Hubbry Logo
Iraqi Ground ForcesIraqi Ground ForcesMain
Open search
Iraqi Ground Forces
Community hub
Iraqi Ground Forces
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Iraqi Ground Forces
Iraqi Ground Forces
from Wikipedia
Iraqi Ground Forces
القوات البرية العراقية
Iraqi Ground Forces' insignia
Founded1921 (1921)
Country Iraq
TypeArmy
RoleGround warfare
Size180,000 personnel (2023)[1]
Part ofIraqi Armed Forces
Garrison/HQBaghdad, Iraq
Colors  Red
AnniversariesArmy Day
(January 6)[2]
EquipmentList of current equipment of the Iraqi Ground Forces
Engagements
Commanders
Current
commander
Lt. Gen. Qassim Muhammad Salih
Insignia
Flag

The Iraqi Ground Forces (Arabic: القوات البرية العراقية), also referred to as the Iraqi Army (Arabic: الجيش العراقي), is the ground force component of the Iraqi Armed Forces. It was formerly known as the Royal Iraqi Army up until the coup of July 1958. The current commander is Lt. Gen. Qassim Muhammad Salih.[3]

The Iraqi Army in its modern form was first created by the United Kingdom during the inter-war period of de facto British control of Mandatory Iraq. Following the invasion of Iraq by U.S. forces in 2003, the Iraqi Army was rebuilt along U.S. lines with enormous amounts of U.S. military assistance at every level. Because of the Iraqi insurgency that began shortly after the invasion, the Iraqi Army was later designed to initially be a counter-insurgency force.[4][5] With the withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2010, Iraqi forces have assumed full responsibility for the nation's security.[6] A New York Times article suggested that, between 2004 and 2014, the U.S. had provided the Iraqi Army with $25 billion in training and equipment in addition to an even larger sum from the Iraqi treasury.[7]

The Army extensively collaborated with Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces during anti-ISIL operations.

History

[edit]
An Iraqi soldier assigned to the Security Battalion, Nineveh Operations Command, fires his AK-47 rifle during night range training at Camp Taji, Iraq, April 3, 2016.

The modern Iraqi armed forces were established by the United Kingdom during their mandate over Iraq after World War I.[8] Before that, from 1533 to 1918, Iraq was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire and fought as part of the Military of the Ottoman Empire. At first, the British created the Iraq Levies, comprising several battalions of troops whose main mission was to garrison the bases of the Royal Air Force (RAF) with which London controlled Iraq. The Levies were adequate for their intended mission of defending airfields of RAF Iraq Command, but the threat of war with the newly forming Republic of Turkey forced the British to expand Iraq's indigenous military forces.[8]

Ankara claimed the Ottoman vilayet of Mosul as part of their country, during their resistance to the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. This province corresponds to the northern third of modern Iraq, mainly Iraqi Kurdistan, and includes the rich oilfields of Kirkuk.[8] In 1920, Turkish troops penetrated into Iraqi Kurdistan and forced the small British garrisons out of as-Sulaymaniyyah and Rawanduz in eastern Kurdistan. This led the British to form the Iraqi Army on 6 January 1921 (later to be marked as Iraqi Army Day),[9] followed by the Iraqi Air Force in 1927. The British recruited former Ottoman officers to man junior and middle ranks of the new Iraqi officer corps, with senior commands, as well as most training positions, being manned by British officers.[8]

The Musa al-Kadhim Brigade consisted of ex-Iraqi-Ottoman officers, whose barracks were located in Kadhimyah. The United Kingdom provided support and training to the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Air Force through a small military mission based in Baghdad;[10] providing weapons and training to defeat the anticipated Turkish invasion of northern Iraq.[citation needed]

Royal Iraqi Army

[edit]

In August 1921, the British installed Hashemite King Faisal I as the client ruler of Mandatory Iraq. Faisal had been forced out as the King of Syria by the French in the aftermath of the Franco-Syrian War in 1920. Likewise, British authorities selected Sunni Arab elites from the region for appointments to government and ministry offices in Iraq. The British and the Iraqis formalized the relationship between the two nations with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. With Faisal's ascension to the throne, the Iraqi Army became the Royal Iraqi Army (RIrA).

In 1922, the army totalled 3,618 men. This was well below the 6,000 men requested by the Iraqi monarchy and even less than the limit set by the British of 4,500. Unattractive salaries hindered early recruiting efforts. At this time, the United Kingdom maintained the right to levy local forces like the British-officered Iraq Levies which were under direct British control. With a strength of 4,984 men, the Iraq Levies outnumbered the army.

In 1924, the army grew to 5,772 men and, by the following year, had grown even more to reach 7,500 men - maintaining this size until 1933. The force consisted of:[11]

By the late 1920s, the threat of Turkish attack diminished, with the Iraqi army refocusing on new, internal missions. While the British command still worried about both Turkish and Persian encroachment on the Iraqi territory - as both of these states were considerably more cohesive and with superior armies -, the new focus shifted towards internal security against centrifugal forces menacing to breakdown the country.

Those threats to the integrity of the nascent Iraqi state were separatist revolts by the Kurds and by the powerful tribes of western and southern Iraq.[8] The British concluded the Iraqi army was not capable of handling either the Turks or the Persians, with the RAF (supported by the Iraq Levies) shouldering the full responsibility for external defense.[12] Henceforth, the Iraqi army was increasingly relegated to internal security duties. Nevertheless, the army enjoyed considerable prestige, with the country's elites seeing the army as a national consolidating force:[12]

  • A strong army ensured Sunni dominance over the Shia majority;
  • Said strong army would allow Baghdad to control the independent tribes who resisted centralization;
  • The army would create a national identity.
Mountain gun of the Iraqi Army column, 'Dicol', shelling Shirwan-A-Mazin from a hillside at Kani-Ling during the anti-Barzani operations, June 1932.

With the majority under control, the unruly tribes kept in line and a national identity across the heterogeneous population, the army would serve as a modernizing and socializing force that would help to weld together the backward Ottoman vilayets into a modern, unified Iraqi nation.[13]

There were doubts about the army's actual capabilities, however. In 1928, the number of British officers commanding Iraqi units was increased because Iraqi officers were slow to adapt to modern warfare.[14] The army's first real test occurred in 1931, when Kurdish leader Ahmed Barzani unified a number of Kurdish tribes and rose up in open revolt. Iraqi army units were badly mauled by tribesmen under Shaykhs Mahmud and Mustafa Barzani. The Iraqi army's dismal performance did not impress, and the situation required the intervention of British troops to restore order.[12]

In 1932, the Kingdom of Iraq was granted official independence.[12] This was in accordance with the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930, whereby the United Kingdom would end its official mandate on the condition that the Iraqi government would allow British advisers to take part in government affairs, allow British military bases to remain, and a requirement that Iraq assist the United Kingdom in wartime.[15]

The new state was weak and the regime survived for only four years, when it was toppled in a coup d'état in 1936. Upon achieving independence in 1932, political tensions arose over the continued British presence in Iraq, with Iraq's government and politicians split between those considered pro-British and those who were considered anti-British. The pro-British faction was represented by politicians such as Nuri as-Said who did not oppose a continued British presence. The anti-British faction was represented by politicians such as Rashid Ali al-Gaylani who demanded that remaining British influence in the country be removed.[15] In 1936, General Bakr Sidqi, who had won a reputation from suppressing tribal revolts (and also responsible for the ruthless Simele massacre), was named Chief of the General Staff and successfully pressured King Ghazi bin Faisal to demand that the Cabinet resign.[16] From that year to 1941, five army coups occurred during each year led by the chief officers of the army against the government to pressure the government to concede to Army demands.[15]

1941 coup

[edit]

In early April 1941, during World War II, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani and members of the anti-British "Golden Square" launched a coup d'état against the current government. Prime Minister Taha al-Hashimi resigned and Rashid Ali al-Gaylani took his place as Prime Minister. Rashid Ali also proclaimed himself chief of a "National Defence Government." He did not overthrow the monarchy, but installed a more compliant regent. He also attempted to restrict the rights of the British which were granted them under the 1930 treaty.

The Golden Square was commanded by the "Four Colonels":[17]

Although Iraq was nominally independent, Britain de facto still governed the country, exercising veto over Iraqi foreign and national security policy. The Iraqi high command saw the opportunity to rid themselves of their colonial master when Britain saw itself in a vulnerable position against Nazi Germany. The golpistas were supported by the pro-Nazi and anti-Jewish Grand Mufti of Jerusalem Haj Amin al-Husseini, the German ambassador Fritz Grobba and Arab guerrilla leader Fawzi al-Qawuqji.[17]

On April 30, Iraqi Army units took the high ground to the south of RAF Habbaniya. An Iraqi envoy was sent to demand that no movements, either ground or air, were to take place from the base. The British refused the demand and then themselves demanded that the Iraqi units leave the area at once. In addition, the British landed forces at Basra and the Iraqis demanded that these forces be removed.

At 0500 hours on 2 May 1941, the Anglo-Iraqi War broke out between the British and Rashid Ali's new government when the British at RAF Habbaniya launched air strikes against the Iraqis. By this time, the army had grown significantly. It had four infantry divisions with some 60,000 men.[18][10] At full strength, each division had three infantry brigades (3 battalions each) plus supporting units - including artillery brigades.[10] The Iraqi 1st and 3rd Divisions were stationed in Baghdad. The 2nd Division was stationed in Kirkuk, and the 4th Division was in Al Diwaniyah, on the main rail line from Baghdad to Basra.

Also based within Baghdad was the Independent Mechanized Brigade composed of:[19]

All these "mechanized" infantry units were transported by trucks. The authorized manpower of the Iraqi Infantry Brigades at full strength were of 26 officers and 820 other ranks, 46 Bren light machine guns; 8 Vickers heavy machine guns (in two platoons of 4 MGs each) and 4 anti-air Lewis guns.[19]

Hostilities between the British and the Iraqis lasted from 2 May to 30 May 1941. The German government dispatched an aviation unit, Fliegerführer Irak, and Italy send limited assistance, but both were too late and far from adequate. Britain pulled together a small force from its armies in the Levant, Habforce and its advance element Kingcol. The British handily defeated the much larger but thoroughly incompetent Iraqi army and air force, marched on Baghdad and ousted the military commanders.[12] The military commanders were sentenced to death by hanging, and their prime minister, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, deposed. In their place the British re-installed Nuri al-Said, which dominated the politics of Iraq until the overthrow of the monarchy and his assassination in 1958. Nuri al-Said pursued a largely pro-western policy during this period.[15] The army was not disbanded, however. Instead, it was maintained to hinder possible German offensive actions via the southern parts of the Soviet Union.

1948 Arab–Israeli War

[edit]
Iraqi army troops led by Taher Abdel Ghafour and with a Humber Armoured Car in the city of Jenin, 1948.

The 1948 Arab–Israeli War was the first combat experience of independent Iraqi forces after the Second World War, and its first war outside its territory. Baghdad joined the Arab states in their opposition to the creation of the Jewish national homeland in Palestine, and in May 1948 sent a sizeable force to help crush the recently independent state of Israel. The Iraqi Army by then boasted 21,000 men in 12 brigades, with the Royal Iraqi Air Force having a force of 100 aircraft (mostly British);[20] sending initially 5,000 men in four infantry brigades and an armoured battalion with corresponding support personnel. Iraq continuously sent reinforcements to its expeditionary force, peaking at 15–18,000 men.[20] Iraq also contributed 2,500 volunteers to the Arab Liberation Army (ALA), an irregular force commanded by the former Ottoman officer Fawzi al-Qawuqji.[21][22]

Before the Arab League resolution to attack Israel, the ALA was used to fight the Jewish settlements, launching its first offensive in February 1948.[23] With a force around 6,000 men it was mainly organized by Syria, with 2,500 Syrian volunteers providing a third of the force,[23] with another third provided by the Iraqis; the rest being Arab Palestinians, Lebanese and other Muslims. Its commander Fawzi was also Syrian, with the costs being paid by members of the Arab League.

Iraqi forces received their baptism of fire with the ALA defending Zefat in April and May 1948.[20] A force of 600 Syrian and Iraqi ALA irregulars were sent to defend this key town, which controlled access between the Huleh Valley and the Sea of Galilee (Lake Kinneret). Zefat was protected by two police forts built into the rock of the hills, forming a formidable position; and also a priority target for the Haganah.[20] The strength of the natural position allowed the ALA, together with some local Arab militiamen, to defeat two Israeli attacks by elements of the Golani Brigade in April.[20] The Israelis brought a new battalion in May and immediately took one of the forts. With the arrival of another battalion, the Israelis assaulted the town itself under cover of mortar fire but the Arabs succeeded in forcing back repeated assaults. Four days after the first attack in the town, the Israelis attacked at night under cover of a rainstorm and surprised the defenders.[20] The Arabs resisted fiercely and forced the Israelis to fight house to house but ultimately were ejected from the town. After this defeat, the Arab force gave up the last police fort without a fight and withdrew.[20]

On 25 April, the Israeli Irgun Zvi Leumi assaulted the Arab town of Jaffa with 600 men,[20] initiating Operation Hametz, but were stopped cold by a similar-sized force of Iraqi ALA irregulars in house to house combat; forcing the Irgun to ask for help from the Haganah after two days of fighting.[20] Heavy fighting continued with British units intervening on behalf of the Arabs and losing a number of tanks against Irgun ambushes. Jaffa would fall to the Israelis on 13 May.

On 29 April, units of the élite Palmach assaulted positions on the Katamon Ridge south of Jerusalem held by Iraqi ALA irregulars.[24] The Palmach secured a foothold with a surprise night attack that took the monastery dominating the ridge. In the morning the Iraqis launched a furious counterattack that evolved into an extremely tough fight, but eventually the Iraqis called off their attack to regroup; at noon the Israelis were reinforced by another battalion.[25] This new balance of combat power lead the exhausted and bloodied Iraqis to decide they did not possess the strength to dislodge the Israelis, and they retired from the field. After these defeats, the ALA took several months to resume operations, but by then most of its Iraqi contingent had joined the main Iraqi expeditionary force that had arrived in northern Samaria.[25]

Arab offensive, 15 May – 10 June 1948.

