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Members of the Greek neo-fascist organisation Golden Dawn in 2015
Part of a series on
Neo-fascism
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Neo-fascism is a post-World War II far-right ideology which includes significant elements of fascism. Neo-fascism usually includes ultranationalism, ultraconservatism, racial supremacy, right-wing populism, authoritarianism, nativism, xenophobia, and anti-immigration sentiment, as well as opposition to social democracy, parliamentarianism, Marxism, communism, socialism, liberalism, neoliberalism,[1] and liberal democracy.[2]

History

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According to Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, neo-fascism emerged in 1942 after Nazi Germany invaded the USSR and decided to reorient its propaganda on a Europeanist ground.[3] Europe then became both the myth and the utopia of the neo-fascists, who abandoned previous theories of racial inequalities within the white race to share a common euro-nationalist stance after World War II, embodied in Oswald Mosley's Europe a Nation policy.[4] The following chronology can therefore be delineated: an ideological gestation before 1919; the historical experience of fascism between 1919 and 1942, unfolded in several phases; and finally neo-fascism from 1942 onward.[3]

Drawing inspiration from the Italian Social Republic, institutional neo-fascism took the form of the Italian Social Movement (MSI). It became one of the chief reference points for the European far-right until the late 1980s,[5] and "the best (and only) example of a Neofascist party", in the words of political scientist Cas Mudde.[6] At the initiative of the MSI, the European Social Movement was established in 1951 as a pan-European organization of like-minded neo-fascist groups and figures such as the Francoist Falange, Maurice Bardèche, Per Engdahl, and Oswald Mosley.[7] Other organizations like Jeune Nation called in the late 1950s for an extra-parliamentarian insurrection against the regime in what amounts to a remnant of pre-war fascist strategies.[8] The main driving force of neo-fascist movements was what they saw as the defense of a Western civilization from the rise of both communism and the Third World, in some cases the loss of the colonial empire.[9]

In 1961, Bardèche redefined the nature of fascism in a book deemed influential in the European far-right at large entitled Qu'est-ce que le fascisme? (What Is Fascism?). He argued that previous fascists had essentially made two mistakes in that they focused their efforts on the methods rather than the original "idea"; and they wrongly believed that fascist society could be achieved via the nation-state as opposed to the construction of Europe. According to him, fascism could survive the 20th century in a new metapolitical guise if its theorists succeed in building inventive methods adapted to the changes of their times; the aim being the promotion of the core politico-cultural fascist project rather than vain attempts to revive doomed regimes:[10] In addition, Bardèche wrote: "The single party, the secret police, the public displays of Caesarism, even the presence of a Führer are not necessarily attributes of fascism. ... The famous fascist methods are constantly revised and will continue to be revised. More important than the mechanism is the idea which fascism has created for itself of man and freedom. ... With another name, another face, and with nothing which betrays the projection from the past, with the form of a child we do not recognize and the head of a young Medusa, the Order of Sparta will be reborn: and paradoxically it will, without doubt, be the last bastion of Freedom and the sweetness of living."[11]

In the spirit of Bardèche's strategy of disguise through framework change, the MSI had developed a policy of inserimento (insertion, entryism), which relied on gaining political acceptance via the cooperation with other parties within the democratic system. In the political context of the Cold War, anti-communism began to replace anti-fascism as the dominant trend in liberal democracies. In Italy, the MSI became a support group in parliament for the Christian Democratic government in the late 1950s–early 1960s, but was forced back into "political ghetto" after anti-fascist protests and violent street clashes occurred between radical leftist and far-right groups, leading to the demise of the short-lived fascist-backed Tambroni Cabinet in July 1960.[12]

The psychologist David Pavón-Cuéllar, of the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, has argued that the emergence of neoliberalism in the late-twentieth century prompted neoliberalist politicians to utilize neo-fascism as a means to remove all limits to capital (including labor laws, social rights and tariffs). According to Pavón-Cuéllar, this is done by employing the aestheticization of politics and by using the narcissism of small differences to find a target for hate, maintain a social hierarchy instead of protecting all individuals.[13]

Causes and description

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A number of historians and political scientists have pointed out that the situations in a number of European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, in particular France, Germany and Italy, were in some significant ways analogous to the conditions in Europe in the period between World War I and World War II that gave rise to fascism in its many national guises. Constant economic crises including high unemployment, a resurgence of nationalism, an increase in ethnic conflicts, and the geo-political weakness of national regimes were all present, and while not an exact one-to-one correspondence, circumstances were similar enough to promote the beginning of neo-fascism as a new fascist movement. Because intense nationalism is almost always a part of neo-fascism, the parties which make up this movement are not pan-European, but are specific to each country they arise in; other than this, the neo-fascist parties and other groups have many ideological traits in common.[14]

While certainly fascistic in nature, it is claimed by some that there are differences between neo-fascism and what can be called "historical fascism", or the kind of neo-fascism which came about in the immediate aftermath of World War II. Some historians claim that contemporary neo-fascist parties are not anti-democratic because they operate within their country's political system. Whether that is a significant difference between neo-fascism and historical fascism is doubted by other scholars, who point out that Hitler worked within the existing political system of the Weimar Republic to obtain power, although it took an anti-democratic but constitutional process in the form of presidential appointment rather than election through the Reichstag. Others point to the current neo-fascists not being totalitarian in nature, but the organization of their parties along the lines of the Führerprinzip would seem to indicate otherwise. Historian Stanley G. Payne claims that the differences in current circumstance to that of the interwar years, and the strengthening of democracy in European countries since the end of the war prevents a general return of historical fascism, and causes true neo-fascist groups to be small and remain on the fringe. For Payne, groups like the National Front in France are not neo-fascists in nature, but are merely "right radical parties" that will, in the course of time, moderate their positions in order to achieve electoral victory.[15]

The problem of immigrants, both legal and illegal or irregular, whether called "foreigners", "foreign workers", "economic refugees", "ethnic minorities", "asylum seekers", or "aliens", is a core neo-fascist issue, intimately tied to their nativism, ultranationalism, and xenophobia, but the specifics differ somewhat from country to country due to prevailing circumstances. In general, the anti-immigrant impetus is strong when the economy is weak or unemployment is high, and people fear that outsiders are taking their jobs. Because of this, neo-fascist parties have more electoral traction during hard economic times. Again, this mirrors the situation in the interwar years, when, for instance, Germany suffered from incredible hyperinflation and many people had their life savings swept away. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis, some neo-fascist groups likewise argued for a Third Position as an alternative to market capitalism.[16]

In contemporary Europe, mainstream political parties see the electoral advantage the neo-fascist and far-right parties get from their strong emphasis on the supposed problem of the outsider, and are then tempted to co-opt the issue by moving somewhat to the right on the immigrant issue, hoping to slough off some voters from the hard right. In the absence in post-war Europe of a strong socialist movement, this has the tendency to move the political centre to the right overall.[17]

While both historical fascism and contemporary neo-fascism are xenophobic, nativist and anti-immigrant, neo-fascist leaders are careful not to present these views in so strong a manner as to draw obvious parallels to historical events. Both Jean-Marie Le Pen of France's National Front and Jörg Haider's Freedom Party of Austria, in the words of historian Tony Judt, "revealed [their] prejudices only indirectly". Jews would not be castigated as a group, but a person would be specifically named as a danger who just happened to be a Jew.[18] The public presentation of their leaders is one principal difference between the neo-fascists and historical fascists: their programs have been "finely honed and 'modernized'" to appeal to the electorate, a "far-right ideology with a democratic veneer". Modern neo-fascists do not appear in "jackboots and brownshirts", but in suits and ties. The choice is deliberate, as the leaders of the various groups work to differentiate themselves from the brutish leaders of historical fascism and also to hide whatever bloodlines and connections tie the current leaders to the historical fascist movements. When these become public, as they did in the case of Haider, it can lead to their decline and fall.[19][18]

International networks

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In 1951, the New European Order (NEO) neo-fascist European-wide alliance was set up to promote pan-European nationalism. It was a more radical splinter group of the European Social Movement. The NEO had its origins in the 1951 Malmö conference, when a group of rebels led by René Binet and Maurice Bardèche refused to join the European Social Movement as they felt that it did not go far enough in terms of racialism and anti-communism. As a result, Binet joined with Gaston-Armand Amaudruz in a second meeting that same year in Zürich to set up a second group pledged to wage war on communists and non-white people.[20]

Francoist-Falangist and Nazi memorabilia in a shop in Toledo, Spain

Several Cold War regimes and international neo-fascist movements collaborated in operations such as assassinations and false flag bombings. Stefano Delle Chiaie, who was involved in Italy's Years of Lead, took part in Operation Condor; organizing the 1976 assassination attempt on Chilean Christian Democrat Bernardo Leighton.[21] Vincenzo Vinciguerra escaped to Franquist Spain with the help of the SISMI, following the 1972 Peteano attack, for which he was sentenced to life.[22][23] Along with Delle Chiaie, Vinciguerra testified in Rome in December 1995 before judge María Servini de Cubría, stating that Enrique Arancibia Clavel (a former Chilean secret police agent prosecuted for crimes against humanity in 2004) and US expatriate DINA agent Michael Townley were directly involved in General Carlos Prats' assassination. Michael Townley was sentenced in Italy to 15 years of prison for having served as intermediary between the DINA and the Italian neo-fascists.[24]

The regimes of Francoist Spain, Augusto Pinochet's Chile and Alfredo Stroessner's Paraguay participated together in Operation Condor, which targeted political opponents worldwide. During the Cold War, these international operations gave rise to some cooperation between various neo-fascist elements engaged in a "Crusade against Communism".[25] Anti-Fidel Castro terrorist Luis Posada Carriles was condemned for the Cubana Flight 455 bombing on 6 October 1976. According to the Miami Herald, this bombing was decided on at the same meeting during which it was decided to target Chilean former minister Orlando Letelier, who was assassinated on 21 September 1976. Carriles wrote in his autobiography that "we the Cubans didn't oppose ourselves to an isolated tyranny, nor to a particular system of our fatherland, but that we had in front of us a colossal enemy, whose main head was in Moscow, with its tentacles dangerously extended on all the planet."[26]

