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Abul A'la Maududi
Abul A'la Maududi
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Abul A'la al-Maududi (Urdu: ابو الاعلیٰ المودودی, romanizedAbū al-Aʿlā al-Mawdūdī; (1903-09-25)25 September 1903 – (1979-09-22)22 September 1979) was an Islamic scholar, Islamist ideologue, Muslim philosopher, jurist, historian, journalist, activist, and scholar active in British India and later, following the partition, in Pakistan.[1] Described by Wilfred Cantwell Smith as "the most systematic thinker of modern Islam",[2] his numerous works, which "covered a range of disciplines such as Qur'anic exegesis, hadith, law, philosophy, and history",[3] were written in Urdu, but then translated into English, Arabic, Hindi, Bengali, Telugu, Tamil, Kannada, Burmese, Malayalam and many other languages.[4] He sought to revive Islam,[5] and to propagate what he understood to be "true Islam".[6] He believed that Islam was essential for politics and that it was necessary to institute sharia and preserve Islamic culture similarly as to that during the reign of the Rashidun Caliphs and abandon immorality, from what he viewed as the evils of secularism, nationalism and socialism, which he understood to be the influence of Western imperialism.[7]

Key Information

He founded the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami.[8][9][10] At the time of the Indian independence movement, Maududi and the Jamaat-e-Islami actively worked to oppose the partition of India.[11][12][13] After it occurred, Maududi and his followers shifted their focus to politicising Islam and generating support for making Pakistan an Islamic state.[14] They are thought to have helped influence General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq to introduce the Islamisation in Pakistan,[15] and to have been greatly strengthened by him after tens of thousands of members and sympathisers were given jobs in the judiciary and civil service during his administration.[16] He was the first recipient of the Saudi Arabian King Faisal International Award for his service to Islam in 1979.[17] Maududi was part of establishing and running of Islamic University of Madinah, Saudi Arabia.[18]

Maududi is acclaimed by the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Brotherhood, Islamic Circle of North America, Hamas and other organisations.

Early life

[edit]

Background

[edit]

Maududi was born in the city of Aurangabad in colonial India, then part of the princely state enclave of Hyderabad. He was the youngest of three sons of Ahmad Hasan, a lawyer by profession.[19] His elder brother, Sayyid Abu'l Khayr Maududi (1899–1979), would later become an editor and journalist.[20]

Although his father was only middle-class, he was the descendant of the Chishti. His last name was derived from the first member of the Chishti Silsilah, i.e., Khawajah Syed Qutb ul-Din Maudood Chishti (d. 527 AH).[21][22] He stated that his paternal family originally moved from Chisht, in modern-day Afghanistan, during the days of Sikandar Lodi (d. 1517), initially settling in the state of Haryana before moving to Delhi later on, and on his mother's side, his ancestor Mirza Tulak, a soldier of Turkic origin, moved into India from Transoxiana around the times of Emperor Aurangzeb (d. 1707),[23] while his maternal grandfather, Mirza Qurban Ali Baig Khan Salik (1816–1881), was a writer and poet in Delhi, a friend of the Urdu poet Ghalib.[24]

Childhood

[edit]

Until he was nine, Maududi "received religious nurture at the hands of his father and from a variety of teachers employed by him."[21] As his father wanted him to become a maulvi, this education consisted of learning Arabic, Persian, Islamic law and Hadith.[25] He also studied books of mantiq (logic).[26][27] A precocious child, he translated Qasim Amin's al-Marah al-Jadidah ("The New Woman"), a modernist and feminist work, from Arabic into Urdu at the age of 11.[28][29] In the field of translation, years later, he also worked on some 3,500 pages from Asfar, the major work of the 17th century Persian-Shi'a mystical thinker Mulla Sadra.[30] His thought would influence Maududi, as "Sadra's notions of rejuvenation of the temporal order, and the necessity of the reign of Islamic law (Shari'ah) for the spiritual ascension of man, found an echo in Maududi's works."[31]

Education

[edit]

When he was eleven, Maududi was admitted to the eighth class directly in Madrasa Fawqaniyya Mashriqiyya (Oriental High School), Aurangabad, founded by Shibli Nomani, a modernist Islamic scholar trying to synthesise traditional Islamic scholarship with modern knowledge, and which awakened Maududi's long-lasting interest in philosophy (particularly from Thomas Arnold, who also taught the same subject to Muhammad Iqbal) as well as natural sciences, like mathematics, physics, and chemistry. He then moved to a more traditionalist Darul Uloom in Hyderabad. Meanwhile, his father shifted to Bhopal – there Maududi befriended Niaz Fatehpuri, another modernist – where he suffered a severe paralysis attack and died leaving no property or money, forcing his son to abort his education. In 1919 by the time he was 16, and still a modernist in mindset, he moved to Delhi and read books by his distant relative, the reformist Sayyid Ahmad Khan. He also learned English and German to study, intensively, Western philosophy, sociology, and history for full five years: he eventually came up to the conclusion that "ulama' in the past did not endeavor to discover the causes of Europe's rise, and he offered a long list of philosophers whose scholarship had made Europe a world power: Fichte, Hegel, Comte, Mill, Turgot, Adam Smith, Malthus, Rousseau, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Darwin, Goethe, and Herder, among others. Comparing their contribution to that of Muslims, he concluded that the latter did not reach even 1 percent."[25]

Journalism

[edit]

Despite his initial publication on electricity in 'Maarif' in 1918 at the age of 15[32] and his subsequent appointment as editor of the weekly Urdu newspaper Taj in 1920 at the age of 17,[33] he subsequently resumed his studies as an autodidact in 1921. Notably through the influence of certain members of the Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, he pursued subjects such as philosophical theology and the Dars-e-Nizami curriculum.[34] Maududi obtained ijazahs, which are certificates and diplomas in traditional Islamic learning. However, he abstained from referring to himself as an ''alim in the formal sense, as he perceived the Islamic scholars as regressive, despite some influence from Deobandi on him:[35]

He said that he was a middle-class man who had learned through both new and old ways of learning. Maududi concluded that neither the traditional nor the contemporary schools are entirely correct, based on his own inner guidance.

Maududi worked as the editor of al-Jamiah, a newspaper of a group of orthodox Muslims, from 1924 to 1927. This time was critical and had a lot of influence.

Maududi, who has consistently remained committed to securing independence from Britain, began to question the legitimacy of the Indian National Congress and its Muslim allies during the 1920s, when the party adopted a more Hindu identity. He began to gravitate towards Islam,[36] and he believed that democracy would only be viable if the vast majority of Indians were Muslims.[36]

Maududi returned to Hyderabad in 1928 after spending some time in Delhi as a young man.[37]

Political writings

[edit]

Maududi's works were written and published throughout his life, including influential works from 1933 to 1941. Maududi's most well-known work, and widely considered his most important and influential work, is the Tafhim-ul-Quran (Urdu: تفہيم القرآن‎, Romanised: Towards Understanding the Qur'an), a 6-volume translation and commentary of the Qur'an which Maududi spent many years writing (which was begun in Muharram, 1361 A.H./February 1942).

In 1932, he joined another journal (Tarjuman al-Quran) and from 1932 to 1937 he began to develop his political ideas,[21] and turn towards the cause of Islamic revivalism and Islam as an ideology,[38] over what he called "traditional and hereditary religion".[39] The government of Hyderabad helped support the journal by buying 300 subscriptions which it donated to libraries around India.[40] Maududi was alarmed by the decline of Muslim ruled Hyderabad, the increasing secularism and lack of purdah among Muslim women in Delhi.[41]

By 1937, he became in conflict with Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and its support for a pluralistic Indian society where the Jamiat hoped Muslims could "thrive ... without sacrificing their identity or interests".[42] In that year he also married Mahmudah Begum, a woman from an old Muslim family with "considerable financial resources". The family provide financial help and allowed him to devote himself to research and political action, but his wife had "liberated", modern ways, and at first rode a bicycle and did not observe purdah. She was given greater latitude by Maududi than were other Muslims.[43]

Political activity

[edit]

At this time he also began work on establishing an organisation for Da'wah (propagation and preaching of Islam) that would be an alternative to both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League.[44]

At this time he decided to leave Hyderabad for Northwest India, closer to the Muslim political center of gravity in India. In 1938, after meeting the famous Muslim poet Muhammad Iqbal, Maududi moved to a piece of land in the village of Pathankot in the Punjab to oversee a Waqf (Islamic foundation) called Daru'l-Islam.[45]

His hope was to make it a "nerve center" of Islamic revival in India, an ideal religious community, providing leaders and the foundation for a genuine religious movement. He wrote to various Muslim luminaries invited them to join him there.[46] The community, like Jamaat-e-Islami later, was composed of rukn (members), a shura (a consultative council), and a sadr (head).[47] After a dispute with the person who donated the land for the community over Maududi's anti-nationalist politics, Maududi quit the waqf and in 1939 moved the Daru'l-Islam with its membership from Pathankot to Lahore.[47]

In Lahore he was hired by Islamiyah College but was sacked after less than a year for his openly political lectures.[48]

Founding the Jamaat-i-Islami

[edit]
Main entrance of the House of Syed Abul A'la Maududi 4-A, Zaildar Park, Ichhra, Lahore.

In August 1941, Maududi founded Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) in British India as a religious political movement to promote Islamic values and practices. His Mission was supported by Amin Ahsan Islahi, Muhammad Manzoor Naumani, Abul Hassan Ali Nadvi and Naeem Siddiqui.[citation needed]

Jamaat-e-Islami actively opposed the partition of India, with its leader Abul A'la Maududi arguing that concept violated the Islamic doctrine of the ummah.[11][12][13] The Jamaat-e-Islami saw the partition as creating a temporal border that would divide Muslims from one another.[11][12]

Maududi held that humans should accept God's sovereignty and adopt the divine code, which supersedes manmade laws, terming it a "theodemocracy",[49] because its rule would be based on the entire Muslim community, not the ulama (Islamic scholars).[50]

Maududi migrated to Lahore, which became part of the new state of Pakistan.[12]

After the creation of Pakistan

[edit]

With the partition of India in 1947, the JI was split to follow the political boundaries of new countries carved out of British India. The organisation headed by Maududi became known as Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan, and the remnant of JI in India as the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind. Later JI parties were the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and autonomous groups in Indian Kashmir.[51]

With the founding of Pakistan, Maududi's career underwent a "fundamental change", being drawn more and more into politics, and spending less time on ideological and scholarly pursuits.[52] Although his Jamaat-e-Islami party never developed a mass following, it and Maududi did develop significant political influence. It played a "prominent part" in the agitation which brought down President Muhammad Ayub Khan in 1969 and in the overthrow of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1977.[53] Ideas of Maududi and the JI were especially influential in the early years of Muhammad Zia ul-Haq's rule.

His political activity, particularly in support of the creation of an Islamic state clashed with the government, (dominated for many years by a secular political class), and resulted in several arrests and periods of incarceration. The first was in 1948 when he and several other JI leaders were jailed after Maududi objected to the government's clandestine sponsorship of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir while professing to observe a ceasefire with India.[54][12]

In 1951[55] and again in 1956-7,[56] the compromises involved in electoral politics led to a split in the party over what some members felt were a lowering of JI's moral standards. In 1951, the JI shura passed a resolution in support of the party withdrawing from politics,[55] while Maududi argued for continued involvement. Maududi prevailed at an open party meeting in 1951, and several senior JI leaders resigned in protest, further strengthened Maududi's position and beginning the growth of a "cult of personality" around him."[55] In 1957 Maududi again overruled the vote of the shura to withdraw from electoral politics.[56]

In 1953, he and the JI participated in a campaign against the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan.[12] Anti-Ahmadi groups argued that the Ahmadiyya did not embrace Muhammad as the last prophet. Maududi as well as the traditionalist ulama of Pakistan wanted Ahmadi designated as non-Muslims, Ahmadis such as Muhammad Zafarullah Khan sacked from all high level government positions, and intermarriage between Ahmadis and other Muslims prohibited.[57] The campaign generated riots in Lahore, leading to the deaths of at least 200 Ahmadis, and selective declaration of martial law.[51]

Maududi was arrested by the military deployment headed by Lieutenant General Azam Khan and sentenced to death for his part in the agitation.[53] However, the anti-Ahmadi campaign enjoyed much popular support,[58] and strong public pressure ultimately convinced the government to release him after two years of imprisonment.[53][59] According to Vali Nasr, Maududi's unapologetic and impassive stance after being sentenced, ignoring advice to ask for clemency, had an "immense" effect on his supporters.[60] It was seen as a "victory of Islam over un-Islam", proof of his leadership and staunch faith.[60]

In particular, Maududi advocated that the Pakistani state should be in accordance to Quran and Sunnah, including in terms of conventional banking and rights to Muslims, minorities, Christians, and other religious sects such as the Ahmadiyya.[61]

An Islamic state is a Muslim state, but a Muslim state may not be an Islamic state unless and until the Constitution of the state is based on the Qur'an and Sunnah.

