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Multiple citizenship
Multiple citizenship
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  Multiple nationality allowed without restriction
  Multiple nationality restricted to specific cases
Countries by birthright citizenship:
  Unconditional birthright citizenship for persons born in the country
  Birthright citizenship with restrictions
  Birthright citizenship abolished
  No birthright citizenship
Residence requirements in years for naturalization by country:

Multiple citizenship (or multiple nationality) is a person's legal status in which a person is at the same time recognized by more than one country under its nationality and citizenship law as a national or citizen of that country. There is no international convention that determines the nationality or citizenship status of a person, which is consequently determined exclusively under national laws, which often conflict with each other, thus allowing for multiple citizenship situations to arise.

A person holding multiple citizenship is, generally, entitled to the rights of citizenship in each country whose citizenship they are holding (such as right to a passport, right to enter the country, right to work, right to own property, right to vote, etc.) but may also be subject to obligations of citizenship (such as a potential obligation for national service, becoming subject to taxation on worldwide income, etc.).

Some countries do not permit dual citizenship or only do in certain cases (e.g., inheriting multiple nationalities at birth). This may be by requiring an applicant for naturalization to renounce all existing citizenship, or by withdrawing its citizenship from someone who voluntarily acquires another citizenship. Some countries permit a renunciation of citizenship, while others do not. Some countries permit a general dual citizenship while others permit dual citizenship but only of a limited number of countries.

A country that allows dual citizenship may still not recognize the other citizenship of its nationals within its own territory (e.g., in relation to entry into the country, national service, duty to vote, etc.). Similarly, it may not permit consular access by another country for a person who is also its national. Some countries prohibit dual citizenship holders from serving in their armed forces or on police forces or holding certain public offices.[1]

History

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Up until the late 19th century, nations often decided whom they claimed as their citizens or subjects and did not recognize any other nationalities they held. Many states did not recognize the right of their citizens to renounce their citizenship without permission because of policies that originated with the feudal theory of perpetual allegiance to the sovereign. This meant that people could hold multiple citizenships, with none of their nations recognizing any other of their citizenships. Until the early modern era, when levels of migration were insignificant, this was not a serious issue. However, when non-trivial levels of migration began, this state of affairs sometimes led to international incidents, with countries of origin refusing to recognize the new nationalities of natives who had migrated, and, when possible, conscripting natives who had naturalized as citizens of another country into military service. The most notable example was the War of 1812, triggered by British impressment into naval service of US sailors who were alleged to be British subjects.[2][3]

In the aftermath of the 1867 Fenian Rising, Irish-born naturalized American citizens who had gone to Ireland to participate in the uprising were caught and charged with treason, as the British authorities considered them to be British subjects. This outraged many Irish-Americans, to which the UK responded by pointing out that, just like British law, US law also recognized perpetual allegiance.[2] As a result, Congress passed the Expatriation Act of 1868, which granted Americans the right to freely renounce their US citizenship. The UK followed suit, and starting from 1870 British subjects who naturalized as US citizens lost their British nationality. During this time, diplomatic incidents had also arisen between the US and several other European countries over their tendency to conscript naturalized US citizens visiting their former homelands. In addition, many 19th century European immigrants to the United States eventually returned to their homelands after naturalizing as US citizens and in some cases then attempted to use their US citizenship for diplomatic protection. The US State Department had to decide which US citizens it should protect and which were subjected to local law, resulting in tensions with immigrant communities in the US and European governments. In 1874, President Ulysses S. Grant, in his annual message to Congress, decried the phenomenon of people "claiming the benefit of citizenship, while living in a foreign country, contributing in no manner to the performance of the duties of a citizen of the United States, and without intention at any time to return and undertake those duties, to use the claims to citizenship of the United States simply as a shield from the performance of the obligations of a citizen elsewhere." The US government negotiated agreements with various European states known as the Bancroft Treaties from 1868 to 1937, under which the signatories pledged to treat the voluntary naturalization of a former citizen or national with another sovereign nation as a renunciation of their citizenship.[2][3][4]

The theory of perpetual allegiance largely fell out of favor with governments during the late 19th century. With the consensus of the time being that dual citizenship would only lead to diplomatic problems, more governments began prohibiting it and revoking the nationality of citizens holding another nationality. By the mid-20th century, dual nationality was largely prohibited worldwide, although there were exceptions. For example, a series of United States Supreme Court rulings permitted Americans born with citizenship in another country to keep it without losing their US citizenship.[2][5] Most nations revoked the nationality of their citizens who naturalized in another nation, as well as if they displayed significant evidence of political or social loyalty to another nation such as military service, holding political office, or even participating in elections. In some cases, naturalization was conditional on renunciation of previous citizenship. Many nations attempted to resolve the issue of dual citizenship emanating from people born in their territory but who inherited citizenship under the laws of another nation by requiring such individuals to choose one of their nationalities upon reaching the age of maturity. The US State Department, invoking provisions of the Bancroft treaties, systematically stripped US citizenship from naturalized US citizens who returned to live in their native countries for extended periods of time. However, in the absence of multilateral cooperation regarding dual nationality, enforcement was leaky. Many individuals continued to hold dual nationality by circumstance of birth, including most children born in the US to non-citizen parents.[6][3][2]

At the League of Nations Codification Conference, 1930, an attempt was made to codify nationality rules into a universal worldwide treaty, the 1930 Hague Convention, whose chief aims would be to completely abolish both statelessness and dual citizenship. The 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws proposed laws that would have reduced both but, in the end, were ratified by only 20 nations.[2] One significant development that emerged was the Master Nationality Rule, which provided that "a State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a state whose nationality such person also possesses."

Although fully eliminating dual nationality proved to be legally impossible during this time, it was subjected to fierce condemnation and social shaming. It was framed as disloyalty and widely compared to bigamy.[3] George Bancroft, the American diplomat who would later go on to negotiate the first of the Bancroft treaties, which were named for him, stated in 1849 that nations should "as soon tolerate a man with two wives as a man with two countries; as soon bear with polygamy as that state of double allegiance."[4] In 1915, former US President Theodore Roosevelt published an article deriding the concept of dual nationality as a "self-evident absurdity." Roosevelt's article was spurred by the case of P.A. Lelong, a US citizen born in New Orleans to French immigrant parents. He had planned to travel to France on business but had been warned that he might be conscripted to fight in World War I, and when he contacted the State Department for assurances that "my constitutional privileges as an American citizen follow me wherever I go", he was informed that France would regard him as a citizen under its jus sanguinis laws, and that the State Department could give no assurances regarding his liability for military service if he voluntarily placed himself in French jurisdiction.[2]

However, the consensus against dual nationality began to erode as a result of changes in social mores and attitudes. By the late 20th century, it was becoming gradually accepted again.[2] Many states were lifting restrictions on dual citizenship. For example, the British Nationality Act 1948 removed restrictions on dual citizenship in the UK, the 1967 Afroyim v. Rusk ruling by the US Supreme Court prohibited the US government from stripping citizenship from Americans who had dual citizenship without their consent, and the Canadian Citizenship Act, 1976, removed restrictions on dual citizenship in Canada. The number of states allowing multiple citizenships further increased after a treaty in Europe requiring signatories to limit dual citizenship lapsed in the 1990s, and countries with high emigration rates began permitting it to maintain links with their respective diasporas.[7]

Types of laws

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Picture of two passport documents.
Dual citizenship means persons can have or travel with two passports.

Each country sets its own criteria for citizenship and the rights of citizenship, which change from time to time, often becoming more restrictive. For example, until 1982, a person born in the UK was automatically a British citizen; this was subjected to restrictions from 1983. These laws may create situations where a person may satisfy the citizenship requirements of more than one country simultaneously. This would, in the absence of laws of one country or the other, allow the person to hold multiple citizenships. National laws may include criteria as to the circumstances, if any, in which a person may concurrently hold another citizenship. A country may withdraw its own citizenship if a person acquires a citizenship of another country, for example:

  • Citizenship by descent (jus sanguinis). Historically, citizenship was traced through the father, but today, most countries permit the tracing through either parent and some also through a grandparent. Today, the citizenship laws of most countries are based on jus sanguinis. In many cases, this basis for citizenship also extends to children born outside the country, and sometimes even when the parent has lost citizenship.
  • Citizenship by birth on the country's territory (jus soli). The US, Canada, and many Latin American countries grant unconditional birthright citizenship. To stop birth tourism, most countries have abolished it; while Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK have a modified jus soli, which requires at least one parent to be a citizen of the country (jus sanguinis) or a legal permanent resident who has lived in the country for several years. In the majority of such countries—for example, in Canada—children born to diplomats and to people outside the jurisdiction of the soil are not granted citizenship at birth. It is usually conferred automatically on the children once one of the parents obtains citizenship.[8][failed verification]
  • Citizenship by marriage (jus matrimonii). Some countries routinely give citizenship to spouses of its citizens or may shorten the time for naturalization but only in a few countries is citizenship granted on the wedding day (e.g., Iran).[9] Some countries have regulations against sham marriages (e.g., the US), and some revoke the spouse's citizenship if the marriage terminates within a specified time (e.g., Algeria).
  • Citizenship by naturalization.
  • Citizenship by adoption. A minor adopted from another country when at least one adoptive parent is a citizen.[10]
  • Citizenship by investment. Some countries give citizenship to people who make a substantial monetary investment in their country.[11] There are two countries in the European Union where this is possible: Malta and Cyprus; as well as the five Caribbean countries of Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia. Additionally, the countries of Vanuatu, Montenegro, Turkey, and Jordan offer citizenship by investment programs. Most of these countries grant citizenship immediately, provided that due diligence is passed, without a requirement for any physical presence in the country. Malta requires one year of residency before citizenship can be given. Portugal offers a permanent residence program by investment, but there is a five-year timeline with periodic short visits in order to be eligible to obtain citizenship. Cambodia has laws enacted that allow foreigners to obtain citizenship through investment, but it is difficult to receive without fluency in Khmer.[12] The countries of Comoros, Nauru, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Tonga, and Moldova previously had citizenship by investment programs; however, these programs have been suspended or discontinued.
  • Some countries grant citizenship based on ethnicity and on religion: Israel gives all Jews the right to immigrate to Israel, by the Law of Return, and fast-tracked citizenship. Dual citizenship is permitted, but, when entering the country, the Israeli passport must be used.[13]
  • Citizenship by holding an office (jus officii). In the case of Vatican City, citizenship is based on holding an office, with Vatican citizenship held by the Pope, cardinals residing in Vatican City, active members of the Holy See's diplomatic service, and other directors of Vatican offices and services. Vatican citizenship is lost when the term of office comes to an end, and children cannot inherit it from their parents. Since Vatican citizenship is time-limited, dual citizenship is allowed, and persons who would become stateless because of loss of Vatican citizenship automatically become Italian citizens.[14]

Once a country bestows citizenship, it may or may not consider a voluntary renunciation of that citizenship to be valid. In the case of naturalization, some countries require applicants for naturalization to renounce their former citizenship. For example, the US Chief Justice John Rutledge ruled "a man may, at the same time, enjoy the rights of citizenship under two governments",[15] but the US requires applicants for naturalization to swear to an oath renouncing all prior "allegiance and fidelity" to any other nation or sovereignty as part of the naturalization ceremony.[16] However, some countries do not recognise one of its citizens renouncing their citizenship. Effectively, the person in question may still possess both citizenships, notwithstanding the technical fact that they may have explicitly renounced one of the country's citizenships before officials of the other. For example, the UK recognizes a renunciation of citizenship only if it is done with competent UK authorities.[17][18] Consequently, British citizens naturalized in the US remain British citizens in the eyes of the UK government even after they renounce British allegiance to the satisfaction of US authorities.[14]

Irish nationality law applies to the whole of the island of Ireland, which at present is divided politically between the sovereign Republic of Ireland, which has jurisdiction over the majority of Ireland, and Northern Ireland, which consists of six of the nine counties of the Irish province of Ulster, and is part of the United Kingdom. People in Northern Ireland are therefore "entitled to Irish, British, or both" citizenships.

Between 1999 and 24 June 2004, anyone born on the island of Ireland was entitled to Irish citizenship automatically. Since 24 June 2004 Irish citizenship has been granted to anyone born on the island of Ireland who has one, or both, parents who; are Irish citizens or British citizens, were entitled to live in Ireland without any residency restrictions, or was legally resident on the island of Ireland for three out of the four years immediately before their birth (excluding residence on a student visa, awaiting an international protection decision or residence under a declaration of subsidiary protection).[19][14]

Prevention of multiple citizenship

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Some countries may take measures to avoid creation of multiple citizenship. Since a country has control only over who has its citizenship but has no control over who has any other country's citizenship, the only way for a country to avoid multiple citizenship is to deny its citizenship to people in cases when they would have another citizenship. This may take the following forms:

  • Automatic loss of citizenship if another citizenship is acquired voluntarily, such as Austria,[20] Azerbaijan,[21] Bahrain, China (with the exception of Hong Kong and Macau, which allow multiple citizenship in parallel with Chinese citizenship, but prevent consular protection of the involved nation in their own and also in Mainland China),[22] India,[23] Indonesia,[24] Japan,[25] Kazakhstan,[26] Malaysia,[27] Nepal,[28] and Singapore.[29] Saudi Arabian citizenship may be withdrawn if a Saudi citizen obtains a foreign citizenship without the permission of the Prime Minister.[30] The Netherlands, which have some exceptions to dual citizenship's admission, such loss, in practice, is not automatic and may depend on the knowledge and the initiative of the executive power to take place.
  • Possible (but not automatic) loss of citizenship if another citizenship is acquired voluntarily, such as South Africa.[31]
  • Possible (but not automatic) loss of citizenship if people with multiple citizenships do not renounce their other citizenships after reaching the age of majority or within a certain period of time after obtaining multiple citizenships, such as Indonesia,[24] Japan,[32] and Montenegro (where such loss is automatic but with some exceptions).[33]
  • Denying automatic citizenship by birth if the child may acquire another citizenship automatically at birth.
  • Requiring applicants for naturalization to apply to renounce their existing citizenship(s) and provide proof from those countries that they have renounced the citizenship.

Multiple citizenship not recognized

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A statement that a country "does not recognize" multiple citizenship is confusing and ambiguous. Often, it is simply a restatement of the Master Nationality Rule, whereby a country treats a person who is a citizen of both that country and another in the same way as one who is a citizen only of the country. In other words, the country "does not recognize" that the person has any other citizenship for the purposes of the country's laws. In particular, citizens of a country may not be permitted to use another country's passport or travel documents to enter or leave the country, or be entitled to consulate assistance from the other country.[34] Also, the dual national may be subject to compulsory military service in countries where they are considered to be nationals.[35]

Complex laws on dual citizenship

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Some countries have special rules relating to multiple citizenships, such as:

  • Some countries allow dual citizenship but restrict the rights of dual citizens:
    • in Egypt and Armenia, dual citizens cannot be elected to Parliament.
    • in Israel, diplomats and members of Parliament must renounce any other citizenship before assuming their job.
    • in Colombia, dual citizens cannot be Ministers of foreign affairs and of defense.
    • in Australia, dual citizens cannot be elected to federal Parliament.[36] In the 2017–18 Australian parliamentary eligibility crisis, 15 members of Parliament were found to have been ineligible for election due to holding another citizenship, although most had not been aware of the fact. In many instances,[37] the affected members of Parliament subsequently renounced any other citizenships, before contesting again in subsequent by-elections (that were triggered by their own prior ineligibility) or general elections.
    • in New Zealand, dual citizens may be elected to Parliament, but MPs once elected may not voluntarily become a citizen of another country, or take any action to have their foreign nationality recognised such as applying for a foreign passport. However, the only person to recently violate this, Harry Duynhoven, was protected by the passage of retroactive law.
    • in the Philippines, dual citizens by naturalization cannot run for any local elective office. However, dual citizens by birth are eligible to run and be elected.[38]
    • in the independent states of the Commonwealth Caribbean, nationals of any Commonwealth country who meet local residency requirements are eligible to vote in elections and run for parliament, with one complicated caveat. Each of those countries has a provision barring anyone who "is by virtue of his own act, under any acknowledgment of allegiance, obedience or adherence to a foreign power or state" (to quote a representative provision from the constitution of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines[39]) from becoming a member of parliament. The precise meaning of those provisions is disputed and is the subject of separate ongoing legal disputes in the countries.[40][41][42]
    • in Kenya, dual citizens may not be elected or appointed to any state office or serve in the armed forces unless their second citizenship was obtained involuntarily, without the ability to opt out.[43]
  • Austria permits dual citizenship only for persons who had obtained another citizenship by birth.[44] Austrians can apply for special permission to keep their citizenship (Beibehaltungsgenehmigung) before taking a second one (for example, both Austria and the US consider Arnold Schwarzenegger a citizen). In general, however, any Austrian who takes up second citizenship will automatically lose Austrian citizenship.
  • Until June 26, 2024, Germany restricted dual citizenship. Since August 2007, in cases of naturalization, Germany accepted dual citizenship if the other citizenship was either one of an EU member country or Swiss citizenship so that permission was not required anymore in these cases, and in some exceptional cases, non-EU and non-Swiss citizens can keep their old citizenship when they become citizens of Germany. For more details, see German nationality law § Dual citizenship. Owing to changes of the German law on dual citizenship, children of non-EU legal permanent residents can have dual citizenship if they were born and grew up in Germany (the foreign-born parents usually cannot have dual citizenship themselves).[citation needed] As of June 27, 2024, an Act to modernize the Nationality Act (StARModG) provides that Germany now accepts dual citizenship in all cases. German citizens no longer lose their citizenship if they acquire a foreign one and foreigners who choose to become German are no longer required to give up ties to their home country.[45] However, the new law is not retroactive and does not automatically restore citizenship to anyone who lost it because of dual citizenship restrictions under the previous law.[46]
  • Acquisition of the nationality of Andorra, France, Portugal, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Iberoamerican countries, is not sufficient to cause the loss of Spanish nationality by birth.[47] Spain has dual citizenship treaties with Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela; Spaniards residing in these countries or territories do not lose their rights as Spaniards if they adopt that nationality.[48] For all other countries, Spanish citizenship is lost three years after the acquisition of the foreign citizenship unless the individual declares officially their will to retain Spanish citizenship (Spanish nationality law).[49] Upon request Spain has allowed persons from Puerto Rico to acquire Spanish citizenship.[50][51] On the other hand, foreign nationals who acquire Spanish nationality must relinquish their previous nationality, unless they are natural-born citizens of an Iberoamerican country, Andorra, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea or Portugal even if these countries do not grant their citizens a similar treatment, or Sephardi Jews. See also the section on "dormant" citizenship.[citation needed]
  • Prior to 2011, South Korea did not permit multiple nationalities and for such a person, the nationality was stripped after that person became the age of 22. Since 2011, a person can hold multiple nationalities if they have multiple nationalities by birthright (i.e. not by naturalization) and explicitly takes an oath not to exercise the other nationality inside the jurisdiction of South Korea.[52] For details, see South Korean nationality law § Dual citizenship.
  • South Africa has required its citizens to apply for, and obtain, permission from the Minister of Home Affairs to retain their citizenship prior to acquiring the citizenship of another country via any voluntary and formal act (other than marriage) if over the age of majority, and failure to do so has resulted in the automatic loss of South African citizenship upon acquiring another country's citizenship.[53] On 13 June 2023, the Supreme Court of Appeal struck down the relevant legislation as being inconsistent with the Constitution of South Africa and ordered the reinstatement of South African citizenship for those who lost their citizenship in this manner;[54] the judgement however requires confirmation by the Constitutional Court,[55] which is pending as of July 2023.
  • Turkey requires Turkish citizens who apply for another nationality to inform Turkish officials (the nearest Turkish embassy or consulate abroad) and provide the original naturalization certificate, Turkish birth certificate, marriage certificate (if applicable) and two photographs. Dual nationals are not compelled to use a Turkish passport to enter and leave Turkey; it is permitted to travel with a valid foreign passport and the Turkish national ID card.[56]
  • Pakistan allows dual citizenship on an inclusionary basis since 1951 with 20 countries: Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[57]
  • In contrast, Bangladesh allows dual citizenship on an exclusionary basis – only with Non-Resident Bangladeshis who are not previously citizens of SAARC countries.[58]
  • In Poland, a Polish citizen who is a dual national of another country is legally treated in the same way as a Polish citizen with one nationality. They cannot exercise additional rights and duties that come from their second citizenship in relation to the Polish government. However, submitting a passport of another country to the border guards is not forbidden and there are no penalties in the law. If the citizen does so, they are going to be treated as a citizen of another country. However, when the border guards find out that the person also has Polish citizenship, they are going to treat them as a Polish citizen only, and they are not going to be able to leave (or enter) Poland only using their foreign passport. Since then, they are obliged to show them their Polish passport.[59]
  • The same principle as Poland is enforced in France, but when being in one of the country they are citizen of, the plural-national is not allowed to request French consular help. For example, a citizen of both France and Italy, they cannot request help from French consulate in Italy and they cannot request Italian consular help in France.[60]

Partial citizenship, and residency

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Many countries allow foreigners or former citizens to live and work. However, for voting, being voted and working for the public sector or the national security in a country, citizenship of the country concerned is almost always required.

  • Since 2008, Poland has granted the "Polish Card" (Karta Polaka) to ethnic Poles who can prove they have Polish ancestors and knowledge of the Polish language and declare their Polish ethnicity in written form. Holders of the Card are not regarded as citizens, but enjoy some privileges other foreigners do not, e.g. entry visa, right to work, education, or healthcare in Poland. As stated above, Poland currently has no specific laws on dual citizenship; second citizenship is tolerated, but not recognized.
  • Turkey allows its citizens to have dual citizenship if they inform the authorities before acquiring the second citizenship (see above), and former Turkish citizens who have given up their Turkish citizenship (for example, because they have naturalized in a country that usually does not permit dual citizenship, such as Germany, Austria or the Netherlands) can apply for the "Blue Card" (Mavi Kart), which gives them some citizens' rights back, e.g. the right to live and work in Turkey, the right to possess land or the right to inherit, but not, for example, the right to vote.
  • Overseas citizenship of India (OCI): The Indian government introduced OCI in 2005. The OCI is applicable to people who fall in the category of Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and migrated from India acquiring citizenship of a foreign country apart from Pakistan and Bangladesh. They are eligible for OCI after renouncing their Indian citizenship as long as their home country allows dual citizenship in some form or other under their relevant national laws.[61][62][63] The Constitution of India does not permit dual citizenship or dual nationality, except for minors where the second nationality was involuntarily acquired. Indian authorities interpreted this to mean a person cannot have another country's passport while simultaneously holding an Indian one, even for a child claimed by another country as its citizen, who may be required by the laws of this country to use the corresponding passports for foreign travel (such as a child born in the United States to Indian parents). Indian courts have given the executive branch wide discretion over this matter. The OCI does not grant political rights to the holder.[64][65]
In 2005, India amended the 1955 Citizenship Act to introduce a form of overseas citizenship,[66] which stops just short of full dual citizenship and is, in all aspects, like permanent residency. Such overseas citizens are exempt from the rule forbidding dual citizenship; they may not vote, run for office, join the army, or take up government posts, though these evolving principles are subject to revolving political discretions [clarification needed] for those born in India with birthrights. Moreover, people who have acquired citizenship in Pakistan or Bangladesh are not eligible for overseas citizenship. Indian citizens do not need a visa to travel to and work in Nepal or Bhutan (and vice versa), but none of the three countries allow dual citizenship.[67]
  • Many countries (e.g. United States, Canada, all EU countries and Switzerland, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore) issue permanent residency status to foreigners deemed eligible. This status generally authorises a person to live and work in the issuing country indefinitely. There is not always any right to vote in the host country, and there may be other restrictions (no consular protection) and rights (not subject to military conscription). Permanent residents may usually apply for citizenship after several years of residency. Depending both on the home country and the guest country, dual citizenship may or may not be permitted.
  • Some countries have concluded treaties regulating travel and access to employment: A citizen of an EU country can live and work indefinitely in other EU countries and the four EFTA countries, and citizens of the EFTA countries can live and work in EU countries. Such EU citizens can vote in EU elections, but not national elections, though permitted to vote in local elections where they reside permanently. The Trans-Tasman Travel Arrangement between Australia and New Zealand allows their citizens to live and work in the other country.
  • A citizen of a GCC member state (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) can live and work in other member states, but dual citizenship (even with another GCC state) is not allowed. In 2021, UAE approved amendments in the Emirati Nationality Law to allow investors, professionals, special talents and their families to acquire the Emirati nationality and passport under certain conditions.[68][69]

Dominant and effective nationality

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The potential issues that dual nationality can pose in international affairs have long been recognized, and as a result, international law recognizes the concept of "dominant and effective nationality", under which a dual national will hold only one dominant and effective nationality for the purposes of international law to one nation that holds their primary national allegiance, while any other nationalities are subordinate. The theory of dominant and effective nationality emerged as early as 1834. Customary international law and precedent have since recognized the idea of dominant and effective nationality, with the Nottebohm case providing an important shift.

The International Court of Justice defines effective nationality as a "legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties". International tribunals have adopted and used the principle. Under customary international law, tribunals dealing with questions involving dual nationality must determine the effective nationality of the dual national by determining to which nation the individual has more of a "genuine link". Unlike dual nationality, one may only be the effective national of a single nation, and different factors are taken into consideration to determine effective nationality, including habitual residence, family ties, financial and economic ties, cultural integration, participation in public life, armed forces service, and evidence of sentiment of national allegiance.[70]

Countries that do not allow renunciation of citizenship

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Source: German Federal Government (as of July 2023)

  • Africa: Algeria, Angola, Eritrea, Morocco, Nigeria, and Tunisia
  • The Americas: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, and Uruguay
  • Asia: Afghanistan, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Thailand

Citizens of these countries may keep their old citizenship if naturalizing in a country that forbids dual citizenship[vague] or that country may refuse their naturalization.

Dormant citizenship and right of return

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The concept of a "dormant citizenship" means that a person has the citizenships of two countries, but as long as while living permanently in one country, their status and citizen's rights in the other country are "inactive". They will be "reactivated" when they move back to live permanently in the other country. This means, in spite of dual citizenship, only one citizenship can be exercised at a time.

The "dormant citizenship" exists, for example, in Spain: Spanish citizens who have naturalized in an Iberoamerican country and have kept their Spanish citizenship are dual citizens, but have lost many of the rights of Spanish citizens resident in Spain—and hence the EU—until they move back to Spain. Some countries offer former citizens or citizens of former colonies of the country a simplified (re-)naturalization process. Depending on the laws of the two countries in question, dual citizenship may or may not be allowed. For details, see right of return.[71]

Another example of "dormant citizenship" (or "hidden citizenship") occurs when a person is automatically born a citizen of another country without officially being recognized. In many cases, the person may even be unaware that they hold multiple citizenship. For example, because of the nationality law in Italy, a person born in Canada to parents of Italian ancestry may be born with both Canadian and Italian citizenship at birth. Canadian citizenship is automatically acquired by birth within Canada. However, that same person may also acquire Italian citizenship at birth if at least one parent's lineage traces back to an Italian citizen. The person, their parent, grandparent, great-grandparent, and great-great-grandparent may have all transmitted the Italian citizenship to the next child in the line without even knowing it. Therefore, even if the person in this case may have been four generations removed from the last Italian-born (and therefore recognized) citizen, the great-great-grandparent, they would still be born with Italian citizenship. Even though the person may not even be aware of the citizenship, it does not change the fact that they are a citizen since birth. Therefore, the second citizenship (in this case, the Italian citizenship) is "dormant" (or "hidden") because the person does not even know they are a citizen and/or does not have official recognition from the country's government. That person would therefore have to gather all necessary documents and present them to the Italian government so that their "dormant" or "hidden" citizenship will be recognized. Once it is recognized, they will be able to do all of the things that any citizen could do, such as apply for a passport.

Automatic multiple citizenship

[edit]

Countries may bestow citizenship automatically (i.e., "by operation of law"), which may result in multiple citizenships, in the following situations:

  • Some countries automatically bestow citizenship on a person whose parent holds that country's citizenship. If they have different citizenships or are multiple citizens themselves, the child may gain multiple citizenships, depending on whether and how jus soli and jus sanguinis apply for each citizenship.
  • Some countries (e.g., Canada, the US, and many other countries in the Americas) regard all children born there automatically to be eligible to be citizens (jus soli) even if the parents are not legally present. For example, a child born in the US to Austrian parents automatically has dual citizenship with the US and Austria, even though Austria usually restricts or forbids dual citizenship. There are exceptions, such as the child of a foreign diplomat living in the US. Such a child would be eligible to become a lawful permanent resident, but not a citizen, based on the US birth.[72]
    This has led to birth tourism, so some countries have abolished jus soli or restricted it (i.e., at least one parent must be a citizen or a legal, permanent resident who has lived in the country for several years). Some countries forbid their citizens to renounce their citizenship or try to discourage them from doing so.[14][relevant?]
  • Changes in the political status of a nation can render its people involuntary holders of citizenship from multiple countries.
    For example, if a belligerent state were to successfully invade another sovereign nation, seize and occupy that nation's territory by force, control the movement of people in that territory, and then declare all residents of occupied territory to be citizens of the occupying state.

Some countries are more open to multiple citizenship than others, as it may help citizens travel and conduct business overseas. Countries that have taken active steps towards permitting multiple citizenship in recent years include Switzerland (since January 1, 1992) and Australia (since April 4, 2002).[73][74]

Subnational citizenship

[edit]
  • Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. Certain rights accrue as an incident of state citizenship and access to federal courts can sometimes be determined on State citizenship. In addition, Native American tribal sovereignty affords members ("citizens") of federally recognized tribes ("nations") special rights and privileges that derive from federal recognition of customs that predate colonization and rights secured in federal treaties.
  • Switzerland has a three-tier system of citizenship – Confederation, canton and commune (municipality).
  • Although considered part of the United Kingdom for British nationality purposes, the Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man have local legislation restricting certain employment and housing rights to those with "local status". Although the British citizenship of people from these islands gives them full citizenship rights when in the United Kingdom, it did not give them the rights that British citizenship generally conferred prior to 2021 when in other parts of the European Union (for example, the right to reside and work). In a similar way, a number of British Overseas Territories have a concept of "belonger status" for their citizens, in addition to their existing British citizenship.
  • Citizens of the People's Republic of China may be permanent residents of the Hong Kong or Macau Special Administrative Regions, or have household registration (hukou) somewhere in mainland China. School enrollment, work permission, and other civic rights and privileges (such as whether one may apply for a Hong Kong SAR passport, Macau SAR passport, or People's Republic of China passport are tied to the region in which the citizen has permanent residence or household registration. Although within mainland China the hukou system has loosened in recent years, movement between Macau, Hong Kong, and the mainland remains controlled. Mainland Chinese who migrate to Hong Kong on one-way permits have their mainland hukou cancelled,[75] while children born in Hong Kong to visiting mainland parents cannot receive mainland hukou unless they cancel their Hong Kong permanent residence status.[citation needed]
  • People from Åland have joint regional (Åland) and national (Finnish) citizenship. People with Ålandic citizenship (hembygdsrätt) have the right to buy property and set up a business on Åland, but Finns without regional citizenship cannot. Finns can get Ålandic citizenship after living on the islands for five years, and Ålanders lose their regional citizenship after living on the Finnish mainland for five years.[76][77]
  • The territorial government of Puerto Rico began issuing Puerto Rican citizenship certificates in September 2007 after Juan Mari Brás, a lifelong supporter of independence, won a successful court victory that validated his claim that Puerto Rican citizenship was valid and can be claimed by anyone born on the island or with at least one parent who was born there.[78]
  • In Bosnia and Herzegovina, citizens hold also citizenship of their respective entity, generally that in which they reside. This citizenship can be of the Republika Srpska or of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. One must have citizenship of at least one, but cannot hold both entity citizenships simultaneously.[79]
  • In Malaysia, a federation of thirteen states, each state gives certain benefits such as baby bonus, education loans and scholarships to children born in the state (or born to parents who were born in the state) and/or residing in the state. The states of Sabah and Sarawak in East Malaysia each has their own immigration control and permanent residency system; citizens from Peninsular Malaysian states are subject to immigration control in the two states.
  • People from the Cook Islands and Niue have New Zealand citizenship, along with a local status that is not extended to other New Zealanders.[80][81][82]

Former instances

[edit]

Supra-national citizenship

[edit]
  • In European Union law, there is the concept of EU citizenship, which flows from the Maastricht Treaty, establishing a legal identity for the European Community. Such citizenship does not replace the member state's citizenship, but is additive in nature, generally conferring rights under EU law and guaranteeing fair treatment broadly equivalent to the treatment a member state's own citizen would receive. However, member states can restrict certain rights, such as voting in national elections and holding specific public roles, to their own citizens. EU citizens can freely live and work in another member state indefinitely. In exceptional cases, a member state may deport or deny entry to citizens of other EU states. Temporary transitional restrictions on free movement rights for citizens of newly admitted states may be imposed for up to 2 years, extendable by an additional 3 years, with an extra 2 years being possible in case of serious labor market disruption. Currently, no such provisions are in effect for any EU member state, though they were previously applied to Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.[84]
Brazilian passport (2015-2023) with the symbol of Mercosur, the southern cross, on its cover
  • Mercosur citizenship allows free movement, residence, and work within member countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, with Bolivia in accession). Citizens can obtain temporary residency and later apply for permanent status, gaining labor rights, social security, and healthcare access. While political rights are limited, direct voting for the Mercosur Parliament has already been implemented in some member countries. Efforts continue to improve labor mobility and recognize academic qualifications. Mercosur citizens and those from associated states (Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) do not need a passport or visa to travel around the region, with only a national identity card or other document being required.
  • The Nordic Passport Union, containing Denmark (including the Faroe Islands and Greenland, unlike the EU), Sweden, Iceland, Norway (including Svalbard Islands) and Finland, allow citizens of members to travel across their borders without requiring any travel documentation, although this has previously been temporarily suspended in response to the European migrant crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. Citizens of members are often eligible for fast track processing to citizenships of other Members, with varying degrees of recognition/tolerance of dual citizenship among the states.
  • The United Kingdom recognises a Commonwealth citizenship for the citizens of the member states of the Commonwealth of Nations. The United Kingdom allows non-nationals who are Commonwealth citizens to vote and stand for election while resident there, while most other Commonwealth countries make little or no distinction between citizens of other Commonwealth nations and citizens of non-Commonwealth nations. Notably Commonwealth citizenship no longer imparts a right of residence in the UK.
  • Commonwealth of Independent States nations (some republics of the former Soviet Union) are often eligible for fast track processing to citizenships of other CIS countries, with varying degrees of recognition/tolerance of dual citizenship among the states.

