Hubbry Logo
Hui peopleHui peopleMain
Open search
Hui people
Community hub
Hui people
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Hui people
Hui people
from Wikipedia

Key Information

Hui people
Chinese回族
Literal meaningIslam ethnicity
Transcriptions
Standard Mandarin
Hanyu PinyinHuízú
Bopomofoㄏㄨㄟˊ ㄗㄨˊ
Gwoyeu RomatzyhHweitzwu
Wade–GilesHui²-tsu²
Tongyong PinyinHueí-zú
IPA[xwěɪ.tsǔ]
other Mandarin
Xiao'erjingخُوِزُو
DunganХуэйзў
Wu
Romanizationwe zoh
Hakka
RomanizationFui-tshuk
Yue: Cantonese
Yale Romanizationwuìh juhk
Jyutpingwui4 zuk6
Southern Min
Hokkien POJHôe-cok
Teochew Peng'imHuê-tsôk
Eastern Min
Fuzhou BUCHuòi-cŭk

The Hui people[a] are an East Asian ethnoreligious group predominantly composed of Chinese-speaking adherents of Islam. They are distributed throughout China, mainly in the northwestern provinces and in the Zhongyuan region. According to the 2020 census, China is home to approximately 11.3 million Hui people. Outside China, the 170,000 Dungan people of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the Panthays in Myanmar, and many of the Chin Haws in Thailand are also considered part of the Hui ethnicity.

The Hui were referred to as Hanhui[b] during the Qing dynasty to be distinguished from the Turkic Muslims, which were referred to as Chanhui.[6][c] The Republic of China government also recognised the Hui as a branch of the Han Chinese rather than a separate ethnic group. In the National Assembly of the Republic of China, the Hui were referred to as Nationals in China proper with special convention.[7] The Hui were referred to as Muslim Han people[d] by Bai Chongxi, the Minister of National Defense of the Republic of China at the time and the founder of the Chinese Muslim Association.[8] Some scholars refer to this group as Han Chinese Muslims,[9][e] Han Muslims,[10][f] Chinese Muslims[11] or Sino-Muslims.[12] While others call them Chinese-speaking Muslims[13] or Sinophone Muslims.[14]

The Hui were officially recognised as an ethnic group by the People's Republic of China government in 1954.[15] The government defines the Hui people to include all historically Muslim communities not included in China's other ethnic groups; they are therefore distinct from other Muslim groups such as the Uyghurs.[16]

The Hui predominantly speak Chinese,[17] while using some Arabic and Persian phrases.[18] The Hui ethnic group is unique among Chinese ethnic minorities in that it is not associated with a non-Sinitic language.[19] The Hui have a distinct connection with Islamic culture.[17] For example, they follow Islamic dietary laws and reject the consumption of pork, the most commonly consumed meat in China,[20] and have therefore developed their own variation of Chinese cuisine. Hui traditional dress includes white caps (taqiyah) worn by some men and headscarves worn by some women, similar to customs in many Islamic cultures.

Definition

[edit]

Ancestry

[edit]

Hui people descend from Han Chinese and Silk Road immigrants. Their ancestors were of primarily East Asian and Central Asian origin, with some Middle Eastern ancestry from ethnic groups such as Arabs and Iranians, who spread Islam. 6.7 percent of Hui peoples' genetics have a Middle Eastern origin,[21] however most Hui samples have very similar characteristics to other East Asian populations, revealing a common genetic makeup.[22] They show significant genetic homogeneity with the Han Chinese population in Linxia and with other East Asian populations rather than European or Middle Eastern, supporting a simple cultural diffusion as the origin of the Hui in China.[22] Several medieval Chinese dynasties, particularly the Tang, Song and Mongol Yuan dynasties, encouraged immigration from predominantly Muslim Central Asia, with both dynasties welcoming traders from these regions and appointing Central Asian officials. In subsequent centuries, the immigrants gradually mixed with the Han Chinese, eventually forming the Hui.[23]

Included among the Hui in Chinese census statistics (and not officially recognized as separate ethnic groups) are members of a few small non-Chinese-speaking communities. These include several thousand Utsuls in southern Hainan Province, who speak an Austronesian language (Tsat) related to the language of the Vietnamese Champa Muslim minority, who according to anthropologist Dru Gladney, descend from Champa people who migrated to Hainan.[24] A small Muslim minority among Yunnan's Bai people are classified as Hui as well, although they speak Bai.[25] Some groups of Tibetan Muslims are classified as Hui as well.[24]

Genetics

[edit]

A study in 2004 calculated that 6.7 percent of Hui peoples' matrilineal genetics have a West-Eurasian origin and 93.3% are East-Eurasian, reflecting historical records of the population's frequent intermarriage, especially with Mongol women.[26][27] Studies of the Ningxia and Guizhou Hui also found only minor genetic contributions from West-Eurasian populations.[28] Analysis of the Guizhou Hui's Y chromosomes showed a high degree of paternal North or Central Asian heritage, indicating the population formed through male-dominated migration, potentially via a northern route, followed by massive assimilation of Guizhou aborigines into Han Chinese and Hui Muslims.[29]

The East Asian Y-chromosome haplogroup O-M122 is found in large quantities, about 24–30%, in other Muslims groups close to the Hui like the Dongxiangs, Bo'an, and Salar people. While the Y chromosome haplogroup R1a (found among Central Asians, South Asians and Europeans) are found among 17–28% of them. Western mtDNA makes up 6.6% to 8%. Other haplogroups include D-M174, N1a1-Tat, and Q, commonly found among East Asians and Siberians. The majority of Tibeto-Burmans, Han Chinese, and Ningxia and Liaoning Hui share paternal Y chromosomes of East Asian origin which are unrelated to Middle Easterners and Europeans. In contrast to distant Middle Easterners and Europeans with whom the Muslims of China are not significantly related, East Asians, Han Chinese, and most of the Hui and Dongxiang of Linxia share more genes with each other. This indicates that native East Asian populations were culturally assimilated, and that the Hui population was formed through a process of cultural diffusion.[30]

An overview study in 2021 estimated that West Eurasian-related admixture among the average Northwestern Chinese minority groups was at ~9.1%, with the remainder being dominant East-Eurasian ancestry at ~90.9%. The study also showed that there is a close genetic affinity among these ethnic minorities in Northwest China (including Uyghurs, Huis, Dongxiangs, Bonans, Yugurs and Salars) and that these cluster closely with other East Asian people, especially in Xinjiang, followed by Mongolic, and Tungusic speakers, indicating the probability of a shared recent common ancestor of "Altaic speakers".[31] A genome study, using the ancestry-informative SNP (AISNP) analysis, found only 3.66% West-Eurasian-like admixture among Hui people, while the Uyghurs harbored the relative highest amount of West-Eurasian-like admixture at 36.30%.[32]

Official

[edit]
A halal meat store sign in Hankou, c. 1934–1935.

After the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the term "Hui" was applied by the Chinese government to one of China's ten historically Islamic minorities.[33] Today, the Chinese government defines the Hui people as an ethnicity without regard to religion, and includes those with Hui ancestry who do not practice Islam.[34]

Chinese census statistics count among the Hui (and not as officially recognized separate ethnic groups) the Muslim members of a few small non-Chinese-speaking communities. These include several thousand Utsuls in southern Hainan Province, who speak an Austronesian language (Tsat) related to the language of the Vietnamese Champa Muslim minority. According to anthropologist Dru Gladney, they descend from Champa people who migrated to Hainan.[24] A small Muslim minority among Yunnan's Bai people are classified as Hui as well, although they speak Bai.[35] Some groups of Tibetan Muslims are classified as Hui as well.[24]

Huihui

[edit]

Huihui (回回) was the usual generic term for China's Muslims (White Hui), Persian Christians (Black Hui) and Jews (Blue Hui) during the Ming and Qing dynasties. It is thought to have had its origin in the earlier Huihe (回紇) or Huihu (回鶻), which was the name for the Uyghur State of the 8th and 9th centuries.[36] Although the ancient Uyghurs were not Muslims[36] the name Huihui came to refer to foreigners, regardless of language or origin, by the time of the Yuan (1271–1368)[37] and Ming dynasties (1368–1644).[36] The use of Hui to denote all foreigners—Muslims, Nestorian Christians, or Jews—reflects bureaucratic terminology developed over the Yuan and Ming dynasties. Arab were white cap, Persians black cap and Jews blue cap Huihui. Islamic mosques and Jewish synagogues at the time were denoted by the same word, Qīngzhēnsì (清真寺: Temple of Purity and Truth).[38] [better source needed]

Kublai Khan called both foreign Jews and Muslims in China Huihui when he forced them to stop halal and kosher methods of preparing food:[39]

"Among all the [subject] alien peoples only the Hui-hui say "we do not eat Mongol food". [Cinggis Qa'an replied:] "By the aid of heaven we have pacified you; you are our slaves. Yet you do not eat our food or drink. How can this be right?" He thereupon made them eat. "If you slaughter sheep, you will be considered guilty of a crime." He issued a regulation to that effect ... [In 1279/1280 under Qubilai] all the Muslims say: "if someone else slaughters [the animal] we do not eat". Because the poor people are upset by this, from now on, Musuluman [Muslim] Huihui and Zhuhu [Jewish] Huihui, no matter who kills [the animal] will eat [it] and must cease slaughtering sheep themselves, and cease the rite of circumcision."

The widespread and rather generic application of the name Huihui in Ming China was attested to by foreign visitors as well. Matteo Ricci, the first Jesuit to reach Beijing (1598), noted that "Saracens are everywhere in evidence ... their thousands of families are scattered about in nearly every province"[40] Ricci noted that the term Huihui or Hui was applied by Chinese not only to "Saracens" (Muslims) but also to Chinese Jews and supposedly even to Christians.[41] In fact, when the reclusive Wanli Emperor first saw a picture of Ricci and Diego de Pantoja, he supposedly exclaimed, "Hoei, hoei. It is quite evident that they are Saracens", and had to be told by a eunuch that they actually weren't, "because they ate pork".[42] The 1916 Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics, Volume 8 said that Chinese Muslims always called themselves Huihui or Huizi, and that neither themselves nor other people called themselves Han, and they disliked people calling them Dungan.[43] French army Commandant Viscount D'Ollone wrote a report on what he saw among Hui in 1910. He reported that due to religion, Hui were classed as a different nationality from Han as if they were one of the other minority groups.[44][45]

Huizu is now the standard term for the "Hui nationality" (ethnic group), and Huimin, for "Hui people" or "a Hui person". The traditional expression Huihui, its use now largely restricted to rural areas, would sound quaint, if not outright demeaning, to modern urban Chinese Muslims.[46]

Halal (清真) restaurants offering Northwestern beef lamian can be found throughout the country

Other nomenclature

[edit]

Islam was originally called Dashi Jiao during the Tang dynasty, when Muslims first appeared in China. "Dashi Fa" literally means "Arab law" in Old Chinese.[47] Since almost all Muslims in China were exclusively foreign Arabs or Persians at the time, it was rarely mentioned by the Chinese, unlike other religions like Zoroastrism or Mazdaism, and Nestorian Christianity, which gained followings in China.[48] As an influx of foreigners, such as Persians, Jews and Christians, the majority of whom were Muslims who came from western regions, were labelled as Semu people, but were also mistaken by Chinese for Uyghur, due to them coming from the west (Uyghur lands).[49] The name "Hui Hui" was applied to them, and eventually became the name applied to Muslims.

Another, probably unrelated, early use of the word Huihui comes from the History of Liao, which mentions Yelü Dashi, the 12th-century founder of the Kara-Khitan Khanate, defeating the Huihui Dashibu (回回大食部) people near Samarkand—apparently, referring to his defeat of the Khwarazm ruler Ahmed Sanjar in 1141.[50] Khwarazm is referred to as Huihuiguo in the Secret History of the Mongols as well.[51]

While Huihui or Hui remained a generic name for all Muslims in Imperial China, specific terms were sometimes used to refer to particular groups, e.g. Chantou Hui ("turbaned Hui") for Uyghurs, Dongxiang Hui and Sala Hui for Dongxiang and Salar people, and sometimes even Han Hui (漢回) ("Chinese Hui") for the (presumably Chinese-speaking) Muslims more assimilated into the Chinese mainstream society.[52][53]

A halal (清真) bathhouse in Linxia City

In the 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) defined the term Hui as indicating only Sinophone Muslims. In 1941, this was clarified by a CCP committee comprising ethnic policy researchers in a treatise entitled "On the question of Huihui Ethnicity" (回回民族问题, Huíhui mínzú wèntí). This treatise defined the characteristics of the Hui nationality as an ethnic group associated with, but not defined by, Islam and descended primarily from Muslims who migrated to China during the Mongol-founded Yuan dynasty (1271–1368), as distinct from the Uyghur and other Turkic-speaking ethnic groups in Xinjiang. The Nationalist government by contrast recognised all Muslims as one of "the five peoples"—alongside the Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, and Han Chinese—that constituted the Republic of China.[54]

A traditional Chinese term for Islam is "回教" (pinyin: Huíjiào, literally "the religion of the Hui"). However, since the early days of the PRC, thanks to the arguments of such Marxist Hui scholars as Bai Shouyi, the standard term for "Islam" within the PRC has become the transliteration "伊斯蘭教" (pinyin: Yīsīlán jiào, literally "Islam religion").[55][56] The more traditional term Huijiao remains in use in Singapore, Taiwan and other overseas Chinese communities.[57]

Qīngzhēn: (清真, literally "pure and true") has also been a popular term for Muslim culture since the Yuan or Ming dynasty. Gladney suggested that a good translation for it would be the Arabic tahára. i.e. "ritual or moral purity"[58] The usual term for a mosque is qīngzhēn sì (清真寺), i.e. "true and pure temple", and qīngzhēn is commonly used to refer to halal eating establishments and bathhouses.

