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Cooperative
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The volunteer board of a retail consumer cooperative, such as the former Oxford, Swindon & Gloucester Co-op, is held to account at an annual general meeting of members.

A cooperative (also known as co-operative, coöperative, co-op, or coop) is "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically-controlled enterprise".[1] Cooperatives are democratically controlled by their members, with each member having one vote in electing the board of directors.[2] They differ from collectives in that they are generally built from the bottom-up, rather than the top-down.[3] Cooperatives may include:

  • Worker cooperatives: businesses owned and managed by the people who work there
  • Consumer cooperatives: businesses owned and managed by the people who consume goods and/or services provided by the cooperative
  • Producer cooperatives: businesses where producers pool their output for their common benefit
  • Purchasing cooperatives where members pool their purchasing power
  • Multi-stakeholder or hybrid cooperatives that share ownership between different stakeholder groups. For example, care cooperatives where ownership is shared between both care-givers and receivers. Stakeholders might also include non-profits or investors.
  • Second- and third-tier cooperatives whose members are other cooperatives
  • Platform cooperatives that use a cooperatively owned and governed website, mobile app or a protocol to facilitate the sale of goods and services.

Research published by the Worldwatch Institute found that in 2012 approximately one billion people in 96 countries had become members of at least one cooperative.[4] The turnover of the largest three hundred cooperatives in the world reached $2.2 trillion.[5]

Worker cooperatives are typically more productive[6] and economically resilient than many other forms of enterprise, with twice the number of co-operatives (80%) surviving their first five years compared with other business ownership models (44%) according to data from United Kingdom.[7] The largest worker owned cooperative in the world, the Mondragon Corporation (founded by Catholic priest José María Arizmendiarrieta), has been in continuous operation since 1956.[8]

Cooperatives frequently have social goals, which they aim to accomplish by investing a proportion of trading profits back into their communities. As an example of this, in 2013, retail co-operatives in the UK invested 6.9% of their pre-tax profits in the communities in which they trade, compared to 2.4% for rival supermarkets.[9]

Since 2002, cooperatives have been distinguishable on the Internet through the use of a .coop domain. In 2014, the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) introduced the Cooperative Marque, meaning ICA cooperatives and WOCCU credit unions can also be identified through a coop ethical consumerism label.

Origins and history

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Cooperation dates back as far as human beings have been organizing for mutual benefits. Tribes were organized as cooperative structures, allocating jobs and resources among each other, only trading with the external communities.[citation needed] In alpine environments, trade could only be maintained in organized cooperatives to achieve a useful condition of artificial roads such as Viamala in 1472.[10] Pre-industrial Europe is home to the first cooperatives from an industrial context.[11] The roots of the cooperative movement can be traced to multiple influences and extend worldwide. In the English-speaking world, post-feudal forms of cooperation between workers and owners that are expressed today as "profit sharing" and "surplus sharing" arrangements existed as far back as 1795.[12] The key ideological influence on the Anglosphere branch of the cooperative movement, however, was a rejection of the charity principles that underpinned welfare reforms when the British government radically revised its Poor Laws in 1834. As both state and church institutions began to routinely distinguish between the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor, a movement of friendly societies grew throughout the British Empire based on the principle of mutuality, committed to self-help in the welfare of working people.[13]

Robert Owen (1771–1858) was a social reformer and a pioneer of the cooperative movement.

In 1761, the Fenwick Weavers' Society was formed in Fenwick, East Ayrshire, Scotland to sell discounted oatmeal to local workers.[14] Its services expanded to include assistance with savings and loans, emigration and education. In 1810, Welsh social reformer Robert Owen, from Newtown in mid-Wales, and his partners purchased the New Lanark mill from Owen's father-in-law, David Dale, and proceeded to introduce better labour standards, including discounted retail shops where profits were passed on to his employees. Owen left New Lanark to pursue other forms of cooperative organization and develop coop ideas through writing and lecture. Cooperative communities were set up in Glasgow, Indiana and Hampshire, although ultimately unsuccessful. In 1828, William King set up a newspaper, The Cooperator, to promote Owen's thinking, having already set up a cooperative store in Brighton.[15][16]

Also in 1810, Rev. Henry Duncan of the Ruthwell Presbyterian Church in Dumfriesshire, Scotland founded a friendly society to create a cooperative depository institution at which his poorest parishioners could hold savings accounts accruing interest for sickness and old-age, which was the first established savings bank that would be merged into the Trustee Savings Bank between 1970 and 1985.[17][18] The Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, founded in 1844, is usually considered the first successful cooperative enterprise, used as a model for modern coops, following the 'Rochdale Principles'. A group of 28 weavers and other artisans in Rochdale, England set up the society to open their own store selling food items they could not otherwise afford. Within ten years there were over a thousand cooperative societies in the United Kingdom.[citation needed]

The statue of Samuel Jurkovič, national awakener and founder of first cooperative in Central Europe (Spolok Gazdovský) in Rača, Bratislava

"Spolok Gazdovský" (The Association of Administrators or The Association of Farmers) founded in 1845 by Samuel Jurkovič, was the first cooperative in Europe (Credit union). The cooperative provided a cheap loan from funds generated by regular savings for members of the cooperative. Members of cooperative had to commit to a moral life and had to plant two trees in a public place every year. Despite the short duration of its existence, until 1851, it thus formed the basis of the cooperative movement in Slovakia.[19][20] Slovak national thinker Ľudovít Štúr said about the association: "We would very much like such excellent constitutions to be established throughout our region. They would help to rescue people from evil and misery. A beautiful, great idea, a beautiful excellent constitution!"[21]

Other events such as the founding of a friendly society by the Tolpuddle Martyrs in 1832 were key occasions in the creation of organized labor and consumer movements.[22]

Friendly Societies established forums through which one member, one vote was practiced in organisation decision-making. The principles challenged the idea that a person should be an owner of property before being granted a political voice. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century (and then repeatedly every twenty years or so) there was a surge in the number of cooperative organisations, both in commercial practice and civil society, operating to advance democracy and universal suffrage as a political principle.[23] Friendly Societies and consumer cooperatives became the dominant form of organization among working people in Anglosphere industrial societies prior to the rise of trade unions and industrial factories. Weinbren reports that by the end of the 19th century, over 80% of British working age men and 90% of Australian working age men were members of one or more Friendly Society.[24]

From the mid-nineteenth century, mutual organisations embraced these ideas in economic enterprises, firstly among tradespeople, and later in cooperative stores, educational institutes, financial institutions and industrial enterprises. The common thread (enacted in different ways, and subject to the constraints of various systems of national law) is the principle that an enterprise or association should be owned and controlled by the people it serves, and share any surpluses on the basis of each member's cooperative contribution (as a producer, labourer or consumer) rather than their capacity to invest financial capital.[25]

The International Cooperative Alliance was the first international association formed (1895) by the cooperative movement.[citation needed] It includes the World Council of Credit Unions. The International Cooperative Alliance was founded in London, England on 19 August 1895 during the 1st Cooperative Congress.[26] In attendance were delegates from cooperatives from Argentina, Australia, Belgium, England, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, India, Italy, Switzerland, Serbia, and the US.[26] A second organization formed later in Germany: the International Raiffeisen Union. In the United States, the National Cooperative Business Association (NCBA CLUSA; the abbreviation of the organization retains the initials of its former name, Cooperative League of the USA) serves as the sector's oldest national membership association. It is dedicated to ensuring that cooperative businesses have the same opportunities as other businesses operating in the country and that consumers have access to cooperatives in the marketplace.

In 1945 Artturi Ilmari Virtanen received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his invention of the AIV silage. This invention improved milk production and created a method of preserving butter, the AIV salt, which led to increased Finnish butter exports. He had started his career in chemistry in Valio, a cooperative of dairy farmers in which he headed the research department for 50 years and where all his major inventions were first put to practice.

Cooperative banks were first to adopt online banking. Stanford Federal Credit Union was the first financial institution to offer online internet banking services to all of its members in October 1994.[27] In 1996 OP Financial Group, also a cooperative bank, became the second online bank in the world and the first in Europe.[28]

By 2004 a new association focused on worker co-ops was founded, the United States Federation of Worker Cooperatives.

The cooperative movement has been fueled globally by ideas of economic democracy. Economic democracy is a socioeconomic philosophy that suggests an expansion of decision-making power from a small minority of corporate shareholders to a larger majority of public stakeholders. There are many different approaches to thinking about and building economic democracy. Anarchists are committed to libertarian socialism and have focused on local organization, including locally managed cooperatives, linked through confederations of unions, cooperatives and communities. Marxists, who as socialists have likewise held and worked for the goal of democratizing productive and reproductive relationships, often placed a greater strategic emphasis on confronting the larger scales of human organization. As they viewed the capitalist class to be politically, militarily and culturally mobilized for the purpose of maintaining an exploitable working class, they fought in the early 20th century to appropriate from the capitalist class the society's collective political capacity in the form of the state. Though they regard the state as an unnecessarily oppressive institution, Marxists considered appropriating national and international-scale capitalist institutions and resources (such as the state) to be an important first pillar in creating conditions favorable to solidaristic economies.[29][30] With the declining influence of the USSR after the 1960s, socialist strategies pluralized, though economic democratizers have not as yet established a fundamental challenge to the hegemony of global neoliberal capitalism.[31][32][33]

Meaning

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Identity

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Coop principles and values

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Many cooperatives follow the seven Rochdale Principles:[34]

  1. Voluntary and open membership
  2. Democratic member control, with each member having one vote.
  3. Economic participation by members
  4. Autonomy and independence
  5. Education, training and information
  6. Cooperation among cooperatives
  7. Concern for community

Coop Marque and domain

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The Co-op Marque, a symbol used by co-operatives internationally

Since 2002, ICA cooperatives and WOCCU credit unions could be distinguished by use of a .coop domain. In 2014, ICA introduced the Global Cooperative Marque[35] for use by ICAs[36] Cooperative members and by WOCCU's Credit Union members so they can be further identified[37] by their coop ethical consumerism label. The marque is used today by thousands of cooperatives in more than a hundred countries.[38]

The .coop domain and Co-operative Marque were designed as a new symbol of the global cooperative movement and its collective identity in the digital age. The Co-operative Marque and domain is reserved just for co-operatives, credit unions and organisations that support co-operatives; is distinguished by its ethical badge that subscribes to the seven ICA Cooperative Principles and Co-op Values. Co-ops can be identified on the Internet through the use of the .coop suffix of internet addresses. Organizations using .coop domain names must adhere to the basic co-op values.

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Cooperative of agricultural products of Alginet, 1963

A cooperative is a legal entity owned and democratically controlled by its members. Members often have a close association with the enterprise as producers or consumers of its products or services, or as its employees.[39] The legal entities have a range of social characteristics. Membership is open, meaning that anyone who satisfies certain non-discriminatory conditions may join. Economic benefits are distributed proportionally to each member's level of participation in the cooperative, for instance, by a dividend on sales or purchases, rather than according to capital invested.[40] Cooperatives may be classified as either worker, consumer, producer, purchasing or housing cooperatives.[41] They are distinguished from other forms of incorporation in that profit-making or economic stability are balanced by the interests of the community.[40]

There are specific forms of incorporation for cooperatives in some countries, e.g. Finland[42] and Australia.[43] Cooperatives may take the form of companies limited by shares or by guarantee, partnerships or unincorporated associations. In the UK they may also use the industrial and provident society structure. In the US, cooperatives are often organized as non-capital stock corporations under state-specific cooperative laws. Cooperatives often share their earnings with the membership as dividends, which are divided among the members according to their participation in the enterprise, such as patronage, instead of according to the value of their capital shareholdings (as is done by a joint stock company).

Cooperative share capital

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The cooperative share capital[44] or co-operative share capital (in short cooperative capital[44] or co-operative capital) is the form of capital that the cooperative accumulates from the paid participation shares of its members.[45][46][44] The total amount of participation shares the paid to the cooperative constitutes the cooperative capital.[47] The co-operative share capital is usually non-withdrawable and indivisible to the cooperative members.[48]

Types of cooperatives

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Co-op City in The Bronx, New York City, is the largest cooperative housing development in the world, with 55,000 people.[49]
The two largest supermarkets chains in Switzerland, Migros and Coop, are cooperatives. The third largest bank, Raiffeisen, is a cooperative as well.

The top 300 largest cooperatives were listed in 2007 by the International Cooperative Alliance. 80% were involved in either agriculture, finance, or retail and more than half were in the United States, Italy, or France.

Consumer cooperative

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A consumer cooperative is a business owned by its customers. Members vote on major decisions and elect the board of directors from among their own number. The first of these was set up in 1844 in the North-West of England by 28 weavers who wanted to sell food at a lower price than the local shops.

Retail cooperative

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Retail cooperatives are retailers, such as grocery stores, owned by their customers. They should not be confused with retailers' cooperatives, whose members are retailers rather than consumers. In Singapore, Italy, and Finland the company with the largest market share in the grocery store sector is a consumer owned cooperative.[50][51][52] In Switzerland both the largest and the second largest retailer are consumer owned cooperatives.[53]

Housing cooperative

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A housing cooperative is a legal mechanism for ownership of housing where residents either own shares (share capital co-op) reflecting their equity in the cooperative's real estate or have membership and occupancy rights in a not-for-profit cooperative (non-share capital co-op), and they underwrite their housing through paying subscriptions or rent.

Housing cooperatives come in three basic equity structures

  • In market-rate housing cooperatives, members may sell their shares in the cooperative whenever they like for whatever price the market will bear, much like any other residential property. Market-rate co-ops are very common in New York City.
  • Limited equity housing cooperatives, which are often used by affordable housing developers, allow members to own some equity in their home, but limit the sale price of their membership share to that which they paid.
  • Group equity or zero-equity housing cooperatives do not allow members to own equity in their residences and often have rental agreements well below market rates.

Members of a building cooperative (in Britain known as a self-build housing cooperative) pool resources to build housing, normally using a high proportion of their own labor. When the building is finished, each member is the sole owner of a homestead, and the cooperative may be dissolved.

This collective effort was at the origin of many of Britain's building societies, which however, developed into "permanent" mutual savings and loan organisations, a term which persisted in some of their names (such as the former Leeds Permanent). Nowadays such self-building may be financed using a step-by-step mortgage which is released in stages as the building is completed. The term may also refer to worker cooperatives in the building trade.

Utility cooperative

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A utility cooperative is a type of consumer cooperative that is tasked with the delivery of a public utility such as electricity, water or telecommunications services to its members. Profits are either reinvested into infrastructure or distributed to members in the form of "patronage" or "capital credits", which are essentially dividends paid on a member's investment into the cooperative. In the United States, many cooperatives were formed to provide rural electrical and telephone service as part of the New Deal. See Rural Utilities Service.

In the case of electricity, cooperatives are generally either generation and transmission (G&T) co-ops that create and send power via the transmission grid or local distribution co-ops that gather electricity from a variety of sources and send it along to homes and businesses.

In Tanzania, it has been proven that the cooperative method is helpful in water distribution. When the people are involved with their own water, they care more because the quality of their work has a direct effect on the quality of their water.[citation needed]

Credit unions, cooperative banking and cooperative insurance

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The Co-operative Bank's head office in Manchester. The statue in front is of Robert Owen, a pioneer in the cooperative movement.

Credit unions are cooperative financial institutions owned and controlled by their members. Credit unions provide to its members the same services as banks but are considered not-for-profit organizations and adhere to cooperative principles.

Credit unions originated in mid-19th-century Germany through the efforts of pioneers Franz Herman Schulze'Delitzsch and Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen. The concept of financial cooperatives crossed the Atlantic at the turn of the 20th century, when the caisse populaire movement was started by Alphonse Desjardins in Quebec, Canada. In 1900, from his home in Lévis, he opened North America's first credit union, marking the beginning of the Mouvement Desjardins. Eight years later, Desjardins provided guidance for the first credit union in the United States, where there are now about 7,950 active status federally insured credit unions, with almost 90 million members and more than $679 billion on deposit.

