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Al-Qaeda
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Al-Qaeda[a] is a pan-Islamist militant organization led by Sunni jihadists who self-identify as a vanguard spearheading a global Islamist revolution to unite the Muslim world under a supra-national Islamic caliphate.[103][104] Its membership is mostly composed of Arabs but also includes people from other ethnic groups.[105] Al-Qaeda has mounted attacks on civilian and military targets of the U.S. and its allies; such as the 1998 US embassy bombings, the USS Cole bombing, and the September 11 attacks. It has been designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations and over two dozen countries around the world.
Key Information
The organization was founded in a series of meetings held in Peshawar during 1988, attended by Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Muhammad Atef, Ayman al-Zawahiri and other veterans of the Soviet–Afghan War.[106] Building upon the networks of Maktab al-Khidamat, the founding members decided to create an organization named "Al-Qaeda" to serve as a "vanguard" for jihad.[106][107] When Saddam Hussein invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, bin Laden offered to support Saudi Arabia by sending his Mujahideen fighters. His offer was rebuffed by the Saudi government, which instead sought the aid of the United States. The stationing of U.S. troops in the Arabian Peninsula prompted bin Laden to declare a jihad against both the rulers of Saudi Arabia – whom he denounced as murtadd (apostates) – and against the US. From 1992, al-Qaeda established its headquarters in Sudan until it was expelled in 1996. It then shifted its base to the Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and later expanded to other parts of the world, primarily in the Middle East and South Asia. In 1996 and 1998, bin Laden issued two fatāwā that demanded the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Saudi Arabia.
In 1998, al-Qaeda conducted the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people. The U.S. retaliated by launching Operation Infinite Reach, against al-Qaeda targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. In 2001, al-Qaeda carried out the September 11 attacks, resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths, long-term health consequences of nearby residents, damage to global economic markets, the triggering of drastic geo-political changes as well as generating profound cultural influence across the world. The U.S. launched the war on Terror in response and invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban and destroy al-Qaeda. In 2003, a U.S.-led coalition invaded Iraq, overthrowing the Ba'athist regime which they falsely accused of having ties with al-Qaeda. In 2004, al-Qaeda launched its Iraqi regional branch. After pursuing him for almost a decade, the U.S. military killed bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011.
Al-Qaeda members believe that a Judeo-Christian alliance (led by the United States) is waging a war against Islam and conspiring to destroy Islam.[108][109] Al-Qaeda also opposes man-made laws, and seek to implement sharīʿah (Islamic law) in Muslim countries.[110] Al-Qaeda fighters characteristically deploy tactics such as suicide attacks (Inghimasi and Istishhadi operations) involving simultaneous bombing of several targets in battle-zones.[111] Al-Qaeda's Iraq branch, which later morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq after 2006, was responsible for numerous sectarian attacks against Shias during its Iraqi insurgency.[112][113] Al-Qaeda ideologues envision the violent removal of all foreign and secularist influences in Muslim countries, which it denounces as corrupt deviations.[51][114][115][116] Following the death of bin Laden in 2011, al-Qaeda vowed to avenge his killing. The group was then led by Egyptian Ayman al-Zawahiri until he too was killed by the United States in 2022. As of 2021[update], they have reportedly suffered from a deterioration of central command over its regional operations.[117]
Organization
[edit]Al-Qaeda only indirectly controls its day-to-day operations. Its philosophy calls for the centralization of decision making, while allowing for the decentralization of execution.[118] The top leaders of al-Qaeda have defined the organization's ideology and guiding strategy, and they have also articulated simple and easy-to-receive messages. At the same time, mid-level organizations were given autonomy, but they had to consult with top management before large-scale attacks and assassinations. Top management included the shura council as well as committees on military operations, finance, and information sharing. Through the information committees of al-Qaeda, Zawahiri placed special emphasis on communicating with his groups.[119] However, after the war on terror, al-Qaeda's leadership has become isolated. As a result, the leadership has become decentralized, and the organization has become regionalized into several al-Qaeda groups.[120][121]
The group was initially dominated by Egyptians and Saudis, with some participation from Yemenis and Kuwaitis. Over time, it has evolved into a more international terrorist organization. While its core group originally shared a background in Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, it has since attracted fighters from other Arab groups, including North Africans, Jordanians, Palestinians, and Iraqis. In the decade following the 9/11 attacks, Muslims from non-Arab backgrounds, such as Pakistanis, Afghans, Turks, Kurds, and European converts to Islam, have also joined the organization.[122]
Many Western analysts do not believe that the global jihadist movement is driven at every level by al-Qaeda's leadership. However, bin Laden held considerable ideological influence over revolutionary Islamist movements across the world. Experts argue that al-Qaeda has fragmented into a number of disparate regional movements, and that these groups bear little connection with one another.[123]
This view mirrors the account given by Osama bin Laden in his October 2001 interview with Tayseer Allouni:
"this matter isn't about any specific person and ... is not about the al-Qa'idah Organization. We are the children of an Islamic Nation, with Prophet Muhammad as its leader, our Lord is one ... and all the true believers [mu'mineen] are brothers. So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an 'organization' with a specific name (such as 'al-Qa'idah') and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us. Brother Abu Ubaida ... created a military base to train the young men to fight against the vicious, arrogant, brutal, terrorizing Soviet empire ... So this place was called 'The Base' ['Al-Qa'idah'], as in a training base, so this name grew and became. We aren't separated from this nation. We are the children of a nation, and we are an inseparable part of it, and from those public demonstrations which spread from the far east, from the Philippines to Indonesia, to Malaysia, to India, to Pakistan, reaching Mauritania ... and so we discuss the conscience of this nation."[124]
As of 2010[update] however, Bruce Hoffman saw al-Qaeda as a cohesive network that was strongly led from the Pakistani tribal areas.[123]

Affiliates
[edit]Al-Qaeda has the following direct affiliates:
The following are presently believed to be indirect affiliates of al-Qaeda:
Al-Qaeda's former affiliates include the following:
- Abu Sayyaf (pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2014[132])
- Caucasus Emirate (dissolved)
- Hurras al-Din (dissolved in 2025)
- Jemaah Islamiyah[133] (dissolved in 2024)
- Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group[134] (dissolved)
- Al-Mourabitoun (joined JNIM in 2017[135])
- Al-Qaeda in Iraq (became the Islamic State of Iraq, which later seceded from al-Qaeda and became ISIL)
- Al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel (inactive since 2015[136])
- Ansar al-Islam (majority merged with ISIL in 2014)
- Ansar Dine (joined JNIM in 2017[135])
- Islamic Jihad in Yemen (became AQAP)
- Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (merged with Al-Mulathameen to form Al-Mourabitoun in 2013)
- Rajah Sulaiman Movement[137]
- Al-Nusra Front (dissolved in 2017, merged with other Islamist organizations to form Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and split ties)
Leadership
[edit]Osama bin Laden (1988 – May 2011)
[edit]
Osama bin Laden served as the emir of al-Qaeda from the organization's founding in 1988 until his assassination by US forces on May 1, 2011.[138] Atiyah Abd al-Rahman was alleged to be second in command prior to his death on August 22, 2011.[139]
Bin Laden was advised by a Shura Council, which consists of senior al-Qaeda members.[119] The group was estimated to consist of 20–30 people.
After May 2011
[edit]Ayman al-Zawahiri had been al-Qaeda's deputy emir and assumed the role of emir following bin Laden's death. Al-Zawahiri replaced Saif al-Adel, who had served as interim commander.[140]
On June 5, 2012, Pakistani intelligence officials announced that al-Rahman's alleged successor as second in command, Abu Yahya al-Libi, had been killed in Pakistan.[141]
Nasir al-Wuhayshi was alleged to have become al-Qaeda's overall second in command and general manager in 2013. He was concurrently the leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) until he was killed by a US airstrike in Yemen in June 2015.[142] Abu Khayr al-Masri, Wuhayshi's alleged successor as the deputy to Ayman al-Zawahiri, was killed by a US airstrike in Syria in February 2017.[143] Al-Qaeda's next alleged number two leader, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, was killed by Israeli agents. His pseudonym was Abu Muhammad al-Masri, who was killed in November 2020 in Iran. He was involved in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.[144]
Al-Qaeda's network was built from scratch as a conspiratorial network which drew upon the leadership of a number of regional nodes.[145] The organization divided itself into several committees, which include:
- The Military Committee, which is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
- The Money/Business Committee, which funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the hawala banking system. US-led efforts to eradicate the sources of "terrorist financing"[146] were most successful in the year immediately following the September 11 attacks.[147] Al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or so hawaladars in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to US$10 million.[148] The committee also procures false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses.[149] In the 9/11 Commission Report, it was estimated that al-Qaeda required $30 million per year to conduct its operations.
- The Law Committee reviews Sharia law, and decides upon courses of action conform to it.
- The Islamic Study/Fatwah Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
- The Media Committee ran the now-defunct newspaper Nashrat al Akhbar (English: Newscast) and handled public relations.
- In 2005, al-Qaeda formed As-Sahab, a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.
After Al-Zawahiri (2022 – present)
[edit]Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, in a drone strike in Afghanistan.[150] In February 2023, a report from the United Nations, based on member state intelligence, concluded that de facto leadership of al-Qaeda had passed to Saif al-Adel, who was operating out of Iran. Adel, a former Egyptian army officer, became a military instructor in al-Qaeda camps in the 1990s and was known for his involvement in the Battle of Mogadishu. The report stated that al-Adel's leadership could not officially be declared by al-Qaeda because of "political sensitivities" of Afghan government in acknowledging the death of Al-Zawahiri as well as due to "theological and operational" challenges posed by the location of al-Adel in Iran.[151][152]
Command structure
[edit]Most of al-Qaeda's top leaders and operational directors were veterans who fought against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s. Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were the leaders who were considered the operational commanders of the organization.[153] Nevertheless, al-Qaeda was not operationally managed by Ayman al-Zawahiri. Several operational groups exist, which consult with the leadership in situations where attacks are in preparation.[119] "... Zawahiri does not claim to have direct hierarchical control over al Qaeda's vast, networked structure. Al Qaeda's core leadership seeks to centralize the organization's messaging and strategy rather than to manage the daily operations of its franchises. But formal affiliates are required to consult with al Qaeda's core leadership before carrying out large-scale attacks." Al-Qaeda central (AQC) is a conglomerate of expert committees, each in supervision of distinct tasks and objectives. Its membership is mostly composed of Egyptian Islamist leaders who participated in the anti-communist Afghan Jihad. Assisting them are hundreds of Islamic field operatives and commanders, based in various regions of the Muslim World. The central leadership assumes control of the doctrinal approach and overall propaganda campaign; while the regional commanders were empowered with independence in military strategy and political maneuvering. This novel hierarchy made it possible for the organisation to launch wide-range offensives.[154]
When asked in 2005 about the possibility of al-Qaeda's connection to the July 7, 2005 London bombings, Metropolitan Police Commissioner Sir Ian Blair said: "Al-Qaeda is not an organization. Al-Qaeda is a way of working ... but this has the hallmark of that approach ... Al-Qaeda clearly has the ability to provide training ... to provide expertise ... and I think that is what has occurred here."[155] On August 13, 2005, The Independent newspaper, reported that the July 7 bombers had acted independently of an al-Qaeda mastermind.[156]
Nasser al-Bahri, who was Osama bin Laden's bodyguard for four years in the run-up to 9/11 wrote in his memoir a highly detailed description of how the group functioned at that time. Al-Bahri described al-Qaeda's formal administrative structure and vast arsenal.[157] However, the author Adam Curtis argued that the idea of al-Qaeda as a formal organization is primarily an American invention. Curtis contended the name "Al-Qaeda" was first brought to the attention of the public in the 2001 trial of bin Laden and the four men accused of the 1998 US embassy bombings in East Africa. Curtis wrote:
The reality was that bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri had become the focus of a loose association of disillusioned Islamist militants who were attracted by the new strategy. But there was no organization. These were militants who mostly planned their own operations and looked to bin Laden for funding and assistance. He was not their commander. There is also no evidence that bin Laden used the term "al-Qaeda" to refer to the name of a group until after September 11 attacks, when he realized that this was the term the Americans had given it.[158]
During the 2001 trial, the US Department of Justice needed to show that bin Laden was the leader of a criminal organization in order to charge him in absentia under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The name of the organization and details of its structure were provided in the testimony of Jamal al-Fadl, who said he was a founding member of the group and a former employee of bin Laden.[159] Questions about the reliability of al-Fadl's testimony have been raised by a number of sources because of his history of dishonesty, and because he was delivering it as part of a plea bargain agreement after being convicted of conspiring to attack US military establishments.[160][161] Sam Schmidt, a defense attorney who defended al-Fadl, said:
There were selective portions of al-Fadl's testimony that I believe was false, to help support the picture that he helped the Americans join together. I think he lied in a number of specific testimony about a unified image of what this organization was. It made al-Qaeda the new Mafia or the new Communists. It made them identifiable as a group and therefore made it easier to prosecute any person associated with al-Qaeda for any acts or statements made by bin Laden.[158]
Field operatives
[edit]
The number of individuals in the group who have undergone proper military training, and are capable of commanding insurgent forces, is largely unknown. Documents captured in the raid on bin Laden's compound in 2011 show that the core al-Qaeda membership in 2002 was 170.[162] In 2006, it was estimated that al-Qaeda had several thousand commanders embedded in 40 countries.[163] As of 2009[update], it was believed that no more than 200–300 members were still active commanders.[164]
According to the 2004 BBC documentary The Power of Nightmares, al-Qaeda was so weakly linked together that it was hard to say it existed apart from bin Laden and a small clique of close associates. The lack of any significant numbers of convicted al-Qaeda members, despite a large number of arrests on terrorism charges, was cited by the documentary as a reason to doubt whether a widespread entity that met the description of al-Qaeda existed.[165] al-Qaeda's commanders, as well as its sleeping agents, are hiding in different parts of the world to this day. They are mainly hunted by the American and Israeli secret services.
Insurgent forces
[edit]According to author Robert Cassidy, al-Qaeda maintains two separate forces which are deployed alongside insurgents in Iraq and Pakistan. The first, numbering in the tens of thousands, was "organized, trained, and equipped as insurgent combat forces" in the Soviet–Afghan war.[163] The force was composed primarily of foreign mujahideen from Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Many of these fighters went on to fight in Bosnia and Somalia for global jihad. Another group, which numbered 10,000 in 2006, live in the West and have received rudimentary combat training.[163]
Other analysts have described al-Qaeda's rank and file as being "predominantly Arab" in its first years of operation, but that the organization also includes "other peoples" as of 2007[update].[166] It has been estimated that 62 percent of al-Qaeda members have a university education.[167] In 2011 and the following year, the Americans successfully settled accounts with Osama bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki, the organization's chief propagandist, and Abu Yahya al-Libi's deputy commander. The optimistic voices were already saying it was over for al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, it was around this time that the Arab Spring greeted the region, the turmoil of which came great to al-Qaeda's regional forces. Seven years later, Ayman al-Zawahiri became arguably the number one leader in the organization, implementing his strategy with systematic consistency. Tens of thousands loyal to al-Qaeda and related organizations were able to challenge local and regional stability and ruthlessly attack their enemies in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe and Russia alike. In fact, from Northwest Africa to South Asia, al-Qaeda had more than two dozen "franchise-based" allies. The number of al-Qaeda militants was set at 20,000 in Syria alone, and they had 4,000 members in Yemen and about 7,000 in Somalia. The war was not over.[60]
In 2001, al-Qaeda had around 20 functioning cells and 70,000 insurgents spread over sixty nations.[168] According to latest estimates, the number of active-duty soldiers under its command and allied militias have risen to approximately 250,000 by 2018.[169]
Financing
[edit]Al-Qaeda usually does not disburse funds for attacks, and very rarely makes wire transfers.[170] In the 1990s, financing came partly from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden.[171] Other sources of income included the heroin trade and donations from supporters in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Islamic Gulf states.[171] A 2009 leaked diplomatic cable stated that "terrorist funding emanating from Saudi Arabia remains a serious concern."[172]
Among the first pieces of evidence regarding Saudi Arabia's support for al-Qaeda was the so-called "Golden Chain", a list of early al-Qaeda funders seized during a 2002 raid in Sarajevo by Bosnian police.[173] The hand-written list was validated by al-Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, and included the names of both donors and beneficiaries.[173][86] Osama bin-Laden's name appeared seven times among the beneficiaries, while 20 Saudi and Gulf-based businessmen and politicians were listed among the donors.[173] Notable donors included Adel Batterjee, and Wael Hamza Julaidan. Batterjee was designated as a terror financier by the US Department of the Treasury in 2004, and Julaidan is recognized as one of al-Qaeda's founders.[173]
Documents seized during the 2002 Bosnia raid showed that al-Qaeda widely exploited charities to channel financial and material support to its operatives across the globe.[174] Notably, this activity exploited the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). The IIRO had ties with al-Qaeda associates worldwide, including al-Qaeda's deputy Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri's brother worked for the IIRO in Albania and had actively recruited on behalf of al-Qaeda.[175] The MWL was openly identified by al-Qaeda's leader as one of the three charities al-Qaeda primarily relied upon for funding sources.[175]
Allegations of Qatari support
[edit]Several Qatari citizens have been accused of funding al-Qaeda. This includes Abd Al-Rahman al-Nuaimi, a Qatari citizen and a human-rights activist who founded the Swiss-based non-governmental organization (NGO) Alkarama. On December 18, 2013, the US Treasury designated Nuaimi as a terrorist for his activities supporting al-Qaeda.[176] The US Treasury has said Nuaimi "has facilitated significant financial support to al-Qaeda in Iraq, and served as an interlocutor between al-Qaeda in Iraq and Qatar-based donors".[176]
Nuaimi was accused of overseeing a $2 million monthly transfer to al-Qaeda in Iraq as part of his role as mediator between Iraq-based al-Qaeda senior officers and Qatari citizens.[176][177] Nuaimi allegedly entertained relationships with Abu-Khalid al-Suri, al-Qaeda's top envoy in Syria, who processed a $600,000 transfer to al-Qaeda in 2013.[176][177] Nuaimi is also known to be associated with Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad 'Abd al-Rahman al-Humayqani, a Yemeni politician and founding member of Alkarama, who was listed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US Treasury in 2013.[178] The US authorities claimed that Humayqani exploited his role in Alkarama to fundraise on behalf of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).[176][178] A prominent figure in AQAP, Nuaimi was also reported to have facilitated the flow of funding to AQAP affiliates based in Yemen. Nuaimi was also accused of investing funds in the charity directed by Humayqani to ultimately fund AQAP.[176] About ten months after being sanctioned by the US Treasury, Nuaimi was also restrained from doing business in the UK.[179]
Another Qatari citizen, Kalifa Mohammed Turki Subayi, was sanctioned by the US Treasury on June 5, 2008, for his activities as a "Gulf-based Al-Qaeda financier". Subayi's name was added to the UN Security Council's Sanctions List in 2008 on charges of providing financial and material support to al-Qaeda senior leadership.[177][180] Subayi allegedly moved al-Qaeda recruits to South Asia-based training camps.[177][180] He also financially supported Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, a Pakistani national and senior al-Qaeda officer who is believed to be the mastermind behind the September 11 attack according to the 9/11 Commission Report.[181]
Qataris provided support to al-Qaeda through the country's largest NGO, the Qatar Charity. Al-Qaeda defector al-Fadl, who was a former member of Qatar Charity, testified in court that Abdullah Mohammed Yusef, who served as Qatar Charity's director, was affiliated to al-Qaeda and simultaneously to the National Islamic Front, a political group that gave al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden harbor in Sudan in the early 1990s.[86]
It was alleged that in 1993 Osama bin Laden was using Middle East based Sunni charities to channel financial support to al-Qaeda operatives overseas. The same documents also report Bin Laden's complaint that the failed assassination attempt of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had compromised the ability of al-Qaeda to exploit charities to support its operatives to the extent it was capable of before 1995.[182]
Qatar financed al-Qaeda's enterprises through al-Qaeda's former affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra. The funding was primarily channeled through kidnapping for ransom.[183] The Consortium Against Terrorist Finance (CATF) reported that the Gulf country has funded al-Nusra since 2013.[183] In 2017, Asharq Al-Awsat estimated that Qatar had disbursed $25 million in support of al-Nusra through kidnapping for ransom.[184] In addition, Qatar has launched fundraising campaigns on behalf of al-Nusra. Al-Nusra acknowledged a Qatar-sponsored campaign "as one of the preferred conduits for donations intended for the group".[185][186]
The Golden Chain
[edit]The "Golden Chain" is a list of sponsors of Al-Qaeda seized in March 2002 in a raid by Bosnian police of the premises of the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo.