The March 2015 International Russian Conservative Forum organized by pro-Putin Rodina-party has been described as a neo-Fascist event by multiple sources.[27][28][29][30] The event was attended by fringe groups like Nordic Resistance Movement from Scandinavia but also by more mainstream MEPs from Golden Dawn and National Democratic Party of Germany. In addition to Rodina, Russian Imperial Movement and Rusich Group were also in attendance. The event was attended by several notable American white supremacists including Jared Taylor and Brandon Russell.[31][32][33]

Europe

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Finland

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In Finland, neo-fascism is often connected to the 1930s and 1940s fascist and pro-Nazi Patriotic People's Movement (IKL), its youth movement Blues-and-Blacks and its predecessor Lapua Movement. Post-war fascist groups such as Patriotic People's Movement (1993), Patriotic Popular Front, Patriotic National Movement, Blue-and-Black Movement and many others consciously copy the style of the movement and look up to its leaders as inspiration. A Finns Party councillor and police officer in Seinäjoki caused small scandal wearing the fascist blue-and-black uniform.[34][35][36]

Suomen Sisu has been identified as neo-fascist and members of Suomen Sisu have given statements understood as condoning fascism such as Juho Eerola saying "a lot can be learned" from Mussolini.[37][38] Members of Suomen Sisu have risen to prominent positions: Jussi Halla-aho is Speaker of the Parliament and Olli Immonen is the General Secretary of the Finns Party.[38][39]

Neo-fascist "Awakening" conference is held annually in Finland, attracting some hundreds of white supremacists from around the globe. The event has been attended by fascists from around the world; Jared Taylor of American Renaissance, Kevin MacDonald, representatives of the National Corps and others.[40][41][42]

France

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In France, the far-right National Rally party is of neo-fascist origin and is frequently accused of promoting anti-semitism and xenophobia.[43][44] The party was founded in 1972 to unify the French nationalist movement by Holocaust denier[45][46] Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was its leader until his resignation in 2011. Jean-Marie Le Pen's daughter, Marine Le Pen, has also been the party's leader and Marine Le Pen's niece, Marion Maréchal has repeated anti-Islam rhetoric such as "We know what we are and we know what we are not. We are not an Islamic nation."[47] Pierre Bousquet, a co-founder, was in the Nazi Waffen-SS during World War II.[48][49]

Germany

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Since German reunification there has been an increase of support for fascism in Germany, primarily led by the National Democratic Party of Germany and Alternative for Germany.[50] Both parties support the concept of ethnic nationalism such as the deportations of German citizens who belong to certain ethnicities.[51][52][53]

Greece

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Golden Dawn demonstration in Greece, 2012 (I will be found dead for Greece is written on the banner.)

After the onset of the Great Recession and economic crisis in Greece, a movement known as the Golden Dawn, widely considered a neo-Nazi party, soared in support out of obscurity and won seats in Greece's parliament, espousing a staunch hostility towards minorities, illegal immigrants and refugees. In 2013, after the murder of an anti-fascist musician by a person with links to Golden Dawn, the Greek government ordered the arrest of Golden Dawn's leader Nikolaos Michaloliakos and other Golden Dawn members on charges related to being associated with a criminal organization. Golden Dawn after emerging as a major political was engaged in numerous murder and criminal trials, such as the murder of Pavlos Fyssas. Following years long legal investigation sentenced its leaders to prison.[54][55]

In October, 2020, the court declared Golden Dawn to be a criminal organization, convicting 68 members of various crimes including murder. However, far-right politics continue to be strong in Greece, such as Ilias Kasidiaris' National Party – Greeks, an Ultranationalist party. In 2021, Greek neo-Nazi youth attacked a rival group at a school in Greece.[56] Following the collapse of Golden Dawn, various neo-Fascist political parties emerged including the Spartans.

Italy

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See also: History of the Italian Republic
See also: Armed, far-right organizations in Italy
Giorgio Almirante, leader of the Italian Social Movement

Italy was broadly divided into two political blocs following World War II: the Christian Democrats, who remained in power until the 1990s, and the Italian Communist Party (PCI), which was very strong immediately after the war and achieved a large consensus during the 1970s. With the beginning of the Cold War, the American and British governments turned a blind eye to the refusal of Italian authorities to honor requested extraditions of Italian war criminals to Yugoslavia, which they feared would benefit the PCI. With no event such as the Nuremberg trials taking place for Italian war crimes, the collective memory of the crimes committed by Italian fascists was excluded from public media, from textbooks in Italian schools, and even from the academic discourse on the Western side of the Iron Curtain throughout the Cold War.[57][58] The PCI was expelled from power in May 1947, a month before the Paris Conference on the Marshall Plan, along with the French Communist Party (PCF).

In 1946, a group of Italian fascist soldiers founded the Italian Social Movement (MSI) to continue advocating the ideas of Benito Mussolini. The leader of the MSI was Giorgio Almirante, who remained at the head of the party until his death in 1988. Despite attempts in the 1970s towards a "historic compromise" between the PCI and the DC, the PCI did not have a role in executive power until the 1980s. In December 1970, Junio Valerio Borghese attempted, along with Stefano Delle Chiaie, the Borghese Coup which was supposed to install a neo-fascist regime. Neo-fascist groups took part in various false flag terrorist attacks, starting with the December 1969 Piazza Fontana massacre, for which Vincenzo Vinciguerra was convicted, and they are usually considered to have stopped with the 1980 Bologna railway bombing.

In 1987, the reins of the MSI party were taken by Gianfranco Fini, under whom in 1995 it was dissolved and transformed into the National Alliance (AN). The party led by Fini distanced itself from Mussolini and fascism and made efforts to improve its relations with the Jewish community, becoming a conservative right-wing party until its merger with Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia into the centre-right party The People of Freedom in 2009. Neo-fascist parties in Italy include the Tricolour Flame (Fiamma Tricolore), the New Force (Forza Nuova), the National Social Front (Fronte Sociale Nazionale), and CasaPound.[59][60] The national-conservative Brothers of Italy (FdI), main heirs of MSI and AN, has been described as neo-fascist by several academics,[61][62] and it has some neo-fascist factions within their internal organization.[63][64] The results of the 2022 Italian general election, in which FdI became the first party, have been variously described as Italy's first far-right-led government in the republican era and its most right-wing government since World War II.[65][66][67] The Russia-Ukraine war has divided the Italian far right, including neo-fascists, into three clusters: the pro-Western and Atlanticist extreme right (e.g. CasaPound), nostalgic and pro-Putin neo-fascism (New Force), and an ideologically evolving collection of National Bolshevik and Eurasianist militants.[68] Recent studies have studied the geopolitical role of Italian neofascism with some groups participating with CIA-backing in the Strategy of Tension during the Cold War where terrorists actions were aimed to keep Italy in NATO and prevent the Communist Party from coming to power [69]

Portugal

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After the fall of authoritarianism in Portugal after the Carnation Revolution of 1974, several neo-fascist groups arose such as the New Order (Portugal) which was created in 1978. A report by the European Parliament defined the ideology of the New Order as revolutionary fascist and hyper-nationalist.[70] The group also had connections to Fuerza Nueva in Spain. The New Order was disbanded in 1982, however its activities continued to as late as 1985.

Romania

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Main article: Neo-Legionarism

In Romania, the ultra-nationalist movement which allied itself with the Axis powers and German National Socialism was the Iron Guard, also known as the Legion of the Archangel Michael. There are some modern political organisations which consider themselves heirs of Legionarism, this includes Noua Dreaptă and the Everything For the Country Party, founded by former Iron Guard members. The latter organisation was outlawed in 2015. Aside, from these Romanian organisations, the Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement representing ultra-nationalism from the Hungarian minority is also present, especially in Transylvania.[71] Other nationalistic and irredentist groups such as the Greater Romania Party do not originate from Legionarism, but in fact grew out of national communist tendencies from the era of Nicolae Ceaușescu (the party was founded by his "court poet" Corneliu Vadim Tudor).[72]

The Romanian Hearth Union (UVR), which had around 4 million supporters in 1992, has been described as neofascist.[73] Its political branch was the Romanian National Unity Party,[74] but had also ties to the Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR),[75] Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania (PDAR).[76] One of the founders of the UVR was the Romanian President Ion Iliescu,[74] who was still its member in 2005.[77]

Russia

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See also: Ruscism

In 1990, Vladimir Zhirinovsky founded the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia. Its leader opposes democratic values, human rights, a multiparty system, and the rule of law. Encyclopedia Britannica considers Zhirinovsky to be a neo-fascist.[78] Zhirinovsky endorsed the forcible re-occupation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and suggested nuclear waste should be dumped there.[79] During the First Chechen War in the mid-1990s, he advocated hitting some Chechen villages with tactical nuclear weapons.[80]

The Russian National Unity was a paramilitary organization which was founded by Alexander Barkashov in 1990. It used a left-pointed swastika and emphasizes the "primary importance" of Russian blood. Concerning Adolf Hitler, the organizations's leader Barkashov declared: "I consider [Hitler] a great hero of the German nation and of all white races. He succeeded in inspiring the entire nation to fight against degradation and the washing away of national values."[78] Before it was banned in 1999, and breakup in late 2000, the group estimated to have had approximately 20,000 to 25,000 members.[81] Alexander Barkashov along with other members of the Russian National Unity have engaged in religious activities and pro-Russian activism in the Russian-Ukrainian War.[82][83][84][85]

Serbia

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A neo-fascist organization in Serbia was Obraz, which was banned on 12 June 2012 by the Constitutional Court of Serbia.[86][87][88]