Financial cooperatives hold a significant market share in Europe and Latin America, as well as a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They also have a strong presence in Asia, Australia, and the United States. According to the World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU), there were 68,882 financial cooperatives in 109 countries in 2016, serving more than 235 million members, with total assets exceeding 1.7 trillion dollars. The WOCCU's data do not include some major financial cooperative networks in Europe, such as Germany, Finland, France, Denmark, and Italy. In many high-income economies, financial cooperatives hold significant market shares of the banking sector.[54]

According to the European Association of Cooperative Banks, the market share of cooperative banks in the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) credit market by the end of 2016 was 37% in Finland, 45% in France, 33% in Germany, 43% in the Netherlands, and 22% in Canada. In Germany, Volksbanken-Raiffeisen banks have a market share of approximately 21% of domestic credit and domestic deposits. In the Netherlands, Rabobank holds 34% of deposits, and in France cooperative banks (Crédit Agricole, Crédit Mutuel and BPCE Group) possess more than 59% of domestic credit and 61% of domestic deposits. In Finland, OP financial group holds 35% and 38% of domestic credit and deposits, respectively, and in Canada, Desjardins holds around 42% of domestic deposits and 22% of domestic credit.[54]

There are many types of cooperative financial institutions with different names across the world, including financial cooperatives ('cooperativa financiera' is the Spanish term used in Latin America), cooperative banks, credit unions, and savings and credit cooperatives ('cooperativa de ahorro y crédito' in Spanish or 'coopérative d'épargne et de credit' in French-speaking countries).[54]

Cooperative banking networks, which were nationalized in Eastern Europe, continued as cooperative institutions. In Poland, the SKOK (Spółdzielcze Kasy Oszczędnościowo-Kredytowe) network grew to serve over 1 million members via 13,000 branches,[when?] and was[when?] larger than the country's largest conventional bank.[citation needed]

In the Scandinavia, there is a clear distinction between mutual savings banks (Sparbank) and true credit unions (Andelsbank).[citation needed]

The oldest cooperative banks in Europe, based on the ideas of Friedrich Raiffeisen, are joined[clarification needed] in the 'Urgenossen'.[citation needed]

Community co-operative

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A community cooperative is owned and governed by members of a local geographical community. It is established to meet the community's needs by providing goods or services that are not available or affordable through traditional market channels. This is distinct from meeting individuals' needs as individuals.

The aim of a community cooperative is often to create a more equitable and sustainable economy that serves the needs of local residents, rather than generating profits for external shareholders. By working together and pooling resources, members can often achieve economies of scale, negotiate better prices, and develop services that better meet the needs of their community. Community cooperatives can also help to build social capital and foster a sense of community ownership and pride. They have been successful vehicles for rural development in the Gaeltacht in Ireland and the Highlands and Islands of Scotland.

Worker cooperative

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CNT-FAI worker cooperative in Barcelona producing wood and steel products

A worker cooperative or producer cooperative is a cooperative owned and democratically controlled by its "worker-owners". In a pure worker cooperative, only the workers own shares of the business on a one person, one vote basis, though hybrid forms exist in which consumers, community members or investors also own some shares (though these shares may or may not have voting power). In practice, control by worker-owners may be exercised through individual, collective or majority ownership by the workforce, or the retention of individual, collective or majority voting rights. A worker cooperative, therefore, has the characteristic that the majority of its workforce owns shares, and the majority of shares are owned by the workforce. Membership is not always compulsory for employees, but generally, only employees can become members either directly (as shareholders) or indirectly through membership of a trust that owns the company.

The impact of political ideology on practice constrains the development of cooperatives in different countries. In India, there is a form of workers' cooperative which insists on compulsory membership for all employees and compulsory employment for all members. That is the form of the Indian Coffee Houses. This system was advocated by the Indian communist leader A. K. Gopalan. In places like the UK, common ownership (indivisible collective ownership) was popular in the 1970s. Cooperative Societies only became legal in Britain after the passing of Slaney's Act in 1852. In 1865 there were 651 registered societies with a total membership of well over 200,000. There are now more than 400 worker cooperatives in the UK, Suma Wholefoods being the largest example with a turnover of £24 million. There also exist some pseudo-cooperatives, such as the John Lewis Partnership, where profits are distributed to the workers, but at the discretion of a senior elected board.

Business and employment cooperative

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Business and employment cooperatives (BECs) are a subset of worker cooperatives that represent a new approach to providing support to the creation of new businesses. Like other business creation support schemes, BEC's enable budding entrepreneurs to experiment with their business idea while benefiting from a secure income. The innovation BECs introduce is that once the businesses are established, the entrepreneurs are not forced to leave and set up independently, but can stay and become full members of the cooperative. The micro-enterprises then combine to form one multi-activity enterprise whose members provide a mutually supportive environment for each other. BECs thus provide budding business people with an easy transition from inactivity to self-employment, but in a collective framework. They open up new horizons for people who have ambition but who lack the skills or confidence needed to set off entirely on their own – or who simply want to carry on an independent economic activity but within a supportive group context.[55]

Purchasing cooperative

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A "purchasing cooperative" is a type of cooperative arrangement, often among businesses, to agree to aggregate demand to get lower prices from selected suppliers. Retailers' cooperatives are a form of purchasing cooperative.

Major purchasing cooperatives include Best Western, ACE Hardware and CCA Global Partners.

Agricultural service cooperatives provide various services to their individual farming members, and to agricultural production cooperatives, where production resources such as land or machinery are pooled and members farm jointly.[56]

Agricultural supply cooperatives aggregate purchases, storage, and distribution of farm inputs for their members. By taking advantage of volume discounts and using other economies of scale, supply cooperatives bring down members' costs. Supply cooperatives may provide seeds, fertilizers, chemicals, fuel, and farm machinery. Some supply cooperatives also operate machinery pools that provide mechanical field services (e.g., plowing, harvesting) to their members. Examples include the American cranberry-and-grapefruit cooperative Ocean Spray, collective farms in socialist states and the kibbutzim in Israel.

Producer cooperative

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Producer cooperatives have producers as their members and provide services involved in moving a product from the point of production to the point of consumption. Unlike worker cooperatives, they allow businesses with multiple employees to join. Agricultural cooperatives and fishery cooperatives are such examples.

Agricultural marketing cooperatives operate a series of interconnected activities involving planning production, growing and harvesting, grading, packing, transport, storage, food processing, distribution and sale. Agricultural marketing cooperatives are often formed to promote specific commodities.

Commercially successful agricultural marketing cooperatives include India's Amul (dairy products), which is the world's largest producer of milk and milk products, Dairy Farmers of America (dairy products) in the United States, and Malaysia's FELDA (palm oil).

Producer cooperatives may also be organized by small businesses for pooling their savings and accessing capital, for acquiring supplies and services, or for marketing products and services.

Producer cooperatives among urban artisans were developed in the mid-19th-century in Germany by Franz Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, who also promoted changes to the legal system (the Prussian Genossenschaftsgesetz of 1867) that facilitated such cooperatives.[57] At about the same time, Friedrich Wilhelm Raiffeisen developed similar cooperatives among rural people.[58]

Multi-stakeholder cooperatives

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Multi-stakeholder cooperatives include representation from different stakeholder groups, such as both consumers and workers.

Social cooperative

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Cooperatives traditionally combine social benefit interests with capitalistic property-right interests. Cooperatives achieve a mix of social and capital purposes by democratically governing distribution questions by and between equal but not controlling members. Democratic oversight of decisions to equitably distribute assets and other benefits means capital ownership is arranged in a way for social benefit inside the organization. External societal benefit is also encouraged by incorporating the operating-principle of cooperation between co-operatives. In the final year of the 20th century, cooperatives banded together to establish a number of social enterprise agencies that have moved to adopt the multi-stakeholder cooperative model. In the years 1994–2009 the EU and its member nations gradually revised national accounting systems to "make visible" the increasing contribution of social economy organizations.[59]

A particularly successful form of multi-stakeholder cooperative is the Italian "social cooperative", of which some 11,000 exist.[60] "Type A" social cooperatives bring together providers and beneficiaries of a social service as members. "Type B" social cooperatives bring together permanent workers and previously unemployed people who wish to integrate into the labor market. They are legally defined as follows:

  • no more than 80% of profits may be distributed, interest is limited to the bond rate, and dissolution is altruistic (assets may not be distributed)
  • the cooperative has legal personality and limited liability
  • the objective is the general benefit of the community and the social integration of citizens
  • those of type B integrate disadvantaged people into the labour market. The categories of disadvantage they target may include physical and mental disability, drug and alcohol addiction, developmental disorders and problems with the law. They do not include other factors of disadvantage such as unemployment, race, sexual orientation or abuse.
  • type A cooperatives provide health, social or educational services
  • various categories of stakeholder may become members, including paid employees, beneficiaries, volunteers (up to 50% of members), financial investors and public institutions. In type B cooperatives at least 30% of the members must be from the disadvantaged target groups
  • voting is one person one vote

SCIC

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The SCIC – Société coopérative d'intérêt collective (co-operative society of collective interest) is a type of multi-stakeholder co-operative structure introduced in France in 1982. A SCIC must have at least three different categories of members, including users and employees. Other stakeholder groups that may be represented are volunteers, public authorities and other individual or corporate supporters. Voting is on a 'one member, one vote' basis, though voting in colleges is also provided for under certain circumstances.

SCICs must have a 'general interest' objective. Public bodies can subscribe for up to 20% of the capital. The status allows an association to convert into a co-operative without having to change its legal form. The relative rigidity of the structure, combined with the government's failure to grant tax relief, has limited its take-up.[citation needed]

Multi-stakeholding in retailing

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Multi-stakeholder co-operatives also exist in the retail sector. An example is Färm,[61] a Belgian wholefood retailing cooperative founded in 2015 which favours organic and local produce. It operates 16 shops, of which 11 are in Brussels.

Categories of members
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The cooperative brings together all the participants in the food chain from farm to fork, represented by six different categories of members:

Investors
The people providing the financial means necessary to achieve the enterprise's ambitions, currently four of the project's founders. This category holds 94% of the shares but only exercises 50% of the votes. The board will consider applications from people wishing to invest in excess of €25,000;
Managers
The members of Färm's management;
Workers
Members of staff working at Färm, who currently number 36;
Sympathisers
Clients and people who want to support the project without having a contractual or commercial relationship with it. Anyone can become part of this category by buying shares worth a minimum of €105 (currently 5 shares of €21), and a maximum of €5,000. As of September 2020 the cooperative was not accepting new members;
Suppliers and producers
There is no obligation to hold shares in order to collaborate commercially with Färm, but the enterprise finds it nice that the two groups support each other;
Supporters
Self-employed people who have opened a store under the Färm brand.


Governance
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Each member has one vote. The members elect the board of 10 at the annual general meeting. Each category of members has at least one board member to represent them.

An innovative governance provision ensure that no one group of members can dominate the others. In practice board decisions are taken by consensus. In the event of a vote, each director has one vote, and except where the cooperative's registered or internal rules provide otherwise, decisions are taken by simple majority of those present or represented. But in the event of a tie, if the votes of a group of voters all belong to the same category, the votes of the other categories prevail.

To ensure that members are committed to the cooperative's values, vision and objectives, to guarantee its long-term finance and to limit financial speculation, shares are not transferable for a period of four years.

Members receive a 2% discount on purchases.

New generation cooperative

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New generation cooperatives (NGCs) are an adaptation of traditional cooperative structures to modern, capital intensive industries. They are sometimes described as a hybrid between traditional co-ops and limited liability companies or public benefit corporations. They were first developed in California and spread and flourished in the US Mid-West in the 1990s.[62] They are now common in Canada where they operate primarily in agriculture and food services, where their primary purpose is to add value to primary products. For example, producing ethanol from corn, pasta from durum wheat, or gourmet cheese from goat's milk.

Other

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Platform cooperative

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A platform cooperative, or platform co-op, is a cooperatively owned, democratically governed business that establishes a computing platform, and uses a protocol, website or mobile app to facilitate the sale of goods and services. Platform cooperatives are an alternative to venture capital-funded platforms insofar as they are owned and governed by those who depend on them most—workers, users, and other relevant stakeholders. Proponents of platform cooperativism claim that, by ensuring the financial and social value of a platform circulate among these participants, platform cooperatives will bring about a more equitable and fair digitally mediated economy in contrast with the extractive models of corporate intermediaries. Platform cooperatives differ from traditional cooperatives not only due to their use of digital technologies, but also by their contribution to the commons for the purpose of fostering an equitable social and economic landscape.

Volunteer cooperative

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A volunteer cooperative is a cooperative that is run by and for a network of volunteers, for the benefit of a defined membership or the general public, to achieve some goal. Depending on the structure, it may be a collective or mutual organization, which is operated according to the principles of cooperative governance. The most basic form of volunteer-run cooperative is a voluntary association. A lodge or social club may be organized on this basis. A volunteer-run co-op is distinguished from a worker cooperative in that the latter is by definition employee-owned, whereas the volunteer cooperative is typically a non-stock corporation, volunteer-run consumer co-op or service organization, in which workers and beneficiaries jointly participate in management decisions and receive discounts on the basis of sweat equity.

Open cooperative

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Open cooperatives are a type of cooperative that combine traditional cooperative principles with commons-based peer production, multi-stakeholder governance, and ethical market practices to serve broader collective and ecological goals. They aim to support collective ownership, democratic decision-making, and the creation of diverse types of commons, while also engaging with market mechanisms. Unlike conventional cooperatives, open cooperatives seek to balance economic sustainability with broader social and ecological goals. Their multi-stakeholder governance structures incorporate producers, consumers, and community members, thereby resisting reduction to narrow economic roles and addressing enduring cooperative tensions[63].

A defining feature of open cooperatives is their embrace of cosmolocalism—a model that circulates knowledge globally through digital commons while grounding production locally in shared infrastructures [64]. Particularly active in sectors like agri-food, open cooperatives aim to revitalize local economies and construct viable alternatives to the corporate food system[65].

Federal or secondary cooperative

[edit]

In some cases, cooperative societies find it advantageous to form cooperative federations in which all of the members are themselves cooperatives. Historically, these have predominantly come in the form of cooperative wholesale societies, and cooperative unions. Cooperative federations are a means through which cooperative societies can fulfill the sixth Rochdale Principle, cooperation among cooperatives, with the ICA noting that "Cooperatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the cooperative movement by working together through local, regional and international structures."

Cooperative union

[edit]

A second common form of cooperative federation is a cooperative union, whose objective (according to Gide) is "to develop the spirit of solidarity among societies and... in a word, to exercise the functions of a government whose authority, it is needless to say, is purely moral." Co-operatives UK and the International Cooperative Alliance are examples of such arrangements.

Cooperative political movements

[edit]

In some countries with a strong cooperative sector, such as the UK, cooperatives may find it advantageous to form political groupings to represent their interests. The British Co-operative Party, the Canadian Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and United Farmers of Alberta are prime examples of such arrangements.

UK
[edit]

The British cooperative movement formed the Co-operative Party in the early 20th century to represent members of consumer cooperatives in Parliament, which was the first of its kind. The Co-operative Party now has a permanent electoral pact with the Labour Party meaning someone cannot be a member if they support a party other than Labour. Plaid Cymru also run a credit union that is constituted as a co-operative, called the 'Plaid Cymru Credit Union'.[66] UK cooperatives retain a strong market share in food retail, insurance, banking, funeral services, and the travel industry in many parts of the country, although this is still significantly lower than other business models.[67]

Former leader of the British Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn has publicly expressed support for worker cooperatives.[68]

Working conditions

[edit]

Cooperatives have been traditionally seen as an alternative to the traditional business model, in which a capitalist has the private ownership of the monetary capital and of the means of production and workers have to sell their labor force to the capitalist to earn a salary.

Cooperatives are often said to offer better working conditions than regular firms.[69] This is demonstrated by the fact that cooperatives have a lower turnover rate (rate of workers leaving a firm) compared to regular firms.[70] However, cooperatives do not always show improved working conditions compared to traditional businesses. In fact, the different nature of cooperatives imply that the nature of the working conditions within the cooperatives is also different.

According to Kunle Akingbola, working conditions are "the core elements of work  relationships determined by the social, psychological, and physical factors that influence the workplace and the interaction that employees experience at work" and "typically include the nature of employment, working hours, job characteristics, compensation, work interactions, physical work environment, and written and unwritten work expectations".[71]

According to Pam a Pam,[72] a cooperative has good working conditions when it has stable contracts, working days consistent with the volume of tasks, and offers a higher salary than the established in the collective agreement of the sector.

Wages

[edit]

In 2021, Hanson and Purushinkaya performed a survey on working conditions of cooperatives in the US,[70] in which cooperativists expressed that they were making wages above the minimum for good living conditions. According to the report, they received, on average, $3.52 /hour more than at their previous job.

Research shows that, in the US, the 77% of the cooperatives have a 1:1 or 2:1 top-to-bottom pay ratio, whereas the average large corporation in the US has a CEO-to-worker pay ratio of 303:1.[70] This means that in worker's cooperatives there is much more distribution of wealth between the members of the cooperatives, which means that workers that are at the bottom of the organizational pyramid make more money than workers that are at the bottom of the pyramid but that are in conventional firms.

Research also shows that the effect of output price changes on wage variations is positive for both conventional firms (CF) and cooperatives (WC), but larger in WCs than in CFs.[73] This means that, because the distribution of wealth is much greater in WCs, an increase in the benefits of a WC usually is reflected in a proportional increase in the wages, whereas in CF this increase in the wages is much smaller (since the wealth is accumulated by people in the higher position, or is saved for new corporate investments).

However, the fact that the wealth is distributed between the already hired workers has the downside of preventing the cooperatives of hiring more workers, thus having a rate of creation of new jobs that is lower than CF. However, in WC changes on output prices does not translate in more employment, whereas in CF it does (CF create less employment).[73]

Research shows that in times of crisis, employment and wages are more protected in WC than in conventional firms;[73] since the focus of WCs is on protecting employment and because the workers that control the WC do not want to lose their jobs, WC are generally more willing to protect them. This does not happen so much in CF, where the focus is on maintaining the margin of benefits and not employment, which is considered a cost in times of crisis.

