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Mamluk Sultanate
Mamluk Sultanate
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Key Information

The Mamluk Sultanate (Arabic: سلطنة المماليك, romanizedSalṭanat al-Mamālīk), also known as Mamluk Egypt or the Mamluk Empire, was a state that ruled Egypt, the Levant and the Hejaz from the mid-13th to early 16th centuries, with Cairo as its capital. It was ruled by a military caste of mamluks (freed slave soldiers) headed by a sultan. The sultanate was established with the overthrow of the Ayyubid dynasty in Egypt in 1250 and was conquered by the Ottoman Empire in 1517. Mamluk history is generally divided into the Turkic or Bahri period (1250–1382) and the Circassian or Burji period (1382–1517), called after the predominant ethnicity or corps of the ruling Mamluks during these respective eras.[6][7][8][9]

The first rulers of the sultanate hailed from the mamluk regiments of the Ayyubid sultan as-Salih Ayyub (r. 1240–1249), usurping power from his successor in 1250. The Mamluks under Sultan Qutuz and Baybars routed the Mongols in 1260, halting their southward expansion. They then conquered or gained suzerainty over the Ayyubids' Syrian principalities. Baybars also installed a surviving branch of the Abbasid dynasty in Cairo, who officially remained as caliphs and granted symbolic prestige to the sultanate. By the end of the 13th century, through the efforts of sultans Baybars, Qalawun (r. 1279–1290) and al-Ashraf Khalil (r. 1290–1293), the Mamluks had conquered the Crusader states, expanded into Makuria (Nubia), Cyrenaica, the Hejaz, and southern Anatolia. The sultanate then experienced a long period of stability and prosperity during the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1293–1294, 1299–1309, 1310–1341), before giving way to the internal strife characterizing the succession of his sons, when real power was held by senior emirs.

One such emir, Barquq, overthrew the sultan in 1382 and again in 1390, inaugurating Burji rule. Mamluk authority across the empire eroded under his successors due to foreign invasions, tribal rebellions, and natural disasters, and the state entered into a long period of financial distress. Under Sultan Barsbay, major efforts were taken to replenish the treasury, particularly monopolization of trade with Europe and tax expeditions into the countryside. He also managed to impose Mamluk authority further abroad, forcing Cyprus to submit in 1426. The sultanate stagnated after this. Sultan Qaitbay's long and competent reign (r. 1468–1496) ensured some stability, though it was marked by conflicts with the Ottomans. The last effective sultan was Qansuh al-Ghuri (r. 1501–1516), whose reign was known for heavy-handed fiscal policies, attempted reforms of the military, and confrontations with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. In 1516, he was killed in battle against Ottoman sultan Selim I, who subsequently conquered Egypt in 1517 and ended Mamluk rule.

Under Mamluk rule, particularly under al-Nasir Muhammad, Cairo reached the peak of its size and wealth before the modern period,[10] becoming one of the largest cities in the world at the time.[11] The sultanate's economy was primarily agrarian, but its geographic position also placed it at the center of trade between Europe and the Indian Ocean. The Mamluks themselves relied on the iqta' system to provide revenues. They were also major patrons of art and architecture: inlaid metalwork, enameled glass, and illuminated Qur'an manuscripts were among the high points of art, while Mamluk architecture still makes up much of the fabric of historic Cairo today and is found throughout their former domains.

Name

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The 'Mamluk Sultanate' is a modern historiographical term.[12][13] Arabic sources for the period of the Bahri Mamluks refer to the dynasty as the 'State of the Turks' (Dawlat al-Atrak or Dawlat al-Turk) or 'State of Turkey' (al-Dawla al-Turkiyya).[14][15][12] During Burji rule, it was also referred to as the 'State of the Circassians' (Dawlat al-Jarakisa).[12] These names emphasized the ethnic origin of the rulers and Mamluk writers did not explicitly highlight their status as slaves, except on rare occasions during the Circassian period.[12]

History

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Origins

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The mamluk was a manumitted slave, distinguished from the ghulam, or household slave. After thorough training in martial arts, court etiquette and Islamic sciences, these slaves were freed but expected to remain loyal to their master and serve his household.[16] Mamluks formed part of the military apparatus in Syria and Egypt since at least the 9th century, rising to become governing dynasties in Egypt and Syria as the Tulunid and Ikhshidid dynasties.[17] Mamluk regiments constituted the backbone of Egypt's military under Ayyubid rule in the late 12th and early 13th centuries, beginning under the first Ayyubid sultan Saladin (r. 1174–1193), who replaced the Fatimid Caliphate's black African infantry with mamluks.[18] Each Ayyubid sultan and high-ranking emir had a private mamluk corps.[19] Most of the mamluks in the Ayyubids' service were ethnic Kipchak Turks from Central Asia, who, upon entering service, were converted to Sunni Islam and taught Arabic. Mamluks were highly committed to their master, to whom they often referred to as 'father', and were in turn treated more as kinsmen than as slaves.[18] The Ayyubid emir and future sultan as-Salih Ayyub acquired about one thousand mamluks (some of them free-born) from Syria, Egypt and Arabia by 1229, while serving as na'ib (viceroy) of Egypt during the absence of his father, Sultan al-Kamil (r. 1218–1238). These mamluks were called the 'Salihiyya' (singular 'Salihi') after their master.[20]

Frontispiece of Sulwan al-Muta’ fi ‘Udwan al-Atba’ by Ibn Zafar al-Siqilli, Mamluk Egypt or Syria, circa 1330.[21]

Al-Salih became sultan of Egypt in 1240, and, upon his accession, he manumitted and promoted large numbers of his mamluks, provisioning them through confiscated iqtaʿat (akin to fiefs; singular iqtaʿ) from his predecessors' emirs. He created a loyal paramilitary apparatus in Egypt so dominant that contemporaries viewed Egypt as "Salihi-ridden", according to historian Winslow William Clifford.[22] While historian Stephen Humphreys asserts the Salihiyya's increasing dominance of the state did not personally threaten al-Salih due to their fidelity to him, Clifford believes the Salihiyya's autonomy fell short of such loyalty.[23]

Rise to power

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Conflict with the Ayyubids

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Tensions between as-Salih and his mamluks culminated in 1249 when Louis IX of France's forces captured Damietta in their bid to conquer Egypt during the Seventh Crusade. Al-Salih opposed the evacuation of Damietta and threatened to punish the city's garrison. This provoked a mutiny by his garrison in al-Mansura, which only dissipated with the intervention of the atabeg al-askar (commander of the military), Fakhr ad-Din ibn Shaykh al-Shuyukh.[24] As the Crusaders advanced, al-Salih died and was succeeded by his Jazira (Upper Mesopotamia)-based son al-Mu'azzam Turanshah.[25] Although the Salihiyya welcomed his succession, Turanshah challenged their dominance in the paramilitary apparatus by promoting his Kurdish retinue from the Jazira and Syria as a counterweight.[26]

On 11 February 1250, the Bahriyya, a junior regiment of the Salihiyya commanded by Baybars, defeated the Crusaders at the Battle of al-Mansura. On 27 February, Turanshah arrived in al-Mansura to lead the Egyptian army. On 5 April 1250, the Crusaders evacuated their camp opposite al-Mansura. The Egyptians followed them into the Battle of Fariskur where the Egyptians destroyed the Crusaders on 6 April. King Louis IX and a few of his surviving nobles were taken as prisoners, effectively ending the Seventh Crusade.[27] Turanshah proceeded to place his own entourage and mamluks, known as the 'Mu'azzamiya',[25] in positions of authority at the expense of the Salihiyya. On 2 May 1250,[25] disgruntled Salihi emirs assassinated Turanshah at Fariskur.[28]

An electoral college dominated by the Salihiyya then convened to choose a successor to Turanshah among the Ayyubid emirs, with opinion largely split between an-Nasir Yusuf of Damascus and al-Mughith Umar of al-Karak. Consensus settled on al-Salih's widow, Shajar al-Durr.[29] She ensured the Salihiyya's dominance of the paramilitary elite, and inaugurated patronage and kinship ties with the Salihiyya. In particular, she cultivated close ties with the Jamdari (pl. Jamdariyya) and Bahri (pl. Bahriyya) corps, distributing to them iqtaʿ and other privileges.[30] Her efforts and Egyptian military's preference to preserve the Ayyubid state were evident when the Salihi mamluk and atabeg al-askar, Aybak, was rebuffed from monopolizing power by the army and the Bahriyya and Jamdariyya, who all asserted that sultanic authority was exclusive to the Ayyubids.[31] The Bahriyya compelled Aybak to share power with al-Ashraf Musa, a grandson of Sultan al-Kamil.[32]

The Mamluk Sultanate and some of the main contemporary polities c. 1300. Most of the Asian continent was occupied by the Mongol Empire by that time, with Turkic polities occupying South and Western Asia, the other main one being the Delhi Sultanate in India

Aybak was the main bulwark against the Bahri and Jamdari emirs, and his promotion as atabeg al-askar led to Bahri rioting in Cairo, the first of many intra-Salihi clashes about his ascendancy. The Bahriyya and Jamdariyya were represented by their patron, Faris al-Din Aktay, a principal organizer of Turanshah's assassination and the recipient of Fakhr ad-Din's large estate by Shajar al-Durr; the latter viewed Aktay as a counterweight to Aybak.[33] Aybak moved against the Bahriyya by shutting their Roda headquarters in 1251 and assassinating Aktay in 1254.[34]

Afterward, Aybak purged his retinue and the Salihiyya of perceived dissidents, causing a temporary exodus of Bahri mamluks, most of whom settled in Gaza.[32][35] The purge caused a shortage of officers, which led Aktay to recruit new supporters from among the army in Egypt and the Turkic Nasiri and Azizi mamluks from Syria, who had defected from an-Nasir Yusuf and moved to Egypt in 1250.[35] Aybak felt threatened by the growing ambitions of the Syrian mamluks' empowered patron Jamal ad-Din Aydughdi. Upon learning of Aydughdi's plot to install an-Nasir Yusuf as sultan, which would leave Aydughdi as practical ruler of Egypt, Aybak imprisoned Aydughdi in Alexandria in 1254 or 1255.[36]

Aybak was assassinated on 10 April 1257,[37] possibly on orders from Shajar al-Durr,[38] who was assassinated a week later. Their deaths left a relative power vacuum in Egypt, with Aybak's teenage son, al-Mansur Ali, as heir to the sultanate and Aybak's close aide, Sayf al-Din Qutuz, as strongman.[39] The Bahriyya and al-Mughith Umar made two attempts to conquer Egypt in November 1257 and 1258 but were defeated.[37] They then turned on an-Nasir Yusuf in Damascus, who defeated them at Jericho. An-Nasir Yusuf followed up with a siege of al-Mughith and the Bahriyya at al-Karak, but the growing threat of a Mongol invasion of Syria led the Ayyubid emirs to reconcile, and Baybars to defect to an-Nasir Yusuf.[40] Qutuz deposed Ali in 1259 and purged or arrested the Mu'izziya and any remaining Bahri mamluks in Egypt to eliminate potential opposition. The surviving Mu'izzi and Bahri mamluks went to Gaza, where Baybars had established a shadow state opposed to Qutuz.[41]

Horsemen with lances. Nihāyat al-su’l (horsemanship manual) by Aḥmad al-Miṣrī ("the Egyptian"), dated 1371, Mamluk Egypt or Syria.

While mamluk factions fought for control of Egypt and Syria, the Mongols under Hulagu Khan had sacked Baghdad, the intellectual and spiritual center of the Islamic world, in 1258, and proceeded westward, capturing Aleppo and Damascus.[42] Qutuz sent military reinforcements to his erstwhile enemy an-Nasir Yusuf in Syria, and reconciled with the Bahriyya, including Baybars, who was allowed to return to Egypt, to face the common Mongol threat.[43] Hulagu sent emissaries to Qutuz in Cairo, demanding submission to Mongol rule but Qutuz had them killed, an act which historian Joseph Cummins called the "worst possible insult to the Mongol throne".[42] After hearing that Hulagu withdrew from Syria to claim the Mongol throne, Qutuz and Baybars mobilized a 120,000-strong force to conquer Syria.[44]

The Mamluks entered Palestine and confronted the Mongol army Hulagu left behind under Kitbuqa in the plains south of Nazareth at the Battle of Ain Jalut in September 1260.[44] The battle ended in a Mongol rout and Kitbuqa's capture and execution. Afterward, the Mamluks recaptured Damascus and the other Syrian cities taken by the Mongols.[45] Upon Qutuz's triumphant return to Cairo, he was assassinated in a Bahri plot. Baybars then assumed power in October 1260,[43] inaugurating Bahri rule.[15]

Bahri rule (1250–1382)

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Reign of Baybars

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Enthroned ruler and attendants in the Baptistère de Saint Louis (1320–1340). This is a probable depiction of Sultan Baybars.[46]

In 1263, Baybars deposed al-Mughith based on allegations of collaboration with the Mongol Ilkhanate of Persia, and thereby consolidated his authority over Islamic Syria.[47] During his early reign, Baybars expanded the Mamluk from 10,000 cavalry to 40,000, with a 4,000-strong royal guard at its core. The new force was rigidly disciplined and highly trained in horsemanship, swordsmanship and archery.[48] To improve intracommunication, Baybars instituted a barid (postal network) extending across Egypt and Syria, which led to large scale building of roads and bridges along the postal route. His military and administrative reforms cemented the power of the Mamluk state.[47] He opened diplomatic channels with the Mongols to stifle their potential alliance with the Christian powers of Europe, while also sowing divisions between the Mongol Ilkhanate and the Mongol Golden Horde. His diplomacy was additionally intended to maintain the flow of Turkic mamluks from Mongol-held Central Asia.[47]

Enameled and gilded bottle with the scene of battle. Egypt, late 13th century. Metropolitan Museum of Art

With his power in Egypt and Islamic Syria consolidated by 1265, Baybars launched expeditions against the Crusader fortresses throughout Syria, capturing Arsuf in 1265, and Halba and Arqa in 1266.[49] Baybars's destroy captured fortresses along the Syrian coast to prevent their potential future use by new waves of Crusaders.[50] In August 1266, the Mamluks launched a punitive expedition against the Armenian Cilician Kingdom for its alliance with the Mongols, laying waste to numerous Armenian villages and significantly weakening the kingdom. At around the same time, Baybars captured Safed from the Knights Templar, and shortly after, Ramla, both cities in interior Palestine. Unlike the coastal fortresses, the Mamluks strengthened and utilized the interior cities as major garrisons and administrative centers.[51] In 1268, the Mamluks captured Jaffa before conquering the Crusader stronghold of Antioch on 18 May.[52] In 1271, Baybars captured the major Krak des Chevaliers fortress from the Crusader County of Tripoli.[53] Despite an alliance with the Isma'ili Shia Assassins in 1272, in July 1273, the Mamluks, who by then considered the Assassins' independence as problematic, wrested control of their fortresses in the Jabal Ansariya range, including Masyaf.[54] In 1277, Baybars launched an expedition against the Ilkhanids, routing them in Elbistan in Anatolia, but withdrew to avoid overstretching his forces and risk being cut off from Syria by a larger incoming Ilkhanid army.[54]

Horseman impales a bear. Nihāyat al-suʾl by Aḥmad al-Miṣrī ("the Egyptian"), dated 1371, Mamluk Egypt or Syria. He is wearing the kallawtah headgear.[55]

To Egypt's south, Baybars had initiated an aggressive policy toward the Christian Nubian kingdom of Makuria. In 1265, the Mamluks invaded northern Makuria, forcing the Nubian king to become their vassal.[56] Around that time, the Mamluks had conquered the Red Sea areas of Suakin and the Dahlak Archipelago, while attempting to extend their control to the Hejaz (western Arabia), the desert regions west of the Nile, and Barqa (Cyrenaica).[57] In 1268, the Makurian king, David I, overthrew the Mamluks' vassal and in 1272, raided the Mamluk Red Sea port of Aydhab.[58] In 1276, the Mamluks defeated King David of Makuria in the Battle of Dongola and installed their ally Shakanda as king. This brought the fortress of Qasr Ibrim under Mamluk suzerainty. The conquest of Nubia was not permanent and the process of invading the region and installing vassal kings was repeated by Baybars's successors.[58] Nonetheless, Baybars' initial conquest led to the annual expectation of tribute from the Nubians by the Mamluks until the Makurian kingdom's demise in the mid-14th century.[56] Furthermore, the Mamluks received the submission of King Adur of al-Abwab further south.[59]

Baybars attempted to establish his Zahirid house as the state's ruling dynasty by appointing his four-year-old son al-Sa'id Baraka as co-sultan in 1264. This represented a break from the Mamluk tradition of choosing the sultan by merit rather than lineage.[47] In July 1277, Baybars died en route to Damascus, and was succeeded by Baraka.[60]

Early Qalawuni period

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The siege of Tripoli, led against the Crusaders by the Mamluks of Qalawun in 1289

Baraka was ousted in a power struggle ending with Qalawun, a top deputy of Baybars, as sultan in November 1279.[61][62] The Ilkhanids launched a massive offensive against Syria in 1281. The Mamluks were outnumbered by the 80,000-strong Ilkhanid-Armenian-Georgian-Seljuk coalition, but routed the coalition at the battle of Homs, confirming Mamluk dominance in Syria.[61] The Ilkhanids' rout enabled Qalawun to proceed against Crusader holdouts in Syria and in May 1285, he captured and garrisoned the Marqab fortress.[63]

Qalawun's early reign was marked by policies intended to garner support from the merchant class, the Muslim bureaucracy and the religious establishment. He eliminated the illegal taxes that burdened the merchants and commissioned extensive building and renovation projects for Islam's holiest sites, such as the Prophet's Mosque in Medina, the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron.[64] His building activities later shifted to more secular and personal purposes, including his large, multi-division hospital complex in Cairo.[65] After the détente with the Ilkhanids, Qalawun suppressed internal dissent by imprisoning dozens of high-ranking emirs in Egypt and Syria.[66] He diversified the hitherto mostly Turkic mamluk ranks by purchasing numerous non-Turks, particularly Circassians, forming out of them the Burjiyya regiment.[67]

Interior of the Mausoleum of Sultan Qalawun in Cairo (1284–1285)[68]

Qalawun was the last Salihi sultan and after his death in 1290, his son, al-Ashraf Khalil, drew legitimacy by emphasizing his lineage from Qalawun.[69] Like his predecessors, Khalil's main priorities were organizing the state apparati, defeating the Crusaders and Mongols, integrating Syria, and preserving the flow of new mamluks and weaponry into the empire.[69] Baybars had purchased 4,000 mamluks, Qalawun 6,000–7,000 and by the end of Khalil's reign, there was an estimated total of 10,000 mamluks in the sultanate.[70] In 1291, Khalil captured Acre, the last major Crusader stronghold in Palestine and Mamluk rule consequently extended across all of Syria.[71]

Khalil's death in 1293 led to period of factional struggle, with Khalil's prepubescent brother, al-Nasir Muhammad, being overthrown the following year by an ethnic Mongol mamluk of Qalawun, al-Adil Kitbugha, who in turn was succeeded by a Greek mamluk of Qalawun, Husam al-Din Lajin. To consolidate control, Lajin redistributed iqtaʿat to his supporters. He was unable to keep power and al-Nasir Muhammad was restored as sultan in 1298, ruling over a fractious realm until being toppled by Baybars II, a Circassian mamluk of Qalawun, who was wealthier, and more pious and cultured than his immediate predecessors.[69]

Early into al-Nasir Muhammad's second reign, the Ilkhanids, whose leader Mahmud Ghazan was a Muslim convert, had invaded Syria and routed a Mamluk army near Homs in the Battle of Wadi al-Khaznadar in 1299. Ghazan largely withdrew from Syria shortly after due to a lack of fodder for their numerous horses and the residual Ilkhanid force retreated in 1300 at the approach of the rebuilt Mamluk army.[72] Another Ilkhanid invasion in 1303 was repelled after a Mamluk victory at the Battle of Marj al-Suffar in the plains south of Damascus.[73]

Third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad

[edit]
Mamluk court scene, with possible depiction of Mamluk Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad.[74][75] Probably Egypt, dated 1334. Maqamat of al-Hariri.[76] "In the paintings the facial cast of these [ruling] Turks is obviously reflected, and so are the special fashions and accoutrements they favored".[77] The brimmed hats in the bottom right corner are Mongol.[78] Al-Nasir Muhammad was himself of Kipchak (Turkic) and Mongol descent.[79]

