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Iranian Azerbaijanis (Persian: آذربایجانی‌های ایران; Azerbaijani: ایران آذربایجانلیلاری [iˈɾɑːn ɑːzæɾbɑjˈdʒɑnlɯlɑɾɯ])[a] are the largest ethnic minority of Iran. They are primarily found in and are native to the Iranian Azerbaijan region (including provinces of East Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan and West Azerbaijan)[20][21][22] and in smaller numbers, in other provinces such as Kurdistan, Qazvin, Hamadan, Gilan, Markazi and Kermanshah.[23] Iranian Azerbaijanis also constitute a significant minority in Tehran, Karaj, and other regions.[24][25][26] Some also have migrated to the Gulf GCC countries.[27]: 42  Most Iranian Azerbaijanis are bilingual in Azerbaijani and Persian.

Demographics

[edit]
Main articles: Ethnicities in Iran and Demographics of Iran

Azerbaijanis comprise the largest minority ethnic group in Iran. Apart from Iranian Azerbaijan (provinces of West Azerbaijan, East Azerbaijan, Ardabil and Zanjan), Azerbaijani populations are found in large numbers in four other provinces: Hamadan (includes other Turkic ethnic groups such as Afshar, Gharehgozloo, Shahsevan, and Baharloo[28][29]),[30] Qazvin,[31] Markazi,[32] and Kurdistan.[33][34] Azerbaijani-populated of Markazi province includes some parts and villages of Komijan,[35] Khondab,[36] Saveh,[37][38] Zarandieh,[39] Shazand,[40] and Farahan.[37] In Kurdistan, Azerbaijanis are mainly found in villages around Qorveh.[33]

Azerbaijanis have also immigrated and resettled in large numbers in Central Iran, mainly Tehran,[41][b] Qom[41][44][45] and Karaj.[46][47] They have also emigrated and resettled in large numbers in Khorasan.[41] Immigrant Azerbaijani communities have been represented by people prominent not only among urban and industrial working classes but also in commercial, administrative, political, religious, and intellectual circles.[41]

Scholars put the population of Azerbaijanis in Iran between 10 and 23 million.[48][2][3][4][5][6][7][8] Iranologist Victoria Arakelova believes that political doctrines following the dissolution of the Soviet Union caused the inflation of the Iranian Azerbaijani as almost half of the 60 million Iranian population, which later decreased to 20 million, lingering for a while. She puts the number at 6 to 6.5 million.[43]

Ethnic groups

[edit]

Sub-ethnic groups of the Azerbaijanis within the modern-day borders of Iran following the ceding of the Caucasus to Russia in the 19th century, include the Shahsevan,[49][50][51][52] the Qarapapaqs,[53] the Ayrums,[49] the Bayat,[54] the Qajars,[55] the Qaradaghis,[49][56] and the Gharagozloo.[57]

Background

[edit]
Main article: Origin of the Azerbaijanis

The Iranian Azerbaijani culture was produced by centuries of a symbiosis and mixture between native and nomadic elements.[58] According to Richard Frye, Iranian Azerbaijanis largely descend from the pre-existing local Iranian population who was gradually Turkified following the major influx of Oghuz nomads into the region.[59] Olivier Roy writes that the Azerbaijani ethnogenesis entailed the Turkification of the natives by Turkomans and the rise of Shiite identity and Turkic tongue.[60] According to Russian scholar Rostislav Rybakov, Iranian Azerbaijan was almost fully Turkicized by 14th and 15th centuries, though the local population left its mark in the Azerbaijani culture and language and the ethnic border between the Turkish people and Azerbaijanis was established in the 16th century.[61] Scholars note cultural similarities between modern Persians and Azerbaijanis.[62]

Genetics

[edit]

A comparative study (2013) on the complete mitochondrial DNA diversity in Iranians has indicated that Iranian Azerbaijanis are more related to the people of Georgia, than they are to other Iranians, as well as to Armenians.[63] There is no significant difference between Iranian Azerbaijanis and other major ethnic groups of Iran.[64]

According to HLA testing, Azerbaijanis of Iran cluster together with the Turkmens of Gorgan and Kurds and constitute an intermediate position between Iranian populations and Western Siberians, specifically Chuvash, Mansi people, and Buryats (subgroups of Turkic peoples, Ugrians, and Mongols respectively).[65] Several genetic studies show that the Azerbaijanis' gene pool largely overlap with that of the native populations in support of language replacement, including elite dominance, scenarios,[66][67] while also demonstrating significant genetic influence from Siberia and Mongolia.[67]

History

[edit]

Background

[edit]
Main articles: Treaty of Gulistan and Treaty of Turkmenchay

Following the Russo-Persian Wars of 1804–13 and 1826–28, the Caucasian territories of Qajar Iran were ceded to the Russian Empire. The Treaty of Gulistan in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmenchay in 1828 finalized the borders between the Russian Empire and Qajar Iran.[68][69] The areas to the north of the river Aras, including the territory of the contemporary Republic of Azerbaijan, were Iranian territory until they were occupied by Russia over the course of the 19th century.[70]

As a direct result of Qajar Iran's forced ceding to Russia, the Azerbaijanis are nowadays parted between two nations: Iran and Azerbaijan.[71] Despite living on two sides of an international border, the Azerbaijanis form a single ethnic group.[72]

Russo-Persian War (1826–28)

[edit]

The burden of the Russo-Persian War (1826–28) was on the tribes of Qaradağ region, who being in front line, provided human resources and provision of the Iranian army. In the wake of the war, a significant fraction of the inhabitants of this area lived as nomadic tribes (ایلات). The major tribes included; Cilibyanlu 1,500 tents and houses, Karacurlu 2500, Haji Alilu 800, Begdillu 200, and various minor groups 500.[73] At the time Ahar, with 3,500 inhabitants, was the only city of Qaradağ.[74]

Persian Constitutional Revolution

[edit]

During the Persian Constitutional Revolution, Tabriz was at the center of battles which followed the ascent to the throne of Mohammad Ali Shah Qajar on 8 January 1907. The revolutionary forces were headed by Sattar Khan who was originally from Arasbaran.[75][76][77] Haydar Khan Amo-oghli had significant contribution in the inception and progression of the revolution, and introducing leftist ideas into Iranian mainstream politics.[78] During the following tumultuous years, Amir Arshad, the headman of Haji-Alilu tribe, had a major impact on the subsequent political developments in Iran in relation to the status of Iranian Kurds. He is credited with fending off communism from Iran.[79][80]

Iranian ultra-nationalism

[edit]
Mirza Fatali Akhundzade (also known as Akhundov), celebrated ethnic Azerbaijani author, playwright, philosopher, and founder of modern literary criticism.[81] Born in Nukha to a family originally hailing from Iranian Azerbaijan.

The ill-fated Constitutional Revolution did not bring democracy to Iran. Instead, Rezā Shāh, then Brigadier-General of the Persian Cossack Brigade, deposed Ahmad Shah Qajar, the last Shah of the Qajar dynasty, and founded the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925 and established a despotic monarchy.[82][83] His insistence on ethnic nationalism and cultural unitarism along with forced detribalization and sedentarization resulted in suppression of several ethnic and social groups, including Azerbaijanis.[84] Ironically, the main architect of this totalitarian policy, which was justified by reference to racial ultra-nationalism, was Mirza Fatali Akhundov, an intellectual from Azerbaijan.[85][86] In accordance with the Orientalist views of the supremacy of the Aryan peoples, he idealized pre-Islamic Achaemenid and Sassanid empires, whilst negating the 'Islamization' of Persia by Muslim forces."[87] This idealization of a distant past was put into practice by both the Pahlavi kings, particularly Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who honored himself with the title Āryāmehr, Light of the Aryans.[88] Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in an interview concisely expressed his views by declaring, "we Iranians are Aryans, and the fact that we are not adjacent to other Aryan nations in Europe is just a geographical anomaly.".[89]

Mirza Fatali Akhundov is not the only Azerbaijani intellectual in framing Iranian ultra-nationalism. Hassan Taqizadeh, the organizer of "Iran Society" in Berlin, has contributed to the development of Iranian nationalism. Since 1916 he published "Kaveh" periodical in Farsi language, which included articles emphasizing the racial unity of Germans and Iranians.[90][91] Ahmad Kasravi, Taqi Arani, Hossein Kazemzadeh (Iranshahr) and Mahmoud Afshar advocated the suppression of the Azerbaijani language as they supposed that the multilingualism contradicted the racial purity of Iranians.[92][93]

Pan-Turkism

[edit]
Main article: Pan-Turkism

The failure of the Democrats in the arena of Iranian politics after the Constitutional movement and the start of modern state-building paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group's cultural nationalism. Whereas the adoption of integrationist policies preserved Iran's geographic integrity and provided the majority of Iranians with a secure and firm national identity, the blatant ignoring of other demands of the Constitutional movement, such as the call for the formation of a society based on law and order, left the country still searching for a political identity. The ultimate purpose was to persuade these populations to secede from the larger political entities to which they belonged and join the new pan-Turkic homeland.[94] It was the latter appeal to Iranian Azerbaijanis, which, contrary to Pan-Turkist intentions, caused a small group of Azerbaijani intellectuals to become the strongest advocates of the territorial integrity of Iran.[94]

After the constitutional revolution in Iran, a romantic nationalism was adopted by Azerbaijani Democrats as a reaction to the pan-Turkist irredentist policies threatening Iran's territorial integrity.[94] It was during this period that Iranism and linguistic homogenization policies were proposed as a defensive nature against all others.[94] Contrary to what one might expect, foremost among innovating this defensive nationalism were Iranian Azerbaijanis.[94] They viewed that assuring the territorial integrity of the country was the first step in building a society based on law and a modern state.[94] Through this framework, their political loyalty outweighed their ethnic and regional affiliations.[94] The adoption of these integrationist policies paved the way for the emergence of the titular ethnic group's cultural nationalism.[94]

World War II and Soviet intervention

[edit]