The campaign shifted the focus of national politics towards Islamicity.[62] The 1956 Constitution was adopted after accommodating many of the demands of the JI. Maududi endorsed the constitution and claimed it a victory for Islam.[62]

However following a coup by General Ayub Khan, the constitution was shelved and Maududi and his party were politically repressed, Maududi being imprisoned in 1964 and again in 1967. The JI joined an opposition alliance with secular parties, compromising with doctrine to support a woman candidate (Fatima Jinnah) for president against Khan in 1965.[62] In the December 1970 general election, Maududi toured the country as a "leader in waiting"[63] and JI spent considerable energy and resources fielding 151 candidates. Despite this, the party won only four seats in the national assembly and four in the provincial assemblies.[63]

The loss led Maududi to withdraw from political activism in 1971 and return to scholarship.[64] In 1972 he resigned as JI's Ameer (leader) for reasons of health.[51] However it was shortly thereafter that Islamism gathered steam in Pakistan in the form of the Nizam-i-Mustafa (Order of the Prophet) movement, an alliance of conservative political groups united against Zulfikar Ali Bhutto which the JI gave shape to and which bolstered its standing.[53][65]

In 1977, Maududi "returned to the center stage". When Bhutto attempted to defuse tensions on 16 April 1977, he came to Maududi's house for consultations.[65] When General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq overthrew Bhutto and came to power in 1977, he "accorded Mawdudi the status of a senior statesman, sought his advice, and allowed his words to adorn the front pages of the newspapers. Maududi proved receptive to Zia's overtures and supported his decision to execute Bhutto."[65] Despite some doctrinal difference (Maududi wanted sharia by education rather than by state fiat[66]), Maududi enthusiastically supported Zia and his program of Islamisation or "Sharisation".[53]

Beliefs and ideology

[edit]

Maududi poured his energy into books, pamphlets and more than 1000 speeches and press statements, laying the ground work for making Pakistan an Islamic state, but also dealing with a variety of issues of interest in Pakistan and the Muslim world.[4] He sought to be a Mujaddid, "renewing" (tajdid) the religion. This role had great responsibility as he believed a Mujaddid "on the whole, has to undertake and perform the same kind of work as is accomplished by a Prophet."[67] While earlier mujaddids had renewed religion he wanted also "to propagate true Islam, the absence of which accounted for the failure of earlier efforts at tajdid."[68][69][70] He was very much disheartened after the Ottoman collapse, he believed the limited vision of Muslims to Islam rather than a complete ideology of living, was its main cause. He argued that to revive the lost Islamic pride, Muslims must accept Islam as complete way of living.[citation needed]

Mawdudi was highly influenced by the ideas of the medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyya, particularly his treatises that emphasised the Sovereignty (Hakimiyya) of God. Mawdudi would stress that armed Jihad was imperative for all contemporary Muslims and like Sayyid Qutb, called for a "universal Jihad".[71] According to at least one biographer (Vali Nasr), Maududi and the JI moved away from some of their more controversial doctrinal ideas (e.g. criticism of Sufism or the Ulama) and closer to orthodox Islam over the course of his career, in order to "expand" the "base of support" of Jama'at-e Islami.[72]

Qur'an

[edit]

Maududi believed that the Quran was not just religious literature to be "recited, pondered, or investigated for hidden truths" according to Vali Nasr, but a "socio-religious institution",[73] a work to be accepted "at face value" and obeyed.[74] By implementing its prescriptions the ills of societies would be solved.[74] It pitted truth and bravery against ignorance, falsehood and evil.[75]

The Qur'an is ... a Book which contains a message, an invitation, which generates a movement. The moment it began to be sent down, it impelled a quiet and pious man to ... raise his voice against falsehood, and pitted him in a grim struggle against the lords of disbelief, evil and iniquity.... it drew every pure and noble soul, and gathered them under the banner of truth. In every part of the country, it made all the mischievous and the corrupt to rise and wage war against the bearers of the truth.[76]

In his tafsir (Quranic interpretation) Tafhimu'l-Qur'an, he introduced the four interrelated concepts he believed essential to understanding the Quran: ilah (divinity), rabb (lord), ibadah (worship, meaning not the cherishing or praising of God but acting out absolute obedience to Him[77]), and din (religion).[73]

Islam

[edit]

Maududi saw Muslims not simply as those who followed the religion of Islam, but as (almost) everything, because obedience to divine law is what defines a Muslim: "Everything in the universe is 'Muslim' for it obeys Allah by submission to His laws."[78] The laws of the physical universe – that Heaven is above the Earth, that night follows day, etc. – were as much a part of sharia as banning consumption of alcohol and interest on debts. Thus it followed that stars, planets, oceans, rocks, atoms, etc. should actually be considered "Muslims" since they obey their creator's laws.[78]

Rather than Muslims being a minority among humans — one religious group among many — it is non-Muslims who are a small minority among everything in the universe. Of all creatures only humans (and jinn) are endowed with free will, and only non-Muslim humans (and jinn) choose to use that will to disobey the laws of their creator.[78]

Maududi believed that those elements of divine law of Islam applying to human beings covered all aspects of life.

Islam is not a 'religion' in the sense this term is commonly understood. It is a system encompassing all fields of living. Islam means politics, economics, legislation, science, humanism, health, psychology and sociology. It is a system which makes no discrimination on the basis of race, color, language or other external categories. Its appeal is to all mankind. It wants to reach the heart of every human being.[79]

Mawdudi adopted Hanbali theologian Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines on apostasy, which asserted that an individual may only be considered a Muslim if his or her beliefs found an adequate representation in their acts.[80] Describing the essential conditions of Islam and stressing the difference between a Muslims and non-Muslims; Mawdudi states:

'Islam is first of all the name of knowledge [ʿilm] and, after knowledge, the name of action [ʿamal]', that 'after you have acquired knowledge it is a necessity to also act upon it', and that 'a Muslim is distinct from an unbeliever [kāfir] only by two things: one is knowledge, the other action [upon it]'.[80]

But in rejecting Islam (Maududi believed) the non-Muslim struggled against truth:

His very tongue which, on account of his ignorance advocates the denial of God or professes multiple deities, is in its very nature 'Muslim'.... The man who denies God is called Kafir (concealer) because he conceals by his disbelief what is inherent in his nature and embalmed in his own soul. His whole body functions in obedience to that instinct.... Reality becomes estranged from him and he in the dark.[81]

Since a Muslim is the one who obeys divine law, simply having made a shahada (declaration of belief in the oneness of God and the acceptance of Muhammad as God's prophet) or being born into a Muslim family does not make you a Muslim.[82][83] Nor is seeking "knowledge of God" part of the religion of Islam.[84] The Muslim is a "slave of God", and "absolute obedience to God" is a "fundamental right" of God. The Muslim does "not have the right to choose a way of life for himself or assume whatever duties he likes."[85]

Though he set a high bar for who would qualify as a Muslim, Maududi was adamant that the punishment for a Muslim leaving the faith was death. He wrote that among early Muslims, among the schools of fiqh both Sunni and Shia, among scholars of shari'ah "of every century ... available on record", there is unanimous agreement that the punishment for apostate is death, and that "no room whatever remains to suggest" that this penalty has not "been continuously and uninterruptedly operative" through Islamic history; evidence from early texts that Muhammad called for apostates to be killed, and that companions of the Prophet and early caliphs ordered beheadings and crucifixions of apostates and has never been declared invalid over the course of the history of Islamic theology (Christine Schirrmacher).[86]

Of all aspects of Islam, Maududi was primarily interested in culture[7]—preserving Islamic dress, language and customs,[87] from (what he believed were) the dangers of women's emancipation, secularism, nationalism, etc.[7] It was also important to separate the realm of Islam from non-Islam—to form "boundaries" around Islam.[88][89][90] It would also be proven scientifically (Maududi believed) that Islam would "eventually ... emerge as the World-Religion to cure Man of all his maladies."[91][92]

But what many Muslims, including many Ulama, considered Islam, Maududi did not. Maudid complained that "not more than 0.001%" of Muslim knew what Islam actually was.[77][93] Maududi not only idealised the first years of Muslim society (Muhammad and the "rightly guided" Caliphs),[94] but considered what came after to be un-Islamic or jahiliya—with the exception of brief religious revivals.[95] Muslim philosophy, literature, arts, mysticism were syncretic and impure, diverting attention from the divine.[96]

Hadith

[edit]

Maududi had a unique perspective on the transmission of hadith—the doings and sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad that were passed on orally before being written down, and which form most of the basis of Islamic law. The authenticity and "quality" of hadith are traditionally left to the judgments of "generations of muhaddithin" (hadith scholars) who base their decisions on factors like the number of chains of oral transmission (known as isnad) passing down the text of the hadith (matn) and reliability of the transmitters/narrators passing down the hadith in the chain. But Maududi believed that "with extensive study and practice one can develop a power and can intuitively sense the wishes and desires of the Holy Prophet", and that he had that intuitive ability. "Thus ... on seeing a Hadith, I can tell whether the Holy Prophet could or could not have said it."[97] Maududi also disagreed with many traditional/conservative Muslims in arguing that evaluating hadith, traditional hadith scholars had ignored the importance of the matn (content) in favor of the isnad (chain of transmission of the hadith).[98] Maududi also broke with traditional doctrine by raising the question of the reliability of companions of the prophet as transmitters of hadith, saying "even the noble Companions were overcome by human weaknesses, one attacking another."[99]

Sunnah

[edit]

Maududi wrote a number of essays on the sunnah[100][101]—the customs and practices of Muhammad—and sought a middle way between the belief of conservative Islamists that the sunnah of the prophet should be obeyed in every aspect, and the traditions that tells us that Muhammad made mistakes,[102] and was not always obeyed by his followers (Zayd divorced his wife against the wishes of Muhammad).[103] Mawdudi argued that mistakes by Muhammad corrected by God mentioned in the Quran should be thought of not as an indication of Muhammad's human frailty but of how God monitored his behavior and corrected even his smallest errors.[103] Mawdudi concluded that in theory (naẓarī) the Prophet's prophetic and personal capacities are separate and distinct, but in practice (ʿamalī) it is "neither practical nor permissible" for mortals to decide for themselves which is which, and so Muslims should not disregard any aspect of the sunnah.[103]

Women

[edit]

According to Irfan Ahmad, while Maududi opposed all Western influence in Islam, "the greatest threat to morality" to him was "women's visibility" in the bazaar, colleges, theatres, restaurants. "Art, literature, music, film, dance, use of makeup by women: all were shrieking signs of immorality."[104]

Maududi preached that the duty of women is to manage the household, bring up children and provide them and her husband with "the greatest possible comfort and contentment".[105] Maududi supported the complete veiling and segregation of women as practiced in most of Muslim India of his time. Women, he believed, should remain in their homes except when absolutely necessary. The only room for argument he saw in the matter of veiling/hijab was "whether the hands and the face" of women "were to be covered or left uncovered."[106][107] On this question Maududi came down on the side of the complete covering of women's faces whenever they left their homes.[106]

Concerning the separation of the genders, he preached that men should avoid looking at women other than their wives, mothers, sisters, etc. (mahram), much less trying to make their acquaintance.[108] He opposed birth control and family planning as a "rebellion against the laws of nature",[109] and a reflection of loss of faith in God—who is the planner of human population[110]—and unnecessary because population growth leads to economic development.[106] Mohammad Najatuallah Siddiqui writes:

As to the argument that family planning enables better nourishment and education of children, Mawdudi refers to the beneficial effects of adversity and want on human character.[111][112]

Maududi opposed allowing women to be either a head of state or a legislator, since "according to Islam, active politics and administration are not the field of activity of the womenfolk."[113] They would be allowed to elect their own all-woman legislature which the men's legislature should consult on all matters concerning women's welfare. Their legislature would also have "the full right to criticise matters relating to the general welfare of the country," though not to vote on them.[113]

Music

[edit]

Maududi saw music and dancing as social evils. In describing the wickedness that comes of ignoring Islamic law he included not only leaving the poor to "starvation and destitution" while wallowing in luxury, liquor and drugs, but having "a regular need" for music, satisfied with "musicians, dancing girls, drum-beaters and manufacturers of musical instruments".[114]

Economics

[edit]

His 1941 lecture "The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution" is generally considered to be one of the founding document of modern Islamic economics.[115][116][117] Maududi has been called the leader of the "vanguard of contemporary Islamic orthodoxy" in "riba and finance"[117] and credited with laying "down the foundations for development" of Islamic economics.[118]

However, Maududi believed Islam "does not concern itself with the modes of production and circulation of wealth",[119] and was primarily interested in cultural issues rather than socioeconomic ones.[62] Maududi dismissed the need for a "new science of economics, embodied in voluminous books, with high-sounding terminology and large organisation",[120] or other "experts and specialists" which he believed to be "one of the many calamities of modern age".[121] But since Islam was a complete system, it included (a shariah-based) economic program, comparable and superior to other economic systems. Capitalism was a "satanic economic system" starting with the fact that it called for the postponement of some consumption in favor of investment.

One of the major fallacies of economics was that it regarded "as foolish and morally reprehensible" spending "all that one earns, and everyone is told that he should save something out of his income and have his savings deposited in the bank or purchase an insurance policy or invest it in stocks and shares of joint-stock companies." In fact, the practice of saving and not spending some income is "ruinous for humanity".[122] This led to overproduction and a downward spiral of lower wages, protectionism, trade wars and desperate attempts to export surplus production and capital through imperialist invasions of other countries,[123] finally ending in "the destruction of the whole society as every learned economist knows".[124]

On the other hand, socialism — by putting control of the means and distribution of production in the hands of the government – concentrates power to such an extent it inevitably leads to enslavement of the masses.[125] Socialists sought to end economic exploitation and poverty by structural changes and putting an end to private ownership of production and property. But in fact poverty and exploitation is caused not by the profit motive but by the lack of "virtue and public welfare" among the wealthy, which in turn comes from a lack of adherence to sharia law.[126] In an Islamic society, greed, selfishness and dishonesty would be replaced by virtue, eliminating the need for the state to make any significant intervention in the economy.[127]

According to Maududi, this system would strike a "golden mean" between the two extremes of laissez-faire capitalism and a regimented socialist/communist society,[128] embodying all of the virtues and none of the vices of the two inferior systems.[129] It would not be some kind of mixed economy/social democratic compromise (as some alleged), because by following Islamic law and banning alcohol, pork, adultery, music, dancing, interest on loans, gambling, speculation, fraud, and "other similar things",[130] it would be distinct and superior to all other systems.[129]

Before the economy (like the government, and other parts of society) could be Islamised, an Islamic revolution-through-education would have to take place to develop this virtue and create support for total sharia law.[127] This put Maududi at a political disadvantage with populist and socialist programs because his solution was "neither immediate nor tangible".[131]

Banning interest

[edit]

Of all the elements of Islamic laws dealing with property and money (payment of zakat and other Islamic taxes, etc.), Maududi emphasised the elimination of interest on loans (riba). (According to one scholar, this was because in British India Hindus dominated the money lending trade.)[127]

Maududi opposed any and all interest on loans as unIslamic riba. He taught that there

is hardly a country of the world in which moneylenders and banks are not sucking the blood of poor labouring classes, farmers and low income groups ... A major portion of the earning of a working man is expropriated by the moneylenders, leaving the poor man with hardly enough money to feed himself and his family.[132]

While the Quran forbid many sins, it saved its "severest terms" of punishment – according to Maududi – for use of interest.[Note 1]

He believed there was no such thing as a low "reasonable rate of interest"[133] and that even "the smallest and apparently harmless form"[124] of interest was intolerable in Islam as rates would inevitably increased over time when the "capitalists" (moneylenders) squeezed the entrepreneurs (borrowers) eliminating any entrepreneurial profit.[134][135] To replace interest-based finance he proposed "direct equity investment" (aka Profit and loss sharing), which he asserted would favor "societally profitable" ventures such as low-income housing that conventional finance ignores in favour of commercially profitable ones.[136] To eliminate the charging of interest he proposed penal punishment with the death penalty for repeat offenders.[137][138]

Feisal Khan says Maududi's description of interest-based finance resembles that of the dynamic between South Asian peasant and village moneylender rather than between modern bank lender and borrower; nor did Maududi give any explanation why direct equity finance would lead to any more investment in what is good for society but not commercially profitable for financiers than interest-based lending has.[139]

Socialism and populism

[edit]

Unlike Islamists such as Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Maududi had a visceral antipathy to socialism,[131] which he spent much time denouncing as "godless" as well as being unnecessary and redundant in the face of the Islamic state.[131] A staunch defender of the rights of property, he warned workers and peasants that "you must never take the exaggerated view of your rights which the protagonists of class war present before you."[131][140] He also did not believe in intervention in the economy to provide universal employment.