Earlier, on 18 June 1990, Vojislav Šešelj organized the Serbian Chetnik Movement (SČP) though it was not permitted official registration due to its obvious Chetnik identification. On 23 February 1991, it merged with the National Radical Party (NRS), establishing the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) with Šešelj as president and Tomislav Nikolić as vice president.[89] It was a Chetnik party,[90] oriented towards neo-fascism with a striving for the territorial expansion of Serbia.[89][91]

Slovakia

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Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia is a far-right political party with views that are considered extremist and fascist. The Party's leader, Marian Kotleba, is a former neo-Nazi,[92] who once wore a uniform modelled on that of the Hlinka Guard, the militia of the 1939–45 Nazi-sponsored Slovak State. He opposes Romani people,[93] immigrants,[94] the Slovak National Uprising,[95] NATO, the United States, and the European Union.[96] The party also endorses the clerical fascist war criminal and former Slovak President Jozef Tiso.[97]

In 2003, Kotleba founded the far-right political party Slovak Community (Slovak: Slovenská Pospolitosť). In 2007, the Slovak interior ministry banned the party from running and campaigning in elections. In spite of this ban, Kotleba's party got 8.04%[98] of votes in the Slovak 2016 parliamentary elections. As of December 2022, voter support has dropped significantly to about 3.1%, under the 5% threshold required to enter parliament.[99]

Turkey

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See also: Grey Wolves (organization)

Grey Wolves is a Turkish ultranationalist[100][101][102] and neo-fascist[103][104][105][106][107][108][109] youth organization. It is the "unofficial militant arm" of the Nationalist Movement Party.[110] The Grey Wolves have been accused of terrorism.[103][105][106] According to Turkish authorities,[who?] the organization carried out 694 murders during the late-1970s political violence in Turkey, between 1974 and 1980.[111]

The nationalist political party MHP founded by Alparslan Türkeş is also sometimes described as neo-fascist.[112][page needed]

United Kingdom

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The British National Party (BNP) is a nationalist party in the United Kingdom which espoused the ideology of fascism[113][114][115][116] and anti-immigration.[117] In the 2009 European elections, it gained two members of the European Parliament (MEPs), including former party leader Nick Griffin.[118] Other British organisations described as fascist or neo-fascist include the National Front,[119][120] Combat 18,[121] the English Defence League,[122] and Britain First.[123][124]

Americas

[edit]

Argentina

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In Argentina, a notable advocate of neo-fascism was president María Estela Martínez de Perón, who applied anti-communist policies under the fascist police organization Triple A and economic market opening policies.[125][126][127] Perón made a direct apology to fascism by performing the Roman salute in an appearance on the national radio network.[128] The National Reorganization Process is also considered a neo-fascist or fascist dictatorship.[129][130][131][132]

Brazil

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The Brazilian government of Jair Bolsonaro is cited as the rising point of neo-fascism in South America in the 21st century,[133][134][135][136][137][138][139] based on the denial of science, bellicose rhetoric and authoritarian measures that withdraw rights from the population linked to a strongly neoliberal economic policy.[140][141][142][143][139] As a result of factors such as opposition to Workers' Party, fear and reaction to the 2013 protests, as well as the 2008 financial crisis and 2014 Brazilian economic crisis, Jair Bolsonaro emerged as a viable option, not because of a well-defined strategic project, but almost accidentally.[144][145] In this way, the multiplicity of groups that make up the Bolsonarism, the different wings (military, ideological, religious, capital, etc.) present pragmatic disagreements, strategies, objectives and distinct methods.[12] The core of this Brazilian neo-fascism converged its interests and rhetoric with Pentecostal religious fundamentalism and both allied themselves with military sectors and liberal think tanks,[140] so that within bolsonarism there is a power bloc made up of non-fascist conservatives and far-right neo-fascists; although still without the support of the broad and fanatical mass movement which was the basis of European fascism.[140]

United States

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See also: Fascism in North America, Alt-right, Radical right (United States), and Donald Trump and fascism

Groups which are identified as neo-fascist in the United States generally include neo-Nazi organizations and movements such as the Proud Boys,[146] the National Alliance, and the American Nazi Party. The Institute for Historical Review publishes negationist historical papers which are often antisemitic.[147] The alt-right—a loosely connected coalition of individuals and organizations which advocates a wide range of far-right ideas, from neo-reactionism to white nationalism—is often included under the umbrella term "neo-fascist" because alt-right individuals and organizations advocate a radical form of authoritarian ultranationalism.[148] Support for neo-fascism has also increased with the Trump administration, pushing anti-immigration ideals and nationalism to the forefront of American politics.[citation needed]

Oceania

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Australia and New Zealand

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Brenton Harrison Tarrant, the Australian perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings at Al Noor Mosque and Linwood Islamic Centre in Christchurch, New Zealand, was an admitted fascist who followed eco-fascism and admired Oswald Mosley. Mosley was the leader of the British fascist organization called the British Union of Fascists (BUF) in the 1930s, and he is quoted in the shooter's manifesto The Great Replacement (named after the French far-right theory of the same name).[149][150]

Africa

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South Africa

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The Economic Freedom Fighters are a self-described pan-Africanist political party founded in 2013 by the expelled former African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) President Julius Malema, and his allies.[151] Malema and the party have frequently courted controversy for engaging in anti-White[152][153] and anti-Indian racism.[154] In November 2019, the Professor of International Relations at University of the Witwatersrand, Vishwas Satgar, defined them as a manifestation of a new phenomenon, 'Black Neofascism'.[155]

Asia

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India

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Main articles: Hindutva, Hindu terrorism, and Akhand Bharat
See also: Violence against Muslims in independent India and Violence against Christians in India

Indonesia

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Adolf Hitler's propaganda which advocated the hegemony of "Greater Germany" inspired similar ideas of "Indonesia Mulia" (esteemed Indonesia) and "Indonesia Raya" (great Indonesia) in the former Dutch colony. The first fascist party was the Partai Fasis Indonesia (PFI). Sukarno admired Nazi Germany under Hitler and its vision of happiness for all: "It's in the Third Reich that the Germans will see Germany at the apex above other nations in this world," he said in 1963.[156] He stated that Hitler was 'extraordinarily clever' in 'depicting his ideals': he spoke about Hitler's rhetorical skills, but denied any association with Nazism as an ideology, saying that Indonesian nationalism was not as narrow as Nazi nationalism.[157]

Israel

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In Israel, various fascist movements exist. Notably, Kahanism gained influence as the conflict between Israel and Palestine continues to persist.[158][159] The kahanist party Otzma Yehudit ("Jewish Power") has widely been described as fascist. Noted Israeli sociologist Eva Illouz has described the party leader of Otzma Yehudit, Itamar Ben-Gvir, as representative of Jewish fascism.[160] Ben-Gvir once kept a portrait of the Israeli terrorist and mass murderer Baruch Goldstein in his living room, sparking outrage.[161] In 1980, the Journal of Palestine Studies published an article describing the rise of fascist movements in Israel and support from governmental institutions.[162]

Japan

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See also: Nippon Kaigi and Uyoku dantai

After World War II, neo-fascism and ultra-nationalism were ostracized from mainstream politics in Germany, while in Japan, they were partially related to major right-wing conservative politics.[163][164] Since 2006, all prime ministers of Japan's LDP have been members of far-right ultranationalist Nippon Kaigi.[165]

Mongolia

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With Mongolia located between the larger nations Russia and China, ethnic insecurities have driven many Mongolians to neo-fascism,[166] expressing nationalism centered around Genghis Khan and Adolf Hitler. Groups advocating these ideologies include Blue Mongolia, Dayar Mongol, and Mongolian National Union.[167]

Pakistan

[edit]

Pakistan's Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan is considered fascist by some analysts because of its engagement in Islamic extremism.[168][169]

Taiwan

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Main article: National Socialism Association

The National Socialism Association (NSA) is a neo-fascist political organization founded in Taiwan in September 2006 by Hsu Na-chi (許娜琦), a 22-year-old female political science graduate of Soochow University. The NSA views Adolf Hitler as its leader and often uses the slogan "Long live Hitler". This has brought them condemnation from the Simon Wiesenthal Center, an international Jewish human rights centre.[170]

See also

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References

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Neo-fascism

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Neo-fascism refers to political ideologies, parties, and movements that arose predominantly in following the defeat of in , aiming to revive or modify core elements of interwar —such as fervent , hierarchical , and rejection of egalitarian —while adapting to postwar democratic constraints and anti-fascist legal frameworks. These entities typically eschew the overt and of original due to historical stigma and international norms, instead emphasizing cultural preservation, anti-immigration stances, and critiques of supranational institutions like the . The archetype emerged in Italy with the Italian Social Movement (MSI), established in 1946 by former adherents of Benito Mussolini's regime, including figures like Giorgio Almirante, who sought to channel fascist legacies into parliamentary opposition against communist influence and liberal reforms. Under MSI leadership, neo-fascism initially glorified the interwar era's corporatist economics and national sovereignty but faced marginalization, peaking in influence during periods of social unrest, such as Italy's "Years of Lead" (1969–1982), where affiliated extremists engaged in bombings and assassinations amid ideological clashes with left-wing groups. Similar formations appeared elsewhere, including Greece's Golden Dawn, which combined ultranationalist rhetoric with street violence and secured parliamentary seats in 2012 by exploiting economic discontent and migration pressures, before its 2020 conviction as a criminal organization. Defining traits include a syncretic blend of anti-communism, traditionalism, and populist appeals to sovereignty, often manifesting in opposition to multiculturalism and globalism rather than explicit racial doctrines, though overlaps with neo-Nazism occur in fringe variants. Controversies surround neo-fascist groups' tactical use of democratic processes to subvert them, including electoral infiltration and extralegal agitation, which have prompted scholarly debates on whether they represent genuine fascist revivals or opportunistic reactions to modernization's dislocations. While rarely achieving state power, their persistence highlights tensions between postwar liberal orders and demands for ethno-cultural homogeneity, with evolution into broader radical-right formations complicating attributions of "neo-fascist" labels amid institutional biases in academic and media assessments.

