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Yemen
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Yemen,[b] officially the Republic of Yemen,[c] is a country in West Asia.[14] Including the Socotra Archipelago, mainland Yemen is located in southern Arabia; bordering Saudi Arabia to the north, Oman to the northeast, the south-eastern part of the Arabian Sea to the east, the Gulf of Aden to the south, and the Red Sea to the west, sharing maritime borders with Djibouti, Eritrea, and Somalia across the Horn of Africa. Covering roughly 455,503 square kilometres (175,871 square miles),[5] with a coastline of approximately 2,000 kilometres (1,200 miles), Yemen is the second largest country on the Arabian Peninsula.[15] Sanaa is its constitutional capital and largest city. Yemen's estimated population is 34.7 million, mostly Arab Muslims.[16] It is a member of the Arab League, the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.
Key Information
Owing to its geographic location, Yemen has been at the crossroads of many civilisations for over 7,000 years. The Sabaeans formed a thriving commercial kingdom that influenced parts of modern Ethiopia and Eritrea.[17][18][19] In 275 CE, it was succeeded by the Himyarite Kingdom, which spanned much of Yemen's present-day territory and was heavily influenced by Judaism.[20] Christianity arrived in the fourth century, followed by the rapid spread of Islam in the seventh century. From its conversion to Islam, Yemen became a center of Islamic learning, and Yemenite troops played a crucial role in early Islamic conquests.[21] Much of Yemen's architecture survived until modern times. For centuries, it was a primary producer of coffee, exported through the port of Mocha. Various dynasties emerged between the 9th and 16th centuries.[22] During the 19th century, the country was divided between the Ottoman and British empires. After World War I, the Kingdom of Yemen was established, which in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) following a coup. In 1967, the British Aden Protectorate became the independent People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen), the first and only officially socialist state in the Arab world. In 1990, the two Yemeni states united to form the modern Republic of Yemen, with Ali Abdullah Saleh serving as the first president until his resignation in 2012 in the wake of the Arab Spring.[23][24]
Since 2011, Yemen has been enduring a political crisis, marked by street protests against poverty, unemployment, corruption, and President Saleh's plan to amend Yemen's constitution and eliminate the presidential term limit.[25] By 2015, the country became engulfed by an ongoing civil war with multiple entities vying for governance, including the Presidential Leadership Council of the internationally recognized government, and the Houthi movement's Supreme Political Council. This conflict, which has escalated to involve various foreign powers, has led to a severe humanitarian crisis.[26][27][28][29][30][31]
Yemen is one of the least developed countries in the world,[32] facing significant obstacles to sustainable development,[33] and is one of the poorest countries in the Middle East and North Africa.[34] In 2019, the United Nations reported that Yemen had the highest number of people in need of humanitarian aid, amounting to about 24 million individuals, or nearly 75% of its population.[35] As of 2020, Yemen ranked the highest in the Fragile States Index[36] and second-worst on the Global Hunger Index, surpassed only by the Central African Republic.[36] As of 2024, Yemen is regarded as the world's least peaceful country by the Global Peace Index.[37] Additionally, it has the lowest Human Development Index out of all non-African countries. Yemen is one of the world's most vulnerable countries to climate change and among the least prepared to handle its effects.
Etymology
[edit]The term Yamnat was first mentioned in the Old South Arabian inscriptions on the title of one of the kings of the second Himyarite Kingdom known as Shammar Yahri'sh. The term probably referred to the southwestern coastline of the Arabian Peninsula and the southern coastline between Aden and Hadhramaut.[38][39] Historical Yemen included much greater territory than the current nation, stretching from northern 'Asir in southwestern Saudi Arabia to Dhofar in southern Oman.[40][41]
One etymology derives Yemen from ymnt, meaning literally "South [of the Arabian Peninsula]", and significantly plays on the notion of the land to the right (𐩺𐩣𐩬).[42] Other sources claim that Yemen is related to yamn or yumn, meaning "felicity" or "blessed", as much of the country is fertile, in contrast to the barren land of most of Arabia.[43][44] The Romans called it Arabia Felix ("happy" or "fortunate" Arabia"), as opposed to Arabia Deserta ("deserted Arabia"). Latin and Greek writers referred to ancient Yemen as "India", which arose from the Persians calling the Abyssinians whom they came into contact with in South Arabia by the name of the black-skinned people who lived next to them.[45][46]
History
[edit]Ancient history
[edit]
With its long sea border between eastern and western civilizations, Yemen has long existed at a crossroads of cultures with a strategic location in terms of trade on the west of the Arabian Peninsula. Large settlements for their era existed in the mountains of northern Yemen as early as 5000 BC.[47] The Sabaean Kingdom existed in Yemen from c. 1000 BCE to c. 275 CE.[48] [49] Its inhabitants were the Sabaeans,[d] The four major kingdoms or tribal confederations in South Arabia were Saba, Hadhramaut, Qataban, and Ma'in.
Sabaʾ (Arabic: سَـبَـأ)[50][51] is thought to be biblical Sheba and was the most prominent federation.[52] The Sabaean rulers adopted the title Mukarrib generally thought to mean unifier,[53] or a priest-king,[54] or the head of the confederation of South Arabian kingdoms, the "king of the kings".[55] The role of the Mukarrib was to bring the various tribes under the kingdom and preside over them all.[56] The Sabaeans built the Great Dam of Marib around 940 BC.[57] The dam was built to withstand the seasonal flash floods surging down the valley.
By the third century BC, Qataban, Hadhramaut, and Ma'in became independent from Saba and established themselves in the Yemeni arena. Minaean rule stretched as far as Dedan,[58] with their capital at Baraqish. The Sabaeans regained their control over Ma'in after the collapse of Qataban in 50 BC. By the time of the Roman expedition to Arabia Felix in 25 BC, the Sabaeans were once again the dominating power in Southern Arabia.[59] Aelius Gallus was ordered to lead a military campaign to establish Roman dominance over the Sabaeans.[60]
The Romans had a vague and contradictory geographical knowledge about Arabia Felix. A Roman army of 10,000 men was defeated before reaching Marib.[61] Strabo's close relationship with Aelius Gallus led him to attempt to justify his friend's defeat in his writings. It took the Romans six months to reach Marib and 60 days to return to Egypt. The Romans blamed their Nabataean guide and executed him for treachery.[62] No direct mention in Sabaean inscriptions of the Roman expedition has yet been found.
After the Roman expedition (perhaps earlier) the country fell into chaos, and two clans, namely Hamdan and Himyar, claimed kingship, assuming the title King of Sheba and Dhu Raydan.[63] Dhu Raydan, i.e., Himyarites, allied themselves with Aksum in Ethiopia against the Sabaeans.[64] The chief of Bakil and king of Saba and Dhu Raydan, El Sharih Yahdhib, launched successful campaigns against the Himyarites and Habashat, i.e., Aksum. El Sharih took pride in his campaigns and added the title Yahdhib to his name, which means "suppressor"; he used to kill his enemies by cutting them to pieces.[65] Sana'a came into prominence during his reign, as he built the Ghumdan Palace as his place of residence.


The Himyarites annexed Sana'a from Hamdan around 100 AD.[66] Hashdi tribesmen rebelled against them and regained Sana'a around 180.[67] Shammar Yahri'sh had conquered Hadhramaut, Najran, and Tihamah by 275, thus unifying Yemen and consolidating Himyarite rule.[68][69] The Himyarites rejected polytheism and adhered to a consensual form of monotheism called Rahmanism.[70]

In 354, Roman Emperor Constantius II sent an embassy headed by Theophilos the Indian to convert the Himyarites to Christianity.[71] According to Philostorgius, the mission was resisted by local Jews.[72] Several inscriptions have been found in Hebrew and Sabaean praising the ruling house in Jewish terms for "...helping and empowering the People of Israel."[73]
According to Islamic traditions, King As'ad the Perfect mounted a military expedition to support the Jews of Yathrib.[74] Abu Kariba As'ad, as known from the inscriptions, led a military campaign to central Arabia or Najd to support the vassal Kingdom of Kinda against the Lakhmids.[75] However, no direct reference to Judaism or Yathrib was discovered from his lengthy reign. Abu Kariba died in 445, having reigned for almost 50 years.[76] By 515, Himyar became increasingly divided along religious lines and a bitter conflict between different factions paved the way for an Aksumite intervention. The last Himyarite king Ma'adikarib Ya'fur was supported by Aksum against his Jewish rivals. Ma'adikarib was Christian and launched a campaign against the Lakhmids in southern Iraq, with the support of other Arab allies of Byzantium.[77] The Lakhmids were a bulwark of Persia, which was intolerant to a proselytizing religion like Christianity.[78]
After the death of Ma'adikarib Ya'fur around 521, a Himyarite Jewish warlord called Dhu Nuwas rose to power. Emperor Justinian I sent an embassy to Yemen. He wanted the officially Christian Himyarites to use their influence on the tribes in inner Arabia to launch military operations against Persia. Justinian I bestowed the "dignity of king" upon the Arab sheikhs of Kindah and Ghassan in central and northern Arabia.[79] From early on, Roman and Byzantine policy was to develop close links with the powers of the coast of the Red Sea. They were successful in converting[clarification needed][80] Aksum and influencing their culture. The results concerning to Yemen were rather disappointing.[79]
A Kendite prince called Yazid bin Kabshat rebelled against Abraha and his Arab Christian allies. A truce was reached once the Great Dam of Marib had suffered a breach.[81] Abraha died around 570. The Sasanid Empire annexed Aden around 570. Under their rule, most of Yemen enjoyed great autonomy except for Aden and Sana'a. This era marked the collapse of ancient South Arabian civilization, since the greater part of the country was under several independent clans until the arrival of Islam in 630.[82]
Middle Ages
[edit]Advent of Islam and the three dynasties
[edit]
Muhammad sent his cousin Ali to Sana'a and its surroundings around 630. At the time, Yemen was the most advanced region in Arabia.[83] The Banu Hamdan confederation was among the first to accept Islam. Muhammad sent Muadh ibn Jabal, as well to Al-Janad, in present-day Taiz, and dispatched letters to various tribal leaders.[84] Major tribes, including Himyar, sent delegations to Medina during the "year of delegations" around 630–631. Several Yemenis accepted Islam before 630, such as Ammar ibn Yasir, Al-Ala'a Al-Hadrami, Miqdad ibn Aswad, Abu Musa Ashaari, and Sharhabeel ibn Hasana. A man named 'Abhala ibn Ka'ab Al-Ansi expelled the remaining Persians and claimed he was a prophet of Rahman. He was assassinated by a Yemeni of Persian origin called Fayruz al-Daylami. Christians, who were mainly staying in Najran along with Jews, agreed to pay jizyah (Arabic: جِـزْيَـة), although some Jews converted to Islam, such as Wahb ibn Munabbih and Ka'ab al-Ahbar.
Yemen was stable during the Rashidun Caliphate. Yemeni tribes played a pivotal role in the Islamic expansion into Egypt, Iraq, Persia, the Levant, Anatolia, North Africa, Sicily, and Andalusia.[85][86][87] Yemeni tribes who settled in Syria contributed significantly to the solidification of Umayyad rule, especially during the reign of Marwan I. Powerful Yemenite tribes such as Kinda were on his side during the Battle of Marj Rahit.[88][89]
Muhammad ibn Abdullah ibn Ziyad founded the Ziyadid dynasty in Tihamah around 818. The state stretched from Haly (in present-day Saudi Arabia) to Aden. They nominally recognized the Abbasid Caliphate but ruled independently from Zabid.[90] By virtue of its location, they developed a special relationship with Abyssinia. The chief of the Dahlak islands exported slaves, as well as amber and leopard hides, to the ruler of Yemen.[91] They controlled only a small portion of the coastal strip in Tihamah along the Red Sea, and never exercised control over the highlands and Hadhramaut.[92] A Himyarite clan called the Yufirids established their rule over the highlands from Saada to Taiz, while Hadhramaut was an Ibadi stronghold and rejected all allegiance to the Abbasids in Baghdad.[90]
The first Zaidi imam, Yahya ibn al-Husayn, arrived in Yemen in 893. He was a religious cleric and judge who was invited to come to Saada from Medina to arbitrate tribal disputes.[93] Yahya persuaded local tribesmen to follow his teachings. The sect slowly spread across the highlands, as the tribes of Hashid and Bakil, later known as "the twin wings of the imamate", accepted his authority.[94] He founded the Zaidi imamate in 897. Yahya established his influence in Saada and Najran. He also tried to capture Sana'a from the Yufirids in 901 but failed miserably.
Sulayhid dynasty (1047–1138)
[edit]The Sulayhid dynasty was founded in the northern highlands around 1040; at the time, Yemen was ruled by different local dynasties. In 1060, Ali ibn Muhammad Al-Sulayhi conquered Zabid and killed its ruler Al-Najah, founder of the Najahid dynasty. His sons were forced to flee to Dahlak.[95] Hadhramaut fell into Sulayhid hands after their capture of Aden in 1162.[96]
By 1063, Ali had subjugated Greater Yemen.[97] He then marched toward Hejaz and occupied Makkah.[98] Ali was married to Asma bint Shihab, who governed Yemen with her husband.[99] The Khutba during Friday prayers was proclaimed in both her husband's name and hers. No other Arab woman had this honor since the advent of Islam.[99]
Ali al-Sulayhi was killed by Najah's sons on his way to Mecca in 1084. His son Ahmed Al-Mukarram led an army to Zabid and killed 8,000 of its inhabitants.[100] He later installed the Zurayids to govern Aden. al-Mukarram, who had been afflicted with facial paralysis resulting from war injuries, retired in 1087 and handed over power to his wife Arwa al-Sulayhi.[101] Queen Arwa moved the seat of the Sulayhid dynasty from Sana'a to Jibla, a small town in central Yemen near Ibb. She sent Ismaili missionaries to India, where a significant Ismaili community was formed that exists to this day.[102]
Queen Arwa continued to rule securely until her death in 1138.[102] She is still remembered as a great and much-loved sovereign, as attested in Yemeni historiography, literature, and popular lore, where she is referred to as Balqis al-sughra ("the junior queen of Sheba").[103] Shortly after Arwa's death, the country was split between five competing petty dynasties along religious lines.[104] The Ayyubid dynasty overthrew the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt. A few years after their rise to power, Saladin dispatched his brother Turan Shah to conquer Yemen in 1174.[105]
Ayyubid conquest (1171–1260)
[edit]Turan Shah conquered Zabid from the Mahdids in 1174, then marched toward Aden in June and captured it from the Zurayids.[106] The Hamdanid sultans of Sana'a resisted the Ayyubid in 1175, and the Ayyubids did not manage to secure Sana'a until 1189.[107] The Ayyubid rule was stable in southern and central Yemen, where they succeeded in eliminating the ministates of that region, while Ismaili and Zaidi tribesmen continued to hold out in several fortresses.[107]
The Ayyubids failed to capture the Zaydis stronghold in northern Yemen.[108] In 1191, Zaydis of Shibam Kawkaban rebelled and killed 700 Ayyubid soldiers.[109] Imam Abdullah bin Hamza proclaimed the imamate in 1197 and fought al-Mu'izz Ismail, the Ayyubid Sultan of Yemen. Imam Abdullah was defeated at first but was able to conquer Sana'a and Dhamar in 1198,[110] and al-Mu'izz Ismail was assassinated in 1202.[111]
Abdullah bin Hamza carried on the struggle against the Ayyubid until his death in 1217. After his demise, the Zaidi community was split between two rival imams. The Zaydis were dispersed, and a truce was signed with the Ayyubid in 1219.[112] The Ayyubid army was defeated in Dhamar in 1226.[112] Ayyubid Sultan Mas'ud Yusuf left for Mecca in 1228, never to return.[113] Other sources suggest that he was forced to leave for Egypt instead in 1223.[114]
Rasulid dynasty (1229–1454)
[edit]
The Rasulid dynasty was established in 1229 by Umar ibn Ali, who was appointed deputy governor by the Ayyubids in 1223. When the last Ayyubid ruler left Yemen in 1229, Umar stayed in the country as caretaker. He subsequently declared himself an independent king by assuming the title "al-Malik Al-Mansur" (the king assisted by Allah).[114]
Umar first established himself at Zabid, then moved into the mountainous interior, taking the important highland centre Sana'a. However, the Rasulid capitals were Zabid and Taiz. He was assassinated by his nephew in 1249.[113] Omar's son Yusuf defeated the faction led by his father's assassins and crushed several counterattacks by the Zaydi imams who still held on in the northern highland. Mainly because of the victories he scored over his rivals, he assumed the honorific title "al-Muzaffar" (the victorious).[115]
After the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258, al-Muzaffar Yusuf I appropriated the title of caliph.[115] He chose the city of Taiz to become the political capital of the kingdom because of its strategic location and proximity to Aden.[116] The Rasulid sultans built numerous Madrasas to solidify the Shafi'i school of thought, which is still the dominant school of jurisprudence amongst Yemenis today.[117] Under their rule, Taiz and Zabid became major international centres of Islamic learning.[118] The kings were educated men in their own right, who not only had important libraries but also wrote treatises on a wide array of subjects, ranging from astrology and medicine to agriculture and genealogy.[116]