The first Iraqi forces of the expeditionary force reached Transjordan in early April 1948, with one infantry brigade and a supporting armoured battalion under the command of General Nur ad-Din Mahmud.[25] On 15 May, Iraqi engineers built a pontoon bridge across the Jordan River, allowing the combat units to cross into Palestine. Over 3,000 Iraqi soldiers with armor and air support were unable to defeat less than 50 lightly armed Jewish defenders. After the crossing, the Iraqis immediately launched a frontal assault against the Israeli settlement of Gesher, only to be quickly driven back.[25] The Iraq army tried again the next day, with their armour attacking from the south and their infantry from the north. The double envelopment was poorly implemented - lacking infantry-tank coordination - which left the Israelis with the breathing space to redeploy their small force along internal lines and defeat each attack in turn.[25] The Iraqis launched clumsy frontal assaults, with the unprotected tanks and armoured cars being easily destroyed by AT hunter-killer teams. Several days later, Mahmud tried to attack another Jewish settlement in the same area, but the troops did not scout their route properly and got ambushed before they could even reach the target settlement. These defeats convinced the Iraqi army to abandon this sector of the front and try their luck elsewhere.[25]

The expeditionary force moved into the NablusJeninTulkarm strategic triangle in May,[25] that being the West Bank region of northern Samaria. That was a key sector for the Arab war effort because it was the ideal jumping point for an attack westward against Haifa to split the narrow Israeli corridor along the Mediterranean coast (which was only 15 km wide) and break the country in half; it would also guard the right flank of the Transjordanian Arab Legion, which was concentrated to the south, around the Jerusalem corridor. Previously, this sector had been held by elements of the ALA that were too weak to pose much of a threat to the Israelis, but the arrival of the powerful Iraqi force led the Arabs to believe they would be able to cut Israel in two. While setting down the Iraqis were reinforced by another infantry brigade and another armoured battalion. The build-up continued steadily, with the expeditionary force reaching seven or eight infantry brigades, an armoured brigade and three air force squadrons.[26][27]

In late May, the Haganah launched a major assault against the Arab Legion's positions in the Latrun police fort on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road.[28] The Israeli attacks were extremely heavy, prompting the Jordanians to plead with the Iraqis to attack to draw off Israeli forces from Latrum; either northwest toward Haifa or north into Galilee. The Iraqi army was slow to respond and only launched two half-hearted attacks that were easily defeated by local Israeli forces.[28] Nevertheless, Haganah commanders pinpointed the Iraqi presence, by its size and location, to be a dangerous threat in a possible offensive. The Israelis decided to launch a preemptive attack south from Galilee to take Jenin, and possibly Nablus, and cut the Iraqi supply lines across the Jordan River. To achieve that the Israelis would employ three brigades: Alexandroni, Carmeli and Golani.[28]

At the same time, the Iraqis were planning the exact offensive the Israelis feared. As the first truce was approaching, the general headquarters of the Arab forces in Zarqaa ordered the commander of the Iraqi forces in Shechem to take control of a number of Israeli settlements in order to strengthen their position at the ceasefire talks. It was decided to take control of the port of Netanya, as it was considered an essential target and an important commercial center, and it would split Israeli communications between north and south - thus denying the Israelis movement between their internal lines.

The Israeli preemptive offensive began on the night of 28 May and caught the Iraqis by surprise. The plan called for the Alexandroni Brigade to make a diversionary attack against Tulkarm, while the Golanis would drive south toward Jenin; holding the high ground to the north. Then, the Carmeli Brigade would exploit the success passing though the Golani's lines and seize the town itself. The Golani attack to the north made good progress - despite the Alexandronis failing to execute their feint - and took a series of hills, villages and police posts en route to Nablus. The Iraqi defenders responded slowly and Israeli infantry repeatedly occupied key positions before Iraqi armoured car battalions arrived. The Golanis outmaneuvered the Iraqi forces in a series of skirmishes, outflanking and mauling them before they could retreat on multiple occasions. The Iraqis kept launching determined attacks against positions already occupied by the Israelis who, by then dug in, easily threw them back. The Israelis were now in a good position to assault Jenin.[29]

Iraqi reinforcements kept arriving north and when the Carmeli Brigade took over the spearhead of the Israeli attack, it began to run into them. An Iraqi brigade had fortified itself in the city by the time the Israelis reached Jenin on 3 June, and on the two hills dominating the city from the south. The Carmeli Brigade launched a clumsy frontal night assault but still managed to push off the Iraqis off both hills in a protracted battle. The next morning the Iraqis brought up fresh forces and counterattacked with a reinforced battalion, with artillery support and inaccurate (albeit helpful) airstrikes, that eventually retook the southwestern hill from the exhausted Israelis. A fierce battle developed for control of Jenin itself, and although in a continuous stalemate, the Iraqi commander kept feeding fresh troops into the fight until the Israelis concluded that holding the town was not worth the price in casualties and pulled back to the hills north of Jenin.[30] They suffered heavy casualties in the Israeli attack on Jenin, but they managed to hold on to their positions and could absorb the losses. Overall, the Iraqi troops distinguished themselves at Jenin, even impressing their Israeli opponents.[31] Active Iraqi involvement in the war effectively ended at this point.

By the beginning of 1951, British General Sir Brian Robertson, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces, was keen to upgrade the Iraqi Army as part of a wider effort to defend against a feared Soviet invasion in the event of war. A British MELF advisory team was dispatched there in November–December 1950. The team estimated that Iraqi's forces of the time, two divisions and a mechanized brigade, but deemed ill-equipped and 'not up to establishment' [full strength] would have to be increased, and a total of four divisions, three additional brigades, and more artillery units would be needed. The shortage of trained technical personnel was 'grave,' and the Iraqis were 'incapable of maintaining even the limited equipment already in their possession.'[32] In January 1951 the British Military Attaché wrote that the Iraqi Army's ability '..to wage modern warfare against a first class enemy is practically nil ... in its present state, the Iraqi army would be entirely incapable of remaining an effective force for more than ten hours of battle ... [it] must be used in war in cooperation with a field force of efficiency and stamina' which would have to do most of the fighting.'[33]

In May 1955 the British finally withdrew from Iraq. The Iraqi authorities said during the withdrawal negotiations that a motorised infantry brigade was to be formed, based at the previous RAF Habbaniya, a location that had been occupied by the British Iraq Levies.[34]

Republic declared

[edit]
A group of Iraqi soldiers, 1958.

The Hashemite monarchy lasted until 1958, when it was overthrown through a coup d'état by the Iraqi Army, known as the 14 July Revolution. King Faisal II of Iraq along with members of the royal family were murdered. The coup brought Abd al-Karim Qasim to power. He withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and established friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

When Qāsim distanced himself from Abd an-Nāsir, he faced growing opposition from pro-Egypt officers in the Iraqi army. `Arif, who wanted closer cooperation with Egypt, was stripped of his responsibilities and thrown in prison. When the garrison in Mosul rebelled against Qāsim's policies, he allowed the Kurdish leader Barzānī to return from exile in the Soviet Union to help suppress the pro-Nāsir rebels.

The creation of the new Fifth Division, consisting of mechanized infantry, was announced on 6 January 1959, Army Day.[35] Qāsim was also promoted to the rank of general.

In 1961, an Army build up close to Kuwait in conjunction with Iraqi claims over the small neighbouring state, led to a crisis with British military forces (land, sea, and air) deployed to Kuwait for a period. In 1961, Kuwait gained independence from Britain and Iraq claimed sovereignty over Kuwait. As in the 1930s, Qasim based Iraq's claim on the assertion that Kuwait had been a district of the Ottoman province of Basra, unjustly severed by the British from the main body of Iraqi state when it had been created in the 1920s.[36] Britain reacted strongly to Iraq's claim and sent troops to Kuwait to deter Iraq. Qāsim was forced to back down and in October 1963, Iraq recognized the sovereignty of Kuwait.

Qāsim was assassinated in February 1963, when the Ba'ath Party took power under the leadership of General Ahmed Hasan al-Bakr (prime minister) and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif (president). Nine months later `Abd as-Salam Muhammad `Arif led a successful coup against the Ba'ath government. On 13 April 1966, President Abdul Salam Arif died in a helicopter crash and was succeeded by his brother, General Abdul Rahman Arif. Following the Six-Day War of 1967, the Ba'ath Party felt strong enough to retake power (17 July 1968). Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr became president and chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

Six-Day War

[edit]
Iraqi Army Panhard AML-60 armored car, 1970s. Iraq ordered about 250 of these vehicles between 1968 and 1976.

During the Six-Day War, the Iraqi 3rd Armoured Division was deployed in eastern Jordan.[37] However, the Israeli attack against the West Bank unfolded so quickly that the Iraqi force could not organise itself and reach the front before Jordan ceased fighting. Repeated Israeli airstrikes also held them up so that by the time they did reach the Jordan River the entire West Bank was in Israeli hands. During the course of the Jordanian Campaign ten Iraqis were killed and 30 Iraqis were wounded, especially as the main battle was in Jerusalem. Fighting also raged in other areas of the West Bank, where Iraqi commandos and Jordanian soldiers defended their positions.[38]

Barzānī and the Kurds who had begun a rebellion in 1961 were still causing problems in 1969. The secretary-general of the Ba`th party, Saddam Hussein, was given responsibility to find a solution. It was clear that it was impossible to defeat the Kurds by military means and in 1970 a political agreement was reached between the rebels and the Iraqi government.

Following the Arab defeat in 1967, Jordan became a hotbed of Palestinian activity. During this time PLO elements attempted to create a Palestinian state within Jordan caused the Jordanians to launch their full military force against the PLO. As they were doing this Syria invaded Jordan and Iraq moved a brigade in Rihab, Jordan.[citation needed] Otherwise the only Iraqi activity was that they fired upon some Jordanian aircraft.

Yom Kippur War

[edit]

Iraq sent a 60,000 man expeditionary force to the Syrian front during the Yom Kippur War. It consisted of the 3rd and 6th Armoured Divisions, two infantry brigades, twelve artillery battalions, and a special forces brigade. The two armoured divisions were, Pollack says, 'unquestionably the best formations of the Iraqi Army.'[37] Yet during their operations on the Golan Heights, their performance was awful in virtually every category of military effectiveness. Military intelligence, initiative, and small unit independent action was virtually absent.[39]

After the war, Iraq started a major military build-up. Active duty manpower doubled, and so did number of divisions, from six to twelve, of which four were now armoured and two mechanised infantry.[40]

Iran–Iraq war

[edit]
Iraqi commanders discussing strategy on the battlefront, 1986. Wafiq Al-Samarrai is center-left.

Later, Saddam Hussein, looking to build fighting power against Iran soon after the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War doubled the size of the Iraqi Army. In 1981, Pollack writes it numbered 200,000 soldiers in 12 divisions and 3 independent brigades, but by 1985, it reached 500,000 men in 23 divisions and nine brigades. An April 1983 CIA estimate suggests that Iraq had at that time five armoured; seven infantry; and two mechanised infantry divisions with ten more forming ("several are probably already operational").[41] The first new divisions were created in 1981 when the 11th and 12th Border Guard Divisions were converted into infantry formations and the 14th Infantry Division was formed.[42] Yet the rise in number of divisions is misleading, because during the war Iraqi divisions abandoned a standard organisation with permanent ('organic') brigades assigned to each division. Instead division headquarters were assigned a mission or sector and then assigned brigades to carry out the task - up to eight to ten brigades on some occasions.[43]

Destroyed iraqi tanks, 1980s.


The war came at a great cost in lives and economic damage - a half a million Iraqi and Iranian soldiers as well as civilians are believed to have died in the war with many more injured and wounded - but brought neither reparations nor change in borders. The conflict is often compared to World War I,[44] in that the tactics used closely mirrored those of the 1914–1918 war, including large scale trench warfare, manned machine-gun posts, bayonet charges, use of barbed wire across trenches and on no-mans land, human wave attacks by Iran, and Iraq's extensive use of chemical weapons (such as mustard gas) against Iranian troops and civilians as well as Iraqi Kurds.

Invasion of Kuwait and the Persian Gulf War

[edit]
Iraqi tanks in Kuwait City of Iraqi-occupied Kuwait on 2 August 1990 during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait that began the Gulf War.

By the eve of the Invasion of Kuwait which led to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the army was estimated to number 1,000,000 men.[45] Just before the Persian Gulf War began, the force comprised 47 infantry divisions plus 9 armoured and mechanised divisions, grouped in 7 corps.[46] This gave a total of about 56 army divisions, and total land force divisions reached 68 when the 12 Iraqi Republican Guard divisions were included. Eisenstadt notes that four Republican Guards security divisions were formed between the invasion of Kuwait and the outbreak of war. They remained in Iraq during the war.[46] Although the coalition ground forces believed they faced approximately 545,000 Iraqi troops at the beginning of the ground campaign,[47] the quantitative descriptions of the Iraqi army at the time were exaggerated, for a variety of reasons.[48] Many[quantify] of the Iraqi troops were also young, under-resourced and poorly trained conscripts. Saddam did not trust the army; among counterbalancing security forces was the Iraqi Popular Army.

The wide range of suppliers of Iraqi equipment resulted in a lack of standardization. It additionally suffered from poor training and poor motivation. The majority of Iraqi armoured forces still used old Chinese Type 59s and Type 69s, Soviet-made T-55s & T-62s from the 1950s and 1960s, and some T-72s from the 1970s in 1991. These vehicles were not equipped with up-to-date equipment, such as thermal sights or laser rangefinders, and their effectiveness in modern combat was very limited. The Iraqis failed to find effective countermeasures to the thermal sights and the sabot rounds used by M1 Abrams, Challenger 1 and other tanks of the Allied forces. U.S. M1A1s could effectively engage and destroy Iraqi tanks from well outside the distance (e.g. 8,200 ft to Iraqi ranges of 6,600 ft) that Iraqi tanks could engage.

Abandoned Iraqi 2S1 "Gvozdika" artillery system, 1991.

