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Deep sea mining
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Deep sea mining is the extraction of minerals from the seabed of the deep sea. The main ores of commercial interest are polymetallic nodules, which are found at depths of 4–6 km (2.5–3.7 mi) primarily on the abyssal plain. The Clarion–Clipperton zone (CCZ) alone contains over 21 billion metric tons of these nodules, with minerals such as copper, nickel, cobalt and manganese making up roughly 30% of their weight.[2] It is estimated that the global ocean floor holds more than 120 million tons of cobalt, five times the amount found in terrestrial reserves.[3]
As of July 2024[update], only exploratory licenses have been issued, with no commercial-scale deep sea mining operations yet. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) regulates all mineral-related activities in international waters and has granted 31 exploration licenses so far: 19 for polymetallic nodules, mostly in the CCZ; 7 for polymetallic sulphides in mid-ocean ridges; and 5 for cobalt-rich crusts in the Western Pacific Ocean.[4] There is a push for deep sea mining to commence by 2025, when regulations by the ISA are expected to be completed.[5][6]
In April 2025, U.S. President Trump signed an Executive Order instructing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to expedite permits for companies to mine in both international and U.S. territorial waters, citing the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act of 1980.[7]
Deep sea mining is being considered in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of countries, such as Norway, where in January 2024 the government announced its intention to allow companies to apply for exploration permits in 2025. In December 2024, Norway's plans to begin awarding exploration licenses were temporarily put on hold after the Socialist Left Party (SV) blocked the planned licensing round as part of negotiations over the government budget.[8][9] In 2022, the Cook Islands Seabed Minerals Authority (SBMA) granted three exploration licenses for cobalt-rich polymetallic nodules within their EEZ.[10] In 2025, it was announced that the Cook Islands had signed a deal with China focussed on deep-sea mining.[11] Papua New Guinea was the first country to approve a deep sea mining permit in state waters for the Solwara 1 project, despite three independent reviews highlighting significant gaps and flaws in the environmental impact statement.[12]
The most common commercial model of deep sea mining proposed involves a caterpillar-track hydraulic collector and a riser lift system bringing the harvested ore to a production support vessel with dynamic positioning, and then depositing extra discharge down the water column below 2,000 meters. Related technologies include robotic mining machines, as surface ships, and offshore and onshore metal refineries.[13][14] Though largely composed of nickel and manganese which are most widely used as key inputs into the steel industry, wind farms, solar energy, electric vehicles, and battery technologies use many of the deep-sea metals.[13] Electric vehicle batteries are a key driver of the critical metals demand that incentivizes deep sea mining, as well as demands for the production of aerospace and defense technologies, and infrastructure.[15][16]
The environmental impact of deep sea mining is controversial.[17][18] Environmental advocacy groups such as Greenpeace and the Deep Sea Mining Campaign[19] claimed that seabed mining has the potential to damage deep sea ecosystems and spread pollution from heavy metal-laden plumes.[20] Critics have called for moratoria[21][22] or permanent bans.[23] Opposition campaigns enlisted the support of some industry figures, including firms reliant on the target metals. Individual countries like Norway, Cook Islands, India, Brazil and others with significant deposits within their exclusive economic zones (EEZ's) are exploring the subject.[24][25]
As of 2021, the majority of marine mining used dredging operations in far shallower depths of less than 200 m, where sand, silt and mud for construction purposes is abundant, along with mineral rich sands containing ilmenite and diamonds.[26][27]
Deposit types
[edit]Deep sea ore deposits are classified into three main types: polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulfide deposits, and cobalt-rich crusts.[28]: 356
Polymetallic nodules
[edit]

Polymetallic nodules are found at depths of 4–6 km (2.5–3.7 mi) in all major oceans, though due to their metallic composition those in the Pacific Ocean are of greatest commercial interest.[29][30] Nodules may also be found in shallow waters like the Baltic Sea and in freshwater lakes.[31][32] They are the most readily minable type of deep sea ore.[33] These nodules typically range in size from 4–14 cm (1.6–5.5 in) in diameter, though some can be as large as 15 cm (5.9 in).
Manganese and related hydroxides precipitate from ocean water or sediment-pore water around a nucleus, which may be a shark's tooth or a quartz grain, forming potato-shaped nodules some 4–14 cm (1.6–5.5 in) in diameter. They accrete at rates of 1–15 mm per million years.[34] These nodules are rich in metals including rare earth elements, cobalt, nickel, copper, molybdenum, and yttrium.[35]
The Clipperton fracture zone hosts the world's largest deposit nickel resource. These nodules sit on the seafloor and require no drilling or excavation.[2] Nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese make up nearly 30% of the contents.[2]
| Location | Manganese | Iron | Nickel | Copper | Cobalt | Total REE (incl Yttrium) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CCZ | 28.4 | 6.16 | 1.30 | 1.07 | 0.210 | 0.0813 |
| Eastern CCZ | 31.4 | 6.3 | 1.40 | 1.18 | 0.174 | 0.0701 |
| Western CCZ | 27.56 | 6.1 | 1.36 | 1.08 | 0.250 | 0.0801 |
| Indian Ocean | 24.4 | 7.14 | 1.10 | 1.04 | 0.111 | 0.1039 |
| Cook Islands | 16.1 | 16.1 | 0.38 | 0.23 | 0.411 | 0.1678 |
| Peru Basin | 34.2 | 6.12 | 1.30 | 0.60 | 0.048 | 0.0403 |
Polymetallic sulfides
[edit]Polymetallic or sulfide deposits form in active oceanic tectonic settings such as island arcs and back-arcs and mid ocean ridge environments.[37] These deposits are associated with hydrothermal activity and hydrothermal vents at sea depths mostly between 1 and 4 km (0.62 and 2.5 mi) and therefore located in shallower waters to other marine mineral types like polymetallic nodules. These minerals are rich in copper, gold, lead, silver and others.[28]: 356
Polymetallic sulphides appear on seafloor massive sulfide deposits. They appear on and within the seafloor when mineralized water discharges from a hydrothermal vent. The ionic metals and sulfides in the hot, mineral-rich water precipitate upon contact with cold seawater.[34] The stock area of the chimney structures of hydrothermal vents can be highly mineralized.
Cobalt-rich crusts
[edit]Cobalt-rich crusts (CRCs) form on sediment-free rock surfaces around oceanic seamounts, ocean plateaus, and other elevated features.[38] The deposits are found at depths of 600–7,000 m (2,000–23,000 ft) and form 'carpets' of metal-rich layers about 30 cm (12 in) thick at the feature surface. Crusts are rich in a range of metals including cobalt, tellurium, nickel, copper, platinum, zirconium, tungsten, and rare earth elements.[28]: 356 Temperature, depth and seawater sources shape how the formations grow.
Cobalt-rich formations exist in two categories depending on the depositional environment:[39]
- hydrogenetic cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts grow at 1–5 mm/Ma, but offer higher concentrations of critical metals.
- hydrothermal crusts and encrustations precipitate quickly, near 1600–1800 mm/Ma, and grow in hydrothermal fluids at approximately 200 °C (392 °F)
Submarine seamount provinces are linked to hotspots and seafloor spreading and vary in depth. They show characteristic distributions. In the Western Pacific, a study conducted at <1500 m to 3500 m bsl reported that cobalt crusts concentrate on less than 20° slopes. The high-grade cobalt crust in the Western Pacific correlated with latitude and longitude, a region within 150°E–140°W and 30°S–30°N.[40]
| Type | Typical depth range | Resources |
|---|---|---|
| Polymetallic nodules Manganese nodules |
4,000 – 6,000 m | Nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese |
| Manganese crusts | 800 – 2,400 m | Mainly cobalt, some vanadium, molybdenum and platinum |
| Polymetallic sulfide deposits | 1,400 – 3,700 m | Copper, lead and zinc, some gold and silver |
Diamonds are mined from the seabed by De Beers and others.
Deposit sites
[edit]Deep sea mining sites hold polymetallic nodules or surround active or extinct hydrothermal vents at about 3,000–6,500 meters (10,000–21,000 ft) depth.[42][41] The vents create sulfide deposits, which collect metals such as silver, gold, copper, manganese, cobalt, and zinc.[20][43] The deposits are mined using hydraulic pumps or bucket systems.
The largest deposits occur in the Clarion–Clipperton zone in the Pacific Ocean. It stretches over 4.5 million square kilometers of the Northern Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and Mexico.[44] Scattered across the abyssal plain are trillions of polymetallic nodules, potato-sized rocklike deposits containing minerals such as manganese, nickel, copper, zinc, and cobalt.[44]
The Cook Islands contains the world's fourth largest deposit in the South Penrhyn basin close to the Manihiki Plateau.[35]
Though the nodule fields of greatest commercial interest are located in the eastern Pacific,[29][30] polymetallic nodules are also found within the Mid-Atlantic Ridge system, around Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and Tonga,[28]: 356 and the Peru Basin.[45]
Cobalt-rich crusts are found on seamounts in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, as well as countries such as the Pacific Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Kiribati.[28]: 356
On November 10, 2020, the Chinese submersible Striver reached the bottom of the Mariana Trench 10,909 meters (35,790 feet). Chief designer Ye Cong said the seabed was abundant with resources and a "treasure map" can be made.[46]
Promising sulfide deposits (an average of 26 parts per million) were found in the Central and Eastern Manus Basin around Papua New Guinea and the crater of Conical Seamount to the east. It offers relatively shallow water depth of 1050 m, along with a nearby gold refinery.[43]
United States
[edit]A 2023 study identified four regions in US territorial waters where deep sea mining would be possible: the Hawaiian Islands, the southeastern Blake Plateau, California, and the Gulf of Alaska. Hawaii has both nodules and CRCs, while the other sites hold CRCs. Each area features distinct risks. Mining Hawaii could generate plumes that could damage important fisheries and other marine life. California's waters host massive ship traffic and communication cables. Alaska waters are rich in bottom-dwelling commercially valuable sea life.[47]
In April 2025, U.S. President Trump signed an Executive Order instructing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to expedite permits for companies to mine in both international and U.S. territorial waters, citing the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resource Act of 1980.[7] This would allow mining of the deep seabed for the first time in the country.
Deep sea mining projects
[edit]Hakurei
[edit]The world's first large-scale mining of hydrothermal vent mineral deposits was carried out by Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC) from August to September 2017,[48] using the research vessel Hakurei,[49] at the 'Izena hole/cauldron' vent field within the hydrothermally active back-arc Okinawa Trough, which contains 15 confirmed vent fields according to the InterRidge Vents Database.[50]
Solwara 1
[edit]The Solwara 1 Project was the first time a legitimate legal contract and framework had been developed on deep sea mining.[51] The project was based off the coast of Papua New Guinea (PNG), near New Ireland province. The project was a joint venture between Papua New Guinea and Nautilus Minerals Inc. Nautilus Minerals held a 70% stake and Papua New Guinea purchased a 30% stake in 2011.[52] PNG's economy relies upon the mining industry, which produces around 30–35% of GDP.[53] Nautilus Minerals is a Canadian deep-sea mining company.[51] The project was approved in January 2011, by PNG's Minister for Mining, John Pundari.[51] The company leased a portion of the seabed in the Bismarck Sea.[54] The lease licensed access to 59 square kilometers. Nautilus was allowed to mine to a depth of 1,600 meters for a period of 20 years.[54][53] The company then began the process of gathering the materials and raising money for the project.[55] The intent was to mine a high grade copper-gold resource from a weakly active hydrothermal vent.[56] The target was 1.3 tons of materials, consisting of 80,000 tons of high-grade copper and 150,000 to 200,000 ounces of gold sulfide ore, over 3 years.[53] The project was to operate at 1600 mbsl[56] using remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROV) technology developed by UK-based Soil Machine Dynamics.[57]
Community and environmental activists[21] launched the Deep Sea Mining Campaign[58] and Alliance of Solwara Warriors, comprising 20 communities in the Bismarck and Solomon Seas who attempted to ban seabed mining. Their campaign against the Solwara 1 project lasted for 9 years. Their efforts led the Australian government to ban seabed mining in the Northern Territory.[59] In June 2019, the Alliance of Solwara Warriors wrote the PNG government calling for them to cancel all deep sea mining licenses and ban seabed mining in national waters.[59] They claimed that PNG had no need for seabed mining due to its abundant fisheries, productive agricultural lands, and marine life.[59] They claimed that seabed mining benefited only a small number of already wealthy people, but not local communities and Indigenous populations.[59] Others chose to engage in more artistic forms, such as Joy Enomoto.[60] She created a series of woodcut prints titled Nautilus the Protector. The activist community argued that authorities had not adequately addressed free, prior and informed consent for affected communities and violated the precautionary principle.[61]
In December 2017 the company had difficulties in raising money and eventually could no longer pay what it owed to the Chinese shipyard where the "production support vessel" was docked.[52] Nautilus lost access to the ship and equipment.[52] In August 2019, the company filed for bankruptcy, delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange, and was liquidated.[62] PNG lost over $120 million dollars.[52] Nautilus was purchased by Deep Sea Mining Finance LTD. PNG has yet to cancel the extraction license contract.
Shell
[edit]In the 1970s Shell, Rio Tinto (Kennecott) and Sumitomo conducted pilot test work, recovering over ten thousand tons of nodules in the CCZ.[63]
Licenses
[edit]Licences for mineral exploration in the area beyond national jurisdiction registered with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) are mostly located in the CCZ.[41] As of June 2025, the ISA has entered into 17 contracts with private companies and national governments for polymetallic nodules in the CCZ, one contract with the Government of India in the Central Indian Ocean Basin (CIOB), and one contract with Chinese contractor Beijing Pioneer Hi-Tech Development Corporation in the Prime Crust Zone (PCZ) in the Western Pacific.[45]
Cook Islands
[edit]In 2019, the Cook Islands passed two deep sea mining laws. The Sea Bed Minerals (SBM) Act of 2019 was to enable "the effective and responsible management of the seabed minerals of the Cook Islands in a way that also...seeks to maximize the benefits of seabed minerals for present and future generations of Cook Islanders."[64] The Sea Bed Minerals (Exploration) Regulations Act and the Sea Bed Minerals Amendment Act were enacted in 2020 and 2021, respectively.[65]
In February 2022, the Cook Islands government Seabed Minerals Agency (SBMA) announced the award of three five-year licences exploration activities in Cook Islands EEZ to private companies Moana Minerals Limited, the Cook Islands Consortium (CIC), and Cook Islands Investment Corporation - Seabed Resources (CIIC-SR).