They had a difficult relationship with the Mamluks of Egypt because the latter considered them a vassal state.[116] Their competition centred over the Hejaz and the right to provide kiswa of the Ka'aba in Mecca.[116] The dynasty became increasingly threatened by disgruntled family members over the problem of succession, combined with periodic tribal revolts, as they were locked in a war of attrition with the Zaydi imams in the northern highlands.[118] During the last 12 years of Rasulid rule, the country was torn between several contenders for the kingdom. The weakening of the Rasulid provided an opportunity for the Banu Taher clan to take over and establish themselves as the new rulers of Yemen in 1454 AD.[117]
Tahirid dynasty (1454–1517)
[edit]The Tahirids were a local clan based in Rada'a. They built schools, mosques, and irrigation channels, as well as water cisterns and bridges in Zabid, Aden, Rada'a, and Juban. Their best-known monument is the Amiriya Madrasa in Rada' District, which was built in 1504.[119] The Tahirids were too weak either to contain the Zaydi imams or to defend themselves against foreign attacks.
Realizing how rich the Tahirid realm was, the Mamluks decided to conquer it.[120] The Mamluk army, with the support of forces loyal to Zaydi Imam Al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din, conquered the entire Tahirid realm but failed to capture Aden in 1517. The Mamluk victory was short-lived. The Ottoman Empire conquered Egypt, hanging the last Mamluk Sultan in Cairo.[120] The Ottomans had not decided to conquer Yemen until 1538. The Zaydi highland tribes emerged as national heroes[121] by offering stiff, vigorous resistance to the Turkish occupation.[122] The Mamluks tried to attach Yemen to Egypt and the Portuguese led by Afonso de Albuquerque, occupied the island of Socotra and made an unsuccessful attack on Aden in 1513.[123]
Portuguese (1498–1756)
[edit]
Starting in the 15th century, Portugal intervened, dominating the port of Aden for about 20 years and maintaining a fortified enclave on the island of Socotra during this period. From the 16th century, the Portuguese posed an immediate threat to Indian Ocean trade. The Mamluks therefore sent an army under Hussein al-Kurdi to fight the intruders [124] The Mamluk sultan went to Zabid in 1515 and entered into diplomatic talks with the Tahiri sultan 'Amir bin Abdulwahab for money that would be needed for the jihad against the Portuguese. Instead of confronting them, the Mamluks, who were running out of food and water, landed on the coast of Yemen and began harassing the villagers of Tihamah to obtain the supplies they needed.
The interest of Portugal on the Red Sea consisted on the one hand of guaranteeing contacts with a Christian ally in Ethiopia and on the other of being able to attack Mecca and the Arab territories from the rear, while still having absolute dominance over trade of spices, the main intention was to dominate the commerce of the cities on the coast of Africa and Arabia.[125] To this end, Portugal sought to influence and dominate by force or persuasion all the ports and kingdoms that fought among themselves. It was common for Portugal to keep under its influence the Arab allies that were interested in maintaining independence from other Arab states in the region.[126]
Modern history
[edit]The Zaydis and Ottomans
[edit]
The Ottomans had two fundamental interests to safeguard in Yemen—the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, and the trade route with India for spices and textiles, both threatened, and the latter virtually eclipsed, by the arrival of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea in the early 16th century.[127] Hadım Suleiman Pasha, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, was ordered to command a fleet of 90 ships to conquer Yemen. The country was in a state of incessant anarchy and discord as Pasha described it by saying:[128]
Yemen is a land with no lord, an empty province. It would be not only possible but easy to capture, and should it be captured, it would be master of the lands of India and send every year a great amount of gold and jewels to Constantinople.
Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din ruled over the northern highlands including Sana'a, while Aden was held by the last Tahiride Sultan 'Amir ibn Dauod. Pasha stormed Aden in 1538, killing its ruler, and extended Ottoman authority to include Zabid in 1539 and eventually Tihamah in its entirety.[129] Zabid became the administrative headquarters of Yemen Eyalet.[129] The Ottoman governors did not exercise much control over the highlands. They held sway mainly in the southern coastal region, particularly around Zabid, Mocha, and Aden.[130] Of 80,000 soldiers sent to Yemen from Egypt between 1539 and 1547, only 7,000 survived.[131] The Ottoman accountant-general in Egypt remarked:[131]
We have seen no foundry like Yemen for our soldiers. Each time we have sent an expeditionary force there, it has melted away like salt dissolved in water.

The Ottomans sent yet another expeditionary force to Zabid in 1547, while Imam al-Mutawakkil Yahya Sharaf ad-Din was ruling the highlands independently. Yahya chose his son Ali to succeed him, a decision that infuriated his other son al-Mutahhar ibn Yahya.[132] Al-Mutahhar was lame, so he was not qualified for the imamate.[132] He urged Oais Pasha, the Ottoman colonial governor in Zabid, to attack his father.[133] Indeed, Ottoman troops supported by tribal forces loyal to Imam al-Mutahhar stormed Taiz and marched north toward Sana'a in August 1547. The Turks officially made Imam al-Mutahhar a Sanjak-bey with authority over 'Amran. Imam al-Mutahhar assassinated the Ottoman colonial governor and recaptured Sana'a, but the Ottomans, led by Özdemir Pasha, forced al-Mutahhar to retreat to his fortress in Thula. Özdemir Pasha effectively put Yemen under Ottoman rule between 1552 and 1560. Özdemir died in Sana'a in 1561 and was succeeded by Mahmud Pasha.
Mahmud Pasha was described by other Ottoman officials as a corrupt and unscrupulous governor, and he was displaced by Ridvan Pasha in 1564. By 1565, Yemen was split into two provinces, the highlands under the command of Ridvan Pasha and Tihamah under Murad Pasha. Imam al-Mutahhar launched a propaganda campaign in which he claimed that the prophet Mohammed came to him in a dream and advised him to wage jihad against the Ottomans.[134] Al-Mutahhar led the tribes to capture Sana'a from Ridvan Pasha in 1567. When Murad tried to relieve Sana'a, highland tribesmen ambushed his unit and slaughtered all of them.[135] Over 80 battles were fought. The last decisive encounter took place in Dhamar around 1568, in which Murad Pasha was beheaded and his head sent to al-Mutahhar in Sana'a.[135][136] By 1568, only Zabid remained under the possession of the Turks.[136]


In 1632, Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad sent an expeditionary force of 1,000 men to conquer Mecca.[137] The army entered the city in triumph and killed its governor.[137] The Ottomans sent an army from Egypt to fight the Yemenites.[137] Seeing that the Turkish army was too numerous to overcome, the Yemeni army retreated to a valley outside Mecca.[138] Ottoman troops attacked the Yemenis by hiding at the wells that supplied them with water. This plan proceeded successfully, causing the Yemenis over 200 casualties, most from thirst.[138] The tribesmen eventually surrendered and returned to Yemen.[139] Al-Mu'ayyad Muhammad died in 1644. He was succeeded by Al-Mutawakkil Isma'il, another son of al-Mansur al-Qasim, who conquered Yemen in its entirety.[140][141][142][143]
Yemen became the sole coffee producer in the world.[144] The country established diplomatic relations with the Safavid dynasty of Persia, Ottomans of Hejaz, Mughal Empire in India, and Ethiopia, as well. In the first half of the 18th century, the Europeans broke Yemen's monopoly on coffee by smuggling coffee trees and cultivating them in their own colonies in the East Indies, East Africa, the West Indies, and Latin America.[145] The imamate did not follow a cohesive mechanism for succession, and family quarrels and tribal insubordination led to the political decline of the Qasimi dynasty in the 18th century.[146]
Great Britain and the nine regions
[edit]
The British were looking for a coal depot to service their steamers en route to India. It took 700 tons of coal for a round-trip from Suez to Bombay. East India Company officials decided on Aden. The British Empire tried to reach an agreement with the Zaydi imam of Sana'a, permitting them a foothold in Mocha, and when unable to secure their position, they extracted a similar agreement from the Sultan of Lahej, enabling them to consolidate a position in Aden.[147] The British managed to occupy Aden and evicted the Sultan of Lahej from Aden and forced him to accept their "protection".[147] In November 1839, 5,000 tribesmen tried to retake the town but were repulsed and 200 were killed.
With emigrants from India, East Africa, and Southeast Asia, Aden grew into a world city. In 1850, only 980 Arabs were registered as original inhabitants of the city.[148] The English presence in Aden put them at odds with the Ottomans. The Turks asserted to the British that they held sovereignty over the whole of Arabia, including Yemen as the successor of Mohammed and the Chief of the Universal Caliphate.[149]
Ottoman return
[edit]
The Ottomans were concerned about the British expansion from the British-ruled subcontinent to the Red Sea and Arabia. They returned to the Tihamah in 1849 after an absence of two centuries.[150] Rivalries and disturbances continued among the Zaydi imams, between them and their deputies, with the ulema, with the heads of tribes, as well as with those who belonged to other sects. Some citizens of Sana'a were desperate to return law and order to Yemen and asked the Ottoman Pasha in Tihamah to pacify the country.[151] The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 strengthened the Ottoman decision to remain in Yemen.[152] By 1873, the Ottomans succeeded in conquering the northern highlands. Sana'a became the administrative capital of Yemen Vilayet.
The Ottomans learned from their previous experience and worked on the disempowerment of local lords in the highland regions. They even attempted to secularize the Yemeni society, while Yemenite Jews came to perceive themselves in Yemeni nationalist terms.[153] The Ottomans appeased the tribes by forgiving their rebellious chiefs and appointing them to administrative posts. They introduced a series of reforms to enhance the country's economic welfare. However, corruption was widespread in the Ottoman administration in Yemen. This was because only the worst of the officials were appointed because those who could avoid serving in Yemen did so.[154] The Ottomans had reasserted control over the highlands for a temporary duration.[150] The so-called Tanzimat reforms were considered heretic by the Zaydi tribes. In 1876, the Hashid and Bakil tribes rebelled against the Ottomans; the Turks had to appease them with gifts to end the uprising.[155]
The tribal chiefs were difficult to appease and an endless cycle of violence curbed Ottoman efforts to pacify the land. Ahmed Izzet Pasha proposed that the Ottoman army evacuate the highlands and confine itself to Tihamah, and not unnecessarily burden itself with continuing military operation against the Zaydi tribes.[154] Imam Yahya Hamidaddin led a rebellion against the Turks in 1904; the rebels disrupted the Ottoman ability to govern.[156] The revolts between 1904 and 1911 were especially damaging to the Ottomans, costing them as many as 10,000 soldiers and as much as 500,000 pounds per year.[157] The Ottomans signed a treaty with imam Yahya Hamidaddin in 1911. Under the treaty, Imam Yahya was recognized as an autonomous leader of the Zaydi northern highlands. The Ottomans continued to rule Shafi'i areas in the mid-south until their departure in 1918.
Mutawakkilite Kingdom
[edit]
Imam Yahya hamid ed-Din al-Mutawakkil was ruling the northern highlands independently from 1911, from which he began a conquest of the Yemen lands. In 1925 Yahya captured al-Hudaydah from the Idrisids.[158] In 1927, Yahya's forces were about 50 km (30 mi) away from Aden, Taiz, and Ibb, and were bombed by the British for five days; the imam had to pull back.[159] Small Bedouin forces, mainly from the Madh'hij confederation of Marib, attacked Shabwah but were bombed by the British and had to retreat.
The Italian Empire was the first to recognize Yahya as the king of Yemen in 1926. This created a great deal of anxiety for the British, who interpreted it as recognition of Imam Yahya's claim to sovereignty over Greater Yemen, which included the Aden protectorate and Asir.[160] The Idrisis turned to Ibn Saud seeking his protection from Yahya. However, in 1932, the Idrisis broke their accord with Ibn Saud and went back to Yahya seeking help against Ibn Saud, who had begun liquidating their authority and expressed his desire to annex those territories into his own Saudi domain.[161][162] Yahya demanded the return of all Idrisi dominion.[161]
Negotiations between Yahya and Ibn Saud proved fruitless. After the 1934 Saudi-Yemeni war, Ibn Saud announced a ceasefire in May 1934.[163] Imam Yahya agreed to release Saudi hostages and the surrender of the Idrisis to Saudi custody. Imam Yahya ceded the three provinces of Najran, Asir, and Jazan for 20 years.[164] and signed another treaty with the British government in 1934. The imam recognized the British sovereignty over Aden protectorate for 40 years.[165] Out of fear for Hudaydah, Yahya did submit to these demands.
Colonial Aden
[edit]
Starting in 1890, hundreds of Yemeni people from Hajz, Al-Baetha, and Taiz migrated to Aden to work at ports, and as labourers. This helped the population of Aden once again become predominantly Arab after, having been declared a free zone, it had become mostly foreigners. During World War II, Aden had increasing economic growth and became the second-busiest port in the world after New York City.[166] After the rise of labour unions, a rift was apparent between the sectors of workers and the first signs of resistance to the occupation started in 1943.[166] Muhammad Ali Luqman founded the first Arabic club and school in Aden, and was the first to start working towards a union.[167]
The Colony of Aden was divided into an eastern colony and a western colony. Those were further divided into 23 sultanates and emirates, and several independent tribes that had no relationships with the sultanates. The deal between the sultanates and Britain detailed protection and complete control of foreign relations by the British. The Sultanate of Lahej was the only one in which the sultan was referred to as His Highness.[168] The Federation of South Arabia was created by the British to counter Arab nationalism by giving more freedom to the rulers of the nations.[169]
The North Yemen Civil War inspired many in the south to rise against the British rule. The National Liberation Front (NLF) of Yemen was formed with the leadership of Qahtan Muhammad Al-Shaabi. The NLF hoped to destroy all the sultanates and eventually unite with the Yemen Arab Republic. Most of the support for the NLF came from Radfan and Yafa, so the British launched Operation Nutcracker, which completely burned Radfan in January 1964.[170]
Two states
[edit]
Arab nationalism had an influence in some circles who opposed the lack of modernization efforts in the Mutawakkilite monarchy. This became apparent when Imam Ahmad bin Yahya died in 1962. He was succeeded by his son, but army officers attempted to seize power, sparking the North Yemen Civil War.[171][172] The Hamidaddin royalists were supported by Saudi Arabia, Britain, and Jordan (mostly with weapons and financial aid, but also with small military forces), whilst the military rebels were backed by Egypt. Egypt provided the rebels with weapons and financial assistance, but also sent a large military force to participate in the fighting. Israel covertly supplied weapons to the royalists to keep the Egyptian military busy in Yemen and make Nasser less likely to initiate a conflict in the Sinai. After six years of civil war, the military rebels formed the Yemen Arab Republic.[173]

The revolution in the north coincided with the Aden Emergency, which hastened the end of British rule in the south.[174] On 30 November 1967, the state of South Yemen was formed, comprising Aden and the former Protectorate of South Arabia. This socialist state was later officially known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and a programme of nationalisation was begun.[175]

Relations between the two Yemeni states fluctuated between peaceful and hostile. The South was supported by the Eastern bloc. The North, however, was not able to get the same connections. In 1972, the two states fought a war. The war was resolved with a ceasefire and negotiations brokered by the Arab League, where it was declared that unification would eventually occur. In 1978, Ali Abdullah Saleh was named as president of the Yemen Arab Republic.[176] After the war, the North complained about the South's help from foreign countries. This included Saudi Arabia.[177]
In 1979, fresh fighting between the two states resumed and efforts were renewed to bring about unification.[176] Thousands were killed in 1986 in the South Yemen Civil War.[174] President Ali Nasser Muhammad fled to the north and was later sentenced to death for treason. A new government formed.[176]
Unification and civil war
[edit]
In 1990, the two governments reached a full agreement on the joint governing of Yemen, and the countries were merged on 22 May 1990, with Saleh as president.[176] The president of South Yemen, Ali Salim al-Beidh, became vice president.[176] A unified parliament was formed and a unity constitution was agreed upon.[176] In the 1993 parliamentary election, the first held after unification, the General People's Congress won 122 of 301 seats.[178]: 309
After the invasion of Kuwait crisis in 1990, Yemen's president opposed military intervention from non-Arab states.[179] As a member of the United Nations Security Council for 1990 and 1991, Yemen abstained on a number of UNSC resolutions concerning Iraq and Kuwait[180] and voted against the "...use of force resolution." The vote outraged the U.S.,[181] and Saudi Arabia expelled 800,000 Yemenis in 1990 and 1991 to punish Yemen for its opposition to the intervention.[182]