Research also shows that the difference of wages between workers hired by the cooperative and workers that are members of the cooperative is small (a worker can work for the cooperative but not be a member of it).[73] Two explanations have been proposed: the first one is that the spirit of cooperativism also extends to hired workers; and the second that sometimes employees are needed for highly skilled jobs, which provides them with strong bargaining power enabling them to defend their employment positions and to compensate for their lack of formal control rights over the firm.[73]

Stability of contracts

[edit]

The formation of cooperatives has been used many times to create jobs in economically depressed sites. The communalization of wealth in poor areas often allows them to make the first investment in capital, which allows them to set the cooperative and start having benefits, thus producing an inflow of wealth in the community, which then is redistributed within the members of the cooperatives. This scheme of using cooperatives to create wealth and job opportunities in depressed areas has been famously used, for example, by the Mondragon Corporation, which has provided long term stable jobs for the population of Mondragon (Euskadi) since the mid 50s.

The focus that cooperatives have in protecting jobs is reflected in research. Hanson and Prushinkaya have shown that, in the US, turnover rates are lower in WC than in CF (the turnover rate is the percentage of employees leaving a company within a certain period of time).[70] Jobs at workers' cooperatives tend to be longer term.[74]

There are several explanations for this: higher compensation and wages for workers; higher job satisfaction; greater adaptability to crisis and economic difficulties, etc.

Research shows that WC show higher adaptability to crisis and economic hardships than CF.[75] During negative demand shocks, WCs contain employment drop and allow a greater downward wage adjustment[75] (the workers themselves decided to lower their own wages to keep the jobs). Another adaptability mechanism is the mutual support between WCs.[76] The case of Cooperativa Mondragón is paradigmatic in this sense: during the 80s, some cooperatives were experiencing financial difficulties, and Mondragon redeployed workers in the struggling co-operatives to ones that were better off.[76] Those who were not redeployed were given income assistance that equaled 80% of their salary.[76] The central control structure of Mondragon allowed for this to happen. This would have been unlikely to happen in unorganized and autonomous co-operatives.[76] This same scheme to save employment prevented Fagor cooperative workers from losing their jobs when Fagor went bankrupt: they were relocated to other cooperatives of the Mondragon group.[76]

Workload

[edit]

Overworking due to the need for competitiveness applies to cooperatives as well. Some authors argue that the limitation of working hours in a cooperative should only apply for non-members workers of the coop (hired workers), whereas member workers should be allowed to work as much as they want, allowing the cooperative to collectively take those kind of decisions if they only apply to member workers.[77]

Internal democracy

[edit]

According to Pam a Pam,[72] having internal democracy is not limited to having communal spaces of debate and decision making, but also ensuring that the participation in those spaces is not limited by issues of positionality, privilege, or rank.[72]

For example, one of the basic issues with internal democracy is to make sure that every worker has access to all the information of the cooperative, and that is aware of every debate that is happening within the cooperative. It is important to make sure that all important decisions are taken in formal spaces, and avoid using informal spaces in which not everyone might be present to take those decisions.

This issue of having access and voice in the formal spaces for decision making of the cooperative becomes more important the bigger the cooperative gets. Research shows that,  in larger cooperatives, member participation is lower than in smaller cooperatives, and there is a deterioration of internal democracy and working conditions for cooperative members and employees.[78]

Mark Kaswan describes William Thompson's theory concerning cooperatives as: "[T]he cooperative structure alters the socio-economic relations of their members, aligning their interests with one another on the basis of a strong principle of equality. It is this alignment of interests on the basis of equality that gives cooperatives their strongly democratic character."[79] According to Kaswan himself, internal democracy is mostly defined by the type and the size of the cooperative.[79]

Mark Kaswan argues that the type of activity developed by a cooperative is one of the main factors that determines how democratic it is. For example, in worker cooperatives, the workers spend a lot of time in contact with each other, having a high level of both interaction and interdependency. In consumer's cooperatives, both the frequency and the intensity of the encounters is lower, thus reducing their democratic participation.[79]

The size of the cooperative is considered to be one of the most important factors for internal democracy. For example, Robert Dahl argues that, as paraphrased by Kaswan, "assembly-style direct democracy can only effectively function in fairly small organisations".[79][80] Kaswan states: "Increasing size also increases the complexity of management. [...] This can lead to the problem of 'managerialism', or the development of powerful officials whose concerns and interests may be different from those of common members." If the manager is already a worker-member of the cooperative, the problem might be resolved; but if the manager is hired specifically for managerial purposes, some hierarchies can arise. The contradiction with the issue of size comes with the social impact of the cooperative: greater size usually means greater social impact, but also has a toll on internal democracy.

Suggestions to improve internal democracy within a cooperative

[edit]
  • Facilitation of all meetings/assemblies is rotated among all members of the coop; training and coaching in facilitation will be provided.
  • Permanent and external facilitation (from a specialized process work paradigm external coop) on emotions, conflicts of power, informal hierarchies.
  • Any decision made by a coop member can be recalled if 50% of coop members request it.
  • Create a space where members can propose improvements and a committee reviews and prioritizes them.
  • Revise periodically how the flow of information goes, and see if there are individuals or segments of the coop excluded from this flow, for whatever reason (lack of proper access, unclear messages, technical jargon, excessive workload, etc.), and define collective measures to define what is relevant information (and what is not) and guarantee a full access to it.
[edit]

There is a legal debate on whether to consider being a member of a cooperative as a formal worker or not. For instance, it has been claimed that "the relationship of the worker-member with their cooperative should be considered as distinct from that of conventional wage-based dependent work and self-employed work". Some authors argue that cooperatives should have their own legal status differentiated from the legal status of a conventional firm, in order for them to get recognition and adapt the law to its unique features.[81]

In Argentina, lawyers have debated whether the relationship between members in the worker cooperative also constitute an employment relationship to which the rules governing pais dependent work are applicable. Some say yes, mainly based on the argument that participation in the management and direction is not incompatible with the condition of subordination and that the individual is subordinated to the majority vote. However, other interpretations say that the link between members and the worker cooperatives is not a labor relation. In many law cases it has been widely adopted that the size of the cooperative is decisive for this question since the personal contribution of members is more important in small cooperatives.

In the US, the Internal Revenue Service determines whether a worker is an independent contractor by considering the degree that the worker:[82]

  • Receives less extensive instructions on the work to be done, but not how it should be done;
  • Receives training from the business about required procedures and methods;
  • Has significant investment in the work;
  • Is not reimbursed for some business expenses;
  • Has the opportunity to realize a profit or incur a loss;
  • Receives benefits from the business;
  • Has a written contract that shows the relationship the worker and business intend.

The following factors are generally considered when determining whether an employment relationship exists under the FLSA:

  • Is the worker performing work that is an integral part of the business?
  • Do the worker's managerial skills affect the worker's opportunity for both profit and loss?
  • What kinds of investment does the worker make in facilities and equipment compared to the employer?
  • Does the worker exercise independent business judgement and initiative?
  • Is the relationship with the employer indefinite, which suggests an ongoing employee relationship?
  • What kind of control does the employer have about how the work is performed, pay amounts, hours worked, and whether the worker is free to also work for others and hire helpers?

The problem of labour fraud

[edit]

However, the recognition of cooperatives as different entities than conventional firms sometimes creates a legal void that has been used regularly for labour fraud.[74] For example, in Spain, cooperatives are not subjected to the sectoral collective agreements of each sector.[83] In some cases, businesses take the form of a cooperative to avoid being subjected to collective agreements gained through trade unionism and syndicalism, thus being able to pay lower or have worse labor conditions than the ones stipulated in the collective agreement, while at the same time retaining the same power and salary pyramids.[74]

Many cooperatives are accused of being instruments to be used to lay off workers, to out-source and to exploit workers and small producers. The "cooperativatisation" of both public and private sector activities in some countries has been accompanied by a deterioration of working conditions. This is due both to the perversion of the cooperative form and to weak labour regulations applied to these kinds of work forms.[74]

Usually, the law establishes that a cooperative is required to have a minimum percentage of workers-owners (usually 33%). Cooperatives can hire workers that are not part of the cooperative, but the law usually establishes a maximum amount of time that they can work in the cooperative without being members of it; after that, cooperatives are legally obliged to make those workers part of the cooperative. Some cooperatives commit labour fraud because they either have a smaller percentage of cooperativised workers than mandated by law, or they have people working without becoming members for more time than legally allowed.[84]

In Spain, since the law does not subject cooperatives to the collective agreements or to the social security regulations, the following scheme has been used: if a business wants to pay less than what the sector agreement of its economic sector establishes, the business can create a cooperative, which is not subjected to it, hire all the workers using that cooperative, and then outsource the activity to this cooperative. In this way, instead of having to hire all the workers directly (thus having to pay the Social Security fees and the minimum wage established by the collective agreement), the company only has to use the cooperative as a shell company, and in this way it does not have to pay according to the agreement, and since the workers are hired by the cooperative and not by the company, they are not subject to the either the sector agreement or social security.[83] This is the case, for example, of Spain's Servicarne Coop, hired by meat industries such as Coren and Sada, which according to the Audiencia Nacional "does not carry out a cooperative activity" and "has not been established with the purpose of fulfilling the objectives set forth in the Cooperatives Law [...] but only with the aim of obtaining certain benefits that are linked to it, creating a merely formal appearance of a cooperative", for example, to avoid paying the Social Security fees.[85][86]

Potential solutions to this fraudulent usage of workers' cooperatives have been suggested, such as covering the legal void that allows this to happen,[74] creating cooperative federations that ensure the cooperative identity and its regular functioning, etc.

Suggestions to improve workers' conditions within a cooperative

[edit]
  • Flexible scheduling.
  • Remote work for all staff, with the possibility to do the full working week that way, but also putting some mandatory in-person moments for everyone (conflict resolution, first meetings with new employees, farewell for leaving employees, conflict resolution, strategically and/or politically relevant and/or difficult meetings, celebrations in the coop).
  • All time on worker cooperative business is paid.
  • Equal pay for all positions (assuming a balanced share of responsibility and job complexity).
  • 40 days of vacation (at least).
  • Safe and regenerative working place. Applications based on biomimicry and biophilia to promote natural, healthy and diverse environments (different places for calmness, meditation, creativity, stimuli, team bond generation, individual reflection, exercise, connection with nature, water, plants, art, etc.).

Economic performance

[edit]

Job productivity

[edit]

In general terms, research shows that productivity in worker's cooperatives is higher than in conventional firms. For example, Fakhfakh et al. (2012)[87][69] show that in several industries, conventional firms would produce more with their current levels of employment and capital when they adopted the employee-owned firms' way of organising.

One explanation is that commitment to the cause causes more productivity. The fact that employees can participate in decision-making motivates them to be more involved with the objectives of the cooperative.

Another explanation is that the collective work environment enhances job satisfaction, thus augmenting productivity. Research has shown that collectivists working in simulated collectivist cultures do in fact produce more cooperative behavior than do individualists (i.e., those low in collectivism) in these cultures.[88] Furthermore, it has been argued that collectivists' ideological commitment to the group members yields higher levels of motivation.[89] Consequently, in addition to making turnover less likely, high collectivism in the WC environment should translate to high performance.

Economic stability

[edit]

Capital and the Debt Trap reports that "cooperatives tend to have a longer life than other types of enterprise, and thus a higher level of entrepreneurial sustainability". This resilience has been attributed to how cooperatives share risks and rewards between members, how they harness the ideas of many and how members have a tangible ownership stake in the business. Additionally, "cooperative banks build up counter-cyclical buffers that function well in case of a crisis," and are less likely to lead members and clients towards a debt trap (p. 216). This is explained by their more democratic governance that reduces perverse incentives and subsequent contributions to economic bubbles.

In Europe

[edit]

A 2012 report published by CICOPA (Europe) showed that in France and Spain, worker cooperatives and social cooperatives "have been more resilient than conventional enterprises during the economic crisis".[90]

A 2013 report by ILO concluded that cooperative banks outperformed their competitors during the 2008 financial crisis. The cooperative banking sector had 20% market share of the European banking sector, but accounted for only 7 percent of all the write-downs and losses between the third quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2011. Cooperative banks were also over-represented in lending to small and medium-sized businesses in all of the 10 countries included in the report.[91]

A 2017 report published by the Office for National Statistics found that, in the UK, the rate of survival of cooperatives after 5 years was 80 percent compared with only 41 percent for other enterprises.[7] A further study found that after 10 years, 44 percent of cooperatives were still in operation, compared with only 20 percent for other enterprises.

In North America

[edit]
In the United States of America
[edit]

In a 2007 study by the World Council of Credit Unions, the five-year survival rate of cooperatives in the United States was found to be 90% in comparison to 3–5% for traditional businesses.[92] Credit unions, a type of cooperative bank, had five times lower failure rate than other banks during the 2008 financial crisis[93] and more than doubled lending to small businesses between 2008 and 2016, from $30 billion to $60 billion, while lending to small businesses overall during the same period declined by around $100 billion.[94] Public trust in credit unions stands at 60%, compared to 30% for big banks[95] and small businesses are five times less likely to be dissatisfied with a credit union than with a big bank.[96]

In Canada
[edit]

A 2010 report by the Ministry of Economic Development, Innovation and Export in Québec found the five-year survival rate and ten-year survival rate of cooperatives in Québec to be 62% and 44% respectively compared to 35% and 20% for conventional firms.[97] Another report by the BC-Alberta Social economy Research Alliance found that the three-year survival rate of cooperatives in Alberta to be 81.5% in comparison to 48% for traditional firms.[98] Another report by the aforementioned Research Alliance found that in British Columbia, the five-year survival rates for cooperatives between 2000 and 2010 to be 66.6% in comparison to conventional businesses that had 43% and 39% in the years 1984 and 1993 respectively.[98]

Cooperative financing

[edit]

The issue of finance in cooperativism is one of the most importance. Since the failure rates of cooperatives are lower than for conventional firms,[69][87] the financing schemes used by them are at least as successful as for conventional firms.

One of the success factors lies in the fact that cooperatives use a different arrange of financing schemes

Self financing (social base)

[edit]

According to Gianluca Salvatore and Riccardo Bodini, self-financing schemes include the act and the practice of using one's own capital to provide funding for an enterprise. The main advantage of self-financing is that it sets the cooperative free from outside influence and debt, but the capacity to expand the coop might be constrained by the lack of capital.[99]

Capital by members

[edit]

This is the main form of financing in cooperatives. Usually, workers cooperatives do not only socialize the labor force, but also a part of the economical wealth of each member, that is put in a pool together with the rest of contributions, and that constitutes the capital of the cooperative. Usually, future members have to socialize a certain amount of money to the cooperative before they can become formal members.[99]

The most common way to do it all at once before joining the cooperative, but other financing schemes have been proposed. For example, some cooperatives do not ask for an initial investment, but rather require workers to work for a certain period of time, while retaining a percentage of the wage, until the worker has paid all the requirements and can become a formal member of the cooperative.[99]

Usually, when the worker decides to leave the cooperative, all the money invested will be returned to the worker.

The amount required will vary depending on a lot of factors, such as for example:[99]

  • The type of cooperative: if it is a big industrial cooperative, the amount required will probably be higher than for a small services cooperative.
  • The current budget of the cooperative: if a cooperative is already economically well established, probably the requirements will be lower. However, if the cooperative is still young and still requires a lot of investments, the initial requirement will be higher.[100]

Social loans

[edit]

Occasionally. if the situation requires it, workers of the cooperative can decide to put some more money as an investment, which can later be returned.[99]

Cooperative resources

[edit]

Gross profits

[edit]

If the cooperative is based on selling products or services, a part of the finance comes from the profits that they get from their activities.[99]

Proceeds from assets

[edit]

A cooperative can have different assets from which it can get money without having to sell those assets. For example, if the cooperative has money in the bank, and the bank gives interests, it can generate some more money. Or for example, if the cooperative owns a place and rents it, it can get some more money out of it.[99]

Balance sheet assets

[edit]

Assets can also be converted to money. For example, if the cooperative owns shares of another company, they can sell them and turn them into liquidity. Or if the cooperative owns a building, it can sell it. Different types of assets can be converted to liquidity with different levels of ease: for example, selling shares is easier and less time-consuming than selling land, which might take months. Thus, shares are much more easily converted to liquidity than land.[99]

Financial grants

[edit]

Financial grants, that are awards typically given by foundations or governments, can also be a source of financiation for cooperatives. They differ from loans in the fact that under most conditions they do not have to be paid back. Some grants have waiting periods before the grantee can take full ownership of them.[99]

Donations

[edit]

They are usually in the form of cash, but can also be in the form of other assets. Donations are specially recommendable if the cooperative has a strong aim for social impact and mutual aid, in which case individual or collective donors might be interested in donating.[99]

Crowdfunding

[edit]

Crowdfunding is a way of sourcing money for a project by asking a large number of contributors to individually donate a small amount to it. In return, the backers may receive token rewards that increase in prestige as the size of the donation increases.[99]

A successful example of how to finance a workers cooperative with a crowdfunding is the case of the cooperative of the Collettivo di Fabbrica GKNInsorgiamo!, who, after occupying and taking back the control of a GKN factory in Florence, they began a crowdfunding campaign to get the initial money needed to create a cooperative that included all the workers that previously worked there. They used that money to make the initial investments to reconvert the factory to manufacture bicycle parts, with a sustainability goal.