Moana Minerals is a subsidiary of Ocean Minerals LLC (OML), a US-based private investment firm led by President and CEO Hans Smit. Hans Smit previously led Neptune Minerals, Inc a DSM company interested in SMS exploitation in Papua New-Guinean waters. He also served as managing director of Royal IHC MMP, focused on underwater mining activities, and worked on underwater mining systems used for subsea diamond mining.[66]
In 2023, the SBMA announced the results of a technical report on the polymetallic nodule deposit of the Cook Islands' exclusive economic zone, undertaken on its behalf by RSC Mining and Mineral Exploration. The study was based on the analysis of both historical samples from previous scientific cruises, as well as data from recent work undertaken by SBMA PMN exploration contractors CIIC-SR and Moana. RSC produced a JORC Code (2012)-compliant Mineral Resource Statement for parts of the EEZ totalling 6.7 billion tons of polymetallic nodules (wet), grading 0.44% Co, 0.21% Cu, 17.4% Fe, 15.8% Mn, and 0.37% Ni. Of this total resource, 304 million tons of nodules grading 0.5% Co, 0.15% Cu, 18.5% Fe, 15.4% Mn, and 0.25% Ni, are assessed at Indicated Resource, whereas Inferred Resources account for 6.4 billion tons grading 0.4% Co, 0.2% Cu, 17% Fe, 16% Mn, and 0.4% Ni.[67]
| Metal grades (%) | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Classification | Cut-off
(kg/m2) |
Abundance
(wet) kg/m2 |
Nodules
Mt (wet) |
Co | Cu | Fe | Mn | Ni |
| Indicated | 5 | 26.7 | 304 | 0.50 | 0.15 | 18.5 | 15.4 | 0.25 |
| Inferred | 5 | 14 | 6400 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 17 | 16 | 0.4 |
| Global | 5 | 14.4 | 6700 | 0.44 | 0.21 | 17.4 | 15.8 | 0.37 |
In 2025, the Cook Islands announced that it had signed a five-year agreement with China focussed on exploration and research into seabed minerals.[11]
The Metals Company (TMC)
[edit]In 2011, the Republic of Nauru sponsored an ISA exploration contract with exploration activities carried out by Nauruan company, Nauru Ocean Resources Inc (NORI).[68] NORI is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canadian company, The Metals Company.[69][70] Since then, The Metals Company has conducted 22 offshore research campaigns on the NORI exploration area as part of its Environmental and Social Impact Assessment.[71] On June 29, 2021, the Republic of Nauru invoked the 'Two-Year Notice' provision of the 1994 Implementation Agreement requiring the ISA to finalize and adopt a Mining Code within two years.[72] This two year deadline elapsed on July 9, 2023, meaning that The Metals Company and other contractors can submit an application for commercial exploitation at any time.[73]
The Metals Company also controls two further ISA exploration licences in the CCZ through Kiribati-based Marawa Research and Exploration Ltd., and through its Tongan subsidiary Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML), which it acquired from Deep Sea Mining Finance Limited in April 2020.[74]
In April 2025, following U.S. President Donald Trump's Executive Order on offshore mining, The Metals Company submitted applications for a commercial recovery permit and two exploration licenses under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act and regulations set by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The commercial recovery permit covers 25,160 square kilometers while the two exploration licence applications cover a combined 199,895 square kilometers.[75]
Norway
[edit]In January 2024 Norway's parliament allowed multiple companies to begin submitting applications to prospect for DSM resources, mainly Seafloor Massive Sulfides (SMS), but also potentially Cobalt-rich crusts in the Norwegian EEZ, as well as on its continental shelf extension, along Mohns and Knipovich ridges Jan Mayen and Svalbard in the North Atlantic.[76]
Norway's Institute of Marine Research recommended five to ten years of research before allowing mining. In late April 2024, the Norwegian Offshore Directorate invited interested parties to nominate blocks in this area for a first round of mineral exploration licences.[77] First licence awards are expected for early 2025.[78]
Three Norwegian start-up companies, Loke Marine Minerals, Green Minerals, and Adepth Minerals were expected to apply for licenses.[79] In March 2023 Loke acquired Lockheed Martin subsidiary UK Seabed Resources Limited (UKSRL). This saw UKSRL's two PMN exploration licences in the CCZ, as well as its 19.9% stake in Ocean Minerals Singapore (OMS), an ISA contractor for PMNs in the CCZ.[80] OMS is majority-controlled by Singaporean state-owned Keppel Offshore & Marine, now part of also Singaporean state-owned Seatrium.[81][82]
Green Minerals is another Norwegian company which has expressed interested in mining seafloor massive sulfide (SMS) deposits in the Norwegian EEZ.[83] In January 2023, Green Minerals signed a memorandum of understanding with the ISA to obtain an exploration licence for PMNs in the CCZ.[84] In its May 2024 Capital Markets Day Presentation, it confirmed its ambitions to commence mining operations on SMS deposits on the Norwegian continental shelf and EEZ by 2028, as well as explore for PMNs in the CCZ in the future.[78]
After in April 2024, the Norwegian government opened up an exploration area in the Norwegian and Greenland Seas, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) declared that it would take legal action against the decision. According to the government, the seabed contains many resources including copper, zinc and cobalt, which are necessary for producing mobile phones, wind turbines, computers and batteries but as for now supplies are controlled by China or "authoritarian countries". In June the energy ministry submitted "a proposal to announce the first licensing round on the Norwegian continental shelf for public consultation." According to the government, the aim is to understand if a sustainable deep sea mining there can occur. Otherwise, "deep-sea mining would not be permitted".[85]
Extraction methods
[edit]
Robotics and AI technologies used to selectively harvest nodules while minimizing disturbances to the deep sea environment are under development.[86]
Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) are used to collect mineral samples from prospective sites, using drills and other cutting tools. A mining ship or station collects the deposits for processing.[57]
The continuous-line bucket system (CLB) is an older approach. It operates like a conveyor-belt, running from the bottom to the surface where a ship or mining platform extracts the minerals, and returns the tailings to the ocean.[87]
Hydraulic suction mining instead lowers a pipe to the seafloor and pumps nodules up to the ship. Another pipe returns the tailings to the mining site.[87]
Borehole Mining is used for mining of natural resources from below the seafloor.
Process
[edit]The three stages of deep-sea mining are prospecting, exploration and exploitation. Prospecting entails searching for minerals and estimating their size, shape and value. Exploration analyses the resources, testing potential recovery and potential economic/environmental extraction impacts. Exploitation is the recovery of these resources.[88]
Resource assessment and pilot mining are part of exploration. If successful, "resources" attain a "reserves" classification.[89] Bottom scanning and sampling use technologies such as echo-sounders, side scan sonars, deep-towed photography, remotely operated vehicles, and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV).
Extraction involves gathering material (mining), vertical transport, storing, offloading, transport, and metallurgical processing.
Polymetallic minerals require special treatment. Issues include spatial tailing discharges, sediment plumes, disturbance to the benthic environment, and analysis of regions affected by seafloor machines.[89]
Environmental impacts
[edit]Deep sea mining has significant environmental impacts. Research on deep-sea polymetallic nodule mining has substantially increased in recent years, but the expected level of environmental impact is still being established.[1] Scientists from MIT examined seafloor sediment plumes generated by a prototype mining collector in the Clarion Clipperton Zone and found that the plume forms a low-lying turbidity current which hugs the seafloor.[90] Another MIT-led study found that modelling can reliably predict plume behaviour in the midwater column, and impact is influenced by the quantity of discharged sediment, and the turbulence of the water upon discharge.[1]
Meta-analysis of 11 separate disturbance and test mining studies showed that impacts are often severe immediately after mining, with major negative changes in density and diversity of most groups occurring. Almost all studies show some recovery in faunal density and diversity for meiofauna and mobile megafauna, often within one year. However, very few faunal groups return to baseline or control conditions after two decades.[91] Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, commissioned by The Metals Company, conducted a life cycle assessment of the environmental impact of producing critical minerals from polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ). The study found that the deep-sea model performed better environmentally than traditional land-based methods, showing 54-70% lower Global Warming Potential (GWP) on average, due to renewable energy use, high metal recovery, and efficient processes.[92] Another study in the Journal of Cleaner Production found that the production of 1 billion electric vehicles using nodules would produce 90% less CO2 equivalent than producing the same amount of vehicles through land-based mining.[93] While some environmental consequences (such as sediment plumes, disturbance of the bottom, and toxic effects) are known, the scientific understanding of deep sea ecosystems is currently insufficient to evaluate all possible impacts.[20]
Technology is under development to mitigate these issues. This includes selective pick-up technology that leaves alone nodules that contain life and leaves behind some nodules to maintain the habitat.[86]
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) emphasizes the need for a comprehensive assessment of the environmental impacts of deep-sea mining, which targets polymetallic nodules at depths of 3–6.5 km (1.9–4.0 mi), polymetallic sulphides at 1–4 km (0.62–2.5 mi), and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts between <400 m and 3.5 km. Researchers and governments have raised significant concerns about the potential impacts on unique and fragile ecosystems, with only 24.9% of the deep seabed mapped. These ecosystems are essential for ocean and carbon cycling and are vulnerable to climate change. There are widespread calls for a moratorium on deep-sea mining until its environmental, social, and economic risks are fully investigated. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) aims to finalize exploitation regulations by 2025, and a new agreement under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on marine biodiversity was adopted on 19 June 2023.[94]
Sediment plumes
[edit]Plumes are caused when seawater and sediment separated from nodules at the surface are is returned to the ocean. As the particles are fine (small and light), they can remain suspended in the water column for extended periods and spread over large areas if regenerated at the surface of the ocean. All proposed projects expect to release sediment at depths of below 2,000 meters below the Oxygen Minimum Zone. Tailings increase water turbidity (cloudiness). Plumes form wherever the tailings are released, typically either near the bottom plumes or at the surface.[41][95] Mining-generated plumes differ significantly from traditional mining tailings, as deep-sea sediment primarily consists of naturally occurring, unprocessed material rather than chemically altered waste. Studies show that most suspended particles settle relatively quickly, with heavy sediment blanketing confined to a limited area near the source. The extent of dispersion depends on local hydrodynamics, sediment properties, and mining technology.[1][96][97]
Near-bottom plumes occur when the sediment is pumped back down to the mining site. Depending on particle size and water currents, surface plumes can spread widely.[41][87] In shallow water, sediment can resuspend following storms, starting another cycle of damage. In-situ studies show most seafloor sediment settles rapidly, with 90% depositing within 2 km and the vast majority within 9 km, even under extreme conditions, while heavy sediment blanketing remains confined to a small area near the source.[1][96][97]
Benthic disturbance
[edit]Disturbing or, in the case of seafloor massive sulfides and cobalt crusts, removing parts of the sea floor impacts the habitat of benthic organisms, albeit to varying degrees.[41][97]
A study analyzing data from 11 experimental mining simulations found that deep-sea mining activities cause immediate declines in faunal density and diversity, with mobile and small-sized fauna recovering more quickly. Some ecosystems fail to return to pre-disturbance levels after 26 years, while some faunal groups partially rebound, particularly meiofauna and mobile megafauna. Due to limited testing, comparable assessments for seafloor massive sulfides (SMS) and cobalt-rich crusts remain limited.[98][99]
Nodule fields provide hard substrate on the bottom, attracting macrofauna. A study of benthic communities in the CCZ assessed a 350 square mile area with an ROV. They reported that the area contained a diverse abyssal plain megafaunal community.[99] Megafauna (species longer than 20 mm (0.79 in)) included glass sponges, anemones, eyeless fish, sea stars, psychropotes, amphipods, and isopods.[99] Macrofauna (species longer than 0.5mm) were reported to have high species diversity, numbering 80 -100 per square meter. The highest species diversity was found among polymetallic nodules.[99] In a follow-up survey in areas with potential for seabed mining, researchers identified over 1,000 species, 90% previously unknown, with over 50% dependent on polymetallic nodules for survival.[99]
Noise and light pollution
[edit]Deep sea mining generates ambient noise in normally quiet pelagic environments. However, planned operations will not use sonar and are not expected to make dangerously loud noises, with most noise highly localized and similar to that of typical marine shipping operations.[100] Noise pollution affects deep sea fish species and marine mammals, though due to the low surface productivity of its surface waters the Clarion Clipperton Zone is unlikely to be a feeding or breeding site for large marine mammals.[100] Impacts include behavior changes, communication difficulties, and temporary and permanent hearing damage.[101]
Light pollution affects the environment of DSM sites as they are normally pitch dark. Mining efforts may increase light levels to illuminate the bottom. Shrimp found at hydrothermal vents suffered permanent retinal damage when exposed to submersible floodlights.[101] Behavioral changes include vertical migration patterns, ability to communicate, and ability to detect prey.[102]
Ecosystem
[edit]Polymetallic nodule fields are hotspots of abundance and diversity for abyssal fauna.[103] Sediment can clog filter-feeding organisms such as manta rays.[95] As they block the sun, they inhibit growth of photosynthesizing organisms, including coral and phytoplankton. Phytoplankton sit at the bottom of the food chain. Reducing phytoplankton reduces food availability for all other organisms.[41][104] Metals carried by plumes can accumulate in tissues of shellfish.[105] This bioaccumulation works its way through the food web, impacting predators, including humans.
A recent study claimed that nodules are also important for oxygen production in the absence of light and photosynthesis. Nodules the size of potatoes have shown to be able to produce an electric current that is almost equal to the voltage in an AA-sized battery. This generate electric currents strong enough to perform electrolysis, which splits water molecules into hydrogen and oxygen.[106][107]
One report states that biomass loss stemming from deep sea mining is estimated to be significantly smaller than that from mining on land.[108] One estimate of land ore mining reports that it will lead to a loss of 568 megatons of biomass (approximately the same as that of the entire human population)[109] versus 42 megatons of biomass from DSM. In addition, land ore mining will lead to a loss of 47 trillion megafauna organisms, whereas deep-sea mining is expected to lead to a loss of 3 trillion.
This kind of estimation does not take into account the recoverability of the situation: how long does nature need to reclaim an abandoned site. By contrast, a different study reported that deep sea mining would be approximately 25 times worse for biodiversity than land mining.[110]
According to the International Union for Conservation of Nature: "Not only is deep-sea mining an energy-intensive industry with high greenhouse gas emissions, but disruption of the ocean floor, which is by far the largest carbon storage reservoir on Earth, can lead to reduced carbon sequestration as well as the release of large amounts of the potent greenhouse gas methane, exacerbating the climate crisis".[111] However, according to the United States Geological Survey, no methane hydrates are known to exist in the Clarion Clipperton Zone where most deep-sea mining activity would take place.[112] Also, a peer-reviewed study published in the Journal of Cleaner Production found that using nodules instead of land-ore mining can reduce CO2 emissions by 80% (Ni), 76% (Cu), 29% (Co), and 22% (Mn).[93]
Dark Oxygen
[edit]A new insight into the complexity of the abyssal environment has been provided by a team of researchers from the Scottish Society of Marine Sciences. They have found that manganese nodules on the deep sea floor could be producing oxygen.[107] The manganese nodules act as a kind of battery due to their composition with different metals and release oxygen into the environment. As it was previously thought that only plants and algae produce dark oxygen (oxygen produced without light), this can be seen as a scientific landslide. The research has since been subject to criticism from mining companies and independent academics who have published multiple rebuttals expressing ethical, data and methodological concerns.[113] Researchers from the University of Gothenburg criticized the authors for "poor-quality lander incubation experiments, leading to faulty oxygen flux measurements" and as a result called for the paper to be retracted.[114] An academic at the University of Tokyo also criticized the paper for providing no evidence for electrolysis at the seafloor and for its inconsistency with decades of prior research that failed to report oxygen production, warning in an article in Science that "there is a high probability that the paper is wrong."[115]
Laws and regulations
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Deep-sea mining is governed by the International Seabed Authority, an autonomous international organization, established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to oversee and regulate all mineral resource-related activities in the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction.[116][117][118]
Formation of the United Nations Convention Law of the Sea
[edit]The ocean was traditionally seen as an ungoverned space, reflected in the 17th-century principle of Mare Liberum, or the freedom of the sea, proposed by Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius. Grotius argued that seas were open to all states for navigation and trade, supporting Dutch maritime expansion. However, as technology advanced and human activity in the ocean grew, tensions over governance arose. This led to the competing framework of Mare Clausum, or the closed sea, proposed by English jurist John Selden in 1635. Mare Clausum advocated for coastal state sovereignty over adjacent waters, aligning with England's goals to control trade routes and fisheries.[116][119][120]
The increasing complexity of maritime use and disputes between Mare Liberum and Mare Clausum highlighted the need for a comprehensive legal framework. Early efforts, including the United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I in 1958 and UNCLOS II in 1960), failed due to disagreements over the balance between freedom of the seas and sovereign rights. These issues were addressed with the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) on December 10, 1982, providing a universally accepted framework. Amendments to the deep seabed provisions led to the 1994 Agreement and the Part XI Implementation Agreement, which entered into force on November 16, 1994, for ratifying states, aligning with the United Nations' role and Sustainable Development Goal 14.[121][122]
UNCLOS, comprising over 400 articles and nine annexes, is the most detailed codification of maritime law ever undertaken by states under the UN.[122][123] Driven by complex historical debates and evolving uses of the sea, the Convention represents a compromise between freedom and territorial control.[119] Adopted after nine years of negotiations, it was celebrated as a milestone in international law, despite challenges over provisions related to reaching a collective consensus over the seabed and areas beyond national jurisdiction.[116]
UNCLOS created three new key institutions, playing distinct yet interrelated roles, ensuring effective governance. First, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), functioning as an independent judicial body with the authority to resolve disputes arising from the interpretation or application of the convention.
Second, is the International Seabed Authority (ISA), an autonomous international organization that oversees and regulates all mineral resource-related activities in the seabed area beyond national jurisdiction (ISA), with a "mandate to ensure the effective protection of the marine environment from harmful effects that may arise from deep-seabed-related activities."[118]
Third, is the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), playing a technical and advisory role, particularly in delineating the outer limits of a state's continental shelf.
