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Police car equipped with an LRAD-500X sonic weapon (Warsaw, Poland, 2011)

A directed-energy weapon (DEW) is a ranged weapon that damages its target with highly focused energy without a solid projectile, including lasers, microwaves, particle beams, and sound beams. Potential applications of this technology include weapons that target personnel, missiles, vehicles, and optical devices.[1][2]

In the United States, the Pentagon, DARPA, the Air Force Research Laboratory, United States Army Armament Research Development and Engineering Center, and the Naval Research Laboratory are researching directed-energy weapons to counter ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles. These systems of missile defense are expected to come online no sooner than the mid to late 2020s.[3]

China,[4][5][6][7] France,[8][9][10][11] Germany,[8][9] the United Kingdom,[12][13] Russia,[14][15][16] India,[17][18][19][20][21] and Israel[22][23][24] are also developing military-grade directed-energy weapons, while Iran[25][26][27][28] and Turkey claim to have them in active service.[29][30][31] The first use of directed-energy weapons in combat between military forces was claimed to have occurred in Libya in August 2019 by Turkey, which claimed to use the ALKA directed-energy weapon.[32] After decades of research and development, most directed-energy weapons are still at the experimental stage and it remains to be seen if or when they will be deployed as practical, high-performance military weapons.[33][34]

Operational advantages

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Directed energy weapons could have several main advantages over conventional weaponry:

  • Directed-energy weapons can be used discreetly; radiation does not generate sound and is invisible if outside the visible spectrum.[35][36]
  • Light is, for practical purposes, unaffected by gravity, windage and Coriolis force, giving it an almost perfectly flat trajectory. This makes aim much more precise and extends the range to line-of-sight, limited only by beam diffraction and spread (which dilute the power and weaken the effect), and absorption or scattering by intervening atmospheric contents.
  • Lasers travel at light-speed and have long range, making them suitable for use in space warfare.
  • Laser weapons potentially eliminate many logistical problems in terms of ammunition supply, as long as there is enough energy to power them.[citation needed]
  • Depending on several operational factors, directed-energy weapons may be cheaper to operate than conventional weapons in certain contexts.[37]
  • Use of high-powered microwave weapons, which are typically used to degrade and damage electronics such as drones, can be hard to attribute to a particular actor.[38]

Types

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Microwave

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Some devices are described as microwave weapons; the microwave frequency is commonly defined as being between 300 MHz and 300 GHz (wavelengths of 1 meter to 1 millimeter), which is within the radiofrequency (RF) range.[39]

Active Denial System

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Active Denial System is a millimeter wave source that heats the water in a human target's skin and thus causes incapacitating pain. It was developed by the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory and Raytheon for riot-control duty. Though intended to cause severe pain while leaving no lasting damage, concern has been voiced as to whether the system could cause irreversible damage to the eyes. There has yet to be testing for long-term side effects of exposure to the microwave beam. It can also destroy unshielded electronics.[40]

Vigilant Eagle

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Vigilant Eagle is a ground-based airport defense system that directs high-frequency microwaves towards any projectile that is fired at an aircraft.[41] It was announced by Raytheon in 2005, and the effectiveness of its waveforms was reported to have been demonstrated in field tests to be highly effective in defeating MANPADS missiles.[citation needed]

The system consists of a missile-detecting and tracking subsystem (MDT), a command and control system, and a scanning array. The MDT is a fixed grid of passive infrared (IR) cameras. The command and control system determines the missile launch point. The scanning array projects microwaves that disrupt the surface-to-air missile's guidance system, deflecting it from the aircraft.[42] Vigilant Eagle was not mentioned on Raytheon's Web site in 2022.[citation needed]

Bofors HPM Blackout

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Bofors HPM Blackout is a high-powered microwave weapon that is said to be able to destroy at short distance a wide variety of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic equipment and is purportedly non-lethal.[43][44][45]

EL/M-2080 Green Pine|EL/M-2080 Green P

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The effective radiated power (ERP) of the EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar makes it a hypothetical candidate for conversion into a directed-energy weapon, by focusing pulses of radar energy on target missiles.[46] The energy spikes are tailored to enter missiles through antennas or sensor apertures where they can fool guidance systems, scramble computer memories or even burn out sensitive electronic components.[46]

Active electronically scanned array

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AESA radars mounted on fighter aircraft have been slated as directed energy weapons against missiles, however, a senior US Air Force officer noted: "they aren't particularly suited to create weapons effects on missiles because of limited antenna size, power and field of view".[47] Potentially lethal effects are produced only inside 100 meters range, and disruptive effects at distances on the order of one kilometer. Moreover, cheap countermeasures can be applied to existing missiles.[48]

Anti-drone rifle

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A Pischal-Pro anti-drone rifle, featured at the Dubai Airshow, 2019

A weapon often described as an "anti-drone rifle" or "anti-drone gun" is a battery-powered electromagnetic pulse weapon held to an operator's shoulder, pointed at a flying target in a way similar to a rifle, and operated. While not a rifle or gun, it is so nicknamed as it is handled in the same way as a personal rifle. The device emits separate electromagnetic pulses to suppress navigation and transmission channels used to operate an aerial drone, terminating the drone's contact with its operator; the out-of-control drone then crashes.[citation needed] The Russian Stupor is reported to have a range of two kilometers, covering a 20-degree sector; it also suppresses the drone's cameras. Stupor is reported to have been used by Russian forces during the Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war.[49]

Both Russia and Ukraine are reported to use these devices during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[49] The Ukrainian army are reported to use the Ukrainian KVS G-6, with a 3.5 km range and able to operate continuously for 30 minutes. The manufacturer states that the weapon can disrupt remote control, the transmission of video at 2.4 and 5 GHz, and GPS and Glonass satellite navigation signals.[50] Ukraine has also used the EDM4S anti drone rifle to shoot down Russian Eleron-3 drones.[51]

Due to the threat posed by drones in regard to terrorism, several police forces have carried anti-drone guns as part of their equipment. For example, during the policing of the Commonwealth Games in 2018, the Australian Queensland Police Service carried anti-drone guns with an effective range of 3 km (2 mi).[52] In Myanmar, police have been equipped with anti-drone guns "ostensibly to defend VIPs".[53]

Counter-electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project

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This paragraph is an excerpt from Counter-electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project.[edit]
The Counter-electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) is a joint concept technology demonstration led by the Air Force Research Laboratory, Directed Energy Directorate at Kirtland Air Force Base to develop an air-launched directed-energy weapon capable of incapacitating or damaging electronic systems[54] by means of an EMP (electromagnetic pulse).[55]

THOR/Mjolnir

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This section is an excerpt from THOR (weapon).[edit]
The Tactical High-power Operational Responder (THOR) is a high-power microwave directed energy weapon developed by the United States Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL).

Radio Frequency Directed Energy Weapon (RFDEW)

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Main article: Radio Frequency Directed Energy Weapon

This UK-developed system was unveiled in May 2024 and uses radio waves to fry the electronic components of its targets, rendering them inoperable. It is capable of engaging multiple targets, including drone swarms, and reportedly costs less than 10 pence (13 cents) per shot, making it a cheaper alternative to traditional missile-based air defense systems.[56]

Laser

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Members of the Directed Energy and Electric Weapon Systems Program Office of the US Navy, fire a laser through a beam director on a Kineto Tracking Mount, controlled by a MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
Main article: Laser weapon

A laser weapon is a directed-energy weapon based on lasers.[57][58]

DragonFire

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Main article: DragonFire (weapon)

An example of a laser directed-energy weapon is the DragonFire currently being developed by the United Kingdom. It is reportedly in the 50 kW class and is capable of engaging any target within line-of-sight at a currently classified range. It has been tested against drones and mortar rounds and is expected to equip ships, aircraft and ground vehicles from 2027.[59]

Particle-beam

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Main article: Particle-beam weapon

Particle-beam weapons can use charged or neutral particles, and can be either endoatmospheric or exoatmospheric. Particle beams as beam weapons are theoretically possible, but practical weapons have not been demonstrated yet. Certain types of particle beams have the advantage of being self-focusing in the atmosphere.

Blooming is also a problem in particle-beam weapons. Energy that would otherwise be focused on the target spreads out and the beam becomes less effective:

  • Thermal blooming occurs in both charged and neutral particle beams, and occurs when particles bump into one another under the effects of thermal vibration, or bump into air molecules.
  • Electrical blooming occurs only in charged particle beams, as ions of like charge repel one another.

Plasma

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Plasma weapons fire a beam, bolt, or stream of plasma, which is an excited state of matter consisting of atomic electrons and nuclei, and free electrons if ionized, or other particles if pinched.

The MARAUDER (Magnetically Accelerated Ring to Achieve Ultra-high Directed-Energy and Radiation) used the Shiva Star project (a high energy capacitor bank which provided the means to test weapons and other devices requiring brief and extremely large amounts of energy) to accelerate a toroid of plasma at a significant percentage of the speed of light.[60]

The Russian Federation claims to be developing various plasma weapons.[61]

Sonic

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Main article: Sonic weaponry

Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD)

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The LRAD is the round black device on top of the NYPD police Humvee.

The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD) is an acoustic hailing device developed by Genasys (formerly LRAD Corporation) to send messages and warning tones over longer distances or at higher volume than normal loudspeakers, and as a non-lethal directed-acoustic-energy weapon. LRAD systems are used for long-range communications in a variety of applications[62] and as a means of non-lethal, non-projectile crowd control. They are also used on ships as an anti-piracy measure.