Baybars II ruled for roughly one year before al-Nasir Muhammad became sultan again in 1310, this time ruling for over three decades in a period often considered by historians to be the zenith of the Mamluk empire.[80] To avoid the experiences of his previous two reigns where the mamluks of Qalawun and Khalil held sway and periodically assumed power, al-Nasir Muhammad established a centralized autocracy. In 1310, he imprisoned, exiled or killed any Mamluk emirs that supported those who toppled him in the past, including the Burji mamluks. He assigned iqta'at to over thirty of his own mamluks.[81] Initially, he left most of his father's mamluks undisturbed, but in 1311 and 1316, he imprisoned and executed most of them, and again redistributed iqta'at to his own mamluks.[82] By 1316, the number of mamluks decreased to 2,000.[70] Al-Nasir Muhammad further consolidated power by replacing Caliph al-Mustakfi (r. 1302–1340) with his own appointee, al-Wathiq, as well as compelling the qadi (head judge) to issue legal rulings advancing his interests.[83]

Interior of the Al-Nasir Muhammad Mosque in the Citadel of Cairo (1318–1335)[84]

Under al-Nasir Muhammad, the Mamluks repulsed an Ilkhanid invasion of Syria in 1313 and concluded a peace treaty with the Ilkhanate in 1322, bringing a long-lasting end to the Mamluk–Mongol wars. Afterward, al-Nasir Muhammad ushered in a period of stability and prosperity through the enactment of major political, economic and military reforms ultimately intended to ensure his continued rule and consolidate the Qalawuni–Bahri regime. Concurrent with his reign was the disintegration of the Ilkhanate into several smaller dynastic states and the consequent Mamluk effort to establish diplomatic and commercial relationships with the new states.[80] Amid conditions reducing the flow of mamluks from the Mongol territories to the sultanate, al-Nasir Muhammad compensated by adopting new methods of training, and military and financial advancement that introduced a great level of permissiveness. This led to relaxed conditions for new mamluks and encouraged the pursuit of military careers in Egypt by aspiring mamluks outside of the empire.[85]

End of the Bahri regime

[edit]

Al-Nasir Muhammad died in 1341 and his rule was followed by a succession of descendants in a period marked by political instability. Most of his successors, except for al-Nasir Hasan (r. 1347–1351, 1354–1361) and al-Ashraf Sha'ban (r. 1363–1367), were sultans in name only, with the patrons of the leading mamluk factions holding actual power.[80] The first of al-Nasir Muhammad's sons to accede was al-Mansur Abu Bakr, who al-Nasir Muhammad designated as successor. Al-Nasir Muhammad's senior aide, Qawsun, held real power and imprisoned and executed Abu Bakr and had al-Nasir Muhammad's infant son, al-Ashraf Kujuk, appointed instead.[86] By January 1342, Qawsun and Kujuk were toppled, and the latter's half-brother, al-Nasir Ahmad of al-Karak, was declared sultan.[87] Ahmad relocated to al-Karak and left a deputy to govern in Cairo.[88] This unorthodox arrangement, together with his seclusive and frivolous behavior and his execution of loyal partisans, ended with Ahmad's deposition and replacement by his half-brother al-Salih Isma'il in June 1342.[89] Isma'il ruled until his death in August 1345, and was succeeded by his brother al-Kamil Sha'ban. The latter was killed in a mamluk revolt and was succeeded by his brother al-Muzaffar Hajji, who was also killed in a mamluk revolt in late 1347.[90]

The complex of Sultan Hasan (1356–1363) is the largest and costliest Mamluk building in Cairo, despite being built in a time of plague.[91][92][93]

After Hajji's death, the senior emirs hastily appointed another son of al-Nasir Muhammad, the twelve-year-old al-Nasir Hasan.[94] Coinciding with Hasan's first reign,[95] in 1347–1348, the Bubonic Plague arrived in Egypt and other plagues followed, causing mass death in the country, which led to major social and economic changes in the region.[80] In 1351, the senior emirs, led by Emir Taz, ousted and replaced Hasan with his brother, al-Salih Salih. The emirs Shaykhu and Sirghitmish deposed Salih and restored Hasan in 1355, after which Hasan gradually purged Taz, Shaykhu and Sirghitmish and their mamluks from his administration.[95] Hasan recruited and promoted the awlad al-nas (descendants of mamluks who did not undergo the enslavement/manumission process) in the military and administration, a process lasted for the remainder of the Bahri period.[95][96] This caused resentment among Hasan's own mamluks, led by Emir Yalbugha al-Umari, who killed Hasan in 1361.[95][97]

Yalbugha became regent to Hasan's successor, the young son of the late sultan Hajji, al-Mansur Muhammad. By then, mamluk solidarity and loyalty to the emirs had dissipated. To restore discipline and unity within the Mamluk state and military, Yalbugha revived the rigorous training of mamluks used under Baybars and Qalawun.[98] In 1365, a Mamluk attempt to annex Armenia, which had since replaced Crusader Acre as the Christian commercial foothold of Asia, was stifled by an invasion of Alexandria by Peter I of Cyprus. The Mamluks concurrently experienced a deterioration of their lucrative position in international trade and the economy declined, further weakening the Bahri regime.[80] Meanwhile, the harshness of Yalbugha's educational methods and his refusal to rescind his disciplinary reforms provoked a mamluk backlash. Yalbugha was killed by his mamluks in an uprising in 1366.[98] The rebels were supported by Sultan al-Ashraf Sha'ban, who Yalbugha had installed in 1363. Sha'ban ruled as the real power in the sultanate until 1377, when he was killed by mamluk dissidents on his way to Mecca perform the Hajj.[99]

Burji rule (1382–1517)

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Reign of Barquq

[edit]

Sha'ban was succeeded by his seven-year-old son al-Mansur Ali, though the oligarchy of the senior emirs held the reins of power.[100] Among the senior emirs who rose to prominence under Ali were Barquq and Baraka, both Circassian mamluks of Yalbugha.[99][100][101] Barquq was made atabeg al-asakir in 1378, giving him command of the Mamluk army,[99] which he used to oust Baraka in 1380.[100] Ali died in May 1381 and was succeeded by his nine-year-old brother, al-Salih Hajji, with real power held by Barquq as regent.[102] The next year, Barquq toppled al-Salih Hajji and assumed the throne.[99][103]

His accession was enabled by Yalbugha's mamluks, whose corresponding rise to power left Barquq vulnerable.[103] His rule was challenged by a revolt in Syria in 1389 by the Mamluk governors of Malatya and Aleppo, Mintash and Yalbugha al-Nasiri, the latter a mamluk of Yalbugha.[103][104] The rebels took over Syria and headed for Egypt, prompting Barquq to abdicate in favor of al-Salih Hajji. The alliance between Yalbugha al-Nasiri and Mintash soon fell apart and factional fighting ensued in Cairo, with Mintash ousting Yalbugha. Barquq was arrested and exiled to al-Karak where he rallied support. In Cairo, Barquq's loyalists took the citadel and arrested al-Salih Hajji. This paved the way for Barquq's usurpation of the sultanate once more in February 1390, firmly establishing the Burji regime.[103] The ruling Mamluks of this period were mostly Circassians drawn from the Christian population of the northern Caucasus.[105][106][107][108]

Interior of the Mosque-Madrasa of Sultan Barquq in Cairo (1384–1386)[109]

Barquq solidified power in 1393, when his forces killed the major opponent to his rule, Mintash, in Syria.[103] Barquq oversaw the mass recruitment of Circassians (estimated at 5,000 recruits[110]) into the mamluk ranks and the restoration of the state's authority throughout its realm in the tradition of Baybars and Qalawun. A major innovation to this system was the division of Egypt into three niyabat (sing. niyaba; provinces), similar to the administrative divisions in Syria.[111] The new Egyptian niyabat were Alexandria, Damanhur and Asyut.[112] Barquq instituted this to better control the Egyptian countryside from the rising strength of the Bedouin tribes. He further dispatched the Berber Hawwara tribesmen of the Nile Delta to Upper Egypt to check the Arab Bedouins.[113]

During Barquq's reign, in 1387, the Mamluks had forced the Anatolian entity in Sivas to become a Mamluk vassal. Towards the end of the 14th century, challengers to the Mamluks emerged in Anatolia, including the Ottoman dynasty and the Turkmen allies of Timur, the Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu tribes of southern and eastern Anatolia.[104]

Crises and restoration of state power

[edit]
Battle between the troops of Timur (left) and the Mamluk troops of al-Nasir Faraj (right)
Ambassadors of al-Nasir Faraj present tribute, including a giraffe, to Timur

Barquq died in 1399 and was succeeded by his eleven-year-old son, an-Nasir Faraj. That year, Timur invaded Syria, sacking Aleppo and Damascus. Timur ended his occupation of Syria in 1402 to fight the Ottomans in Anatolia, whom he deemed a more dangerous threat. Faraj held onto power during this turbulent period, which, in addition to Timur's devastating raids, the rise of Turkmen tribes in the Jazira, and attempts by Barquq's emirs to topple Faraj, also saw a famine in Egypt in 1403, a severe plague in 1405 and a Bedouin revolt that practically ended Mamluk control of Upper Egypt between 1401 and 1413. Mamluk authority throughout the sultanate significantly eroded, while the capital Cairo underwent an economic crisis.[114]

Faraj was toppled in 1412 by the Syria-based emirs, Tanam, Jakam, Nawruz and al-Mu'ayyad Shaykh, against whom Faraj had sent seven military expeditions. The emirs could not usurp the throne themselves, and had Caliph al-Musta'in (r. 1406–1413) installed as a puppet sultan; the caliph had the support of the non-Circassian mamluks and legitimacy with the local population. Six months later, Shakyh ousted al-Musta'in after neutralizing his main rival, Nawruz, and assumed the sultanate.[114] Shaykh's main policy was restoring state authority within the empire, which experienced further plagues in 1415–1417 and 1420. Shaykh replenished the treasury through tax collection expeditions akin to raids across the empire to compensate the tax arrears that accumlated under Faraj. Shaykh also commissioned and led military campaigns against the Mamluks' enemies in Anatolia, reasserting the state's influence there.[115]

Reign of Barsbay

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Barsbay's mausoleum complex in Cairo, completed in 1432. The carved dome (center) covers his tomb.[116]

Before Shaykh died in 1421, he attempted to offset the power of the Circassians by importing Turkish mamluks and installing a Turk as atabeg al-asakir to serve as regent for his infant son Ahmad. After his death, a Circassian emir, Tatar, married Shaykh's widow, ousted the atabeg al-asakir and assumed power. Tatar died three months into his reign and was succeeded by Barsbay, another Circassian emir of Barquq, in 1422.[115] Under Barsbay, the Mamluk Sultanate reached its greatest territorial extent and was militarily dominant throughout the region,[117] but his legacy was mixed in the eyes of contemporary commentators who criticized his fiscal methods and economic policies.[118]

Barsbay pursued an economic policy of establishing state monopolies over the lucrative trade with Europe, particularly spices, at the expense of local merchants.[119] European merchants were forced to buy spices from state agents who set prices that maximized revenue rather than promoting competition. This monopoly set a precedent for his successors, some of whom established monopolies over other goods such as sugar and textiles.[120] Barsbay compelled Red Sea traders to offload their goods at the Mamluk-held Hejazi port of Jeddah rather than the Yemeni port of Aden to derive the greatest financial gain from the Red Sea transit route to Europe.[119] Barsbay's efforts at monopolization and trade protection were meant to offset the severe financial losses of the agricultural sector due to the frequent recurring plagues that took a heavy toll on the farmers.[121] In the long term, the monopoly over the spice trade had a negative effect on Egyptian commerce and became a motivation for European merchants to seek alternative routes to the east around Africa and across the Atlantic.[120]

Barsbay undertook efforts protect the caravan routes to the Hejaz from Bedouin raids.[119] He reduced the independence of the Sharifs of Mecca to a minimum, sent troops to occupy the Hejaz and rein in the Bedouin, and took direct control of much of the region's administration.[122][123] He aimed to secure the Egyptian Mediterranean coast from Catalan and Genoese piracy. Related to this, he launched campaigns against Cyprus in 1425–1426, during which the island's Lusignan king, Janus, was taken captive, because of his alleged assistance to the pirates; the large ransoms paid to the Mamluks by the Cypriots allowed them to mint new gold coinage for the first time since the 14th century.[119] Janus became Barsbay's vassal, an arrangement enforced on his successors for several decades after.[124]

In response to Aq Qoyonlu raids against the Jazira, the Mamluks launched expeditions against them, sacking Edessa and massacring its Muslim inhabitants in 1429 and attacking their capital Amid in 1433. The Aq Qoyonlu consequently recognized Mamluk suzerainty.[119] While the Mamluks succeeded in forcing the Anatolian beyliks to largely submit to their suzerainty, Mamluk authority in Upper Egypt was mostly relegated to the emirs of the Hawwara tribe. The latter had grown wealthy from their burgeoning trade with central Africa and achieved a degree of local popularity due to their piety, education and generally benign treatment of the inhabitants.[119]

Successors of Barsbay

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Gold dinar of Mamluk sultan Sayf ad-Din Jaqmaq minted in Cairo between 1438 and 1440

Barsbay died on 7 June 1438 and, per his wishes, was succeeded by his fourteen-year-old son, al-Aziz Yusuf, with a leading emir of Barsbay, Sayf al-Din Jaqmaq, appointed regent. The usual disputes over succession ensued and after three months Jaqmaq won and became sultan, exiling Yusuf to Alexandria.[125] Jaqmaq maintained friendly relations with the Ottomans. His most important foreign military effort was an abortive campaign to conquer Rhodes from the Knights of St. John, involving three expeditions between 1440 and 1444.[126] Domestically, Jaqmaq largely continued Barsbay's monopolies, though he promised to enact reforms and formally rescinded some tariffs.[127] Jaqmaq died in February 1453. His eighteen-year-old son, al-Mansur Uthman, was installed on the throne but soon lost all support when he tried to buy the loyalty of other mamluks with debased coins.[128]

Sayf al-Din Inal, who Barsbay had made his atabeg al-asakir, won enough support to be declared sultan two months after Jaqmaq's death.[128] He ruled when Mehmed II, the Ottoman sultan, conquered Constantinople in 1453 and ordered public celebrations to commemorate the event,[128] much like the celebrations of a Mamluk victory.[129] It is unclear whether Inal and the Mamluks understood the implications of this event.[128] It marked the rise of the Ottomans as a superpower, a status that brought them into increasing conflict with the evermore stagnant Mamluk Sultanate.[130] By then, the state was under severe financial stress, with the state selling off iqta'at properties, depriving the treasury of their tax revenues. Coins based on precious metals nearly disappeared from circulation.[131]

Inal died on 26 February 1461. His son, al-Mu'ayyad Ahmad, ruled for a short stint under challenges from the governors of Damascus and Jeddah. A compromise candidate, the Greek Khushqadam al-Mu'ayyadi, was then chosen and eventually neutralized his opposition. His reign was marked by further political difficulties abroad and domestically. Cyprus remained a vassal, but Khushqadam's representative was killed in battle after insulting James II (who had been installed by Inal). At home, Bedouin tribes caused unrest and the sultan's attempts to suppress the Labid tribe in the Nile Delta and against the Hawwara in Upper Egypt had little effect.[132]

Reign of Qaitbay

[edit]
Mamluk Sultan Qaitbay (r.1468-1496, here "Mag Caitbeivs Cairi Svltan", "The great Caitbeius, Sultan of Cairo") by Florentine painter Cristofano dell'Altissimo (16th century), Galleria degli Uffizi.[133]

Khushqadam died on 9 October 1467 and the mamluk emirs initially installed Yalbay al-Mu'ayyadi as his successor. After two months he was replaced by Timurbugha al-Zahiri. Timurbugha was deposed in turn on 31 January 1468, but voluntarily consented to the accession of his second in command, Qaitbay.[134] Qaitbay's 28-year-long reign, the second longest in Mamluk history after al-Nasir Muhammad,[135] was marked by relative stability and prosperity. Historical sources present a sultan whose character was markedly different from other Mamluk rulers. Notably, he disliked engaging in conspiracy, even though this had been a hallmark of Mamluk politics. He had a reputation for being even-handed and treating his colleagues and subordinates fairly, examplified by his magnanimous treatment of the deposed Timurbugha.[136] These traits seem to have kept internal tensions and conspiracies at bay throughout his reign.[137] While the Mamluk practices of confiscation, extortion, and bribery continued in fiscal matters, under Qaitbay they were practiced in a more systematic way that allowed individuals and institutions to function within a more predictable environment. His engagement with the civil bureaucracy and the ulema (Islamic jurists and scholars) appeared to reflect a genuine commitment to Sunni Islamic law.[138] He was one of the most prolific Mamluk patrons of architecture, second only to al-Nasir Muhammad,[135] and his patronage of religious and civic buildings extended to the provinces beyond Cairo.[138] Nonetheless, Qaitbay operated in an environment of recurring plague epidemics that underpinned a general population decline. Agriculture suffered, the treasury was often stretched thin, and by the end of his reign the economy was still weak.[139]

Sabil of Qaitbay at al-Aqsa in Jerusalem (1482)[140]

The challenges to Mamluk dominance abroad were also mounting, particularly to the north. Shah Suwar, the leader of the Dulkadirid principality in Anatolia, benefited from Ottoman support and was an excellent military tactician. Meanwhile, Qaitbay supported the ruler of the Karamanid principality, Ahmad.[137] Initially, the Mamluks failed in a series of campaigns against Shah Suwar. The tide turned in 1470–1471 when an agreement was reached between Qaitbay and Mehmed II, by which Qaitbay stopped supporting the Karamanids and the Ottomans stopped supporting the Dulkadirids.[141][142] Now without Ottoman support, Shah Suwar was defeated in 1471 by a Mamluk expedition led by Qaitbay's senior field commander, Yashbak min Mahdi.[142] Shah Suwar held out in his fortress near Zamantı, before agreeing to surrender himself if his life was spared and he was allowed to remain as a vassal. In the end, Qaitbay was unwilling to let him live and Shah Suwar was betrayed, brought to Cairo, and executed.[141][142] Shah Budaq was installed as his replacement and as a Mamluk vassal, though the Ottoman-Mamluk rivalry over the Dulkadirid throne continued.[141]

The next challenge to Qaitbay was the rise of the Aq Qoyunlu leader Uzun Hasan.[142] The latter led an expedition into Mamluk territory around Aleppo in 1472, but was routed by Yashbak.[143] The next year, Uzun Hassan was more resoundingly defeated in battle against Mehmed II near Erzurum.[144] His son and successor, Ya'qub, resorted to inviting Yashbak min Mahdi to participate in a campaign against Edessa. As this avoided any challenge against Qaitbay's authority, Yashbak accepted. Although initially successful, he was killed during the siege of the city, thus depriving Qaitbay of his most important field commander.[142]

A shirt of mail and plate armor belonging to Sultan Qaitbay, one of the few surviving sets of armor from the Mamluk period.[145]

In 1489, the Republic of Venice annexed Cyprus.[146][147] The Venetians promised Qaitbay their occupation would benefit him as well, as their large fleet than could better keep the peace in the eastern Mediterranean than the Cypriots. Venice also agreed to continue the Cypriots' yearly tribute of 8,000 ducats to Cairo. A treaty signed between the two powers in 1490 formalized this arrangement. It was a sign that the Mamluks were now depending partly on the Venetians for naval security.[146]

With the death of Mehmed II in 1481 and the accession of his son, Bayezid II, to the Ottoman throne, Ottoman-Mamluk tensions escalated.[142] Bayezid's claim to the throne was challenged by his brother, Jem. The latter fled into exile and Qaitbay granted him sanctuary in Cairo in September 1481. Qaitbay eventually allowed him to return to Anatolia to lead a new attempt against Bayezid. This venture failed and Jem was fled into exile again, this time into Christian hands to the west. Bayezid interpreted Qaitbay's welcome to Jem as direct support for the latter's cause and was furious.[148][142] Qaitbay also supported the Dulkadirid leader, Ala al-Dawla (who had replaced Shah Budaq), against the Ottomans,[142] but Ala al-Dawla was compelled to shift his loyalty to Bayezid c. 1483 or 1484, which soon triggered the start of an Ottoman–Mamluk war over the next six years.[149][150] By 1491, both sides were exhausted and an Ottoman embassy arrived in Cairo in the spring. An agreement was concluded and the status quo ante bellum was reaffirmed.[151] During the rest of Qaitbay's reign, no further external conflicts took place.[142]