Fourth, the Meeting of States Parties (MSP), or the Meeting of States Parties to the Law of the Sea Convention (SPLOS). Convened in accordance with Article 319, paragraph 2(e) of UNCLOS (1982), the MSP serves as a forum for member states to discuss and coordinate the implementation of the convention. It holds significant administrative functions, including the election of ITLOS, and CLCS members.[124][125][120]
Legal territorialization of water zones
[edit]The 20th century saw significant challenges to the free sea order, particularly regarding claims over maritime resources.[126] In 1945, the Truman Doctrine set a precedent by asserting U.S. jurisdiction over the continental shelf's natural resources, .[127][128] This was followed by the 1952 Santiago Declaration, where Chile, Ecuador, and Peru claimed full sovereignty over their seabed and subsoil up to 200 nautical miles, extending this sovereignty to the waters and airspace above.[129] The wave of decolonization also led newly independent states to prioritize control over marine resources for economic development.[116] These declarations influenced the 1982 Law of the Sea, particularly shaping the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf's extent. This development marked a shift towards a zonal approach in international maritime law, dividing ocean spaces into distinct jurisdictional zones governed by the principles of sovereignty and freedom.[119][126]
Under UNCLOS, states have the right and obligation to regulate activities within their coastal waters and continental shelf, structured spatially by legal zoning as follows: The Territorial Sea, extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, where states can regulate laws and resources, with foreign ships granted innocent passage, including warships; the Exclusive Economic Zone stretches up to 200 nautical miles, where the state holds exclusive rights over mineral and economic resources and must preserve the environment, though it cannot restrict foreign ships. The enclosure of the EEZ marked a shift from global commons to state-controlled waters for economic and security reasons; the Extended Continental Shelf, governed by complex criteria and negotiation, allows states to claim up to 350 nautical miles beyond their continental shelf.[128] Articles 76 to 85 of UNCLOS Part VI emphasize the importance of the continental shelf's natural resources, excluding fisheries. Notably, the Area, where the Convention designates over 50 per cent of the seabed as international jurisdiction, recognizing it as the common heritage of humankind, which entails its non-appropriation by states or private entities, its use exclusively for peaceful purposes, and benefits shared equitably.,[123][119][130] Regarding Straits, Article 38 of UNCLOS ensures the right of international navigation, allowing continuous transit without coastal state interference, though states may regulate for safety and environmental protection. Additionally, the flag state holds jurisdiction over its registered ships, ensuring compliance with international laws.[122]
The International Seabed Authority (ISA)
[edit]The International Seabed Authority (ISA) was established under Article 156 of UNCLOS 1982 as an autonomous intergovernmental organization. Following the adoption of the implementing Agreement on July 28, 1994, and its entry into force on November 16, 1994, the ISA held its inaugural meeting in Jamaica. It gained observer status at the United Nations in October 1996, confirming its recognition as a legal entity under international law.[122][123][131]
Under Article 157 of UNCLOS and the Part XI implementing agreement, the ISA is tasked with organizing and controlling activities in the Area, designated as the common heritage of mankind under Article 140 (LOSC 1982, UN 1994). This role has grown in importance with increasing interest in marine mineral exploitation by states and private entities.[116][119] The ISA operates through three main organs: the Assembly, the council, and the Secretariat. All 168 States Parties to UNCLOS, including the EU, are members of the Assembly, which elects the Council and Secretary-General, holds the authority to approve or reject the council's proposals for seabed mining, and oversees the Authority's budget.[132][133]
The 36-member Council authorizes contracts for seabed exploration and exploitation and proposes governance regulations subject to the Assembly's approval. It also nominates the Secretary-General, who serves a four-year term as the chief administrative officer of the ISA, supervises staff, and ensures impartiality by refraining from mining-related financial interests.[134][135] Additional advisory bodies include the Legal and Technical Commission, which makes recommendations on mining rules, and the Finance Committee, which addresses budgetary matters. Members are nominated by states and serve in their personal capacities. The Enterprise, the Authority's commercial arm, is empowered to conduct mining operations, initially through joint ventures, to generate revenues for equitable distribution among developing nations,.[136][137] However, critics, particularly environmental groups, argue that the ISA faces a conflict of interest as both regulator and potential operator through the Enterprise. The ISA has denied these allegations.[138]
Extraction and exploitation contracts
[edit]Article 153(2) of UNCLOS stipulates that exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals in the Area must occur under a contract with the ISA, adhering to its rules, regulations, and procedures cf. Article 162(2)(b) (UN 1982). Part XI of the Convention and the 1994 Implementation Agreement provide detailed mechanisms for ISA's administration of these contracts, ensuring compliance with international standards.[133]
Contracts are open to both public and private enterprises sponsored by an UNCLOS State Party, provided they meet technological and financial criteria. The Council must evaluate whether economic pressures to exploit deep-sea minerals align with the need to protect marine ecosystems and biodiversity.[135] Section 1(7) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement requires contractors to complete preparatory work, including environmental baseline studies, impact assessments and other obligations, before exploitation. Applications must include an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and a program for oceanographic and environmental studies, with exploitation plans requiring detailed information.[133][135] Revenues from deep-seabed mining are intended for equitable distribution for the benefit of mankind, emphasizing support for developing countries lacking resources to participate independently .[128] To assist in its work, the ISA commissioned Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2019 for a comparative study on various economic models to equitably share deep-sea resource revenues.[139]
Since 1994, the ISA has authorized mining exploration contracts in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans, focusing on polymetallic nodules, polymetallic sulfides, and cobalt crusts found at depths of 400 to 7,000 meters.[137] While regulations include environmental protection measures, scientists warn that mining these deposits risks irreparable harm to critical ecosystems, the ocean's carbon sink functions, and marine biodiversity.[140]
State sponsorship
[edit]Under the ISA licensing framework, only specific entities are eligible to conduct deep seabed mining in the Area I.[141] According to UNCLOS, such activities are restricted to States Parties or entities, state-owned or private, nationally affiliated with or effectively controlled by these states. Sponsorship by a State Party, as required by Article 153(2)(b), is mandatory. Furthermore, Annex III, Article 4(3).[133] specifies that private corporations must secure sponsorship from their home state, and if another state exerts effective control, its sponsorship is also required.[142][143]
To obtain approval, States or State-sponsored entities must submit a plan of work to the ISA, which, upon approval, becomes a binding contract.[143] This framework allows private companies to collaborate with sponsoring states, leveraging their technological resources cf. Article 162(2)(b)[122][133] while operating under ISA's regulatory oversight.[122][133][143][144] The sponsorship requirement ensures entities comply with UNCLOS obligations, as highlighted by ITLOS, binding non-state actors to international and domestic legal responsibilities, cf. Annex III, Article 4(4), and Article 139 in the convention.[122] Sponsorship also reinforces state accountability, ensuring non-state actors operate under domestic legal systems.[142]
Non-parties to UNCLOS and non-state actors associated with such states are excluded from deep seabed mining activities. This exclusion underscores UNCLOS's role as the prevailing legal framework for regulating seabed resource activities, with alternative regimes likely deemed inconsistent with international law.[142][122]
The Two-Year Rule
[edit]UNCLOS, as amended by the 1994 Implementing Agreement, provides the legal framework for regulating activities in the Area and tasks the ISA with developing and enforcing rules, regulations, and procedures for exploring and exploiting mineral resources.[122][123]
A contentious provision within UNCLOS, referred to as the two-year rule, established in Section 1(15) of the Annex to the 1994 Implementation Agreement,[123] permits any Member State of ISA, who's national intends to submit a plan of work for exploitation, to request the ISA Council to complete and adopt the necessary regulatory framework within two years.[123] If the Council fails to finalize the exploitation regulations within the prescribed period, it is nonetheless required to "consider" and "provisionally approve" the submitted application, even in the absence of a fully developed regulatory structure, cf. Section 1(15)(c) of the Annex to the 1994 Agreement on Implementation.[123] As further prescribed in Article 162(2)(o)(ii), UNCLOS though requires the ISA Council to adopt and temporarily apply rules, regulations, and procedures for activities like prospecting, exploration, and exploitation in the seabed area. These temporary rules must then be reviewed and approved by the Assembly, as outlined in Article 160(2)(e)(ii).[123][135]
The council's decisions on these regulations must be reached by consensus, meaning no formal objections can be raised. Unlike most Council decisions, this rule, while ensuring broad agreement, enables any single objection to block progress, potentially leading to deadlock.[133][145] In such cases, the council is required to pursue dispute resolution, including compulsory conciliation. This requirement for consensus is crucial, hence without agreed-upon regulations, the council is not authorized to evaluate applications for exploration or exploitation, effectively stalling activities in the Area.[133][146][147]
Section 1(15) offers a pathway to circumvent such deadlocks, particularly when a small group of members obstructs progress. However, this mechanism is less effective when legitimate concerns exist about the adequacy of the regulatory framework, which may require more time to ensure a precautionary and thorough approach to resource exploitation.[135]
Republic of Nauru
[edit]In June 2021, the Republic of Nauru partnered with The Metals Company to extract deep-sea minerals, driven by the need for renewable energy to support its energy sector.[148] While deep sea mining could provide vital resources, its extraction requires significant energy and capital, and may cause environmental and social impacts on the island. Although it offers some relief, deep sea mining alone is unlikely to meet long-term demand,.[149][150]
By July 2023, Nauru's two-year rule expired, yet UNCLOS ensures that extraction beyond national jurisdiction should benefit developing states,[150][151][152] This highlights the ongoing tension and key ocean paradigms, underpinning the discussing discourse between resource access, ocean health and equitable distribution, compounded by the challenges of crafting universally binding agreements under competing interests.[153]
Since Nauru's application in 2021, the ISA has not established a clear legal process for mining, despite efforts since 2016 to create a Mining Code. The ISA aims to adopt a new code by 2025, which will offer a stronger regulatory framework, but concerns remain about legal gaps until then.[154][155][156] Critics argue for a precautionary morato-rium or ban, with support from over 900 experts,[140][157][158] but experts note that issuing mining licenses is complicated until the Mining Code is finalized.[159]
Economic perspective
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Deep-sea mining offers significant economic potential, driven by the growing demand for critical minerals needed for green technologies such as batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), and renewable energy systems. Estimates suggest that the global economic opportunity from seabed mining could reach $20 trillion.[160] For instance, mining 75,000 square kilometers of the seabed could generate $21–$42 billion in gross metal value over two decades.[161][162]
Since Deep-sea mining represents a transformative $20 trillion economic opportunity to support the global energy transition. To fully realize its potential, it is essential to address challenges including significant costs, environmental risks, and regulatory uncertainties. Achieving sustainability and inclusivity in this emerging industry will require strategic investments, robust international cooperation, and effective governance mechanisms.[162][163]
Resource Abundance and Economic Efficiency
[edit]The economic viability of deep-sea mining is underpinned by the abundance of high-value resources. The Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) in the Pacific Ocean contains 3.4–5 times more cobalt and 1.8–3 times more nickel than global land-based reserves, making it a critical area for meeting future energy demands.[163] These minerals are essential for producing low-carbon technologies, including EV batteries and renewable energy storage systems, as well as for producing steel which is widely used in infrastructure to support global development.[163][162]
In addition to resource abundance, deep-sea mining benefits from high-grade deposits and lower operational costs compared to terrestrial mining due to reduced overburden removal. Optimizations such as reduced trench depth can cut mining time by 26% and increase deposit value by 53%.[164] The process is also less carbon-intensive, offering both environmental and economic advantages.[165] A study published in the Journal of Cleaner Production found that producing battery metals sufficient for the production of 1 billion electric vehicles using nodules will produce 90% less CO2 equivalent than producing the same amount of metals through land-based mining.[93]
Strategic Importance in Global Markets
[edit]From an economic perspective, deep-sea mining offers a way to diversify global mineral supply chains and reduce dependence on terrestrial mining. Nations with access to seabed resources could gain a competitive edge in securing materials essential for modern technologies.[166] Sustainable seabed mining could also alleviate the environmental impact of land-based extraction.[163]
Opportunities for Developing Nations
[edit]Deep-sea mining presents a unique economic opportunity for developing nations, particularly small island states. Revenue from resource exploitation can provide much-needed funding for economic growth and development in vulnerable regions. The International Seabed Authority (ISA) emphasizes equitable profit sharing to ensure that economically disadvantaged nations benefit from deep-sea mining activities.[167][163] This revenue could provide essential income for economically vulnerable island nations, helping to address global economic inequalities and foster inclusive economic growth.[165]
Challenges to Economic Viability
[edit]Despite its promise, deep-sea mining faces economic challenges. High initial investments in technology and infrastructure, coupled with ongoing operational costs, pose barriers to entry for many nations and companies.[162][163] The financial viability of mining operations depends on external factors such as global mineral prices and the availability of marine assets.[164]
Environmental impacts pose long-term economic risks. Habitat destruction and the disruption of ecosystem services, including carbon cycling and biodiversity, could result in costs exceeding $465 billion in lost natural capital.[168][163] Critics argue that these risks may outweigh the immediate financial benefits of mining operations.[168][167]
Regulatory Frameworks
[edit]To maximize its economic potential, deep-sea mining requires effective governance. The ISA's Mining Code aims to balance economic gains with environmental protection, ensuring sustainable and equitable practices.[167][163] Without robust regulations, unchecked environmental degradation and inequitable profit distribution could undermine the sector's economic advantages.
Geopolitical landscape of deep sea mining
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Geopolitical reasons for deep sea mining
[edit]With terrestrial supplies of critical minerals dwindling, countries are seeking to diversify and secure their share of deep-sea mineral resources. As highlighted by the ISA's role in regulating these resources, the demand for seabed mining is driven by several geopolitical factors, including the rise of green technologies, a growing reliance on electronics, and heightened geopolitical tensions, particularly in Europe.[169] According to The U.S. Department of Defense, they set a new record for sales through the foreign military sales system with more than $80 billion in sales and grant assistance, with the main buyers being countries such as Sweden, Poland and the Netherlands.[170]
As nations like the US, Japan, and Norway push for faster exploitation of deep-sea resources, the ISA's structure becomes increasingly critical, especially as countries seek to navigate the balance between economic development and environmental sustainability. The growing focus on energy security and the economic impact of sanctions, such as those imposed on Russia due to the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, further underscores the need for reliable, alternative resource supplies like deep-sea minerals.[171]
Current state of the global mineral market
[edit]The global mineral market is currently dominated by China, which controls approximately 90% of the world's refined critical minerals.[172] This dependency on China has raised concerns, particularly in the U.S., Australia, and Europe, who seek to reduce their reliance on Chinese resources. The global shift is influencing the governance model of the ISA, as countries look for more direct access to seabed minerals. By securing deep-sea mineral resources, states hope to disrupt China's monopoly and gain a stake in the emerging seabed mining market, potentially altering the geopolitical balance in mineral production and supply chains. Meanwhile, China is also trying to secure quick access to the rare materials on the deep seabed.[173]
New dividing lines within traditional alliance blocs
[edit]As seabed mining becomes a more prominent issue, new geopolitical divides are emerging within traditional alliance blocs, including among NATO members. Countries like the US, Japan, and Norway are increasingly aligned in their support for faster seabed resource extraction, driven by their need for critical minerals for green technologies. In contrast, nations such as France and Germany, concerned with environmental protection, call for stronger regulatory frameworks and a more cautious approach to seabed mining.[174] The ISA's role in this divide is critical, as it serves as the body that governs the exploration and exploitation of these resources. The debate within the ISA mirrors broader tensions between economic growth and environmental sustainability, with different nations pushing for contrasting agendas in the regulatory framework.[175]
ISA's structural model and regulatory issues
[edit]The ISA's structural model is increasingly being tested by the growing demand for seabed mining resources. As countries rush to secure deep-sea minerals, the ISA's ability to manage these activities through its existing governance model is under scrutiny. Critics of the ISA point to the organization's reliance on granting exploration and exploitation licenses, which has raised concerns about the speed at which these licenses are being issued and whether adequate environmental safeguards are in place.[176] This issue is highlighted by the differing agendas of member states, with some prioritizing economic development and others, like France and Germany, pushing for more stringent environmental regulations. As these challenges unfold, the ISA's ability to address both the economic and ecological aspects of deep-sea mining becomes a central issue in global resource governance.