In late 1941 Soviet forces invaded Iran in coordination with British Army under an operation known as Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. Their forces broke through the border and moved from the Azerbaijan SSR into Iranian Azerbaijan. Reza Shah was forced by the invading British to abdicate in favor of his son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi who replaced his father as Shah on the throne on 16 September 1941. At the aftermath of a four-year-long tumultuous period the Azerbaijan People's Government, a Soviet puppet state, was established in Tabriz, perhaps through direct involvement of the Soviet leadership.[95][citation needed] This government autonomously ruled the province from November 1945 to November 1946.[96] However, the Soviet soon realized their idea was premature, the mass of the population did not support separatism;[97] under largely Western pressure, the Soviet troops withdrew in 1946, which resulted in the quick collapse of the Azerbaijan People's Government.[96]

Migration to Azerbaijan

[edit]

Beginning in the 1850s, many Iranian Azerbaijanis opted to become work migrants and seek job opportunities in the Russian Empire, primarily in the economically booming Azerbaijani-populated part of the Caucasus. Due to them being Persian subjects, Russian offices often recorded them as "Persians". The migrants referred to one another as hamshahri ("compatriot") as an in-group identity. The word was adopted by the Azerbaijani-speaking locals as həmşəri and has since been applied by them to Iranian Azerbaijani migrants in general. Already in the nineteenth century, the word also spread to urban varieties of Russian of Baku and Tiflis in the form of gamshara (гамшара) or amshara (амшара), where it was, however, used with a negative connotation to mean "a raggamuffin".[98][99] In the Soviet times, the word was borrowed into the Russian slang of Ashkhabad and was used to refer to forestallers.[100]

Iranian Azerbaijanis often worked menial jobs, including on dyer's madder plantations in Guba where 9,000 out of 14,000 Iranian Azerbaijani contract workers were employed as of 1867.[101] In the 1886 economic report on the life of the peasantry of the Guba district, Yagodynsky reported frequent cases of intermarriage between the Iranian work migrants and local women which prompted the former to settle in villages near Guba and quickly assimilate. Children from such families would be completely integrated in the community and not be regarded as foreigners or outsiders by its residents.[102]

Sattar Khan, Iranian Azerbaijani, was a key figure in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution and is held in great esteem by many Iranians.

Starting from the late nineteenth century, Baku was another popular destination for Iranian Azerbaijanis, thanks to its highly developing oil industry. By the beginning of the twentieth century, they already constituted 50% of all the oil workers of Baku,[103] and numbered 9,426 people in 1897, 11,132 people in 1903 and 25,096 people in 1913.[104] Amo-oghli and Sattar Khan notably worked in the Baku oil fields before returning to Iran and engaging in politics.

In 1925, there were 45,028 Iranian-born Azerbaijanis in the Azerbaijan SSR.[105] Of those, 15,000 (mostly oil workers, port and navy workers and railway workers) had retained Iranian citizenship by 1938 and were concentrated in Baku and Ganja. In accordance with the 1938 decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, residents of Azerbaijan with Iranian citizenship were given 10 days to apply for Soviet citizenship and were then relocated to Kazakhstan. Those who refused (numbering 2,878 people) became subject to deportation back to Iran immediately.[106] Some naturalized Iranian Azerbaijanis were later accused of various anti-Soviet activities and arrested or even executed in the so-called "Iranian operation" of 1938.[107]

After the fall of the Azerbaijan People's Government in 1946, as many as 10,000 Iranian Azerbaijani political émigrés relocated to Soviet Azerbaijan, fleeing the inevitable repressions of the Shah's government.[108]

Islamic republic era and present-day

[edit]

However, with the advent of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the emphasis shifted away from nationalism as the new government highlighted religion as the main unifying factor. Within the Islamic Revolutionary government there emerged an Azerbaijani nationalist faction led by Ayatollah Kazem Shariatmadari, who advocated greater regional autonomy and wanted the constitution to be revised to include secularists and opposition parties; this was denied.[109]

Azerbaijanis make up 25%[citation needed] of Tehran's population and 30.3%[110] – 33%[25][111] of the population of the Tehran Province. Azerbaijanis in Tehran live in all of the cities within Tehran Province.[112] They are by far the largest ethnic group after Persians in Tehran and the wider Tehran Province.[113]

In October 2020, several protests erupted in Iranian cities, including the capital Tehran and Tabriz, in support of Azerbaijan in its conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[114][115] Iranian Azerbaijani demonstrators chanted pro-Azerbaijan slogans and clashed with Iran's security forces.[116]

Politics and society

[edit]
Main article: Ethnicities in Iran
Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei, as the highest-ranking official in Iran, is an Iranian Azerbaijani.

Generally, Iranian Azerbaijanis were regarded as "a well integrated linguistic minority" by academics prior to Iran's Islamic Revolution.[117][118] Despite friction, they came to be well represented at all levels of, "political, military, and intellectual hierarchies, as well as the religious hierarchy.".[119]: 188  In addition, the current Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, is half Azerbaijani.[120] Many Iranians who opposed Azerbaijani secession from Iran very often cited how Khamenei was Azerbaijani, as to claim that ethnic discrimination did not exist in Iran and Azerbaijanis had no reason to secede. However, Azerbaijani activists claimed that Khamenei was one of the main oppressors of Azerbaijanis, and that he prioritized his position as the Supreme Leader of Iran over his Azerbaijani origins.[121] Historically, Azerbaijanis did not vote based on ethnicity, and many Azerbaijani politicians in Iran were very disliked by Azerbaijanis.[122] In contrast to the claims of de facto discrimination of some Iranian Azerbaijanis, the government claims that its policy in the past 30 years has been one of pan-Islamism, which is based on a common Islamic religion of which diverse ethnic groups may be part, and which does not favor or repress any particular ethnicity, including the Persian majority.[123] Persian language is thus merely used as the lingua franca of the country, which helps maintain Iran's traditional centralized model of government. More recently, the Azerbaijani language and culture is being taught and studied at the university level in Iran, and there appears to exist publications of books, newspapers and apparently, regional radio broadcasts too in the language.[124] Furthermore, Article 15 of Iran's constitution reads:

The use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian.[125]

According to Professor. Nikki R. Keddie of UCLA: "One can purchase newspapers, books, music tapes, and videos in Azerbaijani and Kurdish, and there are radio and television stations in ethnic areas that broadcast news and entertainment programs in even more languages".[126]

Azerbaijani nationalism has oscillated since the Islamic revolution and recently escalated into riots over the publication in May 2006 of a cartoon that many Azerbaijanis found offensive.[127][128] The cartoon was drawn by Mana Neyestani, an ethnic Azerbaijani, who was fired along with his editor as a result of the controversy.[129][130]

Another series of protests took place in November 2015, in the cities of Iranian Azerbaijan including Tabriz, Urmia, Ardabil and Zanjan, in response to an episode of a popular children's program called Fitileh which had depicted what was seen as a racist image of Azerbaijanis. Mohammad Sarafraz director-general of the IRIB[131] and Davud Nemati-Anarki, the head of the public relations department, officially apologised for the "unintentional offense" caused by the program.[132] Protests were also held in July 2016 in Tehran, Tabriz, Urmia, Maragheh, Zanjan, Ahar, Khoy, and Ardabil in response to "denigration of Azerbaijanis by the state media". Plastic bullets were shot at protesters and several people were arrested.[133][134]

Despite sporadic problems, Azerbaijanis are an intrinsic community within Iran.[135] Currently, the living conditions of Iranian Azerbaijanis closely resemble that of Persians:

The life styles of urban Azeri do not differ from those of Persians, and there is considerable intermarriage among the upper classes in cities of mixed populations. Similarly, customs among Azeri villagers do not appear to differ markedly from those of Persian villagers.[24]

Iranian Azerbaijanis are in high positions of authority with the Azerbaijanis Ayatollah Ali Khamenei currently sitting as the Supreme Leader. Azerbaijanis in Iran remain quite conservative in comparison to most Azerbaijanis in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nonetheless, since the Republic of Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, there has been renewed interest and contact between Azerbaijanis on both sides of the border. Andrew Burke writes:

Azeri are famously active in commerce and in bazaars all over Iran their voluble voices can be heard. Older Azeri men wear the traditional wool hat and their music and dances have become part of the mainstream culture. Azeris are well integrated and many Azeri Iranians are prominent in Persian literature, politics and clerical world.[136]

According to Bulent Gokay:

The Northern part of Iran, that used to be called Azerbaijan, is inhabited by 17 million Azeris. This population has been traditionally well integrated with the multi-ethnic Iranian state.[137]

Richard Thomas, Roger East, and Alan John Day state:

The 15–20 million Azeri Turks living in northern Iran, ethnically identical to Azeris, have embraced Shia Islam and are well integrated into Iranian society[138]

According to Michael P. Croissant:

Although Iran's fifteen-million Azeri population is well integrated into Iranian society and has shown little desire to secede, Tehran has nonetheless shown extreme concern with prospects of the rise of sentiments calling for union between the two Azerbaijans.[139]

While Iranian Azerbaijanis may seek greater linguistic rights, few of them display separatist tendencies. Extensive reporting by Afshin Molavi, an Iranian Azerbaijani scholar, in the three major Azerbaijani provinces of Iran, as well as among Iranian Azerbaijanis in Tehran, found that separatist sentiment was not widely held among Iranian Azerbaijanis. Few people framed their genuine political, social and economic frustration – feelings that are shared by the majority of Iranians – within an ethnic context.[135]

According to another Iranian Azerbaijani scholar, Dr. Hassan Javadi – a Tabriz-born, Cambridge-educated scholar of Azerbaijani literature and professor of Persian, Azerbaijani and English literature at George Washington University – Iranian Azerbaijanis have more important matters on their mind than cultural rights. "Iran's Azerbaijani community, like the rest of the country, is engaged in the movement for reform and democracy," Javadi told the Central Asia Caucasus Institute crowd, adding that separatist groups represent "fringe thinking." He also told EurasiaNet: "I get no sense that these cultural issues outweigh national ones, nor do I have any sense that there is widespread talk of secession."[135]