The list included twenty-five names, twenty of them very wealthy Saudis and Gulf States financial sponsors including bankers, businessmen, and former ministers.[187] Part of the list includes a computer file titled "Tarekh Osama" or "Osama History", but the appellation "Golden Chain" itself is due to al Qaeda defector Jamal al-Fadl, who vouched for its authenticity. The computer file contained photographs of the birth and early days of al-Qaeda as well as letters and documents, some in bin Laden's handwriting. In the seized material, records were found of both the plans for al-Qaeda's activities and its organizational structure and operational foundations. These are believed to have been prepared by bin Laden and his mentor Sheikh Abdallah Azzam.
They also found a list of 20 Arab plutocrats, the "Golden Chain", who were suspected of financing international terrorism, including al-Qaeda. The custody of the secret and confidential material was entrusted to bin Laden's confidant Enaam Arnaout, who was convinced that the documents were in the safest and most secure place in the Sarajevo office of the Benevolence International Foundation. During a search of the Benevolence International Foundation's offices in Sarajevo, the relevant law enforcement agencies found clear evidence of a connection between the head of the office, Enaam Arnaout, and Osama bin Laden, and of "militant" subordination between the two, and charges were brought against Arnaout.[188]
Most accounts are vague on what year the Golden Chain document was written; some say 1988[189] but U.S. counter-terrorism advisor Richard A. Clarke says it dates from 1989. The "Golden Chain" was presented by the U.S. government in the criminal case United States v. Arnaout filed on January 29, 2003, and in other legal filings.
The American government has never publicly released the full document, and so the full list of names is a matter of conjecture and speculation. In 2003, the Wall Street Journal reported that it included "billionaire bankers Saleh Kamel and Khalid bin Mahfouz, as well as the Al-Rajhi family, another banking family, and Mr. bin Laden's brothers."[190] Minutes of the Sarajevo meeting on 11 August 1988 confirmed that bin Laden had begun his jihadist movement at that time. Bin Laden decided to recruit members and raise funds from Saudi Arabia. To carry out his jihadist war, he had to enlist the wealthy plutocrats of the Gulf, the "Golden Chain", to fund al-Qaeda. The "Golden Chain" was a copy of a handwritten 1988 draft listing the wealthy financiers of the mujahedin's operations in Afghanistan, known within al-Qaeda as the "Golden Chain". At the top of the document, translated from Arabic by the US Department of Justice, was a quote from the Quran: 'And spend in the cause of God'.[191]
Strategy
[edit]This section needs to be updated. (August 2016) |
In the disagreement over whether al-Qaeda's objectives are religious or political, Mark Sedgwick describes al-Qaeda's strategy as political in the immediate term but with ultimate aims that are religious.[192] On March 11, 2005, Al-Quds Al-Arabi published extracts from Saif al-Adel's document "Al Qaeda's Strategy to the Year 2020".[11][193] Abdel Bari Atwan summarizes this strategy as comprising five stages to rid the Ummah from all forms of oppression:
- Provoke the United States and the West into invading a Muslim country by staging a massive attack or string of attacks on US soil that results in massive civilian casualties.
- Incite local resistance to occupying forces.
- Expand the conflict to neighboring countries and engage the US and its allies in a long war of attrition.
- Convert al-Qaeda into an ideology and set of operating principles that can be loosely franchised in other countries without requiring direct command and control, and via these franchises incite attacks against the US and countries allied with the US until they withdraw from the conflict, as happened with the 2004 Madrid train bombings, but which did not have the same effect with the July 7, 2005 London bombings.
- The US economy will finally collapse by 2020, under the strain of multiple engagements in numerous places. This will lead to a collapse in the worldwide economic system, and lead to global political instability. This will lead to a global jihad led by al-Qaeda, and a Wahhabi Caliphate will then be installed across the world.
Atwan noted that, while the plan is unrealistic, "it is sobering to consider that this virtually describes the downfall of the Soviet Union."[11]
According to Fouad Hussein, a Jordanian journalist and author who has spent time in prison with Al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's strategy consists of seven phases and is similar to the plan described in al-Qaeda's Strategy to the year 2020. These phases include:[194]
- "The Awakening." This phase was supposed to last from 2001 to 2003. The goal of the phase is to provoke the United States to attack a Muslim country by executing an attack that kills many civilians on US soil.
- "Opening Eyes." This phase was supposed to last from 2003 to 2006. The goal of this phase was to recruit young men to the cause and to transform the al-Qaeda group into a movement. Iraq was supposed to become the center of all operations with financial and military support for bases in other states.
- "Arising and Standing up", was supposed to last from 2007 to 2010. In this phase, al-Qaeda wanted to execute additional attacks and focus their attention on Syria. Hussein believed other countries in the Arabian Peninsula were also in danger.
- Al-Qaeda expected a steady growth among their ranks and territories due to the declining power of the regimes in the Arabian Peninsula. The main focus of attack in this phase was supposed to be on oil suppliers and cyberterrorism, targeting the US economy and military infrastructure.
- The declaration of an Islamic Caliphate, which was projected between 2013 and 2016. In this phase, al-Qaeda expected the resistance from Israel to be heavily reduced.
- The declaration of an "Islamic Army" and a "fight between believers and non-believers", also called "total confrontation".
- "Definitive Victory", projected to be completed by 2020.
According to the seven-phase strategy, the war is projected to last less than two years.
According to Charles Lister of the Middle East Institute and Katherine Zimmerman of the American Enterprise Institute, the new model of al-Qaeda is to "socialize communities" and build a broad territorial base of operations with the support of local communities, also gaining income independent of the funding of sheiks.[195]
Name
[edit]The English name of the organization is a simplified transliteration of the Arabic noun al-qāʿidah (القاعدة), which means "the foundation" or "the base". The initial al- is the Arabic definite article "the", hence "the base".[196] In Arabic, al-Qaeda has four syllables (/alˈqaː.ʕi.da/). However, since two of the Arabic consonants in the name are not phones found in the English language, the common naturalized English pronunciations include /ælˈkaɪdə/, /ælˈkeɪdə/ and /ˌælkɑːˈiːdə/. Al-Qaeda's name can also be transliterated as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, or el-Qaida.[197]
The doctrinal concept of "al-Qaeda" was first coined by the Palestinian Islamist scholar and Jihadist leader Abdullah Azzam in an April 1988 issue of Al-Jihad magazine to describe a religiously committed vanguard of Muslims who wage armed Jihad globally to liberate oppressed Muslims from foreign invaders, establish sharia (Islamic law) across the Islamic World by overthrowing the ruling secular governments; and thus restore the past Islamic prowess. This was to be implemented by establishing an Islamic state that would nurture generations of Muslim soldiers that would perpetually attack United States and its allied governments in the Muslim World. Numerous historical models were cited by Azzam as successful examples of his call; starting from the early Muslim conquests of the 7th century to the recent anti-Soviet Afghan Jihad of the 1980s.[198][199][200] According to Azzam's world-view:
It is about time to think about a state that would be a solid base for the distribution of the (Islamic) creed, and a fortress to host the preachers from the hell of the Jahiliyyah [the pre-Islamic period].[200]
Bin Laden explained the origin of the term in a videotaped interview with Al Jazeera journalist Tayseer Alouni in October 2001:
The name 'al-Qaeda' was established a long time ago by mere chance. The late Abu Ebeida El-Banashiri established the training camps for our mujahedeen against Russia's terrorism. We used to call the training camp al-Qaeda. The name stayed.[201]
It has been argued that two documents seized from the Sarajevo office of the Benevolence International Foundation prove the name was not simply adopted by the mujahideen movement and that a group called al-Qaeda was established in August 1988. Both of these documents contain minutes of meetings held to establish a new military group, and contain the term "al-Qaeda".[202]
Former British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook wrote that the word al-Qaeda should be translated as "the database", because it originally referred to the computer file of the thousands of mujahideen militants who were recruited and trained with CIA help to defeat the Russians.[203] In April 2002, the group assumed the name Qa'idat al-Jihad (قاعدة الجهاد qāʿidat al-jihād), which means "the base of Jihad". According to Diaa Rashwan, this was "apparently as a result of the merger of the overseas branch of Egypt's al-Jihad, which was led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, with the groups Bin Laden brought under his control after his return to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s."[204]
Ideology
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| Islamism |
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The pan-Islamist militant movement of al-Qaeda developed amid the rise of Islamic revivalist and Jihadist movements after the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979) and during the Afghan Jihad (1979–1989). The writings of Egyptian Islamist scholar and revolutionary ideologue Sayyid Qutb strongly inspired the founding leaders of al-Qaeda.[205] In the 1950s and 1960s, Qutb preached that because of the lack of sharia law, the Muslim world was no longer Muslim, and had reverted to the pre-Islamic ignorance known as jahiliyyah. To restore Islam, Qutb argued that a vanguard of righteous Muslims was needed in order to establish "true Islamic states", implement sharia, and rid the Muslim world of any non-Muslim influences. In Qutb's view, the enemies of Islam included "world Jewry", which "plotted conspiracies" and opposed Islam.[206] Qutb envisioned this vanguard to march forward to wage armed Jihad against tyrannical regimes after purifying from the wider Jahili societies and organising themselves under a righteous Islamic leadership; which he viewed as the model of early Muslims in the Islamic State of Medina under the leadership of the Islamic prophet Muhammad. This idea would directly influence many Islamist figures such as Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden; and became the core rationale for the formulation of "al-Qaeda" concept in the near future.[207] Outlining his strategy to topple the existing secular orders, Qutb argued in Milestones:
[It is necessary that] a Muslim community to come into existence which believes that 'there is no deity except God,' which commits itself to obey none but God, denying all other authority, and which challenges the legality of any law which is not based on this belief.. . It should come into the battlefield with the determination that its strategy, its social organization, and the relationship between its individuals should be firmer and more powerful than the existing jahili system.[207][208]
In the words of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, a close college friend of bin Laden:
Islam is different from any other religion; it's a way of life. We [Khalifa and bin Laden] were trying to understand what Islam has to say about how we eat, who we marry, how we talk. We read Sayyid Qutb. He was the one who most affected our generation.[209]
Qutb also influenced Ayman al-Zawahiri.[210] Zawahiri's uncle and maternal family patriarch, Mafouz Azzam, was Qutb's student, protégé, personal lawyer, and an executor of his estate. Azzam was one of the last people to see Qutb alive before his execution.[211] Zawahiri paid homage to Qutb in his work Knights under the Prophet's Banner.[212]
Qutb argued that many Muslims were not true Muslims. Some Muslims, Qutb argued, were apostates. These alleged apostates included leaders of Muslim countries, since they failed to enforce sharia law.[213] He also alleged that the West approaches the Muslim World with a "crusading spirit"; in spite of the decline of religious values in the 20th century Europe. According to Qutb; the hostile and imperialist attitudes exhibited by Europeans and Americans towards Muslim countries, their support for Zionism, etc. reflected hatred amplified over a millennium of wars such as the Crusades and was born out of Roman materialist and utilitarian outlooks that viewed the world in monetary terms.[214]
Formation
[edit]The Afghan jihad against the pro-Soviet government further developed the Salafist Jihadist movement which inspired al-Qaeda.[215] During this period, al-Qaeda embraced the ideals of the Indian Muslim militant revivalist Syed Ahmad Barelvi (d. 1831) who led a Jihad movement against British India from the frontiers of Afghanistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkwa in the early 19th century. Al-Qaeda readily adopted Sayyid Ahmad's doctrines such as returning to the purity of early generations (Salaf as-Salih), antipathy towards Western influences and restoration of Islamic political power.[216][217] According to Pakistani journalist Hussain Haqqani,
Sayyid Ahmed's revival of the ideology of jihad became the prototype for subsequent Islamic militant movements in South and Central Asia and is also the main influence over the jihad network of Al Qaeda and its associated groups in the region.[216][217]
Objectives
[edit]The long-term objective of al-Qaeda is to unite the Muslim World under a supra-national Islamic state known as the Khilafah (Caliphate), headed by an elected Caliph descended from the Ahl al-Bayt (Muhammad's family). The immediate objectives include the expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula, waging armed Jihad to topple US-allied governments in the region, etc.[218][219]
The following are the goals and some of the general policies outlined in al-Qaeda's Founding Charter "Al-Qaeda's Structure and Bylaws" issued in the meetings in Peshawar in 1988:[220][218]
General Goals
i. To promote jihad awareness in the Islamic world
ii. To prepare and equip the cadres for the Islamic world through trainings and by participating in actual combat
iii. To support and sponsor the jihad movement as much as possible
iv. To coordinate Jihad movements around the world in an effort to create a unified international Jihad movement.General Policies
1. Complete commitment to the governing rules and controls of Shari'a in all the beliefs and actions and according to the book [Qur'an] and Sunna as well as per the interpretation of the nation's scholars who serve in this domain
2. Commitment to Jihad as a fight for God's cause and as an agenda of change and to prepare for it and apply it whenever we find it possible...
4. Our position with respect to the tyrants of the world, secular and national parties and the like is not to associate with them, to discredit them and to be their constant enemy till they believe in God alone. We shall not agree with them on half-solutions and there is no way to negotiate with them or appease them
5. Our relationships with truthful Islamic jihadist movements and groups is to cooperate under the umbrella of faith and belief and we shall always attempt to at uniting and integrating with them...