Future Trends and Technologies
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Demand and Supply Uncertainties
[edit]Deep-sea mining focuses on three primary sources of minerals: polymetallic nodules, The IEA (2022)[177] projects that the clean energy sector will increasingly dominate the demand for metals like copper, nickel, cobalt, rare-earth elements, and lithium. This surge is expected to accelerate over the next two decades, with lithium demand growing particularly fast. This rising demand, alongside limited terrestrial resources, is fueling interest in deep-sea mining as a potential source of these critical materials.[178] The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2022) predicts that the clean energy sector will significantly increase its share of demand for critical raw materials (CRMs) in the coming decades. By 2040, demand for lithium is expected to grow more than 40 times, while demand for graphite, cobalt, and nickel will increase by 20-25 times. This growing demand raises concerns about the availability of CRMs, which are also vital to industries like information technology and defense. The European Commission continues to monitor supply risks for these materials (EC 2020c, 2023).
Potential recycling to meet demand
[edit]Future trends in deep-sea mining are increasingly linked to the potential for recycling critical raw materials (CRM). Recycling could address rising demand, particularly in Europe, where the supply of CRMs like cobalt, nickel, and lithium is crucial for clean energy technologies. By 2050, recycling could meet up to 77% of Europe's metal needs.[179] However, challenges in recycling capacity, collection, and sorting must be addressed. Regulatory frameworks are evolving, with new rules on minimum recycling rates for battery metals, aiming to support this transition.[180]
Technological Uncertainties
[edit]Future trends in deep-sea mining are heavily influenced by technological advancements and fluctuating demand for critical materials. While projections for nickel demand by 2050 vary significantly—from 24 to 100 million tones[181] emerging innovations, such as lithium-sulfur and sodium-ion batteries, could reduce reliance on certain minerals like nickel and cobalt. The ISA (2022)[182] forecasts that, by 2035, deep-sea mining could yield up to 36 million tons of nodules annually, meeting a significant portion of global manganese, nickel, and cobalt demand. However, market volatility and advances in recycling could alter the feasibility of these operations.
History
[edit]In the 1960s, the prospect of deep-sea mining was assessed in J. L. Mero's Mineral Resources of the Sea.[43] Nations including France, Germany and the United States dispatched research vessels in search of deposits. Initial estimates of DSM viability were exaggerated. Depressed metal prices led to the near abandonment of nodule mining by 1982. From the 1960s to 1984 an estimated US$650 million was spent on the venture, with little to no return.[43]
A 2018 article argued that "the 'new global gold rush' of deep sea mining shares many features with past resource scrambles – including a general disregard for environmental and social impacts, and the marginalisation of indigenous peoples and their rights".[183][184]
2000s
[edit]- In 2001, China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association (COMRA), received China's first exploration license.[6]
2020s
[edit]2020
[edit]- Researchers assess to what extent international law and existing policy support the practice of a proactive knowledge management system that enables systematic addressing of uncertainties about the environmental effects of seabed mining via regulations that, for example, enable the International Seabed Authority to actively engage in generating and synthesizing information.[185]
2021
[edit]- A moratorium on deep-sea mining until rigorous and transparent impact assessments are carried out is adopted at the 2021 world congress of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The vote, however, has no legal implications given that deep-sea mining regulations continue to be governed by the International Seabed Authority as established by UNCLOS.[186][187][188] Researchers have outlined why there is a need to avoid mining the deep sea.[189][190][191][192][193]
- Nauru requested the ISA to finalize rules so that The Metals Company be approved to begin work in 2023.[194]
- China's COMRA tested its polymetallic nodules collection system at 4,200 feet of depth in the East and South China Seas. The Dayang Yihao was exploring the Clarion–Clipperton zone (CCZ) for China Minmetals when it crossed into the U.S. exclusive economic zone near Hawaii, where for five days it looped south of Honolulu without having requested entry into US waters.[195]
- Belgian company Global Sea Mineral Resources (GSR) and the German Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) conduct a test in the CCZ with a prototype mining vehicle named Patania II. This test was the first of its kind since the late 1970s.[196]
2022
[edit]- Impossible Metals announces its first underwater robotic vehicle, 'Eureka 1', has completed its first trial of selectively harvesting polymetallic nodule rocks from the seabed to help address the rising global need for metals for renewable energy system components, mainly batteries.[197][198][199][200]
2023
[edit]- Supporters of mining were led by Norway, Mexico, and the United Kingdom, and supported by The Metals Company.[194]
- Chinese prospecting ship Dayang Hao prospected in China-licensed areas in the Clarion Clipperton Zone.[195]
2024
[edit]- Norway approved commercial deep-sea mining. 80% of Parliament voted to approve.[201]
- On February 7, 2024, the European Parliament voted in favor of a Motion for Resolution, expressing environmental concerns regarding Norway's decision to open vast areas in Arctic waters for deep-sea mining activities and reaffirming its support for a moratorium.[202][203]
- In July 2024, at the 29th General Assembly of the International Seabed Authority in Kingston, Jamaica, 32 countries united against the imminent start of mining for metallic nodules on the seafloor.[204] In his address titled "Upholding the Common Heritage of Humankind", President Surangel S. Whipps Jr. of Palau spoke about exploitation and modern-day colonialism.[205][206]
- In November 2024, the People's Republic of China unveiled its first deep-sea drilling vehicle.[207]
- In December 2024 Norway suspended deep sea mining, after the Socialist Left (SV) party said that otherwise, it would not support the budget.[208]
2025
[edit]- In April 2025, U.S. President Trump signed an Executive Order instructing the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration to expedite permits for companies to mine in both international and U.S. territorial waters, which would undermine the authority of the International Seabed Authority.[209]
Protests
[edit]In December 2023, the research vessel MV Coco was disrupted by Greenpeace activists blocking the collection of data to support a mining permit.[210] Obstructing canoes and dinghies were countered by water hoses. The mining ship was conducting research for The Metals Company.[210] The vessel MV Coco is owned by Magellan.[211]
BMW pledged not to use DSM materials in its cars. In October 2023, the UK joined Canada and New Zealand in calling for a moratorium.[83] In the beginning of August 2024, 32 countries were against the immediate commencement of deep sea mining.[212]
Alternatives
[edit]The environmental organization "The Oxygen Project" generally proposes, as an alternative to deep sea mining, "system change to sustainable alternative economic models that don't require infinite resource extraction from our environment".[213] The Environmental Justice Foundation and Greenpeace proposed circular economy, public transport, and less car dependency, energy efficiency and resource efficiency.[214][215]
See also
[edit]- Seabed mining – Extracting minerals from the seabed
- Blue economy – Economy based on exploitation and preservation of the marine environment
- Blue justice
- Copper mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
- Deepsea mining in Namibia
- Deepwater drilling – Using a drilling rig to bore holes for petroleum extraction in deep sea
- Human impact on marine life
- Ocean colonization – Type of ocean claim
- Ocean development – Establishing of human activities at sea and use of the ocean
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Deep sea mining
View on GrokipediaMineral Deposits and Types
Polymetallic Nodules
Polymetallic nodules, also known as manganese nodules, are mineral concretions formed through the slow precipitation of metal oxides and hydroxides from seawater and sediment pore waters onto nuclei such as microfossils or rock fragments on abyssal plains.[7] This hydrogenetic and diagenetic process occurs over millions of years at water depths typically between 3,500 and 6,000 meters, where low sedimentation rates allow the nodules to accrete concentric layers without burial.[8] Growth rates average 10 to 20 millimeters per million years, making nodule formation one of the slowest geological processes.[9] These nodules exhibit potato-like shapes, ranging from 1 to 20 centimeters in diameter, with common sizes of 2 to 8 centimeters, and can be rounded, elongated, or flattened depending on the nucleus geometry.[10] Primarily composed of manganese and iron oxides and hydroxides, they contain significant concentrations of economically valuable metals, including approximately 1.3% nickel, 1.1% copper, 0.2% cobalt, and up to 30% manganese by dry weight in high-grade deposits.[11] Trace elements such as rare earths are also present, contributing to their resource potential.[12] The most extensive deposits lie in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) of the northeastern Pacific Ocean, spanning about 4.5 million square kilometers, where nodule abundances average 15 kilograms per square meter but can reach up to 75 kilograms per square meter in optimal areas.[13] Comparable fields occur in the Indian Ocean basins and Peru Basin, though with lower grades and abundances.[7] Conservative estimates indicate over 21 billion dry metric tons of nodules in the CCZ alone, representing vast reserves of contained metals exceeding known terrestrial resources for nickel, cobalt, and manganese in some assessments.[7]Seafloor Massive Sulfides
Seafloor massive sulfides (SMS) are polymetallic deposits formed through the interaction of hydrothermal fluids with seawater at submarine volcanic and tectonic settings, primarily along mid-ocean ridges and back-arc basins. These fluids, heated by underlying magma, leach metals from the oceanic crust and precipitate as sulfide minerals when they mix with cold ambient seawater at depths typically between 1,500 and 4,000 meters.[14][15] The process results in accumulations dominated by pyrite, chalcopyrite, sphalerite, and galena, often manifesting as chimney-like structures known as black smokers, which can reach heights of several meters.[16] Approximately 65% of known SMS occurrences are associated with mid-ocean ridge spreading centers, while 22% form in back-arc basins where subduction-related volcanism drives fluid circulation.[17] These deposits are enriched in base metals such as copper and zinc, alongside precious metals including gold and silver, with lead present in varying amounts. Average compositions from back-arc spreading centers show 3.9 weight percent copper and 16.4 weight percent zinc, while gold concentrations can reach up to 6.7 parts per million and silver up to 1,000 parts per million in mid-ocean ridge samples.[18][19] Such grades significantly exceed those of many terrestrial volcanogenic massive sulfide ores, which typically average 1-5% copper and lower precious metal contents, making SMS attractive for potential extraction despite their remoteness.[20] Iron sulfides form the bulk, but economic value derives from the polymetallic suite, including trace elements like cadmium, bismuth, and tin.[14] SMS fields vary in scale, with individual deposits comprising clusters of chimneys and mounds covering areas up to several square kilometers, though tonnages are generally smaller than continental analogs due to their active, localized formation.[21] Over 280 polymetallic massive sulfide sites have been identified globally, concentrated in tectonically active regions. Key examples include the Trans-Atlantic Geotraverse (TAG) field on the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, discovered in 1985, and deposits in the Okinawa Trough within the Pacific Ring of Fire, where back-arc spreading enhances metal precipitation.[21][22] Other Pacific Ring of Fire sites, such as those along the East Pacific Rise, and Atlantic ridge segments host similar high-grade accumulations tied to ongoing hydrothermal activity.[22]Cobalt-Rich Ferromanganese Crusts
Cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts consist of hydrogenetic deposits formed by the slow precipitation of iron and manganese oxyhydroxides directly from oxygenated seawater onto hard-rock substrates, such as basalt outcrops on seamounts, ocean ridges, and plateaus.[23][24] These substrates remain exposed due to bottom currents that prevent sediment burial, enabling accretion over millions of years at rates of 1-6 mm per million years, one of the slowest geological processes observed.[23][25] Unlike polymetallic nodules, which are discrete and unattached, crusts form continuous, adherent coatings with thicknesses typically ranging from a few millimeters to several centimeters, though exceptional layers exceed 25 cm.[25][26] The mineralogy is dominated by Fe-Mn oxides such as vernadite and feroxyhyte, with iron-to-manganese ratios averaging 0.4 to 1.3.[24][27] Cobalt concentrations reach up to 2.3% by weight, typically averaging 0.5-0.8%, alongside nickel up to 1%, platinum up to 3 ppm, and enrichments in rare earth elements (REEs) and other platinum-group metals (PGMs).[27][28] These compositions reflect direct scavenging from seawater, yielding purer hydrogenetic signatures compared to diagenetic nodules, with economic viability often tied to cobalt grades exceeding 0.2% and combined nickel-cobalt contents above 1% in prospective areas.[29][30] Cobalt-rich crusts occur globally on hard substrates in water depths of 400-7,000 m, but are most abundant on Pacific seamounts and equatorial regions, as well as Indian Ocean ridges, covering an estimated 1.7 million km² of seafloor.[31][24] Concentrations decrease with depth and sedimentation rates, with thicker, metal-richer crusts favored on slopes below 1,500 m where currents enhance precipitation.[32] Resource assessments indicate substantial potential, with Pacific deposits alone hosting cobalt inventories that could exceed terrestrial reserves, alongside critical REEs and PGMs essential for electronics, batteries, and catalysts.[33][34] These crusts represent a distinct deep-sea typology, emphasizing elevated, slow-growing layers over abyssal plains rather than sedimentary or hydrothermal settings.[35]Historical Development
Pre-2000 Exploration Efforts
In the post-World War II era, advances in oceanographic technology enabled systematic surveys of deep-sea environments, shifting focus from incidental discoveries of polymetallic nodules—first noted during the 1872–1876 HMS Challenger expedition—to targeted exploration of their distribution and composition. Soviet expeditions, particularly aboard the research vessel R/V Vitiaz during cruises in the 1950s, recovered manganese nodules from the Pacific Ocean floor, including samples analyzed for uranium, radium, thorium, and ionium content, highlighting their mineral richness in abyssal plains.[36] These efforts built on earlier findings but emphasized regional abundances, such as in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, where nodules were observed at depths exceeding 4,000 meters.[37] By the 1960s and 1970s, U.S. and international scientific programs intensified mapping in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) of the central Pacific, a vast abyssal region identified for high nodule concentrations. The U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) launched the Deep Ocean Mining Environmental Study (DOMES) in 1974, conducting Phase I baseline surveys through 1977 in a designated CCZ area to quantify nodule densities, sediment properties, and biological baselines, revealing abundances that supported feasibility assessments for resource extraction.[38] These surveys, involving coring, photography, and trawling at depths of 4,000–6,000 meters, estimated nodule coverage exceeding 10 kilograms per square meter in parts of the study zone, informing early engineering prototypes like hydraulic collectors tested under controlled disturbances.[39] Concurrent diplomatic efforts addressed governance amid rising commercial interest. In 1970, the United Nations General Assembly's Resolution 2749 declared the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction as the "common heritage of mankind," prohibiting national appropriation and calling for an international regime to manage mineral resources equitably.[2] This stemmed from the UN Seabed Committee's deliberations, initiated by Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo's 1967 proposal, and paved the way for UNCLOS negotiations beginning in 1973, emphasizing shared benefits over unilateral exploitation.[40] Such explorations established the geological viability of nodules containing manganese, nickel, copper, and cobalt but underscored technological and environmental hurdles, without transitioning to full-scale commercial ventures.2000s Institutional Foundations
The International Seabed Authority (ISA), established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), became operational following the entry into force of the 1994 Implementation Agreement, which addressed concerns over Part XI's deep seabed regime and enabled the organization's activities to commence on 16 November 1994.[41] This marked the institutionalization of governance for mineral resources in "the Area" beyond national jurisdiction, with the ISA tasked with regulating exploration and future exploitation while ensuring equitable benefit-sharing among states parties.[42] By the early 2000s, the ISA had issued its first set of regulations on prospecting and exploration for polymetallic nodules in 2000, providing a legal framework for contractors to secure 15-year exploration licenses in designated areas of the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.[43] Pioneering contracts followed, with the China Ocean Mineral Resources R&D Association (COMRA) signing the first for polymetallic nodules on 22 May 2001, granting exclusive exploration rights over 75,000 square kilometers in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone.[44] [45] This initiated a series of agreements, as consortia from governments and private entities pursued resource assessments and technology development for nodule harvesting, reflecting growing interest amid stabilizing ISA procedures.[46] Between 2001 and the late 2000s, additional contracts were awarded, primarily for nodules, signaling the maturation of international frameworks from exploratory prospecting toward structured, licensed activities under ISA oversight.[47] Technological advancements complemented these institutional steps, exemplified by Nautilus Minerals' 2008 exploration program in Papua New Guinea waters, where remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and drilling confirmed high-grade seafloor massive sulfide deposits at Solwara 1, including buried mineralization proximal to surface outcrops.[48] [49] As the first commercial entity targeting polymetallic sulfides, Nautilus' efforts tested early collection tools and highlighted the shift toward viable extraction methods, though still in exploratory phases.[14] Rising global demand for metals like nickel, copper, and cobalt in the 2000s—fueled by industrialization in emerging economies—drove metal price spikes, with copper prices surging from around $0.70 per pound in 2000 to over $4 in 2008, prompting economic viability studies that underscored deep seabed resources' potential role in supply diversification.[50] World Bank analyses during this period examined regulatory and cost frameworks for seabed mining, emphasizing precaution in benefit-cost assessments while noting market dynamics that could render nodule and sulfide deposits economically competitive against land-based sources.[51] These developments laid groundwork for bridging early exploration with emerging commercial interest, distinct from pre-2000 ad hoc efforts.[2]2020s Commercial Momentum