Effects and issues

[edit]

It is often observed that dual citizenship may strengthen ties between migrants and their countries of origin and increase their propensity to remit funds to their communities of origin.[85]

Qualitative research on the effect of dual citizenship on the remittances, diaspora investments, return migration, naturalization and political behavior finds several ways in which multiple citizenship can affect these categories. As a bundle of rights, dual citizenship (a) enables dual citizens by granting special privileges, (b) affects their expectations about privileges in the decision-making process, and (c) eases the transaction process and reduces costs and risks, for example in the case of investing and conducting business. In addition, a dual legal status can have positive effects on diasporic identification and commitment to causes in the homeland, as well as to a higher naturalization rate of immigrants in their countries of residence.[86]

Dual suffrage

[edit]

Multiple citizenship can result in dual transnational voting in contrast to the principle of one man, one vote.[87]

National cohesiveness

[edit]

A study published in 2007 in The Journal of Politics explored questions of whether allowing dual citizenship impedes cultural assimilation or social integration, increases disconnection from the political process, and degrades national or civic identity/cohesiveness.[88]

Stanley Renshon, writing for the anti-immigration think tank Center for immigration studies, cites what he views as a rise in tension between mainstream and migrant communities as evidence of the need to maintain a strong national identity and culture. He asserts that the fact that a second citizenship can be obtained without giving anything up (such as the loss of public benefits, welfare, healthcare, retirement funds, and job opportunities in the country of origin in exchange for citizenship in a new country) both trivializes what it means to be a citizen.[89]

In effect, this approach argues that the self-centered[neutrality is disputed] taking of an additional citizenship contradicts what it means to be a citizen, in that it becomes a convenient[citation needed] and painless means of attaining improved economic opportunity without any real consequences and can just as easily be discarded when it is no longer beneficial.[90] Proponents argue that dual citizenship can actually encourage political activity providing an avenue for immigrants who are unwilling to forsake their country of origin either out of loyalty or based on a feeling of separation from the mainstream society because of language, culture, religion, or ethnicity.[91]

A 2007 academic study concluded that dual citizens had a negative effect on the assimilation and political connectedness of first-generation Latino immigrants to the United States, finding dual citizens:[92]

  • 32% less likely to be fluent in English
  • 18% less likely to identify as "American"
  • 19% less likely to consider the US as their homeland
  • 18% less likely to express high levels of civic duty
  • 9% less likely to register to vote
  • 15% less likely to have ever voted in a national election

The study also noted that although dual nationality is likely to disconnect immigrants from the American political system and impede assimilation, the initial signs suggest that these effects seem to be limited almost exclusively to the first generation (although it is mentioned that a full assessment of dual nationality beyond the first generation is not possible with present data).[92]

Concern over the effect of multiple citizenship on national cohesiveness is generally more acute in the United States. The reason for this is twofold:

  • The United States is a "civic" nation and not an "ethnic" nation. American citizenship is not based on belonging to a particular ethnicity but on political loyalty to American democracy and values. Regimes based on ethnicity, which support the doctrine of perpetual allegiance as one is always a member of the ethnic nation, are not concerned with assimilating non-ethnics since they can never become true citizens. In contrast, the essence of a civic nation makes it imperative that immigrants assimilate into the greater whole as there is not an "ethnic" cohesiveness uniting the populace.[93]
  • The United States is an immigrant nation. As immigration is primarily directed at family reunification and refugee status rather than education and job skills, the pool of candidates tends to be poorer, less educated,[94] and consistently from less stable countries (either non-democracies or fragile ones) with less familiarity or understanding of American values, making their assimilation both more difficult and more important.[93]

The degree of angst over the effects of dual citizenship seemingly corresponds to a country's model for managing immigration and ethnic diversity:

  • The differential exclusionary model, which accepts immigrants as temporary "guestworkers" but is highly restrictive with regard to other forms of immigration and to naturalisation of immigrants. Many countries in Asia such as Japan, China, Taiwan, Singapore and the countries of the Middle East tend to follow this approach.[citation needed]
  • The assimilationist model, which accepts that immigrants obtain citizenship, but on the condition that they give up some or all cultural, linguistic, or social characteristics that differ from those of the majority population. Europe is the primary example of this model, where immigrants are usually required to learn the official language, and cultural traditions such as Islamic dress are often barred in public spaces (see Immigration to Europe).[95][96]
  • The multicultural model grants immigrants access to citizenship and to equal rights without demanding that they give up cultural, linguistic, or intermarriage restrictions or otherwise pressure them to integrate or inter-mix with the mainstream population. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States have historically taken this approach, as exemplified by the fact that the United States has no official language, allowing official documents such as election ballots to be printed in a variety of languages.[97] (See Immigration to the United States.)

Appearance of foreign allegiance

[edit]

People with multiple citizenship may be viewed as having dual loyalty, having the potential to act contrary to a government's interests, and this may lead to difficulties in acquiring government employment where security clearance may be required.

In the United States, dual citizenship is associated with two categories of security concerns: foreign influence and foreign preference. Contrary to common misconceptions, dual citizenship in itself is not the major problem in obtaining or retaining security clearance in the United States. As a matter of fact, if a security clearance applicant's dual citizenship is "based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country", that can be a mitigating condition.[98] However, taking advantage of the entitlements of a non-US citizenship can cause problems. For example, possession or use of a foreign passport is a condition disqualifying one from security clearance and "is not mitigated by reasons of personal convenience, safety, requirements of foreign law, or the identity of the foreign country" as is explicitly clarified in a Department of Defense policy memorandum which defines a guideline requiring that "any clearance be denied or revoked unless the applicant surrenders the foreign passport or obtains official permission for its use from the appropriate agency of the United States Government".[99]

This guideline has been followed in administrative rulings[100] by the United States Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals[101] (DOHA) office of Industrial Security Clearance Review[102] (ISCR), which decides cases involving security clearances for Contractor personnel doing classified work for all DoD components. In one such case, an administrative judge ruled that it is not clearly consistent with US national interest to grant a request for a security clearance to an applicant who was a dual national of the U.S. and Ireland, despite the fact that it has with good relations with the US.[103] In Israel, certain military units, including most recently the Israeli Navy's submarine fleet, as well as posts requiring high security clearances, require candidates to renounce any other citizenship before joining, though the number of units making such demands has declined. In many combat units, candidates are required to declare but not renounce any foreign citizenship.[104]

On the other hand, Israel may view some dual citizens as desirable candidates for its security services because of their ability to legitimately enter neighbouring states which are closed to Israeli passport holders. The related case of Ben Zygier has caused debate about dual citizenship in Australia.[105]

Multiple citizenship among politicians

[edit]

This perception of dual loyalty can apply even when the job in question does not require security clearance. In the United States, dual citizenship is common among politicians or government employees. For example, Arnold Schwarzenegger retained his Austrian citizenship during his service as a Governor of California[106] while US Senator Ted Cruz renounced his Canadian citizenship birthright on 14 May 2014.[107][108]

In 1999, the US Attorney General's office issued an official opinion that a statutory provision that required the Justice Department not to employ a non-"citizen of the United States"[109] did not bar it from employing dual citizens.[110]

In Germany, politicians can have dual citizenship. David McAllister, who holds British and German citizenship, was minister president of the State of Lower-Saxony from July 1, 2010, to February 19, 2013. He was the first German minister president to hold dual citizenship.

A small controversy arose in 2005 when Michaëlle Jean was appointed the Governor General of Canada (official representative of the Queen). Although Jean no longer holds citizenship in her native Haiti, her marriage to French-born filmmaker Jean-Daniel Lafond allowed her to obtain French citizenship several years before her appointment. Article 23-8[111] of the French civil code allows the French government to withdraw French nationality from French citizens holding government or military positions in other countries and Jean's appointment made her both de facto head of state and commander-in-chief of the Canadian forces. The French embassy released a statement that this law would not be enforced because the Governor General is essentially a ceremonial figurehead. Nevertheless, Jean renounced her French citizenship two days before taking up office to end the controversy about it.[112]

However, former Canadian Prime Minister John Turner was born in the United Kingdom and still retained his dual citizenship. Stéphane Dion, former head of the Liberal Party of Canada and the previous leader of the official opposition, holds dual citizenship with France as a result of his mother's nationality; Dion nonetheless indicated a willingness to renounce French citizenship if a significant number of Canadians viewed it negatively.[113] Thomas Mulcair, former Leader of the New Democratic Party and former leader of the Official Opposition in the Canadian House of Commons also holds dual citizenship with France.

In Egypt, dual citizens cannot be elected to Parliament.[citation needed]

The Constitution of Australia, in Section 44(i), explicitly forbids people who hold allegiance to foreign powers from sitting in the parliament of Australia.[114] This restriction on people with dual or multiple citizenship being members of parliament does not apply to the state parliaments, and the regulations vary by state. A court case (see Sue v Hill) determined that the UK is a foreign power for purposes of this section of the constitution, despite Australia holding a common nationality with it at the time that the Constitution was written, and that Senator-elect Heather Hill had not been duly elected to the national parliament because at the time of her election she was a subject or citizen of a foreign power. However, the High Court of Australia also ruled that dual citizenship on its own would not be enough to disqualify someone from validly sitting in Parliament. The individual circumstances of the non-Australian citizenship must be looked at although the person must make a reasonable effort to renounce their non-Australian citizenship. However, if that other citizenship cannot be reasonably revoked (for example, if it is impossible under the laws of the other country or impossible in practice because it requires an extremely difficult revocation process), then that person will not be disqualified from sitting in Parliament.[115] In the 2017 Australian parliamentary eligibility crisis, the High Court disqualified Australia's Deputy Prime Minister and four senators because they held dual citizenship, despite being unaware of their citizenship status when elected.

In New Zealand, controversy arose in 2003 when Labour MP Harry Duynhoven applied to renew his citizenship of the Netherlands. Duynhoven, the New Zealand-born son of a Dutch-born father, had possessed dual citizenship from birth but had temporarily lost his Dutch citizenship as a result of a change in Dutch law in 1995 regarding non-residents.[116] While New Zealand's Electoral Act allowed candidates with dual citizenship to be elected as MPs, Section 55[117] of the Act stated that an MP who applied for citizenship of a foreign power after taking office would forfeit his/her seat. This was regarded by many as a technicality, however; and Duynhoven, with his large electoral majority, was almost certain to re-enter Parliament in the event of a by-election. As such, the Labour Government retrospectively amended the Act, thus enabling Duynhoven to retain his seat. The amendment, nicknamed "Harry's Law",[118] was passed by a majority of 61 votes to 56.[119] The revised Act allows exceptions to Section 55 on the grounds of an MP's country/place of birth, descent, or renewing a foreign passport issued before the MP took office.[120]

Both the former Estonian president Toomas Hendrik Ilves and the former Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus had been naturalized US citizens prior to assuming their offices. Both have renounced their US citizenships: Ilves in 1993 and Adamkus in 1998. This was necessary because neither individual's new country permits retention of a former citizenship. Adamkus was a high-ranking official in the Environmental Protection Agency, a federal government department, during his time in the United States. Former Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga relinquished Canadian citizenship upon taking office in 1999.[121]

Taxation

[edit]
Systems of taxation on personal income
  No income tax on individuals
  Territorial
  Residence-based
  Citizenship-based

In some cases, multiple citizenship can create additional tax liability. Almost all countries that impose tax normally base tax liability on source or residency. A very small number of countries tax their non-resident citizens on foreign income; examples include the United States, Eritrea, and the Philippines[122][123]

  • Residency: a country may tax the income of anyone who lives there, regardless of citizenship or whether the income was earned in that country or abroad (most common system);
  • Source: a country may tax any income generated there, regardless of whether the earner is a citizen, resident, or non-resident; or
  • Citizenship: a country may tax the worldwide income of its citizens, regardless of whether they reside in that country or whether the income was sourced there (as of 2012: only the United States and Eritrea).[122] A few other countries tax based on citizenship in limited situations: Finland,[citation needed] France,[citation needed] Hungary,[citation needed] Italy,[citation needed] and Spain.

Under Spanish tax law, Spanish nationals and companies still have tax obligations with Spain if they move to a country that is in the list of tax havens[124] and cannot justify a strong reason, besides tax evasion. They are required to be residents of that country for a minimum of 5 years; after which they are free from any tax obligations.

U.S. persons living outside the United States are still subject to tax on their worldwide income, although U.S. tax law provides measures to reduce or eliminate double taxation issues for some, namely exemption of earned income (up to an inflation-adjusted threshold which, as of 2023, is $120,000[125]), exemption of basic foreign housing,[126] as well as foreign tax credits. It has been reported that some US citizens have relinquished US citizenship in order to avoid possible taxes, the expense and complexity of compliance, or because they have been deemed unacceptable to financial institutions in the wake of FATCA.[127][128][129]

A person with multiple citizenship may have a tax liability to their country of residence and also to one or more of their countries of citizenship; or worse, if unaware that one of their citizenships created a tax liability, that country may consider the person to be a tax evader. Many countries and territories have signed tax treaties or agreements for avoiding double taxation.

Still, there are cases in which a person with multiple citizenship will owe tax solely on the basis of holding one such citizenship. For example, consider a person who holds both Australian and United States citizenship, and lives and works in Australia. They would be subject to Australian taxation, because Australia taxes its residents, and they would be subject to U.S. taxation because they hold U.S. citizenship. In general, they would be allowed to subtract the Australian income tax they paid from the U.S. tax that would be due. In addition, the U.S. will allow some parts of foreign income to be exempt from taxation; for instance, in 2018 the foreign earned income exclusion allowed up to US$103,900 of foreign salaried income to be exempt from income tax (in 2020, this was increased to US$107,600).[125] This exemption, plus the credit for foreign taxes paid mentioned above, often results in no U.S. taxes being owed, although a U.S. tax return would still have to be filed. In instances where the Australian tax was less than the U.S. tax, and where there was income that could not be exempted from U.S. tax, the U.S. would expect any tax due to be paid.

The United States Internal Revenue Service has excluded some regulations such as Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) from tax treaties that protect double taxation. [citation needed] In its current format even if U.S. citizens are paying income taxes at a rate of 56%, far above the maximum U.S. marginal tax rate, the citizen can be subject to US taxes because the calculation of the AMT does not allow full deduction for taxes paid to a foreign country. Other regulations such as the post date of foreign mailed tax returns are not recognized and can result in penalties for late filing if they arrive at the IRS later than the filing date. However, the filing date for overseas citizens has a two-month automatic extension to June 15.[130]

"If you are a U.S. citizen or resident alien residing overseas, or are in the military on duty outside the U.S., on the regular due date of your return, you are allowed an automatic 2-month extension to file your return and pay any amount due without requesting an extension. For a calendar year return, the automatic 2-month extension is to June 15. If you are unable to file your return by the automatic 2-month extension date, you can request an additional extension to October 15 by filing Form 4868 before the automatic 2-month extension date. However, any tax due payments made after June 15 will be subject to both interest charges and failure to pay penalties." (IRS, 2012)[citation needed]

Issues with international travel

[edit]

Many countries, even those that permit multiple citizenship, do not explicitly recognise multiple citizenship under their laws: individuals are treated either as citizens of that country or not, and their citizenship with respect to other countries is considered to have no bearing. This can mean (in Iran,[131] Mexico,[132] many Arab countries, and former Soviet republics) that consular officials abroad may not have access to their citizens if they also hold local citizenship. Some countries provide access for consular officials as a matter of courtesy but do not accept any obligation to do so under international consular agreements. The right of countries to act in this fashion is protected via the Master Nationality Rule.[citation needed]

Multiple citizens who travel to a country of citizenship are often required to enter or leave the country on that country's passport. For example, a United States Department of State web page on dual nationality contains the information that most US citizens, including dual nationals, must use a US passport to enter and leave the United States.[133] Under the terms of the South African Citizenship Act, it is an offence for someone aged at least 18 with South African citizenship and another citizenship to enter or depart the Republic of South Africa using the passport of another country.[134] Individuals who possess multiple citizenships, may also be required, before leaving a country of citizenship, to fulfill requirements ordinarily required of its resident citizens, including compulsory military service or exit permits. An example of this occurs in Israel, which permits multiple citizenships whilst also requiring compulsory military service for its citizens.