6. We shall carry a relationship of love and affection with the Islamic movements who are not aligned with Jihad...
7. We shall sustain a relationship of respect and love with active scholars...
9. We shall reject the regional fanatics and will pursue Jihad in an Islamic country as needed and when possible
10. We shall care about the role of Muslim people in the Jihad and we shall attempt to recruit them...
11. We shall maintain our economic independence and will not rely on others to secure our resources.
12. Secrecy is the main ingredient of our work except for what the need deems necessary to reveal
13. Our policy with the Afghani Jihad is support, advise and coordination with the Islamic Establishments in Jihad arenas in a manner that conforms with our policies"
Theory of Islamic State
[edit]Al-Qaeda aims to establish an Islamic state in the Arab World, modelled after the Rashidun Caliphate, by initiating a global Jihad against the "International Jewish-Crusader Alliance" led by the United States, which it sees as the "external enemy" and against the secular governments in Muslim countries, that are described as "the apostate domestic enemy".[221] Once foreign influences and the secular ruling authorities are removed from Muslim countries through Jihad; al-Qaeda supports elections to choose the rulers of its proposed Islamic states. This is to be done through representatives of leadership councils (Shura) that would ensure the implementation of Shari'a (Islamic law). However, it opposes elections that institute parliaments which empower Muslim and non-Muslim legislators to collaborate in making laws of their own choosing.[221] In the second edition of his book Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, Ayman Al Zawahiri writes:
We demand... the government of the rightly guiding caliphate, which is established on the basis of the sovereignty of sharia and not on the whims of the majority. Its ummah chooses its rulers....If they deviate, the ummah brings them to account and removes them. The ummah participates in producing that government's decisions and determining its direction. ... [The caliphal state] commands the right and forbids the wrong and engages in jihad to liberate Muslim lands and to free all humanity from all oppression and ignorance.[221]
Grievances
[edit]A recurring theme in al-Qaeda's ideology is the perpetual grievance over the violent subjugation of Islamic dissidents by the authoritarian, secularist regimes allied to the West. Al-Qaeda denounces these post-colonial governments as a system led by Westernised elites designed to advance neo-colonialism and maintain Western hegemony over the Muslim World. The most prominent topic of grievance is over the American foreign policy in the Arab World; especially over its strong economic and military support to Israel. Other concerns of resentment include presence of NATO troops to support allied regimes; injustices committed against Muslims in Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinjiang, Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq etc.[222]
Religious compatibility
[edit]Abdel Bari Atwan wrote that:
While the leadership's own theological platform is essentially Salafi, the organization's umbrella is sufficiently wide to encompass various schools of thought and political leanings. Al-Qaeda counts among its members and supporters people associated with Wahhabism, Shafi'ism, Malikism, and Hanafism. There are even some Al-Qaeda members whose beliefs and practices are directly at odds with Salafism, such as Yunis Khalis, one of the leaders of the Afghan mujahedin. He was a mystic who visited the tombs of saints and sought their blessings – practices inimical to bin Laden's Wahhabi-Salafi school of thought. The only exception to this pan-Islamic policy is Shi'ism. Al-Qaeda seems implacably opposed to it, as it holds Shi'ism to be heresy. In Iraq it has openly declared war on the Badr Brigades, who have fully cooperated with the US, and now considers even Shi'i civilians to be legitimate targets for acts of violence.[223]
On the other hand, Professor Peter Mandaville states that Al-Qaeda follows a pragmatic policy in forming its local affiliates, with various cells being sub-contracted to Shia Muslim and non-Muslim members. The top-down chain of command means that each unit is answerable directly to central leadership, while they remain ignorant of their counterparts' presence or activities. These transnational networks of autonomous supply chains, financiers, underground militias and political supporters were set up during the 1990s, when Bin Laden's immediate aim was the expulsion of American troops from the Arabian Peninsula.[224]
Attacks on civilians
[edit]Under the leadership of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda organization adopted the strategy of targeting non-combatant civilians of enemy states that indiscriminately attacked Muslims. Following the September 11 attacks, al-Qaeda provided a justification for the killing of non-combatants/civilians, entitled, "A Statement from Qaidat al-Jihad Regarding the Mandates of the Heroes and the Legality of the Operations in New York and Washington". According to a couple of critics, Quintan Wiktorowicz and John Kaltner, it provides "ample theological justification for killing civilians in almost any imaginable situation."[225]
Among these justifications are that America is leading the west in waging a War on Islam so that attacks on America are a defense of Islam and any treaties and agreements between Muslim majority states and Western countries that would be violated by attacks are null and void. According to the tract, several conditions allow for the killing of civilians including:
- retaliation for the American war on Islam which al-Qaeda alleges has targeted "Muslim women, children and elderly";
- when it is too difficult to distinguish between non-combatants and combatants when attacking an enemy "stronghold" (hist) or non-combatants remain in enemy territory, killing them is allowed;
- those who assist the enemy "in deed, word, mind" are eligible for killing, and this includes the general population in democratic countries because civilians can vote in elections that bring enemies of Islam to power;
- the necessity of killing in the war to protect Islam and Muslims;
- Muhammad, when asked whether the Muslim fighters could use the catapult against the village of Taif, replied affirmatively, even though the enemy fighters were mixed with a civilian population;
- if the women, children and other protected groups serve as human shields for the enemy;
- if the enemy has broken a treaty, killing of civilians is permitted.[225]
Under the leadership of Sayf al-Adel, al-Qaeda's strategy has undergone transformation and the organization has officially renounced the tactic of attacking civilian targets of enemies. In his book Free Reading of 33 Strategies of War published in 2023, Sayf al-Adel counselled Islamist fighters to prioritize attacking the police forces, military soldiers, state assets of enemy governments, etc. which he described as acceptable targets in military operations. Asserting that attacking women and children of enemies are contrary to Islamic values, Sayf al-Adel asked: "If we target the general public, how can we expect their people to accept our call to Islam?"[226]
History
[edit]Attacks
[edit]
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: August 7, 1998
Aden, Yemen: October 12, 2000
World Trade Center, US: September 11, 2001
The Pentagon, US: September 11, 2001
Istanbul, Turkey: November 15 and 20, 2003
Al-Qaeda has carried out a total of six major attacks, four of them in its jihad against America. In each case the leadership planned the attack years in advance, arranging for the shipment of weapons and explosives and using its businesses to provide operatives with safehouses and false identities.[227]
1991
[edit]To prevent the former Afghan king Mohammed Zahir Shah from coming back from exile and possibly becoming head of a new government, bin Laden instructed a Portuguese convert to Islam, Paulo Jose de Almeida Santos, to assassinate Zahir Shah. On November 4, 1991, Santos entered the king's villa in Rome posing as a journalist and tried to stab him with a dagger. A tin of cigarillos in the king's breast pocket deflected the blade and saved Zahir Shah's life, although the king was also stabbed several times in the neck and was taken to hospital, later recovering from the attack. Santos was apprehended by General Abdul Wali, a former commander of the Royal Afghan Army, and jailed for 10 years in Italy.[228][229]
1992
[edit]On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda launched the 1992 Yemen hotel bombings. Two bombs were detonated in Aden, Yemen. The first target was the Movenpick Hotel and the second was the parking lot of the Goldmohur Hotel.[230]
The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort, Operation Restore Hope. Internally, al-Qaeda considered the bombing a victory that frightened the Americans away, but in the US, the attack was barely noticed. No American soldiers were killed because no soldiers were staying in the hotel at the time it was bombed, however, an Australian tourist and a Yemeni hotel worker were killed in the bombing. Seven others, who were mostly Yemeni, were severely injured.[230] Two fatwas are said to have been appointed by al-Qaeda's members, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim, to justify the killings according to Islamic law. Salim referred to a famous fatwa appointed by Ibn Taymiyyah, a 13th-century scholar admired by Wahhabis, which sanctioned resistance by any means during the Mongol invasions.[231][unreliable source?]
Late 1990s
[edit]
In 1996, bin Laden personally engineered a plot to assassinate United States President Bill Clinton while the president was in Manila for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. However, intelligence agents intercepted a message before the motorcade was to leave, and alerted the US Secret Service. Agents later discovered a bomb planted under a bridge.[232]
On August 7, 1998, al-Qaeda bombed the US embassies in East Africa, killing 224 people, including 12 Americans. In retaliation, a barrage of cruise missiles launched by the US military devastated an al-Qaeda base in Khost, Afghanistan. The network's capacity was unharmed. In late 1999 and 2000, al-Qaeda planned attacks to coincide with the millennium, masterminded by Abu Zubaydah and involving Abu Qatada, which would include the bombing of Christian holy sites in Jordan, the bombing of Los Angeles International Airport by Ahmed Ressam, and the bombing of the USS The Sullivans (DDG-68).
On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda militants in Yemen bombed the missile destroyer USS Cole in a suicide attack, killing 17 US servicemen and damaging the vessel while it lay offshore. Inspired by the success of such a brazen attack, al-Qaeda's command core began to prepare for an attack on the US itself.
September 11 attacks
[edit]

The September 11 attacks on America by al-Qaeda killed 2,996 people – 2,507 civilians, 343 firefighters, 72 law enforcement officers, 55 military personnel as well as 19 hijackers who committed murder-suicide. Two commercial airliners were deliberately flown into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, a third into the Pentagon, and a fourth, originally intended to target either the United States Capitol or the White House, crashed in a field in Stonycreek Township near Shanksville, Pennsylvania after passengers revolted. It was the deadliest foreign attack on American soil since the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and to this day remains the deadliest terrorist attack in human history.
The attacks were conducted by al-Qaeda, acting in accord with the 1998 fatwa issued against the US and its allies by persons under the command of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and others.[30] Evidence points to suicide squads led by al-Qaeda military commander Mohamed Atta as the culprits of the attacks, with bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, and Hambali as the key planners and part of the political and military command.
Messages issued by bin Laden after September 11, 2001, praised the attacks, and explained their motivation while denying any involvement.[233] Bin Laden strongly supported the attacks by identifying numerous grievances of Muslims, such as the general perception that the US was actively oppressing Muslims.[234] In his "Letter to the American people" published in 2002, Osama Bin Laden stated:
Why are we fighting and opposing you? The answer is very simple:
(1) Because you attacked us and continue to attack us. ....
The American government and press still refuses to answer the question: Why did they attack us in New York and Washington?
If Sharon is a man of peace in the eyes of Bush, then we are also men of peace!!! America does not understand the language of manners and principles, so we are addressing it using the language it understands.[32][235]
Bin Laden asserted that America was massacring Muslims in "Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq" and Muslims should retain the "right to attack in reprisal". He also claimed the 9/11 attacks were not targeted at people, but "America's icons of military and economic power", despite the fact he planned to attack in the morning when most of the people in the intended targets were present and thus generating the maximum number of human casualties.[236]
Evidence later came to light that the original targets for the attack may have been nuclear power stations on the US East Coast. The targets were later altered by al-Qaeda, as it was feared that such an attack "might get out of hand".[237][238]
Designation as a terrorist group
[edit]Al-Qaeda is deemed a designated terrorist group by the following countries and international organizations:
Australia[239]
Azerbaijan[240]
Bahrain[241]
Belarus[242]
Brazil[243]
Canada[244]
China[96][245]
European Union[246]
France[247]
India[248]
Indonesia[249]
Iran[250]
Ireland[251]
Israel[252][253]
Japan[254]
Kazakhstan[255]
Kyrgyzstan[256]
NATO[257][258]
Malaysia[259]
Netherlands[260]
New Zealand[261]
Pakistan[262]
Philippines[263]
Russia[264]
Saudi Arabia[265]
South Korea[266]
Sweden[267]
Switzerland[268]
Tajikistan[269]
Turkey designated Al-Qaeda's Turkish branch[270]
United Arab Emirates[271]
United Kingdom[272]
United Nations Security Council[273]
United States[274]
Uzbekistan[275][276]
Vietnam[277]
War on terror
[edit]
In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government responded, and began to prepare its armed forces to overthrow the Taliban, which it believed was harboring al-Qaeda. The US offered Taliban leader Mullah Omar a chance to surrender bin Laden and his top associates. The first forces to be inserted into Afghanistan were paramilitary officers from the CIA's elite Special Activities Division (SAD).
The Taliban offered to turn over bin Laden to a neutral country for trial if the US would provide evidence of bin Laden's complicity in the attacks. US President George W. Bush responded by saying: "We know he's guilty. Turn him over",[278] and British Prime Minister Tony Blair warned the Taliban regime: "Surrender bin Laden, or surrender power."[279]
Soon thereafter the US and its allies invaded Afghanistan, and together with the Afghan Northern Alliance removed the Taliban government as part of the war in Afghanistan. As a result of the US special forces and air support for the Northern Alliance ground forces, a number of Taliban and al-Qaeda training camps were destroyed, and much of the operating structure of al-Qaeda is believed to have been disrupted. After being driven from their key positions in the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan, many al-Qaeda fighters tried to regroup in the rugged Gardez region of the nation.

By early 2002, al-Qaeda had been dealt a serious blow to its operational capacity, and the Afghan invasion appeared to be a success. Nevertheless, a significant Taliban insurgency remained in Afghanistan.
Debate continued regarding the nature of al-Qaeda's role in the 9/11 attacks. The US State Department released a videotape showing bin Laden speaking with a small group of associates somewhere in Afghanistan shortly before the Taliban was removed from power.[280] Although its authenticity has been questioned by a couple of people,[281] the tape definitively implicates bin Laden and al-Qaeda in the September 11 attacks. The tape was aired on many television channels, with an accompanying English translation provided by the US Defense Department.[282]
In September 2004, the 9/11 Commission officially concluded that the attacks were conceived and implemented by al-Qaeda operatives.[283] In October 2004, bin Laden appeared to claim responsibility for the attacks in a videotape released through Al Jazeera, saying he was inspired by Israeli attacks on high-rises in the 1982 invasion of Lebanon: "As I looked at those demolished towers in Lebanon, it entered my mind that we should punish the oppressor in kind and that we should destroy towers in America in order that they taste some of what we tasted and so that they be deterred from killing our women and children."[284]
By the end of 2004, the US government proclaimed that two-thirds of the most senior al-Qaeda figures from 2001 had been captured and interrogated by the CIA: Abu Zubaydah, Ramzi bin al-Shibh and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri in 2002;[285] Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in 2003;[286] and Saif al Islam el Masry in 2004.[287] Mohammed Atef and several others were killed. The West was criticized for not being able to handle al-Qaeda despite a decade of the war.[288]
Activities
[edit]Africa
[edit]
Al-Qaeda involvement in Africa has included a number of bombing attacks in North Africa, while supporting parties in civil wars in Eritrea and Somalia. From 1991 to 1996, bin Laden and other al-Qaeda leaders were based in Sudan.