The 2020s marked a surge in commercial momentum for deep-sea mining, fueled by intensifying global demand for battery metals amid the expansion of electric vehicles and renewable energy infrastructure. Polymetallic nodules, rich in nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese, emerged as a strategic resource to address terrestrial supply constraints, with projections indicating a multi-fold increase in demand for these minerals through the decade to support clean energy transitions.[52] Companies argued that seafloor deposits could offer economic viability with potentially reduced land-based environmental footprints, though extraction feasibility remained tied to unresolved regulatory frameworks.[53] A key trigger was Nauru's invocation of the UNCLOS "two-year rule" on June 29, 2021, notifying the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to complete adoption of exploitation regulations within two years, setting a deadline of July 9, 2023, for rules enabling commercial permits in international waters.[54] This move, backed by Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (a subsidiary of The Metals Company, or TMC), intensified negotiations and highlighted small-island states' leverage in advancing mining agendas to fund economic diversification.[55] Despite the deadline passing without finalization due to disputes over environmental standards and revenue sharing, it catalyzed industry preparations and ISA sessions focused on drafting the mining code. Technological demonstrations amplified investor confidence. In September 2022, the ISA approved TMC's NORI subsidiary to commence pilot nodule collection trials in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, the first such authorization post-1970s experiments.[56] The trials, conducted in October 2022, successfully collected approximately 3,600 tonnes of nodules and lifted them to a surface vessel via a 4 km riser system, validating integrated collection-to-surface processes in water depths exceeding 4,000 meters.[57] Independent monitoring during these operations assessed sediment plumes, providing empirical data on operational impacts.[58] Parallel national efforts underscored decentralized commercialization pressures. Norway's government proposed in June 2023 to open 281,000 km² of its Arctic exclusive economic zone for seabed mineral exploration and exploitation, culminating in parliamentary approval on January 9, 2024, by a 80-20 vote, enabling license applications despite ongoing environmental debates.[59] In the Pacific, the Cook Islands finalized Seabed Minerals Regulations effective October 1, 2024, streamlining licensing for exploration in its exclusive economic zone and attracting bids from entities linked to U.S. and Chinese interests, including a bilateral U.S.-Cook Islands partnership announced August 20, 2025, to secure critical minerals supply chains.[60][61] In early 2026, a Japanese test mission using the research vessel Chikyu retrieved sediment containing rare earth elements from ocean depths of 6,000 meters near Minamitori Island, advancing efforts to access deep-sea rare earth resources and reduce reliance on terrestrial supplies.[62] By mid-2025, ISA sessions in 2024 and early 2025 yielded no exploitation code, preserving a de facto moratorium on commercial mining while prioritizing exploration. The ISA maintained 31 active contracts for polymetallic nodules, sulfides, and crusts, spanning over 1.5 million km² and involving 22 contractors from 20 countries, reflecting sustained investment in data gathering and technology amid regulatory stasis.[46] This preparatory phase highlighted tensions between resource nationalism in exclusive economic zones and the need for unified international standards.[63]Extraction Technologies and Processes
Prospecting and Mapping Techniques
Prospecting and mapping techniques for deep-sea mining rely on geophysical and geochemical surveys to locate and characterize mineral deposits such as polymetallic nodules, seafloor massive sulfides, and cobalt-rich crusts. Multibeam sonar systems mounted on autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs) generate detailed bathymetric maps of the seafloor, identifying topographic features conducive to mineral accumulation.[64] These surveys achieve resolutions on the order of meters in abyssal depths up to 6,000 meters, integrating side-scan sonar for surface imaging and sub-bottom profilers to delineate sediment thickness overlying deposits.[65] Sub-bottom profiling reveals shallow subsurface structures, aiding in the assessment of nodule burial or sulfide stockwork extent without direct disturbance.[66] Geochemical sampling complements geophysical data through targeted collection of seafloor material. Gravity corers, deployed from research vessels, penetrate sediments to extract cores up to several meters long for laboratory analysis of metal grades in nodules and crusts.[67] Remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) enable precise, in-situ sampling and visual inspection, facilitating assays of nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese concentrations via onboard or retrieved specimens.[68] Box corers capture intact seabed samples, preserving stratigraphic context for mineral grade evaluation and baseline sediment chemistry.[69] The International Seabed Authority (ISA) mandates comprehensive environmental baselines as a prerequisite for exploration contracts, encompassing biological surveys to document pre-mining ecosystem states.[70] High-resolution imaging from AUVs and ROVs captures megafauna distributions and nodule coverage, with AI-driven computer vision algorithms automating species identification and abundance quantification from thousands of images. These techniques, applied in regions like the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, support predictive modeling of biodiversity impacts while verifying deposit viability.[71]Collection and Harvesting Methods
Collection methods for polymetallic nodules primarily employ hydraulic collectors that traverse the seafloor using tracked propulsion systems to gather loosely scattered nodules semi-embedded in sediment.[72] These self-propelled devices utilize suction or water-jet mechanisms to lift nodules along with a sediment-water mixture, directing it to onboard separators for initial nodule isolation before vertical transport.[73] Operating at depths of 4,000 to 6,000 meters, such collectors demand high-pressure-resistant designs and substantial power, often supplied via umbilical tethers from surface vessels to enable sustained mobility without onboard batteries limiting runtime.[74] [10] Early prototypes, including continuous-line bucket systems tested in the 1970s and 1980s, demonstrated feasibility by dredging nodules from abyssal plains, with trials such as Japan's 1972 operations at 4,500 meters and Ocean Mining Associates' 1978 efforts recovering disturbed track samples indicative of hundreds of tons potential in scaled systems.[43] Modern iterations prioritize efficiency, with The Metals Company's 2022 pilot collector vehicle—deployed from the MV Hidden Gem—achieving sustained nodule pickup rates of approximately 14 tonnes per hour over a 150-meter seafloor run at 4-kilometer depths during integrated trials.[75] These tests validated collector reliability through multiple deployments, supporting scalability toward commercial targets where individual units aim for 3-5 tonnes per hour to aggregate vessel-level outputs of hundreds of tonnes daily.[76] For seafloor massive sulfides, harvesting relies on cutter-head mechanisms attached to remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) or dedicated miners to excavate chimneys and mound deposits.[77] Systems like bulk cutters, weighing up to 310 tons and electrically powered via tethers, employ rotating drums or blades to fragment hard rock formations, enabling fragmentation for subsequent hydraulic lift.[78] Counter-rotating drum cutters have been analyzed for load characteristics to optimize energy use in these shallower but structurally challenging hydrothermal sites, typically at 1,000-3,000 meters.[79] Self-propelled variants enhance precision in uneven terrains, though tethering remains essential for power-intensive cutting operations exceeding battery capacities. Scalability assessments emphasize modular designs to handle variable deposit densities while minimizing downtime through redundant propulsion.[80]Onboard Processing and Transport Logistics
 of the Pacific Ocean represent the most extensively quantified deep-sea mineral deposits, with conservative estimates placing the resource at 21.1 billion dry metric tons of nodules.[88] These nodules are enriched in critical metals, yielding approximately 280 million metric tons of nickel and 50 million metric tons of cobalt, figures derived from average nodule compositions of about 1.3% nickel and 0.2-0.25% cobalt applied to the total tonnage.[88] Such quantities exceed known terrestrial reserves for these metals, as corroborated by geological surveys comparing seabed abundances to land-based inventories.[89] Beyond the CCZ, global polymetallic massive sulfide deposits, associated with hydrothermal vents, are estimated at around 600 million metric tons of ore, primarily containing copper, zinc, gold, and silver, though precise totals remain constrained by exploration limits.[90] Cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts, forming on seamounts and ridges worldwide, total approximately 1 billion metric tons, with high concentrations of cobalt (up to 2%) and other rare metals like platinum-group elements.[88] Collectively, these seabed resources provide metal inventories sufficient to meet centuries of current global consumption rates for key elements like cobalt and nickel, based on extraction potential from surveyed areas alone.[91] The vast undiscovered potential stems from the fact that only about 27% of the global seafloor has been mapped to modern standards as of 2025, leaving roughly 73% unexplored and likely harboring additional deposits.[92] This unmapped expanse, covering abyssal plains and mid-ocean ridges, suggests total seabed metal abundances could substantially surpass terrestrial reserves, as preliminary surveys indicate consistent nodule and crust formation across similar geological settings.[90] Geological models project that enhanced mapping could reveal resources scaling with ocean area, countering scarcity projections reliant solely on land-based data.[88]Demand Drivers in Critical Minerals Markets
The demand for critical minerals such as cobalt, nickel, copper, and manganese—key components of polymetallic nodules targeted for deep sea mining—has surged due to their essential roles in lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles (EVs), renewable energy infrastructure, and defense technologies. EV battery cathodes, particularly nickel-manganese-cobalt (NMC) formulations, require high cobalt and nickel content for energy density and stability, with global battery demand for cobalt reaching approximately 150,000 metric tons in 2023 and nickel nearly 370,000 metric tons.[93] The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that under a net-zero emissions pathway, overall demand for these minerals will nearly triple by 2030 relative to 2020 levels, driven predominantly by clean energy applications, with cobalt and nickel demand doubling by 2040 as EV adoption accelerates.[94][95] Renewable energy deployment compounds this pressure, as offshore wind farms and solar installations demand vast quantities of copper for cabling and conductors—estimated at over 1 million metric tons annually for new capacity additions by 2030—while permanent magnet generators in turbines incorporate nickel and cobalt alloys for efficiency.[95] Defense applications, including radar systems, jet engines, and missile guidance, further elevate needs, with projections indicating an average 135% increase in demand for ten critical minerals through 2035 to support advanced manufacturing and electronics.[96] These sectors' growth exposes supply vulnerabilities from terrestrial concentration, where China refines 73% of global cobalt and 68% of nickel as of 2024, heightening risks of processing bottlenecks during demand spikes.[97] Deep sea polymetallic nodules offer a potential offset, with feasible production projections estimating cobalt yields equivalent to 25-30% of 2022 global output by 2034, scalable to meet rising shortfalls as land-based mining faces permitting delays and ore grade declines.[11] In 2025, these dynamics manifest in elevated prices, with cobalt averaging over $44,000 per metric ton in October amid persistent supply tightness.[98] Recycling from end-of-life batteries remains marginal, recovering only 1-5% of cobalt and nickel currently due to immature collection infrastructure and low end-of-life volumes, limiting its role in bridging near-term gaps.[99] This underscores seabed resources' prospective value in stabilizing markets without relying on concentrated land supplies.Comparative Economics Versus Land-Based Mining
Deep-sea mining operations for polymetallic nodules entail higher upfront capital expenditures than many land-based mines, with estimates for integrated projects—including collector systems, vessels, and initial processing infrastructure—reaching approximately $4.9 billion, as outlined in The Metals Company's 2025 prefeasibility study for the NORI-D area.[100] In contrast, capital costs for terrestrial nickel or copper mines typically range from $500 million to $2 billion, depending on scale and location, though large-scale greenfield developments can exceed $3 billion when including environmental mitigation and infrastructure.[101] This elevated initial outlay for seabed ventures stems from specialized underwater equipment and ROV fleets, yet proponents argue it is offset by modular scalability and avoidance of site-specific geological risks like unstable terrain or permitting delays common on land.[102] Operational expenditures for nodule harvesting are projected to be competitive or lower than land-based equivalents, potentially $100-200 per tonne of processed ore, due to the nodules' high bulk grades (1.2-1.5% combined nickel, copper, and cobalt) which reduce energy-intensive beneficiation steps and eliminate needs for blasting, hauling, or waste rock management.[103] Terrestrial mining, by comparison, often faces opex inflation from low-grade ores (under 1% for many nickel laterites), extensive tailings disposal, and logistics in remote or politically unstable regions, contributing to all-in sustaining costs exceeding $10,000-15,000 per tonne for nickel equivalents.[104] Seabed operations further benefit from centralized vessel-based processing, minimizing dispersed infrastructure costs and leveraging ocean currents for nodule transport, debunking assumptions of inherently prohibitive expenses rooted in early exploratory models rather than scaled prototypes.[102] Land-based extraction of battery metals like cobalt and nickel carries unpriced externalities that tilt effective economics toward seabed alternatives, including documented child labor in artisanal cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo—where up to 40,000 children work in hazardous conditions—and water usage rates 5-10 times higher than projected for nodule processing due to leaching and tailings evaporation.[105][106] Deep-sea mining circumvents such issues by operating in international waters without reliance on artisanal labor or large-scale deforestation for access roads and pits, though it introduces unique technological risks; overall, these factors enhance long-term cost predictability absent in land regimes plagued by social unrest and regulatory volatility.[107] Break-even thresholds for nodule mining underscore economic viability, with collection phases achievable at nickel prices as low as $6,000 per tonne—well below 2025 spot levels of $15,000-16,000 per tonne—while full operations yield positive net present values in prefeasibility models assuming 20-30% margins post-commercialization around 2028-2030.[108][109] Recent test deployments, such as those by Global Sea Mineral Resources in 2022-2023, validate these projections by demonstrating energy efficiencies and metal recoveries comparable to land hydrometallurgy, positioning deep-sea ventures to capture margins even amid price fluctuations driven by oversupply in Indonesian nickel production.[110]Geoeconomic Benefits for Supply Chain Security
Deep sea mining in international waters governed by the International Seabed Authority (ISA) provides geoeconomic advantages by enabling diversification of critical mineral supply chains away from concentrations in geopolitically volatile regions and processing dominated by single nations. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) supplies approximately 70% of global cobalt, a key battery metal, rendering chains susceptible to political instability, conflict, and supply disruptions in that region.[111] Similarly, China controls over 65% of lithium processing, more than 85% of battery-grade cobalt refinement, and dominant shares in nickel and other inputs essential for electric vehicle batteries and renewable energy technologies.[112] Seabed polymetallic nodules, rich in nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese, offer an alternative source less beholden to these land-based monopolies, allowing Western governments and firms to mitigate risks from export controls, as seen in China's October 2025 restrictions on lithium-ion battery materials.[113] [114] The ISA's emerging payment regime further enhances supply chain security through equitable revenue sharing, directing royalties and contractor fees—potentially creditable against corporate income taxes—into a global mechanism prioritizing least developed countries (LDCs) and developing coastal states.[115] This structure, outlined in ISA Technical Study 31, balances individual contractor incentives with collective benefits, including funds for economic diversification in resource-poor nations via technology transfer and capacity building.[116] For small island developing states in the Pacific, such as Nauru—which invoked the UNCLOS "two-year rule" in 2021 to accelerate regulations—sponsorship of exploration contracts positions them for direct royalties, offering GDP uplift in phosphate-depleted economies otherwise reliant on aid.[117] Such mechanisms incentivize participation without requiring domestic reserves, fostering resilience against overdependence on terrestrial hotspots.[4] By introducing non-China-aligned supply into battery and electronics markets, deep sea mining supports national strategies for energy transition security, as articulated in U.S. policy pushes for offshore critical minerals to counter Beijing's dominance in refining and assembly (over 70% of global battery packs).[118] This diversification reduces vulnerability to price volatility and sanctions, evidenced by cobalt shortages tied to DRC unrest, while enabling LDCs to capture value from "common heritage" resources under ISA oversight.[119] Proponents argue this yields systemic gains over fragmented land-based alternatives, though realization hinges on finalized exploitation regulations.[120]Environmental Considerations
Empirical Evidence on Sediment and Benthic Impacts
