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Climate change mitigation
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Climate change mitigation (or decarbonisation) is action to limit the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that cause climate change. Climate change mitigation actions include conserving energy and replacing fossil fuels with clean energy sources. Secondary mitigation strategies include changes to land use and removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere.[1][2] Current climate change mitigation policies are insufficient as they would still result in global warming of about 2.7 °C by 2100,[3] significantly above the 2015 Paris Agreement's[4] goal of limiting global warming to below 2 °C.[5][6]
Solar energy and wind power can replace fossil fuels at the lowest cost compared to other renewable energy options.[7] The availability of sunshine and wind is variable and can require electrical grid upgrades, such as using long-distance electricity transmission to group a range of power sources.[8] Energy storage can also be used to even out power output, and demand management can limit power use when power generation is low. Cleanly generated electricity can usually replace fossil fuels for powering transportation, heating buildings, and running industrial processes.[9] Certain processes are more difficult to decarbonise, such as air travel and cement production. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) can be an option to reduce net emissions in these circumstances, although fossil fuel power plants with CCS technology is currently a high-cost climate change mitigation strategy.[10][11][12]
Human land use changes such as agriculture and deforestation cause about 1/4th of climate change. These changes impact how much CO2 is absorbed by plant matter and how much organic matter decays or burns to release CO2. These changes are part of the fast carbon cycle, whereas fossil fuels release CO2 that was buried underground as part of the slow carbon cycle. Methane is a short-lived greenhouse gas that is produced by decaying organic matter and livestock, as well as fossil fuel extraction. Land use changes can also impact precipitation patterns and the reflectivity of the surface of the Earth. It is possible to cut emissions from agriculture by reducing food waste, switching to a more plant-based diet (also referred to as low-carbon diet), and by improving farming processes.[13]
Various policies can encourage climate change mitigation. Carbon pricing systems have been set up that either tax CO2 emissions or cap total emissions and trade emission credits. Fossil fuel subsidies can be eliminated in favour of clean energy subsidies, and incentives offered for installing energy efficiency measures or switching to electric power sources.[14] Another issue is overcoming environmental objections when constructing new clean energy sources and making grid modifications. Limiting climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions or removing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere could be supplemented by climate technologies such as solar radiation management (or solar geoengineering). Complementary climate change actions, including climate activism, have a focus on political and cultural aspects.
Definitions and scope
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Climate change mitigation aims to sustain ecosystems to maintain human civilisation. This requires drastic cuts in greenhouse gas emissions.[15]: 1–64 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines mitigation (of climate change) as "a human intervention to reduce emissions or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases".[16]: 2239
It is possible to approach various mitigation measures in parallel. This is because there is no single pathway to limit global warming to 1.5 or 2 °C.[17]: 109 There are four types of measures:
- Sustainable energy and sustainable transport
- Energy conservation, including efficient energy use
- Sustainable agriculture and green industrial policy
- Enhancing carbon sinks and carbon dioxide removal (CDR), including carbon sequestration
The IPCC defined carbon dioxide removal as "Anthropogenic activities removing carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs, or in products. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of biological or geochemical CO2 sinks and direct air carbon dioxide capture and storage (DACCS) but excludes natural CO2 uptake not directly caused by human activities."[16]
Emission trends and pledges
[edit]- CO2 mostly by fossil fuel (72.0%)
- CH4 methane (19.0%)
- N
2O nitrous oxide (6.00%) - Fluorinated gases (3.00%)
- coal (39.0%)
- oil (34.0%)
- gas (21.0%)
- cement (4.00%)
- others (1.50%)
Greenhouse gas emissions from human activities strengthen the greenhouse effect. This contributes to climate change. Most is carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. Human-caused emissions have increased atmospheric carbon dioxide by about 50% over pre-industrial levels. Emissions in the 2010s averaged a record 56 billion tons (Gt) a year.[20] In 2016, energy for electricity, heat and transport was responsible for 73.2% of GHG emissions. Direct industrial processes accounted for 5.2%, waste for 3.2% and agriculture, forestry and land use for 18.4%.[21]
Electricity generation and transport are major emitters. The largest single source is coal-fired power stations with 20% of greenhouse gas emissions.[22] Deforestation and other changes in land use also emit carbon dioxide and methane. The largest sources of anthropogenic methane emissions are agriculture, and gas venting and fugitive emissions from the fossil-fuel industry. The largest agricultural methane source is livestock. Agricultural soils emit nitrous oxide, partly due to fertilizers.[23] There is now a political solution to the problem of fluorinated gases from refrigerants. This is because many countries have ratified the Kigali Amendment.[24]
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the dominant emitted greenhouse gas. Methane (CH4) emissions almost have the same short-term impact.[25] Nitrous oxide (N2O) and fluorinated gases (F-Gases) play a minor role. Livestock and manure produce 5.8% of all greenhouse gas emissions.[21] But this depends on the time frame used to calculate the global warming potential of the respective gas.[26][27]
Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are measured in CO2 equivalents. Scientists determine their CO2 equivalents from their global warming potential (GWP). This depends on their lifetime in the atmosphere. There are widely used greenhouse gas accounting methods that convert volumes of methane, nitrous oxide and other greenhouse gases to carbon dioxide equivalents. Estimates largely depend on the ability of oceans and land sinks to absorb these gases. Short-lived climate pollutants (SLCPs) persist in the atmosphere for a period ranging from days to 15 years. Carbon dioxide can remain in the atmosphere for millennia.[28] Short-lived climate pollutants include methane, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), tropospheric ozone and black carbon.
Scientists increasingly use satellites to locate and measure greenhouse gas emissions and deforestation. Earlier, scientists largely relied on or calculated estimates of greenhouse gas emissions and governments' self-reported data.[29][30]
Needed emissions cuts
[edit]
The annual "Emissions Gap Report" by UNEP stated in 2022 that it was necessary to almost halve emissions. "To get on track for limiting global warming to 1.5°C, global annual GHG emissions must be reduced by 45 per cent compared with emissions projections under policies currently in place in just eight years, and they must continue to decline rapidly after 2030, to avoid exhausting the limited remaining atmospheric carbon budget."[13]: xvi The report commented that the world should focus on broad-based economy-wide transformations and not incremental change.[13]: xvi
In 2022, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its Sixth Assessment Report on climate change. It warned that greenhouse gas emissions must peak before 2025 at the latest and decline 43% by 2030 to have a good chance of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C (2.7 °F).[31][32] Or in the words of Secretary-General of the United Nations António Guterres: "Main emitters must drastically cut emissions starting this year".[33]
A 2023 synthesis by leading climate scientists highlighted ten critical areas in climate science with significant policy implications. These include the near inevitability of temporarily exceeding the 1.5 °C warming limit, the urgent need for a rapid and managed fossil fuel phase-out, challenges in scaling carbon dioxide removal technologies, uncertainties regarding the future contribution of natural carbon sinks, and the interconnected crises of biodiversity loss and climate change. These insights underscore the necessity for immediate and comprehensive mitigation strategies to address the multifaceted challenges of climate change.[34]
Pledges
[edit]Climate Action Tracker described the situation on 9 November 2021 as follows. The global temperature will rise by 2.7 °C by the end of the century with current policies and by 2.9 °C with nationally adopted policies. The temperature will rise by 2.4 °C if countries only implement the pledges for 2030. The rise would be 2.1 °C with the achievement of the long-term targets too. Full achievement of all announced targets would mean the rise in global temperature will peak at 1.9 °C and go down to 1.8 °C by the year 2100.[35] Experts gather information about climate pledges in the Global Climate Action Portal - Nazca. The scientific community is checking their fulfilment.[36]
There has not been a definitive or detailed evaluation of most goals set for 2020. But it appears the world failed to meet most or all international goals set for that year.[37][38]
One update came during the 2021 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Glasgow. The group of researchers running the Climate Action Tracker looked at countries responsible for 85% of greenhouse gas emissions. It found that only four countries or political entities—the EU, UK, Chile and Costa Rica—have published a detailed official policy‑plan that describes the steps to realise 2030 mitigation targets. These four polities are responsible for 6% of global greenhouse gas emissions.[39]
In 2021 the US and EU launched the Global Methane Pledge to cut methane emissions by 30% by 2030. The UK, Argentina, Indonesia, Italy and Mexico joined the initiative. Ghana and Iraq signalled interest in joining. A White House summary of the meeting noted those countries represent six of the top 15 methane emitters globally.[40] Israel also joined the initiative.[41]
Low-carbon energy
[edit]
The energy system includes the delivery and use of energy. It is the main emitter of carbon dioxide (CO2).[43]: 6–6 Rapid and deep reductions in the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from the energy sector are necessary to limit global warming to well below 2 °C.[43]: 6–3 IPCC recommendations include reducing fossil fuel consumption, increasing production from low- and zero carbon energy sources, and increasing use of electricity and alternative energy carriers.[43]: 6–3
Nearly all scenarios and strategies involve a major increase in the use of renewable energy in combination with increased energy efficiency measures.[44]: xxiii It will be necessary to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy six-fold from 0.25% annual growth in 2015 to 1.5% to keep global warming under 2 °C.[45]

The competitiveness of renewable energy is a key to a rapid deployment. In 2020, onshore wind and solar photovoltaics were the cheapest source for new bulk electricity generation in many regions.[47] Renewables may have higher storage costs but non-renewables may have higher clean-up costs.[48] A carbon price can increase the competitiveness of renewable energy.[49]
Solar and wind energy
[edit]
Wind and sun can provide large amounts of low-carbon energy at competitive production costs.[51] The IPCC estimates that these two mitigation options have the largest potential to reduce emissions before 2030 at low cost.[7]: 43 Solar photovoltaics (PV) has become the cheapest way to generate electricity in many regions of the world.[52] The growth of photovoltaics has been close to exponential. It has about doubled every three years since the 1990s.[53][54] A different technology is concentrated solar power (CSP). This uses mirrors or lenses to concentrate a large area of sunlight on to a receiver. With CSP, the energy can be stored for a few hours. This provides supply in the evening. Solar water heating doubled between 2010 and 2019.[55]

Regions in the higher northern and southern latitudes have the greatest potential for wind power.[56] Offshore wind farms are more expensive. But offshore units deliver more energy per installed capacity with less fluctuations.[57] In most regions, wind power generation is higher in the winter when PV output is low. For this reason, combinations of wind and solar power lead to better-balanced systems.[58]
Other renewables
[edit]
Other well-established renewable energy forms include hydropower, bioenergy and geothermal energy.
- Hydroelectricity is electricity generated by hydropower and plays a leading role in countries like Brazil, Norway and China.[59] but there are geographical limits and environmental issues.[60] Tidal power can be used in coastal regions.
- Bioenergy can provide energy for electricity, heat and transport. Bioenergy, in particular biogas, can provide dispatchable electricity generation.[61] While burning plant-derived biomass releases CO2, the plants withdraw CO2 from the atmosphere while they grow. The technologies for producing, transporting and processing a fuel have a significant impact on the lifecycle emissions of the fuel.[62] For example, aviation is starting to use renewable biofuels.[63]
- Geothermal power is electrical power generated from geothermal energy. Geothermal electricity generation is currently used in 26 countries.[64][65] Geothermal heating is in use in 70 countries.[66]
Integrating variable renewable energy
[edit]Wind and solar power production does not consistently match demand.[67][68] To deliver reliable electricity from variable renewable energy sources such as wind and solar, electrical power systems must be flexible.[69] Most electrical grids were constructed for non-intermittent energy sources such as coal-fired power plants.[70] The integration of larger amounts of solar and wind energy into the grid requires a change of the energy system; this is necessary to ensure that the supply of electricity matches demand.[71]
There are various ways to make the electricity system more flexible. In many places, wind and solar generation are complementary on a daily and a seasonal scale. There is more wind during the night and in winter when solar energy production is low.[71] Linking different geographical regions through long-distance transmission lines also makes it possible to reduce variability.[72] It is possible to shift energy demand in time. Energy demand management and the use of smart grids make it possible to match the times when variable energy production is highest.[71] Sector coupling can provide further flexibility. This involves coupling the electricity sector to the heat and mobility sector via power-to-heat-systems and electric vehicles.[73]

Energy storage helps overcome barriers to intermittent renewable energy.[74] The most commonly used and available storage method is pumped-storage hydroelectricity. This requires locations with large differences in height and access to water.[74] Batteries are also in wide use.[75] They typically store electricity for short periods.[76] Batteries have low energy density. This and their cost makes them impractical for the large energy storage necessary to balance inter-seasonal variations in energy production.[77] Some locations have implemented pumped hydro storage with capacity for multi-month usage.[78]
Nuclear power
[edit]Nuclear power could complement renewables for electricity.[79] On the other hand, environmental and security risks could outweigh the benefits.[80][81][82] Examples of these environmental risks being the discharge of radioactive water to nearby ecosystems, and the routine release of radioactive gases as well.[83]
The construction of new nuclear reactors currently takes about 10 years. This is much longer than scaling up the deployment of wind and solar.[84]: 335 And this timing gives rise to credit risks.[85] However nuclear may be much cheaper in China. China is building a significant number of new power plants.[85] As of 2019[update] the cost of extending nuclear power plant lifetimes is competitive with other electricity generation technologies[86] if long term costs for nuclear waste disposal are excluded from the calculation. There is also no sufficient financial insurance for nuclear accidents.[87]
Replacing coal with natural gas
[edit]Switching from coal to natural gas has advantages in terms of sustainability. For a given unit of energy produced, the life-cycle greenhouse-gas emissions of natural gas are around 40 times the emissions of wind or nuclear energy but are much less than coal. Burning natural gas produces around half the emissions of coal when used to generate electricity and around two-thirds the emissions of coal when used to produce heat.[88] Natural gas combustion also produces less air pollution than coal.[89] However, natural gas is a potent greenhouse gas in itself, and leaks during extraction and transportation can negate the advantages of switching away from coal.[90] The technology to curb methane leaks is widely available but it is not always used.[90]
Switching from coal to natural gas reduces emissions in the short term and thus contributes to climate change mitigation. However, in the long term it does not provide a path to net-zero emissions. Developing natural gas infrastructure risks carbon lock-in and stranded assets, where new fossil infrastructure either commits to decades of carbon emissions, or has to be written off before it makes a profit.[91][92]Demand reduction
[edit]Reducing demand for products and services that cause greenhouse gas emissions can help in mitigating climate change. One is to reduce demand by behavioural and cultural changes, for example by making changes in diet, especially the decision to reduce meat consumption,[93] an effective action individuals take to fight climate change. Another is by reducing the demand by improving infrastructure, by building a good public transport network, for example. Lastly, changes in end-use technology can reduce energy demand. For instance a well-insulated house emits less than a poorly-insulated house.[94]: 119
Mitigation options that reduce demand for products or services help people make personal choices to reduce their carbon footprint. This could be in their choice of transport or food.[95]: 5–3 So these mitigation options have many social aspects that focus on demand reduction; they are therefore demand-side mitigation actions. For example, people with high socio-economic status often cause more greenhouse gas emissions than those from a lower status. If they reduce their emissions and promote green policies, these people could become low-carbon lifestyle role models.[95]: 5–4 However, there are many psychological variables that influence consumers. These include awareness and perceived risk.[96]
Government policies can support or hinder demand-side mitigation options. For example, public policy can promote circular economy concepts which would support climate change mitigation.[95]: 5–6 Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is linked to the sharing economy.