On 26 August 2016, 42 members of the Iranian parliament wrote a letter to President Hassan Rouhani requesting that Turkish Language and Literature be added to the curriculum of primary and secondary schools.[140] Months after this request, on 30 October 2016, for the first time in Iranian history, Azerbaijani members of parliament came together regardless of party or political views and announced the establishment of the Fraction of Turkic regions. Masoud Pezeshkian was elected as the leader of the faction. In addition, a management group consisting of 25 members of parliament was formed. This parliamentary group, established by 100 members of parliament, announced that its goals were to obtain the right to education in Turkish and to increase investment in Azerbaijani regions.[141][142][143] Following the intense reaction of the Iranian public and accusations of separatism, the faction dissolved itself on 10 August 2017.[144] According to some analysts, with the support of Turkey, pan-Turkist ideas are spreading among Iranian Azerbaijanis, which is causing ethnic tensions in the Azerbaijan region of Iran.[145]

Masoud Pezeshkian, a West Azerbaijani politician, was elected as the ninth president of Iran. During a speech, he said that he, his mother and father were Turks.[146][147][148] He expressed his pride in this. However, in a speech he later gave, he recited a few lines from Mohammad-Hossein Shahriar's poem "Heydar Baba Salam" and was warned by an official who came from the side. Pezeshkian said to his assistant who came to him, "No problem. No problem reading two Turkic poems" and smiled. This situation later became a subject of controversy.[149]

Culture

[edit]

Iranian Azerbaijanis were influenced by the Iranian culture.[62] At the same time, they have influenced and been influenced by their non-Iranian neighbors, especially Caucasians and Russians. Azerbaijani music is distinct music that is tightly connected to the music of other Iranian peoples such as Persian music and Kurdish music, and also the music of the Caucasian peoples. Although the Azerbaijani language is not an official language of Iran it is widely used, mostly orally, among the Iranian Azerbaijanis. Most Iranian Azerbaijanis are bilingual in Azerbaijani and Persian, and exogamy and intermarriage with other populations, particularly Persian speakers, are common among Iranian Azeri families that originated in the historic Azerbaijan region.[150][151] Azerbaijani-specific cultural aspects have somewhat diminished in prominence among the many Azeri families that have moved to large cities like Tehran during the past century.[150] Iranian Azerbaijanis are traditionally sensitive to their ethnic identity, but are supportive of bilingualism in Azerbaijani and Persian as well.[151]

Literature

[edit]

Jahan Shah (r. 1438–67), the Qara Qoyunlu ("black sheep") ruler of Iran was a master poet. He compiled a diwan under the pen-name Haqiqi. Shah Ismail (1487–1524), who used the pen-name Khata'i, was a prominent ruler-poet and has, apart from his diwan compiled a mathnawi called Deh-name, consisting of some eulogies of Ali, the fourth Caliph of early Islam.[152] After the Safavid era, Azerbaijani could not sustain its early development. The main theme of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the development of verse-folk stories, mainly intended for performance by Ashughs in weddings. The most famous among these literary works are Koroghlu,[153] Ashiq Qərib, and Kərəm ilə Əsli.

Following the establishing of Qajar dynasty in Iran Azerbaijani literature flourished and reached its peak by the end of the nineteenth century. By then, journalism had been launched in Azerbaijani language and social activism had become the main theme of literary works. The most influential writers of this era are Fathali Akhondzadeh[154] and Mojez Shabestari.

Pahlavi era was the darkest[citation needed] period for Azerbaijani literature. The Azerbaijani language was banned in official spheres with the advent of Reza Shah's reign,[155] including at schools.[156][157] This prohibition was formally abolished after the Islamic revolution, though the Azerbaijanis haven't enjoyed much cultural freedom since then.[158] Writers of Azerbaijan, such as Gholam-Hossein Saedi, Samad Behrangi and Reza Barahani, published their works in Persian. The only exception was Mohammad-Hossein Shahriar, who is famous for his verse book, Heydar Babaya Salam;[159] simply he was too mighty to be censored. Shahriar's work was an innovative way of summarizing the Cultural identity in concise poetic form and was adapted by a generation of lesser-known poets, particularly from Qareh Dagh region, to record their oral traditions. One remarkable example is Abbas Eslami, known with his pen-name Barez, (1932–2011)[160] who described the melancholic demise of his homeland in a book titled mourning Sabalan.[161] Another example is Mohamad Golmohamadi's long poem, titled I am madly in love with Qareh Dagh (قاراداغ اؤلکه‌سینین گؤر نئجه دیوانه‌سی ام), is a concise description of the region's cultural landscape.[162]

The long-lasting suppression finally led to a generation of revolutionary poets, composing verses by allegoric allusion to the imposing landscape of Azerbaijan:

Sahand, o mountain of pure snow,
Descended from Heaven with Zoroaster
Fire in your heart, snow on your shoulders,
with storm of centuries,
And white hair of history on your chest ...

Yadollah Maftun Amini (born in 1926)[163]

After the Islamic revolution of 1979, however, great literary works have not yet appeared and glory days of fifteenth century ruler-poets is not on the horizon. The contemporary literature is restricted to oral traditions, such as bayaties.[164][165]

Carpet weaving

[edit]

Tabriz is one of the main centers of carpet weaving in Iran. At present 40% of Iranian carpet exports are originated from Tabriz.[166] These carpets are generally known as Tabriz rugs. Another carpet weaving center is Ardebil, which, despite being overshadowed by Tabriz in recent years, has produced the finest carpets in past. The two most famous Iranian rugs in the world had been woven in Ardebil in 1540. One is hung in the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, and the other is in the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. These carpets have silk warps and contain over thirty million knots.[167]

The acme of carpet weaving art is manifested in Verni,[168][169] which was originated in Nagorno-Karabakh. Verni is a carpet-like kilim with a delicate and fine warp and woof, which is woven without a previous sketch, thanks to the creative talents of nomadic women and girls. Verni weavers employ the image of birds and animals (deer, rooster, cat, snake, birds, gazelle, sheep, camel, wolf and eagle) in simple geometrical shapes, imitating the earthenware patterns that were popular in prehistoric times.[170] A key décor feature, which is intrinsic to many Vernis, is the S-element. Its shape varies, it may resemble both figure 5 and letter S. This element means "dragon" among the nomads. At present, Verni is woven by the girls of Arasbaran Tribes, often in the same room where the nomadic tribes reside,[171] and is a significant income source for about 20,000 families in Qaradagh region.[172][173]

  • Ardebil Carpet
    Ardebil Carpet
  • Tabriz Carpet.
    Tabriz Carpet.
  • Haris Carpet
    Haris Carpet
  • Qaradagh Carpet
    Qaradagh Carpet
  • Vern.
    Vern.

Religion

[edit]

The majority of Azerbaijanis are followers of Shia Islam. Azerbaijanis commemorate Shia holy days (ten first days of the holy month of Muharram) at least with the same intensity as other Iranians. In metropolitan cities with mixed ethnic composition, such as Tehran, Azerbaijanis are thought to be more intense in their expression of religious ritual than their Persian counterparts.[174] There is also a small minority of Azerbaijanis who practice the Baháʼí Faith.[175] Also in recent years, some Azerbaijanis in Iran have begun converting to Christianity,[176] which is strictly prohibited and can result in imprisonment.[177]

Notable people

[edit]
Main article: List of Iranian Azerbaijanis

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Iranian Azerbaijanis

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Iranian Azerbaijanis, also referred to as Iranian Azeris, constitute the largest ethnic minority in Iran, primarily residing in the northwestern provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan, where they form demographic majorities. Estimated to number between 15 and 25 million individuals, they represent approximately 16 to 24 percent of Iran's total population of around 89 million. Of Turkic origin, their ancestors were Oghuz Turkic tribes that migrated to the region during the 11th and 12th centuries, gradually Turkicizing the pre-existing Iranian and Caucasian populations through linguistic and cultural assimilation. Predominantly adherents of Twelver Shia Islam, Iranian Azerbaijanis speak the South Azerbaijani dialect of the Oghuz branch of Turkic languages, which shares mutual intelligibility with the language spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan. Deeply integrated into Iranian society, they have played pivotal roles in the nation's history, including founding the Safavid dynasty that established Shia Islam as Iran's state religion and the Qajar dynasty, as well as producing prominent modern figures such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, of partial Azerbaijani descent, and recent presidents like Ebrahim Raisi and Masoud Pezeshkian. Culturally, they are renowned for traditions like ashik bardic poetry and music, and artisanal crafts including the intricate Tabriz and Ardabil carpets, which exemplify their contributions to Persianate artistic heritage. While generally loyal to the Iranian state and identifying strongly with its Shia religious framework, a minority exhibits pan-Turkic sentiments influenced by cross-border ties with Azerbaijan, occasionally manifesting in demands for greater linguistic rights or cultural recognition amid broader ethnic identity debates.

Demographics

Population Estimates and Distribution

Iranian Azerbaijanis constitute the largest ethnic minority in Iran, with population estimates ranging from 15 to 25 million individuals, or approximately 18-25% of the country's total of around 89 million as of 2023. The absence of official ethnic data in Iranian censuses contributes to this variability, as the government does not systematically track ; lower figures often appear in state-influenced or Western analyses, while higher estimates are advanced by Azerbaijani advocacy groups and some scholars citing linguistic surveys and historical migration patterns. The majority reside in northwestern Iran, forming the core of the historical region known as Iranian Azerbaijan, which encompasses the provinces of East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, and Zanjan. In East Azerbaijan Province (population approximately 4 million as of 2023), Azerbaijanis predominate, with Tabriz serving as the largest urban center and cultural hub for the group. West Azerbaijan Province (population about 3.5 million) has a mixed demographic, with Azerbaijanis forming the plurality alongside Kurds and smaller Assyrian and Armenian communities. Ardabil Province (around 1.3 million) and Zanjan Province (about 1.1 million) are similarly majority Azerbaijani, though Zanjan includes Talysh and Persian-speaking pockets. Substantial Azerbaijani populations extend beyond these provinces due to , particularly to urban centers in central . In (population over 14 million), Azerbaijanis account for an estimated 20-30% of residents, driven by economic opportunities and historical resettlement policies. Smaller but notable communities exist in provinces such as , , and , where they engage in , , and industry, reflecting patterns of Turkic settlement and assimilation since medieval migrations. Overall, while rural concentrations remain in the northwest, has dispersed up to 40% of the group to major cities nationwide.

