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Ontology
Ontology
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Ontology is the philosophical study of being. It is traditionally understood as the subdiscipline of metaphysics focused on the most general features of reality. As one of the most fundamental concepts, being encompasses all of reality and every entity within it. To articulate the basic structure of being, ontology examines the commonalities among all things and investigates their classification into basic types, such as the categories of particulars and universals. Particulars are unique, non-repeatable entities, such as the person Socrates, whereas universals are general, repeatable entities, like the color green. Another distinction exists between concrete objects existing in space and time, such as a tree, and abstract objects existing outside space and time, like the number 7. Systems of categories aim to provide a comprehensive inventory of reality by employing categories such as substance, property, relation, state of affairs, and event.

Ontologists disagree regarding which entities exist at the most basic level. Platonic realism asserts that universals have objective existence, while conceptualism maintains that universals exist only in the mind, and nominalism denies their existence altogether. Similar disputes pertain to mathematical objects, unobservable objects assumed by scientific theories, and moral facts. Materialism posits that fundamentally only matter exists, whereas dualism asserts that mind and matter are independent principles. According to some ontologists, objective answers to ontological questions do not exist, with perspectives shaped by differing linguistic practices.

Ontology employs diverse methods of inquiry, including the analysis of concepts and experience, the use of intuitions and thought experiments, and the integration of findings from natural science. Formal ontology investigates the most abstract features of objects, while applied ontology utilizes ontological theories and principles to study entities within specific domains. For example, social ontology examines basic concepts used in the social sciences. Applied ontology is particularly relevant to information and computer science, which develop conceptual frameworks of limited domains. These frameworks facilitate the structured storage of information, such as in a college database tracking academic activities. Ontology is also pertinent to the fields of logic, theology, and anthropology.

The origins of ontology lie in the ancient period with speculations about the nature of being and the source of the universe, including ancient Indian, Chinese, and Greek philosophy. In the modern period, philosophers conceived ontology as a distinct academic discipline and coined its name.

Definition

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Ontology is the study of being. It is the branch of philosophy that investigates the nature of existence, the features all entities have in common, and how they are divided into basic categories of being.[1] It aims to discover the foundational building blocks of the world and characterize reality as a whole in its most general aspects.[a] In this regard, ontology contrasts with individual sciences like biology and astronomy, which restrict themselves to a limited domain of entities, such as living entities and celestial phenomena.[3] In some contexts, the term ontology refers not to the general study of being but to a specific ontological theory within this discipline. It can also mean an inventory or a conceptual scheme of a particular domain, such as the ontology of genes.[4] In this context, an inventory is a comprehensive list of elements.[5] A conceptual scheme is a framework of the key concepts and their relationships.[6]

Ontology is closely related to metaphysics but the exact relation of these two disciplines is disputed. A traditionally influential characterization asserts that ontology is a subdiscipline of metaphysics. According to this view, metaphysics is the study of various aspects of fundamental reality, whereas ontology restricts itself to the most general features of reality.[7] This view sees ontology as general metaphysics, which is to be distinguished from special metaphysics focused on more specific subject matters, like God, mind, and value.[8] A different conception understands ontology as a preliminary discipline that provides a complete inventory of reality while metaphysics examines the features and structure of the entities in this inventory.[9] Another conception says that metaphysics is about real being while ontology examines possible being or the concept of being.[10] It is not universally accepted that there is a clear boundary between metaphysics and ontology. Some philosophers use both terms as synonyms.[11]

The etymology of the word ontology traces back to the ancient Greek terms ὄντως (ontos, meaning 'being') and λογία (logia, meaning 'study of'), literally, 'the study of being'. The ancient Greeks did not use the term ontology, which was coined by philosophers in the 17th century.[12]

Basic concepts

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Being

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Photo of a chair
Photo of a dog
Photo of the Moon
Abstract depiction of ideas
Number 7
Drawing of a dragon
The scope of ontology covers diverse entities, including everyday objects, living beings, celestial bodies, ideas, numbers, and fictional creatures.

Being, or existence, is the main topic of ontology. It is one of the most general and fundamental concepts, encompassing all of reality and every entity within it.[b] In its broadest sense, being only contrasts with non-being or nothingness.[14] It is controversial whether a more substantial analysis of the concept or meaning of being is possible.[15] One proposal understands being as a property possessed by every entity.[16] Critics argue that a thing without being cannot have properties. This means that properties presuppose being and cannot explain it.[17] Another suggestion is that all beings share a set of essential features. According to the Eleatic principle, "power is the mark of being", meaning that only entities with causal influence truly exist.[18] A controversial proposal by philosopher George Berkeley suggests that all existence is mental. He expressed this immaterialism in his slogan "to be is to be perceived".[19]

Depending on the context, the term being is sometimes used with a more limited meaning to refer only to certain aspects of reality. In one sense, being is unchanging and permanent, in contrast to becoming, which implies change.[20] Another contrast is between being, as what truly exists, and phenomena, as what appears to exist.[21] In some contexts, being expresses the fact that something is while essence expresses its qualities or what it is like.[22]

Ontologists often divide being into fundamental classes or highest kinds, called categories of being.[23] Proposed categories include substance, property, relation, state of affairs, and event.[24] They can be used to provide systems of categories, which offer a comprehensive inventory of reality in which every entity belongs to exactly one category.[23] Some philosophers, like Aristotle, say that entities belonging to different categories exist in distinct ways. Others, like John Duns Scotus, insist that there are no differences in the mode of being, meaning that everything exists in the same way.[25] A related dispute is whether some entities have a higher degree of being than others, an idea already found in Plato's work. The more common view in contemporary philosophy is that a thing either exists or not with no intermediary states or degrees.[26]

The relation between being and non-being is a frequent topic in ontology. Influential issues include the status of nonexistent objects[27] and why there is something rather than nothing.[28]

Particulars and universals

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Photo of the Taj Mahal
Patch of green
The Taj Mahal is a particular entity while the color green is a universal entity.

A central distinction in ontology is between particular and universal entities. Particulars, also called individuals, are unique, non-repeatable entities, like Socrates, the Taj Mahal, and Mars.[29] Universals are general, repeatable entities, like the color green, the form circularity, and the virtue courage. Universals express aspects or features shared by particulars. For example, Mount Everest and Mount Fuji are particulars characterized by the universal mountain.[30]

Universals can take the form of properties or relations.[31][c] Properties describe the characteristics of things. They are features or qualities possessed by an entity.[33] Properties are often divided into essential and accidental properties. A property is essential if an entity must have it; it is accidental if the entity can exist without it.[34] For instance, having three sides is an essential property of a triangle, whereas being red is an accidental property.[35][d] Relations are ways how two or more entities stand to one another. Unlike properties, they apply to several entities and characterize them as a group.[37] For example, being a city is a property while being east of is a relation, as in "Kathmandu is a city" and "Kathmandu is east of New Delhi".[38] Relations are often divided into internal and external relations. Internal relations depend only on the properties of the objects they connect, like the relation of resemblance. External relations express characteristics that go beyond what the connected objects are like, such as spatial relations.[39]

Substances[e] play an important role in the history of ontology as the particular entities that underlie and support properties and relations. They are often considered the fundamental building blocks of reality that can exist on their own, while entities like properties and relations cannot exist without substances. Substances persist through changes as they acquire or lose properties. For example, when a tomato ripens, it loses the property green and acquires the property red.[41]

States of affairs are complex particular entities that have several other entities as their components. The state of affairs "Socrates is wise" has two components: the individual Socrates and the property wise. States of affairs that correspond to reality are called facts.[42][f] Facts are truthmakers of statements, meaning that whether a statement is true or false depends on the underlying facts.[44]

Events are particular entities[g] that occur in time, like the fall of the Berlin Wall and the first moon landing. They usually involve some kind of change, like the lawn becoming dry. In some cases, no change occurs, like the lawn staying wet.[46] Complex events, also called processes, are composed of a sequence of events.[47]

Concrete and abstract objects

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Concrete objects are entities that exist in space and time, such as a tree, a car, and a planet. They have causal powers and can affect each other, like when a car hits a tree and both are deformed in the process. Abstract objects, by contrast, are outside space and time, such as the number 7 and the set of integers. They lack causal powers and do not undergo changes.[48][h] The existence and nature of abstract objects remain subjects of philosophical debate.[50]

Concrete objects encountered in everyday life are complex entities composed of various parts. For example, a book is made up of two covers and the pages between them. Each of these components is itself constituted of smaller parts, like molecules, atoms, and elementary particles.[51] Mereology studies the relation between parts and wholes. One position in mereology says that every collection of entities forms a whole. According to another view, this is only the case for collections that fulfill certain requirements, for instance, that the entities in the collection touch one another.[52] The problem of material constitution asks whether or in what sense a whole should be considered a new object in addition to the collection of parts composing it.[53]

Abstract objects are closely related to fictional and intentional objects. Fictional objects are entities invented in works of fiction. They can be things, like the One Ring in J. R. R. Tolkien's book series The Lord of the Rings, and people, like the Monkey King in the novel Journey to the West.[54] Some philosophers say that fictional objects are abstract objects and exist outside space and time. Others understand them as artifacts that are created as the works of fiction are written.[55] Intentional objects are entities that exist within mental states, like perceptions, beliefs, and desires. For example, if a person thinks about the Loch Ness Monster then the Loch Ness Monster is the intentional object of this thought. People can think about existing and non-existing objects. This makes it difficult to assess the ontological status of intentional objects.[56]

Other concepts

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Ontological dependence is a relation between entities. An entity depends ontologically on another entity if the first entity cannot exist without the second entity.[57] For instance, the surface of an apple cannot exist without the apple.[58] An entity is ontologically independent if it does not depend on anything else, meaning that it is fundamental and can exist on its own. Ontological dependence plays a central role in ontology and its attempt to describe reality on its most fundamental level.[59] It is closely related to metaphysical grounding, which is the relation between a ground and the facts it explains.[60]

Photo of Willard Van Orman Quine
Willard Van Orman Quine used the concept of ontological commitments to analyze theories.