The Iraqi tank guns were supplied with older generation steel core penetrators[which?] which, while perfectly well suited to older Iranian tanks, against the advanced Chobham Armour of the latest US and British tanks of the coalition the results were disastrous[clarification needed]. The Iraqi forces also failed to utilize the advantage that could be gained from using urban warfare — fighting within Kuwait City — which could have inflicted significant casualties on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs and can negate some of the technological advantage that well equipped forces enjoy. Iraqis also tried to use Soviet military doctrine, but the implementation failed due to the lack of skill of their commanders and the preventive air strikes of the USAF and RAF on communication centers and bunkers.

Destroyed iraqi MRLS system, 1991.

While the exact number of Iraqi combat casualties has yet to be firmly determined, sources agree that the losses were substantial. Immediate estimates said up to 100,000 Iraqis were killed. More recent estimates indicate that Iraq probably sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 fatalities, though other figures still maintain fatalities could have been as high as 200,000.[49] A report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, estimated 10,000-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war.[50] This analysis is based on Iraqi prisoner of war reports. It is known[by whom?] that between 20,000 and 200,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed. According to the Project on Defense Alternatives study,[51] 3,664 Iraqi civilians and between 20,000 and 26,000 military personnel were killed in the conflict. 75,000 Iraqi soldiers were wounded in the fighting.

Destroyed iraqi T-72 tank, 1991.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) estimated the army's composition immediately after the 1991 war as six 'armoured'/'mechanised' divisions, 23 infantry divisions, eight Republican Guard divisions and four Republican Guard internal security divisions.[52] Jane's Defence Weekly for 18 July 1992 stated that 10,000 troops from five divisions were fighting against Shia Muslims in the southern marshlands.

The IISS gave the Iraqi Army's force structure as of 1 July 1997 as seven Corps headquarters, six armoured or mechanised divisions, 12 infantry divisions, six RGF divisions, four Special Republican Guard Brigades, 10 commando, and two Special Forces Brigades.[53] It was estimated to number 350,000 personnel, including 100,000 recently recalled reservists.[53]

U.S. invasion in 2003

[edit]

In the days leading up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the following Iraq War, the army consisted of 375,000 troops, organized into five corps. In all, there were 11 infantry divisions, 3 mechanized divisions, and 3 armored divisions. The Republican Guard consisted of between 50,000 and 60,000 troops (although some sources indicate a strength of up to 80,000).

In January 2003, before the start of the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the force was primarily located in eastern Iraq. The five corps were organised as follows:

  • 1st Corps, near Kirkuk consisted of the 5th Mechanized Division, 2nd Infantry Division, 8th Infantry Division and the 38th Infantry Division.[54]
  • 2nd Corps, near Diyala (CNN)[55] had the 3rd Armored Division (HQ Jalawia), 15th Infantry Division (HQ Amerli), and 34th Infantry Division.[54]
  • 3rd Corps, near An Nasiriyah and the Kuwaiti border, had the 6th Armored Division, the 51st Mechanized Division, and the 11th Infantry Division.[56] The 11th Infantry Division defended An Nasiriyah and As Samawah to the southeast on the approaches to An Nasiriyah.[57]
  • 4th Corps, near Amarah and the border with Iran, included the 10th Armored Division, 14th Infantry Division and 18th Infantry Division.[58]
  • 5th Corps (Iraq), with its headquarters at Mosul, covering border areas with Syria and Turkey, had the 1st Mechanised Division, and the 4th, 7th, and 16th Infantry Divisions.[59]
  • Western Desert Force, consisting of an armored infantry division and other units in western Iraq. Malovany's description of deployments generally follows this pattern; A special headquarters was established on the eve of the war called the "Great Day" to command forces defending the Anbar district in west Iraq and the axes leading from it towards Baghdad.[60]
US tanks in central Baghdad after just a 22 days since invasion started, under Victory Arch, 2003.

During the 2003 invasion of Iraq the Iraqi Army was defeated in a number of battles, including by Task Force Viking in the north, and the Battle of Nasiriyah and the Battle of Baghdad. The Iraqi Army was disbanded by Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2 issued by U.S. Administrator of Iraq Paul Bremer on May 23, 2003, after its decisive defeat.[61] Bremer said that it was not feasible to reconstitute the armed forces. His justifications for the disbandment included postwar looting, which had destroyed all the bases; that the largely Shiite draftees of the army would not respond to a recall plea from their former commanders, who were primarily Sunnis, and that recalling the army "would be a political disaster because to the vast majority of Iraqis it was a symbol of the old Baathist-led Sunni ascendancy".[62]

Corps

[edit]
Modified T-55 tank of the 5th Mechanized Division which saw action in the Battle of Khafji
  • 1st Corps – established before Iran-Iraq War.
  • 2nd Corps – reorganised as an armoured corps for the 1991 Gulf War, comprising the 17th Armoured Division and the 51st Mechanised Division
  • 3rd Corps – established before Iran-Iraq War. In 1978 reported to be headquartered at Nasariyah and to consist of 1st and 5th Mechanised Divisions and 9th Armoured Division. In 2003, Nasiriyah was the headquarters of the Iraqi Army's 3rd Corps, composed of the 11th ID, 51st Mech ID, and 6th Armored Division—all at around 50 percent strength. The 51st operated south covering the oilfields, and the 6th was north near Al Amarah, which left three brigade-sized elements of the 11th ID to guard the An Nasiriyah area.[63]
  • 4th Corps – established 22 October 1981 to take over the northern sector of Khuzestan Province, including Basitin, Shush, and Dezful sectors. Maj Gen Hisham Sahab al-Fakhri, previously 10th Armoured Division commander, was appointed as the corps commander. 1st Mechanised, 10th Armoured, and 14th Infantry Division were allocated to the corps, leaving 3rd Corps with 3rd and 9th Armoured, 5th Mechanised, and 11th Infantry Divisions.[64]
    Senior generals of the Iraq Army at the Gizlani military base in Mosul, 1960's.
  • 5th Corps
  • 6th Corps – Malovany 2017 writes that on 25 March 1985, an army meeting chaired by Saddam in Baghdad decided to transform the East Tigris Headquarters into a regular corps, the 6th Corps. It was to be reinforced with four additional divisions; as the 35th Division had been transferred to the 4th Corps, and the 32nd Division was with the East Tigris HQ, the new line-up would consist of the 32nd Division as before; the 12th Armoured Division and 2nd Infantry Division transferred both from the 2nd Corps; the 4th Infantry Division, and the 25th Infantry Division from the 4th Corps.[65] Malovany adds on the same page that during 1986 two more divisions joined the 6th Corps, an infantry division ("apparently the 50th") and the "Marshes" Division.
  • 7th Corps
  • Jihad Forces (Persian Gulf War of 1991)

Infantry and mechanised divisions

[edit]

Armoured divisions up to 2003

[edit]

Brigades

[edit]

The 65th Special Forces Brigade, 66th Special Forces Brigade, 68th Special Forces Brigade, and 440th Marine Brigade were active during the Persian Gulf War.[72]

Rebuilding an Army from 2003

[edit]
BMP-3 in a Military parade celebrating 100th Anniversary of Army's Founding.
soldiers from 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 9th Iraqi Army Division, conduct final checks before leaving on a mission from Combat Outpost Inchon, Jan. 22, 2008.

Based on Bush administration expectations that coalition forces would be welcomed as liberators after the overthrow of the Hussein regime,[73] prewar planners had only been expecting little if any resistance from the Iraqi people. Thus the new army was initially focused on external defence operations. The new Army was originally intended to comprise 27 battalions in three divisions numbering 40,000 soldiers in three years time.[74] Vinnell Corporation was engaged to train the first nine battalions.[75]

The Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT), headed by Major General Paul Eaton, was organized by the Department of Defense with the responsibility of training and development of the new army. On August 2, 2003, the first battalion of new Iraqi Army recruits started a nine-week training course at a training base in Qaraqosh. They graduated on October 4, 2003.[76] In the interim, the new army had been formally established by Coalition Provisional Authority Order 22 of August 18, 2003.[77]

In April 2004, several Iraqi battalions refused to fight as part of the force engaged in the First Battle of Fallujah.[78] The Fifth Battalion was among the new Iraqi units that fought in Fallujah.[79] In June 2004, the CMATT was dissolved, and passed on its responsibilities to the Multi-National Security Transition Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) (initially headed by Lt. Gen. David Petraeus) with the new focus on providing security for the Iraqi people from the emerging threat posed by the Iraqi insurgency.[80]

While the regular army was being formed, U.S. commanders around the country needed additional troops more quickly, and thus the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (which became the Iraqi National Guard by July 2004)[81] was formed. Coalition commanders formed these militia-type units separately in each area; only later were they gradually brought together as one force. There were several instances where they have refused to take military action against fellow Iraqis, such as in Fallujah, deserted, or allegedly aided the resistance. It is alleged that most guardsmen were drawn from the Shia majority in Southern Iraq or the Kurdish majority in northern Iraq, rather than from the Sunni area which they were ordered to attack. In September 2004, a senior member of the National Guard, General Talib al-Lahibi was arrested on suspicion of having links with insurgent groups.[82] In December 2004, it was announced that the Iraqi National Guard would be dissolved.[83] At this time its strength was officially over 40,000 men. Its units became part of the army. The absorption of the ING by the regular army appears to have taken place on January 6, 2005, Iraqi Army Day.[84]

Iraqi commandos training under the supervision of soldiers of the US 82nd Airborne.

On August 14, 2004, the NATO Training Mission - Iraq was established to assist the Iraqi military, including the army. On September 20 the provisional Fallujah Brigade dissolved after being sent in to secure the city. The Fallujah Brigade experiment of using former insurgents to secure a city was not repeated.

Army training was transferred from Vinnell Corporation to the United States Department of Defense supported by U.S. allies. It was impeded by domestic instability, infiltration by insurgents, and high desertion rates.[citation needed] By June 2005, the number of battalions in the new army had grown to around 115. Out of this number, it was deemed that 80 were able to carry out operations in the field with Coalition support limited to logistics and strategic planning, whilst another 20-30 battalions still needed major Coalition support to carry out their operations. As of October 5, 2005 the Iraqi Army had 90 battalions trained well enough to be "deployed independently", without United States help.[85]

On May 3, 2006, a significant command-and-control development took place. The Iraqi Army command and control center opened in a ceremony at the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IFGC) headquarters at Camp Victory.[86] The IGFC was established to exercise command and control of assigned Iraqi Army forces and, upon assuming Operational Control, to plan and direct operations to defeat the Iraqi insurgency. At the time, the IFGC was commanded by Lt. Gen. Abdul-Qadar. In 2006 the ten planned divisions began to be certified and assume battlespace responsibility: the 6th and 8th before June 26, 2006, the 9th on June 26, 2006, the 5th on July 3, 2006, the 4th on August 8, 2006, and the 2nd on December 21, 2006. After divisions were certified, they began to be transferred from U.S. operational control to Iraqi control of the IGFC. The 8th Division was transferred on September 7, 2006,[87][88] and the 3rd Division on December 1, 2006. Another unspecified division also was transferred to IGFC control.[89] Also transferred to the Iraqi chain of command were smaller logistics units: on November 1, 2006, the 5th Motor Transport Regiment (MTR) was the fifth of nine MTRs to be transferred to the Iraqi Army divisions. 2007 plans included, MNF-I said, great efforts to make the Iraqi Army able to sustain itself logistically.[90]

As of June 26, 2006, three Iraqi divisions, 18 brigades and 69 battalions were responsible for their own areas of operations (including two police commando battalions).[91]

2008

[edit]
Iraqi army battalion trains for urban operations

On March 25, 2008, the Iraqi Army launched its first solely planned and executed high-profile division-level operation, Operation Charge of the Knights in Basra. They received Multi-National Force – Iraq support only in air support, logistics and via embedded advisors. Also, a British infantry brigade, part of Multi-National Division South-East, and stationed in Basra, were ready in a tactical overwatch role. Their participation was limited to the provision of embedded training teams.[citation needed]

In April–June 2008, two brigades of the Iraqi Army 11th Division, supported by US forces, moved into the southern third of Sadr City. They were tasked to stop rocket and mortar attacks on US bases and the Green Zone. Following the Siege of Sadr City—a month of fighting—the Mahdi Army agreed to let Iraqi forces into the remaining portion of the city. On May 20, troops from the Iraqi Army 3rd Brigade of the 1st (Iraqi Reaction Force) Division and a brigade from the 9th Division moved into the northern districts of Sadr City and began clearing operations.

In May, Iraqi army forces launched Operation Lion's Roar (later renamed to Operation Mother of Two Springs) in Mosul and surrounding areas of Nineveh Governorate. Iraq became one of the top purchasers of U.S. military equipment with the Iraqi army trading its AK-47 assault rifles for the more accurate U.S. M-16 and M-4 rifles, among other equipment.[92]

In June 2008 the army moved troops to the southern Maysan Governorate. Following a four-day amnesty for insurgents to turn over weapons, the Iraqi Army moved into the provincial capital Amarah.

In late 2008, United States personnel were worried by Prime Minister Maliki's attempt to exert control over the Iraqi Army and police by proliferating regional operations commands. "Using the Baghdad Operations Command as his precedent, Maliki created other regional commands in Basrah, Diyala, the mid-Euphrates region, and Ninawa, and others would follow. Initially coalition leaders welcomed the idea of regional commands that could create unity of Iraqi effort, but their enthusiasm faded as Maliki began to use the new headquarters to bypass the formal chain of command,"[93] which came to resemble the operating mode of the Saddam Hussein regime.

Divisions are forming engineer, logistics, mortar, and other units by identifying over-strength units, such as the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) battalions and other headquarters elements, and then transferring them as needed.

Problems include infiltration and an insufficient US advisory effort. Former members of the Special Republican Guard, members of the intelligence services, senior level officials of the Ba'ath Party, people affiliated with terrorist organizations, and anyone with human rights violations or crimes against humanity were prohibited from entering the new army.[77] However the army was infiltrated by a multitude of groups ranging from local militias to foreign insurgents. This has led to highly publicized deaths and compromised operations (perhaps the most prominent being the attack on a US military base near Mosul in December 2004. More than 20 people, including 13 American servicemen, were killed when a suicide bomber wearing an Iraqi military uniform detonated his vest inside a dining tent).[94]

2011

[edit]

In 2011 Lieutenant General Michael Barbero, Commanding General, MNSTC-I, made an assessment of the Iraqi Armed Forces' shortcomings. Michael Gordon summarized Barbero's findings as:

"..for all the U.S. efforts, Iraq’s special operations forces continued being flown to their targets on American helicopters and relied heavily on U.S. intelligence to plan their missions. Iraqi tank crews, artillery batteries, and infantry battalions had been trained separately and were not practiced in combined arms warfare.