According to the manufacturer's specifications, the systems weigh from 15 to 320 pounds (7 to 145 kg) and can emit sound in a 30°- 60° beam at 2.5 kHz.[63] They range in size from small, portable handheld units which can be strapped to a person's chest, to larger models which require a mount.[64] The power of the sound beam which LRADs produce is sufficient to penetrate vehicles and buildings while retaining a high degree of fidelity, so that verbal messages can be conveyed clearly in some situations.[65]

History

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Ancient

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Mirrors of Archimedes

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Archimedes may have used mirrors acting collectively as a parabolic reflector to burn ships attacking Syracuse.
Main article: Archimedes' heat ray

According to a legend, Archimedes created a mirror with an adjustable focal length (or more likely, a series of mirrors focused on a common point) to focus sunlight on ships of the Roman fleet as they invaded Syracuse, setting them on fire.[66] Historians point out that the earliest accounts of the battle did not mention a "burning mirror", but merely stated that Archimedes's ingenuity combined with a way to hurl fire were relevant to the victory. Some attempts to replicate this feat have had some success; in particular, an experiment by students at MIT showed that a mirror-based weapon was at least possible, if not necessarily practical.[67] The hosts of MythBusters tackled the Mirrors of Archimedes three times (in episodes 19, 57 and 172) and were never able to make the target ship catch fire, declaring the myth busted three separate times.

20th Century

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Robert Watson-Watt

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In 1935, the British Air Ministry asked Robert Watson-Watt of the Radio Research Station (UK) whether a "death ray" was possible.[68][69] He and colleague Arnold Wilkins quickly concluded that it was not feasible, but as a consequence suggested using radio for the detection of aircraft and this started the development of radar in Britain.[70][71]

The fictional "engine-stopping ray"

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Stories in the 1930s and World War II gave rise to the idea of an "engine-stopping ray". They seemed to have arisen from the testing of the television transmitter in Feldberg, Germany. Because electrical noise from car engines would interfere with field strength measurements, sentries would stop all traffic in the vicinity for the twenty minutes or so needed for a test. Reversing the order of events in retelling the story created a "tale" where tourists car engine stopped first and then were approached by a German soldier who told them that they had to wait. The soldier returned a short time later to say that the engine would now work and the tourists drove off. Such stories were circulating in Britain around 1938 and during the war British Intelligence relaunched the myth as a "British engine-stopping ray," trying to spoof the Germans into researching what the British had supposedly invented in an attempt to tie up German scientific resources.[72]

German World War II experimental weapons

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During the early 1940s Axis engineers developed a sonic cannon that could cause fatal vibrations in its target body. A methane gas combustion chamber leading to two parabolic dishes pulse-detonated at roughly 44 Hz. This sound, magnified by the dish reflectors, caused vertigo and nausea at 200–400 meters (220–440 yd) by vibrating the middle ear bones and shaking the cochlear fluid within the inner ear. At distances of 50–200 meters (160–660 ft), the sound waves could act on organ tissues and fluids by repeatedly compressing and releasing compressive resistant organs such as the kidneys, spleen, and liver. (It had little detectable effect on malleable organs such as the heart, stomach and intestines.) Lung tissue was affected at only the closest ranges as atmospheric air is highly compressible and only the blood rich alveoli resist compression. In practice, the weapon was highly vulnerable to enemy fire. Rifle, bazooka and mortar rounds easily deformed the parabolic reflectors, rendering the wave amplification ineffective.[73]

In the later phases of World War II, Nazi Germany increasingly put its hopes on research into technologically revolutionary secret weapons, the Wunderwaffe.

Among the directed-energy weapons the Nazis investigated were X-ray beam weapons developed under Heinz Schmellenmeier, Richard Gans and Fritz Houtermans. They built an electron accelerator called Rheotron to generate hard X-ray synchrotron beams for the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM). Invented by Max Steenbeck at Siemens-Schuckert in the 1930s, these were later called Betatrons by the Americans. The intent was to pre-ionize ignition in aircraft engines and hence serve as anti-aircraft DEW and bring planes down into the reach of the flak. The Rheotron was captured by the Americans in Burggrub on April 14, 1945.[citation needed]

Another approach was Ernst Schiebolds 'Röntgenkanone' developed from 1943 in Großostheim near Aschaffenburg. Richert Seifert & Co from Hamburg delivered parts.[74]

Reported use in Sino-Soviet conflicts

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The Central Intelligence Agency informed Secretary Henry Kissinger that it had twelve reports of Soviet forces using laser weapons against Chinese forces during the 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes, though William Colby doubted that they had actually been employed.[75]

Northern Ireland "squawk box" field trials

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In 1973, New Scientist magazine reported that a sonic weapon known as a "squawk box" underwent successful field trials in Northern Ireland, using soldiers as guinea pigs. The device combined two slightly different frequencies which when heard would be heard as the sum of the two frequencies (ultrasonic) and the difference between the two frequencies (infrasonic) e.g. two directional speakers emitting 16,000 Hz and 16,002 Hz frequencies would produce in the ear two frequencies of 32,002 Hz and 2 Hz. The article states: "The squawk box is highly directional which gives it its appeal. Its effective beam width is so small that it can be directed at individuals in a riot. Other members of a crowd are unaffected, except by panic when they see people fainting, being sick, or running from the scene with their hands over their ears. The virtual inaudibility of the equipment is said to produce a 'spooky' psychological effect."[76] The UK's Ministry of Defence denied the existence of such a device. It stated that it did have, however, an "ultra-loud public address system which [...] could be 'used for verbal communication over two miles, or put out a sustained or modulated sound blanket to make conversation, and thus crowd organisation, impossible.'"[77][78]

East German "decomposition" methods

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The writer Jürgen Fuchs described decomposition methods as 'an attack on the human soul'.[79] He died of a rare form of leukemia in 1999 which he believed was the result of radiation poisoning. He, and others, suspected he had been targeted with directed X-rays during his imprisonment.[80][81]

In East Germany in the 1960s, in an effort to avoid international condemnation for arresting and interrogating people for holding politically incorrect views or for performing actions deemed hostile by the state security service, the Stasi, attempted alternative methods of repression which could paralyze people without imprisoning them. One such alternative method was called decomposition (transl. Zersetzung). In the 1970s and 1980s it became the primary method of repressing domestic "hostile-negative" forces.[82]

Some of the victims of this method suffered from cancer and claimed that they had also been targeted with directed X-rays. In addition, when the East German state collapsed, powerful X-ray equipment was found in prisons without there being any apparent reason to justify its presence. In 1999, the modern German state was investigating the possibility that this X-ray equipment was being used as weaponry and that it was a deliberate policy of the Stasi to attempt to give prisoners radiation poisoning, and thereby cancer, through the use of directed X-rays.[80]

The negative effects of the radiation poisoning and cancer would extend past the period of incarceration. In this manner someone could be debilitated even though they were no longer imprisoned. The historian Mary Fulbrook states,

The subsequent serious illnesses and premature deaths of dissidents such as the novelist Jürgen Fuchs, and the author of the critical analysis of 'The Alternative in Eastern Europe', Rudolf Bahro, have been linked by some to the suspicion of exposure to extraordinarily high and sustained levels of X-rays while waiting for interrogations, and being strapped to unpleasant chairs in small prison cells in front of mysterious closed boxes- boxes that, along with their mysterious apparatus, curiously disappeared after the collapse of the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany) system.[83]

Strategic Defense Initiative

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In the 1980s, U.S. President Ronald Reagan proposed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program, which was nicknamed Star Wars. It suggested that lasers, perhaps space-based X-ray lasers, could destroy ICBMs in flight. Panel discussions on the role of high-power lasers in SDI took place at various laser conferences, during the 1980s, with the participation of noted physicists including Edward Teller.[84][85]

A notable example of a directed energy system which came out of the SDI program is the Neutral Particle Beam Accelerator developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory. This system is officially described (on the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum website[86]) as a low power neutral particle beam (NPB) accelerator, which was among several directed energy weapons examined by the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization for potential use in missile defense. In July 1989, the accelerator was launched from White Sands Missile Range as part of the Beam Experiment Aboard Rocket (BEAR) project, reaching an altitude of 200 kilometers (124 miles) and operating successfully in space before being recovered intact after reentry.[87] The primary objectives of the test were to assess NPB propagation characteristics in space and gauge the effects on spacecraft components.[88] Despite continued research into NPBs, no known weapon system utilizing this technology has been deployed.[86]

Though the strategic missile defense concept has continued to the present under the Missile Defense Agency, most of the directed-energy weapon concepts were shelved. However, Boeing has been somewhat successful with the Boeing YAL-1 and Boeing NC-135, the first of which destroyed two missiles in February 2010. Funding has been cut to both of the programs.

Iraq War

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During the Iraq War, electromagnetic weapons, including high power microwaves, were used by the U.S. military to disrupt and destroy Iraqi electronic systems and may have been used for crowd control. Types and magnitudes of exposure to electromagnetic fields are unknown.[89]

Alleged tracking of Space Shuttle Challenger

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The Soviet Union invested some effort in the development of ruby and carbon dioxide lasers as anti-ballistic missile systems, and later as a tracking and anti-satellite system. There are reports that the Terra-3 complex at Sary Shagan was used on several occasions to temporarily "blind" US spy satellites in the IR range.

It has been claimed that the USSR made use of the lasers at the Terra-3 site to target the Space Shuttle Challenger in 1984.[90][91] At the time, the Soviet Union was concerned that the shuttle was being used as a reconnaissance platform. On 10 October 1984 (STS-41-G), the Terra-3 tracking laser was allegedly aimed at Challenger as it passed over the facility. Early reports claimed that this was responsible for causing "malfunctions on the space shuttle and distress to the crew", and that the United States filed a diplomatic protest about the incident.[90][91] However, this story is comprehensively denied by the crew members of STS-41-G and knowledgeable members of the US intelligence community.[92] After the end of the Cold War, the Terra-3 facility was found to be a low-power laser testing site with limited satellite tracking capabilities, which is now abandoned and partially disassembled.