Definition and Ideological Framework

Core Definition and Principles

Neo-fascism refers to post-World War II political movements and ideologies, primarily in , that incorporate significant elements of historical , including and , while adapting to operate within or alongside democratic institutions. These groups emerged after , often as successors to defeated fascist regimes, and emphasize national revival through strong state control, rejecting and egalitarian universalism. Unlike classical fascism's pursuit of via seizure of power, neo-fascism typically engages electoral processes and claims fidelity to democratic norms to gain legitimacy, avoiding overt calls for . Central principles revolve around ultranationalism, which posits the nation—defined by ethnic, cultural, or racial homogeneity—as the supreme political unit, demanding subordination of individual rights to collective identity and opposing supranational entities like the . This manifests in nativism and , with vehement resistance to viewed as a to demographic purity and social cohesion, often coupled with racial supremacist undertones that prioritize indigenous populations. underpins governance ideals, favoring hierarchical leadership cults and centralized executive power over parliamentary deliberation or , while critiquing as decadent and corrosive to order. Economic doctrines echo fascist , advocating state-mediated collaboration between classes to transcend and , though without the explicit "third way" socialist pretensions of interwar fascism. Anti-globalism and opposition to form ideological pillars, framing , migration, and as existential threats to , with calls for protectionist policies and cultural preservation. integrates these by portraying elites—political, media, or cosmopolitan—as betrayers of the "true" people, mobilizing mass support against perceived betrayals of national interests. Scholarly consensus identifies continuity with in rejection of Enlightenment individualism and embrace of mythic , yet divergences arise from post-1945 stigma, leading neo-fascists to rebrand as "national conservatives" while retaining anti-egalitarian hierarchies. Mainstream academic and media sources, frequently exhibiting left-leaning institutional biases, apply the term expansively to broader right-wing phenomena, potentially diluting its precision for movements explicitly invoking fascist symbols or tactics, as seen in groups like Greece's Golden Dawn, which peaked with 21 seats in parliament in before suppression.

Continuity and Divergences from Classical Fascism

Neo-fascist ideologies retain the core fascist commitment to , defined by historian as a revolutionary form of mythologizing the rebirth or regeneration of a decadent nation through collective struggle against perceived internal and external threats. This mythos parallels classical fascism's emphasis on national renewal, as seen in Mussolini's vision of restoring Roman grandeur or Hitler's , with neo-fascist groups like Italy's invoking similar narratives of cultural revival amid . Both reject liberal individualism and parliamentary democracy in favor of organic, hierarchical societies prioritizing communal identity over universal rights, often framing as a corrosive force eroding national vitality. A key strategic divergence lies in approach to power acquisition: classical fascism pursued revolutionary vanguardism and paramilitary street action to overthrow liberal regimes, as exemplified by the in 1922 or the 1923 , whereas neo-fascism predominantly adopts electoral participation and metapolitical influence to infiltrate democratic systems from within. Historian Stanley Payne notes that post-World War II neo-fascist movements, facing legal bans and stigma, have moderated rhetoric for viability, with groups like France's National Front (now ) achieving electoral gains—peaking at 13.2 million votes (33.4%) in the 2002 presidential runoff—through appeals rather than overt coups. This adaptation reflects causal constraints of Allied victory and , compelling neo-fascists to eschew explicit while subverting institutions incrementally, unlike the interwar era's direct seizures. Ideologically, neo-fascism diverges in its defensive ethno-pluralism, advocating segregated ethnic homelands to preserve cultural homogeneity—"right to difference" without classical fascism's aggressive or racial conquest. Classical variants emphasized expansionist empire-building and hierarchical racial supremacy, as in Italy's Ethiopian invasion (1935–1936) or Nazi , whereas neo-fascist anti-immigration stances, prominent in parties like Germany's (AfD), which garnered 10.3% in the 2021 federal election, frame as an existential threat to indigenous identity, prioritizing repatriation over territorial aggrandizement. Economically, while both endorse corporatist mediation between state and labor, neo-fascism often integrates welfare chauvinism—nationalist redistribution excluding outsiders—with selective , diverging from classical statism's autarkic industrialization drives. These divergences stem from post-1945 geopolitical realities, including NATO's anti-communist framework and integration, which neo-fascists exploit via anti-globalist critiques absent in classical fascism's era of sovereign nation-states. Yet, continuities in anti-egalitarian persist, with neo-fascists adapting fascist anti-Bolshevism to broader anti-liberalism, viewing and supranational bodies as modern equivalents of interwar "decadence." Payne observes that authentic neo-fascist electoral successes invariably involve "post-fascist" dilutions to evade scrutiny, underscoring a tactical over doctrinal purity.

Distinctions from Populism, Conservatism, and Mainstream Right-Wing Politics

Neo-fascism is ideologically distinguished from by its adherence to a "palingenetic" form of , involving a mythic narrative of national rebirth through total societal mobilization and the transcendence of liberal democratic constraints, as articulated by in his analysis of post-war fascist variants. In contrast, functions as a "thin" overlaying various host ideologies, primarily emphasizing antagonism between the "pure people" and a "corrupt " while often remaining compatible with electoral democracy and pluralism, allowing parties to adapt rhetoric for broader appeal without committing to revolutionary upheaval. This difference is evident in practice: populist formations like Italy's Lega or Hungary's govern through parliamentary means and coalition-building, whereas neo-fascist entities, such as Greece's Golden Dawn—which secured 6.97% of the vote and 21 parliamentary seats in the May 2012 Greek elections—integrated squads, , and fascist salutes, resulting in the party's 2020 conviction as a criminal organization by an court for directing violent attacks. Organizationally, neo-fascism shades into but remains distinct from radical right through its tolerance or endorsement of extra-legal and anti-system , rather than mere nativist exclusion within democratic rules; scholars note that while both may share anti-immigration stances, neo-fascist groups prioritize biological and historical fascist continuity, leading to electoral marginalization, as opposed to populists' pragmatic moderation for voter gains. Empirical data underscores this: European neo-fascist parties have averaged under 2% national vote shares since the , compared to populist radical right parties exceeding 10% in countries like (National Rally at 33.4% in 2022 legislative elections) and the Netherlands (PVV at 23.5% in 2023), reflecting voter aversion to overt versus tolerance for anti-elite protest. Academic analyses influenced by progressive paradigms sometimes conflate the two to broaden "fascist" labeling against non-establishment , yet causal distinctions persist in neo-fascism's explicit rejection of pluralism for a hierarchical "organic" state. Relative to , neo-fascism rejects the counter- preservation of existing institutions and traditions in favor of a to forge a new national order, diverging from conservatism's emphasis on , , and often economics subordinated to moral order rather than state-directed . Conservative thought, as in Burke's framework, prioritizes inherited hierarchies and skepticism of , viewing as destabilizing; neo-fascism, conversely, glorifies perpetual struggle and leader cults to achieve mythic renewal, incompatible with conservatism's accommodation of liberal and markets. For instance, post-war Italian neo-fascists in the (MSI) initially invoked Mussolini's legacy with squadrist violence until evolving toward electoral conservatism by the , illustrating the tension between fascist dynamism and conservative stability. Mainstream right-wing politics further separates by its commitment to democratic contestation, individual liberties, and institutional evolution within , eschewing neo-fascism's anti-liberal that subordinates economy and society to ethno-national imperatives. Parties like Germany's CDU or the UK's Conservatives integrate social traditionalism with pro-EU integration (pre-Brexit) and welfare-state compromises, accepting multiculturalism's limits without pursuing ethno-homogeneity via expulsion or suppression; neo-fascism demands the latter, as seen in groups like Britain's National Front, which in the advocated policies beyond mainstream controls, achieving negligible votes (0.3% in 1979) due to perceived . This electoral chasm—mainstream right often governing coalitions versus neo-fascists' fringe status—highlights ideological incompatibility, though alliances against historically blurred lines without erasing core divergences in vision.

Historical Development

Post-World War II Origins (1945–1970s)

Neo-fascism originated in the immediate aftermath of World War II among survivors of defeated fascist regimes, who sought to preserve and adapt core ideological elements such as ultranationalism, anti-communism, and authoritarianism within the constraints of emerging democratic systems. In Italy, the primary locus of early organization, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) was established on December 26, 1946, by former adherents of Benito Mussolini's Italian Social Republic, including veterans and Republican Fascist Party members, with the explicit aim of continuing fascist legacies through electoral participation rather than overt dictatorship. The MSI positioned itself as a bulwark against communism and the perceived dilutions of national identity in the post-war republic, achieving modest electoral support while maintaining ties to pre-1945 personnel and symbols. Key figures like , who had served as in Mussolini's final government, helped shape the MSI's direction, promoting a moderated that emphasized legal opposition to leftist influences during the . By the mid-1950s, internal frustrations with the MSI's parliamentary restraint spurred the creation of more radical offshoots, such as , founded around 1956 by and associates disillusioned by the party's alliances with conservative forces. drew heavily on the traditionalist philosophy of , advocating spiritual hierarchy, anti-egalitarianism, and rejection of modern as degenerative. Similarly, Avanguardia Nazionale emerged in 1960 under , focusing on militant anti-communist activism and youth mobilization. These groups represented a shift toward extraparliamentary action, blending ideological purity with tactical violence. Beyond Italy, neo-fascist stirrings manifested in fragmented forms across , often suppressed by and anti-extremist laws but sustained by informal networks. In , parties like the (active 1949–1952) briefly rallied ex-Nazis before constitutional bans, paving the way for the National Democratic Party (NPD) in 1964, which echoed nationalist grievances without explicit fascist revival. In , organizations such as (formed 1966) combined with fascist-inspired and opposition to . Attempts at transnational coordination, including the short-lived in the late 1940s and subsequent informal exchanges via publications and gatherings, aimed to unify these efforts but largely failed to produce a cohesive structure, remaining limited to ideological solidarity amid divisions. Into the 1970s, these origins evolved amid rising tensions, with Italian neo-fascists increasingly linked to the ""—a pattern of bombings and provocations intended to discredit left-wing movements and justify authoritarian responses—as exemplified by the December 1969 Piazza Fontana explosion in , which killed 17 and was traced to affiliates. Such actions highlighted the persistence of underground militancy despite surface-level democratic adaptations, setting the stage for further radicalization while mainstream parties like the MSI navigated electoral margins, typically securing 5–6% of votes in national contests through the .