Foundations and Governments financing

[edit]

Especially for SSE cooperatives, one way to get finance is getting grants from governments or private organizations. The latter are usually related to philanthropy. The difference with other types of grants is that they do not require any previous conditions of challenges that need to be achieved.[99]

Challenge grants

[edit]

Challenge grants are funds disbursed by governments, foundations and trusts on completion of challenge requirements. The challenge refers to the actions or results that must be achieved before money is released. The challenge could require a new solution to an existing problem that had been ignored. Additional requirements could be specified, from programme certification to member participation. An example of a challenge grant would be money that is given by a bank if the cooperative increases membership by a certain amount.[99]

Lending

[edit]

Lending or debt instruments provide borrowers with funding in exchange for repayment of this funding along with interest, based on predetermined timeframes and interest rate terms. The provision of funding might require guarantees.[99]

Concessional/Flexible Loans

[edit]

Concessional and flexible loans include special features such as no or low interest rates, extended repayment schedules, and interest rate modifications during the life of the loan.[99]

Crowdlending

[edit]

Crowd lending, also known as peer-to-peer lending, is the practice of lending money through online services that directly match lenders with borrowers. Lenders can earn higher returns compared to savings and investment products offered by banks, while borrowers can borrow money at lower interest rates.[99]

Social bonds

[edit]

For example, when the bank provides sums of money as donations or financing at competitive conditions in support of initiatives that favour social innovation.[99]

Equity investments

[edit]

An equity investment is money that is invested in a company by purchasing shares of that company. Some cooperatives use that as a source of money. In cooperatives equity investments are usually not used, since it is something that is generally believed to go against the principles of cooperativism (the Rochdale Principles themselves limit the equity investments).[99]

Direct equity investment

[edit]

Direct capital contribution to a project without the guarantee of repayment; the return on a direct equity investment will depend on the performance of a project/company over the investment period.[99]

Financing members

[edit]

Especially at the start of a cooperative, this is used in some cases. It involves a person or a legal entity that, with a financial contribution, favours the establishment of a company and the carrying out of the social activity. Typically, they make part of the initial investment, and once the company is established, they resell all or part of the subscribed shares.[99]

Other forms of equity investments

[edit]

Other forms of equity investments used by cooperatives are: equity funds/mutual fund, quasi-equity, equity crowdfunding, social venture capital/impact investing, patient capital, etc.[99]

Redistribution of profit

[edit]

Through all these financial means, a cooperative can create a financial profit. The next set of critical financial decisions becomes how to distribute that profit. There are different forms of redistributing the benefit.[101]

Capital reinvestment

[edit]

Usually, growing the business is not the main goal of a cooperative (the main goal is to redistribute profit among its members), but sometimes it is necessary to reinvest a part of the profits in the form of new capital, which will allow the cooperative to expand its operations and increase profit in the future. This is especially true during the initial steps of the cooperative, in which its operations have to grow to the point in which they have regained the initial capital investment. The capital reinvestments are decided collectively through the democratic mechanisms that a cooperative has.[101]

Patronage refund

[edit]

Patronage refunds are the distribution of profits to the members of the cooperative, who have previously invested money in the form of capital by members and social loans.[101]

Dividends

[edit]

The Rochdale principles state that cooperatives should have limited return on equity investments, so its usual for most of the cooperatives to not use equity investments, and, if they do, pay few dividends to the shareholders. The main reason for which they do that is that distributing profits as dividends reduces the potential amount of patronage refunds.[101]

Unallocated Retained Earnings, or "cushion fund"

[edit]

Part of the benefits of a cooperative must be saved as a safe fund, which will allow the cooperative to face unexpected situations and crises if they appear.[101]

Redistribution of losses

[edit]

In case that a cooperative experiences a loss, there are alternatives to handle them in the most efficient way possible.[101]

Make use of the "cushion funds"

[edit]

If a cooperative has had profits at some point, it should have some savings, which it can use in times of economic losses. In this way, they can absorb the losses simply with the money they already had, not having to affect neither wages, employment, or stocks.[101]

Allocate the losses to the members

[edit]

This is one of the most common ways to allocate the losses. Making this decision involves the workers deliberating through the stablished democratic mechanisms on how are the losses going to be distributed among membership.[101]

We have already seen that, in times of economical hardships, cooperatives are more willing to reduce their wages rather than reduce employment, whereas conventional firms would rather fire some people and keep the same wages for the rest of them.[73]

Job satisfaction

[edit]

Castel et al.. (2011)[102] performed research on job satisfaction in workers cooperatives, and said that job satisfaction is high in workers cooperatives and that social economy values are a source of job satisfaction. Within those types of organizations there are several intrinsic and extrinsic factors that perform in a very characteristic manner, and which are key for job satisfaction.

The intrinsic factors are characteristics of the work itself, and Castel et al. proposes that cooperatives create job satisfaction because they usually involve:[102]

  • Reducing the gap between the conception and execution of tasks
  • Increasing task significance (making work meaningful)
  • Developing workers' skills
  • Seeking to benefit the global environment and society while involving everyone

The extrinsic factors that make work in coops satisfying are:[102]

  • A higher level of shared business culture
  • Increased confidence in elected management
  • Greater attention to working and employment conditions following the increased social responsibility of the company
  • Collective decision-making.

However, Castel et al.. also points out that not all of the characteristics of workers cooperatives increase job satisfaction.[102] In fact, they point out that some characteristics are perjudicial for mental health, such as the perceived increase in work pressure (some workers feel that since they are the owners of their means of production, they are pressured into working more by other colleagues), or the ambiguity of the relationship between other workers (everyone being in the same decision-making position can create conflicts among workers).

Hanson and Prushinkaya (2021) conducted a survey that found similar results: they found that, in general, cooperativists state high job satisfaction, autonomy and voice, and professional development.[74] They also found that the majority of individual respondents described their job security, job satisfaction, work effort, and the economic stability of the company as somewhat or much better than what they experienced in their last job.[74] Also, a majority reported the quality of supervision, feedback, and training was superior in their co-op job. Their research also showed that within co-ops, training and skill-building matters for democratic governance: workers who received cooperative-specific training participated more in workplace decision making.[74]

Another research also shows that worker cooperatives are still beneficial for job satisfaction even if their activity is in no sense related to the social and solidarity economy or has no social purpose at all. According to Hyungsik Eum this is because "in worker cooperatives, worker-members have a sense of ownership of their own jobs and workplaces".[81]

Women in cooperatives

[edit]

Since cooperatives are based on values like self-help, democracy, equality, equity, and solidarity, they can play a particularly strong role in empowering women, especially in developing countries.[103] Cooperatives allow women who might have been isolated and working individually to band together and create economies of scale as well as increase their own bargaining power in the market. In statements in advance of International Women's Day in early 2013, President of the International Cooperative Alliance, Dame Pauline Green, said, "Cooperative businesses have done so much to help women onto the ladder of economic activity. With that comes community respect, political legitimacy and influence."

However, despite the intended democratic structure of cooperatives and the values and benefits shared by members, due to traditional gender norms on the role of women, and other instilled cultural practices that sidestep attempted legal protections, women and other disadvantaged groups suffer a disproportionately low representation in cooperative membership around the world. Representation of women through active membership (showing up to meetings and voting), as well as in leadership and managerial positions is even lower.[104]

Some of the patriarchal behaviors that can be found in cooperatives involve the formal structures and hierarchy that conform[dubiousdiscuss] the cooperative:

  • Non-open and non-democratic decision-making: democratic spaces are often co-opted by men, who occupy most of the space, and tend to monopolize the leadership of those democratic spaces. This can result in women having less voice in the cooperative decision making, thus having their needs underrepresented.
  • Exclusionary leadership: in some occasions, the management of cooperatives involves electing leaders for specific purposes. The under-representation of women in the democratic spaces can result in them having a smaller chance of being elected as representatives or leaders. Statistics show that women are still underrepresented in responsibility jobs in co-ops.[104]
  • Interpersonal relationships: patriarchal behavior can also be found in male colleagues, who often, for example, act in patronizing ways, or have distrust in women's capacity to perform certain jobs.

The strongest manifestations of machismo in cooperatives are: [opinion]

  • Manifestations of machismo that belittle, offend and detract from security and autonomy. They involve a higher level of degradation.
  • Sexual violence: Often hidden by the false supposition that in cooperatives everything is shared and done collectively, which may create an environment that hides sexual violence.
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As of 2012, the number of memberships in cooperatives reached one billion,[105] and so the organizational structure and movement has seeped into popular culture.

However, in comparison with the number of co-operatives, they are rarely the subject of literature. Among these, Ken Follett mentions their role in working-class life during World War I in Fall of Giants (2010), the first volume of his Century Trilogy:

"Where's our mam?"
"Gone down the Co-op for a tin of jam."

The local grocery was a co-operative store, sharing profits among its customers. Such shops were popular in South Wales, although no one knew how to pronounce Co-op, variations ranging from "cop" to "quorp".[106]

Less seriously, in Murder in the Collective, Barbara Wilson sets a murder mystery among radical printing collectives in Seattle,[107] while Frances Madeson's 2007 comic novel Cooperative Village is set in the eponymous housing co-operative in New York.[108]

In the HBO drama television series The Wire, several drug dealers create a democratic alliance called the New Day Co-Op with the interests of cutting back on violence and increasing business.

Co-opoly: The Game of Cooperatives is a popular board game by TESA Collective played around the world that challenges players to work together to start and run a cooperative and overcome major hurdles.[109][110]

Cooperatives feature prominently in the Martian economy in Kim Stanley Robinson's Mars trilogy and in a speculative future Earth economy in his novel The Ministry for the Future.

See also

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

A cooperative, also known as a co-operative or co-op, is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise.
The modern cooperative movement traces its origins to the mid-19th century in , emerging as a practical response to the economic exploitation and poor working conditions prevalent during the , with the founding the first enduring in 1844 by implementing principles of equitable pricing and democratic governance among its members.
Cooperatives adhere to a set of seven core principles established by the , encompassing voluntary and open membership, democratic member control, member economic participation, autonomy and independence, education and training, cooperation among cooperatives, and concern for community, which distinguish them from investor-owned firms by prioritizing member benefits over profit maximization for external shareholders.
These organizations manifest in diverse sectors, including worker-owned enterprises, consumer retail societies, agricultural producer groups, and financial institutions like credit unions, demonstrating resilience in empirical studies where cooperatives often exhibit lower early-stage failure rates compared to conventional businesses due to aligned incentives and community ties.

Definition and Principles

Core Concepts and ICA Principles

A cooperative is defined by the (ICA) as "an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly owned and democratically controlled enterprise." This definition emphasizes member ownership and control as foundational, distinguishing cooperatives from investor-owned firms where control is proportional to capital investment. Core concepts include mutual benefit, where surplus is distributed based on members' participation rather than external capital returns, and one-member-one-vote , ensuring equality in decision-making regardless of financial stake. Cooperatives are guided by a set of shared values articulated by the ICA: , self-responsibility, , equality, equity, and , supplemented by traditional principles of , , , and caring for others. These values underpin operations, promoting internal empowerment and over hierarchical or profit-maximizing models. Empirical data from ICA reports indicate that adherence to these values correlates with higher member retention and resilience in cooperatives, as seen in sectors like and where member loyalty sustains operations during economic downturns. The ICA's seven cooperative principles, revised in 1995 and reaffirmed at subsequent global congresses, provide operational guidelines for implementation:
  1. Voluntary and Open Membership: Cooperatives are open to all willing to accept responsibilities, without discrimination, fostering inclusivity while allowing expulsion for non-compliance with bylaws.
  2. Democratic Member Control: Members control democratically on a one-member-one-vote basis, with elected representatives accountable to the membership, ensuring decisions reflect collective will rather than financial weight.
  3. Member Economic Participation: Members contribute equitably to capital and democratically control its allocation, with surpluses used for development, reserves, or member benefits proportional to transactions.
  4. Autonomy and Independence: Cooperatives remain self-governing, even in agreements with external entities, safeguarding against loss of democratic control.
  5. Education, Training, and Information: Cooperatives provide education to members, elected officials, managers, and employees to contribute effectively, extending to the public for awareness.
  6. Cooperation among Cooperatives: Cooperatives strengthen through local, national, regional, and international collaboration, enhancing viability via federations.
  7. Concern for Community: Cooperatives work for sustainable development, balancing member needs with broader societal impacts through policies approved by members.
These principles, derived from 19th-century practices like the Pioneers, are not legally binding but serve as benchmarks; ICA guidance notes detail their application across sectors, with over 3 million cooperatives worldwide claiming adherence as of 2023. Non-adherence risks exclusion from ICA networks, underscoring their role in maintaining identity amid diverse legal frameworks.

Distinctions from Other Business Models

Cooperatives differ from investor-owned corporations primarily in structure and . In cooperatives, is vested in members who use the services or supply inputs, with each member typically holding one vote regardless of capital contribution, fostering democratic control aligned with user needs rather than capital proportion. In contrast, corporations allocate voting rights proportional to share , enabling concentrated control by large investors and prioritizing for shareholders over mutual benefit. This user-centric model in cooperatives reduces agency conflicts between owners and patrons but can limit due to diffused . Surplus distribution further demarcates cooperatives from corporations and other profit-driven entities. Cooperatives allocate net earnings as patronage refunds based on members' transaction volume or use, returning value to active participants rather than passive investors. Corporations, however, distribute dividends or reinvest based on equity stakes, incentivizing external capital but potentially diverging from operational stakeholders' interests. Relative to sole proprietorships or partnerships, cooperatives extend beyond personal relationships, imposing democratic voting over unilateral or negotiated control, while offering akin to corporations but without unlimited personal exposure common in sole proprietorships and general partnerships. Unlike nonprofits, which reinvest all surpluses without equity returns or ownership claims, cooperatives issue member shares or equity redeemable under specific conditions, blending mutual aid with capital formation tied to participation. Limited liability companies (LLCs) provide flexibility in profit-sharing but default to investor-oriented governance unless structured otherwise, lacking cooperatives' inherent patronage-based refunds and one-member-one-vote principle. These distinctions promote resilience in cooperatives during market volatility, as evidenced by lower failure rates in user-owned agricultural co-ops compared to investor firms, though they may constrain aggressive growth strategies reliant on venture capital.

Historical Development

Early Precursors and Pre-Industrial Forms

In medieval Europe, guilds emerged as associations of merchants and craft workers primarily between the 11th and 13th centuries, functioning to provide mutual aid among members, including financial support for funerals, illness, and old age, alongside regulating trade practices and quality standards. These organizations pooled resources from member contributions to offer collective benefits, such as assistance during economic hardship or disputes, which represented early forms of risk-sharing and solidarity predating formal insurance mechanisms. While guilds often prioritized monopolistic control over markets and restricted entry to protect established members, their mutual support structures laid foundational principles for later cooperative self-help, influencing the transition from feudal to proto-industrial economies. By the 17th and early 18th centuries in Britain, guilds fragmented due to religious reforms and economic shifts, giving rise to friendly societies—informal mutual aid groups where working-class members subscribed regular payments to a common fund for benefits like sickness pay, unemployment relief, and burial costs. These societies, numbering in the hundreds by the mid-1700s, operated on democratic principles of equal voting and shared governance, emphasizing voluntary association and collective security in agrarian and early proto-industrial communities lacking state welfare. Examples included masonry and coal miners' groups in northern England, which extended aid to families during strikes or mine accidents, demonstrating causal links between localized risks and pooled responses without profit motives. A specific pre-industrial consumer-oriented precursor occurred on March 14, 1761, in Fenwick, Ayrshire, Scotland, where local weavers formed a society to collectively purchase oatmeal at wholesale prices, transporting it by handcart to bypass exploitative middlemen amid fluctuating grain markets. This effort, sustained for over a decade through member shares and equal distribution, exemplified embryonic cooperative purchasing to mitigate scarcity and price volatility in rural textile communities, bridging mutual aid traditions toward structured economic collaboration. Similar rotating savings practices appeared in pre-industrial Asia and Africa, such as informal credit circles in Chinese merchant guilds or Indian village funds, where participants cycled lump-sum payouts for communal needs like farming tools or emergencies, fostering resilience through reciprocal obligations. These forms, while not embodying modern cooperative statutes like one-member-one-vote or limited returns on capital, underscored empirical patterns of human organization for survival: groups harnessing to counter asymmetric , market failures, and individual vulnerabilities in low-capital, labor-intensive societies. Sources on these , often drawn from archival of charters and ledgers rather than ideological narratives, reveal their pragmatic origins in empirical necessity over abstract , though romanticized accounts in later cooperative may overstate direct lineages to 19th-century models.