In contrast, the Uyghurs were called "Chan Tou Hui" ("Turban Headed Muslim"), and the Turkic Salars called "Sala Hui" (Salar Muslim), while Turkic speakers often referred to Hui as "Dungan".[53][59]

Zhongyuan ren: During the Qing dynasty, the term Zhongyuan ren (中原人; 'people from the Central Plain') was the term for all Chinese, encompassing Han Chinese and Hui in Xinjiang or Central Asia. While Hui are not Han, they consider themselves to be Chinese and include themselves in the larger group of Zhongyuan ren.[60] The Dungan people, descendants of Hui who fled to Central Asia, called themselves Zhongyuan ren in addition to the standard labels lao huihui and huizi.[61] Zhongyuan ren was used by Turkic Muslims to refer to ethnic Chinese. When Central Asian invaders from Kokand invaded Kashgar, in a letter the Kokandi commander criticised the Kashgari Turkic Muslim Ishaq for allegedly not behaving like a Muslim and wanting to be a Zhongyuan ren (Chinese).[62][63]

Some Uyghurs barely see any difference between Hui and Han. A Uyghur social scientist, Dilshat, regarded Hui as the same people as Han, deliberately calling Hui people Han and dismissing the Hui as having only a few hundred years of history.[64]

Pusuman: Pusuman was a name used by Chinese during the Yuan dynasty. It could have been a corruption of Musalman or another name for Persians. It means either Muslim or Persian.[65][66] Pusuman Kuo (Pusuman Guo) referred to the country where they came from.[67][68] The name "Pusuman zi" (pusuman script), was used to refer to the script that the HuiHui (Muslims) were using.[69]

Muslim Chinese: The term Chinese Muslim is sometimes used to refer to Hui people, given that they speak Chinese, in contrast to, e.g., Turkic-speaking Salars. During the Qing dynasty, Chinese Muslim (Han Hui) was sometimes used to refer to Hui people, which differentiated them from non-Chinese-speaking Muslims. However, not all Hui are Muslims, nor are all Chinese Muslims, Hui. For example, Li Yong is a famous Han Chinese who practices Islam and Hui Liangyu is a notable atheist Hui. In addition, most Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz and Dongxiang in China are Muslims, but are not Hui.[citation needed]

John Stuart Thomson, who traveled in China, called them "Mohammedan Chinese".[70] They have also been called "Chinese Mussulmans", when Europeans wanted to distinguish them from Han Chinese.[71]

Non-Muslim Huis

[edit]

Throughout history, the identity of Hui people has been fluid, often changing as was convenient.[72][unreliable source?] Some identified as Hui out of interest in their ancestry or because of government benefits. These Hui are concentrated on the southeast coast of China, especially Fujian province.[73]

Some Hui clans around Quanzhou in Fujian, such as the Ding and Guo families, identify themselves by ethnicity and no longer practice Islam. In recent years, more of these clans have identified as Hui, increasing the official population.[74][75][76] They provided evidence of their ancestry and were recognized as Hui.[76] Many clans across Fujian had genealogies that demonstrated Hui ancestry.[77] These clans inhabited Fujian, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines.[78] None of these clans were Muslims but they do not offer pork during their ancestral worship.

In Taiwan, the Hui clans who followed Koxinga to Formosa to defeat the Dutch settlers no longer observe Islam and their descendants embrace the Chinese folk religion. The Taiwanese branch of the Guo (Kuo in Taiwan) clan with Hui ancestry does not practice Islam, yet does not offer pork at their ancestral shrines. The Chinese Muslim Association counts these people as Muslims.[79] Also on Taiwan, one branch of the Ding (Ting) clan that descended from Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar resides in Taisi Township in Yunlin County. They trace their descent through him via the Quanzhou Ding family of Fujian. While pretending to be Han Chinese in Fujian, they initially practiced Islam when they came to Taiwan 200 years ago, but their descendants have embraced Buddhism or Taoism.[80]

An attempt was made by the Chinese Islamic Society to convert the Fujian Hui of Fujian back to Islam in 1983, by sending four Ningxia imams to Fujian.[81] This futile endeavour ended in 1986, when the final Ningxia imam left. A similar endeavour in Taiwan also failed.[82]

Until 1982, a Han could "become" Hui by converting to Islam. Thereafter, a converted Han counts instead as a "Muslim Han". Symmetrically, Hui people consider other Hui who do not observe Islamic practices as still Hui, and that their Hui nationality cannot be lost.[83] For both of these reasons, simply calling them "Chinese Muslims" is no longer accurate, strictly speaking, just as with Bosniaks in former Yugoslavia.

Population

[edit]

The Hui nationality is the most widely distributed ethnic minority in China, and it is also the main ethnic minority in many provinces. There are 10,586,087 Hui people in China (2010 census), accounting for 0.79% of the total population, making them the third largest ethnic group after Han Chinese and Zhuang.

Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region and Gansu Province have a Hui population of more than one million. In Ningxia, 33.95% of the population are of Hui ethnicity. Hui are the major minority in Qinghai (15.62%), Gansu and Shaanxi and is the overall major minority in Henan.

Subgroups

[edit]
The minaret of the Dungan mosque in Karakol, Kyrgyzstan
Dungan mosque in Karakol, Kyrgyzstan

Dungan (simplified Chinese: 东干族; traditional Chinese: 東干族; pinyin: Dōnggānzú; Russian: Дунгане) is a term used in Central Asia and in Xinjiang to refer to Chinese-speaking Muslim people. In the censuses of Russia and Central Asian nations, the Hui are distinguished from Chinese, termed Dungans. However, in both China and Central Asia members of this ethnic group call themselves Lao Huihui or Zhongyuanren, rather than Dungan. Zhongyuan 中原, literally means "The Central Plain," and is the historical name of Shaanxi and Henan provinces. Most Dungans living in Central Asia are descendants of Hui people from Gansu and Shaanxi.[citation needed]

Hui people are referred to by Central Asian Turkic speakers and Tajiks by the ethnonym Dungan. Joseph Fletcher cited Turkic and Persian manuscripts related to the preaching of the 17th century Kashgarian Sufi master Muhammad Yūsuf (or, possibly, his son Afaq Khoja) inside the Ming Empire (in today's Gansu and/or Qinghai), where the preacher allegedly converted ulamā-yi Tunganiyyāh (i.e., "Dungan ulema") into Sufism.[84]

As early as the 1830s, Dungan, in various spellings appeared in both English and German, referring to the Hui people of Xinjiang. For example, James Prinsep in 1835 mentioned Muslim "Túngánis" in Chinese Tartary.[85] The word (mostly in the form "Dungani" or "Tungani", sometimes "Dungens" or "Dungans") acquired currency in English and other western languages when books in the 1860–70s discussed the Dungan Revolt.

Later authors continued to use variants of the term for Xinjiang Hui people. For example, Owen Lattimore, writing ca. 1940, maintained the terminological distinction between these two related groups: the Donggan or "Tungkan" (the older Wade-Giles spelling for "Dungan"), described by him as the descendants of the Gansu Hui people resettled in Xinjiang in the 17–18th centuries, vs. e.g. the "Gansu Moslems" or generic "Chinese Moslems".[86]

The name "Dungan" sometimes referred to all Muslims coming from China proper, such as Dongxiang and Salar in addition to Hui. Reportedly, the Hui disliked the term Dungan, calling themselves either Huihui or Huizi.[43]

In the Soviet Union and its successor countries, the term "Dungans" (дунгане) became the standard name for the descendants of Chinese-speaking Muslims who emigrated in the 1870s and 1880s to the Russian Empire, mostly to today's Kyrgyzstan and south-eastern Kazakhstan.[87]

Panthay

[edit]
Muslim restaurant in Kunming, Yunnan

The Panthay are a group of Chinese Muslims in Myanmar (Burma) and Yunnan Province. In Thailand, Chinese Muslims are referred to as Chin Ho (จีนฮ่อ).

Utsul

[edit]

The Utsuls of Hainan are a Chamic-speaking ethnic group which lives southernmost tip of the island near the city of Sanya. They are thought to be descendants of Cham refugees who fled their homeland of Champa in what is now modern Central Vietnam to escape the Vietnamese invasion.[88] Although they are culturally, ethnically and linguistically distinct from the Hui, the Chinese government nevertheless classifies them as Hui due to their Islamic faith.

History

[edit]


Hui people praying in the Dongguan Mosque, Xining

Many Hui are direct descendants of Silk Road travelers. On the southeast coast (e.g., Guangdong, Fujian) and in major trade centers elsewhere in China, some are of mixed local and foreign descent. The foreign element, although greatly diluted, came primarily from Iranian (Bosi) traders, who brought Islam to China. These foreigners settled and gradually intermarried, while assimilating into Chinese culture.[89]

Early European explorers speculated that T'ung-kan (Dungans, i.e. Hui, called "Chinese Mohammedans") in Xinjiang, originated from Khorezmians who were transported to China by the Mongols, and descended from a mixture of Chinese, Iranian and Turkic peoples. They also reported that the T'ung-kan were Shafi'ites, as were the Khorezmians.[90]

The Hui people of Yunnan and Northwestern China resulted from the convergence of Mongol, Turkic, and Iranian peoples or other Central Asian settlers recruited by the Yuan dynasty, either as artisans or as officials (the semu). The Hui formed the second-highest stratum in the Yuan ethnic hierarchy (after the Mongols but above Chinese).[91][92] A proportion of the ancestral nomad or military ethnic groups were originally Nestorian Christians, many of whom later converted to Islam under the Ming and Qing dynasties.[citation needed]

However, Hui peoples from Gansu, along with their Dongxian neighbors, did not receive substantial gene flow from Western and Central Asia or European populations during their Islamization.[93] Chi Ma Tan Jun, a Yuan Dynasty's army consisted of Muslims from western tribes Around 13-14th AD, were stationed on several places from Mobei, Dadu (historical name of Beijing), to the South and northwest of Yangtze River and Yuanhan River. This followed with their assimilation to the Hui people, which caused the Hui population increased sharply during the Yuan Dynasty.[94]

The formation of large clans of Hui Muslims in Yunnan area were indicated by the appearances of certain figures like Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar and Nestardin, local officials in Yuan Dynasty; and Mu Ying, Ha Yuansheng and Ye Daxiong, military officers stationed in Yunnan during Ming and Qing dynasties. Here, the Hui Muslims enjoyed important roles in border trade in Yunnan, which spanning the southwest frontier of China, Thailand and Myanmar.[95]

Military service

[edit]
Chiang Kai-shek, head of the Kuomintang with Muslim General Ma Fushou.
Ma Jiyuan, a Muslim General, at his wedding with Kuomintang flag.

Muslims have served extensively in the Chinese military for a long time in Chinese history, as both officials and soldiers, often filling the more distinguished military positions.[96] During the Tang dynasty, 3,000 Chinese soldiers and Arab 3,000 Muslim soldiers were traded to each other in an agreement.[97] In 756, 3,000 Arab mercenaries joined the Chinese against the An Lushan rebellion.[98] A mythical Hui legendary folklore account claims 3000 Chinese soldiers were swapped by Guo Ziyi with the Muslims for 300 "Hui" soldiers, and said that only 3 Hui survived the war against An Lushan and populated Ningxia.[99] A massacre of thousands of foreign Arab and Persian Muslim merchants and other foreigners by former Yan rebel general Tian Shengong happened during the An Lushan rebellion in the Yangzhou massacre (760),[100][101] The rebel Huang Chao's army in southern China committed the Guangzhou massacre against over 120,000 to 200,000 foreign Arab and Persian Muslim, Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian merchants in 878–879 at the seaport and trading entrepot of Guangzhou.[102]

During the Ming dynasty, Hui generals and troops loyal to Ming fought against Mongols and Hui loyal to the Yuan dynasty in the Ming conquest of Yunnan.[103][104] Hui also fought for the emperor against aboriginal tribes in southern China during the Miao Rebellions. Many Hui soldiers of the Ming dynasty then settled in Yunnan and Hunan provinces.

During the Qing dynasty, Hui troops in the Imperial army helped crush Hui rebels during the Dungan revolt and Panthay Rebellion. The Qing administration in Xinjiang also preferred to use Hui as police.[105] Yang Zengxin, the Han Chinese governor of Xinjiang, extensively relied on Hui generals like Ma Shaowu and Ma Fuxing. Qing Muslim general Zuo Baogui (1837–1894), from Shandong province, was killed in Pingyang in Korea by Japanese cannon fire in 1894 while defending the city, where a memorial to him stands.[106] Hui troops also fought western armies for the first time in the Boxer Rebellion, winning battles including the Battle of Langfang and Battle of Beicang. These troops were the Kansu Braves led by General Dong Fuxiang.

Military service continued into the Republic of China period. After the Kuomintang party took power, Hui participation in the military reached new levels. Qinghai and Ningxia were created out of Gansu province, and the Kuomintang appointed Hui generals as military governors of all three provinces. They became known as the Ma Clique. Many Muslim Salar joined the army in the Republic era; they and Dongxiang who have joined the army are described as being given "eating rations" meaning military service.[107][108]

The Chinese government appointed Ma Fuxiang as military governor of Suiyuan. Ma Fuxiang commented on the willingness for Hui people to become martyrs in battle (see Martyrdom in Islam), saying:

They have not enjoyed the educational and political privileges of the Han Chinese, and they are in many respects primitive. But they know the meaning of fidelity, and if I say "do this, although it means death," they cheerfully obey.[109]

Hui generals and soldiers fought for the Republic against Tibet in the Sino-Tibetan War, against Uyghur rebels in the Kumul Rebellion, the Soviet Union in the Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang and against Japan in the Second Sino Japanese War. The Japanese planned to invade Ningxia from Suiyuan in 1939 and create a Hui puppet state. The next year in 1940, the Japanese were defeated militarily by Kuomintang Muslim general Ma Hongbin. Ma Hongbin's Hui Muslim troops launched further attacks against Japan in the Battle of West Suiyuan.[110] The Chinese Islamic Association issued "A message to all Muslims in China from the Chinese Islamic Association for National Salvation" in Ramadan of 1940 during the Second Sino-Japanese War.