There is a debate regarding the correlation of economic growth and emissions. It seems economic growth no longer necessarily means higher emissions.[97][98]
A 2024 article in Nature Climate Change emphasises the importance of integrating behavioural science into climate change mitigation strategies. The article presents six key recommendations aimed at improving individual and collective actions toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions, including overcoming barriers to research, fostering cross-disciplinary collaborations, and promoting practical behaviour-oriented solutions. These insights suggest that behavioural science plays a crucial role alongside technological and policy measures in addressing climate change.[99]
Energy conservation and efficiency
[edit]Global primary energy demand exceeded 161,000 terawatt hours (TWh) in 2018.[100] This refers to electricity, transport and heating including all losses. In transport and electricity production, fossil fuel usage has a low efficiency of less than 50%. Large amounts of heat in power plants and in motors of vehicles go to waste. The actual amount of energy consumed is significantly lower at 116,000 TWh.[101]
Energy conservation is the effort made to reduce the consumption of energy by using less of an energy service. One way is to use energy more efficiently. This means using less energy than before to produce the same service. Another way is to reduce the amount of service used. An example of this would be to drive less. Energy conservation is at the top of the sustainable energy hierarchy.[102] When consumers reduce wastage and losses they can conserve energy. The upgrading of technology as well as the improvements to operations and maintenance can result in overall efficiency improvements.
Efficient energy use (or energy efficiency) is the process of reducing the amount of energy required to provide products and services. Improved energy efficiency in buildings ("green buildings"), industrial processes and transportation could reduce the world's energy needs in 2050 by one third. This would help reduce global emissions of greenhouse gases.[103] For example, insulating a building allows it to use less heating and cooling energy to achieve and maintain thermal comfort. Improvements in energy efficiency are generally achieved by adopting a more efficient technology or production process.[104] Another way is to use commonly accepted methods to reduce energy losses.
Lifestyle changes
[edit]
Individual action on climate change can include personal choices in many areas. These include diet, travel, household energy use, consumption of goods and services, and family size. People who wish to reduce their carbon footprint can take high-impact actions such as avoiding frequent flying and petrol-fuelled cars, eating mainly a plant-based diet, having fewer children,[106][107] using clothes and electrical products for longer,[108] and electrifying homes.[109][110] These approaches are more practical for people in high-income countries with high-consumption lifestyles. Naturally, it is more difficult for those with lower income statuses to make these changes. This is because choices like electric-powered cars may not be available. Excessive consumption is more to blame for climate change than population increase.[111] High-consumption lifestyles have a greater environmental impact, with the richest 10% of people emitting about half the total lifestyle emissions.[112][113]
Dietary change
[edit]Some scientists say that avoiding meat and dairy foods is the single biggest way an individual can reduce their environmental impact.[114] The widespread adoption of a vegetarian diet could cut food-related greenhouse gas emissions by 63% by 2050.[115] China introduced new dietary guidelines in 2016 which aim to cut meat consumption by 50% and thereby reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 1 Gt per year by 2030.[116] Overall, food accounts for the largest share of consumption-based greenhouse gas emissions. It is responsible for nearly 20% of the global carbon footprint. Almost 15% of all anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions have been attributed to the livestock sector.[110]
A shift towards plant-based diets would help to mitigate climate change.[117] In particular, reducing meat consumption would help to reduce methane emissions.[118] If high-income nations switched to a plant-based diet, vast amounts of land used for animal agriculture could be allowed to return to their natural state. This in turn has the potential to sequester 100 billion tonnes of CO2 by the end of the century.[119][120] A comprehensive analysis found that plant based diets reduce emissions, water pollution and land use significantly (by 75%), while reducing the destruction of wildlife and usage of water.[121]

Family size
[edit]
Population growth has resulted in higher greenhouse gas emissions in most regions, particularly Africa.[43]: 6–11 However, economic growth has a bigger effect than population growth.[95]: 6–622 Rising incomes, changes in consumption and dietary patterns, as well as population growth, cause pressure on land and other natural resources. This leads to more greenhouse gas emissions and fewer carbon sinks.[123]: 117 Some scholars have argued that humane policies to slow population growth should be part of a broad climate response together with policies that end fossil fuel use and encourage sustainable consumption.[124] Advances in female education and reproductive health, especially voluntary family planning, can contribute to reducing population growth.[95]: 5–35
Preserving and enhancing carbon sinks
[edit]
An important mitigation measure is "preserving and enhancing carbon sinks".[7] This refers to the management of Earth's natural carbon sinks in a way that preserves or increases their capability to remove CO2 from the atmosphere and to store it durably. Scientists call this process also carbon sequestration. In the context of climate change mitigation, the IPCC defines a sink as "Any process, activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere".[16]: 2249 Globally, the two most important carbon sinks are vegetation and the ocean.[125]
To enhance the ability of ecosystems to sequester carbon, changes are necessary in agriculture and forestry.[126] Examples are preventing deforestation and restoring natural ecosystems by reforestation.[127]: 266 Scenarios that limit global warming to 1.5 °C typically project the large-scale use of carbon dioxide removal methods over the 21st century.[128]: 1068 [129]: 17 There are concerns about over-reliance on these technologies, and their environmental impacts.[129]: 17 [130]: 34 But ecosystem restoration and reduced conversion are among the mitigation tools that can yield the most emissions reductions before 2030.[7]: 43
Land-based mitigation options are referred to as "AFOLU mitigation options" in the 2022 IPCC report on mitigation. The abbreviation stands for "agriculture, forestry and other land use"[7]: 37 The report described the economic mitigation potential from relevant activities around forests and ecosystems as follows: "the conservation, improved management, and restoration of forests and other ecosystems (coastal wetlands, peatlands, savannas and grasslands)". A high mitigation potential is found for reducing deforestation in tropical regions. The economic potential of these activities has been estimated to be 4.2 to 7.4 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2 -eq) per year.[7]: 37
Forests
[edit]Conservation
[edit]
The Stern Review on the economics of climate change stated in 2007 that curbing deforestation was a highly cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.[131] About 95% of deforestation occurs in the tropics, where clearing of land for agriculture is one of the main causes.[132] One forest conservation strategy is to transfer rights over land from public ownership to its indigenous inhabitants.[133] Land concessions often go to powerful extractive companies.[133] Conservation strategies that exclude and even evict humans, called fortress conservation, often lead to more exploitation of the land. This is because the native inhabitants turn to work for extractive companies to survive.[134]
Proforestation is promoting forests to capture their full ecological potential.[135] This is a mitigation strategy as secondary forests that have regrown in abandoned farmland are found to have less biodiversity than the original old-growth forests. Original forests store 60% more carbon than these new forests.[136] Strategies include rewilding and establishing wildlife corridors.[137][138]
Afforestation, reforestation and preventing desertification
[edit]Afforestation is the establishment of trees where there was previously no tree cover. Scenarios for new plantations covering up to 4000 million hectares (Mha) (6300 x 6300 km) suggest cumulative carbon storage of more than 900 GtC (2300 GtCO2) until 2100.[139] But they are not a viable alternative to aggressive emissions reduction.[140] This is because the plantations would need to be so large they would eliminate most natural ecosystems or reduce food production.[141] One example is the Trillion Tree Campaign.[142][143] However, preserving biodiversity is also important and for example not all grasslands are suitable for conversion into forests.[144] Grasslands can even turn from carbon sinks to carbon sources.

Reforestation is the restocking of existing depleted forests or in places where there were recently forests. Reforestation could save at least 1 GtCO2 per year, at an estimated cost of $5–15 per tonne of carbon dioxide (tCO2).[147] Restoring all degraded forests all over the world could capture about 205 GtC (750 GtCO2).[148] With increased intensive agriculture and urbanisation, there is an increase in the amount of abandoned farmland. By some estimates, for every acre of original old-growth forest cut down, more than 50 acres of new secondary forests are growing.[136][149] In some countries, promoting regrowth on abandoned farmland could offset years of emissions.[150]
Planting new trees can be expensive and a risky investment. For example, about 80 per cent of planted trees in the Sahel die within two years.[145] Reforestation has higher carbon storage potential than afforestation. Even long-deforested areas still contain an "underground forest" of living roots and tree stumps. Helping native species sprout naturally is cheaper than planting new trees and they are more likely to survive. This could include pruning and coppicing to accelerate growth. This also provides woodfuel, which is otherwise a major source of deforestation. Such practices, called farmer-managed natural regeneration, are centuries old but the biggest obstacle towards implementation is ownership of the trees by the state. The state often sells timber rights to businesses which leads to locals uprooting seedlings because they see them as a liability. Legal aid for locals[151][152] and changes to property law such as in Mali and Niger have led to significant changes. Scientists describe them as the largest positive environmental transformation in Africa. It is possible to discern from space the border between Niger and the more barren land in Nigeria, where the law has not changed.[145][146]
Rangelands account for more half the world's land and could sequester 35% of terrestrial carbon.[153] Pastoralists are those who move with their herds that feed and migrate over often unenclosed grazelands. Such land is usually unable to grow any other kind of food. Rangelands coevolved with large wild herds, many of which have decreased or gone extinct, and pastoralists' herds replace such wild herds and thus help maintain the ecosystem.[154] However, the movement of herds grazing on large areas over vast distances is increasingly restricted by governments, who often grant exclusive title to lands for more profitable uses which restricts pastoralists to more enclose spaces.[155] This has led to the overgrazing of the land and desertification, as well as conflict.[153]
Soils
[edit]There are many measures to increase soil carbon.[156] This makes it complex[157] and hard to measure and account for.[158] One advantage is that there are fewer trade-offs for these measures than for BECCS or afforestation, for example.[159]
Globally, protecting healthy soils and restoring the soil carbon sponge could remove 7.6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere annually. This is more than the annual emissions of the US.[160][161] Trees capture CO2 while growing above ground and exuding larger amounts of carbon below ground. Trees contribute to the building of a soil carbon sponge. Carbon formed above ground is released as CO2 immediately when wood is burned. If dead wood remains untouched, only some of the carbon returns to the atmosphere as decomposition proceeds.[160]
Farming can deplete soil carbon and render soil incapable of supporting life. However, conservation farming can protect carbon in soils, and repair damage over time.[162] The farming practice of cover crops is a form of carbon farming.[163] Methods that enhance carbon sequestration in soil include no-till farming, residue mulching and crop rotation. Scientists have described the best management practices for European soils to increase soil organic carbon. These are conversion of arable land to grassland, straw incorporation, reduced tillage, straw incorporation combined with reduced tillage, ley cropping system and cover crops.[164]
Another mitigation option is the production of biochar and its storage in soils This is the solid material that remains after the pyrolysis of biomass. Biochar production releases half of the carbon from the biomass—either released into the atmosphere or captured with CCS—and retains the other half in the stable biochar.[165] It can endure in soil for thousands of years.[166] Biochar may increase the soil fertility of acidic soils and increase agricultural productivity. During production of biochar, heat is released which may be used as bioenergy.[165]
Wetlands
[edit]Wetland restoration is an important mitigation measure. It has moderate to great mitigation potential on a limited land area with low trade-offs and costs.[167] Wetlands perform two important functions in relation to climate change. They can sequester carbon, converting carbon dioxide to solid plant material through photosynthesis. They also store and regulate water.[168][169] Wetlands store about 45 million tonnes of carbon per year globally.[170]
Some wetlands are a significant source of methane emissions.[171] Some also emit nitrous oxide.[172][173] Peatland globally covers just 3% of the land's surface.[174] But it stores up to 550 gigatonnes (Gt) of carbon. This represents 42% of all soil carbon and exceeds the carbon stored in all other vegetation types, including the world's forests.[175] The threat to peatlands includes draining the areas for agriculture. Another threat is cutting down trees for lumber, as the trees help hold and fix the peatland.[176][177] Additionally, peat is often sold for compost.[178] It is possible to restore degraded peatlands by blocking drainage channels in the peatland, and allowing natural vegetation to recover.[137][179]
Mangroves, salt marshes and seagrasses make up the majority of the ocean's vegetated habitats. They only equal 0.05% of the plant biomass on land. But they store carbon 40 times faster than tropical forests.[137] Bottom trawling, dredging for coastal development and fertiliser runoff have damaged coastal habitats. Notably, 85% of oyster reefs globally have been removed in the last two centuries. Oyster reefs clean the water and help other species thrive. This increases biomass in that area. In addition, oyster reefs mitigate the effects of climate change by reducing the force of waves from hurricanes. They also reduce the erosion from rising sea levels.[180] Restoration of coastal wetlands is thought to be more cost-effective than restoration of inland wetlands.[181]
Deep ocean
[edit]These options focus on the carbon which ocean reservoirs can store. They include ocean fertilization, ocean alkalinity enhancement or enhanced weathering.[182]: 12–36 The IPCC found in 2022 ocean-based mitigation options currently have only limited deployment potential. But it assessed that their future mitigation potential is large.[182]: 12–4 It found that in total, ocean-based methods could remove 1–100 Gt of CO2 per year.[94]: TS-94 Their costs are in the order of US$40–500 per tonne of CO2. Most of these options could also help to reduce ocean acidification. This is the drop in pH value caused by increased atmospheric CO2 concentrations.[183]
The recovery of whale populations can play a role in mitigation as whales play a significant part in nutrient recycling in the ocean. This occurs through what is referred to as the whale pump, where whales' liquid feces stay at the surface of the ocean. Phytoplankton live near the surface of the ocean in order use sunlight to photosynthesize and rely on much of the carbon, nitrogen and iron of the feces. As the phytoplankton form the base of the marine food chain this increases ocean biomass and thus the amount of carbon sequestrated in it.[184]