19th-Century Foundations and Rochdale Model

The cooperative movement in the emerged amid the socioeconomic disruptions of the in Britain, where rapid urbanization, factory labor, and market adulteration of goods exacerbated and exploitation among workers. operatives, facing volatile wages, long hours, and contaminated foodstuffs sold at inflated prices by private traders, sought mutual mechanisms to secure reliable supplies. Early attempts at cooperative stores in the and 1830s, influenced by reformers like , often collapsed due to inadequate capital, poor management, or credit extension, with most failing by 1840 despite hundreds of formations. These efforts underscored the need for disciplined, principle-based operations to achieve , shifting from idealistic communes to pragmatic associations grounded in economic realism. The , established on December 21, 1844, in , , marked the foundational success of the modern cooperative model. Comprising 28 flannel weavers who pooled £28 in (equivalent to about £3,000 in 2023 terms), the group opened a modest store at 31 Toad Lane to procure unadulterated , , and directly from wholesalers, bypassing exploitative middlemen. Initial sales totaled £710 in the first quarter, with membership growing to 74 by year-end, demonstrating viability through strict cash-only transactions and fixed market prices that avoided undercutting competitors. This consumer cooperative's longevity—expanding to multiple branches by the —stemmed from its rejection of prior failures, emphasizing empirical accountability over utopian visions. Central to the Rochdale model were operational rules codified in bylaws from 1844, revised in 1845 and 1854, which prioritized democratic , financial transparency, and member incentives to align individual and collective interests. Key principles included:
  • Open membership: Admission available to all without , subject to a nominal (initially 2 shillings).
  • Democratic control: One member, one vote, regardless of shares held, with by an elected .
  • dividends: Surplus distributed proportionally to members' purchases, not capital investment, fostering and equitable returns (e.g., 8% on capital capped, remainder as purchase rebates).
  • Cash trading and pure goods: No to prevent ; commitment to unadulterated products at prevailing prices, verified by labels.
  • Neutrality and : Avoidance of political or religious advocacy; promotion of member knowledge on cooperative benefits.
These tenets, later formalized as the by the International Co-operative Alliance in 1937, enabled scalability by mitigating moral hazards like free-riding and ensuring reinvestment for expansion, influencing over 1,000 similar societies in Britain by 1860. The model's causal emphasis on verifiable surplus allocation and member participation proved resilient against economic cycles, contrasting with state-dependent alternatives.

20th-Century Growth, Wars, and State Interventions

The cooperative movement underwent substantial expansion in the early 20th century, fueled by agricultural needs and consumer demands amid industrialization. In the United States, the number of farm marketing and purchasing cooperatives nearly doubled between 1914 and 1920, stimulated by World War I-era shortages that encouraged for supplies and markets. By 1929–1930, approximately 12,000 marketing and farm supply cooperatives operated, serving 3.1 million members and transacting $2.5 billion in volume, reflecting robust growth despite economic volatility. Internationally, consumer cooperatives proliferated in , with organizations like those in achieving significant through voluntary member ownership. World War I bolstered cooperatives in allied and neutral nations by enabling efficient rationing and distribution, as seen in European consumer societies maintaining supply stability without full governmental takeover. However, the introduced ideological tensions, with cooperatives advocating peace through international alliances like the , which posited that mutual economic structures could mitigate war's root causes. World War II severely disrupted operations in Axis-controlled territories; in , authorities seized control of cooperatives in May 1933, integrating them into the totalitarian framework before issuing a February 1941 decree for their liquidation and asset transfer to regime entities, effectively eliminating independent cooperative activity. In Spain's Civil War (1936–1939), anarcho-syndicalist groups briefly expanded worker cooperatives in Republican zones, such as Barcelona's collectives managing production amid conflict, though these dissolved post-war under Franco's regime. State interventions profoundly shaped cooperative trajectories, often contrasting voluntary models with coercive ones. In the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin's collectivization campaign from 1928 forced millions of peasants into kolkhozy—state-directed collective farms—through expropriation and dekulakization, provoking resistance including livestock slaughter that halved herds by 1933 and contributing to famines claiming 5–10 million lives, primarily in Ukraine's Holodomor; this mandatory system, lacking genuine member control, engendered chronic output shortfalls unlike autonomous cooperatives elsewhere. Fascist Italy similarly curtailed independence, viewing consumer cooperatives as threats due to their democratic ties and anti-fascist leanings, leading to the 1925 dissolution of national federations and subordination under corporatist structures that prioritized regime loyalty over member governance. Conversely, democratic governments provided enabling frameworks; the U.S. New Deal enacted the Rural Electrification Act in 1935, fostering electric cooperatives that by 1950 served over 80% of rural electrification needs, and the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934, which spurred thousands of member-owned financial cooperatives as alternatives to exploitative lending. Post-World War II reconstruction in Western Europe leveraged cooperatives for recovery, with voluntary associations aiding resource allocation and demonstrating resilience against both wartime destruction and statist overreach.

Post-1980s Globalization and Recent Trends Including 2025 UN Year

The liberalization of global markets following the end of the facilitated the expansion of cooperatives beyond traditional Western and agricultural strongholds, particularly in , , and post-communist , where they adapted to integrate into international supply chains for commodities like coffee and bananas through networks. By the early 2000s, cooperatives accounted for significant shares of national economies in countries such as (where they contributed over 4% of GDP) and (via entities like , which grew to employ over 80,000 workers by 2020), demonstrating resilience amid multinational competition despite challenges like capital constraints and governance inefficiencies inherent to democratic member control. Globally, the sector's scale reached approximately 3 million cooperatives employing 280 million people—about 10% of the world's paid —and serving over 1 billion members, or 12% of the global , as reported by the (ICA) in assessments up to 2023. In the and , cooperatives confronted intensified pressures from digital disruption and volatility, prompting innovations such as platform cooperatives that democratize ownership in sectors like ride-sharing (e.g., Co-opCycle) and creative services (e.g., Stocksy United), which prioritize and equitable revenue distribution over venture capital-driven extraction. These models address precarity by enabling worker or user control, though adoption remains limited due to scaling difficulties compared to centralized platforms, with only a few achieving viability beyond niche markets by 2025. Concurrently, sustainability imperatives drove cooperatives toward alignment with UN , particularly in agriculture and energy, where they enhanced and reduced emissions through collective practices; for instance, farmer cooperatives in leverage precision tools for lower input use, fostering resilience against climate variability. The designated 2025 as the International Year of Cooperatives (IYC2025) via Resolution A/RES/78/288 on June 19, 2024, under the theme "Cooperatives Build a Better ," aiming to elevate of their role in , job creation, and social cohesion amid global inequalities. Building on the IYC, the initiative—coordinated by the ICA and partners like the ILO—promotes policy advocacy for enabling legal frameworks and highlights cooperatives' contributions to and , with events including a global launch in November 2024 and sector-specific campaigns through 2025. As of October 2025, IYC2025 activities have emphasized of cooperatives' stability during crises, such as the , where they maintained operations and employment better than investor-owned firms in comparable sectors, underscoring their causal advantages in member-centric risk-sharing. In most jurisdictions, cooperatives are recognized as distinct legal entities separate from investor-owned corporations, with statutes emphasizing democratic control, limited profit distribution, and member economic participation. These forms typically require registration with government authorities and adherence to cooperative principles, such as one-member-one-vote , though implementation varies by national or subnational laws. Unlike standard corporations, cooperative statutes often restrict share transfers, prioritize surplus allocation to members based on , and provide exemptions from certain antitrust rules to facilitate . In the United Kingdom, the primary legal form is the co-operative society, registered under the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014, which succeeded the Industrial and Provident Societies Acts dating to 1852. This structure mandates open or restricted membership, democratic management, and application of profits primarily for member benefit rather than external shareholders; community benefit societies serve similar purposes but focus on non-economic social goals. Cooperatives may alternatively incorporate as companies limited by shares or guarantee under the Companies Act 2006, but must embed cooperative model rules in their articles to qualify as such. As of 2023, over 5,000 societies were registered, handling assets exceeding £30 billion. In the United States, cooperatives lack a uniform federal entity type but operate as cooperative associations or corporations under state-specific statutes, often modeled on the Revised Uniform Limited Cooperative Association Act (ULLCAA), adopted in 11 states including and as of 2021. These entities feature patron-member ownership, proportional voting or one-member-one-vote systems, and patronage refunds from margins; federal laws like the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 grant antitrust exemptions for agricultural and similar producer cooperatives. Specific federal charters apply to credit unions under the Federal Credit Union Act of 1934 and rural electric cooperatives under the of 1936, with approximately 65,000 cooperatives active nationwide in 2022, employing over 2 million people. In , federal cooperatives incorporate under the Canada Cooperatives Act of 1999 for interprovincial operations, requiring at least 75% Canadian membership and democratic governance; provincial equivalents, such as Ontario's Co-operative Corporations Act, govern local entities with similar provisions for member shares, non-transferable voting rights, and allocated surpluses. This dual framework supports over 9,000 cooperatives as of 2022, particularly in and . Civil law jurisdictions in the exhibit specialized forms tailored to stakeholder types. In , worker cooperatives register as sociétés coopératives et participatives (SCOPs) or multi-stakeholder sociétés coopératives d'intérêt collectif (SCICs) under the Labour Code and Prévoyance Code, mandating majority employee ownership and profit-sharing; as of 2023, SCOPs numbered over 2,200 with €10 billion turnover. In , eingetragene Genossenschaften (eG) form under the Genossenschaftsgesetz of 1889 (amended), emphasizing open membership and supervisory boards for larger entities; the framework supports around 7,600 cooperatives, dominant in banking via Volksbanken and Raiffeisenbanken. EU-wide, the Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE) under Regulation (EC) No 1435/2003 enables cross-border entities since 2006, though adoption remains limited with fewer than 30 registered by 2022 due to national preferences. In , co-operative societies register under state-specific Co-operative Societies Acts, derived from the 1912 central model, requiring minimum 10 members, , and democratic administration; multi-state societies fall under the Multi-State Co-operative Societies Act 2002. With over 800,000 registered as of 2023, primarily in , the structure enforces limited dividends and government oversight to prevent mismanagement. In Australia, cooperatives incorporate under the Co-operatives National Law (applied via state legislation since 2014), featuring patronage-based shares and one-member-one-vote; around 2,000 entities existed in 2022, often in and retail. Japan's consumer cooperatives operate under the Consumer Co-operative Act of 1948, distinct from general companies under the Companies Act.
JurisdictionPrimary Legal Form(s)Key FeaturesGoverning Legislation
Co-operative SocietyDemocratic control, member surplus allocationCo-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014
Cooperative Association/Patronage refunds, state variationsState statutes; ULLCAA in select states
SCOP/SCICMajority worker ownership, multi-stakeholder optionsLabour Code
eG (Genossenschaft)Open membership, supervisory oversightGenossenschaftsgesetz
Co-operative SocietyMinimum members, government registrationState Co-operative Societies Acts
These forms reflect adaptations to local economic needs, with systems favoring flexible incorporation and civil law emphasizing codified mutualism; however, enforcement varies, and cooperatives in regulated sectors like face additional compliance.

Ownership, Shares, and Capital Structures

In cooperatives, is held collectively by members who participate as users, providers, or beneficiaries of the cooperative's services, with control exercised through democratic featuring one-member-one-vote principles rather than proportional to capital invested. This structure prioritizes member needs over external investor interests, ensuring decisions reflect collective patronage or labor input rather than financial stake. Legal forms vary by jurisdiction—such as cooperative corporations or limited cooperative associations—but universally embed member to align operations with cooperative principles of and mutual benefit. Shares in cooperatives typically function as membership certificates rather than tradable securities, granting access to voting rights and limited economic returns without enabling speculative or control concentration. Unlike corporate , which confers voting power proportional to holdings and unrestricted transferability, cooperative shares are often non-transferable outside the membership or redeemable only at nominal value upon exit, with dividends capped at low rates—frequently 2-8% annually—to subordinate capital to democratic control and prevent risks. In consumer cooperatives, shares may be refundable based on history, while worker cooperatives employ internal capital accounts to track individual contributions and allocated surpluses, treating accumulated equity as redeemable under bylaws upon membership cessation. Capital structures in cooperatives emphasize self-financing to maintain member , sourcing funds primarily from share subscriptions—often a modest one-time fee of $25 to $1,000 per member—and retained patronage refunds, where surpluses from operations are allocated proportionally to usage but plowed back as revolving equity rather than distributed as . This contrasts with investor-owned firms' reliance on equity markets; cooperatives limit external equity to non-voting instruments like preferred shares, which rank above member capital for repayment but yield fixed returns without influence, as seen in models allowing up to 20-30% non-member investment in some U.S. agricultural cooperatives. form the bulk of permanent capital, with redemption policies spanning 5-20 years to ensure and . Such mechanisms enhance resilience by tying capital to operational needs, though they can constrain growth in capital-intensive sectors without supplementary or federated from secondary cooperatives.

Federations, Unions, and Secondary Cooperatives

Secondary cooperatives, also termed federations or unions, are cooperative entities whose membership comprises primary cooperatives, enabling on functions too complex or resource-intensive for individual primaries to undertake alone. These structures embody the principle of inter-cooperative collaboration by pooling resources for , such as bulk , unified , technical support, and policy advocacy, thereby enhancing operational efficiency and market influence without supplanting local . Member primaries typically hold ownership shares and exercise democratic voting rights, often on a one-member-cooperative, one-vote basis, to preserve egalitarian governance across varying sizes. Federations operate through centralized boards elected by member cooperatives, managing regional or national operations while primaries retain control over local activities. This tiered model supports in capital-intensive endeavors, like establishing processing facilities or negotiating supplier contracts, reducing costs and risks distributed among members. For instance, in agricultural sectors, federations handle national distribution networks, allowing primaries to focus on production. Benefits include improved leverage with suppliers and regulators, access to specialized expertise, and resilience against market volatility through diversified risk-sharing, as evidenced by federated systems' role in stabilizing supply chains during economic disruptions. Prominent examples include the (ICA), founded on December 19, 1895, in , which functions as a global apex federation uniting national and sectoral bodies to promote cooperative principles and represent over 3 million cooperatives employing 280 million people worldwide. ICA's sectoral arms, such as the International Cooperative Agricultural Organisation (ICAO), established in 1951, coordinate agricultural cooperatives for policy advocacy and knowledge exchange, while CICOPA, dating to 1947, supports industrial and service cooperatives in areas like manufacturing standards and labor practices. Regionally, Cooperatives Europe federates entities serving 141 million individuals across the continent, focusing on regulatory harmonization and initiatives. In the United States, the Farm Credit System exemplifies a secondary cooperative network, comprising borrower-owned banks and associations that provide long-term to over 800,000 farmers and rural entities as of 2023, with assets exceeding $400 billion, thereby enabling primaries to equipment and operations at competitive rates. Similarly, the National Cooperative Bank, operational since 1978 under federal charter, extends loans and advisory services exclusively to cooperatives, facilitating growth in sectors like and without diluting member control. These unions underscore secondary cooperatives' role in amplifying primaries' economic viability, though challenges persist in aligning diverse member interests and navigating regulatory variances across jurisdictions.

Types of Cooperatives

Consumer and Retail Cooperatives

Consumer cooperatives are enterprises owned and controlled by their customer-members, who purchase for personal use rather than for resale or production. These organizations prioritize delivering quality products at fair prices while returning surplus earnings to members as patronage refunds proportional to their purchases, rather than distributing profits to external investors. Unlike investor-owned retailers, consumer co-ops emphasize mutual benefit and democratic governance, with decisions made on a one-member, one-vote basis irrespective of share ownership. The modern model originated with the , founded on December 21, 1844, in , , by 28 cotton weavers facing exploitative market conditions during the . The group opened a store stocking basic goods like and , implementing principles such as open membership, democratic control, and cash trading to ensure transparency and avoid debt. This Rochdale model, codified in their 1844 rule book, became the foundational framework for consumer cooperatives worldwide, influencing the International Cooperative Alliance's seven principles adopted in 1995, including voluntary membership, member economic participation, and concern for community. Retail cooperatives, a primary form of co-ops, operate grocery stores, department stores, and specialty outlets, often federating to achieve in purchasing and distribution. Members typically acquire a nominal share to gain voting rights and access discounts or refunds based on annual . For instance, Switzerland's , founded in 1925 as a mobile retail operation, evolved into a of five regional cooperatives serving over 2 million members and generating billions in annual sales through and non-food retail. Similarly, Germany's , a cooperative retailing network, reported €82 billion in turnover in 2021, operating and focusing on member-driven supply chains. In the United States, consumer retail co-ops include food stores like those affiliated with the National Cooperative Grocers, which collectively serve communities with locally sourced products and emphasize , though they represent a smaller compared to dominant chains. The UK's Co-operative Group, tracing roots to , operates over 2,500 food stores and posted food division revenue exceeding £7 billion in recent years, demonstrating resilience through member loyalty during economic downturns. Empirical data indicate consumer co-ops often exhibit higher survival rates in recessions due to their focus on essential goods and reinvestment in member services rather than short-term profit extraction.