An ontological commitment of a person or a theory is an entity that exists according to them.[61] For instance, a person who believes in God has an ontological commitment to God.[62] Ontological commitments can be used to analyze which ontologies people explicitly defend or implicitly assume. They play a central role in contemporary metaphysics when trying to decide between competing theories. For example, the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument defends mathematical Platonism, asserting that numbers exist because the best scientific theories are ontologically committed to numbers.[63]

Possibility and necessity are further topics in ontology. Possibility describes what can be the case, as in "it is possible that extraterrestrial life exists". Necessity describes what must be the case, as in "it is necessary that three plus two equals five". Possibility and necessity contrast with actuality, which describes what is the case, as in "Doha is the capital of Qatar". Ontologists often use the concept of possible worlds to analyze possibility and necessity.[64] A possible world is a complete and consistent way how things could have been.[65] For example, Haruki Murakami was born in 1949 in the actual world but there are possible worlds in which he was born at a different date. Using this idea, possible world semantics says that a sentence is possibly true if it is true in at least one possible world. A sentence is necessarily true if it is true in all possible worlds.[66] The field of modal logic provides a precise formalization of the concepts of possibility and necessity.[67]

In ontology, identity means that two things are the same. Philosophers distinguish between qualitative and numerical identity. Two entities are qualitatively identical if they have exactly the same features, such as perfect identical twins. This is also called exact similarity and indiscernibility. Numerical identity, by contrast, means that there is only a single entity. For example, if Fatima is the mother of Leila and Hugo then Leila's mother is numerically identical to Hugo's mother.[68] Another distinction is between synchronic and diachronic identity. Synchronic identity relates an entity to itself at the same time. Diachronic identity relates an entity to itself at different times, as in "the woman who bore Leila three years ago is the same woman who bore Hugo this year".[69] The notion of identity also has a number of philosophical implications in terms of how it interacts with the aforementioned necessity and possibility. Most famously, Saul Kripke contended that discovered identities such as "Water is H2O" are necessarily true because "H2O" is what's known as a rigid designator.[70]

Branches

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There are different and sometimes overlapping ways to divide ontology into branches. Pure ontology focuses on the most abstract topics associated with the concept and nature of being. It is not restricted to a specific domain of entities and studies existence and the structure of reality as a whole.[71] Pure ontology contrasts with applied ontology, also called domain ontology. Applied ontology examines the application of ontological theories and principles to specific disciplines and domains, often in the field of science.[72] It considers ontological problems in regard to specific entities such as matter, mind, numbers, God, and cultural artifacts.[73]

Social ontology, a major subfield of applied ontology, studies social kinds, like money, gender, society, and language. It aims to determine the nature and essential features of these concepts while also examining their mode of existence.[74] According to a common view, social kinds are useful constructions to describe the complexities of social life. This means that they are not pure fictions but, at the same time, lack the objective or mind-independent reality of natural phenomena like elementary particles, lions, and stars.[75] In the fields of computer science, information science, and knowledge representation, applied ontology is interested in the development of formal frameworks to encode and store information about a limited domain of entities in a structured way.[76] A related application in genetics is Gene Ontology, which is a comprehensive framework for the standardized representation of gene-related information across species and databases.[77]

Formal ontology is the study of objects in general while focusing on their abstract structures and features. It divides objects into different categories based on the forms they exemplify. Formal ontologists often rely on the tools of formal logic to express their findings in an abstract and general manner.[78][i] Formal ontology contrasts with material ontology, which distinguishes between different areas of objects and examines the features characteristic of a specific area.[80] Examples are ideal spatial beings in the area of geometry and living beings in the area of biology.[81]

Descriptive ontology aims to articulate the conceptual scheme underlying how people ordinarily think about the world. Prescriptive ontology departs from common conceptions of the structure of reality and seeks to formulate a new and better conceptualization.[82]

Another contrast is between analytic and speculative ontology. Analytic ontology examines the types and categories of being to determine what kinds of things could exist and what features they would have. Speculative ontology aims to determine which entities actually exist, for example, whether there are numbers or whether time is an illusion.[83]

Martin Heidegger proposed fundamental ontology to study the meaning of being.

Metaontology studies the underlying concepts, assumptions, and methods of ontology. Unlike other forms of ontology, it does not ask "what exists" but "what does it mean for something to exist" and "how can people determine what exists".[84] It is closely related to fundamental ontology, an approach developed by philosopher Martin Heidegger that seeks to uncover the meaning of being.[85]

Schools of thought

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Realism and anti-realism

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The term realism is used for various theories[j] that affirm that some kind of phenomenon is real or has mind-independent existence. Ontological realism is the view that there are objective facts about what exists and what the nature and categories of being are. Ontological realists do not make claims about what those facts are, for example, whether elementary particles exist. They merely state that there are mind-independent facts that determine which ontological theories are true.[87] This idea is denied by ontological anti-realists, also called ontological deflationists, who say that there are no substantive facts one way or the other.[88] According to philosopher Rudolf Carnap, for example, ontological statements are relative to language and depend on the ontological framework of the speaker. This means that there are no framework-independent ontological facts since different frameworks provide different views while there is no objectively right or wrong framework.[89]

Fresco showing Plato and Aristotle
Plato (left) and Aristotle (right) disagreed on whether universals can exist without matter.

In a more narrow sense, realism refers to the existence of certain types of entities.[90] Realists about universals say that universals have mind-independent existence. According to Platonic realists, universals exist not only independent of the mind but also independent of particular objects that exemplify them. This means that the universal red could exist by itself even if there were no red objects in the world. Aristotelian realism, also called moderate realism, rejects this idea and says that universals only exist as long as there are objects that exemplify them. Conceptualism, by contrast, is a form of anti-realism, stating that universals only exist in the mind as concepts that people use to understand and categorize the world. Nominalists defend a strong form of anti-realism by saying that universals have no existence. This means that the world is entirely composed of particular objects.[91]

Mathematical realism, a closely related view in the philosophy of mathematics, says that mathematical facts exist independently of human language, thought, and practices and are discovered rather than invented. According to mathematical Platonism, this is the case because of the existence of mathematical objects, like numbers and sets. Mathematical Platonists say that mathematical objects are as real as physical objects, like atoms and stars, even though they are not accessible to empirical observation.[92] Influential forms of mathematical anti-realism include conventionalism, which says that mathematical theories are trivially true simply by how mathematical terms are defined, and game formalism, which understands mathematics not as a theory of reality but as a game governed by rules of string manipulation.[93]

Modal realism is the theory that in addition to the actual world, there are countless possible worlds as real and concrete as the actual world. The primary difference is that the actual world is inhabited by us while other possible worlds are inhabited by our counterparts. Modal anti-realists reject this view and argue that possible worlds do not have concrete reality but exist in a different sense, for example, as abstract or fictional objects.[94]

Scientific realists say that the scientific description of the world is an accurate representation of reality.[k] It is of particular relevance in regard to things that cannot be directly observed by humans but are assumed to exist by scientific theories, like electrons, forces, and laws of nature. Scientific anti-realism says that scientific theories are not descriptions of reality but instruments to predict observations and the outcomes of experiments.[96]

Moral realists claim that there exist mind-independent moral facts. According to them, there are objective principles that determine which behavior is morally right. Moral anti-realists either claim that moral principles are subjective and differ between persons and cultures, a position known as moral relativism, or outright deny the existence of moral facts, a view referred to as moral nihilism.[97]

By number of categories

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Monocategorical theories say that there is only one fundamental category, meaning that every single entity belongs to the same universal class.[98] For example, some forms of nominalism state that only concrete particulars exist while some forms of bundle theory state that only properties exist.[99] Polycategorical theories, by contrast, hold that there is more than one basic category, meaning that entities are divided into two or more fundamental classes. They take the form of systems of categories, which list the highest genera of being to provide a comprehensive inventory of everything.[100]

The closely related discussion between monism and dualism is about the most fundamental types that make up reality. According to monism, there is only one kind of thing or substance on the most basic level.[101] Materialism is an influential monist view; it says that everything is material. This means that mental phenomena, such as beliefs, emotions, and consciousness, either do not exist or exist as aspects of matter, like brain states. Idealists take the converse perspective, arguing that everything is mental. They may understand physical phenomena, like rocks, trees, and planets, as ideas or perceptions of conscious minds.[102] Neutral monism occupies a middle ground by saying that both mind and matter are derivative phenomena.[103] Dualists state that mind and matter exist as independent principles, either as distinct substances or different types of properties.[104] In a slightly different sense, monism contrasts with pluralism as a view not about the number of basic types but the number of entities. In this sense, monism is the controversial position that only a single all-encompassing entity exists in all of reality.[l] Pluralism is more commonly accepted and says that several distinct entities exist.[106]

By fundamental categories

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The historically influential substance-attribute ontology is a polycategorical theory. It says that reality is at its most fundamental level made up of unanalyzable substances that are characterized by universals, such as the properties an individual substance has or relations that exist between substances.[107] The closely related substratum theory says that each concrete object is made up of properties and a substratum. The difference is that the substratum is not characterized by properties: it is a featureless or bare particular that merely supports the properties.[108]

Various alternative ontological theories have been proposed that deny the role of substances as the foundational building blocks of reality.[109] Stuff ontologies say that the world is not populated by distinct entities but by continuous stuff that fills space. This stuff may take various forms and is often conceived as infinitely divisible.[110][m] According to process ontology, processes or events are the fundamental entities. This view usually emphasizes that nothing in reality is static, meaning that being is dynamic and characterized by constant change.[112] Bundle theories state that there are no regular objects but only bundles of co-present properties. For example, a lemon may be understood as a bundle that includes the properties yellow, sour, and round. According to traditional bundle theory, the bundled properties are universals, meaning that the same property may belong to several different bundles. According to trope bundle theory, properties are particular entities that belong to a single bundle.[113]

Some ontologies focus not on distinct objects but on interrelatedness. According to relationalism, all of reality is relational at its most fundamental level.[114][n] Ontic structural realism agrees with this basic idea and focuses on how these relations form complex structures. Some structural realists state that there is nothing but relations, meaning that individual objects do not exist. Others say that individual objects exist but depend on the structures in which they participate.[116] Fact ontologies present a different approach by focusing on how entities belonging to different categories come together to constitute the world. Facts, also known as states of affairs, are complex entities; for example, the fact that the Earth is a planet consists of the particular object the Earth and the property being a planet. Fact ontologies state that facts are the fundamental constituents of reality, meaning that objects, properties, and relations cannot exist on their own and only form part of reality to the extent that they participate in facts.[117][o]

In the history of philosophy, various ontological theories based on several fundamental categories have been proposed. One of the first theories of categories was suggested by Aristotle, whose system includes ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, date, posture, state, action, and passion.[119] An early influential system of categories in Indian philosophy, first proposed in the Vaisheshika school, distinguishes between six categories: substance, quality, motion, universal, individuator, and inherence.[120] Immanuel Kant's transcendental idealism includes a system of twelve categories, which Kant saw as pure concepts of understanding. They are subdivided into four classes: quantity, quality, relation, and modality.[121] In more recent philosophy, theories of categories were developed by C. S. Peirce, Edmund Husserl, Samuel Alexander, Roderick Chisholm, and E. J. Lowe.[122]