Islamist rebels in the Sahara calling themselves al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb have stepped up their violence in recent years.[289] French officials say the rebels have no real links to the al-Qaeda leadership, but this has been disputed. It seems likely that bin Laden approved the group's name in late 2006, and the rebels "took on the al Qaeda franchise label", almost a year before the violence began to escalate.[290]
In Mali, the Ansar Dine faction was also reported as an ally of al-Qaeda in 2013.[291] The Ansar al Dine faction aligned themselves with the AQIM.[292]
In 2011, al-Qaeda's North African wing condemned Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and declared support for the Anti-Gaddafi rebels.[293][294]
Following the Libyan Civil War, the removal of Gaddafi and the ensuing period of post-civil war violence in Libya, various Islamist militant groups affiliated with al-Qaeda were able to expand their operations in the region.[295] The 2012 Benghazi attack, which resulted in the death of US Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, is suspected of having been carried out by various Jihadist networks, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia and several other al-Qaeda affiliated groups.[296][297] The capture of Nazih Abdul-Hamed al-Ruqai, a senior al-Qaeda operative wanted by the United States for his involvement in the 1998 United States embassy bombings, on October 5, 2013, by US Navy Seals, FBI and CIA agents illustrates the importance the US and other Western allies have placed on North Africa.[298]
Europe
[edit]Before the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, westerners who had been recruits at al-Qaeda training camps were sought after by al-Qaeda's military wing. Language skills and knowledge of Western culture were generally found among recruits from Europe, such was the case with Mohamed Atta, an Egyptian national studying in Germany at the time of his training, and other members of the Hamburg Cell. Osama bin Laden and Mohammed Atef would later designate Atta as the ringleader of the 9/11 hijackers. Following the attacks, Western intelligence agencies determined that al-Qaeda cells operating in Europe had aided the hijackers with financing and communications with the central leadership based in Afghanistan.[181][299]
In 2003, Islamists carried out a series of bombings in Istanbul killing fifty-seven people and injuring seven hundred. Seventy-four people were charged by the Turkish authorities. Some had previously met bin Laden, and though they specifically declined to pledge allegiance to al-Qaeda they asked for its blessing and help.[300][301]
In 2009, three Londoners, Tanvir Hussain, Assad Sarwar and Ahmed Abdullah Ali, were convicted of conspiring to detonate bombs disguised as soft drinks on seven airplanes bound for Canada and the US. The MI5 investigation regarding the plot involved more than a year of surveillance work conducted by over two hundred officers.[302][303][304] British and US officials said the plot – unlike many similar homegrown European Islamic militant plots – was directly linked to al-Qaeda and guided by senior al-Qaeda members in Pakistan.[305][306]
In 2012, Russian Intelligence indicated that al-Qaeda had given a call for "forest jihad" and has been starting massive forest fires as part of a strategy of "thousand cuts".[307]
Arab world
[edit]
Following Yemeni unification in 1990, Wahhabi networks began moving missionaries into the country. Although it is unlikely bin Laden or Saudi al-Qaeda were directly involved, the personal connections they made would be established over the next decade and used in the USS Cole bombing.[308] Concerns grew over al-Qaeda's group in Yemen.[309]
In Iraq, al-Qaeda forces loosely associated with the leadership were embedded in the Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad group commanded by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Specializing in suicide operations, they have been a "key driver" of the Sunni insurgency.[310] Although they played a small part in the overall insurgency, between 30% and 42% of all suicide bombings which took place in the early years were claimed by Zarqawi's group.[311][312] Reports have indicated that oversights such as the failure to control access to the Qa'qaa munitions factory in Yusufiyah have allowed large quantities of munitions to fall into the hands of al-Qaida.[313] In November 2010, the militant group Islamic State of Iraq, which is linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq, threatened to "exterminate all Iraqi Christians".[314][315]
Al-Qaeda did not begin training Palestinians until the late 1990s.[316] Large groups such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have rejected an alliance with al-Qaeda, fearing that al-Qaeda will co-opt their cells. This may have changed recently. The Israeli security and intelligence services believe al-Qaeda has managed to infiltrate operatives from the Occupied Territories into Israel, and is waiting for an opportunity to attack.[316]
As of 2015[update], Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey are openly supporting the Army of Conquest,[317][318] an umbrella rebel group fighting in the Syrian Civil War against the Syrian government that reportedly includes an al-Qaeda linked al-Nusra Front and another Salafi coalition known as Ahrar al-Sham.[319]
Kashmir
[edit]Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri consider India to be a part of an alleged Crusader-Zionist-Hindu conspiracy against the Islamic world.[320] According to a 2005 report by the Congressional Research Service, bin Laden was involved in training militants for Jihad in Kashmir while living in Sudan in the early 1990s. By 2001, Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen had become a part of the al-Qaeda coalition.[321] According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), al-Qaeda was thought to have established bases in Pakistan administered Kashmir (in Azad Kashmir, and to some extent in Gilgit–Baltistan) during the 1999 Kargil War and continued to operate there with tacit approval of Pakistan's Intelligence services.[322]
Many of the militants active in Kashmir were trained in the same madrasahs as Taliban and al-Qaeda. Fazlur Rehman Khalil of Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was a signatory of al-Qaeda's 1998 declaration of Jihad against America and its allies.[323] In a 'Letter to American People' (2002), bin Laden wrote that one of the reasons he was fighting America was because of its support to India on the Kashmir issue.[32] In November 2001, Kathmandu airport went on high alert after threats that bin Laden planned to hijack a plane and crash it into a target in New Delhi.[324] In 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, on a trip to Delhi, suggested that al-Qaeda was active in Kashmir though he did not have any evidence.[325][326] Rumsfeld proposed hi-tech ground sensors along the Line of Control to prevent militants from infiltrating into Indian-administered Kashmir.[326] An investigation in 2002 found evidence that al-Qaeda and its affiliates were prospering in Pakistan-administered Kashmir with tacit approval of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence.[327] In 2002, a special team of Special Air Service and Delta Force was sent into Indian-administered Kashmir to hunt for bin Laden after receiving reports that he was being sheltered by Kashmiri militant group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which had been responsible for kidnapping western tourists in Kashmir in 1995.[328] Britain's highest-ranking al-Qaeda operative Rangzieb Ahmed had previously fought in Kashmir with the group Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and spent time in Indian prison after being captured in Kashmir.[329]
US officials believe al-Qaeda was helping organize attacks in Kashmir in order to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan.[330] Their strategy was to force Pakistan to move its troops to the border with India, thereby relieving pressure on al-Qaeda elements hiding in northwestern Pakistan.[331] In 2006 al-Qaeda claimed they had established a wing in Kashmir.[323][332] However Indian Army General H. S. Panag argued that the army had ruled out the presence of al-Qaeda in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Panag also said al-Qaeda had strong ties with Kashmiri militant groups Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed based in Pakistan.[333] It has been noted that Waziristan has become a battlefield for Kashmiri militants fighting NATO in support of al-Qaeda and Taliban.[334][335][336] Dhiren Barot, who wrote the Army of Madinah in Kashmir[337] and was an al-Qaeda operative convicted for involvement in the 2004 financial buildings plot, had received training in weapons and explosives at a militant training camp in Kashmir.[338]
Maulana Masood Azhar, the founder of Kashmiri group Jaish-e-Mohammed, is believed to have met bin Laden several times and received funding from him.[323] In 2002, Jaish-e-Mohammed organized the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl in an operation run in conjunction with al-Qaeda and funded by bin Laden.[339] According to American counter-terrorism expert Bruce Riedel, al-Qaeda and Taliban were closely involved in the 1999 hijacking of Indian Airlines Flight 814 to Kandahar which led to the release of Maulana Masood Azhar and Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh from an Indian prison. This hijacking, Riedel said, was rightly described by then Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh as a 'dress rehearsal' for September 11 attacks.[340] Bin Laden personally welcomed Azhar and threw a lavish party in his honor after his release.[341][342] Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh, who had been in prison for his role in the 1994 kidnappings of Western tourists in India, went on to murder Daniel Pearl and was sentenced to death in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda operative Rashid Rauf, who was one of the accused in 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot, was related to Maulana Masood Azhar by marriage.[343]
Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Kashmiri militant group which is thought to be behind 2008 Mumbai attacks, is also known to have strong ties to senior al-Qaeda leaders living in Pakistan.[344] In late 2002, top al-Qaeda operative Abu Zubaydah was arrested while being sheltered by Lashkar-e-Taiba in a safe house in Faisalabad.[345] The FBI believes al-Qaeda and Lashkar have been 'intertwined' for a long time while the CIA has said that al-Qaeda funds Lashkar-e-Taiba.[345] Jean-Louis Bruguière told Reuters in 2009 that "Lashkar-e-Taiba is no longer a Pakistani movement with only a Kashmir political or military agenda. Lashkar-e-Taiba is a member of al-Qaeda."[346][347]
In a video released in 2008, American-born senior al-Qaeda operative Adam Yahiye Gadahn said that "victory in Kashmir has been delayed for years; it is the liberation of the jihad there from this interference which, Allah willing, will be the first step towards victory over the Hindu occupiers of that Islam land."[348]
In September 2009, a US drone strike reportedly killed Ilyas Kashmiri who was the chief of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, a Kashmiri militant group associated with al-Qaeda.[349] Kashmiri was described by Bruce Riedel as a 'prominent' al-Qaeda member[350] while others have described him as head of military operations for al-Qaeda.[351][352] Kashmiri was also charged by the US in a plot against Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper which was at the center of Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy.[353] US officials also believe that Kashmiri was involved in the Camp Chapman attack against the CIA.[354] In January 2010, Indian authorities notified Britain of an al-Qaeda plot to hijack an Indian airlines or Air India plane and crash it into a British city. This information was uncovered from interrogation of Amjad Khwaja, an operative of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, who had been arrested in India.[355]
In January 2010, US Defense secretary Robert Gates, while on a visit to Pakistan, said that al-Qaeda was seeking to destabilize the region and planning to provoke a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.[356]
Internet
[edit]Al-Qaeda and its successors have migrated online to escape detection in an atmosphere of increased international vigilance. The group's use of the Internet has grown more sophisticated, with online activities that include financing, recruitment, networking, mobilization, publicity, and information dissemination, gathering and sharing.[357]
Abu Ayyub al-Masri's al-Qaeda movement in Iraq regularly releases short videos glorifying the activity of jihadist suicide bombers. In addition, both before and after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi (the former leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq), the umbrella organization to which al-Qaeda in Iraq belongs, the Mujahideen Shura Council, has a regular presence on the Web.
The range of multimedia content includes guerrilla training clips, stills of victims about to be murdered, testimonials of suicide bombers, and videos that show participation in jihad through stylized portraits of mosques and musical scores. A website associated with al-Qaeda posted a video of captured American entrepreneur Nick Berg being decapitated in Iraq. Other decapitation videos and pictures, including those of Paul Johnson, Kim Sun-il (posted on websites),[358] and Daniel Pearl obtained by investigators, have taken place.[359]
In December 2004 an audio message claiming to be from bin Laden was posted directly to a website, rather than sending a copy to al Jazeera as he had done in the past. Al-Qaeda turned to the Internet for release of its videos in order to be certain they would be available unedited, rather than risk the possibility of al Jazeera editing out anything critical of the Saudi royal family.[360]
The US government charged a British information technology specialist, Babar Ahmad, with terrorist offences related to his operating a network of English-language al-Qaeda websites, such as Azzam.com. He was convicted and sentenced to 12+1⁄2 years in prison.[361][362][363]
Online communications
[edit]In 2007, al-Qaeda released Mujahedeen Secrets, encryption software used for online and cellular communications. A later version, Mujahideen Secrets 2, was released in 2008.[364]
Aviation network
[edit]Al-Qaeda is believed to be operating a clandestine aviation network including "several Boeing 727 aircraft", turboprops and executive jets, according to a 2010 Reuters story. Based on a US Department of Homeland Security report, the story said al-Qaeda is possibly using aircraft to transport drugs and weapons from South America to various unstable countries in West Africa. A Boeing 727 can carry up to ten tons of cargo. The drugs eventually are smuggled to Europe for distribution and sale, and the weapons are used in conflicts in Africa and possibly elsewhere. Gunmen with links to al-Qaeda have been increasingly kidnapping Europeans for ransom. The profits from the drug and weapon sales, and kidnappings can, in turn, fund more militant activities.[365]
Involvement in military conflicts
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The following is a list of military conflicts in which al-Qaeda and its direct affiliates have taken part militarily.
| Start of conflict | End of conflict | Conflict | Continent | Location | Branches involved |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1991 | ongoing | Somali Civil War | Africa | Somalia | Al-Qaeda Central |
| 1992 | 1996 | Civil war in Afghanistan (1992–1996) | Asia | Islamic State of Afghanistan | Al-Qaeda Central |
| 1992 | ongoing | Al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen | Asia | Yemen | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula |
| 1996 | 2001 | Civil war in Afghanistan (1996–2001) | Asia | Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan | Al-Qaeda Central |
| 2001 | 2021 | War in Afghanistan (2001–2021) | Asia | Afghanistan | Al-Qaeda Central |
| 2002 | ongoing | Insurgency in the Maghreb (2002–present) | Africa | Algeria Chad Mali Mauritania Morocco Niger Tunisia |
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| 2003 | 2011 | Iraq War | Asia | Iraq | Al-Qaeda in Iraq |
| 2004 | ongoing | War in North-West Pakistan | Asia | Pakistan | Al-Qaeda Central |
| 2009 | 2017 | Insurgency in the North Caucasus | Asia | Russia | Caucasus Emirate |
| 2011 | ongoing | Syrian Civil War | Asia | Syria | al-Nusra Front |
| 2015 | ongoing | Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen | Asia | Yemen | Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula[366][367][368] |
Broader influence
[edit]Anders Behring Breivik, the perpetrator of the 2011 Norway attacks, was inspired by al-Qaeda, calling it "the most successful revolutionary movement in the world." While admitting different aims, he sought to "create a European version of Al-Qaeda."[369][370]
The appropriate response to offshoots is a subject of debate. A journalist reported in 2012 that a senior US military planner had asked: "Should we resort to drones and Special Operations raids every time some group raises the black banner of al Qaeda? How long can we continue to chase offshoots of offshoots around the world?"[371]
Criticism
[edit]According to CNN journalists Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, a number of "religious scholars, former fighters and militants" who previously supported Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) had turned against the al-Qaeda-supported Iraqi insurgency in 2008; due to ISI's indiscriminate attacks against civilians while targeting US-led coalition forces. American military analyst Bruce Riedel wrote in 2008 that "a wave of revulsion" arose against ISI, which enabled US-allied Sons of Iraq faction to turn various tribal leaders in the Anbar region against the Iraqi insurgency. In response, Bin Laden and Zawahiri issued public statements urging Muslims to rally behind ISI leadership and support the armed struggle against American forces.[372]
In November 2007, former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) member Noman Benotman responded with a public, open letter of criticism to Ayman al-Zawahiri, after persuading the imprisoned senior leaders of his former group to enter into peace negotiations with the Libyan regime. While Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the affiliation of the group with al-Qaeda in November 2007, the Libyan government released 90 members of the group from prison several months after "they were said to have renounced violence."[373]
In 2007, on the anniversary of the September 11 attacks,[374] the Saudi sheikh Salman al-Ouda delivered a personal rebuke to bin Laden. Al-Ouda addressed al-Qaeda's leader on television asking him:
My brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocent people, children, elderly, and women have been killed ... in the name of al-Qaeda? Will you be happy to meet God Almighty carrying the burden of these hundreds of thousands or millions [of victims] on your back?[375]
According to Pew polls, support for al-Qaeda had dropped in the Muslim world in the years before 2008.[376] In Saudi Arabia, only ten percent had a favorable view of al-Qaeda, according to a December 2007 poll by Terror Free Tomorrow, a Washington-based think tank.[377]
In 2007, the imprisoned Dr. Fadl, who was an influential Afghan Arab and former associate of Ayman al-Zawahiri, withdrew his support from al-Qaeda and criticized the organization in his book Wathiqat Tarshid Al-'Aml Al-Jihadi fi Misr w'Al-'Alam (English: Rationalizing Jihad in Egypt and the World). In response, Al-Zawahiri accused Dr. Fadl of promoting "an Islam without jihad" that aligns with Western interests and wrote a nearly two hundred pages long treatise, titled "The Exoneration" which appeared on the Internet in March 2008. In his treatise, Zawahiri justified military strikes against US targets as retaliatory attacks to defend Muslim community against American aggression.[374]
In an online town hall forum conducted in December 2007, Zawahiri denied that al-Qaeda deliberately targeted innocents and accused the American coalition of killing innocent people.[378] Although once associated with al-Qaeda, in September 2009 LIFG completed a new "code" for jihad, a 417-page religious document entitled "Corrective Studies". Given its credibility and the fact that several other prominent Jihadists in the Middle East have turned against al-Qaeda, the LIFG's reversal may be an important step toward staunching al-Qaeda's recruitment.[379]
Other criticisms
[edit]Bilal Abdul Kareem, an American journalist based in Syria created a documentary about al-Shabab, al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia. The documentary included interviews with former members of the group who stated their reasons for leaving al-Shabab. The members made accusations of segregation, lack of religious awareness and internal corruption and favoritism. In response to Kareem, the Global Islamic Media Front condemned Kareem, called him a liar, and denied the accusations from the former fighters.[380]
In mid-2014 after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant declared that they had restored the Caliphate, an audio statement was released by the then-spokesman of the group Abu Muhammad al-Adnani claiming that "the legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the expansion of the Caliphate's authority." The speech included a religious refutation of al-Qaeda for being too lenient regarding Shiites and their refusal to recognize the authority Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Adnani specifically noting: "It is not suitable for a state to give allegiance to an organization." He also recalled a past instance in which Osama bin Laden called on al-Qaeda members and supporters to give allegiance to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi when the group was still solely operating in Iraq, as the Islamic State of Iraq, and condemned Ayman al-Zawahiri for not making this same claim for Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Zawahiri was encouraging factionalism and division between former allies of ISIL such as the al-Nusra Front.[381][382]
See also
[edit]- Al-Qaeda involvement in Asia
- Al Qaeda Network Exord
- Allegations of support system in Pakistan for Osama bin Laden
- Belligerents in the Syrian civil war
- Bin Laden Issue Station (former CIA unit for tracking bin Laden)
- Steven Emerson
- Fatawā of Osama bin Laden
- International propagation of Salafism and Wahhabism (by region)
- Iran – Alleged Al-Qaeda ties
- Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition
- Operation Cannonball
- Psychological warfare
- Religious terrorism
- Takfir wal-Hijra
- Videos and audio recordings of Osama bin Laden
- Violent extremism
Publications
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ /ælˈkaɪ(ə)də/ ⓘ; Arabic: القاعدة, romanized: al-Qāʿidah, lit. 'the Foundation', IPA: [alˈqaː.ʕi.da]
- ^ pro Al-Qaeda factions
References
[edit]- ^ Driss El-Bay (September 21, 2021). "Afghanistan: The pledge binding al-Qaeda to the Taliban". BBC. Archived from the original on February 5, 2024. Retrieved September 21, 2021.
- ^ Stenersen, Anne (2017). Al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Cambridge University Press. pp. 93–95. ISBN 978-1-107-07513-9.
- ^ Centanni, Evan (May 31, 2013). "War in Somalia: Map of Al Shabaab Control (June 2013)". Political Geography Now. Archived from the original on August 19, 2014. Retrieved August 18, 2014.
- ^ "Aden intelligence service building targeted". Gulf News. Agence France-Presse. August 22, 2015. Archived from the original on August 22, 2015. Retrieved August 22, 2015.
- ^ a b Gallagher & Willsky-Ciollo 2021, p. 14
- ^ a b c Bokhari, Kamran; Senzai, Farid, eds. (2013). "Rejector Islamists: al-Qaeda and Transnational Jihadism". Political Islam in the Age of Democratization. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 101–118. doi:10.1057/9781137313492_6. ISBN 978-1-137-31349-2.
- ^ a b c d Moussalli, Ahmad S. (2012). "Sayyid Qutb: Founder of Radical Islamic Political Ideology". In Akbarzadeh, Shahram (ed.). Routledge Handbook of Political Islam (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. pp. 24–26. ISBN 978-1-138-57782-4. LCCN 2011025970. Archived from the original on January 11, 2023. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
- ^ O'Bagy, Elizabeth (2012). Middle East Security Report: Al-Qaeda Sunni Islamist Rebels – Jihad in Syria (PDF). Vol. 6. Washington, D.C. p. 27. Archived from the original (PDF) on March 27, 2014. Retrieved September 21, 2012.
{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link) - ^ [5][6][7][8]
- ^ A. Geltzer, Joshua (2010). "4: The al-Qaeda world-view". US Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda. New York: Routledge. pp. 83, 84. ISBN 978-0-203-87023-5.
- ^ a b c Atwan, Abdel Bari (March 11, 2005). The Secret History of Al Qaeda. University of California Press. p. 221. ISBN 0-520-24974-7. Retrieved May 8, 2011 – via Internet Archive.