The Disturbance and Recolonization (DISCOL) experiment, conducted in 1989 in the Peru Basin at approximately 4,150 m depth, simulated deep-sea mining disturbances by plowing a roughly 10 km² area with a steel plow harrow towed 10 times in overlapping tracks, creating furrows 0.2–0.8 m deep and 1–3 m wide flanked by berms up to 0.5 m high.[5] These physical tracks persisted visibly for at least 26 years, as documented in photographic and multibeam surveys, due to the site's low natural sedimentation rate of 1.5–11 mm per thousand years, which limited infilling.[5] While the disturbance homogenized surface sediments and resuspends material akin to collector tracks, it did not result in total benthic sterilization; post-disturbance sampling revealed altered but non-zero faunal densities, with megafaunal abundances reduced compared to undisturbed controls but showing no complete absence.[5] Empirical data from nodule collector trials indicate that benthic sediment plumes form low-lying gravity currents that propagate close to the seafloor, with rapid flocculation and settling dominating over long-range dispersion. In a 2024 pre-prototype collector test at 4,500 m depth, the plume extended downslope up to 500 m before lateral spreading reached 690 m, influenced by topography, and was detectable up to 4.5 km away at concentrations of 0.1 mg/L after 35 hours.[121] Over 80% of resuspended particles settled within 30–45 minutes in a plume height of 2–3 m, resulting in redeposition thicknesses of at least 3 cm within 100 m of the source and averaging ~0.2 mm over an affected area of ~6 km², with blanketing sufficient to cover nodules and reduce seafloor microtopography.[121] In situ plume release experiments at 2,500–3,000 m on Tropic Seamount in 2017–2018, simulating mining discharge at rates up to 8.2 kg/s, measured lateral extents limited to ~1.4 km under tidal currents of 0.03–0.2 m/s, with concentrations diluting to background levels (~10 µg/L) by 1 km via enhanced settling of flocculated aggregates.[122] Coarser particles deposited within tens of meters, while finer fractions contributed to thin smothering layers proximal to the release point, emphasizing current-driven confinement rather than widespread advection.[122] These observations from controlled tests underscore that benthic smothering remains localized, with plume dynamics favoring near-field accumulation over extensive coverage.[121][122]  provide microhabitats for dense assemblages of microbes and meiofauna, including nematodes, which colonize nodule surfaces and interstices. Bacterial densities on nodules can exceed cells per cm², supporting specialized microbial communities that drive local biogeochemical processes such as carbon cycling via scavenger-mediated loops. Nematode abundances, while lower in the surrounding sediment (typically 10-100 individuals per m²), increase on nodules due to elevated organic substrates and topographic complexity, contributing to overall benthic diversity metrics like Shannon index values that vary with nodule coverage.[123][124] These nodules are targeted for extraction due to their content of nickel and other metals critical for lithium-ion batteries in electric vehicles, raising concerns over potential deep-sea ecosystem disruption and habitat loss amid efforts to secure supplies for clean energy transitions.[125][126] Mining-induced disturbances, including direct nodule removal and sediment resuspension from collector vehicles, have demonstrably reduced faunal densities in CCZ test sites. Short-term experimental tracks simulating nodule harvesting showed 50-90% declines in meio- and macrofaunal abundances immediately post-disturbance, with nodule-associated species experiencing near-total local extirpation due to habitat obliteration. These reductions correlate with metrics of community vulnerability, such as low evenness and dominance by obligate nodule-dwellers, highlighting disparities in response across taxa—sessile epifauna suffer acutely, while mobile scavengers exhibit partial evasion.[5][127] Ecosystem dynamics in nodule fields reveal limited propagation of benthic impacts to higher trophic levels, with no robust evidence of cascades affecting pelagic fisheries. Deep-sea mining plumes, while dispersing fine sediments over kilometers, dissipate rapidly in low-turbulence abyssal waters, minimizing entrainment of midwater biota; observed fishery yields in overlying waters show no attributable declines from CCZ prospecting activities. Hydrothermal vent ecosystems, analogous in isolation but distinct from nodule plains, demonstrate species resilience to episodic natural plumes exceeding mining-scale pulses in volume and frequency, underscoring adaptive tolerances in sparse, patchy habitats.[128][129] Recent 2024-2025 investigations have intensified scrutiny of nodules' potential role in "dark oxygen" production via electrochemical reactions on metal surfaces, which could sustain aerobic microenvironments for fauna in oxygen-minima zones. Experimental deployments at CCZ sites recorded oxygen surges in enclosed nodule-seawater systems, implying a nexus to microbial respiration and faunal distribution; however, replication challenges and alternative explanations (e.g., peroxide artifacts) have fueled debate, with no empirical quantification of mining's disruption to this process or downstream biodiversity shifts. Deep-sea biota in these oligotrophic settings possess traits like K-selected life histories—slow growth, low fecundity, and dependence on episodic phytodetritus—amplifying vulnerability to anthropogenic pulses that outpace intrinsic adaptive capacities.[130][131][132]Long-Term Recovery Data from Test Sites
Longitudinal observations from the DISCOL experiment in the Peru Basin, initiated in 1989 with artificial plowing of approximately 11 km² of seafloor at depths around 4,100 meters, demonstrate partial benthic recovery over 26 years. By 2015, faunal densities in disturbed areas showed variable rebound, with mobile epifauna and infauna exhibiting densities approaching 10-30% of reference site levels in some taxa, though sessile megafauna remained significantly reduced.[133] Sedimentary structures normalized through bioturbation by burrowing organisms, reinstating porewater gradients and organic matter distribution akin to undisturbed conditions.[134] A 2025 analysis of tracks from early polymetallic nodule collection tests in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, disturbed circa 1980, revealed enduring impacts 44 years later, including nodule scarcity and depressed densities for habitat-specialist organisms. However, mobile taxa such as polychaetes and crustaceans displayed recolonization signals, with abundances in recovering patches reaching up to 20% of controls, indicating no total faunal extirpation and initial community restructuring without mass die-offs.[5] These findings, derived from ROV imagery and core sampling, counter claims of absolute irreversibility by evidencing gradual ingress via larval dispersal and opportunistic settlement.[135] Decadal datasets highlight that abyssal ecosystems' low standing biomass—often below 1 g C m⁻²—constrains trophic cascade propagation from mining-scale disturbances (typically <1 km² per operation), as connectivity relies on sparse, slow larval pools rather than dense networks. Natural perturbations, including megabenthic grazing and turbidity currents covering thousands of km² episodically, impose comparably or greater disruptions, fostering inherent resilience through periodic resets that exceed localized mining footprints.[136] Bioturbators, comprising 40-60% of infaunal biomass in recovering zones, accelerate sediment reworking, mitigating smothering effects over timescales of years to decades.[137]Relative Impacts Compared to Terrestrial Alternatives
A lifecycle assessment conducted by Benchmark Mineral Intelligence in 2023 for The Metals Company's NORI-D polymetallic nodule project in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone indicated that nodule-derived nickel, copper, and cobalt production yielded lower environmental impacts than comparable land-based routes in categories such as acidification, eutrophication, human toxicity, and land use, though global warming potential was comparable or slightly higher depending on energy sources used in processing.[138] Similarly, a 2022 prospective life cycle assessment in the Journal of Cleaner Production compared deep-sea nodule mining to terrestrial equivalents, finding reduced freshwater ecotoxicity and land occupation for nodules, attributed to the absence of extensive surface excavation and ore waste generation on land.[139] These analyses emphasize that nodules' high metal concentration—up to 30% combined nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese—minimizes processing waste relative to low-grade terrestrial ores requiring vast stripping ratios, such as 10:1 or higher in laterite nickel deposits.[140] Terrestrial mining for these metals frequently entails substantial habitat destruction and pollution not paralleled in seabed operations. In Indonesia, a major nickel producer, mining activities nearly doubled deforestation rates in affected villages from 2011 to 2018, contributing to soil erosion and loss of tropical forest biodiversity, with laterite ore extraction linked to acid drainage and tailings discharge into coastal waters.[141] [142] Artisanal and small-scale cobalt mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which supplies over 70% of global cobalt, generates riverine pollution from heavy metals and acids, causing documented toxic harm to local ecosystems and human populations through direct exposure and bioaccumulation.[143] [144] In contrast, deep-sea nodule collection disturbs only targeted seabed patches, with sediment plumes dispersing in midwater or benthic layers rather than entering persistent terrestrial waterways, and avoids wholesale ecosystem conversion like the 100,000+ hectares of Indonesian rainforest cleared for nickel since 2018.[126] [145] Beyond biophysical effects, seabed mining circumvents social externalities inherent to land-based alternatives, including displacement of communities and exploitation in labor-intensive operations; for instance, Congolese artisanal cobalt sites involve widespread child labor and conflict-linked violence, absent in remote oceanic extraction.[146] While deep-sea activities may elevate localized marine sedimentation, their contained nature—lacking the cascading runoff of terrestrial tailings dams, which have failed catastrophically in events like Brazil's 2015 Mariana dam collapse releasing 43 million cubic meters of toxic sludge—positions DSM as potentially less disruptive to human-adjacent environments.[147] Comparative models, such as those in a 2023 Resources Policy study, further suggest that nodule sourcing could lower overall metal production's climate footprint if integrated with low-carbon refining, offsetting land mining's higher embodied emissions from deforestation-driven carbon releases.[148] These relative advantages hinge on scalable DSM technologies mitigating plume dispersion, underscoring the need for empirical validation against terrestrial benchmarks amid depleting high-grade land ores.[149]Legal and Regulatory Landscape
UNCLOS Framework and ISA Establishment
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted on 10 December 1982 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, and entering into force on 16 November 1994, delineates in Part XI a comprehensive regime for mineral resources in the "Area"—defined as the seabed and ocean floor, and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.[150][151] This part declares the Area and its resources the common heritage of mankind, vesting all rights therein collectively in humanity and prohibiting any state or entity from claiming sovereignty or exercising sovereign rights over them.[150] Exploration and exploitation activities are restricted to those authorized by an international mechanism, conducted for the benefit of all peoples with special regard for developing countries' interests, and subject to effective protection of the marine environment.[150] The regime emphasizes equitable benefit-sharing, including financial and technological contributions from contractors to support global welfare rather than exclusive national gains.[152] Part XI establishes the International Seabed Authority (ISA) as the institutional body to regulate all resource-related activities in the Area, with powers to adopt rules, issue exploration contracts, supervise operations, and distribute proceeds from exploitation.[150] Headquartered in Kingston, Jamaica, the ISA commenced operations upon UNCLOS's entry into force on 16 November 1994, comprising 168 member states and the European Union as of 2025.[41] Its structure includes an Assembly of all members, a Council elected to represent diverse interests (such as major consumers, producers, and coastal states), a Legal and Technical Commission for expert oversight, and a Secretariat for administration.[41] The ISA has issued regulations for mineral exploration since 2000, granting 31 contracts across polymetallic nodules, sulphides, and crusts as of 2024, while exploitation rules remain under negotiation.[41] Initial resistance to Part XI, particularly from industrialized nations objecting to provisions like mandatory technology transfers, an autonomous "Enterprise" for state-led mining, and potential production quotas that echoed centrally planned economic models, prompted the 1994 Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI.[42] Adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 1994 and entering into force simultaneously with UNCLOS, this agreement effectively modifies Part XI by prioritizing market-oriented principles: it curbs obligatory technology sharing to contractual incentives, removes production controls to avoid distorting global markets, sidelines the Enterprise's direct operational role in favor of private contractors under ISA oversight, and streamlines decision-making to prevent veto-like blocks by ideological majorities.[42][153] These reforms, driven by empirical concerns over investment deterrence—evidenced by pre-1994 parallel national licensing regimes in states like the United States and Germany—facilitated near-universal adherence, though gaps persist in real-time monitoring of deep-sea compliance due to technological and jurisdictional limits.[152]National EEZ Regulations and Sovereignty Claims
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), coastal states exercise sovereign rights over natural resources, including seabed minerals, within their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), extending up to 200 nautical miles from baselines. This framework contrasts with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) regime for the "Area" beyond national jurisdiction, allowing nations to develop domestic regulations for exploration and exploitation without requiring ISA approval. National EEZ mining thus proceeds under sovereign authority, often enabling more streamlined permitting processes amid ISA delays in finalizing exploitation rules.[89] Norway exemplifies rigorous national oversight in its EEZ, where the Storting approved seabed mineral activities on January 9, 2024, opening 281,200 square kilometers in the Arctic for exploration under the 2019 Seabed Minerals Act.[154] This legislation mandates strict environmental impact assessments and baseline studies before licenses, reflecting Norway's integration of mining with precautionary ecosystem protections.[155] Permits for seafloor massive sulfides followed in 2024, prioritizing deposits in the Norwegian EEZ while deferring high-seas activities.[156] In the United States, which has not ratified UNCLOS, Executive Order 14285, signed April 24, 2025, directs federal agencies to expedite permitting for offshore critical minerals within the U.S. EEZ and outer continental shelf (OCS).[157] Titled "Unleashing America's Offshore Critical Minerals and Resources," the order tasks the Department of the Interior and others with issuing domestic licenses by June 2025, bypassing ISA involvement to secure polymetallic nodules and sulfides.[158] This approach leverages U.S. claims, including extended continental shelf delineations announced December 19, 2023, covering over 1 million square kilometers.[159] Sovereignty claims extend beyond standard EEZs into disputed extended continental shelves (ECS), where overlaps complicate mining. The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) reviews submissions under UNCLOS Article 76, but non-ratifiers like the U.S. assert unilateral ECS boundaries based on geophysical data, as in Arctic and Western Pacific regions.[160] Disputes, such as those in the South China Sea involving ECS projections from islands, risk unilateral resource claims absent CLCS consensus.[161] Hybrid models emerge in jurisdictions like the Cook Islands, which enacted a 2019 Seabed Minerals Act for EEZ auctions and exploration, partnering with the U.S. in 2025 for nodule development while aligning partially with ISA standards.[61][162] National EEZ regimes offer advantages over ISA processes, including accelerated licensing—Norway issued approvals within months of parliamentary vote, versus ISA's protracted code negotiations—and full sovereign revenue retention without mandatory benefit-sharing.[163] Substantial mineral deposits, including seafloor massive sulfides and cobalt-rich crusts, lie within EEZs, enabling countries to pursue extraction under tailored environmental and fiscal terms absent international veto.[90]Exploitation Rules, Contracts, and the Two-Year Trigger
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) oversees the transition from exploration to exploitation activities in the international seabed Area through a framework of contracts and prospective regulations. As of June 2025, the ISA had approved 31 fifteen-year exploration contracts with 22 contractors, covering polymetallic nodules, sulphides, and cobalt-rich crusts across over 1.3 million square kilometers, primarily permitting geophysical surveys, sampling, and resource assessment without commercial extraction.[164][46] Exploitation, by contrast, would authorize large-scale harvesting via separate plans of work, subject to ISA approval, with contractors required to submit detailed proposals including technology descriptions, production limits, and revenue-sharing mechanisms.[165] The core operational rules for exploitation are outlined in the draft Mining Code's exploitation regulations, which remain under negotiation as of the ISA Council's thirtieth session in July 2025, where discussions advanced on environmental standards and financial obligations but stalled on consensus for final adoption.[166][167] These regulations mandate royalties from contractors—typically a percentage of production value or profits—directed to the ISA's Enterprise for equitable benefit-sharing among member states, alongside financial instruments like performance bonds to ensure site restoration and liability for environmental harm.[168] Contracts would also enforce adaptive management, with annual reporting and ISA oversight to verify compliance, differing from exploration's lighter touch by imposing production quotas and waste discharge limits tied to real-time monitoring data.[165] Nauru's invocation of the "two-year rule" in June 2021—under section 1(15) of the 1994 Agreement implementing UNCLOS—compelled the ISA to finalize exploitation rules by June 2023 or face applications for provisional approvals, a mechanism designed to break deadlock while protecting the common heritage principle.[169][170] The ISA extended this timeline to July 2025 via Council decision, amid debates over readiness, allowing sponsoring states like Nauru to potentially sponsor exploitation plans if no code is adopted, under interim measures derived from exploration precedents.[171][89] Without finalized regulations, provisional exploitation risks inconsistent application, with critics warning of a "Wild West" environment lacking uniform standards for plume dispersion or biodiversity offsets, potentially amplifying transboundary impacts.[63] Proponents counter that self-submitted plans would necessitate rigorous environmental baselines and contingency funding to secure ISA endorsement, fostering caution amid liability exposure and market scrutiny.[172] This contractual flexibility underscores the tension between enabling investment in high-risk ventures and enforcing precautionary governance, as exploration contractors like those affiliated with The Metals Company prepare applications contingent on regulatory clarity.[165]2024-2025 Negotiation Milestones