In accordance with the European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), the EU citizens who have multiple nationalities will be obliged to use the passport issued by an EU Member State for entering the Schengen area.[135]

Military service

[edit]
  No armed forces
  No enforced conscription
  Active conscription system, but less than 20% people who are fit for service are conscripted
  Active universal conscription
  No information

Military service for dual nationals can be an issue of concern. Several countries have entered into a Protocol relating to Military Obligations in Certain Cases of Double Nationality established at The Hague, 12 April 1930. The protocol states "A person possessing two or more nationalities who habitually resides in one of the countries whose nationality he possesses, and who is in fact most closely connected with that country, shall be exempt from all military obligations in the other country or countries. This exemption may involve the loss of the nationality of the other country or countries." The protocol has several provisions.[136]

Healthcare

[edit]

The right to healthcare in countries with a public health service is often discussed in relation to immigration but is a non-issue as far as nationality is concerned. The right to use public health services may be conditioned on nationality and/or on legal residency. For example, anyone legally resident and employed in the UK is entitled to use the National Health Service; non-resident British citizens visiting Britain do not have this right unless they are UK state pensioners who hold a UK S1 form.[citation needed]

By region

[edit]

Africa

[edit]

Dual citizenship is allowed in Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe; others restrict or forbid dual citizenship. Lesotho observes dual citizenship,[citation needed] as well as jus soli. There are problems regarding dual citizenship in Namibia.[137] Eritreans,[citation needed] Egyptians,[citation needed] and South Africans[31] wanting to take another citizenship need permission to maintain their citizenship, though multiple citizenship acquired from birth is not affected. Eritrea taxes its citizens worldwide, even if they have never lived in the country.[138] Equatorial Guinea does not allow dual citizenship, but it is allowed for children born abroad, if at least one parent is a citizen of Equatorial Guinea.[139] Tanzania and Cameroon do not allow dual citizenship.[140]

The Americas

[edit]

Most countries in the Americas allow dual citizenship, some only for citizens by descent or with other countries, usually also in the region with which they have agreements. Some countries (e.g., Argentina, Bolivia) do not allow their citizens to renounce their citizenship, so their nationals retain it even when naturalizing in a country that forbids dual citizenship. Most countries in the region observe unconditional jus soli, i.e. a child born there is regarded as a citizen even if the parents are not. Some countries, such as the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay, allow renunciation of citizenship only if it was involuntarily acquired by birth to non-citizen parents.

Dual citizenship is restricted or forbidden in Cuba, Suriname, Panama,[141] and Guyana.

  • Colombia's Constitution gives every Colombian the right to have more than one nationality.[142] It does not, however, grant automatic birthright citizenship.[143] To obtain Colombian nationality at birth, a person must have at least one parent who is a national or legal resident of Colombia. A child born outside Colombia who has at least one Colombian parent can be registered as a Colombian national by birth, either upon returning to Colombia (for residents) or at a consulate abroad (for non-residents).[143]
  • Venezuela allows dual nationality as stated in Article 34 of the Constitution of Venezuela.[144] The only requirement for citizens with dual nationality to enter Venezuelan territory is to present documents proving their Venezuelan nationality (even if they have expired).[145] Venezuelans who possess dual citizenship have the same rights and duties as Venezuelans who do not possess dual citizenship.
  • United States law does not mention dual nationality or require a person to choose one nationality or another. A U.S. citizen may naturalize in a foreign state without any risk to their U.S. citizenship.[146] The United States also permits the formal renunciation of U.S. citizenship.[147]

Asia and Oceania

[edit]

Most countries in Asia restrict or forbid dual citizenship.[citation needed] In some of these countries (e.g. Iran, North Korea, Kuwait), it is very difficult or even impossible for citizens to renounce their citizenship, even if a citizen is naturalized in another country.[citation needed]

  • Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, Tonga, Vanuatu, and Vietnam allow dual citizenship.[148][149][150] Australia's constitution does not permit dual nationals to be elected to the federal Parliament. The issue of multiple citizenship caused a parliamentary eligibility crisis.
  • Cambodia allows dual citizenship and observes jus soli for children born to legal permanent residents born in Cambodia or to children whose parents are unknown. In 2021 Cambodia banned dual citizenship for prime minister, presidents of the National Assembly, Senate and the Constitutional Council.[151][152]
  • Hong Kong and Macau allow dual citizenship for citizens by birth but do not permit applicants for naturalization to retain their prior citizenship. However, there is no such thing as Hong Kong and Macau citizenship. The nationality law of the People's Republic of China (CNL) has been applied in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Macau Special Administrative Region since 1 July 1997 and 20 December 1999 respectively. Hong Kong and Macau residents who are Chinese citizens holding foreign passports must make a declaration of change of nationality to the HKSAR Immigration Department or MSAR Identification Services Bureau in order to be regarded as foreign nationals. Foreign nationals or stateless persons can apply for naturalisation as a Chinese national provided that they are Hong Kong or Macau residents and meet the requirements under CNL.[153][154]
  • South Korea allows dual citizenship for certain groups of overseas Koreans who acquired foreign citizenship at birth. In general, Korean nationals born with other foreign nationality must declare an intention to renounce foreign nationality or refrain from exercising foreign nationality while in the Republic of Korea, or risk losing Korean nationality at age 22 for women, and age 18 for men. Foreign nationals who naturalize must renounce former nationality as precondition.
  • Taiwan[155] allows dual citizenship for citizens by birth or for its own citizens but do not permit foreign applicants for naturalization to retain their prior citizenship unless they are senior professionals or have made outstanding contributions to Taiwan. This restriction does not apply to Hong Kong and Macau residents who do not possess a foreign nationality. Naturalised citizens may apply for resumption of their original citizenship following renunciation and granting of Republic of China (Taiwan) citizenship.[a]
  • Burmese nationality law forbids its citizens to have dual citizenship, and foreigners cannot become naturalized citizens, unless they can prove a close familial connection to the country.
  • Pakistan restricts dual citizenship (see above), but observes jus soli.
  • In Papua New Guinea, there was overwhelming support from parliament to amend their Constitution to allow dual citizenship; however, the law had yet to come into force as of February 2014.[156]
  • In the Philippines, Republic Act No. 9225, approved 29 August 2003, provided that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who had lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country would be deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic, that their children whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen years of age, shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines, and that natural born citizens of the Philippines who become citizens of a foreign country subsequent to its enactment would retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath.[157]
  • Sri Lanka allows dual citizenship.[158] However, under the 19th amendment of that country's constitution, dual citizens are not allowed to hold public office.
  • Bahrain and Qatar do not allow dual citizenship.
  • The United Arab Emirates has permitted dual citizenship to both Expatriates and Emirati citizens since 2021.
  • Lebanon allows dual citizenship.
  • Israel allows dual citizenship except in the case of one being chosen as a member of the Knesset, appointed a government minister or a judge, both in secular and religious courts, in which case one must relinquish other citizenships when possible.[159]
  • Iraq allows dual citizenship.
  • Syria allows dual citizenship.
  • Kyrgyzstan allows dual citizenship, but only if a mutual treaty on dual citizenship is in force.
  • The Indian constitution does not allow voluntary Dual Citizenship.[160] However, in response to persistent demands for dual citizenship, The Overseas Citizenship of India (OCI) scheme was introduced by amending The Citizenship Act, 1955 in August 2005.[161] The older PIO classification was merged with OCI in 2015.[162] However, OCIs do not have the right to vote, stand in an election or get government jobs, but they can invest in the country and purchase farmland (agricultural property).
  • Japan does not allow dual citizenship past the age of 22. Japanese nationals born with other foreign nationality must declare an intention to renounce foreign nationality or risk losing Japanese nationality after this age. This was upheld in a decision from the Tokyo District Court in January 2021.[163] In 2016, Japanese politician Renhō caused a minor scandal having held both Japan and Republic of China citizenship.[164] Foreign nationals who naturalize must renounce former nationality as precondition.

Europe

[edit]

EU and EFTA countries and microstates

[edit]

EU and EFTA countries have varying policies regarding dual citizenship. Under EU rules, a citizen of one EU or EFTA country can live and work indefinitely in the other EU and EFTA countries. However, countries can limit the right to vote and work in certain sensitive fields (such as government, police, military) to local citizens only.[165] Immigrants from another EU or EFTA country can be refused welfare benefits.[166] Welfare fraud may result in deportation. Economically inactive EU citizens who want to stay longer than three months in another Member State have to fulfill the condition of having health insurance and "sufficient resources" in order not to become an "unreasonable burden" for the social assistance system of the host Member State, which otherwise can legitimately expel them.[167] For consular protection in non-EU/non-EFTA countries, immigrants must contact the embassy of the country of their citizenship, not the one of their guest country (exception: In countries where there is no embassy of their home country, citizens of an EU country have the right to get consular protection from the embassy of any other EU country present in that country.)

Within the EU, mandatory military service exists, at least in peacetime, only in Austria, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, and Greece (In all countries but Cyprus, alternative service is available). Within the EFTA countries, only Switzerland requires it (alternative service is available); Iceland and Liechtenstein have no armed forces; in Norway, military service is de jure mandatory, but the enforcement is limited, so some sources claim it is de facto voluntary.[citation needed]

EU countries and microstates
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For details, see the nationality law of the country concerned and Citizenship of the European Union.[168]

  • In Austria, dual citizenship is possible with special permission or if it was obtained at birth. (See also Austrian nationality law)
  • Belgium allows dual citizenship. (See also Belgian nationality law)
  • In Bulgaria, Bulgarian citizens of descent can have dual citizenship, but foreigners wanting to naturalize must renounce their old citizenship. (See also Bulgarian nationality law)
  • Croatia generally allows citizens by descent to have dual citizenship and forbids it only in certain cases, but foreigners wanting to naturalize must renounce their old citizenship. (See also Croatian nationality law)
  • Cyprus allows dual citizenship. (See also Cypriot nationality law)
    Cyprus has been divided into a southern (Greek) and northern (Turkish) region since the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus on July 20, 1974. Northern Cyprus is not generally recognized by the international community as a sovereign state.[169] The United Nations considers the declaration of independence by Northern Cyprus as legally invalid.[170][171] The United Nations recognises Northern Cyprus as territory of the Republic of Cyprus under Turkish occupation.[170] Turkey permits Citizens of Northern Cyprus to live and work in Turkey under the same requirements as Turkish citizens and provides an alien's passport for Northern Cyprus citizens.[172]
  • The Czech Republic has allowed multiple citizenship since January 1, 2014.[173] (See also Czech nationality law)
  • Denmark has allowed dual citizenship since September 1, 2015. Note that not all Danish citizens are EU citizens.
The Faroe Islands belong to Denmark, but not the EU, so their inhabitants are Danish citizens, but not EU citizens. Greenland left the EC in 1985, but Greenlanders are considered EU citizens. In practice, citizens of Faroe Islands and Greenland can choose between local and "European" passports and can become "full" EU citizens by moving to and living permanently in Denmark. (See also Danish nationality law)
Nationals of Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) are free to enter, reside and work in the Faroe Islands and Greenland; citizens of other EU/EFTA countries can visit them visa-free for 90 days.
EU/EFTA citizens can enter and reside for an unlimited period without a visa in Overseas France. They may use their national identity card instead of their passport as a travel document to enter any French territory. They may also work freely in the parts of Overseas France that are part of the European Union (overseas departments and regions, and Saint Martin), but those who are not nationals of France need a permit to work in other parts such as French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and Wallis and Futuna.
  • Germany allows dual citizenship without restrictions as of June 27, 2024. Prior to that date, it was allowed in the following cases: with other EU countries and Switzerland; with other countries with special permission or if obtained at birth; children of non-EU/non-Swiss legal permanent residents could have dual citizenship if born and grown up in Germany (the parents born and grown up abroad must have resided in Germany for at least eight years and must have had the legal-permanent-resident status for at least three years). Children born to foreigners in Germany after June 27, 2024 will automatically be granted citizenship if at least one parent is a legal permanent resident who has been living in Germany for at least five years. (See also German nationality law)
  • Greece allows dual citizenship. (See also Greek nationality law)
  • Hungary allows dual citizenship; grants dual citizenship to people living in, and having ancestors in territories which were annexed from Hungary at the end of World War I, provided they can still speak Hungarian. (See also Hungarian nationality law)
  • Ireland allows and encourages dual citizenship, but a naturalized citizen can lose Irish citizenship again when naturalized in another country; Ireland was the last European country to abolish unconditional birthright citizenship [in 2004] in order to stop "birth tourism" and to replace it by a modified form: at least one parent must be a citizen or a legal permanent resident. (See also Irish nationality law) Since Brexit and as of 2023, Irish citizens are the only nationality in the world with the right to live and work in both the European Union and the United Kingdom.
  • Italy allows dual citizenship. (See also Italian nationality law)
  • In Latvia, since October 1, 2013 dual citizenship has been allowed for citizens of member countries of the EU, NATO and EFTA [Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Switzerland]; citizens of Australia, Brazil, and New Zealand; citizens of the counties that have mutual recognition of dual citizenship with Latvia; people who were granted the dual citizenship by the Cabinet of Ministers of Latvia; people who have applied for dual citizenship before the previous Latvian Citizenship law [1995]; ethnic Latvians or Livonians who registered Latvian citizenship can keep previous citizenships with any country. (See also Latvian nationality law)
  • Lithuania generally prohibits dual citizenship. (See Article 12 of the Lithuanian Constitution, which allows it only in narrow and individual cases. See also Lithuanian nationality law.)
  • Luxembourg allows dual citizenship. (See also Luxembourgian nationality law)
  • Malta allows dual citizenship. (See also Maltese nationality law)
  • In the Netherlands, dual citizenship is allowed under certain conditions: e.g., foreign citizenship may be kept if obtained at birth or in the event of naturalization via marriage. (See also Dutch nationality law)
Although all Dutch nationals have the right of abode in the European Netherlands, right of abode in the Dutch Caribbean is limited to those who have a connection to the region. Other Dutch can enter the region visa-free for a maximum of 6 months.[174][175] The identity card BES and the cedula of Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten are valid for entering Bonaire, Sint Eustatius or Saba, but the Dutch identity card is not.[176]
Citizens of other EU/EFTA countries can visit Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten and the Caribbean Netherlands visa-free for 90 days.
  • Poland does not deal with the issue of dual citizenship, but possession of another citizenship is tolerated since there are no penalties for its possession alone. However, penalties do exist for exercising foreign citizenship, such as identifying oneself to Polish authorities using a foreign identification document. Dual citizens are usually not exempted from their duties as Polish citizens such as entering/leaving Poland using a Polish passport or Polish ID card. Under some circumstances, ethnic Poles can apply for the "Polish Card" [Karta Polaka]. (see below) (See also Polish nationality law)
  • Portugal allows dual citizenship. (See also Portuguese nationality law)
  • Romania allows dual citizenship. (See also Romanian nationality law)
  • In Slovakia, dual citizenship is permitted to Slovak citizens who acquire a second citizenship by birth or through marriage; and to foreign nationals who apply for Slovak citizenship and meet the requirements of the Citizenship Act. Please note that after the 'Hungarian-Slovak citizenship conflict' (year 2010) some restrictions to dual citizenship may apply.[177] (See also Slovak nationality law)
  • Slovenia generally allows citizens by descent to have dual citizenship and forbids it only in certain cases, but foreigners wanting to naturalize must renounce their old citizenship. (See also Slovenian nationality law)
  • In Spain, Spanish citizens by descent can have dual citizenship; Spanish laws recognize a "dormant citizenship" for citizens naturalizing in Iberoamerican countries. They do not lose their citizenship, but their status and their rights as citizens of Spain—and of the EU—are inactive until they move back to Spain. Foreigners wanting to naturalize in Spain must usually renounce their old citizenship; exceptions are made for citizens of some Iberoamerican countries, Puerto Rico, Andorra, France, the Philippines, Equatorial Guinea, and Portugal. Since 2014, Spain has granted Spanish nationality to Sephardi Jews regardless of nationality.[178] (See also Spanish nationality law)
  • Sweden allows dual citizenship. (See also Swedish nationality law)
  • The four European microstates surrounded by EU countries (Andorra, Monaco, San Marino, and Vatican City) are not EU or EFTA members, and only Vatican City grants (time-limited) dual citizenship (see above). Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino forbid it. In 2015, however, only 21.6% of the inhabitants of Monaco were citizens. Note that Monégasque citizens, including members of the royal family, are not allowed to gamble at Monaco's casinos.
See also Andorran nationality law, Monégasque nationality law, and San Marino nationality law.
EFTA countries
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  • Iceland allows dual citizenship.
  • Liechtenstein allows citizens by descent to have dual citizenship, but foreigners wanting to naturalize must renounce their old citizenship.
  • Norway allows dual citizenship.[179]
  • Switzerland allows dual citizenship, but the conditions for the naturalization of foreigners vary from canton to canton. Male Swiss citizens under the age of 25, including male dual citizens, are required to perform military or civilian service (women can do it voluntarily), and Swiss citizens (men and women) are not allowed to work for a foreign (non-Swiss) military. Foreign military service is a felony for Swiss citizens (the Swiss Guards of Vatican City are regarded as a "house police", not an army). In the Canton of Schaffhausen, voting is compulsory. For more details, see Swiss nationality law and Schweizer Bürgerrecht (in German).
The Nordic Passport Union and the Common Travel Area
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The Nordic Passport Union allows citizens of Denmark (including the Faroe Islands), Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland to travel and reside in other Nordic countries without a passport or a residence permit.