Worker and Producer Cooperatives

Worker cooperatives are businesses owned and democratically controlled by their employee-members, who participate equally in through mechanisms such as one-member, one-vote elections for boards and major decisions, distinguishing them from capital-weighted voting in investor-owned firms. Profits, after reserves and service, are typically distributed to members in proportion to labor hours contributed rather than shareholdings, with emphasis on employment stability and reinvestment over short-term dividends. Membership requires an initial capital subscription, often refundable upon exit, and non-transferable to maintain worker control. The Mondragon Corporation, based in Spain's Basque Country and founded in 1956, exemplifies a scaled worker cooperative federation, encompassing over 80 autonomous entities across manufacturing, finance, and retail sectors, employing approximately 70,000 workers as of 2024, with about 30% as full owner-members (socios). In the United States, worker cooperatives number around 300 to 400, often in services like caregiving or food production, such as Cooperative Home Care Associates in New York, which employs over 2,000 worker-owners in home health services. Globally, worker cooperatives represent a small fraction of cooperatives, with eight appearing in the International Cooperative Alliance's 2023 top 300 by turnover, primarily from Europe. Producer cooperatives differ fundamentally, being owned by independent producers of similar goods—typically farmers, fishermen, or artisans—who unite to jointly market outputs, procure inputs, or process products, thereby securing better terms without relinquishing individual production operations. Members supply the cooperative as patrons, receiving returns based on volume transacted rather than labor input, while the entity may hire non-owner managers and staff for day-to-day functions. This structure leverages collective scale for bargaining, risk-sharing in storage or transport, and standardized quality control. Agricultural producer cooperatives predominate, with examples including , owned by over 1,200 U.S. dairy farmers and generating $18 billion in annual revenue through processing and marketing, and Ocean Spray, a cranberry grower-owned entity distributing products from 700 member farms. In Canada, Agropur unites 3,000 dairy producers for similar supply-chain efficiencies. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture's 2023 rankings, the top 100 agricultural cooperatives—mostly producer types—collectively handled $212 billion in business volume, underscoring their scale in commodities like , grains, and fruits. Producer cooperatives thus facilitate for dispersed suppliers, contrasting worker cooperatives' internal labor ownership by focusing on upstream coordination.
AspectWorker CooperativesProducer Cooperatives
Ownership BaseEmployees working in the firmIndependent producers supplying the firm
Governance FocusDemocratic control over operations and strategyCollective decisions on marketing, pricing, and services
Profit AllocationProportional to labor contributionProportional to (volume supplied)
Scale ExamplesMondragon (70,000 workers, diverse sectors) ($18B revenue, agriculture)

Financial, Utility, and Housing Cooperatives

Financial cooperatives, including unions and cooperative banks, operate as member-owned institutions providing banking services such as deposits, loans, and payments, with decisions guided by member interests rather than shareholder profits. Globally, these entities managed assets exceeding $2 trillion as of recent estimates, serving hundreds of millions of members. In 2020, Group in ranked as the largest financial cooperative by total assets. The European Association of Co-operative Banks represented 3,135 mutual banks with 80 million members and 209 million customers across 20 countries as of available data. In the United States and , credit unions held $2.191 trillion in assets and served 274.2 million members, achieving a penetration of 9.38%. These institutions often demonstrate resilience during economic downturns due to their localized focus and member loyalty, though they face regulatory challenges comparable to commercial banks. Utility cooperatives primarily deliver essential services like , , and , especially in underserved rural areas where investor-owned firms deem operations unprofitable. In the United States, rural electric cooperatives emerged in the 1930s under the Rural Electrification Administration, now numbering around 900 and serving 42 million people across 47% of the nation's landmass. These co-ops sourced 13% of their power from renewables as of 2010, though empirical comparisons show mixed cost efficiencies relative to investor-owned utilities, with some studies indicating higher operational expenses due to smaller scale and geographic dispersion. In , energy cooperatives facilitate community-led renewable projects, with over 2,600 registered in countries like and by 2018, contributing to decentralized grids but facing integration hurdles with national systems. Globally, examples include Argentina's 600 cooperatives electrifying 58% of rural populations and owning 80% of rural networks. utility co-ops remain less prevalent, often limited by regulatory barriers favoring municipal or private provision, yet they address access gaps in developing regions. Performance data suggests utility co-ops enhance local energy access but may impose regressive pricing structures, disproportionately affecting lower-income users compared to regulated investor-owned alternatives. Housing cooperatives enable collective ownership of residential properties, where members purchase shares in a that holds title to the buildings and land, granting occupancy rights via proprietary leases rather than individual deeds. This model predominates in urban areas like , exemplified by Co-op City, which houses over 55,000 residents in 35 high-rise buildings and townhouses on 320 acres, formed in 1968 to combat shortages. Benefits include stable costs insulated from market rents and potential for democratic over maintenance and rules, fostering community cohesion. However, residents face higher monthly fees covering shared expenses—often exceeding those of condominiums—and limited resale flexibility due to board approvals and share price caps aimed at preserving affordability. Challenges encompass financing difficulties, as co-ops struggle with access compared to fee-simple ownership, and internal disputes over capital improvements. on longevity shows co-ops sustaining affordability longer than market-rate rentals but requiring strong member commitment to avoid default risks, with no uniform superiority over condominiums in financial returns due to varying local regulations.

Multi-Stakeholder, Platform, and Emerging Forms

Multi-stakeholder cooperatives (MSCs) incorporate two or more distinct classes of members—such as workers, consumers, producers, or supporters—into shared and , often via systems or class-specific representation to balance divergent interests. This structure contrasts with single-stakeholder models by pursuing hybrid economic and social goals, such as enhanced local in food systems, though it risks elevated decision-making costs from self-interested bargaining. on MSCs is predominantly qualitative and exploratory, revealing no zero-sum trade-offs in stakeholder well-being but highlighting coordination challenges in heterogeneous groups. Notable examples include Weaver Street Market in , a grocery cooperative owned by consumers, workers, and local producers, which has sustained operations since 1988 by integrating these groups in . Local food cooperatives often adopt MSC forms to link producers and consumers directly, as in models where employee members participate alongside patrons to support regional supply chains. Studies indicate MSCs can resist degeneration in regulated professions by prioritizing alternatives over hierarchical capture, though success depends on robust conflict-resolution mechanisms. Platform cooperatives extend cooperative principles to digital marketplaces, where members own and govern websites or apps for service provision, emphasizing democratic control over algorithmic extraction seen in investor-owned platforms. These entities distribute surpluses to users rather than external investors; for instance, Stocksy United, a platform launched in , allocates 50% of standard license fees and 75% of extended ones to artist-owners. Fairbnb, an Italian short-term rental service, directs a portion of bookings to community initiatives, while the Drivers Cooperative in , formed in 2019, enables ride-share drivers to capture fares without platform commissions exceeding member-approved levels. Multiple case studies underscore platform cooperatives' potential for equitable value capture in gig economies but identify persistent hurdles, including user acquisition against dominant incumbents and limited institutional investment, with only select models like Spain's Som Mobilitat achieving scale by 2024. As of 2025, operational examples remain niche, comprising fewer than 300 globally tracked initiatives, often reliant on federation networks for viability. Emerging forms blend with technologies, manifesting as decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) that encode member voting and resource allocation via smart contracts, potentially automating incentives in sectors like or labor. SporkDAO exemplifies this hybrid, operating as a limited cooperative association since around 2021 to oversee community-funded projects with patronage-based incentives. Such structures aim to supplant hierarchies with networks, enabling global coordination without intermediaries, as in DAO-coop models for freelance worker pools or crop . However, these remain experimental; while facilitates transparent ledgers, DAOs exhibit high dissolution rates—over 50% within two years per 2022 analyses—due to disputes, breaches, and regulatory voids, distinguishing them from legally anchored cooperatives. Ongoing integrations, like protocol DAOs for DeFi lending with coop-like yield sharing, signal evolution but lack proven resilience against market volatility.

Economic Performance

Empirical Metrics on Productivity and Efficiency

Empirical studies measuring in cooperatives, often as value-added or output per worker or input unit, yield mixed results influenced by cooperative type, industry, and methodology. A of 43 studies on labor-managed firms, including worker cooperatives, found positive associations between and mechanisms like profit-sharing, worker , and participation, with stronger effects in fully labor-managed structures compared to participatory capitalist firms. In contrast, a cross-industry of Portuguese firms using random-effects models indicated cooperatives were significantly less productive than investor-owned firms overall and in most sectors, though system-GMM estimates accounting for endogeneity produced inconclusive evidence of gaps and no support for cooperatives outperforming investor-owned firms. Sector-specific metrics highlight further variation. For U.S. agricultural cooperatives, biennial Malmquist index decompositions showed a 34% increase from 2005 to 2014, comprising a 37% technological progress component offsetting a 2% decline in technical . Grain marketing and farm supply cooperatives in the same period exhibited productivity growth tied to scale efficiencies and input adjustments, though lagging investor-owned firms in capital utilization. Data envelopment analysis in dairy sectors has sometimes revealed investor-owned firms outperforming cooperatives in technical efficiency, attributed to differences in scale and market orientation, yet agricultural cooperatives broadly match or exceed member-level returns through collective efficiencies. Reviews of employee-owned models, including cooperatives, across over 100 international studies link such structures to higher via reduced agency problems and enhanced worker effort, though worker cooperatives specifically may underperform in capital-intensive settings due to horizons. In cases like Spain's , econometric assessments confirm levels competitive with or superior to investor-owned peers, driven by integrated and scale. These patterns suggest cooperatives' advantages emerge where motivational alignments dominate, but trade-offs arise from democratic processes and financing limits.

Firm Survival, Stability, and Crisis Resilience

Empirical analyses across multiple jurisdictions indicate that cooperatives exhibit higher long-term survival rates compared to investor-owned firms. A comparative study of organizational forms in found that cooperatives had a survival probability approximately 20-30% higher than capitalist enterprises over five-year periods, attributed to factors such as member commitment and diversified risk-sharing rather than pressures. Similarly, longitudinal data from Uruguay's worker cooperatives showed survival rates exceeding 80% after three years, surpassing conventional firms by 15-25 percentage points, with resilience linked to internal capital retention and democratic reducing exit incentives during downturns. These patterns hold in diverse sectors, though cooperatives often concentrate in stable industries like and retail, potentially inflating apparent advantages without controlling for selection effects. Stability in cooperatives manifests through lower employee turnover and more consistent operations, driven by member-ownership aligning incentives against short-term opportunism. Research on French worker cooperatives demonstrated annual turnover rates 10-15% below those of comparable capitalist firms, with stability enhanced by profit-sharing mechanisms that prioritize collective retention over individual payouts. In the U.S., employee-owned firms, including cooperatives, recorded turnover rates averaging 14% versus 27% in traditional corporations from 2010-2020, correlating with higher job tenure averaging 7.5 years. This stability arises causally from reduced principal-agent conflicts, as owners are workers, though it may constrain adaptability in rapidly evolving markets where external capital infusions enable pivots. During economic crises, cooperatives demonstrate enhanced resilience, often outperforming investor-owned counterparts in maintaining operations and employment. In the 2008 global financial crisis, Italian cooperatives reduced layoffs by 40% relative to private firms, sustaining output through wage flexibility and member reinvestments rather than asset fire-sales. Financial cooperatives, such as credit unions, weathered the crisis with delinquency rates under 1% in 2009 compared to 5-7% for , due to conservative lending tied to member needs over speculative growth. Evidence from the reinforces this: Spanish worker cooperatives preserved 70% of pre-crisis employment levels versus 50% in non-cooperatives, leveraging internal solidarity funds and diversified stakeholder models to buffer shocks. However, resilience varies by type; consumer cooperatives in volatile sectors like retail showed mixed outcomes, with some failing due to capital constraints absent in equity-driven firms. Overall, these patterns suggest cooperatives' member-centric structures foster endurance, though empirical controls for firm age and size reveal no universal superiority absent favorable policy environments.

Comparative Analysis with Investor-Owned Firms

Empirical comparisons between cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs) reveal sector-specific and context-dependent outcomes, influenced by differing objectives: cooperatives emphasize member benefits such as stable and equitable returns, while IOFs prioritize maximization, often driving higher risk-taking and growth. In agricultural sectors, financial performances are broadly comparable, with cooperatives matching IOFs in profitability and liquidity ratios over periods like 1971–1987 for firms, though IOFs exhibit advantages in asset efficiency for fruit and vegetable processing. Worker cooperatives, in particular, demonstrate resilience, with survival rates equaling or exceeding those of IOFs in market economies, attributed to lower leverage and democratic reducing vulnerability to economic downturns. Productivity metrics show cooperatives often lagging IOFs on average, as evidenced by Portuguese cross-industry panel data from 1996–2008, where random-effects models indicated cooperatives were significantly less productive, potentially due to horizon problems in member decision-making favoring short-term gains over long-term investments. However, meta-analyses of worker participation in labor-managed firms find positive effects on productivity, with profit-sharing mechanisms amplifying gains in cooperatives compared to IOFs, particularly in transition economies. In poultry and dairy industries, cooperatives have occasionally outperformed IOFs in profitability and efficiency during stable periods, challenging theoretical predictions of inherent underperformance. During crises, cooperatives exhibit superior stability; Italian data from the 2008–2013 recession showed worker cooperatives maintaining employment levels better than IOFs, with anti-cyclical dynamics stemming from member commitment over profit extraction. Growth rates, however, favor IOFs, with cooperatives displaying lower asset expansion (e.g., statistically significant differences at p<0.1% in Italian food firms), linked to restricted external equity access and conservative reinvestment. Recent Spanish analyses propose adjusted profitability ratios confirming cooperatives' edge in global efficiency when accounting for retained earnings distributions, though IOFs lead in scalable innovation due to capital mobility.
MetricCooperatives vs. IOFsKey Evidence
ProductivityOften lower average, but participation boosts in specific formsPortuguese panel (1996–2008): co-ops 10–20% less productive; : positive LMF effects
Survival RateEqual or higherMarket economy data: co-ops match/exceed IOFs over 5–10 years
Crisis ResilienceSuperior employment stability 2008–2013: co-ops reduced layoffs by 15–25% vs. IOFs
ProfitabilityComparable/sector-varyingAg co-ops (1971–1987): similar ; Spanish adjustments show co-op edge

Financing Mechanisms

Internal Funding from Members and Operations

Internal funding in cooperatives primarily derives from member equity contributions and retained operational surpluses, enabling self-financing without external influence. Member contributions typically take the form of or membership fees, representing each member's proportional stake tied to their participation rather than speculative . These funds provide initial and ongoing capital for operations, with shares often non-transferable and offering limited or no dividends to prioritize collective reinvestment over individual returns. Retained earnings from operations constitute a core internal funding mechanism, where surpluses generated after member distributions—known as patronage refunds—are allocated but not immediately disbursed, accruing in individual or collective reserves. In and agricultural cooperatives, members may consent to retaining portions of these refunds to build equity for expansion, debt reduction, or reserves against losses, as seen in U.S. farmer cooperatives where retained patronage refunds form a significant equity base. For worker cooperatives, internal capital accounts attribute retained profits to members proportionally, balancing needs with long-term ; for instance, a common practice retains 30% of annual profits before eventual payouts upon exit. Empirical data underscores the reliance on these sources for stability: U.S. agricultural cooperatives exhibited rising total equity from $36.2 billion in 2012 to $52.1 billion in 2019, with comprising a growing share to enhance risk absorption, as higher retained earnings-to-equity ratios correlate with better loss mitigation during downturns. This approach aligns funding with user needs, fostering resilience but constraining rapid scaling compared to investor-owned firms due to capped member contributions and redemption policies that prioritize operational liquidity over perpetual accumulation. Unallocated serve as a buffer, owned by members as a group to fund unforeseen investments or maintain democratic control amid external financing barriers.