Reign of al-Ghuri

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Mamluk Sultan Qansuh al-Ghuri (r. 1501–1516, here "Campson Gavro re d'Egitto", "Campson Gauro, king of Egypt") by Florentine painter Cristofano dell'Altissimo, Galleria degli Uffizi.[152]

Qaitbay's death on 8 August 1496 inaugurated several years of instability.[153] Eventually, following several brief reigns by other candidates, Qansuh al-Ghuri (or al-Ghawri) was placed on the throne in 1501.[154] Al-Ghuri secured his position over several months and appointed new figures to key posts. His nephew, Tuman Bay was appointed dawadar and his second in command.[155] In Syria, al-Ghuri appointed Sibay, a former rival who opposed him in 1504–1505, as governor of Damascus in 1506. The latter remained a major figure during his reign but he acknowledged Cairo's suzerainty and helped to keep the peace.[156]

Al-Ghuri is often viewed negatively by historical commentators, particularly Ibn Iyas, for his draconic fiscal policies.[156] He inherited a state beset by financial problems. In addition to the demographic and economic changes under his predecessors, changes in the organisation of the Mamluk military over time had also resulted in large numbers of soldiers feeling alienated and repeatedly threatening to revolt unless given extra payments, which drained the state's finances.[156] To address the shortfalls, al-Ghuri resorted to heavy-handed and far-reaching taxation and extortion to refill the treasury, which elicited protests that were sometimes violent. He used the raised funds to repair fortresses throughout the region, to commission his own construction projects in Cairo, and to purchase a large number of new mamluks to fill his military ranks.[157]

Al-Ghuri also attempted reforms of the Mamluk military. He recognized the impact of gunpowder technology used by the Ottomans and Europeans, but which the Mamluks had eschewed. In 1507, he established a foundry to produce cannons and created a new regiment trained to use them, known as the 'Fifth Corps' (al-Ṭabaqa al-Khamisa). The latter's ranks were filled recruits from outside the traditional mamluk system, including Turkmens, Persians, awlad al-nas, and craftsmen.[156] The traditional mamluk army, however, regarded firearms with contempt and vigorously resisted their incorporation into Mamluk warfare, which prevented al-Ghuri from making effective use of them until the end of his reign.[156][158]

Anonymous 1511 painting depicting a reception of Venetian ambassadors in Damascus during the time of al-Ghuri[159]

In the meantime, Shah Ismail I had emerged in 1501 and forged the Safavid Empire in Iran. The Safavids styled themselves as champions of Twelver Shi'ism, in direct opposition to the Sunnism of the Mamluks and Ottomans.[160] Tensions along this frontier encouraged al-Ghuri to rely more on the Ottomans for aid, a policy that the Venetians ultimately also urged him to follow in order to counter their common foe, the Portuguese.[146][161][162]

The latter's expansion into the Indian Ocean was one of the major concerns of al-Ghuri's time.[156] In 1498, the Portuguese navigator Vasco da Gama had circumnavigated Africa and reached India, thus opening a new route for European trade with the east which bypassed the Middle East. This posed a serious threat to Muslim commerce, which was dominant in the area, as well as to the prosperity of Venice, which relied on trade passing from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean through Mamluk lands.[163] For over more than a decade, a series of confrontations took place between Portuguese forces in the Indian Ocean and Muslim expeditions sent against them. A Mamluk fleet of fifty ships left from Jeddah in 1506, with assistance of forces from the Gujarat Sultanate. It defeated the Portuguese in 1507 but lost at the Battle of Diu in 1509.[164] In 1515, a joint Ottoman-Mamluk fleet set out under the leadership of Salman Ra'is, but ultimately it did not accomplish much.[165]

Fall to the Ottomans

[edit]
Ottoman painting showing the head of Mamluk Sultan al-Ghuri being remitted to Selim I

Selim I, the new Ottoman sultan, defeated the Safavids decisively at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514. Soon after, he attacked and defeated the Dulkadirids, a Mamluk vassal, for refusing to aid him against the Safavids.[160] Secure now against Ismail I, in 1516 he drew together a great army aiming at conquering Egypt, but to obscure the fact he presented the mobilisation of his army as being part of the war against Ismail I. The war started in 1516 which led to the later incorporation of Egypt and its dependencies in the Ottoman Empire, with Mamluk cavalry proving no match for the Ottoman artillery and the janissaries. On 24 August 1516, at the Battle of Marj Dabiq, the Ottomans were victorious against an army led by al-Ghuri himself.[166] Khayr Bak, the governor of Aleppo, had secretly conspired with Selim and betrayed al-Ghuri, leaving with his troops part-way during the battle. In the subsequent chaos, al-Ghuri was killed.[167] The surviving Mamluk forces returned to Aleppo but were denied entry to the city and marched back to Egypt, harassed along the way.[168] Syria passed into Ottoman possession,[169] and the Ottomans were welcomed in many places as deliverance from the Mamluks.[170][171][172]

The Mamluk Sultanate survived a little longer until 1517. Tuman Bay, whom al-Ghuri had left as deputy in Cairo, was hastily and unanimously proclaimed sultan on 10 October 1516.[167][173] The emirs rejected his plan to confront the next Ottoman advance at Gaza, so instead he prepared a final defense at al-Raydaniyya to the north of Cairo.[167] In the early days of 1517, Tuman Bay received news that a Mamluk army was defeated at Gaza.[174] The Ottoman attack at al-Raydaniyya overwhelmed the defenders on 22 January 1517 and reached Cairo.[168] Over the following days, furious fighting continued between Mamluks, locals, and Ottomans, resulting in much damage to the city and three days of pillaging. Selim proclaimed an amnesty on 31 January, at which point many of the remaining Mamluks surrendered.[175] Tuman Bay fled to Bahnasa in Middle Egypt with some of his remaining forces.[168]

Selim initially offered the Mamluk sultan peace as an Ottoman vassal, but his messengers were intercepted and killed by mamluks.[176] Tuman Bay, with 4,000 cavalry and some 8,000 infantry, confronted the Ottomans in a final bloody battle near Giza on 2 April 1517, where he was defeated and captured.[176][168] Selim intended to spare him, but Khayr Bak and Janbirdi al-Ghazali, another former Mamluk commander, persuaded the Ottoman sultan that Tuman Bay was too dangerous to keep alive. Accordingly, the last Mamluk sultan was executed by hanging at Bab Zuwayla, one of Cairo's gates, on 13 April 1517.[177] In reward for his betrayal at Marj Dabiq, Selim installed Khayr Bak as Ottoman governor of Egypt.[168] Janbirdi was appointed governor of Damascus.[178]

Mamluks under Ottoman rule

[edit]
Armour of a Mamluk horseman from the Ottoman period, c. 1550.

While the Mamluk Sultanate ceased to exist with the Ottoman conquest and the recruitment of Royal Mamluks ended, the mamluks as a military-social class continued to exist.[179][180] They constituted a "self-perpetuating, largely Turkish-speaking warrior class" that continued to influence politics under Ottoman rule.[181] They existed as military units in parallel with the more strictly Ottoman regiments like the janissaries and the azabs. The difference between these Ottoman regiments and the Egyptian mamluk regiments became blurred over time as intermarriage became common, resulting in a more mixed social class.[180]

One of the last Mamluks, painted by William Page in 1816–1824

During this period, a number of mamluk 'households' formed, with a complex composition including both true mamluks and awlad al-nas, who could also rise to high ranks. Each household was headed by an ustadh, who could be an Ottoman officer or a local civilian. Their patronage extended to include retainers recruited from other Ottoman provinces as well as allies among the local urban population and tribes.[179] Up to the early 17th century, the vast majority of Egyptian mamluks were still of Caucasian or Circassian origin. In the later 17th and 18th centuries, mamluks from other parts of the Ottoman Empire or its frontiers, such as Bosnia and Georgia, began to appear in Egypt.[182]

Throughout the Ottoman period, powerful mamluk households and factions struggled for control of important political offices and of Egypt's revenues.[179] Between 1688 and 1755, mamluk beys, allied with Bedouin and factions within the Ottoman garrison, deposed at least thirty-four governors.[183] The mamluks remained a dominating force in Egyptian politics until their final elimination at the hands of Muhammad Ali in 1811.[184]

Society

[edit]

Language

[edit]

By the time the Mamluks took power, Arabic had already been established as the language of religion, culture and the bureaucracy in Egypt, and was widespread among non-Muslim communities there as well. Arabic's wide usage among Muslim and non-Muslim commoners had likely been motivated by their aspiration to learn the language of the ruling and scholarly elite. Another contributing factor was the wave of Arab tribal migration to Egypt and subsequent intermarriage between Arabs and the indigenous population. The Mamluks contributed to the expansion of Arabic in Egypt through their victory over the Mongols and the Crusaders and the subsequent creation of a Muslim haven in Egypt and Syria for Arabic-speaking immigrants from other conquered Muslim lands. The continuing invasions of Syria by Mongol armies led to further waves of Syrian immigrants, including scholars and artisans, to Egypt.[6]

Although Arabic was used as the administrative language of the sultanate, a variety of Kipchak Turkic, namely the Mamluk-Kipchak language was the spoken language of the Mamluk ruling elite.[185] According to Petry, "the Mamluks regarded Turkish as their caste's vehicle of communication, even though they themselves spoke Central Asian dialects such as Qipjak, or Circassian, a Caucasic language."[186] According to historian Michael Winter, Turkishness was the distinctive aspect of the Mamluk ruling elite, for only they knew how to speak Turkish and had Turkish names.[187] While the Mamluk elite was ethnically diverse, those who were not Turkic in origin were Turkicized nonetheless.[188] As such, the ethnically Circassian mamluks who gained prominence with the rise of the Burji regime and became the dominant ethnic element of the government, were educated in the Turkish language and were considered to be Turks by the Arabic-speaking population.[185][187] Kipchak Turkish was also used in writing, but to a lesser extent than Arabic and mainly for a mamluk audience. Over time, it was replaced in this role by Oghuz Turkish due to the growing influence of Turkish Anatolia.[3][189][1]

The ruling military elite of the sultanate was exclusive to those of mamluk background, with rare exceptions.[190] Ethnicity served as a major factor separating the mostly Turkic or Turkicized Mamluk elite from their Arabic-speaking subjects.[187] Ethnic origin was a key component of an individual mamluk's identity, and ethnic identity manifested itself through given names, dress, access to administrative positions and was indicated by a sultan's nisba.[191] The sons of mamluks, known as the awlad al-nas, did not typically hold positions in the military elite and instead, were often part of the civilian administration or the Muslim religious establishment.[188] Among the Bahri sultans and emirs, there existed a degree of pride of their Kipchak Turkish roots, and their non-Kipchak usurpers such as sultans Kitbuqa, Baybars II and Lajin were often de-legitimized in the Bahri-era sources for their non-Kipchak origins. The Mamluk elites of the Burji period were also apparently proud of their Circassian origins.[192]

Religion

[edit]

Muslim community

[edit]
Finispiece from the Qur'an copied by Ahmad ibn Kamal al-Mutatabbib in 1334. This manuscript is part of the National Library of Egypt's Collection of Mamluk Qur'an Manuscripts inscribed in the UNESCO Memory of the World Register

A wide range of Islamic religious expression existed in Egypt during the early Mamluk era, namely Sunni Islam and its major madhabs (schools of jurisprudence) and different Sufi orders, but also small communities of Ismai'li Shia Muslims, particularly in Upper Egypt. There remained a significant minority of Coptic Christians. Under Saladin, the Ayyubids embarked on a program of reviving and strengthening Sunni Islam in Egypt to counter Christianity, which had been reviving under the religiously benign rule of the Fatimids, and Isma'ilism, the branch of Islam of the Fatimid state. Under the Bahri sultans, the promotion of Sunni Islam was pursued more vigorously than under the Ayyubids.[193] The Mamluks were motivated by personal piety or political expediency for Islam was both an assimilating and unifying factor between the Mamluks and the majority of their subjects; the early mamluks had been brought up as Sunni Muslims and the Islamic faith was the only aspect of life shared between the Mamluk ruling elite and its subjects. While the precedent set by the Ayyubids highly influenced the Mamluk state's embrace of Sunni Islam, the circumstances in the Muslim Middle East in the aftermath of the Crusader and Mongol invasions also left Mamluk Egypt as the last major Islamic power able to confront the Crusaders and the Mongols. Thus, the early Mamluk embrace of Sunni Islam also stemmed from the pursuit of a moral unity within their realm based on the majority views of its subjects.[194]

The Mamluks cultivated and utilized Muslim leaders to channel the religious feelings of their Muslim subjects in a manner that did not disrupt the sultanate's authority.[6] Similar to their Ayyubid predecessors, the Bahri sultans favored the Shafi'i madhab, while additionally promoting the other major Sunni madhabs, namely the Maliki, Hanbali and Hanafi. Baybars ended the Ayyubid and early Mamluk tradition of selecting a Shafi'i scholar as qadi al-qudah (chief judge) and instead appointed a qadi al-qudah from each of the four madhabs. This policy was partly motivated to accommodate an increasingly diverse Muslim population whose components had immigrated to Egypt from regions where other madhabs prevailed. The diffusion of the post of qadi al-qudah enabled Mamluk sultans to patronize each madhab and gain more influence over them. Nevertheless, the Shafi'i scholars kept a number of privileges over their counterparts.[195]

The Mamluks embraced the Sufi orders in the empire.[196] Sufism was widespread in Egypt by the 13th century, and the Shadhiliyya was the most popular order. The Shadhiliyya lacked an institutional structure and was flexible in its religious thought, allowing it to easily adapt to its local environment. It incorporated Sunni Islamic piety with its basis in the Qur'an and hadith, Sufi mysticism, and elements of popular religion such as sainthood, ziyarat (visitation) to the tombs of saintly or religious individuals, and dhikr (invocation of God). Other Sufi orders with large numbers of adherents were the Rifa'iyya and Badawiyya.[197] While the Mamluks patronized the Sunni ulema through appointments to government office, they patronized the Sufis by funding zawiyas (Sufi lodges).[6] On the other end of the spectrum of Sunni religious expression were the teachings of the Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyya, which emphasized stringent moral rigor based on literal interpretations of the Qur'an and the Sunna, and a deep hostility to the aspects of mysticism and popular religious innovations promoted by the Sufis. While Ibn Taymiyya was not a typical representative of Sunni orthodoxy in the sultanate, he was the most prominent Muslim scholar of the Mamluk era and arrested several times by the Mamluks for his religious teachings, which are still influential in the modern Muslim world.[197] Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines were regarded as heretical by the Sunni establishment patronized by the Mamluks.[6]

Christian and Jewish communities

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Mamluk-era astrolabe with Coptic numerals, dated 1282/1283. This astrolabe and other items of its kind are proof that Mamluks still used Coptic numerals and Coptic calendar for various practical and scientific purposes.[198] Turkish and Islamic Arts Museum

Christians and Jews in the empire were governed by the dual authority of their respective religious institutions and the sultan. The authority of the former extended to many of the everyday aspects of Christian and Jewish life and was not restricted to the religious practices of the two communities. The Mamluk government, often under the official banner of the Pact of Umar which gave Christians and Jews dhimmi (protected peoples) status, determined the taxes paid by Christians and Jews, including the jizya (poll tax on non-Muslims), permission to construct houses of worship, and the public appearance of Christians and Jews.[199] Jews generally fared better than Christians, and the latter experienced more difficulties under the Mamluks than their Muslim predecessors.[199][6] The association of Christians with the Mongols, due to the latter's use of Armenian and Georgian Christian auxiliaries, the attempted alliance between the Mongols and the Crusader powers, and the massacres of Muslim communities and the sparing of Christians in cities captured by the Mongols, contributed to rising anti-Christian sentiments in the Mamluk era. The manifestations of anti-Christian hostility were mostly spearheaded at the popular level rather than by the Mamluk sultans. The main source of popular hostility was resentment at the privileged positions many Christians held in the Mamluk bureaucracy.[6]

The Coptic decline in Egypt occurred under the Bahri sultans and accelerated further under the Burji regime.[200] There were several instances of Egyptian Muslim protests against the wealth of Copts and their employment with the state, and both Muslim and Christian rioters burned down each other's houses of worship during intercommunal clashes.[6] As a result of popular pressure, Copts had their employment in the bureaucracy terminated at least nine times between the late 13th and mid-15th centuries, and on one occasion, in 1301, the government ordered the closure of all churches.[6] Coptic bureaucrats were often restored to their positions after tensions passed. Many Copts were forced to convert to Islam or at least adopted outward expressions of Muslim faith to protect their employment and avoid the jizya and official measures against them.[201] A large wave of Coptic conversions to Islam occurred in the 14th century,[201] as a result of persecution, destruction of churches,[6] and to retain employment.[201] By the end of the Mamluk period, the ratio of Muslims to Christians in Egypt may have risen to 10:1.[6]

In Syria, the Mamluks uprooted the local Maronite and Greek Orthodox Christians from the coastal areas to prevent their contact with European powers. The Maronite Church was especially suspected by the Mamluks of collaboration with the Europeans due to the close relations between the Maronite Church and the papacy in Rome and the Christian European powers, particularly Cyprus. The Greek Orthodox Church declined after the Mamluk destruction of its spiritual center, Antioch, and the Timurid destruction of Aleppo and Damascus in 1400.[202] The Syriac Christians also significant declined in Syria due to intra-communal disputes over patriarchal succession and the destruction of churches by the Timurids or local Kurdish tribes.[203] The Mamluks inaugurated a similar decline of the Armenian Orthodox Church after their conquest of the Cilicia in 1374, in addition to the raids of the Timurids in 1386 and the conflict between the Timurids and the Aq Qoyunlu and Kara Qoyonlu tribal confederations in Cilicia.[204]

Bedouin relationship with the state

[edit]

Bedouins were a reserve force in the Mamluk military. During the third reign of al-Nasir Muhammad, the Bedouin tribes, particularly those of Syria, such as the Al Fadl, were strengthened and integrated into the economy.[205] Bedouin tribes were also a major supplier of the Mamluk cavalry's Arabian horses. Qalawun purchased horses from the Bedouin of Barqa, which were inexpensive but of high quality, while al-Nasir Muhammad spent extravagantly for horses from Bedouins in Barqa, Syria, Iraq and Bahrayn (eastern Arabia).[206]

Baybars and Qalawun, and the Syrian viceroys of al-Nasir Muhammad during his first two reigns, emirs Salar and Baybars II, were averse to granting Bedouin sheikhs iqtaʿat, and when they did, the iqtaʿat were of low quality. During al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign, the Al Fadl were granted high-quality iqtaʿat in abundance, strengthening the tribe to become the most powerful among the Bedouin of the Syrian Desert. Beyond his personal admiration of the Bedouin, al-Nasir Muhammad's distributed iqtaʿat to the Al Fadl to prevent their defection to the Ilkhanate, which the Al Fadl had frequently done during the early 14th century.[207] Competition over iqtaʿat and the post of amir al-ʿarab (chief commander of the Bedouin) in Syria, led to conflict and rebellion among the tribes, leading to mass bloodshed in Syria in the aftermath of al-Nasir Muhammad's death. The Mamluk leadership in Syria, weakened by the losses of the Black Plague, was unable to quell the Bedouin through military expeditions, so they resolved to assassinate the chiefs of the tribes. The Al Fadl eventually lost favor, to the advantage of the Bedouin tribes around al-Karak under later Bahri sultans.[208]

In Egypt, during al-Nasir Muhammad's third reign, the Mamluks had a similar relationship with the Bedouin. The Isa Ibn Hasan al-Hajjan tribe became powerful there after being assigned massive iqtaʿat. The tribe remained strong after al-Nasir Muhammad's death, but frequently rebelled against the succeeding Bahri sultans. They were restored after each rebellion, before the tribe's sheikh was finally executed in 1353. In Sharqiya in Lower Egypt, the Tha'laba tribes were entrusted to supervise the postal routes, but were often unreliable and joined the Al A'id tribe during their raids.[209] Bedouin tribal wars frequently disrupted trade and travel in Upper Egypt, and destroyed cultivated lands and sugar processing plants. In the mid-14th century, the rival Arak and Banu Hilal tribes of Upper Egypt, became de facto rulers of the region, forcing the Mamluks to rely on them for tax collection.[210] The Bedouin were purged from Upper and Lower Egypt by the campaigns of Shaykhu in 1353.[211]

Government

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The Mamluks did not significantly alter the administrative, legal and economic systems they inherited from the Ayyubid state.[212] The Mamluk ruled over essentially the same territory of the Ayyubid state, i.e. Egypt, Syria and the Hejaz. Unlike the collective sovereignty of the Ayyubids, where territory was divided among members of the royal family, the Mamluk state was unitary. Under many Ayyubid sultans, Egypt had paramountcy over the Syrian provinces, but under the Mamluks this paramountcy was consistent and absolute.[213] Cairo remained the capital of the empire and its social, economic and administrative center, with the Citadel of Cairo serving as the sultan's headquarters.[212]

Authority of the sultan

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Yellow cartouche
Red cartouche
Illuminated frontispiece to the manuscript of Al-Kawākib ad-durriyya by Al-Busiri made for the sultan Qaitbay. Large lobed medallions in the center bear the name of the sultan (right) and blessing on him (left).[214] Above and below on the right is the certificate of commissioning stating the manuscript to have been produced for his library, while opposite, on the facing page, the upper and lower panels contain the title of the work.[215] Chester Beatty Library.