Islam does not make it binding on society to provide employment for each and every one of its citizens, since this responsibility cannot be accepted without thorough nationalisation of the country's resources.[127][141]

Maududi held to this position despite his florid denunciations of how the rich were "sucking the blood" and enslaving the poor,[132][142] the popularity of populism among many Pakistanis,[131] and the poverty and vast gap between rich and poor in Pakistan (a situation often described a "feudal" (jagirdari) in its large landholdings and rural poverty).

He openly opposed land reform proposals for Punjab by Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan in the 1950s, going so far as to justify feudalism by pointing to Islam's protection of property rights.[143] He later softened his views, extolling economic justice and equity (but not egalitarianism),[144] but cautioned the government against tampering with "lawful Jagirdari",[143] and continuing to emphasise the sanctity of private property.[144]

Islamic Modernism

[edit]

Maududi believed that Islam supported modernisation but not Westernisation.[145] He agreed with Islamic Modernists that Islam contained nothing contrary to reason, and that it was superior in rational terms to all other religious systems. He disagreed with their practice of examining the Quran and the Sunnah using reason as the standard, instead of starting from the proposition that "true reason is Islamic" and accepting the Book and the Sunnah, rather than reason, as the final authority.[146]

He also took a narrow view of ijtihad, limiting the authority to use it to those with thorough grounding in Islamic sciences, faith in the sharia, and then only to serve the needs of his vision of an Islamic state.[147]

At the same time, one scholar, Maryam Jameelah, has noted the extensive use of modern, non-traditionally Islamic ideas and "Western idioms and concepts" in Maududi's thought.

Islam was a "revolutionary ideology" and a "dynamic movement", the Jama'at-e-Islami, was a "party", the Shari'ah a complete "code" in Islam's "total scheme of life." His enthusiasm for [Western idioms and concepts] was infectious among those who admired him, encouraging them to implement in Pakistan all his "manifestos", "programmes" and "schemes'", to usher in a true Islamic "renaissance".[87][148]

Mughal Empire

[edit]

Abul A'la Maududi, condemned Mughal Emperor Akbar's belief in an individual's common spirituality (controversially known as the Din-e Ilahi, or "Religion of God") as a form of apostasy. (Contemporary scholars such as S. M. Ikram argue that Akbar's true intentions were to create an iradat or muridi (discipleship) and not a new religion.)[149]

Maududi appears to be a critic of not only Western Civilisation but also of the Mughal Empire, many of whose achievements he deemed "Unislamic".

Secularism

[edit]

Maududi did not see secularism as a way for the state/government to dampen tensions and divisions in multi-religious societies by remaining religiously neutral and avoid choosing sides. Rather, he believed, it removed religion from society (he translated secularism into Urdu as la din, literally "religionless"[150]). Since (he believed) all morality came from religion, this would necessarily mean "the exclusion of all morality, ethics, or human decency from the controlling mechanisms of society."[151] It was to avoid the "restraints of morality and divine guidance", and not out of pragmatism or some higher motive, that some espoused secularism.[152]

Science

[edit]

Maududi believed "modern science was a 'body' that could accommodate any 'spirit'—philosophy or value system—just as radio could broadcast Islamic or Western messages with equal facility."[153]

Nationalism

[edit]

Maududi strongly opposed the concept of nationalism, believing it to be shirk (polytheism),[154][155] and "a Western concept which divided the Muslim world and thus prolonged the supremacy of Western imperialist powers".[156] After Pakistan was formed, Maududi and the JI forbade Pakistanis to take an oath of allegiance to the state until it became Islamic, arguing that a Muslim could in clear conscience render allegiance only to God.[54][157]

Ulama

[edit]

Maududi also criticised traditionalist clergy or ulama for their "moribund" scholastic style, "servile" political attitudes, and "ignorance" of the modern world".[158] He believed traditional scholars were unable to distinguish the fundamentals of Islam from the details of its application, built up in elaborate structures of medieval legal schools of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence). To rid Islam of these obscure laws Muslims should return to the Quran and Sunna, ignoring judgments made after the reign of the first four "rightfully guided" caliphs (al-Khulafāʾu ar-Rāshidūn) of Islam.[159]

Maududi also believed there would be little need for the traditional roll of ulama as "leaders, judges, and guardians of the community", in a "reformed and rationalised Islamic order" where those trained in modern as well as traditional subjects would practice ijtihad and where Muslims were educated properly in Arabic, the Quran, Hadith, etc.[158]

However, over time Maududi became more orthodox in his attitudes,[160] including toward the ulama, and at times allied himself and his party with them after the formation of Pakistan.[161]

[edit]

Like other contemporary revivalists, Maududi was critical of Sufism and its historical influence in the early part of his life.[162][163] However, as he got older, his views on Sufism changed and focused his criticism mainly on unorthodox and popular practices of Sufism that was not based on the Sharia [164] In his youth, Maududi studied various sciences of Tasawwuf under the Deobandi seminary in Fatihpuri Mosque; from where he obtained an Ijazat (certificate) on the subject "gradations of mystical ecstasy" in 1926. Influenced by the Deobandi reformist doctrines and writings of past scholars like Ibn Taymiyya and Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab; Mawdudi opposed folkish forms of excessive Sufism. Maududi's conception of Tasawwuf was based on strict adherence to Qur'an and Sunnah like those of the earlier Sufis. He was heavily critical of the cult of saints that developed during the medieval period of Islam, and believed that abiding by the sharia (Islamic law) was essential to achieve Zuhd and Ihsan. Most significantly, Maududi asserts that the very highest stage of Ihsan was to be reached through collective societal efforts that establishes a just Islamic state as what occurred during the early period of Islam in the Rashidun Calpihate.[165]

Maududi would later clarify that he did not have any antagonism towards Sufism as a whole; by himself or the Jama'at.[166][167] (According to at least one biographer, this change in position was a result of the importance of Sufism in Pakistan not only among the Muslim masses but the ulama as well.)[168] Maududi distinguished between the Orthodox Sufism of Shaikhs like 'Alau'ddin Shah which were bounded in the Sharia (which he approved of), and the shrines, festivals, and rituals of unorthodox popular Sufism (which he did not).[166] While praising Tasawwuf that strictly abides by the Qur'an and Sunnah, Mawdudi condemned later manifestations of Sufism, writing in Risala-i Diniyya (Treatise on Religion):

"They polluted the pure spring of Islamic Tasawwuf with absurdities that could not be justified by any stretch of imagination on the basis of the Qur'an and the Hadith. Gradually a section of Muslims appeared who thought and proclaimed themselves immune to and above the requirements of the Shari'ah. These people are totally ignorant of Islam, for Islam cannot admit of Tasawwuf that loosens itself out of the Shariah and takes liberties with it. No Sufi has the right to transgress the limits of the Shariah or treat lightly the primary obligations such as daily prayers, fasting, zakat and the Hajj"[165]

He "redefined" Sufism, describing it not in the modern sense as the form and spirit of an "esoteric dimension" of Islam, but as the way to measure "concentration" and "morals" in religion, saying: "For example, when we say our prayers, Fiqh will judge us only by fulfillment of the outward requirements such as ablution, facing toward the Ka'ba ... while Tasawwuf (Sufism) will judge our prayers by our concentration ... the effect of our prayers on our morals and manners."[166][169]

Sufism is a reality whose signs are the love of Allah and the love of the Prophet (s), where one absents oneself for their sake, and one is annihilated from anything other than them, and it is to know how to follow the footsteps of the Prophet (s). ..Tasawwuf searched for the sincerity in the heart and the purity in the intention and the trustworthiness in obedience in an individual's actions." "The Divine Law and Sufism: "Sufism and Shariah: what is the similitude of the two? They are like the body and the soul. The body is the external knowledge, the Divine Law, and the spirit is the internal knowledge.[170]

From the mid-1960s onward, "redefinition" of Islam "increasingly gave way to outright recognition of Tasawwuf", and after Maududi's death the JI amir Qazi Hussain Ahmad went so far as to visit the Sufi Data Durbar in Lahore in 1987 as part of a tour to generate mass support for JI.[72] However, as of 2000s, Jamaat-e Islami has grown more critical of certain Sufi trends.[171]

Sharia

[edit]

Maududi believed that sharia was not just a crucial command that helped define what it meant to be a Muslim, but something without which a Muslim society could not be Islamic:

That if an Islamic society consciously resolves not to accept the sharia, and decides to enact its own constitution and laws or borrow them from any other source in disregard of the sharia, such a society breaks its contract with God and forfeits its right to be called 'Islamic.'"[172]

Many unbelievers agreed that God was the creator, what made them unbelievers was their failure to submit to his will, i.e. to God's law. Obedience to God's law or will was "the historical controversy that Islam has awakened" throughout the world. It brought not only heavenly reward, but earthly blessing. Failure to obey, or "rebellion" against it, brought not only eternal punishment, but evil and misery here on earth.[78]

The source of sharia, was to be found not only in the Quran but also in the Sunnah (the doings and sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad), since the Quran proclaimed "Whoever obeys the messenger [i.e. Muhammad] obeys Allah."[Quran 4:80][173] Sharia was perhaps most famous for calling for the abolition of interest-bearing banks, hadd penalties such as flogging and amputation for alcohol consumption, theft, fornication, adultery and other crimes.[174] Hadd penalties have been criticised by Westernised Muslims as cruel and in violation of international human rights but Maududi argued that any cruelty was far outweighed by the cruelty in the West that resulted from the absence of these punishments,[175][176][177] and in any case would not be applied until Muslims fully understood the teachings of their faith and lived in an Islamic state.[175]

But in fact sharia was much more than these laws. It recognises no division between religion and other aspects of life, in Maududi's view,[178][179] and there was no area of human activity or concern which the sharia did not address with specific divine guidance.[151]

Family relationships, social and economic affairs, administration, rights and duties of citizens, judicial system, laws of war and peace and international relations. In short it embraces all the various departments of life ... The sharia is a complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order where nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking.[180][181]

A "very large part" of sharia required "the coercive power and authority of the state" for its enforcement.[182] Consequently, while a state based on Islam has a legislature which the ruler must consult, its function "is really that of law-finding, not of law-making."[183]

At the same time, Maududi states ("somewhat astonishingly" according to one scholar)[184] "there is yet another vast range of human affairs about which sharia is totally silent" and which an Islamic state may write "independent" legislation.[184]

According to scholar (Vali Nasr), Maududi believed that the sharia needed to be "streamlined, reinterpreted, and expanded" to "address questions of governance to the extent required for a state to function." For example, sharia needed to "make clear the relation between the various branches of government".[185]

Islamic Revolution

[edit]

Though the phrase "Islamic Revolution" is commonly associated with the 1979 Iranian Revolution,[186] (or General Zia's Islamisation),[187] Maududi coined and popularised it in the 1940s. The process Maududi envisioned—changing the hearts and minds of individuals from the top of society downward through an educational process or da'wah[188]—was very different than what happened in Iran, or under Zia ul-Haq. Maududi talked of Islam being "a revolutionary ideology and a revolutionary practice which aims at destroying the social order of the world totally and rebuilding it from scratch",[189][190][191] but opposed sudden change, violent or unconstitutional action, and was uninterested in grassroots organising, socio-economic changes, or even street demonstrations, often associated with revolutions.

His "revolution" would be achieved "step-by-step"[192][193] with "patience",[194] since "the more sudden a change, the more short-lived it is."[195] He warned against the emotionalism of "demonstrations or agitations, ... flag waving, slogans ... impassioned speeches ... or the like".[196] He believed that "societies are built, structured, and controlled from the top down by conscious manipulation of those in power,"[197] not by grassroots movements. The revolution would be carried out by training a cadre of pious and dedicated men who would lead and then protect the Islamic revolutionary process.[188] To facilitate this far-reaching program of cultural change, his party "invested heavily" in producing and disseminating publications.[187]

Maududi was committed to non-violent legal politics "even if the current methods of struggle takes a century to bear fruit."[198] In 1957 he outlined a new Jama'at policy declaring that "transformation of the political order through unconstitutional means" was against sharia law.[199] Even when he and his party were repressed by the Ayub Khan or People's Party (in 1972) governments, Maududi kept his party from clandestine activity.[200] It was not until he retired as emir of JI that JI and Jam'iat-e Tulabah "became more routinely involved in violence."[144]

The objective of the revolution was to be justice (adl) and benevolence (ihsan), but the injustice and wrong to be overcome that he focused on was immorality (fahsha) and forbidden behavior (munkarat).[198] Maududi was interested in ethical changes, rather than socio-economic changes of the sort that drive most historical revolutions and revolutionary movements. He did not support these (for example, opposing land reform in the 1950s as an encroachment on property rights)[143] and believed the problems they addressed would be solved by the Islamic state established by the revolution.[201]

Islamic state

[edit]

The modern conceptualisation of the "Islamic state" is also attributed to Maududi.[186] This term was coined and popularised in his book, The Islamic Law and Constitution (1941),[202] and in subsequent writings.[186]

After the creation of Pakistan, Maududi's "concentrated" his efforts on converting it to an Islamic state, where he envisioned Sharia would be enforced—banks that charged and gave interest would be abolished, the sexes would be segregated, hijab compulsory, and the hadd penalties (public lashing, amputation of hands and/or feet, stoning to death, etc.) for theft, alcohol consumption, adultery and other crimes.[203]

Maududi's Islamic state is both ideological and all-embracing,[204] based on "Islamic Democracy,"[205] and will eventually "rule the earth".[206] In 1955 he described it as a "God-worshipping democratic Caliphate, founded on the guidance vouchsafed to us through Muhammad."[207][208] Ultimately though, Islam was more important and the state would be judged by its adherence to din (religion and the Islamic system) and not democracy.[209]

Unlike the Islamic state of Ayatollah Khomeini, it would not establish and enforce Islamisation, but follow the Islamisation of society. As Maududi became involved in politics, this vision was "relegated to a distant utopia".[210]

Three principles underlying it: tawhid (oneness of God), risala (prophethood) and khilafa (caliphate).[211][212][213][214] The "sphere of activity" covered by the Islamic state would be "co-extensive with human life ... In such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private."[215]

The Islamic state recognises the sovereignty of God, which meant God was the source of all law.[216] The Islamic state acts as the vicegerent or agent of God on earth[Quran 24:55][173] and enforces Islamic law, which as mentioned above is both all-embracing and "totally silent" on a "vast range of human affairs".[184] While the government follows the sharia law, when it comes to a question about which no explicit injunction is to be found in the sharia, the matter is "settled by consensus among the Muslims."[217][218]

The state can be called a caliphate, but the "caliph" would not be the traditional descendant of the Quraysh tribe[219] but (Maududi believed) the entire Muslim community, a "popular vicegerency".[173] (Although there would also be an individual leader chosen by the Muslim community.) Thus the state would be not a "theocracy", but a "theodemocracy".[218] Maududi believed that the sovereignty of God (hakimiya) and the sovereignty of the people are mutually exclusive.[220] Sovereignty of human beings is simply the domination of man by man, the source of most human misery and calamity.[221] Governance based on sovereignty other than that of God's does not just lead to inferior governance and "injustice and maladministration", but "evil."[222]

Therefore, while Maududi used the term democracy to describe his state,[223][224] (in part to appeal to Westernised Muslim intellectuals),[225] his "Islamic democracy" was to be the antithesis of secular Western democracy which transfers hakimiya (God's sovereignty) to the people,[226] who may pass laws without regard for God's commands.