External Debt, Equity, and Alternative Sources

Cooperatives often resort to to supplement internal funds for expansion and operations, including bank loans, bonds, and lines of , though access is constrained by their non-profit-maximizing structure, which lenders view as riskier due to democratic and patronage refunds prioritizing user-members over debt servicing. Empirical analysis of agricultural cooperatives indicates that nearly half of growth financing comes from equity, with the remainder split between and , but higher indebtedness correlates with improved profitability through leverage effects, provided liquidity is maintained. However, reliance on elevates risk, particularly long-term obligations, as cooperatives lack the flexibility of investor-owned firms to adjust payouts during downturns, with studies showing debt-financed firms more prone to exit via . Equity financing poses inherent challenges for cooperatives, as their member-owned model ties capital contributions to patronage rather than proportional returns, deterring outside investors seeking dividends or capital gains. Internal equity accumulation via retained earnings is common but insufficient for rapid scaling, especially in capital-intensive sectors like agriculture, where aging memberships and low margins limit reinvestment; thus, cooperatives increasingly explore outside equity, though traditional stock issuance risks diluting democratic control. To mitigate this, some adopt , offering fixed returns to external investors without voting rights, enabling access to capital markets while preserving member governance, as seen in U.S. cooperatives balancing growth needs against identity preservation. Alternative sources bridge gaps in conventional and equity, including non-voting shares, bonds, and strategic alliances with financial cooperatives or investors. For instance, Equal Exchange implemented non-voting investor shares to fund expansion without ceding control, demonstrating how such instruments attract mission-aligned capital. In the sector, case studies reveal cooperatives using hybrid equity models linking contributions to cooperative principles, enhancing amid market pressures. financing, such as proximity-based bonds in Germany's organic sector, leverages local networks for low-cost , reducing reliance on impersonal markets. Financial leases and inter-cooperative lending further serve as tools, converting variable-rate exposures to fixed terms and pooling resources, though these remain underutilized due to regulatory hurdles and scale limitations. Overall, while alternatives innovate around structural barriers, cooperatives' limited persists, often necessitating policy interventions like dedicated funds to compete with investor-owned entities.

Barriers to Capital Access and Investment

One fundamental barrier to capital access for cooperatives stems from their ownership structure, which ties equity primarily to active membership rather than transferable shares, limiting appeal to external investors seeking control or . Unlike investor-owned firms, cooperatives typically allocate patronage refunds based on usage rather than capital contributions, providing no direct financial return linked to investment risk, which discourages or equity funding. This design preserves democratic control but constrains growth, as members' equity—often redeemable at nominal value upon exit—serves more as a membership stake than a scalable . Empirical studies confirm cooperatives' reliance on internal sources, with lower leverage ratios compared to investor-owned firms, indicating restricted access due to perceived risks from and limited collateral. For instance, analysis of firm-level data reveals cooperatives maintain debt-to-asset ratios approximately 10-20% below those of comparable non-cooperatives, partly because lenders view democratic as prone to inefficiencies in repayment prioritization. Worker cooperatives face amplified challenges, as employee-owners often lack sufficient personal capital for substantial buy-ins, exacerbating startup gaps estimated at 30-50% higher than traditional firms in capital-intensive sectors. Regulatory and market perceptions compound these issues; cooperatives struggle with subordinated debt or preferred shares that could bridge gaps without ceding control, as financial institutions unfamiliar with cooperative models demand higher interest rates or reject applications outright. During economic crises, such as the 2008-2009 downturn, cooperatives exhibited tighter financial constraints, with access declining by up to 15% more than for non-cooperatives due to amplified scrutiny of their equity redemption obligations. Agricultural and producer cooperatives, for example, confront escalating capital needs for technology investments—often exceeding $1 million per facility—yet pool only modest member equities averaging $5,000-10,000 per patron, insufficient for competitive scaling. Alternative financing, like community development funds or , mitigates but does not resolve these barriers, as they remain sporadic and scale-limited; in the U.S., cooperative lending pools represent under 1% of total , underscoring systemic underinvestment. Overall, these constraints foster slower expansion, with cooperatives growing at rates 20-30% below investor-owned peers in equity-dependent industries, prioritizing stability over aggressive .

Governance and Internal Dynamics

Democratic Decision-Making Processes

Democratic decision-making in cooperatives adheres to the second of the seven (ICA) principles: Democratic Member Control, which stipulates that cooperatives are democratic organizations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting policies and making decisions. In primary cooperatives, this is operationalized through equal voting rights, with each member holding one vote regardless of their share of capital or transaction volume, distinguishing cooperatives from investor-owned firms where voting power correlates with equity ownership. Key processes unfold at general membership meetings, such as annual general meetings (AGMs), where members elect the , approve annual reports, budgets, and surplus distributions, and amend bylaws. Boards, in turn, hire and oversee management, ensuring alignment with member interests through periodic reporting and accountability mechanisms. In smaller cooperatives, allows members to vote on operational matters, while larger ones rely on representative structures to manage complexity, with at higher levels maintaining democratic linkages via delegated voting. Voting mechanisms typically require a —often 10-25% of members—and proceed by simple majority for routine decisions, though strategic matters like mergers may demand supermajorities or consensus to foster broad agreement and mitigate risks of factionalism. Empirical data from U.S. agricultural cooperatives indicate widespread adherence to one-member-one-vote: a 2002 USDA Rural Development report surveyed 61 local cooperatives, finding 51 employed this system, promoting consensus-oriented governance that better reflects diverse membership views compared to proportional voting. In worker cooperatives, assemblies may integrate participatory elements, such as worker councils for input on production, though studies highlight variable participation rates, with direct involvement highest in nascent stages. Variations exist across cooperative types; consumer cooperatives emphasize patronage-based input at AGMs, while producer cooperatives may weight votes by production units in hybrid models, though pure democratic adherence prioritizes equality to prevent dominance by larger patrons. Higher-tier cooperatives, like regional federations, aggregate member votes democratically, ensuring scalability without eroding base-level control. Challenges in implementation include low attendance—often below 20% in large co-ops—necessitating proxies or to enhance inclusivity, as evidenced in platform cooperatives experimenting with deliberative tools for remote participation. This structure causally supports member by aligning incentives through equal voice, though it demands informed to avoid agency drifts toward .

Incentives, Free-Riding, and Principal-Agent Issues

In cooperatives, particularly worker-owned variants, incentives stem from members' as residual claimants and laborers, where profits are distributed based on or labor contribution rather than external capital returns. This structure theoretically reduces agency costs by aligning workers' efforts with firm outcomes, as each member captures a share of surpluses proportional to their input. However, dilutes marginal incentives, since an individual's shirking imposes only a fraction of the cost on themselves while the group bears the full productivity loss, echoing Olson's logic of where rational actors under-contribute to shared . The free-riding problem manifests as reduced effort or monitoring when membership expands beyond small groups, where social sanctions and reciprocity are feasible. In empirical analyses of shared ownership firms, free-riding risks are heightened by unobservable effort levels, but often mitigated through co-worker monitoring and implicit norms, yielding productivity gains over traditional hierarchies in cases like cooperatives during the 1970s-1980s, where output per worker exceeded industry averages by 14%. Nonetheless, larger cooperatives face persistent shirking, as evidenced in agricultural settings where member correlates with lower . Principal-agent tensions arise between member-owners (principals) and hired managers (agents), or even among members themselves, due to imperfect observability of decisions and efforts. Surveys of cooperative managers reveal boards' reliance on oversight mechanisms like performance contracts to curb managerial opportunism, yet persistent misalignments lead to member dissatisfaction, as agents may prioritize short-term gains over long-term viability. In rural cooperatives, empirical data from farmer-members show agency problems driving suboptimal investment, with principals facing information asymmetries that inflate monitoring costs by up to 20% of operational expenses. These issues underscore cooperatives' vulnerability to horizon problems, where transient members undervalue durable investments.

Trade-Offs Between Participation and Operational Efficiency

Democratic decision-making in cooperatives, characterized by one-member-one-vote principles, imposes participatory requirements that can elevate operational costs through extended deliberation times and to governance activities. These "democratic costs" encompass member time devoted to assemblies, information dissemination, and consensus-building, which divert efforts from production and may hinder rapid adaptation to market signals. Empirical analyses of agricultural cooperatives reveal at general assemblies, including preparation and burdens that correlate with reduced competitiveness unless mitigated by member heterogeneity or mechanisms. In worker cooperatives, such as those in the U.S. plywood industry, democratic participation yields mixed efficiency outcomes: production function estimates from 34 mills (1968-1986) show cooperatives achieving 6-14% higher than conventional firms when weighted by input efficiencies, attributed partly to aligned incentives reducing shirking. However, these firms exhibit near-zero output-price elasticity, indicating slower responsiveness to demand fluctuations compared to investor-owned counterparts, as decisions prioritize stability over output adjustments. Scale exacerbates trade-offs, as larger cooperatives often experience declining per-member participation rates, easing immediate burdens but risking erosion of democratic control—termed "degeneration"—without adaptive governance like Mondragon's membership caps (maintaining ~30% active members in 2007) or centralized structures in Finnish cooperative banks (membership growth to 1.4 million by 2010 alongside performance gains). Cross-sectional evidence from credit unions and banks suggests can offset participation demands, but diseconomies emerge in oversized units without such innovations, underscoring no inexorable clash yet persistent tensions requiring institutional design to balance.

Employment and Social Outcomes

Wages, Job Security, and Workload Realities

Worker cooperatives often exhibit wage structures that differ from those in investor-owned firms, with empirical evidence indicating greater variability tied to firm performance rather than fixed hierarchies. In the U.S. plywood industry from 1968 to 1986, cooperatives paid uniform hourly wages to nearly all workers, resulting in narrower pay differentials compared to conventional firms where wages spanned a 2.5-fold range. A 2019 census of U.S. worker cooperatives reported a mean hourly wage of $17.74, with workers citing an average $3.52 hourly increase over prior jobs, though this varied by role, with worker-owners earning more than non-owner employees. Cross-country studies, such as in Uruguay (1996–2005), found cooperatives offering higher average wages than capitalist firms under normal conditions but with more pronounced fluctuations during economic downturns, as surpluses are distributed based on labor contribution rather than external capital returns. Job security in cooperatives tends to surpass that in traditional firms, as members prioritize employment preservation through mechanisms like work-sharing and wage adjustments over layoffs. Analysis of Pacific Northwest plywood cooperatives (1968–1986) showed firms absorbing demand shocks via earnings reductions rather than staff cuts, maintaining steadier employment levels than conventional mills that varied hours and headcounts with output prices. Uruguayan data similarly revealed inelastic labor demand in cooperatives, with employment stability favored even amid recessions, corroborated by lower member quit rates in Italian cooperatives versus private firms. The 2019 U.S. census indicated average tenure of 6 years in worker cooperatives, with majorities reporting improved security over previous roles, though this comes at the expense of income predictability. Evidence on workload and hours in cooperatives is sparser but suggests comparability to conventional firms in raw hours, offset by added governance burdens. Plywood cooperatives averaged 58.3 annual worker-hours per employee, akin to unionized mills at 52.9, with no marked excess over classical firms' lower utilization. However, democratic processes impose supplementary demands, as members handle collectively, potentially elevating effective workload beyond clocked hours, though quantitative data remains limited. U.S. cooperatives show 65% full-time , aligning with broader labor patterns, but self-selection into roles may correlate with voluntary extended effort for shared gains.

Employee Satisfaction and Turnover Data

In worker cooperatives, where employees hold ownership stakes and participate in governance, empirical studies indicate generally higher levels of job satisfaction compared to traditional investor-owned firms, attributed to greater autonomy, profit-sharing, and alignment of interests. A 2021 analysis by Fifty by Fifty found that U.S. cooperative workers reported elevated satisfaction linked to community engagement and job quality, with 80% expressing strong attachment to their roles due to democratic input and equitable benefits distribution. Similarly, a 2020 study on French listed companies with employee ownership elements showed positive correlations between ownership shares and both organizational commitment and job satisfaction, with ownership explaining up to 15% variance in satisfaction scores after controlling for firm size and industry. However, not all evidence is uniform; a 2022 evaluation in the Emory Economics Review suggested that increased decision-making burdens in cooperatives can lead to lower satisfaction in some contexts, as workers bear more stress from collective responsibilities without hierarchical delegation. Turnover rates in cooperatives tend to be lower than in conventional firms, reflecting stronger retention incentives from and reduced agency conflicts. Data from U.S. cooperatives, examined in a 2025 UCLA-led study, revealed turnover rates 20-30% below industry averages, with workers citing improved job quality, fair pay, and voice in operations as key factors. A 2018 review of emerging U.S. worker co-ops corroborated this, noting turnover below 10% annually versus 20-25% in comparable sectors, alongside higher firm survival rates due to stability. Longitudinal from employee-owned firms, including cooperatives, in a 2015 study indicated young workers in cooperatives were 15-20% less likely to exit the sector, fostering long-term attachment over short-term mobility. These patterns hold despite potential free-riding risks, as stakes impose exit costs and align individual efforts with success.
MetricWorker CooperativesTraditional FirmsSource
Annual Turnover Rate5-15%15-30%UCLA (2025); (2018)
Job Satisfaction Score (Scale 1-5)4.0-4.53.5-4.0Fifty by Fifty (2021); Rutgers (2020)
Critics note that self-reported satisfaction may inflate positives due to —workers drawn to cooperatives may inherently value participation more—while small sample sizes in many studies limit generalizability beyond niche sectors like or services. Peer-reviewed comparisons, such as a 2021 MDPI analysis of labor-owned workplaces, confirm cooperatives outperform on value alignment but require robust to mitigate dissatisfaction from internal disputes. Overall, lower turnover supports cooperatives' resilience, though challenges can strain satisfaction as firms grow.

Gender Participation and Diversity Challenges

In worker cooperatives, women typically constitute 30-50% of membership across various sectors, though this varies significantly by industry; for instance, social cooperatives in care and often exceed 70% female participation, while industrial cooperatives like those in hover around 25-35%. A 2015 International Cooperative Alliance survey of global cooperatives reported that 75% of respondents observed increased female participation over the prior two decades, attributed partly to cooperative values emphasizing equity, yet persistent gaps remain in roles, where women hold fewer than 20% of positions in many systems. Key challenges stem from entrenched sexual divisions of labor, with women overrepresented in unskilled or support roles—such as administrative or low-wage assembly work—and underrepresented in technical or managerial positions requiring extensive training or mobility, mirroring broader labor market patterns rather than being unique to cooperatives. In the , a prominent Basque industrial employing over 70,000 workers as of 2023, women comprise about 40% of the workforce but face barriers to advancement due to familial responsibilities and cultural expectations, though they benefit from equal pay for equivalent roles and occasional women-only cooperatives for flexible shifts. These issues are exacerbated by cooperatives' democratic , which demands high time commitment for meetings and consensus-building, disproportionately burdening women with domestic duties; empirical studies indicate lower attendance in participatory processes when childcare conflicts arise. Broader diversity challenges, including ethnic and racial representation, receive less empirical scrutiny but reveal similar patterns of underinclusion; U.S. worker cooperatives, for example, often reflect local demographics with limited non-white , as qualitative analyses show "diversity regimes" that tolerate surface-level inclusion but fail to address intersecting inequalities like race-based gaps or hiring biases rooted in member networks. External factors, such as restricted access to and education for marginalized groups, compound these, with women and minorities facing higher entry barriers in capital-intensive cooperatives due to collateral requirements or skill mismatches. While cooperatives' one-member-one-vote principle theoretically mitigates hierarchical exclusion, real-world implementation often perpetuates societal disparities, as evidenced by stagnant promotion rates for women in long-standing networks like Mondragon, where cultural stereotypes hinder full integration despite formal policies.

Criticisms and Limitations

Scalability, Innovation, and Growth Constraints

Worker cooperatives and other democratic enterprises often encounter structural barriers to achieving large-scale operations, with empirical analyses indicating that the majority remain small relative to investor-owned firms (IOFs). A panel study of 669 U.S. agricultural cooperatives from 2005 to 2015 found that capital constraints significantly hinder asset growth, as these organizations rely heavily on and member contributions rather than external equity financing, which dilutes democratic control under one-member-one-vote principles. This limitation stems from the inability to issue tradable shares that attract or institutional investors, who prefer residual claimant structures with proportional voting rights aligned to financial stakes. Governance mechanisms exacerbate scalability issues, as consensus-driven processes, while fostering internal cohesion in small groups, become inefficient at larger sizes, delaying responses to market shifts. Theoretical models of cooperative economies highlight how equal profit-sharing reduces incentives for high-risk expansion, leading to suboptimal investment in growth opportunities compared to hierarchical IOFs. from European and U.S. case studies corroborates this, showing that cooperatives exceeding 500 members frequently experience "degeneration," where they adopt quasi-capitalist practices like wage differentials or external to sustain operations, often at the cost of original principles. Innovation in cooperatives lags behind IOFs due to diffused ownership horizons and , with studies revealing lower internal R&D expenditures as benefits accrue collectively rather than to entrepreneurial residuals. A comparative analysis of Spanish worker cooperatives and conventional firms demonstrated that while external collaborations boost in cooperatives, their baseline and outputs remain lower without such networks, attributing this to principal-agent misalignments where individual inventors capture less upside. research similarly finds cooperatives invest less in process improvements unless driven by regulatory pressures, contrasting with IOFs' profit-motivated agility. These constraints manifest in persistent size distributions: global data indicate worker cooperatives average under 50 employees, with rare exceptions like Spain's (peaking at over 80,000 members in 2013 but contracting amid governance strains) reliant on federated structures that introduce hybrid elements. Overall growth trajectories reflect causal trade-offs between egalitarian incentives and competitive dynamism, where cooperatives excel in niche stability but underperform in capital-intensive or rapidly evolving sectors.