Modern 21st-century use

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Havana syndrome

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Main article: Havana syndrome

Havana syndrome is a disputed medical condition reported by US personnel in Havana, Cuba and other locations, originally suspected to be caused by microwave radiation.[93] In January 2022, the Central Intelligence Agency issued an interim assessment concluding that the syndrome is not the result of "a sustained global campaign by a hostile power." Foreign involvement was ruled out in 976 cases of the 1,000 reviewed.[94][95] In February 2022, the State Department released a report by the JASON Advisory Group, which stated that it was highly unlikely that a directed-energy attack had caused the health incidents.[96] The cause of Havana syndrome remains unknown and controversial.[97][98]

Anti-piracy measures

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LRADs are often fitted on commercial and military ships. They have been used on several occasions to repel pirate attacks by sending warnings and by producing intolerable levels of sound. For example, in 2005 the cruise liner Seabourn Spirit used a sonic weapon to defend itself from Somali pirates in the Indian ocean.[99] A few years later, the cruise liner Spirit of Adventure also defended itself from Somali pirates by using its LRAD to force them to retreat.[100][101]

Non-lethal weapon capability

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The TECOM Technology Symposium in 1997 concluded on non-lethal weapons, "determining the target effects on personnel is the greatest challenge to the testing community", primarily because "the potential of injury and death severely limits human tests".[102]

Also, "directed-energy weapons that target the central nervous system and cause neurophysiological disorders may violate the Certain Conventional Weapons Convention of 1980. Weapons that go beyond non-lethal intentions and cause 'superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering' may also violate the Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1977."[103]

Some common bio-effects of non-lethal electromagnetic weapons include:

Interference with breathing poses the most significant, potentially lethal results.

Light and repetitive visual signals can induce epileptic seizures. Vection and motion sickness can also occur.

Russia has reportedly been using blinding laser weapons during the Russo-Ukrainian War.[104]

See also

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Notes

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References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia

Directed-energy weapon

View on Grokipedia
from Grokipedia
A directed-energy weapon (DEW) is a system that directs concentrated electromagnetic energy, rather than kinetic projectiles, to incapacitate, damage, disable, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, or personnel. These weapons convert chemical or electrical energy into radiated electromagnetic forms, such as photons from high-energy lasers or radiofrequency waves from high-power microwaves, focusing them on targets to induce thermal, mechanical, or electrical effects. Primary types include high-energy laser (HEL) systems, which deliver precise thermal damage at the speed of light, and high-power microwave (HPM) systems, which disrupt electronics through induced currents or overloads. DEWs offer advantages over traditional munitions, including virtually unlimited "ammunition" limited only by , lower cost per engagement, and immunity to many countermeasures like decoys due to their line-of-sight precision. The U.S. Department of Defense has prioritized their development since the , achieving operational deployments such as systems for countering unmanned aerial vehicles and missiles, with successes reported by U.S. and Israeli forces. However, challenges persist, including vulnerability to atmospheric conditions that attenuate energy propagation, high power requirements, and uncertain long-term health effects from exposure, such as potential thermal injuries or neurological impacts, though empirical data on human effects remains limited. While promising for and asymmetric threats, DEWs raise concerns over escalation risks and dual-use potential in non-lethal applications.

Definition and Fundamental Principles

Physical Mechanisms of Energy Delivery

Directed-energy weapons (DEWs) deliver concentrated energy to targets via focused beams of or accelerated particles, propagating at or near the to enable rapid, precise effects without kinetic projectiles. This delivery contrasts with conventional munitions by relying on wave or particle interactions for energy deposition, typically inducing thermal damage, structural disruption, or electronic malfunction through absorption and conversion processes. The efficiency of energy transfer depends on beam coherence, atmospheric , and target material properties, with power densities often exceeding 1 kW/cm² for destructive effects. In high-energy laser (HEL) systems, energy is delivered as a coherent beam of photons generated by stimulated emission, allowing tight collimation with divergence angles as low as arcseconds for minimal beam spread over kilometers. Upon reaching the target, photons are absorbed according to the material's wavelength-dependent absorptivity, converting radiant energy to heat via electronic excitation and subsequent lattice vibrations, potentially leading to melting at temperatures above 1000°C or ablation through vaporization. Propagation through the atmosphere introduces attenuation from molecular absorption (e.g., water vapor at 1-10 μm wavelengths), scattering by aerosols, and nonlinear effects like thermal blooming, where absorbed energy heats air parcels, defocusing the beam via refractive index changes. High-power microwave (HPM) weapons deliver energy via broadband or narrowband radiofrequency pulses, typically 1-100 GHz, that propagate as electromagnetic waves with larger apertures due to limits scaling inversely with . Energy deposition occurs through ohmic heating in conductive targets or dielectric losses in non-conductors, where induced oscillating drive currents that dissipate as Joule , potentially disrupting semiconductors at field strengths above 10 kV/m. HPM beams exhibit lower atmospheric absorption at frequencies compared to lasers but face challenges from ionized air breakdown at high intensities, forming plasma shields that reflect subsequent pulses. Particle beam systems accelerate ions or to relativistic speeds, delivering energy through direct collisional and secondary electron cascades in the target, with deposition depths governed by the Bethe-Bloch formula for charged particles. Neutralized beams mitigate effects but suffer rapid divergence and atmospheric , limiting effective delivery range to under 1 km in air due to multiple Coulomb and energy loss via radiation. These mechanisms enable scalable effects from temporary incapacitation to structural failure, contingent on fluence levels achieving thresholds like 10-100 J/cm² for thermal damage.

Electromagnetic and Particle Interactions with Targets

Electromagnetic interactions in directed-energy weapons primarily involve the absorption of photons by target materials, leading to localized heating and structural . High-energy lasers deliver coherent optical that is absorbed according to the target's material properties, such as wavelength-dependent absorption coefficients; for instance, lasers at 1.06 μm wavelength, as used in early :YAG systems, efficiently heat metals by converting into thermal vibrations, raising surface temperatures to points (e.g., above 1,500°C for ) within milliseconds at fluences exceeding 10 kJ/cm². This thermal deposition can induce phase changes, including , vaporization, and plasma formation, where pressures reach 10-100 MPa, ejecting material and creating shock waves that propagate subsurface. Damage thresholds vary; continuous-wave lasers cause bulk heating, while pulsed variants (e.g., nanosecond pulses) exploit nonlinear effects like dielectric breakdown, amplifying energy coupling in dielectrics. High-power microwave (HPM) systems, operating in the radio-frequency (typically 1-100 GHz), interact differently by inducing oscillating that drive currents in conductive targets or polarize molecules in , resulting in ohmic heating or dielectric losses. For , HPM pulses with peak powers above 1 GW couple through apertures or antennas, generating voltages that exceed component breakdown thresholds (e.g., >100 V for semiconductors), causing , filamentation, or in semiconductors like at field strengths over 10 kV/cm. Biological or composite targets experience bulk heating via excitation, with specific absorption rates (SAR) up to 100 W/kg potentially leading to tissue damage, though shielding like Faraday cages mitigates effects by reflecting or attenuating the waves. HPM beams often exhibit broader spot sizes (meters-wide) compared to lasers, enabling area effects but reducing precision against hardened targets. Particle beams, involving accelerated charged or neutral particles (e.g., electrons, protons, or ions at energies of 1-100 MeV), deposit energy through collisional ionization and Bremsstrahlung radiation, creating cascades of secondary electrons that thermalize target material. Charged particle beams follow Bethe-Bloch energy loss formulas, with stopping power dE/dx proportional to Z² (target atomic number) and inversely to velocity, leading to shallow penetration (microns to cm) in solids where energy density exceeds 1 MJ/cm³, vaporizing or exploding surface layers via rapid plasma expansion. Neutral beams, neutralized post-acceleration, avoid space charge dispersion but still ionize on impact, potentially inducing nuclear reactions at GeV energies, though practical systems limit to electronic or thermal disruption to avoid excessive beam instability. Unlike electromagnetic waves, particles provide superior coupling to dense targets due to momentum transfer, but atmospheric scattering and neutralization limit terrestrial use, favoring vacuum environments.

Classification of Directed-Energy Weapons

High-Energy Laser Systems

High-energy laser (HEL) systems direct concentrated beams of coherent light to deliver to targets, causing damage through rapid heating, melting, or ignition. These weapons differ from high-power microwave systems by using shorter-wavelength photons for precise, line-of-sight engagement rather than broader electromagnetic pulses. Solid-state lasers, employing doped crystals or fiber optics to amplify light via , predominate in current military applications due to their scalability and efficiency.