The Mamluk sultan was the supreme government authority, while he delegated power to provincial governors known as nuwwab al-saltana (deputy sultans, sing. na'ib al-saltana). The vice-regent of Egypt was the top na'ib, followed by the na'ib of Damascus, then Aleppo, then the nuwwab of al-Karak, Safed, Tripoli, Homs and Hama. In Hama, the Mamluks permitted the Ayyubids to continue governing until 1341 (its popular governor in 1320, Abu'l Fida, was granted the honorary title of sultan by al-Nasir Muhammad), but otherwise the nuwwab of the provinces were mamluk emirs.[213]

A consistent accession process occurred with every new sultan. It mostly involved an election by a council of emirs and mamluks (who would proffer an oath of loyalty), the sultan's assumption of the regal title al-malik, a state-organized procession through Cairo led by the sultan, and the reading of the sultan's name in the khutba (Friday prayer sermon).[216] The process was not formalized and the electoral body never defined, but typically consisted of the emirs and mamluks of whichever Mamluk faction held sway; usurpations of the throne by rival factions were relatively common.[217] Despite the electoral nature of accession, dynastic succession was nonetheless a reality at times,[83] especially during the Bahri period, where Baybars' sons Baraka and Solamish succeeded him, before Qalawun usurped the throne and was thereafter succeeded by four generations of direct descendants, with occasional interruptions.[217] Hereditary rule was much less frequent under the Burji regime. Nonetheless, with rare exception, the Burji sultans were all linked to the regime's founder Barquq through blood or mamluk affiliation.[218] The accession of blood relatives to the sultanate was often the result of the decision or indecision of leading Mamluk emirs or the will of the preceding sultan.[83] The latter situation applied to the sultans Baybars, Qalawun, the latter's son, al-Nasir Muhammad and Barquq, who formally arranged for one or more of their sons to succeed them.[217] More often than not, the sons of sultans were elected by the senior emirs with the intention that they serve as convenient figureheads presiding over an oligarchy of the emirs.[218]

Lesser-ranked emirs viewed the sultan as a peer whom they entrusted with ultimate authority and as a benefactor whom they expected to guarantee their salaries and monopoly on the military. When emirs felt the sultan was not ensuring their benefits, disruptive riots, coup plots or delays to calls for service were all likely scenarios.[219] Often, the practical restrictions on a sultan's power came from his own khushdashiyya,[220] defined by historian Amalia Levanoni as "the fostering of a common bond between mamluks who belonged to the household of a single master and their loyalty towards him."[221] The foundation of Mamluk organization and factional unity was based on the principles of khushdashiyya, which was a crucial component of a sultan's authority and power.[221] The sultan also derived power from other emirs, with whom there was constant tension, particularly in peacetime. According to Holt, the factious nature of emirs who were not the sultan's khushdashiyya stemmed from their primary loyalty being to their ustadh. Emirs who were part of the sultan's khushdashiyya also rebelled at times, particularly the nuwwab of Syria who had power bases in their provinces. Typically, the faction most loyal to the sultan were the Royal Mamluks, particularly those whom the sultan had personally recruited and manumitted, as opposed to the qaranis, who were recruited by his predecessors. The qaranis occasionally constituted a hostile faction, such as with as-Salih Ayyub and the Qalawuni successors of al-Nasir Muhammad.[220]

Among the sultan's responsibilities were issuing and enforcing specific legal orders and general rules, making the decision to go to war, levying taxes for military campaigns, ensuring the proportionate distribution of food supplies throughout the empire and, in some cases, overseeing the investigation and punishment of alleged criminals. The sultan or his appointees led the Hajj caravans from Cairo and Damascus to Mecca in the capacity of amir al-hajj (commander of the Hajj caravan). Starting with Qalawun, the sultans monopolized the provision of the Kiswa (mantle) that was annually draped over the Kaaba, in addition to patronizing Jerusalem's Dome of the Rock.[222] Another prerogative, at least of the early Bahri sultans, was to import as many mamluks as possible, preferably those from the territories of the Mongols. The Mamluks' enemies, namely the Mongol states and their Muslim vassals, the Armenians, and the Crusaders, disrupted the flow of mamluks to the sultanate. Unable to meet the military's need for new mamluks, the sultans often resorted to recruiting wafidiyya (Ilkhanid deserters or prisoners of war).[223]

Role of the caliph

[edit]

To legitimize their rule, the Mamluks presented themselves as the defenders of Islam, and, beginning with Baybars, sought confirmation of their executive authority from a caliph. The Ayyubids had owed their allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate, but the latter was destroyed when the Mongols sacked the Abbasid capital Baghdad in 1258 and killed Caliph al-Musta'sim. Three years later, Baybars reestablished the institution of the caliphate by making a member of the Abbasid dynasty, al-Mustansir, caliph, who in turn confirmed Baybars as sultan.[224] The caliph recognized the sultan's authority over Egypt, Syria, the Jazira, Diyar Bakr, the Hejaz and Yemen and any territory conquered from the Crusaders or Mongols.[225]

Al-Mustansir's Abbasid successors continued in their official capacity as caliphs, but held no real power.[224] The less than year-long reign of Caliph al-Musta'in as sultan in 1412 was an anomaly.[220] In an anecdotal testament to the caliph's lack of real authority, a group of rebellious mamluks responded to Lajin's presentation of the Caliph al-Hakim's decree asserting Lajin's authority with the following comment, recorded by Ibn Taghribirdi: "Stupid fellow. For God's sake—who pays any heed to the caliph now?"[220]

The Abbasid presence was nonetheless an important political asset for the legitimacy of the Mamluk rulers and conferred significant prestige on them.[226] The caliphs themselves also continued to be relevant figureheads even to other Muslim rulers until the end of the 14th century; for example, the sultans of Delhi, the Muzaffarid sultan Muhammad, the Jalayirid sultan Ahmad, and the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I all sought diplomas of investiture from the Abbasid caliphs or declared nominal allegiance to them.[227] During the 15th century, however, the institution of the caliphate declined in importance and the caliphs became little more than religious dignitaries who visited the sultan on special occasions.[228]

Military and administrative hierarchy

[edit]
Mamluk lancers, early 16th century (etching by Daniel Hopfer). British Museum.

The sultans were products of the military hierarchy, entry into which was essentially restricted to mamluks. Awlad al-nas could enter and rise high within the hierarchy,[229] but typically did not enter military service. Instead, many entered into mercantile, scholastic or other civilian careers.[230]

Adult Mamluks were not slaves, but former slaves. The Mamluks were sons of kafir (non-Muslim) parents from Dar al-harb (non-Muslim lands); they were bought on the slave market as children, converted to Islam and brought up in military barracks where they were raised to become Muslim soldiers, during which they were raised, as slave children without families, to view the sultan as their father and the other mamluks as their brothers.[231] Their education was finished by the kharj ceremony, during which they were manumitted and given a position in either the courtly administration or the army, and free to begin a career as a free ex-slave Mamluk.[232] Mamluk slave soldiers were preferred to freeborn soldiers because they were raised to view the army and their sultan-ruler as their family and thus seen as more loyal than a freeborn soldier who would have a biological family to whom thei would have their first loyalty.[233]

The army Baybars inherited consisted of Kurdish and Turkic tribesmen, refugees from the Ayyubid armies of Syria, and other troops from armies dispersed by the Mongols. After the Battle of Ain Jalut, Baybars restructured the army into three components: the Royal Mamluk regiment, the soldiers of the emirs, and the halqa (non-mamluk soldiers). The Royal Mamluks, who were under the direct command of the sultan, were the highest-ranking body within the army, entry into which was exclusive.[234]

The Royal Mamluks were the private corps of the sultan. The lower-ranking emirs also had their own corps, akin to private armies,[229] which were also mobilized by the sultan when needed.[234] As emirs were promoted, the number of soldiers in their corps increased, and when rival emirs challenged each other's authority, they often utilized their forces, leading to major disruptions of civilian life.[229] The halqa had inferior status to the mamluk regiments. It had its own administrative structure and was under the direct command of the sultan. The halqa regiments declined in the 14th century when professional non-mamluk soldiers generally stopped joining the force.[235]

The Ayyubid army had lacked a clear and permanent hierarchical system and one of Baybars's early reforms was creating such a hierarchy. To that end, he a ranking system for emirs of ten, forty and one hundred, each indicating the number of mamluks were assigned to an emir's command. An emir of one hundred could further be assigned one thousand mounted troops during battle.[236] Baybars instituted uniformity within the army and ended the improvised nature of the Ayyubid forces in Egypt and Syria.[237] Baybars and Qalawun standardized the undefined Ayyubid policies of distributing iqtaʿat to emirs. This reform created a clear link between an emir's rank and the size of his iqtaʿ.[238] Baybars started biweekly inspections of the troops to verify sultanic orders were implemented, in addition to the periodic inspections where he distributed new arms to the troops. Beginning under Qalawun, the sultan and the military administration recorded all emirs in the empire and defined their roles as part of the right or left flanks of the army during wartime.[237]

Horsemen wheeling around, with a sword in each one's hand. Nihāyat al-su’l (horsemanship manual) by Aḥmad al-Miṣrī ("the Egyptian"), dated 1371, Mamluk Egypt or Syria.

Gradually, as mamluks filled administrative and courtier posts within the state, Mamluk innovations to the Ayyubid hierarchy were developed. The offices of ustadar (majordomo), hajib (chamberlain), amir jandar (commander of the arsenal) and khazindar (treasurer), which existed during the Ayyubid period, were preserved, but Baybars added the offices of dawadar (secretary or adviser), amir akhur (commander of the royal stables), ru'us al-nawab (chief of the mamluk corps) and amir majlis (commander of the audience). These additional offices were largely ceremonial posts and were closely connected to the military hierarchy.[239]

The ustadar (from the Arabic ustadh al-dar, lit.'master of the house') was the sultan's chief of staff, responsible for organizing the royal court's daily activities, managing the sultan's personal budget, and supervising all of the buildings of the Citadel of Cairo and its staff. The ustadar was often referred to as the ustadar al-aliya (grand master of the house) to distinguish from his subordinate ustadar saghirs (lesser majordomos) who oversaw specific aspects of the court and citadel, such as the sultan's treasury, private property, and the kitchens of the citadel. Emirs had their own ustadars.[240] The ustadar al-aliya became a powerful office in the late 14th century, particularly under Barquq and al-Nasir Faraj, who transferred the responsibilities of the special bureau for their mamluks to the authority of the ustadar, turning the latter into the state's chief financial official.[240][241]

Economy

[edit]
A Blood-Measuring Device: folio from a manuscript of The Book of Knowledge of Ingenious Mechanical Devices (Kitab al-hiyal al-nafisa) of Al-Jazari (1136–1206). Edition created for an amir of Mamluk Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad in Cairo in 1354.[242]

The Mamluk economy essentially consisted of two spheres: the state economy, which was organized like an elite household and controlled by the caste government headed by the sultan, and the free market economy, which was the domain of society and associated with the local subjects, in contrast to the ethnic outsiders of the ruling elite.[243] The Mamluks introduced greater centralization of the economy by organizing the state bureaucracy in Cairo (Damascus and Aleppo already had organized bureaucracies), and the military hierarchy and its associated iqtaʿ system. In Egypt, the centrality of the Nile River facilitated Mamluk centralization of the region.[80] The Mamluks used the same currency system as the Ayyubids, consisting of gold dinars, silver dirhams and copper fulus.[244] The monetary system during the Mamluk period was highly unstable due to frequent monetary changes enacted by the sultans. Increased circulation of copper coins and the increased use of copper in dirhams often led to inflation.[245]

The Mamluks created an administrative body called the hisba to supervise the market, with a muhtasib (inspector-general) in charge. There were four muhtasibs based in Cairo, Alexandria, al-Fustat and Lower Egypt. The muhtasib in Cairo was the most important and his position akin to a finance minister. The muhtasib inspected weights and measures and the quality of goods, maintained legal trade, and detected price gouging.[244] A qadi or Muslim scholar occupied the post, but in the 15th century, mamluk emirs began to be appointed as muhtasibs to recompense them during cash shortages or as a result of the gradual shift of the muhtasib's role from the legal realm to enforcement.[246]

Iqtaʿ system

[edit]

The iqtaʿ system was inherited from the Ayyubids and further organized under the Mamluks to fit their military needs.[247] Iqtaʿat were a central component of the Mamluk power structure.[248] The iqtaʿ of the Muslims differed from the European concept of fiefs in that the iqtaʿ represented a right to collect revenue from a fixed territory and was accorded to an officer (an emir) as income and a financial source to provision his soldiers. Before the Mamluks' rise, there was a growing tendency of iqtaʿ holders to treat their iqtaʿ as personal, heritable property. The Mamluks effectively ended this, with the exception of some areas, mainly in Mount Lebanon, where longtime Druze iqtaʿ holders (see Buhturids), who became part of the halqa, successfully resisted the abolition of their hereditary iqtaʿat.[249] In the Mamluk era, the iqtaʿ was an emir's main income source,[250] and starting in 1337,[251] Iqtaʿ holders sometimes leased or sold rights to their iqtaʿat to non-mamluks to extract more profits.[250] By 1343, the practice was commonplace and by 1347, the sale of iqta'at became taxed.[251] The iqtaʿ was a more stable revenue source than other methods the Mamluks employed, such as tax hikes, the sale of administrative offices, and extortion of the population.[250] According to historian Jo van Steenbergen,

The iqtaʿ system was fundamental in assuring a legitimized, controlled and guaranteed access to the resources of the Syro-Egyptian realm to an upper level of Mamluk society that was primarily military in form and organization. As such it was a fundamental feature of Mamluk society, on the one hand giving way to a military hierarchy that crystallized into an even more developed economic hierarchy and that had substantial economic interests in society at large; on the other hand, it deeply characterized the realm's economic and social development, its agriculture, grain trade, and rural demography in particular.[247]

The system consisted of land assignments from the state in return for military services. Land was assessed by the periodic rawk (cadastral survey), which a survey of land parcels (measured by feddan units), assessment of land quality, and the annual estimated tax revenue of the parcels, and classification of a parcel's legal status as waqf (endowment) or iqtaʿ.[252] The rawk organized the iqtaʿ system and the first was carried out in 1298 under Lajin. A second and final rawk was completed in 1315 under al-Nasir Muhammad and influenced political and economic developments of the Mamluk Sultanate until its fall in the early 16th century.[253]

Gradually, the iqtaʿ system was expanded, and increasingly larger areas of kharaj (taxable lands) were appropriated as iqtaʿ lands to meet the fiscal needs of the military, namely payment of emirs and their subordinates. The state resolved to increase allotments by dispersing an emir's iqtaʿat across several provinces and for short terms. This led to iqtaʿ holders neglecting the administrative oversight, maintenance, and infrastructure of their iqtaʿat, and concentrating solely on collecting taxes, resulting in less productivity.[250]

Agriculture

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Mamluk Wool Carpet, Egypt, c. 1500–1550. Museum of Islamic Art, Doha

Agriculture was the primary source of revenue in the Mamluk economy.[243][254] Agricultural products were the main exports of Mamluk Egypt, Syria and Palestine. Moreover, the major industries of sugar and textile production depended on crops (sugar cane and cotton).[243] Every agricultural commodity was taxed by the state, with the sultan's treasury taking the largest share of the revenues; emirs and major private brokers followed. An emir's main source of income were the agricultural products of his iqtaʿ.[255]

In Egypt, Mamluk centralization of agricultural production was more thorough than in Syria and Palestine. All agriculture in Egypt depended on a single source of irrigation, the Nile, and the measures and rights to irrigation were determined by the river's flooding, whereas in Syria and Palestine, there were multiple sources of mostly rain-fed irrigation, and measures and rights were determined at the local level. Centralization in Syria and Palestine was also more complicated than in Egypt due to the diversity of those regions' geography and their frequent invasions.[256] The state's role in Syro-Palestinian agriculture was restricted to the fiscal administration and to the irrigation networks and other rural infrastructure.[195] Although the degree of centralization was not as high as in Egypt, the Mamluks imposed sufficient control over the Syrian economy to derive significant revenues. The maintenance of the Mamluk army in Syria relied on the state's control over Syrian agricultural revenues.[257]

Among the responsibilities of a Mamluk provincial or district governor were repopulating abandoned areas to foster agricultural production, protecting the lands from Bedouin raids, increasing productivity in barren lands (likely through the upkeep and expansion of existing irrigation networks), and devoting special attention to the cultivation of the more arable low-lying regions.[258] To ensure rural life was undisturbed by Bedouin raiding, which disrupted agricultural work or damaged crops and agrarian infrastructure and thus decreased revenues, the Mamluks attempted to prevent Bedouin armament and confiscate existing weapons from them.[259]

Trade and industry

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Al-Jazarī (d. 1206), The Musical Boat. Mamluk period, 1315.[260]

Egypt and Syria played a central transit role in international trade in the Middle Ages.[261] Early into their rule, the Mamluks expanded the empire's role in foreign trade, with Baybars signing a commercial treaty with Genoa and Qalawun signed a similar agreement with Ceylon.[262] By the 15th century, internal upheaval from Mamluk power struggles, diminishing iqtaʿ revenue from plagues, and the encroachment of abandoned farmlands by Bedouin tribes had led to a financial crisis in the sultanate.[263] To compensate these losses, the Mamluks applied a three-pronged approach: taxing the urban middle classes, boosting production and sale of cotton and sugar to Europe, and profiting from their transit position in the trade between Europe and the Far East. The last was the Mamluks' most lucrative policy and was accomplished by cultivating trade ties with Venice, Genoa and Barcelona, and increasing tariffs on commodities.[264] At this time, the long-established trade between Europe and the Islamic world began to make up a significant part of state revenues as the Mamluks taxed the merchants operating or passing through the empire's ports.[265]

Mamluk Egypt was a major producer of textiles and a supplier of raw materials for Western Europe.[266] The frequent outbreaks of the Black Plague led to a decline in the production of textiles, silk products, sugar, glass, soaps, and paper, which coincided with the Europeans' increasing production of these goods. Trade continued nonetheless and despite papal restrictions on trade with the Muslims during the Crusades. Mediterranean trade was dominated by spices, such as pepper, muscat nuts and flowers, cloves and cinnamon, as well as medicinal drugs and indigo. These goods originated in Persia, India, and Southeast Asia and made their way to Europe via the Mamluk ports of Syria and Egypt. These ports were frequented by European merchants, who in turn sold gold and silver ducats and bullion, silk, wool and linen fabrics, furs, wax, honey, and cheeses.[267]

Under Barsbay, a state monopoly was established on luxury goods, namely spices, with the state setting prices and collecting a percentage of the profits.[265] In 1387, Barsbay established direct control over Alexandria, the principal Egyptian commercial port, transferring its tax revenues to his personal treasury (diwan al-khass) instead of the imperial treasury, which was linked with the military's iqtaʿ system. In 1429, he ordered the spice trade to Europe be conducted through Cairo before goods reached Alexandria to end the direct transportation of spices from the Red Sea to Alexandria.[268] In the late 15th and early 16th centuries, the Portuguese expansion into Africa and Asia significantly decreased the revenues of the Mamluk–Venetian monopoly on trans-Mediterranean trade. This contributed to and coincided with the fall of the sultanate.[269]