Blue carbon management is another type of ocean-based biological carbon dioxide removal (CDR). It can involve land-based as well as ocean-based measures.[182]: 12–51 [185]: 764 The term usually refers to the role that tidal marshes, mangroves and seagrasses can play in carbon sequestration.[16]: 2220 Some of these efforts can also take place in deep ocean waters. This is where the vast majority of ocean carbon is held. These ecosystems can contribute to climate change mitigation and also to ecosystem-based adaptation. Conversely, when blue carbon ecosystems are degraded or lost they release carbon back to the atmosphere.[16]: 2220 There is increasing interest in developing blue carbon potential.[186] Scientists have found that in some cases these types of ecosystems remove far more carbon per area than terrestrial forests. However, the long-term effectiveness of blue carbon as a carbon dioxide removal solution remains under discussion.[187][186][188]
Enhanced weathering
[edit]Enhanced weathering could remove 2–4 Gt of CO2 per year. This process aims to accelerate natural weathering by spreading finely ground silicate rock, such as basalt, onto surfaces. This speeds up chemical reactions between rocks, water, and air. It removes carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, permanently storing it in solid carbonate minerals or ocean alkalinity.[189] Cost estimates are in the US$50–200 per tonne range of CO2.[94]: TS-94
Other methods to capture and store CO2
[edit]
In addition to traditional land-based methods to remove carbon dioxide (CO2) from the air, other technologies are under development. These could reduce CO2 emissions and lower existing atmospheric CO2 levels. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a method to mitigate climate change by capturing CO2 from large point sources, such as cement factories or biomass power plants. It then stores it away safely instead of releasing it into the atmosphere. The IPCC estimates that the costs of halting global warming would double without CCS.[190]
Among the most viable carbon dioxide removal methods considered alongside solar radiation modification, biochar soil amendment is already being deployed commercially. Studies indicate that the carbon it contains remains stable in soils for centuries, giving it a durable potential of removing gigatonnes of CO2 per year.[191] Expert assessments place the net cost of removing CO2 with biochar between US$30 and $120 per tonne. Market data show that biochar supplied 94% of all durable CDR credits delivered in 2023, demonstrating current scalability.[192][193] Stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), by comparison, could reduce global temperature quickly by dispersing sulfate aerosols in the stratosphere; however, deployment at climatically relevant scale would require the design and certification of a new fleet of high‑altitude aircraft, a process estimated to take a decade or more, and ongoing operating costs of about US$18 billion for each degree Celsius of cooling.[194] While models confirm that SAI would lower global mean temperature, there are potential side effect including ozone depletion, altered regional precipitation patterns, and the risk of a sudden "termination shock" warming if the programme were interrupted. These systemic risks are absent from biochar deployment.[195]
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) expands on the potential of CCS and aims to lower atmospheric CO2 levels. This process uses biomass grown for bioenergy. The biomass yields energy in useful forms such as electricity, heat, biofuels, etc. through consumption of the biomass via combustion, fermentation, or pyrolysis. The process captures the CO2 that was extracted from the atmosphere when it grew. It then stores it underground or via land application as biochar. This effectively removes it from the atmosphere.[196] This makes BECCS a negative emissions technology (NET).[197]
Scientists estimated the potential range of negative emissions from BECCS in 2018 as 0–22 Gt per year.[198] As of 2022[update], BECCS was capturing approximately 2 million tonnes per year of CO2 annually.[199] The cost and availability of biomass limits wide deployment of BECCS.[200][201]: 10 BECCS currently forms a big part of achieving climate targets beyond 2050 in modelling, such as by the Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) associated with the IPCC process. But many scientists are sceptical due to the risk of loss of biodiversity.[202]
Direct air capture is a process of capturing CO2 directly from the ambient air. This is in contrast to CCS which captures carbon from point sources. It generates a concentrated stream of CO2 for sequestration, utilisation or production of carbon-neutral fuel and windgas.[203] Artificial processes vary, and there are concerns about the long-term effects of some of these processes.[204][obsolete source]
Mitigation by sector
[edit]Buildings
[edit]The building sector accounts for 23% of global energy-related CO2 emissions.[17]: 141 About half of the energy is used for space and water heating.[206] Building insulation can reduce the primary energy demand significantly. Heat pump loads may also provide a flexible resource that can participate in demand response to integrate variable renewable resources into the grid.[207] Solar water heating uses thermal energy directly. Sufficiency measures include moving to smaller houses when the needs of households change, mixed use of spaces and the collective use of devices.[94]: 71 Planners and civil engineers can construct new buildings using passive solar building design, low-energy building, or zero-energy building techniques. In addition, it is possible to design buildings that are more energy-efficient to cool by using lighter-coloured, more reflective materials in the development of urban areas.
Heat pumps efficiently heat buildings, and cool them by air conditioning. A modern heat pump typically transports around three to five times more thermal energy than electrical energy consumed. The amount depends on the coefficient of performance and the outside temperature.[208]
Refrigeration and air conditioning account for about 10% of global CO2 emissions caused by fossil fuel-based energy production and the use of fluorinated gases. Alternative cooling systems, such as passive cooling building design and passive daytime radiative cooling surfaces, can reduce air conditioning use. Suburbs and cities in hot and arid climates can significantly reduce energy consumption from cooling with daytime radiative cooling.[209]
Energy consumption for cooling is likely to rise significantly due to increasing heat and availability of devices in poorer countries. Of the 2.8 billion people living in the hottest parts of the world, only 8% currently have air conditioners, compared with 90% of people in the US and Japan.[210] Adoption of air conditioners typically increases in warmer areas at above $10,000 annual household income.[211] By combining energy efficiency improvements and decarbonising electricity for air conditioning with the transition away from super-polluting refrigerants, the world could avoid cumulative greenhouse gas emissions of up to 210–460 GtCO2-eq over the next four decades.[212] A shift to renewable energy in the cooling sector comes with two advantages: Solar energy production with mid-day peaks corresponds with the load required for cooling and additionally, cooling has a large potential for load management in the electric grid.[212]
Urban planning
[edit]
Cities emitted 28 GtCO2-eq in 2020 of combined CO2 and CH4 emissions.[94]: TS-61 This was from producing and consuming goods and services.[94]: TS-61 Climate-smart urban planning aims to reduce sprawl to reduce the distance travelled. This lowers emissions from transportation. Switching from cars by improving walkability and cycling infrastructure is beneficial to a country's economy as a whole.[214]
Urban forestry, lakes and other blue and green infrastructure can reduce emissions directly and indirectly by reducing energy demand for cooling.[94]: TS-66 Methane emissions from municipal solid waste can be reduced by segregation, composting, and recycling.[215]
Transport
[edit]
Transportation accounts for 15% of emissions worldwide.[217] Increasing the use of public transport, low-carbon freight transport and cycling are important components of transport decarbonisation.[218][219]
Electric vehicles and environmentally friendly rail help to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. In most cases, electric trains are more efficient than air transport and truck transport.[220] Other efficiency means include improved public transport, smart mobility, carsharing and electric hybrids. Fossil-fuel for passenger cars can be included in emissions trading.[221] Furthermore, moving away from a car-dominated transport system towards low-carbon advanced public transport system is important.[222]
Heavyweight, large personal vehicles (such as cars) require a lot of energy to move and take up much urban space.[223][224] Several alternatives modes of transport are available to replace these. The European Union has made smart mobility part of its European Green Deal.[225] In smart cities, smart mobility is also important.[226]

The World Bank is helping lower income countries buy electric buses. Their purchase price is higher than diesel buses. But lower running costs and health improvements due to cleaner air can offset this higher price.[227]
Between one quarter and three quarters of cars on the road by 2050 are forecast to be electric vehicles.[228] Hydrogen may be a solution for long-distance heavy freight trucks, if batteries alone are too heavy.[229]
Shipping
[edit]In the shipping industry, the use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) as a marine bunker fuel is driven by emissions regulations. Ship operators must switch from heavy fuel oil to more expensive oil-based fuels, implement costly flue gas treatment technologies or switch to LNG engines.[230] Methane slip, when gas leaks unburned through the engine, lowers the advantages of LNG. Maersk, the world's biggest container shipping line and vessel operator, warns of stranded assets when investing in transitional fuels like LNG.[231] The company lists green ammonia as one of the preferred fuel types of the future. It has announced the first carbon-neutral vessel on the water by 2023, running on carbon-neutral methanol.[232] Cruise operators are trialling partially hydrogen-powered ships.[233]
Hybrid and all electric ferries are suitable for short distances. Norway's goal is an all electric fleet by 2025.[234]
Air transport
[edit]
Jet airliners contribute to climate change by emitting carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, contrails and particulates. Their radiative forcing is estimated at 1.3–1.4 that of CO2 alone, excluding induced cirrus cloud. In 2018, global commercial operations generated 2.4% of all CO2 emissions.[236]
The aviation industry has become more fuel efficient. But overall emissions have risen as the volume of air travel has increased. By 2020, aviation emissions were 70% higher than in 2005 and they could grow by 300% by 2050.[237]
It is possible to reduce aviation's environmental footprint by better fuel economy in aircraft. Optimising flight routes to lower non-CO2 effects on climate from nitrogen oxides, particulates or contrails can also help. Aviation biofuel, carbon emission trading and carbon offsetting, part of the 191 nation ICAO's Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA), can lower CO2 emissions. Short-haul flight bans, train connections, personal choices and taxation on flights can lead to fewer flights. Hybrid electric aircraft and electric aircraft or hydrogen-powered aircraft may replace fossil fuel-powered aircraft.
Experts expect emissions from aviation to rise in most projections, at least until 2040. They currently amount to 180 Mt of CO2 or 11% of transport emissions. Aviation biofuel and hydrogen can only cover a small proportion of flights in the coming years. Experts expect hybrid-driven aircraft to start commercial regional scheduled flights after 2030. Battery-powered aircraft are likely to enter the market after 2035.[238] Under CORSIA, flight operators can purchase carbon offsets to cover their emissions above 2019 levels. CORSIA will be compulsory from 2027.
Agriculture, forestry and land use
[edit]
Almost 20% of greenhouse gas emissions come from the agriculture and forestry sector.[239] To significantly reduce these emissions, annual investments in the agriculture sector need to increase to $260 billion by 2030. The potential benefits from these investments are estimated at $4.3 trillion by 2030, offering a substantial economic return of 16-to-1.[240]: 7–8
Mitigation measures in the food system can be divided into four categories. These are demand-side changes, ecosystem protections, mitigation on farms, and mitigation in supply chains. On the demand side, limiting food waste is an effective way to reduce food emissions. Changes to a diet less reliant on animal products such as plant-based diets are also effective.[13]: XXV
With 21% of global methane emissions, cattle are a major driver of global warming.[241]: 6 When rainforests are cut and the land is converted for grazing, the impact is even higher. In Brazil, producing 1 kg of beef can result in the emission of up to 335 kg CO2-eq.[242] Increasing the milk yield of dairy cows has been shown to reduce emissions.[243] Other livestock, manure management and rice cultivation also emit greenhouse gases, in addition to fossil fuel combustion in agriculture.
Important mitigation options for reducing the greenhouse gas emissions from livestock include genetic selection,[244][245] introduction of methanotrophic bacteria into the rumen,[246][247] vaccines, feeds,[248] diet modification and grazing management.[249][250][251] Other options are diet changes towards ruminant-free alternatives, such as milk substitutes and meat analogues. Non-ruminant livestock, such as poultry, emit far fewer GHGs.[252]
It is possible to cut methane emissions in rice cultivation by improved water management, combining dry seeding and one drawdown, or executing a sequence of wetting and drying. This results in emission reductions of up to 90% compared to full flooding and even increased yields.[253]
Reducing the usage of nitrogen fertilizers through nutrient management could avoid nitrous oxide emissions equal to 2.77 - 11.48 gigatons of carbon dioxide from 2020 to 2050.[254]
Industry
[edit]- China (31.8%)
- United States (14.4%)
- European Union (4.90%)
- India (9.50%)
- Russia (5.80%)
- Japan (3.50%)
- Other (30.1%)
Industry is the largest emitter of greenhouse gases when direct and indirect emissions are included. Electrification can reduce emissions from industry. Green hydrogen can play a major role in energy-intensive industries for which electricity is not an option. Further mitigation options involve the steel and cement industry, which can switch to a less polluting production process. Products can be made with less material to reduce emission-intensity and industrial processes can be made more efficient. Finally, circular economy measures reduce the need for new materials. This also saves on emissions that would have been released from the mining of collecting of those materials.[13]: 43
The decarbonisation of cement production requires new technologies, and therefore investment in innovation.[255] Bioconcrete is one possibility to reduce emissions.[256] But no technology for mitigation is yet mature. So CCS will be necessary at least in the short-term.[257]
Another sector with a significant carbon footprint is the steel sector, which is responsible for about 7% of global emissions.[258] Emissions can be reduced by using electric arc furnaces to melt and recycle scrap steel. To produce virgin steel without emissions, blast furnaces could be replaced by hydrogen direct reduced iron and electric arc furnaces. Alternatively, carbon capture and storage solutions can be used.[258]
Coal, gas and oil production often come with significant methane leakage.[259] In the early 2020s some governments recognised the scale of the problem and introduced regulations.[260] Methane leaks at oil and gas wells and processing plants are cost-effective to fix in countries which can easily trade gas internationally.[259] There are leaks in countries where gas is cheap; such as Iran,[261] Russia,[262] and Turkmenistan.[263] Nearly all this can be stopped by replacing old components and preventing routine flaring.[259] Coalbed methane may continue leaking even after the mine has been closed. But it can be captured by drainage and/or ventilation systems.[264] Fossil fuel firms do not always have financial incentives to tackle methane leakage.[265]
Co-benefits
[edit]Co-benefits of climate change mitigation, also often referred to as ancillary benefits, were firstly dominated in the scientific literature by studies that describe how lower GHG emissions lead to better air quality and consequently impact human health positively.[266][267] The scope of co-benefits research expanded to its economic, social, ecological and political implications.