Linguistic and Ethnic Composition

Iranian Azerbaijanis predominantly speak South Azerbaijani, a Turkic language belonging to the Oghuz branch, which serves as the mother tongue for an estimated 20 million speakers in , representing the country's largest group. This language, also referred to as Azeri Turkish or Turki by its speakers, exhibits regional dialects such as Tabrizi, Ardabili, and Urmiyeh, characterized by variations in , , and loanwords from Persian and , yet maintaining high across variants. Near-universal bilingualism exists with Persian, the official state language, driven by mandatory education, media, and administrative requirements, though Azerbaijani remains the primary medium in informal and familial settings, particularly in rural and urban centers of northwestern . Ethnically, Iranian Azerbaijanis form a distinct, largely homogeneous group self-identifying as Turks or , comprising approximately 23-24% of Iran's population and concentrated in provinces including East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, , and Zanjan. Their collective identity emphasizes Turkic linguistic and cultural traits, solidified through historical migrations and assimilation processes that replaced earlier like Āḏarī with Turkish by the medieval period. While genetic studies reveal admixture with indigenous Iranian and Caucasian ancestries, contemporary ethnic cohesion is marked by shared Shia Muslim adherence, endogamous practices, and resistance to full Persian assimilation, with minimal internal subgroups altering this uniformity—though some nomadic Turkic elements like Afshars are occasionally affiliated. In the broader northwestern region, non-Azerbaijani ethnicities such as (concentrated in western areas) and Assyrian Christians persist but are demographically separate and not subsumed under the Azerbaijani category.

Origins and Genetics

Genetic Evidence of Continuity

Genetic studies of autosomal DNA reveal that Iranian Azerbaijanis cluster closely with other Iranian ethnic groups, such as , , , , and Mazanderanis, forming a Central Iranian Cluster characterized by shared ancestry dating back at least 5,000 years. This overlap indicates long-standing genetic continuity within the populations, with limited distinguishing Azeris from Central Asian Turkic groups like , despite the latter's linguistic ties. Such patterning supports a model of through cultural or elite-mediated processes rather than substantial population replacement during Turkic migrations. Y-chromosome analyses further underscore patrilineal continuity with regional West Asian lineages. Iranian Azerbaijanis exhibit high Y-DNA diversity, dominated by haplogroup J (approximately 39%), which aligns more closely with neighboring Iranian and Caucasian populations than with Central Asian Turkic sources. Genetic distances show significant differentiation from Turkmens (P < 0.0001), with minimal shared haplotypes, implying weak patrilineal input from historical Turkic invaders and reinforcing autochthonous origins for the majority of lineages. Ancient DNA from the Northern , encompassing the region, demonstrates remarkable stability in the over 3,000 years, from the Copper Age through the Sassanid Empire. Core ancestries, including (CHG) and Early Neolithic Iranian farmer components (45–51% persistence into historical periods), remain dominant, with only minor admixture from external sources like or South-Central Asian influences. Modern Iranian populations, including those in northern regions, reflect this continuity with limited alterations, consistent with the genetic profile of Iranian Azerbaijanis as descendants of ancient local inhabitants rather than recent migrants.

Ethnogenesis and Language Shift

The ethnogenesis of Iranian Azerbaijanis traces to indigenous populations of northwestern , including descendants of ancient Iranian groups such as the and speakers of , a northwestern Iranian language akin to modern Talysh, who underwent cultural and linguistic assimilation following Turkic migrations. This process formed a distinct ethnic group characterized by Turkic speech and shared historical experiences within , rather than direct descent from Central Asian nomads, as evidenced by genetic continuity with regional pre-Turkic substrates. The language shift from Iranian dialects to Oghuz Turkic began intensifying in the with the Seljuk Turks' incursions and conquests, as Oghuz nomads settled in after defeating Buyid emirs and Ghaznavid forces by 1055 CE. Scholars attribute this primarily to an elite dominance mechanism, wherein small Turkic military and administrative elites leveraged political power, nomadic mobility, and prestige to supplant local languages among sedentary Iranian-speaking majorities, without requiring mass demographic replacement. Reinforcement occurred through successive Turkic-led entities, including the Mongol Ilkhanate's facilitation of Oghuz settlement in the 13th century, followed by the Kara Koyunlu (1375–1468) and Ak Koyunlu (1378–1501) confederations, which governed from and promoted Turkic as a . The (1501–1736), originating from and speaking Azerbaijani Turkish at court and in military contexts, cemented the shift, with the language spreading via tribal networks and intermarriage, while Persian retained administrative dominance. Genetic data underscores this as linguistic replacement atop genetic stability: Iranian Azerbaijanis exhibit high Y-chromosomal diversity (h = 0.9934), with dominant haplogroups like J (39.39%) mirroring Middle Eastern patterns and minimal Central Asian input (e.g., low N3 frequencies), indicating proximity to neighboring Iranian and Caucasian groups over distant Turkic sources. F_ST genetic distances further reveal greater affinity to eastern Anatolian Turks than to , aligning with localized elite-driven diffusion rather than wholesale migration. This dynamic preserved core population continuity while forging a hybrid identity blending Iranian heritage with Turkic overlay.

History

Ancient and Medieval Roots

The territory comprising modern Iranian Azerbaijan, historically known as Atropatene or Media Atropatene, was settled by indigenous groups predating Indo-European arrivals, including the Mannaeans, a non-Iranian people who established kingdoms in the 9th to 6th centuries BCE around Lake Urmia, engaging in conflicts with Assyria and Urartu. By the 7th century BCE, Indo-Iranian Medes dominated the region, incorporating it into their empire, which extended from the Caspian Sea to central Anatolia; Median rule facilitated early Zoroastrian influences and administrative structures later absorbed by the Achaemenid Persians after Cyrus the Great's conquest around 550 BCE. Under Achaemenid, Parthian (247 BCE–224 CE), and Sassanid (224–651 CE) empires, the area remained a core Iranian domain, with populations speaking northwestern Iranian dialects and practicing Zoroastrianism, as evidenced by rock reliefs, fire temples, and inscriptions like those at Bisotun detailing Persian imperial control. Following Alexander the Great's campaigns (334–323 BCE), the secured autonomy, naming the province Āturpātakān, which persisted as an Iranian stronghold resisting Seleucid ; by the Sassanid era, intensified occurred through administrative centralization, Zoroastrian orthodoxy, and migration of Persian elites, solidifying an Iranian ethnic and linguistic substrate amid sparse archaeological evidence of significant pre-Islamic Turkic presence. The Arab Muslim conquest in 651 CE introduced , gradually eroding Zoroastrian dominance while preserving like Old Azari, a northwestern Iranian tongue spoken until the medieval period; caliphal rule under the Umayyads and Abbasids (651–1258 CE) saw limited to elites, with local Iranian dynasties such as the Tahirids (821–873 CE) and Sajids (889–929 CE) maintaining Persianate administration. Turkic migrations commenced in the CE with Oghuz tribes entering from , accelerating under the (977–1186 CE) and culminating in the Seljuk Empire's conquest of by 1040 CE, when under Tughril Beg established dominance, resettling nomadic warriors in and initiating demographic shifts through intermarriage and elite replacement. This Seljuk era (1037–1194 CE) marked the onset of , as Turkic became the of and ruling classes, though widespread adoption among sedentary Iranian populations occurred gradually via rather than wholesale replacement, substantiated by medieval chronicles noting linguistic persistence of Iranian dialects into the . Subsequent Ilkhanid Mongol rule (1256–1335 CE), led by Turkic-Mongol elites, further embedded Turkic elements, yet the region's ethnic continuity reflected hybrid Iranian-Turkic ethnogenesis rather than erasure of ancient substrates.

Early Modern Period and Turkic Migrations

The , established in 1501 by Shah Ismail I in , marked a pivotal consolidation of Turkic elements in Iranian Azerbaijan, drawing on the —a militant confederation of primarily Oghuz-derived Turkoman tribes including the Ustajlu, Shamlu, Rumlu, and Tekkelu—for its military backbone and governance. These tribes, originating from nomadic groups in , the , and , were strategically settled in northwestern to secure the realm against Ottoman and Uzbek threats, reinforcing the Turkic demographic presence that had emerged from earlier Oghuz influxes. Azerbaijani Turkish emerged as the predominant vernacular of the Safavid court, military, and elite administration, with Ismail himself composing in the language, such as his , which reflected its literary vitality. This linguistic dominance introduced around 1,200 Azerbaijani-derived terms into Persian, particularly in domains of warfare, , and tribal titles, fostering a Turco-Persian symbiosis while entrenching Turkic speech among the populace of proper. Although the bulk of Oghuz migrations into the region occurred between the 11th and 15th centuries under Seljuk, Mongol, and Turkmen dynasties like the Kara Koyunlu and Ak Koyunlu, the Safavid era witnessed continued nomadic settlements and relocations of Turkic tribes for strategic purposes, including reinforcements from border regions amid conflicts with the Sunni . This period saw no massive demographic waves comparable to medieval incursions but sustained tribal influxes that solidified Azerbaijan's Turkic majority, with local Iranian and Caucasian elements increasingly adopting the language through elite emulation and intermarriage. The post-Safavid interregnum and subsequent Afsharid rule under (r. 1736–1747), of the Turkic Afshar tribe, perpetuated this trajectory, with serving as a key power base for Turkic military confederations. The rise of the in 1789, from the Oghuz Qajar clan that had integrated into Iranian tribal networks since the 16th century, further embedded Turkic leadership, as Qajar forces drawn from northern nomadic groups reasserted control over the northwest, blending tribal loyalties with centralized authority.