We have to implement the teaching "the love of the fatherland is an article of faith" by the Prophet Muhammad and to inherit the Hui's glorious history in China. In addition, let us reinforce our unity and participate in the twice more difficult task of supporting a defensive war and promoting religion ... We hope that ahongs and the elite will initiate a movement of prayer during Ramadan and implement group prayer to support our intimate feeling toward Islam. A sincere unity of Muslims should be developed to contribute power towards the expulsion of Japan.

Ma Bufang and Hui children in Egypt.

"Ahong" is the Mandarin Chinese word for "imam". During the war against Japan, the imams supported Muslim resistance, calling for Muslims to participate in the fight against Japan, claiming that casualties would become shaheeds (martyrs).[111] Ma Zhanshan was a Hui guerilla fighter against the Japanese.

Hui forces were known for their anti-communist sentiment, and fought for the Kuomintang against the CCP in the Chinese Civil War, and against rebels during the Ili Rebellion. Bai Chongxi, a Hui general, was appointed to the post of Minister of National Defence, the highest military position in the Republic of China. After the Communist victory and evacuation of the Kuomintang to Taiwan, Hui people continued to serve in the military of the Republic as opposed to the Communist-led People's Republic. Ma Bufang became the ambassador of the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Saudi Arabia. His brother, Ma Buqing, remained a military general on Taiwan. Bai Chongxi and Ma Ching-chiang were other Hui who served in Taiwan as military generals.

The PLA recruited Hui soldiers who formally had served under Ma Bufang, as well as Salafi soldiers, to crush the Tibetan revolt in Amdo during the 1959 Tibetan uprising.[112]

Politics

[edit]
Chinese Generals pay tribute to the Sun Yat-sen Mausoleum at the Temple of the Azure Clouds in Beijing after the success of the Northern Expedition. From right to left, are Generals Cheng Jin, Zhang Zuobao, Chen Diaoyuan, Chiang Kai-shek, Woo Tsin-hang, Wen Xishan, Ma Fuxiang, Ma Sida and Bai Chongxi. (6 July 1928)

The majority of the Hui Muslim Ma Clique Generals were Kuomintang party members and encouraged Chinese nationalism in their provinces. Kuomintang members Ma Qi, Ma Lin (warlord), and Ma Bufang served as military governors of Qinghai, Ma Hongbin served as military governor of Gansu, and Ma Hongkui served as military governor of Ningxia. General Ma Fuxiang was promoted to governor of Anhui and became chairman of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs. Ma Bufang, Ma Fuxiang, and Bai Chongxi were all members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, which ruled China in a one-party state. Member Bai Chongxi helped build the Taipei Grand Mosque on Taiwan. Many members of the Hui Ma Clique were Kuomintang.

Hui put Kuomintang Blue Sky with a White Sun party symbols on their Halal restaurants and shops. A Christian missionary in 1935 took a picture of a Muslim meat restaurant in Hankou that had Arabic and Chinese lettering indicating that it was Halal (fit for Muslim consumption). It had two Kuomintang party symbols on it.[113]

Modern period

[edit]

The Hui played an important role in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Japan's attempt to get the Hui people on its side failed, because many generals such as Bai Chongxi, Ma Hongbin, Ma Hongkui, and Ma Bufang were Hui and fought against the Imperial Japanese Army. The Japanese attempted to approach Ma Bufang but could not make any agreement with him.[114] During China's land reform movement (which began after the defeat of the Japanese in the Second Sino-Japanese War and continued in the early years of the People's Republic of China), the Communist Party encouraged rural women in achieving a "double fanshen"—a revolutionary transformation as both a peasant and a feminist awakening as a woman.[115] The progress of Hui women was promoted as by the party as an example of such a success.[116] Through the rural movement, Hui women were said to have not just received land, but also "freedom over their own bodies."[116] Hui women embraced political participation and the rural revolution.[116] The land reform movement succeeded among Hui people because activists first won over elder generations.[116]

The Cultural Revolution wreaked much havoc on all cultures and ethnicities in China. The quelling of Hui militant rebels at the hands of the People's Liberation Army in Yunnan, known as the Shadian incident, reportedly claimed over 1,600 lives in 1975.[117]


Muslim restaurant in Xi'an

Different Muslim ethnic groups in different regions are treated differently by the Chinese government in regards to religious freedom. A greater freedom is permitted for Hui Muslims, who can practice their religion, build mosques, and have their children attend mosques.[118] Since the 1980s, Islamic private schools have been supported and permitted by the Chinese government in Muslim areas.[119] Although religious education for children is officially forbidden by law in China, the CCP allows Hui Muslims to have their children educated in the religion and attend mosques. After secondary education is completed, China then allows Hui students who would like to, embark on religious studies under an imam.[120]

Hui religious schools are also allowed to establish a large autonomous network of mosques and schools run by a Hui Sufi leader, which was formed with the approval of the Chinese government even though he admitted to attending an event where Osama Bin Laden spoke.[121][122]

Hui Muslims who are employed by the state are allowed to fast during Ramadan. The number of Hui going on Hajj is expanding. Hui women are allowed to wear veils.[123] Many Hui women wear veils and headscarves.[124] There is a major halal industry and Islamic clothing industry to manufacture Muslim attire such as skull caps, veils, and headscarves in the Hui region of Ningxia.[125]

China banned a book entitled Xing Fengsu ("Sexual Customs") which insulted Islam and placed its authors under arrest in 1989 after protests in Lanzhou and Beijing by Chinese Hui Muslims. During the protests, the Chinese police provided protection to the Hui Muslim protestors, and the Chinese government organized public burnings of the book.[126][127][128][129] The Chinese government assisted them and gave into their demands because Hui do not have a separatist movement.[130]

In 2007, anticipating the coming "Year of the Pig" in the Chinese calendar, depictions of pigs were banned from CCTV "to show respect to Islam, and upon guidance from higher levels of the government".[131]

The Dungan and Panthay revolts were set off by racial antagonism and class warfare, rather than religion.[96] During the first Dungan revolt from 1862 to 1877, fighting broke out between Uyghur and Hui groups.[132] In the military, imbalances in promotion and wealth were other motives for holding foreigners in poor regard.[96]

In 1936, after Sheng Shicai expelled 20,000 Kazakhs from Xinjiang to Qinghai, the Hui led by Ma Bufang massacred their fellow Muslims, the Kazakhs, until only 135 remained.[133]

The Hui people have had a long presence in Qinghai and Gansu, or what Tibetans call Amdo, although Tibetans have historically dominated local politics. The situation was reversed in 1931 when the Hui general Ma Bufang inherited the governorship of Qinghai, stacking his government with Hui and Salar and excluding Tibetans. In his power base in Qinghai's northeastern Haidong Prefecture, Ma compelled many Tibetans to convert to Islam and acculturate. Tensions also mounted when Hui started migrating into Lhasa in the 1990s. In February 2003, Tibetans rioted against Hui, destroying Hui-owned shops and restaurants.[134] Local Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders led a regional boycott movement that encouraged Tibetans to boycott Hui-owned shops.[135]

Hui Muslims have been alleged to have experienced greater repression of religious activities in recent years.[136] In 2018, paramount leader Xi Jinping issued a directive aimed at the sinicization of Chinese Muslims.[137] Since then, the government has been accused of repressing aspects of Hui culture deemed "Arab". Most of these repressions have been limited to the removal of aesthetically Islamic buildings and symbols, with the government renovating architecture to appear more Chinese and banning Arabic signs in Hui regions.[138] More drastic repressions have been taken, such as closing mosques or removing licenses from imams who have traveled outside of China.[139] In order to sinicize the Hui, schools and mosques in Ningxia have been changed to include traits from traditional Han architecture.[140]

At least two Hui Muslims have allegedly been included in reeducation camps, termed "Vocational Education and Training Centers" which the Chinese government claims are aimed at reforming the political thought of detainees, including extremist religious beliefs and separatist or terrorist sympathies.[141][142] One or more of the Hui within these camps may have faced torture, and are allegedly grouped in different cells from Kazakhs and Uighurs, and on rare occasion die from stress.[139][143]

Tensions between Hui and Uyghurs

[edit]

Tensions with Uyghurs arose because Qing and Republican Chinese authorities used Hui troops and officials to dominate the Uyghurs and crush Uyghur revolts.[144] Xinjiang's Hui population increased by over 520 percent between 1940 and 1982, an average annual growth of 4.4 percent, while the Uyghur population only grew at 1.7 percent. This dramatic increase in Hui population led inevitably to significant tensions between the Hui and Uyghur populations. Many Hui Muslim civilians were killed by Uyghur rebel troops in the Kizil massacre (1933).[145] Some Uyghurs in Kashgar remember that the Hui army at the 1934 Battle of Kashgar massacred 2,000 to 8,000 Uyghurs, which caused tension as more Hui moved into Kashgar from other parts of China.[146] Some Hui criticize Uyghur separatism and generally do not want to get involved in conflict in other countries.[147] Hui and Uyghur live separately, attending different mosques.[148] During the 2009 rioting in Xinjiang that killed around 200 people, "Kill the Han, kill the Hui" was the recurring cry spread across social media among extremist Uyghurs.[123]

Tensions between Hui Muslims and Uyghurs have arisen because Hui troops and officials often dominated the Uyghurs and crushed Uyghur revolts.[144] Xinjiang's Hui population increased by more than 520 percent between 1940 and 1982, an average annual growth of 4.4 percent, while the Uyghur population only grew at 1.7 percent. This dramatic increase in Hui population led inevitably to significant tensions between the Hui and Uyghur populations. Many Hui Muslim civilians were killed by Uyghur rebel troops in the Kizil massacre of 1933.[145] Some Uyghurs in Kashgar remember that the Hui army at the Battle of Kashgar (1934) massacred 2,000 to 8,000 Uyghurs, which causes tension as more Hui moved into Kashgar from other parts of China.[146] Some Hui criticize Uyghur separatism and generally do not want to get involved in conflict in other countries.[147] Hui and Uyghur live separately, attending different mosques.[148] During the 2009 rioting in Xinjiang that killed around 200 people, "Kill the Han, destroy the Hui" is a common cry spread across social media among Uyghur extremists.[123]

The Uyghur militant organization East Turkestan Islamic Movement's magazine Islamic Turkistan has accused the Chinese "Muslim Brotherhood" (the Yihewani) of being responsible for the moderation of Hui Muslims and the lack of Hui joining militant jihadist groups in addition to blaming other things for the lack of Hui Jihadists, such as the fact that for more than 300 years Hui and Uyghurs have been enemies of each other, no separatist Islamist organizations among the Hui, the fact that the Hui view China as their home, and the fact that the "infidel Chinese" language is the language of the Hui.[149][150]

Even among Hui Salafis (Sailaifengye) and Uyghur Salafis, there is little coordination or cooperation and the two have totally different political agendas, with the Hui Salafists content to carry out their own teachings and remain politically neutral.[151][152]

Hui Muslim drug dealers are accused by Uyghur Muslims of pushing heroin onto Uyghurs.[153][154] There is a typecast image in the public eye of Hui being heroin dealers.[155]

Tibetan-Muslim sectarian violence

[edit]
The Lhasa Great Mosque in Tibet

In Tibet, the majority of Muslims are Hui people. Antagonism between Tibetans and Muslims stems from events during the Muslim warlord Ma Bufang's rule such as the Ngolok rebellions (1917–49) and the Sino-Tibetan War, but such hostility was suppressed after the annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China.[156] However, renewed Tibetan-Muslim violence broke out in the wake of the gradual liberalization of China, that resulted in increased movement of people, such as Han and Hui Chinese, into Tibetan areas.[156] Muslim restaurants were attacked, and apartments and shops of Muslims were set on fire in the riot in mid-March 2008, resulting in death and injury. Tibetans also boycotted Muslim owned businesses.[157] In August 2008, the main mosque in Lhasa was burned down by Tibetans during the 2008 Tibetan unrest.[158] Some Muslims avoided overt display of religious identity in the wake of the violence. Many Hui Muslims also supported the repression of Tibetan separatism by the Chinese government, complicating their relationship.[156] Problems also exist between Chinese-speaking Hui and Tibetan Hui (the Tibetan-speaking Kache minority of Muslims).[159]

Sectarian conflict

[edit]

There have been many occurrences of violent sectarian fighting between different Hui sects, mostly dating from the Qing dynasty. Sectarian fighting between Hui sects led to the Jahriyya rebellion in the 1780s and the 1895 revolt. After a hiatus after the People's Republic of China came to power, sectarian infighting resumed in the 1990s in Ningxia between different sects. In recent years, the Salafi movement in China has increased rapidly among Hui population with more mosques occupied under Salafis in China. Several sects refuse to intermarry with each other. One Sufi sect circulated an anti-Salafi pamphlet in Arabic.