Positive secondary effects that occur from climate mitigation and adaptation measures have been mentioned in research since the 1990s.[268][269] The IPCC first mentioned the role of co-benefits in 2001, followed by its fourth and fifth assessment cycle stressing improved working environment, reduced waste, health benefits and reduced capital expenditures.[270] In the early 2000s the OECD was further fostering its efforts in promoting ancillary benefits.[271]
The IPCC pointed out in 2007: "Co-benefits of GHG mitigation can be an important decision criteria in analyses carried out by policy-makers, but they are often neglected" and added that the co-benefits are "not quantified, monetised or even identified by businesses and decision-makers".[272] Appropriate consideration of co-benefits can greatly "influence policy decisions concerning the timing and level of mitigation action", and there can be "significant advantages to the national economy and technical innovation".[272]
An analysis of climate action in the UK found that public health benefits are a major component of the total benefits derived from climate action.[273]
Employment and economic development
[edit]Co-benefits can positively impact employment, industrial development, states' energy independence and energy self-consumption. The deployment of renewable energies can foster job opportunities. Depending on the country and deployment scenario, replacing coal power plants with renewable energy can more than double the number of jobs per average MW capacity.[274] Investments in renewable energies, especially in solar- and wind energy, can boost the value of production.[275] Countries which rely on energy imports can enhance their energy independence and ensure supply security by deploying renewables. National energy generation from renewables lowers the demand for fossil fuel imports which scales up annual economic saving.[276]
The European Commission forecasts a shortage of 180,000 skilled workers in hydrogen production and 66,000 in solar photovoltaic power by 2030.[277]
Energy security
[edit]A higher share of renewables can additionally lead to more energy security.[278] Socioeconomic co-benefits have been analysed such as energy access in rural areas and improved rural livelihoods.[279][280] Rural areas which are not fully electrified can benefit from the deployment of renewable energies. Solar-powered mini-grids can remain economically viable, cost-competitive and reduce the number of power cuts. Energy reliability has additional social implications: stable electricity improves the quality of education.[281]
The International Energy Agency (IEA) spelled out the "multiple benefits approach" of energy efficiency while the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) operationalised the list of co-benefits of the renewable energy sector.[282][283]
Health and well-being
[edit]The health benefits from climate change mitigation are significant. Potential measures can not only mitigate future health impacts from climate change but also improve health directly.[284][285] Climate change mitigation is interconnected with various health co-benefits, such as those from reduced air pollution.[285] Air pollution generated by fossil fuel combustion is both a major driver of global warming and the cause of a large number of annual deaths. Some estimates are as high as 8.7 million excess deaths during 2018.[286][287] A 2023 study estimated that fossil fuels kill over 5 million people each year, as of 2019,[288] by causing diseases such as heart attack, stroke and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.[289] Particulate air pollution kills by far the most, followed by ground-level ozone.[290]
Mitigation policies can also promote healthier diets such as less red meat, more active lifestyles, and increased exposure to green urban spaces.[291][292] Access to urban green spaces provides benefits to mental health as well.[291]: 18 The increased use of green and blue infrastructure can reduce the urban heat island effect. This reduces heat stress on people.[94]: TS-66
Climate change adaptation
[edit]Some mitigation measures have co-benefits in the area of climate change adaptation.[293]: 8–63 This is for example the case for many nature-based solutions.[294]: 4–94 [295]: 6 Examples in the urban context include urban green and blue infrastructure which provide mitigation as well as adaptation benefits. This can be in the form of urban forests and street trees, green roofs and walls, urban agriculture and so forth. The mitigation is achieved through the conservation and expansion of carbon sinks and reduced energy use of buildings. Adaptation benefits come for example through reduced heat stress and flooding risk.[293]: 8–64

Negative side effects
[edit]Mitigation measures can also have negative side effects and risks.[94]: TS-133 In agriculture and forestry, mitigation measures can affect biodiversity and ecosystem functioning.[94]: TS-87 In renewable energy, mining for metals and minerals can increase threats to conservation areas.[297] There is some research into ways to recycle solar panels and electronic waste. This would create a source for materials so there is no need to mine them.[298][299]
Scholars have found that discussions about risks and negative side effects of mitigation measures can lead to deadlock or the feeling that there are insuperable barriers to taking action.[299]
Costs and funding
[edit]Several factors affect mitigation cost estimates. One is the baseline. This is a reference scenario that the alternative mitigation scenario is compared with. Others are the way costs are modelled, and assumptions about future government policy.[300]: 622 Cost estimates for mitigation for specific regions depend on the quantity of emissions allowed for that region in future, as well as the timing of interventions.[301]: 90
Mitigation costs will vary according to how and when emissions are cut. Early, well-planned action will minimise the costs.[147] Globally, the benefits of keeping warming under 2 °C exceed the costs,[302] which according to The Economist are affordable.[303]
Economists estimate the cost of climate change mitigation at between 1% and 2% of GDP.[304][305] While this is a large sum, it is still far less than the subsidies governments provide to the fossil fuel industry. The International Monetary Fund estimated this at more than $5 trillion per year.[306][44]
Another estimate says that financial flows for climate mitigation and adaptation are going to be over $800 billion per year. These financial requirements are predicted to exceed $4 trillion per year by 2030.[307][308]
Globally, limiting warming to 2 °C may result in higher economic benefits than economic costs.[309]: 300 The economic repercussions of mitigation vary widely across regions and households, depending on policy design and level of international cooperation. Delayed global cooperation increases policy costs across regions, especially in those that are relatively carbon intensive at present. Pathways with uniform carbon values show higher mitigation costs in more carbon-intensive regions, in fossil-fuels exporting regions and in poorer regions. Aggregate quantifications expressed in GDP or monetary terms undervalue the economic effects on households in poorer countries. The actual effects on welfare and well-being are comparatively larger.[310]
Cost–benefit analysis may be unsuitable for analysing climate change mitigation as a whole. But it is still useful for analysing the difference between a 1.5 °C target and 2 °C.[304] One way of estimating the cost of reducing emissions is by considering the likely costs of potential technological and output changes. Policymakers can compare the marginal abatement costs of different methods to assess the cost and amount of possible abatement over time. The marginal abatement costs of the various measures will differ by country, by sector, and over time.[147]
Eco-tariffs on only imports contribute to reduced global export competitiveness and to deindustrialisation.[311]
Avoided costs of climate change effects
[edit]It is possible to avoid some of the costs of the effects of climate change by limiting climate change. According to the Stern Review, inaction can be as high as the equivalent of losing at least 5% of global gross domestic product (GDP) each year, now and forever. This can be up to 20% of GDP or more when including a wider range of risks and impacts. But mitigating climate change will only cost about 2% of GDP. Also it may not be a good idea from a financial perspective to delay significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.[312][313]
Mitigation solutions are often evaluated in terms of costs and greenhouse gas reduction potentials. This fails to take into account the direct effects on human well-being.[314]
Distributing emissions abatement costs
[edit]Mitigation at the speed and scale required to limit warming to 2 °C or below implies deep economic and structural changes. These raise multiple types of distributional concerns across regions, income classes and sectors.[310]
There have been different proposals on how to allocate responsibility for cutting emissions.[315]: 103 These include egalitarianism, basic needs according to a minimum level of consumption, proportionality and the polluter-pays principle. A specific proposal is "equal per capita entitlements".[315]: 106 This approach has two categories. In the first category, emissions are allocated according to national population. In the second category, emissions are allocated in a way that attempts to account for historical or cumulative emissions.
Funding
[edit]In order to reconcile economic development with mitigating carbon emissions, developing countries need particular support. This would be both financial and technical. The IPCC found that accelerated support would also tackle inequities in financial and economic vulnerability to climate change.[316] One way to achieve this is the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Policies
[edit]National policies
[edit]
Climate change mitigation policies can have a large and complex impact on the socio-economic status of individuals and countries This can be both positive and negative.[317] It is important to design policies well and make them inclusive. Otherwise climate change mitigation measures can impose higher financial costs on poor households.[318]
An evaluation was conducted on 1,500 climate policy interventions made between 1998 and 2022.[319] The interventions took place in 41 countries and across 6 continents, which together contributed 81% of the world's total emissions as of 2019. The evaluation found 63 successful interventions that resulted in significant emission reductions; the total CO2 release averted by these interventions was between 0.6 and 1.8 billion metric tonnes. The study focused on interventions with at least 4.5% emission reductions, but the researchers noted that meeting the reductions required by the Paris Agreement would require 23 billion metric tonnes per year. Generally, carbon pricing was found to be most effective in developed countries, while regulation was most effective in the developing countries. Complementary policy mixes benefited from synergies, and were mostly found to be more effective interventions than the implementation of isolated policies.[320][321][322]
The OECD recognise 48 distinct climate mitigation policies suitable for implementation at national level. Broadly, these can be categorised into three types: market based instruments, non market based instruments and other policies.[323][319]
- Other policies include the Establishing an Independent climate advisory body.[323]
- Non market based policies include the Implementing or tighening of Regulatory standards. These set technology or performance standards. They can be effective in addressing the market failure of informational barriers.[324]: 412
- Among market based policies, the carbon price has been found to be the most effective (at least for developed economies),[319] and has its own section below. Additional market based policy instruments for climate change mitigation include:
Emissions taxes These often require domestic emitters to pay a fixed fee or tax for every tonne of CO2 emissions they release into the atmosphere.[324]: 4123 Methane emissions from fossil fuel extraction are also occasionally taxed.[325] But methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture are typically not subject to tax.[326]
Removing unhelpful subsidies: Many countries provide subsidies for activities that affect emissions. For example, significant fossil fuel subsidies are present in many countries.[327] Phasing-out fossil fuel subsidies is crucial to address the climate crisis.[328] It must however be done carefully to avoid protests[329] and making poor people poorer.[330]
Creating helpful subsidies: Creating subsidies and financial incentives.[331] One example is energy subsidies to support clean generation which is not yet commercially viable such as tidal power.[332]
Tradable permits: A permit system can limit emissions.[324]: 415
Carbon pricing
[edit]
Imposing additional costs on greenhouse gas emissions can make fossil fuels less competitive and accelerate investments into low-carbon sources of energy. A growing number of countries raise a fixed carbon tax or participate in dynamic carbon emission trading (ETS) systems. In 2021, more than 21% of global greenhouse gas emissions were covered by a carbon price. This was a big increase from earlier due to the introduction of the Chinese national carbon trading scheme.[333]: 23
Trading schemes offer the possibility to limit emission allowances to certain reduction targets. However, an oversupply of allowances keeps most ETS at low price levels around $10 with a low impact. This includes the Chinese ETS which started with $7/tCO2 in 2021.[334] One exception is the European Union Emission Trading Scheme where prices began to rise in 2018. They reached about €80/tCO2 in 2022.[335] This results in additional costs of about €0.04/KWh for coal and €0.02/KWh for gas combustion for electricity, depending on the emission intensity.[citation needed] Industries which have high energy requirements and high emissions often pay only very low energy taxes, or even none at all.[336]: 11–80
While this is often part of national schemes, carbon offsets and credits can be part of a voluntary market as well such as on the international market. Notably, the company Blue Carbon of the UAE has bought ownership over an area equivalent to the United Kingdom to be preserved in return for carbon credits.[337]
International agreements
[edit]International cooperation is considered a critical enabler for climate action[7]: 52 while conflicts generally hamper it.[338] Almost all countries are parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[339][340] The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to stabilise atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases at a level that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system.[341]
Although not designed for this purpose, the Montreal Protocol has benefited climate change mitigation efforts.[342] The Montreal Protocol is an international treaty that has successfully reduced emissions of ozone-depleting substances such as CFCs. These are also greenhouse gases.
Paris Agreement
[edit]
History
[edit]Historically efforts to deal with climate change have taken place at a multinational level. They involve attempts to reach a consensus decision at the United Nations, under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).[347] This is the dominant approach historically of engaging as many international governments as possible in taking action on a worldwide public issue. The Montreal Protocol in 1987 is a precedent that this approach can work. But some critics say the top-down framework of only utilising the UNFCCC consensus approach is ineffective. They put forward counter-proposals of bottom-up governance. At this same time this would lessen the emphasis on the UNFCCC.[348][349][350]
The Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC adopted in 1997 set out legally binding emission reduction commitments for the "Annex 1" countries.[351]: 817 The Protocol defined three international policy instruments ("Flexibility Mechanisms") which could be used by the Annex 1 countries to meet their emission reduction commitments. According to Bashmakov, use of these instruments could significantly reduce the costs for Annex 1 countries in meeting their emission reduction commitments.[352]: 402 [needs update]
The Paris Agreement reached in 2015 succeeded the Kyoto Protocol which expired in 2020. Countries that ratified the Kyoto protocol committed to reduce their emissions of carbon dioxide and five other greenhouse gases, or engage in carbon emissions trading if they maintain or increase emissions of these gases.