In the absence of strong state institutions, elite politics in Yemen constituted a de facto form of collaborative governance, where competing tribal, regional, religious, and political interests agreed to hold themselves in check through tacit acceptance of the balance it produced.[183] The informal political settlement was held together by a power-sharing deal among three men: President Saleh, who controlled the state; major general Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who controlled the largest share of the Yemeni Armed Forces; and Abdullah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar, figurehead of the Islamist al-Islah party and Saudi Arabia's chosen broker of transnational patronage payments to various political players,[184] including tribal sheikhs.[185][186][187][188] The Saudi payments have been intended to facilitate the tribes' autonomy from the Yemeni government and to give the Saudi government a mechanism with which to weigh in on Yemen's political decision-making.[189]
Following food riots in major towns in 1992, a new coalition government made up of the ruling parties from both the former Yemeni states was formed in 1993. However, Vice President al-Beidh withdrew to Aden in August 1993 and said he would not return to the government until his grievances were addressed. These included northern violence against his Yemeni Socialist Party, as well as the economic marginalization of the south.[190] Negotiations to end the political deadlock dragged on into 1994. The government of Prime Minister Haydar Abu Bakr Al-Attas became ineffective due to political infighting.[191]
An accord between northern and southern leaders was signed in Amman, Jordan on 20 February 1994, but this could not stop the civil war.[192] During these tensions, both the northern and southern armies (which had never integrated) gathered on their respective frontiers.[193]
Contemporary Yemen
[edit]
Ali Abdullah Saleh became Yemen's first directly elected president in the 1999 presidential election, winning 96% of the vote.[178]: 310 The only other candidate, Najeeb Qahtan Al-Sha'abi, was the son of Qahtan Muhammad al-Sha'abi, a former president of South Yemen. Though a member of Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC) party, Najeeb ran as an independent.[195]
In October 2000, 17 U.S. personnel died after an al-Qaeda suicide attack on the U.S. naval vessel USS Cole in Aden. After the September 11 attacks on the United States, President Saleh assured U.S. President George W. Bush that Yemen was a partner in his War on Terror. In 2001, violence surrounded a referendum, which apparently supported extending Saleh's rule and powers.
The Houthi insurgency in Yemen began in June 2004 when dissident cleric Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi, head of the Zaidi Shia sect, launched an uprising against the Yemeni government. The Yemeni government alleged that the Houthis were seeking to overthrow it and to implement Shī'ite religious law. The rebels countered that they were "defending their community against discrimination" and government aggression.[196] In 2005, at least 36 people were killed in clashes across the country between police and protesters over rising fuel prices. In the 2006 presidential election, Saleh won with 77% of the vote. His main rival, Faisal bin Shamlan, received 22%.[197][198] Saleh was sworn in for another term on 27 September.[199]
A suicide bomber killed eight Spanish tourists and two Yemenis in the Marib Governorate in July 2007. A series of bomb attacks occurred on police, official, diplomatic, foreign business, and tourism targets in 2008. Car bombings outside the U.S. embassy in Sana'a killed 18 people, including six of the assailants in September 2008. In 2008, an opposition rally in Sana'a demanding electoral reform was met with police gunfire.[200]
Revolution and aftermath
[edit]The 2011 Yemeni revolution followed other Arab Spring mass protests in early 2011. The uprising was initially against unemployment, economic conditions, and corruption, as well as against the government's proposals to modify the constitution of Yemen so that Saleh's son could inherit the presidency.
In March 2011, police snipers opened fire on a pro-democracy camp in Sana'a, killing more than 50 people. In May, dozens were killed in clashes between troops and tribal fighters in Sana'a. By this point, Saleh began to lose international support. In October 2011, Yemeni human rights activist Tawakul Karman won the Nobel Peace Prize, and the UN Security Council condemned the violence and called for a transfer of power. On 23 November 2011, Saleh flew to Riyadh, in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, to sign the Gulf Co-operation Council plan for political transition, which he had previously spurned. Upon signing the document, he agreed to legally transfer the office and powers of the presidency to his deputy, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.[201]
Hadi took office for a two-year term upon winning the uncontested presidential elections in February 2012.[202] A unity government—including a prime minister from the opposition—was formed. Al-Hadi would oversee the drafting of a new constitution, followed by parliamentary and presidential elections in 2014. Saleh returned in February 2012. In the face of objections from thousands of street protesters, parliament granted him full immunity from prosecution. Saleh's son, General Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, continues to exercise a strong hold on sections of the military and security forces.
AQAP claimed responsibility for a February 2012 suicide attack on the presidential palace that killed 26 Republican Guards on the day that President Hadi was sworn in. AQAP was also behind a suicide bombing that killed 96 soldiers in Sana'a three months later. In September 2012, a car bomb attack in Sana'a killed 11 people, a day after a local al-Qaeda leader Said al-Shihri was reported killed in the south.
By 2012, there was a "small contingent of U.S. special-operations troops"—in addition to CIA and "unofficially acknowledged" U.S. military presence—in response to increasing terror attacks by AQAP on Yemeni citizens.[203] Many analysts have pointed out the former Yemeni government role in cultivating terrorist activity in the country.[204] Following the election of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, the Yemeni military was able to push Ansar al-Sharia back and recapture the Shabwah Governorate.

The central government in Sana'a remained weak, staving off challenges from southern separatists and Houthis as well as AQAP. The Houthi insurgency intensified after Hadi took power, escalating in September 2014 as anti-government forces led by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi swept into the capital and forced Hadi to agree to a "unity" government.[205] The Houthis then refused to participate in the government,[206] although they continued to apply pressure on Hadi and his ministers, even shelling the president's private residence and placing him under house arrest,[207] until the government's mass resignation in January 2015.[208] The following month, the Houthis dissolved parliament and declared that a Revolutionary Committee under Mohammed Ali al-Houthi was the interim authority in Yemen. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, a cousin of the acting president, called the takeover a "glorious revolution". However, the "constitutional declaration" of 6 February 2015 was widely rejected by opposition politicians and foreign governments, including the United Nations.[29]
Hadi managed to flee from Sana'a to Aden, his hometown and stronghold in the south, on 21 February 2015. He promptly gave a televised speech rescinding his resignation, condemning the coup, and calling for recognition as the constitutional president of Yemen.[209] The following month, Hadi declared Aden Yemen's "temporary" capital.[210][211] The Houthis, however, rebuffed an initiative by the Gulf Cooperation Council and continued to move south toward Aden. All U.S. personnel were evacuated, and President Hadi was forced to flee the country to Saudi Arabia. On 26 March 2015, Saudi Arabia announced Operation Decisive Storm and began airstrikes and announced its intentions to lead a military coalition against the Houthis, who they claimed were being aided by Iran and began a force buildup along the Yemeni border. The coalition included the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Egypt, and Pakistan. The United States announced that it was assisting with intelligence, targeting, and logistics. After Hadi troops took control of Aden from Houthis, jihadist groups became active in the city, and some terrorist incidents were linked to them such as Missionaries of Charity attack in Aden on 4 March 2016. In February 2018, Aden was seized by the UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council.[212]
Yemen has been suffering from a famine since 2016 as a result of the civil war. More than 50,000 children in Yemen died from starvation in 2017.[213][214] Numerous commentators have condemned the Saudi-led coalition's military campaign, including its blockade of Yemen, as genocide.[215][216][217] The famine is being compounded by an outbreak of cholera that has affected more than one million people.[218] The Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen and blockade of Yemen have contributed to the famine and cholera epidemic.[219][220] The UN estimated that by the end of 2021, the war in Yemen would have caused over 377,000 deaths, and roughly 70% of deaths were children under age 5.[221][222]
On 4 December 2017, deposed strongman and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, accused of treason, was assassinated by Houthis whilst attempting to flee clashes near rebel-held Sana'a between Houthi and pro-Saleh forces.[223] After losing the support of the Saudi-led coalition, Yemen's President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi resigned, and the Presidential Leadership Council took power in April 2022.[224]
Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Houthis began to fire missiles at Israel and attack ships off Yemen's coast in the Red Sea, which they say is in solidarity with the Palestinians and aiming to facilitate entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip.[225][226]
In June 2024, the UAE-backed STC were putting pressure to lease the Aden International Port to Abu Dhabi Ports. The move was opposed by the Parliament and the public. A joint statement by 24 members of Shura Council expressed categorical rejection of the lease agreement. Economists said the Emirates was attempting to control the Aden Port and limit its activities, in order to keep its own ports active. Governor of Aden, Tariq Salam also said the lease attempt aims to devalue the Aden Port and take its international maritime status.[227][228][229] Aden International Port had ended its agreement to manage two container terminals with Dubai Ports World in 2012, due to economic decline and failure to fulfill commitments.[230]
Geography
[edit]
Yemen covers 455,000 km2 (175,676 sq mi)[5] and is located at the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula.[231] It is bordered by Saudi Arabia to the north, the Red Sea to the west, the Gulf of Aden and Guardafui Channel to the south, and Oman to the east.
Several Red Sea islands, including the Hanish Islands, Kamaran, and Perim, as well as Socotra in the Arabian Sea, belong to Yemen; the largest of these is Socotra. Many of the islands are volcanic; Jabal al-Tair Island had volcanic eruptions in 1883 and 2007. Although mainland Yemen is in the southern Arabian Peninsula and thus part of Asia, and its Hanish Islands and Perim in the Red Sea are associated with Asia, the archipelago of Socotra, which lies east of the Horn of Africa and is much closer to Africa than to Asia, is geographically and bio-geographically associated with Africa.[232]
Regions and climate
[edit]Yemen can be divided geographically into four main regions: the coastal plains in the west, the western highlands, the eastern highlands, and the Rub' al Khali in the east. The Tihamah ("hot lands" or "hot earth") form a very arid and flat coastal plain along Yemen's entire Red Sea coastline. Despite the aridity, the presence of many lagoons makes this region very marshy and a suitable breeding ground for malaria-borne mosquitos. Extensive crescent-shaped sand dunes are present. The evaporation in the Tihamah is so great that streams from the highlands never reach the sea, but they do contribute to extensive groundwater reserves. Today, these are heavily exploited for agricultural use.

Near the village of Madar about 50 km (30 mi) north of Sana'a, dinosaur footprints were found, indicating that the area was once a muddy flat. The Tihamah ends abruptly at the escarpment of the western highlands. This area, now heavily terraced to meet the demand for food, receives the highest rainfall in Arabia, rapidly increasing from 100 mm (3.9 in) per year to about 760 mm (29.9 in) in Taiz and over 1,000 mm (39.4 in) in Ibb. Temperatures are warm in the day but fall dramatically at night.
The central highlands are an extensive high plateau over 2,000 m (6,562 ft) in elevation. This area is drier than the western highlands because of rain-shadow influences, but still receives sufficient rain in wet years for extensive cropping. Water storage allows for irrigation and the growing of wheat and barley. Sana'a is in this region. The highest point in Yemen and Arabia is Jabal An-Nabi Shu'ayb, at about 3,666 m (12,028 ft).[231][234] Yemen's portion of the Rub al Khali desert in the east is much lower, generally below 1,000 m (3,281 ft), and receives almost no rain. It is populated only by Bedouin herders of camels.
Although Yemen has contributed little to causing climate change,[235] it is one of the world's most vulnerable countries to climate change and among the least prepared to handle its effects.[236] Around half of the population is exposed to at least one major climate threat.[237] Climate change impacts in Yemen include increasing temperatures, drought, desertification, disease outbreaks and sea level rise. Extreme weather events like cyclones, floods and landslides have been intensifying in Yemen as a result of climate change. These impacts have already worsened the country's existing water scarcity issues, decreased agricultural and fishery productivity and affected the food security and health of Yemenites.[238]
Yemen is one of only three countries that has not yet joined the Paris Agreement and has not submitted any Nationally Determined Contributions, although they did submit an intended NDC in 2015.[239][240] To help the country adapt to climate change, The World Bank recommends investments in disaster risk management strategies, renewable energy, water management, soil conservation and climate smart agriculture. However, Yemen faces challenges in accessing climate finance due to low institutional capacity and poor stakeholder coordination.[241]Biodiversity
[edit]Yemen contains six terrestrial ecoregions: Arabian Peninsula coastal fog desert, Socotra Island xeric shrublands, Southwestern Arabian foothills savanna, Southwestern Arabian montane woodlands, Arabian Desert, and Red Sea Nubo-Sindian tropical desert and semi-desert.[242] The flora is a mixture of the tropical African, Sudanian plant geographical region and the Saharo-Arabian region. The Sudanian element—characterized by relatively high rainfall—dominates the western mountains and parts of the highland plains. The Saharo-Arabian element dominates in the coastal plains, eastern mountain, and the eastern and northern desert plains.
A high percentage of Yemen plants belong to tropical African plants of Sudanian regions. Among the Sudanian element species, the following may be mentioned: Ficus spp., Acacia mellifera, Grewia villosa, Commiphora spp., Rosa abyssinica, Cadaba farinosa and others.[243] Among the Saharo-Arabian species, these may be mentioned: Panicum turgidum, Aerva javanica, Zygophyllum simplex, Fagonia indica, Salsola spp., Acacia tortilis, A. hamulos, A. ehrenbergiana, Phoenix dactylifera, Hyphaene thebaica, Capparis decidua, Salvadora persica, Balanites aegyptiaca, and many others. Many of the Saharo-Arabian species are endemic to the extensive sandy coastal plain (the Tihamah).[244]
Among the fauna, the Arabian leopard, which would inhabit the mountains, is considered rare here.[245]
Culture
[edit]Media
[edit]
Radio broadcasting in Yemen began in the 1940s.[246] After unification in 1990, the government reformed its corporations and founded some additional radio stations that broadcast locally. However, it drew back after 1994, due to destroyed infrastructure resulting from the 1994 civil war.
Television is the most significant media platform. Given the low literacy rate in the country, television is the main source of news. There are six free-to-air channels currently headquartered in Yemen, of which four are state-owned.[247] The Yemeni film industry is in its early stages; only eight Yemeni films have been released as of 2023[update].
Theatre
[edit]
Yemeni theatre dates to the early 20th century. Both amateur and professional (government-sponsored) theatre troupes perform in the country's major urban centres. Many significant poets and authors, like Ali Ahmed Ba Kathir, Muhammad al-Sharafi, and Wajdi al-Ahdal, have written dramatic works; poems, novels, and short stories by Yemeni authors like Mohammad Abdul-Wali and Abdulaziz Al-Maqaleh have also been adapted for the stage.
There have been Yemeni productions of plays by Arab authors such as Tawfiq al-Hakim and Saadallah Wannous and by Western authors, including Shakespeare, Pirandello, Brecht, and Tennessee Williams. Historically speaking, Aden is the cradle of Yemeni theatre; in recent decades Sana'a has hosted numerous theatre festivals, often in conjunction with World Theatre Day.
Sport
[edit]Football is the most popular sport. The Yemen Football Association is a member of FIFA and AFC. The Yemeni national football team participates internationally. The country also hosts many football clubs. They compete in the national and international leagues.
Yemen's mountains provide many opportunities for outdoor sports, such as biking, rock climbing, trekking, hiking, and other more challenging sports, including mountain climbing. Mountain climbing and hiking tours to the Sarawat Mountains, including peaks of 3,000 m (9,800 ft) and above, particularly that of An-Nabi Shu'ayb,[231][234] are seasonally organized by local and international alpine agencies. The coastal areas and Socotra provide many opportunities for water sports, such as surfing, bodyboarding, sailing, swimming, and scuba diving. Socotra is home to some of the best surfing destinations in the world.

Camel jumping is a traditional sport that is becoming increasingly popular among the Zaraniq tribe on the west coast. Camels are placed side to side and victory goes to the competitor who leaps, from a running start, over the most camels. Tribesmen (women may not compete) tuck their robes around their waists for freedom of movement while running and leaping.[248]
Yemen's biggest sports event was hosting the 20th Arabian Gulf Cup in Aden and Abyan in 2010. Yemen was defeated in the first three matches of the tournament.[249]
Architecture
[edit]
Yemen is notable for its historic tower-houses, built on two or more floors. These houses vary in form and materials from region to region. They are typically built of mud (either rammed earth or sun-dried mud-brick), stone, or a combination of both, with timber used for roofs and floors.[250][251] In some cases, as at Sanaa, the lower floors are built in heavier stone and the upper floors are built in lighter brick.[251][252] Mud is sometimes mixed with straw and the walls are sometimes finished with lime.[251] Coral stone is also used in coastal towns.[253] Traditionally, the ground floor could be used for practical functions such as agriculture, the middle floors consisted of various multi-functional rooms, and the top floor often had a large reception room (mafraj) which enjoyed the best views.[250][251]

Decoration of houses is often executed with gypsum, lime or some other plaster. At Sanaa, typical designs consist of bands of geometric motifs on the exterior created with protruding bricks that are whitewashed.[250] Plasterwork is also found around the windows,[254] and geometric or floral motifs can be used in coloured glass within the semicircular fanlights. This style can be seen also be seen at Dar al-Hajar, a palace built on a rocky outcrop in Wadi Dahr (15 kilometres north of Sanaa), dating to the 1930s, which features rich gypsum decoration and coloured glass fanlights.[250]