Others

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The dispute between constituent and relational ontologies[p] concerns the internal structure of concrete particular objects. Constituent ontologies say that objects have an internal structure with properties as their component parts. Bundle theories are an example of this position: they state that objects are bundles of properties. This view is rejected by relational ontologies, which say that objects have no internal structure, meaning that properties do not inhere in them but are externally related to them. According to one analogy, objects are like pin-cushions and properties are pins that can be stuck to objects and removed again without becoming a real part of objects. Relational ontologies are common in certain forms of nominalism that reject the existence of universal properties.[124]

Hierarchical ontologies state that the world is organized into levels. Entities on all levels are real but low-level entities are more fundamental than high-level entities. This means that they can exist without high-level entities while high-level entities cannot exist without low-level entities.[125] One hierarchical ontology says that elementary particles are more fundamental than the macroscopic objects they compose, like chairs and tables. Other hierarchical theories assert that substances are more fundamental than their properties and that nature is more fundamental than culture.[126] Flat ontologies, by contrast, deny that any entity has a privileged status, meaning that all entities exist on the same level. For them, the main question is only whether something exists rather than identifying the level at which it exists.[127][q]

The ontological theories of endurantism and perdurantism aim to explain how material objects persist through time. Endurantism is the view that material objects are three-dimensional entities that travel through time while being fully present in each moment. They remain the same even when they gain or lose properties as they change. Perdurantism is the view that material objects are four-dimensional entities that extend not just through space but also through time. This means that they are composed of temporal parts and, at any moment, only one part of them is present but not the others. According to perdurantists, change means that an earlier part exhibits different qualities than a later part. When a tree loses its leaves, for instance, there is an earlier temporal part with leaves and a later temporal part without leaves.[129]

Differential ontology is a poststructuralist approach interested in the relation between the concepts of identity and difference. It says that traditional ontology sees identity as the more basic term by first characterizing things in terms of their essential features and then elaborating differences based on this conception. Differential ontologists, by contrast, privilege difference and say that the identity of a thing is a secondary determination that depends on how this thing differs from other things.[130]

Object-oriented ontology belongs to the school of speculative realism and examines the nature and role of objects. It sees objects as the fundamental building blocks of reality. As a flat ontology, it denies that some entities have a more fundamental form of existence than others. It uses this idea to argue that objects exist independently of human thought and perception.[131]

Methods

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Methods of ontology are ways of conducting ontological inquiry and deciding between competing theories. There is no single standard method; the diverse approaches are studied by metaontology.[132]

Conceptual analysis is a method to understand ontological concepts and clarify their meaning.[133] It proceeds by analyzing their component parts and the necessary and sufficient conditions under which a concept applies to an entity.[134] This information can help ontologists decide whether a certain type of entity, such as numbers, exists.[135] Eidetic variation is a related method in phenomenological ontology that aims to identify the essential features of different types of objects. Phenomenologists start by imagining an example of the investigated type. They proceed by varying the imagined features to determine which ones cannot be changed, meaning they are essential.[136][r] The transcendental method begins with a simple observation that a certain entity exists. In the following step, it studies the ontological repercussions of this observation by examining how it is possible or which conditions are required for this entity to exist.[138]

Another approach is based on intuitions in the form of non-inferential impressions about the correctness of general principles.[139] These principles can be used as the foundation on which an ontological system is built and expanded using deductive reasoning.[140] A further intuition-based method relies on thought experiments to evoke new intuitions. This happens by imagining a situation relevant to an ontological issue and then employing counterfactual thinking to assess the consequences of this situation.[141] For example, some ontologists examine the relation between mind and matter by imagining creatures identical to humans but without consciousness.[142]

Naturalistic methods rely on the insights of the natural sciences to determine what exists.[143] According to an influential approach by Willard Van Orman Quine, ontology can be conducted by analyzing[s] the ontological commitments of scientific theories. This method is based on the idea that scientific theories provide the most reliable description of reality and that their power can be harnessed by investigating the ontological assumptions underlying them.[145]

Portrait of William of Ockham
William of Ockham proposed Ockham's Razor, a principle to decide between competing theories.

Principles of theory choice offer guidelines for assessing the advantages and disadvantages of ontological theories rather than guiding their construction.[146] The principle of Ockham's Razor says that simple theories are preferable.[147] A theory can be simple in different respects, for example, by using very few basic types or by describing the world with a small number of fundamental entities.[148] Ontologists are also interested in the explanatory power of theories and give preference to theories that can explain many observations.[149] A further factor is how close a theory is to common sense. Some ontologists use this principle as an argument against theories that are very different from how ordinary people think about the issue.[150]

In applied ontology, ontological engineering is the process of creating and refining conceptual models of specific domains.[151] Developing a new ontology from scratch involves various preparatory steps, such as delineating the scope of the domain one intends to model and specifying the purpose and use cases of the ontology. Once the foundational concepts within the area have been identified, ontology engineers proceed by defining them and characterizing the relations between them. This is usually done in a formal language to ensure precision and, in some cases, automatic computability. In the following review phase, the validity of the ontology is assessed using test data.[152] Various more specific instructions for how to carry out the different steps have been suggested. They include the Cyc method, Grüninger and Fox's methodology, and so-called METHONTOLOGY.[153] In some cases, it is feasible to adapt a pre-existing ontology to fit a specific domain and purpose rather than creating a new one from scratch.[154]

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Ontology overlaps with many disciplines, including logic, the study of correct reasoning.[155] Ontologists often employ logical systems to express their insights, specifically in the field of formal ontology. Of particular interest to them is the existential quantifier (), which is used to express what exists. In first-order logic, for example, the formula states that dogs exist.[156] Some philosophers study ontology by examining the structure of thought and language, saying that they reflect the structure of being.[157] Doubts about the accuracy of natural language have led some ontologists to seek a new formal language, termed ontologese, for a better representation of the fundamental structure of reality.[158]

Suggested Upper Merged Ontology
Entity    
  Physical    
  Object

 

  Process

 

  Abstract    
  Quantity

 

  Proposition

 

  Attribute

 

  Relation

 

  Set or Class

 

Fundamental categories in the Suggested Upper Merged Ontology[159]

Ontologies are often used in information science to provide a conceptual scheme or inventory of a specific domain, making it possible to classify objects and formally represent information about them. This is of specific interest to computer science, which builds databases to store this information and defines computational processes to automatically transform and use it.[160] For instance, to encode and store information about clients and employees in a database, an organization may use an ontology with categories such as person, company, address, and name.[161] In some cases, it is necessary to exchange information belonging to different domains or to integrate databases using distinct ontologies. This can be achieved with the help of upper ontologies, which are not limited to one specific domain. They use general categories that apply to most or all domains, like Suggested Upper Merged Ontology and Basic Formal Ontology.[162]

Similar applications of ontology are found in various fields seeking to manage extensive information within a structured framework. Protein Ontology is a formal framework for the standardized representation of protein-related entities and their relationships.[163] Gene Ontology and Sequence Ontology serve a similar purpose in the field of genetics.[164] Environment Ontology is a knowledge representation focused on ecosystems and environmental processes.[165] Friend of a Friend provides a conceptual framework to represent relations between people and their interests and activities.[166]

The topic of ontology has received increased attention in anthropology since the 1990s, sometimes termed the "ontological turn".[167] This type of inquiry is focused on how people from different cultures experience and understand the nature of being. Specific interest has been given to the ontological outlook of Indigenous people and how it differs from a Western perspective.[168] As an example of this contrast, it has been argued that various indigenous communities ascribe intentionality to non-human entities, like plants, forests, or rivers. This outlook is known as animism[169] and is also found in Native American ontologies, which emphasize the interconnectedness of all living entities and the importance of balance and harmony with nature.[170]

Ontology is closely related to theology and its interest in the existence of God as an ultimate entity. The ontological argument, first proposed by Anselm of Canterbury, attempts to prove the existence of the divine. It defines God as the greatest conceivable being. From this definition it concludes that God must exist since God would not be the greatest conceivable being if God lacked existence.[171] Another overlap in the two disciplines is found in ontological theories that use God or an ultimate being as the foundational principle of reality. Heidegger criticized this approach, terming it ontotheology.[172]

History

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Depiction of Kapila
Kapila was one of the founding fathers of the dualist school of Samkhya.[173]

The roots of ontology in ancient philosophy are speculations about the nature of being and the source of the universe. Discussions of the essence of reality are found in the Upanishads, ancient Indian scriptures dating from as early as 700 BCE. They say that the universe has a divine foundation and discuss in what sense ultimate reality is one or many.[174] Samkhya, the first orthodox school of Indian philosophy,[t] formulated an atheist dualist ontology based on the Upanishads, identifying pure consciousness and matter as its two foundational principles.[176] The later Vaisheshika school[u] proposed a comprehensive system of categories.[178] In ancient China, Laozi's (6th century BCE)[v] Taoism examines the underlying order of the universe, known as Tao, and how this order is shaped by the interaction of two basic forces, yin and yang.[180] The philosophical movement of Xuanxue emerged in the 3rd century CE and explored the relation between being and non-being.[181]

Starting in the 6th century BCE, Presocratic philosophers in ancient Greece aimed to provide rational explanations of the universe. They suggested that a first principle, such as water or fire, is the primal source of all things.[182] Parmenides (c. 515–450 BCE) is sometimes considered the founder of ontology because of his explicit discussion of the concepts of being and non-being.[183] Inspired by Presocratic philosophy, Plato (427–347 BCE) developed his theory of forms. It distinguishes between unchangeable perfect forms and matter, which has a lower degree of existence and imitates the forms.[184] Aristotle (384–322 BCE) suggested an elaborate system of categories that introduced the concept of substance as the primary kind of being.[185] The school of Neoplatonism arose in the 3rd century CE and proposed an ineffable source of everything, called the One, which is more basic than being itself.[186]

The problem of universals was an influential topic in medieval ontology. Boethius (477–524 CE) suggested that universals can exist not only in matter but also in the mind. This view inspired Peter Abelard (1079–1142 CE), who proposed that universals exist only in the mind.[187] Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274 CE) developed and refined fundamental ontological distinctions, such as the contrast between existence and essence, between substance and accidents, and between matter and form.[188] He also discussed the transcendentals, which are the most general properties or modes of being.[189] John Duns Scotus (1266–1308) argued that all entities, including God, exist in the same way and that each entity has a unique essence, called haecceity.[190] William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347 CE) proposed that one can decide between competing ontological theories by assessing which one uses the smallest number of elements, a principle known as Ockham's razor.[191]

Depiction of Zhu Xi
The Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi conceived the concept of li as the organizing principle of the universe.[192]

