685
  60. https://builds.openlogicproject.org/content/many-valued-logic/three-valued-logics/lukasiewicz.pdf
  61. https://philpapers.org/rec/PRITLA-5
  62. https://www.loebclassics.com/view/marcus_tullius_cicero-de_fato/1942/pb_LCL349.225.xml
  63. https://philpapers.org/rec/BOBFAA
  64. https://philpapers.org/rec/HRSACD
  65. https://academic.oup.com/book/3613/chapter/144921538
  66. https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/343646054.pdf
  67. https://philarchive.org/archive/ANDFAF-2
  68. https://repository.essex.ac.uk/1709/1/Nietzsche%20and%20Amor%20Fati.pdf
  69. https://iep.utm.edu/freewill/
  70. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/
  71. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-freewill/
  72. https://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/philosophers/vaninwagen/
  73. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/libertarian-accounts-of-free-will/
  74. https://selfawarepatterns.com/2014/02/17/free-will-and-the-value-of-compatibilism/
  75. https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:504043/FULLTEXT02.pdf
Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.