Culture

[edit]

Art

[edit]
Baptistère de Saint Louis, basin from the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad (r.1285-1341), which from the 17th century was used as a baptismal font for French Kings. Louvre

Mamluk decorative arts—especially enameled and gilded glass, inlaid metalwork, woodwork, and textiles—were prized around the Mediterranean as well as in Europe, where they had a profound impact on local production. Mamluk glassware influenced the Venetian glass industry.[270] Trade with Iran, India, and China was even more extensive, turning Mamluk cities into centers of both trade and consumption. Imported luxury goods from the East sometimes influenced local artistic vocabularies, as exemplified by the incorporation of Chinese motifs into both objects and architecture.The Mamluks themselves, as former slaves who rose through the ranks by their own efforts, were status-conscious patrons who commissioned luxury objects marked with emblems of their ownership. Architecture was the most significant form of Mamluk patronage and numerous artistic objects were commissioned to furnish Mamluk religious buildings, such as glass lamps, Qur'an manuscripts, brass candlesticks, and wooden minbars. Decorative motifs in one art form were often applied in other art forms, including architecture.[271]

Patronage varied over time, but the two high points of the arts were the reigns of al-Nasir Muhammad and of Qaitbay.[271] Some art forms also varied in importance over time. For example, enameled glassware was a prominent industry during the first half of the Mamluk period but declined significantly in the 15th century. Most of the surviving examples of carpets, by contrast, date from the end of the Mamluk period. Ceramic production was relatively less important overall, in part because Chinese porcelains were widely available.[272]

Qur'an commissioned by sultan Al-Ashraf Sha'ban, dated to 1372[273][274]

In the art of manuscript decoration, the Qur'an was the book most commonly produced with a high degree of artistic elaboration.[272] Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo were among the main centers of manuscript production. Mamluk-period Qur'ans were richly illuminated and exhibit stylistic similarities with those produced under the contemporary Ilkhanids in Iran. The production of high-quality paper at this time also allowed for pages to be larger, which encouraged artists to elaborate new motifs and designs to fill these larger formats. Some manuscripts could be monumental in size; for example, one Qur'an manuscript produced for al-Ashraf Sha'ban measured between 75 and 105 centimetres tall. One of the stylistic features that distinguished Mamluk manuscript decoration was the presence of gilded foliate scrollwork over pastel-coloured backgrounds set within wide margins. Frontispieces were often decorated with star-shaped or hexagonal geometric motifs.[275]

Metalware, whether in the form of ewers, basins, or candlesticks, was widely used in various contexts and many examples have survived today. They were made of brass or bronze with inlaid decoration, though in the later periods decoration was often engraved rather than inlaid. The quality and quantity of metalwork was also generally higher in the early period.[271] One of the best examples of this period is the so-called Baptistère of Saint-Louis (kept at the Louvre today), a large brass basin inlaid with arabesques and horizontal scenes of animals, hunters, and riders playing polo.[272] An example of the later period is a series of candlesticks commissioned by Qaitbay for Muhammad's tomb in the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. They are made of engraved brass, with black bitumen filling parts of the surfaces in order to create contrast with the motifs in polished brass. Their decoration consists almost entirely of Arabic calligraphy, with the thuluth script prominently used.[276]

Glass lamps were another high point of Mamluk art, particularly those commissioned for mosques. Egypt and Syria already possessed a rich tradition of glassmaking before this period and Damascus was the most important production center during the Mamluk period. Coloured glass had been common in the preceding Ayyubid period, but during the Mamluk period enamel and gilding became the most important techniques of decorating glass. Mosque lamps had a bulbous body with a wide flaring neck at the top. They were produced in the thousands and suspended from the ceiling by chains.[277]

Architecture

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Funerary complex of Sultan Qaitbay (built 1470–1474), one of the finest examples of late Mamluk architecture

Mamluk architecture is distinguished in part by the construction of multi-functional buildings whose floor plans became increasingly creative and complex due to the limited available space in the city and the desire to make monuments visually dominant in their urban surroundings.[278][279][280] While Cairo was the main center of patronage, Mamluk architecture also appears in Damascus, Jerusalem, Aleppo, and Medina.[281] Patrons, including sultans and high-ranking emirs, typically set out to build mausoleums for themselves but attached to them charitable structures such as madrasas, zawiyas, sabils (public fountains), or mosques. The revenues and expenses of these charitable complexes were governed by inalienable waqf agreements that also served the secondary purpose of ensuring some form of income or property for the patrons' descendants.[280][278]

The cruciform or four-iwan floor plan was adopted for madrasas and became more common for new monumental complexes than the traditional hypostyle mosque, though the vaulted iwans of the early period were replaced with flat-roofed iwans in the later period.[282][283] The decoration of monuments also became more elaborate over time, with stone-carving and colored marble paneling and mosaics (including ablaq) replacing stucco as the most dominant architectural decoration. Monumental decorated entrance portals became common compared to earlier periods, often carved with muqarnas. Influences from Syria, Ilkhanid Iran, and possibly even Venice were evident in these trends.[284][285] Minarets, which were also elaborate, usually consisted of three tiers separated by balconies, with each tier having a different design than the others. Late Mamluk minarets, for example, most typically had an octagonal shaft for the first tier, a round shaft on the second, and a lantern structure with finial on the third level.[286][287] Domes also transitioned from wooden or brick structures, sometimes of bulbous shape, to pointed stone domes with complex geometric or arabesque motifs carved into their outer surfaces.[288] The peak of this stone dome architecture was achieved under Qaitbay in the late 15th century.[289]

After the Ottoman conquest of 1517, new Ottoman-style buildings were introduced, however the Mamluk style continued to be repeated or combined with Ottoman elements in many subsequent monuments. Some building types which first appeared in the late Mamluk period, such as sabil-kuttabs (a combination of sabil and kuttab) and multi-storied caravanserais (wikalas or khans), actually grew in number during the Ottoman period.[290] In modern times, from the late 19th century onwards, a neo-Mamluk style also appeared, partly as a nationalist response against Ottoman and European styles, in an effort to promote local 'Egyptian' styles.[291][292][293]

Emblems and blazons

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Mosque lamp of Amir Qawsun, dated 1329. Qawsun's blazon, a red cup on a yellow field, is prominently visible on the upper section. Metropolitan Museum of Art.[294]

Mamluks sultans and emirs had personal blazons, which were important symbols of their status and a distinctive cultural feature of the Mamluk ruling class.[295][296][297] With the possible exception of the earliest years of the regime, Mamluks chose their own blazons.[296] This was done while they were emirs and the blazon usually symbolized the office or position they held at this time.[298][296] The blazon appeared on their banners and it was retained even after they became sultans.[298] Such blazons were an important feature of Mamluk visual culture and they are found on all kinds of objects manufactured for Mamluk patrons.[296][297] They were also featured in Mamluk architecture, though less consistently.[295] This heraldic practice was unique in the medieval Muslim world.[297]

Unlike European heraldry, Mamluk blazons used a much more limited set of images and symbols for their charges: only about forty-five symbols were used. Early Mamluk blazons were simple, usually featuring a single symbol such as a cup, sword, or an animal. Some banners were merely distinguished by patterned fabrics and plain geometric divisions.[296] The blazon of Baybars was a panther, lion, or leopard,[295][299] while that of Qalawun, according to one author, was a fleur-de-lis.[295] From the late 13th century to the mid 14th century, the crescent moon appears on Mamluk ceramics and some Mamluk coins, either alone or in conjunction with other symbols, though it was rarely used for personal blazons.[300] Starting with al-Nasir Muhammad, epigraphic blazons (with Arabic calligraphy) became part of the heraldic repertoire.[301]

From the late 14th to the mid-15th centuries, blazons became more complex and their shields were usually divided into three parts, with the main symbol placed within each division, sometimes in pairs. After this, late Mamluk blazons became even more elaborate but were more homogenous in style. They were filled with details, including up to five or six different symbols. By this point, they were possibly no longer used as individualized personal blazons but perhaps more as general marks of their social class.[296]

The Mamluk sultans also followed the Ayyubids in using yellow as the official colour associated with the sultan and used on sultanic banners.[298] Baybars is said to have noted the yellow colour of his banners in opposition to the red banners of Bohemund VI.[302] After Selim II conquered Damascus in 1516, a contemporary writer, Ibn Tulun, noted that the rich yellow silk banner of the Mamluks was replaced by the plain red banner of the Ottomans.[303] Red banners are also known to have been used by the Mamluks, as the historian Ibn Taghribirdi (d. 1470) recorded that Sultan al-Mu'ayyad gifted a red banner to one of his vassals in Anatolia.[298]

Representation of Mamluk Egypt in the medieval European Catalan Atlas (1375)

Various symbols were also used to represent the Mamluk realm in European sources. The Book of Knowledge of All Kingdoms, written by an anonymous European author after 1360, attributes to Cairo a white flag with a blue crescent moon.[304] In the Catalan Atlas of 1375, created by a Majorcan cartographer (likely Abraham Cresques), the Mamluk empire is symbolized by the drawing of a Muslim ruler shown with a green parrot on his arm, the latter possibly a symbol of nobility.[305][304] Next to this, an icon symbolizing Babylon (alongside Cairo), is marked by a yellow flag with a crescent moon, with the crescent representing Muslim rule. Nearby, the city of Alexandria is marked with a flag containing the panther symbol of the former Sultan Baybars, whose reputation was known from the Crusades.[304]

List of sultans

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See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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Further reading

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from Grokipedia
The Mamluk Sultanate (Arabic: سلطنة المماليك, Salṭanat al-Mamālīk) was a Muslim realm that governed , , and parts of the from 1250 to 1517, with as its capital, under sultans who were themselves Mamluks—elite military slaves, typically of Arabized Turkic or Circassian origin, who had been manumitted and trained as cavalry warriors. The sultanate emerged from the Mamluks' overthrow of their Ayyubid masters in in 1250, establishing a system where power derived from military prowess and loyalty among these freed slaves rather than hereditary rule. Divided into the Turkic-dominated Bahri period (1250–1382), named after the Nile barracks where early Mamluks were quartered, and the Circassian Burji period (1382–1517), named for the Cairo Citadel towers, the sultanate maintained a unique polity where sultans rose through merit in warfare and factional alliances among Mamluk households. Its military achievements defined its legacy, including the decisive victory over the Mongol Ilkhanate at the Battle of Ain Jalut in 1260, which halted Mongol incursions into the Levant and preserved Muslim rule in the region, and the systematic expulsion of Crusader forces, culminating in the capture of Acre in 1291 and the end of Latin Christian footholds on the Levantine coast. Economically, the Mamluks controlled vital trade routes linking , , and , fostering prosperity through commerce in spices, textiles, and slaves, while patronizing , , and that elevated as a center of . The sultanate declined amid internal factionalism, fiscal strains from prolonged warfare, and the rise of , ultimately succumbing to Ottoman conquest after defeats at Marj Dabiq in 1516 and Ridaniyah in 1517, after which Mamluks persisted as a subordinate elite under Ottoman rule.

Name and Terminology

Etymology and Historical Usage

The term mamluk originates from the mamlūk (مملوك), the passive participle of the verb malaka (مَلَكَ) ("to possess"), literally denoting "one who is owned" or "possessed," specifically a slave acquired through purchase. In medieval Islamic contexts, it applied to non-Arab boys—predominantly from Turkic steppe regions like the —captured or purchased as slaves, converted to , circumcised, and subjected to intensive military training in barracks, forming an elite warrior class unbound by tribal or familial ties. This usage evolved to distinguish the mamluks who seized power in Egypt in 1250 from their Ayyubid predecessors, who functioned as a subservient slave-soldier under free-born Kurdish rulers; the new regime institutionalized the mamluk system as a hereditary-free ruling , where elite status required from and was perpetuated by sultans importing fresh non-Muslim slaves to train as successors, explicitly barring biological sons from inheriting authority to ensure perpetual renewal and loyalty. The modern label "Mamluk Sultanate" retrospectively describes this state (–1517), centered in and encompassing , , and parts of , though contemporary chroniclers like referred to its rulers as al-mamalik al-salṭāna (الْمَمَالِيكِ الْسُلْطَانِيَّة) ("the royal slaves") or by factional names like Bahriyya (riverine) and Burjiyya (tower-dwelling), highlighting their slave origins without implying a monolithic ethnic or dynastic unity. Post-conquest by the Ottomans in 1517, the term persisted in reference to the autonomous Mamluk beys who retained de facto control over Egypt until Muhammad Ali's massacre in 1811, reflecting the enduring conceptual link to slave-soldier elites despite shifts in nominal sovereignty.

Origins and Rise to Power

Ayyubid Context and Mamluk Emergence

The Ayyubid dynasty, established by following his conquest of in 1171, depended heavily on mamluks—non-Arab slave soldiers, chiefly of Turkic extraction—as a core military element to circumvent the unreliability of tribal Arab levies bound by kinship loyalties. , drawing from earlier Islamic traditions of employing such slaves, expanded their recruitment and integrated them into his forces during campaigns against the Crusaders, prioritizing their discipline and detachment from local power structures. This approach addressed the Ayyubids' need for a professional amid fragmented familial rule across and , where free-born troops often prioritized clan interests over sultanic authority. Successive Ayyubid sultans amplified this reliance, particularly al-Salih Ayyub (الملك الصالح نجم الدين أيوب) (r. 1240–1249), who acquired thousands of Kipchak Turkic slaves—displaced by Mongol incursions into the Eurasian steppes—forming elite regiments such as the Bahriyya and Salihiyya. These mamluks underwent intensive training in fortified sites, including Rawda Island in the near , where they mastered , lance combat, and tactical maneuvers under strict oversight to instill unwavering obedience. By the 1240s, mamluk contingents had proliferated in Cairo's , evolving into distinct factions with internal hierarchies, as evidenced in contemporary chronicles detailing their procurement from Black Sea markets and progressive emancipation into officer roles. Prominent figures like al-Turkmani, purchased as a youth and elevated to command positions under al-Salih, exemplified the ascent, commanding loyalty from fellow slaves while navigating Ayyubid court intrigues. This military dependence, rooted in the sultans' strategic preference for purchasable, rootless warriors over hereditary elites, inadvertently empowered mamluk emirs, fostering factional cohesion that undermined Ayyubid control without yet precipitating outright usurpation.

The 1250 Coup and Early Consolidation

In May 1250, following the assassination of , the last Ayyubid sultan, on May 2 amid his efforts to curb influence, was proclaimed sultana, issuing coins and decrees in her name as Umm Khalil to invoke continuity with her late husband al-Salih Ayyub's regime. This brief female sultanate, lasting approximately three months, bridged the Ayyubid collapse—precipitated by Turanshah's arrival on February 23, 1250, and his threats to the Bahriyya —and the formal takeover, leveraging 's control of the and her role in concealing al-Salih's in November 1249 to sustain military cohesion against residual Crusader pressures. To legitimize the nascent regime and preempt Ayyubid loyalist backlash, married the in May 1250, elevating him to atabak al-asakir while retaining oversight of state affairs until August 1250, when she abdicated the titular sultanate to him. Aybak, ruling as from 1250 to 1257, consolidated authority by establishing the Cairo Citadel as the primary power base, from which he directed operations to neutralize Ayyubid remnants in and . His campaigns, including the decisive victory at Kurra in 1253, eliminated key opposition pockets and secured Islamic under oversight, demonstrating the slave-soldiers' tactical agency in transforming from regimental enforcers to sovereign rulers. This early expansion addressed the power vacuum left by Ayyubid fragmentation, while Aybak's marriage to provided symbolic continuity, though internal rivalries persisted amid the looming Mongol incursions that destabilized regional caliphal authority after the sack of in 1258. Power struggles intensified in 1257 when , fearing Aybak's planned marriage to the daughter of the Ayyubid emir of for a against Syrian defectors, orchestrated his strangulation on 10. She concealed the murder as a natural death, but , a prominent , exposed it, leading to her arrest and killing three days later by attendants loyal to Aybak's son, , who nominally ascended as a teenager. , serving as vice-sultan, effectively stabilized the regime by 1259 through deposing and assuming direct control from , prioritizing military readiness against the Mongol advance while suppressing factional unrest within the elite. This transition underscored the ' meritocratic ethos, where command competence trumped hereditary claims, enabling short-term cohesion amid existential threats.

Bahri Period (1250–1382)

Defense Against External Threats

Following the Mamluk seizure of power in Egypt in May 1250, the nascent sultanate confronted an existential threat from the , whose forces under Hulagu Khan sacked on February 10, 1258, extinguishing the and advancing into , capturing in January 1260 and in March 1260. Sultan Saif , who ascended in November 1259, responded by mobilizing a force of approximately 20,000 cavalry, including slaves, Ayyubid remnants, and auxiliaries, rejecting demands for submission conveyed via envoys in early 1260. This cohesion among diverse Muslim factions contrasted with the ' internal divisions, exacerbated by the death of Great Khan Möngke in 1259, which prompted Hulagu's withdrawal of most troops, leaving General with a of 10,000-20,000 to hold . Qutuz forged a critical with al-Bunduqdari, a Kipchak commander previously exiled for opposing Ayyubid policies, granting him command of the after Baybars pledged loyalty and contributed tactical expertise derived from warfare traditions akin to Mongol methods. To isolate the Mongol threat, Qutuz pursued diplomatic truces with the in Acre and Antioch, securing a one-year in spring 1260 that neutralized Frankish intervention, as the Crusaders viewed the Mongols as a greater peril despite prior overtures for anti-Muslim coalitions. These maneuvers enabled undivided focus on the eastern front, with Mamluk forces marching northward from Cairo in July 1260, defeating a Mongol near Gaza before engaging the main enemy. The decisive on September 3, 1260, near , showcased Mamluk adaptations in heavy cavalry charges and archery, employing ' feigned retreat to lure 's tumens into , resulting in the and death of and most commanders, with Mamluk losses estimated at under 5,000 against near-total enemy annihilation. This victory, leveraging numerical superiority and the ' logistical overextension without Hulagu's reinforcements, halted their westward expansion into and the , preserving Mamluk sovereignty and establishing their military doctrine of aggressive preemption against nomadic incursions. Subsequent raids persisted until 1303, but Ain Jalut's causal impact lay in demonstrating Mamluk cohesion and tactical parity, deterring full-scale reinvasion amid Ilkhanid civil strife.

Reign of Baybars and Expansion

Al-Zahir ascended to the sultanate in late 1260 following the assassination of , ruling until his death in 1277 and establishing the foundational model for military expansion and internal consolidation. His regime prioritized relentless campaigns to neutralize external threats, leveraging the elite slave-soldier system's discipline and mobility to project power across the , , and beyond. Baybars' forces numbered around 20,000 at key engagements, matching opponents in scale but excelling through rapid maneuvers and archery that outranged Mongol recurves in decisive clashes. The on September 3, 1260, exemplified this approach, as commanded the Mamluk vanguard against a Mongol detachment under , inflicting the first major defeat on the invaders since their conquests began two decades earlier. Mamluk tactics mirrored and countered Mongol methods, initiating a to draw the enemy into ambush, followed by arrow barrages that disrupted cohesion before closing with lances and swords; this halted Mongol southward momentum into and , preventing further incursions into proper. ' strategic acumen in exploiting terrain near the springs of Ain Jalut and dividing Mongol attention across multiple fronts ensured a rout, with Mongol losses estimated in the thousands while Mamluk casualties remained proportionally lower due to disciplined reserves. Baybars extended these gains through targeted assaults on Crusader remnants, capturing key strongholds like Caesarea and Arsuf in 1265, Safad in 1266, in 1268, and culminating in the swift of Antioch that year, which annihilated the city's Frankish population and treasury, effectively collapsing the . These operations dismantled fragmented Latin polities through warfare and blockades, reducing Crusader holdings to isolated enclaves by the end of his reign; full expulsion followed under successors by 1291, as ' precedents eroded their logistical bases. Concurrently, he raided , subjugating Armenian principalities via punitive expeditions that enforced tribute, and in 1277 invaded , defeating a Mongol-Ilkhanid force at to deter eastern threats. An earlier thrust into around 1272 imposed Mamluk suzerainty, extracting oaths of and resources from the Christian Makurian kingdom to secure southern frontiers. To underpin these conquests, cultivated legitimacy by patronizing the , consulting scholars like Ibn Taymiyya's circle for fatwas endorsing against and , and integrating their counsel into governance to frame his rule within Islamic orthodoxy amid the regime's slave origins. This alliance with religious authorities not only mobilized support for campaigns but also countered perceptions of usurpation, emphasizing defense of the over dynastic claims.