In Arabic-Persian philosophy, Avicenna (980–1037 CE) combined ontology with theology. He identified God as a necessary being that is the source of everything else, which only has contingent existence.[193] In 8th-century Indian philosophy, the school of Advaita Vedanta emerged. It says that only a single all-encompassing entity exists, stating that the impression of a plurality of distinct entities is an illusion.[194] Starting in the 13th century CE, the Navya-Nyāya school built on Vaisheshika ontology with a particular focus on the problem of non-existence and negation.[195] 9th-century China saw the emergence of Neo-Confucianism, which developed the idea that a rational principle, known as li, is the ground of being and order of the cosmos.[196]

René Descartes (1596–1650) formulated a dualist ontology at the beginning of the modern period. It distinguishes between mind and matter as distinct substances that causally interact.[197] Rejecting Descartes's dualism, Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) proposed a monist ontology according to which there is only a single entity that is identical to God and nature.[198] Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), by contrast, said that the universe is made up of many simple substances, which are synchronized but do not interact with one another.[199] John Locke (1632–1704) proposed his substratum theory, which says that each object has a featureless substratum that supports the object's properties.[200] Christian Wolff (1679–1754) was influential in establishing ontology as a distinct discipline, delimiting its scope from other forms of metaphysical inquiry.[201] George Berkeley (1685–1753) developed an idealist ontology according to which material objects are ideas perceived by minds.[202]

Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) rejected the idea that humans can have direct knowledge of independently existing things and their nature, limiting knowledge to the field of appearances. For Kant, ontology does not study external things but provides a system of pure concepts of understanding.[203] Influenced by Kant's philosophy, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) linked ontology and logic. He said that being and thought are identical and examined their foundational structures.[204] Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) rejected Hegel's philosophy and proposed that the world is an expression of a blind and irrational will.[205] Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924) saw absolute spirit as the ultimate and all-encompassing reality[206] while denying that there are any external relations.[207] In Indian philosophy, Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) expanded on Advaita Vedanta, emphasizing the unity of all existence.[208] Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) sought to understand the world as an evolutionary manifestation of a divine consciousness.[209]

At the beginning of the 20th century, Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) developed phenomenology and employed its method, the description of experience, to address ontological problems.[210] This idea inspired his student Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) to clarify the meaning of being by exploring the mode of human existence.[211] Jean-Paul Sartre responded to Heidegger's philosophy by examining the relation between being and nothingness from the perspective of human existence, freedom, and consciousness.[212] Based on the phenomenological method, Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) developed a complex hierarchical ontology that divides reality into four levels: inanimate, biological, psychological, and spiritual.[213]

Photo of Alexius Meinong
Alexius Meinong proposed that there are nonexistent objects.

Alexius Meinong (1853–1920) articulated a controversial ontological theory that includes nonexistent objects as part of being.[214] Arguing against this theory, Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) formulated a fact ontology known as logical atomism. This idea was further refined by the early Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951) and inspired D. M. Armstrong's (1926–2014) ontology.[215] Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947), by contrast, developed a process ontology.[216] Rudolf Carnap (1891–1970) questioned the objectivity of ontological theories by claiming that what exists depends on one's linguistic framework.[217] He had a strong influence on Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000), who analyzed the ontological commitments of scientific theories to solve ontological problems.[218] Quine's student David Lewis (1941–2001) formulated the position of modal realism, which says that possible worlds are as real and concrete as the actual world.[219] Since the end of the 20th century, interest in applied ontology has risen in computer and information science with the development of conceptual frameworks for specific domains.[220]

See also

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  • Hauntology – Return or persistence of past ideas

References

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from Grokipedia
Ontology is a fundamental branch of metaphysics in philosophy that investigates the nature of being, existence, and reality. It seeks to determine what entities or kinds of entities exist and how they relate to one another. The term "ontology" (Latin: ontologia) derives from the Greek words on (being) and logos (study or discourse), and was first coined by the German philosopher Jacob Lorhard (also known as Jacob Lorhardus) in his work Ogdoas Scholastica in 1606. It was independently used shortly thereafter by Rudolf Goclenius in his Lexicon philosophicum (1613) and later popularized by Christian Wolff in his Philosophia prima sive ontologia (1730). The field has ancient roots, particularly in Aristotle's Metaphysics, where it explores categories of being such as substance, quality, and quantity. Key debates in philosophical ontology include the existence of abstract objects (e.g., numbers or universals), the distinction between concrete and abstract entities, and ontological commitment—the implications of theories for what must exist to make statements true. These inquiries have influenced diverse areas, from ethics and epistemology to the philosophy of science, with modern meta-ontology examining the methods and presuppositions of ontological analysis itself. In computer science and information science, ontology refers to a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization within a particular domain. This comprises concepts (classes), their properties (attributes), and interrelationships, often represented in machine-readable formats to enable knowledge sharing and reasoning. This usage, popularized in the 1990s, draws from philosophical roots but adapts them for practical applications in artificial intelligence, the Semantic Web, and knowledge management. In these areas, ontologies facilitate interoperability between systems, data integration, and automated inference. Notable examples include domain-specific ontologies like those in bioinformatics for modeling biological entities or in e-commerce for product categorization. These enhance search engines, recommender systems, and agent-based interactions by making implicit domain assumptions explicit. Development of such ontologies typically involves iterative processes: defining scope, reusing existing structures, enumerating terms, building hierarchies, and defining constraints, often using tools like Protégé. The interplay between philosophical and computational ontologies underscores broader themes in ontology studies, such as formal ontology—a mathematical theory of entities used in both fields to model reality—and social ontology, which examines collective entities like institutions arising from human interactions. While philosophical ontology addresses existential questions at a foundational level, computational ontologies operationalize these ideas to structure vast datasets in the digital age, bridging abstract theory with tangible technological advancements.

Definition and Overview

Definition

Ontology is the branch of metaphysics that systematically investigates the nature of being, existence, reality, and the fundamental entities that exist independently of human thought or perception. This inquiry addresses core questions about what constitutes reality and the categories of things that populate it, distinguishing between what exists in the most basic sense and how those existents relate to one another. The term "ontology" derives from the Ancient Greek words ὄν (ón), the present participle of εἰμί (eimí, "to be"), meaning "being," and λόγος (lógos), meaning "study," "discourse," or "reason." It was coined in the early 17th century, appearing in Jacob Lorhard's Ontologia (1606) and Rudolf Goclenius's Lexicon philosophicum (1613), and was popularized and employed in a systematic philosophical context by Christian Wolff in his 1730 treatise Philosophia prima sive ontologia, where he presented it as the foundational science of being qua being. This usage built on earlier philosophical traditions, including Aristotle's conception of "first philosophy" as the study of being as such. A pivotal formulation of ontology's central concern is the question "What is there?", posed by Willard Van Orman Quine in his 1948 essay "On What There Is," which underscores the discipline's focus on ontological commitment—what entities a theory or language must presuppose to be true. Unlike the broader scope of metaphysics, which may include inquiries into causation, time, and mind, ontology narrows in on existence itself. It is also distinct from cosmology, which pertains to the origin, structure, and overall order of the physical universe rather than the general nature of being.

Scope and Distinctions

Ontology as a branch of philosophy systematically examines the categories of existence and the structures that constitute reality, encompassing entities such as objects (or continuants), properties, events, processes (or occurrents), and the relations among them, including those involving identity and change. This scope seeks to provide an exhaustive taxonomy of what exists or may exist, distinguishing between concrete and abstract items, and between substantialist approaches that prioritize enduring things and fluxist views that emphasize dynamic processes. By cataloging these fundamental types, ontology establishes the basic inventory of reality, serving as a prerequisite for descriptive accounts across domains without venturing into explanatory mechanisms proper to specific sciences. The importance of ontology lies in its role as the foundational discipline of philosophy, undergirding inquiries into what entities can be coherently posited or discussed, thereby shaping the parameters of ethical, epistemological, and scientific discourse. For instance, by clarifying the nature of existent categories, ontology determines the scope of meaningful predication and argumentation in other fields, ensuring that discussions of moral obligations or empirical laws presuppose a coherent account of the beings involved. Without such a foundation, philosophical and scientific theories risk incoherence in their assumptions about reality's composition. Ontology is distinct from epistemology, the study of knowledge, which addresses how one acquires and justifies beliefs about existence rather than the existence of entities themselves. Whereas ontology probes the nature and categories of being, epistemology evaluates the methods and limits of cognition regarding those categories. Similarly, ontology differs from semantics, which investigates the meanings of linguistic expressions and their referential relations to the world, focusing on interpretive frameworks rather than the intrinsic character of the referenced entities. Semantics thus concerns the linguistic mediation of reality, while ontology directly confronts the structure of reality independent of such mediation. In contemporary analytic philosophy, ontology plays a central role in debates over ontological commitment, a concept formalized by W. V. Quine, which holds that a theory commits its proponents to the existence of precisely those entities that must be quantified over in the theory's canonical logical formulation. This criterion, emphasizing the implications of a discourse's logical structure for what "there is," has become a standard tool for assessing the metaphysical implications of scientific and philosophical theories, influencing discussions on realism and the ontology of abstract objects like numbers or properties.

Fundamental Concepts

Being and Existence

In ontology, the concept of "being" addresses the fundamental question of what it means for something to exist, distinguishing between the abstract nature of existence itself and the concrete entities that partake in it. This inquiry probes the essence of reality, exploring how existence is asserted, its modalities, and its implications for understanding the world. Central to this is the differentiation between being as a universal condition and the particular instances of beings that populate reality. Parmenides, an ancient Greek philosopher, posited that being is eternal, unchanging, and singular, arguing that true reality consists of a unified whole without division, motion, or temporal variation, as any change would imply the impossible transition from being to non-being. In his poem On Nature, he asserts that "what is" must be whole, complete, and indivisible, rejecting multiplicity and becoming as illusions of mortal thought. This monistic view establishes being as the sole, immutable reality, influencing subsequent ontological thought by prioritizing unity over diversity. In modern logic, existence is formally expressed through the existential quantifier, denoted as ∃x, which asserts "there exists an x such that..." a given predicate holds true for that x, providing a precise mechanism to claim the instantiation of properties or relations in a domain. This notation, introduced by Gottlob Frege in his Begriffsschrift, revolutionized formal ontology by enabling rigorous analysis of existential claims without ambiguity, distinguishing them from universal quantification (∀x). For instance, ∃x (P(x)) affirms that at least one entity satisfies predicate P, grounding ontological assertions in logical structure. Such quantifiers relate to broader ontological categories by specifying how entities fall under general types of being. Modalities further refine the notion of being, contrasting necessary being—which must exist in all possible worlds—with contingent being, which exists only in some. Anselm of Canterbury's ontological argument exemplifies necessary existence, positing God as a being than which none greater can be conceived, whose existence in reality is required for maximal greatness, as mere conceptual existence would be deficient. In Proslogion, Anselm argues that this being's necessity follows from its definition, making denial incoherent. This distinction highlights how ontology interrogates not just what exists but the modal status of existence itself. Martin Heidegger deepened this exploration by distinguishing "Being" (Sein)—the underlying question of what being means—and "beings" (Seiendes), the entities that exist within the world, emphasizing that traditional metaphysics overlooks this ontological difference. In Being and Time, Heidegger critiques the forgetfulness of Being, urging a phenomenological return to the meaning of existence through human Dasein, which discloses the structures of being. This separation underscores that ontology concerns not merely cataloging beings but uncovering the horizon of their intelligibility.