Irish and British citizens enjoy freedom of movement in each other's country (Common Travel Area).

The rest of Europe

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  • Albania,[citation needed] Kosovo,[citation needed], North Macedonia, Moldova,[180] Russia[181] and Serbia[182] allow dual citizenship; in Russia, if a person resides within its territory, they must report their foreign citizenships to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
  • Bosnia and Herzegovina[citation needed] has a bilateral agreement on dual citizenship with Serbia, Croatia and Sweden. Montenegro[citation needed] has allowed dual citizenship with Serbia since 2022.
  • Belarus does not recognise dual nationality.
  • Ukrainian law permits multiple citizenship as of June 2025.[183][184] The law forbids dual citizenship with Russia or any country whose government denies Ukrainian territorial integrity.
  • The United Kingdom allows dual citizenship. Note that owing to the complexity of the British nationality law, there are different types of British nationality, so not every British national is also a British citizen.
Note that British citizens do not automatically have the right of abode in the British Overseas Territories, and the visa requirements for British citizens and British nationals vary. See also
Visa policy of the United Kingdom, Visa requirements for British citizens, Visa requirements for British Overseas citizens,
Visa policies of British Overseas Territories, Visa requirements for British Overseas Territories citizens, and
Visa requirements for British Nationals (Overseas)
British citizens have the right to live and work in Ireland.

Note

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  1. ^ According to Article 4 of Laws and Regulations Regarding Hong Kong & Macao Affairs, defines Hong Kong residents are persons who qualify for permanent residency in Hong Kong and do not hold a travel document other than HKSAR passport or BN(O) passport; Macau residents are persons who qualify for permanent residency in Macau and do not hold a travel document other than MSAR passport or those who hold a Portuguese passport prior to the end of Portuguese rule.

See also

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References

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Multiple citizenship, also known as dual or multiple , refers to the legal status in which an individual is recognized as a citizen by two or more simultaneously, entailing and obligations toward each. Countries establish their own laws governing whether multiple citizenship is permitted, with policies ranging from full allowance to outright prohibition or conditional acceptance upon of prior nationalities. The , for instance, recognizes multiple citizenship but asserts primary allegiance from its nationals and does not formally encourage the practice. This status arises commonly through birthright citizenship ( or ), marriage, , or investment programs, and has become more prevalent amid global migration and interconnected economies. While conferring advantages such as enhanced travel mobility via multiple passports, access to diverse job markets, and inheritance rights across borders, multiple citizenship imposes dual fiscal responsibilities, including potential taxation on worldwide income by countries like the regardless of residence. Significant challenges include conflicting obligations, where dual nationals may face demands from multiple states, and diplomatic vulnerabilities, as one country's protection might not extend fully in another's . Historically viewed with suspicion for risking divided loyalties—likened to "self-evident absurdity" in early 20th-century discourse—multiple persists amid debates over and , particularly in contexts of or wartime . Despite these tensions, acceptance has grown, with many nations now permitting it to retain ties with emigrants and attract skilled migrants.

Conceptual Foundations

Definition and Core Concepts

Multiple citizenship, interchangeably termed dual citizenship, plural citizenship, or dual nationality, refers to the legal status in which an individual is simultaneously recognized as a citizen by two or more sovereign states. This condition stems from the autonomous nationality laws of each involved country, which independently determine citizenship eligibility through mechanisms such as birthright (jus soli or jus sanguinis), descent, naturalization, or marriage, without mandating the forfeiture of existing citizenships. As of 2022, approximately 75% of countries worldwide permit some form of multiple citizenship, though policies vary, with full reciprocity between states being rare. At its core, multiple citizenship entails a dual set of rights and obligations, potentially amplifying personal opportunities while introducing compliance complexities. Rights may include access to multiple passports for travel, eligibility for social services, property ownership, and political participation like voting in each nation's elections, subject to residency requirements. Obligations, however, extend to fulfilling legal duties in all jurisdictions, such as income tax reporting on worldwide earnings in high-tax countries like the United States, irrespective of residence, or mandatory military service where applicable, as seen in nations like Israel or South Korea for dual nationals. Dual nationals must often use the passport of the destination country for entry and exit to avoid diplomatic issues, underscoring the practical interplay of state sovereignty over nationals abroad. A fundamental tension in multiple citizenship arises from the principle of exclusive allegiance historically embedded in , such as the 1930 Hague Convention's preference for singular to prevent or conflicting loyalties. While modern practice accommodates multiplicity for pragmatic reasons like global mobility and family ties, it can lead to conflicts during wartime, disputes, or clearances, where one state's claims may supersede another's. The recognizes multiple citizenship , derived from the 14th Amendment's clause and statutes, but does not actively promote it and requires naturalizing immigrants to swear an renouncing prior allegiances, though enforcement of renunciation remains unenforced in practice. The legal status of multiple citizenship rests on the principle of state sovereignty in defining nationality, whereby each sovereign state holds exclusive competence to establish criteria for acquiring, retaining, or losing its nationality, without international law imposing a general duty to prohibit or permit multiplicity. This sovereignty, rooted in customary international law, allows states to enact domestic laws tolerating dual or multiple nationalities—such as through jus soli (birth on territory) or jus sanguinis (descent)—while others impose restrictions, like mandatory renunciation upon naturalization, to avoid divided loyalties. Conflicts arise when an individual's multiple nationalities lead to competing claims of allegiance, prompting international principles to prioritize factual ties over formal status. To address such conflicts, the doctrine of effective nationality or dominant nationality serves as a customary rule, requiring assessment of an individual's genuine connection to a state—evaluated by factors including , center of interests, family ties, participation in public life, and history—rather than mere legal attribution. This principle, articulated by the in the 1955 Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), holds that must reflect a "genuine link" for purposes like , barring a state from espousing a claim against another state of which the individual is also a national unless their dominant ties lie with the claimant state. In practice, this resolves issues in , obligations, and taxation, where the state of effective exercises precedence; for instance, arbitral tribunals under investment treaties apply it to determine eligibility, disqualifying dual nationals whose dominant links are to the respondent state. Early 20th-century efforts sought to curtail multiple citizenship to prevent and allegiance conflicts, as embodied in the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Laws, which urged states to avoid dual acquisition at birth (e.g., via parental option to elect one ) and required adults with multiple nationalities to choose one upon reaching , with third states recognizing only the retained in international dealings. Ratified by only 20 states and lacking provisions for enforcement, the Convention failed to establish a binding norm against multiplicity, influencing few modern policies and yielding to sovereign discretion. Subsequent frameworks reflect greater tolerance for multiple citizenship, balancing with obligations to prevent arbitrary under the 1954 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of , which indirectly accommodate dual by prohibiting deprivation that creates absent voluntary . Regionally, the 1997 European Convention on marks a shift by defining multiple and permitting it without mandatory in cases like or , while allowing states to limit it domestically (e.g., for public office holders) and regulating obligations to the state of dominant residence. As of 2023, 21 states have ratified it, promoting consistency in where over 80% of countries now allow dual citizenship for adults. These principles underscore that while multiple citizenship imposes no inherent international prohibition, states must navigate resultant obligations through effective assessments to uphold causal in cross-border relations.

Historical Evolution

Ancient and Pre-Modern Practices

In ancient Greek city-states, such as Athens and Sparta, citizenship was an exclusive status confined to a single polis, acquired primarily through paternal descent from existing citizens and requiring active participation in civic life. Free adult males meeting these criteria enjoyed rights like assembly participation and legal protections, while women, slaves, and metics—resident foreigners from other poleis—were excluded; metics paid special taxes and could not own property or vote, underscoring the singular allegiance demanded. No formal mechanism existed for multiple citizenships, as shifting loyalty to another polis typically required renunciation of the original, a rare occurrence granted only by exceptional decree. The Roman Republic introduced greater flexibility, particularly after the Social War (91–88 BCE), when citizenship (civitas Romana) was extended to Italian allies via the lex Julia, allowing them to retain local municipal citizenships alongside Roman status. This dual arrangement preserved provincial civic institutions and rights, such as local magistracies, while subordinating them to Roman authority; for instance, the Apostle Paul held both Roman citizenship and that of Tarsus, a Hellenistic city, enabling him to invoke protections from both. By the 1st century BCE, this practice was institutionalized, distinguishing Rome from Greek exclusivity and facilitating imperial integration, though full equality remained limited until the Edict of Caracalla in 212 CE extended citizenship empire-wide without necessarily abolishing local statuses. In the Graeco-Roman East, elites often navigated multiple civic identities, with poleis granting honorary citizenships compatible with Roman, though primary fiscal and military obligations favored the imperial center. In medieval , citizenship shifted toward urban communes and guilds, emphasizing oaths of fidelity to specific cities rather than expansive states; residents could acquire multiple urban citizenships through prolonged residence, economic contributions, or purchase, as seen in like or , where merchants held statuses in trade networks spanning regions. However, these were pragmatic, non-exclusive affiliations tied to privileges like and legal recourse, not undivided national loyalty, amid fragmented feudal structures where overlords and ecclesiastical ties created layered . Pre-modern practices thus tolerated overlapping civic ties in multi-jurisdictional empires like the , but formal multiple —as a state-level status—remained undeveloped until the rise of sovereign nation-states in the , when singular became a diplomatic norm.

19th and 20th Century Shifts

In the nineteenth century, the consolidation of sovereign nation-states prompted a doctrinal shift from perpetual —under which was lifelong and irrevocable—to elective , allowing individuals to renounce original upon acquiring a foreign one. This transition, evident in Britain's Naturalisation Act of 1870, which permitted expatriation but automatically revoked British for those naturalizing abroad, reflected concerns over divided loyalties amid rising interstate rivalries and emigration waves. Similarly, the affirmed expatriation rights through the Expatriation Act of 1868, following diplomatic disputes like the 1863 "" involving dual nationals, yet dual persisted inadvertently through combinations of (birthright by soil) and (descent-based) rules. Governments viewed multiple nationalities as a threat to exclusive , particularly for , leading to policies that penalized dual status, such as automatic upon foreign enlistment or voting. These measures aligned with an international consensus against dual nationality to avert diplomatic conflicts, as states feared "hyphenated" citizens might claim protections from multiple governments while owing obligations to adversaries. By the late nineteenth century, over 20 bilateral treaties, including the 1868 U.S.- agreement, sought to clarify expatriation and reduce dual status by recognizing abroad as terminating prior . However, enforcement varied; and tolerated limited dual for minors but required choice upon majority, while empires like grappled with ethnic minorities holding overlapping claims. The era's mass migrations—numbering 36 million Europeans to the between 1870 and 1914—intensified these tensions, as returnees or children born abroad invoked conflicting claims, prompting statutes like Germany's 1871 Nationality Law, which mandated loss of upon foreign unless explicitly retained. Entering the twentieth century, world wars amplified aversion to dual nationality, with over 100,000 U.S. dual citizens facing dilemmas in 1917–1918, leading to the 1907 U.S. Expatriation Act provisions stripping citizenship from women marrying foreigners. The 1930 Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, ratified by 20 states, urged minimizing dual nationality through rules favoring the nationality of habitual residence and requiring choice at , but its limited adoption—due to assertions—failed to curb the practice. Post-1945 and labor migrations shifted priorities; Britain’s 1948 British Nationality Act permitted dual citizenship for citizens without mandatory , accommodating 800 million subjects transitioning to . By the , economic imperatives and family unification policies eroded prohibitions: the U.S. ’s 1967 decision (5–4) barred involuntary loss of citizenship except for fraud, protecting dual status as a , while countries like (1978 reform) and (1986) began allowing retention for emigrants' descendants. This gradual liberalization, driven by and remittances exceeding $700 billion annually by 2000, marked a pragmatic of multiple ties, though concerns persisted in restricting dual nationals from sensitive offices.

Post-2000 Developments and Policy Reversals

Following the trends of the late , the period after 2000 saw further expansions of multiple citizenship policies in numerous countries, driven by aims to enhance immigrant integration, attract skilled migrants, and strengthen economic links with diasporas through remittances and . Empirical data indicate that such reforms correlated with increased rates; for instance, Germany's 2000 citizenship law reform, which permitted dual for children born in the country to long-term foreign residents, resulted in a sustained uptick in citizenship acquisitions without that restricting dual deterred applications. Similarly, Latin American nations like and , building on 1990s reforms, codified dual rights post-2000 to re-engage emigrants, enabling voting and property rights abroad while retaining origin-country ties. Australia enacted a pivotal change on April 4, 2002, by repealing Section 17 of the Australian Citizenship Act 1948, which had previously caused automatic loss of Australian citizenship upon voluntary acquisition of another nationality. This reversal of prior exclusivity aligned with pressures, allowing over 4 million Australians holding foreign passports to retain full rights without renunciation. The followed with Republic Act No. 9225 on August 29, 2003, the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act, permitting natural-born Filipinos who had naturalized abroad to reacquire Philippine citizenship without forfeiting their foreign one, thereby formalizing dual status for an estimated 10 million overseas workers and their descendants to facilitate return migration and economic contributions. Germany's trajectory exemplifies iterative policy evolution, with the 2000 reform's conditional dual allowance for births giving way to the June 27, 2024, Act on the Modernization of Citizenship Law, which eliminated requirements for naturalized adults and shortened residency periods, reflecting empirical recognition that prior restrictions hindered integration amid labor shortages. In contrast, reversals or tightenings were less common but occurred in contexts of security and integration concerns; the , after briefly easing in the , reinforced post-2000 its default rule mandating of prior upon naturalization, except for EU/EEA/Swiss nationals or refugees, to prioritize singular allegiance, though exceptions have proliferated amid practical enforcement challenges. Post-9/11 securitization prompted debates on in several states, yet few outright bans emerged where allowances existed; instead, functional restrictions proliferated, such as barring dual citizens from certain public offices in countries like and . Italy's April 2025 decree limited claims to descendants of emigrants after February 27, 1948, curtailing automatic multiple acquisitions via distant ancestry to curb administrative overload from over 60,000 annual applications, though existing dual statuses remain unaffected. These adjustments underscore causal tensions between openness for economic gain and safeguards against divided allegiances, with data showing permissive policies boosting fiscal inflows but occasionally straining welfare systems in high-immigration contexts.

Mechanisms of Acquisition and Retention

Automatic Acquisition via Birth or Descent

Multiple citizenship is automatically acquired through , the principle conferring based on descent from citizen , when parents hold citizenships from different countries that both transmit rights at birth. This occurs irrespective of the child's birthplace, as long as each parent's country recognizes the descent claim without immediate renunciation requirements. For instance, a child born to one Italian parent acquires Italian citizenship by birth under Law No. 91 of 1992, which explicitly permits holding multiple citizenships simultaneously. Similarly, under , citizenship passes to children of at least one French parent born abroad, often resulting in dual status alongside the other parent's if compatible. In , since the Nationality Act of 2000, children born to foreign parents may acquire German citizenship by descent if a parent has legally resided for eight years, but pure applies for German citizen parents, enabling multiple nationalities from birth without prohibition for minors. Furthermore, several countries allow adults to register citizenship by descent, effectively recognizing nationality transmitted through ancestral lineage via application processes that confirm pre-existing rights. Italy recognizes jus sanguinis claims without generational limits for those proving unbroken descent from an Italian ancestor. Ireland permits registration via the Foreign Births Register for descendants of Irish-born grandparents. Poland enables confirmation for descendants of Polish citizens, and Portugal offers acquisition for those with qualifying Portuguese ancestry, including through Sephardic Jewish descent. These pathways support multiple citizenship acquisition without residency requirements, provided documentation of lineage is furnished. The principle, granting by birthplace, leads to automatic multiple citizenship in countries with unconditional application when combined with parental descent rights. In the United States, the Fourteenth Amendment, ratified on July 9, 1868, provides that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens," applying to children of non-citizen parents (except diplomats), who retain any foreign citizenship acquired by descent. U.S. law, per the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1401), accommodates dual nationality at birth without requiring relinquishment. follows suit, with Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act granting citizenship to those born in , while permitting multiple citizenships explicitly since amendments in 1977. This overlap frequently produces dual or triple citizenship; for example, a child born in to U.S. and Italian parents receives Canadian citizenship by soil, U.S. by descent (if a parent meets transmission criteria), and Italian by descent. In , unrestricted jus soli predominates, with countries like (Constitution of 1988, Article 12), (Constitution of 1853, Article 75), and granting automatic citizenship at birth on territory, often alongside parental nationalities since most allow dual status. Approximately 33 countries worldwide apply unconditional as of 2025, primarily in the , facilitating multiple citizenship when parents transmit foreign rights. These mechanisms reflect historical shifts toward inclusive nationality laws, though some nations impose later choices upon majority if dual is disallowed, the initial acquisition remains automatic.