Coherent Beam Combining and Distributed Aperture Technologies

Coherent beam combining (CBC) synchronizes multiple laser sources through phase-locking to enable constructive interference, achieving power scaling proportional to N² (where N is the number of sources) while preserving beam quality, surpassing the linear scaling of incoherent methods. DARPA's Excalibur program successfully developed and employed a single-platform 21-element optical phased array, which was used to hit a target at a distance of 7 kilometers. This technique, applied in single-platform fiber laser arrays or phased emitters, enhances focusing for directed-energy weapons. Distributed aperture systems extend CBC across multiple platforms, creating a virtual high-power beam that improves resilience and efficacy against atmospheric distortion and countermeasures. While single platform coherence already improves focusing, distributed coherence from multiple platforms enhances it further. For instance, U.S. Air Force SBIR topic AF212-0007 develops algorithms for MIMO techniques to enable a coherent distributed array from multiple airborne platforms, utilizing precision timing for phase coherence to function as a large distributed aperture for radar, jamming, and communications, with the goal of aggregating transmitted and received pulses into a single radar detection or jamming waveform at the target location. Earlier development in this area is evidenced by a 2014 GAO decision (B-409765), which describes the development and integration of a distributed aperture prototype for satellite communications, demonstrating the basic combined performance of distributed apertures; in this satcom context, "combined" was understood to imply coherent combining, and the decision finds credible the agency's claim that the system envisioned coherently combining multiple aperture signals. Similarly, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's LDRD project 22-ERD-035 develops wireless coordination technology for distributed high-power microwave sources to address deployment challenges, including picosecond time and frequency synchronization for coherent distributed aperture antenna arrays and time and phase alignment for wideband beamforming in distributed phased arrays. Furthermore, 2024 DARPA budget justification describes the MELT program and explicitly states it leverages advances in coherent beam combining and related photonics to develop tiled arrays and scalable high energy laser sources for laser weapon systems, including a planned laboratory demonstration of coherent beam combination in a planar array of emitters. Additionally, 2024 Kirtland Air Force Base documents describe the High-Power Adaptive Directed Energy System (HADES), which originated as a Small Business Innovation Research effort to develop coherent beam combining technology. The U.S. Navy's Laser Weapon System (LaWS), a 30-kilowatt prototype, was deployed aboard USS Ponce in the starting in 2014 for operational testing against small boats and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). LaWS demonstrated feasibility in maritime environments but highlighted needs for higher power and integration with existing fire control systems like the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System. Successor programs, such as , aim for 60-kilowatt class lasers scalable to 120 kilowatts, focusing on counter-drone and from surface ships. U.S. Army efforts center on mobile platforms like the Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD), mounting 50-kilowatt lasers on vehicles. Prototypes were fielded for testing in the by 2024 and underwent live-fire exercises at in June 2025, targeting UAVs up to 5 miles away. Despite progress, soldiers reported reliability issues in operational conditions, prompting refinements in power management using lithium nickel cobalt aluminum oxide batteries. is developing 300-kilowatt systems for protection, emphasizing deep magazines limited only by electrical supply. HEL systems offer low cost-per-shot—around $1—and speed-of-light delivery, ideal for countering drone swarms and hypersonic threats. However, atmospheric effects like absorption by , scattering in or , and beam distortion from reduce effectiveness at ranges beyond a few kilometers. High power demands necessitate advanced cooling and electrical generation, often exceeding vehicle or ship capacities without hybrid solutions. mitigate some propagation issues, but full operational deployment requires overcoming these physics-based limits. Internationally, Israel's achieved initial deployments in 2024 for short-range interception, engaging multiple targets at high rates. U.S. programs like the Enduring High Energy Laser (E-HEL) plan competitions in 2026 for scalable, truck-mounted systems exceeding 100 kilowatts. These advancements prioritize empirical testing over theoretical promises, with as of May 2025, at least 22 U.S. laser prototypes in advanced trials or deployment.

High-Power Microwave and Radio Frequency Systems

High-power microwave (HPM) and radio frequency (RF) directed-energy weapons emit concentrated electromagnetic radiation in the microwave or RF spectrum to disrupt, damage, or destroy electronic systems or induce physiological effects on targets. HPM systems typically operate in the 1-100 GHz range with peak powers in the gigawatt range delivered in short pulses, coupling energy into target electronics via antenna resonances or apertures to cause voltage surges, semiconductor failures, or logic upsets without physical projectiles. Pulsed HPM variants mimic non-nuclear electromagnetic pulse effects, enabling non-kinetic defeat of command-and-control nodes, sensors, or swarms, while continuous-wave systems sustain lower-power outputs for prolonged disruption. RF systems, often overlapping with HPM at higher frequencies like millimeter waves (30-300 GHz), can target biological tissues by shallow penetration and rapid heating of water molecules, producing repellant thermal sensations. Research into plasma waveguides offers potential enhancements for HPM propagation and range extension. Experimental studies have shown that high-power microwaves can propagate and self-guide in plasma structures formed by plasma expansion driven by the microwave's ponderomotive force, trapping the pulse within the waveguide. Modeling work further describes the creation of long-lived plasma channels in the atmosphere via filamentation, enabling sustained microwave transmission over extended distances by tailoring plasma decay dynamics. A 2007 US Army briefing “Multimode HPM and Laser Induced Plasma Channel Technology” contains statement of intent to use LIPC as the guidance path for high power microwave and RF effects. It states the “Purpose” is to “Demonstrate Laser Induced Plasma Channel (LIPC) guiding HPM High Voltage RF,” and it frames this as a “Multi mode Directed Energy Weapon Demonstrator.” Unclassified U.S. Army research under Program Element (PE) 0602624A funded laser-induced plasma channel (LIPC) efforts to create cavities in the air using short-pulse lasers, channeling high-powered microwaves (HPM) for standoff target defeat. This included investigations of radio frequency field interactions in custom waveguides for HPM applications and verification tests coupling LIPC components with HPM waveforms, compared to standard waveguide transmission. NATO STO Meeting Proceedings STO MP SET 255, “Standoff applications of ultrashort pulse lasers,” explicitly discusses channeling high power microwave beams using plasma channels created by ultrashort laser pulses, conceptually aligned with US Army LIPC efforts. The U.S. Counter-electronics High Power Microwave Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP), developed by for the , demonstrated operational capability in a on October 22, 2012, when a released targeted HPM bursts over the , disabling in seven simulated across multiple buildings in a single pass without structural damage. By 2019, CHAMP missiles were integrated on B-52 bombers for potential deployment against hardened electronic threats in contested environments, prioritizing reversible or permanent soft-kill effects on radars, communications, and . Raytheon's Phaser system, a ground-based HPM prototype, provides short-range counter-unmanned aerial system (C-UAS) defense by generating microwave pulses to overload drone , with tests showing efficacy against small UAVs at tactical distances. Solid-state HPM advancements, such as Epirus's Leonidas using semiconductors, enable modular, high-repetition-rate pulses for area-denial against drone swarms, reducing logistics burdens compared to kinetic interceptors. In non-lethal applications, the U.S. Active Denial System (ADS) employs a 95 GHz millimeter-wave beam from a vehicle-mounted transmitter to deliver a painful heating sensation on exposed skin up to 500 meters away, penetrating only 0.4 mm to stimulate heat-pain nerves without permanent injury, as validated in human effects testing. The solid-state variant, developed by the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Center, replaces vacuum-tube generators with compact RF modules for improved reliability and deployability in crowd-control or perimeter security roles. RF directed-energy weapons extend to counter-drone roles; on April 17, 2025, British forces used a portable RF system to neutralize a drone swarm at ranges up to 1 km by disrupting unjammable guidance links, highlighting advantages over traditional electronic warfare in dynamic threats. These systems offer deep magazines limited primarily by electrical power, instantaneous engagement at light speed, and scalability against massed low-cost threats, though challenges include line-of-sight requirements, atmospheric absorption at higher frequencies, and target hardening via shielding.

Particle Beam and Plasma-Based Weapons

Particle beam weapons accelerate subatomic particles, such as electrons, protons, or heavier ions, to relativistic speeds using electromagnetic fields, directing the resulting beam to impart , damage, or effects on targets. These systems differ from lasers by delivering massive particles rather than photons, enabling deeper penetration into materials through nuclear interactions or secondary radiation, though they require immense power—often gigawatts—for sustained output. Charged particle beams suffer from rapid due to electrostatic repulsion among particles, exacerbated in atmospheric environments where collisions with air molecules cause and a "bloom" effect, the beam and dissipating energy within meters. beams mitigate this by accelerating charged particles and then stripping electrons to create neutral atoms, such as , which propagate with less deflection; however, neutralization efficiency remains low, and systems demand conditions or space-based deployment for viability. U.S. military research intensified during the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, focusing on neutral particle beams for intercepting ballistic missiles in space, with Los Alamos National Laboratory developing accelerators capable of producing beams at near-light speeds using magnetic fields to ionize and propel hydrogen atoms. The 1989 BEAM Experiment Aboard Rocket (BEAR) marked the first space test of a neutral particle beam, launching a low-power accelerator on a sounding rocket to verify beam formation and propagation in vacuum, though it was diagnostic rather than weaponized. Soviet programs paralleled this, exploring charged beams for anti-satellite roles, but both efforts stalled post-Cold War due to technical hurdles and shifting priorities toward lasers. Development largely stopped due to technical challenges like beam divergence in the atmosphere, high power requirements, and impracticality for operational use. As of 2024-2026, no operational particle beam weapons exist; they remain theoretical or in very early research stages with no known active programs leading to deployment. Plasma-based weapons, involving beams or projectiles of ionized gas, face greater physical constraints than particle beams, as plasma expands rapidly and cools via radiative and conductive losses, limiting range to tens of meters even in vacuum. The U.S. Air Force's MARAUDER project in the 1990s tested compact toroid plasma rings accelerated to hypersonic speeds, achieving fusion-relevant energies in lab settings but failing to produce stable, weaponizable projectiles due to instability and containment issues, leading to cancellation around 1995. Unlike sustained particle beams, plasma systems often blur into kinetic weapons, requiring magnetic confinement that adds complexity without overcoming dissipation in air. No other significant types (e.g., plasma-based) have reached credible development or operational status beyond conceptual or experimental levels. No particle or plasma beam weapons have achieved operational deployment as of 2026, with programs deprioritized in favor of high-energy lasers owing to the latter's superior atmospheric and lower power scaling requirements; ongoing research emphasizes applications where reduces , but engineering challenges like accelerator size and cooling persist. Overall, directed-energy weapon development focuses heavily on lasers and microwaves, with particle and plasma types remaining niche or abandoned.