- ^ Gunaratna 2002, Introduction, pp. 12, 87.
- ^ Aydınlı, Ersel (2018). "The Jihadists pre-9/11". Violent Non-State Actors: From Anarchists to Jihadists. Routledge Studies on Challenges, Crises, and Dissent in World Politics (1st ed.). London and New York: Routledge. p. 66. ISBN 978-1-315-56139-4. LCCN 2015050373.
- ^ Wright 2006, p. 79
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- ^ Giustozzi, Antonio (2023). "2: The strategies of global jihadists in Pakistan after 2001". Jihadism in Pakistan. New York: I.B. Tauris. pp. 27–52. ISBN 978-0-7556-4735-4.
- ^ Celso, Anthony (2014). "1: Al-Qaeda's Jihadist Worldview". Al-Qaeda's Post-9/11 Devolution. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 15–29. ISBN 978-1-4411-5589-4.
- ^ Holbrook, Donald (2017). Al-Qaeda 2.0. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. viii, 2, 3. ISBN 9780190856441.
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Al-Qaeda's 'pan-Islamic ideology' seeks to unify the umma not only by emphasising Islam over nationalism but also by specifically calling for unity among all Muslims, including the often hostile Sunnis and Shiites... 'For an organization led by a Sunni fundamentalist' to 'make common cause with Shiite terrorists', and then with potential Shiite supporters more broadly, was considered 'extraordinary'—yet doing so was central to al-Qaeda's vision of Islamic unity against America.
- ^ Byman, Daniel (2015). "3: Strategy and Tactics". Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement. New York: Oxford University Press. p. 53. ISBN 978-0-19-021725-9.
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Ayman Al-Zawahiri became the leader of Al-Qaeda—a leader who was "in favour of" forging an alliance between the Shia and the Sunni against their common enemy—Al-Qaeda developed deeper relations with the IRGC.
- Aly Sergie, Mohammed (April 27, 2023). "The Sunni-Shia Divide". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on June 10, 2023.
Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia Hezbollah, have not defined their movements in sectarian terms, and have favored using anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist, and anti-American frameworks to define their jihad, or struggle.
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Bin Laden, a Sunni Muslim, saw cooperation between Islam's two sects—Sunni and Shia—as essential to Al-Qaeda's success.
- Aly Sergie, Mohammed (April 27, 2023). "The Sunni-Shia Divide". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on June 10, 2023.
- ^ a b Devji, Faisal (2005). Landscapes of the Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity. London: Hurst & Co. p. 53. ISBN 1-85065-775-0.
Al-Qaeda leaders like Osama Bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri have never been known either to preach or practice anti-Shia politics, indeed the opposite, with Bin Laden repeatedly urging Muslims to ignore internal differences and even appearing to uphold the religious credentials of Shiite Iran by comparing the longed-for-ouster of the Saudi monarch to the expulsion of the Shah
- "The spider in the web". The Economist. September 20, 2001. Archived from the original on June 6, 2023.
[Bin Laden] has insisted that differences within the Islamic world should be set aside for the sake of the broader struggle against western and Jewish interests. American officials say there is clear evidence of tactical co-operation between his organisation, al-Qaeda, the government of Iran, and Iran's proxies in Lebanon, the Hizbullah group. From the early 1990s, members of his group and its Egyptian allies were being sent to Lebanon to receive training from Hizbullah: an unusual example of Sunni-Shia co-operation in the broader anti-western struggle.
- al-Aloosy, Massaab (2020). The changing ideology of Hezbollah. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 79. ISBN 978-3-030-34846-5.
according to the 9/11 Commission Report, Hezbollah allowed Al-Qaeda activists to train in their camps involved in terrorist attacks against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998... Osama Bin Laden mentioned Hezbollah in a 2003 speech—or as he called them the resistance—in a positive light as the group that compelled the US marines to withdraw from Lebanon
- "The spider in the web". The Economist. September 20, 2001. Archived from the original on June 6, 2023.
- ^ Gunaratna 2002, p. 12.
- ^ Bergen, Peter L., Holy war, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, New York: Free Press, 2001., pp. 70–71 [ISBN missing]
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Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, the militant group's Yemen-based branch, criticized Qatar for 'bringing immoral people, homosexuals, sowers of corruption and atheism into the Arabian Peninsula' and said the event served to divert attention from the 'occupation of Muslim countries and their oppression.'
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The idea of Deobandism is the third doctrinal school for al-Qaedaism. It became popular within northern India in response to reactions against British colonial and imperial power in the nineteenth century.
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The link between the Taliban and both Al-Qaida and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains strong and symbiotic..The relationship between the Taliban and Al-Qaida remained close and symbiotic, with Al-Qaida viewing Taliban-administered Afghanistan a safe haven. Al-Qaida still aims to strengthen its position in Afghanistan and has been interacting with the Taliban, supporting the regime and protecting senior Taliban figures. Al-Qaida maintains a low profile, focusing on using the country as an ideological and logistical hub to mobilize and recruit new fighters while covertly rebuilding its external operations capability
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Two months before 9/11, Zawahiri, who had become al Qaeda's second-in-command, published Knights Under the Banner of the Prophet, which offers insight into why al Qacda decided to attack the United States within its borders. In it, he stated that al Qaeda aimed to establish an Islamic state in the Arab world: Just as victory is not achieved for an army unless its foot soldiers occupy land, the mujahid Islamic movement will not achieve victory against the global infdel alliance unless it possesses a base in the heart of the Islamic world. Every plan and method we consider to rally and mobilize the ummab will be hanging in the air with no concrete result or tangible return unless it leads to the establishment of the caliphal state in the heart of the Islamic world. Achieving this goal, Zawahiri explained elsewhere in the book, would require a global jihad: It is not possible to incite a conflict for the establishment of a Muslim state if it is a regional conflict.... The international Jewish-Crusader alliance, led by America, will not allow any Muslim force to obtain power in any of the Muslim lands. ... It will impose sanctions on whoever helps it, even if it does not declare war against them altogether. Therefore, to adjust to this new reality, we must prepare ourselves for a battle that is not confined to a single region but rather includes the apostate domestic enemy and the Jewish-Crusader external enemy. To confront this insidious alliance, Zawahiri argued, al Qaeda had to first root out U.S. influence in the region...
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Reviews
[edit]- Akacem, Mohammed (August 2005). "Review: Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars behind the Terror Networks". International Journal of Middle East Studies. 37 (3): 444–445. doi:10.1017/S0020743805362143. S2CID 162390565.
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Government reports
[edit]- Kronstadt, K. Allen; Katzman, Kenneth (November 2008). "Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy" (PDF). US Congressional Research Service. Archived (PDF) from the original on October 9, 2022.
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External links
[edit]- "Al Qaeda Training Manual". US Department of Justice. Archived from the original on March 31, 2005.
- Al-Qaeda in Oxford Islamic Studies Online
- Al-Qaeda, Counter Extremism Project profile
- 17 de-classified documents captured during the Abbottabad raid and released to the Combating Terrorism Center
- Excerpt: The Osama bin Laden I know
- Context of '1988: 'Al-Qaeda' Possibly the Name of a Computer Database Archived October 12, 2013, at the Wayback Machine at Cooperative Research
Media
- Peter Taylor. (2007). "War on the West". Age of Terror, No. 4, series 1. BBC.
- Investigating Al-Qaeda, BBC News
- Adam Curtis (2004). The Power of Nightmares. BBC.
- "Al Qaeda's New Front" from PBS Frontline, January 2005
- "Inside al Qaeda (National Geographic)". August 20, 2007. Archived from the original on February 7, 2022. Retrieved September 20, 2021 – via YouTube.
{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link) - "Bin Laden documents at a glance". CBS News. Archived from the original on May 11, 2012.
- Der Spiegel, "Osama's Road to Riches and Terror"
- Al-Qaida collected news and commentary at The Guardian
- al-Qaeda collected news and commentary at The New York Times
Al-Qaeda
View on GrokipediaName and Etymology
Origins of the Name
The Arabic term al-Qāʿida (القاعدة) literally translates to "the base," "the foundation," or "the pedestal," denoting a foundational structure or support in both literal and metaphorical senses, such as a military outpost or a database (qāʿidat maʿlūmāt).[10][11] This etymology reflects its initial conceptualization during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), where it symbolized a vanguard of committed mujahideen fighters intended as the enduring core for broader Islamic resistance and revival.[10] The phrase's earliest documented ideological usage traces to Palestinian scholar and jihadist recruiter Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden's mentor, who in the mid-1980s described the elite Arab volunteers in Afghanistan as al-qāʿida al-sulba ("the solid base").[11][10] In Azzam's writings and publications, such as the journal Al-Jihād, this "solid base" represented a hardened nucleus of pious warriors—screened for reliability and steadfastness—who would form the unshakeable foundation (al-qāʿida) for an anticipated global Islamic society and ongoing jihad against perceived enemies of Islam, including Soviet forces and secular regimes.[11] Azzam's emphasis on this concept emerged amid efforts to organize and catalog foreign fighters, potentially drawing from practical tools like databases to track recruits, though the term's primary connotation was metaphorical rather than strictly technological.[11] Osama bin Laden adopted and formalized the name for his nascent network around 1988, shortly before the Soviet withdrawal, as al-Qāʿida al-Jihād or simply al-Qāʿida, envisioning it as an operational "base" for coordinating post-Afghan jihadist activities beyond local conflicts.[10] U.S. intelligence first referenced the term in a 1996 CIA report, by which time bin Laden's group had evolved from Afghan support logistics into a decentralized structure for transnational operations.[10] Bin Laden himself later described al-Qāʿida in a 1998 interview as the foundational hub from which mujahideen launched attacks, aligning with its originary meaning as a strategic and ideological bedrock.[10] While some speculative accounts propose literary influences, such as Arabic translations of Isaac Asimov's Foundation series (rendered as al-Qāʿida), no primary evidence substantiates this as the direct origin, which remains rooted in Azzam's wartime rhetoric and bin Laden's organizational adaptation.[11]Variations and Translations
The Arabic name of the organization is الْقَاعِدَة (al-qāʿida), a definite article construction literally translating to "the base" or "the foundation" in English, alluding to its initial role as a logistical and training hub for mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War from 1979 to 1989.[12][13] This etymological sense derives from the root q-ʿ-d, connoting sitting, establishing, or a fixed position, rather than modern connotations like a computerized "database," which some secondary accounts have inaccurately suggested but which lacks support in primary organizational documents or Arabic linguistics.[14] Transliteration into Latin script varies due to the absence of standardized conventions for Arabic phonetics, leading to forms such as al-Qaida, al-Qa'ida, al-Qaedad, and al-Qaeda (with the latter incorporating a diaeresis or "e" to approximate the long ā vowel).[15] Official entities adopt specific variants for consistency: the United Nations employs "Al-Qaida" (capitalized with no apostrophe or hyphen) in sanctions resolutions and listings since 1999, while U.S. government documents often use "al-Qaida" or "al-Qaeda."[16] These differences arise from choices in rendering the ʿayn (ʿ) as an apostrophe or omission, the qāf (q) as "q" or "k," and the tāʾ marbūṭah (ة) as "a" or "ah." In non-English languages using Roman alphabets, adaptations include al-Qaïda (French, with trema for the diphthong) and al-Kaida (occasional Turkish or Persian-influenced renderings), while Cyrillic-script languages transliterate as Аль-Каида (Russian: Al'-Kaida).[17] In Arabic-speaking contexts, the group retains the original script without translation, emphasizing its self-identification as a foundational vanguard for jihad. Translations beyond "the base" occasionally appear as "la base" in Spanish or "die Basis" in German, but these are direct equivalents rather than idiomatic variants, preserving the military-logistical connotation over abstract foundations.[18]Origins and Early Development
Founding During Soviet-Afghan War
Al-Qaeda originated amid the Soviet-Afghan War, which began with the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, and involved Afghan mujahideen resistance supported by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United States through channels like Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).[19] Osama bin Laden, born in 1957 to a wealthy Saudi family, arrived in Peshawar, Pakistan, in late 1980 to aid the jihad, using his personal funds to support fighters and establishing early guesthouses for Arab volunteers.[1] By 1984, bin Laden, alongside Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, founded the Maktab al-Khidamat al-Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK), or Afghan Services Bureau, as a recruitment and logistics network that channeled thousands of Arab fighters—estimated at 10,000 to 20,000 over the war's course—to the Afghan front lines, funding operations through private donations exceeding $20 million annually from Saudi sources. MAK operated from Peshawar, providing training, supplies, and ideological motivation rooted in defensive jihad against the atheist Soviet invaders, though it emphasized returning fighters to their home countries post-victory rather than perpetual global conflict.[20] As Soviet forces withdrew in February 1989 following the Geneva Accords of April 1988, bin Laden diverged from Azzam's defensive focus, seeking to form a vanguard cadre for offensive jihad beyond Afghanistan. On August 11, 1988, in Peshawar, bin Laden convened a meeting with approximately 12 to 20 key associates, including Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and ideologue Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (Dr. Fadl), where participants pledged bay'ah (oath of allegiance) to establish Al-Qaeda as an independent entity separate from MAK.[21] [22] The group's name, "al-Qaida al-Askariya" or simply "al-Qaeda," derived from Arabic for "the base" or "the foundation," initially denoting a computerized database (qaidat) tracking MAK-recruited mujahideen for potential future mobilization.[12] This founding crystallized Al-Qaeda's core as a tight-knit network of battle-hardened Arab veterans, prioritizing loyalty oaths and operational secrecy over mass recruitment, with bin Laden elected as amir (commander). Early activities included compiling fighter lists and planning post-Soviet contingencies, though the organization remained small, with core membership under 100 by war's end.[23] The Soviet-Afghan context provided Al-Qaeda's foundational cadre, drawn from Arab mujahideen who gained combat experience against a superpower, fostering a sense of ideological triumph and entitlement to expand jihadist ambitions. While U.S. aid totaling over $3 billion flowed to Afghan resistance via ISI intermediaries—never directly to bin Laden or MAK, per declassified assessments—the war's proxy dynamics inadvertently honed a generation of transnational jihadists unbound by local Afghan loyalties.[24] Tensions with Azzam over strategy led to Al-Qaeda's autonomy, culminating in Azzam's assassination on November 24, 1989, via a roadside bomb in Peshawar, an event that eliminated opposition and solidified bin Laden's control amid emerging Afghan civil war chaos.[25] This phase marked Al-Qaeda's birth not as a terrorist outfit but as a jihadist "vanguard base" for sustaining the global ummah's defense, though its full militant turn awaited later geopolitical shifts.[26]Transition to Global Focus
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, where he initially sought to leverage his mujahideen experience to oppose Saddam Hussein's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, proposing an Arab defense force instead of relying on U.S. troops.[27] The Saudi government's decision to host U.S. forces on the Arabian Peninsula, including near Mecca and Medina, marked a pivotal grievance, as bin Laden viewed it as a desecration of Islam's holiest sites by non-Muslims, prompting his public criticism of the Saudi monarchy as apostate for permitting such "occupation."[25] This opposition escalated tensions, leading to bin Laden's passport revocation and effective exile by 1991, after which he relocated to Sudan, where he invested in infrastructure projects like roads and farms to generate funds for sustaining jihadist networks beyond Afghanistan.[1][28] In Sudan from 1991 to 1996, bin Laden expanded Al-Qaeda's operations by hosting training camps, importing heavy machinery for construction, and providing financial and logistical support to militants fighting in conflicts such as Somalia, Yemen, and Bosnia, signaling a shift from localized Afghan resistance to coordinating transnational jihadist activities.[29] Under international pressure, particularly from the United States, Sudanese authorities expelled bin Laden in May 1996, forcing his return to Afghanistan under Taliban protection, where he established secure bases in the Hindu Kush mountains to plan operations against distant enemies.[28] This relocation enabled Al-Qaeda to prioritize the "far enemy"—primarily the United States and its allies—over immediate regional foes, as bin Laden articulated in his August 1996 fatwa, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," which urged Muslims worldwide to expel U.S. forces from the Arabian Peninsula through violence.[30][31] The global orientation crystallized with the February 1998 fatwa, co-signed by bin Laden and allied clerics including Ayman al-Zawahiri, titled "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders," which expanded the call to kill American civilians and military personnel anywhere, citing U.S. support for Israel, sanctions on Iraq (which bin Laden claimed caused over 1 million Muslim deaths), and bases in the Gulf as casus belli for defensive jihad.[32] This doctrinal pivot framed Al-Qaeda not as a residual Afghan force but as a vanguard for ummah-wide insurgency, inspiring decentralized cells and affiliates to target Western interests transnationally, as evidenced by the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed 224 people and demonstrated operational reach across continents.[1] Saudi Arabia formally stripped bin Laden of citizenship in 1994 amid these developments, further isolating him and reinforcing Al-Qaeda's self-conception as an independent global actor unbound by state loyalties.[33] By the late 1990s, this transition had transformed Al-Qaeda into a hub for recruiting "Arab Afghans" and others into a networked structure aimed at provoking superpowers to overextend, thereby igniting broader Muslim revolts against perceived oppressors.[34]Ideology and Worldview
Salafi-Jihadist Foundations