Logistics remained a challenge, and the Iraqi Army had an enormous and costly maintenance backlog. The Iraqis had no counter-battery radar system to pinpoint the location of rocket attacks on the Green Zone—the fortified sanctuary that served as the seat of the Iraqi government—or, as yet, an air force that could protect the nation’s skies. In short, Barbero concluded, Iraq had a “checkpoint army” that was very much a work in progress."[95]

The response from Iraqi officials was that U.S. troops would have to stay longer.

2012

[edit]

Each of the joint and multi-agency operational commands also include the Department of Border Enforcement, Federal Police, Emergency Police, Oil Police, FPS, etc. in their command as well as Iraqi Army.

As of the Fall of 2012, the Iraqi Army was organized as follows:

U.S. Military Transition Teams

[edit]

Up until 2010–2011, all Iraqi Army battalions were supposed to have had embedded U.S. Military transition teams. The MiTTs provided intelligence, communications, fire support, logistics and infantry tactics advice. Larger scale operations were often done jointly with U.S. forces. The training aimed to make the battalion self-sustainable tactically, operationally and logistically so that the battalion would have been prepared to take over responsibility for a particular area.

As of March 2007, the United States Department of Defense reported that 6000 advisors in 480+ teams were embedded with Iraqi units.[108] However, in April, the Congressional Research Service reported that only around 4000 U.S. forces were embedded with Iraqi units at a rate of 10 per battalion.[109] Former U.S. Army analyst Andrew Krepinevich argued that the roughly twelve advisors per Iraqi battalion (approximately 500 troops) was less than half the sufficient amount needed to efficiently implement the combat advisory effort.[110] Krepinevich argues that officers try to avoid taking on advisory tasks due to the US Army's practice of prioritising the promotion of officers that have served with a U.S. unit over ones that have served with foreign forces.[111]

Advisors remained after all U.S. combat brigades left Iraq in August 2010.[112] These troops were required to leave Iraq by 31 December 2011 under an agreement between the U.S. and Iraqi governments.[113]

2014–2016

[edit]

In the summer of 2014, large elements of the Iraqi army were routed by a much smaller and less well-equipped force from the Islamic State. Nineteen Iraqi Army brigades and six Federal Police brigades disintegrated, a quarter of Iraq's security forces. These losses comprised all of the Ninawa-based 2nd and 3rd Iraqi Army divisions; most of the Salah al-Din-based 4th Iraqi Army division; all of the Kirkuk-based 12th Iraqi Army division; plus at least five southern Iraqi Army brigades that had previously been redeployed to the Syrian border."[114] Islamic State managed to conquer large swaths of Al Anbar Governorate and Iraq's second largest city, Mosul.

Budget problems continued to hinder the manning of combat support and combat service support units. The lack of soldiers entering boot camp is forcing Iraqi leaders at all levels to face the dual challenge of manning and training enabler units out of existing manpower. In the 2015 Pentagon budget, a further $1.3 billion has been requested to provide weapons for the Iraqi Army.[7] However, the New York Times reported that "some of the weaponry recently supplied by the army has already ended up on the black market and in the hands of Islamic State fighters". The same November 2014 article contended that corruption is endemic in the Iraqi Army. It quoted Col. Shaaban al-Obeidi of the internal security forces, who told the paper: "Corruption is everywhere." The article claimed that one Iraqi general is known as "chicken guy" because of his reputation for selling the soldiers' poultry provisions.[7]

Iraqi special forces wearing masks and armed with M4A1 carbines, March 2020.

In late June 2014, after the large-scale Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant offensive in the north of Iraq, it was reported that ISIL ""took the weapons stores of the 2nd and 3rd Iraqi army divisions in Mosul, the 4th division in Salah al Din, the 12th division in the areas near Kirkuk, and another division in Diyala (the 5th Division)," said Jabbar Yawar, secretary-general of the Kurkish Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs.[115]

Reuters reported that the 5th Division (Iraq), located in Diyala Governorate, was by October 2014 reporting to informal "militias' chain of command," not to the Iraqi Army, according to several U.S. and coalition military officials.[116]

A much later report from Small Wars Journal said that in "..2013 and 2014 the 7th Division of the Iraqi Army, 99% Sunni, fought IS virtually alone, until it was almost completely destroyed."[117]

The October 2014 Reuters report quoted Lieutenant General Mick Bednarek, Chief of the Office of Security Cooperation, in Iraq from 2013 until July 2014, as estimating that "the army has only five functioning divisions ... whose fighting readiness ranges between 60 and 65 percent."

The new government under Haider al-Abadi dismissed the Iraqi Ground Forces Command commander General Ali Ghaidan Majid (circa September 2014) and the Iraqi Army chief of operations, General Aboud Kanbar. Lieutenant General Riyadh Tawfiq, the former head of the Ninewa Operational Command, was appointed as the new head of the IGFC and the Mosul Liberation Command.[118]

Michael Knights wrote in 2016 that the rebuilding from the mid-2014 disaster had been steady but "very slow". "By January 2015 a fair number of brigades had been salvaged and a couple of new brigades were built but the overall frontline combat strength of the ISF was halved due to attrition in the manning of each brigade. [U]nits were weaker and many were too demoralized or lightly equipped to do more than hold in place. A year later, by January 2016, significant progress has been made in terms of available forces albeit largely by shuffling around personnel and raising around a dozen new and very small 1,000-strong brigades."[119] The new 15th and 16th Divisions have been identified, which appear to comprise some of the new brigades that Knights mentions, including the 71st, 72nd, 73rd, 75th, and 76th.

Structure

[edit]
Iraqi Special Operations Forces training April 2011

The Iraqi Army began the Anglo-Iraqi War with a force of four divisions. A fifth was formed in 1959. By the outbreak of the Iran–Iraq War, the force had grown to nine divisions. By 1990, with wartime expansion, the force had grown greatly to at least 56 divisions, making the Iraqi army the fourth largest army in the world and one of the strongest in the Middle East. After the defeat in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, force size dropped to around 23 divisions, as well as Republican Guard formations. The new army formed after 2003 was initially planned to be three divisions strong, but was then raised to ten divisions, and more later.

The U.S. House Armed Services Committee commented in 2007 that "It is important to note that in the initial fielding plan, five army divisions would be tied to the regions from where they were recruited and the other five would be deployable throughout Iraq. This was partially due to the legacy of some army divisions being formed from the National Guard units and has caused some complications in terms of making these forces available for operations in all areas of Iraq, and the military becoming a truly national, non-sectarian force."[120]

According to the United States Department of Defense Measuring Safety and Security in Iraq report of August 2006, plans at that time called for the Iraqi Army to be built up to an approximately 137,500-person force. This was based around an Army with 9 infantry divisions and one mechanised division consisting of 36 brigades and 112 battalions. Nine Motorized Transportation Regiments, 5 logistics battalions, 2 support battalions, 5 Regional Support Units, and 91 Garrison Support Units were intended to provide logistics and support for each division, with Taji National Depot providing depot-level maintenance and resupply. Each battalion, brigade, and division headquarters was to be supported by a Headquarters and Service Company (HSC) providing logistical and maintenance support. The army was also planned to include 17 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions and an Iraqi Special Operations Forces brigade of two battalions.[121]

The Iraqi Army consists of nine regional joint commands. The Joint Operational Commands fall under the command of the National Operations Center. The Iraqi Ground Forces Command does not directly command the army's divisions.

As of July 2009, the Iraqi Army had 14 divisions (1st-12th, 14th, and 17th, the designation 13 not being used), containing 56 brigades or 185 combat battalions.[citation needed] The designations "15th" and "16th" had been reserved for forces to be formed from the Kurds (which did not eventuate). Each division had four line brigades, an engineering regiment, and a support regiment. However both the 6th Division and the 17th Division only had three manoeuvre brigades each. By April 2010, the combat battalion total had risen to 197 combat battalions.

Three of the 56 brigades are not Iraqi Ground Forces Command combatant brigades and were not assigned to a division. They are the Baghdad Brigade formed in the fall of 2008, the 1st Presidential Brigade formed in January 2008, and the 2nd Presidential Brigade formed in the spring of 2009.[citation needed]

After the Fall of Mosul to ISIS, a number of new Iraqi formations and units were created. Among them was (finally) a division numbered "16th" which was "new" when the 82nd Airborne Division's 3rd Brigade arrived in 2015, and operational by November 2015 after fighting in Ramadi.[122] In November 2014 the first units of the new 15th and 16th Divisions held graduation ceremonies.[123]

The Institute for the Study of War said in their 29 December 2014 situation report that "..The 19th Division is a new military formation intended to include members from the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 12th IA divisions that melted away during the rapid advance of ISIS in June 2014. This formation will almost certainly include volunteer fighters, most likely displaced persons from Mosul, who reside in refugee camps. The.. sectarian composition of the unit will be important to watch. The formation of the division was initially proposed by Defense Minister Khaled al-Obaidi on November 4, 2014 during a visit to Iraqi Kurdistan. During that visit he requested assistance from the Kurdistan Regional Government [with] basing the new division in Iraqi Kurdistan and giving the force responsibility for clearing Mosul."[124] The 19th Division was not listed in either the Institute's 2017 listing of units, or the IISS Military Balance 2022.

In late 2020, the International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated that the Army was about 180,000 strong, with three SF brigades, a ranger brigade HQ which supervised one ranger battalion; the 9th Armoured Division (2 armoured brigades, 2 mech bdes); the 5th, 8th & 10th Divisions with four mechanised infantry brigades each; the 7th Mechanised Division with 2 mech inf bde and 1 inf bde; the 6th Motorised Division with three motorised infantry brigades and an infantry brigade; the 14th Motorised Division with five motorised and infantry brigades; the 1st Infantry Division with two infantry brigades; the 11th Infantry Division with three light inf brigades; the 15th Infantry Division with five infantry brigades; the 16th Infantry Division with two infantry brigades; the 17th Commando Division with four infantry brigades; the independent 17th Infantry Brigade; and the Prime Minister's Security Force division of three infantry brigades.[125]

The Counter-Terrorism Service is a Ministry of Defence (Iraq) funded component that reports directly to the Prime Minister of Iraq.[126]

Rank insignia

[edit]

Training

[edit]
An Iraqi Army T-72 tank performs a live-fire training exercise at the Besmaya Gunnery Range, in Besmaya, Baghdad, 28 October 2008.

There are three levels of troop capability in the new army: one, two, and three. Level three refers to troops that have just completed basic training, level two refers to troops that are able to work with soldiers, and level one refers to troops that can work by themselves.

Members of NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I) opened a Joint Staff College in ar Rustamiyah in Baghdad on September 27, 2005, with 300 trainers. Training at bases in Norway, Italy, Jordan, Germany, and Egypt has also taken place and 16 NATO countries have allocated forces to the training effort.[127]

The Multi-National Force Iraq has also conducted a variety of training programs for both enlisted soldiers and officers including training as medics, engineers, quartermasters, and military police. Beyond the various courses and programs being held in-country, both American staff colleges and military academies have begun taking Iraqi applicants, with Iraqi cadets being enrolled at both the United States Military Academy and the US Air Force Academy.[128]

Recruits and enlisted soldiers

[edit]
Iraqi soldiers assigned to 71st Iraqi Army Brigade move closer to an objective, seeking a new location for cover during a simulated exercise under fire at Camp Taji, Iraq, Nov. 18, 2015

Iraqi Army recruits undergo a standard eight-week[109] basic training course that includes basic soldiering skills, weapons marksmanship and individual tactics. Former soldiers are eligible for an abbreviated three-week "Direct Recruit Replacement Training" course designed to replace regular basic training to be followed by more training once they have been assigned to a unit.

Soldiers later go on to enroll in more specific advanced courses targeted for their respective fields. This could involve going to the Military Intelligence School, the Signal School, the Bomb Disposal School, the Combat Arms Branch School, the Engineer School, and the Military Police School.

Officers

[edit]

The Iraqi Armed Service and Supply Institute located in Taji plays a significant role in training aspiring Iraqi non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers. The training is based on the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst model, chosen in part due to its shorter graduation time compared to West Point. Much of the Iraqi officer training programme is copied directly from the Sandhurst course.

Equipment

[edit]
The 2nd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Division took delivery of 10 armored HMMWVs

Virtually all of the equipment used by the former Iraqi Army was either destroyed by the U.S. and British forces during the 2003 invasion, or was looted during the chaotic aftermath shortly after the fall of the Hussein regime. Among these were more than 20,000 sets of body armor.[129] Four T-55 tanks however have been recovered from an old army base in al-Muqdadiyah and are now in service with the 1st Division.

In February 2004 the U.S. government announced that Nour USA was awarded a $327,485,798 contract to procure equipment for both the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi National Guard; however, this contract was canceled in March 2004 when an internal Army investigation (initiated due to complaints from losing bidders) revealed that Army procurement officers in Iraq were violating procedures with sloppy contract language and incomplete paperwork. On May of that same year the U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) stated that they would award a contract worth $259,321,656 to ANHAM Joint Venture in exchange for procuring the necessary equipment (and providing its required training) for a minimum of 15 and a maximum of 35 battalions. The minimum bid would begin to be delivered immediately and further orders could be placed until the maximum of 35 battalion sets or September 2006 after the first order was fully delivered.