19th-Century Division and Russo-Persian Wars

The Russo-Persian War of 1804–1813 stemmed from Russian expansion into the Caucasus, particularly after the empire's annexation of Kartli-Kakheti (eastern Georgia) in 1801, which Persia viewed as a violation of its suzerainty over the region and its vassal khanates. Persian forces under Crown Prince Abbas Mirza initially made gains but suffered defeats, including the loss of Ganja in 1804 and subsequent Russian advances into Azerbaijan proper. The conflict ended with the Treaty of Gulistan, signed on 24 October 1813 between Russian General Fyodor Paulucci and Persian diplomat Mirza Abbas Khan, by which Persia ceded to Russia the khanates north of the Aras River—including Baku, Shirvan, Karabakh, Ganja, Shaki, and Derbent—along with Dagestan and full control of Georgia. This treaty marked Russia's initial consolidation of northern Azerbaijan, where the majority population consisted of Turkic-speaking Muslims who had previously owed nominal allegiance to the Persian shah. Encouraged by British subsidies and religious fervor stirred by clerics, Persia launched a second war in 1826, aiming to reclaim lost territories; Abbas Mirza's armies briefly recaptured areas like Lenkoran but were decisively routed by Russian forces under General Ivan Paskevich at battles such as Echmiadzin and the siege of Erivan (Yerevan). The war concluded with the Treaty of Turkmenchay, signed on 22 February 1828, which compelled Persia to relinquish the Erivan Khanate, Nakhchivan, and Talysh to Russia, recognize Russian suzerainty over Georgia, grant Russia exclusive navigation rights on the Caspian Sea, and pay an indemnity of 20 million silver rubles (approximately 10 tonnes of silver). These concessions finalized the Aras River as the de facto border, partitioning the historical Azerbaijani lands and their Turkic-speaking inhabitants: roughly two-thirds of the territory, including major urban centers like Baku and Gandja, fell under Russian administration as part of Transcaucasia, while the southern khanates (such as Tabriz, Urmia, and Ardabil) remained under Qajar Persian control. The division profoundly affected the Azerbaijani population, separating ethnic kin across an artificial frontier and exposing northern communities to Tsarist policies of gradual Russification, military conscription, and economic integration via Baku's emerging oil industry, in contrast to the south's continued feudal khanate structure under Persian overlordship until centralizing reforms in the late 19th century. Persian defeats weakened the Qajar dynasty financially and militarily, fostering internal discontent among Azerbaijani elites in the south who had supplied much of the shah's cavalry and administration, while northern khans were reduced to Russian vassals or exiled. This bifurcation laid the groundwork for divergent cultural trajectories, with southern Azerbaijanis—comprising the bulk of Iran's Azerbaijani minority—retaining ties to Persian Shia orthodoxy amid ongoing tribal autonomy.

20th-Century Nationalism and Revolutions

During the of 1905–1911, Iranian Azerbaijanis in emerged as key defenders of constitutionalist forces against royalist troops. In 1908–1909, amid the lesser autocracy imposed by , local fighters under , a native born in 1868, repelled royalist sieges of the city, sustaining the revolutionary cause until constitutional forces relieved in July 1909. 's mujahideen, numbering around 1,000–2,000 irregulars, coordinated with Baqir Khan's forces to maintain control of strategic points, contributing to the shah's eventual deposition and the Majlis's restoration. This episode elevated Azerbaijani fighters as national heroes, though their ethnic identity fueled later pan-Turkic interpretations absent in contemporary accounts. Following Pahlavi's rise in 1921 and coronation in 1925, centralizing policies suppressed regional autonomies and ethnic expressions in Azerbaijan. 's campaigns dismantled tribal structures and enforced Persian as the sole administrative language, banning Azerbaijani Turkish in schools and publications by the late to forge a unitary Iranian identity. Rebellions, such as Sheikh Mohammad Khiabani's 1920 uprising in , which demanded and cultural rights under the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan, were crushed by 1921, with Khiabani killed in action. 's military reforms integrated Azerbaijani recruits into a national army but prioritized loyalty to the Persian-centric state over ethnic particularism, quelling unrest in regions like and by 1926. World War II occupations revived autonomist sentiments, culminating in the (APG) proclaimed on December 12, 1945, in under . Backed by Soviet forces lingering after their 1941–1942 occupation of northern Iran, the APG, led by the Azerbaijani Democratic Party, enacted land reforms, , and Azerbaijani-language education while nominally pledging loyalty to . With a population base of about 1.5 million in Iranian Azerbaijan, the regime redistributed 500,000 hectares of land but relied on Soviet subsidies and Tudeh Party communists, limiting its nationalist appeal. Soviet withdrawal in May 1946, pressured by U.S.-UK diplomacy and UN resolutions, enabled Iranian forces to reenter on December 13, 1946, dissolving the APG amid minimal resistance and executing or exiling leaders. This crisis underscored Soviet instrumentalization of ethnic nationalism, as Pishevari's government prioritized ideological alignment over sustainable separatism, per declassified diplomatic records.

Soviet Influence and Post-WWII Tensions

During , forces occupied northwestern , including the region, following the Anglo- on August 25, 1941, aimed at securing Allied supply lines through the . The occupation disrupted central Iranian authority, fostering local unrest and enabling cultural and political influence, such as the promotion of Azerbaijani-language publications and support for leftist groups. By 1945, as the war ended, the delayed withdrawal despite the January 1942 Tripartite Treaty obligating Allied forces to leave six months after hostilities ceased, citing security concerns and demanding oil concessions in the region. In this context, the emerged on December 12, 1945, in , proclaimed by the Soviet-backed Democratic Party of Azerbaijan under Seyyed Jafar , who had ties to the Communist Tudeh Party. The regime declared autonomy from , implemented land reforms redistributing estates to peasants, and emphasized Azerbaijani Turkic identity, but its viability depended on the presence of approximately 30,000 Soviet troops that prevented Iranian reentry. Soviet support included military protection, economic aid, and portraying the government as a national against Persian centralism, though declassified documents reveal Moscow's orchestration to create a or facilitate eventual incorporation into the . The resulting Iran Crisis of 1946 escalated into the first major Cold War confrontation, with the United States and Britain pressuring the Soviets through diplomatic channels and UN Security Council debates starting in January 1946. On March 24, 1946, Moscow announced troop withdrawal within six weeks, ostensibly in exchange for parliamentary ratification of an oil agreement granting the Soviets 51% control of northern fields for 50 years, though the Iranian Majlis later rejected it. Soviet forces completed evacuation by mid-May 1946, allowing Iranian troops under General Fazlollah Zahedi to advance into Azerbaijan by December 1946, prompting the government's collapse; Pishevari and key leaders fled to the Soviet Union, where many received asylum and pensions. Post-crisis, Iranian authorities suppressed separatist elements, executing or imprisoning hundreds of Democratic Party members and reintegrating the region through military governance and cultural policies. The episode fueled enduring suspicions among Iranian Azerbaijanis toward Soviet , particularly as the Azerbaijan SSR propagated pan-Azerbaijani unity, yet empirical data from subsequent censuses and loyalty during the 1979 Revolution indicate limited grassroots support for , with most communities prioritizing Iranian over Soviet-aligned . Tensions persisted into the late through covert Soviet agitation and Kurdish separatist parallels in , but Western and Iran's oil in 1951 shifted focus away from direct territorial threats.

Islamic Revolution and Contemporary Era

The 29 Bahman uprising in on February 18, 1978, represented a pivotal moment in the , as Azerbaijani-majority crowds engaged in the first large-scale armed clashes against Pahlavi regime forces, killing dozens and inspiring nationwide unrest that accelerated the Shah's downfall. Azerbaijani participation stemmed from shared grievances over , , and cultural marginalization under the monarchy, with the city's religious seminaries and networks mobilizing protests aligned with Khomeini's calls for Islamic governance. After the 1979 revolution, the new Islamic Republic's emphasis on as a unifying mitigated ethnic divisions by prioritizing religious over Persian-centric , enabling —who constitute about 16-24% of Iran's population and predominantly adhere to Shi'a —to achieve socioeconomic integration and access to power. Ethnic ascended to high offices, including Supreme Leader (of Azerbaijani descent from ) and former , reflecting pragmatic co-optation rather than systemic exclusion. In July 2024, Masoud Pezeshkian, whose father was Azerbaijani and who speaks the language, won the presidency amid reformist appeals, underscoring continued elite representation despite underlying cultural restrictions like bans on mother-tongue in public schools. Cultural policies post-1979 perpetuated assimilationist measures inherited from the Pahlavi era, such as prohibiting Azerbaijani-language broadcasting and textbooks, which Iranian officials justify as preserving national unity but critics attribute to suppressing minority identities amid fears of Pan-Turkic fueled by and the Republic of Azerbaijan. This tension erupted in May 2006, when a state newspaper's cartoon likening to cockroaches sparked riots in , , and , drawing tens of thousands and resulting in at least four protester deaths from security force gunfire, with Azerbaijani activists demanding and . The regime's response—arrests, media blackouts, and scapegoating foreign agitators—highlighted persistent friction, though widespread did not materialize due to and religious cohesion. In the contemporary period, Iranian Azerbaijanis have migrated en masse to and other urban centers, dominating sectors like the Grand networks and contributing disproportionately to and remittances, which bolsters their economic leverage despite regional underdevelopment in East and West provinces. They also feature prominently in the military, including ethnic Azerbaijani units within the deployed for internal security, such as suppressing Kurdish unrest, as a to leverage intra-ethnic trust. Participation in broader dissent, including the 2022 "" protests triggered by Mahsa Amini's death, saw Azerbaijanis in cities like chanting against compulsory and corruption, facing heightened arrests and executions in minority areas as authorities intensified crackdowns on perceived ethnic . Relations with the Republic of remain strained over border dams, Zangezur corridor disputes, and accusations of fomenting plots, yet most Iranian Azerbaijanis prioritize reform within over unification, wary of geopolitical risks.