Cold War Suppression and Underground Persistence (1970s–1991)

During the Cold War, neo-fascist movements in Western Europe faced significant legal and social suppression due to post-World War II anti-fascist legislation and the dominant anti-extremist consensus shaped by Allied victory narratives and democratic reconstruction efforts. In Italy, the Italian Social Movement (MSI), established in 1946 by former fascists, operated as the primary institutional vehicle for neo-fascist continuity, claiming to defend national traditions while harboring ideological fidelity to Mussolini's legacy. Under Giorgio Almirante's leadership from 1969 to 1987, the MSI adopted a more confrontational stance, emphasizing anti-communism and youth mobilization through groups like the Italian Youth Front, which attracted radical elements amid rising political violence. Neo-fascist persistence manifested underground through extra-parliamentary organizations such as and Avanguardia Nazionale, which were implicated in the ""—a series of bombings designed to destabilize the state, provoke authoritarian responses, and discredit the left. Notable attacks included the 1972 Peteano bombing killing three policemen, attributed to MSI-linked militants, and the 1980 railway station massacre that claimed 85 lives, later convicted as the work of neo-fascist . These groups evaded full eradication by leveraging anti-communist alliances, including alleged ties to NATO's stay-behind networks, though official inquiries confirmed only peripheral involvement of right-wing extremists. Suppression intensified with 's 1973 dissolution for attempting to reconstitute the fascist party, yet underground cells reformed, sustaining ideological transmission via publications and clandestine training. Across Europe, similar patterns emerged in fragmented networks; in , neo-Nazi cells like the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann operated semi-clandestinely until dismantled in the , while French groups such as Ordre Nouveau dissolved under pressure but influenced later formations. The MSI's electoral resilience—peaking at 8.7% in the elections—demonstrated political persistence despite marginalization, with Almirante's rhetoric framing the party as a bulwark against "red subversion." By 1991, as the ended, these movements adapted by moderating public facades, but underground persistence ensured survival of core tenets like and anti-liberalism amid waning suppression. Academic analyses note that while media and leftist institutions amplified threats, empirical records of underscore genuine radical continuity rather than mere amplification.

Post-Cold War Resurgence and Adaptation (1990s–2010s)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of Cold War constraints on far-right expression, enabling neo-fascist groups to resurface amid rising concerns over globalization, EU integration, and immigration in Europe. These movements adapted by shifting from overt paramilitarism to electoral participation and rhetorical moderation, though overt neo-fascist entities largely remained fringe, achieving limited success compared to broader radical right parties that distanced themselves from explicit fascist legacies. Scholars observe that neo-fascist proximity inversely correlated with electoral viability, as voters favored nativist appeals within democratic norms over antidemocratic extremism. In , the neo-fascist (MSI), tracing continuity to Mussolini's regime, underwent significant adaptation by refounding as the National Alliance (AN) in January 1995 under , who emphasized conservatism over fascism. This strategic pivot allowed AN to secure 15.7% of the vote (78 seats) in the 1996 parliamentary elections and join Silvio Berlusconi's center-right coalition governments from 2001 to 2006, influencing policies on and while publicly repudiating totalitarian pasts—Fini described Mussolini's as "absolute evil" in 2003. Such transformations reflected a broader trend of "post-fascist" normalization, enabling participation in pluralistic systems without abandoning ultranationalist cores. Elsewhere, adaptations yielded mixed results. The (BNP), emerging from neo-fascist roots in the 1980s National Front, capitalized on anti-immigration sentiment to win 12 local council seats by 2002 and two seats in 2009 with 6.2% of the national vote, peaking amid economic downturns but facing internal splits and legal challenges over membership discrimination. In , the National Democratic Party (NPD), with neo-Nazi ties, polled under 2% in federal elections throughout the period, surviving constitutional scrutiny but failing to breakthrough due to historical stigma and cordon sanitaire tactics. Eastern European transitions post-1989 spurred neo-fascist networks and parties like Romania's , which garnered 19.5% in 2000 elections by invoking interwar fascist nostalgia, yet fragmented without institutional power. The catalyzed more radical expressions, notably Greece's Golden Dawn, which blended fascist iconography, violence, and anti-austerity rhetoric to enter in May 2012 with 21 seats (7% vote share), exploiting 27% and migration flows; the party maintained squads while adapting via media savvy. Intellectual adaptations paralleled this, with the French Nouvelle Droite's metapolitical strategy—influenced by —shaping identitarian groups across by the 2000s, prioritizing and anti-globalism over direct power seizures. Despite media amplification, empirical records show neo-fascist electoral gains confined to crises, underscoring adaptations' limits against voter aversion to extremism amid systemic left-leaning biases in coverage that often overstated threats from marginal actors.

Recent Evolutions in the 2020s

In , neo-fascist organizations persisted as marginal actors in the 2020s, often engaging in extra-parliamentary activities amid broader far-right electoral gains by more moderated nationalist parties. In , Forza Nuova, a self-avowed neo-fascist party founded in 1997, mobilized during anti-COVID-19 vaccine passport protests in on October 9, 2021, where participants stormed a headquarters, resulting in clashes with police and injuries to over 40 officers. This incident prompted the Italian Senate to request the government's dissolution of the party under anti-fascist laws, though no ban materialized by 2025, reflecting ongoing legal challenges to such groups' operations. Forza Nuova's electoral performance remained negligible, garnering less than 1% in national votes, underscoring neo-fascism's confinement to street-level agitation rather than mainstream politics. CasaPound Italia, another Italian neo-fascist entity emphasizing "third-millennium fascism" through social centers and , continued occupying buildings and organizing cultural events into the mid-2020s, framing these as prefigurative enactments of authoritarian, nationalist ideals amid economic discontent. The group engaged in sporadic violence, including brawls with left-wing opponents, but avoided significant electoral inroads, with participation in coalitions yielding under 0.5% support in local races. Similar patterns emerged elsewhere: Greece's Golden Dawn, convicted as a criminal in 2020 for murders and attacks, saw its remnants dissolve formally, though ideological echoes lingered in splinter groups without parliamentary traction. These cases illustrate neo-fascism's evolution toward networked activism over formal parties, influenced by post-2010s crackdowns and competition from populist rivals. In the United States, neo-fascist activity shifted toward decentralized, fitness-oriented networks like "active clubs," which proliferated from 2020 onward, using training to foster white nationalist and fascist ideologies, with chapters expanding internationally by 2025. Groups such as these, often overlapping with neo-Nazi —advocating to rebuild along authoritarian lines—leveraged online platforms for recruitment, evading through encrypted apps and gaming communities. Domestic incidents remained sporadic, with federal designations of entities like as terrorist threats leading to arrests, yet online radicalization sustained low-level persistence without . Globally, this digital pivot marked a key evolution, enabling ideological dissemination amid physical suppression, though empirical data from monitoring reports indicate neo-fascist violence comprised a fraction of overall far-right , often amplified by institutional biases in threat assessments.

Key Doctrinal Elements

Ultranationalism, Identity, and Anti-Globalism

Neo-fascist ideologies center on , which subordinates individual and group loyalties to an overarching national entity, demanding urgent and total dedication often framed as essential for survival against perceived existential threats. This form of posits as a superior, organic whole requiring protection through exclusionary policies, including in extreme cases, and embraces as a tool for securing and expanding national interests. Drawing from fascist traditions, neo-fascists invoke —a mythic rebirth of from —emphasizing reclamation of a glorified past to foster collective renewal. Central to this is a rigid conception of identity rooted in ethnic, cultural, or racial homogeneity, rejecting as a corrosive force that dilutes native heritage. Neo-fascist groups promote nativism and racial supremacy, portraying non-native immigrants and minorities as threats to social cohesion and , thereby justifying xenophobic measures to preserve an imagined pure national community. This leverages social Darwinist principles, viewing national strength as dependent on internal purity and hierarchical order, often opposing egalitarian international norms that challenge such hierarchies. Anti-globalism forms a key pillar, with neo-fascists decrying and supranational institutions like the as erosive to sovereign identity and autonomy, favoring instead and to shield domestic interests from foreign influences. They frame global integration—through trade, migration, and cultural exchange—as a mechanism of elite-driven homogenization that undermines local traditions and empowers cosmopolitan forces over national priorities. This stance aligns with broader opposition to , prioritizing unilateral national policies to counteract perceived dilutions of identity and power.

Authoritarian Governance and Anti-Liberalism

Neo-fascist doctrine posits that liberal democratic systems, characterized by checks and balances, pluralism, and individual rights, foster national decay and vulnerability to internal division and external threats, advocating instead for a centralized authoritarian state under a hierarchical leadership cadre to enforce unity and decisive action. This rejection draws from interwar fascist critiques, updated for postwar contexts, viewing parliamentary institutions as inefficient arenas for elite capture rather than genuine popular sovereignty. Proponents argue that such systems prioritize minority interests and proceduralism over the organic will of the national community, necessitating their supersession by a regime prioritizing collective discipline and state-directed mobilization. Central to this anti-liberalism is the endorsement of a or rule, inspired by Carl Schmitt's concept of sovereign decisionism, where the leader embodies the state's existential authority unbound by constitutional limits or judicial oversight. Neo-fascist texts and manifestos, such as those from thinkers, decry liberal as atomizing society, promoting instead a corporatist where is curtailed through state mechanisms to preserve ethno-cultural homogeneity and order. Empirical instances include parties like Greece's Golden Dawn, which in its 2012-2015 platform called for abolishing parliamentary in favor of a national socialist republic with executive dominance, though such groups often mask explicit authoritarian calls under electoral to evade bans. Critics from academic analyses note that while neo-fascist consistently opposes liberal norms—evident in documented calls for media , opposition suppression, and loyalty oaths—this authoritarian strain remains marginal, with no neo-fascist regime achieving power since , suggesting doctrinal limits in mass appeal compared to classical fascism's crisis-era mobilizations. Nonetheless, the ideology's persistence in fringe networks underscores a causal logic: liberalism's perceived failures in control and invite authoritarian remedies framed as restorative .