Acquired Through Naturalization, Marriage, or Investment

![Naturalization residence requirements by country][float-right] ![](./_assets_/Naturalization_Residence_Requirements_by_Country_$Years_of_Residence$) typically requires a period of lawful residency, , and oaths of , with outcomes for multiple citizenship varying by the naturalizing and origin countries' laws. Beyond standard requirements, many countries offer rare discretionary naturalization paths for individuals with exceptional achievements in science, arts, athletics, or significant economic or cultural contributions; these grants, often termed citizenship by merit or exception, demand evidence of global-level accomplishments and are unsuitable for ordinary applicants, with approval probabilities near zero absent such distinctions. In the United States, does not mandate of prior nationalities, permitting dual or multiple citizenship provided the origin country recognizes it. Similarly, and allow multiple citizenship upon naturalization without requiring renunciation. In contrast, countries like , , and prohibit multiple citizenship, compelling applicants to renounce prior nationalities during naturalization. reformed its policy effective June 27, 2024, to permit dual citizenship for naturalized immigrants in most cases, reversing prior restrictions that often required renunciation except for or Swiss citizens. Citizenship through often accelerates timelines for spouses of citizens, facilitating multiple citizenship where permitted. In the United States, spouses of U.S. citizens can apply for after three years of (versus five for others), retaining origin citizenship if allowed by both nations. grants citizenship to foreign spouses after one year of marriage and residency, explicitly allowing dual nationality. offers after one year of legal residency for spouses, with dual citizenship permitted for certain Latin American origin countries but requiring renunciation otherwise. provides expedited citizenship to spouses under the , compatible with dual status. However, acquisition is not automatic and demands proof of genuine marriage to avoid scrutiny. Citizenship by investment (CBI) programs enable multiple citizenship through financial contributions, real estate, or bonds, with most explicitly permitting retention of prior nationalities. Caribbean nations dominate this field: Antigua and Barbuda requires a minimum $230,000 non-refundable contribution or $400,000 real estate investment, processing applications in 3-4 months. St. Kitts and Nevis, operational since 1984, mandates $250,000 contributions for a single applicant, offering visa-free access to over 150 countries. Grenada accepts $235,000 donations, uniquely providing E-2 visa eligibility for U.S. investment. Beyond the Caribbean, Turkey's program demands $400,000 real estate for citizenship in 3-6 months, allowing dual. Vanuatu offers passports via $130,000 donations, processed in 1-2 months. Nauru launched its CBI in 2024 with no residency requirement and full dual citizenship support. These programs face criticism for potential security risks but adhere to due diligence standards set by organizations like the Investment Migration Council.
ProgramMinimum InvestmentProcessing TimeDual Citizenship Allowed
$230,000 contribution3-4 monthsYes
St. Kitts and $250,000 contribution3-6 monthsYes
$235,000 contribution4-6 monthsYes
$400,000 real estate3-6 monthsYes
$130,000 donation1-2 monthsYes
Restrictions persist in CBI contexts; for instance, EU programs like Malta's have tightened amid concerns over rule-of-law compliance, though it still permits dual under specific investment thresholds exceeding €600,000 plus residency. Applicants must navigate origin-country rules, as nations prohibiting multiple citizenship may impose penalties for undisclosed acquisitions.

Restrictions, Renunciation, and Forced Loss

Several countries maintain strict restrictions on multiple citizenship to prioritize national loyalty and security, often requiring applicants for to renounce prior nationalities or imposing automatic forfeiture upon acquisition of a foreign one. China's of 1980, as amended, explicitly bars dual nationality in Article 3, mandating that any Chinese national who voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship loses Chinese nationality automatically under Article 9, with no recognition of retained ties. similarly prohibits dual citizenship for adults under the Citizenship Act of 1955, as amended, offering status as a lifelong visa-like alternative but requiring formal of Indian citizenship to naturalize elsewhere, with penalties for concealment including fines up to 10,000 rupees or imprisonment. In , the requires of foreign citizenship upon reaching adulthood for dual nationals or mandates loss upon voluntary foreign , enforced through notifications to authorities. European nations exhibit varied restrictions, often tied to naturalization processes. Austria's Nationality Act generally demands renunciation of prior citizenships for naturalization, with limited exceptions for those born with dual status or via descent from Austrian emigrants, as confirmed in 2024 policy updates. The Netherlands requires renunciation unless the applicant holds citizenship from certain countries like former colonies or via special ministerial discretion, reflecting concerns over integration and allegiance. These policies stem from historical fears of divided loyalties, particularly in security-sensitive roles, though empirical data on loyalty risks from multiple citizenship remains sparse and contested, with no large-scale studies linking it causally to higher treason rates compared to single nationals. Voluntary , frequently pursued to comply with restrictive policies or alleviate dual obligations like taxation, follows formalized procedures varying by jurisdiction. , under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(6), individuals must appear personally before a U.S. consular or diplomatic officer abroad, swear an of with intent to relinquish, and pay a $2,350 fee as of 2024, after which a Certificate of Loss of is issued, though tax liabilities under the Reed Amendment may apply for those deemed tax evaders. South Africa's Citizenship Act allows only after acquiring another citizenship, requiring submission of Form BI-1664 to the Department of Home Affairs along with proof of alternative and a R350 fee, effective upon ministerial approval to prevent . , countries like permit via declaration to authorities if the individual holds or will acquire another , but restricts it to those residing abroad, ensuring no resulting per the 1961 UN Convention. These processes underscore causal incentives: often enables access to otherwise barred opportunities, such as in restrictive states, but irreversible effects like loss of rights or consular protection highlight the gravity of the decision. Forced or involuntary loss of citizenship arises primarily through automatic mechanisms triggered by prohibited acts or judicial denaturalization for procurement irregularities, particularly relevant in multiple citizenship contexts where foreign naturalization violates exclusivity rules. Under U.S. law, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(2) provides for loss via voluntary naturalization in a foreign state through an oath of allegiance, but only if accompanied by intent to relinquish U.S. citizenship, as clarified in Afroyim v. Rusk (1967) and subsequent cases; mere acquisition of dual status without expatriating intent does not trigger forfeiture. Denaturalization for fraud, per 8 U.S.C. § 1451, targets concealment of material facts like criminal convictions during naturalization, with the Department of Justice revoking citizenship in 94 cases from 2009-2018, escalating to priorities for terrorism-linked fraud post-2025. In nations prohibiting multiples, such as China, foreign naturalization directly causes automatic loss without judicial process, enforced administratively to uphold unitary allegiance. Other grounds include disloyalty acts, like serving in a foreign military against the state's interests, leading to revocation in countries like the UK under the British Nationality Act 1981 for national security threats, as in 2020-2024 cases involving ISIS affiliates where 20+ citizenships were stripped. These measures reflect realist assessments of risk, prioritizing empirical threats from divided allegiances over abstract rights claims, though international law via the 1961 Convention limits application to avoid statelessness.

Dominant and Effective Nationality Doctrines

The doctrines of dominant and effective serve as mechanisms in to ascertain the prevailing among multiple citizenships held by an individual, particularly in contexts such as and . These principles prioritize factual connections over mere formal acquisition, ensuring that reflects a genuine link between the individual and the state for purposes of international claims. They emerged as responses to the increasing prevalence of dual or multiple nationalities, aiming to prevent in interstate disputes. The principle of effective nationality was articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nottebohm case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala, judgment of April 6, 1955), where the Court ruled that naturalization conferring nationality must demonstrate a real and effective connection, such as habitual residence, center of interests, or family ties, rather than serving solely as a pretext for diplomatic protection. In that case, Friedrich Nottebohm, a German national residing primarily in Guatemala, acquired Liechtenstein citizenship in 1939 without substantial ties to Liechtenstein; the ICJ held that Guatemala was not obligated to recognize this nationality for protection claims against it, as it lacked genuine effectiveness compared to his Guatemalan residence and business interests. This established effective nationality as a requirement for third states to respect a claimant state's assertion of diplomatic protection, emphasizing factual bonds over nominal status. The doctrine of dominant nationality complements effective nationality specifically for individuals with dual or multiple citizenships involving the respondent state, determining which nationality predominates based on the strength of ties to each state. Factors considered include the individual's predominant residence, participation in public life, , taxation, and intent as evidenced by declarations or conduct; for instance, longer-term residence and economic interests in one state may render that nationality dominant. This approach, rooted in and reflected in the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws (Article 5), allows the state of dominant nationality to exercise against third states but bars claims against the state of the individual's other nationality, as affirmed in arbitral practice such as the Merge claim ( v. , 1955). Tribunals apply it discretionarily, weighing evidence holistically rather than mechanically. In modern applications, such as investor-state under treaties like the ICSID Convention or bilateral treaties, tribunals invoke dominant and effective to assess standing for dual nationals, often rejecting claims where the investor's dominant ties lie with the respondent state, as in Champion Trading Co. v. (2006), where U.S.-Egyptian dual nationals were denied protection due to predominant Egyptian connections. These doctrines underscore a causal realism in attribution: formal multiple citizenships do not equate to equal international , with empirical ties dictating enforceability to avoid opportunistic assertions. However, their scope remains debated, as some treaties explicitly exclude dual nationals or limit the doctrines' application, reflecting varying state practices amid rising multiple citizenships.

Supranational and Regional Arrangements

The (EU) represents a primary supranational framework addressing aspects of multiple citizenship through its layered citizenship model. Established by the on European Union, effective November 1, 1993, EU citizenship is automatically conferred upon individuals holding the nationality of any EU member state, granting supranational rights such as freedom of movement, residence, and participation in elections irrespective of national restrictions on dual nationality. This arrangement does not harmonize member states' policies on multiple nationality, which remain a national competence under Article 9 of the ; thus, while EU citizenship supplements national ones without requiring renunciation, countries like and the generally prohibit dual nationality for naturalized citizens, whereas others like and permit it broadly. The has upheld that EU law prevails in cases where national rules conflict with EU rights, as in the 2007 Micheletti case affirming Spain's recognition of dual EU/non-EU nationality. The , a distinct from the , has shaped multiple nationality through conventions emphasizing reduction or tolerance based on evolving state practices. The 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple and Obligations in Cases of Multiple , ratified by 20 states including (1964) and (1999), mandates of prior upon and prohibits automatic acquisition of multiple by children of binational parents unless retained until age 18 or 23. However, its limited ratifications and a 1993 protocol allowing voluntary multiple reflect declining adherence, as many signatories have since liberalized policies amid migration pressures. In contrast, the 1997 European Convention on , ratified by 22 members as of 2023, permits states to allow multiple without restriction, prohibits arbitrary deprivation leading to multiple , and prioritizes avoidance of , influencing reforms in countries like the (1981 British Act amendments). These instruments underscore a causal shift from post-World War II concerns over loyalty and to pragmatic acceptance of multiple allegiances in diverse societies. Beyond Europe, regional arrangements in other continents facilitate multiple citizenship indirectly through mobility and naturalization pathways rather than supranational citizenship. The Southern Common Market (), via its 2002 Agreement on Residence for Nationals of Mercosur States, enables citizens of member states (, , , ) and associates (e.g., ) to obtain temporary residence for up to two years, renewable and convertible to permanent status, often leading to naturalized citizenship without mandatory renunciation in permissive members like . This has processed over 100,000 applications annually by 2015, enhancing regional integration without overriding national dual nationality laws, which vary (e.g., allows it since 1994). In Africa, the (AU) lacks a unified citizenship but advanced compatibility via the 2014 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Older Persons and related nationality protocols; however, the 2006 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ratified by 35 states as of 2023) implicitly supports dual nationality by prohibiting based on it, contributing to policy shifts in 28 AU members permitting it by acquisition or descent as of 2020. These frameworks prioritize and engagement over strict singularity, though enforcement varies due to national sovereignty.

Conflicts in International Law and Treaties

International law encounters persistent conflicts with multiple nationality due to the absence of uniform rules on acquisition and the sovereign right of states to determine their nationals, often resulting in overlapping claims of and . prohibits a state from exercising on behalf of one of its nationals against another state of which that person is also a national, as the individual cannot invoke protection from one while bound by allegiance to the respondent state. This principle stems from the Vattel-inspired doctrine that states protect their own subjects abroad but refrain from interfering in internal matters of another to which the person owes duties. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws attempted to address these tensions by establishing rules for dual nationals, such as requiring third states to recognize exclusively the nationality of the state of in cases of multiple (Article 5), and affirming that states could treat dual nationals as their own domestically (Article 3). However, the convention received only limited ratifications—fewer than 20 states—and failed to curb the incidence of multiple or resolve inter-state disputes effectively, as it prioritized avoidance over elimination and lacked enforcement mechanisms. The of Justice's 1955 ( v. ) further highlighted conflicts by requiring a "genuine link" or effective for claims, denying 's protection of naturalized Nottebohm against due to his predominant ties to the latter, even absent formal dual status at the time. Military obligations represent another domain of treaty-based conflict mitigation, where dual nationals may face simultaneous conscription demands from multiple states. The 1963 Council of Europe Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality sought to prevent such dual burdens by mandating loss of prior nationality upon voluntary acquisition of another (Article 1) and coordinating service to one state only, often based on residence or age at acquisition. Yet, with limited adherence and subsequent policy shifts—such as the 1997 European Convention on Nationality, which permits states to allow multiple nationality without reduction requirements (Article 14)—these treaties have not universally resolved competing claims, leaving dual nationals vulnerable to enforcement by either state. In bilateral investment treaties, conflicts arise when dual nationals attempt investor-state arbitration against a state of either , with tribunals often denying under the "denial of benefits" or customary non-protection rules, though decisions remain inconsistent and debated. Overall, while conventions like the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of indirectly influence practices by prioritizing avoidance of apatridy over multiple status, no comprehensive global harmonizes obligations, perpetuating state as the primary source of unresolved tensions.

Regional Variations in Policy

Europe and Supranational Entities

The acquisition and possession of multiple citizenships in are primarily regulated at the national level, with the (EU) deferring to member states' sovereignty over nationality laws under Article 9 of the . EU citizenship, which confers rights such as free movement and residence across member states, is automatically derived from holding the nationality of any EU member state and operates cumulatively alongside any additional nationalities permitted by the relevant state. This framework accommodates dual or multiple citizenships without EU-level restrictions, though rare instances of dual EU-nationality (citizenship of two member states) trigger application of the "effective nationality" principle in under the 1930 Convention, prioritizing the state of . The , a supranational body encompassing nearly all European states, influences policies through the European Convention on (ECN) of 1997, ratified by 21 members as of 2020. Unlike the earlier 1963 Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple , which sought to minimize dual via requirements, the ECN explicitly permits multiple in cases such as children acquiring from each parent of different nationalities, , and state succession, while prohibiting arbitrary deprivation based solely on acquiring another . The ECN also addresses military obligations for multiple nationals, requiring states to avoid double through agreements, reflecting a shift from viewing multiple as a loyalty conflict to recognizing it as compatible with integration, albeit with persistent concerns over divided allegiances and electoral influences in host states. European policies on multiple citizenship have liberalized since the , driven by migration needs, , and , with 49% of global states now permitting it under varying conditions as of 2025; in , this trend manifests in eased restrictions to prevent and enhance immigrant retention. , for example, enacted reforms on June 27, 2024, eliminating the prior requirement for most applicants to renounce their original citizenship, shortening residence periods to five years (or three for well-integrated individuals), and extending tolerances for children born abroad to German parents. Similar unrestricted permissions exist in , , , , , and , where naturalized adults and children via descent or marriage retain prior nationalities without compulsion to choose.
CountryDual Citizenship Policy for Naturalization (as of 2025)
CzechiaPermitted since 2014, no required.
Restrictions lifted; now generally allowed.
Unrestricted for adults and children.
Unrestricted since June 2024 reforms.
Unrestricted, including via descent without generational limits.
Restricted; generally required except for EU/EEA/Swiss citizens or refugees.
Eased restrictions; permitted for integration purposes.
Despite liberalization, restrictions persist in several states to prioritize singular allegiance, particularly amid security concerns; mandates renunciation for absent exceptional contributions or reciprocity agreements, while and limit it for non-Baltic origins to safeguard post-Soviet ethnic majorities. announced in 2024 intentions to revoke dual citizenship for threats, such as involvement in foreign military actions against allies, underscoring causal tensions between mobility benefits and potential or divided loyalties in geopolitically sensitive contexts. These variations reflect empirical trade-offs: permissive policies correlate with higher rates and remittances but raise fiscal strains from welfare access without proportional contributions, as evidenced in integration studies.