Language and Identity

Azerbaijani Turkic Language

The Azerbaijani Turkic language spoken by Iranian Azerbaijanis, known as South Azerbaijani, belongs to the Oghuz branch of the Turkic language family and serves as the mother tongue for the majority of this ethnic group. It is characterized by agglutinative grammar, vowel harmony, and SOV word order typical of Turkic languages, with core vocabulary and phonology closely resembling those of Turkish and North Azerbaijani. Estimates place the number of South Azerbaijani speakers in Iran at approximately 15.5 million, though unofficial figures from advocacy groups suggest higher numbers up to 25 million due to the absence of ethnic census data in Iran. South Azerbaijani encompasses several dialects, including those centered in Tabriz, Ardabil, Urmia, and Zanjan, which exhibit regional variations in pronunciation and lexicon but remain mutually intelligible within the broader Azerbaijani continuum. Compared to North Azerbaijani spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan, the southern variety incorporates a higher proportion of Persian and Arabic loanwords—estimated at 30-40% of its lexicon—reflecting centuries of bilingualism and cultural exchange under Persianate rule, whereas the northern form shows more Russian influences. Mutual intelligibility between north and south varieties is high, often exceeding 80% in spoken form, though comprehension decreases with the script barrier and accumulated divergences since the 19th-century division of Azerbaijan. In Iran, South Azerbaijani is written using a Perso-Arabic script adapted with additional letters for Turkic sounds, such as variants of گ for /g/ and sounds absent in standard Persian, maintaining continuity with pre-20th-century Ottoman Turkish orthography. This contrasts with the Latin-based alphabet adopted in Azerbaijan after 1991. The language lacks official status, with Persian mandated for government, education, and media; primary schooling occurs exclusively in Persian, leading to diglossia where South Azerbaijani dominates informal and familial domains but faces attrition among urban youth. Limited state broadcasting in the language exists via outlets like IRIB's Azerbaijani service, but publishing and higher education remain Persian-centric, contributing to claims of linguistic marginalization despite its role in oral literature and folk traditions.

Cultural Assimilation and Identity Debates

Iranian Azerbaijanis have faced state policies promoting Persian linguistic dominance since the establishment of the in 1925, when enforced cultural homogenization by mandating Persian as the exclusive medium of instruction in schools and administration, effectively marginalizing Azerbaijani Turkic in public spheres. This approach continued under Mohammad Reza Shah, with efforts including name changes for places and suppression of non-Persian media, contributing to a gradual shift where younger generations in urban areas increasingly default to Persian for formal communication. Post-1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran's constitution (Article 15) permits local languages in media but requires Persian for official use and education, resulting in no state-funded Azerbaijani-language schooling despite bilingual proficiency among an estimated 80-90% of the population. Identity debates among Iranian Azerbaijanis revolve around balancing ethnic Turkic heritage with overarching Iranian nationality, often framed as voluntary integration versus coerced assimilation. Proponents of cultural preservation argue for mother-tongue and media rights to counter perceived erosion, pointing to incidents like the 2006 protests in and other cities—sparked by a cartoon depicting Azerbaijanis as —which drew tens of thousands demanding linguistic equity before being suppressed. However, empirical indicators of integration predominate: Azerbaijanis constitute a disproportionate share of Iran's political, military, and clerical elite, including Supreme Leader (whose mother was Azerbaijani) and numerous generals, reflecting loyalty reinforced by shared Shiite religiosity and historical inter-ethnic ties. Urban migration to and other centers has accelerated assimilation through intermarriage rates exceeding 50% in mixed families and widespread adoption of Persian as a , with surveys showing most self-identify dually as both Azerbaijani and Iranian without favoring . Critics of assimilation narratives, including some Azerbaijani intellectuals, contend that demands for separatism or exclusive ethnic rights stem from external pan-Turkist influences rather than endogenous grievances, as domestic socioeconomic mobility—evident in Azerbaijanis' overrepresentation in commerce and professions—undermines claims of systemic discrimination. Government resistance to decentralizing education persists due to fears of fragmentation, substantiated by historical precedents like the short-lived (1945-1946), yet causal analysis reveals that cultural retention thrives informally through family, , and private media consumption, mitigating outright erasure. While advocacy groups amplify suppression claims, often aligned with or Turkish diasporas, data on voluntary bilingualism and participation indicate resilience in hybrid identities over polarized assimilation-or-extinction binaries.

Pan-Turkism and Separatist Movements

, an ideology advocating the political and cultural unity of originating in the late among Crimean Tatar intellectuals, has influenced segments of the Iranian Azerbaijani population by promoting ethnic solidarity across borders with and the Republic of . In Iran, this ideology intersects with local grievances over and perceived cultural marginalization, though it remains marginal among the broader Azerbaijani community, which largely identifies with Iranian national unity. Historical episodes of autonomy-seeking, such as Mohammad Khiabani's 1920 declaration of the "Azerbaijan National Government" in , emphasized rather than outright , drawing on early 20th-century nationalist sentiments amid post-World War I instability but collapsing after intervention. The most prominent separatist episode occurred during the Azerbaijan Crisis of 1945-1946, when Soviet forces occupying northwestern supported the establishment of the under on November 15, 1945. This short-lived entity, backed by the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, implemented land reforms, measures, and Azerbaijani-language education while declaring autonomy from , but it functioned as a Soviet proxy amid tensions rather than a purely ethnic nationalist venture. The regime collapsed in December 1946 following Soviet troop withdrawal under international pressure, leading to Iranian military reassertion and the execution or flight of leaders like Pishevari, who died in a 1947 car accident en route to the USSR. In the post-Islamic Revolution era, pan-Turkist sentiments have manifested in cultural activism and sporadic protests, often channeled through platforms like the Tractor Sazi football club in Tabriz, where fans display Azerbaijani symbols during matches to protest perceived discrimination. Groups such as the Southern Azerbaijan National Awakening Movement, operating largely from Baku, advocate self-determination for Iranian Azerbaijanis, citing suppression of Turkic language in education and media as key issues, though Iranian authorities label them as foreign-instigated separatists. Despite claims of thousands detained during 2006 and 2022 protests over water rights and ethnic slurs—resulting in reported arrests of over 5,000 in some accounts—empirical evidence indicates limited separatist traction, with intermarriage rates and urban integration suggesting most Iranian Azerbaijanis prioritize socioeconomic advancement within the Iranian state over irredentism.

Politics

Integration in Iranian Governance

Iranian Azerbaijanis, constituting approximately 16% of Iran's population, have demonstrated substantial integration into the country's governance apparatus, with representation across executive, legislative, judicial, and military domains. This integration is evidenced by their occupancy of pivotal national roles, often aligned with the ideological framework of the , which prioritizes loyalty to the revolutionary principles over ethnic quotas. Despite occasional claims of systemic exclusion in top military commands—where ethnic reportedly comprise over 75% of (IRGC) and regular army leadership—Azerbaijanis maintain notable presence in mid- and lower-tier positions within the IRGC and broader security structures. At the apex of power, ethnic Azerbaijanis have held the presidency and supreme leadership. Supreme Leader , who assumed the role in 1989 following Khomeini's death, is of Azerbaijani descent, a fact underscoring the ethnic group's access to ultimate authority in Iran's theocratic system. The current president, Pezeshkian, elected in 2024, has an Azerbaijani father from Mahabad in , blending Turkic heritage with his mother's Kurdish background; Pezeshkian previously served as health minister and parliament speaker, illustrating upward mobility through electoral and appointive channels. Earlier post-revolutionary figures, such as (serving 1981–1989) from Khameneh in East Azerbaijan, further highlight this pattern of elite inclusion during formative governance periods. In the legislative sphere, Azerbaijanis enjoy robust representation in the (), exceeding proportional expectations relative to their demographic share, particularly from constituencies in provinces like East and West Azerbaijan, , and Zanjan. This overrepresentation stems from high and political engagement in these regions, enabling Azerbaijanis to influence policy on issues ranging from to foreign relations, though always within the bounds of vetting by the Guardian Council. Judicial and clerical hierarchies also feature prominent Azerbaijani figures, including clerics in seminaries and provincial governorships, reflecting deep embedding in the Shia religious establishment that underpins state legitimacy. Military integration, while concentrated in operational rather than command echelons, includes Azerbaijani staffing in specialized IRGC units, contributing to Iran's asymmetric defense posture. Overall, this level of participation—spanning all branches since the 1979 Revolution—contrasts with less integrated minorities and aligns with scholarly assessments of as Iran's most assimilated ethnic group, facilitated by shared Shia faith and historical loyalty to Persianate state traditions.

Ethnic Tensions and Discrimination Claims

Iranian Azerbaijanis have raised persistent claims of ethnic discrimination, primarily centered on cultural suppression, political underrepresentation, and economic marginalization in provinces such as , , , and Zanjan. These grievances often manifest in protests demanding mother-tongue and media , as Azerbaijani Turkish is not used in official schooling despite Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution permitting limited private use of minority languages in literature and local media. for these is frequently framed by authorities as a threat, leading to arrests and of activists on charges such as "propaganda against the state" and "assembly and collusion to act against ." A pivotal incident occurred in May 2006, when a cartoon in the state-run newspaper depicted a speaking Azerbaijani Turkish, interpreted by many as an ethnic slur; this sparked widespread riots in Azerbaijani-majority cities including , , and , resulting in at least four deaths, over 70 injuries, and the temporary shutdown of the newspaper. The protests highlighted underlying frustrations over perceived cultural mockery and , with demonstrators calling for greater ethnic recognition amid reports of economic neglect in the northwest. Similar tensions resurfaced in November 2015 following a state television sketch mocking , prompting demonstrations and legal complaints that underscored ongoing sensitivities around media portrayals. In recent years, repression has intensified against ethnic rights advocates, with Iranian courts issuing heavy sentences to Azerbaijani . Since October 2024, at least 24 individuals have received prison terms ranging from 3 to 14 years, often for environmental tied to the drying of —a crisis exacerbating water shortages in Azerbaijani regions—or for representing victims of the 2022 nationwide protests. Notable cases include Ayaz Seifkhah's 14-year sentence in 2025 for alleged and collusion, and Alireza Farshi's 15-year term in 2017 for promoting language rights. Protests in and other cities from 2023 to 2025 have linked water mismanagement—blamed on upstream damming and climate factors disproportionately affecting ethnic areas—to broader claims, with authorities responding via arrests exceeding 200 in some instances. Politically, Azerbaijanis report underrepresentation in senior roles, despite individuals of partial Azeri descent holding positions like the under (2005–2013); exclusion persists in sensitive security posts, attributed to loyalty concerns amid Pan-Turkic influences from neighboring and . Economically, Azeri provinces exhibit disparities in infrastructure and development, fueling allegations of deliberate neglect, though integration in urban centers like has allowed for many. These tensions are compounded by assimilation policies promoting Persian dominance, yet Iranian officials maintain that such measures preserve national unity against separatist risks, denying while acknowledging isolated incidents.