In August 2024, the ISA Assembly elected Leticia Reis de Carvalho of Brazil as Secretary-General for the 2025-2028 term, marking the first time a woman and oceanographer from Latin America held the position; her campaign emphasized transparency and environmental stewardship amid criticisms of the prior leadership's perceived favoritism toward industry interests.[173][174] During the ISA's 30th session in March 2025, the Council advanced discussions on draft exploitation regulations but failed to resolve key disputes, with 32 member states openly advocating for a moratorium or precautionary pause on commercial mining until environmental risks are better quantified, though no consensus emerged to halt proceedings.[175][3] The United States, as a non-party to UNCLOS, issued Executive Order 14285 on April 24, 2025, directing federal agencies to expedite offshore critical mineral development, followed by NOAA's proposed revisions on July 7, 2025, to regulations governing exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits for deep seabed hard minerals in areas subject to U.S. jurisdiction or freedom of the seas claims.[157][176] This unilateral push highlighted tensions, as the ISA expressed concerns over potential undermining of multilateral governance.[177] At the July 2025 portion of the 30th session (July 7-25), the Council concluded negotiations without adopting the mining code, missing the informal target tied to the two-year rule from contractor applications; drafts incorporated demands for empirical environmental impact assessments, including sediment plume modeling and biodiversity baselines, but divisions persisted between resource-dependent developing states favoring adoption and developed nations prioritizing data-driven safeguards, extending substantive talks into 2026.[178][166][3]Geopolitical Implications
Major Power Rivalries in Seabed Resources
China maintains the largest portfolio of exploration contracts with the International Seabed Authority (ISA), holding five as of 2025, surpassing all other nations and encompassing polymetallic nodules, sulphides, and cobalt-rich crusts across vast areas in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, Indian Ocean, and Southwest Pacific.[179][180] These state-sponsored entities, including China Ocean Mineral Resources Research and Development Association, leverage dual-use research fleets and vessels like the Tansuo 3, commissioned in December 2024, to advance technological capabilities and secure resource access within the multilateral framework.[181][182] This positioning enables China to influence ISA regulations while pursuing operational readiness, including planned equipment trials in the Pacific in 2025.[183] The United States has countered with unilateral measures to sponsor commercial ventures, notably backing The Metals Company (TMC) via domestic authority under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act. In March 2025, TMC USA submitted applications to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for exploration licenses targeting high-seas polymetallic nodules, aiming to initiate recovery ahead of ISA approvals.[184] A presidential executive order issued on April 24, 2025, directed federal agencies to accelerate permitting for offshore critical minerals, explicitly framing seabed access as a national security imperative to reduce dependencies on foreign supplies.[157] This approach underscores resource nationalism, where strategic denial—preventing adversaries from dominating supplies—prevails over UNCLOS's "common heritage of mankind" mandate for equitable sharing, potentially fragmenting international governance.[185][186] Sino-U.S. tensions manifest in competitive bids for partnerships, particularly in the Cook Islands, which holds rich nodule deposits within its national jurisdiction. China formalized a comprehensive strategic partnership in February 2025, including seabed minerals cooperation under a 2025–2030 action plan.[187] The U.S. responded in August 2025 with a joint statement committing technical assistance and investment to develop these resources responsibly, signaling an intent to counter Beijing's influence in the South Pacific.[188][189] Such maneuvers erode multilateral consensus, as evidenced by European Union divisions: Germany has consistently opposed commercial deep-sea mining, advocating moratoriums alongside France and Portugal, while other members pursue exploratory interests without unified restraint.[190][191] This rivalry prioritizes zero-sum control over collaborative stewardship, heightening risks of overlapping claims and technological escalation.[192][193]Strategic Mineral Independence Debates
Advocates for deep sea mining emphasize its potential to mitigate national security vulnerabilities arising from concentrated foreign control over critical mineral supply chains, particularly for defense and technology applications. China imposed export licensing restrictions on gallium and germanium in August 2023, materials essential for semiconductors, radar systems, and high-performance electronics, exacerbating concerns over supply disruptions given China's dominance in over 90% of global gallium production.[194][195] Polymetallic nodules on the seabed contain significant concentrations of nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese—key inputs for batteries, alloys, and electric motors used in military hardware and renewable energy infrastructure—offering a potential hedge against such geopolitical leverage.[196] Proponents, including U.S. policy analysts, argue that exploiting these resources accelerates supply chain diversification, enabling faster deployment of technologies for energy transition and defense without relying on land-based mining prone to territorial disputes or permitting delays. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has highlighted the U.S. mineral supply chain's high vulnerability, noting that disruptions could hinder economic and national security objectives, with seabed minerals positioned as a strategic alternative to foreign-dominated terrestrial sources.[197] This perspective underscores a causal link: prolonged dependence stifles domestic innovation in downstream industries like advanced manufacturing, as evidenced by price spikes following China's 2023 curbs, which saw global gallium prices diverge sharply from Chinese domestic levels.[194] Critics counter that the urgency for deep sea mining is overstated, given substantial known terrestrial reserves and emerging alternatives like recycling and substitution, which could meet projected demand growth for critical minerals without venturing into unproven seabed extraction. While acknowledging supply risks, they point to empirical data showing that nodule resources, though vast, represent only a fraction of long-term needs when factoring in efficiency improvements and reduced material intensity in battery designs, potentially delaying the economic viability of mining operations.[52] This debate reflects broader tensions: proponents prioritize immediate diversification to avert innovation lags tied to import reliance, whereas skeptics emphasize that causal risks from foreign controls can be addressed through diversified alliances and technological adaptation rather than rushing ecologically uncertain ventures.[197]Alliance Fractures Over Mining Policies
In the European Union, divisions emerged prominently in 2024 over deep-sea mining policies, with southern member states advocating for bans while northern counterparts initially pursued approvals. France supported international moratorium calls, including through joint declarations emphasizing ocean protection, and major French financial institutions rejected investments in the sector by mid-2025. Portugal's parliament adopted a moratorium in early 2025 prohibiting seabed mining in its territorial waters until 2050, marking the first such national law globally. In contrast, Norway, a Nordic nation outside the EU but aligned with Western interests, approved commercial deep-sea mining in its Arctic exclusive economic zone on January 9, 2024, becoming the first country to do so, though plans were suspended by December 2024 amid domestic and international opposition. The European Parliament responded with a February 7, 2024, resolution criticizing Norway's advance and calling for a global moratorium due to scientific uncertainties, highlighting a left-right and regional rift within European institutions. These intra-Western fractures extended to broader alliances like the Five Eyes, where the United States explored unilateral paths, with The Metals Company (TMC) seeking domestic approvals in 2025 to bypass the International Seabed Authority (ISA), citing national security needs for minerals independence. Such moves underscored eroding multilateral unity, as delays in ISA regulations prompted bilateral or national licensing pursuits over coordinated frameworks. In the Global South, tensions surfaced at the ISA between small island sponsors like Nauru, partnering with TMC, and larger groups demanding equitable benefit-sharing. Nauru's 2021 invocation of the UNCLOS two-year rule to expedite exploitation regulations drew criticism from the African Group of 47 nations, who in a letter to the ISA Council highlighted risks to collective interests and proposed an additional royalty mechanism in 2023 to address perceived inequities in sponsorship agreements exempting corporate taxes. ISA votes and negotiations revealed persistent North-South divides, with developing states pushing for technology transfers and profit shares from "common heritage" resources, while sponsors like Nauru prioritized rapid commercialization to fund national needs. These alliance fractures have implications for geopolitical cohesion, as prolonged ISA stalemates—evident in the failure to adopt exploitation regulations by July 2025—favor incumbents like China, which holds multiple ISA exploration contracts and influences rulemaking amid Western hesitancy. Empirical patterns show delays enabling China's state-backed firms to advance preparatory technologies, potentially consolidating dominance in seabed minerals processing and supply chains, while fracturing Western and Global South unity incentivizes ad-hoc bilateral deals over ISA multilateralism.Key Projects and Initiatives
The Metals Company (TMC) Operations
, headquartered in Vancouver, Canada, operates primarily through its subsidiaries Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI) and Tonga Offshore Mining Limited (TOML), holding two exploration contracts for polymetallic nodules in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) of the Pacific Ocean, covering approximately 161,000 square kilometers.[58] NORI's contract, sponsored by the Republic of Nauru since June 2021, triggered the UNCLOS two-year rule, prompting the International Seabed Authority (ISA) to accelerate exploitation regulations by July 2023, though full adoption remains pending as of October 2025.[89] An updated sponsorship agreement with Nauru was signed on June 4, 2025, refining terms to support ongoing development.[198] In October 2022, TMC conducted the Clarion-1 pilot collection trials in partnership with Allseas, marking the first integrated nodule collection system test in the CCZ since the 1970s. During a 60-minute seafloor run over approximately 150 meters, the pilot collector vehicle retrieved about 14 tonnes of nodules, which were lifted via a riser pipe to the surface vessel for processing tests, demonstrating feasibility of nodule recovery and initial dewatering.[75] Independent monitoring confirmed the system's performance, with nodule grades aligning with pre-test assays averaging 1.3% nickel, 0.2% cobalt, and 1.1% manganese, supporting claims of viable resource yields despite operational complexities at 4,000-meter depths.[58] As of August 2025, TMC declared the world's first probable mineral reserves for deep-sea nodules at its NORI-D project, estimating 51 million tonnes of reserves with an after-tax net present value of $5.5 billion under a pre-feasibility study (PFS).[110] The company targets initial commercial production in Q4 2027, scaling to a steady-state rate of 10.8 million tonnes of wet nodules annually by 2031, processed onshore to yield approximately 97,000 tonnes per year of battery metals including nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese.[199] With Q2 2025 cash reserves of $115.8 million and ongoing equity raises exceeding $200 million in market value gains, TMC plans phased stockpiling of nodules ahead of full processing infrastructure.[200] Persistent ISA regulatory delays have prompted TMC to pursue parallel U.S. permitting through its subsidiary TMC USA LLC, submitting applications for exploration licenses and commercial recovery permits under national jurisdiction frameworks in April 2025, potentially bypassing ISA oversight while leveraging domestic strategic mineral policies.[201] Test data from Clarion-1 and resource modeling indicate collection efficiencies sufficient for economic viability, with nodule densities in NORI contract areas exceeding 15 kilograms per square meter, though scaling to commercial volumes requires validation through extended trials.[58]Nautilus Minerals and Solwara Ventures
Nautilus Minerals Inc., a Toronto-listed exploration company, spearheaded the Solwara 1 project to commercially mine seafloor massive sulfide (SMS) deposits in Papua New Guinea's territorial waters within the Bismarck Sea, at depths of about 1,600 meters.[202] The targeted SMS systems, analogous to terrestrial volcanogenic massive sulfide deposits, featured high-grade concentrations of copper (up to 7.2% in indicated resources), gold (up to 6.0 g/t), silver, and zinc, with an indicated resource of 0.87 million tonnes.[203][14] This initiative represented the earliest attempt at large-scale commercial deep-sea extraction in a national exclusive economic zone, distinct from nodule-focused efforts elsewhere due to its hydrothermal vent-hosted polymetallic richness.[204] In February 2018, Nautilus executed submerged trials of its Seafloor Production Tools (SPTs) off Papua New Guinea, achieving the first-ever seafloor cutting and material collection tests for a planned mining operation.[205][206] The SPT suite included three specialized remotely operated vehicles—a seafloor cutter, auxiliary collector, and bulk cutter—for excavating, fragmenting, and slurrying ore to a support vessel via riser system, with trials validating functionality in real ocean conditions.[207] Project plans projected a ramp-up to steady-state production of approximately 1.2–1.6 million tonnes of ore annually over a 30-month initial mine life, operating at up to 5,900 tonnes per day for 300 days per year.[202][86] Concurrently, Nautilus established environmental baselines through surveys of benthic communities, water chemistry, and vent ecosystems, informing the project's Environmental Impact Statement approved by PNG authorities in 2012.[208][209] The venture collapsed in September 2019 when Nautilus filed for creditor protection and entered administration, primarily due to chronic funding shortfalls—exacerbated by a key investor withdrawal—and unresolved regulatory and partnership disputes with the PNG government, which held a 15% equity stake.[210][204] Despite the failure, the project demonstrated operational feasibility for sulfide extraction technologies and underscored the economic allure of high-grade SMS deposits, where ore values far exceed typical land-based thresholds, potentially justifying risks if scaled with improved financing models.[211] The SPT hardware, partially constructed and tested, left a technical legacy for subsequent deep-sea ventures, while the episode highlighted acute financial and logistical vulnerabilities in pioneering seabed operations absent robust international regulatory frameworks.[212]Norwegian Continental Shelf Approvals
In January 2024, the Norwegian Parliament (Storting) approved a government proposal to open specified areas of the Norwegian continental shelf for seabed mineral exploration, with 80 votes in favor and 20 against.[213][214] The decision, building on Norway's established offshore petroleum regulatory framework, authorizes prospecting and exploration activities in regions of the Norwegian Sea and Arctic margins, emphasizing a knowledge-based approach to resource management.[156] This step reflects Norway's intent to extend its expertise in deep-water operations from oil and gas to mineral extraction, targeting deposits formed in geologically active zones.[214] The primary targets include seafloor massive sulfides—rich in copper, zinc, gold, and silver—and cobalt-rich manganese crusts, which occur along mid-ocean ridges and seamounts in the Norwegian exclusive economic zone (EEZ).[214] Regulations mandate rigorous environmental impact assessments (EIAs) prior to any activity, coordinated by the Norwegian Offshore Directorate, to evaluate effects on marine ecosystems, including sediment plumes and biodiversity in deep-sea habitats.[215] Additional requirements incorporate Norway's broader carbon pricing mechanisms and sustainability standards, akin to those applied in the petroleum sector, to mitigate climate-related emissions from operations.[216] Exploration permits would necessitate detailed work programs, with progression to exploitation licenses dependent on demonstrated feasibility and environmental safeguards.[213] Initial plans called for issuing the first exploration licenses in the first half of 2025 following a public consultation launched in June 2024, covering an area approximately the size of Iceland in the northern Norwegian Sea.[213] However, in December 2024, the Norwegian government paused the licensing round amid domestic political negotiations, delaying advancement despite prior parliamentary endorsement.[217] This pause occurred against a backdrop of concerns raised by the European Union, which in October 2023 issued a note verbale highlighting potential transboundary environmental risks to shared Arctic waters and fisheries, though Norway maintained its sovereign regulatory authority over the EEZ.[154] As of October 2025, no licenses have been awarded, leaving exploration activities in abeyance pending further review.[218]Pacific Island Explorations (e.g., Cook Islands)
The Cook Islands enacted the Seabed Minerals Regulations 2024, effective October 1, 2024, establishing a national framework for issuing exploration and exploitation licenses within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), including provisions for polymetallic nodule prospecting in deep waters.[60] These regulations enable 5-year exploration licenses, potentially extendable based on progress, as demonstrated by ongoing activities from contractors like Ocean Minerals LLC, which secured rights in 2017 for a 23,000 square kilometer area.[219][220] The regime prioritizes environmental assessments and revenue-sharing mechanisms, positioning the Cook Islands as a pioneer among small Pacific states in regulating domestic seabed resources amid global demand for critical minerals.[221] In 2025, geopolitical interest intensified, with China signing a five-year strategic partnership in February for seabed minerals exploration, followed by a U.S.-Cook Islands cooperation agreement in August committing to responsible development and scientific research.[222][223] These pacts reflect small island nations leveraging their EEZ claims to attract investment from major powers, bypassing stalled International Seabed Authority (ISA) processes for areas beyond national jurisdiction.[61] Such sponsorships and bilateral deals by Pacific states like the Cook Islands amplify pressure on the ISA to expedite mining regulations, as delays hinder revenue potential from nodule deposits estimated to hold billions in nickel, cobalt, and manganese.[187] The Nauru-TMC model exemplifies this dynamic, where Nauru extended its sponsorship agreement with The Metals Company in June 2025, incorporating a benefit-sharing framework that includes equity stakes for the sponsor nation rather than fixed fees.[224] This approach aims to generate royalties and dividends, potentially diversifying economies historically reliant on foreign aid, though precise GDP impacts remain speculative without commercial extraction.[225] For resource-poor Pacific islands, these models offer empowerment through resource sovereignty, enabling negotiations with contractors for technology transfer and fiscal terms, yet expose vulnerabilities from limited regulatory capacity and enforcement resources.[226] Despite these gaps, sponsorships sustain ISA exploration contracts—31 as of mid-2025—fueling urgency for a finalized exploitation code to unlock equitable benefits.[89]Controversies and Counterarguments