The Americas

Policies on multiple citizenship in the Americas generally permit dual or multiple nationalities, with variations reflecting historical emigration patterns and efforts to sustain ties with overseas communities. North American countries tolerate or explicitly endorse it, while many Latin American nations reformed restrictive laws in the late 20th century to avoid losing nationals to naturalization abroad, particularly in the United States. In the United States, dual nationality is permitted under , arising automatically from differing statutes without formal recognition by the . U.S. citizens acquiring foreign citizenship do not forfeit U.S. , but dual nationals must enter and exit the country using a U.S. and bear allegiance to U.S. laws. fully authorizes multiple citizenships, allowing individuals to retain Canadian upon acquiring others, with no statutory loss for voluntary foreign naturalization since amendments to the Citizenship Act. Dual Canadian citizens must comply with both nations' obligations, including potential foreign exemptions under Canadian policy. Mexico's 1998 constitutional reform under Article 30 enabled dual for those by birth, reversing prior expatriation rules; Mexicans naturalizing abroad now retain rights like property ownership and consular protection without renouncing Mexican status, though naturalized Mexicans face restrictions on additional nationalities. South American countries predominantly allow multiple citizenships, often without requiring renunciation. Argentina recognizes dual nationality but treats dual citizens as exclusively Argentine within its territory, mandating use of Argentine documents for entry and exit. permits it for native-born citizens, facilitating descent-based claims, while naturalized citizens may acquire others after residency. authorizes dual citizenship, including via investment pathways requiring Spanish proficiency and interviews after two years. Similar permissive stances prevail in , , and , driven by diaspora remittances exceeding billions annually, though some impose oaths of loyalty or residency minima for naturalization. Central American and Caribbean nations vary: and allow dual citizenship post-reforms, but others like restrict it for naturalized citizens. Regional treaties, such as agreements, indirectly support mobility without harmonizing citizenship rules, leading to case-by-case diplomatic resolutions for conflicts. Overall, these policies balance with economic incentives, though they raise unaddressed security concerns over divided allegiances in consular and military s.

Asia, Oceania, and the Pacific

In , policies on multiple citizenship remain predominantly restrictive, reflecting concerns, cultural emphasis on singular loyalty, and efforts to prevent or divided allegiances, particularly in populous or strategically sensitive states. prohibits dual nationality under its 1980 , automatically terminating Chinese citizenship upon acquisition of foreign nationality, a policy enforced rigorously to maintain control over and deter espionage risks. Similarly, requires individuals with dual nationality to choose one by age 22 under the 1950 , with adults facing demands to retain Japanese status, driven by historical fears of foreign influence post-World War II. does not permit dual citizenship per its 1955 , offering (OCI) status instead as a lifelong visa-like alternative for without full like voting, motivated by concerns over remittances dilution and . enforces a strict ban for adults, requiring of other nationalities upon , as outlined in its 1957 , to preserve social cohesion in a multi-ethnic vulnerable to external loyalties. and also prohibit multiple nationalities, with mandating choice upon reaching majority to safeguard . Exceptions exist in select Asian nations, often conditional or limited to descent or investment. The Philippines allows reacquisition of Filipino citizenship alongside foreign ones via Republic Act 9225 (2003), enabling former citizens to regain rights without renouncing the second nationality, aimed at harnessing skills and remittances exceeding $30 billion annually. permits dual nationality conditionally under the 1997 Nationality Act for those born with it or via special merit, such as ethnic Koreans abroad, but requires for naturalized citizens to address military service evasion. , , , , , and authorize multiple citizenships through , , or descent, with Vietnam's 2008 amendments allowing it explicitly to attract overseas Vietnamese investment, though practical enforcement varies by consulate scrutiny. In Oceania, and embrace multiple citizenships, facilitating mobility and global ties. has permitted dual nationality since the Australian Citizenship Amendment Act 2002, reversing prior requirements, with over 5 million dual citizens as of 2023, benefiting from enhanced diplomatic protections and economic migration. similarly allows it under the Citizenship Act 1977, requiring disclosure but imposing no , supporting its 1.2 million expatriates and reciprocal rights with via the since 1973. Pacific island nations exhibit variability, with many permitting dual citizenship to counter and risks amid vulnerabilities. , , and explicitly allow it, Vanuatu via its 1980 Constitution to promote investment programs granting citizenship for $130,000 donations since 2015. The prohibits it constitutionally, rejecting amendments in 2021 referendums due to fears, leaving without automatic return rights. restricts it for naturalized citizens but tolerates birth-based dualities under rules, while and others debate expansions to retain talent, as 20-30% of Pacific populations reside abroad per 2020 estimates. These policies balance demographic retention against security, with allowing states leveraging citizenship-by-investment to fund development.

Africa and the Middle East

In , policies on multiple citizenship have evolved significantly since the post-colonial era, when many states prohibited it to foster singular national loyalties and prevent expatriate influence. By 2023, 28 of 's 54 recognized states (excluding ) fully permitted dual citizenship for both birthright and naturalized citizens, while 23 imposed partial restrictions, such as requirements for prior government approval or limitations on holding public office. This liberalization, driven by economic incentives to repatriate skills and capital, contrasts with earlier rejections in countries like , the of Congo, , and , where dual nationality remains barred for nationals abroad to prioritize undivided allegiance. exemplifies recent advancements: although dual citizenship was legalized in 2004 with retention applications required, a May 6, 2025, ruling in Democratic Alliance v Minister of Home Affairs invalidated automatic upon acquiring foreign nationality, retroactively restoring full rights—including voting and passport access—to thousands affected since 1995 without need for formal reinstatement. Similarly, amended its laws post-2020 to allow citizens to retain nationality upon acquiring another, avoiding automatic forfeiture. North African states generally align with permissive trends: imposes no restrictions on dual citizenship, enabling retention of original nationality upon or marriage to an Egyptian. and permit it under conditions, such as for descendants of expatriates, to encourage remittances and investment, which totaled $85 billion continent-wide in 2022 per World Bank data. Sub-Saharan examples include , which has allowed dual citizenship since 1999 for adults over 18, excluding security-sensitive roles, and , which permits it via a 2000 act but mandates declaration to authorities. These policies often balance economic gains against risks of divided loyalties, with empirical evidence from bonds showing higher investment flows in permissive regimes—e.g., 's dual citizens contributed $20 billion in remittances annually by 2023. Guinea-Bissau's January 2025 initiative granting citizenship to people of African descent via descent claims further illustrates targeted expansions to reclaim historical ties, issuing passports to initial groups without mandates. In the , multiple citizenship remains more constrained, reflecting security imperatives in volatile regions and emphasis on homogeneous , particularly in Gulf monarchies where divided allegiances could undermine regime stability. prohibits dual citizenship entirely, requiring of foreign nationality for and treating undeclared dual nationals as solely Saudi for legal purposes. , , and similarly ban it, with processes demanding proof of prior to ensure amid tribal and sectarian dynamics; violations can lead to citizenship revocation and . The partially relaxed this in 2021 via amendments to its , allowing exceptional dual status for high-skilled investors, scientists, and executives under golden visa extensions, though standard still requires renouncing other nationalities and proving UAE primacy. Israel, uniquely, accommodates multiple citizenship to facilitate Jewish immigration under the 1950 , granting nationality to eligible , their spouses, and descendants without mandating renunciation of prior citizenships—over 3 million have naturalized since , many retaining originals like U.S. or European passports. permits dual citizenship outright, allowing retention upon or birth abroad, a policy rooted in its confessional system and expatriate communities remitting $7 billion annually by 2023. aligns with permissive approaches, granting citizenship via (e.g., $250,000 bonds since 2019) or marriage without dual restrictions, treating dual nationals as fully Egyptian for and obligations. and impose caveats, such as barring dual citizens from certain offices, while Iran's constitution forbids it, enforcing renunciation for naturalized Iranians to align with theocratic unity. These variations correlate with geopolitical stability: prohibitive policies in Gulf states, facing persistent threats, prioritize causal deterrence of foreign influence over benefits observed in or .

Economic and Fiscal Implications

Taxation Challenges and Double Obligations

Multiple citizens face taxation challenges arising from divergent national tax regimes, particularly between citizenship-based and residence-based systems, which can impose obligations in multiple jurisdictions on the same income. Citizenship-based taxation, employed by the and , requires citizens to report and potentially pay taxes on worldwide income irrespective of residence, while most nations, including , the , , , , , , and the majority of countries, rely on residence-based taxation that targets income earned or received within their borders or by residents. This mismatch compels dual citizens, especially those holding U.S. citizenship alongside another nationality, to file returns in both countries of citizenship and residence, navigating complex rules on sourcing, deductions, and credits to avoid . Double taxation occurs when the same income is taxed by multiple countries without relief mechanisms, though bilateral tax treaties—over 60 of which the U.S. maintains—often allocate taxing rights or provide for credits against taxes paid abroad. For U.S. dual citizens living overseas, tools like the Foreign Tax Credit allow offsets for foreign taxes paid, while the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion permits exclusion of up to $126,500 of foreign-earned income for 2025, alongside deductions for foreign housing costs. However, these require meticulous documentation and compliance with additional reporting, such as Foreign Bank Account Reports (FBAR) for accounts exceeding $10,000 and Form 8938 for specified foreign assets, with non-compliance penalties reaching $60,000 annually per form. Eritrea's 2% diaspora tax on citizens abroad adds a flat obligation, though less comprehensive than U.S. worldwide taxation. The administrative burden of dual obligations is particularly acute for U.S. multiple citizens, who must track worldwide assets, convert currencies, and reconcile differing fiscal years, often incurring professional fees estimated in thousands annually due to the complexity of forms like Schedule B and FATCA requirements. In non-U.S. contexts, dual citizens may encounter exit taxes or deemed disposition rules upon relocation, as in or , further complicating mobility. While treaties mitigate outright in many cases, residual challenges persist from varying definitions of residency, source income, and allowable credits, disproportionately affecting lower-income expatriates unable to afford specialized advice.

Remittances, Investment Flows, and Economic Mobility

Multiple citizenship facilitates higher remittance flows from emigrants to their countries of origin by strengthening ties to the home nation and reducing barriers to financial transfers. Empirical studies indicate that countries permitting dual citizenship receive, on average, more remittances than those prohibiting it, as expatriates maintain stronger economic connections without the risk of losing original nationality. For instance, dual citizenship policies have been shown to increase remittances by nearly 40 percent, driven by expatriates' greater willingness to send funds when assured of retained rights and belonging. This effect stems from home countries' strategic extension of dual citizenship to tap diaspora capital, as evidenced in analyses of migrant behavior where such policies correlate with sustained remittance streams rather than one-off transfers. In 2011 research using cross-national data, nations recognizing dual citizenship for emigrants averaged higher per capita remittances, reflecting causal incentives like voting rights and property ownership that encourage ongoing support for families and communities. Globally, remittances from such populations contribute significantly to GDP in origin countries; for example, in low-income states, these inflows can exceed foreign direct investment, funding consumption, investment, and poverty alleviation without the volatility of aid. Regarding investment flows, multiple citizenship enables diaspora members to channel capital into origin economies more readily, often through direct investments in , businesses, or bonds, bypassing some regulatory hurdles faced by non-citizens. Governments promoting dual citizenship view it as a tool to attract foreign from expatriates, who benefit from legal protections and in both jurisdictions, thereby fostering bilateral economic links. Peer-reviewed assessments confirm that such policies grow workforces and bases via repatriated investments, with expatriates from dual-citizenship-granting countries exhibiting higher remittance-linked investment behaviors that extend to productive assets. Economic mobility for individuals holding multiple citizenships is enhanced by expanded access to labor markets, , and entrepreneurial opportunities across borders, conferring advantages over single-nationality migrants restricted by visas or residency rules. Naturalization enabling dual status correlates with improved wage growth, occupational advancement, and employment stability, as citizens leverage networks and credentials in multiple economies. For example, dual nationals experience greater upward mobility in global terms, relocating strategically for higher sectors while retaining fallback options, a dynamic observed in empirical data on migrant life courses where citizenship acquisition boosts intra- and inter-country movements. This mobility, however, depends on host-country policies; while it drives personal gains, aggregate effects include brain circulation benefiting origin states through skill transfers upon return or .

Welfare Access and Fiscal Strain on Host Nations

Multiple nationals, by virtue of their host country citizenship, gain unrestricted access to social welfare programs, including , healthcare subsidies, and family allowances, equivalent to those available to native-born citizens. This access raises concerns about fiscal sustainability in high-welfare states, as naturalized dual citizens—often originating from lower-income nations—may draw on public resources without equivalent lifetime tax contributions, particularly if integration into the labor market is delayed or incomplete. Empirical analyses of immigrant fiscal impacts, encompassing naturalized cohorts, frequently reveal net deficits for non-EU migrants, who constitute a significant portion of dual nationals in . For instance, a 2020 study projected negative net fiscal contributions from non-EU across nearly all member states, even assuming optimal integration scenarios. Similarly, in the , only 20% of immigrants achieve a positive lifetime net fiscal position, with first-generation migrants imposing average lifetime costs exceeding €200,000 per individual due to higher welfare utilization and lower rates. In , where dual citizenship has been permitted since 2001, the fiscal burden from and family-based —many recipients of whom —has been particularly acute. A 2015 analysis estimated the cost of a typical at approximately SEK 180,000 (€17,000) annually over their working life, driven by elevated and public service usage, with total immigration-related expenditures reaching 1-2% of GDP. exacerbates this by enabling immediate full benefit eligibility, including child allowances and housing support, without residency-based waiting periods that apply to non-citizens. While host governments recoup some costs through eventual taxation, low-skilled dual nationals from non-Western backgrounds often remain net consumers, straining municipal budgets and contributing to policy shifts like proposed incentives for foreign-born citizens. Countervailing evidence suggests that dual citizenship policies can mitigate strain by incentivizing , which correlates with improved economic outcomes. A study of German guest workers found that access to dual nationality rights increased naturalization rates by up to 10 percentage points, yielding relative gains in (5-10%) and (10-15%), alongside a 20-30% drop in welfare receipt post-. These integration effects imply that permissive dual citizenship frameworks may enhance long-term fiscal contributions by fostering attachment to the host , though benefits accrue primarily to higher-skilled or second-generation dual nationals. Overall, while access to welfare underscores potential short-term pressures, the net fiscal impact hinges on selection criteria for and origin-country levels, with low-skilled inflows amplifying host-nation expenditures.

Security and Obligation Conflicts

Military Service and Conscription Dilemmas

Multiple citizens face significant challenges when their countries of citizenship impose compulsory , as obligations may arise in more than one simultaneously. Countries enforcing typically apply it to all male citizens—or in some cases females—regardless of dual nationality status, creating potential for dual or conflicting demands. For instance, requires all male citizens over 20 to complete 6 to 15 months of service, extending this duty to dual nationals even if residing abroad. Similarly, mobilizes dual citizens during drafts, as evidenced by policies applied during the 2022 partial mobilization. In , mandatory service for males aged 18 to 35 persists since 1957, compelling dual citizens to either fulfill the 18-21 month obligation or renounce Korean citizenship, a policy that has led thousands to forfeit to avoid enlistment. Israel's Defense Forces mandate service for most citizens aged 18, with dual nationals comprising about 10% of troops, often facing pressure to serve despite foreign ties, particularly amid ongoing conflicts. These requirements can result in penalties for evasion, including jail time, as seen in where dual citizens have faced for failing to report. Resolutions vary: some nations offer exemptions for dual citizens of specific countries, such as exempting those holding U.S. citizenship from service upon application. Others demand of foreign for enlistment, though this does not always absolve prior obligations. In extreme cases, if dual citizens' countries enter conflict, serving one may render them in the other, heightening risks of or legal , as hypothetical scenarios involving U.S.- dual nationals illustrate. The U.S. State Department advises that dual nationals may face immediate upon entering the foreign state, underscoring the absence of automatic exemptions. Empirical data from 2025 indicates over 60 countries maintain , including , , and numerous European states like and , amplifying dilemmas for the estimated 10-15% of global migrants holding multiple citizenships. While bilateral agreements occasionally mitigate overlaps—such as credits for service in one counting toward another—most lack such provisions, leaving individuals to navigate residency-based enforcement or diplomatic interventions.