Acoustic Directed-Energy Devices

Acoustic directed-energy devices utilize focused beams of high-intensity sound waves, often in the audible or ultrasonic , to incapacitate targets, deter intruders, or enable long-range communication without physical projectiles. These systems leverage principles such as parametric acoustic arrays, which generate propagation by modulating ultrasonic carriers to produce audible tones at a distance, minimizing dispersion and collateral effects, for non-lethal effects such as disorientation, pain, or crowd control. The Long Range Acoustic Device (LRAD), developed by American Technology Corporation (now Genasys Inc.), exemplifies this technology. Its creation was spurred by the October 12, 2000, suicide bombing of the USS Cole in , which killed 17 U.S. sailors and highlighted vulnerabilities of naval vessels to small boat attacks; LRAD was designed to hail and deter approaching threats from afar. The device first saw operational deployment by U.S. forces in in , where it was mounted on vehicles and used for perimeter security and crowd dispersal. LRAD systems are operational and deployed since the 2000s by military, law enforcement, and naval forces (e.g., US Navy for anti-piracy, crowd control) and remain in active use as of 2026, though limited to non-lethal applications and short ranges. LRAD systems vary in size and power, with models like the LRAD 1000X capable of projecting voice messages intelligibly up to 5,500 meters or emitting a 30-degree beam of deterrent reaching 2,500 meters, with peak output exceeding 150 decibels at one meter—levels that can induce immediate pain, disorientation, and temporary hearing impairment in exposed individuals. Larger variants, such as those used on ships, achieve voice projection up to 8,900 meters and maximum outputs of 162 decibels. By 2022, over 25 navies worldwide had integrated LRAD or similar acoustic hailing devices for , vessel protection, and non-lethal force options. In military applications, these devices serve dual roles: as hailing tools for issuing warnings and commands, and as area-denial weapons via variable-intensity tones that exploit the human auditory system's sensitivity to cause , vertigo, or rupture at close range without permanent lethality under controlled use. Ground, vehicle, and vessel-mounted versions have been employed in operations ranging from counter-piracy patrols off to urban , though prolonged exposure risks include , , and psychological distress, prompting debates on their classification as truly non-lethal. Research indicates limited penetration through barriers and inefficacy against hearing protection, constraining their tactical utility against equipped adversaries. Development of acoustic weapons remains niche, with ongoing efforts focused on enhancing beam directivity and integrating with other directed-energy systems, but physiological constraints—such as sound's in air and inability to damage hardened targets—limit their role compared to electromagnetic counterparts. No verified instances of lethal acoustic directed-energy use in exist, though experimental infrasonic and ultrasonic variants have been explored for inducing organ or disorientation without audible cues.

Historical Development

Ancient and Pre-Modern Concepts

The most prominent ancient concept resembling a directed-energy weapon is the "heat ray" or "death ray" attributed to the Greek mathematician during the Roman of Syracuse in 214–212 BCE. According to later historical accounts, devised an array of polished bronze mirrors or shields to concentrate sunlight onto approaching Roman ships, igniting their wooden hulls and sails from a distance of up to several hundred meters. This device, if real, would represent an early application of solar concentration for thermal damage, aligning with principles of focused electromagnetic energy (in this case, visible light and ). However, no contemporary evidence from Archimedes' era supports the existence of such a weapon; the earliest descriptions appear in works by authors like (2nd century CE) and (6th century CE), who referenced burning-glasses or mirrors as defensive tools. Ancient historians such as and alluded to Archimedes' ingenuity in repelling invaders with fire, but these accounts are ambiguous and may conflate mirrors with incendiary projectiles or other mechanisms. Modern analyses, including studies, question the practicality due to optical challenges like mirror alignment, atmospheric dispersion, and the energy flux required to ignite damp wood at range, suggesting the legend may exaggerate simpler fire-starting techniques or steam-powered catapults. Experimental recreations provide mixed validation of the concept's feasibility. In 1973, a Greek scientist demonstrated small-scale ignition using parabolic mirrors, while tests in 2005 and 2010 failed to replicate ship-scale fires but confirmed localized heating. More recent efforts, such as a 2024 project by a 12-year-old using 440 mirrors to ignite a mock at 150 meters, indicate that concentrated can achieve under controlled conditions, though scaling to battlefield efficacy remains debated. These tests underscore the physical plausibility of thermal focusing but highlight logistical hurdles absent in contexts. Pre-modern references to similar ideas are sparse and derivative. Byzantine accounts from the CE describe burning mirrors defending , echoing without independent innovation. No verifiable evidence exists for operational directed-energy-like devices beyond conceptual or legendary solar concentrators, distinguishing them from proven mechanical or chemical weapons of the era.

20th-Century Research and Prototypes

Research into directed-energy weapons accelerated following the invention of the in 1960 by at Hughes Research Laboratories, which enabled the concentration of coherent light for potential destructive applications. Military programs in the United States initially explored for anti-aircraft and roles, with early efforts emphasizing ground-based systems to test beam propagation and target interaction. By the mid-1960s, the U.S. Department of Defense funded prototype development under agencies like (now ), focusing on scaling laser power outputs from milliwatts to kilowatts for tactical effects. In 1968, U.S. inventor Frederick Schollhammer patented a "Portable Beam Generator," an early conceptual design for a man-portable device intended as a directed-energy sidearm, though it remained non-operational due to power and cooling limitations. High-power (HPM) research also emerged in the U.S. during the , drawing from observations of electromagnetic pulses generated by high-altitude nuclear tests, leading to prototypes aimed at disrupting electronics without physical projectiles. A landmark demonstration occurred in 1973 under , where an ARPA-funded system successfully destroyed a drone target at short range, validating atmospheric propagation and thermal damage mechanisms in a controlled test. The Soviet Union pursued parallel programs, advancing from basic laser research in the 1960s to prototype testing by the 1970s, including gas-dynamic and electric-discharge lasers suitable for weapons. One documented effort produced a handheld "Laser Gun with Pyrotechnic Flash Lamp" in the late 1970s, designed for blinding or incapacitating optics at short distances, though limited by battery life and beam coherence. Soviet prototypes emphasized space-based applications, with ground tests of high-energy systems for anti-satellite roles reported in declassified assessments, reflecting a focus on strategic denial capabilities amid Cold War tensions. These efforts yielded functional demonstrators but faced similar engineering hurdles, such as inefficient energy conversion and vulnerability to environmental factors like dust and humidity. Particle beam prototypes received exploratory funding in both nations during the 1970s, with U.S. accelerators modified to accelerate charged particles for neutral beam injection tests, achieving initial beam focusing but failing to produce weaponizable intensities due to immense power requirements. Acoustic directed-energy devices, precursors to modern non-lethal systems, underwent limited prototyping for , including early ultrasonic projectors tested by U.S. forces, though efficacy remained marginal without scalable amplification. Overall, 20th-century prototypes demonstrated proof-of-concept for energy delivery but highlighted persistent challenges in power scaling, beam control, and integration into deployable platforms, informing subsequent advancements.

Cold War Advancements and Strategic Defense Initiative

During the , both the and the pursued directed-energy weapons research primarily for defense and anti-satellite applications, with efforts intensifying from the onward. Soviet programs emphasized high-energy s and particle beams, as evidenced by declassified assessments indicating development for neutralizing U.S. satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These initiatives included ground-based laser facilities capable of tracking and potentially damaging satellites, with reported tests against low-orbit targets by the late . U.S. noted Soviet investments in charged-particle accelerators and systems, driven by fears of vulnerability to American nuclear forces, though operational deployment remained limited due to technical hurdles like beam propagation in atmosphere. In response to perceived Soviet advances, the U.S. accelerated its own directed-energy programs, including early laser experiments under the and the , focusing on carbon-dioxide and lasers for . By the early , tests demonstrated laser-induced damage to nose cones at short ranges, but scaling to strategic distances proved challenging. Soviet efforts reportedly extended to vehicle-mounted lasers for blinding optical sensors, with experiments on tanks to counter targeting systems during potential European conflicts. These parallel developments reflected mutual deterrence dynamics, where each side viewed directed-energy systems as a means to neutralize the other's offensive arsenals without kinetic projectiles. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), announced by President Ronald Reagan on March 23, 1983, marked a pivotal escalation in U.S. directed-energy pursuits, aiming to render nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete" through layered space- and ground-based defenses. SDI allocated billions to directed-energy technologies, including chemical oxygen-iodine lasers for boost-phase kill, neutral particle beams accelerated to near-light speeds for midcourse interception, and X-ray lasers pumped by nuclear explosions for exo-atmospheric engagements. Ground-based free-electron lasers and space-based mirrors were explored to focus beams on Soviet ICBMs during their vulnerable ascent, with prototypes like the Zenith Star experiment testing megawatt-class outputs by the late 1980s. Proponents argued these systems offered precision and unlimited "ammunition" compared to interceptors, though critics within scientific communities highlighted propagation losses and power requirements as insurmountable without breakthroughs in adaptive optics. SDI spurred technological advancements, such as improved particle accelerators yielding beams with energies exceeding 100 MeV, and -induced plasma channels for guiding charged particles through space-like vacuums. However, Soviet countermeasures, including ICBM hardening and MIRV proliferation, complicated feasibility, while U.S. tests revealed atmospheric blooming—where heat dissipates focus—as a persistent barrier for ground-launched systems. The program faced opposition from arms-control advocates who claimed it violated the , though Reagan administration officials countered that it promoted stability by shifting focus from offense to defense. By the Cold War's end in 1991, SDI had transitioned elements to the , but full directed-energy deployment remained unrealized, influencing subsequent non-lethal and tactical applications.

Post-1990s Maturation and Testing

Following the conclusion of major Cold War-era programs like the , directed-energy weapon development in the post-1990s emphasized tactical, ground- and sea-based systems using more practical solid-state and s, driven by advancements in beam control and power scaling. The US-Israel (THEL) program, initiated in , marked a key milestone with its deuterium-fluoride prototype achieving first light in June 1999 and successfully intercepting Katyusha rockets in tests starting in 2000. By 2001, THEL had demonstrated 28 successful intercepts of Katyusha rockets and five shells in flight, validating laser lethality against short-range threats at ranges up to several kilometers, though the program later pivoted from full deployment due to size and logistical constraints toward lighter mobile variants. US Navy efforts advanced with the Laser Weapon System (LaWS), a 30-kilowatt prototype deployed aboard USS Ponce in 2014 for operational testing in the , where it successfully neutralized unmanned aerial vehicles and simulated small boat threats, confirming reliability in maritime environments with effects ranging from dazzling sensors to structural damage. Further maturation occurred with the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance () system, a 60-kilowatt to 150-kilowatt scalable laser integrated on Arleigh Burke-class destroyers by 2022, undergoing at-sea tests to counter drones and missiles. In 2021, USS Portland (LPD-27) conducted successful high-energy laser demonstrations in the , engaging aerial targets and demonstrating power-efficient threat neutralization at costs under $1 per shot compared to kinetic interceptors. High-power microwave (HPM) systems saw parallel testing, with Army prototypes like the Multi-Mission High Energy Laser (but extended to HPM variants) accelerated for fielding by 2022 to disrupt in swarms of drones or missiles through induced voltages and circuit overloads. Tests in the confirmed HPM effects on unshielded at standoff ranges, though challenges in beam coherence and power output limited operational maturity compared to . Internationally, Israel's 450, a 100-kilowatt , completed development and rigorous testing by September 2025, achieving intercepts of rockets, mortar shells, and UAVs, paving the way for integration with as a low-cost supplement operationalized across units. These programs highlighted maturation through iterative testing, shifting from proof-of-concept to demonstrations, with over a decade of data showing directed-energy weapons' potential for precision engagement but underscoring ongoing needs for enhanced atmospheric compensation and compact power sources to achieve widespread deployment.