Al-Nasir Muhammad's Reigns and Centralization

Al-Nasir Muhammad ibn ascended the throne as a child in 1293, marking the start of his first brief reign until deposition in 1294; he returned in 1299, ruling until 1309, before his longest tenure from 1310 to his death in 1341. His third reign represented the zenith of Bahri Mamluk centralization, as he systematically consolidated authority through administrative and military reforms that prioritized loyalty to the over entrenched elites. A key innovation was the overhaul of the iqta' system, involving a comprehensive land cadaster that reassigned revenue grants predominantly to his personal mamluks, thereby limiting hereditary claims by veteran amirs and enhancing direct sultanic oversight of fiscal and military resources. This redistribution, executed around 1316–1320, curbed the autonomy of provincial governors and ensured that iqta' holders remained dependent on the throne for renewals, typically limited to three years, fostering a more responsive administrative hierarchy. While these measures temporarily stabilized revenue flows—estimated to have increased agricultural yields through better enforcement—they intensified reliance on the sultan's personal networks, exposing structural vulnerabilities upon his demise. In , shifted from confrontation with the Ilkhanid to pragmatic diplomacy, particularly after their ruler ’s conversion to Islam in 1295, culminating in a durable in 1323 that neutralized eastern threats and redirected resources inward. This facilitated economic policies that bolstered Red Sea commerce, with investments in ports like Aydhab and Qusayr to handle growing spice and slave imports from the , yielding heightened customs revenues that supported patronage. Concurrently, he commissioned architectural projects, including the 1318 within Cairo's , which served as the royal site and symbolized centralized piety and power. However, al-Nasir Muhammad's centralizing efforts, predicated on exclusive favoritism toward his khalīṣa mamluks—numbering over 10,000 by the 1330s—engendered factional resentments among sidelined groups, undermining long-term cohesion. The system's fragility stemmed from its personalization: without his arbitrating presence after 1341, iqta' competitions and emir rivalries precipitated instability, as successors lacked the authority to enforce similar redistributions, marking the onset of systemic decline despite short-term gains in control and prosperity.

Internal Decline and Transition

Following the death of Sultan al-Nasir Muhammad on June 7, 1341, the Bahri Mamluk Sultanate entered a phase of political instability characterized by rapid successions among his underage sons and dominance by powerful emirs acting as regents or atabegs. Sultans such as al-Mansur Abu Bakr (r. 1341), al-Ashraf Kujuk (r. 1341–1342), and al-Nasir Hasan (r. 1347–1351, 1354–1361) were largely figureheads, with effective control exercised by senior emirs who orchestrated coups and eliminations of rivals to secure regencies. This pattern persisted through the reigns of al-Mansur Muhammad (r. 1361–1363) and al-Ashraf Sha'ban (r. 1363–1377), where emirs like Yalbugha al-Umari amassed personal armies exceeding 4,000 mamluks—primarily —and wielded de facto authority, sidelining the sultans and fostering factional rivalries among the Turkish-origin Bahri elite. The , arriving in in late 1348 and peaking in 1349, intensified these vulnerabilities by causing severe depopulation and disrupting the sultanate's military and fiscal foundations. The plague ravaged urban centers like and rural irrigation networks, leading to labor shortages that decayed 's canal systems and reduced agricultural output, while recurrent outbreaks further eroded the tax base and mamluk recruitment pools. Military capacity suffered as well, with significant losses among the soldiery contributing to fiscal strain from diminished iqta revenues and increased reliance on short-term levies, undermining the centralized structures had built. These internal fractures culminated in the 1382 coup by Sayf al-Din Barquq, a Circassian mamluk who had risen under Yalbugha al-Umari and exploited revolts against the ineffective Sultan al-Mansur Ali (r. 1377–1381; 1384–1385). Barquq's seizure of power in Cairo marked the transition to the Burji period, as he prioritized Circassian mamluks from the Citadel's towers (burj) over the traditional Turkish Bahri factions from the Nile barracks, initiating an ethnic shift that reoriented the military elite toward Caucasian origins and away from Kipchak Turkic dominance. This change, while stabilizing short-term authority through Barquq's personal networks, reflected deeper erosions in the Bahri system's cohesion, as emirs increasingly pursued autonomous power amid economic pressures and weakened central oversight.

Burji Period (1382–1517)

Shift to Circassian Dominance

By the late fourteenth century, the traditional sources of Kipchak Turkic slaves that had sustained the were severely depleted due to recurrent plagues, internal civil wars, and disruptions in the Pontic-Caspian steppe trade networks, compelling Mamluk elites to increasingly import slaves from the region. These were funneled through established slave trade routes, with serving as a key transit hub for pagan captives destined for Egyptian markets. This pragmatic reorientation in recruitment—driven by availability rather than ethnic preference—facilitated the gradual ascendance of factions within the military hierarchy, setting the stage for their dominance without disrupting the core system of freed slave soldiers. The pivotal transition occurred in 1382, when the Circassian mamluk officer Sayf al-Din , originally purchased during the reign of , orchestrated the overthrow of the last Bahri sultan, al-Salih Hajji, amid factional infighting and weak central authority. 's coup, backed by Circassian and other non-Turkic mamluks quartered in the Burjiya barracks of Cairo's , marked the inception of the Burji period, so named for these fortified origins rather than a formal dynasty. His first reign (1382–1389) was briefly interrupted by a rival emir's usurpation, but regained power in 1390 and ruled until his death in 1399, during which he entrenched Circassian loyalty through strategic manumissions, appointments to emiral ranks, and suppression of lingering Bahri loyalists. This ethnic shift introduced new factional dynamics, with Circassian kinship ties fostering tighter patronage circles that supplanted the looser Turkic alliances of the Bahri era, though it also sowed seeds of nepotism and regional clannishness. Early Burji consolidation faced acute instability under Barquq's underage successor, al-Nasir Faraj, as internal revolts in Syria and Egypt coincided with the Timurid Empire's western campaigns; Timur's forces sacked Aleppo in October 1400 and devastated Damascus by March 1401, massacring inhabitants and razing infrastructure before withdrawing eastward. The Mamluks avoided direct confrontation, paying tribute to avert further incursions, but the invasions underscored the transitional regime's fragility, exposing overreliance on Syrian revenues and prompting temporary administrative reforms to rebuild legitimacy.

Stabilization under Barsbay and Successors

Al-Ashraf ascended to the sultanate in 1422 following a period of instability, implementing policies aimed at bolstering fiscal resources through control of commerce. He established state monopolies on high-value commodities such as pepper and , channeling via the Mamluk-controlled port of and compelling merchants to offload cargoes there, which generated substantial revenues despite resistance from independent traders. These measures, including the creation of a dedicated financial office to oversee 's operations, temporarily alleviated economic pressures by redirecting profits from spices and other goods away from private networks toward the central treasury, fostering a brief resurgence in state finances amid broader 15th-century stagnation. Barsbay reinforced central authority through military actions against internal and external challengers. He conducted campaigns to subdue Bedouin tribes disrupting trade routes and agricultural lands in Upper Egypt and the Levant, thereby securing vital supply lines and tax collection. Border tensions with the rising Ottoman Empire in southeastern Anatolia prompted defensive postures and sporadic clashes over frontier territories, where Mamluk forces aimed to preserve stasis against Ottoman expansionist aims, though without decisive engagements during his reign. Efforts to develop a Red Sea fleet, including shipbuilding initiatives, sought to protect these trade arteries from piracy and potential European interlopers, linking enhanced naval capacity directly to the sustainability of monopoly-driven income. Under successors like Jaqmaq (r. 1438–1453) and Inal (r. 1453–1461), these stabilizing elements persisted amid mounting challenges. Jaqmaq sustained controls and suppressed factional unrest within the Mamluk elite, while Inal balanced court intrigues and provincial revolts, including incursions, through targeted expeditions that temporarily restored order. However, growing —manifest in by amirs and dilution of recruitment quality—eroded these gains, as revenues from monopolies proved insufficient to offset rising military stipends and administrative graft, signaling the limits of mid-century recovery. The causal chain from enforced exclusivity to suppressed thus yielded short-term , but underlying structural weaknesses, including inconsistent naval , foreshadowed renewed vulnerabilities.

Qaitbay and al-Ghuri: Peak and Final Crises

Sultan Al-Ashraf Sayf al-Din 's reign from 1468 to 1496 marked a period of relative stability amid escalating external pressures, particularly from the . Facing Ottoman encroachments in southeastern and northern , engaged in defensive warfare during the Ottoman- conflict of 1485–1491, where forces successfully repelled invasions, including victories near in 1486 that forced temporary Ottoman retreats. To bolster coastal defenses against potential Ottoman naval threats, he constructed the Citadel of in between 1477 and 1479 on the site of the ancient Pharos Lighthouse, equipping it with robust limestone walls and towers to safeguard Egypt's Mediterranean approaches. Diplomatic efforts interspersed these actions, yielding truces that preserved territorial integrity, though underlying rivalries persisted, including disputes over Cilician cities like and Tarsus. Internally, addressed fiscal strains through reforms aimed at curbing corruption and optimizing revenue collection, such as auditing iqta' land grants and enhancing agricultural taxation amid declining productivity from plagues and environmental stresses. These measures temporarily alleviated budgetary pressures from high expenditures, but factional rivalries among Circassian Mamluk elites continued to undermine cohesion, with amirs frequently plotting against perceived favorites. Qansuh al-Ghuri ascended in 1501 following a decade of instability marked by short-lived sultans and revolts, inheriting a system strained by persistent fiscal deficits and outdated military tactics. He pursued alliances against the Ottomans, including overtures to the Safavids, whose defeat at the in August 1514 demonstrated Ottoman dominance through superior and disciplined formations, underscoring the Mamluks' lag in adopting technologies despite al-Ghuri's tentative reforms introducing handheld firearms to select units. Efforts to modernize faltered due to resistance from traditional cavalry-oriented Mamluks, exacerbating internal divisions as Circassian factions vied for influence, often resorting to assassinations and coups. Al-Ghuri's policies intensified fiscal exhaustion, with army maintenance costs surging in response to Ottoman threats—rising by factors linked to recruitment drives and protracted campaigns—while currency debasement and trade disruptions from conflicts further eroded revenues. These crises, compounded by endemic strife among emirs and provincial governors, hollowed out the sultanate's capacity to sustain prolonged warfare, setting the stage for vulnerability to decisive external assault.

Ottoman Conquest and Fall

The Ottoman invasion of the Mamluk Sultanate, led by Sultan , began in the summer of 1516 following tensions over border principalities and control of trade routes. Selim's forces, having secured their eastern flank after the 1514 against the Safavids, numbered around 65,000 troops equipped with advanced armaments. This campaign exploited Mamluk vulnerabilities exposed by their outdated military doctrines. The decisive engagement occurred at the Battle of Marj Dabiq on August 24, 1516, north of Aleppo in Syria, where Selim I's Ottoman army clashed with Sultan al-Ashraf Qansuh al-Ghuri's Mamluk forces of comparable size. Ottoman artillery positioned on the flanks and central musketeers from Janissary units decimated Mamluk cavalry charges, resulting in approximately 7,000 Mamluk casualties and a rout of their army. Al-Ghuri perished amid the chaos, likely from a heart attack or combat wounds, amid rumors spread by the defecting Mamluk governor Khayr Bey, which triggered panic and flight toward Damascus. This victory granted the Ottomans control of Syria, including key cities like Damascus and Jerusalem, without further major resistance in the region. With secured, Ottoman armies advanced into by late 1516, prompting the Mamluks to install Tuman Bay, a seasoned Circassian , as Tuman Bay II in . Tuman Bay fortified positions near the capital, culminating in the on January 22, 1517, where Mamluk defenses attempted to neutralize Ottoman firepower through earthen barriers and ambushes. Selim I's troops, however, bypassed these via flanking assaults supported by sustained and fire, shattering Mamluk lines and compelling a retreat. surrendered days later, with Ottoman forces entering the city unopposed amid internal Mamluk disarray. Tuman Bay II evaded initial capture and waged irregular warfare from Cairo's citadel, but Ottoman sieges and betrayals forced his surrender in early April 1517. He was executed by hanging at the Bab Zuweila gate on April 15, 1517, symbolizing the extinction of Mamluk sovereignty. The sultanate's territories were annexed as Ottoman provinces, with Egypt governed by a pasha and Syria integrated into the imperial structure. Causal analysis reveals Ottoman success rooted in their systematic adoption of gunpowder technologies—integrating , hand-held firearms, and disciplined like wagon-fort formations—against Mamluk adherence to cavalry-centric warfare. Mamluk elites, viewing arms as dishonorable for slave-soldiers bred for prowess, integrated firearms sporadically and ineffectively, preserving rigid charges vulnerable to ranged fire. Defections, such as Khayr Bey's at Marj Dabiq, compounded these structural failings, but empirical evidence from the battles underscores technological and tactical disparities as primary drivers of the swift conquest.

Government and Administration

Sultanate Authority and Succession

The sultan exercised supreme executive authority over the Mamluk Sultanate, functioning as the ultimate arbiter in military, judicial, and fiscal matters, with his rule reinforced by direct control over the treasury and land grants distributed to loyal amirs. This centralized power stemmed from the sultan's origins as a warrior, where demonstrated martial skill—such as leading campaigns against external foes—served as a primary basis for legitimacy, supplemented by formal from the Abbasid caliph in . However, the sultan's position remained precarious, constrained by the ambitions of senior emirs who could withhold military support or orchestrate depositions if the ruler failed to maintain their allegiance through patronage and coercion. Succession to the sultanate was inherently non-hereditary, rejecting dynastic in favor of selection through factional power struggles among elites, which prioritized capable leadership but fostered chronic instability. From 1250 to 1517, approximately 45 individuals ascended to the , with reigns often brief and terminated violently; historical tallies indicate that 22 of 50 sultans (or 22 of 29 "real" sultans excluding puppets) met their end by , reflecting a system where ambitious emirs bid for supremacy via coups backed by armed retinues. Early attempts to impose hereditary rule, such as under the , collapsed due to resistance from non-kin factions, underscoring the elite incentives for meritocratic—or forceful—accession over bloodlines. To counter these threats, sultans cultivated loyalty through the khushdashiyya, their cohort of fellow mamluks purchased and trained together, forming a personal guard bound by shared origins and oaths rather than familial ties. This "brotherhood in arms" enabled enforcement of fidelity, as seen in rulers like who elevated their khushdashiyya to high commands while purging rivals, yet it perpetuated factionalism since new sultans often disbanded predecessors' units to install their own. The mechanism proved effective for short-term consolidation but exacerbated turnover, as the absence of institutionalized succession invited preemptive violence from emirs eyeing the throne, yielding a model resilient in crises yet undermined by internal predation.

Caliphal Role and Legitimacy

In 1261, Sultan arranged for the installation of , a purported Abbasid descendant and uncle of the last caliph , as the nominal caliph in following the Mongol sack of in 1258. pedigree was vetted by religious scholars to affirm his legitimacy within the Abbasid line, after which he publicly invested as sultan over , , and associated territories, thereby providing religious endorsement for Mamluk rule. This restoration served primarily as a symbolic gesture to bolster the Mamluks' Islamic credentials amid threats from and Crusaders, rather than restoring temporal authority to the . The Cairo caliphs functioned as ceremonial figures under tight Mamluk oversight, issuing fatwas to legitimize campaigns, such as jihads against Crusader strongholds and Mongol incursions, as well as internal actions against rebellious emirs or rivals. For instance, al-Mustansir and his successors endorsed ' victories, framing them as defenses of the faith, which enhanced the sultan's prestige among Muslim subjects and without granting the caliphs independent political influence. Historians note that these caliphs lacked , fiscal, or administrative power, existing instead as puppets whose primary utility lay in ritual investitures and religious pronouncements that reinforced the sultan's authority. By the Burji period (1382–1517), the caliphate's symbolic role persisted but waned in practical relevance, as sultans like and increasingly invoked caliphal-like prerogatives in , coinage, and titles while maintaining the Abbasid figurehead for orthodoxy. The caliphs remained confined to Cairo's or mosques, participating in Friday prayers and occasional ceremonies, but their endorsements carried diminishing weight amid Mamluk factionalism and external pressures. This shadow authority underscored the ' pragmatic co-optation of Abbasid legitimacy, which endured until the Ottoman conquest in 1517 transferred the last caliph, , to .

Administrative Hierarchy and Provincial Control

The Mamluk administrative hierarchy placed the at the apex, supported by a cadre of high-ranking amirs and civilian officials, including the ustadar (major-domo) who managed the royal household and diwan (council). In the Burji period, the vizierate reemerged as a key position, handling fiscal and diplomatic affairs, though its influence varied with the sultan's preferences and was often curtailed to prevent power concentration. Amirs, ranked by their mamluk regiments and grants, oversaw provincial nuwwab and enforced central directives, with oversight extending to regions like and the through appointed deputies. Provincial control relied on na'ibs (governors) appointed by the , with the na'ib al-saltana of serving as viceroy over Syrian territories, including sub-provinces like , Tripoli, , and . To curb entrenchment and potential rebellions, these appointments featured frequent rotations, often every few years, ensuring loyalty to but disrupting local continuity. In the , amirs managed pilgrimage routes and ports like , collecting revenues while maintaining symbolic authority over holy sites. This decentralized structure, tied to assignments, incentivized personal allegiance to the amid rivalries, yet bred inefficiencies from transient and inconsistent . Judicial administration operated under , with qadis appointed to enforce rulings; Sultan Baybars in 1265 established four chief qadis in —one each for the Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali schools—to accommodate legal diversity and prevent dominance. Provincial qadis mirrored this in major cities, handling civil and criminal cases, but Mamluk amirs and na'ibs exerted oversight, intervening via siyasah (discretionary justice) for security or fiscal matters outside strict Sharia bounds. Corruption permeated the bureaucracy, normalized through bribery for appointments and iqta allocations, eroding efficiency as officials prioritized short-term gains over long-term stability. High offices changed hands via graft, fostering a system where loyalty was bought rather than inherent, contributing to administrative fragility despite the hierarchical framework.

Military System

Recruitment, Training, and Slave Origins

The military elite originated primarily from non-Muslim slave boys purchased in the markets of and , sourced from the Kipchak steppe and regions, including Turkic groups such as Qipchaqs and later . These youths, typically aged 8 to 12, were captured or sold by traders operating small-scale imports from the northern steppes and sold individually to sultans, amirs, or households for , as Islamic law prohibited enslaving fellow . Upon acquisition, they underwent ritual conversion, marking their entry into the system as pagans from dar al-harb (lands of ), which ensured their legal enslavement while aligning them with the sultanate's Sunni orthodoxy. Training commenced immediately in barracks (furushiyya), emphasizing physical conditioning, horsemanship on bareback mounts starting with clay models, and proficiency in archery, lances, swords, and group drills to forge disciplined cavalry units. Instruction also included basic Islamic tenets and Quranic recitation for religious indoctrination, alongside functional Arabic for commands, though fluency was limited to preserve ethnic cohesion and prevent deep assimilation into Arab society, with Turkic languages serving as the internal lingua franca. This multi-year regimen, often lasting until early adulthood, instilled absolute obedience and martial excellence, weeding out the unfit through harsh discipline. Upon completion, successful trainees were manumitted as freedmen (mamluks proper), bound by enduring loyalty to their patron (ustadh) who had invested in their upbringing, akin to a father-son tie, and to their cohort (khushdashiyya) for mutual solidarity. This non-hereditary structure deliberately excluded sons (awlad al-nas) from full mamluk status or elite inheritance, as the system prioritized fresh slave imports to maintain ideological purity, merit based on training rather than bloodlines, and prevent dynastic entrenchment that could dilute the patron's control. Patrons thus continually recruited to sustain power, perpetuating the cycle of enslavement and elevation central to the sultanate's military causality.