A small but growing number of Huis who supported or even joined the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. Chinese officials were believed to have ignored growing Hui Sufis' resentment against growing Salafi movement until recently.[160] ISIL had released a music video called "I am a mujahid" (我們是Mujahid) in Mandarin to reportedly attract Hui Muslims into joining the organization.[161][162]

Relations with other religions

[edit]

Some Hui believed that Islam was the true religion through which Confucianism could be practiced, superior to "barbarian" religions, and accused Buddhists and Daoists of "heresy", like most other Confucian scholars.[163] Among the many Muslims in pre-Chinese Lhasa, the Kokonor Hui community was permitted to maintain the abattoirs outside the confines of the girdling pilgrims' circuit of the city.[164]

Muslim general Ma Bufang allowed polytheists to openly worship and Christian missionaries to station themselves in Qinghai. Ma and other high-ranking Muslim generals attended the Kokonuur Lake ceremony where the God of the Lake was worshipped, and during the ritual, the Chinese national anthem was sung, participants bowed to a portrait of Kuomintang party founder Sun Yat-sen, and to the God of the Lake. Offerings were given to Sun by the participants, including Muslims.[165] Ma Bufang invited Kazakh Muslims to attend the ceremony.[166] Ma Bufang received audiences of Christian missionaries, who sometimes preached the Gospel.[167] His son Ma Jiyuan received a silver cup from the missionaries.[168]

The Muslim Ma Zhu wrote "Chinese religions are different from Islam, but the ideas are the same."[169]

During the Panthay Rebellion, the Muslim leader Du Wenxiu said to a Catholic priest: "I have read your religious works and I have found nothing inappropriate. Muslims and Christians are brothers."[170]

Culture

[edit]

Sects of Islam

[edit]
The Sufi mausoleum (gongbei) of Ma Laichi in Linxia City, China.

Most Hui people are Sunni Muslims, and their Islamic sects can be divided into:[171]

  • Gedimu[g] (Old Sect[h]): This is the oldest and most widely followed sect in China. Members typically do not actively proselytise. It is divided into four main Sufi orders,[i] each with its own hereditary leader. Each order has gongbei,[j] which serve as the tombs of its leader.
  • Yihewani[s] (New Sect[t]): This sect focuses exclusively on the Quran, without establishing any Sufi order, gongbei, or hereditary leadership.
  • Salafi[u] (New New Sect[v]): Influenced by Wahhabi thought, this sect aims to reform the New Sect and advocates for a return to the purity and spirituality of early Islam.
  • Xidaotang[w] (Chinese Learning Sect[x]): This sect, founded on the Chinese translations of Islamic texts by scholars like Liu Zhi, has a centralised religious authority. Its leader serves for life but does not pass down the position hereditarily.

Ma Tong recorded that the 6,781,500 Sunni Hui in China followed 58.2% Gedimu, 21% Yihewani, 10.9% Jahriyya, 7.2% Khuffiya, 1.4% Qadariyya, and 0.7% Kubrawiyya Sufi schools.[172]

Among the northern Hui, Central Asian Sufi schools such as Kubrawiyya, Qadiriyya, and Naqshbandiyya (Khufiyya and Jahriyya) were strong influences, mostly of the Hanafi Madhhab.

With the exception of Sailaifengye, which heavily influnced by Salafi,[173] most branches of Hui Muslims have a long tradition of synthesizing Confucian teachings with Qur'anic teachings and reportedly have contributed to Confucianism from the Tang period on. Before the "Yihewani" movement, a Chinese Muslim sect inspired by the Middle Eastern reform movement, northern Hui Sufis blended Taoist teachings and martial arts practices with Sufi philosophy.

Kaifeng Jews

[edit]

Many Jews in China, for example the Kaifeng Jews,[174] and in particular the Jewish Zhang family Zhang of Kaifeng at the start of the 20th century,[175][176] converted to Islam and became Hui people.[177][178]

Converted Han

[edit]
Ma Hetian

According to legend, a Muhuyindeni person converted an entire village of Han with the surname Zhang to Islam.[179] Hui also adopted Han children and raised them as Hui.[180] Hui in Gansu with the surnames Tang (唐) and Wang (汪) descended from Han Chinese who converted to Islam and married Muslim Hui or Dongxiangs, joining the Hui and Dongxiang ethnic groups, both Muslim. Tangwangchuan and Hanjiaji were notable as towns with a multi-ethnic community, with both non-Muslims and Muslims.[181]

Kuomintang official Ma Hetian visited Tangwangchuan and met an "elderly local literatus from the Tang clan" while he was on his inspection tour of Gansu and Qinghai.[182][183]

In Gansu province in the 1800s, a Muslim Hui woman married into the Han Chinese Kong lineage of Dachuan District, which was descended from Confucius. The Han Chinese groom and his family converted to Islam after the marriage.[184] In 1715 in Yunnan province, a few Han Chinese descendants of Confucius also surnamed Kong married Hui women and converted to Islam.[185]

Around 1376 the 30-year-old Chinese merchant Lin Nu visited Ormuz in Persia, converted to Islam, and married a Semu girl ("娶色目女") (either Persian or Arab) and brought her back to Quanzhou in Fujian.[186][187] The Confucian philosopher Li Zhi was their descendant.[188]

Mosques

[edit]
The Xianxian Mosque in Guangzhou

The style of architecture of Hui mosques varies according to their sect. The traditionalist Gedimu Hanafi Sunnis, influenced by Chinese culture, build mosques which look like Chinese temples. The reformist modernist Yihewani, originally inspired by Salafism, build their mosques in a middle-eastern style.

Foot binding

[edit]

Hui women once practiced foot binding, at the time a common practice across China. It was particularly prevalent in Gansu.[96] The Dungan people, descendants of Hui from northwestern China who fled to Central Asia, also practised foot binding until 1948.[189] However, in southern China, in Canton, James Legge encountered a mosque that had a placard denouncing footbinding, saying Islam did not allow it, since it violated God's creation.[190]

Cultural practices

[edit]
An ethnic Hui family celebrating Eid ul-Fitr in Ningxia.

French army Commandant Viscount D'Ollone reported in 1910 that Sichuanese Hui did not strictly enforce the Islamic practices of teetotaling, ritual washing and Friday prayers. Chinese practices like incense burning at ancestral tablets and honoring Confucius were adopted. One practice that was stringently observed was the ban on pork consumption.[44]

Hui men praying in a mosque

The Sunni Gedimu and the Yihewani burned incense during worship. This was viewed as Daoist or Buddhist influence.[191] The Hui were also known as the "white capped". Hui used incense during worship, while the Salar, also known as "black capped" Hui considered this to be a heathen ritual and denounced it.[192]

In Yunnan province, during the Qing dynasty, tablets that wished the Emperor a long life were placed at mosque entrances. No minarets were available and no chanting accompanied the call to prayer. The mosques were similar to Buddhist temples, and incense was burned inside.[193]

Hui enlisted in the military and were praised for their martial skills.

Circumcision in Islam is known as khitan. Islamic scholars agree that it is required (mandatory), or recommended.[194] However, circumcision is not universally practiced among the Hui.[195] In the regions where it is undertaken, Hui tradition is that the maternal uncle (Jiujiu) play an important role by the circumcision and wedding of his nephew.[195]

Names

[edit]

The long history of Hui residence and mixing in China has led the Hui to adopt names typical of their Han neighbors; however, some common Hui names are actually Chinese renderings of common Muslim (i.e. Arabic) and Persian names. For instance, surname "Ma" for "Muhammad".

Hui people usually have a Chinese name and a Muslim name in Arabic, although the Chinese name is used primarily. Some Hui do not remember their Muslim names.[196]

Hui people who adopt foreign names may not use their Muslim names.[197] An example of this is Pai Hsien-yung, a Hui author in America, who adopted the name Kenneth. His father was Muslim general Bai Chongxi, who had his children adopt western names.

Surnames

[edit]

Hui people commonly believe that their surnames originated as "Sinified" forms of their foreign Muslim ancestors some time during the Yuan or Ming eras.[198] Common Hui surnames:[199][200][201][202]

A Ningxia legend states that four common Hui surnames—Na, Su, La, and Ding—originate with the descendants of Nasruddin, a son of Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar, who "divided" the ancestor's name (Nasulading, in Chinese) among themselves.[204]

Literature

[edit]

The Han Kitab is a collection of Islamic and Confucian texts written by various Hui authors in the 18th century, including Liu Zhi. New works were written by Hui intellectuals following education reform by Ma Clique warlords and Bai Chongxi. Some texts were translated from Arabic.[205]

A new edition of a book by Ma Te-hsin, called Ho-yin Ma Fu-ch'u hsien-sheng i-shu Ta hua tsung kuei Ssu tien yaohui, first printed in 1865, was reprinted in 1927 by Ma Fuxiang.[206] General Ma Fuxiang invested in new editions of Confucian and Islamic texts.[207] He edited Shuofang Daozhi,[208][209] a gazette and books such as Meng Cang ZhuangKuang: Hui Bu Xinjiang fu.[210]

Language

[edit]

The Hui of Yunnan, whom the Burmese called Panthays, were reportedly fluent in Arabic.[211] During the Panthay Rebellion, Arabic replaced Chinese as the official language of the rebel kingdom.[212]

Published in 1844, The Chinese repository, Volume 13 includes an account of an Englishman who stayed in the Chinese city of Ningbo, where he visited the local mosque. The Hui running the mosque was from Shandong and descended from residents of the Arabian city of Medina. He was able to read and speak Arabic with ease, but was illiterate in Chinese, although he was born in China and spoke Chinese.[213]

Marriage

[edit]

Hui marriages resemble typical Chinese marriages except that traditional Chinese rituals are not used.[214] Endogamy is practiced by Hui, who mainly marry amongst themselves rather than with Muslims from other sects.[215] However, the Hui Na family in Ningxia is known to practice both parallel and cross cousin marriage.[199] The Najiahu village in Ningxia is named after this family, descended from Sayyid Ajjal Shams al-Din Omar.[204]

Intermarriage generally involves a Han Chinese converting to Islam when marrying a Hui, and marriage without conversion only takes place rarely. In Hui discourse, marriage between a Hui woman and a Han man is not allowed unless the Han converts to Islam, although it occurred repeatedly in Eastern China. Generally Han of both sexes have to convert to Islam before marrying. This practice helped increase the population of Hui.[216] A case of switching nationality occurred in 1972 when a Han man married a Hui and was considered a Hui after converting.[199]

Zhao nuxu is a practice where the son-in-law moves in with the wife's family. Some marriages between Han and Hui are conducted this way. The husband does not need to convert, but the wife's family follows Islamic customs. No census data documents this type of marriage, reporting only cases in which the wife moves in with the groom's family.[217] In Henan province, a marriage was recorded between a Han boy and Hui girl without the Han converting, during the Ming dynasty. Steles in Han and Hui villages record this story and Hui and Han members of the Lineage celebrate at the ancestral temple together.[218]

In Beijing, Oxen street Gladney found 37 Han–Hui couples; two of which were had Hui wives and the other 35 had Hui husbands.[219] Data was collected in different Beijing districts. In Ma Dian 20% of intermarriages were Hui women marrying into Han families, in Tang Fang 11% of intermarriage were Hui women marrying into Han families. 67.3% of intermarriage in Tang Fang were Han women marrying into a Hui family and in Ma Dian 80% of intermarriage were Han women marrying into Hui families.[220]

Li Nu, the son of Li Lu, from a Han Chinese Li family in Quanzhou visited Hormuz in Persia in 1376. He married a Persian or an Arab girl, and brought her back to Quanzhou. He then converted to Islam. Li Nu was the ancestor of Ming dynasty reformer Li Chih.[221][222]

In Gansu province in the 1800s, a Muslim Hui woman married into the Han Chinese Kong lineage of Dachuan, which was descended from Confucius. The Han Chinese groom and his family were only converted to Islam after the marriage by their Muslim relatives. In 1715 in Yunnan province, few Han Chinese married Hui women and converted to Islam.

Jiang Xingzhou, a Han bannerman lieutenant from the Bordered Yellow Banner, married a Muslim woman in Mukden during Qianlong's late reign. He fled his position due to fear of being punished for being a bannerman marrying a commoner woman. He was sentenced to death for leaving his official post but the sentence was commuted and he was not executed.[223]

In the Dungan Revolt (1895–96) 400 Muslims in Topa 多巴 did not join the revolt and proclaimed their loyalty to China. An argument between a Han Chinese and his Muslim wife led to these Muslims getting massacred, when she threatened that the Muslims from Topa would attack Tankar and give a signal to their co-religionists to rise up and open the gates by burning the temples atop the hills. The husband reported this to an official and the next day the Muslims were massacred with the exception of a few Muslim girls who were married off to Han Chinese.[224][225][226]

In the 21st century, Hui men marrying Han women and Han men who marry Hui women have above average education.[227]

Education

[edit]

Hui have supported modern education and reform. Hui such as Hu Songshan and the Ma Clique warlords promoted western, modern secular education. Elite Hui received both Muslim and Confucian education. They studied the Quran and Confucian texts like the Spring and Autumn Annals.[228] Hui people refused to follow the May Fourth Movement. Instead, they taught both western subjects such as science along with traditional Confucian literature and classical Chinese, along with Islamic education and Arabic.[229] Hui warlord Ma Bufang built a girls' school in Linxia that taught modern secular subjects.[230] Hui have had female imams, called Nu Ahong for centuries. They are the world's only female Imams. They guide women in prayer but are not allowed to lead prayers.[231]

Increasing religiosity in China

[edit]
Ma Fuxiang

According to Dru Gladney, professor at Pomona College in California and a leading scholar on the Hui people, Hui Muslims are enjoying a resurgence in religiosity in China, and that the number of practising Muslims among the Hui people, are rising as well as a "dramatic increase" in the number of Hui women wearing the Hijab, and the numbers of Hui going on the Haj. There are also estimated twice as many mosques in China today than there were in 1950, in which majority were built by Hui Muslims.[232]