The Islamic state would conduct its affairs by mutual consultation (shura) among all Muslims.[218] The means of consultation should suit the conditions of the particular time and place but must be free and impartial. While the government follows the sharia law, when it comes to a question about which no explicit injunction is to be found in the sharia, the matter is "settled by consensus among the Muslims."[217][218] Maududi favored giving the Islamic state exclusive right to the power of declaring jihad and ijtihad (establishing an Islamic law through "independent reasoning"), traditionally the domain of the ulama.[227]

Rights

While no aspect of life was to be considered "personal and private"[215] and the danger of foreign influence and conspiracies was ever present, (nationalism, for example, was "a Western concept which divided the Muslim world and thus prolonged the supremacy of Western imperialist powers"[156]), there would also be personal freedom and no suspicion of government. Maududi's time spent in jail as a political prisoner led him to have a personal interest in individual rights, due process of law, and freedom of political expression.[228] Maududi stated:

This espionage on the life of the individual cannot be justified on moral grounds by the government saying that it is necessary to know the secrets of the dangerous persons.... This is exactly what Islam has called as the root cause of mischief in politics. The injunction of the Prophet is: "When the ruler begins to search for the causes of dissatisfaction amongst his people, he spoils them" (Abu Dawud).[229]

However, the basic human right in Islamic law was to demand an Islamic order and to live in it. Not included were any rights to differ with its rulers and defy its authority.[230]

Islamic Constitution

According to Maududi, Islam had an "unwritten constitution" that needed "to be transformed into a written one".[56][231] The constitution would not be the sharia (or the Quran, as Saudi Arabia's constitution is alleged to be) but a religious document based on "conventions" of the "rightly guided caliphs", and the "canonised verdicts of recognised jurists" (i.e. the sharia) as well as the Quran and hadith.[185]

Model of government

In expanding on what the government of an Islamic state should look like in his book The Islamic Law and Constitution, Maududi took as his model the government of Muhammad and the first four caliphs (al-Khulafāʾu ar-Rāshidūn). The head of state should be the supreme head of legislature, executive and judiciary alike, but under him these three organs should function "separately and independently of one another." This head of state should be elected and must enjoy the country's confidence, but he is not limited to terms in office.[232] No one is allowed to nominate him for the office, nor to engage in electioneering or run for office, according to another source.[227] Because "more than one correct position" could not exist, "pluralism", i.e. competition between political views/parties, would not be allowed,[227][233] and there would be only one party.[234]

On the other hand, Maududi believed the state had no need to govern in the Western sense of the term, since the government and citizenry would abide by the same "infallible and inviolable divine law", power would not corrupt and no one would feel oppressed. Power and resources would be distributed fairly. There would be no grievances, no mass mobilisations, demands for political participation, or any other of the turmoil of non-Islamic governance.[235] Since the prophet had told early Muslims "My community will never agree on an error", there was no need for establishing concrete procedures and mechanisms for popular consultation.[236][237]

Since the state would be defined by its ideology—not by boundaries or ethnicity—its raison d'etre and protector would be ideology, the purity of which must be protected against any efforts to subvert it.[238] Naturally it must be controlled and run exclusively by Muslims,[239] and not just any Muslims but only "those who believe in the ideology on which it is based and in the Divine Law which it is assigned to administer".[240][241]

The state's legislature "should consist of a body of such learned men who have the ability and the capacity to interpret Quranic injunctions and who in giving decisions, would not take liberties with the spirit or the letter of the sharia". Their legislation would be based on the practice of ijtihad[242] (a source of Islamic law, relying on careful analogical reasoning, using both the Qu'ran and Hadith, to find a solution to a legal problem), making it more a legal organ than a political one.[242] They must also be "persons who enjoy the confidence of the masses". They may be chosen by "the modern system of elections", or by some other method which is appropriate to "the circumstances and needs of modern times."[232] Since upright character is essential for office holders and desire for office represents greed and ambition, anyone actively seeking an office of leadership would be automatically disqualified.[243]

Non-Muslims or women may not be a head of state but could vote for separate legislators.[244]

Originally Maududi envisioned a legislature only as a consultative body, but later proposed using a referendum to deal with possible conflicts between the head of state and the legislature, with the loser of the referendum resigning.[245] Another later rule was allowing the formation of parties and factions during elections of representatives but not within the legislature.[232]

In the judiciary, Maududi originally proposed the inquisitional system where judges implement law without discussion or interference by lawyers, which he saw as un-Islamic. After his party was "rescued" from government repression by the Pakistani judiciary he changed his mind, supporting autonomy of the judiciary and accepting the adversarial system and right of appeal.[246]

Failure of Western Democracy

[edit]

Secular Western representative democracy—despite its free elections and civil rights—is a failure (Mawdudi believed) for two reasons. Because secular society has "divorced" politics from religion, its leaders have "ceased to attach much or any importance to morality and ethics" and so ignore their constituents' interests and the common good. Furthermore, without Islam "the common people are incapable of perceiving their own true interests". An example being the Prohibition law in the United States, where despite the fact that (Maududi states) "it had been rationally and logically established that drinking is injurious to health, produces deleterious disorder in human society", the law banning alcohol consumption was repealed by the American Congress.[247]

Non-Muslims

[edit]

Maududi believed that copying cultural practices of non-Muslims was forbidden in Islam, having

very disastrous consequences upon a nation; it destroys its inner vitality, blurs its vision, befogs its critical faculties, breeds inferiority complexes, and gradually but assuredly saps all the springs of culture and sounds its death-knell. That is why the Holy Prophet has positively and forcefully forbidden the Muslims to assume the culture and mode of life of the non-Muslims.[248]

In his commentary on Surah An-Nisa Ayat 160 he wrote

The Jews, on the whole, are not satisfied with their own deviation from the path of God. They have become such inherent criminals that their brains and resources seem to be behind almost every movement which arises for the purpose of misleading and corrupting human beings. And whenever there arises a movement to call people to the Truth, the Jews are inclined to oppose it even though they are the bearers of the Scripture and inheritors of the message of the Prophets. Their latest contribution is Communism – an ideology which is the product of a Jewish brain and which has developed under Jewish leadership. It seems ironical that the professed followers of Moses and other Prophets should be prominent as the founders and promoters of an ideology which, for the first time in human history, is professedly based on a categorical denial of, and an undying hostility to God, and which openly strives to obliterate every form of godliness. The other movement which in modern times is second only to Communism in misleading people is the philosophy of Freud. It is a strange coincidence that Freud too was a Jew.[249][250]

He was appalled at (what he saw as) the

satanic flood of female liberty and licence which threatens to destroy human civilisation in the West.[251]

Maududi strongly opposed the Ahmadiyya sect, a sect which Maududi and many other Muslims do not consider as Muslim. He preached against Ahmadiyya in his pamphlet The Qadiani Problem and the book The Finality of Prophethood.[252]

Under the Islamic state

The rights of non-Muslims are limited under Islamic state as laid out in Maududi's writings. Although non-Muslim "faith, ideology, rituals of worship or social customs" would not be interfered with, non-Muslims would have to accept Muslim rule.

Islamic 'jihad' does not recognise their right to administer state affairs according to a system which, in the view of Islam, is evil. Furthermore, Islamic 'jihad' also refuses to admit their right to continue with such practices under an Islamic government which fatally affect the public interest from the viewpoint of Islam."[253]

Non-Muslims would be eligible for "all kinds of employment", but must be "rigorously excluded from influencing policy decisions"[254][255] and so not hold "key posts" in government and elsewhere.[256] They would not have the right to vote in presidential elections or in elections of Muslim representatives. This is to ensure that "the basic policy of this ideological state remains in conformity with the fundamentals of Islam." An Islamic Republic may however allow non-Muslims to elect their own representatives to parliament, voting as separate electorates (as in the Islamic Republic of Iran).[257] While some might see this as discrimination, Islam has been the most just, the most tolerant and the most generous of all political systems in its treatment of minorities, according to Maududi.[258]

Non-Muslims would also have to pay a traditional special tax known as jizya. Under Maududi's Islamic state, this tax would be applicable to all able-bodied non-Muslim men—elderly, children and women being exempt—in return from their exemption from military service, (which all adult Muslim men would be subject to).[259] Those who serve in the military are exempted. Non-Muslims would also be barred from holding certain high level offices in the Islamic state.[57] Jizya is thus seen as a tax paid in return for protection from foreign invasion,[260] but also as a symbol of Islamic sovereignty.

... Jews and the Christians ... should be forced to pay Jizya in order to put an end to their independence and supremacy so that they should not remain rulers and sovereigns in the land. These powers should be wrested from them by the followers of the true Faith, who should assume the sovereignty and lead others towards the Right Way.[261]

Jihad

[edit]

Maududi's first work to come to public attention was Al Jihad fil-Islam ("Jihad in Islam"), which was serialised in a newspaper in 1927, when he was only twenty-four.[262] In it he maintained that because Islam is all-encompassing, the Islamic state was for all the world and should not be limited to just the "homeland of Islam" where Muslims predominate. Jihad should be used to eliminate un-Islamic rule everywhere and establish a worldwide Islamic state:

Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam, regardless of the country or the nation which rules it. The purpose of Islam is to set up a state on the basis of its own ideology and programme, regardless of which nation assumes the role of the standard-bearer of Islam or the rule of which nation is undermined in the process of the establishment of an ideological Islamic State. Islam requires the earth—not just a portion, but the whole planet.... because the entire mankind should benefit from the ideology and welfare programme [of Islam] ... Towards this end, Islam wishes to press into service all forces which can bring about a revolution and a composite term for the use of all these forces is 'Jihad'.... the objective of the Islamic 'jihād' is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule.[263]

Maududi taught that the destruction of the lives and property of others was lamentable (part of the great sacrifice of jihad), but that Muslims must follow the Islamic principle that it is better to "suffer a lesser loss to save ourselves from a greater loss". Though in jihad "thousands" of lives may be lost, this cannot compare "to the calamity that may befall mankind as a result of the victory of evil over good and of aggressive atheism over the religion of God." [264]

He explained that jihad was not only combat for God but activity by the rear echelon in support those waging combat (qitaal), including non-violent work:

In the jihad in the way of Allah, active combat is not always the role on the battlefield, nor can everyone fight in the front line. Just for one single battle preparations have often to be made for decades on end and the plans deeply laid, and while only some thousands fight in the front line there are behind them millions engaged in various tasks which, though small themselves, contribute directly to the supreme effort.[265]

At the same time he took a more conservative line on jihad than other revivalist thinkers (such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Sayyid Qutb), distinguishing between jihad properly understood and "a crazed faith ... blood-shot eyes, shouting Allahu akbar, decapitating an unbeliever wherever they see one, cutting off heads while invoking La ilaha illa-llah [There is no god but God]". During a cease-fire with India (in 1948), he opposed the waging of jihad in Kashmir, stating that Jihad could be proclaimed only by Muslim governments, not by religious leaders.[143]

Mystique, personality, personal life

[edit]

As the Amir (Guide) of Jama'at e-Islami (JI), Mawdudi remained in close contact with JI members, conducting informal discussions every day in his house between Asr and Maghrib salat prayers,[266] although according to some, in later years discussion was replaced by answers to members' questions with any rebuttals ignored.[267]

For his votaries in the Jama'at, Maududi was not only a "revered scholar, politician, and thinker, but a hallowed Mujaddid."[5] Adding to his mystic was his survival of assassination attempts, while the Jama'at's enemies (Liaquat Ali Khan, Ghulam Muhammad, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) "fell from grace" or were killed.[6] He had a powerful command of Urdu language which he insisted on using, in order to "free Muslims minds from the influence of English."[268]

In private he has been described as "strict but not rigid", taciturn, poised, composed, uncompromising and unyielding.[64] His biographers have talked of his karamat (special gifts) and haybah (great presence)."[6] His public speaking style has been described as having "great authority". Maududi would make his argument step-by-step with Islamic edicts, rather than attempting to excite his audience with oratory.[267] Although he did not publicise the fact, Maududi was a practitioner of traditional medicine or unani tibb.[64]

Family and health

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Maududi has been described as close to his wife, but not able to spend much time with his six sons and three daughters due to his commitments to religious dawah and political action. Only one of his offspring, ever joined the JI. And only his second daughter Asma, showed "any scholarly promise".[269]

Maududi suffered from a kidney ailment most of his life. He was often bedridden in 1945 and 1946, and in 1969 was forced to travel to England for treatment.[269]

Late life

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In April 1979, Maududi's long-time kidney ailment worsened and by then he also had heart problems. He went to the United States for treatment and was hospitalised in Buffalo, New York, where his second son worked as a physician. Following a few surgical operations, he died on 22 September 1979, at the age of 75. His funeral was held in Buffalo, but he was buried in an unmarked grave at his residence in Ichhra, Lahore after a very large funeral procession through the city.[59] Yusuf al-Qaradawi led the funeral prayer for him.[270]

Legacy

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Grave of Maududi, Lahore

Mawdudi is regarded by many as "the most influential" of the contemporary Islamic revivalist scholars; whose efforts influenced revivalism across the Islamic World.[271] His doctrines would also inspire the Iranian revolution and shape the ideological foundations of Al-Qaeda.