Some villages and towns, such as Rada'a, were built around a fortified citadel (e.g. the Citadel of Rada'a), others were encircled by a high mud-brick wall (e.g. Shibam), and some were built so that the houses themselves formed an outer wall along an elevated position (e.g. Khawlan).[251]
While these structures are repaired and restored over time, this architectural style has remained generally unchanged for hundreds of years.[250] The old city of Sanaa is a prominent example which preserves many of these houses.[252][255] Since 1986 it is a UNESCO World Heritage Site, although its conservation is threatened by the ongoing Yemeni Civil War.[255][256][257] The oldest house in the city is believed to one of stone and earth located in the Harat al-'Alami area, as its existence is documented as early as the 14th century.[252]World Heritage sites
[edit]
Among its natural and cultural attractions are four World Heritage sites.[258][259] The Old Walled City of Shibam in Wadi Hadhramaut, inscribed by UNESCO in 1982, two years after Yemen joined the World Heritage Committee, is nicknamed "Manhattan of the Desert" because of its skyscrapers. Surrounded by a fortified wall made of mud and straw, the 16th-century city is one of the oldest examples of urban planning based on the principle of vertical construction.[260]
The Old City of Sana'a, at an altitude of more than 2,100 metres (7,000 ft), has been inhabited for over two and a half millennia and was inscribed in 1986. Sana'a became a major Islamic center in the seventh century, and the 103 mosques, 14 hammams (traditional bathhouses), and more than 6,000 houses that survive all date from before the 11th century.[261]
Close to the Red Sea coast, the historic town of Zabid, inscribed in 1993, was Yemen's capital from the 13th to the 15th century and is an archaeological and historical site. It played an important role for many centuries because of its university, which was a centre of learning for the whole Arab and Islamic world.[262]
The latest addition to Yemen's list of World Heritage Sites is the Socotra Archipelago. Mentioned by Marco Polo in the 13th century, this remote and isolated archipelago consists of four islands and two rocky islets delineating the southern limit of the Gulf of Aden. The site has a rich biodiversity. Nowhere else in the world do 37% of Socotra's 825 plants, 90% of its reptiles and 95% of its snails occur. It is home to 192 bird species, 253 species of coral, 730 species of coastal fish, and 300 species of crab and lobster,[263] as well as the Dragon's Blood Tree (Dracaena cinnabari).[264] The cultural heritage of Socotra includes the unique Soqotri language.
Government and politics
[edit]Prime Minister
5 February 2024 – 3 May 2025, succeeded by Salem Saleh bin Braik
Yemen is a republic with a bicameral legislature. Under the 1991 constitution, an elected president, an elected 301-seat Assembly of Representatives, and an appointed 111-member Shura Council share power. The president is the head of state, and the prime minister is the head of government. In Sana'a, a Supreme Political Council (not recognized internationally) forms a government for Houthi-controlled territory of Yemen.
The 1991 constitution provides that the president be elected by popular vote from at least two candidates endorsed by at least 15 members of the Parliament. The prime minister, in turn, is appointed by the president and must be approved by two-thirds of the Parliament. The presidential term of office is seven years, and the parliamentary term of elected office is six years. Suffrage is universal for people aged 18 and older, but only Muslims may hold elected office.[265]
President Ali Abdullah Saleh became the first elected president in reunified Yemen in 1999 (though he had been president of unified Yemen since 1990 and president of North Yemen since 1978). He was re-elected to office in September 2006. Saleh's victory was marked by an election that international observers judged was "partly free", though the election was accompanied by violence, violations of press freedoms, and allegations of fraud.[266] Parliamentary elections were held in April 2003, and the General People's Congress maintained an absolute majority. Saleh remained almost uncontested in his seat of power until 2011, when local frustration at his refusal to hold another round of elections, as combined with the consequences of the 2011 Arab Spring, resulted in mass protests.[202] In 2012, he was forced to resign from power, though he remained an important factor in Yemeni politics, allying with the Houthis during their takeover in the mid-2010s.[267]
The constitution calls for an independent judiciary. The former northern and southern legal codes have been unified. The legal system includes separate commercial courts and a Supreme Court based in Sana'a. Sharia is the main source of laws, with many court cases being debated according to the religious basis of law and many judges being religious scholars as well as legal authorities. The Prison Authority Organization Act, Republican decree no. 48 (1981), and Prison Act regulations, provide the legal framework for management of the country's prison system.[268]
According to International IDEA’s Global State of Democracy (GSoD) Indices and Democracy Tracker, Yemen performs in the low range on overall democratic measures, with particular weaknesses in political representation, including elected government and effective parliament.[269][270][271]
Foreign relations
[edit]Yemen is a member of the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, and also participates in the nonaligned movement. Yemen has acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Since the end of the 1994 civil war, tangible progress has been made on the diplomatic front in restoring normal relations with Yemen's neighbors. In the summer of 2000, Yemen and Saudi Arabia signed an International Border Treaty settling a 50-year-old dispute over the location of the border between the two countries.[272] Yemen's northern border had been undefined; the Arabian Desert prevented any human habitation there. The Saudi – Yemen barrier was constructed by Saudi Arabia against an influx of illegal immigrants and against the smuggling of drugs and weapons.[273] The Independent headed an article with "Saudi Arabia, one of the most vocal critics in the Arab world of Israel's "security fence" in the West Bank, is quietly emulating the Israeli example by erecting a barrier along its porous border with Yemen."[274][unreliable source?]

In March 2020, the Trump administration and key U.S. allies, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, cut off tens of millions of dollars for health care programs and other aid to the United Nations' appeal for Yemen. As a result of funding cuts, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs stated that the UN agencies were forced to either close or reduce more than 75 per cent of its programs that year alone, affecting more than 8 million people. Saudi Arabia had been leading a Western-backed military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates as a key member, which intervened in Yemen in 2015, in a bid to restore the government ousted from power by the Houthi movement. The United Nations described the situation in Yemen, where the war killed tens of thousands of people and left millions on the brink of famine, as the world's worst humanitarian crisis.[275]
In January 2024, President Joe Biden announced that the United States, Britain and allies Australia, Bahrain, Canada and the Netherlands had launched a military assault on Houthi militant targets in Yemen.[276]
Military
[edit]
The armed forces of Yemen include the Yemen Army (includes Republican Guard), Navy (includes Marines), Yemeni Air Force (Al Quwwat al Jawwiya al Yamaniya; includes Air Defense Force). A major reorganization of the armed forces continues. The unified air forces and air defenses are now under one command. The navy has concentration in Aden. Total armed forces manning numbers about 401,000 active personnel, including moreover especially conscripts.
The number of military personnel is relatively high; in sum, Yemen has the second largest military force on the Arabian Peninsula after Saudi Arabia. In 2012, total active troops were estimated as follows: army, 390,000; navy, 7,000; and air force, 5,000. In September 2007, the government announced the reinstatement of compulsory military service. Yemen's defense budget, which in 2006 represented approximately 40 percent of the total government budget, is expected to remain high for the near term, as the military draft takes effect and internal security threats continue to escalate. By 2012, Yemen had 401,000 active personnel.
Human rights
[edit]Corruption in Yemen is such that it ranked 176 out of 180 countries in the 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index.[277] The government and its security forces have been responsible for torture, inhumane treatment, and extrajudicial executions. There are arbitrary arrests of citizens, especially in the south, as well as arbitrary searches of homes. Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem, and judicial corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference undermine due process. Freedom of speech, the press, and religion are all restricted.[278] Journalists critical of the government are often harassed and threatened by the police.[180] Homosexuality is illegal, punishable by death.[279]
Yemen is ranked last of 135 countries in the 2012 Global Gender Gap Report.[280] Human Rights Watch reported on discrimination and violence against women as well as on the abolition of the minimum marriage age of 15 for women. The onset of puberty (interpreted by some to be as low as the age of nine) was set as a requirement for marriage instead.[281] Publicity about the case of ten-year-old Yemeni divorcee Nujood Ali brought the child marriage issue to the forefront worldwide.[282][283][284]
In 2017, the UN Human Rights Council voted to create a team of experts to investigate suspected breaches of humanitarian law and human rights in Yemen.[285] In December 2021, The Guardian revealed, Saudi Arabia used "incentives and threats" as part of a pressure campaign to end a UN inquiry into human rights infringements in Yemen.[286] In June 2020, a human rights group revealed the scale of torture and deaths in Yemen's unofficial detention centres. UAE and Saudi forces were responsible for some of the most shocking treatment of prisoners, including being hung upside down for hours and sexual torture such as the burning of genitals.[287]
According to 2020 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) estimates, 6.1 million girls and women were in need of gender-based violence services. The UNFPA also reported a rise in gender-based violence cases amid COVID-19 pandemic, increase in rate of child marriages, most acutely among internally displaced persons (IDPs). One in five girls aged 10 to 19 were married in IDP camps, compared to 1 in 8 in host communities.[288]
The United States Department of State 2013 Trafficking in Persons report classified Yemen as a Tier 3 country,[289] meaning that its government does not fully comply with the minimum standards against human trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.[290] Yemen officially abolished slavery in Yemen in 1962,[291] but it is still being practiced.[292] On 22 June 2020, Human Rights Watch wrote an open letter to the UN Secretary-General on "Children and Armed Conflict" report to improve the protection of children in Yemen and in Myanmar.[293] Amnesty said, United Nations Security Council must urgently fix its monitoring and reporting mechanism for children affected by armed conflict.[294] On 14 September 2020, Human Rights Watch demanded an end to the interference caused by Houthi rebels and other authorities in Yemen aid operations, as millions of lives dependent on the aid operations were being put at risk.[295]
Administrative divisions
[edit]
Yemen is divided into twenty-one governorates (muhafazat) plus one municipality called "Amanat Al-Asemah" (the latter containing the constitutional capital, Sana'a).[296] An additional governorate (Soqatra Governorate) was created in December 2013 comprising Socotra Island, previously part of Hadramaut Governorate.[297] The governorates are subdivided into 333 districts (muderiah), which are subdivided into 2,210 sub-districts, and then into 38,284 villages (as of 2001).