Environmental Advocacy Campaigns
The Deep Sea Conservation Coalition (DSCC) has campaigned for a global moratorium on deep-sea mining, arguing that extraction risks irreversible harm to fragile deep-sea ecosystems through habitat destruction, sediment plumes, and biodiversity loss, with insufficient scientific understanding to mitigate impacts.[227] Similarly, Greenpeace has advocated for a permanent ban, highlighting potential toxic discharges and disruption to marine food webs, and organized protests including high-seas actions against survey vessels in late 2023 and demonstrations at International Seabed Authority (ISA) sessions in Jamaica during 2024.[228] [229] In March 2024, Greenpeace hosted ISA side events defending protest rights while demanding a halt to mining approvals, and continued advocacy through 2025 sessions urging states to prioritize environmental protection over commercialization.[228] These efforts have influenced policy debates, contributing to statements from approximately 37 nations by mid-2025 calling for a precautionary pause or moratorium on deep-sea mining until regulations ensure no serious harm, including recent joiners like Romania in October 2025.[230] [231] Advocacy groups attribute this momentum to public campaigns and scientific petitions, such as over 400 scientists in 2021 warning of extinction risks for endemic species from plume smothering and direct removal.[191] However, critiques of these campaigns emphasize reliance on predictive models and small-scale experiments rather than large-scale empirical data, with claims of widespread extinctions remaining hypothetical absent verified die-offs from analogous disturbances.[232] Studies of 1970s mining tracks in the Pacific Clarion-Clipperton Zone, revisited in 2025, document persistent sediment changes but also initial biological recovery signals, including recolonization by certain megafauna and microbes after decades, suggesting resilience in low-biomass deep-sea environments.[5] [135] Sediment plume experiments indicate rapid dilution, with concentrations normalizing within kilometers of discharge sites, contrasting with advocacy portrayals of indefinite oceanic dispersion.[233] [234] Furthermore, such campaigns often overlook documented terrestrial mining impacts—like widespread deforestation, acid mine drainage, and tailings dam failures affecting millions via contamination— which exceed deep-sea scales in human and biodiversity tolls, raising questions of selective environmental prioritization influenced by institutional biases in conservation NGOs.[235] [236]Critiques of Economic Projections
Critics argue that optimistic economic projections for deep-sea mining underestimate operational costs and overestimate timelines for commercial viability, rendering the venture speculative. Capital expenditures for nodule collection, processing vessels, and riser systems are estimated at $2-5 billion per project, with ongoing operational challenges including high energy demands for seabed pumping and sediment management adding to per-tonne costs exceeding $100-200 for key metals like nickel and cobalt. A 2025 analysis in npj Ocean Sustainability describes these projections as based on "false claims," highlighting slow rollout due to unproven full-scale integration of collector vehicles, surface ships, and metallurgical separation, potentially delaying first commercial output beyond 2030 despite pilot tests.[237] Such skepticism points to historical precedents in offshore oil where initial hype gave way to cost overruns, arguing that deep-sea mining's remote logistics amplify risks without corresponding revenue guarantees amid fluctuating metal prices.[238] These critiques often overlook potential scale economies achievable through modular deployment and shared infrastructure across multiple contracts in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone, where nodule densities of 10-20 kg/m² enable higher recovery rates than terrestrial laterite ores, potentially driving unit costs below $50/tonne for polymetallics at production scales of 3-5 million tonnes annually. Proponents note that current projections incorporate premiums for battery-grade metals, with nickel spot prices reaching $20,000/tonne in 2022 supply squeezes, making even conservative internal rates of return (8-12%) feasible if regulatory approvals materialize by 2027. Recycling alternatives are invoked as sufficient substitutes, yet empirical data shows low global yields—cobalt battery recycling recovers under 10% of demand, nickel around 20-30% from end-of-life sources, and lithium less than 5%—insufficient to offset inelastic demand growth from electrification projected at 10-15% CAGR through 2040.[101][239] Causally, observed delays stem primarily from International Seabed Authority regulatory bottlenecks and moratorium advocacy rather than technological flaws, as evidenced by successful 2022-2023 pilot collections by The Metals Company and Allseas, which lifted over 4,000 tonnes of nodules with 95% uptime on collector systems, validating core engineering at depths of 4,000-6,000 meters. Financial realism demands discounting skeptic models that assume perpetual high costs without factoring iterative improvements from these trials or geopolitical incentives for supply diversification, which could sustain elevated metal values independent of volume flooding. While risks persist, projections grounded in demonstrated nodule grades (1.1-1.4% nickel, 0.2% cobalt) and avoidance of land mining's acid leaching expenses suggest viability hinges on policy timelines, not inherent economic invalidity.[237]Regulatory Capture and Equity Disputes
Critics, including representatives from developing nations and environmental advocacy groups, have accused the International Seabed Authority (ISA) of regulatory capture by multinational corporations, alleging that Western firms exert undue influence over exploration contracts, thereby diluting equitable benefit-sharing mechanisms intended under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[240][241] Such claims highlight concerns that sponsorship arrangements allow corporate entities to secure vast seabed areas—exceeding 1.5 million km² across 31 contracts as of 2025—while Global South states receive limited direct gains, potentially exacerbating resource inequities akin to historical colonial patterns.[242] In response, defenders of the ISA framework emphasize its intergovernmental structure, where member states hold equal voting rights in the Assembly (one state, one vote), which structurally resists capture by any single corporate or national interest, as regulatory decisions require broad consensus rather than industry veto power.[243] Empirical distribution of contracts counters narratives of Western dominance: China holds the most with five active licenses as of 2024, followed by entities from Russia, Japan, and Europe, reflecting geopolitical competition over corporate favoritism.[244][182] Sponsorship models illustrate potential equity upsides for smaller states; Nauru's 2011 partnership with The Metals Company (TMC), updated in June 2025, positions the Pacific nation to receive financial remuneration, including royalties if exploitation commences, demonstrating how resource-scarce countries can leverage ISA contracts for economic diversification without direct operational capacity.[198][245] However, geopolitical realities—such as major powers' strategic pursuits of minerals for technological independence—often supersede abstract equity ideals, rendering calls like those from African states for enhanced data transparency in ISA proceedings (amid 2025 sessions) valid for accountability but secondary to commercial viability determinations.[191][3]Alternatives and Mitigation Strategies
Recycling Advancements for Critical Metals
Advancements in hydrometallurgical processes have enabled recovery efficiencies exceeding 95% for critical metals such as cobalt, nickel, and copper from spent lithium-ion batteries, surpassing traditional pyrometallurgical methods in selectivity and energy use.[246][247] These techniques involve acid leaching followed by solvent extraction or precipitation to isolate metals, allowing production of battery-grade precursors with minimal impurities.[248] However, scaling these technologies requires expanded collection infrastructure, as current global end-of-life recycling input rates for cobalt remain below 10%, despite theoretical recoverability of up to 50% from battery cathodes.[249][250] E-waste represents a significant untapped reservoir, with over 34,000 tonnes of cobalt discarded annually alongside other critical metals like nickel and copper, exacerbated by inadequate collection systems and informal processing that dissipates value through losses exceeding 80% in many regions.[249][251] For nickel and copper, secondary supply from scrap recycling contributes more substantially—around 17% for end-of-life copper—but still falls short of demand growth driven by electrification.[252] Despite regulatory mandates, such as the EU's requirement for 65% lithium-ion battery collection by 2025 rising to 70% by 2030, actual metal recovery lags due to technological and logistical barriers.[253] Recycling's potential as a substitute is constrained by temporal mismatches between metal demand surges and product end-of-life availability; batteries deployed in the 2020s will not enter recycling streams until the 2030s, limiting secondary supply to under 20% of cobalt and nickel needs by 2030 even under optimistic collection scenarios.[99] Projections indicate that while improved recycling could offset 15-30% of primary supply requirements for these metals by 2040, it cannot independently meet the tripling demand anticipated by 2030 without parallel primary extraction to build the necessary scrap feedstock base.[254][246] This underscores recycling's role as a complementary strategy rather than a standalone solution for critical metal security.[255]Land Mining Expansion and Efficiency Gains
Terrestrial reserves of critical metals essential for batteries and electronics, such as nickel, cobalt, and copper, are finite and geographically concentrated, with Indonesia holding approximately 22% of global nickel reserves as of recent assessments.[256] This concentration has prompted resource nationalism, exemplified by Indonesia's ban on raw nickel ore exports implemented on January 1, 2020, aimed at compelling domestic processing and value addition rather than raw material shipment abroad.[257][258] Efforts to expand land-based mining operations have increasingly incorporated automation technologies, including autonomous drilling rigs and robotic systems, which enhance productivity by reducing labor dependencies and optimizing extraction processes.[259] Industry implementations have demonstrated operational cost reductions of 15-25% through such automation, primarily via lowered personnel exposure risks and minimized downtime.[260] These gains enable scaling of output from existing deposits, but they do not eliminate underlying constraints from reserve depletion or geopolitical access limitations. Despite efficiency improvements, terrestrial mining expansions continue to generate significant environmental externalities, including water and air pollution from tailings and processing. In Indonesia, rapid nickel production growth following the 2020 policy shift has resulted in documented incidents of toxic sediment spills into coastal waters and elevated respiratory illnesses in nearby communities as of 2024-2025.[261][145] Deforestation associated with mine site preparation has further compounded habitat loss, with studies indicating nickel mining concessions in Sulawesi alone covering expansive forested areas.[141] Projections indicate that even optimized terrestrial operations fall short of supplying the anticipated surge in demand for battery metals, forecasted to quadruple in mass usage from 12 million tons in 2025 to 53 million tons by 2040 amid electrification trends.[262] Nickel demand, in particular, is expected to rise substantially, with land-based supply chains strained by processing bottlenecks and reserve quality declines, underscoring the limitations of relying solely on efficiency-driven expansion.[263]Technological Substitutes and Demand Reduction
Efforts to develop technological substitutes for metals extracted via deep-sea mining, such as cobalt, nickel, and manganese used in lithium-ion batteries, include sodium-ion batteries, which eliminate the need for cobalt and nickel entirely by relying on abundant sodium and other materials.[264] These batteries achieve energy densities of 75 to 160 Wh/kg, compared to 120 to 260 Wh/kg for conventional lithium-ion variants, resulting in heavier packs that constrain their viability for electric vehicles requiring high range.[265] Similarly, the shift toward lithium iron phosphate (LFP) cathodes in batteries reduces or eliminates cobalt and nickel content while maintaining compatibility with existing production lines, though LFP's lower energy density—typically 130-150 Wh/kg at the pack level—limits applications in performance-oriented EVs.[126] Copper, essential for conductive wiring in electrification infrastructure, faces fewer viable substitutes due to its superior electrical conductivity and resistance to corrosion; alternatives like aluminum require larger cross-sections to match performance, increasing material volume and system weight.[266] Demand management through efficiency gains, such as advanced semiconductors and power electronics that optimize current flow, has historically curbed per-unit metal intensity—for instance, in consumer electronics—but these savings are dwarfed by absolute demand surges from policy-mandated electrification.[267] Projections indicate that meeting global net-zero targets will necessitate 115% more copper mining over the next three decades than historical totals, as electric vehicles and renewable grids consume 3-4 times more copper per unit than fossil fuel equivalents, outpacing efficiency improvements.[268] Fundamental physical limits, rooted in electrochemical thermodynamics, cap the energy density of chemical batteries at around 1,250 Wh/kg theoretically for lithium-based systems, with practical substitutes like sodium-ion trailing due to sodium's larger ionic radius and lower voltage potential, delaying widespread adoption by decades.[269] Manganese substitution remains challenging, as its role in stabilizing battery cathodes lacks direct, high-performance analogs without compromising cycle life or capacity. While material science innovations offer incremental reductions in reliance, causal drivers like expanding EV fleets—projected to require 36.6 million metric tons of copper annually by 2031—constrain net demand reduction, particularly under regulatory frameworks prioritizing rapid decarbonization over conservation.[268][52]Future Trajectories
Emerging Technologies for Sustainable Extraction
 integrated with artificial intelligence (AI) enable targeted harvesting by visually identifying polymetallic nodules detached from organisms, using hovering mechanisms that avoid physical contact with the seafloor.[270] For example, Impossible Metals' Eureka II AUV, which underwent deep-water testing in April 2024, employs AI-driven arms for gentle nodule pickup, minimizing sediment resuspension relative to conventional crawler-based systems that rely on suction or raking.[271] These designs reduce the physical footprint of operations by limiting disturbance to nodule-rich patches.[272] Sediment plume mitigation advances include low-flow hydraulic collectors and onboard separation technologies to curb turbidity in discharge water. Crawler prototypes incorporate optimized water jets and vibrating screens for initial nodule-sediment sorting at the seabed, decreasing the volume of resuspended fines.[272] Experimental features like near-bottom plume discharge and containment barriers further confine particle dispersion, with field tests demonstrating reduced plume extent compared to high-turbidity alternatives.[272] Such innovations aim to preserve ambient turbidity levels critical for deep-sea ecosystems adapted to low-sediment environments.[273] Autonomous fleets of AI-equipped remotely operated vehicles (ROVs) and AUV swarms facilitate precision mapping and extraction, coordinating to cover areas with minimal overlap and energy use. Prototypes tested in 2024-2025, including those from Impossible Metals, integrate swarm robotics for efficient nodule detection and collection, lowering overall seabed traversal needs.[272] These systems support scalable operations while curtailing habitat compression from large-scale vehicle tracks.[274] Real-time environmental monitoring leverages AI sensors, multibeam imaging, and digital twin models to track plume dynamics and biodiversity responses, informing adaptive extraction adjustments under International Seabed Authority (ISA) guidelines. ISA workshops in 2024 highlighted quantitative 3D backscatter for plume forecasting and integration with operational controls, enabling responsive mitigation during active mining.[275] This data-driven approach allows operators to halt or redirect activities based on threshold exceedances, enhancing sustainability without predefined regulatory pauses.[275]Projected Regulatory Outcomes Post-2025
Following the lapse of Nauru's two-year notice period in 2023 without adoption of the exploitation regulations, the International Seabed Authority (ISA) extended negotiations into 2025, with sessions in June-July focusing on unresolved sections of the draft Mining Code, including environmental management and benefit-sharing provisions.[89][166] Post-2025 projections indicate two primary paths: conditional approval of a regulatory framework by mid-2026 incorporating data-derived environmental thresholds for sediment plumes, biodiversity impacts, and nodule recovery efficiency; or protracted delays extending beyond 2026, potentially enabling provisional licensing under existing exploration rules amid geopolitical pressures.[276][277] The first scenario aligns with industry and sponsor-state incentives, where adoption of a code with performance-based standards—such as plume dilution limits informed by trial data from exploration contracts—would facilitate commercial operations while addressing verifiable risks like habitat disturbance, as evidenced by midwater plume modeling from test deployments.[278] Benefit-sharing mechanisms, including equity participation for developing states like Nauru (up to 10% carried interest in mining ventures), provide economic motivation for approval, countering indefinite moratoriums that disproportionately disadvantage non-jurisdictional actors.[279] This data-driven approach prioritizes causal evidence from seabed trials over precautionary stasis, enabling extraction where empirical monitoring demonstrates ecosystem recovery potential.[280] Alternatively, ongoing advocacy for delays—driven by environmental coalitions citing incomplete biodiversity baselines—could result in no code by 2026, shifting activity to national waters or bilateral arrangements, as seen in U.S. regulatory revisions under the Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act.[281][176] Geopolitical factors, including U.S. non-ratification of UNCLOS and domestic pushes for unilateral permits to secure critical minerals amid China’s 17 exploration contracts, may fragment governance, favoring states with extended continental shelves.[282][193] China's strategic interest in polymetallic nodules for battery metals exerts parallel pressure on ISA timelines, potentially accelerating a minimal viable code if supply chain vulnerabilities intensify.[283][284]| Scenario | Key Drivers | Projected Timeline | Implications for Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Code Adoption with Thresholds | Industry trials, sponsor equity incentives, mineral demand | Mid-2026 | Enables ISA-licensed extraction in the Area with adaptive monitoring |
| Indefinite Delay | Precautionary advocacy, unresolved environmental data gaps | Beyond 2026 | Provisional rules or national shifts; risks regulatory fragmentation |
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