Pakistan and South Asia

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In Pakistan, (where the JI claims to be the oldest religious party[51]) it is "hard to exaggerate the importance" of that country's "current drift" toward Maududi's "version of Islam", according to scholar Eran Lerman.[272]

His background as a journalist, thinker, scholar and political leader has been compared to Indian independence leader Abul Kalam Azad by admiring biographers.[273]

He and his party are thought to have been the most important factors in Pakistan working to generate support for an Islamic state.[14] They are thought to have helped inspire General Zia-ul-Haq to introduce "Sharisation" to Pakistan,[15] (Sharia laws decreed by Zia included bans on interest on loans (riba), deduction by the government of 2.5% annual Zakat tax from bank accounts, the introduction of Islamic punishments such as stoning and amputation with the 1979 Hudood Ordinances. One policy of Zia's that was originally proposed by Maududi, and not found in classic Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), was the introduction of separate electorates for non-Muslims (Hindus and Christians) in 1985.[274])

In return, Maududi's party was greatly strengthened by Zia with 10,000s of members and sympathisers given jobs in the judiciary and civil service early in Zia's rule.[16]

South Asia in general, including the diaspora, including "significant numbers" in Britain, was "hugely influenced" by Maududi's work.[275]

Arab world

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Outside of South Asia, Muslim Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb read him, according to historian Philip Jenkins. Qutb "borrowed and expanded" Maududi's concept of Islam being modern, Muslims have fallen into pre-Islamic ignorance (Jahiliyya), and of the need for an Islamist revolutionary vanguard movement. His ideas influenced Abdullah Azzam, the Palestinian Islamist jurist and renewer of jihad in Afghanistan and elsewhere.[275]

Iran

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Maududi also had a major impact on Shia Iran, where Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini is reputed to have met Maududi as early as 1963 and later translated his works into Persian. "To the present day," according to Philip Jenkins, "Iran's revolutionary rhetoric often draws on his themes."[275]

Turkey

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In Turkey, where his name is spelled Mevdudi, from the mid-1960s onward his "full oeuvre was available in Turkey within a few years" and he became an influential figure within the local religious circles.[276]

Militant Islamist movements

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Maududi is considered as "second to Qutb" among the intellectual fathers of contemporary militant Islamist movements.[71] According to Youssef M. Choueiri, "all the major contemporary radicalised" Islamist movements (the Tunisian Islamic Tendency, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad organisation, and the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria), "derive their ideological and political programmes" from the writings of Maududi and Sayyid Qutb.[277]

His works have also influenced the leadership of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in their ideology.[278]

Timeline of Abul A'la Maududi's life

[edit]
  • 1903 – Born in Aurangabad, Hyderabad State, colonial India
  • 1918 – Started career as journalist in Bijnore newspaper
  • 1920 – Appointed as editor of the daily Taj, based in Jabalpur
  • 1921 – Learned Arabic from Maulana Abdul Salam Niazi in Delhi
  • 1921 – Appointed as editor daily Muslim newspaper
  • 1926 – Took the Sanad of Uloom e Aqaliya wa Naqalia from Darul Uloom Fatehpuri, Delhi
  • 1928 – Took the Sanad in Jamay Al-Tirmidhi and Muatta Imam Malik Form same Teacher
  • 1925 – Appointed as editor Al-jameeah, Delhi
  • 1927 – Wrote Al Jihad fil Islam
  • 1933 – Started Tarjuman-ul-Qur'an from Hyderabad
  • 1937 – aged 34, introduced to South Asia's premier Muslim poet-philosopher, Allama Muhammad Iqbal, by Chaudhry Niaz Ali Khan at Lahore[279]
  • 1938 – Aged 35, moved to Pathankot from Hyderabad Deccan and joined the Dar ul Islam Trust Institute, which was established in 1936 by Chaudhry Niaz Ali Khan on the advice of Allama Muhammad Iqbal for which Chaudhry Niaz Ali Khan donated 66 acres (270,000 m2) of land from his vast 1,000-acre (4.0 km2) estate in Jamalpur, 5 km west of Pathankot[279]
  • 1941 – Founded Jamaat-e-Islami Hind at Lahore, British India; appointed as Amir
  • 1942 – Jamaat's headquarters moved to Pathankot
  • 1942 – Started writing a commentary of the Qur'an called Tafhim-ul-Quran
  • 1947 – Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan headquarters moved to Lahore, Pakistan
  • 1948 – Campaign for Islamic constitution and government
  • 1948 – Thrown in jail by the Pakistani government for fatwa on jihad in Kashmir
  • 1949 – Pakistani government accepted Jamaat's resolution for Islamic constitution
  • 1950 – Released from jail
  • 1953 – Sentenced to death for his historical part in the agitation against Ahmadiyya to write a booklet Qadiani Problem. He was sentenced to death by a military court, but it was never carried out;
  • 1953 – Death sentence commuted to life imprisonment and later canceled.
  • 1958 – Jamaat-e-Islami banned by Martial Law Administrator Field Martial Ayub Khan
  • 1964 – Sentenced to jail
  • 1964 – Released from jail
  • 1971 – In the question of united Pakistan or separation of the East Pakistan (later Bangladesh) he relinquished his authority to East Pakistan Shura (consultative body of Jamaat)[280]
  • 1972 – Completed Tafhim-ul-Quran
  • 1972 – Resigned as Ameer-e-Jamaat
  • 1978 – Published his last book "Seerat-e-Sarwar-e-Aalam" in two volumes.
  • 1979- Received King Faisal International Prize
  • 1979 – Left for the United States for a medical treatment
  • 1979 – Died in Buffalo, United States[281]
  • 1979 – Buried in Ichhra, Lahore

Selected bibliography

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See also

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References

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Further reading

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Abul A'la Maududi (1903–1979) was an Indo-Pakistani Islamic scholar, theologian, and Islamist ideologue renowned for founding in 1941 as a vanguard movement to implement Islamic principles in politics and society. Born into a religious family in , British , he rejected secular nationalism and Western democratic models, instead promoting a comprehensive centered on —a system of governance wherein sovereignty resides exclusively with God, human rulers serve as vicegerents enforcing law, and legislative authority derives from divine revelation rather than popular will. Maududi's extensive oeuvre, encompassing over a hundred books and including his monumental Quranic exegesis Tafhim al-Qur'an, articulated as a total way of life integrating faith, state, economy, and law, influencing subsequent Islamist thinkers and organizations worldwide. His advocacy for revolutionary establishment of Islamic states, endorsement of against un-Islamic regimes, and critique of compromise with non-Islamic systems sparked both acclaim among revivalists and sharp controversies, with critics viewing his framework as incompatible with pluralistic and conducive to authoritarianism under religious pretext. After migrating to post-partition, he faced imprisonment for opposing secular policies but continued shaping through Jamaat-e-Islami's activism and his writings' global dissemination.

Early Life and Intellectual Formation

Family Background and Childhood

Abul A'la Maududi was born on September 25, 1903, in , a town in the of Hyderabad Deccan under British India (present-day ). He hailed from a family of scholars and religious figures with roots tracing to Mughal-era nobility and Sufi lineages, including descendants of the founded by Moinuddin Chishti. Maududi was the youngest of three sons of Ahmad Hasan Maududi, born in 1855, who worked as a but prioritized religious devotion, briefly abandoning his profession during his son's early years to immerse himself in mystical and ascetic practices. His father, known for , directly oversaw his initial religious instruction, employing tutors to instill traditional Islamic knowledge. One elder brother, Abu'l Khayr Maududi (1899–1979), later pursued scholarly activities, reflecting the family's emphasis on learning. From childhood, Maududi received homeschooling focused on core Islamic disciplines, including the , , , and Persian, under his father's guidance and hired scholars, fostering an early immersion in orthodox Sunni thought without formal attendance. This environment, marked by his father's shift toward Sufi-influenced , shaped Maududi's foundational worldview, prioritizing scriptural fidelity over secular influences prevalent in .

Education in Traditional and Modern Knowledge

Maududi received his foundational education at home from his father, Ahmad Hasan, a with scholarly inclinations who emphasized traditional Islamic disciplines including the , , , , and . Born into a family tracing its lineage to scholarly ancestors, Maududi demonstrated early aptitude for languages, achieving proficiency in and Persian by his early teens, which enabled him to study classical Islamic texts independently. At age 11 in 1914, Maududi enrolled directly in the eighth class of Madrasah Furqaniyah (also known as Oriental High School) in , an institution that integrated traditional Islamic learning with modern Western subjects such as , natural sciences, English, and , following a influenced by the reformist scholar . He excelled in his studies there, but his formal was interrupted after approximately one to two years due to his father's prolonged illness and death around 1915–1916, which imposed financial hardships on the family. Following this disruption, Maududi pursued self-directed studies to complete the equivalent of outside formal institutions, focusing on both Islamic scholarship and modern knowledge; he acquired functional English skills and engaged with contemporary ideas through reading, including the works of modernist thinkers like by 1919. Although he briefly attempted further studies at in Hyderabad, these too were curtailed, leaving him without a traditional alim but with broad autodidactic exposure to diverse intellectual traditions.

Early Journalistic Career and Political Writings

In 1920, at the age of 17, Maududi began his journalistic career as editor of the Urdu newspaper Taj in , following contributions to other leading publications as early as 1918. He soon advanced to editing the daily Muslim in 1921, where his writings emphasized Islamic revivalism amid the post-World War I collapse of the and rising communal tensions in British India. These early roles honed his polemical style, focusing on defending Islamic principles against perceived Western secular influences and Hindu-majority . Maududi later served as editor of Al-Jamiat, the organ of Jamiat Ulama-e-Hind, but resigned in 1925 in protest against the organization's alliance with the , which he viewed as endorsing that diluted Muslim distinctiveness under a secular framework. This departure underscored his emerging critique of political compromises that subordinated Islamic sovereignty to democratic or nationalist ideologies, a theme recurrent in his subsequent work. By the early , he relocated to Hyderabad and assumed editorship of Tarjuman al-Quran in 1932–1933, transforming it into a platform for systematic Islamic and socio-political commentary that reached Urdu-speaking Muslim audiences across . His political writings during this period, including essays compiled in Al-Jihad fil-Islam (1927), addressed not merely as defensive warfare but as a comprehensive struggle for establishing amid Hindu-Muslim violence and colonial erosion of Muslim institutions. Through Tarjuman al-Quran, Maududi from 1933 onward critiqued , , and modernist reinterpretations of , arguing for a holistic Islamic order where resided solely with rather than popular will or territorial loyalty. These publications, numbering dozens of essays on Quranic , , and contemporary issues, laid the groundwork for his later organizational efforts by mobilizing intellectual opposition to both British imperialism and indigenous secular movements.

Establishment of Islamist Ideology

Critiques of Colonialism, Nationalism, and Secularism

Maududi regarded British colonialism as a profound form of domination that transcended military and economic control, imposing "intellectual slavery" through the propagation of European political concepts that eroded Islamic governance frameworks. In his 1930s writings, he emphasized that colonial rulers perpetuated power not only by the sword but also by embedding alien ideas of sovereignty and statehood, necessitating a decolonization of Muslim thought via reclamation of Quranic principles over Western models. This critique drew on observations of colonial India's socio-political landscape, including the Khilafat Movement's aftermath, where he engaged anti-colonial discourses while rejecting Marxist materialism as insufficiently rooted in divine order. Central to Maududi's opposition was , which he dissected as a modern European construct fostering racial exclusion and fragmentation, incompatible with 's emphasis on universal equality under . In Musalman aur Maujooda Syasi Kashmakash (1938) and Masala-e-Qaumiyat (1939)—translated elements of which appear as "Nationalism and "—he argued surpassed mere affinity for (quom) or homeland (watan), instead promoting oppression based on ethnic or racial lines that contradicted Islamic . This led him to initially reject the movement's as secular and inadequate, insisting Muslim statehood required subordination to rather than popular ethnic mobilization, a stance that deepened his analysis beyond surface-level to question 's ethical foundations in colonial contexts. Secularism faced Maududi's sharpest rebuke as an ideological severance of from , confining to personal domains and enabling human usurpation of (hakimiyyat), which he deemed morally corrupting and generative of injustice. He contended secular governance atomized societies through unchecked individualism and illusory , leading to ethical degradation absent divine restraint, as elaborated in Pardah (1939) where such equality appeared as a "" dissolving communal bonds. Proposing "" as counterpoint, Maududi envisioned a system vesting ultimate authority in while rejecting theocratic mischaracterizations, using colonial liberal states as foils to highlight secular democracy's failure to foster or humility before revelation. These intertwined critiques— as enabler, and secularism as symptoms—underpinned his call for revolutionary , prioritizing systemic adherence to and over accommodation with Western-derived reforms.

Engagement with Islamic Modernism and Traditional Ulama

Abul A'la Maududi critiqued Islamic modernism for its emphasis on reconciling Islamic teachings with Western rationalism and empirical standards, arguing that this subordinated divine revelation to human judgment and eroded Sharia's sovereignty. Modernists such as Muhammad Abduh advocated expansive ijtihad to adapt religious rulings to scientific progress and secular governance, but Maududi viewed such reforms as a gateway to Westernization, insisting that Islam's comprehensive framework required no alteration to accommodate modernity—instead, modern ideologies should be evaluated against Islamic criteria. In publications like Tarjuman al-Quran, which Maududi edited from 1932 onward, he rejected modernist tendencies to prioritize verifiable rationality over textual authority, positioning Islam as a total revolutionary ideology rather than a selective ethical system compatible with or . While acknowledging shared concerns with figures like on the need for , Maududi limited their alignment to the primacy of , diverging sharply on modernism's philosophical openness to non-Islamic influences, which he deemed a dilution of (divine unity) in and society. Maududi's engagement with traditional ulama highlighted their limitations in addressing colonial-era challenges, criticizing madrasa-trained scholars for confining expertise to minutiae, ritual observance, and (imitation of precedents), which rendered them passive amid political subjugation. He argued that these ulama failed to conceptualize as a dynamic program for state reconstruction and systemic , often aligning with secular nationalists or compromising under British rule rather than pursuing comprehensive revival. In envisioning an , Maududi contended that traditional 's roles as community guardians and jurists would diminish under divine sovereignty, where legislation derives directly from and , obviating the need for interpretive intermediaries beyond core principles. This critique stemmed from his observation that pre-modern ulama operated in unchallenged contexts, lacking the activist orientation required for modern ideological struggle, prompting him to advocate for scholar-activists trained beyond conventional madrasas to integrate with organizational .

Synthesis of Quranic Interpretation and Revolutionary Thought

Maududi's seminal Quranic exegesis, Tafhim al-Qur'an (undertaken from 1942 to 1972), fused classical methods with a politicized lens, portraying the as an ideological manifesto for revolutionary overhaul of society under divine law. He contended that the 's core message mandates the rejection of human sovereignty in favor of hakimiyyah (God's exclusive rule), interpreting verses like 5:44 ("And whoever does not judge by what has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers") as indictments of secular equivalent to disbelief. This framework elevated prophetic narratives—such as Joseph's ascent in Surah Yusuf ( 12:55)—as models for Muslims to seize administrative power through exemplary conduct, thereby engineering an "Islamic revolution" from within un-Islamic systems. In synthesizing with , Maududi reconceived jihad not solely as defensive warfare but as a comprehensive struggle () against —the dominance of non-divine norms in and culture—drawing parallels to prophets' confrontations with tyrannical orders while insisting on primacy over borrowed tactics. His methodology blended philological precision with socio-political analysis, applying verses on communal obligation (e.g., Quran 3:104, urging a "" to enjoin good and forbid evil) to justify an organized movement for ideological mobilization and , akin to a disciplined cadre effecting systemic change. This positioned as a totalizing din (system), demanding believers pioneer reconstruction of , , and per Quranic directives, rather than passive ritualism. Maududi's revolutionary Quranic hermeneutic emphasized gradualist ascent to power via , (tabligh), and political engagement, eschewing premature in favor of building a "theo-democratic" order where legislators serve as God's caliphs under constraints. He critiqued Western as idolatrous for vesting in the populace (contra 12:40), yet adapted electoral tools instrumentally to embed Islamic norms, viewing ultimate success as the global extension of a caliphate-like rooted in revelation. This , disseminated through channels, framed modern Muslim plight as deviation from Quranic militancy, urging a return to the Prophet's model as blueprint for overthrowing colonial and nationalist legacies.