One of the reasons for the trend in China, is that Hui Muslims play a vital role as being middlemen in trade between the Middle East and China, and the China-Middle East trade has become increasingly important to the country. Consequently, the government has started constructing a $3.7 billion Islamic theme park called "World Muslim City", in Yinchuan, one of Hui Muslims hubs. Additionally unlike Uyghurs, who faces far more restrictions in religious freedoms, Hui Muslims generally do not seek independence from China and have a cultural affinity to the Han, and are far more assimilated into mainstream Chinese life. "It's not an issue of freedom of religion," says Gladney, "Clearly, there are many avenues of religious expression that are unfettered in China, but when you cross these very often nebulous and shifting boundaries of what the state regards as political, then you're in dangerous territory. Obviously this is what we see in Xinjiang and in Tibet".[233]

Outside mainland China

[edit]

In Southeast Asia, presence of Hui Muslims may date back 700 years to the time of Zheng He, who was a Hui.[234] Hui people also joined the wave of Chinese migrants that peaked between 1875 and 1912. They inhabited Penang, Sabah, Singapore and Pangkor prior to World War II. Most were Hokkien-speaking coolies and merchants from Fujian. The colonial British welfare system was commissioned according to language groups, so the Hui were classed as Hokkien. A small number of Hui may have become assimilated into mainstream Chinese society and local Muslim populations.[234] In 1975, five Hui leaders started a campaign to get every clansman to put up a notice listing their ancestors for 40 generations, as a way of reminding them of their origins. The exact Hui population is unclear today as many families left Islam before independence. In 2000 official census figures gave the number of Muslim Chinese in Malaysia as 57,000 but most were Han converts. According to the Malaysian Chinese Muslim Association, the surnames Koay, Ma, Ha, Ta, Sha, Woon, and An (or Ang) may indicate Hui ancestry.[235]

Saudi Arabia was settled by hundreds of Hui Muslim soldiers under Ma Chengxiang after 1949.[236] The Hui General Ma Bufang settled permanently in Mecca in 1961.[237] For a while Cairo was the dwelling place of Ma Bukang and Ma Bufang in between the time they were in Saudi Arabia.[238][239] The death of Ma Jiyuan in Jeddah on 27 February 2012 was greeted with sorrow by the Chinese consulate.

The Panthays in Myanmar and some of the Chin Haw in Thailand are Hui Muslims, while Hui in Central Asia and Russia are called Dungans.[236]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Hui people (Chinese: 回族; pinyin: Huízú) are an East Asian ethnoreligious group in China primarily defined by their adherence to Islam, numbering 11,377,914 according to the 2020 national census, which ranks them as the fourth-largest ethnic minority in the country. They speak Chinese dialects as their native languages and exhibit cultural practices largely indistinguishable from those of the Han majority, except in religious observance, such as strict adherence to halal dietary rules and participation in Sunni Islamic rituals. Genetic analyses reveal a predominantly East Asian ancestry, with minor West Eurasian contributions—typically around 6%—stemming from historical male-mediated gene flow from Central Asian and Persian Muslim migrants who assimilated local populations beginning in the 7th century during the Tang dynasty. The Hui are dispersed throughout , with the highest concentrations in northwestern provinces like (where the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region is located), , and , as well as in urban centers such as and , reflecting centuries of migration and settlement patterns tied to trade routes like the . Unlike Turkic-speaking Muslim groups such as the , the Hui's linguistic and cultural integration has facilitated their role as intermediaries in Sino-Muslim relations, contributing to fields like commerce, cuisine (notably beef noodle soups and ), and architecture, exemplified by hybrid Chinese-Islamic mosques that blend styles with minarets. Historically, the Hui trace their ethnogenesis to intermarriages between incoming Muslim merchants, soldiers, and artisans from Persia, Arabia, and with and other locals, a process accelerated during the Mongol , though genetic evidence indicates limited direct descent from West Eurasians and emphasizes assimilation over conversion of intact communities. This assimilation has enabled socioeconomic success in modern , with Hui communities often thriving in and avoiding the separatist tendencies seen in other Muslim minorities, though they have faced periodic repression, including devastating 19th-century rebellions against Qing rule that resulted in millions of deaths and subsequent resettlement policies. In contemporary times, the Hui maintain a distinct identity through religious institutions and endogamous practices, yet their compatibility with state policies on "" of religion has positioned them as a relatively favored Muslim group under the , contrasting with stricter controls on more ethno-linguistically distinct populations.

Identity and Definition

Etymology and nomenclature

The designation "Hui" (回) for the ethnic group derives from the historical term "Huihui" (回回), which appeared in Chinese records as early as the Tang dynasty (618–907 CE) to denote Central Asian peoples and later specifically Muslims arriving via the Silk Road. During the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368 CE), "Huihui" broadly encompassed Muslim communities of Persian, Arab, and Turkic origin, reflecting their foreign ("returning") status in Chinese nomenclature rather than a unified ethnic identity. The character "回" literally means "to return" or "circuit," possibly evoking migratory patterns or cyclical pilgrimage motifs in Islamic practice, though this interpretation stems from traditional Chinese Muslim scholarship without direct textual attestation in early sources. In pre-modern China, "Huihui" functioned as a religious rather than ethnic label, applied indiscriminately to all Muslims irrespective of linguistic or ancestral background, including non-Sinitic groups later distinguished as or . By the (1368–1644 CE), as these communities assimilated linguistically and culturally with , the term contracted to "Hui" while retaining its association with , though it no longer covered Turkic-speaking Muslims. diaspora communities, such as in and , preserved "Hui jiao tu" (回教徒, "followers of the Hui religion") into the as a generic synonym for , underscoring the term's original religious connotation before its ethnic specialization in . In contemporary nomenclature, the officially recognizes them as the "Huízú" (回族, Hui nationality), one of 56 ethnic groups, emphasizing Sinicized who speak Mandarin dialects and adhere to without . This classification, formalized post-1949, excludes other Muslim minorities to align with state policies on ethnic , though self-identification among Hui remains tied to religious practice over strict genealogy. Internationally, English sources render it as "Hui people" or "Chinese ," avoiding conflation with global categories, while historical texts sometimes translate "Huihui" as "Moors" or "Saracens" in European .

Official classification in China

The officially recognizes the Hui as one of its 56 ethnic groups (minzu), classifying them as a distinct minority alongside the majority Han and 54 other minorities. This status grants them certain benefits, including preferential policies in , , and , as well as the right to establish autonomous administrative regions where they form significant populations, such as the Hui Autonomous Region established in 1958. The classification originated from the Ethnic Classification Project (minzu shibie), a nationwide effort from 1954 to 1964 that identified and formalized ethnic categories based on adapted Stalinist criteria—common language, territory, economic life, and psychological self-identification—while incorporating genealogical and cultural factors. For the Hui, who speak Sinitic dialects and exhibit substantial cultural assimilation with Han Chinese, the defining marker was their Islamic religious identity and historical descent from Muslim traders, soldiers, and settlers from Central Asia and the Middle East dating to the Tang and Yuan dynasties. This religion-centric approach differentiated them from other Muslim groups like Uyghurs or Kazakhs, who possess distinct languages and territories, effectively grouping Chinese-speaking Muslims under the Hui label unless they self-identified otherwise. Critics note that the Hui classification can be fluid and pragmatic, encompassing diverse Muslim communities without a unified non-religious ethnic core, leading to debates over its coherence compared to more territorially or linguistically defined groups; nonetheless, it has enabled institutional accommodations for Islamic practices amid the state's secular framework. The 2010 census recorded approximately 10.5 million Hui, underscoring their status as China's largest officially recognized Muslim ethnicity.

Distinction from Han Chinese and other Muslims

The Hui people differ from the Han Chinese mainly through their Islamic faith, which enforces strict halal dietary laws excluding pork and alcohol, mandates religious rituals like daily prayers and mosque attendance, and encourages endogamous marriages to sustain ethnic boundaries amid assimilation pressures. Although Hui communities have adopted Han linguistic norms—speaking Mandarin or regional Chinese dialects—and integrated Confucian ethical frameworks, they preserve distinct social institutions such as Hui-only neighborhoods and markets specializing in halal goods. Genetically, Hui maternal lineages align closely with Han populations, sharing about 45.92% of mitochondrial haplotypes, indicative of extensive historical admixture since the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368 CE), yet they maintain self-identification as a separate ethnoreligious group under China's official minority classification. Unlike other Muslim minorities in China, such as the , the Hui exhibit profound , using Chinese as their primary language without a separate Turkic or Persian vernacular, which enables seamless interaction within Han-dominated society. Hui religious architecture fuses Islamic minarets with traditional Chinese roofs and courtyards, reflecting cultural absent in Uyghur mosques that retain Central Asian designs. This assimilation manifests in physical indistinguishability from —often requiring only a white prayer cap for identification—and a historical role as intermediaries loyal to central authority, contrasting with Uyghur retention of Turkic ethnicity, nomadic heritage, and regional autonomy demands in . Hui dispersal across , rather than concentration in a homeland, further diminishes separatist tendencies, positioning them as a model of integrated Muslim identity.

Ancestry and Genetics

Historical migrations and origins

The origins of the Hui people trace to Muslim migrants from the and who arrived in beginning in the (618–907 CE), primarily as traders, sailors, and diplomats along maritime and routes. Early settlements occurred in coastal ports like , where Arab and Persian merchants established communities; a commemorative from 651 CE records the arrival of a Persian envoy, , though archaeological evidence for the first dates to a 742 CE inscription in describing its construction for a growing Muslim population. These migrants, often from the and Persia, intermarried with local , initiating a pattern of while preserving Islamic practices. A significant escalation in migration occurred during the (1271–1368 CE) under Mongol rule, which facilitated the influx of tens of thousands of Central Asian, Persian, and classified as ("color-eyed people")—serving as administrators, soldiers, artisans, and traders in the imperial bureaucracy and military garrisons. Historical records indicate that after the Yuan collapse in 1368 CE, many of these Muslim soldiers and officials remained in China, settling in inland regions like , , and , where they formed self-sustaining communities through further intermarriage with Han populations. This period marked a shift from transient trade networks to permanent enclaves, with migrations driven by Mongol conquests, including the deportation of Persian speakers following the sack of in 1258 CE. By the (1368–1644 CE), these groups coalesced into the proto-Hui identity, distinguished by adherence to amid , though the term "Hui" (回) initially denoted broader Muslim or foreign Muslim affiliations before solidifying as an ethnic label. Migrations continued sporadically via overland routes from , but the core Hui population arose from localized assimilation rather than continuous large-scale influxes, as evidenced by administrative censuses and traveler accounts from the era. This process involved male-dominated West Eurasian migrations overlaying East Asian substrates, fostering enclaves that balanced Islamic with broader cultural integration.

Genetic composition and admixture

Genetic studies indicate that the Hui people possess a predominantly East Asian autosomal genetic profile, closely resembling that of populations, with limited admixture from West Eurasian or Central Asian sources estimated at approximately 6% in certain subgroups such as those in . This minor non-East Asian component reflects historical interactions along trade routes rather than substantial , as evidenced by clustering analyses showing Hui samples aligning 58-64% with East Asian reference groups in models. No significant from Middle Eastern or European populations has been detected, supporting a model of cultural Islamization of local East Asian inhabitants over large-scale population replacement. Uniparental markers reveal sex-biased admixture patterns, with elevated West Eurasian-associated Y-chromosome s suggesting male-mediated . In Hui samples (n=282), the predominant was O-M175 at 57%, characteristic of East Asians, followed by J-M304 (8.86%), C-M130 (8.51%), and Q-M242 (8.15%), the latter two linked to Central Asian or Siberian lineages. Across broader Chinese Hui datasets, O-M175 comprises about 47%, with R-M207 (11.85%) and J-M304 (9.69%) indicating sporadic paternal inputs from western sources. In contrast, (mtDNA) lineages are overwhelmingly East Asian, featuring s such as D4, B, F, and R in Hui, with negligible West Eurasian contributions and no evidence of maternal influx from distant western populations. Regional variations exist, with northwestern Hui (e.g., ) displaying greater genetic homogeneity to (F_ST < 0.023) and minimal western admixture signals compared to or , while southwestern groups like Hui show higher assimilation of indigenous Han maternal lines (70-85% Han-related ancestry) alongside North/Central Asian paternal haplogroups such as Q1b (53%) and N1b (27%). These patterns underscore massive genetic assimilation of Hui with local East Asian populations following initial male-dominated migrations, resulting in a genetic composition that is fundamentally East Asian despite Islamic cultural adoption.

Assimilation patterns

The formation of the Hui ethnicity involved significant genetic assimilation, primarily through sex-biased admixture where male migrants of West Eurasian origin intermarried with local East Asian women, resulting in paternal lineages carrying higher proportions of non-East Asian haplogroups while maternal mtDNA remains predominantly East Asian. Autosomal DNA studies confirm that Hui populations exhibit a genetic structure dominated by East Asian ancestry, with West Eurasian contributions limited to around 6% in subgroups like those in Guizhou, underscoring massive assimilation of indigenous East Asians rather than sustained separation. This pattern aligns with historical migrations of Muslim traders and soldiers from Central Asia and the Middle East during the Tang and Song dynasties, who integrated into Han-majority societies without forming isolated gene pools. Contemporary genetic analyses reveal Hui closeness to across regions, with Y-chromosome and autosomal markers showing greater affinity to Han and Manchu than to Central Asian or Middle Eastern populations, indicating ongoing admixture and minimal recent from Islamic heartlands. For example, Hui in northwest share distributions overlapping heavily with , reflecting centuries of intermixing facilitated by shared linguistic and cultural frameworks excluding religious practices. No substantial Middle Eastern paternal input during later Islamization periods has been detected, further evidencing assimilation into the East Asian genetic continuum over isolation. Marital patterns demonstrate variable but persistent assimilation, with Hui-Han intermarriage rates ranging from under 30% in rural or conservative areas to over 80% in urban centers like , driven by socioeconomic proximity and reduced religious barriers in secular settings. However, Hui exhibit stronger preferences than Han counterparts, with surveys in indicating more negative attitudes toward out-marriage among Hui, which sustains some genetic distinctiveness despite overall convergence. This duality—genetic proximity to Han amid cultural —highlights assimilation tempered by Islamic identity, as intermarriage often correlates with declining religious observance in offspring.