In 2014, a constitutional panel decided to divide the country into six regions—four in the north, two in the south, and capital Sana'a outside of any region—creating a federalist model of governance.[298] This federal proposal was a contributing factor toward the Houthis' subsequent coup d'état against the government.[299][300][301]
Economy
[edit]
Since its unification in 1990, Yemen has been one of the poorest countries in the Middle East.[302] As of 2013[update] Yemen had a GDP (PPP) of US$61.63 billion, with an income per capita of $2,500. Services are the largest economic sector (61.4% of GDP), followed by the industrial sector (30.9%), and agriculture (7.7%). Of these, petroleum production represents around 25% of GDP and 63% of the government's revenue.[4] After the start of the civil war in 2014, its GDP dropped rapidly by over 50%,[303][304] thanks to the blockade led by Saudi Arabia and an effective embargo on oil exports imposed by the Houthis.[305]
Agriculture
[edit]
Principal agricultural commodities produced include grain, vegetables, fruits, pulses, qat, coffee, cotton, dairy products, fish, livestock (sheep, goats, cattle, camels), and poultry.[4] Most Yemenis are employed in agriculture. However, the role of agricultural sector is limited by the relatively low share of the sector in GDP and the large share of net food-buying households (97%).[306] Sorghum is the most common crop. Cotton and many fruit trees are also grown, with mangoes being the most valuable.
A big problem in Yemen is the cultivation of Khat (or qat), a psychoactive plant that releases a stimulant when chewed, and accounts for up to 40 percent of the water drawn from the Sana'a Basin each year, and that figure is rising. Some agricultural practices are drying the Sana'a Basin and displaced vital crops, which has resulted in increasing food prices. Rising food prices, in turn, pushed an additional six percent of the country into poverty in 2008 alone,[307] and led to food riots starting in 2008 in poorer cities.[308] Efforts are being made by the government and Dawoodi Bohra community at northern governorates to replace qat with coffee plantations.[309]
Industry
[edit]The industrial sector is centred on crude oil production and petroleum refining, food processing, handicrafts, small-scale production of cotton textiles and leather goods, aluminum products, commercial ship repair, cement, and natural gas production. In 2013, Yemen had an industrial production growth rate of 4.8%.[4] It also has large proven reserves of natural gas.[310] Yemen's first liquified natural gas plant began production in October 2009.
Export and import
[edit]In 2013, exports totaled $6.694 billion. The main export commodities are crude oil, coffee, dried and salted fish, liquefied natural gas. These products were mainly sent to China (41%), Thailand (19.2%), India (11.4%), and South Korea (4.4%). Imports totaled $10.97 billion. The main imported commodities are machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, livestock, and chemicals. These products were mainly imported from the EU (48.8%), UAE (9.8%), Switzerland (8.8%), China (7.4%), and India (5.8%).[4]
State budget
[edit]
As of 2013[update], the government's budget consisted of $7.769 billion in revenues and $12.31 billion in expenditures. Taxes and other revenues constituted roughly 17.7% of the GDP, with a budget deficit of 10.3%. The public debt was 47.1% of GDP. Yemen had reserves of foreign exchange and gold of around $5.538 billion in 2013. Its inflation rate over the same period based on consumer prices was 11.8%. The external debt totaled $7.806 billion.[4] Yemen is missing some international support because, as of 2024, it is one of three countries which have not ratified the Paris Agreement to limit climate change.[311]
Water supply and sanitation
[edit]A key challenge is severe water scarcity, especially in the Highlands, prompting The Times, in 2009, to write "Yemen could become first nation to run out of water."[312] A second key challenge is a high level of poverty, making it difficult to recover the costs of service provision. Access to water supply sanitation is low. Yemen is both the poorest country and the most water-scarce country in the Arab world. Third, the capacity of sector institutions to plan, build, operate and maintain infrastructure remains limited. Last but not least the security situation makes it even more difficult to improve or even maintain existing levels of service.
The average Yemeni has access to only 140 cubic meters of water per year (101 gallons per day) for all uses, while the Middle Eastern average is 1,000 m3/yr, and the internationally defined threshold for water stress is 1,700 cubic meters per year.[313] Groundwater is the main source of water in the country, but the water tables have dropped severely leaving Yemen without a viable source of water. For example, in Sana'a, the water table was 30 metres (98 feet) below surface in the 1970s but had dropped to 1,200 metres (3,900 feet) below the surface by 2012. The groundwater has not been regulated by Yemen's governments.[314]
Even before the revolution, Yemen's water situation had been described as increasingly dire by experts who worried that Yemen would be the first country to run out of water.[315] In part due to the 2015 Yemeni civil war, the infrastructure required to build better access to water has been delayed in construction. It is estimated that as many as 80% of the population struggles to access water to drink and bathe. Bombing has forced many Yemenis to leave their homes for other areas, leaving wells in the new areas under increasing demands.[316]
Together with partners, UNICEF has advanced its efforts and provided access to safe and sustained drinking water to 8.8 million people (5.3 million children). It scaled up its emergency WASH assistance in Yemen to ensure sustainable WASH services through capacity building of local WASH authorities, solarisation of water systems and rainwater harvesting.[317]
Demographics
[edit]
Yemen's population is 33 million by 2021 estimates,[318][319] with 46% of the population being under 15 years old and 2.7% above 65 years. In 1950, it was 4.3 million.[320][321] By 2050, the population is estimated to increase to about 60 million.[322] Yemen has a high total fertility rate, at 4.45 children per woman.[323] Sana'a's population has increased rapidly, from roughly 55,000 in 1978[324] to nearly 1 million in the early 21st century.[325]
People
[edit]
When the states of North and South Yemen were established, most resident minority groups departed.[326] Yemen is a largely tribal society.[327] There are also hereditary caste groups in urban areas such as Al-Akhdam.[328] There are also Yemenis of Persian origin. According to Muqaddasi, Persians formed the majority of Aden's population in the 10th century.[329][330]
Yemenite Jews once formed a sizable minority with a distinct culture from other Jewish communities in the world.[331] Most emigrated to Israel in the mid-20th century, following the Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries and Operation Magic Carpet. An estimated 100,000 people of Indian origin are concentrated in the southern part of the country, around Aden, Mukalla, Shihr, Lahaj, Mokha and Hodeidah.[332]
Most of the prominent Indonesians, Malaysians, and Singaporeans of Arab descent are Hadhrami people with origins in southern Yemen in the Hadhramaut coastal region.[333] Today there are almost 10,000 Hadramis in Singapore.[334] The Hadramis migrated to Southeast Asia, East Africa and the Indian subcontinent.[335]
The Maqil were a collection of Arab Bedouin tribes of Yemeni origin who migrated westwards via Egypt. Several groups of Yemeni Arabs turned south to Mauritania, and by the end of the 17th century, they dominated the entire country. They can also be found throughout Morocco and in Algeria as well as in other North African countries.[336]
Yemen is the birthplace of the Arabs and the language; Qahtanite Arabs — the original Arabs — originated in Yemen. According to Arab tradition, Ishmael son of Abraham married a woman from the Jurhum tribe.[337]
Yemen is the only country in the Arabian Peninsula that is signatory to two international accords dating back to 1951 and 1967 governing the protection of refugees.[338] Yemen hosted a population of refugees and asylum seekers numbering approximately 124,600 in 2007. Refugees and asylum seekers were predominantly from Somalia (110,600), Iraq (11,000), Ethiopia (2,000),[339] and Syria.[340] Additionally, more than 334,000 Yemenis have been internally displaced by conflict.[338] The Yemeni diaspora is largely concentrated in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, where between 800,000 and 1 million Yemenis reside,[341] and the United Kingdom, home to between 70,000 and 80,000 Yemenis.[342]
Languages
[edit]Modern Standard Arabic is the official language, while Yemeni Arabic is used as the vernacular. In al Mahrah Governorate in the far east and the island of Socotra, several non-Arabic languages are spoken.[343][344] Yemeni Sign Language is used by the deaf community.
Yemen is part of the homeland of the South Semitic languages. Mehri is the largest South Semitic language spoken in the nation, with more than 70,000 speakers. The ethnic group is called Mahra. Soqotri is another South Semitic language, with speakers on the island of Socotra isolated from the pressures of Arabic on the Yemeni mainland. According to the 1990 census, the number of speakers was 57,000.[345] Yemen was home of the Old South Arabian languages. The Razihi language appears to be the only remaining Old South Arabian language.
English is the most important foreign language, being widely taught and spoken mostly in the south, a former British protectorate.[346]
Religion
[edit]Islam is the state religion. Religion in Yemen consists primarily of two Islamic religious groups. According to a UNHCR report, the Shia "Zaydis make up about 45 percent of the population, Sunnis 53 percent and there are also tiny minorities of other Shia groups—the Ismaili and Twelver communities."[348] Sunnis are primarily Shafi'i but also include significant groups of Malikis and Hanbalis. Shias are primarily Zaydi and also have significant minorities of Ismaili[349] and Twelver[349][350] Shias.
The Sunnis are predominantly in the south and southeast which traditionally have less population. The Zaidis/Shias are predominantly in the north and northwest where the vast majority of the Yemeni population traditionally lives whilst the Ismailis are in the main centres such as Sana'a and Ma'rib. There are mixed communities in the larger cities.[351][352] According to WIN/Gallup International polls, Yemen has the highest share of the population identifying as religious among Arab countries, and one of the highest in the world.[353]
About .05 percent of Yemenis are non-Muslim—adhering to Christianity, Judaism, or Hinduism or having no religious affiliation. Yemen is number five on Open Doors' 2022 World Watch List, an annual ranking of the 50 countries where Christians face the most extreme persecution.[354] Estimates of the number of Christians in Yemen range from 25,000[355] to 41,000.[356] A 2015 study estimates 400 Christians from a Muslim background reside in the country.[357] There are approximately 50 or fewer Jews left in Yemen. Some 200 Yemeni Jews were brought to Israel by the Jewish Agency c. 2016.[358] According to a 2020 estimate, as few as 26 Jews remain in Yemen.[359] However, in 2022 it was estimated that only one Yemeni Jew remained according to a United Nations report about the treatment of religious minorities in conflict zones. Despite this, there are reportedly several crypto-Jews that still remain in the country.[360]
Education
[edit]
The adult literacy rate in 2010 was 64%.[361] The government has committed to reduce illiteracy to less than 10% by 2025.[362] Although the government provides for universal, compulsory, free education for children ages six through 15, the U.S. Department of State reports that compulsory attendance is not enforced. The government developed the National Basic Education Development Strategy in 2003 that aimed at providing education to 95% of children between the ages of six and 14 years and also at decreasing the gap between males and females in urban and rural areas.[363]
A seven-year project to improve gender equity and the quality and efficiency of secondary education, focusing on girls in rural areas, was approved by the World Bank in March 2008. Following this, Yemen has increased its education spending from 5% of GDP in 1995 to 10% in 2005.[180]
According to the Webometrics Ranking of World Universities, the top-ranking universities in the country are the Yemeni University of Science & Technology (6532nd worldwide), Al Ahgaff University (8930th) and Sanaa University (11043rd).[364] Yemen was ranked 131st in the Global Innovation Index in 2021, down from 129th in 2019.[365][366][367][368]
Health
[edit]
Despite the significant progress the government has made to expand and improve its health care system over the past decade, the system remains severely underdeveloped. Total expenditures on health care in 2002 constituted 3.7 percent of GDP.[369] In that same year, the per capita expenditure for health care was very low, as compared with other Middle Eastern countries—US$58 according to United Nations statistics and US$23 according to the World Health Organization.
According to the World Bank, the number of doctors rose by an average of more than 7 percent between 1995 and 2000, but as of 2004, there were still only three doctors per 10,000 persons. In 2003, Yemen had only 0.6 hospital beds available per 1,000 persons.[369] Health care services are particularly scarce in rural areas. Only 25 percent of rural areas are covered by health services, as compared with 80 percent of urban areas. Emergency services, such as ambulance service and blood banks, are non-existent.[369]
See also
[edit]Notes
[edit]Language notes
- ^ Also see Religion in Yemen.
- ^ /ˈjɛmən/ ⓘ; Arabic: ٱلْيَمَنْ, romanized: al-Yaman
- ^ Arabic: ٱلْجُمْهُورِيَّةُ ٱلْيَمَنِيَّةُ, romanized: al-Jumhūriyya l-Yamaniyya (ALA-LC: al-Jumhūrīyah al-Yamanīyah), lit. 'the Yemeni Republic'
- ^ Sabaean: 𐩪𐩨𐩱, romanized: S¹Bʾ; Arabic: ٱلسَّبَئِيُّوْن, romanized: as-Sabaʾiyyūn; Hebrew: סְבָאִים, romanized: Səḇāʾīm
General notes
- ^ Constitutional capital under Houthi control.
- ^ Claimed by the Presidential Leadership Council as its provisional capital.[1]
- ^ Disputed by Mahdi al-Mashat of the Supreme Political Council. Despite not holding an official position in the government, Houthi movement leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi controls the SPC.
- ^ Disputed by Muhammad Ahmed Miftah of the Supreme Political Council
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External links
[edit]Government
[edit]- National Information Center Archived 25 October 2020 at the Wayback Machine – Official Yemen Information Portal
- Presidential Leadership Council Archived 29 August 2025 at the Wayback Machine – official website of the president of Yemen
- Prime Minister – official website of the prime minister of Yemen
- Shura Council – official website of the Yemeni Shura Council
- House of Representatives – official website of the Yemeni House of Representatives
- Statistics Archived 1 September 2025 at the Wayback Machine – official website of Central Statistical Organization
History
[edit]- "History" Archived 5 September 2025 at the Wayback Machine – Yemeni History at National Information Center
Tourism
[edit]- Explore Yemen – Yemen's official tourism portal
Maps
[edit]
Wikimedia Atlas of Yemen
Geographic data related to Yemen at OpenStreetMap
Yemen
View on GrokipediaName and Etymology
Etymology
The name Yemen derives from the Arabic al-Yaman (الْيَمَن), rooted in yamīn (يَمِين), signifying "right hand" or "south," a reference to its location southward from Mecca—as determined by facing the Kaaba during prayer, with south corresponding to the right.[7][8] This directional etymology appears in classical Arabic geographical and historical texts, emphasizing Yemen's position on the Arabian Peninsula relative to sacred Islamic orientations.[9] Alternative derivations in Arabic traditions connect Yaman to yumn (يُمْن), implying prosperity or blessedness, which parallels the ancient Roman epithet Arabia Felix ("Fertile Arabia" or "Happy Arabia"), applied by writers like Pliny the Elder around 77 CE to denote the region's agricultural wealth and trade in spices, incense, and myrrh.[10][9] The prosperity interpretation underscores Yemen's historical economic prominence, though the directional origin predominates in linguistic analyses tracing to Proto-Semitic yamān-.[11]History
Ancient and Pre-Islamic Era
The ancient history of Yemen encompasses the rise of several South Arabian kingdoms that dominated the region from the 2nd millennium BCE through the 6th century CE, primarily through control of lucrative incense trade routes exporting frankincense and myrrh to the Mediterranean, Egypt, and Mesopotamia.[12] These kingdoms included Saba (Sheba), which flourished from the 8th century BCE to 275 CE, leveraging advanced irrigation systems like the Marib Dam to support agriculture in an arid landscape.[13] The Sabaeans developed a distinctive monumental architecture, including temples and inscriptions in the Old South Arabian script, reflecting a polytheistic religion centered on deities such as Athtar, the god of fertility and rain.[13] Concurrent kingdoms such as Ma'in (Minaean, 8th–1st century BCE) and Qataban (4th century BCE–200 CE) emerged as trading powers, with Ma'in specializing in caravan routes and Qataban controlling eastern incense production areas.[14] Hadramaut maintained independence in the east, benefiting from local frankincense yields. By the 1st century BCE, the Himyarite Kingdom, originating around 110 BCE, began consolidating power, conquering Saba circa 25 BCE, Qataban around 200 CE, and Hadramaut circa 300 CE, establishing hegemony over southern Arabia by the 4th century CE.[15] Himyar's capital at Zafar became a center of wealth, with rulers issuing coinage influenced by Hellenistic and Aksumite models. Engineering feats underpinned prosperity, notably the Marib Dam, an earthen barrier approximately 650 meters long and 15 meters high, which irrigated up to 10,000 hectares and sustained Sabaean agriculture for over a millennium before repeated breaches, including major failures in 450 CE and 542 CE, culminating in a catastrophic collapse around 570 CE that displaced populations northward.[16][17] Pre-Islamic religious shifts marked Himyar's era: while early kingdoms adhered to paganism, Himyarite kings adopted Judaism around 380 CE under leaders like Abu Karib, enforcing conversions and persecuting Christians, which provoked interventions from Christian Aksum (Ethiopia) and Byzantine interests, leading to wars by the 6th century CE.[18] This monotheistic pivot, possibly strategic for alliances or internal consolidation, contrasted with lingering polytheistic practices and introduced early Christian communities in ports like Najran, setting the stage for regional tensions.[18]Islamic Conquest and Early Dynasties
In 631 CE, the Prophet Muhammad dispatched Muadh ibn Jabal to Yemen as a teacher, judge, and collector of zakat, instructing him to prioritize the Quran, then the Sunnah, and then ijtihad based on analogy, which facilitated the initial establishment of Islamic governance and jurisprudence in the region.[19] Following Muhammad's death in 632 CE, widespread apostasy erupted among several Yemeni tribes during the Ridda wars, as some rejected central authority in Medina and withheld zakat, prompting Caliph Abu Bakr to deploy armies under commanders like Ikrima ibn Abi Jahl to suppress rebellions in areas such as Hadramawt and Sana'a by 633 CE, thereby reintegrating Yemen into the Rashidun Caliphate as a province.[20] These campaigns, combining military force with alliances to pro-Medina factions, ensured nominal Islamic unity across the Arabian Peninsula, though local resistance persisted due to tribal autonomy and pre-existing Christian, Jewish, and Zoroastrian influences under prior Himyarite and Sassanid rule. Under the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 CE), Yemen functioned as a peripheral province administered from Damascus, contributing troops to broader conquests in North Africa and Persia while experiencing gradual Arabization and Islamization, evidenced by the construction of early mosques like the Great Mosque of Sana'a around 705 CE during Caliph al-Walid I's reign.[20] The subsequent Abbasid Caliphate (750–1258 CE) maintained nominal suzerainty but faced weakening central control by the 9th century, allowing semi-autonomous governors to consolidate power; Yemenis participated extensively in Abbasid armies, but regional fragmentation arose from Abbasid overextension and internal revolts, including Zaydi Shiite uprisings against perceived Sunni dominance.[20] The Ziyadid dynasty emerged in 819 CE when Muhammad ibn Ziyad, initially an Abbasid-appointed governor, established de facto independence in Tihama with Zabid as capital, ruling until 1018 CE and controlling lowland trade routes while nominally pledging allegiance to Baghdad.[21] Concurrently, in northern Yemen's highlands, the Zaydi imamate was founded around 893 CE by Yahya ibn al-Husayn (al-Hadi ila l-Haqq), a descendant of Ali ibn Abi Talib, who rallied tribes against Abbasid rule through doctrinal appeals to Zaydi Shiism, emphasizing rationalist jurisprudence and opposition to Umayyad-era deviations, thus establishing a theocratic stronghold that endured intermittent challenges.[22] These early dynasties reflected causal shifts from caliphal centralization to localism, driven by geographic isolation, tribal loyalties, and Abbasid fiscal strains, marking Yemen's transition to fragmented Muslim polities rather than unified imperial provinces.[21]Medieval Period and Dynastic Rule