Military Applications and Operational Use

The U.S. Navy's first operational deployment of a directed-energy weapon at sea occurred in 2014 with the (LaWS), a 30-kilowatt high-energy laser installed aboard the ship USS Ponce in the . This system, developed under a $40 million research effort, was authorized for defensive use against threats such as small boats and unmanned aerial vehicles, marking a shift from testing to operational status by December 2014. LaWS integrated with the Phalanx Close-In Weapon System for targeting and demonstrated effectiveness in engaging drone surrogates and simulated threats during its deployment, which lasted through at least 2017. Advancing from LaWS prototypes, the Navy integrated the High Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-dazzler and Surveillance (HELIOS) system, a 60-kilowatt , onto Arleigh Burke-class destroyers starting in 2024. , developed by , was first outfitted on , with successful at-sea tests in 2024 destroying an airborne drone target at ranges up to five miles. This marked the initial tactical integration of a scalable on an operational , capable of dazzling sensors or delivering destructive energy, though full fleet-wide deployment remains in development phases as of 2025. Naval directed-energy systems like LaWS and primarily target asymmetric threats including swarms of small unmanned surface vessels, drones, and missiles, offering cost-effective intercepts compared to kinetic munitions. High-power variants have been explored for maritime use but lack confirmed operational deployments, with emphasis remaining on technologies for their precision and magazine-depth advantages in prolonged engagements. Despite progress, challenges such as power scaling and integration into existing ship architectures continue to limit widespread adoption beyond experimental platforms.

Aerial and Ground-Based Systems

Ground-based directed energy systems have advanced toward operational integration, particularly for countering low-cost aerial threats like drones. The U.S. 's Directed Energy Maneuver-Short Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD) equips armored vehicles with a 50-kilowatt high-energy to engage unmanned , rockets, artillery, and mortars at ranges up to several kilometers. In June 2025, prototypes successfully neutralized drone swarms during live-fire tests at , , demonstrating rapid retargeting and minimal costs compared to kinetic interceptors. Three systems were deployed to by early 2024 for field experimentation against real-world threats, though evaluations revealed constraints in power output and engagement reliability under operational conditions, prompting officials to note dissatisfaction with early performance. Higher-power ground systems are in development to address more robust threats. secured contracts in 2023 to prototype up to four 300-kilowatt-class weapons for the Army's Protection Capability program, integrating them into mobile ground platforms for layered air and . These systems exploit the precision and unlimited "magazine depth" of directed energy, where dwell time on target determines effect, but require robust cooling and power generation—typically from vehicle-mounted generators—to sustain outputs without overheating. , contributing to DE M-SHORAD, emphasizes acquisition, tracking, and targeting via electro-optical/ sensors fused with the laser beam director. Aerial directed energy applications lag behind ground counterparts due to platform constraints like size, weight, and aerodynamics. The U.S. Air Force's Self-protect High-Energy Laser Demonstrator (), initiated in the 2010s, aimed to mount podded on fighter jets such as the F-15 or F-16 for against incoming missiles, with ground tests validating beam control by 2021. However, the program concluded in 2024 without flight integration or operational deployment, as technical challenges in airborne power scaling and atmospheric turbulence outweighed projected benefits. Prior efforts, including the on a modified 747, invested over $5 billion by 2012 before cancellation, citing excessive operational costs and vulnerability to counter-detection. Emerging aerial programs focus on unmanned platforms. In April 2025, confirmed development of an air-to-air for MQ-9 drones, enabling engagement of enemy unmanned aerial vehicles at beyond-visual-range distances without expending missiles. This podded system prioritizes lightweight fiber lasers for endurance-limited drones, potentially reducing costs for swarm defense, though integration tests remain pending amid broader reassessments of directed energy viability. Overall, aerial systems face amplified engineering barriers, including vibration-induced beam jitter and fuel-dependent power, limiting them to defensive roles against subsonic threats.

Countermeasures Against Drones and Missiles

High-energy laser (HEL) systems represent a primary directed-energy approach for countering drones and missiles, offering engagements at the with costs as low as $1 per shot after initial power setup. These weapons damage targets by heating surfaces, igniting fuels, or disrupting electronics, proving effective against low-cost, high-volume threats like drone swarms. The U.S. Navy's (LaWS), deployed on USS Ponce in 2014, successfully neutralized ScanEagle unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) during at-sea tests, demonstrating precision against moving aerial targets. Subsequent prototypes, including the MK 2 MOD 0 laser, downed drones in 2020 evaluations, while the 2022 Laser Trailblazer test confirmed capability to destroy UAVs in flight. In 2025, efforts integrated to enable rapid targeting of multiple drones, addressing swarm tactics. Israel's , a 100 kW HEL system developed by , reached full operational maturity in September 2025 following successful tests against rockets, mortars, and drones. Designed for short-range threats, it complements kinetic interceptors like by providing unlimited engagements limited only by , with deployment expected in October 2025. U.S. Army programs, such as the Directed Energy Maneuver Short-Range Air Defense (DE M-SHORAD), conducted live-fire exercises in June 2025 at , validating laser interception of drone threats in ground-based scenarios. High-power microwave (HPM) variants disrupt drone electronics without physical destruction, offering complementary non-thermal effects for electronic warfare. These systems prioritize scalability against proliferating asymmetric threats, though atmospheric conditions like fog can attenuate beam propagation.

Non-Lethal and Incapacitation Capabilities

Crowd Control and Personnel Effects

Directed-energy weapons (DEWs) employed for and personnel incapacitation primarily utilize millimeter-wave or optical systems to induce temporary physiological discomfort or sensory disruption without intending permanent harm. These non-lethal applications aim to deter advances, enforce perimeters, or disperse groups by exploiting targeted energy delivery to affect skin sensation or vision, bridging the gap between verbal warnings and lethal force. Empirical testing by the U.S. Department of Defense has focused on systems like the (ADS), which demonstrates reversible effects in controlled human volunteer studies, though operational deployments remain limited due to logistical and ethical considerations. The ADS, a millimeter-wave DEW operating at 95 GHz, projects a focused beam that penetrates approximately 0.4 millimeters into the skin, heating molecules to produce an intense burning sensation equivalent to touching a 200°C (390°F) lightbulb for fractions of a second. This triggers an involuntary flight response in exposed individuals, with effects ceasing immediately upon beam cessation, as confirmed by peer-reviewed safety assessments involving over 13,000 exposures on volunteers showing no lasting injuries when protocols are followed. Developed under the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate since the early 2000s, the system was first publicly demonstrated in 2007 and tested for scenarios, such as perimeter security at forward operating bases, with a range exceeding 500 meters. In 2013, ADS was evaluated for maritime interdiction by U.S. Central Command, successfully repelling simulated threats without penetration or burns in trials. Optical dazzlers, typically green laser systems emitting in the 500-532 nm wavelength range, target personnel by overwhelming photoreceptors to cause temporary , afterimages, or disorientation lasting seconds to minutes, depending on exposure duration and distance. variants, such as vehicle-mounted units deployed by U.S. and allied forces since the , serve as warning devices to halt advancing individuals or vehicles, with power outputs limited to under 1 watt to comply with the 1995 Protocol IV to the , which prohibits permanent blinding. Canadian Forces equipped vehicles in with dazzlers by 2009, reporting negligible risk of eye damage at standoff ranges over 50 meters, though isolated incidents of injury from misuse highlight the need for precise beam control and training. These effects stem from photochemical saturation rather than damage, allowing recovery without intervention in most cases, as evidenced by U.S. field tests. High-power microwave (HPM) DEWs in anti-personnel configurations offer potential for non-lethal crowd dispersal by inducing neuromuscular incapacitation or through pulsed electromagnetic fields, though practical systems remain developmental and less deployed than ADS or dazzlers. U.S. analyses indicate HPM could enable perimeter defense or convoy protection by disrupting electronics on threats while affecting human targets via skin heating similar to ADS, but with broader beam coverage suited to groups, which may not discriminate between military personnel and civilians; however, human effects data is primarily extrapolated from and simulations, lacking extensive volunteer trials comparable to ADS. Overall, while these DEWs provide scalable, speed-of-light engagement for personnel effects, their efficacy in uncontrolled crowd environments depends on atmospheric conditions, power efficiency, and operator judgment to minimize risks of unintended escalation or injury. The 2024 CRS Report suggests that Congress may consider prohibitions on nonlethal anti-personnel uses of DE weapons, while other analysts argue that DE weapons could be more humane than conventional weapons due to reduced collateral damage and provision of nonlethal options where lethal force might otherwise apply. The report notes this area remains unregulated and poses the question: "What, if any, regulations, treaties, or other measures should the United States consider regarding the use of DE weapons in both war and peacetime?"