Al-Qaeda's ideological foundations are rooted in Salafi-jihadism, a variant of Sunni Islamism that combines the puritanical doctrinal methodology of Salafism—emphasizing emulation of the first three generations of Muslims (the salaf al-salih)—with a militant commitment to jihad as the primary means to restore a global caliphate.[35] This framework rejects modern national boundaries, democratic governance, and perceived innovations (bid'ah) in Islamic practice, viewing them as deviations from tawhid (the oneness of God) and shirk (polytheism).[3] Unlike quietist Salafis who prioritize personal piety and avoid politics, or political Salafis who engage electoral systems, Salafi-jihadists like Al-Qaeda deem armed struggle obligatory to overthrow apostate Muslim regimes and expel non-Muslim influences from dar al-Islam (the abode of Islam).[35][36] Central to this ideology is the concept of takfir, the declaration of Muslims as unbelievers, applied by Al-Qaeda to rulers of Muslim-majority states allied with the West, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, for failing to enforce sharia and permitting foreign troops on holy lands.[3] Osama bin Laden articulated this in his August 23, 1996, "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," framing jihad as a defensive duty (fard ayn) against U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia post-1991 Gulf War, while invoking Salafi principles to justify targeting civilians as complicit in aggression.[37] His February 1998 fatwa, co-signed with allies, escalated this to offensive jihad against "Jews and Crusaders," prioritizing the "far enemy" (United States and allies) over local tyrants, a strategic shift from earlier Afghan jihad focuses.[37] This global orientation draws from Abdullah Azzam's emphasis on defensive jihad during the 1979–1989 Soviet-Afghan War but radicalizes it through Sayyid Qutb's notions of jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) applied to contemporary societies.[3] Ayman al-Zawahiri, merging Al-Qaeda with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 2001, reinforced these foundations with his critique of Muslim Brotherhood gradualism, advocating immediate violent purification and takfir against compromisers.[38] His writings, such as "Bitter Harvest," lambast secular nationalists and insufficiently militant Islamists, aligning Al-Qaeda's Salafi-jihadism with a vanguardist model where elite mujahideen lead the ummah toward caliphal restoration.[3] Empirical patterns in Al-Qaeda's operations, including suicide bombings adopted post-1990s, reflect this ideology's innovation in martyrdom tactics to maximize impact against perceived crusader-zionist conspiracies.[36] While drawing from Wahhabi influences via Saudi funding of Afghan Arabs, Al-Qaeda diverges by universalizing jihad beyond defensive bounds, critiquing Saudi royals as taghut (idolatrous tyrants).[3] This doctrinal coherence has sustained recruitment amid setbacks, prioritizing ideological purity over pragmatic alliances.[4]Grievances Against the West and Muslim Regimes
Al-Qaeda's grievances against the West, articulated primarily by Osama bin Laden, centered on the perceived occupation of Muslim holy lands and broader aggression against the Islamic ummah. In his August 23, 1996, declaration of jihad, bin Laden condemned the stationing of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia following the 1990-1991 Gulf War, viewing it as a defilement of the Arabian Peninsula, home to Mecca and Medina, and a violation of Islamic injunctions against non-Muslim military presence there.[30] He demanded the immediate withdrawal of American forces, framing their presence as enabling the Saudi regime's subservience to Washington.[31] These complaints expanded in bin Laden's February 23, 1998, fatwa, co-signed by leaders of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, signed by al-Qaeda's World Islamic Front, which issued a religious ruling obligating Muslims to kill Americans and their allies—civilian and military—anywhere possible.[32] Central accusations included U.S. support for Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories, particularly Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque, described as ongoing since 1967; economic sanctions on Iraq post-1991, which bin Laden claimed had caused the deaths of over 1 million Muslims, including 500,000 children from malnutrition and disease; and U.S. military interventions in Somalia (1993) and elsewhere, seen as plundering Muslim resources and propping up secular dictators.[32] Bin Laden portrayed these as part of a deliberate Crusader-Zionist campaign to eradicate Islam, invoking historical precedents like the Mongol invasions to justify defensive jihad.[39] Parallel grievances targeted Muslim regimes, deemed apostate for their complicity in Western dominance and deviation from Sharia governance. The 1996 fatwa excoriated the Saudi monarchy for inviting U.S. "infidels" onto sacred soil, squandering oil wealth on palaces while oppressing clerics, and allying with America against Iraq in 1990, actions bin Laden labeled as treasonous betrayal of Islamic sovereignty.[30] Al-Qaeda extended this critique to regimes like Egypt's under Hosni Mubarak, accused of enforcing secular laws, torturing Islamists, and maintaining peace treaties with Israel (Camp David Accords, 1979); Jordan's Hashemite rulers for similar Western alignment; and broader "tyrants" in the Muslim world for fragmenting the ummah through national borders imposed post-World War I, prioritizing personal rule over caliphate restoration.[39] These governments were seen not as legitimate but as puppets sustaining Western hegemony, necessitating their overthrow as a prerequisite for global jihad, though al-Qaeda prioritized the "far enemy" (West) to weaken the "near enemy" indirectly.[40] Bin Laden's rhetoric emphasized causal links: regime corruption stemmed from abandoning divine law for imported ideologies like nationalism and democracy, resulting in moral decay and vulnerability to foreign exploitation.[32]Vision for Islamic Governance
Al-Qaeda's vision for Islamic governance centers on the re-establishment of a transnational caliphate uniting the global Muslim ummah under strict Sharia law, as articulated by its leaders including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.[41] This caliphate would supplant existing nation-states, which al-Qaeda deems artificial divisions imposed by colonial powers and apostate rulers, prioritizing instead a centralized Islamic authority enforcing divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah) over human legislation.[32] Bin Laden's 1996 declaration emphasized expelling non-Muslims from the Arabian Peninsula to restore pure Islamic rule there as a foundational step toward broader governance reform.[31] Central to this model is the absolute implementation of Sharia, derived from the Quran, Sunnah, and classical jurisprudence as interpreted through Salafi-jihadist lenses, rejecting innovations (bid'ah) and secular influences.[42] Governance would feature an emir or caliph selected by shura (consultation among qualified scholars and mujahideen), wielding executive, judicial, and military authority without separation of powers, as Zawahiri outlined in directives prioritizing emirate-building in liberated territories like Syria.[41] Hudud punishments—such as amputation for theft, stoning for adultery, and execution for apostasy—would be enforced rigorously, alongside prohibitions on usury, alcohol, and non-Islamic media, as demonstrated in areas controlled by affiliates like al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which has advocated Sharia courts and moral policing in Algeria.[42] Non-Muslims in this envisioned state would face dhimmi status, paying jizya tax for protection but barred from sovereignty or proselytizing, while women would adhere to strict seclusion, veiling, and familial roles under male guardianship (qiwamah).[43] Al-Qaeda rejects democratic mechanisms as shirk (polytheism), viewing them as usurpation of God's law, and instead promotes jihad as the primary tool for territorial expansion and internal purification, with governance emerging organically from victorious mujahideen councils.[32] This framework, while claiming fidelity to early Islamic precedents, diverges from historical caliphates by emphasizing perpetual global jihad over stable administration, as Zawahiri critiqued overly hasty state-building in Iraq to avoid alienating the ummah.[43] Affiliates' local experiments, such as AQIM's calls for Sharia in North Africa, illustrate phased implementation starting with "near enemy" regimes before caliphal unification.[42]Justification for Violence
Al-Qaeda's ideological framework posits violence as a divinely mandated religious duty, rooted in a Salafi-jihadist interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence that elevates jihad—armed struggle in defense of the faith—as fard 'ayn (an individual obligation) when Muslim lands face occupation or aggression.[3] This doctrine draws from selective readings of Quranic verses, hadiths, and medieval jurists, asserting that passive suffering under perceived infidel domination constitutes apostasy, thereby necessitating offensive actions to restore Islamic sovereignty.[40] Leaders like Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri framed such violence not as optional but as a corrective to historical humiliations, including the post-World War I dismantling of the Ottoman Caliphate and subsequent Western interventions.[44] Central to this justification is the concept of jihad defensif against the "far enemy," primarily the United States, accused of enabling aggression through military bases in Saudi Arabia—established during the 1990-1991 Gulf War—and support for Israel, which bin Laden cited as desecrating Islam's holiest sites.[30] In his August 23, 1996, declaration of war, bin Laden enumerated grievances such as U.S. sanctions on Iraq, which he claimed killed over 600,000 Muslim children by 1996, and troop deployments near Mecca and Medina, invoking fatwas from scholars like Ibn Taymiyyah to argue that expelling occupiers supersedes other religious duties.[45] Al-Zawahiri echoed this in writings portraying Western presence as a continuation of Crusader colonialism, obligating Muslims to prioritize jihad over internal reforms.[44] The February 23, 1998, fatwa, co-signed by bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, and leaders from other jihadist groups, explicitly ruled that "the killing of Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is an individual obligation for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible," based on Sharia consensus against those who "fight against Allah" by aiding polytheists.[30] This extended to targeting civilians, justified by takfir (declaring Muslims as apostates for complicity) and the precedent of indiscriminate warfare in early Islamic conquests, though al-Qaeda texts rarely acknowledge classical Islamic prohibitions on non-combatants without provisos for necessity.[46] Against "near enemies"—secular Muslim regimes like those in Egypt and Saudi Arabia—violence is rationalized as rebellion against taghut (tyrannical rulers), with al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad background emphasizing assassination and coups as preludes to global caliphate restoration.[44] Al-Qaeda's apologists, including ideologues like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, maintain that such violence purifies the ummah (Muslim community) and averts divine punishment, citing prophetic traditions where jihad redeems collective sins.[47] However, this framework relies on expansive reinterpretations, such as equating economic sanctions or alliances with direct warfare, diverging from mainstream Sunni scholarship that conditions fard 'ayn on verifiable invasion by non-Muslim armies.[3] Bin Laden's post-9/11 statements reiterated these rationales, portraying attacks as proportional retaliation for over a million Muslim deaths attributed to U.S. policies since 1990.[48]Organizational Structure
Central Leadership and Succession
Al-Qaeda's central leadership is structured around an emir (commander or prince), who holds ultimate authority over strategic direction, ideological pronouncements, and coordination with affiliates, advised by a Shura Majlis (consultative council) comprising senior ideologues, military commanders, and regional representatives.[49] The Shura Council, formalized in the group's early years, facilitates collective decision-making on major issues, including successor selection via bay'ah (oath of allegiance), though the emir retains veto power and operational primacy.[50] This pyramidal model, drawn from Salafi interpretations of early Islamic governance, prioritizes loyalty to the founder's vision amid decentralized field operations.[51] Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national born in 1957, founded al-Qaeda's precursor during the Soviet-Afghan War and assumed the emir role upon its formalization as a global jihadist network around 1988–1990.[15] Under his 20-year tenure, bin Laden orchestrated high-profile attacks, including the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East Africa (killing 224) and the September 11, 2001, assaults (killing 2,977), while evading capture through Pakistan-based networks.[15] He was killed on May 2, 2011, by U.S. Navy SEALs in a raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, disrupting centralized command but not collapsing the organization.[8] The Shura Council swiftly selected Ayman al-Zawahiri as bin Laden's successor, announcing his bay'ah on June 16, 2011, to maintain ideological continuity.[8] An Egyptian-born physician (1951–2022) and former leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zawahiri merged his group with al-Qaeda in 2001, contributing theological justifications for global jihad.[52] His decade-long leadership emphasized affiliate empowerment and anti-Western fatwas but faced challenges from U.S. drone campaigns, internal disputes (e.g., with ISIS splinter factions), and his less charismatic style compared to bin Laden, leading to operational decentralization.[51] Al-Zawahiri was killed on July 31, 2022, in a U.S. Hellfire missile strike on his Kabul safe house, confirmed by Taliban officials and U.S. intelligence.[8] Succession after al-Zawahiri proceeded opaquely, with no immediate public announcement, reflecting al-Qaeda's adaptation to leadership decapitation.[49] Saif al-Adel (born April 11, 1963), an Egyptian ex-special forces operative and early al-Qaeda trainer involved in the 1998 embassy attacks, emerged as de facto emir by late 2022, with the United Nations Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team confirming his role in a February 2023 report based on intercepted communications and affiliate pledges.[53] Believed to reside in Iran under loose protection since the early 2000s—despite ideological tensions—al-Adel has directed restraint against the Taliban to preserve Afghan sanctuary while urging attacks on Western targets.[54] His tenure, as of 2024, underscores al-Qaeda's resilience through veteran continuity, though repeated losses (e.g., deputy Abu Muhammad al-Masri killed in Tehran on August 7, 2020) have strained the Shura's capacity and prompted reliance on regional deputies.[51] This pattern of rapid, council-vetted transitions prioritizes experienced mujahideen over ideological purists, enabling survival despite over 20 senior killings since 2011.[55]Command Hierarchy and Operatives
Al-Qaeda's command structure operates hierarchically, with the emir at the apex exercising ultimate authority over strategic direction, major operational approvals, and the issuance of fatwas. The emir is advised by a Majlis al-Shura, a consultative council of senior ideologues and commanders that deliberates on policy, strategy, and key appointments, though it lacks formal veto power over the leader. Specialized functional committees oversee domains such as military affairs, security, finance, media propagation, and political outreach; for instance, the military committee is typically headed by experienced commanders who must have at least five years in combat roles, be over 30 years old, and possess a university education. This setup enforces a principle of centralized decision-making paired with decentralized execution, enabling affiliates and field units to adapt tactics locally while aligning with core directives communicated via secure couriers or encrypted channels.[50][56] Succession to the emirate has historically prioritized ideological continuity and operational experience, transitioning from Osama bin Laden, killed by U.S. forces on May 2, 2011, to Ayman al-Zawahiri, who led until his death in a U.S. drone strike on July 31, 2022. Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian national born April 11, 1963, and a veteran of Afghan training camps since the 1980s, assumed the role of emir around early 2023, leveraging his prior positions in security and training committees. Al-Adel's leadership, based reportedly in Iran or Afghanistan, emphasizes rebuilding core capabilities amid losses, including directing foreign fighters to Afghan training sites. Potential deputies or council members, such as Abdul Rahman al-Maghrebi or regional affiliate heads, provide continuity but face challenges from geographic dispersal and targeted killings.[53][57][58] Operatives form the operational backbone, recruited primarily through personal networks, mosque sermons, online propaganda, and referrals from trusted jihadists, with rigorous vetting to ensure ideological commitment and exclude infiltrators. Selected individuals undergo phased training in remote camps—historically in Afghanistan, Sudan, and Yemen, and more recently in Taliban-controlled areas—covering urban combat, improvised explosives, assassination techniques, and basic tradecraft, as outlined in captured manuals emphasizing physical fitness, weapons proficiency, and suicidal resolve. Roles vary by skill: elite planners and trainers coordinate multi-stage attacks, financiers manage fund transfers, media operatives produce videos for recruitment, while foot soldiers execute bombings, hijackings, or ambushes, as seen in operations like the 1998 U.S. embassy attacks involving 224 deaths. Mid-level commanders, reporting upward through regional cells, enjoy tactical flexibility but must secure approval for high-impact actions to preserve unity. This model has sustained resilience despite U.S.-led disruptions, with an estimated 400-600 core operatives active as of 2023, supplemented by thousands in affiliates.[50][59][60]Affiliates and Networks
Al-Qaeda's organizational model emphasizes a decentralized network of regional affiliates that pledge bay'ah (allegiance) to its central leadership, enabling global reach while permitting semi-autonomous operations adapted to local insurgencies and environments.[61] These affiliates align ideologically with Al-Qaeda's Salafi-jihadist goals of establishing emirates under sharia and targeting perceived enemies of Islam, but they often prioritize regional dominance over centralized directives from Al-Qaeda core, which has diminished since the deaths of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022.[51] This structure contrasts with more rigid hierarchies like that of the Islamic State, fostering resilience amid counterterrorism pressures but also leading to tensions, such as rivalries with breakaway groups.[62] Prominent affiliates include Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), formed on January 27, 2009, through the merger of Al-Qaeda branches in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, which has conducted high-profile attacks like the 2009 Christmas Day underwear bombing attempt and the 2010 cargo plane bomb plot while focusing on overthrowing the Yemeni government.[63] [64] AQAP maintains operational ties to Al-Qaeda central, receiving ideological guidance and occasionally personnel, though it operates independently in Yemen's civil war, exploiting chaos to control territory and finance via kidnapping and extortion.[65] Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), rebranded from the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in 2006–2007 upon pledging allegiance, spans Algeria, Mali, and neighboring Sahel states, emphasizing kidnappings for ransom—generating millions annually—and suicide bombings, such as the 2008 Mauritanian attack on French tourists.[66] [67] Its operations have fragmented into sub-groups like Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) since 2017, which coordinates with other jihadists but retains AQIM's anti-Western focus amid French and regional interventions.[68]| Affiliate | Formation Date | Primary Region | Key Activities |
|---|---|---|---|
| Al-Shabaab | Pledged allegiance February 2012 | Somalia, East Africa | Insurgency against Somali government; suicide bombings (e.g., 2013 Westgate Mall attack killing 67); transnational strikes in Kenya; funded by extortion and diaspora remittances.[69] [70] |
| Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) | Announced September 4, 2014 | Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh | Assassination attempts (e.g., 2014 Pakistani naval base raid); recruitment via propaganda targeting South Asian Muslims; seeks caliphate across subcontinent, though limited by local crackdowns.[72] [73] |
| Jabhat al-Nusra (predecessor to HTS) | Founded January 2012 | Syria | Formed as Al-Qaeda's Syrian branch; major role in anti-Assad fighting until 2016 disavowal and rebranding to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, severing formal ties amid territorial gains in Idlib.[74] [75] |
Financing and Resources
Primary Funding Sources