The Sulayhid dynasty emerged in 1047 under Ali ibn Muhammad al-Sulayhi, who established an Ismaili Shia state in central Yemen as a nominal vassal of the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, unifying fragmented regions through military campaigns against local rivals and restoring Ismaili influence in the Arabian Peninsula.[23] Al-Sulayhi's forces captured Sana'a in 1060 and extended control over much of Yemen's highlands and coastal areas, promoting Fatimid da'wa (missionary activity) and facilitating trade routes to India.[24] Following al-Sulayhi's death in 1084 and his son al-Mukarram's incapacitation, Queen Arwa al-Sulayhi assumed effective rule from 1084 to 1138, marking one of the longest reigns by a woman in Islamic history; she relocated the capital to Jibla and strengthened ties with the Fatimids while overseeing architectural projects and administrative reforms.[23] [25] Upon Queen Arwa's death in 1138, the Sulayhid state fragmented into successor entities, including the Zurayid dynasty in southern Yemen, amid internal strife and external pressures from Zaydi imams in the north.[26] In 1174, Ayyubid forces under Turan Shah invaded and conquered Yemen, establishing Egyptian Ayyubid rule over the lowlands and Tihama coast until 1229, during which they suppressed Ismaili strongholds and integrated Yemen into broader Ayyubid trade networks.[27] The Rasulid dynasty, originating from Turkic or Circassian military slaves serving the Ayyubids, rose when Umar ibn Rasul declared independence in 1229, founding a Sunni dynasty that governed Yemen and Hadramawt until 1454, capitalizing on maritime commerce through ports like Aden and Mocha to amass wealth from spices, coffee precursors, and Indian Ocean trade.[27] [28] Rasulid rulers, such as al-Muzaffar Yusuf I (1250–1295), fostered cultural and scientific advancements, commissioning agricultural treatises, astronomical works, and historical chronicles that detailed Yemen's economy and governance; their administration emphasized taxation of trade caravans and ports, yielding prosperity evidenced by extensive building projects in Zabid and Taiz.[29] [30] The dynasty competed with Mamluk Egypt for influence over Hejaz pilgrimage routes and Red Sea commerce, maintaining relative stability despite occasional Zaydi incursions from the highlands.[31] The Tahirid dynasty succeeded the Rasulids in 1454, ruling Lower Yemen from Rada'a until 1517 under a local clan of uncertain ethnic origin; though less militarily dominant, they focused on infrastructure like mosques and forts, but faced declining trade revenues and internal rebellions, culminating in vulnerability to Portuguese naval incursions in the Indian Ocean and the resurgence of Ottoman ambitions.[32] [33] Throughout these dynasties, Yemen's strategic position drove economic reliance on incense, myrrh, and emerging coffee exports, with slave labor in agriculture and ports documented in Rasulid-era records from the 13th century, reflecting a hierarchical society where dynastic legitimacy blended religious authority, military prowess, and commercial acumen.[34] Zaydi imams maintained de facto control in northern highlands, coexisting uneasily with lowland dynasties and preserving Shia theological traditions against Sunni or Ismaili dominance.[26] This period's dynastic shifts underscored causal dynamics of trade wealth enabling consolidation, while ideological divisions and external interventions precipitated cycles of unity and fragmentation.[35]Ottoman Influence and Regional Powers
The Ottoman Empire first intervened in Yemen in 1538, capturing the port of Aden to counter Portuguese naval threats to Red Sea trade routes during the reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent.[36] This marked the beginning of Ottoman efforts to secure the southwestern Arabian Peninsula, with forces under Hadım Süleyman Pasha advancing inland to establish the Yemen Eyalet. By the 1550s, commander Özdemir Pasha had garrisoned key cities including Sana'a and Zabid, fortified coastal defenses, and subdued lowland tribes in the Tihama region to protect pilgrimage routes and coffee exports from ports like Mocha.[37] However, Ottoman control remained precarious in the mountainous highlands, where Zaidi Shiite imams mobilized tribal resistance against perceived religious and fiscal impositions. The Qasimid dynasty, founded in 1597 by Imam al-Mansur al-Qasim, emerged as the primary regional power opposing Ottoman dominance, drawing on Zaidi religious authority to rally highland tribes.[38] Through protracted guerrilla warfare from the early 1600s, Qasimid forces recaptured northern strongholds like Sa'dah by 1608 and Sana'a in 1629, exploiting Ottoman overextension and logistical strains from distant Istanbul. By 1635–1636, sustained rebellions forced a full Ottoman withdrawal from Yemen, ending direct rule after nearly a century of intermittent control, though coastal enclaves like Mocha lingered under nominal suzerainty until the late 17th century.[38] The Qasimids consolidated a Zaidi imamate over northern Yemen's interior, extracting tribute from lowland tribes and fostering coffee cultivation for export, which briefly extended influence southward before internal divisions fragmented authority in the 18th century.[39] In the mid-19th century, amid Tanzimat reforms, the Ottoman Empire reasserted influence in northern Yemen around 1849, advancing from the coast to occupy Sana'a and Ta'izz by the 1870s to curb Wahhabi incursions from Najd and secure revenues.[40] Conflicts resumed with Zaidi imams, including Imam Yahya's guerrilla campaigns, which pressured Ottomans into granting de facto autonomy by 1911 amid Balkan distractions. Regional dynamics involved southern tribal confederations, such as those in Lahej and Hadhramaut, maintaining semi-independence until British annexation of Aden in 1839 shifted power southward, while Qasimid successors preserved highland theocratic rule. Ottoman forces evacuated Yemen entirely in 1918 following defeat in World War I, enabling Imam Yahya Muhammad Hamid ad-Din to declare the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen.[41][40]19th–20th Century: Imamate, Colonialism, and Independence
In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire maintained nominal control over northern Yemen until its collapse in 1918, while facing ongoing resistance from Zaydi Imams in the highlands.[42] Concurrently, Britain captured the port of Aden in 1839 to secure maritime routes to India via the Red Sea, establishing it as a key coaling station and later a Crown Colony in 1937.[43] Britain expanded influence by forming protectorates over surrounding tribal areas in South Arabia to buffer against Ottoman advances and ensure strategic depth.[43] Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din seized power in 1904, launching a rebellion against Ottoman rule that culminated in Yemen's de facto independence in 1919 following the empire's defeat in World War I.[44] He founded the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, reuniting much of the northern territories under Zaydi authority and pursuing expansionist policies envisioning a greater Yemen.[44] Yahya's governance was marked by authoritarian control, including suppression of tribes through harsh measures such as hostage-taking and executions, which stifled modernization and intellectual development.[44] In 1934, Yemen clashed with Saudi Arabia over border regions, resulting in Saudi victories and the Treaty of Taif, which ceded areas like Asir, Najran, and Jizan to Saudi control while establishing a delineated border.[45] Yahya was assassinated in Sanaa on February 17, 1948, by a tribal figure held hostage for decades, after which his son Ahmad bin Yahya succeeded him, maintaining the Imamate amid internal challenges.[44] In the south, British rule eroded amid rising Arab nationalism and insurgencies; the Aden Emergency from 1963 to 1967 involved bombings and mutinies by groups like the National Liberation Front (NLF), forcing Britain's withdrawal on November 30, 1967.[46] South Yemen achieved independence as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, marking the end of 128 years of colonial presence, while the north remained under the Imamate until revolutionary changes.[43][42]Republican Era, Unification, and Instability
On September 26, 1962, military officers led by Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal overthrew the Zaydi Imamate of Imam Muhammad al-Badr in a coup in Sana'a, proclaiming the Yemen Arab Republic and ending over a millennium of theocratic rule.[5] The revolutionaries, influenced by Nasserist pan-Arabism and trained in Egypt, executed the imam and established a republican council, but the coup immediately triggered the North Yemen Civil War as royalist tribes loyal to al-Badr's family launched a counterinsurgency from mountain strongholds.[47] Egypt deployed up to 70,000 troops to support the republicans, while Saudi Arabia and Jordan provided arms and funds to the royalists, turning the conflict into a Cold War proxy war that drained Egyptian resources during Nasser's Yemen adventure.[48] The civil war, lasting until 1970, involved brutal guerrilla fighting, aerial bombings, and chemical weapon use by Egyptian forces, resulting in an estimated 100,000-200,000 deaths and widespread devastation in rural areas.[49] A turning point came in 1967 with Egypt's Six-Day War defeat, prompting partial withdrawal, but fighting persisted until a UN-brokered compromise in 1970 allowed royalist integration into the republican system, the return of exiles, and the formal end of the imamate, consolidating the republic under Sallal before his ouster in a 1967 corrective coup.[50] Subsequent North Yemeni governments under presidents like Abdul Rahman al-Iryani and Ibrahim al-Hamdi faced tribal revolts, border clashes with South Yemen in 1972, and economic stagnation, with Ali Abdullah Saleh assuming power via a 1978 coup and stabilizing rule through military control and Saudi subsidies.[51] In the south, British withdrawal from Aden in November 1967 led to the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), backed by the Soviet Union, which pursued land reforms, nationalizations, and suppression of sheikhdoms but endured internal purges, including the 1978 assassination of President Ahmed Hussein al-Ghashmi amid factional strife within the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP).[52] The PDRY's economy crumbled post-Soviet collapse in 1991, prompting unification talks; on May 22, 1990, North and South Yemen merged into the Republic of Yemen under a five-year transitional constitution, with Saleh as president, Ali Salim al-Beidh as vice president, and a unicameral legislature blending the General People's Congress (GPC) from the north and YSP from the south.[41] Initial optimism included multiparty elections in 1993, but unification exacerbated disparities, with northern dominance over southern ports and resources fueling resentment.[53] Instability intensified in the early 1990s due to unintegrated militaries, economic liberalization favoring northern elites, and YSP grievances over centralization; border skirmishes escalated into the 1994 civil war when southern forces seceded on May 21, declaring the Democratic Republic of Yemen.[54] Northern troops, augmented by tribal militias and Islamists, launched a counteroffensive in April, capturing Aden by July 7 after heavy fighting that killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands, with southern leaders fleeing into exile.[55] The GPC emerged dominant, dissolving the YSP's vice presidency and enacting a new constitution in 1994 that entrenched Saleh's authority, though southern separatism simmered, setting the stage for recurring unrest amid corruption, qat-driven economic malaise, and Saleh's patronage networks.[4]Yemeni Civil War (2014–Present)
The Yemeni Civil War erupted in September 2014 when Houthi forces, a Zaydi Shia militant group with ties to Iran, seized control of the capital Sana'a, dissolving parliament and forcing President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to resign.[2] The Houthis, previously confined to northern Yemen, capitalized on widespread discontent with Hadi's government, including fuel subsidy cuts and failure to implement power-sharing from the 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council transition deal, but their advance reflected long-standing ambitions for dominance rather than purely grassroots support.[56] Hadi fled to Aden and later Saudi Arabia, where he requested intervention; the Houthis initially allied with forces loyal to ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh before killing him in 2017. In March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition—including the United Arab Emirates, Sudan, and others—launched Operation Decisive Storm with airstrikes and naval blockade to restore Hadi and counter perceived Iranian expansion via Houthi proxies.[2] The intervention prevented Houthi advances southward but failed to dislodge them from Sana'a or key ports like Hodeidah, leading to a protracted stalemate marked by ground battles in Aden (recaptured by coalition forces in July 2015), Taiz, and Marib. Southern separatists under the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) seized Aden in 2019, fracturing the anti-Houthi front and complicating unification efforts.[2] Both sides committed documented war crimes, including indiscriminate bombings by the coalition and Houthi use of child soldiers and landmines, exacerbating a proxy dynamic where Iran supplied Houthis with missiles and drones while coalition actions drew international scrutiny for civilian tolls.[57] [58] The conflict has caused over 150,000 direct combat deaths and an estimated 377,000 total fatalities including indirect effects like starvation and disease by late 2021, with Yemen facing the world's worst humanitarian crisis: 21 million people—two-thirds of the population—requiring aid, widespread cholera outbreaks, and famine risks in Houthi-held areas due to blockades and aid diversion. [59] Extremist groups like Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula exploited the chaos, controlling territory in Abyan and Shabwa until coalition offensives in 2016-2017.[2] A UN-brokered truce in April 2022 reduced violence but expired without renewal, as Houthi demands for economic concessions stalled talks.[2] From late 2023, Houthis escalated by launching over 60 drone and missile attacks on Red Sea shipping, targeting vessels they claimed linked to Israel in solidarity with Hamas amid the Gaza war, disrupting global trade and prompting US-UK airstrikes under Operation Prosperity Guardian.[60] Attacks killed four sailors by mid-2025 and continued sporadically despite pauses, with Houthis resuming strikes in July 2025 after a Gaza ceasefire, vowing persistence until broader demands met.[61] [62] As of October 2025, Houthis control northern Yemen and parts of the west, while the Presidential Leadership Council governs the south amid fragile ceasefires and stalled Saudi-Houthi dialogues focused on de-escalation and reconstruction.[2] The war's persistence stems from irreconcilable territorial claims, external backing, and governance vacuums, yielding no decisive victor despite coalition withdrawals in 2023.[63]Geography
Physical Features and Regions
Yemen's terrain features a narrow coastal plain along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains that rise sharply inland, transitioning to dissected upland desert plains in the center that slope eastward into the vast desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula.[1] The country's total land area spans 527,968 square kilometers, with an extensive coastline of 1,906 kilometers and over 200 islands, predominantly arid with elevations averaging 999 meters above sea level.[1] [64] The western region includes the Tihama coastal plain, a low-lying, sandy strip averaging 32 kilometers in width, characterized by hot, humid conditions and mud flats, extending northward into Saudi Arabia.[65] Inland from the Tihama rise the Sarawat Mountains, part of the western highlands reaching heights of over 3,000 meters, including Jabal an-Nabi Shu'ayb, Yemen's highest peak at 3,666 meters located in the Haraz subrange west of Sana'a.[66] [67] These highlands feature steep escarpments and terraced valleys supporting agriculture in higher elevations. Central Yemen comprises upland plateaus and basins with rugged, dissected terrain prone to erosion, while the eastern expanse merges into the Rub' al-Khali (Empty Quarter), one of the world's largest sand deserts covering much of the border with Saudi Arabia and Oman.[1] The Hadhramaut region in the southeast features a long, fertile wadi valley flanked by plateaus and escarpments, contrasting the surrounding arid badlands and serving as a historical trade corridor.[68] Off the southern coast lies the Socotra Archipelago, administered as a governorate, encompassing about 3,796 square kilometers of volcanic islands with unique biodiversity, including endemic species adapted to arid, mountainous interiors rising to 1,503 meters at Hagher Peak.[69]Climate and Environmental Conditions
Yemen's climate varies significantly by topography, ranging from hot, arid coastal deserts to temperate highlands. The coastal regions, including the Tihama plain along the Red Sea, experience tropical desert conditions with high humidity and minimal rainfall, typically less than 50 mm annually, while summer temperatures often exceed 40°C.[70] In contrast, the western highlands and plateaus feature a subtropical to temperate climate, moderated by elevation, with average annual precipitation of 100-600 mm concentrated during the summer monsoon from March to September.[71] [72] Inland deserts, such as the Rub' al-Khali extension in the east, are hyper-arid with negligible precipitation and extreme diurnal temperature swings.[73] Nationwide, Yemen's average annual temperature is approximately 25.5°C, with the coldest month, January, averaging 20.7°C and the hottest, July, reaching up to 35.4°C in lowland areas.[74] [71] Recorded extremes include a high of 43°C in July 2023 and a low daytime temperature of 10°C in February 2021, reflecting the country's vulnerability to heatwaves and cold snaps in elevated regions.[75] Highland areas like Sanaa exhibit pronounced daily fluctuations, often dropping from 30°C daytime highs to near-freezing nights, which influences agriculture and settlement patterns.[76] Environmental conditions are dominated by acute water scarcity and accelerating desertification, exacerbated by overexploitation of groundwater aquifers. Yemen ranks among the world's most water-stressed nations, with per capita renewable water resources at just 80 cubic meters annually, far below the global scarcity threshold of 1,000 m³.[77] Unsustainable extraction for agriculture, which consumes over 90% of supply, has led to aquifer depletion rates outpacing recharge, projecting exhaustion of major reserves within 20-25 years in some areas.[78] Desertification affects up to 70% of land, reducing arable area and intensifying soil erosion, particularly in the highlands where terraced farming has historically mitigated runoff but now faces degradation from erratic rainfall.[79] Climate change amplifies these pressures through intensified droughts, flash floods, and rising temperatures, contributing to food insecurity for over 17 million people as of 2024.[80] Prolonged dry spells, such as those from 2016-2021, have halved crop yields in rain-fed agriculture, while extreme events like the 2020 floods destroyed infrastructure and displaced thousands.[81] Fisheries, vital for coastal livelihoods, suffer from overfishing and warming seas disrupting marine ecosystems, with sardine stocks declining by 80% since 2015 due to environmental shifts.[82] These dynamics, compounded by conflict-induced neglect of water infrastructure, underscore Yemen's low adaptive capacity despite its rugged terrain offering some natural resilience in isolated wadi systems.[83]Biodiversity and Resource Challenges
Yemen's biodiversity is concentrated in its varied topography, including coastal plains, highlands, and the Socotra archipelago, which hosts exceptional endemism. Socotra alone features approximately 825 plant species, with about one-third endemic, including the iconic Dragon's Blood Tree (Dracaena cinnabari) known for its red sap used in traditional medicine.[84] The archipelago supports over 1,560 insect taxa, with more than 42% endemic, alongside unique reptiles, birds such as the Socotra Golden-winged Grosbeak (Rhynchostruthus socotranus), and marine life comprising over 730 coastal fish species and 230 hard coral species, five of which are endemic.[85] [86] Mainland Yemen exhibits lower diversity due to aridity but includes species adapted to wadis and mountains, though comprehensive surveys are limited by ongoing conflict. Resource challenges dominate Yemen's environmental landscape, with acute water scarcity posing the most immediate threat. Per capita water availability stands at roughly 150 cubic meters annually, far below the global scarcity threshold of 1,000 cubic meters, exacerbated by rapid groundwater depletion from agricultural overuse, particularly qat cultivation, which consumes up to 40% of water resources.[87] As of 2023, approximately 15.3 million people—over half the population—lack sufficient safe water, a situation worsened by conflict-damaged infrastructure and institutional collapse.[88] By 2025 estimates, this figure reached 17 million, with aquifers projected to deplete within decades absent intervention.[89] Land degradation and desertification further compound vulnerabilities, affecting about 71.6% of Yemen's land area as of recent assessments, with projections indicating up to 86% desertification risk driven by climate variability, overgrazing, and flash floods.[90] Annual sandstorms erode roughly 20% of arable land, while deforestation has accelerated, with over 5 million trees felled since 2018 for firewood amid fuel shortages and conflict-induced displacement.[91] [81] Natural forests cover only 0.20% of land, reflecting long-term trends intensified by war, which has disrupted conservation and promoted habitat loss through unregulated resource extraction.[92] Hydrocarbon resources, primarily oil in the Marib and Hadhramaut basins, represent Yemen's chief non-renewable asset but face depletion and extraction hurdles. Production peaked in the early 2000s but has declined sharply due to conflict disrupting fields and pipelines, with output halting in some areas since 2022 and depriving the state of vital revenue.[93] Reserves are modest compared to neighbors, rendering Yemen vulnerable to the resource curse, where oil dependency—once funding up to 70% of government budgets—fuels elite competition rather than sustainable development, amid limited diversification into minerals like salt or fisheries.[94] The civil war has amplified these pressures, with environmental fallout including oil spills and infrastructure sabotage threatening marine and terrestrial ecosystems.[82]Demographics
Population Dynamics and Ethnic Composition