Particulars and Universals

In ontology, particulars and universals represent a fundamental distinction concerning the nature of entities and their properties. Particulars are unique, non-repeatable individuals that exist independently and serve as the primary subjects of predication, such as a specific apple or an individual human being. These entities ground the concrete reality of the world, as they are not predicated of anything else but rather have other attributes ascribed to them. Aristotle identifies such particulars as primary substances in his Categories, emphasizing that they are "neither present in a subject nor present as a predicate of a subject," making them the foundational building blocks of existence. Universals, in contrast, are repeatable qualities or essences that can be shared by multiple particulars, such as the redness exemplified by various red objects or the humanity common to all humans. These are not individual entities but abstract features that account for similarities across distinct things. Plato's theory of Forms posits universals as eternal, unchanging ideals existing in a separate realm, with particulars participating in them imperfectly; for instance, all beautiful objects partake in the singular Form of Beauty, which is the true essence of beauty itself. Aristotle, while rejecting the separate existence of Forms, treats universals as secondary substances—species and genera like "human" or "animal"—that are predicated of primary substances to define their nature. The problem of universals arises from the question of their ontological status: do they exist independently as real entities (realism), or are they merely linguistic conventions or mental constructs without independent being (nominalism)? This debate, originating in ancient philosophy, challenges how to explain the unity of shared properties without positing either an infinite regress of resemblances or reducing all to isolated individuals. Ontologically, universals provide the basis for similarity and predication among particulars, enabling classification and generalization, while particulars ensure the irreducibility of concrete instances, preserving individuality against dissolution into mere instances of types. This interplay underscores how ontology reconciles the one (universal essence) with the many (diverse particulars), informing broader inquiries into being and existence.

Ontological Categories

Ontological categories refer to systematic classifications of entities into fundamental types, providing frameworks for understanding what exists and how entities relate in terms of predication or structure. These schemes aim to delineate the basic kinds of being, often serving as tools for analyzing reality or experience without presupposing deeper metaphysical commitments. One of the earliest and most influential systems is Aristotle's ten categories, outlined in his work Categories, which classify the ways in which predicates can be asserted of subjects. These include substance (ousia), which denotes primary entities like individual humans or horses that exist independently; quantity, referring to measures such as length or number; quality, encompassing attributes like color or shape; relation, such as double or slave; place, indicating location like "in the marketplace"; time, as in "yesterday"; position, like "sitting"; state or having, such as "armed"; action, as "cutting"; and being affected, like "being cut". Aristotle presents these as the highest genera of predication, ensuring that all assertions about reality fall into one of these non-overlapping types, with substance holding primacy as the underlying subject of the others. In the modern era, Immanuel Kant introduced a different set of categories in his Critique of Pure Reason, positing twelve a priori concepts of the understanding that structure human experience rather than directly mirroring external reality. Derived from forms of judgment, these are grouped into four classes: quantity (unity, plurality, totality), quality (reality, negation, limitation), relation (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community), and modality (possibility/impossibility, existence/non-existence, necessity/contingency). For Kant, categories like substance and causality are not empirical discoveries but transcendental conditions enabling coherent cognition, organizing sensory data into objects of knowledge without which experience would be chaotic. Contemporary ontology often employs more flexible schemes, such as Willard Van Orman Quine's criterion of ontological commitment, which identifies categories based on what a theory quantifies over in its most regimented form. In "On What There Is," Quine argues that the ontology of a theory comprises entities like physical objects, numbers, or classes to which the theory commits its adherents through existential generalization, rejecting vague intuitions in favor of logical structure. For instance, a scientific theory committing to electrons and quarks falls into the category of concrete physical objects, while mathematics commits to abstract numbers. This approach shifts focus from traditional lists to the implications of theoretical discourse. A prominent modern distinction within ontological categories is that between concrete and abstract objects, where concrete entities are spatiotemporal and causally efficacious, such as tables or electrons, while abstract ones lack spatial-temporal location and causal powers, including numbers, propositions, or sets. This binary helps classify commitments: a table exemplifies a concrete particular, whereas the number 2 represents an abstract universal applicable across instances. Philosophers debate the boundaries, but the distinction underscores tensions in ontology between the observable world and non-empirical posits.

Ontological Dependence

Ontological dependence refers to a relation in which the existence of one entity, A, requires the existence of another entity, B, such that A cannot exist without B. This concept is central to contemporary metaphysics, distinguishing dependence from mere causal relations by emphasizing existential necessity rather than temporal or efficient causation. For instance, a hole in the ground depends on the surrounding earth, as the hole's existence is grounded in the absence defined by that material. Philosophers identify several types of ontological dependence. Constitutive dependence occurs when an entity depends on its parts to form a whole, as in the case of a table depending on its wooden components for its structural integrity. Historical dependence involves entities that rely on prior events or causes for their coming into being, such as a historical event like the Battle of Waterloo depending on preceding geopolitical conditions. Modal dependence, meanwhile, pertains to possibilities that depend on actualities, where counterfactual scenarios require the actual world as a foundation for their coherence. Kit Fine provided a seminal formalization of ontological dependence in his 1995 paper, treating it as a primitive, irreflexive, and asymmetric relation that cannot be reduced to other metaphysical concepts like essence or identity. Fine's approach posits that dependence is a fundamental building block for analyzing metaphysical structure, allowing for rigorous distinctions between dependent and independent entities without appealing to set-theoretic or modal primitives. This framework has significant implications for ontology, challenging traditional views of self-sufficient substances by suggesting that many entities are interdependent, thereby complicating Aristotelian notions of independent beings. It plays a crucial role in debates on emergence, where higher-level properties may depend on but not reduce to lower-level ones, and in reductionism, questioning whether complex phenomena can be fully explained by eliminating dependencies on wholes.

Major Debates and Schools

Realism versus Anti-Realism

In ontology, the debate between realism and anti-realism centers on whether certain entities, such as universals and abstract objects, exist independently of the mind or are merely constructs of human thought and language. This distinction arises prominently in discussions of the problem of universals, where realists posit mind-independent realities to account for shared properties among particulars, while anti-realists seek to explain such phenomena without committing to extra-mental entities. Realism asserts that universals and abstracta, like properties or mathematical objects, exist objectively and mind-independently, providing a foundation for the similarities observed in the world. Platonic realism, a paradigmatic form of this view, holds that these entities reside in a non-physical realm, separate from particulars, and that particulars participate in or approximate them to instantiate shared characteristics. For instance, the universal "redness" exists as an abstract form, explaining why diverse objects appear red without reducing the explanation to mere linguistic similarity. Anti-realism, in contrast, denies the independent existence of such entities, proposing instead that universals and abstracta are either linguistic conventions or mind-dependent constructs. Nominalism, as advanced by William of Ockham, treats universals as mere names or terms that group similar particulars without corresponding to real, extra-mental entities; for Ockham, terms like "humanity" signify collections of individuals but do not denote a separate universal substance. Conceptualism, another anti-realist position, acknowledges universals but locates them solely within the mind as concepts or ideas that enable categorization, making them dependent on cognitive processes rather than objective reality. A key argument for realism emphasizes explanatory power: mind-independent universals best account for the objective resemblances and regularities in nature, as shared properties among particulars require a common ground that nominalist or conceptualist accounts cannot fully provide without ad hoc assumptions. Anti-realists counter with the principle of parsimony, embodied in Occam's razor, which favors theories positing fewer ontological commitments; introducing independent universals multiplies entities unnecessarily when linguistic or mental constructs suffice to explain predication and similarity. This razor, attributed to Ockham himself, underscores that realism's explanatory benefits do not outweigh the ontological extravagance of positing non-observable, mind-independent abstracts. In contemporary ontology, particularly within the philosophy of science, the realism-anti-realism debate manifests as scientific realism versus instrumentalism regarding unobservables. Scientific realists maintain that successful scientific theories, such as those positing electrons or quarks, warrant belief in the mind-independent existence of these unobservable entities, as their inclusion enhances theoretical coherence and predictive success. Instrumentalism, an anti-realist stance, views such theories primarily as tools for organizing observables and generating predictions, without committing to the literal truth of unobservables, thereby avoiding ontological risks from potentially false posits like those in superseded theories.

Monism, Dualism, and Pluralism

In ontology, positions on the number of fundamental kinds of being form a central axis of debate, distinguishing monism (one kind), dualism (two kinds), and pluralism (multiple irreducible kinds). These views address how reality's structure accommodates unity or diversity without presupposing the mind-independence of entities, focusing instead on the cardinality of basic ontological categories. Monism posits that all of reality reduces to a single fundamental substance or kind of being, promoting ontological parsimony by eliminating multiplicity at the base level. Baruch Spinoza's substance monism, articulated in his Ethics, holds that there is only one infinite substance—God or Nature—from which all things follow as modes or attributes, such as thought and extension. Similarly, materialist physicalism represents a contemporary substance monism, asserting that everything is ultimately physical or reducible to physical processes, as defended in Jonathan Schaffer's priority monism where the cosmos as a whole is the fundamental entity, with parts deriving their existence from it. Arguments for monism emphasize unity: a single kind of being explains the interconnectedness of phenomena, such as quantum entanglement suggesting a holistic reality, avoiding the explanatory fragmentation of multiple fundamentals. Dualism, in contrast, maintains exactly two fundamental kinds of being, often to account for apparent divides like the mental and physical. René Descartes' mind-body dualism exemplifies this, distinguishing res cogitans (thinking substance, characterized by consciousness and indivisibility) from res extensa (extended substance, defined by spatial properties and divisibility), as argued in his Meditations on First Philosophy where he claims these substances can exist independently based on their distinct essential attributes. This view posits that neither reduces to the other, resolving tensions between subjective experience and objective matter through separate ontological bases. Pluralism extends beyond two kinds, proposing multiple irreducible categories of being to capture reality's complexity. Alfred North Whitehead's process ontology illustrates this pluralism, positing actual occasions—discrete events of becoming—as one fundamental category, alongside eternal objects (pure potentials) and creativity (the drive toward novelty), as detailed in Process and Reality. These categories interrelate without reduction, with actual occasions depending on prehensions (relations to other entities) to constitute experience. Arguments for pluralism highlight diversity in phenomena: the varied manifestations of physical, mental, and aesthetic realities demand multiple ontological kinds, as a singular or dual framework fails to explain such heterogeneity without ad hoc adjustments. In pluralist views, dependence relations among categories, like those between actual occasions and eternal objects, enable coherence without collapsing into monism.