Population and Distribution

Demographic estimates

The Hui ethnic group, officially recognized as one of China's 56 nationalities, numbered 11,377,914 individuals in according to the Seventh National Population conducted in November 2020, representing 0.81% of the mainland's total population of 1,411,778,724. This figure reflects a growth rate of approximately 7.5% from the , when the Hui population was recorded at 10,586,087 (0.79% of the total). Earlier, the 2000 census reported 9,828,126 Hui (0.78%). These enumerations rely on self-identification under China's ethnic , which attributes Hui status primarily to those of descent practicing , though the criteria emphasize cultural and religious markers over strict . Population growth among the Hui has aligned closely with national trends, driven by natural increase and rather than high fertility rates distinctive to the group; Hui fertility has converged with levels post-1980s policies, with total fertility rates around 1.5-1.7 children per woman in recent decades per provincial data. Outside , Hui-identifying communities remain small, with diasporic populations in (e.g., and ) and Central Asia totaling under 500,000, often classified locally as distinct groups like Dungans—descendants of 19th-century Hui migrants numbering about 170,000 across and combined. Global estimates for the broader Hui Muslim population do not exceed 12 million, as overseas groups frequently assimilate or reclassify ethnically.
Census YearHui Population% of Total Population
20009,828,1260.78%
201010,586,0870.79%
202011,377,9140.81%
These statistics position the Hui as China's fourth-largest minority group, following the Zhuang, , and Manchus, with concentrations in autonomous regions like (where they form about 36% of the population) underscoring their demographic significance despite dispersed settlement patterns.

Geographic spread within China

The Hui people are dispersed across all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities of , with the highest concentrations in the . According to the national , the Hui population totals approximately 11.38 million, representing 0.81% of 's overall population. They form compact communities in urban and rural areas, often centered around mosques, and are recognized through the establishment of 29 Hui autonomous counties and three autonomous prefectures primarily in , , and . Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region hosts the largest proportional concentration, with Hui comprising about one-third of its 7.2 million residents, or roughly 2.4 million individuals. Province has over one million Hui, particularly in the , where they form a majority in several counties. Province also features significant Hui populations in the region and around the city of . In Uyghur Autonomous Region, Hui account for about 10% of the national Hui population, concentrated in northern areas like Ili and Changji, distinct from Uyghur-majority southern regions. Smaller but notable communities exist in central provinces such as , (notably ), and , as well as in eastern areas like and , often resulting from historical migrations and . Approximately 42% of Hui reside in , , and combined, underscoring the northwest as the core of their distribution. Urban centers like , , and host communities engaged in commerce and food industries.

Subgroups and regional variations

Hui communities display regional variations influenced by geographic settlement, historical migrations, and degrees of interaction with Han populations. In northern and northwestern , particularly in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, , and provinces, Hui maintain more distinct ethnic enclaves with stronger adherence to Islamic customs, including higher rates and prominent Sufi traditions in areas like Linxia. These groups often exhibit greater religious observance and community organization around mosques, reflecting less assimilation compared to eastern regions. In contrast, Hui in central and eastern provinces such as , , , and show higher integration, with cultural practices more aligned to local Han norms beyond dietary restrictions. Southern Hui populations, notably in Yunnan Province, feature localized subgroups defined by terrain and history, including the Dianxi Hui in the west around Dali, Diandong Hui in the east, and Dinnan Hui in the south. These divisions stem from 19th-century migrations and conflicts, such as the , fostering martial traditions and distinct architectural styles blending Islamic and regional Chinese elements. Genetic studies corroborate a north-south divide, with northern Hui showing closer affinity to northwestern Han while southern groups reflect admixture with southwestern populations. Linguistically, all Hui speak Sinitic dialects of their locales, but northwestern variants incorporate more and Persian loanwords for religious and terms, preserving historical ties to Central Asian influences. Customs adapt regionally, such as beef noodle variations in or in , yet adherence remains universal, with urban Hui in diverse provinces exhibiting flexible social practices amid migration pressures.

Historical Development

Pre-modern origins

The introduction of Islam to China, which forms the basis of Hui ethnogenesis, occurred during the (618–907 CE) through overland trade and maritime routes from the . Arab and Persian merchants, diplomats, and missionaries arrived in coastal ports like and inland centers such as (modern ), establishing initial communities that intermarried with local and other residents. A pivotal early contact was the 651 CE embassy from the Umayyad caliph ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān to Emperor Taizong, documented in Tang court records as a introducing Islamic teachings. These settlers, often engaged in and craftsmanship, built the first mosques, including the foundational structures in dating to around 742 CE under Emperor Xuanzong, blending with Chinese elements. Communities of these "Huihui" (a term initially denoting Muslim foreigners) endured and expanded during the (960–1279 CE), with archaeological and textual evidence of Islamic burial sites, markets, and mosques in cities like , , and . Intermarriage and conversion among Han populations grew, particularly in urban trading hubs, fostering proto-Hui lineages that adopted Chinese surnames (e.g., Ma for , Na for Nasruddin) while maintaining core Islamic rituals like and avoidance of pork. Song-era records, such as those in the Song Shi history, reference "Persian Muslims" and "" as distinct resident groups numbering in the thousands, contributing to imperial tribute systems and naval expertise. However, periodic anti-foreign pogroms, like the 878–879 CE under Huang Chao's rebellion, which killed an estimated 120,000–200,000 foreigners including , disrupted but did not eradicate these enclaves. The (1271–1368 CE) marked a transformative phase in Hui formation due to massive Mongol-orchestrated migrations of Muslim populations. Kublai Khan's administration recruited tens of thousands of (non-Mongol, non-Han) experts from Persia, (e.g., Uyghur and Kashgari Turks), and the as administrators, astronomers, physicians, and engineers, resettling them across northern , the Yangtze valley, and . Figures like the Persian Sayyid Ajall Shams al-Din Omar, appointed governor of in 1274 CE, oversaw infrastructure projects and Islamic propagation, leading to localized Hui clusters. Yuan censuses and edicts, such as those exempting Muslims from certain corvée labors, indicate a peak Muslim population of over 1 million, with "Huihui" becoming a standard exonym for these assimilated yet religiously distinct groups. This era solidified Hui ancestry as a mix of foreign Muslim settlers (estimated 20–30% genetic input from West Eurasian sources in modern studies) and Han converts, setting the stage for cultural . By the early (1368–1644 CE), following the expulsion of , Hui communities had largely shed foreign linguistic and nomadic traits, adopting Mandarin dialects, Confucian education, and agrarian lifestyles while preserving mosques as communal anchors. Ming founder Zhu Yuanzhang's policies tolerated but enforced assimilation, prohibiting ostentatious foreign dress and promoting Han-style governance among Muslim elites. This pre-modern consolidation distinguished Hui from less assimilated Muslim groups like Turko-Mongols, emphasizing endogamy, clerical hierarchies, and vernacular texts blending Arabic theology with .

Imperial era integration

During the Ming dynasty (1368–1644), the Hui experienced accelerated cultural assimilation, or Sinicization, as imperial policies under founder Zhu Yuanzhang emphasized conformity to Han Chinese norms to consolidate power after the Mongol Yuan era. Hui communities adopted Chinese surnames—replacing Arabic or Persian ones—along with Han-style clothing and the Mandarin language for daily and even religious use, while preserving core Islamic tenets like halal dietary laws and prayer rituals. This pragmatic adaptation enabled Hui participation in state affairs; for instance, Hui Muslims served as generals and troops loyal to the Ming, combating Yuan remnants in campaigns such as the conquest of Yunnan in the late 14th century. A prominent example was Zheng He (born Ma He, c. 1371–1433), a eunuch admiral from a Hui Muslim family in Yunnan with claimed descent from Persian Muslims, who led seven maritime expeditions between 1405 and 1433, projecting Ming influence across the Indian Ocean. To facilitate integration, Hui constructed mosques blending Islamic functionality with Chinese imperial architecture, featuring courtyards, pavilions, and upturned eaves reminiscent of Confucian temples, as seen in the expansion of the Great Mosque of Xi'an during the Ming period. This architectural fusion symbolized compatibility between Islam and Confucian hierarchy, with scholars like Wang Daiyu (late 16th–early 17th century) authoring texts reconciling Quranic principles with Chinese classics to affirm Hui loyalty to the throne. Economically, Hui engaged in trade, salt production, and horse breeding, leveraging garrison systems inherited from the Yuan to settle in strategic inland regions like Gansu and Ningxia. Under the (1644–1912), Hui integration deepened amid Manchu rule, with many Hui enlisting in the imperial army and bureaucracy, yet it was marred by large-scale rebellions stemming from local Han-Hui economic rivalries, land disputes, and intra-Hui sectarian conflicts between the conservative Khafiyya (Old Teaching) and reformist Jahriyya (New Teaching) Sufi orders. The (1856–1873) in , led by , established a short-lived Islamic sultanate before Qing forces, including loyal Hui troops, suppressed it; similarly, the in and , involving up to 10 million participants across ethnic lines, resulted in massive casualties—estimated at 8–12 million—but ended with Hui survivors resettling under Qing oversight. Despite these upheavals, which arose from provincial governance failures rather than inherent , the Qing classified Hui as a distinct but assimilated group, allowing rebuilding in Chinese styles and participation in exams, fostering a stable, Sinicized identity by the dynasty's close.

Republican and early PRC period

During the Republican era (1912–1949), Hui Muslims navigated a fragmented political landscape marked by warlordism, particularly in northwestern China, where the Ma Clique—a network of Hui warlords including Ma Fuxiang, Ma Hongkui, and Ma Bufang—exercised control over Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai provinces from the 1910s onward. These leaders, drawing on Hui military traditions, governed semi-autonomously under nominal allegiance to the central government in Nanjing, maintaining Islamic legal codes in personal matters while suppressing local rebellions and Tibetan unrest to consolidate power. Hui forces under Ma Clique command participated in the Northern Expedition against rival warlords in the 1920s and resisted Japanese incursions during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945), with Hui generals contributing to defenses in regions like Suiyuan. Urban Hui communities in cities such as Beijing, Xi'an, and Shanghai emphasized religious education through madrasas and pilgrimage networks, fostering a sense of pan-Islamic identity amid debates over whether "Hui" denoted an ethnic group or purely a religious affiliation. Intellectuals like those in the Chinese Muslim Association argued for Hui as a religious category akin to Han Buddhists, rejecting racial essentialism to align with Republican nationalism, though this view competed with emerging ethnic framing that positioned Hui as one of five major non-Han groups. Economic activities centered on trade, halal butchery, and agriculture, with Hui merchants leveraging cross-regional networks despite periodic anti-Muslim violence, such as the 1928 clashes in Gansu. Following the Communist victory in 1949, the initiated ethnic classification projects, formally recognizing Hui as a distinct minority by 1954, distinct from Turkic Muslims like , based on shared Chinese-speaking Islamic practices rather than foreign origins. This status entitled Hui to affirmative policies, including the establishment of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region in 1958 and Hui autonomous prefectures in and , aimed at integrating minorities through Soviet-inspired while promoting that redistributed holdings from Hui landlords. Early 1950s policies tolerated religious institutions, with over 10,000 mosques registered and Hui leaders co-opted into the Chinese Islamic Association to oversee certification and under state supervision. However, the (1958–1962) and subsequent (1966–1976) imposed severe restrictions, closing thousands of mosques, confiscating religious texts, and persecuting Hui clerics as feudal remnants, resulting in widespread famine impacts on rural Hui populations and erosion of communal autonomy. Hui resistance, including underground networks preserving Arabic-script scriptures, persisted despite campaigns equating with superstition, reflecting tensions between nominal minority protections and Maoist ideological drives.

Post-1949 developments

Following the establishment of the in 1949, the Hui were officially recognized as one of the country's ethnic minorities through the government's ethnic classification project, which identified them as a distinct group alongside nine other Muslim nationalities. This recognition enabled the creation of administrative autonomies tailored to Hui concentrations, culminating in the formation of the Hui Autonomous Region on , 1958, after its separation from Province, as well as several Hui autonomous counties elsewhere. Early policies under permitted limited religious organization via state-sanctioned bodies like the , established in 1953, though practice was subordinated to socialist goals and foreign influences curtailed. The from 1966 to 1976 brought intense antireligious campaigns, with destroying or repurposing thousands of s, banning Islamic rituals, and persecuting Hui clerics and adherents as feudal remnants. Hui communities faced violence, including forced pork consumption and conversions to factories, exacerbating famine-era hardships that disrupted religious transmission. A notable flashpoint was the 1975 Shadian uprising in , where Hui resistance to seizures led to military suppression, killing over 1,600 civilians including women and children. Deng Xiaoping's reforms after facilitated a Hui , with mosques rapidly rebuilt—rising from near-zero operable sites to over 20,000 nationwide by the —and pilgrimage to resuming for hundreds annually. This era saw Hui economic integration through trade and , bolstered by autonomous governance allowing cultural preservation amid broader market openings. Under from the 2010s, policies shifted toward "" of , mandating removal of Arabic architectural features like domes and minarets from Hui mosques, closure of unlicensed religious schools, and alignment of teachings with socialist values, echoing Uyghur controls. Over 1,600 mosques in alone were altered or shuttered by 2023, with bans on minors' religious participation and labeling restrictions curbing Hui commercial practices. These measures, framed by authorities as antiterrorism and cultural unification, have strained Hui religious expression despite their historical assimilation and loyalty to the state.