In May 2005, Hungary agreed to donate 77 T-72s to the Iraqi Army, with the refurbishment contract going to Defense Solutions to bring the tanks up to operational status for an estimated 4.5 million dollars US.[130] After a delay in the payment of funds from the Iraqi government,[131] the 9th Mechanised Division received the tanks at its headquarters in Taji over a three-day period starting on November 8, 2005.[130]

A convoy of 1st Motor Transport Regiment, 1st Iraqi Army Division KrAZ-6322

On July 29, 2005, the United Arab Emirates gained approval to purchase 180 M113A1 APCs in good condition from Switzerland, with the intent to transfer them to Iraq as a gift. Domestic political opposition in Switzerland successfully froze the sale, fearing that the export would violate the country's longstanding tradition of neutrality as well as perhaps make Switzerland a target for terrorism.[132]

173 M113s, 44 APC Talhas, and 100 FV103 Spartans were donated by Jordan, Pakistan and UAE. 600 AMZ Dzik-3 (Ain Jaria) APCs were ordered in Poland (option for 1,200) for delivery by Jan 2007. 573 Otokar Akrep APCs for delivery by Jan 2007. 756 Iraqi Light Armored Vehicles (option for 1,050) for delivery by November 2008.[133][134] Greece donated 100 BMP-1 to the Iraqi Army.

713 M1114 and 400 M1151 HMMWVs purchased for IA with delivery complete by end July 2006.

Serbia has signed a US$230m deal with Iraq to sell weapons and military equipment, the defence ministry said in March 2008. It did not specify the weapons but Serbian military experts believe they include Serbian-made CZ-99 hand guns, Zastava M21 5.56 mm assault rifles, Zastava M84 machine guns, anti-tank weapons (M79 "Osa", Bumbar, and M90 "Strsljen"), ammunition and explosives and about 20 Lasta 95 basic trainer aircraft. Iraq's defence Minister Abdul-Qadir al-Obaidi visited Belgrade in September and November to discuss boosting military ties with Serbia.[135][136]

In August 2008, the United States proposed military sales to Iraq, which will include the latest upgraded M1A1 Abrams battle tanks, attack helicopters, Stryker armored vehicles, modern radios, all to be valued at an estimated $2.16 billion.[137]

In December 2008, the United States approved a $6 billion arms deal with Iraq that included 140 M1A1 Abrams tanks and 400 Stryker combat vehicles for elite Iraqi army units.[138]

In December 2009, Ukraine has signed a deal to deliver $550 million worth of arms to Iraq, the agreement with the Iraqi ministry of defense calls for Ukraine to produce and deliver 420 BTR-4 armored personnel carriers, six AN-32B military transport planes and other military hardware to Iraq.[139]

In February 2009, the United States Department of Defense announced it had struck deals with Iraq that would see Baghdad spend $5 billion on U.S.-made weapons, equipment and training.[140]

In 2016, Iraq finalized an order with Uralvagonzavod for 73 T-90S and SK tanks. The T-90SK is a command variant equipped additional radios and navigation equipment. As of 2018, 36 had been delivered and have been assigned to 35th Brigade of the 9th Armored Division.

Uniforms and personal weapons

[edit]

The average Iraqi soldier is equipped with an assortment of uniforms ranging from the Desert Camouflage Uniform, the 6 color "Chocolate Chip" DBDU, the woodland-pattern BDU, the U.S. Marine Corps MARPAT, or Jordanian KA7. Nearly all have a PASGT ballistic helmet, Generation I OTV ballistic vest, and radio. Their light weapons consist of stocks of Cold War-era arms, namely the Tabuk series of Zastava M-70 copies and derivatives like the Tabuk Sniper Rifle, the Soviet AKM and the Chinese Type 56 assault rifles, the Zastava M72 and PKM machine guns, and Al-Kadesih sniper rifle though they have received assistance from the U.S. in the form of American-made weapons, including M16A2 and M16A4 rifles and M4 carbines.

However weapons registration is poor. A 2006 report by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) notes that out of the 370,000 weapons turned over to the U.S. since the fall of Saddam's regime, only 12,000 serial numbers have been recorded.[141] The lack of proper accounting for these weapons makes the acquisition of small arms by anti-governmental forces such as insurgents or sectarian militias much easier.

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Iraqi Ground Forces (IGF; Arabic: القوات البرية العراقية), the principal land warfare component of the Iraqi Armed Forces, is tasked with territorial defense, counterinsurgency operations, and conventional ground combat to safeguard Iraq's sovereignty. Formed on 6 January 1921 under British mandate administration following the Ottoman Empire's collapse, the IGF originated as a small constabulary force to maintain order in the newly delineated territory, later expanding into a royal army during the Hashemite monarchy before undergoing republican transformations after the 1958 coup. Throughout its history, the IGF has been defined by cycles of rapid militarization, battlefield attrition, and institutional collapse, including massive buildups during the 1970s-1980s Iran-Iraq War that fielded over a million troops with Soviet-supplied armor, near-total devastation in the 1991 and 2003 U.S.-led , and a near-disintegration in 2014 amid the Islamic State's territorial conquests due to failures, poor , and desertions despite numerical advantages. Rebuilt post-2003 with U.S. training and equipment totaling billions in aid, and again after 2017 with coalition support to reclaim lost ground from , the force has demonstrated resilience in individual soldier performance and nationalist motivation but recurrent brittleness under stress from top-down command rigidity and inadequate initiative. As of 2025, the IGF operates under the Iraqi Ground Forces Command with roughly 10 active divisions organized into mechanized, motorized, and brigades, supported by and units, fielding over 350 main battle tanks including U.S.-origin M1A1 Abrams and Russian / variants, alongside 1,500+ armored vehicles and 400+ pieces for a total active strength contributing to Iraq's 193,000 uniformed personnel. Despite modernization, persistent challenges include corruption eroding procurement, sectarian imbalances in recruitment, and competition from Iran-aligned militias that operate semi-independently, complicating unified command and exposing vulnerabilities to internal political interference over merit-based professionalism.

Origins and Early Development

Formation of the Royal Iraqi Army

The Royal Iraqi Army was formally established on January 6, 1921, during the British mandate over following the after . This creation aimed to develop a local security force capable of maintaining internal order and border defense, thereby reducing Britain's direct military footprint and associated costs in the region. The mandate, granted by of Nations in 1920, positioned Britain to oversee Iraq's administration while fostering institutions like a national army modeled on British organizational principles. The inaugural unit, designated the Musa al-Kadhim Regiment (Fawj Musa al-Kadhim), was raised in , drawing initial recruits from existing tribal levies and Ottoman-era veterans to form a core. By June 1921, the first was operational, with volunteers enlisting to build out basic structures under British supervision. A British advisory mission was embedded from the outset to provide training, doctrine, and equipment, ensuring alignment with imperial standards while prioritizing loyalty to the emerging Hashemite under King Faisal I, who ascended in August 1921. In April 1921, an officers' training school—later evolving into a full military college—was founded in , explicitly patterned after the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst to cultivate a cadre of Iraqi commanders versed in British tactics and administration. This institution emphasized discipline and technical proficiency, with early classes comprising a mix of Arab officers from Sharifian backgrounds and local recruits, though British instructors retained veto power over promotions and curricula to safeguard mandate interests. The army's nascent size remained limited in its formative years, starting with a few thousand personnel focused on gendarmerie-like duties, reflecting Britain's cautious approach to arming a potentially restive population amid tribal unrest and Assyrian minority tensions.

Interwar Period and Initial Coups

Following its establishment in 1921 under the British mandate, the Iraqi Army in the interwar period primarily focused on internal security and suppressing tribal revolts, with limited external engagements that constrained its operational development. British assistance established foundational training infrastructure, including an officers' school in 1924 and infantry training bases, yet the army's activities remained confined to maintaining order amid ethnic and tribal unrest. A notable operation occurred in 1932 against the Barzani Kurdish revolt led by Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, protesting Iraq's impending admission to the League of Nations; Iraqi ground forces, supported by Royal Air Force airstrikes, deployed mountain artillery to shell Barzani positions and ultimately subdued the insurgents, forcing leaders underground. General emerged as a pivotal figure in the army during , earning promotion for suppressing rebellions, including the Assyrian revolt near Simele and subsequent tribal uprisings in 1935 and 1936. Appointed Chief of the General Staff under King Ghazi, Sidqi leveraged growing military discontent with civilian governments to orchestrate Iraq's first military coup on October 29, 1936, overthrowing and installing Hikmat Sulayman as head of a "popular government." This event, the inaugural military coup in the , marked the army's direct entry into politics, driven by officers' frustrations over perceived civilian incompetence and British influence, though it initially avoided Sidqi assuming formal power himself. The 1936 coup initiated a cycle of instability, as internal factionalism between military leaders and civilian reformers eroded the regime's cohesion. Sidqi's assassination on August 11, , by rivals amid suspicions of his Kurdish sympathies and authoritarian tendencies, triggered further army interventions, including the 1937 "White Revolution" backlash and subsequent power shifts among officers. These early coups entrenched the military's role as a political arbiter, foreshadowing repeated interventions through 1941, while highlighting the army's evolution from a colonial-era to an institution capable of challenging monarchical authority.

Republican and Ba'athist Era (1958–2003)

Early Republican Conflicts and Arab Wars

Following the 1958 revolution that established the Iraqi Republic, the Iraqi Ground Forces faced immediate internal challenges, including coup attempts and regional insurgencies. In March 1959, pro-monarchy elements in Mosul attempted an uprising against the republican government of Abd al-Karim Qasim, prompting the army to deploy units to suppress the revolt, resulting in hundreds of casualties and marking early instability in military loyalty. The most significant early republican conflict was the First Iraqi-Kurdish War, initiated in September 1961 when Kurdish leader declared autonomy and launched guerrilla operations against central government forces. The Iraqi army committed up to 80% of its strength to operations in northern , employing ground assaults supported by air strikes against fighters. By 1963, Syrian forces aided with 6,000 troops, armored vehicles, and aircraft in campaigns against Kurdish positions. Renewed offensives occurred in 1965 and 1969, with the army launching major operations in October 1969 to regain territory, though terrain and guerrilla tactics prolonged the stalemate. The conflict, which caused 75,000 to 105,000 military and civilian deaths, ended in a 1970 autonomy agreement that temporarily halted hostilities but tied down significant ground force resources throughout the decade. In external engagements, Iraqi ground forces participated in the 1967 , deploying an infantry division to in response to Egyptian and Jordanian requests for support against . Approximately 12,000 troops with tanks crossed into but arrived after the main Israeli advances, engaging in limited skirmishes near the with minimal impact on the overall outcome. Iraqi air assets suffered heavy losses, but ground units withdrew largely intact following the ceasefire on June 10, 1967. Iraq's involvement intensified in the 1973 , where it dispatched an expeditionary force of approximately 60,000 troops, including the 3rd and 6th Armoured Divisions equipped with tanks, to the Syrian front on the . These units, totaling around 18,000 men and several hundred tanks in the central sector, participated in counterattacks against Israeli forces starting , 1973, inflicting casualties but sustaining significant losses from Israeli air and armored superiority. The deployment strained Iraqi logistics over long supply lines from , highlighting command coordination issues with Syrian allies, yet demonstrated the ground forces' capacity for rapid mobilization under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr's regime.

Iran–Iraq War and Military Expansion

![Iran–Iraq War ground forces](./assets/Iran-Iraq_War%252C_color_photos_%E2%80%93_Defapress_%2819) At the start of the on September 22, 1980, Iraq's ground forces numbered around 190,000 active personnel organized into 12 divisions, comprising four armored or mechanized divisions and eight infantry divisions, primarily equipped with Soviet T-55 and tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and artillery systems. The initial invasion deployed six divisions across three fronts, achieving rapid advances into Iranian territory, including the capture of by November 1980. However, Iranian resistance and counteroffensives from 1982 onward stalled Iraqi momentum, exposing limitations in manpower and logistics, which prompted Saddam Hussein's regime to pursue aggressive military expansion funded by oil revenues. Iraq's regular army grew significantly through conscription and mobilization, reaching approximately 500,000 troops by the mid-1980s, with the addition of the People's Army—a reserve force of light infantry exceeding 250,000 personnel by 1985—to bolster defensive lines against Iranian human-wave assaults. By 1988, total ground forces approached 955,000 active and reserve personnel across 37 regular divisions, including enhanced armored units with superior Soviet-supplied equipment. This expansion included the procurement of over 4,500 tanks (notably models), thousands of armored personnel carriers, and extensive artillery, financed by $22 billion in arms imports from primary suppliers like the , , and between 1980 and 1988. Parallel to regular forces, the —initially a small presidential security brigade in the early 1980s—expanded into an elite parallel army, growing to six divisions and 110,000 troops by 1988, equipped with premium tanks and vehicles reserved for loyalty-tested units. These forces played a pivotal role in late-war counteroffensives, such as the recapture of the Fao Peninsula in April 1988, leveraging tactics with air support and chemical weapons to blunt Iranian advances, though overall Iraqi performance suffered from officer purges, rigid command structures, and high attrition rates exceeding 200,000 dead by war's end. The war's demands catalyzed doctrinal shifts toward fortified defenses along the front, massed barrages, and mechanized thrusts, but systemic issues like poor and political interference limited effectiveness despite numerical superiority. Iraq's ground forces emerged larger and better armed, yet the expansion prioritized quantity over quality, setting precedents for future vulnerabilities evident in subsequent conflicts.