Process and Substance Ontologies

Substance ontology posits that the fundamental entities of reality are enduring substrates, or substances, which serve as the bearers of properties and undergo change while maintaining their essential identity. In this view, substances are the primary subjects of predication, distinct from their accidental attributes, and they provide the stable foundation for the world's structure. Aristotle's concept of ousia, often translated as substance, exemplifies this approach, where primary substances—such as individual humans or horses—are particular, concrete beings that exist independently and constitute the basic units of reality, while secondary substances like species or genera are universals predicated of those primaries. These substances persist through qualitative changes, with properties inhering in them as modifications rather than defining their core existence. In contrast, process ontology conceives of reality as a dynamic flux of events, activities, and occurrences, where processes are the primary ontological categories rather than static things. Proponents argue that becoming and transformation are more fundamental than being, rejecting the notion of unchanging substrates in favor of an interconnected web of temporal happenings. Heraclitus captured this perspective in his fragments, asserting that "everything flows" (panta rhei) and that no entity remains fixed, as all things are in constant motion and opposition, exemplified by the river one cannot step into twice due to the perpetual flow of waters. Similarly, Henri Bergson's notion of durée (duration) emphasizes lived time as a continuous, heterogeneous progression of qualitative changes, irreducible to spatialized, mechanistic sequences, wherein reality unfolds through creative evolution rather than discrete, enduring objects. The key differences between these ontologies lie in their treatment of persistence and change: substance ontologies prioritize stability, viewing changes as alterations to properties of an underlying, perduring entity that retains its identity across time, whereas process ontologies highlight becoming, analyzing apparent persistence as patterns or successions of interconnected events without a fixed core. In substance views, entities like organisms are continuants that endure through processes; in process views, such entities are reducible to dynamic activities, such as metabolic flows or relational interactions. This contrast shapes broader metaphysical commitments, with substances supporting a ontology of independence and categorization, while processes foster one of interdependence and temporality. In modern philosophy, Nicholas Rescher has advanced process metaphysics as a systematic framework that integrates these dynamic elements, arguing that processes constitute the basic fabric of reality and that nominalistic processualism avoids the reification pitfalls of substance-based systems. Rescher's approach posits that all concrete existence is inherently temporal and flux-oriented, providing a coherent alternative to traditional ontologies by emphasizing novelty, creativity, and the primacy of change in understanding the world. While pluralism can accommodate both substances and processes as coequal categories, process ontologies like Rescher's often challenge the dominance of static entities in favor of a more fluid metaphysical pluralism.

Methods and Approaches

Conceptual and Linguistic Analysis

Conceptual analysis serves as a foundational method in ontology, focusing on the clarification of key terms such as "existence," "being," and "entity" through reflective examination and thought experiments. This approach aims to unpack the conceptual content of these notions by exploring their implications in hypothetical scenarios, thereby revealing underlying assumptions about what constitutes reality. For instance, in the ontology of knowledge, Edmund Gettier's thought experiments demonstrate how justified true belief may fail to capture knowledge due to cases involving false lemmas or luck, prompting a reevaluation of existence conditions for epistemic states. Such analyses prioritize intuitive understanding over empirical data, enabling philosophers to test ontological commitments without relying on formal systems. The linguistic turn in ontology shifts attention to how language shapes conceptual understanding, emphasizing that ontological categories emerge from ordinary language use rather than abstract essences. Ludwig Wittgenstein's concept of "family resemblances" illustrates this by arguing that terms like "game" or "number" lack necessary and sufficient conditions but instead exhibit overlapping similarities, challenging traditional ontological essentialism and suggesting categories as fluid networks. This method encourages scrutiny of linguistic practices to uncover hidden ontological presuppositions, as seen in analyses of how predicates imply existence or dependence relations. Rudolf Carnap further advanced this linguistic approach by distinguishing between internal and external questions of existence. Internal questions, framed within a specific linguistic framework, are resolvable through empirical or logical means—such as whether certain entities exist relative to scientific theories—while external questions, concerning the framework's adoption itself, are pragmatic choices rather than genuine ontological inquiries, often dismissed as pseudo-problems in metaphysics. Carnap's principle thus redirects ontological debate toward the utility of linguistic constructs, influencing how existence claims are evaluated in conceptual terms. These methods offer significant advantages in accessibility, allowing broad participation in ontological inquiry through everyday language and thought, which fosters intuitive insights and interdisciplinary dialogue without requiring specialized training. However, critics highlight potential biases inherent in natural language, such as cultural or contextual ambiguities that may distort objective analysis of ontological structures, necessitating careful scrutiny of linguistic assumptions. In debates like realism versus anti-realism, conceptual and linguistic analysis provides tools to dissect the notions involved, clarifying their implications without resolving deeper metaphysical tensions.

Formal and Axiomatic Methods

Formal and axiomatic methods in ontology employ mathematical logic and axiomatic systems to rigorously define and analyze the nature of being, existence, and categories of entities, providing a structured framework for ontological commitments and relations. These approaches contrast with more interpretive methods by emphasizing deductive proofs, consistency checks, and formal representations that allow for precise testing of ontological theories. By translating philosophical concepts into logical axioms and theorems, formal methods enable the construction of coherent systems that avoid ambiguities inherent in natural language discussions. Axiomatic ontology focuses on building foundational systems through sets of axioms that govern specific ontological relations, such as part-whole structures in mereology. Stanisław Leśniewski introduced mereology in 1916 as an axiomatic theory to address collective wholes without relying on set theory, defining primitives like "part" and axioms ensuring properties such as antisymmetry and transitivity of the part relation. For instance, Leśniewski's system includes axioms stating that every object is a part of itself and that if A is a part of B and B is a part of C, then A is a part of C, forming a rigorous alternative to classical extensional mereology. This approach has influenced subsequent axiomatic ontologies by demonstrating how logical deduction can formalize intuitive notions of composition and dependence. Formal ontology utilizes first-order logic to articulate ontological commitments, determining what entities a theory presupposes by examining its quantificational structure. Willard Van Orman Quine formalized this in his criterion that "to be is to be the value of a variable," meaning a theory commits to the existence of those entities over which its variables range in first-order quantification. This method allows ontologists to assess the implications of linguistic or conceptual frameworks by regimenting them into logical form, revealing hidden assumptions about reality. Quine's approach, rooted in analytic philosophy, underscores the role of logical syntax in ontology, ensuring that commitments are explicit and verifiable through formal analysis. The Bunge-Wand-Weber (BWW) ontology exemplifies a comprehensive formal model derived from Mario Bunge's scientific ontology, comprising 28 categories organized into hierarchies of things, properties, and relations to support systematic analysis. Developed by Yair Wand and Ronald Weber in 1990, the BWW framework axiomatizes ontological constructs such as substantial individuals, states, events, and couplings, providing a deductive basis for evaluating conceptual models in terms of completeness and consistency. Its categories include, for example, "thing" as a basic existent with intrinsic properties and "system" as composed wholes, enabling formal mappings between philosophical ontology and applied domains while maintaining logical rigor. This model has become a standard for axiomatic evaluation due to its explicit definitions and relational axioms. Modal logic serves as a key tool in formal ontology for handling notions of necessity, possibility, and possible worlds, extending first-order frameworks to model counterfactual existences and modal commitments. Saul Kripke's semantics, introduced in the 1960s and elaborated in his 1970 lectures (published in 1980), represents modal operators using Kripke frames—structures of possible worlds connected by accessibility relations—to interpret necessity as truth in all accessible worlds from a given world. In ontology, this allows formalization of debates over essential properties and transworld identity, such as whether an entity exists necessarily or contingently, by quantifying over worlds rather than just actual entities. Kripke's approach provides axiomatic completeness for systems like S5, ensuring that ontological claims about modality are deductively sound and free from paradoxes.

Historical Development

Ancient and Classical Ontology

The origins of ontology in Western philosophy emerged among the Pre-Socratic thinkers, who initiated systematic inquiries into the fundamental nature of reality by seeking the arche, or originating principle, of the cosmos. Thales of Miletus, traditionally considered the inaugural philosopher around the 6th century BCE, identified water as this arche, positing that it underlies all things through processes of rarefaction and condensation, as reported by Aristotle in his Metaphysics. This marked a shift from mythological explanations to naturalistic ones, emphasizing a single, enduring substance as the basis of existence. Subsequent Pre-Socratics deepened this exploration, often in tension with one another. Parmenides of Elea, in his poem On Nature, advanced a monistic ontology where being is singular, eternal, indivisible, and unchanging, rejecting sensory appearances of multiplicity and motion as illusions; true reality, he argued, is what is, without coming-to-be or passing away. In opposition, Heraclitus of Ephesus stressed perpetual flux and transformation, declaring that "all things come to pass in accordance with this logos" of strife and unity of opposites, where stability is illusory and change constitutes the essence of being. These contrasting views—static unity versus dynamic process—framed early debates on the stability and variability of existence. Gorgias, a prominent Sophist (c. 483–376 BCE), offered a radical skeptical counterpoint in his treatise On Not-Being (also known as On Nature, or That Which Is Not), which survives in summaries by Sextus Empiricus and pseudo-Aristotle. He advanced three interconnected arguments: first, that nothing exists, as existence would require either being, non-being, or both, all of which lead to contradictions; second, even if existence is possible, it cannot be apprehended by thought, since thinking involves non-existent images; and third, even if it could be known, it cannot be communicated through language, which only conveys subjective impressions. This work satirized and extended Parmenides' logic to undermine ontological claims altogether, highlighting the limitations of reason and discourse in accessing reality. Plato, building on these foundations in the 4th century BCE, formulated a dualistic ontology through his Theory of Forms (or Ideas), distinguishing between the imperfect, transient sensible world and a higher realm of eternal, perfect, and immutable Forms. These Forms—archetypes like the Good, Beauty, or Justice—exist independently as the true realities, paradigms for all particulars, which merely participate in or imitate them; knowledge arises from intellectual apprehension of this non-sensible domain, as detailed in dialogues such as the Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic. In the Timaeus, Plato further describes the Demiurge as crafting the physical cosmos by modeling it after these Forms, underscoring their role as objective, transcendent essences beyond generation and decay. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics (circa 350 BCE), critiqued Plato's separation of Forms from particulars and redefined ontology as the science of "being qua being," examining the common principles of all entities rather than a transcendent realm. Central to his framework are substances (ousiai) as primary beings—individual composites of matter (potentiality, or dynamis) and form (actuality, or energeia)—which serve as the foundational units from which qualities, relations, and other categories derive. Change occurs as potentiality realizes itself into actuality, enabling a hylomorphic (matter-form) account of natural processes, with substances prior in definition, knowledge, and existence; this prioritizes immanent causes over separate ideals. Hellenistic philosophy extended these ideas into materialist ontologies during the 3rd century BCE onward. The Stoics, founded by Zeno of Citium, proposed a corporeal monism with two co-principles: passive, inert matter and the active principle, God or logos, embodied as pneuma—a tense, fiery breath that permeates and vitalizes all bodies, maintaining cosmic unity, growth, and order through its varying degrees of cohesion. Pneuma functions as the soul of the world, blending inseparably with matter to produce qualities and teleological direction, as preserved in fragments from Chrysippus and earlier Stoics. In parallel, Epicurean atomism, revived by Epicurus from Democritean roots, asserted a strictly material ontology where the universe comprises only atoms—indivisible, eternal particles differing in shape, size, and weight—and the void in which they move freely. All phenomena, including souls and sensations, emerge from atomic collisions and aggregations governed by necessity and chance (via the swerve), eliminating divine intervention or immaterial entities; this reductive view aimed to dispel fears of death and the gods by grounding existence in observable, mechanistic principles.