Yemen's population is estimated at 41.8 million as of mid-2025, reflecting projections from pre-war census data adjusted for ongoing conflict impacts.[95] This figure represents continued growth from approximately 33.7 million in 2022, despite elevated mortality from violence, famine, and disease during the civil war that began in 2014.[96] The annual growth rate stands at roughly 2.5-3%, sustained by a high total fertility rate of about 3.6 children per woman, though war-related disruptions have likely suppressed net gains through excess deaths estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Population density averages 79 persons per square kilometer, concentrated in western highlands and coastal areas, with rural-majority demographics persisting amid limited infrastructure.[97] The civil war has profoundly altered dynamics, displacing over 4.5 million people internally as of 2024, primarily from Houthi-controlled northern regions to government-held south and east, exacerbating urban overcrowding and resource strains.[98] An additional 4 million Yemenis have fled as refugees, mainly to Saudi Arabia and Oman, while inflows of Somali and Ethiopian migrants via porous Red Sea routes add to demographic pressures in coastal governorates like Aden and Hudaydah.[99] Urbanization has accelerated modestly to about 40% of the population by 2023, up from 30% two decades prior, driven by conflict-induced rural exodus and economic collapse forcing migration to cities like Sanaa and Taiz, though infrastructure collapse limits sustainable urban growth.[100] Ethnically, Yemenis are overwhelmingly Arab, accounting for 92-98% of the population, with descent tracing to ancient Semitic tribes in the Arabian Peninsula and admixtures from historical migrations.[1] Subgroups include northern highland Arabs affiliated with Zaydi Shia traditions and southern Hadhrami Arabs with Shafi'i Sunni orientations, though these are cultural-linguistic rather than distinct ethnic categories. Afro-Arabs, comprising 2-5% and including the marginalized al-Muhamasheen (Akhdam) community of darker-skinned laborers possibly of ancient African origin, face social discrimination and reside mainly in urban peripheries.[101] Smaller minorities include Somalis (around 3-4%, concentrated in coastal areas due to proximity and migration) and trace South Asian traders in ports like Aden, with negligible European presence. Tribal affiliations overlay ethnicity, with over 80% of Yemenis identifying with clans like Hashid and Bakil in the north, influencing social organization more than strict ethnic lines.[102]Languages and Dialects
Modern Standard Arabic serves as the official language of Yemen, used in government, education, and formal media.[103][104] The predominant vernacular is Yemeni Arabic, encompassing a range of dialects that exhibit significant regional variation due to Yemen's mountainous terrain, tribal divisions, and historical isolation, preserving archaic features closer to Classical Arabic than many other Peninsular varieties.[105][106] Key dialects include Sanaani Arabic, spoken by approximately 10 million people in the northern highlands around Sana'a and characterized by conservative phonology such as retention of the glottal stop; Ta'izzi-Adeni Arabic, prevalent in central and southern urban areas including Taiz and Aden, which shows substrate influences from South Arabian languages; Hadhrami Arabic in the eastern Hadramaut region, noted for its distinct vowel system and trade-related lexicon; and Tihamiyya Arabic along the western Red Sea coast, featuring substrate effects from African languages due to historical migration and slavery.[107][103][108] These dialects are mutually intelligible to varying degrees within Yemen but often diverge sharply from Standard Arabic and neighboring dialects like those in Saudi Arabia or Oman, complicating cross-border communication.[105] Minority languages, primarily Modern South Arabian tongues unrelated to Arabic despite Semitic roots, persist in peripheral regions: Mehri in the Mahra governorate near the Oman border, spoken by around 100,000-200,000 individuals; Soqotri on Socotra Island by roughly 50,000-60,000 speakers, an endangered isolate with oral traditions but no standardized script, facing pressure from Arabic dominance; and smaller varieties like Hobyot and Bathari in eastern border areas, each with fewer than 5,000 speakers and classified as vulnerable.[109][110][103] Judeo-Yemeni Arabic, a distinct ethnolect with Hebrew loanwords, was historically spoken by Yemen's Jewish community but is now nearly extinct following mass emigration in the mid-20th century, with fewer than 50 fluent speakers remaining as of recent assessments.[111] English serves as a secondary language in business and education among urban elites, while Russian influences appear in Socotra from Soviet-era aid, though neither displaces Arabic in daily use.[104][112]Religion and Sectarian Divisions
Islam is the predominant religion in Yemen, practiced by approximately 99% of the population, with the remainder consisting of small communities of Jews, Christians, Hindus, and Baha'is.[1] Estimates of the Muslim sectarian breakdown vary due to the absence of recent official censuses, but sources consistently indicate a division between Sunni and Shia Muslims, specifically the Zaydi branch of Shia Islam. The U.S. State Department estimates 65% of the population as Sunni (primarily Shafi'i school) and 35% as Zaydi Shia, while other analyses, such as those from ACAPS, suggest a closer split of 55% Sunni and 45% Zaydi.[113][114] Zaydis, who adhere to a theological tradition closer to Sunni Islam than Twelver Shia predominant in Iran, are concentrated in the northwestern highlands, including Sana'a and Saada governorates, while Sunnis predominate in the south, east, and coastal areas.[39] Historically, Zaydi imams ruled northern Yemen for over a millennium until the 1962 republican revolution, fostering a political system intertwined with religious authority but marked by pragmatic alliances across sects rather than rigid divisions. Inter-sectarian marriages and shared religious practices were common, reflecting minimal historical sectarian tension despite doctrinal differences, such as Zaydis' rejection of infallible imams beyond certain descendants of Ali. This tolerance eroded in the late 20th century amid socioeconomic marginalization of Zaydi communities and the rise of Salafi-influenced Sunni movements, which portrayed Zaydis as deviant.[39][115] The Houthi movement, emerging in the 1990s as a Zaydi revivalist group in Saada, initially focused on cultural preservation against perceived Wahhabi encroachment but evolved into an armed insurgency blending Zaydi identity with anti-corruption and anti-imperialist rhetoric.[116] In the ongoing civil war since 2014, sectarian fault lines have sharpened, though the conflict originated primarily from elite power struggles, tribal loyalties, and governance failures rather than inherent religious antagonism. The Houthis' capture of Sana'a in September 2014 and subsequent advances framed their opposition to the Sunni-majority, internationally recognized government—backed by Saudi-led coalitions—as a Zaydi challenge to Sunni dominance, amplified by Iranian support for Houthis and Saudi fears of Shia expansionism. This external involvement, including Saudi airstrikes targeting Houthi areas from March 2015 onward, has fueled retaliatory rhetoric and attacks on Sunni mosques, exacerbating polarization and eroding centuries-old coexistence.[117][118][119] Reports document Houthi-imposed restrictions on Sunni practices, such as forced attendance at Zaydi ceremonies, alongside Salafi militants' targeting of Zaydi sites, contributing to displacement and intra-Muslim violence that has killed tens of thousands since 2014.[113] Non-Muslim minorities face heightened persecution, with Houthis reportedly executing Baha'is for apostasy in 2016–2017 and Christians concealing their faith amid blasphemy laws enforced unevenly across territories.[113] Despite these tensions, Yemen's divisions remain more political and resource-driven than purely theological, with cross-sectarian alliances persisting in areas like Hadhramaut.[120]Tribal Structures and Social Organization
Yemeni society is predominantly tribal, with tribes constituting 70-80% of the population and exerting significant influence over social, economic, and political life, particularly in rural northern and central regions where state institutions remain weak.[121] Tribal structures are multi-layered, extending from basic household units (bayt) to villages (qarya), tribal sections (ʿuzla), individual tribes (qabila), and larger confederations formed through contractual alliances rather than strict patrilineal descent.[121] These organizations derive legitimacy from customary norms (ʿurf), emphasizing collective responsibility, territorial identity, and mutual protection (himaya), which provide members with security, resource access, and dispute mediation in the absence of reliable formal governance.[122][121] Leadership within tribes centers on sheikhs, who function as "first among equals" selected for their mediation skills and consensus-building abilities rather than hereditary entitlement alone, though positions often pass within families.[121][122] Sheikhs represent tribes at various levels, arbitrating conflicts through dialogue, negotiation, and rituals such as the "guns of reason" to signal peaceful resolution, with enforcement relying on communal guarantees like weapons or financial pledges.[122] Social hierarchies incorporate religious elites, such as Hashemites claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammad, who hold elevated status in many northern communities, influencing alliances and authority dynamics.[123] In southern Yemen, tribal structures are less pervasive, with historical state socialism under the People's Democratic Republic diminishing their role until post-unification efforts in 1994 rebuilt them as extensions of central control.[123] The two dominant northern confederations are Hashid, noted for its cohesion and political leverage, encompassing tribes like Bakil, and Bakil itself, the largest by membership with around 31 tribes including sub-groups such as Dahm and Wael.[123][124] Madhhij operates centrally in areas like Marib, with sub-tribes including Murad, maintaining resistance-oriented alliances.[124] Tribes regulate internal affairs via ʿurf, resolving approximately 90% of disputes—often over land, water, or honor—through tiered appeals and forgiveness-oriented outcomes that prioritize community stability over retribution.[122][121] This system substitutes for deficient state justice, fostering local order but occasionally escalating into feuds when mediation fails, as seen in historical inter-tribal violence.[122] In governance, tribes bridge state weaknesses by mobilizing resources and manpower, with sheikhs integrating into national structures—such as parliamentary seats or military commands—while retaining autonomy for local arbitration.[123] During conflicts, including the ongoing civil war, tribes align pragmatically with factions like the Houthis or government forces, providing fighters or truces, though only about 20% maintain armed contingents, underscoring that influence stems more from mediation than military might.[123][124] Examples include Hashid's failed 2011 mobilization against President Saleh and Madhhij's defense of Marib against Houthi advances since 2015, where tribal losses exceeded 3,500 from single sub-tribes.[123][124] State co-option under leaders like Saleh eroded traditional cohesion by prioritizing loyalty to regimes over tribal contracts, yet tribes persist as essential stabilizers amid fragmentation.[124]Government and Politics
Fragmented Governance Structures
Yemen's governance remains profoundly fragmented as a result of the ongoing civil war that escalated after the Houthi seizure of Sana'a on September 21, 2014, leading to competing authorities with overlapping claims and limited territorial cohesion.[125] No single entity exercises nationwide control, with de facto administration divided primarily among Houthi forces in the northwest, the internationally recognized Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) in parts of the south and east, and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) in southern strongholds, exacerbated by tribal autonomy and local councils filling governance voids.[126] This division stems from the 2011 uprising against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, which weakened central institutions, enabling the Houthis' expansion and subsequent Saudi-led intervention in March 2015, but has persisted despite UN-mediated truces, such as the one extended into 2023.[127] The Houthis, formally Ansar Allah, dominate northern and western Yemen, including the capital and densely populated governorates like Saada, al-Jawf, and Hudaydah, governing through a hierarchical structure centered on the Supreme Political Council established in 2016, which enforces Zaydi Shia-influenced policies, controls key revenue sources like ports, and maintains a repressive apparatus with documented arbitrary detentions of over 100 critics in 2024 alone.[128] Their administration prioritizes military mobilization, with an estimated 100,000 fighters by 2023, and extracts taxes informally, funding operations amid economic isolation, though international reports note systemic human rights abuses, including forced disappearances of UN personnel since 2021.[2] Houthi rule rejects the PLC's legitimacy, viewing it as a foreign puppet, and has rebuffed power-sharing initiatives, consolidating control over 70-80% of the population despite holding less than half the land area.[125][127] In contrast, the PLC, formed on April 7, 2022, following President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi's transfer of powers to an eight-member body chaired by Rashad al-Alimi, serves as the nominal head of the recognized government, operating from Aden and claiming authority over eastern provinces like Hadhramaut and Shabwa, backed by Saudi Arabia's financial and military support totaling over $5 billion annually until recent reductions.[129] However, the PLC's effectiveness is undermined by internal factionalism, including rivalries between Islah-affiliated elements and southern separatists, resulting in stalled reforms and dependency on external patrons, with governance limited to sporadic service provision and security coordination against Houthi advances.[130] By mid-2025, reports indicated the council's near-collapse risk due to unresolved power-sharing disputes, hindering unified anti-Houthi efforts.[130] The STC, established in May 2017 under UAE patronage, asserts control over Aden, Abyan, and Lahij, maintaining security forces like the Security Belt with approximately 90,000 personnel by 2022, and pursues southern self-determination, clashing with PLC troops in events like the August 2019 Aden battle that killed over 40.[131] Despite integrating into the PLC structure in 2022, the STC operates semi-autonomously, collecting local revenues and advocating partition; on September 25, 2025, its president Aidarus al-Zoubaidi publicly called for a two-state solution, citing the improbability of ousting the Houthis and irreconcilable northern-southern divides.[132] This stance reflects broader southern grievances over resource allocation and historical marginalization post-1990 unification, fostering hybrid governance where STC-aligned elites manage ports and oil fields amid ongoing skirmishes.[133] Underlying this tripartite split, tribal confederations such as Hashid and Bakil wield influence in ungoverned spaces, adjudicating disputes and providing parallel security, while subnational entities deliver essential services like water and education in 2025, adapting to conflict-induced decentralization but perpetuating inefficiency and corruption risks.[134] UN efforts, including the 2018 Stockholm Agreement on Hudaydah, have yielded partial ceasefires but failed to bridge structural rifts, with proposals for federalism or enhanced localism dismissed amid mutual distrust.[135] Overall, this fragmentation prioritizes survival over integration, with external actors—Saudi Arabia consolidating PLC loyalty, UAE bolstering STC capabilities, and Iran supplying Houthi arms—entrenching divisions rather than resolving them.[127]Houthi Administration in Northern Yemen
The Houthi movement, also known as Ansar Allah, established administrative control over Sana'a and surrounding northern territories following their capture of the capital on September 21, 2014, amid the unraveling of Yemen's transitional government.[116] This control expanded by 2016 to encompass Yemen's northwest provinces, including Saada, Amran, Dhamar, Al Mahwit, Sana'a, Raymah, Al Jawf, Hajjah, and parts of Hudaydah, governing territories populated by an estimated 70% of Yemen's total inhabitants.[136] The administration functions through the Supreme Political Council (SPC), formed in 2016 as the primary executive body, chaired by Mahdi al-Mashat, who directs political and governance decisions in coordination with Houthi military leadership.[137] [138] At the apex of the Houthi governing structure is Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the movement's supreme leader, who exercises centralized authority rooted in Zaydi Shia traditions of Hashemite descent, overriding formal institutions with personal directives disseminated through weekly speeches and security apparatuses.[139] The SPC appoints ministers and oversees a parallel bureaucracy that includes repurposed Yemeni state ministries for finance, health, and education, though key positions are dominated by loyalists from Houthi heartlands like Saada, fostering cronyism and exclusion of non-aligned technocrats.[139] [140] In August 2024, the Houthis announced a streamlined cabinet of 21 ministers under Prime Minister Ahmed al-Rahawi, ostensibly to enhance efficiency but primarily consolidating power amid economic pressures.[141] Houthi economic policies in northern Yemen emphasize revenue extraction through informal taxation, port fees at Hudaydah, and customs duties, generating an estimated $1.6 billion annually by 2023, while confiscating state assets and extorting businesses via arbitrary levies and seizures.[142] These measures, coupled with diversion of humanitarian aid—such as pilfering food distributions for resale—have exacerbated poverty in controlled areas, where the economy operates in isolation from southern banking systems following a 2024 government order to relocate financial headquarters to Aden.[143] [144] [140] Mismanagement and corruption, including misuse of anti-corruption bodies for political vendettas, have led to hyperinflation and currency devaluation, with the Houthi-issued rial trading at premiums over official rates.[142] [144] Security governance relies on a network of intelligence units, prisons, and loyalist militias to suppress dissent, with documented arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and raids targeting civil society, journalists, and perceived opponents, as seen in over 100 abductions in Ibb governorate in September 2024 alone.[145] [146] The administration enforces a personality cult around Abdul-Malik al-Houthi through mandatory public displays, controlled media, and ideological indoctrination in schools and mosques, while maintaining judicial independence only insofar as it aligns with Zaydi revivalist norms, often imposing hudud punishments for offenses like theft or adultery.[143] [139] Despite providing basic services like fuel distribution and water management in urban centers, the regime's prioritization of military expenditures—funded partly by smuggling and external support—over civilian welfare has perpetuated humanitarian crises, including child recruitment into forces estimated at 10,000-20,000 minors since 2015.[142] [137]Recognized Government and Southern Entities
The Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) serves as the executive body of Yemen's internationally recognized government, formed on April 7, 2022, following the transfer of presidential powers by Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi to an eight-member council amid ongoing civil war fragmentation.[147][130] Chaired by Rashad Mohammed al-Alimi, a former interior minister and deputy prime minister, the PLC includes representatives from military, tribal, and political factions aligned against Houthi control, with its operations centered in Aden as the provisional capital.[129][148] Backed primarily by Saudi Arabia through the Saudi-led coalition, the PLC maintains nominal authority over government institutions, including a central bank in Aden handling southern economic functions, though its effective governance is limited to pockets in the south and east, such as parts of Hadramaut and Shabwa governorates.[149][150] The Southern Transitional Council (STC), established in May 2017 by southern separatist leaders, emerged from the anti-Houthi resistance but pursues autonomy or independence for the territories of the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, reflecting longstanding grievances over northern dominance since unification in 1990.[131][151] Led by Aidarus al-Zoubaidi, who also holds a seat on the PLC, the STC commands the Southern Armed Forces and exerts de facto control over key southern provinces including Aden, Abyan, Lahij, Dhale, and parts of al-Dhalea, often through UAE-aligned militias that prioritize local security against both Houthis and perceived northern incursions.[152][153] This control encompasses ports like Aden and Mukalla, vital for humanitarian aid and trade, enabling the STC to collect revenues independently while challenging the PLC's unified Yemen framework.[154] Relations between the PLC and STC remain strained by competing visions—the former advocating national unity under international legitimacy, the latter emphasizing southern self-determination—leading to periodic clashes, such as the August 2019 STC takeover of Aden from government forces, which displaced PLC-allied troops and highlighted underlying factional rivalries.[155][2] Despite power-sharing agreements like the 2019 Riyadh Accord brokered by Saudi Arabia to integrate STC elements into government structures, implementation has faltered, with the STC retaining autonomous governance in its areas and occasionally threatening secession amid economic disputes over oil revenues from fields like those in Shabwa.[154] As of October 2025, these entities coexist uneasily in southern Yemen, with the PLC's authority diluted by STC dominance in urban centers, contributing to governance vacuums exploited by local militias and underscoring the recognized government's challenges in asserting centralized control.[156][130]Political Controversies and Power Struggles