Invasion of Kuwait, Gulf War, and Sanctions Era

The commenced on August 2, 1990, when ground forces numbering approximately 100,000 troops, including four divisions such as the and Nebuchadnezzar, alongside regular army units, crossed the border and overran Kuwaiti defenses within hours. The , Saddam Hussein's elite praetorian units estimated at 100,000-150,000 personnel equipped with superior tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, spearheaded the assault to ensure loyalty and rapid execution, while the regular army—comprising conscripts in outdated equipment—provided supporting roles in securing territory. By August 4, Iraqi forces had fully occupied , deploying an additional 300,000-500,000 troops to fortify positions against potential counterattacks, including minefields, trench networks, and oil-filled ditches along the Saudi border. In response, a U.S.-led coalition initiated Operation Desert Shield to defend Saudi Arabia, followed by Operation Desert Storm on January 17, 1991, with an intense air campaign that targeted Iraqi command structures, logistics, and ground forces, destroying an estimated 1,400 tanks and severely disrupting communications before the ground phase. The Iraqi ground forces, totaling around 500,000-600,000 in theater from an overall army of nearly 900,000 active personnel organized into 60 divisions (including 5 Republican Guard divisions), relied on static defenses in Kuwait and southern Iraq, with the elite Guard units held in reserve near Baghdad or Basra to counter any breakthroughs. The coalition ground offensive launched on February 24, 1991, employing a "left hook" maneuver through the western desert, where Iraqi regular divisions—poorly trained conscripts in T-55 and T-62 tanks—surrendered en masse, with over 80,000 captured in the first days due to low morale, supply shortages, and overwhelming coalition air and armored superiority. Republican Guard divisions, better equipped and motivated, offered stiffer resistance in key engagements like the on February 26, where U.S. 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment destroyed elements of the Tawakalna Division with minimal losses, leveraging thermal sights and helicopters against Iraqi T-72s blinded by poor visibility and command failures. Iraqi ground forces suffered catastrophic losses, with estimates of 20,000-50,000 killed, 60,000-100,000 wounded, and 3,000-4,000 tanks destroyed or abandoned during the 100-hour ground war ending February 28, as units fled northward, setting Kuwaiti oil wells ablaze to cover retreats. The Guard's Division was mauled at Medina Ridge, highlighting tactical deficiencies in and electronic warfare against coalition forces equipped with GPS-guided munitions and tanks. Post-ceasefire, UN Security Council Resolution 687 imposed comprehensive sanctions on , prohibiting military imports and dual-use goods, which over the next decade led to severe degradation of ground forces through spare parts shortages, equipment cannibalization, and stalled modernization efforts. By the late 1990s, the regular army's operational readiness plummeted, with many divisions reduced to 25-50% strength due to maintenance issues and desertions, though the —prioritized by Saddam for regime protection—retained better capabilities via smuggling and internal resource allocation, enabling suppression of 1991 Shiite and Kurdish uprisings. Sanctions, enforced via no-fly zones and inspections, constrained 's ability to project power externally, fostering internal purges and reliance on paramilitary units, while overall military spending shifted from expansion to survival amid economic isolation until the 2003 invasion.

Post-2003 Dissolution and Reconstruction

U.S.-Led Invasion and Army Dissolution

The U.S.-led coalition invasion of commenced on March 20, 2003, with ground operations involving approximately 160,000 coalition troops, primarily American, advancing from toward . The Iraqi Ground Forces, numbering around 375,000 personnel organized into five corps with conventional divisions, paramilitary units, and formations, offered disorganized resistance marked by widespread desertions and ineffective defenses. Iraqi units, hampered by years of sanctions, poor morale, and Saddam Hussein's fear of coups leading to dispersed command structures, failed to mount coherent counterattacks; for instance, the Medina Division of the collapsed rapidly near . Coalition forces captured on April 9, 2003, after a swift campaign lasting less than a month, with Iraqi units largely melting away rather than engaging in sustained . President declared the end of major operations on May 1, 2003, aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, though pockets of irregular and Ba'athist loyalists continued sporadic fighting. The collapse of the regime left a vacuum, as planners had anticipated using existing Iraqi structures for post-invasion stability but faced decisions on restructuring amid concerns over Ba'athist infiltration. On May 23, 2003, (CPA) Administrator L. issued Order Number 2, "Dissolution of Entities," which formally disbanded the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior, Iraqi Intelligence and Bureaus, and the Iraqi Army, among other entities. The order demobilized all personnel in these dissolved organizations, prohibited their reemployment in new security institutions without vetting, and suspended financial obligations while directing the CPA to review pensions and provide one-time payments to former soldiers. This decision, made against advice from U.S. military commanders who favored retaining mid-level officers for a new Iraqi force, aimed to eliminate Ba'athist repressive apparatuses but overlooked the apolitical nature of many conscript soldiers. The dissolution rendered approximately 400,000 Iraqi soldiers—many armed and trained—unemployed without immediate pensions or roles, exacerbating in a already strained by damage. Analysts attribute this policy to fueling the emerging , as demobilized troops, feeling humiliated and economically desperate, provided recruits and expertise to groups like , contributing to a surge in attacks that by late overwhelmed nascent stabilization efforts. While intended to prevent regime remnants from reorganizing, the abrupt disbandment created a self-reinforcing cycle of lawlessness, as former soldiers joined militias amid the absence of a national police or replacement until CPA Order 22 in August outlined a new Iraqi Corps.

Rebuilding Amid Insurgency (2003–2011)

Following the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority Administrator L. Paul Bremer issued Order Number 2 on May 23, 2003, formally dissolving the Iraqi army and other Ba'athist-era military and intelligence entities, which led to the unemployment of approximately 400,000 soldiers and contributed to early insurgency recruitment. Recruitment for a New Iraqi Army (NIA) began shortly thereafter, with the first group of recruits entering a nine-week training program on August 2, 2003, at a base near Qaraqosh; the inaugural battalion graduated on October 4, 2003, marking the initial step in reconstructing ground forces from scratch. The Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), established on June 28, 2004, oversaw the expansion of training efforts, focusing on basic infantry skills, equipment familiarization, and tactics amid escalating violence from Sunni insurgents and affiliates. By late 2005, approximately 37 Iraqi army battalions had been trained and assigned operational responsibilities in their areas, though many operated with embedded coalition advisors due to limited independent capabilities. The hampered progress, with frequent attacks on training sites, high desertion rates—often exceeding 20% in early units—and infiltration by insurgents, including members of the and other Shia militias, which fostered sectarian divisions within the ranks. The 2007 U.S. troop surge facilitated accelerated force generation, enabling the Iraqi army to grow to over 100 capable battalions by 2008, participating in joint operations like the Charge of the Knights against Shia extremists in . Persistent challenges included , with funds for equipment and salaries siphoned by officers, and uneven leadership quality, as former Ba'athists were barred under policies, depleting experienced non-commissioned officers. By 2011, the Iraqi Ground Forces numbered around 200,000 personnel across 13 divisions, assuming primary security roles as U.S. combat troops withdrew in December, though vulnerabilities in and air support persisted.

Sectarian Strife and U.S. Withdrawal

The completed its military withdrawal from on December 18, 2011, transferring full security responsibilities to the Iraqi Ground Forces after nearly nine years of involvement that had trained and equipped over 300,000 personnel. This shift exposed underlying fractures in the army, exacerbated by Nouri al-Maliki's Shiite-centric governance, which prioritized loyalty to his Dawa Party over merit-based command. Maliki's policies systematically marginalized Sunni Arabs, who comprised a significant portion of Iraq's population but faced exclusion from senior roles; by 2013, only two of the Iraqi Army's division commanders were Sunni, one a close Maliki ally, reflecting a broader Shiite dominance in the officer corps estimated at over 80% in key positions. Sunni officers reported routine arrests, interrogations, and dismissals on suspicions of disloyalty, often without evidence, fostering resentment and eroding trust in the chain of command. Such actions, including the replacement of Sunni-led units with Shiite loyalists in Sunni-majority areas, prioritized political control over operational readiness, leading to widespread and ghost soldier payrolls that siphoned up to 20-30% of defense budgets. Sectarian divisions manifested in declining morale and cohesion, particularly among Sunni enlisted personnel, who viewed the army as an extension of Shiite dominance rather than a national institution; desertion rates spiked in Sunni regions, with units in Anbar and provinces struggling to maintain strength amid protests against perceived discrimination. Insurgent violence from remnants surged, with over 4,000 civilian deaths from bombings and shootings in 2013 alone, as the Ground Forces proved ineffective in securing Sunni areas due to gaps and reluctance to engage communities alienated by Baghdad's heavy-handed tactics. The absence of U.S. advisory oversight post-withdrawal amplified these issues, as unchecked political interference hollowed out standards and , setting conditions for operational failures.

Rise of ISIS and Initial Collapse (2014)

In early 2014, the and Syria (ISIS) escalated its insurgent campaign in Iraq's Anbar Province, capturing on January 4 after Iraqi security forces withdrew amid heavy fighting. The group, building on gains in , exploited local Sunni grievances against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shia-dominated government, which had pursued policies alienating Sunni tribes through arrests of former Ba'athists and marginalization of Sunni officers. saw partial ISIS control by January, with the group establishing structures and using captured U.S.-supplied equipment from earlier raids. The decisive collapse occurred during the ISIS offensive on , Iraq's second-largest city, beginning June 5, 2014. Approximately 25,000 to 30,000 Iraqi Ground Forces troops from the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, equipped with tanks, , and U.S.-provided armored vehicles, faced an estimated 800 to 1,500 core fighters augmented by local Sunni collaborators. Despite numerical superiority, Iraqi units disintegrated within days due to systemic issues: widespread inflating payrolls with "" (non-existent personnel siphoning funds), poor leadership under politically appointed officers, and eroded morale from sectarian discrimination, where Sunni soldiers anticipated reprisals or lacked loyalty to a perceived Shia-centric command. By June 10, seized with minimal resistance, as thousands of troops abandoned positions, stripped uniforms, and fled southward, leaving behind over 2,000 vehicles, 400 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and vast stockpiles of ammunition. The fall of exposed the Iraqi Ground Forces' structural vulnerabilities post-2011 U.S. withdrawal, including inadequate training sustainment, over-reliance on static defenses, and failure to integrate intelligence on local sympathies. Maliki's initial response emphasized military reinforcement, declaring a on June 10 and requesting U.S. airstrikes, but his government's refusal to share power with Sunnis had fostered passive local acquiescence or active aid to , accelerating the rout. Grand Ali al-Sistani's June 13 mobilized Shia volunteers into militias, compensating for the army's vacuum but deepening sectarian divides. By late June, controlled a swath of northern and western , including and , prompting international intervention planning.

Counter-ISIS Campaign and Victories (2014–2017)

In June 2014, the Iraqi Ground Forces suffered a catastrophic collapse during ISIS's capture of and , with multiple divisions abandoning positions and equipment due to low morale, inadequate leadership, and sectarian fractures within the ranks. The counteroffensive began in earnest following the establishment of the (CJTF-OIR) on October 17, 2014, which provided critical airstrikes starting August 8, 2014, to blunt ISIS advances and support Iraqi ground operations. Iraqi army units, bolstered by U.S. training programs that had rebuilt select divisions since 2011, conducted initial defensive stands around and while coalition advisors embedded with brigades to improve . By early 2015, Iraqi Ground Forces achieved their first major territorial recapture at in March–April 2015, where army elements coordinated with (PMF) to dislodge fighters entrenched in urban areas, though the operation highlighted ongoing coordination issues and reliance on militia firepower. Subsequent advances in Anbar province included the liberation of on May 17, 2016, led by the Iraqi army's 7th Division and federal police, utilizing tactics with coalition-supplied Abrams tanks and artillery to clear defenses amid heavy improvised explosive device (IED) usage. Fallujah followed in June 2016, with Iraqi army brigades executing a methodical that expelled after weeks of fighting, reducing the group's hold on key Sunni population centers and enabling further momentum. The campaign's decisive phase unfolded in the Battle of Mosul, launched October 17, 2016, involving roughly 40,000 Iraqi Ground Forces troops as part of a 100,000-strong Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) coalition, facing 3,000–12,000 ISIS defenders in dense urban terrain. Key units included the 9th, 15th, and 16th Divisions alongside the Counter-Terrorism Service's Golden Division, which spearheaded assaults using "bite and hold" tactics to methodically clear neighborhoods while coalition aircraft delivered over 29,000 munitions to dismantle ISIS command nodes, tunnels, and vehicle-borne IEDs. Eastern Mosul fell by January 24, 2017, but western sectors, particularly the Old City, prolonged the fight until July 9, 2017, due to ISIS's defensive adaptations, booby-trapped buildings, and use of civilians as shields, resulting in over 8,200 ISF casualties and extensive destruction. These operations restored Iraqi Ground Forces' credibility after 2014's failures, though successes were inextricably linked to CJTF-OIR's precision strikes and advisory support, which compensated for persistent Iraqi deficiencies in , , and . Iraqi Prime Minister declared Mosul's liberation on July 10, 2017, marking the effective end of ISIS's in , followed by a national victory announcement on December 9, 2017, after minor holdouts like were cleared.

Post-ISIS Stabilization and Reforms (2018–Present)

Following the territorial defeat of in 2017, Iraqi Ground Forces prioritized securing liberated urban centers and rural areas, conducting clearance operations against remaining insurgent cells, and establishing forward operating bases to prevent resurgence. By 2018, the forces had shifted from major combat to stabilization missions, including border patrols and counter-insurgency sweeps in provinces like Anbar, , and Diyala, where ISIS remnants conducted guerrilla attacks. The U.S.-led Global Coalition transitioned to an advise-and-assist role under , providing intelligence sharing and logistical support to enable Iraqi-led operations, with over 100 Iraqi battalions assuming primary responsibility for internal security by 2019. This phase saw incremental improvements in force readiness, though persistent low-level threats from ISIS affiliates necessitated ongoing deployments. Reforms emphasized professionalization through enhanced training programs and doctrinal updates, supported by international partners. The Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve delivered specialized training to Iraqi brigades on , counter-IED tactics, and operations, graduating thousands of personnel annually from onward. NATO's Mission Iraq, launched in , contributed to capacity-building in areas like and officer education, aiming for sustainable self-reliance. Structural adjustments included consolidating mechanized and brigades within existing divisions to improve , while efforts to integrate select (PMF) units into the formal of command faced resistance from Iran-aligned factions seeking . These initiatives were partially funded through U.S. Foreign Financing, including $3.4 billion in loans disbursed by for equipment sustainment. Significant challenges impeded comprehensive reforms, including systemic that diverted funds from maintenance and , leading to degraded equipment readiness rates often below 50% for armored vehicles. Political interference and sectarian loyalties exacerbated command fragmentation, with PMF groups—formalized under state oversight in but retaining operational independence—undermining the Ground Forces' monopoly on legitimate violence and complicating unified . Iran-backed PMF units, controlling key territories, prioritized partisan agendas over national defense, fostering graft and that eroded army morale and . External analyses highlight how these factors, compounded by inadequate budgeting (military expenditure fluctuating amid oil revenue volatility), limited the forces' ability to transition fully to independent operations. Equipment acquisitions provided modest modernization, with deliveries of U.S. M1A1 Abrams tanks and Russian BMP-3 infantry vehicles continuing into 2019, alongside contracts for artillery systems announced in 2022 to bolster fire support capabilities. By 2024, the Ground Forces operated approximately 55 brigades, including mechanized elements, though sustainment issues persisted due to financing shortfalls. In September 2024, Iraq and the U.S. agreed to conclude the Coalition's combat mission by September 2025, shifting to bilateral advisory ties with U.S. personnel consolidated in the Kurdistan Region, reflecting Iraqi forces' assumed lead against ISIS threats while exposing vulnerabilities to militia influence and economic constraints. Ongoing operations in 2025 targeted ISIS cells, with Iraqi divisions conducting joint raids supported by residual coalition enablers.