Economic Corporatism and Anti-Communism

Neo-fascist ideology incorporates economic corporatism as a doctrinal inheritance from interwar fascism, emphasizing a "third position" that mediates between capital and labor through state-orchestrated syndicates or corporations to prioritize national interests over class conflict or market individualism. This approach retains private ownership while subordinating it to autarkic goals and social cohesion, rejecting the atomistic competition of capitalism and the class warfare of socialism. In practice, post-1945 neo-fascist groups adapted these ideas to critique post-war welfare states and globalization, advocating sector-based organizations under national control to ensure economic self-sufficiency and worker protections aligned with ethnic or cultural homogeneity. The Italian Social Movement (MSI), founded in 1946 as a direct successor to Mussolini's Republican Fascist Party, exemplified this corporatist orientation by promoting "socialization" policies that echoed fascist-era charters, such as the 1927 Labour Charter, which integrated employers and workers into state-supervised bodies to avert strikes and foster productivity for the nation. MSI platforms in the 1950s and 1960s called for reforming Italy's mixed economy toward greater interventionism, including profit-sharing and guild-like structures, while opposing both multinational corporations and labor unions independent of state oversight. Later third-positionist offshoots, like those influenced by Roberto Fiore in the 1980s, extended this to anti-usury banking and community-based mutual aid, positioning corporatism as a bulwark against neoliberal deregulation following the 1971 end of the Bretton Woods system. Anti-communism forms the ideological counterpart to corporatism in neo-fascism, framing -Leninism as a subversive force that erodes national sovereignty through internationalism and materialist dialectics antithetical to organic hierarchies. For MSI, this manifested in vehement opposition to the (PCI), which garnered 34.4% of the vote in the 1976 elections; MSI leaders like delegitimized communists as agents of Soviet expansion, justifying alliances with anti-communist structures such as . This stance persisted beyond 1991, with neo-fascist critiques targeting "cultural " and EU integration as continuations of communist leveling, as evidenced in manifestos from groups like Italia, which in 2013 elections advocated expelling non-national elements from welfare systems to preserve resources for indigenous workers. Empirical from European far-right platforms show consistent polling support for such views, with 15-20% of respondents in 2010s favoring Golden Dawn's nationalist economic controls amid 25% peaks in 2013, underscoring anti-communist rhetoric's appeal in crisis contexts.

Controversies and Analytical Debates

Overapplication of the Neo-Fascism Label to Non-Fascist Movements

Critics of contemporary political discourse contend that the neo-fascism label is routinely extended to right-wing populist and nationalist movements that prioritize electoral participation, cultural preservation, and opposition to supranational institutions, yet do not pursue the revolutionary overthrow of , mobilization, or a mythic national rebirth central to fascist . Historians emphasize that entails a totalizing rejection of pluralism and a glorification of violence for palingenetic transformation, traits absent in groups operating within constitutional bounds. This conflation arises partly from definitional looseness, where rhetoric or suffice for the accusation, diluting the term's precision and echoing George Orwell's observation that "fascism" often denotes merely "something cruel, unscrupulous, arrogant, obscurantist, anti-liberal and anti-working-class." Scholars like Federico Finchelstein argue that , while potentially illiberal, remains tethered to democratic mechanisms by invoking "the people" against elites, whereas neo-fascism incarnates in a leader and seeks to dismantle those mechanisms entirely. Overapplication manifests in characterizations of Europe's mainstream conservative parties, such as France's , which has moderated since 2011 by abandoning explicit alliances with extremists and focusing on and controls through ballots rather than street violence. Similarly, Italy's , led by since 2014, draws from post-fascist traditions but rejects totalitarian governance, emphasizing parliamentary conservatism and without reviving corporatist statism or suppression of dissent. Such labels, often issued by left-leaning analysts, prioritize historical guilt by association over empirical alignment with fascist doctrines, impeding objective assessment. This misuse not only obscures distinctions between democratic nationalism and authoritarian revivalism but also erodes public trust in warnings about authentic threats, such as Greece's Golden Dawn, convicted in 2020 as a criminal organization for murders, assaults, and fascist-inspired hierarchy dating to its 1980 founding. By contrast, populist entities lack Golden Dawn's overt , expulsion of parliamentary norms, or documented pogroms against minorities. The pattern reflects institutional incentives in media and academia, where hyperbolic framing amplifies perceived dangers to justify interventions, yet empirical studies show most labeled "neo-fascist" groups achieve influence via votes—e.g., National Rally's 33% in France's 2022 presidential runoff—without eroding . Rigorous application of criteria, per experts like , demands evidence of sustained anti-democratic praxis, not mere rhetoric, to preserve the label's utility against genuine ideological heirs.

Empirical Evidence of Influence Versus Media Amplification

Neo-fascist groups have demonstrated limited empirical influence through electoral channels in post-Cold War Europe, with peak vote shares rarely exceeding 7-10% in national parliaments and swift declines following legal or voter backlash. In Greece, Golden Dawn secured 6.92% of the vote and 21 seats in the June 2012 parliamentary election amid economic crisis, marking its highest influence, but its support fell to 2.7% by July 2019, failing to enter parliament, after which leaders were convicted of directing a criminal organization in October 2020. Similarly, Italy's neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI), founded in 1946, evolved into moderated post-fascist entities like National Alliance in the 1990s, influencing coalitions but diluting core doctrines; its successor, Brothers of Italy, achieved 26% in the 2022 election through populist adaptation rather than overt fascist revival, holding power without implementing corporatist or authoritarian policies akin to interwar fascism. Across Europe, neo-fascist parties like Germany's NPD or Greece's post-Golden Dawn fragments have garnered under 2% in recent elections, lacking the systemic policy leverage seen in historical fascism. Violence associated with neo-fascist networks provides further evidence of contained impact, with incidents like Golden Dawn's attacks on immigrants (documented in over 500 cases from 2012-2019) leading to prosecutions rather than sustained territorial control or . Quantitative analyses of far-right extremism, including neo-fascist subsets, show attack frequencies rising modestly in the (e.g., 10-20% of European terrorist incidents attributed to right-wing motives annually post-2010), but these pale against Islamist or separatist threats in lethality and scale, with no neo-fascist group achieving the dominance of 1920s-1930s precursors. Policy influence remains negligible outside fringe local gains, such as anti-immigration ordinances in isolated Italian municipalities by groups like , which polled under 1% nationally in 2018. Media portrayal often amplifies this marginal presence, framing electoral upticks or isolated as harbingers of fascist resurgence, despite vote shares indicating voter rejection of unmoderated neo-fascism. Studies of media framing reveal disproportionate focus on far-right , with coverage volume exceeding empirical threat metrics; for instance, post-2015 European outlets allocated 3-5 times more articles to right-wing incidents than comparable left-wing , correlating with heightened public perception of risk over actual incidence rates. This amplification stems from institutional tendencies in to equate doctrinal echoes (e.g., ) with imminent , as seen in characterizations of Greece's 2012 Golden Dawn surge as a "neo-Nazi breakthrough" despite its rapid containment. Academic critiques note such narratives overlook causal factors like economic discontent driving support, instead prioritizing symbolic alarmism that boosts engagement but distorts scale.

Internal Criticisms and External Achievements of Associated Groups

Groups associated with neo-fascism, such as Greece's Golden Dawn and Italy's CasaPound Italia, have faced internal criticisms centered on leadership authoritarianism, tactical divergences over violence versus electoral pragmatism, and operational secrecy. In Golden Dawn, former members testified to a rigid hierarchy with "closed cells" reserved for violent operations, fostering dissent among those uncomfortable with the party's paramilitary structure; one witness highlighted conflicts over gender roles, as female members were compelled to run as candidates despite the party's traditionalist views on women in politics. These tensions contributed to fractures, including an MEP's defection in 2019 to form a breakaway party amid the leadership's trial for criminal activities. Similarly, CasaPound has expelled members for perceived ideological lapses, such as "intellectual laziness," reflecting purist pressures within its militant core, though the group maintains strong loyalty to founder Gianluca Iannone. Externally, these groups have achieved notable electoral inroads and community initiatives, particularly during economic distress. Golden Dawn surged to 6.97% of the vote in Greece's May 2012 parliamentary election, securing 21 seats in the 300-member —up from negligible support in 2009—by capitalizing on anti-immigration sentiment and the sovereign debt crisis. The party organized "Greeks-only" food banks, drives, and neighborhood patrols, such as escorting vulnerable citizens, which addressed perceived state failures in welfare provision and bolstered grassroots support among working-class voters. CasaPound Italia expanded to over 100 social centers by 2018, originating from a 2003 building occupation in ; these hubs provided gyms, bookstores, homeless shelters, and anti-eviction aid, filling voids in public services while embedding the group's ideology in local communities. The movement gained a municipal council seat in 's Ostia district in 2017, demonstrating localized electoral viability despite national thresholds barring broader parliamentary entry. Such efforts have influenced public discourse, normalizing discussions of national preference in welfare and housing amid migration pressures, though mainstream outlets often emphasize threats over these pragmatic appeals.