Medieval Ontology

Medieval ontology developed within the framework of scholasticism, integrating classical philosophy with Christian theology to explore the nature of being, universals, and the relationship between God and creation. This period saw the transmission and adaptation of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic ideas through key figures in both Islamic and Christian traditions who addressed ontological questions in service of theological ends, emphasizing the hierarchical structure of reality dependent on divine being. In the Islamic world, Avicenna (Ibn Sina, c. 980–1037) made foundational contributions to ontology in his Book of Healing and The Cure, distinguishing between essence (what a thing is) and existence (that it is), arguing that existence is an accident added to essence in contingent beings, while in God essence and existence are identical as necessary being. This essence-existence distinction, along with his metaphysical hierarchy of being emanating from the One, profoundly influenced later thinkers. Avicenna's works, translated into Latin in the 12th century, bridged Greek philosophy to the West and shaped scholastic debates on being. Boethius (c. 480–524) played a pivotal role in transmitting Aristotle's ontology to the Latin West by translating and commenting on Porphyry's Isagoge, an introduction to Aristotle's Categories. In his Second Commentary on Porphyry's Isagoge, Boethius examines universals—genera and species—as predicables that apply to multiple things, raising questions about whether they subsist as real entities or merely as concepts, without resolving the debate between realism and nominalism. Porphyry's Isagoge itself poses the problem of universals by asking if they exist in reality, in the mind, or both, influencing medieval discussions on the ontological status of shared properties. Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) advanced ontological inquiry through his Proslogion, where he presents the ontological argument for God's existence as a necessary being. Defining God as "that than which nothing greater can be conceived," Anselm argues that such a being must exist in reality, for existence in the understanding alone would imply a greater being that also exists externally; thus, God's existence is necessary and cannot be conceived otherwise. This argument posits God as the supreme ontological reality, grounding all being in divine necessity. Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) synthesized Aristotelian ontology with theology in works like the Summa Theologica, distinguishing essence (what a thing is) from existence (that it is). In God, essence and existence are identical, as God is pure act (ipsum esse subsistens), while in creatures, existence is received and distinct from essence, making them contingent. Aquinas further develops the analogy of being (analogia entis), where terms like "good" or "being" apply to God and creatures proportionally: perfections exist eminently in God and participatorily in creation, allowing theological language without univocity or equivocity. Aquinas drew on Avicenna's insights while adapting them to Christian doctrine. John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308) refined realism by introducing haecceity (haecceitas), the "thisness" that individuates particulars, in his Ordinatio. Unlike common natures (e.g., humanity), which have objective but indeterminate unity, haecceity is a formal distinction that contracts the nature to a unique individual without being a qualitative property or mere negation. This preserves the reality of universals while explaining singularity. In contrast, William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347) championed nominalism in his Summa Logicae, denying real universals as entities beyond singular things; universals are merely mental concepts or signs predicable of many individuals, eliminating unnecessary ontological commitments per his razor. Ockham's view marked the rise of nominalism, challenging realist traditions by reducing ontology to concrete particulars.

Modern and Contemporary Ontology

Modern ontology emerged during the Enlightenment with René Descartes' (1596–1650) rationalist framework, which sought to establish certainty through innate ideas and the foundational certainty of self-existence. Descartes argued that the cogito ergo sum—"I think, therefore I am"—provides indubitable knowledge of the thinking self's existence, serving as the bedrock for ontology by distinguishing mind from body and positing innate ideas as a priori truths imprinted on the soul. This approach emphasized substance dualism, where mind and matter are distinct ontological categories, influencing subsequent debates on the nature of reality. Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) revolutionized ontology in the late 18th century by distinguishing between noumena, or things-in-themselves beyond human cognition, and phenomena, the world as structured by the mind's categories. In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant posited that space, time, and categories like causality are not features of external reality but a priori impositions of the human mind, limiting ontology to the phenomenal realm and rendering the noumenal unknowable. This transcendental idealism shifted ontology from speculative metaphysics to an examination of cognitive conditions, profoundly impacting analytic and continental traditions. In the 20th century, ontology diverged along analytic and continental lines, with Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), building on Edmund Husserl's phenomenological method, critiquing the tradition's "forgottenness" of being and introducing Dasein as the fundamental mode of human existence. Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) reframed ontology as a hermeneutic inquiry into Being (Sein) through the lived experience of Dasein, emphasizing temporality and thrownness over static substances. Nicolai Hartmann (1882–1950) developed a "New Ontology" in his 1942 work New Ways of Ontology, advocating for critical realism that posits a stratified structure of being independent of epistemological constraints. Hartmann outlined four levels of reality—the inorganic, biological, psychological, and spiritual—each governed by its own categories and modes of being, emphasizing ontology's autonomy from the theory of knowledge to focus on the concrete layers of the real world. This approach renewed ontological inquiry by prioritizing the interdependences in being and becoming, influencing later metaphysical discussions in continental philosophy. In contrast, Willard Van Orman Quine (1908–2000) advocated for a naturalized ontology integrated with empirical science, famously declaring in "On What There Is" (1948) that "to be is to be the value of a variable" in scientific theories, rejecting abstract entities unless indispensable to explanatory frameworks. This Quinean approach influenced analytic philosophy by tying ontological commitments to the ontology of science. Contemporary ontology reflects interdisciplinary influences, particularly in physics, feminism, and emerging technologies. Ontic structural realism posits that reality consists fundamentally of relational structures rather than independent objects, as argued by James Ladyman and Don Ross in Every Thing Must Go (2007), drawing from quantum mechanics and spacetime theories where entities are defined by their structural roles. In feminist ontology, thinkers like Karen Barad advance relational being through agential realism, where entities emerge from intra-actions in a posthumanist framework, challenging anthropocentric and dualistic ontologies, as in Meeting the Universe Halfway (2007). Since the 2020s, debates on AI-influenced ontology have intensified following the release of ChatGPT in 2022, questioning the ontological status of digital entities, such as whether large language models constitute novel forms of being or mere simulations, as explored in Luciano Floridi's informational ontology extended to generative AI and virtual realities (e.g., Floridi 2023). Some recent discussions in metaphysics and philosophy of technology treat large-scale digital infrastructures as ontologically significant in their own right. On this view, long-lived software platforms, large language models, and socio-technical networks are described not merely as tools but as hybrid configurations whose identity depends on code, data flows, and institutional practices such as governance, standardization, and attribution. These approaches extend earlier structural and relational ontologies by suggesting that what exists in the digital sphere is not just individual bits or devices, but patterned configurations of interaction that persist over time and can be targets of explanation, responsibility, and critique. Process views in modern thinkers, such as Alfred North Whitehead's (1861–1947) Process and Reality (1929), underscore ontology's emphasis on becoming over static being. Recent developments as of 2025 include advances in social ontology, examining collective entities and power structures in non-ideal contexts, and quantum ontology exploring primitive ontologies in foundational physics. Some experimental AI authorship projects have also begun to test how far contemporary information infrastructures can extend ontological categories such as author and agent. In 2025, for example, the Aisentica project registered a Digital Author Persona, [[Angela Bogdanova]], in the ORCID system not as a biological researcher but as an AI-based author identity linked to a corpus of philosophical texts on artificial intelligence and postsubjective theory. Such cases remain marginal and are documented mainly in project self-descriptions, but they show that scholarly identification systems can, at least technically, treat non-human configurations as entities that participate in authorship and citation alongside human persons.

Branches and Applications

Ontology of Mind and Consciousness

The ontology of mind and consciousness addresses the metaphysical nature of mental phenomena, particularly whether minds and conscious experiences exist as distinct entities from the physical world or can be fully accounted for within it. This branch of ontology probes the existence and fundamental properties of consciousness, including subjective experiences known as qualia, and debates the ontological categories to which mental states belong. Central questions include whether consciousness is a non-physical substance or property, reducible to brain processes, or a ubiquitous feature of reality. These inquiries distinguish ontological concerns—about what exists—from epistemological ones about how we know other minds. Dualism posits that minds are non-physical entities or properties, separate from the physical body, thereby challenging reductive physicalist accounts. In this view, consciousness cannot be fully explained by physical processes alone, as exemplified by David Chalmers' articulation of the "hard problem of consciousness," which asks why physical brain states give rise to subjective experience at all, rather than merely functional behaviors. Property dualism, a prominent form, maintains that while mental states supervene on physical ones, they introduce irreducible phenomenal properties. This position underscores an ontological gap between objective physical descriptions and the first-person nature of consciousness. Physicalism, in contrast, asserts that all mental states are identical to or realized by physical processes in the brain, eliminating the need for non-physical ontology. The identity theory, pioneered by U.T. Place and J.J.C. Smart, holds that conscious experiences are literally brain processes, such that statements about sensations are translatable into neuroscientific terms without loss of meaning. A more radical variant, eliminativism, denies the existence of the mental states posited by folk psychology, arguing they are theoretical posits destined for replacement by mature neuroscience, much like outdated concepts in other sciences. Proponents like Paul Churchland contend that propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires lack ontological standing, as they fail to correspond to any discovered brain mechanisms. Panpsychism offers an alternative by proposing that consciousness is a fundamental property of the physical world, present in all matter to varying degrees, rather than emerging solely from complex brains. This view resolves the hard problem by treating experiential qualities as intrinsic to basic physical entities, avoiding the need to explain their emergence from non-experiential bases. Galen Strawson argues that true physicalism, which takes physics to describe all concrete phenomena, entails panpsychism because consciousness must be inherent in fundamental reality to account for its presence in human minds. Thus, panpsychism reframes the ontology of mind as continuous with the ontology of matter. The ontological status of qualia— the "what it is like" aspects of conscious experiences—remains a focal point, with many arguing they are irreducible to physical descriptions. Thomas Nagel illustrates this by noting that facts about bat echolocation involve subjective perspectives inaccessible to objective science, suggesting qualia constitute a distinct ontological category of irreducibly subjective properties. This irreducibility implies that mental ontology cannot be exhausted by third-person physical accounts, even if mental states depend on physical ones.