Culture and Practices

Religious sects and observances

The Hui people primarily follow Sunni Islam of the Hanafi madhhab, characterized by a division into distinct sects or menhuan (Sufi lineages) and non-Sufi traditions that reflect historical adaptations to Chinese society. The predominant sect is Gedimu (literally "old teaching"), a non-Sufi, orthodox Sunni tradition emphasizing adherence to the Quran, Hadith, and classical fiqh without mystical hierarchies, representing the majority of Hui Muslims since the Ming dynasty. This sect maintains standard Islamic observances such as the five daily prayers (salat), Friday congregational prayer (jumu'ah), and strict adherence to halal dietary laws, with Hui communities operating separate halal butcher shops and restaurants to ensure ritual slaughter (dhabihah). Sufi orders, particularly branches of the Naqshbandiyya tariqa, constitute significant minorities among the Hui, with the Khufiyya (silent ) and Jahriyya (vocal ) being the most prominent. The Khufiyya, introduced in the by Afak, promotes discreet spiritual practices and has integrated more seamlessly with norms, while the Jahriyya, founded by Ma Mingxin in the , emphasizes audible remembrance of and has historically led to tensions, including rebellions in the Qing era due to its perceived militancy. Other Sufi groups include the and Kubrawiyya, which maintain gongbei (mausoleums) for saint veneration and hereditary spiritual leadership. According to a study by Chinese Islamic scholar Ma Tong, approximately 42% of Hui Muslims affiliated with Sufi menhuan as of the late , though exact proportions vary regionally. The ( or "brotherhood" sect), emerging in the early under Ma Wanfu, represents a reformist, anti-Sufi movement influenced by Salafi ideas from the , rejecting saint cults and menhuan hierarchies in favor of direct scriptural interpretation. Hui observances across sects include , celebrated communally with meals and culminating in prayers, as well as sacrifices, though state regulations in the have intermittently restricted public expressions, particularly for government employees. Pilgrimage to () is undertaken by thousands annually, subject to quotas, with Hui mosques (qingzhen si) featuring Chinese architectural elements like pagoda-style minarets to facilitate local worship. (khitan) is practiced for males, and while veiling is optional for women, reflecting , gender segregation in mosques persists.

Linguistic features and naming conventions

The Hui people primarily speak dialects of Chinese, reflecting their linguistic assimilation to the Han majority, with regional variations such as Mandarin in northern China, Gan in Jiangxi, and Wu in Anhui corresponding to local populations. Unlike Turkic-speaking Muslim minorities like the Uyghurs, the Hui lack a distinct non-Sinitic language and use standard Mandarin as the basis for communication, supplemented by Perso-Arabic loanwords in religious and communal contexts. These loanwords, transliterated into Chinese characters, include terms for Islamic concepts (e.g., niujiao for niyya or intention in prayer), greetings like salaam alaikum, and daily expressions, particularly among Hui in Hunan and Ningxia where Persian influences persist from historical Central Asian trade and migration. Such vocabulary arises from centuries of Islamic scholarship but does not form a separate dialect, as Hui speech remains mutually intelligible with surrounding Han varieties. Hui naming conventions blend Chinese structure with Islamic elements, featuring patrilineal surnames often derived from Sinicized Arabic or Persian forebears to preserve Muslim lineage amid historical assimilation pressures. Common surnames include Ma (馬), a phonetic approximation of Muhammad adopted during the Ming dynasty when foreign names were required to be rendered in Chinese form; others like Na (from Hasan), Su (from Husayn), and Ti (from Ali) signal descent from prophetic companions or imams. Given names follow Chinese norms (one or two characters) but frequently draw from Arabic or Persian roots, such as Amin or Hafiz, transliterated (e.g., Ma Dexin), or purely Chinese selections for secular use. Many Hui maintain dual nomenclature: a huiming (Hui name, typically Arabic for religious identity and mosque records) alongside a hanming (Han name, fully Chinese for official documents and daily interaction), as exemplified by figures like Mahmud Ma Xiao. This practice underscores religious continuity while facilitating integration, with Arabic names invoked in wang (lineage halls) tracing ahuric (prophetic) descent.

Dietary and social customs

![Shanghai-Lanzhou-Zhengzong-Niurou-Lamian-2782.jpg][float-right] The Hui adhere strictly to , prohibiting the consumption of pork, alcohol, and non-halal meats such as those from pigs, dogs, horses, donkeys, and mules. All meat must be prepared according to halal slaughter methods, primarily featuring , lamb, and , with "qingzhen" (pure and true) ensuring compliance in Hui communities. This observance distinguishes Hui cuisine from traditions, emphasizing ritual purity and often involving specialized markets and restaurants operated by Hui entrepreneurs. Hui culinary traditions include hand-pulled noodles in beef broth, originating from in the early through Hui Muslim innovators like Ma Baozi, who established the first dedicated shop in 1915 or 1919. These dishes, compatible with Muslim dietary restrictions, feature translucent noodles, spiced beef, and clear broth, reflecting adaptations of wheat-based staples to Islamic needs during the and later. Social customs among the Hui blend Islamic prescriptions with localized Chinese influences, including rituals for naming, adulthood, , and funerals led by an . Weddings emphasize Qur'anic recitation and the Nikah contract, often within the Muslim community to maintain religious continuity. Major festivals include marking Ramadan's end, (Corban or Zaisheng) commemorating Abraham's sacrifice with animal offerings, and an-Nabi honoring the Prophet Muhammad's birth, all involving communal prayers and feasts of foods. Family structures prioritize Islamic values, fostering and hospitality while navigating interactions with non-Muslim Han through separate dining practices during shared events.

Architecture and material culture

Hui architecture exemplifies a synthesis of traditional Chinese building techniques and Islamic functional requirements, primarily evident in mosque design. Traditional Hui mosques employ wooden frames, brick walls, ceramic tiles, and stone elements, mirroring Han Chinese imperial styles with features such as dougong brackets, curved roof tiles, and enclosed courtyards, while incorporating Islamic orientations like the qibla-facing prayer hall and calligraphic inscriptions replacing figurative art. This Sino-Islamic style emerged during the Ming and Qing dynasties, adapting to local materials and aesthetics to fulfill religious needs without domes or tall minarets in early forms, often featuring pagoda-like towers instead. Prominent examples include the , originally established in 742 during the and rebuilt in the 14th-18th centuries, which utilizes pavilion-style halls with rendered in Chinese artistic conventions and stone steles commemorating Hui . Similarly, mosques in northern Chinese Hui communities, such as those in Linxia, serve as central community hubs with quiet, enclosed spaces contrasting urban bustle, constructed using timber beams and walls for structural integrity. Post-1976 reconstructions initially favored more overt Islamic motifs like onion domes and spires, reflecting influences from Middle Eastern styles, though recent state policies have prompted demolitions or modifications to emphasize Chinese characteristics. In broader material culture, Hui artifacts and attire integrate Islamic prescriptions with Chinese practicality. Men traditionally don white taqiyah skullcaps and loose Chinese-style robes, while women may wear headscarves alongside Han-influenced dresses, evolving from Ming-era assimilation where veils were retained but clothing adopted local cuts. Household items and commercial signs, such as halal meat shop markers, often feature alongside , underscoring the community's dual cultural heritage without distinct artisanal crafts unique to Hui beyond religious contexts. This material expression prioritizes functionality and conformity to Islamic standards, like specialized butchery tools, over ornate non-religious production.

Socioeconomic and Political Role

Economic contributions and occupations

The Hui people engage in diverse economic activities across , with occupations spanning agriculture, commerce, and urban services. In rural regions such as Hui Autonomous Region, Hui households predominantly specialize in rearing, particularly for meat, which generates higher income returns than the crop production typical of counterparts, contributing to comparable average disposable incomes and poverty rates between the groups as of the early . This focus aligns with Islamic dietary requirements and supports local meat processing industries. Urban Hui populations, often concentrated in cities like and , excel in small-scale enterprises, including qingzhen () restaurants, butchery, and processing of leather, fur, and jade products. Hui communities significantly contribute to China's burgeoning halal economy, serving both domestic Muslim consumers and international markets. In , a key Hui area, the halal sector featured over 120 companies by 2013, with annual production exceeding RMB 8 billion (approximately $1.27 billion), emphasizing products and facilitating revival along historical routes to Gulf countries. Hui migrants in hubs like actively participate in export-oriented businesses targeting (MENA) regions, leveraging cultural and linguistic familiarity to bridge Sino-Muslim commerce. These activities underscore the Hui's entrepreneurial adaptability, though they face labor market challenges, including documented hiring biases against Muslim identifiers. Overall, Hui economic roles enhance China's market, valued at over $77 billion in 2024 and projected to grow at 10.8% annually through 2034, driven partly by ethnic Muslim operators like the Hui.

Education and military service

Hui communities have traditionally emphasized religious education through (madrasa schools) and mosque-based instruction, focusing on Islamic texts alongside basic literacy, though this has often resulted in lower rates of formal compared to the Han majority. According to China's 1990 census data, 32.8 percent of Hui individuals aged 6 and over were illiterate or semi-illiterate, exceeding rates among . More recent analyses show Hui approaching Han levels, particularly among urban residents and younger cohorts, with average years of schooling for Hui similar to the national Han average, though rural Hui—especially males—lag behind, averaging fewer years than urban counterparts. policies, including bonus points on the university entrance exam for ethnic minorities, have facilitated increased Hui access to higher education since the 1950s, contributing to rising enrollment in institutions like Ningxia University. Hui participation in military service dates to imperial times, with Muslim troops reinforcing armies as early as the , and has continued prominently through modern eras. During the Republic of China period, Hui formed entire divisions in the , including cavalry units led by Hui generals who played key roles in anti-Japanese campaigns from 1937 to 1945. In the (1945–1949), the actively recruited Hui and Mongol cavalry, integrating them into campaigns that proved decisive. Post-1949, Hui serve in the (PLA), benefiting from minority recruitment preferences and accommodations such as food provisions in barracks and on naval vessels, reflecting their integration without the separatist tensions seen in other Muslim groups. This loyalty has positioned Hui as reliable contributors to national defense, with no recorded widespread refusals of service.

Political representation and loyalty

The Hui people have secured political representation through China's ethnic minority quota system in the (NPC), where seats are allocated based on population size and geographic distribution rather than strict proportionality. Hui delegates, benefiting from their widespread presence across provinces, have consistently numbered in the dozens per session; for example, they held 62 seats in the 13th NPC (2013–2018), ranking second among ethnic minorities by raw numbers. This structure ensures Hui voices influence national legislation, particularly on issues affecting autonomous regions like . At subnational levels, Hui hold prominent positions in party and government organs within Hui autonomous prefectures and counties, such as Hui Autonomous Region, where local CCP committees and people's congresses prioritize ethnic cadre selection to implement central policies while addressing minority concerns. Nationally, Hui integration into the (CCP) is evident, with members rising through ranks; Hui Liangyu served as Vice Premier from 2003 to 2013, one of only two ethnic minorities in the over the past 35 years, highlighting selective advancement for loyal figures. Hui loyalty to the PRC government manifests in sustained participation in state institutions without demands for independence, distinguishing them from groups like the Uyghurs. This allegiance traces to historical subservience to central authority, where obedience to laws and rare involvement in rebellions preserved community stability and privileges. Post-1949, the CCP's recognition of Hui as an official ethnicity in 1954 and establishment of autonomous areas reinforced this dynamic, with Hui elites prioritizing national unity over pan-Islamic ties for practical gains like economic integration and religious tolerance under state oversight. Such cooperation has included military service and compliance with Sinicization campaigns, though recent restrictions on religious expression test but have not eroded core alignment with Beijing's directives.

Relations and Conflicts

Interactions with Han majority

The Hui people, despite their adherence to Islam, exhibit a high degree of cultural assimilation with the Han majority, sharing linguistic, sartorial, and customary practices such as speaking Mandarin dialects, wearing Han-style clothing, and participating in Han festivals like the Spring Festival. This assimilation accelerated during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), when Hui communities adopted mainstream Han cultural norms while retaining religious observances, resulting in physical indistinguishability from Han Chinese. Intermarriage between Hui and Han has historically reinforced this integration, with Hui-Han unions surging during the socialist transformations of the 1950s and continuing to rise through the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), often involving Han women converting to Islam or children being raised Muslim. Such marriages, while increasing ethnic blending, frequently lead to family conflicts over dietary halal requirements and religious upbringing, as Han spouses navigate Hui customs in predominantly Han social environments. Economically, Hui-Han interactions are characterized by cooperation in and urban , with Hui entrepreneurs operating businesses—such as beef noodle shops and meat markets—that cater to both communities while adhering to Islamic standards, fostering everyday interdependence in cities like and . However, dietary boundaries persist as a key separator, with Hui avoiding and alcohol central to Han , which can limit social mixing during meals or festivals and perpetuate subtle prejudices. In rural and semi-urban areas, like Pingliang in Province, historical patterns of Hui migration and land-sharing with Han have built networks of mutual reliance, though resource competition occasionally sparks localized disputes. Tensions, while less severe than those with Turkic Muslim groups, arise sporadically from ethnic prejudices and competition, as seen in the 2004 Henan Province clashes in Nanyang, where armed conflicts between Hui and Han communities resulted in 148 deaths over economic grievances. Under the administration since 2012, everyday Han-Hui relations reveal underlying separation, with Han residents in mixed areas expressing wariness toward Hui religious practices amid state campaigns for "," yet Hui loyalty to the Chinese state—evident in their and political alignment—mitigates broader antagonism. Academic analyses note that while CCP rhetoric promotes harmony, pervasive stereotypes portray Hui as insular due to mosque-centered social life, hindering full integration despite shared Han-like identities.