Organizational Structures and Tactics

Political Parties and Electoral Strategies

Neo-fascist have primarily operated within democratic frameworks by contesting elections, often emphasizing ultranationalist platforms to capitalize on economic discontent and concerns. Their electoral strategies typically involve direct appeals to disenfranchised voters through rhetoric, while navigating legal constraints on overt . Success has been sporadic, with peaks during crises but generally marginal national influence due to bans, dilutions into broader , or voter rejection of extremism. In , the Golden Dawn party achieved its electoral zenith in the May parliamentary elections, securing 21 seats with 6.97% of the vote amid severe measures and social unrest. The party maintained a similar share of 6.92% in the subsequent June elections, leveraging vigilante-style community patrols and opposition to bailouts to attract working-class support. However, by 2015, its vote fell to 6.3% despite leadership arrests, and it failed to enter in 2019, leading to a court-ordered dissolution as a criminal organization in 2020. Italy's (MSI), founded in 1946 by former Mussolini regime officials, pursued a strategy of gradual normalization, polling consistently between 5% and 8% from the through the by blending nostalgia for fascist with . In the 1990s, MSI evolved into the National Alliance (AN) under , entering coalitions with Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia in 1994, which boosted its legitimacy and vote share to 13.5% in 2001 and 15.7% in 2006. This adaptation allowed neo-fascist elements to influence policy without explicit revivalism, though AN later merged into party in 2009. In , the National Democratic Party (NPD), established in 1964 with neo-Nazi ties, has employed persistent regional campaigning on ethnic German repatriation and anti-immigration themes but garnered under 2% nationally, failing to surpass the 5% threshold for entry since its founding. Strategies included youth outreach and legal challenges to surveillance, yet constitutional court rulings in 2017 deemed it unconstitutional, limiting its operations without achieving . In Finland, the Blue-and-Black Movement (Sinimusta Liike), a neo-fascist party emphasizing ethnic nationalism, participates in democratic elections. It received a marginal vote share of around 0.1% in the 2023 parliamentary elections, winning no seats, and re-registered as a party in May 2025 following a prior deregistration. Broader neo-fascist groups have increasingly adopted for virality, framing grievances in populist terms to evade platform bans and amplify anti-globalist narratives, as seen in coordinated campaigns that blend fascist with contemporary memes. This digital pivot aids fringe parties in building parallel structures but often amplifies rather than substitutes for electoral bids, with limited translation to votes absent mainstream alliances.

Militant and Extralegal Networks

Neo-fascist movements have historically incorporated or allied with militant networks that operate outside legal frameworks, employing , , and occasional to enforce ideological goals such as ethnic exclusion and anti-leftist suppression. These networks often function as paramilitary-style squads attached to or as autonomous cells, drawing from interwar fascist blackshirt traditions but adapted to post-World War II constraints like bans on overt . Empirical records show such activities peaking during economic crises or political instability, with documented assaults on migrants, political opponents, and minorities, though prosecutions have curtailed many operations. In Italy during the 1960s-1980s "Years of Lead," neo-fascist groups like orchestrated extralegal bombings and shootings as part of a "" to destabilize and provoke authoritarian responses, resulting in over 80 deaths from attacks attributed to these networks. These actions involved clandestine cells coordinating with elements of the security apparatus, as evidenced by judicial investigations linking figures like to the 1972 Peteano bombing and the 1980 station . Italia, emerging in 2006 as a social center network, has maintained militant squads engaging in building occupations, brawls with antifascists, and Roma expulsions, framing violence as "" against perceived invasions, with incidents including the 2018 inspired by similar rhetoric. Greece's Golden Dawn, active from the 1980s but surging in the 2010s amid , operated formalized "storm trooper" units for organized pogroms against immigrants and leftists, with party leadership convicted in 2020 of directing over 500 attacks, including the 2013 murder of rapper by a cadre member. Court testimonies revealed hierarchical command structures mirroring fascist militias, where MPs funded and mobilized assailants via text messages for "discipline" operations. Similar patterns appear in skinhead-linked networks like , founded in 1987 as a music promotion front but evolving into transnational cells funding weapons and coordinating riots, such as 1990s clashes in and the , though its neo-Nazi tilt distinguishes it from strictly fascist lineages. These networks' efficacy relies on subcultural via concerts and gyms, but from European monitoring indicates declining incidence post-2010s due to laws and internal fractures, with fewer than 100 annual violent incidents tied to neo-fascist militants across the by 2020, contrasting media portrayals of existential threats.

International Alliances and Diffusion

Neo-fascist diffusion has primarily occurred through decentralized online forums and militant training networks rather than centralized international organizations, enabling ideological exchange and operational coordination across borders. The forum, active until 2017, served as a pivotal hub for young neo-fascists worldwide, fostering the creation of transnational groups like the Skull Mask network by providing a space for strategy-sharing and recruitment beyond established national organizations. Similarly, accelerationist ideologies—advocating violent —have spread globally via multi-node structures, with neo-fascist actors leveraging encrypted communications and shared manifestos to link cells in the United States, , and beyond, as evidenced by cross-border inspirations in attacks like the 2019 . Militant alliances emphasize physical and training, exemplified by the Active Clubs, a U.S.-originated neo-Nazi and white supremacist model that expanded to over 100 chapters in countries including , the , , and by mid-2025. These clubs promote "fight training" as a recruitment tool, drawing from neo-fascist tactics of building resilient networks resistant to infiltration, with documented collaborations such as joint events between American and European chapters. Western intelligence agencies have noted this model's role in an emerging international white supremacist movement, where neo-fascist groups escalate threats through shared logistics and , as seen in 2025 monitoring of cross-Atlantic activities. Cross-border ties among explicitly neo-fascist entities include the Feuerkrieg Division, a small but violent international neo-Nazi group operational since around 2018, which has recruited from multiple continents and advocated race-war tactics, influencing lone actors via online dissemination. , active in the late , forged explicit connections with neo-Nazi outfits, including joint propaganda and training exchanges documented in federal investigations. Historical precedents for such diffusion trace to mid-20th-century networks, such as Spanish-Italian neo-fascist collaborations revived through transnational publications like magazines that linked exiles and activists across and into the 1970s. These networks' growth reflects adaptation to digital globalization, with neo-fascist diffusion amplified by platforms allowing pseudonymous cooperation, though formal alliances remain rare due to legal risks and ideological purism; instead, ad-hoc partnerships focus on mutual reinforcement of ultranationalist and anti-globalist narratives. Empirical tracking by counter-extremism researchers indicates that while European neo-Nazis and nationalists form the densest interconnections, diffusion to and occurs via ideological exports rather than hierarchical command structures.

Regional Manifestations

Europe

In post-World War II Europe, neo-fascist movements arose most prominently in , where the legacy of Benito Mussolini's regime provided fertile ground for continuity. The (MSI), established on December 26, 1946, by former fascists including , functioned as the main neo-fascist political party, advocating , , and defense of Italian traditions while operating within democratic constraints. The MSI achieved modest electoral success, reflecting appeal among segments disillusioned with post-war liberalization and economic challenges, though it never exceeded 10% nationally and faced marginalization due to its fascist associations. By the 1990s, under leaders like , the MSI rebranded as the National Alliance in 1995, diluting explicit neo-fascist rhetoric to enter mainstream coalitions, eventually influencing modern parties like . Splinter groups persisted, such as Italia, founded in 2003 as a fascist emphasizing , including building occupations for and anti-immigration , viewing itself as a "third millennium" adaptation of Mussolini's ideology. garnered limited electoral support, around 0.7% in 2013, but maintained influence through militant networks and cultural events glorifying . In , the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, formed in 1985 by Nikos Michaloliakos, surged during the 2009-2015 , exploiting economic discontent and anti-immigrant sentiment to win 21 seats (6.97% of the vote) in the May 2012 parliamentary election. The group employed tactics, including assaults on migrants and leftists, leading to convictions in October 2020 for operating as a criminal organization responsible for murders, such as the 2013 killing of rapper , with leaders like Michaloliakos sentenced to 13 years. Despite the convictions, which effectively dismantled the party, Michaloliakos was briefly released in September 2025 before the decision was overturned, highlighting ongoing judicial challenges against neo-fascist remnants. Elsewhere in , neo-fascist activity remained fragmented and marginal, often confined to small groupuscules rather than mass parties. In , post-war groups like Ordre Nouveau echoed fascist tactics but dissolved into broader far-right formations without significant electoral impact. Germany's strict anti-Nazi laws suppressed overt neo-fascism, limiting it to underground networks like the National Democratic Party (NPD), which polled under 2% in federal elections. In the , organizations such as National Action, designated a terrorist group in 2016, represented neo-Nazi extremism but lacked broad support, with activities centered on propaganda and isolated violence. Across the , these movements prioritized , , and opposition to , yet empirical data shows their influence amplified by media coverage disproportionate to voter bases, which rarely surpassed 5-7% in affected countries.