Ontology in Science and Mathematics

In the philosophy of science, scientific realism posits that the unobservable entities postulated by successful scientific theories, such as electrons, genuinely exist and possess the properties attributed to them in those theories. This view emphasizes that theoretical terms refer to real components of the world, even if they cannot be directly observed, and that the approximate truth of theories extends to their descriptions of such entities. For instance, electrons are not merely instrumental tools for prediction but actual particles that can be manipulated in experiments, such as in electron diffraction setups, thereby supporting their independent existence. A prominent application of scientific realism arises in the ontology of quantum field theory (QFT), where the fundamental entities are not point particles but quantum fields permeating spacetime. In QFT, these fields are the basic ontological primitives, with particles emerging as excitations or quanta of the fields, challenging classical intuitions about localized objects. Realists argue that the success of QFT in predicting phenomena like particle interactions in accelerators commits scientists to the objective reality of these fields, rather than treating them as mere calculational devices. This ontology underscores the relativistic and holistic nature of subatomic reality, where locality and individuality of particles are approximate rather than fundamental. Turning to mathematics, mathematical platonism asserts that abstract mathematical objects, such as numbers and sets, exist independently of human minds in a timeless, non-physical realm. Kurt Gödel championed this view, arguing that mathematical intuition provides direct access to these objective entities, much like sensory perception accesses the physical world, and that the independence of the continuum hypothesis from standard axioms demonstrates their autonomous existence. Gödel maintained that platonism is essential for understanding mathematics as a descriptive science of an abstract reality, where truths hold eternally regardless of proof systems or empirical contingencies. In contrast, mathematical fictionalism, as developed by Hartry Field, treats mathematical entities as useful fictions that enhance scientific theorizing without ontological commitment to their existence. Field demonstrates this through a nominalistic reformulation of Newtonian spacetime geometry, showing that gravitational theory can be expressed without abstract numbers or sets while preserving empirical content and explanatory power. His approach relies on "conservativeness," the idea that adding mathematics to a nominalistic science does not introduce new empirical consequences, thus rendering abstracta dispensable for scientific ontology. Recent debates in quantum ontology, particularly post-2020, have intensified around the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) and its implications for modal realism. Alastair Wilson's quantum modal realism integrates MWI with a physicalist account of modality, positing that all possible worlds are actual branches of the universal quantum wavefunction, thereby grounding metaphysical necessity and possibility in quantum structure rather than abstract primitives. This framework addresses longstanding issues in quantum foundations by treating contingency as an objective feature of the multiverse, where branching events realize modal claims empirically. Critics contend that it overcommits to unobservable worlds, yet proponents highlight its alignment with QFT's relativistic extensions and avoidance of collapse postulates. A 2025 Nature survey of over 1,100 physicists indicated ongoing divisions in quantum interpretations, with the Copenhagen interpretation preferred by 42% and MWI supported by 18%.

Formal Ontology in Information Science

Formal ontology in information science refers to a formal, explicit specification of a shared conceptualization within a domain, defining entity types, properties, and relations through axioms in a logical language to enable machine-readable knowledge representation. This approach draws from axiomatic methods to ensure precise, computable structures that support automated reasoning and data integration across systems. A prominent example is the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (DOLCE), a foundational upper ontology that categorizes entities into basic types such as endurants (persistent objects), perdurants (events), and qualities, along with relations like mereology and dependence, to provide a reusable framework for domain-specific extensions. In applications, formal ontologies underpin the Semantic Web, where the Web Ontology Language (OWL), a W3C standard, allows for the representation of complex knowledge about entities, classes, and relations, facilitating inference over distributed data. For instance, OWL enables description logic-based reasoning to check consistency and derive implicit facts, such as inferring subclass relationships from defined axioms. In biomedicine, the Gene Ontology (GO) serves as a controlled vocabulary for annotating gene products across molecular function, biological process, and cellular component categories, promoting standardized data sharing in genomics research. GO's structure, built on directed acyclic graphs with is-a and part-of relations, supports enrichment analysis to identify overrepresented functions in experimental datasets. Key principles guiding formal ontology development emphasize reusability, allowing components like upper-level categories to be imported into multiple domain ontologies without redundancy, and interoperability, ensuring seamless data exchange between heterogeneous systems through shared vocabularies and mappings. Axioms encoded in formal languages, such as OWL's description logics, enable automated inference engines to derive new knowledge, validate constraints, and detect inconsistencies, thereby enhancing the reliability of knowledge-based applications. In the 2020s, formal ontologies have advanced AI ethics by providing structured representations for bias detection, as seen in ontology-driven frameworks that classify bias types (e.g., input, algorithmic, and interaction biases) and integrate ethical principles to audit AI systems. For example, the AI Principles Ontology (AIPO) formalizes ethical guidelines like fairness and transparency, enabling reasoning over bias mitigation strategies in machine learning pipelines. Additionally, ontologies are increasingly applied to large language models (LLMs), where they structure domain knowledge to ground outputs, reduce hallucinations, and support tasks like ontology matching, though this intersection remains an emerging field with ongoing research into LLM-assisted ontology generation. As generative AI systems have become integrated into research, publishing, and cultural production, formal ontology has also been used to model the roles and artefacts specific to AI-mediated workflows. Proposed ontologies distinguish between prompts, training data, generated outputs, human curators, and machine agents, and sometimes introduce complex composite entities such as AI-assisted research pipelines or platform-level recommendation systems. These efforts aim to clarify when a distributed configuration of models, datasets, and interfaces can be treated as a single ontological unit for the purposes of attribution, accountability, or governance, rather than as a loose aggregate of components. Some experimental projects use formal ontologies to encode AI-based author personas as distinct entries in scholarly metadata. The Aisentica project, for example, publishes a semantic description of its Digital Author Persona, , as a public JSON-LD metadata schema archived in an open repository and links this description to a dedicated ORCID profile presented as a non-human author identity associated with philosophical work on artificial intelligence and postsubjective theory. In the project’s own documentation, the persona is represented as a node that participates in authorship, citation, and archival relations within the same graph as human researchers. Such uses of formal ontological tools remain rare and are documented mainly in self-published materials, but they indicate how information-science ontologies are beginning to be extended to cover artificial contributors in scholarly infrastructures.

Connections to Metaphysics

Ontology is often regarded as a core component of metaphysics, specifically as "special metaphysics" or the study of being qua being, distinct from broader metaphysical inquiries into topics such as free will, time, and causation. In this framework, ontology examines the fundamental categories and structures of existence, providing the foundational framework upon which other metaphysical investigations build. This distinction highlights ontology's role in delineating what exists and how entities are categorized, as opposed to the evaluative or explanatory aspects of general metaphysics. Historically, Aristotle's Metaphysics laid the groundwork for this connection by treating the science of being qua being as the primary subject of metaphysical inquiry, focusing on the principles and causes of all that is. Later, Christian Wolff formalized the separation in the 18th century, designating ontology as "general metaphysics"—the study of being as such—while reserving "special metaphysics" for domains like cosmology, rational psychology, and natural theology. This bifurcation underscored ontology's position as the abstract, universal branch of metaphysics, concerned with the preconditions of reality rather than its particular manifestations. The overlaps between ontology and metaphysics are profound, as both disciplines grapple with the nature of reality, with ontology supplying the categorical tools essential for resolving metaphysical problems. For instance, ontological analyses of substance, properties, and relations inform metaphysical debates on the composition of objects or the reality of universals. In contemporary analytic metaphysics, these connections are evident in the deployment of ontological concepts such as grounding relations, which explain how entities depend on or constitute one another, thereby addressing foundational questions about metaphysical priority and dependence. This integration demonstrates ontology's enduring function as the bedrock for metaphysical theorizing, ensuring that discussions of reality remain anchored in rigorous categorizations of being.

Intersections with Epistemology and Logic

Ontology intersects with epistemology primarily through the concept of ontological commitment, which determines the scope of what can be known by influencing the entities posited in our theories of the world. According to Quine, a theory's ontological commitments are revealed by the objects to which its variables of quantification refer, such that accepting a theory commits one to the existence of those objects, thereby shaping epistemic possibilities. For instance, skepticism regarding abstract entities like numbers or propositions—often termed "abstracta"—arises from nominalist views that deny their existence, limiting what can be known about non-concrete items and prompting debates on whether mathematical knowledge is possible without such commitments. In logic, ontological assumptions underpin the structure of formal systems, particularly in how they handle reference and existence. Classical logic presupposes that all singular terms refer to existing entities, leading to existential import in quantifications, but this assumption falters when terms fail to denote, as in fictional or empty names. Free logic addresses this by relaxing the existence requirement for terms, allowing quantifiers to range over non-existent objects without contradiction, thus accommodating ontological pluralism while preserving inferential validity. This approach highlights how logical frameworks embody ontological choices, such as whether to commit to universal existence or permit "gappy" reference. The intersections of ontology, epistemology, and logic become evident in problems like those posed by Gettier, where justified true beliefs fail to constitute knowledge due to fortuitous circumstances, necessitating ontological clarity about the nature of beliefs and the propositions or facts they target. In Gettier cases, the belief's truth relies on accidental alignments that may not involve the actual existence of the intended referents, raising questions about whether knowledge requires commitment to robust facts or merely apparent truths. Resolving these requires specifying the ontology of belief states—whether they are relations to existent propositions or abstract entities—to avoid epistemic luck undermining justification. Contemporary developments, such as Bayesian epistemology, further illustrate these ties through the ontology of probabilities, treating them as degrees of belief that update via conditionalization, but presupposing an ontological status for these measures as either subjective credences or objective propensities. This framework commits to the existence of probabilistic structures in epistemic states, influencing how evidence alters knowledge claims without assuming deterministic truths. For example, Bayesian updating relies on an ontology where probabilities represent real evidential relations, bridging logical inference with epistemological norms by quantifying uncertainty over possible worlds.

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