Organizational Structure

Command Hierarchy and Corps

The Iraqi Ground Forces operate under the oversight of the Ministry of Defense, with the Joint Headquarters coordinating joint service activities and the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) exercising direct operational authority over units, including conventional divisions and forces. The IGFC, headquartered near , plans and executes ground operations, maintains readiness, and integrates logistics and training across the force. This structure emerged post-2003 reconstruction to centralize command while decentralizing tactical execution amid persistent and territorial threats. Corps-level formations, functioning as regional operational commands, bridge the IGFC and subordinate divisions, enabling geographically focused security missions, rapid response, and coordination with local police and provincial authorities. These commands typically report to the IGFC and are led by major generals or generals, overseeing 2-4 divisions each depending on the sector's threat profile and terrain. Historical precedents from pre-2003 emphasized as primary warfighting echelons without intermediate layers, a model partially retained in modern iterations despite reforms emphasizing brigade-level modularity. Notable examples include the Ninewa Operations Command, which directs forces in province against residual insurgent threats, integrating infantry and mechanized units under a two-star for area denial and . Similarly, sector-specific commands in areas like Anbar and handle desert mobility operations and oil infrastructure protection, reflecting adaptations to Iraq's diverse operational environments from urban counterterrorism to rural patrols. As of 2016 assessments, these commands incorporated lessons from campaigns, prioritizing joint fires integration and intelligence-driven maneuvers over rigid hierarchies. The exact number of active corps varies with political realignments and resource allocation, but they collectively enable the IGFC to project approximately 150,000-200,000 personnel across Iraq's 18 governorates.

Divisions, Brigades, and Specialized Units

The Iraqi Ground Forces are structured around a modular framework of divisions, each typically comprising three to four maneuver brigades supported by artillery, reconnaissance, and logistics battalions. As of 2025, the force includes ten operational divisions assigned to three geographic corps—Northern, Central, and Southern—under the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, with plans for expansion to 14 divisions outlined since 2009 but constrained by recruitment and readiness issues. Brigades serve as the core tactical units, organized into approximately 55 combat brigades encompassing 196 infantry battalions, with specialized types including motorized infantry, mechanized, armored, and rapid reaction formations; for instance, the 9th Armored Division fields two armored and two mechanized brigades, while the 5th, 8th, and 10th Divisions emphasize mechanized infantry brigades for mobile operations. Key divisions include the 1st Motorized Division (quick reaction force), 7th Infantry Division (transferred to full Iraqi control in 2011 as the last of the initial ten), and 14th Motorized Division, alongside mountain divisions like the 15th and 16th for terrain-specific roles in northern regions. The 17th Division provides airborne and special maneuver capabilities. These units have undergone reforms post-2017 to address 2014 collapses, incorporating U.S.-trained battalions focused on tactics, though persistent challenges like equipment maintenance and sectarian infiltration limit full operational cohesion. ![Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF)][float-right] Specialized units fall under the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), particularly the Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), which operate semi-independently for high-risk missions. ISOF comprises three brigades: the 1st Special Operations Brigade (also known as the Golden Division), based in Baghdad with the 1st (formerly 36th Commando), 2nd, and 5th Special Operations Battalions, plus support and training elements; the 2nd Brigade, distributed across Basra, Mosul, Diyala, and Al Asad with four battalions; and the 3rd Brigade in Basra. The Golden Division, credited with pivotal roles in the 2014–2017 counter-ISIS campaigns including the recapture of Mosul, maintains elite status through rigorous selection and U.S. advisory support, though it faces risks from political interference and militia encroachments. Additional specialized elements include commando and reconnaissance battalions embedded in regular divisions for rapid deployment.

Rank Insignia and Personnel Composition

The rank structure of the Iraqi Ground Forces divides personnel into commissioned officers, warrant officers (limited use), non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted ranks, modeled after British conventions with Arabic nomenclature. Commissioned officers progress from mulāzim (, denoted by one star) to mulāzim awal (, two stars), naqīb (, three stars), rāʾid (major, crown and one star), muqaddam (, crown and two stars), ʿaqīd (colonel, crossed sword and baton with crown), ʿamīd (, one star in wreath), liwāʾ (, crossed sword and baton with one star), farīq (, two stars), to farīq awal (general, three stars or equivalent). Insignia typically feature embroidered or metal stars, pips, crowns, and crossed swords on shoulder epaulets or slides, with higher generals using additional laurels or eagles; field uniforms employ subdued versions for combat.,4548.html) NCO and enlisted ranks emphasize hierarchy in leadership roles, starting with jundī (private, no insignia) and jundī awal (, one chevron), advancing to ʿarīf (, two chevrons), raqīb (, three chevrons), raqīb awal (, three chevrons with arc), and up to raqīb ula (, complex chevrons with stars or crowns).,4548.html) These are worn as sleeve stripes or shoulder patches, with combat variants in subdued colors; promotions depend on service length, performance, and specialized training, though and favoritism have historically undermined merit-based advancement. As of 2023, the Iraqi Ground Forces maintain an active personnel strength of approximately 180,000 to 193,000, predominantly enlisted soldiers forming the bulk of combat units, with officers and NCOs comprising a smaller cadre focused on command and . No official breakdown of officer-to-enlisted ratios is publicly detailed, but structural reforms post-2003 aimed to professionalize the force by limiting officer bloat inherited from Saddam-era practices, emphasizing NCO development for . Sectarian composition mirrors Iraq's demographics—roughly 60-65% Shi'a Arab, 15-20% Sunni Arab, 15-20% , and minorities—but recruitment patterns have skewed toward Shi'a majorities in enlisted ranks due to regional enlistment bases and post-2003 purges of Ba'athist (predominantly Sunni) officers, resulting in underrepresentation of Sunnis (estimated below 20% in officer corps by mid-2010s analyses) and contributing to morale failures during the 2014 ISIS offensive in Sunni-majority areas. Efforts to integrate Sunnis and via quotas and tribal outreach have yielded mixed results, hampered by influences and distrust, though recent stabilization has improved retention through pay incentives and U.S.-backed professionalization.

Training and Operational Doctrine

Basic Training for Enlisted Personnel

![Iraqi army battalion trains for urban operations](./assets/Flickr_-DVIDSHUB-Iraqi_army_battalion_trains_for_urban_operationsImage_2_of_3 Basic training for enlisted personnel in the Iraqi Ground Forces, conducted at regional training centers such as those at Kirkush and Taji, typically spans 6 to 8 weeks for new recruits. This duration has been standard since the post-2003 rebuilding efforts, with former soldiers from the pre-invasion era receiving abbreviated 3-week refreshers to expedite integration. The program emphasizes foundational skills to prepare recruits for roles, drawing initially from U.S.-led advisory models but increasingly managed by Iraqi cadre. The curriculum covers essential soldiering competencies, including weapons marksmanship with the rifle and 9mm pistol, first aid procedures, physical fitness regimens, drill and ceremony, and indoctrination in army values. Recruits undergo rigorous physical conditioning to build endurance, alongside basic tactical movements and individual combat skills, often under simulated field conditions to foster discipline and . Training incorporates live-fire exercises, with emphasis on qualifying under varied environmental challenges to ensure proficiency regardless of weather or time constraints. Upon completion, graduates—known as jundi in —receive assignment to operational units, where they may pursue specialized follow-on based on branch needs, such as or roles. Recent iterations, as seen in the activation of units like the 6th in 2025, maintain this structure while integrating lessons from counter-ISIS operations to enhance readiness against hybrid threats. Despite improvements in and instructor quality through international partnerships, persistent challenges like shortages and variable recruit motivation have historically impacted efficacy, though empirical data on attrition rates remains limited in public assessments.

Officer Development and Professionalization

The Iraqi Military Academy at Rustamiyah, established in 1924 and relocated to its current site in 1947, serves as the primary institution for commissioning new officers in the Iraqi Ground Forces, conducting a 12-month course that graduates second lieutenants after training in basic military skills, tactics, and leadership. The academy adapted elements of the British military academy model post-2003, aiming to produce approximately 600 officers annually to address shortages in the officer corps. For mid-level professionalization, the Iraqi Staff College at Ar Rustamiyah provides advanced education equivalent to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, offering a 10.5-month curriculum on tactics, intelligence, logistics, counterinsurgency, and joint operations to prepare officers for staff roles. Following the 2003 disbandment of Saddam Hussein's army under , officer development shifted to rebuilding a non-sectarian, merit-based cadre amid , which removed experienced but politicized leaders, creating gaps filled initially by accelerated commissioning of enlisted personnel and college graduates. U.S.-led efforts from 2004 onward integrated coalition advisors into academies, customizing doctrines like the U.S. "Legacy Force" for Iraqi contexts and emphasizing small-unit tactics suited to rather than . By 2007, U.S. Air University teams contributed curricula for junior officer programs, focusing on leadership and ethics to counter Ba'ath-era loyalty-based promotions. International assistance has evolved to include NATO Training Mission-Iraq support for the since 2007, incorporating interoperability exercises like the Golden Falcon and UN missions, with recent 2025 inspections confirming ongoing joint planning to elevate training standards. Ethics training, such as sessions at U.S. institutions like West Point for academy commandants, addresses leadership integrity, though implementation remains inconsistent. Persistent challenges undermine professionalization, including systemic corruption that diverts funds from training and equipment, leading to "" and inflated payrolls, as evidenced by the 2014 collapse of units like the 2nd Division due to failures beyond mere tactical shortcomings. Sectarian quotas imposed by political elites since 2003 prioritize loyalty over competence, fostering divided commands and risk-averse officers reluctant to engage threats independently, as seen in high and poor administration during crises. Despite reforms, Iranian influence and integration exacerbate these issues, limiting the officer corps' evolution into a unified, apolitical force capable of sustaining operations without external support.

International Assistance and Doctrinal Evolution

Following the 2003 invasion, international assistance to the Iraqi Ground Forces emphasized rebuilding from scratch, with the leading efforts to train and equip new units under the Multi-National Force-Iraq. This included establishing basic training centers and transitioning from Ba'athist-era structures to a volunteer-based force oriented toward operations. NATO's Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I), launched in 2004 at Iraq's request, provided institutional training, focusing on ministry-level , officer education, and doctrinal development to create self-sustaining armed forces. By 2011, NTM-I had trained over 5,000 personnel and facilitated the handover of key training academies, though challenges persisted due to ongoing and internal political divisions. Doctrinal evolution during this period involved shifting from Soviet-influenced mass mobilization tactics to Western-style professional standards, including the adoption of a formal doctrine hierarchy discussed at the 2008 Iraqi Military Doctrine Conference involving U.S., NATO, and Iraqi leaders. This conference aimed to standardize operational concepts, logistics, and command structures over an 18-month planning horizon, prioritizing brigade-level maneuver and combined arms integration. However, implementation was uneven, as evidenced by the Iraqi army's rapid collapse in 2014 against ISIS advances, highlighting gaps in unit cohesion and leadership despite prior training investments. The rise of ISIS prompted renewed international support through the Global Coalition against Daesh, formed in 2014 with 89 members, which provided advisory, training, and equipping assistance to Iraqi Security Forces under Operation Inherent Resolve. U.S.-led Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF-OIR) embedded advisors to enhance capabilities in urban warfare, intelligence sharing, and fire support coordination, enabling victories like the 2016-2017 Mosul campaign where Iraqi forces integrated coalition airpower with ground maneuvers. Post-territorial defeat of ISIS in 2017, focus shifted to stabilization, with NATO Mission Iraq (established 2018) delivering tactical-level training to over 20,000 personnel annually across four Iraqi divisions, emphasizing non-combat advisory roles and doctrinal alignment with international standards like humanitarian law integration. Doctrinal advancements post-ISIS included professionalization efforts, such as brigade-centric operations, improved logistics sustainment, and counter-terrorism tactics derived from Mosul battle lessons, where Iraqi units learned to employ against fortified defenses. Contributors like , , and the supplemented U.S. and efforts with specialized training in night operations and urban patrolling. By 2024, the Coalition's military mission in Iraq concluded, transitioning to bilateral security partnerships and enduring advisory presence to sustain doctrinal gains amid ongoing threats from ISIS remnants. Despite progress, reports note persistent issues in motivation and corruption undermining full doctrinal implementation.

Equipment and Logistics

Small Arms, Uniforms, and Personal Gear

The Iraqi Ground Forces utilize a mix of sourced from international donors, including the and legacy Soviet-era stocks, reflecting post-2003 reconstruction efforts and ongoing . Standard issue assault rifles include the American for select units, particularly within the Iraqi Forces (ISOF), alongside and variants widely employed across regular due to their prevalence in pre-2003 inventories and continued provision through aid packages. Pistols such as the are issued to ISOF personnel, while machine guns like the PKM serve as squad automatic weapons in mechanized and formations. Uniforms for the Iraqi Ground Forces have evolved through multiple patterns, incorporating desert camouflage uniforms (DCU) and chocolate-chip desert battle dress uniforms (DBDU) inherited from earlier eras, with recent adoption of arid-pattern fabrics resembling Chinese PLA Type 07 for some elements. On January 6, 2025, during the army's 104th anniversary, a new design was officially introduced, replacing the previous version in use for 18 years to modernize appearance and functionality amid ongoing stabilization efforts. ISOF units often employ distinct black tactical uniforms for operational signature and psychological effect, supplemented by limited-issue variants with mesh reinforcements for mobility. Personal gear emphasizes ballistic protection supplied primarily through U.S. assistance, including combat helmets such as the (MICH) and Personnel Armor System for Ground Troops (PASGT) variants, with high-cut models entering wider service around 2013 for enhanced compatibility with communications and optics. Body armor consists of plate carriers like the (IOTV) and lighter systems such as Eclipse or Diamondback Tactical models, often in tan or configurations with attachments for ammunition and identification patches; these are prioritized for frontline troops but distribution remains uneven due to logistical constraints.