Travel Restrictions and Diplomatic Protections

Individuals with multiple citizenships face mandatory passport usage rules for international travel, which can create logistical challenges and risks of denial at borders. United States law requires dual nationals to enter and exit the country exclusively using their U.S. passport, irrespective of other nationalities held. The foreign state of secondary citizenship often imposes reciprocal obligations, mandating the use of its passport for entry and departure from its territory. Non-compliance with these requirements may lead to entry refusals, detention, or legal penalties enforced by immigration authorities. In third countries, the choice of travel document influences visa access; for example, under the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, applicants with dual nationality including Cuba are ineligible due to Cuba's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Diplomatic and consular protections for multiple citizens are frequently limited, particularly when travel involves a state of secondary . The U.S. Department of State indicates that dual nationality complicates governmental efforts to extend abroad, as the other country of citizenship may assert exclusive jurisdiction over the individual, treating them solely as its own national and barring intervention by the U.S. embassy. This aligns with traditional international practice, where a state refrains from exercising on behalf of a national against another state sharing that nationality, to prevent conflicts over . Against third states, however, multiple states of nationality may jointly or individually provide protection, as affirmed in the UN Commission's Draft Articles on , which reject dual nationality as an absolute bar in modern law. In practice, reliance on one state's assistance can strain relations or prove ineffective if the host government prioritizes the competing nationality claim. Certain states that do not recognize multiple citizenships exacerbate these vulnerabilities by denying consular access from foreign embassies to their nationals abroad, regardless of other passports presented. For instance, travel to or from non-recognizing countries like or on a secondary may trigger demands for or loss of primary citizenship status upon detection. These dynamics underscore how multiple s can inadvertently expose holders to asymmetric protections, where effective recourse diminishes in jurisdictions enforcing singular allegiance.

National Security Risks from Divided Loyalties

Dual citizenship can engender divided loyalties, potentially enabling foreign states to exert influence over individuals in sensitive positions, thereby heightening risks of , unauthorized disclosure of , or prioritization of foreign interests over . This concern stems from the formal legal to multiple sovereigns, which may create incentives for conflicting obligations, particularly in , defense, or diplomatic roles where access to state secrets is required. Governments worldwide have codified these risks in security vetting protocols, viewing dual nationality as an indicator of possible foreign preference that demands scrutiny and mitigation. In the United States, federal guidelines treat the exercise or possession of dual as a disqualifying factor in personnel evaluations, as it raises concerns about and vulnerability to foreign or recruitment. The Department of State requires investigators to weigh dual against an applicant's willingness to renounce foreign ties, with unresolved cases often resulting in of access to classified material. The similarly flags dual as evoking questions of foreign , necessitating evidence of primary to the U.S., such as formal of the secondary . These policies reflect causal assessments that legal bonds to adversarial or allied states alike can compromise impartial decision-making in high-stakes environments. Several nations, including , , , and , prohibit dual citizenship explicitly to avert security threats like or divided military obligations, arguing that undivided is essential for trust in . In contrast, permissive jurisdictions like the U.S. permit dual nationality but impose barriers to sensitive roles; for example, dual citizens face heightened scrutiny or outright exclusion from positions involving or . Empirical assessments of realized risks remain contested: while some analyses assert no prominent instances tied directly to dual status, government protocols and historical precedents—such as Cold War-era concerns over immigrant spies with retained foreign ties—underscore the precautionary rationale, prioritizing prevention over post-hoc validation. Critics of unrestricted dual citizenship, including policy analysts, contend that eroding restrictions on classified access for dual nationals amplifies vulnerabilities, especially amid rising state-sponsored theft and tactics observed since 2010. Studies on immigrant perceptions further indicate that dual status correlates with public skepticism toward an individual's undivided commitment, informing stricter vetting in host nations facing geopolitical tensions. Despite claims of negligible empirical threats, the persistence of these policies across democracies and autocracies alike evidences a consensus on the intrinsic security hazard posed by legally bifurcated citizenship.

Political and Social Ramifications

Voting Rights and Dual Suffrage Issues

Dual citizens typically retain voting rights in the elections of both countries of , provided they meet standard eligibility criteria such as age and residency where applicable, enabling what is known as dual . This practice is common in nations like the , where dual nationals may participate in federal, state, and local elections regardless of their other or residence abroad, as affirmed by U.S. authorities. Similarly, countries such as , the , and permit dual citizens to vote in national elections without requiring renunciation of foreign voting privileges. However, dual suffrage can amplify an individual's electoral influence across borders, raising concerns about divided allegiances and the potential for non-resident citizens to shape policies in states where they no longer bear primary obligations like taxation or . A primary issue arises in supranational contexts, such as (EP) elections, where EU law explicitly prohibits double-voting to maintain . Under Directive 93/109/EC, as amended, EU citizens—including dual nationals—must choose to vote either in their country of residence or their home , with self-declaration required to affirm no duplicate participation; violations can result in fines or imprisonment, though enforcement varies and relies on cross-border data sharing, which remains inconsistent. For instance, during the 2024 EP elections, reports highlighted gaps in monitoring, allowing potential double-voting despite the legal ban, as national systems often lack real-time coordination. This framework stems from efforts to prevent over-representation, but critics note that weak verification—dependent on voter honesty—undermines its effectiveness, potentially distorting outcomes in low-turnout voting. Beyond the EU, dual suffrage prompts debates over national sovereignty and loyalty, particularly when dual citizens vote in foreign referendums or elections affecting their host nation's interests. In the U.S., while no federal prohibition exists on dual nationals voting abroad, analysts have argued that such participation by naturalized citizens could prioritize foreign ties, as seen in cases where immigrants vote in ancestral countries' elections post-naturalization, potentially conflicting with full assimilation expectations. Empirical studies indicate minimal widespread fraud from double-voting due to logistical barriers like differing election dates and residency proofs, yet theoretical risks persist: a single individual influencing policies in multiple sovereign entities without equivalent stakes. Some nations mitigate this through residency requirements for non-citizen voting abroad; for example, Australia's overseas voting is limited to recent emigrants, indirectly curbing perpetual dual influence. Proponents of restrictions, including policy reports, contend that unrestricted dual suffrage erodes the causal link between citizenship duties and rights, fostering elite expatriate blocs that sway outcomes detached from daily civic burdens. In practice, few countries permitting dual citizenship outright bar dual nationals from voting, focusing instead on office-holding restrictions to address loyalty conflicts—such as Australia's 2017 , where seven parliamentarians were disqualified for undisclosed foreign citizenships, though their voting rights remained intact. Overall, while dual suffrage enhances personal agency, it challenges the principle of undivided electoral sovereignty, with ongoing calls for harmonized international standards to balance mobility against potential distortions in democratic representation.

Impacts on National Cohesion and Identity

Multiple citizenship raises concerns about divided loyalties, potentially eroding the singular national attachment essential for social cohesion and shared identity within a . Countries such as , , and prohibit dual nationality primarily to ensure undivided allegiance and preserve cultural unity, arguing that competing citizenships foster fragmented commitments that undermine collective solidarity. Empirical research indicates that dual citizens often exhibit lower explicit and implicit attachment to their host state compared to single nationals. For instance, a study of American citizens found single nationals demonstrated stronger state attachment, while dual nationals displayed symmetrical but diluted bonds to both countries, suggesting a dilution of primary national ties. Native populations perceive dual citizens as less loyal to the host nation and more oriented toward foreign allegiances, which can exacerbate social tensions and reduce trust in institutions reliant on unified civic bonds. This perceived and actual division manifests in reduced political engagement tied to ; dual nationals may prioritize instrumental benefits over deep-rooted , weakening the causal link between and communal obligations that sustain cohesion. In contexts of geopolitical strain, such as or disputes, divided allegiances complicate mutual trust, as evidenced by restrictions on dual nationals in sensitive roles across nations like and the . Scholars note that expanding tolerance for multiple citizenship correlates with erosion, as states implicitly concede exclusive loyalty in favor of plural identities that prioritize individual mobility over national unity.

Representation in Politics and Foreign Allegiance Concerns

Multiple citizenship raises apprehensions regarding the undivided loyalty required for political representation, as elected officials may face competing obligations to foreign states that could influence decision-making on national security, foreign policy, or resource allocation. These concerns stem from the principle that full allegiance to one's polity demands exclusive commitment, potentially undermined by dual nationality's legal ties, such as eligibility for foreign military service or inheritance rights abroad. In practice, several nations embed prohibitions against foreign allegiance in their constitutions to safeguard legislative integrity; for instance, Australia's Constitution Section 44(i) disqualifies members of Parliament who are "subject to any allegiance, obedience, or restraint" to a foreign power, encompassing dual citizenship unless formally renounced. The 2017 Australian parliamentary crisis exemplified these issues when revelations of undisclosed dual nationalities led to the disqualification of 11 federal politicians, including senators and representatives from both major parties, prompting by-elections and governmental instability. High-profile cases involved figures like , whose citizenship trace triggered scrutiny, highlighting how even inadvertent foreign ties—often inherited—could invalidate elections and erode in representatives' singular national focus. This episode, unfolding from July 2017 onward, underscored causal risks: dual citizens might prioritize foreign kin or interests subconsciously, though empirical instances of overt betrayal remain rare, with disqualifications rooted in strict rather than proven disloyalty. In the United States, while the imposes no explicit ban on dual for congressional service—requiring only seven years' for members and nine for senators—debates persist over potential conflicts, particularly in roles. Proposals like the 2025 Disclosure Act seek mandatory revelation of dual status for candidates, reflecting historical antipathy toward divided allegiances, as evidenced by the 1795 Naturalization Act's rejection of perpetual foreign ties. Critics argue that dual nationals in sensitive positions, such as those handling , pose security vulnerabilities due to foreign leverage, with past practices denying clearances to such individuals; yet, no systematic empirical data demonstrates heightened disloyalty rates among politicians compared to single nationals. Cases like Senator Ted Cruz's 2014 renunciation of Canadian birthright illustrate voluntary mitigation, but ongoing concerns highlight how multiple could incentivize policies favoring foreign allies over domestic priorities. Other jurisdictions enforce similar restrictions for high office; Switzerland's 2017 Federal Council appointment of required renunciation of Italian citizenship to affirm exclusive Swiss allegiance, amid debates over divided incentives in executive roles. Countries like and prohibit dual citizenship outright for public officials, mandating renunciation to prevent foreign influence, a policy grounded in preservation rather than documented disloyalty cases. Overall, while dual citizenship facilitates diverse representation—potentially enhancing policy perspectives from expatriate experiences—the countervailing risks of perceptual or actual foreign allegiance strains democratic legitimacy, prompting calls for transparency or disqualification to ensure representatives' primary duty aligns unequivocally with their constituents' nation.

Debates and Empirical Assessments

Benefits: Empirical Evidence of Gains

Empirical analyses of dual citizenship policies indicate that granting such rights facilitates higher rates of among immigrants, which in turn correlates with improved economic outcomes for individuals. A study examining Latin American immigrants following dual nationality reforms found that affected groups experienced a statistically significant 2.5% increase in earnings for those with a high education, alongside relative gains in and reductions in welfare usage. These effects stem from the added security and opportunities provides, such as access to public-sector jobs and protection from , without the forfeiture of origin-country ties. For origin countries, dual citizenship recognition empirically boosts inflows and economic linkages with diasporas. Research shows that expatriates from nations permitting dual citizenship remit at higher rates than those from countries prohibiting it, as the policy signals enduring ties and reduces barriers to maintaining connections. analyses confirm that such policies increase remittance volumes, with one study documenting elevated inflows tied to dual citizenship allowances, enhancing recipient households' welfare and national pools. Additionally, dual citizens facilitate greater (FDI) and trade, as their cross-border networks leverage personal affiliations for business opportunities, contributing to GDP growth in home economies. Host nations benefit through enhanced migrant integration and labor market contributions. Quasi-experimental evidence from European dual citizenship reforms demonstrates a 6.7 percentage point rise in naturalization rates, particularly among skilled and educated migrants, leading to long-term earnings growth and reduced fiscal dependency. This attracts higher-quality immigration inflows, expanding the workforce and tax base while minimizing brain drain risks for origin countries, as dual rights encourage circular migration patterns. Overall, these policies yield net economic gains by aligning incentives for sustained productivity and global mobility, though effects vary by migrant skill levels and policy implementation.

Criticisms: Sovereignty Erosion and Elite Advantages

Critics of multiple citizenship argue that it erodes national by diluting the exclusivity of owed to a single state, thereby complicating the enforcement of core functions such as taxation, , and diplomatic relations. In principle, relies on citizens' undivided to facilitate unified ; divided nationalities allow individuals to selectively invoke protections or evade duties from multiple jurisdictions, as evidenced by historical bilateral tensions where dual citizens prompted competing claims for during conflicts, such as U.S.-European disputes in the early 20th century over military obligations. Countries like , , and prohibit dual nationality precisely to preserve this control, viewing multiple citizenship as a threat to national cohesion and state authority over their populations. This erosion manifests empirically in challenges to on and ; for example, dual citizens in nations with universal , such as or , may exploit foreign passports to defer or avoid service, undermining the collective defense rationale that underpins . Scholars contend that widespread toleration of multiple citizenship normalizes "flexible ," where states cede control in exceptional circumstances like crises, as dual nationals' competing ties fragment and invite external influences on domestic affairs. Such dynamics, critics assert, weaken the causal link between citizenship and state legitimacy, fostering a transnational layer that prioritizes individual over national imperatives. Regarding elite advantages, multiple citizenship disproportionately benefits high-net-worth individuals through mechanisms like citizenship-by-investment (CBI) programs, which commodify and entrench class disparities by enabling the wealthy to acquire strategic passports without genuine integration or reciprocal burdens. Programs in nations such as (requiring a €750,000 non-refundable contribution plus investment as of 2023) and (minimum $230,000 donation since 2013) cater exclusively to affluent applicants, granting visa-free access to over 140 countries and unavailable to average citizens. This creates a bifurcated system where elites—often comprising global business leaders and investors—gain "compensatory " for mobility and , while exacerbating inequalities in origin countries by draining talent and capital from non-Western states. Critics highlight how such privileges undermine egalitarian principles of , producing "supra-citizens" who can renounce ties (e.g., over 6,000 renounced U.S. citizenship annually by 2020, many for reasons while retaining others) to optimize fiscal and legal outcomes, thus evading the obligations borne by singular nationals. Empirical assessments link this to deepened global stratification, as dual citizenship consolidates a Western-oriented network, with reporting that CBI passports enhance travel freedom for the top 1% but reinforce barriers for the majority lacking financial means. In essence, these programs transform into a marketable asset, prioritizing elite utility over communal bonds and state reciprocity.

Nationalism Versus Globalist Perspectives

Nationalist perspectives on multiple citizenship emphasize the primacy of undivided to one's nation-state, viewing dual or multiple nationalities as inherently divisive and a potential threat to and cohesion. Proponents argue that citizenship entails a singular bond of loyalty, akin to a marital commitment, where divided obligations could compromise , particularly in scenarios involving or conflicts. For instance, countries such as and explicitly prohibit dual citizenship to safeguard state integrity and ensure citizens' full commitment, reflecting a causal link between exclusive and robust national unity. Similarly, historical U.S. policy under figures like condemned dual nationality as a "self-evident " that undermines the exclusivity of loyalty owed to one's primary sovereign. Empirical concerns include heightened risks of or preferential treatment in intelligence access, as highlighted in analyses warning that dual citizens in sensitive roles may prioritize foreign interests, eroding trust in institutions. In contrast, globalist viewpoints frame multiple citizenship as an adaptive response to interconnected economies and human mobility, fostering cosmopolitan identities that transcend national borders without necessarily diluting practical loyalties. Advocates contend that in an era of , exclusive hinders talent flows and , with dual nationals contributing to remittances, , and diplomatic bridges between states. For example, organizations promoting investment migration highlight how multiple passports enhance cross-border opportunities and provide safeguards against instability, aligning with broader trends toward supranational frameworks like the . Studies on migrant integration, such as those in , indicate that dual citizens often exhibit stronger identification with their host country than non-citizen residents, participating more in and maintaining positive ties to both nations without evident conflict. This perspective posits that loyalty is multifaceted and instrumental rather than zero-sum, supported by evidence of dual nationals' remittances bolstering origin countries' development without undermining host commitments. The tension arises from differing causal assumptions: nationalists prioritize empirical risks of perceptual disloyalty—where host populations view dual citizens as less trustworthy, potentially fracturing social cohesion—over aggregated benefits, as native respondents in surveys consistently rate them as more aligned with origin countries. Globalists, however, downplay such perceptions as outdated in a mobile world, citing minimal historical instances of dual-national and arguing that prohibitions reflect nationalist anxieties rather than data-driven threats. While empirical data shows no systemic disloyalty among dual citizens, the debate underscores a fundamental divide: whether state demands monolithic identities or can accommodate plural affiliations amid global interdependence.

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