North America

In the United States, neo-fascist ideologies have manifested primarily through small, fringe neo-Nazi and white supremacist organizations since the post-World War II era, rather than through mass political movements akin to interwar European fascism. The American neo-Nazi movement emerged in the late and , with figures like advocating for a fascist-inspired "" against and , influencing subsequent groups that blended with calls for authoritarian ethno-nationalism. By the 1970s and 1980s, leaders such as William Pierce, author of The Turner Diaries (1978), and promoted revolutionary neo-fascist tactics, including networks aimed at overthrowing the government to establish a , though these efforts remained confined to low membership numbers, often under 1,000 active participants per group. Empirical data from monitoring organizations indicate that neo-Nazi groups, which sometimes overlap with neo-fascist emphasizing corporatist and anti-egalitarianism, have conducted sporadic rallies and propaganda but achieved negligible electoral success, with incidents peaking around events like the 2017 in , where approximately 200-300 neo-Nazi affiliates participated amid broader white nationalist gatherings. Contemporary U.S. neo-fascist activity centers on decentralized "accelerationist" networks and fitness-oriented "active clubs," which recruit young men via online forums like the now-defunct (active 2011-2017) to train for potential racial conflict while promoting fascist ideals of hierarchy and national rebirth. Groups such as , formed in 2015 and disbanded by 2020, explicitly drew from neo-fascist thinkers like , advocating terrorist acts to hasten , with documented plots including the 2017 murders of two individuals by members in the U.S. Active clubs, emerging around 2018, operate as groups espousing white nationalist and fascist views, with over 100 chapters reported by 2023, though membership remains small—typically 10-20 per club—and focused on local protests against immigration or LGBTQ+ events rather than structured political organizations. These entities prioritize preparation over electoralism, reflecting a causal shift from 20th-century party models to post-internet radicalization, but federal disruptions, including FBI designations of groups like The Base (founded 2018) as terrorist threats, have limited their operational scale to isolated violence, with fewer than 10% of tracked incidents involving fatalities since 2000. In Canada, neo-fascist expressions align closely with U.S. patterns, featuring minor extremist cells rather than institutionalized parties, often under the umbrella of white nationalist "active clubs" that have expanded since 2020. These clubs, such as Toronto's "" offshoots or Ontario-based groups, recruit via fitness training and online propaganda, promoting anti-immigrant and ethno-separatist ideologies with fascist undertones of martial masculinity and opposition to , with activities including 2023-2025 rallies numbering in the dozens of participants. Historical precedents include the 1980s-1990s , which blended neo-Nazi culture with fascist calls for , leading to confrontations with authorities and internal collapse by 1997 due to infiltration and low support, estimated at under 500 members at peak. has listed entities like (active since the 1990s) for promoting neo-fascist music and networks, resulting in bans under anti-terrorism laws, yet quantitative assessments show far-right violence constitutes less than 5% of domestic extremism incidents annually, with neo-fascist groups contributing minimally compared to Islamist or lone-actor threats. Cross-border ties with U.S. active clubs facilitate diffusion, but Canadian manifestations remain fragmented, lacking the electoral foothold seen in , and are curtailed by robust laws enacted since the 1970s.

Latin America

In Latin America, neo-fascist manifestations have remained largely fringe and decentralized since , differing from European models by lacking significant electoral vehicles or mass mobilization; instead, they appear in isolated neo-Nazi cells, cultural subcultures, and occasional ties to authoritarian legacies. points to small, violent groups rather than structured parties, with activities centered on hate crimes, online propaganda, and , often drawing from European immigrant communities in southern and . These elements have not achieved the institutional penetration seen elsewhere, partly due to regional anti-fascist norms reinforced by U.S. hemispheric influence post-1945, which discouraged overt fascist alliances. Brazil hosts the most documented neo-fascist activity in the region, particularly in states like Santa Catarina and Paraná with historical German and Italian immigrant populations. Neo-Nazi groups, such as the skinhead organization Neuland, have engaged in organized violence, including assaults on minorities and distribution of propaganda materials, as reported in southern cities since the early 2000s. By 2023, police tracked a rising number of neo-Nazi incidents, including anonymous threats proclaiming areas as "land of WHITE PEOPLE" signed with "SIEG HEIL," amid a broader multiplication of such cells linked to black metal scenes and online metapolitics. These groups blend Holocaust denial with anti-communist rhetoric, but remain marginal, with membership estimated in the low hundreds and no parliamentary representation; claims of a "neo-fascist" surge tied to figures like former President Jair Bolsonaro often conflate nationalist populism with fascism, overlooking the absence of core fascist traits like state corporatism or leader cults demanding total obedience. In Argentina, post-1945 neo-fascist undercurrents stem from the influx of over 5,000 European fascists and Nazis fleeing via "," including figures like , who integrated into society under Perón's protection; Perón, an admirer of Mussolini and Hitler from his 1930s military postings, fostered these networks for technical expertise. Modern expressions include German nationalist groups promoting neo-Nazi ideology, documented by intelligence reports through the , and sporadic Evola-inspired traditionalism in far-right circles, but without forming durable parties. Pinochet-era saw tactical alliances with Italian neo-fascists for counter-revolutionary training during the 1973 coup and , involving shared anti-leftist tactics like disappearances, yet these were pragmatic rather than ideological adoptions of , with Chilean rooted more in than fascist or . Across the region, neo-fascist diffusion occurs via think tanks and U.S.- or Spain-backed networks promoting culture-war strategies over street militancy, as seen in Brazilian and Argentine far-right foundations echoing Evola's spiritual ; however, these lack the structures of historical and face suppression under hate-speech laws. Scholarly analyses note originality in Latin American variants, adapting fascist anti-elitism to local inequalities without reviving interwar mass parties, which collapsed by 1945 amid Allied pressures.

Asia and Oceania

In Australia, neo-fascist activity manifests primarily through neo-Nazi organizations that promote white supremacist ideologies, racial , and anti-immigration stances, often drawing inspiration from European fascist aesthetics and tactics. , founded in October 2016 by former members of the online forum, has distributed propaganda stickers, organized flash demonstrations, and targeted immigrant communities with harassment campaigns. Leaked private messages from 2025 exposed ties between Australian neo-Nazi cells and overseas groups like and The Base, facilitating the adoption of militant training methods and encrypted communication. The , led by Thomas Sewell since around 2020, has escalated visibility through public rallies, including a 2025 neo-Nazi march in where participants chanted slogans and displayed banned symbols like the number 88 (code for "Heil Hitler"). These groups, numbering in the low hundreds of active members, have faced legal crackdowns, with Sewell charged in 2021 for and weapons offenses following a violent confrontation. Australian authorities designated several such networks as terrorist organizations in 2024, citing plots for attacks on minorities and infrastructure. In , neo-fascist expressions have been historically marginal and tied to imported British models, with limited post-1980s organizational success. The National Front, formed in the late 1960s as a copy of the neo-fascist party, advocated white immigration preferences and opposition to land rights but dissolved by the 1980s amid electoral irrelevance, peaking at under 1% vote share in local elections. Contemporary activity remains fragmented, influenced by global online , though the 2019 mosque attacks by Brenton Tarrant—killing 51—highlighted accelerationist white with fascist undertones, rather than structured neo-fascist parties. No major neo-fascist electoral vehicles have emerged, with groups like the Dominion Movement focusing on ethno-nationalism but disavowing explicit . Across , neo-fascism lacks significant organized presence, overshadowed by indigenous ultranationalisms that predate or diverge from post-World War II fascist revivalism. In , uyoku dantai groups—estimated at over 1,000 small outfits with 100,000 participants as of the 2010s—promote imperial revisionism, visits, and anti-China/Korea rhetoric through sound trucks and pamphlets, but academic analyses classify them as conservative nationalists rather than neo-fascists, absent the totalitarian or leader cults of interwar . Postwar suppression under the U.S. occupation and alliance with have channeled such sentiments into mainstream politics via the Liberal Democratic Party, without fascist revival. In , critics from leftist circles, including Communist Party of India (Marxist) leaders, label the (RSS) and BJP's ideology as neo-fascist for mobilizing Hindu , vigilante actions against minorities, and centralizing power since Narendra Modi's 2014 election, citing over 1,000 cow incidents by 2020. These claims, often from sources with ideological opposition to , emphasize parallels to fascist myth-making and exclusionism, yet are contested by proponents and neutral scholars who highlight Hindutva's roots in pre-fascist cultural revivalism (dating to 1925) and India's functioning multiparty democracy, with BJP securing 37% of votes in 2019 elections amid opposition activity. No explicit neo-fascist parties or adoption of fascist symbols occurs, distinguishing it from European models.

Africa and Middle East

In South Africa, neo-fascist elements have manifested primarily among white Afrikaner nationalist groups responding to the end of apartheid in 1994. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB), founded in 1973 by Eugène Terre'Blanche, adopted neo-Nazi iconography such as the number 88 and swastika-like symbols, while promoting a paramilitary structure and ethnonationalist ideology aimed at establishing a whites-only Boer state. The group peaked in influence during the early 1990s, with thousands of members and involvement in violent clashes, including the 1993 assassination of Chris Hani, though Terre'Blanche's conviction for murder in 1997 weakened it; remnants persist in fringe online networks. Internationally linked neo-Nazi organizations, such as The Base, have recruited in South Africa since at least 2020, exploiting local grievances over land reform and crime to propagate accelerationist violence targeting perceived racial threats. Elsewhere in , organized neo-fascist activity remains negligible, with far-right more often tied to ethnic militias or anti-immigrant vigilantism in countries like or , lacking explicit fascist ideological frameworks. No major political parties or sustained movements echoing interwar —such as corporatist or leader cults—have gained traction, overshadowed by Islamist insurgencies and postcolonial . In the , neo-fascism has limited institutional presence, constrained by dominant Islamist, pan-Arabist, or monarchist ideologies that diverge from European fascist models. Historical fascist sympathies, evident in 1930s-1940s alliances like the Grand Mufti's collaboration with , have echoes in contemporary online spaces where digital Nazi communities in and the promote antisemitic content fused with local , such as in Egyptian or Lebanese Telegram channels admiring Hitler's as a counter to perceived Western decadence. These networks, active since at least the mid-2010s, number in the low thousands of adherents and occasionally intersect with Salafi-jihadist rhetoric, though they lack offline mobilization or electoral vehicles. Ba'athist regimes in and under (1979-2003) and exhibited neo-fascist traits, including totalitarian control, militarized nationalism, and suppression of dissent, drawing partial inspiration from European models via Michel Aflaq's writings; however, their and pan-Arab focus distinguish them from purer neo-fascist revivals. Post-Arab Spring, fringe far-right groups in or have surfaced with fascist aesthetics, but they remain marginal, with no verifiable electoral success or capacity as of 2025. Overall, regional dynamics favor religious extremism over secular neo-fascist imports.

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