Relations with Azerbaijan Republic and Turkey

Iranian Azerbaijanis share deep ethnic, linguistic, and cultural affinities with the population of the , stemming from common Turkic roots and historical migrations across the shared border regions. An estimated 15-20 million Iranian Azerbaijanis reside primarily in Iran's adjacent to , fostering familial ties, informal trade, and cultural exchanges despite official restrictions. These connections are evident in cross-border marriages, remittances, and the popularity of Azerbaijani media among Iranian Azeris, though access is often limited by Iranian . State-to-state relations between and , however, have been marked by persistent tensions that indirectly affect Iranian Azerbaijanis. has long suspected of harboring pan-Turkist ambitions to unite all Azeri-populated territories, including Iranian Azerbaijan, often referred to by Azerbaijani nationalists as "Western Azerbaijan." These fears intensified after 's 2020 victory in the Second War, supported by and involving Israeli-supplied weapons, which perceived as a threat to its regional influence and Shi'a solidarity. In response, conducted large-scale military exercises near the border in October 2022 and January 2023, signaling deterrence against perceived encirclement. Tensions peaked in 2023 with the armed attack on Azerbaijan's embassy in Tehran on January 27, killing one diplomat and injuring two others, which Azerbaijan attributed to Iranian complicity, leading to mutual expulsions of diplomats and heightened border alerts. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev described bilateral ties as reaching their "lowest level ever" in May 2023. Among Iranian Azerbaijanis, these frictions have sparked divided sentiments: while many express solidarity with Azerbaijan's Karabakh claims—evident in 2020 protests in Tabriz supporting Baku—separatist inclinations remain marginal, with most prioritizing Iranian national identity amid integration in governance and military structures. Over eight million Iranian Azerbaijanis live as immigrants or refugees in Azerbaijan, often facing political scrutiny from Tehran. Relations with Turkey further complicate dynamics due to Ankara's close alliance with , encapsulated in the "one nation, two states" doctrine, and its promotion of . Iranian Azerbaijanis benefit from cultural proximity to via shared Turkic and media consumption, including Turkish television series that evade bans and influence youth identity. However, Iran views Turkey's regional activism—such as drone supplies to and advocacy for a Zangezur corridor—as exacerbating irredentist risks in its Azeri provinces. Historical precedents, like the short-lived in 1945-1946 backed by Soviet pan-Turkist elements, underscore Tehran's wariness, though contemporary Iranian Azeri elites, including high-ranking officials, demonstrate loyalty to the . Efforts at de-escalation emerged in 2025, with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian's visit to yielding agreements on transport and trade, potentially easing people-to-people contacts.

Society and Economy

Urban Migration and Social Mobility

Significant numbers of Iranian Azerbaijanis have migrated from rural and semi-urban areas in the provinces of East and West , , and Zanjan to larger urban centers, particularly , since the mid-20th century, driven primarily by limited economic opportunities in their home regions and the pull of industrial, commercial, and educational prospects in the capital. This internal migration pattern aligns with broader Iranian trends of rural-to-urban shifts accelerating after the and land reforms, with Azerbaijanis forming a disproportionate share of inflows to due to their geographic proximity and established networks facilitating settlement. By the early , estimates indicate that Iranian Azerbaijanis comprise 25-30% of 's , making the home to around 5 million of them and positioning it as the world's largest Azerbaijani Turkic-speaking outside proper. This urban relocation has enabled notable for many Azerbaijani families, transitioning from agrarian livelihoods to roles in , , and services, where their entrepreneurial acumen has led to overrepresentation in the economy and small-to-medium enterprises across . Studies on ethnic socio-economic indicators reveal that urban-dwelling Azerbaijanis often exhibit higher and income levels compared to rural counterparts in their provinces, with factors such as bilingualism (Azerbaijani Turkish and Persian) aiding integration into professional sectors like , , and academia. For instance, research comparing ethnic groups in northwestern highlights Azerbaijanis' relatively strong performance in socio-economic metrics, including access to higher education and urban employment, despite persistent regional in Azerbaijan provinces characterized by higher poverty rates and limited investment. However, social mobility is uneven, with claims of systemic in resource allocation to Azerbaijani-majority areas potentially exacerbating rural-urban divides, though underscores successful assimilation and upward mobility for migrants in , where ethnic networks provide mutual support in business and politics without widespread exclusion. Azerbaijani migrants have contributed disproportionately to 's economic vitality, including in construction booms and retail trade, fostering intergenerational advancement as second- and third-generation urbanites access universities and elite positions, countering narratives of perpetual marginalization propagated by some advocacy groups. This pattern reflects causal drivers like market incentives and family remittances bolstering home-region ties, rather than ethnic favoritism, enabling Azerbaijanis to leverage urban opportunities for broader Iranian societal integration.

Economic Contributions and Disparities

Iranian Azerbaijanis, forming approximately 25-30% of Iran's population, contribute substantially to the national economy via agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and trade in their ancestral provinces of East and West Azerbaijan. East Azerbaijan Province, centered around Tabriz, hosts significant mineral reserves exceeding 8 billion tons and serves as a key industrial hub for textiles, machinery, and food processing. In the Iranian year ending March 2025, the province exported 160,000 tons of agricultural products valued at $186 million, including 37,000 tons of dried fruits worth $82.2 million. It also handled 1.47 million tons of total trade worth $1.18 billion from March to August 2025, underscoring its border proximity to Turkey and Azerbaijan Republic as a trade gateway. The province accounts for 35% of Iran's carpet production, a traditional industry tied to Azerbaijani craftsmanship. Beyond regional output, Iranian Azerbaijanis exhibit high entrepreneurial activity, with many migrating to and other urban centers to dominate sectors like , , and bazaar , leveraging networks that enhance capital flow and market efficiency. Tabriz's base supports national supply chains, positioning East Azerbaijan among Iran's more industrialized provinces despite national challenges like sanctions. Their is evident in the prominence of Azerbaijani figures in leadership, reflecting causal factors such as historical routes and cultural emphasis on over ethnic barriers. Economic disparities persist, however, with Iranian Azerbaijani regions exhibiting heterogeneous development—urban centers like advancing while rural areas lag due to geographic isolation, limited , and broader national favoring . Claims of ethnic , including underrepresentation in high-paying state jobs and denied access to development funds, are voiced by Azerbaijani activists and echoed in reports citing systemic biases against non-Persian groups. Counterassessments, however, find no explicit , attributing integration challenges to rather than targeted , with Azerbaijanis holding influential roles amid overall minority patterns in . Regional resentment stems partly from perceived Persian-centric budgeting, exacerbating gaps despite individual successes. Empirical data on provincial GDP shares (e.g., East Azerbaijan's contribution in early around 5-6% of national totals per Statistical Centre of Iran) indicate below-proportional output relative to population, though updated per capita metrics remain scarce amid opaque reporting.

Culture

Literature and Folklore

Iranian Azerbaijani literature encompasses a body of works primarily in the Azerbaijani Turkish language, alongside Persian compositions, with roots tracing to the post-Mongol era and significant development in the following the establishment of the , which elevated Azerbaijani Turkish in administrative and cultural spheres. Classical poets contributed to genres such as ghazals and masnavis, drawing from Persianate traditions while incorporating Turkic motifs. In the modern period, (1906-1988), born in Khosrowshahr near , stands as a pivotal figure, authoring approximately 3,000 verses in Azerbaijani Turkish and 28,000 in Persian; his 1954 poem Heydar Babaya Salam evokes rural nostalgia and has been translated into 76 languages, cementing his influence across Turkic-speaking communities. Folklore among Iranian Azerbaijanis is preserved through oral traditions, including epic narratives and lyrical poetry performed by ashiqs—wandering bards who accompany their recitations on the saz, a long-necked lute. The ashiq art form, blending poetry, storytelling, improvisation, and music, emerged prominently in the 15th-16th centuries amid Safavid cultural patronage and symbolizes collective identity, with repertoires featuring tales of heroism like those of Koroghlu, adapted from broader Oghuz Turkic lore. Recognized by UNESCO as an Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity in 2009 for its practice among Azerbaijani communities, including in Iran, the tradition emphasizes moral and philosophical themes, often performed at gatherings and festivals. Regional variations in Iranian Azerbaijan, centered in areas like Tabriz and Ardabil, incorporate local dialects and historical references, sustaining transmission through master-apprentice lineages despite modernization pressures.

Traditional Arts, Music, and Cuisine

Iranian Azerbaijanis have made significant contributions to traditional arts, most notably through carpet weaving centered in , the capital of . Tabriz rugs are distinguished by their high knot density, often exceeding 500,000 knots per square meter, and feature elaborate designs such as central medallions, arabesques, and floral motifs drawn from Persian and Islamic aesthetics. These carpets, produced using or on asymmetric knots, have been traded internationally since the Safavid period (1501–1736 CE), with the city's historic serving as a key hub. The Carpet pair, commissioned in 1539–1540 CE by Shah Tahmasp I for the Sheikh Safi al-Din Ardabili shrine, represents a masterpiece of this craft, measuring approximately 10.5 by 5.3 meters and incorporating cartouches with dedicatory inscriptions and intricate details. Embroidery constitutes another prominent among Iranian Azerbaijanis, particularly in domestic textiles and traditional attire from the Safavid era onward. These works employ techniques like and on or bases, depicting stylized floral, geometric, and animal patterns influenced by regional nomadic and urban styles in historical (1550–1800 CE). The bardic tradition forms the core of Iranian Azerbaijani music, involving wandering poets who improvise epic narratives () such as the tale of Koroghlu, accompanied by the saz lute. This oral art, transmitted through apprenticeship and performances in coffeehouses or villages, blends vocal , instrumental melodies, and rooted in pre-Islamic Turkic , persisting as a social and cultural practice in Iranian . Cuisine emphasizes hearty, meat-based dishes adapted to the region's and economy. Koofteh Tabrizi, a signature preparation, consists of large meatballs (up to 15 cm in diameter) formed from ground lamb or mixed with chickpeas, , and herbs like and leeks, stuffed with prunes, walnuts, and onions, then poached in a light broth. Complementary staples include (noodle soups thickened with or herbs) and qeymeh (stews of split peas and lamb), often served with flatbreads and reflecting shared Turkic-Persian culinary elements.