Army Structure and Tactics

The Mamluk army's core comprised elite cavalry, typically numbering 10,000 royal mamluks under the sultan's direct command and an additional 8,000 attached to amirs, forming a force of approximately 18,000. This slave-origin elite emphasized equestrian skill and combat prowess, evolving from Bahri Turkic units in the 13th century to Circassian Burji dominance by the 14th, with organizational units (yāmak) grouping mamluks by or master for loyalty and cohesion. Supplementing the mamluks were the halqa, freeborn Egyptian cavalry troops numbering around 24,000, including prestigious awlad (sons of mamluks), who provided additional mounted support but ranked below the slaves in status and pay. tribal auxiliaries offered for scouting and harassment, leveraging desert mobility, though their reliability varied and they were not integrated into the core structure. played a subordinate role, often limited to urban guards or support, as from field engagements underscored cavalry's decisive impact in open battles, where mounted charges and archery overwhelmed slower foot soldiers. Tactics prioritized cavalry dominance through composite bow archery from horseback, enabling mobile firepower akin to steppe traditions, combined with lance charges and close-quarters swordplay. Mamluk forces employed feigned retreats to lure enemies into ambushes, encircling maneuvers to isolate knights, and rapid maneuvers exploiting horse superiority, tactics honed against Mongol hordes and adapted for Crusader heavy infantry. Resistance to gunpowder weapons persisted until the late 15th century, with traditionalists favoring proven cavalry methods over early hand cannons and artillery, which disrupted horse archery formations; adoption accelerated only under sultans like Qaitbay amid Ottoman threats, but never supplanted the mounted core. Factional divisions within the army, rooted in ethnic origins (Turkic vs. Circassian) and yāmak loyalties, frequently precipitated civil strife, as rival amirs vied for sultanic favor, leading to intra-Mamluk wars that weakened unified command despite tactical brilliance in external conflicts. These internal fractures, evident in recurring coups and street battles among Cairo's barracks, prioritized personal over meritocratic hierarchy, eroding the army's cohesion by the .

Key Victories: Mongols, Crusaders, and Internal Suppression

The Mamluks secured a landmark triumph over the at the on September 3, 1260, when and his general led roughly 20,000 troops in an ambush against the equivalent-sized force commanded by near in southeastern . Employing feigned retreats to draw the into unfavorable terrain followed by flanking attacks with , the Mamluks shattered the invaders, killing and capturing Mongol commanders, thus reversing the momentum of conquest that had toppled the in earlier that year. This proactive engagement not only preserved Islamic governance in but also positioned the Mamluks as defenders of the Muslim heartlands against further incursions, with later reinforcing control through victories like in 1277 against Mongol remnants. Mamluk campaigns against the Crusader states unfolded systematically from the 1260s, with Baybars capturing Nazareth in 1263, Arsuf and Safad by 1266, and Antioch—home to 17,000 Franks—in May 1268 through a swift siege that annihilated its garrison. Qalawun extended these gains by seizing Tripoli after a month-long blockade in 1289, deploying trebuchets and sappers to breach fortifications, while his son al-Ashraf Khalil orchestrated the final assault on Acre starting April 6, 1291, culminating in its surrender on May 18 amid massacres of 10,000-15,000 defenders and civilians, thereby eradicating the last Latin footholds in Palestine and Syria. These operations showcased Mamluk logistical prowess, including mobile field fortifications and coordinated assaults, which exploited Crusader disunity and isolation from European reinforcements. To consolidate power domestically, Mamluk rulers ruthlessly quelled uprisings that threatened sultanic authority, such as tribal revolts in and , where forces dispersed rebels through violent campaigns until submission was achieved, as in the suppression under early Bahri sultans. , for instance, neutralized factional dissent among amirs by launching arrests across and post-1280 truces, imprisoning dozens of high-ranking emirs to prevent coups. Suppression extended to Syrian and heterodox groups challenging orthodoxy, with harsh measures like , , and mass executions deterring further insurrections and enforcing hierarchical order amid the regime's slave-soldier dynamics. These actions underscored the Mamluks' capacity for internal pacification, transforming potential fragmentation into unified territorial defense.

Economy

Iqta System and Land Management

The iqta system served as the primary mechanism for revenue extraction and remuneration in the Mamluk Sultanate, whereby sultans granted mamluk amirs temporary rights to collect taxes from designated agricultural lands in lieu of salaries, with assignments explicitly non-hereditary and revocable to maintain central and incentivize . This revocability allowed sultans to reallocate iqtas based on service performance, fostering short-term efficiency by aligning elite incentives with state needs rather than personal dynasties, though it inherently prioritized extraction over . Land grants focused predominantly on Egypt's Valley, where annual inundations enabled basin irrigation for staple grains such as and , which constituted the core of taxable output and supported both local consumption and state granaries. Despite these advantages, the system's structure encouraged corruption, as muqtis (iqta holders) frequently imposed unauthorized surtaxes on fellahin ( cultivators), embezzled revenues, and shirked responsibilities for land maintenance, resulting in overburdened peasants fleeing fields and diminished yields over time. The non-hereditary tenure exacerbated underinvestment, as high turnover rates among assignees—often every few years—discouraged capital-intensive improvements like canal dredging or soil enrichment, rendering large-scale fixed assets unprofitable and contributing to long-term of . Sultan (r. 1293–1341, with interruptions) attempted to address these inefficiencies through rawk cadastral surveys, conducting comprehensive reassessments in in 1313 and in 1315 that recalibrated values based on current productivity and redistributed grants to curb abuses, yielding estimated annual revenues exceeding 9.4 million jayshi from Egyptian lands alone. These reforms included selective commutations of revenues into cash payments for certain amirs, reducing direct dependence on land extraction and enhancing fiscal flexibility, though this trend foreshadowed later systemic rigidities and weakened sultanic leverage as cash flows became vulnerable to inflation and .

Trade, Commerce, and State Monopolies

The Mamluk Sultanate derived substantial wealth from its strategic position astride the and trade routes linking to , primarily through control of the and Mediterranean ports such as . Spices, including pepper, were transported from ports like northward via harbors including ʿAydhāb and Qusayr, then overland along the to and onward to for export. This intermediary role generated significant customs duties and taxes, with the Karimi merchant network facilitating the bulk of transactions until state interventions curtailed their autonomy. Commercial treaties with , renewed periodically to regulate exports, ensured preferential access for European buyers while imposing fixed tariffs and quotas, as seen in agreements under Sultan that prioritized state oversight over free merchant enterprise. During the Burji period, sultans like (r. 1422–1438) imposed monopolies on key commodities such as pepper and , centralizing sales through government warehouses in and to capture higher revenues amid fiscal strains from plagues and expenditures. These measures, enforced by and embargoes on private sales, temporarily swelled the treasury by directing profits away from independent traders like the Karimi, who faced coercion to procure goods solely from the state. However, such interventions stifled merchant initiative and long-distance networks, contributing to economic rigidity as private capital fled or diminished, exacerbating vulnerabilities in a trade-dependent system. The Portuguese circumnavigation of Africa in 1498 under Vasco da Gama fundamentally disrupted these routes by enabling direct maritime access to Indian spices, bypassing Mamluk intermediaries and subjecting Red Sea-bound convoys to naval attacks. Pepper supplies in Alexandria plummeted, with Venetian imports dropping from approximately 1,600 tons annually pre-1498 to under 500 tons within a decade, as Portuguese cartaz licensing and seizures enforced their dominance. Mamluk responses, including alliances with Venice for joint fleets, faltered at defeats like the Battle of Diu in 1509, accelerating revenue losses and exposing the fragility of state-reliant commerce to external shocks.

Fiscal Policies, Currency, and Decline Factors

The Mamluk Sultanate's fiscal policies centered on extracting revenues primarily through the land tax on agricultural produce and the poll tax levied on non-Muslims, both of which were calibrated to sustain the expansive military apparatus comprising thousands of cavalrymen. Early in the dynasty, Sultan Baybars I (r. 1260–1277) doubled jizya rates to bolster war funding against Crusaders and , with collections reaching peaks equivalent to several million dinars annually by the , though exact yields varied by provincial assessments. These taxes, often exceeding 50% of peasant output in fertile regions, prioritized army stipends over infrastructure, fostering dependency on continuous fiscal extraction that strained rural producers and triggered periodic revolts, such as the Arab tribal uprisings in during the , where overtaxed Bedouin-peasants rebelled against enforcers. Sultan (r. 1293–1341, with interruptions) implemented rawk land surveys starting in 1316 to standardize valuations, reallocating iqta' grants more efficiently and temporarily boosting state revenues by up to 20% through precise yield-based taxation rather than fixed lump sums. Currency standards comprised gold s (approximately 4.25 grams initially), silver dirhams (2.97 grams), and copper fulus, with mints in and enforcing to facilitate trade and payments; al-Nasir's oversight curbed earlier fluctuations, maintaining dinar purity above 90% during his reigns. Later, under (r. 1422–1438), the ashrafi dinar was introduced in 1425 as a devalued gold coin weighing 3.4 grams to counter European influx, aiming to reclaim monetary sovereignty but signaling underlying silver shortages. Fiscal decline accelerated in the Circassian period (1382–1517), as chronic warfare against Timurids, Ottomans, and internal rivals necessitated over-minting, with copper fulus production surging tenfold by the 1410s, leading to —fineness dropping below 50% in some dirhams—and documented by chronicler , where grain prices quadrupled between 1400 and 1420 amid monetary chaos. Concurrently, iqta' erosion undermined : 15th-century shifts toward hereditary tenures and endowments reduced state-controlled lands from over 80% of arable acreage in the to roughly 40% by 1500, as emirs fragmented grants among heirs, causing collection shortfalls estimated at 30–50% in Syrian provinces and overall treasury deficits that forced reliance on irregular spice monopolies and debased coinage. This structural contraction, exacerbated by neglect and plague-induced depopulation halving rural taxpayers by the 1460s, rendered the sultanate fiscally brittle, unable to sustain 10,000–15,000 standing troops without escalating debasements that eroded and military loyalty.

Society

Ethnic and Social Composition

The Mamluk Sultanate's ruling elite comprised a hereditary military caste of mamluks—manumitted slave soldiers—who held exclusive access to political and military power, distinct from the free-born population. In the Bahri period (1250–1382), mamluks were predominantly Turkic, drawn mainly from Kipchak groups in the Eurasian steppes and sourced through Black Sea slave markets, with sultans like Baybars importing around 4,000 such recruits to bolster forces. This ethnic composition shifted in the Burji period (1382–1517), when Circassians from the North Caucasus supplanted Turks as the primary mamluk origin, reflecting evolving trade routes and preferences for light-skinned warriors from non-Arab regions. To preserve loyalty and prevent assimilation, the system relied on perpetual importation of adolescent males, often numbering in the thousands annually during peak recruitment, barring mamluks' own sons from elite status and thus necessitating fresh inflows from slave markets. Enslaved women and children from similar regions served in domestic or auxiliary roles within households, but the core institution emphasized male military exclusivity, with slaves' ethnic foreignness reinforcing separation from local . This structure subordinated the free population, which formed the demographic majority as Arab peasants tilling lands, urban artisans in crafts like textiles, and merchants handling , yet lacked pathways to supreme . Social hierarchy privileged mamluks above free-born groups, with mobility restricted to the slave-soldier track; free , despite numerical dominance, deferred to mamluk emirs in governance, while the —free Muslim scholars trained in madrasas—emerged as a countervailing force through control of and , occasionally checking mamluk excesses without achieving parity. This ethnic and status divide underpinned the sultanate's stability, as mamluk cohesion derived from shared outsider origins rather than local kinship ties.

Urban and Rural Life

Cairo served as the political, economic, and cultural capital of the Mamluk Sultanate, boasting a population estimated at around 500,000 inhabitants by the mid-14th century, making it one of the largest cities in the world at the time. The city's urban fabric featured extensive suqs, or markets, such as Souq al-Silah specializing in weapons and other goods, which facilitated in commodities ranging from spices and textiles to grains, regulated by state-appointed muhtasibs to enforce quality and prices. Craft guilds, known as asnaf, organized artisans and merchants into hierarchical associations that controlled production, apprenticeships, and market allocations, often centered in specific quarters to minimize competition and ensure oversight. Public hammams proliferated, providing hygiene and social spaces amid dense neighborhoods, while the influx of pilgrims, traders, and scholars sustained a vibrant daily life despite periodic overcrowding and challenges. In contrast, rural life for the fellahin, or peasant farmers comprising the majority of Egypt's population, was marked by tied to the Nile's annual inundation, with villages clustered around irrigation s maintained through labor imposed by holders. Excessive or deficient floods—low levels risking and crop failure, high ones destroying fields—compounded vulnerabilities, as peasants bore heavy land taxes () and additional levies often exceeding harvest yields, leading to indebtedness and land loss to urban elites or amirs. demands for dredging and repairs, enforced under threat of punishment, diverted labor from personal plots, perpetuating cycles of and migration to cities during crises, though chronic underinvestment in rural amplified hardships. The of 1348–1349 inflicted severe demographic shocks across the Sultanate, with mortality estimates ranging from 30% to 40% in urban centers like , where chronicles record mass burials and abandoned homes, exacerbating labor shortages in guilds and markets. Rural areas faced comparable losses, but urban recovery was swifter, driven by influxes of rural migrants seeking opportunities, which repopulated cities and restored trade by the 1360s, whereas countryside depopulation undermined maintenance, contributing to long-term agricultural decline. Recurrent plagues into the sustained these disparities, with urban vibrancy rebounding through adaptive migration while rural fellahin endured persistent vulnerability to environmental and fiscal pressures.

Bedouin Relations and Tribal Dynamics

The Mamluk Sultanate maintained complex relations with tribes, viewing them simultaneously as potential auxiliaries for border security and chronic predators on settled and routes. Nomadic raiding by tribes such as those in and the disrupted economic productivity, with marauding intensifying during periods of sultanic weakness, as tribes exploited vulnerabilities to seize crops, , and . This predation stemmed from Bedouin reliance on in arid zones, where seasonal scarcities incentivized incursions into fertile areas, necessitating Mamluk countermeasures grounded in deterrence rather than ideological accommodation. To secure loyalty and mitigate threats, sultans disbursed subsidies known as rawatib to tribal shaykhs, often in exchange for escorting the pilgrimage caravans and refraining from attacks on pilgrimage routes from and to and . These payments, combined with grants of iqta' lands to cooperative chiefs, aimed to co-opt tribes into the state's fiscal and security framework, particularly for protecting vital religious conduits that bolstered legitimacy as guardians of the . Yet such incentives proved insufficient against entrenched raiding incentives, as tribes frequently violated agreements, leading to breakdowns in protection and economic losses from disrupted grain transport and rural depopulation. When subsidies failed, Mamluks resorted to punitive expeditions to enforce submission, exemplified by Sultan Baybars I's (r. 1260–1277) campaigns that subdued unruly 'urban () groups in and through targeted devastation of camps and water sources. These operations reflected pragmatic realism: coercion preserved order against nomadic opportunism, as unchecked tribes eroded state revenues from agriculture and pilgrimage tolls. Tribal revolts persisted, however, notably in where Hawwara and other groups seized control from 1401 to 1413, highlighting the limits of Mamluk authority in peripheral zones where terrain favored mobility over centralized force. Despite occasional alliances, such as Bedouin auxiliaries in expeditions against , the dynamic remained adversarial, with sultans balancing inducements and reprisals to curb existential threats to agrarian stability.

Religion

Enforcement of Sunni Orthodoxy

The Mamluk sultans positioned themselves as guardians of , enforcing orthodoxy through the institutionalization of the four major Sunni schools of (madhhabs): Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, and Hanbali. Sultan Baybars I (r. 1260–1277) formalized this by appointing four chief qadis, one for each madhhab, in , thereby standardizing judicial authority and sidelining other interpretive traditions to consolidate Sunni doctrinal unity. This structure extended to madrasas, where curricula emphasized these schools, reinforcing application in governance and suppressing heterodox interpretations deemed bid'a (innovations). Baybars rigorously purged Shiite influences, targeting groups like the (Nusayris) with severe persecutions, including forced relocations and executions, to eliminate perceived threats to Sunni primacy. His policies extended to punishing violations of Islamic prohibitions, such as alcohol consumption and moral infractions, through public floggings and fines, framing these as essential to upholding purity amid external jihad obligations. Such measures reflected a causal prioritization of internal doctrinal cohesion to sustain military legitimacy against non-Sunni adversaries like and Crusaders. The Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) exerted significant influence by critiquing Mamluk-era bid'a, including saint veneration and Sufi excesses, while endorsing the sultanate's role in enforcing orthodox . He collaborated on expeditions against Shiite communities, such as the 1300 campaign in Kasrawan, advocating (declaration of unbelief) for deviations and urging rulers to prioritize over political expediency. Despite occasional imprisonments for his uncompromising stance against (blind adherence), his fatwas bolstered the sultans' self-image as Sunni defenders, linking regime stability to the eradication of theological impurities. This intellectual reinforcement underscored the Mamluks' reliance on scholarly authority to legitimize coercive , distinguishing it from mere tolerance narratives.

Patronage of Islamic Institutions

The Mamluk sultans extensively patronized Islamic institutions through the system, establishing pious endowments that funded mosques, madrasas, and other religious complexes to bolster their legitimacy as defenders of against Mongol threats and internal heterodoxies. These endowments, derived from agricultural lands, urban properties, and commercial revenues, provided perpetual income streams insulated from state confiscation, enabling the construction and maintenance of over 900 new religious institutions during the Bahri period alone across and . By tying institutional support to orthodox Shafi'i and Hanafi , sultans reinforced Sunni dominance, countering Shi'a and other rival interpretations prevalent in the region post-Mongol invasions. Sultan ibn exemplified this patronage during his reigns (1293–1341), commissioning multiple -mosque complexes endowed with substantial s, such as the al-Nasiriyya in dedicated in 1326 and his completed around 1334–1335, which included teaching halls for and alongside mausolea for royal burial. These endowments not only sustained scholarly activities but also integrated into the state apparatus via stipends and positions, fostering loyalty and enabling sultans to co-opt religious authorities for political ends, such as endorsing fiscal policies or quelling dissent against Mamluk rule. This strategy suppressed potential opposition by aligning their economic dependence with state-enforced orthodoxy, as seen in cases where scholars issued fatwas approving revenue reallocations for military needs. Amid the Mongol sack of Baghdad in 1258, which destroyed vast repositories of Islamic texts, Mamluk patronage facilitated the preservation and transmission of hadith collections and legal compendia in Egyptian and Syrian madrasas, where scholars compiled and taught works like those of al-Bukhari and al-Shafi'i, ensuring continuity of Sunni scholarship displaced from eastern centers. Waqf-funded libraries and teaching endowments in Cairo's complexes, supported by sultanic grants, attracted ulama refugees and produced generations of jurists who codified orthodoxy, thereby sustaining causal chains of doctrinal transmission disrupted by eastern devastations.

Policies Toward Christians and Jews

The Mamluk Sultanate upheld the traditional Islamic system, granting Christians and Jews protected status in exchange for subordination, manifested primarily through the poll tax levied on adult non-Muslim males capable of or labor. This , collected annually, provided significant ; rates were initially doubled at the outset of Mamluk rule in the mid-13th century and later stabilized at up to one for the highest bracket by the late , often extracted harshly to fund military campaigns against and Crusaders. Non-payment or resistance could lead to imprisonment or , balancing fiscal imperatives against exemptions for the poor, elderly, or converts to . Dhimmi restrictions included mandatory distinctive attire to signify inferiority—such as the zunnar belt for Christians and yellow badges or turbans for Jews—and prohibitions on bearing arms, riding saddles, or constructing new churches and synagogues without rare sultanic permission. Sultan Baybars I (r. 1260–1277) rigorously enforced these, invoking the Pact of Umar to demolish or repurpose unauthorized structures and curb perceived encroachments, amid pressures from Sunni ulama to assert Islamic dominance post-Crusader threats. Repairs to existing places of worship were tolerated sporadically for utility but frequently contested by local populations, reflecting tensions between state pragmatism and societal enforcement of sharia norms. Despite vulnerabilities, Coptic retained roles in fiscal administration due to their inherited bureaucratic expertise from prior regimes, handling collection and record-keeping, while served as court physicians in dynastic families, treating sultans with skills honed in Galenic traditions. These positions stemmed from economic necessity, as rulers lacked equivalent Muslim cadres initially, yet invited periodic backlash; in 1321, riots erupted in against Coptic officials' perceived dominance and exactions, resulting in widespread church burnings, mass forced conversions, and dismissals from office to placate Muslim mobs. In the Burji period (1382–1517), external pressures from Ottoman expansion and Portuguese maritime disruptions intensified restrictions, with edicts like the 1448 ban on non-Muslim physicians treating Muslims (reissued in 1463 alongside broader dhimmi curbs) signaling heightened orthodoxy to unify the realm. Jewish communities declined demographically under cumulative discriminations, including testimony limitations in courts and occasional extortions, underscoring a causal dynamic where short-term utility for skilled dhimmis clashed with long-term Islamic supremacist ideologies and populist demands for conformity.