Al-Qaeda's initial funding primarily stemmed from Osama bin Laden's personal wealth, derived from his family's construction empire and subsequent business ventures, which he redirected toward mujahideen efforts during the Soviet-Afghan War and later al-Qaeda operations. By the early 1990s, bin Laden had access to an estimated $25–30 million in liquid assets, supplemented by income from agricultural and construction enterprises in Sudan, enabling the group's expansion without heavy reliance on external donors at the outset.[80] [81] Private donations from wealthy sympathizers in Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, constituted another core revenue stream, often funneled through informal hawala networks, mosques, and ostensibly legitimate Islamic charities that diverted zakat contributions intended for humanitarian aid. These donors, motivated by shared Salafi-jihadist ideology, provided millions annually in the 1990s, with bin Laden cultivating a financial support network that sustained al-Qaeda during its relocations from Sudan to Afghanistan. U.S. intelligence assessments identified over 20 such charities worldwide as conduits, though prosecutions revealed only partial flows due to the opacity of informal transfer systems.[82] [83] In the post-9/11 era, as centralized funding diminished under international sanctions, al-Qaeda and its affiliates increasingly turned to criminal activities, including kidnapping for ransom, which generated tens of millions—such as AQIM's $40–65 million from Western hostages between 2008 and 2014—alongside extortion and smuggling. However, core leadership funding remained modest, relying on small-scale donations and self-financing by operatives, with annual estimates for the central organization dropping below $1 million by the 2010s amid disrupted Gulf networks. The 2015 U.S. National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment identified al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, including AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab, as major terrorist financing threats, with funding from kidnapping for ransom, private donations, abuse of charitable organizations, and criminal enterprises; U.S. cases included unlicensed money transmitters such as the $2.2 million laundered by Ranjha and misuse of PayPal accounts, with funds moved via hawala, bulk cash, and money services businesses, alongside emerging risks from cybercrime and virtual currencies.[84] [85][86]Allegations of State Sponsorship
Al-Qaeda received safe haven and logistical support from the Sudanese government under Hassan al-Turabi from 1991 to 1996, during which Osama bin Laden relocated there after his Saudi citizenship was revoked in 1994, establishing training camps, businesses, and a network for recruiting and funding militants.[12] Sudanese authorities facilitated bin Laden's operations, including arms purchases and infrastructure development, despite U.S. diplomatic pressure leading to his expulsion in May 1996 under a U.S.-brokered agreement requiring Sudan to share intelligence on his activities.[1] The Taliban regime in Afghanistan provided explicit sanctuary to bin Laden and al-Qaeda from 1996 until the U.S. invasion in October 2001, hosting training camps that trained thousands of fighters and rejecting repeated U.S. demands for extradition following the 1998 embassy bombings.[87] This alliance included mutual military support, with al-Qaeda fighters aiding Taliban forces against the Northern Alliance, and bin Laden publicly pledging loyalty to Taliban leader Mullah Omar in exchange for protection and operational freedom.[88] Following the Taliban's 2021 return to power, U.S. intelligence assessed that al-Qaeda maintained a residual presence with tacit Taliban tolerance, evidenced by the July 2022 U.S. drone strike killing Ayman al-Zawahiri in a Kabul guesthouse, though the Taliban denied active sponsorship and claimed limited oversight of affiliates.[89] Post-9/11, Iran extended safe passage and refuge to senior al-Qaeda figures, including bin Laden family members and operatives like Saif al-Adel, following their flight from Afghanistan, in a pragmatic arrangement despite sectarian differences between Sunni al-Qaeda and Shia Iran.[90] Declassified documents and detainee interrogations indicate Iran allowed al-Qaeda to operate a facilitation network from its territory, providing travel documents, training with Iranian intelligence, and financial channels for attacks in the Levant and South Asia, as confirmed in U.S. State Department reports.[91] U.S. officials, including former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, described Iran as a de facto "home base" for al-Qaeda leadership, enabling reconstitution efforts, though Iran has denied direct control or endorsement, attributing aid to border security lapses.[92][93] Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has faced persistent allegations of providing covert support to al-Qaeda and affiliated networks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North Waziristan from the early 2000s onward, including sanctuary for bin Laden until his 2011 killing in Abbottabad, a site 35 miles from Islamabad raising questions of complicity or negligence.[94] U.S. congressional hearings and intelligence assessments cited evidence of ISI elements supplying logistics, funding, and intelligence to al-Qaeda-linked groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, often as proxies against Indian influence in Afghanistan, though Pakistani officials maintain such ties ended after 9/11 and attribute remnants to rogue actors.[95] The 2011 Abbottabad raid uncovered documents suggesting ISI awareness of high-value targets, but no conclusive proof of direct operational command has been publicly declassified.[96] Allegations of Saudi state sponsorship primarily involve pre-9/11 lax oversight of private donors and charities channeling funds to al-Qaeda through hawala networks and Islamic relief organizations, with 15 of the 19 hijackers being Saudi nationals, but U.S. investigations found no evidence of direct royal family or government orchestration.[97] The 9/11 Commission and subsequent inquiries, including declassified "28 pages" from the 2002 Joint Inquiry, highlighted connections between Saudi officials and extremists but concluded these reflected individual sympathies rather than systemic policy, leading Saudi Arabia to intensify crackdowns after 2003 al-Qaeda attacks on its soil.[98][99]Strategy and Operations
Global Jihad Doctrine
Al-Qaeda's global jihad doctrine posits that military struggle against perceived enemies of Islam—primarily the United States, its Western allies, and apostate Muslim regimes—is an individual religious obligation for all able-bodied Muslims worldwide, extending beyond defensive local conflicts to offensive operations aimed at expelling foreign influences from Muslim lands and ultimately establishing Islamic governance under sharia.[32] This ideology, rooted in Salafi-jihadist interpretations, frames jihad as both defensive against occupation and proactive to weaken supporters of tyranny, with Osama bin Laden elevating it from regional Afghan resistance in the 1980s to a transnational imperative by the mid-1990s.[100] Unlike localized insurgencies focused on national liberation, al-Qaeda's approach prioritizes striking the "far enemy" (Western powers) to collapse the "near enemy" (corrupt Muslim governments propped up by the West), thereby catalyzing broader Muslim uprising.[62] Central to this doctrine are bin Laden's public declarations, including his August 23, 1996, fatwa titled "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," which condemned U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia post-Gulf War as desecration and called for attacks on American forces and assets globally until withdrawal.[100] This was escalated in the February 23, 1998, World Islamic Front fatwa, co-signed by bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others, which explicitly urged the killing of Americans and their allies—civilian and military, in any country—as a duty incumbent on every Muslim, justified by alleged U.S. aggression in the Arabian Peninsula, support for Israel, and sanctions on Iraq that purportedly caused over 1 million Muslim deaths.[32][37] These texts invoke classical Islamic jurisprudence on defensive jihad (fard ayn) but extend it to permit tactics like suicide bombings, reinterpreted as martyrdom operations rather than prohibited self-harm, targeting economic and symbolic nodes to impose high costs on adversaries.[101] Strategically, the doctrine emphasizes a vanguard of elite mujahideen to inspire and lead a decentralized global network, avoiding premature state-building in favor of sustained attrition warfare against superior forces, as articulated in bin Laden's post-9/11 statements prioritizing disruption over territorial control.[62] It rejects national boundaries as colonial impositions, advocating unity under a caliphate, yet pragmatically tolerates affiliates pursuing local agendas if aligned with anti-Western priorities, distinguishing it from groups like ISIS that prioritize immediate territorial caliphates over phased global confrontation.[102] Critics from jihadist rivals and Western analysts alike note inconsistencies, such as al-Qaeda's selective targeting that spares certain regimes (e.g., Iran) despite doctrinal enmity toward Shia, revealing tactical flexibility over ideological purity.[103] Empirical outcomes, including the 9/11 attacks killing 2,977 and inspiring affiliates' operations in over 20 countries by 2010, underscore the doctrine's mobilization power, though it has faced setbacks from counterterrorism disrupting command structures.[4]Propaganda and Recruitment
Al-Qaeda has relied on a dedicated propaganda apparatus to disseminate its Salafi-jihadist ideology, glorify operations, and justify violence against perceived enemies, including Western powers and Muslim-majority governments deemed apostate. Following the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which dismantled its physical bases, the group shifted to decentralized online platforms as its primary medium, operating an estimated 5,600 jihadist websites by the mid-2000s, with around 900 added annually.[6] This evolution enabled global reach through videos, audio statements, and digital magazines, often produced by specialized media wings like As-Sahab, established in the mid-2000s to create multilingual content featuring leaders such as Osama bin Laden exhorting followers to wage jihad.[6] Content typically included graphic footage of attacks, threats against adversaries, and training materials, such as an 80-page manual on nuclear and biological devices posted online in November 2005 that garnered 57,000 views.[6] Affiliate branches developed their own outlets to tailor messaging, with Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launching Inspire magazine in summer 2010 as the group's first English-language publication aimed at Western audiences.[104] Edited by figures like Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, Inspire adopted a glossy, youth-oriented format with bomb-making tutorials, calls for "individual jihad," and cultural appeals like rap lyrics to inspire lone-actor attacks, reflecting a strategic pivot toward encouraging independent operations without direct organizational ties.[104] Core propaganda emphasized a narrative of defensive jihad against occupation and tyranny, portraying Al-Qaeda as defenders of Muslims oppressed by Crusaders and hypocrites, while downplaying sectarian targeting to broaden appeal. By the late 2000s, platforms expanded to social media like YouTube and forums, facilitating echo chambers for self-radicalization through phased exposure: initial indoctrination via ideological texts, followed by calls to action.[104] Recruitment operates less through aggressive outreach and more via aspirational branding that draws self-selecting individuals, particularly young men seeking identity, status, revenge, or thrill amid personal dissatisfaction. Analysis of over 2,000 foreign fighter profiles from conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere reveals revenge as a motivator for about 30% and status-seeking for 25%, often among those with superficial religious knowledge rather than deep piety or economic deprivation.[105] Propaganda channels, including some 4,500 jihadist websites by 2007, amplify this by showcasing heroic mujahideen imagery and success stories, prompting recruits to approach via personal networks, mosques, or online queries.[105] Post-9/11 dispersal accelerated virtual recruitment, with chat rooms and later social media enabling direct contact, though core Al-Qaeda emphasized quality over quantity, prioritizing ideologically committed operatives for training camps when accessible. Affiliates in regions like Yemen and Somalia adapted locally, using satellite TV and radio alongside digital tools to target grievances such as foreign interventions. Despite competition from groups like ISIS, Al-Qaeda's model sustained resilience by fostering autonomous cells, as seen in plots inspired by Inspire issues.[6]Tactical Methods
Al-Qaeda's tactical methods are rooted in asymmetric warfare principles, prioritizing covert preparation, small-unit operations, and high-lethality strikes against civilian, military, and symbolic targets to achieve psychological and material disruption. These methods, detailed in organizational training materials, emphasize self-reliant operatives trained in basic weaponry, explosives fabrication, and evasion techniques, enabling operations with limited resources against superior conventional forces.[106] Central elements include assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage via improvised explosives, and suicide missions, often executed by compartmentalized cells to minimize detection risks.[106] Assassinations form a core tactic, employing rifles, pistols, edged weapons, poisons, or explosives for targeted eliminations of enemy leaders or personnel. Operatives are instructed to conduct reconnaissance on targets' routines and security, using small teams of three or fewer with forged documents and pre-planned withdrawal routes; firearms techniques stress two-handed grips for stability in ambushes and aiming at vital zones such as the heart or neck veins.[106] Poisons like ricin from castor beans or nicotine are applied covertly, while "cold steel" methods involve stabbing the rib cage or blunt trauma to the head.[106] This approach was used in the September 9, 2001, suicide assassination of Afghan Northern Alliance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud by Al-Qaeda operatives posing as journalists, detonating explosives hidden in camera equipment.[107] Explosives and sabotage operations rely on improvised devices, including vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), time-delay bombs, and booby traps triggered by mechanical, electrical, or chemical switches such as door contacts or ignition wires. Training covers bomb assembly from commercial or scavenged materials, storage separation of explosives from detonators to prevent premature detonation, and placement to maximize structural damage, targeting embassies, bridges, or economic sites.[106] Detonation methods include slow-burning fuses (1 cm per second) for timed escapes or high-speed detonating cords (5-7 km per second) for immediate effects; examples in doctrine include failed 200 kg TNT attempts due to catalyst errors and successful car bombs.[106] Al-Qaeda applied these in the August 7, 1998, bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, using truck bombs driven by suicide operatives that killed 224 people and injured over 4,500.[108] Suicide attacks integrate these explosives tactics with deliberate self-sacrifice, amplifying impact through direct delivery to targets; while not explicitly doctrinal in early manuals, Al-Qaeda operationalized them extensively, as in the September 11, 2001, hijackings of four commercial aircraft by 19 operatives who crashed them into the World Trade Center, Pentagon, and a Pennsylvania field, killing 2,977.[109] Tactics involved flight training for navigation and minimal resistance, with hijackers using box cutters and mace for control before piloting impacts.[110] Affiliates later refined suicide VBIEDs and body-borne bombs for urban assaults, contributing to thousands of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan post-2001.[111] Kidnappings support leverage for prisoner exchanges, funding, or propaganda, executed via rapid vehicle interdiction: teams block targets' cars, neutralize guards with gunfire, and extract hostages swiftly, as in a 1985 Cairo operation against an Israeli diplomat using four operatives.[106] Security protocols underpin all methods, mandating cell structures where members know few others, surveillance countermeasures like route changes and false identities, and isolated training camps for small arms, topography, and explosives handling to build operative autonomy.[106][112] Post-2001 decentralization encouraged "lone jihad" variants, adapting core tactics for inspired actors using everyday vehicles or knives to bypass hardened defenses.[113]Historical Timeline
1988–2000: Formation and Initial Attacks
Al-Qaeda originated during the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989), when Osama bin Laden, a wealthy Saudi national, traveled to Pakistan in the early 1980s to support the mujahideen resistance against the Soviet occupation.[114] Bin Laden co-founded the Maktab al-Khidamat al-Mujahidin al-Arab (MAK), or Afghan Services Bureau, in 1984 alongside Palestinian scholar Abdullah Azzam, to recruit, finance, and logistically support Arab volunteers fighting in Afghanistan; the organization raised funds primarily from private Gulf donors and established recruitment offices worldwide, including in the United States.[1] By 1988, as Soviet forces withdrew, bin Laden began organizing a core group of loyal Arab veterans into al-Qaeda—literally "the base"—initially as a database and vanguard force to sustain global jihad beyond Afghanistan, targeting perceived enemies of Islam such as the United States and secular Muslim governments.[114] The assassination of Azzam in November 1989, attributed by some associates to bin Laden's faction amid ideological disputes over prioritizing distant jihad against near enemies, allowed bin Laden to consolidate control and shift MAK's remnants toward al-Qaeda's militant framework.[25] Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, bin Laden proposed mobilizing his Afghan-trained fighters to defend Saudi Arabia but was rebuffed by the Saudi monarchy in favor of U.S. troops, prompting his public criticism of the royal family's reliance on "infidels" and leading to the revocation of his citizenship in 1994.[1] In 1991, bin Laden relocated to Sudan, where he received protection from the Islamist regime of Hassan al-Turabi and invested in infrastructure, agriculture, and paramilitary training camps that hosted thousands of jihadists, including early al-Qaeda operatives; these facilities served as hubs for plotting attacks and forging ties with groups like Egyptian Islamic Jihad.[114] Under Sudanese auspices, al-Qaeda attempted unsuccessful bombings against U.S. targets, such as hotels in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992, aimed at American troops transiting to Somalia—attacks bin Laden later cited as early strikes against U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula.[87] Expelled from Sudan in 1996 due to U.S. diplomatic pressure, bin Laden resettled in Afghanistan under Taliban hospitality, where al-Qaeda expanded its shura council, merged formally with Egyptian Islamic Jihad in 1998, and issued fatwas declaring war on America, framing attacks as defensive jihad against occupation of holy lands.[16] Al-Qaeda's initial major attacks materialized in the late 1990s. On August 7, 1998, coordinated suicide truck bombings struck U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing 224 people (including 12 Americans) and injuring over 4,500; bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly claimed responsibility, citing retaliation for U.S. actions in Somalia and support for Israel.[115] The operation, planned from Afghan camps and executed by al-Qaeda cells with Sudanese logistical aid, demonstrated the group's emerging transnational capabilities, using inexpensive explosives and local recruits.[114] In October 2000, al-Qaeda operatives detonated a small boat laden with explosives alongside the USS Cole during a refueling stop in Aden Harbor, Yemen, on October 12, killing 17 U.S. sailors and wounding 39 while severely damaging the destroyer; the suicide attack, approved by bin Laden, targeted naval assets as symbols of American military projection in Muslim territories.[116] These strikes, preceding the September 11 attacks, escalated al-Qaeda's focus on high-impact operations against U.S. interests, financed through bin Laden's personal wealth, donations, and hawala networks rather than state sponsorship.[114]2001–2011: Peak Under Bin Laden