Reported Physiological Impacts

The (ADS), a millimeter-wave directed-energy device, induces a rapid heating of the skin's surface layer to approximately 44–54°C within fractions of a second, creating an intense burning sensation that prompts involuntary retreat without penetrating deeper than 0.4 mm into tissue. This effect arises from the absorption of 95 GHz electromagnetic energy by water molecules in the , activating heat-sensitive nociceptors while engineered safeguards—such as automatic shutoff after 2–3 seconds—minimize injury risk. Over 13,000 controlled volunteer exposures in U.S. testing from 2003 to 2010 reported no permanent injuries, with transient effects limited to superficial or mild discomfort resolving within hours. Prolonged or repeated exposure, however, has produced second-degree burns or blisters in animal models and isolated human trials, particularly on thin-skinned areas like the face or genitals, though human data indicate such outcomes require durations exceeding operational limits. Project MEDUSA (Mob Excess Deterrent Using Silent Audio), developed by WaveBand Corporation under U.S. Navy funding from approximately 2003 to 2008, utilized short pulses of microwaves to induce the microwave auditory effect—thermoelastic expansion in head tissues producing perceived sounds—for non-lethal incapacitation and crowd deterrence. Phase 1 experiments demonstrated successful generation of auditory sensations at power densities in the hundreds of mW/cm², resulting in discomfort or disorientation from perceived loud noises without causing tissue damage beyond transient effects, as safety thresholds were designed to limit exposure. Lower-power laser dazzlers, operating in the visible or , target the to cause temporary or afterimages lasting seconds to minutes by overwhelming photoreceptors without . Empirical tests by the U.S. Department of Defense, including protocols under ANSI Z136.1 standards, confirm recovery within 10–30 minutes for exposures below 0.25 W/cm², but unintended ocular hits from higher-energy systems have resulted in permanent scotomas or macular damage due to photochemical or of tissue. exposure to mid- lasers (e.g., 1.5–10.6 μm ) causes localized scaling with fluence: at 10–50 J/cm², superficial burns occur; above 100 J/cm², full-thickness dermal is possible, as documented in U.S. vulnerability assessments. These effects are deterministic functions of , duration, and beam spot size, with shorter pulses (<1 μs) favoring photochemical damage over bulk heating. Reported systemic effects from non-lethal directed-energy exposures remain rare and unsubstantiated beyond localized responses, with no verified evidence of neurological or cardiovascular disruption in controlled studies; claims of deeper penetration inducing or disorientation often stem from unverified anecdotal reports rather than dosimetry-matched experiments. Vulnerable populations, such as those with pacemakers or photosensitive conditions, exhibit heightened susceptibility, potentially amplifying pain thresholds or triggering arrhythmias via reflexive sympathetic activation, per bioeffects modeling from the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate. Independent reviews, including those by the National Academies, emphasize that physiological impacts are primarily nociceptive and reversible under designed parameters, contrasting with advocacy critiques positing unproven long-term risks like from repeated sub-threshold exposures.

Technical Limitations and Engineering Challenges

Atmospheric Propagation and Environmental Constraints

Atmospheric propagation of directed-energy weapons (DEWs), particularly high-energy lasers (HELs), is governed by the Beer-Lambert law, which quantifies beam attenuation as I=I0e−αLI = I_0 e^{-\alpha L}, where II is transmitted intensity, I0I_0 is initial intensity, α\alpha is the extinction coefficient (combining absorption and ), and LL is path length; this results in exponential energy loss over distance, limiting effective range to tens of kilometers under clear conditions for wavelengths like 1.06 μm or 10.6 μm. Absorption occurs primarily from molecular species such as , CO₂, and oxygen, with peaks at specific wavelengths, while by aerosols and particulates further reduces on-target , especially at lower altitudes where is highest. For microwave-based DEWs, is generally lower due to longer wavelengths experiencing less molecular absorption, though and atmospheric gases still impose constraints over extended paths. Turbulence-induced beam degradation arises from refractive index fluctuations due to temperature and pressure variations, causing distortion and beam wander that spreads the spot size beyond limits, reducing fluence on target; this effect scales with the r0r_0, typically 10-20 cm in moderate conditions, confining reliable engagement ranges to under 10 km without mitigation. exacerbates this by heating the air along the beam path, creating a self-induced lens that defocuses the beam at power densities above 10-100 kW/cm², a threshold common in weapon-class systems. Platform motion, such as shipboard , compounds these issues, necessitating real-time beam control via deformable mirrors or phase conjugation, though full correction remains computationally intensive. Environmental factors impose severe constraints, with , , and increasing via Mie processes for wavelengths, potentially attenuating beams by orders of magnitude; for instance, dense can reduce and transmission to near zero over 1-2 km for 1.55 μm , rendering systems ineffective despite claims of penetration capabilities in lighter obscurants. Heavy or sandstorms elevate the extinction coefficient α\alpha to 0.1-1 km⁻¹, far exceeding clear-air values of 0.01-0.1 km⁻¹, while naval operations face amplified effects from sea spray and . DEWs fare better in due to lower cross-sections but suffer from increased absorption in high- environments. Overall, these constraints preclude all-weather reliability, with operational dropping below 50% in adverse conditions like storms or thick aerosols, as modeled in tools like that integrate , , and blooming.

Power Generation, Cooling, and Scalability Barriers

Directed-energy weapons (DEWs), particularly high-energy lasers (HELs) and high-power microwaves (HPMs), demand substantial electrical power inputs, often in the range of tens to hundreds of megawatts for effective engagement durations. For instance, HPM systems can generate over 100 megawatts of output power, equivalent to approximately 150,000 times the power of a typical , necessitating platform-level power systems that exceed conventional generator capacities. Megawatt-class HELs require input power on the order of tens of megawatts delivered in short bursts, challenging integration onto mobile platforms like ships, , or where space, weight, and are constrained. Current solutions rely on diesel generators or emerging high-density batteries and capacitors, but these impose trade-offs in system mobility and endurance, as DEWs consume power at rates that deplete onboard stores rapidly during sustained operations. Cooling represents a parallel engineering hurdle, as DEW operation converts a significant fraction of input energy into waste heat—often 50-70% inefficiency in solid-state lasers—requiring advanced thermal management to prevent component degradation or system shutdown. High-power lasers demand robust cooling subsystems, such as liquid-cooled diode arrays or phase-change materials for burst-mode heat absorption, which themselves consume additional power and add mass, exacerbating the overall energy burden. In naval or aerial applications, where ambient cooling via air or seawater is limited by motion or altitude, these systems must dissipate kilowatts to megawatts of heat flux without compromising beam quality or reliability, a factor that has delayed transitions from laboratory prototypes to fielded units. Scalability barriers compound these issues, as transitioning DEWs from kilowatt-scale demonstrators to operational megawatt systems involves non-linear increases in power and cooling demands that strain supply chains and manufacturing. Production scaling encounters bottlenecks in specialized components, such as high-precision , , and thermal exchangers, where low-volume military demand hinders and reliability testing. U.S. Department of Defense programs, including the Army's planned 2026 competition for scalable HELs, highlight ongoing efforts to address these through modular designs, but persistent challenges in efficiency and integration limit deployability against peer threats requiring rapid, high-volume engagements. Space-based directed-energy lasers encounter additional scalability barriers when targeting heavily reinforced structures like government buildings or bunkers. Constrained by realistic power generation capacities, atmospheric propagation losses upon re-entry into the atmosphere, and immense engineering challenges in achieving sustained high fluence over orbital distances, these systems cannot penetrate thick walls, structural reinforcements, or hardened enclosures to induce collapse or substantial destruction. Instead, effects are limited to superficial damage, such as burning exterior paint, melting windows, or initiating localized fires at exposed points.

Controversies, Allegations, and Empirical Scrutiny

Havana Syndrome and Directed-Energy Hypotheses

refers to a cluster of unexplained anomalous health incidents (AHIs) first reported by U.S. diplomats and intelligence personnel in , , beginning in late 2016, involving sudden onset symptoms such as intense pressure or pain in the head, dizziness, nausea, hearing strange grating or buzzing sounds, balance disturbances, and cognitive impairments like memory issues and difficulty concentrating. These incidents expanded to other locations, including , , and , affecting over 1,000 U.S. government personnel by 2024, with symptoms persisting in some cases for years and leading to medical diagnoses of traumatic brain injury-like conditions, though without uniform pathology. Investigations by the U.S. State Department, CIA, and other agencies confirmed the symptoms as real and debilitating but failed to identify a definitive cause, prompting hypotheses ranging from environmental factors to intentional attacks. Directed-energy weapon (DEW) hypotheses gained traction early, positing that pulsed radiofrequency (RF) or energy could induce symptoms through mechanisms like the Frey effect—audible perception of microwave pulses—or localized heating of brain tissue, potentially from portable devices operated by foreign adversaries such as Cuban or Russian agents. A 2020 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report deemed directed pulsed RF energy the "most plausible mechanism" for a subset of cases, citing consistency with symptoms and historical precedents like Soviet-era microwave experiments on U.S. embassy staff in during the 1970s, though it noted the absence of direct evidence such as device signatures or attacker traces. Proponents, including some U.S. intelligence analysts and lawmakers, argued that DEWs could be non-lethal, concealable, and targeted, with 2024 journalistic investigations linking incidents to Russia's , which reportedly developed such non-lethal acoustic and RF weapons for sabotage. These claims were bolstered by witness accounts of directional sounds and proximity to suspected hostile actors, though no forensic evidence of energy exposure—like RF burns or electromagnetic residue—was documented at incident sites. Countervailing empirical assessments have largely undermined the DEW hypothesis. The scientific advisory panel, in its 2022 report commissioned by the State Department, analyzed audio recordings, medical data, and attack parameters, concluding that directed energy sources were implausible due to insufficient power output from portable devices to produce observed symptoms without visible hardware or thermal effects, and instead suggested possibilities like psychogenic factors or incidental exposures such as pesticides. A 2023 U.S. intelligence community assessment, drawing from seven agencies, determined it "very unlikely" that a foreign adversary or DEW caused the incidents, with most agencies citing lack of attributable evidence and inconsistencies in symptom patterns across cases. Further, 2024 (NIH) studies of 86 affected individuals using advanced MRI, blood biomarkers, and cognitive testing found no detectable brain injuries, vestibular abnormalities, or biological markers consistent with RF exposure or trauma, revealing symptoms as severe but attributable to preexisting conditions or stress rather than a unified external assault. Recent developments as of 2025 have not resolved the debate, with new intelligence reportedly suggesting possible GRU involvement in select cases but maintaining the overall "very unlikely" foreign causation assessment, prompting congressional criticism of intelligence handling and calls for further scrutiny. Critics of DEW theories emphasize physical constraints: atmospheric attenuation of microwaves limits range and intensity, while the absence of epidemiological clusters or device recoveries contradicts covert weapon deployment, favoring explanations like mass psychogenic illness amplified by high-stress postings. Despite persistent allegations from affected personnel and some officials, no verifiable causal link to directed energy has been established, highlighting the challenges in attributing rare, non-reproducible events amid geopolitical tensions.