In 2015, the UNFCCC's "structured expert dialogue" came to the conclusion that, "in some regions and vulnerable ecosystems, high risks are projected even for warming above 1.5 °C".[353] Together with the strong diplomatic voice of the poorest countries and the island nations in the Pacific, this expert finding was the driving force leading to the decision of the 2015 Paris Climate Conference to lay down this 1.5 °C long-term target on top of the existing 2 °C goal.[354]
Barriers
[edit]

There are individual, institutional and market barriers to achieving climate change mitigation.[95]: 5–71 They differ for all the different mitigation options, regions and societies.
Difficulties with accounting for carbon dioxide removal can act as economic barriers. This would apply to BECCS (bioenergy with carbon capture and storage).[43]: 6–42 The strategies that companies follow can act as a barrier. But they can also accelerate decarbonisation.[95]: 5–84
In order to decarbonise societies the state needs to play a predominant role. This is because it requires a massive coordination effort.[355]: 213 This strong government role can only work well if there is social cohesion, political stability and trust.[355]: 213
For land-based mitigation options, finance is a major barrier. Other barriers are cultural values, governance, accountability and institutional capacity.[123]: 7–5
Developing countries face further barriers to mitigation.[356]
- The cost of capital increased in the early 2020s.[357] A lack of available capital and finance is common in developing countries.[358] Together with the absence of regulatory standards, this barrier supports the proliferation of inefficient equipment.
- There are also financial and capacity barrier in many of these countries.[95]: 97
One study estimates that only 0.12% of all funding for climate-related research goes on the social science of climate change mitigation.[359] Vastly more funding goes on natural science studies of climate change. Considerable sums also go on studies of the impact of climate change and adaptation to it.[359]
Society and culture
[edit]Commitments to divest
[edit]
More than 1000 organisations with investments worth US$8 trillion have made commitments to fossil fuel divestment.[361] Socially responsible investing funds allow investors to invest in funds that meet high environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) standards.[362]
Impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic
[edit]The COVID-19 pandemic led some governments to shift their focus away from climate action, at least temporarily.[363] This obstacle to environmental policy efforts may have contributed to slowed investment in green energy technologies. The economic slowdown resulting from COVID-19 added to this effect.[364][365]
In 2020, carbon dioxide emissions fell by 6.4% or 2.3 billion tonnes globally.[366] Greenhouse gas emissions rebounded later in the pandemic as many countries began lifting restrictions. The direct impact of pandemic policies had a negligible long-term impact on climate change.[366][367]
Examples by country
[edit]United States
[edit]The United States government has held shifting attitudes toward addressing greenhouse gas emissions. The George W. Bush administration opted not to sign the Kyoto Protocol,[370] but the Obama administration entered the Paris Agreement.[371] The Trump administration withdrew from the Paris Agreement while increasing the export of crude oil and gas, making the United States the largest producer.[372]
In 2021, the Biden administration committed to reducing emissions to half of 2005 levels by 2030.[373] In 2022, President Biden signed the Inflation Reduction Act into law, which is estimated to provide around $375 billion over 10 years to fight climate change.[374] As of 2022[update] the social cost of carbon is 51 dollars a tonne whereas academics say it should be more than three times higher.[375]
In 2025, however, under the Trump administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administrator Lee Zeldin proposed a rule to eliminate the reporting and measuring of carbon emissions by a vast majority of US industries, including fossil fuel producers and refiners[376]. The White House considers the GHGRP rollback as part of its plan to increase US oil and gas production[377].China
[edit]China has committed to peak emissions by 2030 and reach net zero by 2060.[378] Warming cannot be limited to 1.5 °C if any coal plants in China (without carbon capture) operate after 2045.[379] The Chinese national carbon trading scheme started in 2021.
European Union
[edit]The European Commission estimates that an additional €477 million in annual investment is needed for the European Union to meet its Fit-for-55 decarbonisation goals.[277][380]
In the European Union, government-driven policies and the European Green Deal have helped position greentech (as an example) as a vital area for venture capital investment. By 2023, venture capital in the EU's greentech sector equalled that of the United States, reflecting a concerted effort to drive innovation and mitigate climate change through targeted financial support.[277][381] The European Green Deal has fostered policies that contributed to a 30% rise in venture capital for greentech companies in the EU from 2021 to 2023, despite a downturn in other sectors during the same period.[382]
While overall venture capital investment in the EU remains about six times lower than in the United States, the greentech sector has closed this gap significantly, attracting substantial funding. Key areas benefitting from increased investments are energy storage, circular economy initiatives, and agricultural technology. This is supported by the EU's ambitious goal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030.[382]
Related approaches
[edit]Relationship with solar radiation modification (SRM)
[edit]While solar radiation modification (SRM) could reduce surface temperatures, it temporarily masks climate change rather than addressing the root cause, which is greenhouse gases.[383]: 14–56 SRM would work by altering how much solar radiation the Earth absorbs.[383]: 14–56 Examples include reducing the amount of sunlight reaching the surface, reducing the optical thickness and lifetime of clouds, and changing the ability of the surface to reflect radiation.[384] The IPCC describes SRM as a climate risk reduction strategy or supplementary option rather than a climate mitigation option.[383]
The terminology in this area is still evolving. Experts sometimes use the term geoengineering or climate engineering in the scientific literature for both CDR or SRM, if the techniques are used at a global scale.[15]: 6–11 IPCC reports no longer use the terms geoengineering or climate engineering.[16]
See also
[edit]References
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Our first action call is a direct, global appeal to all women and men to choose none or at most one child. Individuals, especially if they aspire to large families, may pursue adoption, which is a desirable and compassionate choice for children who are here and need to be cared for.
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- ^ ● Source for carbon emissions data: "Territorial (MtCO2) / Emissions / Carbon emissions / Chart View". Global Carbon Atlas. 2024.
● Source for country population data: "Population 2022" (PDF). World Bank. 2024. Archived (PDF) from the original on 22 October 2024. - ^ Stevens, Harry (1 March 2023). "The United States has caused the most global warming. When will China pass it?". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 1 March 2023.
- ^ Dessai, S. (December 2001), Tyndall Centre Working Paper 12: The climate regime from The Hague to Marrakech: Saving or sinking the Kyoto Protocol?, Norwich, UK: Tyndall Centre, archived from the original on 31 October 2012. p. 5.
- ^ "President Obama: The United States Formally Enters the Paris Agreement". whitehouse.gov. 2016-09-03. Retrieved 2021-11-19.
- ^ "Effect of the US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement | Climate Action Tracker". climateactiontracker.org. Retrieved 2020-08-22.
- ^ Plumer, Brad; Popovich, Nadja (2021-04-22). "The U.S. Has a New Climate Goal. How Does It Stack Up Globally?". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 2021-07-15.
- ^ "Biden signs massive climate and health care legislation". AP NEWS. 2022-08-16. Retrieved 2022-10-16.
- ^ Rennert, Kevin; Errickson, Frank; Prest, Brian C.; Rennels, Lisa; Newell, Richard G.; Pizer, William; Kingdon, Cora; Wingenroth, Jordan; Cooke, Roger; Parthum, Bryan; Smith, David; Cromar, Kevin; Diaz, Delavane; Moore, Frances C.; Müller, Ulrich K. (October 2022). "Comprehensive evidence implies a higher social cost of CO2". Nature. 610 (7933): 687–692. Bibcode:2022Natur.610..687R. doi:10.1038/s41586-022-05224-9. ISSN 1476-4687. PMC 9605864. PMID 36049503. S2CID 252010506.
- ^ "Trump Administration Attempt to Eliminate Carbon Emissions Reporting Could Backfire". The Equation. 2025-10-02. Retrieved 2025-10-24.
- ^ "Here Comes the Fossil Fuel Agenda". The Equation. 2025-01-23. Retrieved 2025-10-24.
- ^ Stanway, David (2022-11-21). "China's CO2 emissions fall but policies still not aligned with long-term goals". Reuters. Retrieved 2023-04-14.
- ^ China's New Growth Pathway: From the 14th Five-Year Plan to Carbon Neutrality (PDF) (Report). Energy Foundation China. December 2020. p. 24. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 April 2021. Retrieved 20 July 2021.
- ^ Andersson, Malin; Nerlich, Carolin; Pasqua, Carlo; Rusinova, Desislava (2024-06-18). "Massive investment needs to meet EU green and digital targets". European Central Bank.
- ^ "Financing and commercialisation of cleantech innovation" (PDF).
- ^ a b "Cleantech Annual Briefing 2023". www.cleantechforeurope.com. Retrieved 2024-08-31.
- ^ a b c IPCC (2022) Chapter 14: International cooperation in Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, United States]
- ^ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering (25 March 2021). Reflecting Sunlight: Recommendations for Solar Geoengineering Research and Research Governance. Bibcode:2021nap..book25762N. doi:10.17226/25762. ISBN 978-0-309-67605-2. S2CID 234327299.
Further reading
[edit]- Leal Filho, Walter; Kovaleva, Marina; Pimenta Dinis, Maria Alzira; Luetz, Johannes M.; Alves, Fátima; Nagy, Gustavo J.; Yaffa, Sidat; Ayal, Desalegn Yayeh; Kalungu, Jokastah, eds. (2025). Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in Practice. Climate Change Management. Cham: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-031-85217-6. ISBN 978-3-031-85217-6.
- Lackner, Maximilian; Sajjadi, Baharak; Chen, Wei-Yin, eds. (2022). Handbook of Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation (3rd ed.). New York: Springer. doi:10.1007/978-3-030-72579-2. ISBN 978-3-030-72579-2.
- Climate Mitigation Best Practices. ChaseDay Publishing. 2025. Retrieved 2025-07-07.