Founding and Direction of Jamaat-e-Islami

Inception in British India (1941)

Abul A'la Maududi established on August 26, 1941, in , British India, amid rising political tensions following the of March 1940, which called for Muslim-majority states. The founding meeting occurred at the residence of Mistree Abdullah in Islamia Park, Poonch Road, where Maududi, previously editor of the journal Tarjuman al-Quran in , gathered around 75 supporters disillusioned with mainstream political movements. Maududi's initiative stemmed from his rejection of the Indian National Congress's and the All-India Muslim League's emphasis on , which he viewed as incompatible with Islamic principles of divine sovereignty (hakimiyyat Allah). He positioned as a vanguard movement (jama'at) to achieve an Islamic through gradual moral and intellectual transformation of society, rather than electoral politics or compromise with colonial or nationalist frameworks. At inception, Maududi was elected as the first amir (leader), with the group's constitution emphasizing adherence to and , rejection of Western ideologies, and commitment to jihad as a comprehensive struggle for Islamic dominance. The early Jamaat focused on recruiting committed cadres from urban educated Muslims, prioritizing ideological purity over , in contrast to the League's broader appeal. This foundational approach reflected Maududi's synthesis of traditional Islamic with modern organizational methods, aiming to model an ideal Islamic community as a precursor to state implementation. Initial activities included , lectures, and small study circles, setting the stage for expansion despite limited resources and opposition from established religious and political entities.

Adaptation to Partition and Focus on Pakistan

Prior to the on August 14, 1947, Maududi and opposed the Muslim League's demand for , viewing it as a form of secular that divided the Muslim ummah and failed to guarantee an governed by sharia. Maududi criticized the League as comprising "nominal " influenced by Western ideologies, arguing that a Muslim-majority territory alone could not eradicate jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance) without a revolutionary commitment to Quranic sovereignty. Following partition, Maududi migrated to , , where he reestablished as the organization's primary base, while a separate branch, , continued operations in . Recognizing the new state's existence as an irreversible reality, he pragmatically redirected efforts toward transforming into a for Islamic governance, emphasizing that its Muslim-majority population provided a foundation for implementation despite its secular origins. In late 1947, Maududi outlined a four-point program for gradual Islamization: reforming individuals through moral and doctrinal ; organizing a cadre of committed ; reshaping societal norms; and restructuring government and politics via legal means. This framework positioned as a force, contributing to early constitutional debates by co-authoring a 22-point Islamic charter with 33 scholars and delivering invited lectures on principles, broadcast under Muhammad Ali Jinnah's auspices. Maududi's subsequent advocacy targeted Pakistan's legal code, , and constitution to align with and , marking a shift from pan-Islamic aspirations to nation-specific reform.

Organizational Methods, Expansion, and Internal Dynamics

under Maududi's leadership adopted a hierarchical yet consultative , with the Amir serving as the elected supreme leader responsible for both ideological guidance and administrative decisions. The Majlis-e-Shura functioned as a central consultative body to deliberate on policies and strategies, while a network of regional and local units enabled grassroots operations. Membership was stratified into full members (rukn), who underwent rigorous ideological training (tarbiyah) and moral evaluation, affiliated supporters (mutafiq), and broader sympathizers, ensuring a committed cadre focused on long-term rather than short-term political gains. This disciplined approach emphasized peaceful methods such as da'wah (propagation), intellectual struggle ( bil ), educational initiatives, and social welfare, distinguishing it from conventional . Expansion efforts centered on methodical grassroots mobilization, including study circles, publishing houses disseminating Maududi's works, and through welfare services like and provisions. Following the partition, Maududi relocated to , redirecting the organization's primary focus there while branches emerged in and, later, (becoming after 1971). A key framework was the four-point program outlined by Maududi in : personal moral reform, assembling virtuous individuals into a , societal transformation, and ultimate restructuring of governance toward an . This facilitated incremental growth via legal participation in elections, alliances, and public rallies, though membership expansion remained gradual, prioritizing quality over quantity to maintain ideological purity. Internal dynamics reflected a balance between authoritarian leadership and consultative mechanisms, with Maududi retaining unchallenged authority as Amir from until 1972, when health issues prompted his step-back. The organization enforced strict discipline and ideological conformity, fostering resilience amid government bans and persecutions, such as arrests during the 1953 Punjab disturbances. Regular internal elections at various levels promoted democratic practices within the cadre, though debates arose over tactical shifts like electoral coalitions versus purist withdrawal. Women's involvement grew through dedicated wings, contributing to broader mobilization while adhering to Maududi's vision of comprehensive societal influence.

Core Doctrinal Positions

Foundations in Quran, Hadith, Sunnah, and Sharia

Maududi regarded the Quran as the primary and infallible source of divine guidance, constituting a comprehensive din (way of life) that encompasses theology, law, ethics, economics, and politics, rather than a mere spiritual or ritual code. In his seminal work Tafhim al-Qur'an, serialized from 1942 to 1972 across six volumes, he adopted a tafsir methodology integrating asbab al-nuzul (occasions of revelation), linguistic analysis, and cross-referential theming to extract socio-political imperatives, such as the obligation to establish theocracy (divine rule) over human sovereignty. This exegesis prioritized verses like Quran 5:44 ("Whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then it is those who are the disbelievers") to argue for the Quran's mandate of hakimiyyah (God's exclusive legislative authority), rejecting interpretive relativism in favor of objective, contextually grounded revivalism. He positioned Hadith and Sunnah as indispensable secondary authorities, serving to clarify, exemplify, and operationalize Quranic injunctions through the Prophet Muhammad's sayings, actions, and approvals, authenticated via chains of narration (isnad). Drawing from his Deobandi training under scholars like Maulana Abdul Salam, Maududi emphasized reliance on the six canonical Sunni collections (e.g., Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim), using them to substantiate doctrines like collective jihad as a systemic duty derived from prophetic precedents such as the Treaty of Hudaybiyyah. While critiquing Hadith deniers in the subcontinent as deviants from orthodoxy, he selectively applied Hadith to purge perceived bid'ah (innovations), such as folk rituals, insisting that authentic Sunnah demanded emulation in establishing a caliphate-like order rather than passive scholarship. Sharia, in Maududi's framework, synthesized Quran, Hadith, and Sunnah into a holistic legal-ethical system (fiqh al-wahy, jurisprudence of revelation), binding all domains of human activity under divine law and superseding man-made codes. He advocated its total implementation via an Islamic state apparatus, where rulers function as amirs enforcing hudud punishments, economic prohibitions (e.g., riba), and social norms from primary sources, updated through qualified ijtihad to address modernity without compromising textual fidelity. This conception, articulated in works like Islamic Law and Constitution (1955), viewed partial Sharia application as hypocrisy, mandating revolutionary enforcement to restore the ummah's original purity as modeled in the Medinan polity. Maududi's emphasis on Sharia's supremacy stemmed from causal realism: human legislation inevitably leads to moral decay, whereas divine law ensures justice through empirically verifiable prophetic success in seventh-century Arabia.

Conception of the Islamic State and Rejection of Western Democracy

Maududi conceived the Islamic state as a system where sovereignty (hakimiyya) belongs exclusively to God, with humans serving as vicegerents (khalifa) bound to enforce divine law (Sharia) derived from the Quran and Sunnah. In this framework, outlined in works like The Islamic Law and Constitution (published 1955), the state's purpose is not merely governance but the comprehensive implementation of God's will across all spheres of life, ensuring no human legislation contradicts revealed law. He envisioned this as a restoration of the Rashidun Caliphate model established by the Prophet Muhammad and his immediate successors, where rulers act as trustees rather than autonomous lawmakers. Central to Maududi's theory is "," a term he coined to describe a blending divine supremacy with participatory human agency under strict theological limits. Here, authority flows from God's unchallengeable commands, with elected officials functioning as executors of , not creators of policy. Maududi argued that true Islamic governance rejects by integrating religion into politics, economics, and society, aiming to produce a community oriented toward the rather than temporal utilities. This system, he contended, avoids the pitfalls of or by grounding power in scriptural accountability, where leaders can be deposed if they deviate from divine mandates. Maududi explicitly rejected Western as incompatible with , viewing it as an idolatrous elevation of human will over divine ordinance. He criticized —the notion that the people or their representatives hold ultimate legislative power—as a form of shirk (associating partners with ), since it permits majorities to enact laws potentially opposing . In The Islamic Law and Constitution, he described as permitting "the masses to legislate without any let or hindrance," leading to and the erosion of absolute truths. Maududi asserted that demands the destruction of man-made governments, declaring: " is a revolutionary that comes to destroy any government made by man." This stance positioned the in direct antithesis to democratic systems, which he saw as rooted in and prone to tyranny through unchecked popular whim.

Doctrine of Jihad as Systemic Struggle

Maududi conceptualized jihad as a multifaceted and obligatory struggle (jihad fi sabilillah) to assert the sovereignty of God (hakimiyyah) over all human affairs, extending beyond mere defensive warfare to encompass a systematic effort to reform society, politics, and global order in accordance with Sharia. In his 1927 treatise Al-Jihad fil Islam, he described jihad as the "utmost struggle" employing all human faculties—intellectual, moral, social, and military—to eradicate oppression (fitnah), uproot un-Islamic systems of governance, and establish justice under divine law, distinguishing it from secular war (harb) which lacks moral purpose. This doctrine framed jihad as inherently revolutionary, targeting not only aggressors but any entrenched systems of cruelty, arrogance, or human sovereignty that obstruct the supremacy of Allah's word, requiring Muslims to propagate Islamic principles through preaching, ethical reform, and, when necessary, organized force to suppress evil (munkar). Central to Maududi's view was jihad's comprehensive scope as a systemic endeavor to transform the world order, involving the creation of an Islamic vanguard (jama'at) committed to total exertion (jihad) for establishing an Islamic state where Sharia prevails unequivocally. He argued that true jihad mandates combating evil universally, not confined to defensive actions, but as a proactive duty to replace despotic or secular regimes with a caliphate-like system enforcing righteousness (ma'ruf) and prohibiting vice, thereby ridding humanity of strife through a divinely ordained framework of law and equity. For instance, Maududi posited that jihad serves to "establish the sovereignty of Allah," utilizing non-coercive means like invitation (da'wah) and reasoning alongside militant action only against those who resist the implementation of Islamic governance, while prohibiting harm to non-combatants such as women, children, and the elderly. This holistic approach integrated personal self-purification with collective political mobilization, positioning jihad as the mechanism for Islam's expansion and the eventual global dominance of its ethical and legal order. Maududi's doctrine rejected pacifist or inward-only interpretations of jihad, insisting it as a perpetual obligation for the Muslim community (ummah) to challenge jahiliyyah-like conditions—pre-Islamic ignorance manifested in modern secularism or nationalism—through sustained revolutionary struggle until "persecution is no more, and religion is for Allah." He emphasized centralized command and obedience in jihad operations to ensure efficacy, drawing from Quranic imperatives like "strive (do jihad) for Allah with endeavor which is His right" (Al-Hajj: 78), while underscoring that force aims at systemic reform rather than forced conversion, as "there is no coercion in religion" (Al-Baqarah: 256). This framework influenced his founding of Jamaat-e-Islami in 1941, where jihad manifested as organizational discipline and ideological warfare to Islamize states like Pakistan, portraying Islam itself as a "revolutionary ideology" demanding upheaval of non-divine social orders worldwide.

Social, Cultural, and Economic Perspectives

Views on Women, Family, and Gender Relations

Abul A'la Maududi articulated his views on , , and relations primarily in Purdah and the Status of Woman in Islam, where he argued that the proper relationship between men and women constitutes the foundational issue of any civilization, with Islamic prescriptions ensuring moral order against the chaos of unchecked sexual impulses. He posited that men and women are equal in human dignity and moral accountability but differ in natural functions, with men holding a degree of authority (qiwamah) over women due to their role as providers and protectors, as per 4:34 and 2:228, which states "men are a degree above them." This , he contended, aligns with physiological and psychological realities, assigning women primary duties in motherhood and household management while deeming them unsuited for extensive public or economic roles that could disrupt family stability. Central to Maududi's framework was the enforcement of , or strict gender segregation, including veiling beyond the hands and face for women in public and restraint of gazes for both sexes, as mandated by Quran 24:30-31 and 33:59. He viewed free intermingling of sexes as inevitably leading to sexual , illicit relations, and societal decay—evident, in his analysis, in Western phenomena like widespread nudism and venereal epidemics—contrasting this with Islam's of that channels sexual energy toward family and procreation. Women were instructed to remain primarily within the home (Quran 33:33), venturing out only when necessary and accompanied by a male relative (), to preserve chastity and prevent fitna (temptation). Maududi proposed reforms like segregated and shifts to institutionalize this, emphasizing that elevates women's status by shielding them from exploitation rather than confining them, unlike what he saw as Western "emancipation" turning women into objects of display. In family structure, Maududi advocated a patriarchal model where the husband serves as head, with wives owing obedience in reasonable (ma'ruf) matters in exchange for financial maintenance and protection, rooted in Quranic principles of mutual rights and duties (huquq al-zawjayn). He defended polygamy as permissible up to four wives under strict conditions of justice (Quran 4:3), framing it not as male privilege but as a regulated solution for social welfare, such as caring for orphans or widows, while critiquing unrestricted Western promiscuity as more destructive to lineage and morality. Women's rights in marriage included consent, the option to stipulate monogamy in contracts, and post-divorce maintenance, which Maududi championed by reconstructing personal law directly from Quran and Sunnah rather than colonial-distorted fiqh or British-influenced codes. Inheritance followed Sharia norms, with daughters receiving half the share of sons to reflect familial responsibilities, yet he stressed equitable implementation to avoid economic vulnerability. Overall, Maududi rejected identical roles for sexes as unnatural, warning that blurring gender distinctions erodes the family unit—the bedrock of Islamic society—and invites civilizational collapse, as observed in pre-Islamic and modern secular examples.

Stance on Sufism, Music, and Folk Practices

Maududi approached , or tasawwuf, with a reformist lens, recognizing its potential as the interior spiritual dimension of that complements (fiqh) through moral self-purification, sincerity in worship, and the pursuit of ihsan (excellence in faith). He drew from early ascetic figures like Fudayl ibn Iyad, portraying true Sufism as disciplined devotion aligned with and active vicegerency on earth, rather than escapist mysticism. However, he critiqued later Sufi traditions for deviations, including the adoption of non- philosophical influences such as Greek or Vedantic ideas, which he argued undermined (divine unity) and promoted passive renunciation over societal reform. He particularly condemned popular Sufi practices that elevated pirs (spiritual guides) to near-divine status, fostering servile dependency and rituals like veneration or ecstatic trances that risked shirk (associating partners with ) or neglect of communal duties. Maududi's writings, such as A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in , advocate purging these accretions to restore Sufism's original rigor, acknowledging his own Sufi heritage while engaging critically with its corpus to align it with scriptural orthodoxy. This stance reflects his broader effort to integrate spiritual depth with political , rejecting monastic isolation as contrary to 's holistic demands. Regarding music, Maududi classified it alongside dancing as a social vice that erodes moral discipline, diverts from divine remembrance, and facilitates in base desires, often linking it to Western cultural infiltration or un-Islamic festivities. He extended this disapproval to Sufi-associated forms like when performed in indulgent contexts, viewing them as incompatible with austere piety. Folk practices, which he subsumed under (religious innovations), faced similar rejection; Maududi warned against customs blending pre-Islamic or local superstitions—such as amulets, grave rituals, or syncretic shrine fairs—with Islam, arguing they corrupt and perpetuate ignorance, as outlined in his calls to adhere strictly to and over cultural traditions.