Customs and Festivals

Iranian Azerbaijanis, predominantly Shia Muslims residing in provinces such as East and West Azerbaijan, participate in Nowruz celebrations marking the vernal equinox on March 20 or 21, featuring rituals like the arrangement of the Haft-Seen table with symbolic items such as sprouted wheat (sabzeh) for rebirth and garlic (sir) for health, alongside family gatherings and feasts. In Tabriz, the historic bazaar—recognized as the world's largest roofed market—transforms into a vibrant center for Nowruz preparations, where locals purchase traditional sweets, fish, and herbs for dishes like sabzi polo ba mahi. Preceding Nowruz, Chaharshanbe Suri involves jumping over bonfires on the eve of the last Wednesday before the equinox to ward off misfortune, a practice observed across Iranian ethnic groups including Azerbaijanis. Religious festivals hold central importance, with —the tenth day of —commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussein at in 680 CE through mourning processions, chest-beating (sinazani), and passion plays reenacting the battle. In , these rituals draw large crowds, including drummers and black-clad participants marching in streets, as seen in annual observances where Iranian leaders have joined local commemorations. Such events underscore the community's Shia devotion, with heightened intensity during the first ten days of , blending grief with communal solidarity. and follow Islamic lunar calendars, involving prayers, charity (), and sacrificial feasts shared among kin. Yalda Night, celebrated on the around , honors the triumph of over through extended family vigils featuring pomegranates, watermelons, and nuts for their red hues symbolizing the sun, alongside recitations from poets like . Among Iranian Azerbaijanis, it retains the name Çillə Gecəsi, linking to pre-Islamic Zoroastrian roots while adapted to local customs of and sweets consumption until dawn. This festival, observed nationwide, reinforces seasonal renewal amid the longest night. Customs extend to lifecycle events, with weddings emphasizing family alliances through stages like (elçilik), (nişan) with ring exchanges and feasts, and the main ceremony featuring traditional attire, music from instruments like the , and dances. Brides often wear embroidered dresses reflecting Turkic influences, while feasts include and kebabs; these blend Persian sofreh aghd (marriage cloth) rituals with Azerbaijani elements like bride processions. Hospitality norms dictate generous hosting with and sweets for guests, rooted in communal ties in rural and urban settings alike. Local folk events, such as nomadic cultural festivals in East Azerbaijan, showcase and crafts, though these are contemporary rather than ancient traditions.

Religion

Shi'a Islam Dominance

Iranian Azerbaijanis are overwhelmingly adherents of Twelver Shi'a , comprising the dominant religious affiliation within the community, consistent with national demographics where Shi'a Muslims constitute 90-95% of Iran's population. This predominance reflects historical integration into Iran's state-enforced religious framework, with minimal Sunni or other Muslim minorities among ethnic Azeris in provinces such as East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, , and Zanjan. Local religious practices emphasize Twelver doctrines, including belief in the and the occultation of the twelfth Imam, . The establishment of Shi'a dominance traces to the (1501–1736), originating from in the Azerbaijani region, where Shah Ismail I decreed as the official in 1501 to consolidate power against Sunni Ottoman and Uzbek threats. Prior to this, the region featured a mix of Sunni Hanafi and Shafi'i alongside lingering Zoroastrian and Christian elements from earlier eras. Conversion was achieved through aggressive policies, including importation of Shi'a scholars from and , destruction of Sunni institutions, and executions of resistant , resulting in widespread adoption by the early . By the dynasty's end in 1722, the vast majority of inhabitants in modern Iranian Azerbaijan had embraced , embedding it in social structures and folklore. Contemporary expressions of Shi'a dominance include fervent observance of rituals, particularly the first ten days mourning Imam Hussein's martyrdom at , with processions, passion plays, and in cities like and drawing massive participation. Pilgrimages to shrines such as the Imamzadeh complex in or the Safavid-era Sheikh Safi al-Din shrine in reinforce communal ties to Shi'a heritage, while Azerbaijani ulema, including prominent marja' , influence jurisprudence from seminaries. Despite occasional secular undercurrents influenced by urban migration, Shi'a identity remains a core ethnic marker, distinguishing Iranian Azerbaijanis from Sunni-majority Turkic groups elsewhere and fostering solidarity with Iran's Persian Shi'a majority.

Historical Religious Shifts and Minorities

Prior to the , the region of Iranian Azerbaijan, like much of , practiced predominantly following its introduction during the Arab conquests of the CE, with subsequent reinforcement under Turkic dynasties such as the Seljuks (11th–12th centuries), who promoted Hanafi Sunnism among the incoming Oghuz Turkic tribes that formed the basis of the Azerbaijani ethnic group. These tribes, migrating from , adopted en masse as , aligning with the Ottoman-influenced Sunni currents in the area, though Zoroastrian remnants and other pre-Islamic faiths lingered in rural pockets until at least the . The pivotal religious shift occurred under the Safavids, who seized power in 1501 CE when Shah Ismail I declared the , transforming a region historically Sunni into a Shia stronghold through systematic enforcement, including importation of Shia scholars from () and coercive measures such as forced recantations, executions of Sunni clerics, and destruction of Sunni institutions. This conversion, initially rooted in the Safavids' evolution from a Sunni-oriented Sufi order in to a militant Shia movement, affected Azerbaijani Turks directly, as the dynasty's power base was in ; by the mid-16th century, resistance had waned under Abbas I (r. 1588–1629), who intensified propagation via state-supported seminaries, resulting in over 90% adherence to in the northwest by the dynasty's end in 1722 CE. Historians note that while initial adoption involved violence—estimated tens of thousands killed in sectarian purges—the long-term entrenchment stemmed from institutionalization, intermarriage, and alignment with Persianate Shia culture, distinguishing Iranian Azerbaijanis from Sunni-majority Turkic groups elsewhere. Today, Iranian Azerbaijanis remain overwhelmingly Twelver Shia, comprising the dominant religious identity with negligible minorities; small pockets of Sunni adherents persist near the Azerbaijan Republic border, numbering fewer than 5% regionally, often linked to historical Ottoman influences rather than organized communities. Sufi orders, such as remnants of the Safavid-era Safaviyya, survive in syncretic forms within Shiism, but non-Muslim minorities like or Yarsanis are virtually absent among ethnic , who share the national Shia framework that affords them relative integration compared to Iran's Sunni or Baha'i groups. This uniformity, forged by the Safavid legacy, has buffered from the sectarian tensions affecting other Iranian minorities, though secularism has grown post-1979 Revolution, with surveys indicating lower ritual observance rates than among Persian Shia.

Notable Figures

Political and Military Leaders

(1868–1914), born in a village near in Iran's , emerged as a key military commander during the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. He led forces in defending against royalist troops during the Lesser Tyranny of 1908–1909, organizing irregular fighters into a disciplined unit that repelled sieges and contributed to the revolution's success. Mohammad Khiabani (1880–1920), a cleric and politician from Khameneh in East Azerbaijan, founded the Democrat Party branch in and led an uprising in 1920 against central government policies, establishing the short-lived Republic of Azadistan to advocate for regional autonomy and democratic reforms. His movement highlighted Azerbaijani demands for greater political representation amid post-World War I instability. In the contemporary era, (born 1939), Iran's Supreme Leader since 1989, has paternal ancestry from Khameneh, tracing to ethnic Azerbaijani roots, though raised in a Persian-speaking environment in . Previously serving as president from 1981 to 1989, his leadership has shaped Iran's theocratic governance. Masoud Pezeshkian (born 1954), elected president in 2024, is of mixed Azerbaijani-Kurdish descent with an Azerbaijani father; he speaks Azerbaijani Turkish and served as a frontline medical officer during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), later heading the health ministry and parliament. His presidency emphasizes pragmatic reforms while navigating ethnic dynamics. During the (1789–1925), which originated from Turkic tribes in the with Azerbaijani linguistic ties, military figures like (1789–1833), crown prince and regent, modernized Iran's army by adopting European tactics and leading campaigns against Russian expansion, though suffering defeats in the of 1804–1813 and 1826–1828.

Intellectuals, Artists, and Scientists

(1890–1946), born near , was a prominent Iranian intellectual, historian, and linguist who critiqued Shi'a Islam and advocated secular reforms, authoring over 70 books including analyses of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. His works emphasized and national unity, though he faced opposition from religious authorities, leading to his assassination in 1946. Samad Behrangi (1939–1968), an educator and writer of Azerbaijani origin from Tabriz, produced influential children's literature and social critiques, such as The Little Black Fish, which symbolized resistance against oppression through simple narratives aimed at rural Azerbaijani audiences. Behrangi's focus on literacy and folklore in Azerbaijani Turkish challenged Iran's centralized education system, and his suspicious drowning in the Aras River at age 29 fueled debates over political foul play. Mohammad-Hossein Shahriar (1906–1988), a of Azerbaijani ethnicity born in Khorasani village near , bridged Persian and Azerbaijani literary traditions, publishing Heydar Babaya Salam in 1954 as a nostalgic epic in Azerbaijani Turkish that evoked rural life and became a cornerstone of modern Azerbaijani-Iranian poetry. His bilingual oeuvre, including ghazals and qasidas, earned national acclaim, with annual commemorations in reflecting his enduring cultural impact. In mathematics, Mohsen Hashtroodi (1908–1976), born in , advanced as a student of in , later founding studies at the and authoring foundational Persian texts on the subject. His public lectures popularized science in , and he mentored generations of mathematicians despite political upheavals. Iranian Azerbaijanis have also contributed to fields like physics and engineering abroad, though systematic ethnic tracking in academia limits comprehensive lists.

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