Case study-based volume; citation details may vary
Climate change mitigation
View on GrokipediaConceptual Foundations
Definitions and Objectives
Climate change mitigation refers to anthropogenic interventions that reduce sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions or enhance GHG sinks, with the aim of limiting the radiative forcing that contributes to global warming. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines it as "human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gas emissions or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases."[12] These interventions target long-lived GHGs like carbon dioxide (CO₂), primarily from fossil fuel combustion, cement production, and land-use changes, as well as shorter-lived ones such as methane (CH₄) from agriculture and fossil operations.[13] Mitigation distinguishes from adaptation, which addresses impacts of realized warming rather than altering the underlying drivers.[14] Objectives of mitigation are framed by international policy frameworks, particularly the 2015 Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which seeks to hold global mean surface temperature increase to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5°C.[15] This requires global GHG emissions to peak before 2025 at the latest, decline by 43% from 2019 levels by 2030, and reach net zero by around 2050 to align with 1.5°C pathways, according to IPCC assessments.[14] Net-zero emissions denote a balance where any remaining anthropogenic GHG releases are counterbalanced by removals via natural sinks (e.g., forests, soils) or engineered methods (e.g., direct air capture), though residual emissions from difficult sectors like aviation persist in modeled scenarios.[16] These targets derive from integrated assessment models projecting climate responses to emission trajectories, but their feasibility hinges on rapid technological deployment and behavioral shifts, with historical data showing emissions rising 1.1% annually from 2010 to 2019 despite pledges.[14] Broader objectives include stabilizing atmospheric GHG concentrations to avert dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, as per UNFCCC principles, prioritizing cost-effective reductions where marginal abatement costs are lowest, such as energy efficiency improvements yielding negative costs.[17] However, policy ambitions often exceed empirical progress, with only 20% of countries implementing sufficiently stringent measures by 2023 to meet nationally determined contributions (NDCs), per UNFCCC reviews. Mitigation success metrics emphasize verifiable emission inventories and sink enhancements, avoiding reliance on offsets that may overestimate permanence due to leakage or reversibility risks in carbon markets.[14]Scientific Basis and Uncertainties
The scientific basis for climate change mitigation rests on the established physics of the greenhouse effect, whereby atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other long-lived greenhouse gases trap outgoing infrared radiation, exerting a positive radiative forcing that contributes to global surface warming. Human activities, primarily fossil fuel combustion, deforestation, and industrial processes, have increased atmospheric CO₂ from approximately 280 parts per million (ppm) pre-industrially to over 420 ppm as of 2024, with isotopic analysis confirming the fossil fuel origin of the excess. This anthropogenic forcing is empirically linked to observed global temperature rise of about 1.1°C since the late 19th century, as evidenced by surface station data, satellite measurements showing reduced outgoing longwave radiation in CO₂ absorption bands, and paleoclimate proxies indicating current warming rates exceed natural variability seen in the Holocene. A survey of over 88,000 peer-reviewed papers through 2021 found greater than 99.9% agreement that human emissions are the primary driver of recent warming, though such consensus studies have faced methodological critiques for potentially overstating unanimity by categorizing neutral or ambiguous abstracts.[18][19][20][21] Mitigation strategies derive from the premise that stabilizing or reducing greenhouse gas concentrations can limit further forcing and warming, as formalized in frameworks like the IPCC's representative concentration pathways, which project temperature outcomes based on emission trajectories. Observational data support a causal link, with instrumental records showing tropospheric warming and stratospheric cooling consistent with greenhouse gas influences rather than solar or volcanic forcings alone, and attribution studies estimating human contributions to 100% of post-1950 warming. However, systemic biases in academic institutions, including funding incentives favoring alarmist narratives, may inflate perceived urgency in source selection for such assessments, as noted in critiques of IPCC processes where dissenting empirical findings receive less weight.[22][23] Significant uncertainties persist in quantifying the climate response, particularly equilibrium climate sensitivity (ECS), defined as the long-term global temperature change from doubled pre-industrial CO₂. IPCC AR6 assesses ECS likely between 2.5°C and 4°C (very likely 2–5°C), but recent instrumental and paleoclimate analyses, including 2024–2025 studies, suggest the lower end may predominate, with some emergent constraints indicating medians around 2.6–3°C amid ongoing debates over narrowing the range. Cloud feedbacks, a major source of spread, remain low-confidence in models due to unresolved microphysical processes, while aerosol effects and ocean heat uptake introduce additional variability in transient warming projections. Climate models, integral to mitigation scenarios, exhibit systematic biases: many CMIP6 ensembles overestimate recent tropospheric warming rates by 0.3–0.5°C per decade in the tropics, and hindcasts often fail to reproduce observed decadal pauses or regional patterns without parameter tuning.[24][25][26][27] These uncertainties imply that mitigation efficacy—such as the temperature stabilization achievable by net-zero emissions by 2050—carries wide error bars, with AR6 projections for 2100 ranging from 1.5°C to 4.4°C under low-emission scenarios, compounded by natural forcings like volcanic activity or solar cycles not fully captured in models. Empirical critiques highlight that models tuned to 20th-century data diverge in 21st-century hindcasts, potentially overstating anthropogenic dominance by underweighting internal variability, as seen in the 2010–2020 "hiatus" where observed warming lagged projections by up to 50%. While the core physics supports emission reductions to avert high-end risks, overreliance on models with known limitations risks inefficient policy allocation, underscoring the need for adaptive strategies informed by ongoing observations rather than scenario-driven alarmism.[28][29][22]Emission Dynamics
Historical and Current Trends
Global anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions began rising significantly during the Industrial Revolution, with fossil fuel CO₂ emissions increasing from near-zero levels in the early 1800s to approximately 0.3 billion tonnes (Gt) by 1900, driven primarily by coal use in Europe and North America.[30] By 1950, annual global CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels and cement had reached about 6 Gt, accelerating post-World War II due to expanded industrialization, population growth, and oil dependency, reaching 20 Gt by 1980.[30] Total GHG emissions, including methane and nitrous oxide, followed a similar trajectory, with cumulative CO₂ emissions from 1750 to 2023 totaling over 2,500 Gt, more than 80% occurring after 1950; the United States and Europe accounted for the majority of early cumulative emissions, but Asia's share has dominated since the 2000s due to rapid economic development in China and India.[31] This historical pattern reflects causal links between economic expansion, energy-intensive urbanization, and fossil fuel reliance, with emissions decoupling from GDP per capita in some developed economies through efficiency gains but remaining tightly coupled globally.[32] In recent decades, global fossil CO₂ emissions have continued upward, growing from 23 Gt in 1990 to 37.0 Gt in 2023, a 61% increase, while total GHG emissions reached 52.9 Gt CO₂-equivalent (CO₂e) in 2023, up 62% from 1990 levels.[33] Annual growth slowed to 1.1% in 2023 (adding 410 million tonnes), limited partly by renewable energy expansion and post-COVID economic patterns, but emissions rebounded strongly after a 5.3% drop in 2020.[34] Per capita CO₂ emissions have stabilized globally at around 4.7 tonnes per person since 2010, masking divergences: high-income countries average over 10 tonnes (e.g., United States at 14.7 tonnes in 2022), while low-income nations remain below 1 tonne, reflecting ongoing development needs in populous regions.[35] Absolute emissions trends show regional shifts, with advanced economies like the EU reducing output by 30% since 1990 through deindustrialization and policy, contrasted by China's emissions surpassing the United States and EU combined by 2006, contributing over 30% of global totals in 2023 due to coal-heavy growth.[34] As of 2024, preliminary data indicate fossil CO₂ emissions will hit a record 37.4 Gt, up 0.8% from 2023, with growth concentrated in Asia (e.g., China's coal rebound offsetting clean energy gains) and aviation rebounding to pre-pandemic levels.[36] Total GHG emissions, including land-use changes, stood at 57.4 Gt CO₂e in 2022, with fossil fuels comprising 75-80% of the total; sectors like energy (73% of emissions) and agriculture (12-18%) dominate, underscoring persistent reliance on unabated combustion despite technological advancements.[37] These trends highlight implementation gaps in mitigation, as global emissions have not peaked despite pledges, with projections from the Global Carbon Project suggesting continued rises absent accelerated transitions in emerging markets.[38] Data from sources like the International Energy Agency and Global Carbon Project, which aggregate national inventories and satellite observations, provide robust empirical tracking, though underreporting in some developing contexts may underestimate totals by 10-20%.[39]Pledges, Targets, and Implementation Gaps
The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, requires signatory nations to submit nationally determined contributions (NDCs) outlining their emission reduction plans, with updates every five years to pursue a global temperature limit well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels, ideally 1.5°C.[40] As of 2024, 168 latest NDCs from 195 parties project only a 5.9% global emission reduction by 2030 relative to 2019 levels if fully implemented, far short of the 43% cut needed from 2019 levels to align with 1.5°C pathways.[41] Current unconditional NDCs collectively point to approximately 2.6–2.8°C of warming by 2100, while even enhanced pledges incorporating long-term net-zero targets still imply over 2°C.[42] Global greenhouse gas emissions reached a record 57.1 GtCO₂e in 2023, increasing 1.3% from 2022, despite widespread pledges, with preliminary 2024 data indicating continued growth to around 53.2 GtCO₂eq excluding land-use factors.[42] [6] To close the emissions gap for 1.5°C, annual reductions of 42% by 2030 and 57% by 2035 are required from 2023 levels, but existing policies and targets would yield at most a 2–6% decline by 2030.[42] Implementation lags are evident in major emitters: China's emissions rose due to coal expansion despite peak pledges by 2030, while India's growth continues amid conditional NDC reliance on international finance; the EU has achieved relative decoupling but absolute reductions remain modest globally.[43] [44] Key gaps stem from unenforced commitments, overreliance on projected future technologies like carbon capture, and insufficient policy stringency, as rated "critically insufficient" or "highly insufficient" for most G20 nations by independent trackers.[43] Net-zero pledges by 2050, announced by over 140 countries covering 90% of emissions, often lack interim milestones or verifiable pathways, with many incorporating offsets of dubious permanence.[42] Developing nations cite unfulfilled $100 billion annual climate finance promises from developed countries—reaching only $83.3 billion in 2020—as barriers to bolder action, exacerbating North-South divides.[42] As of October 2025, early submissions for "NDCs 3.0" due in 2025 show minimal ambition upgrades, with no sector fully on track for 1.5°C-aligned milestones per comprehensive assessments.[45]Primary Mitigation Strategies
Energy Supply Transformations
Energy supply transformations for climate mitigation primarily involve transitioning from fossil fuel-dominated generation to low-emission alternatives, targeting the energy sector's contribution of approximately 73% to global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in 2019.[46] This shift emphasizes scaling renewables like solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind, alongside nuclear power, while addressing hydro and other sources, to reduce CO2 emissions from electricity and heat production.[47] In 2023, fossil fuels accounted for about 80% of global primary energy supply, with low-carbon sources—nuclear at 4.3%, hydropower at 6.6%, and other renewables at 7.5%—comprising the remainder.[48] Renewable energy capacity additions reached a record 585 gigawatts (GW) in 2024, representing 15.1% annual growth and over 90% of total global power expansion, driven predominantly by solar PV (473 GW added) and wind.[49] This surge contributed to renewables generating 30% of global electricity in 2023, up from 19% in 2012, with solar and wind alone adding more new energy than any other source that year.[50] However, renewables' intermittency—dependent on weather and diurnal cycles—poses grid stability risks, necessitating overbuild, geographic dispersion, and backup systems; without sufficient storage or dispatchable power, scaling beyond 50-70% penetration in isolated grids risks blackouts during low-output periods.[51] Battery storage deployments grew, but costs and material constraints limit their role in addressing seasonal variability, where multi-day lulls in wind and solar output can exceed current storage capacities by factors of 10 or more.[52] Nuclear power provides reliable, dispatchable low-carbon energy, supplying 9.2% of global electricity in 2022 and avoiding over 60 gigatonnes of CO2 emissions since 1971—equivalent to two years of current global energy-related emissions.[53] It has historically comprised 18% of low-carbon electricity in advanced economies, offering baseload capacity that complements intermittent renewables by operating continuously at high capacity factors (80-90%).[53] Despite this, new builds face regulatory delays and high upfront costs, with global capacity stagnant at around 390 GW since 2010, though small modular reactors (SMRs) and extensions of existing plants could expand its role; IAEA scenarios indicate nuclear must triple by 2050 in pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C.[54] Hydropower, at 15% of electricity, remains significant but limited by suitable sites and environmental impacts, while geothermal and bioenergy offer niche baseload options with capacities of 15 GW and 140 GW, respectively, as of 2023. These transformations require massive infrastructure investments—estimated at $4 trillion annually through 2030 for clean energy supply—alongside grid enhancements to handle variable inputs and electrification demands.[47] Empirical data from regions like Europe, where renewables exceeded 40% of generation in 2023, show increased curtailment and reliance on gas peakers during shortfalls, underscoring that full decarbonization demands integrated systems including nuclear for firmness, as pure renewable-heavy grids inflate system costs via backup needs.[55] IEA models project that without accelerated nuclear and storage, fossil fuels retain 60% of primary energy by 2050 even in net-zero scenarios, highlighting implementation gaps between capacity growth and emission reductions.[56]Demand-Side Reductions
Demand-side reductions in climate change mitigation target decreases in the consumption of energy-intensive goods, services, and resources to lower greenhouse gas emissions, distinct from supply-side shifts like renewable energy deployment. These strategies span efficiency enhancements—delivering equivalent utility with less input—and sufficiency measures that curb absolute demand through behavioral or policy-induced changes in lifestyles and production processes. Assessments indicate demand-side options could cut end-use sector emissions by 40–70% by 2050 compared to baseline projections, contingent on overcoming barriers like upfront costs and cultural resistance, while preserving or enhancing welfare in modeled scenarios.[57][58] Energy efficiency has demonstrably decoupled emissions from economic growth in historical contexts. In IEA member countries, improvements since 2000 averted final energy consumption equivalent to 24% of projected 2021 levels, offsetting rises driven by population and GDP expansion.[59] Globally, efficiency accounts for the largest share of avoided demand in net-zero pathways, with potential to reduce energy-related CO2 emissions by up to 3.5 Gt annually by 2030 through accelerated adoption in appliances, buildings, and industry.[60][61] However, progress has slowed, with global energy intensity declining by only 1–2% yearly post-2020 amid economic recovery and policy gaps, underscoring the need for stronger incentives like standards and subsidies.[62] Rebound effects, where savings enable expanded use, typically erode 10–50% of gross efficiency gains, varying by sector and income level, as evidenced in meta-analyses of empirical data.[63] Sufficiency approaches emphasize reducing service demands outright, such as via slower speed limits, smaller living spaces, or minimized material throughput, potentially amplifying mitigation beyond efficiency limits imposed by physics and economics.[64] Yet, evidence for scalable impacts remains limited; behavioral interventions like feedback programs or social norms yield household electricity savings of 1–5% on average across hundreds of field experiments, often fading without sustained enforcement.[65][66] In transportation, modal shifts to public transit or cycling— as observed in dense urban settings—can reduce per capita emissions by 20–50% where infrastructure supports high utilization, though total demand rebounds if induced trips increase.[67] Dietary reductions in ruminant meat consumption offer sector-specific leverage, with lifecycle studies showing 10–30% cuts in food system emissions feasible through partial shifts to plant-based alternatives in high-meat diets.[57] Policies advancing demand-side reductions often prioritize efficiency via regulations like minimum performance standards, which have driven appliance transitions (e.g., LEDs displacing incandescents, saving 1.5 Gt CO2 yearly by 2020), but neglect sufficiency due to equity concerns and political feasibility. Comprehensive strategies combining both, including caps on high-emission activities, could address implementation gaps, as current efforts fall short of pledged targets amid rebound and leakage risks.[68][69] Empirical tracking reveals that without addressing these, demand-side contributions may cap at 20–30% of required global reductions by mid-century.[70]Carbon Removal Techniques