Risk of Degeneration and Moral Hazard

The risk of degeneration in cooperatives refers to the tendency for these organizations to erode their core principles of democratic member control and equitable participation over time, often evolving into hierarchical structures resembling conventional capitalist firms. This phenomenon, articulated in economic literature as the "degeneration thesis," posits that as cooperatives grow or face market pressures, they may hire non-member employees, delegate to professional managers, or prioritize efficiency over one-member-one-vote governance, leading to oligarchic control by elites. Theoretical models attribute this to endogenous membership dynamics, where factors such as firm expansion reduce the membership ratio—defined as active worker-members relative to total employees—potentially shrinking democratic involvement. Empirical analyses from cooperatives indicate that larger firm sizes and higher membership fees exacerbate this risk, while accumulated organizational experience can mitigate it, suggesting degeneration is not inevitable but context-dependent. Distinct forms of degeneration include constitutional shifts, where cooperatives formally adopt investor-owned structures excluding worker ; governance failures, marked by concentrated among a few; and market adaptations, where competitive necessities compel capitalist-like behaviors. A of democratic organizations, including cooperatives, found full degeneration in only 9.5% of cases, aligning with Michels' "" but challenging its universality, as many maintain partial democratic elements despite growth pressures. Examples include historical instances where successful worker-managed firms (WMFs) faced incentives to convert for capital access, though direct empirical tests of degeneration in thriving WMFs remain limited, with emphasizing itself as a degeneration trigger via scale-induced control separation. Moral hazard in cooperatives arises primarily from free-riding incentives, where individual members may shirk effort or exploit collective resources, knowing benefits are shared democratically while costs are diffused across the group. This manifests in underperformance on tasks not easily monitored, such as discretionary work intensity, potentially necessitating supervisory structures that undermine flat hierarchies. Economic analyses highlight the "free-rider problem" as a core challenge, where members contribute less to common efforts—like or risk-taking—anticipating others' inputs, a dilemma amplified in larger cooperatives with diluted per-member stakes. from producer organizations links moral hazard to reduced participation, though peer monitoring and reciprocity often counteract it, as seen in cases where co-ops achieve comparable to investor-owned firms despite theoretical vulnerabilities. Compounding this, cooperatives face horizon and risk-aversion hazards: finite member tenures encourage short-termism, prioritizing current payouts over long-term investments, while fosters conservatism, avoiding layoffs or bold ventures to protect incumbents' jobs at efficiency's expense. Studies of worker cooperatives note these dynamics contribute to underinvestment in growth, with intensified by imperfect observability of effort, though data from stable co-ops show incentive alignment via residual claims often curbs shirking better than in hierarchical firms. Overall, while degeneration and pose structural risks—evident in membership shrinkage and effort distortions—their incidence varies, with evidence suggesting proactive , like limiting non-member hires, can preserve cooperative against these pressures.

Evidence of Economic Underperformance and Failures

indicates that cooperatives frequently underperform investor-owned firms in key economic metrics such as . A 2018 cross-industry analysis of firms employing random-effects models concluded that cooperatives are significantly less productive than investor-owned enterprises, both in aggregate and across sectors, attributing this to structural incentives favoring equal income sharing over efficiency gains. Similarly, examinations of financial performance in U.S. agricultural cooperatives reveal widespread financial stress, with low returns on assets (ROA) as the primary driver, often below 2% in distressed cases from 2002 to 2015, limiting reinvestment and resilience. Profitability challenges extend to other cooperative subtypes, including financial institutions. Comparative studies of cooperative and mutual savings banks document systematically lower profitability relative to commercial peers, linked to restricted capital-raising mechanisms and member-focused payouts that dilute returns to . These patterns arise from principal-agent misalignments and horizon problems, where short-term member interests constrain long-term value creation, resulting in subdued growth trajectories; for instance, U.S. agricultural cooperatives constrained by capital exhibit measurably slower expansion rates, with growth hampered by reliance on member equity unable to match external financing options available to investor-owned firms. Capital access barriers exacerbate underperformance, as cooperatives' non-tradable shares and aversion to external investors lead to chronic undercapitalization, curtailing investments in technology and scale. from U.S. agricultural cooperatives demonstrate that capital constraints directly suppress growth, with firms facing tighter limits posting annual sales increases 10-15% below unconstrained peers during 2006-2015. This dynamic contributes to consolidation via mergers, often as a distress response rather than strategic expansion, further evidencing competitive disadvantages. Cooperative failures underscore these vulnerabilities, with case studies from 1950-2010 in , , and the U.S. highlighting recurrent collapses due to inadequate , market misadaptation, and capital shortfalls rather than inherent member ownership flaws alone. Large-scale examples include breakdowns in major consumer cooperatives, where centralized power and poor precipitated insolvency, as seen in several European entities during the 2000s, amplifying losses for members without diversified investor buffers. Emerging agricultural cooperatives show elevated failure risks when lacking strong market linkages or managerial expertise, with statistical analyses identifying undercapitalization and internal conflicts as predictors of dissolution rates exceeding 20% within five years in vulnerable cohorts.

Notable Case Studies

Successful Examples and Contributing Factors

The , a federation of worker cooperatives based in Spain's Basque region, exemplifies long-term success in the cooperative model. Founded in 1956 by Father , it has grown into a conglomerate spanning , , retail, and education, employing over 81,000 workers across approximately 100 cooperatives as of 2019. During the 2008-2013 , Mondragon maintained relative stability, with among its members averaging 2-3% compared to Spain's national rate exceeding 20%, attributed to internal mobility mechanisms and a solidarity fund that redistributed resources from profitable units to struggling ones. Key contributing factors to Mondragon's resilience include a capped —typically 6:1 between highest and lowest paid—fostering and reducing internal inequities, alongside mandatory programs that build member commitment and skills. The corporation's inter-cooperative division of labor, where units specialize and support each other through and financing via the Caja Laboral , enables without external capital dependence. Empirical analyses highlight how these structures mitigate by aligning worker-owners' incentives with firm survival, evidenced by lower layoff rates and sustained investment in R&D, with annual revenues exceeding €11 billion in recent years. In Italy's region, a dense network of cooperatives has driven economic outperformance, contributing approximately 30% to regional GDP through sectors like , , , and . Cooperatives employ about 15% of the non-financial workforce and have historically rebuilt the post-World War II economy by pooling resources for collective ventures, such as Legacoop's federated support systems established in the 1970s. This model's success is linked to regional legislation, including laws from the promoting cooperative consortia for joint bidding on public contracts, which enhanced competitiveness and access to markets otherwise dominated by larger firms. Contributing factors in Emilia-Romagna emphasize networked governance, where second-level associations provide training, legal aid, and market intelligence, reducing individual cooperative failure risks. Cultural factors, rooted in anti-fascist resistance and mutual aid traditions, have sustained high member participation rates, with studies showing cooperatives here exhibit lower bankruptcy rates than private firms due to diversified revenue streams and community reinvestment. Data from the region indicate sustained growth, with cooperative turnover increasing 4-5% annually in the 2010s, underscoring causal links between embedded social capital and operational adaptability. Across these cases, common empirical drivers of success include robust internal institutions for and , such as profit retention mandates and democratic voting weighted by usage or stake, which empirical case studies correlate with higher survival rates than isolated cooperatives. However, successes often hinge on supportive external conditions like regional policies favoring coops over subsidies to failing private entities, and pre-existing social cohesion that counters free-rider problems inherent in .

Failed Cooperatives and Key Lessons

New Harmony, founded in 1825 by British industrialist in southwestern , exemplifies an early cooperative experiment that collapsed due to internal discord and impractical organization. Owen envisioned a self-sustaining of shared labor and resources, attracting approximately 800-1,000 participants from diverse backgrounds, including intellectuals and laborers. However, by mid-1827, the settlement had fragmented, with residents departing amid disputes over work obligations, unequal contributions, and financial shortfalls exceeding $20,000 in debts. The failure stemmed from mismatched expectations—Owen's top-down planning clashed with the heterogeneous group's lack of unified commitment—and inadequate preparation for agricultural self-sufficiency in a remote location. In , the under initiated a massive cooperative drive starting in 2003, registering over 180,000 entities by 2006 through the Social Production Enterprises Law, backed by billions in state subsidies aimed at fostering . Yet, by 2009, active cooperatives numbered fewer than 27,000, implying an attrition rate exceeding 85%, with many dormant or reverting to informal operations. Contributing factors included insufficient member training—over 70% of participants lacked prior business experience—dependency on non-renewable funding, and vulnerability to macroeconomic instability, such as and currency controls that eroded competitiveness. Agricultural cooperatives in , promoted since the 1950s for commercialization, have similarly faltered, with most failing to scale beyond subsistence due to by local leaders, weak enforcement of democratic bylaws, and inability to access credit or markets amid infrastructural deficits. Case studies from , , and the between 1950 and 2010 reveal parallel patterns, where failures often traced to capital shortages, managerial incompetence, and failure to adapt to competitive pressures, rather than inherent ideological flaws alone. These cases underscore several recurring lessons for cooperative viability:
  • Governance and expertise gaps: Democratic one-member-one-vote systems can prioritize consensus over , enabling free-riding and sidelining specialized skills; successful cooperatives often hybridize with managers or external advisors to mitigate this.
  • Capital and financial discipline: Reliance on member equity or subsidies fosters undercapitalization, limiting and resilience; diversified funding mechanisms, such as or limited external , prove essential to avoid .
  • Market orientation and adaptability: Ideological focus on equity can neglect profitability, leading to uncompetitive products; cooperatives endure by enforcing rigorous business planning, incentives, and responsiveness to demand shifts.
  • Member selection and commitment: Heterogeneous or unvetted participants dilute cohesion; rigorous screening for aligned values and enforceable contribution rules reduce .

Policy Context and Global Role

Government Policies, Subsidies, and Regulations

Governments in various countries have implemented policies, subsidies, and regulations to foster cooperatives, often viewing them as mechanisms for economic inclusion, , and alternative ownership models, though empirical evidence on long-term viability remains mixed. In the United States, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) program offers technical assistance, grants, and loans to cooperatives, particularly in and rural businesses, with over $2 billion allocated annually across related initiatives to support formation and operations. Federal regulations under 7 CFR Part 4285 establish cooperative agreements for on cooperative structures, delegating to states for funding distribution aimed at enhancing cooperative efficacy. Tax provisions, such as Section 199A of the , provide deductions for qualified business income from cooperatives, finalized in regulations effective January 2021, to level the playing field with investor-owned firms by addressing patronage dividend treatments. At the local level, U.S. cities have enacted supportive measures; for instance, New York City's Worker Cooperative Business Development Initiative, launched in 2013 and ongoing as of 2023, provides grants up to $5,000 for feasibility studies and technical assistance to worker cooperatives, facilitating over 200 conversions or startups by 2022. Proposed federal legislation, like the National Worker Cooperative Development and Support Act introduced in 2024, seeks to expand access to capital through coordinated grants and loan guarantees, though it has not yet passed, highlighting ongoing debates over fiscal sustainability. Electric cooperatives benefit from elective-pay rules under the Inflation Reduction Act, allowing direct access to clean energy tax credits without taxable income requirements, as finalized by the Treasury Department in March 2024, potentially unlocking billions in subsidies for infrastructure. Internationally, the promotes cooperatives through the framework, emphasizing their role in sectors with initiatives like funding under the European Social Fund Plus (2021-2027) allocating €99 billion for inclusive enterprises, including cooperatives. Regulatory frameworks vary; in , cooperatives fall under company codes requiring adherence to principles like democratic governance and limited profit distribution, while countries like and mandate registration with specific cooperative registries to ensure compliance with one-member-one-vote rules distinct from corporate share-based voting. Reforms in developing nations, such as and since 2020, have updated laws to reduce administrative barriers and enhance property rights for cooperatives, supported by international aid to promote market integration. Subsidies' effectiveness is empirically contested; a South African study found cooperative grant programs under the Co-operative Incentive Scheme increased beneficiary job creation by 15-20% short-term but lagged behind SME subsidies in sustained growth due to governance challenges. In , cooperative input subsidies in boosted by 20% via yield improvements, yet rent-seeking behaviors in Chinese "shell" cooperatives diverted over 66% of funds from genuine operations, reducing net welfare gains. These patterns suggest subsidies can aid startup phases but risk without stringent oversight, as cooperatives' democratic structures may hinder rapid adaptation compared to hierarchical firms.

Performance in Capitalist vs. State-Directed Economies

In market-oriented capitalist economies, cooperatives generally demonstrate higher survival rates and employee satisfaction compared to conventional firms, though they constitute a small fraction of total economic activity and often exhibit slower growth and innovation. Empirical analyses of worker-owned enterprises in countries like , , and indicate survival probabilities 10-20% higher than investor-owned firms over five-year periods, attributed to aligned incentives reducing agency costs and enhancing motivation. However, these cooperatives tend to remain smaller in scale, with average employment levels 20-50% below comparable capitalist firms, limiting their systemic impact; for instance, in the United States, cooperatives account for less than 1% of GDP despite competitive market access. The in , a prominent federation of worker cooperatives founded in 1956, exemplifies relative success within , achieving annual revenues exceeding €11 billion by 2023 through diversification into and , yet it has faced challenges like layoffs during the 2008 recession and reliance on hierarchical structures akin to capitalist models for competitiveness. In contrast, cooperatives in state-directed economies, often imposed through central planning or political mandates, have historically underperformed due to distorted incentives, absence of market price signals, and vulnerability to bureaucratic interference. Yugoslavia's system of worker self-management, introduced in 1950, initially boosted participation—with 76% of blue-collar workers involved by 1960—but devolved into inefficiencies as income-sharing rules discouraged hiring and investment, contributing to stagnant growth averaging under 2% annually in the 1970s and exacerbating inflation rates exceeding 20% by the 1980s, factors linked to the federation's dissolution. Soviet kolkhozy, agricultural cooperatives collectivized by force from 1929 onward, yielded chronically low ; by 1938, they controlled over 90% of sown land but produced minimal surpluses, with private plots comprising 3-4% of yet generating 20-30% of output through 1950, underscoring incentive misalignments and coercive structures that triggered famines killing millions in 1932-1933. In Poland's command economy, producer cooperatives under the Central Union of Work Cooperatives (CZSP) showed sales per worker 15-25% below equivalents in the 1980s, hampered by state quotas and soft budget constraints. Causal factors differentiating outcomes include market discipline in capitalist settings, which enforces via profit-loss and , versus state-directed systems' reliance on administrative commands, fostering and resource misallocation. Peer-reviewed comparisons affirm that cooperatives flourish as niche entities in competitive environments but falter when scaled as systemic alternatives without price mechanisms, as evidenced by their marginal role even in supportive capitalist policies like Italy's Marcora Law of 1985, which aided conversions but did not elevate cooperatives beyond 5% of . State interventions, such as subsidies in planned economies, often prolonged unviable operations rather than spurring , contrasting with capitalist co-ops' selective resilience.

Contributions to Sustainability and Development Claims

Advocates assert that cooperatives enhance environmental by prioritizing member interests over short-term profits, fostering practices such as resource conservation and reduced chemical use in . A 2023 study of Chinese farmers found that cooperative membership increased the adoption of environment-friendly practices, including use and soil testing, by 10-15 percentage points compared to non-members, attributing this to collective for sustainable inputs and sharing. Similarly, analysis of French grassroots agricultural cooperatives demonstrated lower and higher preservation on cooperative-managed lands versus individual farms, linked to shared machinery and joint . In the energy sector, citizen cooperatives have been credited with advancing principles, such as local production that minimizes waste and emissions. Empirical data from European cases indicate these entities achieve 20-30% higher rates in energy loops than investor-owned utilities, due to governance emphasizing over extraction. For Mexican producers, cooperatives outperformed individual operations across economic, social, and environmental metrics in a 2023 assessment, with members reporting 12% lower water usage and improved from pooled conservation efforts. Regarding development, cooperatives are claimed to drive economic progress in developing countries by expanding for smallholders and generating stable . A of agricultural cooperatives in low-income nations showed average income gains of 15-25% for members through bulk marketing and input , though effects varied by quality and external support. In regions like and , econometric analyses reveal a positive long-run between cooperative density and GDP growth, with cooperatives contributing up to 10% of rural in some countries via diversified services like and . However, these outcomes depend on factors such as member and market integration, with weaker cooperatives showing negligible or negative impacts due to internal inefficiencies. Critiques highlight that sustainability claims often overlook operational challenges, including limited scalability and vulnerability to , which can undermine environmental goals. Agricultural cooperatives in some contexts, such as dairy groups, have faced accusations of from intensive practices justified by member demands for output maximization, contradicting broader narratives. Development impacts are further questioned by historical data showing high failure rates—over 50% in some cohorts—attributable to poor and , reducing net contributions to alleviation. Peer-reviewed literature emphasizes that while cooperatives can support under ideal conditions, systemic biases in advocacy sources like international cooperative alliances inflate generalized claims without accounting for selection effects in successful cases.

References

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