Economic Reforms: Prohibition of Interest and Critique of Socialism

Abul A'la Maududi articulated an Islamic economic system that strictly prohibits , defined as any form of interest or usury, viewing it as a mechanism of exploitation that enables unearned wealth accumulation and exacerbates social inequalities. In his analysis, violates core principles by decoupling returns from productive labor and risk-sharing, as evidenced in Quranic injunctions against it, and he equated certain contemporary practices like differential cash and credit pricing in transactions to . To replace riba-based , Maududi promoted equity-based instruments such as mudarabah (profit-sharing partnerships) and musharakah (joint ventures), where gains and losses are shared proportionally, thereby aligning economic incentives with ethical responsibility and communal welfare. He outlined these reforms in works like Sud (1978), emphasizing that an interest-free system would curb speculative bubbles and promote stable, productive investment. Maududi positioned Islamic economics as a balanced alternative to both and , rejecting the former for its unchecked pursuit of and the latter for its atheistic foundations and coercive centralization. He critiqued socialism's materialistic worldview and emphasis on class struggle as antithetical to (divine oneness), arguing that it denies spiritual dimensions of human existence and imposes totalitarian state control over production and distribution, potentially stifling individual initiative. In contrast, his framework upholds rights as a natural incentive for effort but subordinates them to moral limits, including prohibitions on hoarding and mandatory (2.5% annual ) alongside ushr ( on produce) for equitable redistribution without abolishing . Maududi advocated societies and simplicity in consumption to prevent excess, as detailed in First Principles of Islamic Economics (2011 edition), ensuring economic activity serves broader societal justice rather than ideological extremes. This system, he contended, integrates market freedoms with ethical oversight under , avoiding socialism's rejection of God-ordained hierarchy while mitigating capitalism's moral vacuum.

Political Engagements and Persecutions

Advocacy for Islamization in Post-Partition Pakistan

Following the partition of British on August 14, 1947, Abul A'la Maududi relocated from to , initially settling in before moving to and later back to , where he refocused the (JI) on transforming the nascent state into one under full Islamic governance. Despite his prior opposition to partition as a product of secular incompatible with (divine unity), Maududi pragmatically embraced as a vehicle for realizing an Islamic polity, prioritizing the enforcement of over territorial . Maududi outlined a four-point program for systematic Islamization shortly after , which JI adopted as its core strategy: first, reforming the individual through moral and intellectual purification aligned with Quranic injunctions; second, organizing and training a cadre of pious, disciplined activists; third, extending reform to broader society via propagation and community networks; and fourth, restructuring government institutions to subordinate human legislation to . This approach emphasized gradual, non-violent struggle (jihad bil nafs and jihad bil qalam) over immediate revolution, leveraging education, publications, and political advocacy to cultivate an Islamic consciousness. JI expanded its organizational footprint in by establishing branches, madrasas, and journals like Tarjuman al-Quran to disseminate Maududi's ideas, aiming to produce a capable of steering the state toward . A pivotal early advocacy came with Maududi's support for the , introduced by Prime Minister and passed by the on March 12, 1949, which declared that "sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty alone" and pledged to enable Pakistan's "to order their individual and collective lives in accord with the teachings and requirements of ." While endorsing its theological foundation as a step against , Maududi criticized the resolution for ambiguities that allowed non-Islamic elements and for insufficient mechanisms to enforce , urging stronger provisions for of laws against Islamic criteria. JI mobilized ulama and public campaigns to amplify such demands, influencing the document's inclusion of Islamic principles as a baseline for future constitutions. Maududi's writings further propelled this agenda, notably his 1947 collaboration with 33 scholars on a 22-point proposing constitutional features like a board of Islamic scholars to vet and economic policies prohibiting (). In The Islamic Law and Constitution (first published in Urdu as Khilafat wa Mulukiyat and translated into English by 1955), he contended that Pakistan's framework must reject Western democratic —where people are the ultimate law-makers—in favor of a system deriving authority exclusively from the and , with rulers as mere executors of divine will. He advocated phased implementation: immediate moral , intermediate societal reforms, and ultimate state overhaul, including punishments and zakat-based economics. These texts, circulated widely through JI's presses, shaped debates in the and pressured leaders to incorporate Islamic advisory councils in the 1956 's directive principles. Despite JI's marginal electoral performance—securing less than 1% of seats in early provincial polls—Maududi's advocacy fostered alliances with traditionalist and influenced policy discourse, embedding demands for courts and anti-blasphemy measures. His emphasis on ideological purity over positioned JI as a pressure group, critiquing governments for diluting Islamic identity with Western legal imports, and laying groundwork for future enactments like the 1962 Constitution's Islamic provisions under Ayub Khan. This sustained campaign underscored Maududi's vision of Islamization as a totalizing , subordinating , , and to religious imperatives.

Conflicts with State Authorities and Imprisonments (1950s-1970s)

Maududi's actively opposed aspects of the Pakistani state's early policies, viewing them as insufficiently Islamic and influenced by Western . In the early 1950s, tensions escalated over the status of the community, whom Maududi and other Islamists deemed non-Muslims for their beliefs regarding prophethood. participated in the 1953 agitation demanding Ahmadis be declared non-Muslims, culminating in riots in that prompted . Maududi's pamphlet Qadiani Masla was cited as inciting unrest, leading to his arrest in March 1953. A martial law court sentenced Maududi to death on May 11, 1953, for his role in provoking the disturbances, alongside other leaders like Abdul Sattar Niazi. Public protests, including mass demonstrations across and international appeals from Muslim scholars, pressured the government to commute the sentence first to and later to release him in April 1955 after approximately two years of incarceration. This episode highlighted Maududi's willingness to challenge state authority on doctrinal grounds, framing the conflict as a defense of Islamic orthodoxy against perceived governmental leniency. Under President Ayub Khan's regime (1958–1969), which emphasized modernization and limited religious influence in governance, faced renewed suppression. The party opposed Ayub's 1961 Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, which introduced reforms on , , and seen as diluting principles. In 1964, following protests against these laws, the government banned , confiscated its funds, and arrested Maududi, charging him with and alleged foreign affiliations. He was imprisoned for over a year before release amid ongoing political agitation. Maududi faced further detention in 1967 during continued opposition to Ayub's policies, including criticism of the regime's controlled and secular leanings. These imprisonments, totaling additional periods under Ayub, stemmed from 's broader campaign against what Maududi described as un-Islamic state practices, reinforcing his of establishing a sovereign Islamic order over secular nationalism. By the early 1970s, as Ayub's rule ended, Maududi's health declined, limiting further direct confrontations, though persisted in advocating Islamization against successive governments.

Relations with Ulama, Mughal Legacy, and Science in Islamic Context

Maududi's relations with traditional ulama were marked by initial collaboration followed by significant divergence and mutual criticism. In the early 1930s, he served as editor of Muslim, the organ of Jamiat Ulama-i-Hind, aligning temporarily with their anti-colonial stance alongside the Indian National Congress. However, by the late 1930s, he broke with them, viewing many ulama as insufficiently revolutionary and complicit in Muslim societal decline through rigid adherence to taqlid (imitation of past jurisprudence) rather than dynamic ijtihad (independent reasoning). Maududi rejected the ulama's monopoly on religious authority, advocating reinterpretation of Quran and Sunnah to address modern challenges, as seen in his 1937 fatwa permitting loudspeakers in mosques against ulama opposition, arguing they amplified Islamic propagation. In response, groups like Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam accused him and Jamaat-e-Islami of forming a deviant sect termed "Maududiat," highlighting tensions over his activist, politicized Islam versus their more ritualistic focus. Early critics among ulama, such as Syed Hussain Ahmed Madani, identified his ideas as a fitna (discord) disrupting orthodox unity. Regarding the Mughal legacy, Maududi critiqued the empire as emblematic of post-Rashidun (Rightly Guided Caliphs) deviation into mulukiyat (kingship) rather than true khilafat (). In his 1966 work Khilafat wa Mulukiyat, he argued that after the fourth caliph, Muslim rulers—including Mughals—usurped divine sovereignty, prioritizing dynastic power over implementation, leading to moral and political decline. He specifically condemned Emperor (r. 1556–1605) for promoting , a syncretic blending with other traditions, as a betrayal of (divine unity) and evidence of secular erosion in Muslim governance. Maududi saw the Mughal era's vast territorial expanse and cultural patronage as superficial achievements masking failure to establish hakimiyya (divine rule), contributing to the ummah's vulnerability to colonial conquest by fostering separation of from state affairs. This historical analysis underscored his broader thesis that authentic Islamic polity ended with the model, rendering later empires like the Mughals illegitimate precedents. On science in the Islamic context, Maududi affirmed compatibility between and empirical inquiry, portraying the faith as inherently rational and scientific, with the encouraging observation of natural signs as proofs of divine order. He esteemed modern as a neutral "body" adaptable to Islamic "spirit," urging Muslims to master it for societal advancement while rejecting Western that divorced it from —evident in his call for "Islamization" of scientific methods to align with . Acknowledging limited Muslim contributions to post-medieval (estimating under 1% to modern ), he advocated reconstruction of Islamic thought through scientific lens, distinguishing beneficial modernization (e.g., , industry) from corrosive . Yet, he opposed naturalistic exegeses reducing Quranic miracles to scientific metaphors, upholding supernatural elements like against evolutionary theory, positioning as a balanced framework transcending extremes of or . This view informed Jamaat-e-Islami's emphasis on educating cadres in both religious and technical s to revive Muslim civilizational leadership.

Personal Life, Health, and Final Years

Family Dynamics and Personal Habits

Maududi was married to Mehmooda Begum, who survived him until her death in 2003 and was buried near his grave in . The couple had nine children, reflecting a traditional Muslim structure aligned with his advocacy for large families as a means of community strengthening amid perceived moral decline. Limited public records exist on interpersonal relations within the household, though one son, Ahmad Farouk Maududi, later expressed reservations about the political instrumentalization of religion, diverging from his father's foundational role in . In personal habits, Maududi adhered rigorously to Islamic observances, never omitting obligatory prayers or fasts despite recurrent health issues, and undertook and pilgrimages on multiple occasions. His daily routine as an adult emphasized scholarly work, writing, and organizational leadership over leisure, contrasting with his earlier journalistic phase in when he occasionally viewed films in urban . He prioritized verbal commitments, fulfilling promises even under duress, as noted by associates who observed his consistency in personal conduct amid political activism.

Health Struggles, Travel, and Death (1979)

In April 1979, Abul A'la Maududi's longstanding kidney ailment, which had periodically incapacitated him since at least the 1940s, intensified dramatically, accompanied by newly diagnosed heart complications that rendered him bedridden. Unable to receive adequate treatment in Pakistan, he departed for the United States in search of specialized medical intervention, arriving in Buffalo, New York, where his physician son resided and could oversee aspects of his care. Hospitalized there, Maududi endured multiple surgical procedures aimed at addressing his renal and cardiac failures, but his prognosis remained grave amid progressive organ deterioration. Maududi succumbed to kidney and on September 22, 1979, at the age of 76, marking the end of a life marked by ideological activism and health adversities. His body was repatriated to , , where over 100,000 mourners attended his prayers at the before burial at the headquarters in Ichhra.

Enduring Legacy and Global Influence

Role in Pakistan's Islamization and South Asian Politics

Maududi relocated to , Pakistan, following the 1947 partition of British , where he reestablished as a key advocate for transforming the new state into an Islamic polity governed by principles rather than secular or Western models. , under his leadership, adopted a four-point program emphasizing Islamic education, organizational reform, cadre training, and political activism to achieve comprehensive Islamization, including the enforcement of Quranic injunctions in legislation and society. This agenda positioned the party as a vanguard against perceived secular drift by Pakistan's founders, with Maududi arguing that true sovereignty belonged to God alone in a system he termed "," rejecting as un-Islamic. In the early constitutional debates, Maududi and pressured the to incorporate Islamic provisions, notably influencing the of March 12, 1949, which declared sovereignty as residing with and mandated future laws to align with the and . Although Maududi critiqued the resolution for insufficiently binding the state to full implementation and allowing non-Muslim accommodations, leveraged it as a foundational step toward embedding Islamic ideals in Pakistan's 1956 and subsequent constitutions. The organization participated in elections from 1946 onward, securing limited seats but exerting outsized influence through alliances, protests, and lobbying to block secular reforms and promote punishments and anti-blasphemy measures. Maududi's ideological framework extended beyond Pakistan, shaping Jamaat-e-Islami's branches across , including in and what became , where the party pursued societal Islamization through grassroots mobilization and opposition to nationalist . In (later ), Jamaat-e-Islami, guided by Maududi's rejection of partition as diluting pan-Islamic unity, collaborated with Pakistani forces during the 1971 war, framing independence as a deviation from Islamic . Post-independence, these affiliates continued advocating Maududi's vision of a caliphate-like order, influencing Islamist opposition to secular regimes in and , though often facing bans or marginalization for alleged . Maududi's death in 1979 preceded but ideologically underpinned General Zia-ul-Haq's 1977–1988 Islamization drive, which enacted blasphemy laws, ordinances, and codes echoing Jamaat-e-Islami's demands; the party provided intellectual and political support, with Zia's policies drawing directly from Maududi's writings on state-enforced . Jamaat-e-Islami's electoral alliances and welfare networks amplified this shift, embedding Maududi's anti-secularism into Pakistan's legal framework despite resistance from modernist factions. Across , his emphasis on as a total sustained Jamaat-e-Islami's role in countering Hindu-majority dominance in and secular in , fostering transnational Islamist networks.