Carbon dioxide removal (CDR) encompasses technologies and practices designed to extract CO2 from the atmosphere and sequester it in durable sinks, such as geological formations, soils, biomass, or oceans, complementing emission reductions to achieve net-zero targets.[71] Unlike emission avoidance strategies, CDR addresses residual emissions from hard-to-abate sectors, though its deployment remains limited, with global capacity under 0.01 GtCO2/year as of 2023, far below the several GtCO2/year needed in many net-zero scenarios.[72] Empirical evidence highlights scalability challenges, including high costs, energy demands, and land/water constraints, while over-reliance on uncertain future CDR risks moral hazard by postponing immediate decarbonization.[73] Biological methods leverage ecosystems to sequester carbon. Afforestation and reforestation (AR) involve planting trees on previously unforested or degraded lands, with sequestration rates varying from 4.5 to 40.7 tCO2/ha/year depending on species, climate, and management, though global potential is constrained to about 96.9 GtC (equivalent to 355 GtCO2) maximum, or 3.7-12% of cumulative anthropogenic emissions.[74] [75] Field studies confirm AR's efficacy in offsetting deforestation losses, with newly established forests contributing 1559 TgC/year in net ecosystem productivity gains, but permanence is vulnerable to fires, pests, and land-use reversion.[76] Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) combines biomass cultivation for energy production with CO2 capture, offering negative emissions of up to 0.44-2.62 GtCO2/year if land-neutral, yet it competes with food production, requiring 0.1-0.4 ha per tCO2 removed and increasing supply-chain emissions from land conversion.[77] [78] Geochemical approaches accelerate natural mineral carbonation. Enhanced rock weathering (ERW) spreads crushed silicate rocks like basalt on agricultural lands, where they react with CO2 and water to form stable bicarbonates, potentially removing 0.5-4 tCO2/ha/year in croplands while improving soil pH and crop yields.[79] Pilot trials in the US Corn Belt demonstrate verifiable removal rates, but efficacy depends on particle size, application rates, and monitoring runoff to prevent unintended ocean impacts; costs remain low initially ($10-50/tCO2) but scale poorly due to mining and transport logistics.[80] [81] Ocean-based variants, such as alkalinity enhancement, aim for similar reactions in marine environments but face ecological risks and verification hurdles, with limited field data as of 2024.[82] Technological methods include direct air capture (DAC), which uses chemical sorbents to bind atmospheric CO2 for subsequent storage. As of 2024, global DAC capacity stands at approximately 20,000 tCO2/year across a handful of facilities, with costs ranging $250-600/tCO2, potentially dropping to $100-385/tCO2 at Gt-scale through modular designs and renewable energy integration.[83] [84] [85] Scalability requires vast energy (1-2 MWh/tCO2) and infrastructure, with projections indicating deployment below 1 GtCO2/year by 2050 without policy support, underscoring its role as a high-cost supplement rather than primary solution.[86] Durability of storage—via geological injection—is critical, as reversal risks undermine net removal; combined approaches, like DAC with mineralization, enhance permanence but add complexity.[87] Across techniques, co-benefits include biodiversity gains from AR and soil health from ERW, but challenges persist: biological methods risk saturation and reversibility, while engineered options demand massive upfront investment and face public skepticism over greenwashing.[88] Integrated assessments emphasize early deployment of diverse CDR portfolios to minimize climate risks, with near-term focus on AR and ERW for their lower costs ($10-50/tCO2 versus DAC's hundreds), though total CDR must not exceed 5-10 GtCO2/year to avoid biophysical limits like nitrogen constraints or albedo effects.[89] [90] Verification via protocols like those from the IPCC ensures credibility, countering biases in optimistic modeling that undervalue real-world frictions.[91]Sectoral Applications
Power Generation and Industry
The power generation and industrial sectors together account for over 40% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, with electricity and heat production contributing approximately 25% and industry around 24% of energy-related CO2 emissions in 2023.[92][34] Global energy-related CO2 emissions reached 37.4 billion tonnes in 2023, with power sector emissions influenced by rising demand and varying fuel mixes, though clean energy additions tempered growth to 1.1%.[93] Mitigation in these sectors focuses on transitioning to low-carbon technologies, improving efficiency, and deploying carbon capture and storage (CCS), amid challenges like intermittency in renewables and the energy intensity of industrial processes. In power generation, renewables have driven capacity expansions, adding a record 585 gigawatts (GW) globally in 2024, comprising over 90% of total power capacity growth and surpassing fossil fuel additions.[49] Solar photovoltaic and wind accounted for nearly all renewable growth, with their share in global electricity generation rising from 30% in 2023 to a projected 46% by 2030.[94] However, fossil fuels still generated 61% of electricity in 2023, with a 1.4% increase in 2024 due to surging demand outpacing renewable deployment in some regions.[95][55] Nuclear power provides reliable low-carbon baseload, having avoided over 60 gigatonnes of CO2 emissions historically, and complements variable renewables by stabilizing grids.[53] CCS applied to fossil plants offers a bridge for unabated capacity, though deployment remains limited, capturing less than 0.1% of global emissions as of 2023. Industrial mitigation targets hard-to-abate emissions from processes like cement, steel, and chemicals, which require high temperatures and chemical reactions resistant to simple electrification. Electrification using low-carbon power, green hydrogen from electrolysis, and CCS are key strategies; for instance, hydrogen can replace fossil fuels in steel reduction, potentially cutting emissions by up to 95% in direct reduction processes.[96] CCS retrofits in sectors like refineries and cement plants could reduce U.S. industrial emissions by 81-132 million metric tons annually by 2040, though global capture rates lag due to high costs and infrastructure needs.[97] Efficiency measures and material substitution, such as recycled steel or low-carbon cement alternatives, provide near-term reductions, with the IEA estimating that electrification and hydrogen could decarbonize up to 30% of industrial energy demand by 2050 under net-zero pathways.[98] Challenges persist, as industrial CO2 emissions grew alongside energy demand in 2023, underscoring the need for scaled deployment beyond pilots.[34]Transportation Systems
The transportation sector accounts for about 23% of global energy-related CO₂ emissions, with road transport comprising over three-quarters of that share, primarily from passenger cars and freight trucks.[99] Emissions have grown steadily due to rising demand for mobility, particularly in developing economies, reaching approximately 8 gigatons of CO₂ equivalent annually by 2023.[100] Mitigation strategies emphasize fuel efficiency gains, electrification of vehicles, adoption of low-carbon fuels, and modal shifts toward shared or non-motorized options, though effectiveness varies by subsector and geography.[101] In road transport, which dominates sectoral emissions at around 12% of global totals, battery electric vehicles (EVs) offer substantial reductions in lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions compared to gasoline internal combustion engine (ICE) vehicles, typically 50-70% lower when accounting for manufacturing, operation, and disposal, even in grids with moderate fossil fuel reliance.[102] [103] This advantage stems from zero tailpipe emissions and efficiencies in electric drivetrains exceeding 80%, versus 20-30% for ICEs, though upfront battery production emissions—driven by lithium, cobalt, and nickel mining—can equal 10,000-20,000 kilometers of gasoline car driving, narrowing benefits in coal-dependent regions initially.[104] Heavy-duty trucks face greater hurdles, with electrification limited by battery weight and range needs, prompting exploration of hydrogen fuel cells, which could cut emissions by 80-90% if produced via electrolysis using low-carbon electricity, but current costs exceed $5 per kilogram, hindering scalability.[105] Efficiency standards, such as those implemented in the European Union and United States, have historically reduced new vehicle fuel consumption by 1-2% annually since 2000, yet rebound effects from cheaper driving can offset up to 30% of gains.[99] Public and active transport modes provide high emissions reduction potential per passenger-kilometer, with buses and trains emitting up to two-thirds less than solo-driven cars when operating at typical load factors above 20-30 passengers.[106] [107] Expanding urban rail and bus rapid transit systems, as seen in cities like Bogotá and Curitiba, has shifted 10-20% of trips from private vehicles, yielding 4-8% citywide emissions drops when paired with infrastructure investments.[108] Cycling and walking, nearly zero-emission options, could replace short car trips (under 5 km) in dense areas, potentially cutting urban transport emissions by 10-15% where infrastructure supports 20-30% mode share, as in Amsterdam or Copenhagen, though sprawl and safety barriers limit broader adoption.[101] Biofuels and synthetic fuels offer transitional reductions of 20-80% versus fossil diesel, depending on feedstock and production pathways, but compete with food systems and require vast scaling—global blending mandates reached only 3% in road fuels by 2023.[99] Aviation and maritime shipping, though smaller contributors (2-3% and 2% of global CO₂, respectively), pose acute decarbonization challenges due to energy density requirements and long-haul demands.[109] [110] Sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), derived from waste oils or synthetic processes, can reduce lifecycle emissions by 50-80%, but supply constraints limit uptake to under 0.1% of jet fuel in 2023, with production costs 2-4 times higher than conventional kerosene.[109] Efficiency improvements, like winglet designs and air traffic management, have curbed per-passenger emissions by 1-2% annually since 2000, yet projected demand growth could double sector emissions by 2050 without breakthroughs such as hydrogen aircraft, viable only post-2035 for short-haul routes.[99] Shipping relies on similar fuel transitions, with ammonia and methanol pilots demonstrating 70-90% cuts, but infrastructure for bunkering and engine retrofits lags, projecting only modest progress toward the IMO's 2030 intensity target amid stable 1.7% global CO₂ share.[111] Rail, already low-emission at 20-50 grams CO₂ per passenger-kilometer versus 150-250 for cars, supports mitigation through electrification, which has expanded to cover 60% of global track length, reducing freight emissions by up to 80% where renewables dominate grids.[101] Overall, transportation mitigation demands integrated policies beyond technology, including urban planning to curb vehicle kilometers traveled—essential as efficiency alone yields diminishing returns—and incentives like carbon pricing, which could halve road emissions by 2050 in modeled scenarios, though implementation gaps persist in low-income regions.[112] Source biases in academic projections, often from IPCC-affiliated models assuming aggressive policy uptake, may overestimate feasibility without accounting for behavioral resistance or supply chain vulnerabilities.[99]Buildings and Urban Infrastructure
Buildings account for approximately 30% of global final energy consumption, with operational emissions from heating, cooling, lighting, and appliances contributing about 26% of energy-related greenhouse gas emissions worldwide as of recent assessments.[113] Direct emissions from on-site fuel combustion represent around 8% of this total, while indirect emissions arise primarily from electricity and heat production.[113] In 2022, the sector's energy and process-related CO2 emissions reached 37% of the global total, driven by rising demand in developing regions and inefficient stock in older structures.[114] Mitigation in buildings emphasizes energy efficiency improvements, such as enhanced insulation, high-performance glazing, and airtight envelopes, which can reduce heating and cooling demands by 20-50% in retrofitted structures depending on climate and baseline efficiency.[115] Appliance and lighting upgrades, including LED systems and efficient HVAC, have historically delivered rapid reductions; for instance, global lighting efficiency improvements averted emissions equivalent to 1.4 gigatons of CO2 annually by 2020 through policy-driven shifts.[113] Electrification paired with heat pumps can cut fossil fuel use in heating—responsible for over 40% of building energy in cold climates—by up to 75% compared to gas boilers, though net emissions savings hinge on grid decarbonization.[115] Deep retrofits, integrating multiple measures, could reduce sector-wide emissions by over 50% in high-income countries, but upfront costs and payback periods of 10-20 years limit adoption without incentives.[116] New construction standards prioritize near-zero energy designs, incorporating passive solar orientation, thermal mass, and on-site renewables like rooftop solar, which have proliferated in regions with supportive codes; Europe's nearly zero-energy building directive, implemented from 2020, mandates such features for public buildings, yielding 40-60% lower operational emissions.[117] Sufficiency strategies, including limiting per capita floor area growth—particularly in developed nations where space per person exceeds needs—further curb demand; IPCC analysis indicates that capping expansion reduces mitigation reliance on technological fixes alone.[117] Embodied emissions from materials, often 10-20% of lifecycle totals, necessitate low-carbon alternatives like mass timber over concrete, though scaling supply chains remains constrained.[118] Urban infrastructure mitigation integrates building strategies with spatial planning to minimize transport and heat-related demands. Compact, mixed-use developments reduce per capita emissions by shortening commutes and enabling shared heating systems; dense urban forms correlate with 20-30% lower transport emissions than sprawling suburbs, as evidenced in European city comparisons.[119] District energy networks, supplying low-carbon heat and cooling, serve over 10% of urban buildings in leading cities like Copenhagen, achieving 50% efficiency gains over individual systems.[113] Green infrastructure, such as cool roofs and urban forests, mitigates urban heat islands—exacerbating cooling needs by 2-5°C in megacities—but primarily aids adaptation; their carbon sequestration is marginal compared to avoided energy use.[119] Integrated policies, like those in Singapore's urban master plans since 2019, combine density controls with efficiency mandates, projecting 15% sectoral emission cuts by 2030 through reduced infrastructure sprawl.[119] Overall, comprehensive building and urban measures could slash sector emissions by more than 95% by 2050 if efficiency, electrification, and renewables are fully deployed, though rebound effects from cheaper energy may erode 10-30% of savings without behavioral interventions.[115][120]Agriculture, Forestry, and Land Management
Agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) activities contribute approximately 24% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, primarily through methane from livestock enteric fermentation, nitrous oxide from fertilizer application, and carbon dioxide from deforestation and soil disturbance, though the sector also serves as a net sink in some regions via biomass growth and soil carbon storage.[121] Mitigation strategies in this domain focus on curbing emissions from agricultural practices and enhancing natural carbon sinks, with estimated technical potentials reaching up to 10-20 GtCO2eq per year by 2050 under IPCC assessments, though realizable outcomes depend on implementation barriers like land competition and verification challenges.[121] Empirical evidence indicates that while options like improved feed for ruminants and reforestation can yield measurable reductions, many carbon offset projects, particularly avoided deforestation schemes, have overstated impacts, with studies finding 90-94% of credits from major programs failing to deliver verifiable emission reductions due to baseline inflation and leakage. [122] In agriculture, enteric methane from ruminants accounts for about 32% of sector emissions, equivalent to roughly 5 GtCO2eq annually; feed additives such as 3-nitrooxypropanol (3-NOP) have demonstrated 30% reductions in dairy cattle trials over 12 weeks, while bromoform-containing seaweed like Asparagopsis taxiformis achieved up to 82% mitigation in beef cattle without affecting productivity, though long-term efficacy and scalability remain under evaluation due to supply constraints and potential toxin accumulation.[123] [124] Nitrous oxide emissions from synthetic fertilizers, comprising 40% of cropland GHGs, can be lowered by 20-50% through precision application technologies and nitrification inhibitors, as shown in field meta-analyses, yet adoption lags in developing regions due to cost and farmer incentives. Soil carbon sequestration via practices like cover cropping and reduced tillage shows modest gains, with a global meta-analysis of 3,049 observations reporting 0.1-0.4 tC/ha/year increases under climate-smart agriculture, though total profile benefits are often confined to topsoil and may reverse under drought or tillage resumption.[125] Dietary shifts toward lower ruminant consumption could cut agrifood emissions by 8 GtCO2eq by 2050, per FAO models, but causal evidence ties this more to efficiency gains than substitution alone.[126] Forestry mitigation emphasizes halting deforestation, which released 4.7 GtCO2eq in 2022, and active restoration; avoided deforestation in tropical regions could avert 1.5-2.7 GtCO2eq annually if rates halved by 2030, but independent audits reveal pervasive over-crediting in REDD+ projects, with only 6-16% of issued credits reflecting genuine reductions after accounting for counterfactual baselines and displacement.[127] [128] Reforestation and afforestation sequester 4.5-40 tCO2/ha/year in early decades for planted systems, per global reviews, with boreal and temperate sites averaging 3.15 tC/ha/year over 30 years including soil gains, though saturation limits long-term uptake and biodiversity trade-offs arise if monocultures displace native ecosystems.[74] [129] Sustainable management like selective logging preserves sinks while yielding timber, but permanence risks from fire and pests underscore the need for diversified portfolios over reliance on forestry credits.[121] Land management interventions, such as peatland rewetting, target high-emission soils; drained peatlands emit up to 100 tCO2eq/ha/year, but restoration via blocking drainage canals can cut net GHGs by 80-90% within years, restoring oligotrophic conditions and yielding 5-10 tCO2eq/ha/year sequestration in boreal sites over decades, as evidenced by UK and tropical case studies.[130] [131] Grazing management in savannas and agroforestry integration enhance soil carbon by 0.2-1 tC/ha/year, per meta-analyses, but compete with food production, with net benefits hinging on local hydrology and avoiding conversion of high-biodiversity grasslands. Overall, AFOLU mitigation's causal impact derives from biophysical limits—e.g., land area constraints cap global reforestation at 0.9 billion ha without yield penalties—necessitating prioritization of high-integrity options amid skepticism toward unverifiable offsets from biased verification bodies.[129] [121]Economic Analyses
Costs of Implementation
Achieving net zero emissions by 2050 requires annual global clean energy investments to reach approximately $4 trillion by 2030, more than tripling current levels from around $1.8 trillion in 2023, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA).[132] These investments encompass electricity generation, networks, end-use sectors, and supporting infrastructure, with total annual energy sector spending projected to rise to $5 trillion by 2030.[132] The IPCC's Sixth Assessment Report estimates that average annual mitigation investments for limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C necessitate scaling current climate finance flows by a factor of 3 to 6 through 2030, equating to roughly 1.4% to 3.9% of global savings or 0.8% to 3% of GDP annually, depending on the scenario.[133] Current tracked climate finance stands at about $630–$674 billion per year as of 2019–2020, primarily from public and private sources, underscoring the magnitude of required expansion.[133] Sectoral allocations highlight varying cost intensities. In electricity, annual investments for 1.5°C-consistent pathways reach $1.19 trillion, dominated by renewables exceeding $1 trillion by 2030 excluding biomass, while 2°C scenarios require around $639 billion.[133] Transportation demands $1–1.1 trillion annually from 2023–2032 for electrification and infrastructure, including $90 billion yearly for EV charging by 2030 per IEA projections.[133][132] Energy efficiency measures across buildings and industry necessitate $500 billion to $1.7 trillion per year in the same period, with agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) requiring $100–300 billion annually through 2032 and up to $431 billion by 2050.[133] Levelized costs of energy (LCOE) for new-build unsubsidized renewables like utility-scale solar ($24–$96/MWh) and onshore wind ($24–$75/MWh) are competitive with or lower than fossil gas combined cycle ($39–$101/MWh) and coal ($68–$166/MWh) as of 2024, per Lazard analyses, though these exclude system integration expenses.[134] Beyond generation, implementation incurs substantial system-level costs to address intermittency and reliability. Grid investments must surge from $260 billion currently to $820 billion annually by 2030 for networks and flexibility, with global shortfalls potentially reaching $14.3 trillion by 2050 if unmet.[132][135] In the European Union alone, integrating renewables implies at least €1.3 trillion in power network upgrades through 2030.[136] Uncertainties in these estimates arise from technology cost trajectories, policy effectiveness, regional disparities (e.g., higher financing costs in developing countries requiring 4–7 times current investments), and risks of stranded fossil assets, with some analyses critiquing overly narrow LCOE metrics for understating full delivery costs including storage and backups.[133][8] The IEA notes these outlays add about 0.4 percentage points to annual global GDP growth through 2030, potentially boosting GDP by 4%, though affordability challenges persist in lower-income regions without targeted support.[132]Benefits, Including Avoided Damages
Mitigation of climate change is projected to yield economic benefits primarily through the avoidance of damages associated with higher levels of global warming, such as disruptions to agriculture, infrastructure, and labor productivity. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) commonly estimate that unmitigated warming to 3°C above pre-industrial levels could reduce global GDP by 2-9% by 2100, with avoided damages representing the differential under lower-emission scenarios.[137] For instance, empirical analyses of historical temperature variations across over 1,600 regions indicate committed damages escalating to 19% of global income by 2050 under current trends, underscoring potential savings from emission reductions that limit warming below 2°C.[138] These projections derive from damage functions linking temperature anomalies to output losses, though they exhibit wide uncertainty due to assumptions about adaptation and non-linear risks.[139] Sector-specific avoided damages include reductions in extreme weather costs, which empirical attribution studies link to anthropogenic warming at approximately $143 billion annually in the United States alone, predominantly from human mortality and crop failures.[140] In agriculture, mitigation could prevent yield declines of 10-25% in tropical regions by mid-century, preserving food security and export revenues.[141] Coastal infrastructure faces sea-level rise threats costing up to $14 billion yearly in property damages by 2050 without adaptation, with mitigation delaying such exposures.[142] Labor productivity gains from cooler conditions could offset up to 52% of mitigation costs globally by 2100, as heat stress currently impairs work in warmer economies.[143] Critiques of these estimates highlight IAM limitations, including underrepresentation of tipping points like permafrost thaw or biodiversity collapse, which could amplify damages beyond linear projections, and overreliance on historical data that may not capture accelerating impacts.[144] Conversely, some analyses argue high-end forecasts exaggerate by neglecting human adaptation and technological progress, with total climate damages more realistically equating to 3-4% of GDP under business-as-usual paths, implying modest avoided benefits from mitigation relative to implementation costs.[145] Policy examples, such as the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, project $5 trillion in cumulative global benefits from reduced greenhouse gases through 2050, though these incorporate co-benefits beyond pure climate avoidance.[146]| Source/Model | Warming Level | Projected Global GDP Loss by 2100 | Key Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|
| DICE-2023 | 3°C | ~3% | Includes adaptation, quadratic damage function[147] |
| Empirical meta-analysis | 3°C | 3.2-9.2% (with/without growth effects) | Non-catastrophic, historical panel data[137] |
| Panel econometrics | 4°C | 2-10% | Regional variation, slow adaptation[148] |
Cost-Benefit Frameworks and Critiques
Cost-benefit frameworks for climate change mitigation evaluate policies by comparing the economic costs of emission reductions—such as investments in alternative energy, efficiency measures, and carbon removal—with the monetized benefits of avoided damages from warming, including impacts on agriculture, sea levels, and extreme weather. These analyses predominantly rely on integrated assessment models (IAMs), which couple economic growth projections, energy systems, and simplified climate physics to simulate scenarios and derive optimal carbon prices or emission paths. IAMs like DICE and FUND typically prescribe moderate mitigation, with optimal global carbon prices starting low (around $10-40 per ton of CO2 in early decades) and rising gradually, reflecting a balance where marginal abatement costs equal marginal damage avoidance.[150][151] A pivotal output of these frameworks is the social cost of carbon (SCC), estimating the present discounted value of global damages from emitting one additional metric ton of CO2, encompassing market losses (e.g., reduced GDP) and non-market effects (e.g., health impacts). Meta-analyses of over 200 SCC estimates yield medians of approximately $21 per ton under 3% consumption discounting, though values span negative figures to over $100, driven by assumptions on climate sensitivity and damage functions. Higher SCC estimates, such as $185 per ton from recent updates incorporating updated damage extrapolations, assume low discount rates (1-2%) and higher climate sensitivities (around 4°C per CO2 doubling), but these diverge from empirical ranges where observed sensitivities cluster lower (2-3°C).[152][153][154] Critiques of IAM-based CBA emphasize structural limitations, including oversimplified representations of climate dynamics that underweight fat-tailed risks like abrupt ice sheet collapse or biosphere feedbacks, while over-relying on quadratic damage functions that fail to capture nonlinear or irreversible harms. Modelers often embed optimistic priors on total factor productivity growth (2-3% annually) and substitution elasticities, leading to understated mitigation costs; for instance, rapid decarbonization scenarios in IAMs project lower expenses than empirical evidence from energy transitions, where intermittency in renewables necessitates costly backups and grid upgrades exceeding $1-3 trillion annually by 2050 for net-zero pathways. Moreover, IAMs inadequately incorporate adaptation's efficacy, such as historical reductions in weather-related deaths (from 500,000 annually in 1920 to under 10,000 by 2010 via better infrastructure), which empirical data suggest could offset 50-90% of projected damages in vulnerable sectors.[150][155][144] Discounting remains contentious: standard rates (3-5%, aligning with market returns) heavily discount distant damages, rendering post-2100 impacts near-negligible and favoring delayed action, whereas low-rate approaches (e.g., Stern Review's 1.4% including equity weighting) inflate SCC by factors of 5-10 but ignore opportunity costs of capital for immediate needs like poverty alleviation, where $1 invested in health yields 20-50 times more welfare than in hypothetical future climate avoidance. Broader methodological flaws include ethical judgments masquerading as economics—such as aggregating global damages without addressing distributional inequities—and sensitivity to unverified parameters, prompting arguments that CBA cannot robustly guide policy amid deep uncertainties, potentially justifying precautionary thresholds over optimization. Empirical tests reveal IAMs' poor predictive track record, with pre-2000 projections overestimating warming costs relative to observed greening effects from CO2 fertilization, which have boosted global vegetation by 14% since 1980.[156][157][150] Proponents of stringent mitigation counter that updated IAMs with empirical damage data (e.g., from hurricanes or crop yields) support higher action, yet skeptics note systemic biases in model inputs from institutions favoring alarmist scenarios, such as IPCC-linked assumptions that amplify non-linear risks without proportional evidence from paleoclimate records showing past high-CO2 eras without catastrophe. Overall, while CBA frameworks highlight that aggressive near-term cuts (e.g., 50% reductions by 2030) often fail net-benefit tests under realistic parameters—yielding benefit-cost ratios below 1—critiques underscore the need for hybrid approaches integrating real-options analysis for uncertainty and prioritizing verifiable, high-return interventions like R&D over mandates.[154][150]Policy Mechanisms
Market-Oriented Instruments
Market-oriented instruments for climate change mitigation encompass economic tools designed to incentivize greenhouse gas emission reductions by assigning a cost to carbon emissions, thereby leveraging price signals to drive behavioral and technological shifts among emitters. These primarily include carbon taxes, which levy a fixed fee per ton of CO₂ equivalent emitted, and emissions trading systems (ETS), which establish a declining cap on total emissions with tradable allowances allocated to participants. Unlike regulatory mandates, these mechanisms allow flexibility in how reductions are achieved, theoretically minimizing abatement costs by enabling emitters to choose the least-expensive options. Empirical assessments indicate they have induced domestic emission cuts, though global impacts are moderated by factors such as carbon leakage, where production shifts to unregulated jurisdictions. Carbon taxes provide price certainty, directly taxing fossil fuel combustion or emissions at the source, often with revenues recycled via rebates or reductions in other taxes to offset regressive effects. British Columbia implemented a revenue-neutral carbon tax in 2008, starting at CAD 10 per ton and rising to CAD 50 by 2022, covering about 70% of provincial emissions from fuels. Studies attribute a 5-15% reduction in per capita emissions to the tax, with one plant-level analysis estimating a 4% drop in GHG emissions without significant economic contraction. Similarly, Sweden's carbon tax, introduced in 1991 at SEK 250 per ton (adjusted for inflation), has been linked to sustained emission declines alongside GDP growth, though isolating causal effects requires controlling for confounding factors like fuel switching. A meta-analysis of ex-post evaluations across multiple carbon pricing regimes confirms statistically significant emission reductions, averaging 0.2-2% per year depending on stringency and coverage. Emissions trading systems offer quantity certainty by capping aggregate emissions while allowing market-determined prices for allowances, fostering innovation through trading. The European Union ETS, operational since 2005 and covering roughly 40% of EU emissions from power and industry, has achieved substantial reductions: emissions from covered installations fell 47.6% below 2005 levels by early 2024, on track for a 62% cut by 2030. Early phases (2005-2012) yielded more modest results, with Phase I reductions estimated at 2.5-5%, hampered by over-allocation of allowances and windfall profits for utilities. Firm-level evidence from the EU ETS demonstrates global emission mitigation without detectable economic downturns, as regulated entities adopted lower-carbon technologies. China's national ETS, launched in 2021 for the power sector, has similarly curbed emissions in pilot regions by 6-7%, though broader coverage remains limited. Comparisons between carbon taxes and ETS reveal trade-offs in implementation and outcomes. Taxes simplify administration and avoid price volatility seen in ETS (e.g., EU ETS prices dropped to near zero in 2007-2008 due to surplus allowances), providing predictable incentives for long-term investment. ETS, however, ensure absolute emission caps, potentially more effective for stringent targets, though they incur higher transaction costs from monitoring and trading. A cross-country analysis found ETS-linked emission changes 2.15% lower than under taxes, but both outperform non-pricing policies in cost-effectiveness. Despite domestic successes, carbon leakage erodes net global benefits: OECD estimates indicate trade-related leakage offsets about 13% of emission reductions from EU-style pricing, with evidence of increased carbon intensity in imports to ETS jurisdictions.| Instrument | Example Jurisdiction | Launch Year | Emission Coverage | Key Impact Data |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Carbon Tax | British Columbia, Canada | 2008 | ~70% (fuels) | 4-9% per capita GHG reduction; minimal GDP drag[158][159] |
| ETS | European Union | 2005 | ~40% (power, industry) | 47.6% below 2005 levels (2024); 2.5-5% in Phase I[160][161] |