The September 11, 2001, attacks represented al-Qaeda's most ambitious operation under Osama bin Laden's leadership, involving 19 hijackers who seized four commercial airliners and crashed them into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, and a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania after passengers intervened on the fourth plane; the assaults killed 2,977 people and injured over 6,000 others.[117] Bin Laden claimed responsibility in a videotaped statement released in October 2004, framing the strikes as retaliation for U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, including support for Israel and military presence in Saudi Arabia.[1] The plot, orchestrated by bin Laden and operational planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, demonstrated al-Qaeda's capacity for high-impact, synchronized terrorism against Western targets, elevating the group's global profile and prompting the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 to dismantle its Taliban-hosted infrastructure.[1] Following the U.S. invasion, al-Qaeda's core leadership, including bin Laden, evaded capture during the Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001 and relocated to Pakistan's tribal regions, where bin Laden directed operations via couriers and audio-video messages exhorting followers to global jihad against the United States and its allies.[118] From hiding, bin Laden issued directives emphasizing attacks on civilian and economic symbols in the West, while al-Qaeda adopted a franchise model, inspiring and supporting regional affiliates to execute decentralized operations; this shift sustained the group's momentum despite losses in Afghanistan, where U.S. and NATO forces killed or captured hundreds of fighters by 2003.[118] Key early post-9/11 plots included the December 22, 2001, attempted mid-air bombing by Richard Reid, who failed to detonate explosives hidden in his shoes on a transatlantic flight, an act bin Laden later praised as part of ongoing holy war.[1] Al-Qaeda's affiliates amplified its reach during this decade, with Jemaah Islamiyah—linked through training and funding ties to al-Qaeda—detonating bombs at nightclubs and the U.S. consulate in Bali, Indonesia, on October 12, 2002, killing 202 people, mostly foreign tourists.[119] Similar coordinated strikes occurred in Mombasa, Kenya, on November 28, 2002, targeting an Israeli-owned hotel (killing 13) and attempting to down an Arkia Airlines jet with shoulder-fired missiles.[120] In 2003, al-Qaeda-inspired cells bombed multiple sites in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia (May 12, killing 35), Casablanca, Morocco (May 16, killing 45), and Istanbul, Turkey (November 15 and 20, killing over 60 combined), underscoring the network's expansion into Muslim-majority countries perceived as apostate regimes allied with the West.[120] These operations reflected bin Laden's strategy of instilling fear through spectacular violence, often using suicide bombers and truck bombs, while avoiding direct core involvement to preserve leadership survival. The Madrid train bombings on March 11, 2004, exemplified al-Qaeda's influence on European jihadists, as a cell of Moroccan and Tunisian operatives detonated 10 backpack bombs on commuter trains, killing 193 civilians and injuring about 2,000; the attackers left claims citing Spain's participation in the Iraq War and invoking al-Qaeda's call to jihad.[121] Investigations revealed training links to al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and ideological alignment with bin Laden's fatwas.[122] In Iraq, after the U.S. invasion in 2003, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's network pledged bay'ah (allegiance) to bin Laden in October 2004, forming al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which conducted over 500 suicide bombings by 2006, targeting Coalition forces, Iraqi security, and Shiite civilians to ignite sectarian conflict.[62] AQI's tactics, including beheadings and market bombings, killed thousands and represented al-Qaeda's adaptation to insurgent warfare, though bin Laden occasionally critiqued Zarqawi's anti-Shiite excesses in private correspondence seized later.[1] In Britain, the July 7, 2005, London bombings involved four homegrown suicide attackers detonating rucksack bombs on three Underground trains and a bus, killing 52 and injuring over 700; the perpetrators produced a video pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda and citing bin Laden's rhetoric against British involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan.[123] Al-Qaeda's propaganda, disseminated via tapes from bin Laden and deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, claimed credit and urged further strikes, fostering self-radicalized cells trained informally rather than in central camps.[123] Foiled plots, such as the 2006 transatlantic aircraft liquid explosives conspiracy targeting up to 10 U.S.-bound flights, highlighted ongoing threats, with bin Laden praising the arrested plotters in messages.[118] By 2007-2010, intensified U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan eliminated senior figures like Abu Laith al-Libi (January 2008) and Baitullah Mehsud of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (August 2009), eroding al-Qaeda's command structure, yet affiliates like AQI persisted amid Iraq's instability until Zarqawi's death in a U.S. airstrike on June 7, 2006.[124] The period culminated in bin Laden's death on May 2, 2011, during a U.S. Navy SEAL raid on his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan, where documents revealed his continued oversight of plots, including attempted strikes on U.S. cities and airlines; his elimination disrupted al-Qaeda's symbolic core but did not immediately halt affiliate activities.[125] Under bin Laden, al-Qaeda orchestrated or inspired attacks killing over 5,000 outside Afghanistan from 2001-2011, shifting from centralized planning to ideological franchising that prolonged its resilience against counterterrorism pressures.[1] This era marked al-Qaeda's zenith in global operational tempo and media dominance, though empirical assessments note that core capacity for mass-casualty plots in the West declined post-2005 due to intelligence disruptions and inter-affiliate tensions.[118]2011–2022: Decline and Zawahiri Era
Following the death of Osama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, in a U.S. special operations raid in Abbottabad, Pakistan, Ayman al-Zawahiri assumed leadership of al-Qaeda on June 16, 2011, as announced by the group's media arm.[1][52] Zawahiri, a former Egyptian Islamic Jihad leader and bin Laden's deputy since the late 1980s, lacked his predecessor's charismatic appeal and global fundraising networks, contributing to internal fractures and reduced operational cohesion in the core organization.[126] Under his tenure, al-Qaeda's central command faced sustained pressure from U.S. drone strikes and counterterrorism operations, which eliminated key figures and disrupted communications, leading to a marked decline in the group's ability to orchestrate large-scale, synchronized attacks comparable to September 11, 2001.[127] Zawahiri emphasized a strategy of decentralized affiliates while denouncing the Islamic State (ISIS) as deviant after its 2013-2014 split from al-Qaeda's Iraq branch under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared a caliphate in June 2014.[62] This rivalry eroded al-Qaeda's influence in Iraq and Syria, where ISIS seized territory and recruits, forcing Zawahiri to prioritize ideological purity over territorial gains and condemn ISIS's takfiri excesses. Affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab in Somalia, and al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS, formed 2014) maintained regional operations, including AQAP's attempted 2015 Charlie Hebdo-inspired attacks in Paris and AQIM's assaults in Mali and Algeria, but these lacked central direction and failed to reverse the core's marginalization.[8][128] By 2020, al-Qaeda's core had dwindled to a few dozen operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, reliant on Taliban protection post-2021 U.S. withdrawal, while affiliates numbered in the thousands across Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.[129] Zawahiri's era ended on July 31, 2022, when he was killed in a U.S. Hellfire missile drone strike at his safe house in Kabul, Afghanistan, conducted by the CIA based on months of intelligence tracking his movements with family members.[130][131] The strike, which avoided civilian casualties, underscored al-Qaeda's vulnerability despite affiliate resilience, as Zawahiri's death left the group without a clear successor and highlighted its dependence on host environments like Taliban-held Afghanistan.[132][133]2022–Present: Leadership Vacuum and Affiliate Resilience
Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's leader since the 2011 death of Osama bin Laden, was killed in a U.S. drone strike on July 31, 2022, while standing on a balcony in a Kabul safe house frequented by Taliban leaders.[134][135] The operation, conducted by the CIA using two Hellfire missiles, eliminated Zawahiri but left the group's central command without a publicly designated successor, creating a leadership vacuum that persists as of 2025.[8] This absence of a formal emir has decentralized decision-making further, with core al-Qaeda elements relying on encrypted communications and historical networks rather than unified directives.[54] Speculation has focused on Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian militant and veteran of the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings, as the de facto leader operating from Iran or Afghanistan.[53] Al-Adel, sanctioned by the UN and U.S. for his role in al-Qaeda's military committee, issued an audio message in June 2024 urging global jihadists to migrate to Afghanistan for training and operations under Taliban protection.[58] Despite these indications, al-Qaeda has avoided announcing a successor, possibly to evade targeting or internal divisions, allowing affiliates to maintain autonomy while pledging nominal loyalty to the core.[54] Al-Qaeda's affiliates have exhibited resilience, compensating for central weaknesses through localized insurgencies and territorial control. In Somalia, al-Shabaab—al-Qaeda's most capable branch, with allegiance affirmed in 2012—launched an ambitious offensive in late February 2025, recapturing swaths of central regions like Moqokori and Buq-Aqable despite Somali government and U.S. airstrikes.[136][137] The group, controlling rural taxation and governance in southern Somalia, conducted over 1,000 attacks in 2024 alone, exploiting state fragility and clan divisions to sustain recruitment and funding estimated at $100-200 million annually from extortion.[138] In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) persisted with hit-and-run operations against Houthi and government forces amid the civil war, shifting focus to provincial strongholds like al-Bayda since 2022 while plotting external threats.[65] AQAP's leadership under Khalid Batarfi emphasized anti-Western propaganda, conducting assassinations and ambushes that killed dozens in 2023-2024, though internal purges and rivalries limited spectacular attacks.[139] United Nations assessments as of July 2025 describe al-Qaeda's affiliate network as a enduring threat, with expanded training camps in Afghanistan and operations in Africa and South Asia, underscoring the organization's adaptation via provincial autonomy over centralized control.[140] This structure has enabled survival despite decapitation strikes, as affiliates prioritize regional dominance and resource extraction over synchronized global plots.[141]Key Attacks and Plots
Pre-9/11 Operations
Al-Qaeda's pre-9/11 operations primarily targeted U.S. interests abroad, escalating from support for jihadist networks in the early 1990s to direct suicide bombings by the late 1990s. Founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988 as a logistical hub for Arab fighters against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the group relocated to Sudan in 1991 and then Afghanistan in 1996, where it established training camps and issued fatwas declaring war on the United States for its military presence in Saudi Arabia and support for Israel.[1] These activities included financing and training militants, but executed attacks remained limited until 1998. The group's first large-scale assaults occurred on August 7, 1998, when al-Qaeda suicide bombers detonated truck bombs nearly simultaneously outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.[115] The attacks killed 224 people, including 12 Americans, with planning from 1993 involving local cells and modest resources (~$10,000); over 4,500 were wounded in total, exploiting lax local security and using rented trucks loaded with urea nitrate-fuel oil explosives equivalent to 2,000-3,000 pounds each.[142] Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri publicly praised the bombings as retaliation for U.S. cruise missile strikes on al-Qaeda camps following the operations, confirming the group's responsibility in a communiqué.[115] In late 1999 and early 2000, al-Qaeda affiliates were involved in foiled plots, including the millennium bombing attempt by Algerian operative Ahmed Ressam, who was arrested on December 14, 1999, at the U.S.-Canada border with 130 pounds of urea nitrate intended for Los Angeles International Airport; Ressam had trained at al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.[143] A related Jordanian plot to bomb hotels and a border crossing during millennium celebrations, led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's network with al-Qaeda ties, was thwarted after arrests on December 30, 1999, yielding 16 tons of seized explosives.[120] Al-Qaeda's final pre-9/11 strike against U.S. forces was the October 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the USS Cole, a guided-missile destroyer refueling in Aden, Yemen.[116] Two al-Qaeda operatives piloted an explosives-laden dinghy—carrying approximately 400-700 pounds of C-4—alongside the ship, detonating it and ripping a 40-foot hole in the hull, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39 others.[144] The attack, planned over months with local Yemeni recruits, demonstrated maritime precision and adaptation from a failed prior attempt on USS The Sullivans in January 2000, and was claimed by bin Laden in a January 2001 video.[116] These operations, killing over 250, illustrated al-Qaeda's evolving operational capabilities from regional bombings with modest resources to sophisticated maritime precision, foreshadowing the U.S.-infiltrated attacks of 9/11 amid growing U.S. intelligence focus.[145]September 11 Attacks
The September 11 attacks consisted of four coordinated suicide hijackings and crashes by 19 al-Qaeda operatives targeting major U.S. symbols of economic, military, and political power on September 11, 2001.[146][117] The hijackers, primarily Saudi nationals recruited globally over years, trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, and received flight instruction in the United States, seized control of American Airlines Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, American Airlines Flight 77 from Washington Dulles, and United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark.[114] Flight 11 struck the North Tower of the World Trade Center at 8:46 a.m. EDT, followed by Flight 175 impacting the South Tower at 9:03 a.m., causing both structures to collapse within two hours due to fire and structural damage.[114] Flight 77 hit the Pentagon at 9:37 a.m., damaging its western facade, while Flight 93 crashed in a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania, at 10:03 a.m. after passengers and crew fought back against the hijackers.[114][146] The operation's principal architect was Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who first proposed using aircraft as weapons against U.S. targets in 1996 and refined the "planes operation" plan, securing approval from al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in late 1998 or early 1999.[114] Bin Laden provided strategic direction, selected key operatives including Mohamed Atta as tactical commander, and facilitated financing and safe houses from al-Qaeda's base in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, with total costs estimated at $400,000 to $500,000.[114] The hijackers entered the U.S. between 2000 and 2001, conducting intelligence operations such as casing flights, blending into American society through counterintelligence measures, and final preparations while evading detection despite prior intelligence on some associates.[114] Al-Qaeda's motivation stemmed from its declared jihad against the United States for perceived aggressions including military presence in Saudi Arabia, support for Israel, and sanctions on Iraq.[114] The attacks killed 2,977 people, excluding the 19 hijackers: 2,753 at the World Trade Center, 184 at the Pentagon, and 40 on Flight 93, with thousands more injured and long-term health effects from toxic exposure at Ground Zero.[147] Economic damages exceeded $100 billion, including infrastructure loss and market disruptions.[114] Bin Laden initially denied direct involvement in statements shortly after the attacks but praised them as retribution; in October 2004, he explicitly claimed responsibility in a video message aired on Al Jazeera, stating the strikes were planned to restore balance to U.S. foreign policy imbalances.[148] U.S. intelligence had linked al-Qaeda to the plot within days based on intercepted communications, hijacker identities, and prior threats, leading to the group's formal designation as responsible by the Bush administration on September 11 itself.[146]Post-9/11 Major Incidents
One of the first post-9/11 attempts by Al-Qaeda operatives occurred on December 22, 2001, when Richard Reid, a British convert trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, attempted to ignite explosives concealed in his shoes aboard American Airlines Flight 63 en route from Paris to Miami; the plot failed due to passenger and crew intervention, with no fatalities but leading to enhanced airport security measures worldwide.[149] In 2002, Al-Qaeda orchestrated coordinated attacks in Kenya on November 28, including a suicide bombing at the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa that killed 13 people and a failed missile strike on an Israeli charter plane departing Mombasa; Al-Qaeda publicly claimed responsibility for both, targeting Western and Israeli interests.[150] On October 12, 2002, bombings in Bali, Indonesia, executed by the Al-Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah group with direct support from Al-Qaeda figures including Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), detonated at nightclubs and killed 202 people, mostly foreign tourists, marking a shift toward Southeast Asian operations.[151] Al-Qaeda's expansion into Iraq began after the 2003 U.S. invasion, with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden and forming Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI); major AQI attacks included the August 19, 2003, truck bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad that killed 22, including Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello, and multiple suicide bombings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 12, 2003, targeting Western expatriate compounds and killing 35.[152] AQI conducted hundreds of bombings from 2003 to 2010, including the February 22, 2006, destruction of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, which ignited widespread sectarian violence and over 1,000 deaths in subsequent weeks.[153] In Europe, Islamist cells inspired and directed by Al-Qaeda executed the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings, detonating 10 bombs on commuter trains that killed 193 and injured over 2,000; a group claiming affiliation with Al-Qaeda issued a communiqué demanding Spanish withdrawal from Iraq, though investigations revealed ties to North African jihadist networks trained in Afghanistan.[122] The July 7, 2005, London bombings (7/7), carried out by four British-Pakistani suicide bombers who had trained in Pakistan under Al-Qaeda oversight, targeted the transit system and killed 52 civilians plus the perpetrators; video statements from the attackers referenced Al-Qaeda's ideology and bin Laden's calls for attacks on the UK over its Iraq involvement.[123] Al-Qaeda's Arabian Peninsula branch (AQAP), formed in 2009 from Yemeni and Saudi affiliates, claimed the December 25, 2009, attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to detonate explosives in his underwear on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 approaching Detroit, which failed and injured only the perpetrator; AQAP later confirmed directing the "underwear bomber" plot as retaliation for U.S. operations in Yemen. AQI and AQAP continued sporadic high-profile plots into the 2010s, though core Al-Qaeda's capacity for spectacular attacks diminished amid leadership losses and affiliate autonomy.[154]Designation and International Response
Terrorist Group Listings
The United States Department of State designated al-Qaeda as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, enabling measures to disrupt its support networks and operations.[155] This designation imposes criminal and immigration penalties on material supporters and restricts al-Qaeda's access to U.S. financial systems.[155] The United Nations Security Council includes al-Qaeda on its consolidated sanctions list under the ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida regime, established via Resolution 1267 (1999) targeting Taliban assets and extended to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda through Resolution 1390 (2002).[16] These measures, binding on UN member states, mandate asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes against listed entities to counter terrorist financing and activities.[156] The European Union lists al-Qaeda and associated entities under Council Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, which applies asset freezes and other restrictive measures to combat terrorism, renewed periodically and aligned with UN sanctions.[157] Numerous national governments have independently or in implementation of UN resolutions designated al-Qaeda as a terrorist group, including:| Country/Body | Key Legislation/Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Canada | Anti-Terrorism Act; listed as a terrorist entity since 2002[158] |
| United Kingdom | Terrorism Act 2000 and UN sanctions implementation; subject to asset freezes[159] |
| Australia | Criminal Code Act 1995 and UN ISIL/Al-Qaida sanctions framework[160] |