Culture

Literature, Scholarship, and Historiography

Mamluk historiography relies heavily on contemporary chronicles, which offer meticulous annalistic records of sultanic reigns, court intrigues, and military engagements from 1250 to 1517, enabling precise dating of events like the in 1260 or the Ottoman conquest in 1517. These works, produced by and bureaucrats often embedded in the power structure, disproportionately emphasize elite viewpoints, glorifying patrons while marginalizing rural economies, interactions, and commoner experiences, thus requiring cautious cross-verification for broader causal inferences. Nonetheless, their empirical detail—such as troop numbers in campaigns or fiscal decrees—facilitates reconstruction of institutional dynamics when triangulated with non-narrative sources like deeds or fiscal manuals. Key figures include (1332–1406), who, during his residency from 1382, critiqued Mamluk reliance on imported slave soldiers as eroding (group solidarity) and fostering fiscal parasitism, as analyzed in his , where he portrayed the sultanate as exemplifying and cyclical decline inherent to sedentary military regimes. Similarly, (1364–1442), a Shafi'i scholar disillusioned by personal hardships under Burji rule, documented Mamluk history in al-Suluk li-Ma'rifat Duwal al-Muluk and Ighathat al-Umma bi-Kashf al-Ghumma, lambasting sultanic extravagance, currency debasement after 1382, and agrarian neglect as root causes of 14th–15th-century crises, drawing on firsthand observation to challenge official narratives of prosperity. These authors' independence from direct allowed sharper causal realism, though their reformist agendas—rooted in orthodox Sunni critique—introduced interpretive slants favoring moral decay over structural factors like plague demographics. Beyond historiography, Mamluk literature encompassed and adab compilations that evolved through patronage, featuring panegyric odes for sultans like (r. 1293–1341) and ethical treatises, refuting claims of postclassical stagnation by demonstrating incremental innovations in rhetorical forms such as badi'iyyat blending verse with piety. In , primarily Shafi'i, scholars produced extensive commentaries and super-commentaries on core texts like al-Nawawi's works, advancing usul al-fiqh through analytical refinements on limits and applications, as seen in Zakariyya al-Ansari's (d. 1520) glosses that synthesized prior juristic debates for practical adjudication. Turkic elements appeared sporadically in Kipchak-influenced verse among Circassian elites post-1382, but Arabic remained dominant, reflecting the sultanate's . Madrasas and endowed libraries, numbering over 100 in by 1400, functioned as intellectual hubs, housing collections of 10,000+ volumes and fostering encyclopedic works like al-Nuwayri's Nihayat al-Arab (early ), which aggregated knowledge across disciplines. Recent scholarship, such as Carl F. Petry's 2022 synthesis, reassesses these outputs by integrating chronicle data with material evidence, portraying intellectual life as adaptive rather than derivative, while highlighting gaps in non-elite voices and urging first-principles reevaluation of decline narratives through quantitative fiscal analysis. This approach counters earlier orientalist framings by privileging verifiable institutional continuity over teleological decay.

Art and Material Culture

Mamluk art emphasized luxury metalwork and glassware, which functioned primarily as markers of elite status among the ruling military class rather than purely aesthetic pursuits. Inlaid brass objects, such as basins and ewers, featured intricate silver and gold damascening with arabesques, animal motifs, and personalized blazons denoting the owner's rank. These artifacts, produced in urban workshops of Cairo and Damascus from the late 13th to 15th centuries, reflected the sultans' and amirs' patronage, with surviving examples like a 14th-century brass basin in the Metropolitan Museum showcasing heraldic emblems alongside hunting scenes that underscored the warrior ethos of Mamluk society. Blazons, known as runuk, were quasi-heraldic devices—often circular and composite, comprising stylized cups, crescents, or stars—engraved or inlaid on arms, flags, and vessels to signify specific offices or allegiance, with approximately 70% incorporating multiple elements for distinction. ![Enameled and Gilded Bottle MET DT478.jpg][float-right] Enameled and gilded vessels, a innovation peaking in the , included bottles and beakers decorated with vivid scenes of courtiers, , and , produced mainly in Syrian centers like . A notable surviving example is a second-half 13th-century enameled from or , featuring gilded inscriptions and figural motifs that highlighted the technical prowess of artisans in fusing with metal oxides for durability and opulence. These items, exported across the Mediterranean, served as diplomatic gifts and for high-ranking households, embodying the sultans' wealth without overt religious symbolism. External influences shaped these arts through trade and conquest, incorporating Ilkhanid Mongol motifs like interlocking clouds and dragons into metal inlays, as seen in early 14th-century pieces inspired by Persian workshops. Chinese porcelain imports, arriving via routes, prompted imitations in and with blue-and-white aesthetics and phoenix designs, evident in artifacts dated to the reign of al-Nasir Muhammad (r. 1310–1341). Surviving museum collections, including over 100 metal and glass items in the Metropolitan Museum, demonstrate this synthesis, prioritizing functional prestige over innovation, with blazons ensuring traceability to patrons amid the competitive hierarchy of Mamluk amirs.

Architecture and Urban Development

The Mamluk rulers commissioned extensive architectural projects, primarily multifunctional complexes combining , , , and sabils (public fountains), to project authority and facilitate governance. These structures emphasized durability and visibility, with features like tall minarets for and ablution fountains for utility, often positioned to overlook urban expanses. In , underwent significant enhancements starting from Sultan ' additions in the 1260s, transforming it into a fortified administrative hub with barracks, palaces, and the of completed between 1318 and 1335, which included a prominent and expansive courtyards for assembly. Urban development under the Mamluks prioritized defensive integration and commercial vitality, with 's walls and gates—such as those rebuilt by Sultan Qalawun in the 1280s—fortified against Crusader and Mongol threats while channeling trade routes into centralized markets. saw analogous planning, where Mamluk patronage aligned religious buildings with arterial streets, as in ' palace (circa 1260s) employing masonry (alternating light and dark stone) for both structural reinforcement and visual demarcation of elite spaces. These layouts exploited for , with complexes like the Funerary Complex of Sultan Qaytbay (constructed 1472–1474) in 's Northern Cemetery featuring a madrasa-mosque attached to a domed , its facades adorned with hoods and trilobed portals to assert permanence amid the city's expansion. Waqf endowments underpinned the longevity of these projects, dedicating revenues from attached agricultural lands, shops, and mills—often yielding annual incomes equivalent to thousands of dinars per complex—to cover repairs, staffing, and utilities, thereby insulating structures from fiscal disruptions post-patron. For instance, Qaytbay's deeds specified allocations for maintenance and water distribution, ensuring operational continuity into the Ottoman era despite elite turnover. This system reflected pragmatic realism in , prioritizing self-sustaining over transient royal largesse to mitigate decay from neglect or conflict.

Criticisms and Challenges

Political Instability and Elite Violence

The Mamluk Sultanate's governance was characterized by recurrent political upheaval, with succession often determined through rather than institutionalized . Over the course of its existence from 1250 to 1517, approximately 50 sultans ruled, of whom 22 were murdered, reflecting a systemic pattern where served as a primary mechanism for power transfer. This extended beyond rulers to the elite amir class, where purges eliminated rivals and consolidated control, as new sultans frequently executed predecessors' loyalists to prevent challenges. The absence of dynastic continuity—stemming from the ' origins as purchased slave soldiers elevated by merit and loyalty—fostered an environment where amirs perpetually maneuvered for supremacy, leading to mutinies and coups that destabilized the regime. Notable instances underscore this instability, such as the 1250 assassination of the last Ayyubid sultan, al-Mu'azzam Turanshah, by , which inaugurated the sultanate amid the chaos of repelling a Crusader invasion. Subsequent regicides proliferated; for example, Sultan was murdered in 1293 while hunting, a coup orchestrated by amirs fearing his authoritarian purges. By the , under sultans like , who ruled three times (1293–1294, 1299–1309, 1309–1341), temporary stabilizations gave way to renewed violence upon his death, as factions vied to install puppets or seize the throne directly. These events were not aberrations but hallmarks of a system where sultans, upon ascension, systematically liquidated potential threats among the high-ranking amirs to secure their position. Factional rivalries among Mamluk cohorts exacerbated elite violence, eroding military and administrative cohesion. Divisions between Bahri (Kipchak Turkic) and later Burji (Circassian) Mamluks fueled internecine conflicts, often manifesting as street riots or barracks clashes in that paralyzed governance. Such yamak-style factional wars—intense, localized skirmishes between rival amir households—frequently escalated into broader purges, as victorious groups dismantled opponents' patronage networks to monopolize iqta' land grants and royal favor. This internal fragmentation weakened the sultanate's response to external threats, as resources and loyalty were diverted to suppressing domestic rivals rather than unified defense. The root cause lay in the slave-meritocratic structure, which precluded stable hereditary succession and incentivized perpetual elimination of competitors to avoid challenges from freed Mamluk peers. Without familial ties binding elites to a ruling lineage, power remained fluid and contestable, perpetuating cycles of deposition and as the normative path to authority. Chroniclers like Ibn Taghribirdi documented this as an inherent flaw, noting how sultans' reliance on purchased slaves bred loyalty only through fear and elimination, ultimately undermining the regime's longevity despite its military prowess.

Economic Stagnation and Corruption

The * system, which allocated land revenues to military s in lieu of salaries, increasingly strained state finances from the mid-14th century onward, as agricultural shortfalls reduced yields available for redistribution. By the , chronic land shortages emerged due to depopulation from recurrent plagues, which decimated rural labor and , limiting the system's capacity to support the of up to 10,000-12,000 Mamluks. This forced sultans to sell off iqta' properties to cover military expenses, depriving the of long-term tax revenues and exacerbating fiscal deficits. High military spending, consuming a disproportionate share of the —estimated at over 80% in some periods—prioritized elite upkeep over productive investments, contributing to broader economic . Corruption permeated the Mamluk , with becoming normalized for securing administrative posts and judicial favors, particularly in the as civil officials exploited weakened oversight. High offices were often auctioned to the highest bidders, fostering graft that diverted public funds into private hands and eroded tax collection efficiency. further entrenched itself despite formal prohibitions on hereditary succession among Mamluks, as amirs increasingly favored kin or clients in appointments, sidelining merit-based recruitment of slave soldiers and stifling administrative . This creep, evident in the proliferation of khushdashiyya (client factions), prioritized loyalty over competence, hindering adaptations to economic pressures like shifting trade routes. Currency debasement accelerated fiscal woes, with sultans from the reducing the silver content of dirhams and s to mint more coins for immediate expenditures, sparking that eroded . For instance, by the reign of al-Ashraf Qaytbay (1468–1496), fineness had declined significantly, contributing to price surges in staples like , which reached 17 dirhams per ardabb in crises around 1324 and worsened periodically thereafter. fulus suffered similar adulteration, flooding markets with low-value issues that undermined trust in the . The maritime breakthroughs from 1498 onward bypassed Mamluk-controlled routes, slashing revenues from the that had comprised up to 10-20% of Egypt's customs income. By dominating shipping via the , fleets captured key ports like and Hormuz, diverting pepper and other commodities away from and , which halved transit duties by the early . Population stagnation compounded these issues, with plague waves from 1348 onward halving Egypt's rural populace in some estimates, stalling agricultural output and urban growth while for unskilled labor remained flat or declined relative to pre-plague levels. Historical reconstructions indicate Egypt's GDP plateaued around 600-700 international dollars (1990 PPP) from 1300 to 1500, contrasting with Europe's ascent from similar baselines to over 1,000 by 1500 and the Ottoman core's modest gains through fiscalism. This inertia reflected institutional rigidities, including the iqta'-tied elite's resistance to reforms that might dilute their privileges.

Contemporary Islamic Critiques

Prominent Hanbali scholar Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), while acknowledging the Mamluks' role in defeating Mongol invasions at Ain Jalut in 1260 and expelling Crusaders from Acre in 1291, issued pointed critiques against their ruling elite for moral and administrative deviations that undermined Islamic governance. He condemned practices such as military music, , and prevalent among Mamluk amirs, viewing them as heterodox indulgences incompatible with jihad's ascetic demands. These excesses, Ibn Taymiyyah argued, fostered corruption, including the misuse of state treasury funds () and the imposition of illicit taxes (mukus), which prioritized elite enrichment over equitable rule. Ibn Taymiyyah's fatwas extended to rebuking alliances or truces with non-Muslims, such as occasional diplomatic overtures toward Crusader remnants or successor states, which he deemed potential kufr if they compromised obligations against persistent threats like the Ilkhanids. He emphasized that even nominal Muslim converts among remained infidels if adhering to Yasa codes over , implicitly critiquing any Mamluk leniency that neglected full confrontation. Such positions reflected a broader insistence on causal links between rulers' luxury—manifest in amirs' wealth hoarding and favoritism overriding legal judgments—and the erosion of military vigilance, as resources diverted to opulence weakened sustained campaigns against external foes. Contemporary critiques also highlighted the Mamluk system's reliance on imported slave soldiers, which ulama like Ibn Taymiyyah saw as practically unstable despite initial successes, due to severed kinship ties and foreign origins lacking indigenous (group solidarity), leading to recurrent internal violence over succession. Earlier scholar al-Izz ibn Abd al-Salam (1180–1262), active during the transition to Mamluk rule, issued fatwas demanding sultans surrender ill-gotten wealth to the , underscoring moral limits on slavery-derived power accumulation that Islamic law permitted only under strict and service norms. These rebukes often faced suppression through or ; Ibn Taymiyyah endured multiple imprisonments, including from 1318 to 1324 and until his death in 1328 under Sultan , for challenging elite-backed doctrines and policies that tolerated such excesses. opposition to sultanic overreach, including fatwas against unjust fiscal impositions for financing, similarly prompted concessions or silencing, as rulers balanced influence against military autonomy. This dynamic underscored critiques as truth-signaling mechanisms, exposing how slave-elite privileges engendered governance flaws predisposing the sultanate to factional strife rather than enduring stability.

Legacy

Survival under Ottoman Rule

Following the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517, Sultan Selim I ordered the massacre of numerous Mamluk sultans and emirs but preserved a cadre of Mamluk officers for their administrative expertise in managing the province's complex fiscal and military systems. Selim appointed Khayr Bey, a former Mamluk who had defected to the Ottomans, as the inaugural governor (beylerbeyi) of Egypt, thereby integrating select Mamluks into the Ottoman hierarchy while subordinating them to Istanbul's authority. Over the subsequent centuries, surviving Mamluks adapted by serving as beys who governed sanjaks—Ottoman administrative districts—retaining iqta-like land grants that provided revenue through tax farming and military obligations, albeit under nominal Ottoman oversight. These beys formed powerful military households (bayt), recruiting new mamluks primarily from Circassia and Georgia, which perpetuated their elite warrior ethos and enabled them to dominate local politics despite periodic purges by Ottoman governors. By the late 17th century, Mamluk factions such as the Faqariyya and Qasimi engaged in internecine conflicts that weakened central Ottoman control, allowing beys to extract resources and field armies independently. The 18th century witnessed a marked resurgence of influence, exemplified by the Qazdaghli household under Ibrahim Katkhuda and his successors, who consolidated power in and challenged the Ottoman viceroy's authority through alliances with tribes and control over trade routes. Figures like (r. 1760–1772) briefly asserted near-independence by deposing the Ottoman governor, minting coins in his name, and dispatching expeditions to , though Ottoman intervention and internal rivalries curtailed these ambitions. This era of de facto dominance persisted amid Ottoman decentralization, with beys effectively ruling Egypt's countryside and Cairo's military apparatus until the early . Mamluk power abruptly terminated on March 1, 1811, when , the Albanian Ottoman , lured approximately 470 beys to a banquet in Cairo's under the pretext of and Wahhabi campaign consultations, then massacred them via gunfire and blocked exits. This event, known as the Citadel Massacre, eliminated the Mamluk elite as a cohesive force, enabling to centralize authority, modernize the military, and establish hereditary rule in . Scattered survivors fled or integrated marginally, but their institutional role in governance ended decisively.

Influence on Successor States

The , after defeating the Mamluk Sultanate at the on January 22, 1517, preserved and adapted Mamluk military households as provincial governors in , allowing them to dominate local administration and taxation through a network of beys and amirs that prioritized factional loyalties over central authority. This arrangement extended the Mamluk practice of relying on manumitted slave soldiers for elite military roles into Ottoman provincial systems, particularly in regions like and , where similar non-hereditary warrior classes managed land grants and security, fostering decentralized power structures resistant to imperial standardization. In the Hejaz, the Mamluks' established mechanisms for overseeing Mecca and Medina—through appointed agents, annual subsidies, and cavalry detachments to ensure Sharifian compliance—were directly inherited by the Ottomans, who maintained these traditions to legitimize their caliphal claims and secure pilgrimage routes until the 19th century. Ottoman sultans, like Selim I, compelled the Sharif of Mecca to transfer allegiance from the Mamluks, but retained the supervisory framework to control trade revenues from the hajj, which had generated up to 10% of Mamluk fiscal income. The entrenched Mamluk elites in , controlling key fiscal offices and military commands, systematically obstructed centralizing reforms such as uniform taxation and bureaucratic , perpetuating a patronage-based that prioritized household aggrandizement over infrastructural and technological adoption. This causal persistence of elite violence and land privatization via endowments—often exceeding 15% of under Mamluk precedents—impeded Egypt's integration into broader Ottoman modernization efforts, sustaining stagnation until Muhammad Ali Pasha's massacres of 1811 dismantled the beylik system.

Modern Historiographical Perspectives

Early scholarship on the Mamluk Sultanate, influenced by Orientalist frameworks, often depicted it as an era of despotic stagnation and inevitable decline following the Mongol incursions of the 13th century, emphasizing internal factionalism over institutional resilience. This Eurocentric lens, prevalent in mid-20th-century works, prioritized narratives of cultural and political inertia compared to contemporaneous European developments, undervaluing the sultanate's adaptive mechanisms in military recruitment and fiscal administration. Recent historiography, particularly since the 1990s, has shifted toward viewing the Mamluks as a dynamic experiment in pre-modern Islamic state-building, highlighting processes of "Mamlukization" where slave-soldier elites integrated with local bureaucracies to sustain governance amid external pressures. Carl F. Petry's 2022 synthesis underscores this evolution, positioning the sultanate within global comparative political systems and critiquing earlier decline biases through empirical analysis of administrative records and trade data. Central debates in contemporary Mamluk studies revolve around the military system's efficiency versus its inherent unsustainability. Proponents of efficiency argue that the importation of non-Muslim slaves—primarily from the and regions, numbering in the thousands annually during peak periods—fostered unparalleled loyalty and martial prowess, enabling victories like Ain Jalut in 1260 and sustained defense against Crusader remnants. However, reveals structural flaws: reliance on perpetual slave inflows created vulnerabilities, exacerbated by the Black Death's demographic shocks from 1347 onward, while manumitted Mamluks' factional rivalries fueled chronic coups, undermining long-term stability. Petry and others caution against romanticizing this model, noting its empirical limits in fostering broad institutional continuity compared to hereditary dynasties, though it temporarily optimized elite cohesion in a jihad-oriented . Modern views also reevaluate the sultanate's global integration, countering stagnation narratives with evidence of economic vitality as a nexus between the and Mediterranean spheres. Controlling key ports like and , Mamluks facilitated , , and slave exchanges, generating revenues that peaked at over 10 million dinars annually in the , per fiscal iqta' records. This role, interacting with Venetian merchants and East African intermediaries, underscores adaptive commercial policies rather than isolation, though scholarship grounded in archival data rejects exaggerated claims of multicultural pluralism, recognizing instead a realist where Islamic militancy—evident in anti-Mongol and anti-Crusader campaigns—prioritized defense over inclusive . Such perspectives, drawing from primary chronicles like those of , privilege causal factors like geographic positioning over ideologically driven tolerance motifs prevalent in some academic narratives.

References

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