Transmission to Arab World, Iran, and Turkey

Maududi's writings began reaching the Arab world through Arabic translations starting in the 1950s, with key works such as Towards Understanding Islam and Jihad in Islam disseminated by publishers in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, facilitating their adoption by Islamist groups. These translations influenced the Muslim Brotherhood, whose ideologue Sayyid Qutb integrated Maududi's concepts of hakimiyya (divine sovereignty) and comprehensive Islamic governance into his own framework, as seen in Qutb's Milestones, which echoed Maududi's rejection of secular nationalism and call for revolutionary jihad against jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance equated with modern un-Islamic states). Brotherhood affiliates credited Maududi's Jamaat-e-Islami model for inspiring organized political Islamism, though Qutb radicalized these ideas further toward takfir (declaring Muslims apostates). In , transmission occurred via direct personal contact and Persian translations, notably during Maududi's 1963 pilgrimage where he met Ayatollah through an interpreter, discussing shared views on Islamic governance. Khomeini later incorporated elements of Maududi's theodemocratic theory—emphasizing velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) as an extension of Maududi's model—into his 1970 treatise , building on Maududi's critique of Western secularism despite sectarian differences between Sunni and Shia traditions. Maududi's works were translated into Persian by Iranian scholars in the 1960s and 1970s, influencing pre-revolutionary Islamists, and he publicly endorsed the 1979 as a model of Islamic resurgence, with leaders viewing it as validation of his sovereignty doctrines. However, post-revolution divergences arose, as Iran's Shia clerical hierarchy clashed with Maududi's more consultative Sunni approach, limiting deeper assimilation. Transmission to Turkey was more subdued due to the country's secular Kemalist framework, but gained traction from the via translations by Islamist publishing houses like Hilal Yayınları, which rendered Maududi's texts alongside those of Qutb and , fueling underground Islamist networks. These efforts informed the Milli Görüş movement led by , who drew on Maududi's anti-Western economic and political critiques to advocate for an Islamic-oriented and pan-Islamic , as articulated in Erbakan's Milli Görüş writings. By the 1970s, Maududi's emphasis on Islamic revivalism resonated with Turkish groups resisting , contributing to the ideological groundwork for later AKP-era , though adapted to 's Sufi-influenced and pragmatic political context rather than Maududi's stricter scripturalism. Despite state bans on overt until the 1980s, these translations sustained intellectual influence among dissident and youth, evidenced by citations in Turkish Islamist periodicals.

Impact on Militant Movements and Islamist Ideologies

Maududi's interpretation of jihad as a revolutionary doctrine profoundly shaped subsequent Islamist ideologies by framing it not merely as defensive warfare but as an ongoing struggle to dismantle non-Islamic political and social orders worldwide. In his 1939 address "Jihad in Islam," he described jihad as a "revolutionary struggle and utmost exertion" aimed at rebuilding the world "in conformity with its own tenets and ideals," positioning Islam as a comprehensive system intent on annihilating "all tyrannical and evil systems." This conceptualization elevated jihad to a perpetual ideological offensive against jahiliyyah—pre-Islamic ignorance extended to modern secular or insufficiently Islamic governance—emphasizing a vanguard of committed believers to enforce divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah). These ideas directly influenced Sayyid Qutb, whose synthesized Maududi's revolutionary with calls for (declaring Muslims apostates for insufficient piety) and offensive violence to establish rule, as explored in comparative analyses of their works on and the . Qutb explicitly drew from Maududi's framework of as an "International Militant Party" organized for global transformation, integrating it into justifications for armed against perceived apostate regimes. This transmission radicalized Maududi's thought, with providing the ideological backbone for groups like and , whose leaders such as and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi echoed the imperative to overthrow un-Islamic systems through militant action. In , Maududi's (JI), while primarily a political organization, disseminated these ideologies that inspired offshoots and allied militant networks, including (LeT), which adopted JI's anti-secular, pro-sharia militancy for operations in and beyond. JI cadres and sympathizers have historically provided recruitment pipelines and rhetorical support for jihadist groups resisting "un-Islamic influences," contributing to the puritanical ideologies of South Asian militants like those in Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, though direct operational ties vary. Maududi's emphasis on ideological purity over compromise thus fostered environments where political evolved into , particularly in Pakistan's volatile proxy conflicts. Critics attribute to Maududi's legacy the normalization of totalizing ideologies that prioritize of , influencing not only Salafi-jihadis but also broader Islamist militancy by blurring lines between revivalism and . However, while his writings supplied theoretical —such as viewing non-sharia states as legitimate targets for upheaval—empirical links to specific attacks remain mediated through interpretive chains, with groups like the drawing more from Deobandi traditions than direct Maududi emulation. This indirect yet pervasive impact underscores how Maududi's first articulations of modern political jihadism enabled successors to operationalize them in global conflicts from the 1980s Afghan jihad onward.

Controversies and Critical Assessments

Accusations of Totalitarianism and Theodemocracy

Abul A'la Maududi conceptualized "" as a governance system in which belongs exclusively to , with human rulers acting as vicegerents (khalifah) to enforce () derived from the and , distinguishing it from pure by rejecting clerical rule in favor of consultative implementation by qualified Muslims. In this framework, outlined in works like The Islamic Law and Constitution (1941), legislation is confined to detailing and applying unchanging divine principles, rendering man-made laws illegitimate and secondary to ethical obedience to . Critics have labeled Maududi's totalitarian due to its comprehensive subjugation of state, , , and personal conduct to a singular ideological framework, mirroring aspects of 20th-century totalitarian regimes in its demand for total mobilization toward ideological purity. Maududi himself likened the "totalitarianism of God's " to that of modern dictatorships, portraying it positively as a voluntary, that permeates all life spheres to prevent ethical relativism, unlike coercive secular tyrannies. Scholar Jeffrey M. Bale, analyzing Maududi alongside figures like Hasan al-Banna and , identifies substantial parallels with , including ideological , suppression of as , and a enforcing , though diverges in its theocentric and rejection of personal cults. Further accusations highlight theocratic undertones, as the system's rejection of secular pluralism and confinement of rights to Sharia-compliant actions inherently curtails freedoms for non-Muslims, women, and ideological opponents, fostering authoritarian enforcement mechanisms like punishments and state-sponsored moral policing. Pakistani analyst Ishtiaq Ahmed and others argue this blueprint, influential in Jamaat-e-Islami's agitation, prioritizes unity over individual autonomy, potentially enabling perpetual ideological surveillance absent in liberal democracies. While proponents view it as anti-imperialist revivalism, skeptics from secular and evangelical perspectives contend its divine absolutism replicates totalitarian control by divine proxy, unsubstantiated by empirical success in pluralistic societies.

Debates Over Views on Non-Muslims and Minorities

Maududi articulated a framework for non-Muslims in an primarily through the traditional dhimmi system, as detailed in his 1955 work Islamic Law and Constitution. Under this model, non-Muslims—termed s or protected peoples—would enjoy protections including freedom to practice their religion, maintain cultural and educational institutions, and adhere to personal laws derived from their own religious codes. They would also possess equal economic opportunities, civil rights, and exemptions from military service in exchange for paying the tax, which Maududi described as compensation for state-provided security rather than a punitive measure. However, these rights came with explicit subordination to Islamic sovereignty: non-Muslims were barred from proselytizing among Muslims, holding positions in policy-making or vital state affairs, or exercising authority over Muslims, as such roles required adherence to Islamic ideology. Apostasy from by a Muslim was equated with and punishable by , reinforcing the state's commitment to preserving the Muslim community's ideological integrity. Maududi defended this arrangement as inherently just and transparent, arguing that the Islamic state openly delineates rights and limitations based on , avoiding the "hypocritical equality" of secular systems that mask underlying conflicts over ideology. He contrasted it with historical instances of Christian and communist of minorities, claiming Islam's covenantal protections historically fostered tolerance and stability for communities like and under Muslim rule. In practice, Maududi advocated reimposing on non-Muslims in modern Muslim nations as a of their protected status and to deter nationalist assimilation that could erode Islamic primacy. He extended these views to specific groups, such as leading campaigns against Ahmadis in , declaring them non-Muslims in 1953 and supporting their constitutional exclusion in 1974, on grounds that their beliefs deviated from core Islamic tenets and threatened communal unity. Critics, particularly from secular and Western scholarly perspectives, have characterized Maududi's model as institutionalizing second-class citizenship, with serving as a marker of subjugation and exclusion from perpetuating systemic inequality incompatible with modern egalitarian norms. They point to inconsistencies, such as permitting non-Muslim personal while prohibiting religious , as evidence of intolerance rather than balanced realism, arguing it prioritizes ideological over individual . Some reformist Muslim thinkers, like , have called for adapting the dhimma concept to contemporary contexts, questioning its feasibility amid global pluralism, while others link Maududi's ideas to Pakistan's post-independence minority challenges, including laws and discriminatory policies influenced by advocacy. Defenders counter that empirical historical data shows arrangements often yielded better outcomes for minorities than forcible conversions or expulsions under non-Islamic regimes, framing Maududi's views as a pragmatic application of Sharia's contractual realism rather than .

Influence on Extremism Versus Revivalist Achievements

Maududi's foundational role in Islamic revivalism centered on intellectual and organizational efforts to reinvigorate Muslim adherence to in modern societies, primarily through the establishment of in 1941 as a vanguard for global tajdid, or reformative renewal, rather than mere innovation. This organization emphasized political participation, ethical education, and socioeconomic reforms aligned with Quranic principles, countering Western secular influences by promoting as a comprehensive system for , , and personal conduct. His multi-volume , Tafhim al-Qur'an, completed over three decades and first published in segments starting in the 1940s, provided contextual interpretations linking classical texts to 20th-century issues like and , fostering a resurgence in Islamic scholarship and piety among South Asian Muslims and beyond. These revivalist initiatives yielded tangible achievements, including the translation of works like Towards Understanding Islam into 26 languages by 1974, which disseminated concepts of (God-consciousness) and moral revival to diverse audiences, influencing Islamist movements toward structured political activism over anarchic responses. Jamaat-e-Islami's branches in , and Bangladesh engaged in welfare programs, educational institutions, and electoral campaigns, contributing to the Islamization of public discourse in post-colonial by 1970s, as evidenced by its role in advocating sharia-influenced policies without initial recourse to violence. In contrast, Maududi's doctrinal emphasis on as a "" to overthrow jahiliyya (pre-Islamic ignorance equated with modern ) and establish divine sovereignty laid ideological groundwork for militant appropriations, notably shaping Qutb's extensions into violence. His 1939 lecture " in Islam" framed it as an obligatory exertion to reorder global society under Islamic law, a perspective that informed Qutbism's radicalism and, through it, the operational doctrines of and , groups that cited similar imperatives for transnational by the and . Maududi's vision of —a system where God's hakimsiyya (sovereignty) manifests via -enforced , rejecting as idolatrous—aimed at holistic revival but mirrored totalitarian controls in The Islamic Law and Constitution (), where he analogized divine rule to fascist or communist monopolies on life aspects, potentially enabling authoritarian militancy when pursued coercively. While largely channeled these ideas into non-violent politics, offshoots and interpreters in contexts like post-1979 or Afghan networks adapted them toward armed enforcement, highlighting how revivalist blueprints for Islamic supremacy could devolve into absent empirical checks on implementation. This duality underscores a causal pathway: Maududi's first-principles insistence on uncompromised revived Muslim agency against but furnished extremists with justificatory frameworks for violence, as seen in the ideological overlap with groups operationalizing his anti-jahiliyya rhetoric by the .

Major Works and Intellectual Output

Key Publications and Their Themes

Maududi's most extensive scholarly contribution is Tafhim al-Qur'an, a six-volume (Quranic ) initiated in 1942 and completed in 1972, which integrates traditional interpretation with modernist analysis to apply Quranic principles to contemporary domains such as economics, sociology, history, and , emphasizing the establishment of divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah) over human legislation. The work promotes (independent reasoning) to derive rulings for modern challenges, portraying as a complete code for individual reform and societal reconstruction under , while critiquing secular ideologies for their materialistic and polytheistic underpinnings. Towards Understanding Islam, first published in Urdu as Deeniyaat around 1932 and later translated into English, serves as an introductory outlining 's foundational beliefs—including (divine oneness), prophethood, and the —while presenting as a holistic system governing personal conduct, , family, , and to foster moral and . It stresses that true demands submission to God's directives in all life spheres, rejecting compartmentalized religion and advocating as the antidote to Western and nationalism. In Al-Jihad fil-Islam (Jihad in Islam), delivered as lectures in 1939 and published shortly thereafter, Maududi defines as comprehensive striving (including military action) to eradicate (idolatrous rule) and implement God's law, distinguishing it from or mere by framing offensive as obligatory when Islamic governance is suppressed, though regulated by and proportionality. The text counters orientalist portrayals of as unbridled aggression, instead positioning it as a divinely sanctioned means to achieve global ic dominance, subordinate to ethical constraints like avoiding harm to non-combatants. Other significant publications, such as Khilafat wa Mulukiyat (Caliphate and Monarchy, 1966), examine historical deviations from prophetic governance, advocating restoration of caliphal authority vested in rather than hereditary or popular rule, while critiquing and democracies as forms of shirk (associating partners with ). Across these works, recurring themes include the inseparability of din (religion) and (world), the imperative of Muslim political activism to counter colonial and secular influences, and the vision of an as theocratic yet consultative, prioritizing 's will over human sovereignty.

Translations, Dissemination, and Scholarly Reception

Maududi's writings, originally composed in , underwent extensive translation efforts that broadened their reach beyond . By the mid-20th century, key texts such as Towards Understanding Islam (originally Risalat al-Din) and Jihad in Islam (originally Al-Jihad fil-Islam) appeared in English translations, with the former rendered by teams including Khurshid Ahmad and published widely through outlets like the Islamic Foundation in the . His magnum opus, the Qur'anic commentary Tafhim al-Qur'an, was progressively translated into English as The Meaning of the Quran in multiple volumes starting in the , making it accessible to non--speaking audiences. Translations also extended to , , Bengali, Tamil, Burmese, and other languages, with over 80 works disseminated in these forms by the late , aiding propagation among diverse Muslim communities. Dissemination occurred primarily through Jamaat-e-Islami's networks and affiliated publishing houses, which distributed pamphlets, books, and serialized commentaries in print and later digital formats. In the West, organizations like the Islamic Foundation Leicester printed English editions, reaching students and intellectuals; for instance, Towards Understanding Islam circulated in North American Muslim circles by the . In the Arab world, Arabic versions influenced figures associated with the , though Maududi's South Asian context sometimes limited direct adoption. Global spread accelerated post-1979 via Iranian and Afghan exile communities, with Persian translations emerging amid the Islamic Revolution. Scholarly reception of Maududi's oeuvre has been polarized, with academics praising his systematic revival of while critiquing its implications for and pluralism. In political theory, works like Beatrice von der Beek's analysis frame his "theodemocracy" as an innovative colonial-era synthesis of sovereignty concepts, blending Islamic with participatory elements, though scholars note its tension with . Ismail Raja Faruqi's appraisals highlight Maududi's subconscious integration of Western ideas into Islamic frameworks, viewing it as a pragmatic adaptation rather than pure innovation. Conversely, security-focused analyses, such as those from the , link his doctrines on hakimiyya (divine sovereignty) to Qutbist ideologies influencing groups like , arguing they prioritize ideological purity over pragmatic coexistence. Ethico-jurisprudential studies, including those on maqasid al-shari'a, commend his emphasis on justice-oriented reinterpretation but fault rigid applications that marginalize minorities. Recent critiques, like those refuting his hakimiyya as overly literalist, contrast it with historical Islamic flexibility in . Overall, while peer-reviewed literature underscores his role in modern Islamist intellectual history, reception varies by disciplinary lens, with Western academia often emphasizing risks of over revivalist merits.

References

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