Tensions with Uyghurs and other minorities

The Hui and Uyghur Muslim communities in exhibit significant tensions rooted in cultural, religious, and socioeconomic differences, particularly in where approximately 1 million Hui reside alongside over 8 million . Hui Muslims, having assimilated linguistically and culturally with the Han majority by adopting Mandarin and Sinicized Islamic practices, are often viewed by Uyghurs as insufficiently devout or overly compliant with state authorities, leading to practices such as attending separate mosques, rare intermarriage, and Uyghur refusal to consume Hui-prepared meat. This rift is exacerbated by historical perceptions of Hui as enforcers of central authority; during the Republican era, Hui military figures participated in suppressing Uyghur-led rebellions in , fostering longstanding resentment among who see Hui as collaborators rather than co-religionists. State policies further widen this divide by treating Hui as a model of "loyal" —granting them relative religious freedoms such as mosque construction and halal economic activities—while subjecting to stringent controls under anti-separatism campaigns, including restrictions on beards, veils, and fasting. In the 2009 Urumqi riots, which killed nearly 200 people, Uyghur attackers explicitly targeted both and Hui, chanting "kill the Han, kill the Hui," highlighting Hui as perceived beneficiaries of Han migration and economic favoritism in , where Hui hold disproportionate positions in state enterprises due to their Mandarin proficiency. Hui communities, in turn, publicly disavow Uyghur-linked violence, such as the 2014 attack attributed to Uyghur separatists that killed 29 and injured over 140, reinforcing mutual distrust and undermining pan-Islamic solidarity. Tensions extend to other minorities in Xinjiang, such as and Kyrgyz, where Hui economic expansion—through migration that increased their Xinjiang from 681,527 in 1990 to 983,015 by 2010—creates for resources and amplifies perceptions of Hui as proxies for Han interests. Unlike Uyghurs' demands for autonomy, Hui integration aligns with state goals, positioning them as a "bridge" between Han and Turkic groups, yet this role invites accusations of disloyalty to broader Muslim interests from more separatist-leaning minorities. Recent extensions of "Xinjiang-style" restrictions to Hui areas signal converging pressures, but historical and ongoing disparities continue to fuel inter-minority friction independent of state actions.

Sectarian and interfaith dynamics

The Hui Muslim community is characterized by internal sectarian divisions rooted in differing interpretations of Islamic practice, particularly between traditional non-Sufi schools and various Sufi tariqas. The Gedimu (Old Teaching), the oldest and most prevalent sect, follows orthodox Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence without Sufi mysticism and constitutes the majority of Hui adherents, emphasizing scriptural fidelity and integration with Chinese cultural norms. In contrast, Sufi orders such as the Naqshbandi-derived Khufiyya (practicing silent , or remembrance of ) and Jahriyya (employing vocal ) represent minority but influential groups, comprising approximately 9% and 5% of Hui Muslims, respectively. Other tariqas include the and Kubrawiyya, often centered around gongbei shrines venerating saintly figures, which serve as focal points for ritual and . These divisions have historically fueled conflicts, often escalating into violence over ritual practices, leadership, and doctrinal purity. The most notable sectarian strife occurred in the mid-18th century when Ma Mingxin, founder of the Jahriyya, challenged Khufiyya dominance, leading to street fights, lawsuits, and his imprisonment by Qing authorities in 1762 to quell the unrest; this tension contributed to broader rebellions, including the Jahriyya revolt of the 1780s, which resulted in thousands of deaths among Hui factions. Such intra-Hui clashes, while framed religiously, frequently intertwined with socioeconomic disputes and local power struggles, as evidenced by recurring feuds in and provinces. Modern sectarian dynamics are subdued under state oversight, though reformist groups like the (, or New Teaching), influenced by Salafi ideas since the early , occasionally critique traditionalist practices, promoting scripturalism over localized customs. Interfaith relations between Hui Muslims and non-Muslim groups, particularly the Han majority, are marked by pragmatic coexistence amid , with Hui adopting Han language, dress, and Confucian-influenced social structures while preserving core Islamic tenets like dietary laws and mosque-centered worship. Historical intermingling has fostered benign interactions through shared economic activities and courtesy norms, enabling Hui to navigate Han-dominated society without widespread proselytization or forced separation; however, remains normative to safeguard religious identity, with conversions from Han to occasionally blurring ethnic lines but rarely vice versa. Tensions arise sporadically from religious prohibitions—such as Hui avoidance of Han festivals involving or alcohol—yet these have seldom escalated to systemic conflict post-1949, contrasting with 19th-century uprisings where faith differences amplified ethnic violence. Relations with other faiths like or are minimal and indirect, mediated through state , though Hui mosques occasionally host interfaith dialogues under government auspices to promote "harmonious" .

Government Policies and Contemporary Challenges

Sinicization of Islam

The of Islam among the Hui people encompasses historical adaptations of Islamic practices and architecture to Chinese cultural norms, as well as contemporary state-driven policies under the (CCP) to align religious expression with socialist ideology and traditions. Historically, Hui mosques integrated Chinese architectural elements, such as courtyards and tiled roofs resembling imperial palaces, with Islamic features like prayer halls oriented toward , a process evident from the medieval period onward. This blending reflected centuries of , where Hui scholars incorporated Confucian into Islamic , producing texts like the Han Kitab that emphasized harmony with imperial authority. In the modern era, the CCP has intensified through explicit policies initiated under . At the 19th National Congress in October 2017, Xi advocated for the "Sinicization of religion," requiring faiths to adapt doctrines, customs, and morality to and socialist core values. This culminated in revised Regulations on Religious Affairs in , mandating state oversight of religious activities to ensure loyalty to the party. For Hui Muslims, implementation has involved altering over 1,600 mosques in provinces like and by 2023, including the removal of domes, minarets, and inscriptions deemed "foreign influences" in favor of traditional Chinese designs. These measures target post-Cultural Revolution mosques built in "Arabic style" with onion domes and tall spires, which local authorities view as incompatible with national unity. The campaign, accelerating since 2017, has shuttered or consolidated hundreds of Hui mosques, reduced their numbers by significant margins in Hui-dominated areas, and enforced Chinese-language sermons alongside patriotic education. Hui communities have occasionally resisted, as seen in May 2023 when thousands protested alterations to a mosque in province to preserve Islamic architectural identity. While less severe than Uyghur internment policies, these efforts mirror the " model" by prioritizing state control over religious autonomy, fostering assimilation but eliciting concerns over cultural erasure.

Recent crackdowns and protests

In the context of the Chinese government's of campaign initiated under President in 2016, Hui Muslim communities have faced intensified regulatory measures since 2017, including the decommissioning, closure, or architectural alteration of mosques to remove Islamic features such as domes, minarets, and Arabic inscriptions in favor of Chinese-style elements. These efforts, which authorities describe as promoting religions compatible with socialist values and countering extremism, have affected thousands of mosques across Hui-populated regions like , , , and , with satellite imagery and on-site reports documenting over 1,000 such modifications or demolitions by 2023. A prominent example occurred in February 2024 at the Grand Mosque of Shadian in province, a major Hui center built to commemorate survivors of a 1975 massacre; workers removed its golden domes and minarets, replacing them with pagoda-like structures as part of the campaign's five-year plan concluded that year, despite local objections. Similar alterations targeted the Najiayingzi Mosque in , , prompting thousands of Hui Muslims to gather in May 2023 to protest the removal of onion domes and signs, with authorities deploying security forces to disperse the crowd after several days. In August 2018, approximately 2,000 Hui residents in Binzhou county, , staged a three-day to oppose the demolition of the Weizhou Grand Mosque's dome, halting the work temporarily after negotiations but leading to eventual modifications. Earlier incidents include June 2015 clashes in , where Hui villagers rioted against the forced demolition of a annex, injuring nine police officers and resulting in over 40 detentions; authorities attributed the unrest to opposition from "fanatical" elements resisting anti-extremism measures. Following a 2022 at a barbecue restaurant that killed 44 people, mostly students, Hui online commentators criticized local negligence tied to restrictions, prompting detentions for "fabricating rumors" and further scrutiny of Hui religious networks in . has characterized these actions as a systematic erosion of Islamic practice among Hui, contrasting with more assimilative historical policies, though maintains they enhance national unity without targeting ethnicity per se.

Comparisons to Uyghur policies

Policies toward China's Hui Muslims, while increasingly restrictive under the of Islam campaign, differ markedly in scale and intensity from those imposed on in , primarily due to the Hui's greater historical assimilation, lack of separatist movements, and dispersed population across Han-majority areas rather than a concentrated autonomous region. Uyghur policies, initiated around 2014 and intensified post-2017, include mass of over one million individuals in re-education camps, widespread via facial recognition and mandatory apps, forced labor transfers, and coercive measures targeting cultural and religious identity, framed by the government as countering "three evils" of , , and . In contrast, Hui communities have not faced equivalent mass detentions or demographic engineering, with restrictions focusing on public religious expression and infrastructure rather than wholesale societal remaking. Similarities in approach have grown since 2017, as policies extend elements of the " model" to Hui areas, including the demolition or "renovation" of domes and minarets to align with Chinese architectural styles, bans on signage, and prohibitions on minors attending religious services or wearing veils and beards in public. For instance, in and Hui regions, hundreds of mosques underwent forced modifications between 2018 and 2021, mirroring Xinjiang's campaigns but without the accompanying intra-communal policing or ideological indoctrination centers reported for . Both groups must register religious activities through state-sanctioned Patriotic Religious Associations, subordinating practice to oversight, though Hui have retained more leeway for private rituals like daily prayers and fasting compared to Uyghur bans on these in detention contexts. The divergence stems from causal factors rooted in perceived loyalty and threat levels: Hui, numbering around 10-11 million and ethnically Sino-Tibetan with Mandarin as their primary language, have integrated economically and politically with Han society, avoiding the ethnic separatism linked to Uyghur unrest in , where Turkic-Muslim identity fuels independence aspirations. Government rhetoric distinguishes "good" compliant Muslims (Hui) from "bad" resistant ones (), allowing Hui relatively higher socioeconomic mobility and urban residency rates, though recent crackdowns signal eroding privileges as universalizes control over . Analysts note Hui policies may preview broader application, with fears among Hui of escalating to -level repression if local compliance wanes. As of 2024, -specific regulations further tightened religious oversight, such as mandatory state approval for sermons, but equivalent province-wide edicts in Hui areas like remain less pervasive.

Diaspora Communities

Overseas populations

The primary overseas populations of Hui descendants are the in , who trace their origins to Hui who fled following the Dungan revolts of 1862–1877 against the . These migrations, triggered by ethnic and religious conflicts, led to settlements in the Russian Empire's territories, now , , and . The Dungans maintain a distinct identity as "Hui-Zu" or Chinese , preserving elements of Hui culture including , traditional cuisine, and a Chinese-derived language known as Dungan. In , Dungan communities number approximately 100,000 to 150,000 individuals. hosts the largest group, with 78,817 Dungans recorded in the 2021 census, concentrated in regions like Zhambyl. has around 60,000 to 81,000, primarily in the Chüy Valley and areas, while has about 10,000. These populations engage in , particularly , and have adapted to local Turkic-speaking environments while retaining endogamous practices and Hui-influenced customs, though intermarriage and assimilation pressures persist. Smaller Hui communities exist in , stemming from 19th- and 20th-century migrations of Yunnanese Hui traders and refugees via caravan routes. In , known locally as , they number around 91,000, mainly in northern provinces like , where they historically participated in cross-border trade and today operate businesses while practicing . hosts approximately 9,000 Hui, scattered in northern areas and , often involved in commerce. These groups emphasize practices and mosque-centered community life, though they face integration challenges in predominantly Buddhist societies.

Cultural preservation abroad

The primary diaspora communities preserving Hui cultural elements abroad are the Dungan populations in and , descendants of Hui who migrated from following the Dungan Revolt of 1862–1877 and subsequent conflicts. Numbering around 100,000 in and 50,000–60,000 in as of recent estimates, these groups maintain a distinct ethnoreligious identity centered on , with practices including communal prayers in purpose-built mosques featuring traditional Chinese architectural influences, such as curved roofs and minarets. Cultural preservation among Dungans emphasizes linguistic continuity, with the Dungan language—a variant of written in —taught in community schools and used in literature, , and religious texts to resist assimilation into Turkic-speaking environments. Culinary traditions, including dishes like beef noodles () and mutton-based meals prepared without , are upheld through family gatherings and festivals, reinforcing communal bonds and dietary laws derived from Hui Islamic customs. Elaborate ceremonies, such as colorful weddings and banquets, further sustain norms and social rituals imported from ancestral Hui practices in . In , smaller Hui-descended communities, known as in and Panthay in , preserve elements through mosque-centered worship and commerce, with populations estimated at several thousand each. In , these groups, originating from Yunnan's Hui traders, operate community-funded mosques and educational initiatives that transmit Islamic knowledge and basic Chinese-Muslim customs, though some adaptation occurs, such as occasional laxity in avoidance when isolated from coreligionists. Myanmar's Hui maintain Sunni observances in self-financed mosques, focusing on networks that echo historical Hui mercantile roles, amid broader challenges from regional ethnic tensions. Despite pressures from Soviet-era in and local assimilation in , these groups actively revive traditions via cultural associations and festivals; for instance, Kazakhstan's Dungans organize events to document and perform ancestral arts, countering toward Russian or Kazakh. Preservation efforts highlight resilience in maintaining as the core of Hui identity abroad, distinct from host societies, though generational dilution poses ongoing risks without institutional support.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.