Armored Vehicles and Mechanized Assets

The Iraqi Ground Forces' armored capabilities center on a mix of main battle tanks (MBTs) acquired primarily from the and , supplemented by refurbished Soviet-era systems. The primary MBT is the M1A1 Abrams, with 135 operational units reported out of 140 delivered by the as of March 2025, these equipped with 120mm smoothbore guns and enhanced systems suited for modern combined-arms operations. Complementing these are variants, including T-72M1 and upgraded T-72M2 models sourced from in a 2022 deal valued at $245 million, which bolstered the fleet amid ongoing maintenance challenges for older stocks depleted during prior conflicts. Overall MBT inventory exceeds 390 units, incorporating limited T-90S models ordered in 2016 for improved fire control and armor. Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) provide support, dominated by BMP-series platforms. Approximately 400 BMP-1s remain in service, armed with 73mm low-pressure guns and AT-3 Sagger missiles, though many have undergone local modifications for urban combat. Newer additions include around 90 Ms, featuring 100mm/30mm dual autocannons and enhanced amphibious capabilities, delivered via Russian contracts to replace losses from ISIS engagements. BMP-2s, with 30mm cannons and Konkurs missiles, number fewer but support roles. These tracked IFVs enable rapid troop deployment in Iraq's varied terrain, though logistical strains from mixed Soviet and Western parts limit full readiness. Armored personnel carriers (APCs) emphasize mobility and , totaling over 650 wheeled and tracked variants. Key types include 100 BTR-80s for high-speed wheeled transport with 14.5mm machine guns, 60 BTR-4s offering modular armor upgrades, and U.S.-sourced M113s for legacy tracked haulage. In December 2024, Iraq introduced the Chinese VN22 6x6 APC, a wheeled carrier with 30mm remote turret and anti-IED features, marking diversification from traditional suppliers to address gaps in protected mobility. This eclectic inventory reflects post-2003 rebuilding efforts, prioritizing quantity over uniformity, with ongoing U.S. contracts for Abrams sustainment underscoring interoperability priorities.

Artillery, Support Weapons, and Recent Acquisitions

The Iraqi Ground Forces' artillery capabilities consist primarily of legacy Soviet-era systems supplemented by limited Western acquisitions, with an estimated 281 pieces and 1,446 towed systems in service as of 2024. Self-propelled units include variants such as the Chinese Type 83 152mm , while towed features 122mm D-30 and 130mm M-46 guns, though exact quantities of specific models remain classified or variably reported due to ongoing maintenance challenges and losses from prior conflicts. Multiple launch rocket systems form a key component, with 122mm launchers providing area saturation fire, alongside Brazilian systems produced under license as the Sajil-60 for extended-range strikes up to 300 kilometers. Mortars, including 81mm, 82mm, and 120mm models, support infantry operations at the battalion level, emphasizing mobility over precision in urban and environments. Support weapons emphasize crew-served systems for and anti-armor roles, including 12.7mm heavy machine guns for and PKM 7.62mm general-purpose machine guns integrated into vehicle mounts and static positions. Anti-tank capabilities rely on launchers with tandem-warhead rounds for short-range engagements, supplemented by man-portable systems like the (AT-5 Spandrel) wire-guided missiles, though integration of Western options such as TOW has been limited by logistical dependencies. Recoilless rifles, such as the 73mm, provide against light armor, reflecting a prioritizing volume over advanced guidance amid resource constraints. Recent acquisitions have focused on sustainment rather than wholesale modernization, with Iraq's Defense Industries Commission announcing expansions in domestic production of and small-caliber systems in April 2025, aiming to reduce import reliance and achieve cost savings estimated at $700 million. In April 2025, Iraq signed an agreement with to establish an artillery production facility, enhancing self-sufficiency in 155mm and other calibers to support ongoing operations against residual insurgent threats. Procurement restructuring ordered by Prime Minister in May 2025 prioritizes vetted suppliers and maintenance contracts, though deliveries of major new platforms remain unconfirmed amid fiscal pressures and regional tensions.

Controversies, Criticisms, and Achievements

Military Effectiveness and Failures

The Iraqi Ground Forces demonstrated mixed battlefield performance across major conflicts, often excelling in initial mechanized offensives but faltering due to leadership deficiencies, logistical strains, and motivational shortfalls. During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), Iraqi forces achieved early territorial gains through armored thrusts, capturing key Iranian provinces by late 1980, leveraging Soviet-supplied tanks and artillery for operations. However, prolonged exposed weaknesses in sustaining momentum, with human wave counterattacks by forcing Iraq into defensive postures by 1982, resulting in over 200,000 Iraqi casualties by war's end and no decisive victory despite chemical weapon use. Later offensives, such as the 1988 recapture of the Fao Peninsula, showcased improved tactical effectiveness under units, but overall operational stagnation highlighted command rigidity and overreliance on quantity over quality. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Iraqi army, then the world's fourth-largest with approximately 950,000 personnel and 5,500 tanks, suffered catastrophic defeats against a U.S.-led coalition. Air campaigns neutralized much of Iraq's integrated air defenses and command structure within weeks, followed by a 100-hour ground offensive that routed divisions, destroying or capturing over 3,000 tanks with minimal coalition losses. Factors included outdated Soviet doctrine ill-suited to , poor troop morale after eight years of sanctions and war fatigue, and Saddam Hussein's prioritization of regime loyalty over merit-based promotions, rendering elite units ineffective against precision strikes and rapid advances. The 2003 U.S.-led invasion exposed similar vulnerabilities, with Iraqi ground forces collapsing within three weeks despite numerical advantages; units abandoned equipment, while the Special Republican Guard, intended as a praetorian force, failed to mount coherent resistance due to centralized control and fear of purges. Post-invasion rebuilding under U.S. advisory programs aimed to create a force, investing over $25 billion by , yet systemic issues persisted. The most glaring failure occurred in June 2014, when approximately 30,000 Iraqi troops in fled before 800-1,500 ISIS militants, abandoning U.S.-supplied tanks and Humvees, due to rampant (including "ghost soldiers" inflating payrolls), sectarian alienation in Sunni areas, and absent leadership that prioritized personal survival over cohesion. RAND analyses attribute this to Saddam-era legacies of politicized command and failure to instill unit loyalty, compounded by Nouri al-Maliki's Shia-centric policies eroding trust. Subsequent operations against from 2014-2017 revealed partial recovery, with Iraqi forces retaking by July 2017 through a coalition-supported offensive involving 100,000 troops, , and , but success hinged on U.S. airpower delivering over 10,000 strikes and embedded advisors rather than independent Iraqi initiative. Elite units like the Counter-Terrorism Service performed effectively in urban assaults, such as Ramadi's liberation in December 2015, yet broader ground forces exhibited high desertion rates and dependence on militias, underscoring enduring deficiencies in , sustainment, and non-sectarian integration. These patterns indicate that while and foreign can enable tactical wins, underlying causal factors—corrupt networks, ethnic fractures, and weak institutional —consistently undermine strategic effectiveness, as evidenced by recurring collapses despite doctrinal reforms.

Sectarianism, Corruption, and Leadership Issues

The Iraqi Ground Forces have been marred by deep sectarian divisions since their reconstitution following the 2003 U.S.-led invasion and the disbandment of Saddam Hussein's military, which disproportionately affected Sunni through de-Baathification policies. This resulted in a Shia-dominated , with Sunnis comprising less than 20% of senior ranks by the late despite their demographic share, fostering widespread Sunni distrust and perceptions of the as an extension of Shia political power rather than a national institution. Such imbalances alienated Sunni communities, contributing to mass desertions—estimated at over 30,000 troops during the 2014 ISIS offensive in northern —and enabling insurgent gains in Sunni-majority provinces like Anbar and , where local forces viewed the as an occupying Shia force. Corruption has compounded these fissures, particularly through the proliferation of ""—fictitious personnel listed on rosters to divert salaries and equipment funds. A 2014 government audit uncovered around 50,000 such entries across the , equating to roughly 10-15% of nominal troop strength and costing hundreds of millions in U.S.-provided aid annually, with officers pocketing pay for non-existent units while real frontline numbers plummeted. This scam, rooted in lax oversight and politicized command chains, directly undermined combat readiness, as evidenced by the near-total collapse of four divisions in against a far smaller force in June 2014. Earlier scandals, including a 2005 Ministry of Defense involving over $1 billion in rigged weapons contracts, highlighted systemic graft, with funds siphoned through kickbacks and phantom deals rather than bolstering ground capabilities. Despite periodic purges, such as the 2016 parliamentary of Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi on charges and 2023 dismissals of officials, ranks Iraq's military sector among the world's most corrupt, with defense budgets routinely inflated by 20-30% through nepotistic contracting. Leadership failures stem from politicized appointments prioritizing sectarian loyalty and militia ties over merit, eroding professional cohesion. Under Prime Minister (2006-2014), key Ground Forces commands were awarded to Shia loyalists with minimal combat experience, sidelining competent officers and integrating (PMF) elements—often Iran-backed Shia militias—into the structure post-2014, which blurred lines between regular army units and partisan groups. This patronage system, exemplified by the retention of underperforming generals despite battlefield losses, perpetuated a culture where promotions depended on allegiance to ruling coalitions rather than tactical proficiency, as noted in U.S. military assessments of Iraqi command paralysis during anti-ISIS operations. Intersecting with , such leadership has sustained Sunni underrepresentation in decision-making, while scandals reveal commanders exploiting ethnic networks for personal gain, further demoralizing ranks and hindering doctrinal reforms despite international training efforts.

Human Rights Concerns and Atrocities

During the military campaign against the () from 2014 to 2017, units of the Iraqi Ground Forces were implicated in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and other abuses targeting Sunni Arab civilians, often under suspicion of collaboration with . These actions contributed to a pattern of sectarian reprisals, exacerbating distrust among Sunni communities and hindering post-conflict reconciliation. documented cases where Iraqi army soldiers beat, tortured, and disappeared detainees, with thousands of Sunni men subjected to arbitrary arrests without . A prominent incident occurred in mid-July 2017 during the battle for Mosul's Old City, where soldiers from the U.S.-trained 16th Division of the executed four naked men in an alleyway, an act witnessed by two international observers who heard beatings followed by gunshots. On the same day, the body of an approximately 14-year-old boy was found nearby with his hands bound behind his back, showing execution-style wounds. The following day, soldiers displayed at least 25 bodies of alleged fighters along the River, including a severed head purportedly of an American female sniper, with photographs of the executions and remains provided to investigators. Bulldozers were observed burying additional bodies under rubble to seal tunnels, actions suggestive of efforts to conceal evidence. Similar concerns arose in other operations, such as the 2016 recapture of , where elements of the Iraqi army's 1st Brigade—nicknamed the "Dirty Brigade" by locals—faced allegations of looting, arbitrary arrests, and mistreatment of civilians post-liberation. Reports indicated that , including army units, destroyed homes and infrastructure in Sunni areas like and surrounding villages in 2015, displacing thousands and amounting to . Amnesty International highlighted how government forces and affiliated paramilitaries conducted sectarian killings and abductions, with over 100 Sunni detainees executed between June and July 2014 alone. Accountability for these violations has been limited, with Iraqi authorities conducting few credible investigations and prosecutions, despite promises from in 2017 to address abuses by security forces. The U.S. government urged suspension of training aid under the pending probes into the 16th Division's actions, but no significant outcomes were reported. This impunity, compounded by the army's Shia-majority composition post-2003, has perpetuated cycles of alienation and potential radicalization among Sunni populations.

Strategic Achievements in Key Conflicts

During the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi Ground Forces executed Operation Ramadan al-Mubarak on April 17-18, 1988, recapturing the in a coordinated amphibious and airborne that expelled Iranian occupiers who had seized the territory in February 1986. This 36-hour operation involved over 100,000 Iraqi troops, including elite units, who overcame marshy terrain and fortified Iranian positions through extensive artillery barrages and engineering support, restoring control over a vital foothold that enhanced Iraq's defensive posture and logistical access. The victory, which inflicted heavy casualties on Iranian forces estimated at 15,000-20,000, marked a turning point in the war's final phase, contributing to Iran's acceptance of UN Resolution 598 ceasefire terms later that year. In earlier phases of the same conflict, Iraqi forces contained major Iranian counteroffensives after 1982, preventing a collapse of frontline defenses despite Iran's human-wave tactics and recapture of initial Iraqi gains inside Iran, thereby preserving Iraq's territorial integrity through fortified trench networks and mechanized counterattacks. This defensive stabilization, achieved amid chemical weapons use and international arms support, allowed Iraq to transition from offensive setbacks to regaining the strategic initiative by 1988. Against the () from 2015-2017, Iraqi Ground Forces led ground operations to reclaim significant territories following their 2014 collapse in northern . In Operation Ashura, launched March 2015, elements of the Iraqi Army's 4th and 9th Divisions, alongside Shia militias, liberated on March 31 after three weeks of urban combat, disrupting ISIS supply lines along the River and signaling a reversal of fortunes. Subsequent advances included the recapture of on February 25, 2016, by the Golden Division and Anbar tribal allies, which severed ISIS control over Anbar Province's capital and key crossings. fell on June 27, 2016, to a combined force of Iraqi units and federal police, clearing entrenched ISIS defenses in a prelude to larger offensives. The campaign's apex was the nine-month Battle of Mosul, initiated October 17, 2016, where approximately 90,000 Iraqi troops from the army, Counter-Terrorism Service, and federal police encircled and assaulted ISIS-held positions in Iraq's second-largest city, declaring victory on July 9, 2017, after house-to-house fighting that expelled the group's leadership and dismantled its urban headquarters. This operation, supported by coalition airstrikes but executed primarily by Iraqi ground elements, restored government control over Nineveh Province and prevented ISIS consolidation of a cross-border proto-state with . By December 2017, Iraqi forces had liberated all major ISIS-held urban areas, reducing the group's territorial to rural pockets.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.