Unverified Claims of Covert Deployment

Various unverified claims allege the covert deployment of directed-energy weapons (DEWs) by governments or non-state actors for purposes such as igniting wildfires or targeting civilians with harassment. These assertions, primarily circulated on and fringe platforms, posit that high-energy lasers or microwaves have been secretly used to manipulate or induce psychological effects, often without or independent verification. Proponents cite anomalous fire patterns, such as structures burning while nearby trees remain intact, as purported proof, but empirical analyses attribute such observations to dynamics influenced by moisture content and wind-driven spread rather than directed energy. In the context of wildfires, claims surged following the August 2023 Maui fires in , where social media users alleged DEWs—possibly space-based lasers controlled by elites—initiated the blazes to facilitate land grabs or . Videos purportedly showing laser beams were shared millions of times, but fact-checks identified them as unrelated , such as a Russian gas station , while official investigations linked the fires to high winds, dry conditions, and downed power lines. Similar theories reemerged during the January 2025 Los Angeles wildfires, with posts claiming DEWs targeted specific areas, evidenced by "laser scars" on buildings; however, no forensic or data supports signatures, and experts dismiss the claims due to inconsistencies with known DEW effects like precise absent in widespread charring. These narratives echo earlier 2018 conspiracies, lacking corroboration from meteorological records or residue analysis that would indicate non-thermal ignition sources. Another set of allegations involves "targeted individuals" (TIs), self-identified victims who claim covert microwave DEWs are used for electronic harassment, including voice-to-skull (V2K) technology beaming auditory hallucinations or physical pain via satellites or ground-based emitters. Advocacy groups assert thousands endure such attacks, attributing symptoms like burning sensations or induced voices to classified programs, sometimes linking to declassified patents for non-lethal directed energy systems. Investigations, including medical evaluations, find no hardware implants or electromagnetic anomalies consistent with weaponized microwaves at civilian scales, with symptoms often aligning with delusional disorders or environmental factors like radiofrequency interference from legal sources. Claims of widespread deployment remain unsubstantiated, as operational DEWs require substantial power infrastructure incompatible with undetected, mobile targeting of individuals. Despite the existence of overt military DEW prototypes, no declassified intelligence or forensic evidence confirms covert operational use for arson or personal targeting, with claims persisting amid distrust of official narratives but failing causal tests against observable physics and deployment logistics. Skeptics note that while DEW vulnerabilities like atmospheric attenuation limit range, conspiracy proponents overlook these engineering realities in favor of speculative attributions.

Debunking Speculative Narratives Lacking Evidence

Speculative assertions that directed-energy weapons (DEWs) were deployed to ignite wildfires, such as the 2023 Lahaina fire or the 2025 Los Angeles-area blazes, have circulated widely on platforms, often citing visual anomalies like melted vehicles adjacent to intact structures or unburnt trees amid scorched landscapes as indicators of precise targeting. These claims posit covert governmental or elite orchestration, with alleged DEW signatures including straight-line burn patterns or instantaneous ignition defying natural fire spread. Official investigations, including those by the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology and local fire authorities, have consistently identified prosaic ignition sources: for , a combination of downed Hawaiian Electric power lines and 60-80 mph winds from Hurricane Dora fanning embers; for earlier events like the 2018 Camp Fire, a failed Pacific Gas & Electric transmission line sparking dry vegetation. No spectroscopic analysis of debris or soil samples from fire origins has revealed plasma residues, patterns, or thermal signatures unique to high-energy lasers or microwaves, which would produce distinct microcratering or isotopic anomalies absent in wildfire forensics. Fire behavior experts explain purported anomalies through empirical physics: fast-moving crown fires driven by low and high burn ground fuels selectively, sparing green trees whose moist bark and resist radiant up to 1,000°C, while vehicles melt due to their lower ignition thresholds (around 400-600°C) and enclosed flammable contents. Claims of "laser beams" in often misidentify contrails, lens flares, or unrelated aerial phenomena, with no corroborating or orbital data supporting DEW activation. Engineering constraints further undermine feasibility: operational DEWs, like the U.S. Navy's 30-150 kW systems tested as of 2023, require line-of-sight, stationary targeting, and gigawatt-scale for sustained area ignition, unattainable via mobile or space-based platforms without detectable energy blooms or logistical footprints. Absent verifiable sensor logs, whistleblower hardware, or independent replication of claimed effects, these narratives persist on anecdotal visuals rather than causal mechanisms, contravening principles of reproducible evidence in fire causation studies. Broader speculations, such as DEWs embedded in civilian infrastructure like towers for mass incapacitation or weather manipulation, similarly evade substantiation: radiofrequency emissions from such arrays fall orders of magnitude below weaponized thresholds (e.g., 10-100 W/cm² for tissue damage versus milliwatts in telecom), with no epidemiological spikes in correlated health events beyond baseline. Regulatory monitoring by bodies like the FCC confirms compliance with safety limits derived from decades of bioeffects research, precluding undetected high-power diversions. These hypotheses, often amplified in fringe outlets, prioritize narrative coherence over falsifiable tests, yielding no artifacts like anomalous electromagnetic pulses or victim matching DEW profiles.

Strategic Value and Future Prospects

Advantages in Asymmetric and Peer Conflicts

In asymmetric conflicts, directed-energy weapons (DEWs) excel against low-cost, high-volume threats such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and small boats, where traditional kinetic interceptors prove economically unsustainable. Laser systems like the U.S. Navy's (LaWS) demonstrated effectiveness against drone boats during deployments in 2014-2015, neutralizing targets at a fraction of the cost of missile-based defenses—approximately $1 per shot compared to millions for guided munitions. This cost asymmetry allows sustained engagements without depleting finite ammunition stocks, preserving expensive kinetic weapons for higher-value threats. High-power microwave (HPM) variants further enhance utility against drone swarms; for instance, the U.S. Army's Protection Capability-High Power Microwave (IFPC-HPM) system, tested in May 2025, targets groups of drones simultaneously via wide-area electromagnetic pulses, disabling electronics mid-flight without physical projectiles. DEWs provide tactical advantages through speed-of-light propagation, enabling near-instantaneous target engagement and reducing vulnerability windows in fluid, scenarios. trials in April 2025 using a radiofrequency DEW downed swarms of drones in the UK's largest such test, highlighting scalability against massed, inexpensive attacks common in asymmetric operations. Precision effects minimize , as energy can be tuned for disablement rather than destruction, aligning with in urban or populated environments. In peer conflicts against advanced adversaries, DEWs offer strategic depth by complementing kinetic systems in layered air and , countering saturation attacks that aim to exhaust interceptor inventories. Their "deep magazine" capability—limited only by —supports prolonged engagements, as seen in conceptual applications for boost-phase interception where rapid, repeated firings outpace reload times of conventional launchers. Operating at the provides a defensive edge of approximately six orders of magnitude over projectile-based systems, minimizing flight time and enhancing survivability against hypersonic or maneuvering threats. Reduced burdens, with fewer personnel required for operation compared to batteries, further bolster force efficiency in high-intensity scenarios. U.S. programs anticipate DEW superiority over peer competitors, enabling asymmetric advantages through scalable effects on sensors, , and structures.

Recent Developments and Global Programs (2020-2025)

The allocated $789.7 million for directed energy weapons programs in its fiscal year 2025 budget request, reflecting a decrease from the prior year's $962.4 million appropriation and $1.1 billion request, amid ongoing efforts to integrate high-energy lasers and high-power microwaves into tactical systems. These investments support prototypes like the Army's Indirect Fires Protection Capability-High Energy Laser, tested for countering drones and rockets, with systems described as "pretty mature" for potential contributions to next-generation by August 2025. However, programs have encountered setbacks, including delays and performance issues in high-profile laser initiatives over the preceding year. Israel advanced its Iron Beam high-energy laser system, completing development by September 2025 with successful interceptions of drones, rockets, mortars, and aircraft using a 100-kilowatt output during trials. The system, intended for operational deployment by late 2025, marked a milestone when the Israel Defense Forces reportedly used a laser to down Hezbollah drones in combat for the first time in August 2025. This positions Israel as the first nation to employ lasers against enemy aerial threats in active warfare. China unveiled the LY-1 high-power in September 2025, designed primarily for naval protection against drones and missiles but adaptable for ground use, alongside multiple mobile high-power systems demonstrated at the in November of the prior year. Additionally, a compact directed-energy weapon capable of neutralizing drones and missiles was developed by May 2025, emphasizing electronic disruption over kinetic effects. In the , the extended a £160 million contract with in May 2025 to accelerate development, following a land-based demonstration in October 2024. The Directed Energy Weapon (RFDEW), aimed at countering unmanned threats through electronic damage, is slated for introduction by 2026, with industry proposals solicited in June 2025. Russia has prioritized directed-energy weapons in conjunction with AI and robotics advancements, including longstanding research into space-based high-power microwave systems dating back decades, though specific 2020-2025 deployments remain unverified in open sources. European programs, including efforts, underscore directed energy's role in enhancing air defenses against proliferating drone and threats.

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