The Houthi movement, a Zaydi Shia group originating in northern Yemen, escalated its insurgency against the central government in 2014, capturing Sana'a on September 21 after clashes with security forces and protests over fuel subsidies.[157] [158] This takeover dissolved the elected parliament, forced President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi to resign temporarily in January 2015, and installed a Houthi-led presidential council, marking a de facto coup that fragmented national authority.[116] [2] Initially allied with former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who provided military support from his General People's Congress party, the Houthis consolidated power until internal rifts emerged in late 2017. Saleh publicly broke with the Houthis on November 28, 2017, seeking reconciliation with the Saudi-led coalition, prompting Houthi forces to besiege his residence in Sana'a and kill him on December 4 during his attempted escape, via sniper fire and RPG attacks on his convoy.[159] [160] This purge eliminated a key rival, allowing Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi to centralize control but highlighting the movement's intolerance for dissent and reliance on coercion.[161] [162] In southern Yemen, power struggles intensified with the rise of separatist factions, culminating in the Southern Transitional Council's (STC) declaration of self-rule in Aden on April 30, 2017, backed by the United Arab Emirates amid grievances over marginalization post-1990 unification.[155] Tensions boiled over into clashes between STC forces and pro-Hadi government troops in Aden in August 2019, displacing thousands and exposing divisions within the anti-Houthi coalition, as the STC demanded greater autonomy and accused the government of corruption.[2] [133] The STC has faced criticism for restricting civic space, including threats to NGOs and seizure of a women's shelter in Aden in July 2024 by affiliated groups, actions that undermine claims of representing southern interests.[163] [164] Hadi's presidency, extended indefinitely without elections since his 2012 interim mandate under the Gulf Cooperation Council deal, has been marred by allegations of nepotism and graft, with family members reportedly controlling lucrative ports and fuel imports, eroding legitimacy among allies.[165] [166] No national elections have occurred since 2006, perpetuating elite bargaining over power-sharing amid stalled UN-mediated talks, where Houthi demands for veto authority and southern calls for partition clash with the recognized government's unity rhetoric.[167] Foreign proxies exacerbate these divides: Iran's provision of missiles and training to Houthis since at least 2014 enables their Red Sea disruptions, while Saudi and Emirati interventions, starting March 26, 2015, prioritize containing Tehran over resolving internal Yemeni disputes.[116] [168] [63]Armed Forces and Security
National Military and Loyalist Forces
The National Military and Loyalist Forces encompass the remnants of the pre-2014 Yemeni Armed Forces that remained aligned with the internationally recognized government, along with ad hoc resistance units and paramilitary groups formed in response to the Houthi insurgency. These forces operate under the nominal authority of the Ministry of Defense, based in Aden, and fall within the command structure of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), established in April 2022 to lead the government-in-exile.[169][170] Command is decentralized across military regions, such as the Fourth Military Region centered in Aden and the newly created Eighth Military Region encompassing Ibb, Dhamar, and Al-Bayda governorates, announced in May 2025 to bolster defenses in central areas.[171][172] Estimated active personnel stood at approximately 60,000 in 2023, per assessments from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, though this figure excludes irregular loyalist militias and reflects chronic underfunding, desertions, and equipment shortages that have halved effective combat strength since the war's escalation in 2015.[173] Composition includes infantry brigades, artillery units, and specialized formations like the National Resistance Forces (NRF), which have conducted operations against Houthi advances in Marib and Taiz provinces, often with logistical backing from the Saudi-led coalition.[174] Efforts to modernize include the October 2025 rollout of electronic military ID systems for the Fourth Region to improve payroll and accountability amid factional payroll disputes.[171] Despite formal unification under the PLC, operational cohesion remains undermined by factionalism, with many units retaining loyalty to individual council members—such as Tariq Saleh's forces in the west or Aidarus al-Zoubaidi's Southern Transitional Council-aligned militias in the south—leading to intra-loyalist clashes, as seen in Aden in 2019 and Shabwa in 2022.[130][175] This fragmentation, exacerbated by divergent Saudi and Emirati sponsorship of rival groups, has prevented full integration into a national command, limiting capabilities to defensive postures and localized offensives rather than sustained territorial reconquest.[176] Recent initiatives, including the formation of the Nation Shield Forces by PLC Chairman Rashad al-Alimi, aim to create a more centralized rapid-response unit, but implementation faces resistance from entrenched regional commanders.[177] Military capabilities emphasize ground warfare with outdated Soviet-era armor and small arms, while the air force—reduced to fewer than 10 operational aircraft—and navy possess negligible offensive projection, relying heavily on coalition airstrikes for Houthi targeting until the Saudi ceasefire in 2022.[178] Loyalist successes, such as repelling Houthi incursions in Marib through 2021, stemmed from tribal alliances and external munitions rather than inherent organizational strength, highlighting vulnerabilities to supply disruptions and internal rivalries that have stalled broader counterinsurgency efforts.[179] As of late 2025, these forces control roughly 40% of Yemen's territory, primarily in the south and east, but hold no northern strongholds beyond sporadic outposts.[169]Houthi Military Capabilities
The Houthi movement, formally known as Ansar Allah, commands an estimated 350,000 fighters as of 2024, bolstered by extensive recruitment drives initiated amid Red Sea operations, comprising core ideologically committed members, tribal auxiliaries, and coerced conscripts from controlled territories.[179][180] These forces emphasize asymmetric warfare tactics honed during over a decade of conflict, prioritizing mobility, ambushes, and fortified mountain positions in northern Yemen over large-scale conventional maneuvers.[181] On the ground, Houthi units retain access to captured Yemeni army stockpiles, including artillery pieces, tanks such as T-62 variants, and multiple rocket launchers, though maintenance and ammunition shortages limit sustained operations against mechanized foes.[178] Their infantry excels in defensive engagements, leveraging terrain familiarity and improvised explosive devices, as demonstrated in repelling Saudi-led coalition advances from 2015 onward, but lacks the logistics for offensive pushes beyond local theaters.[173] Houthi projectile capabilities form the core of their power projection, featuring Iranian-supplied or reverse-engineered ballistic missiles like the Burkan series (ranges up to 1,000 km), cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones such as the Samad-3, enabling strikes on Saudi infrastructure, UAE assets, and maritime targets in the Red Sea and Arabian Sea.[182][183] Anti-ship ballistic missiles, including adaptations of the Khalij Farda, have been fired at U.S. warships and commercial vessels, with over 100 such attacks claimed since late 2023, though interception rates exceed 90% by coalition defenses.[184][185] Drone swarms and sea-based unmanned surface vessels further extend naval denial efforts, disrupting shipping lanes despite limited indigenous production capacity for advanced systems.[181] Iran serves as the primary enabler, supplying components, designs, and training that have elevated Houthi forces from insurgents to a regional threat, including transfers intercepted in 2025 totaling 750 tons of missiles and radar systems.[186][187] While Houthis assemble some munitions domestically, complex guidance and propulsion rely on Tehran, with UN experts noting this support's role in sustaining attacks amid U.S. and Israeli strikes that degraded launch sites by mid-2025.[150][188] Air defense systems, including man-portable units and imported radar-guided missiles, have downed coalition drones but remain vulnerable to suppression, as evidenced by persistent Houthi losses.[189]Militias, Tribes, and Non-State Actors
Yemen's tribal structures form a foundational element of non-state power, with confederations such as Hashid and Bakil exerting significant influence over local governance, security, and conflict mediation across rural areas, where central authority has historically been weak.[123] Tribes maintain internal codes of conduct that prioritize dispute resolution through sheikhs and assemblies, often averting escalation into broader violence, as seen in eastern provinces like Mahra, where tribal norms have contained spillover from the civil war since 2015.[190] However, tribes have variably aligned with warring parties, providing fighters or logistics in exchange for resources or autonomy, contributing to fragmented control; for instance, tribal militias in al-Bayda and Shabwah provinces defended against al-Qaeda advances in 2012 before shifting focus amid the 2014 Houthi offensive.[191] This pragmatic opportunism stems from tribes' reliance on customary law over state institutions, enabling them to fill security vacuums but also perpetuating feuds and resource-based rivalries.[121] Pro-government and anti-Houthi militias, often rooted in tribal networks, emerged prominently during the civil war. Popular Committees, initially formed in 2012 to counter al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in southern governorates like Abyan, evolved into irregular forces allied with the Internationally Recognized Government (IRG), comprising local tribesmen armed with light weapons and supported by coalition airstrikes.[192] By 2015, these committees, alongside Resistance Forces in Aden and Taiz, halted Houthi advances, numbering in the thousands and controlling key checkpoints, though their decentralized nature led to human rights abuses, including arbitrary detentions reported by the U.S. State Department in 2024.[142] Other groups, such as the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, operate in eastern Yemen to secure oil fields and borders, blending tribal loyalty with IRG affiliation to combat jihadists and smuggling networks.[193] Salafist militias, trained in Saudi Arabia and active in areas like Dammaj until 2014, have provided ideological resistance but fragmented post-conflict, with remnants integrating into broader anti-Houthi coalitions.[194] Non-state actors beyond tribes and militias include jihadist organizations and separatist entities that exploit governance voids. AQAP, designated a terrorist group by the UN, maintains a presence in Yemen's hinterlands, reorganizing as of August 2025 with cells in Shabwah and al-Bayda capable of plotting external attacks, despite leadership losses like the 2019 death of Qasim al-Raymi; U.S. drone strikes reduced its operational capacity by 80% from peak levels, yet it retains local recruitment through anti-drone propaganda.[195] [196] ISIS-Yemen, a smaller affiliate, conducts sporadic bombings in IRG-held areas, with activity peaking in 2018 before declining due to rivalries with AQAP and coalition operations, though both groups benefit from war-induced poverty affecting 80% of Yemenis.[196] The Southern Transitional Council (STC), established in 2017 with UAE backing, functions as a de facto authority in Aden and southern provinces, commanding the Security Belt Forces—a militia of 90,000 fighters by 2020 estimates—and pursuing secession, clashing with IRG allies in 2019 while accusing rivals of ties to extremists; as of September 2025, AQAP labeled the STC a "Zionist project," highlighting ideological frictions.[197] [198] These actors underscore Yemen's militia proliferation, where foreign patrons like the UAE amplify local divisions, sustaining a war economy of arms trafficking estimated at $1 billion annually by 2020 UN reports, without formal accountability.[199]Terrorism and Insurgent Threats
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains one of Yemen's most persistent terrorist threats, operating primarily in the southern and eastern provinces such as Hadhramaut, Shabwa, and Abyan. Formed in 2009 through the merger of al-Qaeda branches from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, AQAP has conducted high-profile attacks including suicide bombings, assassinations of security officials, and attempts on Western targets, such as the 2009 underwear bomb plot and the 2010 cargo plane bomb attempt.[200] Despite sustained U.S. drone strikes and Yemeni government operations that have killed key leaders like Anwar al-Awlaki in 2011 and subsequent emirs, AQAP maintains a resilient network estimated at several thousand fighters, exploiting governance vacuums created by the Houthi-Saudi war.[201] In 2023, AQAP demonstrated tactical adaptability by shifting focus to rural ambushes and prison breaks, though its overall operational tempo showed signs of fluctuation amid competition from other actors.[202] AQAP's activities pose direct risks to Yemeni security forces and international interests, with attacks often targeting military convoys and checkpoints in government-held areas. On October 23, 2025, AQAP executed a complex assault on a Yemeni army post in Shabwa province, employing two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) followed by six suicide bombers with explosive vests, resulting in four soldiers killed and several wounded.[203] This incident underscores AQAP's continued capacity for coordinated, lethal operations despite resource constraints, with the group framing such strikes as resistance against both the Houthi administration and the internationally recognized government.[2] AQAP also benefits from local tribal alliances and extortion rackets, funding operations through smuggling and kidnappings, while propagating anti-Western ideology via online propaganda. The Islamic State in Yemen (ISIS-Y), an affiliate of the global Islamic State network, represents a secondary but ideologically rival threat, mainly active in central and southern Yemen including Bayda and Lahij provinces. Emerging around 2015 amid the civil war, ISIS-Y has conducted sporadic suicide bombings and shootings, often targeting AQAP members, Houthi fighters, and Shia mosques to stoke sectarian tensions. Unlike AQAP's focus on foreign plots, ISIS-Y prioritizes local insurgent-style attacks, with incidents peaking in 2017-2018 but declining thereafter due to inter-jihadist clashes and coalition airstrikes; by 2023, its presence was limited to small cells rather than territorial control.[204] U.S. assessments indicate ISIS-Y's threat level remains low compared to AQAP, though it exploits the same ungoverned spaces for recruitment among disaffected Sunnis.[201] Both groups exacerbate Yemen's security fragmentation by preying on the civil war's chaos, conducting attacks that killed dozens of civilians and security personnel annually between 2023 and 2025, though precise casualty figures are obscured by underreporting in conflict zones.[2] Their insurgent tactics, including hit-and-run raids and IED campaigns, challenge fragmented Yemeni forces unable to mount sustained counteroperations, while posing risks to regional stability through potential cross-border plots. Iranian-backed groups like the Houthis, designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the U.S. in January 2025 for maritime attacks and missile strikes, add to the insurgent landscape but operate as a distinct Shia proxy force rather than aligning with Sunni jihadists.[205] Overall, these threats persist due to weak state control, arms proliferation, and external financing, hindering any unified national security apparatus.[61]Economy
Macroeconomic Overview
Yemen's economy, one of the smallest and most fragile in the Middle East, has contracted sharply since the escalation of civil conflict in 2015, with real GDP declining by approximately 58% in per capita terms through 2023 due to war-related destruction, disrupted trade, and governance fragmentation.[206] Nominal GDP reached about $19.1 billion in 2024, reflecting a real contraction of 1% that year, following a 2% decline in 2023 and modest 1.5% growth in 2022 amid intermittent ceasefires and partial oil export resumption.[207] [208] Projections for 2025 indicate further real GDP contraction of 1.5%, exacerbated by halted oil exports from fields under Internationally Recognized Government (IRG) control, multiple exchange rates across territories, and external shocks like Red Sea shipping disruptions.[206] [209] Key macroeconomic indicators underscore persistent distress: unemployment hovered at 17.1% in 2024, with youth rates significantly higher, driven by labor market collapse and displacement affecting over 4 million people.[210] Inflation remains elevated, projected at 20.4% for 2025, fueled by Houthi-controlled central bank money printing in northern areas, parallel currency depreciations (the rial traded at over 1,300 to the USD in Houthi zones versus 500-600 in IRG areas by mid-2025), and supply chain breakdowns from conflict blockades.[211] [209] Fiscal revenues fell over 30% in recent assessments, primarily from diminished oil and customs income, as production—historically 70-90% of exports—dropped from pre-war peaks of 400,000 barrels per day to intermittent lows below 50,000 due to Houthi-IRG disputes over revenue sharing and infrastructure sabotage.[208] [212] Monetary and fiscal fragmentation compounds vulnerabilities, with the IRG's Aden-based central bank maintaining limited reserves while Houthi authorities in Sana'a issue unsubstantiated currency, eroding confidence and amplifying import costs for essentials.[6] Public debt, largely domestic, balloons amid deficits financed by printing and aid, though external arrears to multilateral lenders persist; remittances (around 10-15% of GDP pre-war) and humanitarian inflows provide partial buffers but cannot offset the war's causal toll on productive capacity.[209] Recovery hinges on unified governance and export resumption, yet territorial divisions sustain a dual-economy structure ill-suited to integration, perpetuating reliance on subsistence agriculture and informal trade over formal output.[1]Primary Sectors and Resources
Agriculture employs approximately 54% of Yemen's workforce and contributes about 20% to GDP, primarily through subsistence farming of crops such as sorghum, millet, fruits, vegetables, and the cash crop qat, which consumes substantial water resources amid chronic scarcity.[213] Qat production, while providing income for many farmers, has exacerbated environmental degradation and reduced arable land for food crops, with over 25% of cultivated area dedicated to it pre-war.[214] Oil and natural gas extraction historically dominated exports, accounting for over 90% of government revenue before the civil war, but production has plummeted due to conflict-related disruptions, facility attacks, and blockades. In 2023, crude oil output reached only 15,000 barrels per day, down from peaks exceeding 400,000 barrels per day in the early 2000s, with further declines in 2024 attributed to halted exports from Houthi-controlled fields.[215][209] Yemen holds proven oil reserves of about 3 billion barrels and natural gas reserves of 17 trillion cubic feet, concentrated in the Marib and Shabwa basins, though underinvestment and insecurity limit development.[216] Fisheries represent an underutilized resource along Yemen's 2,500-kilometer coastline, with potential annual catches exceeding 300,000 tons, but actual production remains low at around 100,000 tons due to overfishing by foreign vessels, lack of infrastructure, and war-induced risks to fishermen.[6] Mineral resources, including salt, gypsum, marble, and minor deposits of copper and gold, contribute negligibly to GDP, with total minerals production at 3.4 million metric tons in 2022, hampered by rudimentary extraction methods and absence of large-scale mining operations.[217]War Economy and Sanctions Effects
The Houthi movement sustains its war effort through control of key ports such as Hodeidah and Salif, where it collects customs duties and taxes on imports, accounting for approximately 70% of Yemen's total tax revenue.[218] These revenues, derived from levies on goods entering Houthi-held territories—including those imported via government-controlled ports like Aden—enable systematic extortion, with the group imposing up to 100% surcharges on traders as of August 2023.[219] Oil smuggling forms a core pillar, involving the importation of Iranian petroleum products through Houthi ports, which are resold on the domestic black market, generating estimates of hundreds of millions to billions annually; for instance, fuel trade operations have been valued at over $789 million in recent assessments.[220] This illicit network, including weaponized taxation on overland transport from government areas, has allowed the Houthis to centralize collections via electronic systems introduced in March 2025, further entrenching their economic dominance despite the civil war's fragmentation.[221] Diversion of humanitarian aid exacerbates the war economy's resilience, with the Houthis systematically pilfering food, fuel, and cash assistance intended for civilians, redirecting it for military procurement and elite enrichment.[143] Reports indicate that aid agencies operating in Houthi areas face coercion to comply with group oversight, enabling taxation on distributions and resale of commodities, which undermines delivery to vulnerable populations and bolsters Houthi finances amid Yemen's economic collapse.[222] This pattern persists despite UN monitoring, as the group's port authority enforces rigorous controls, converting aid inflows into revenue streams that sustain recruitment and operations. United Nations and United States sanctions, intensified since 2021, target Houthi financial networks, including exchange houses, smuggling entities, and procurement channels, with major actions in September 2025 designating over a dozen firms for oil smuggling and taxation schemes.[223] These measures prohibit dealings with sanctioned parties, aiming to disrupt billions in illicit flows, yet enforcement gaps allow evasion through alternative smuggling routes, informal hawala systems, and opaque global networks.[224] While US Treasury actions in January and July 2025 expanded pressure on fuel imports and Red Sea extortion—estimated at up to $2 billion yearly from vessel shakedowns—the sanctions' efficacy remains limited, as Houthi revenues endure via adaptive tactics like proxy companies and unmonitored ports.[225] [226] Civilian impacts predominate, with sanctions inadvertently exacerbating shortages by restricting petroleum flows through Houthi ports, as seen in the April 2025 US import/export ban on refined products, which depleted government revenues to 2.5% of pre-war levels without proportionally weakening Houthi capabilities.[206] [227] UN-brokered deals, such as the 2023 economic framework easing central bank restrictions, have occasionally relieved Houthi pressures but emboldened their fiscal autonomy, highlighting how fragmented enforcement and aid dependency perpetuate the war economy over targeted disruption.[228] This dynamic underscores causal realities: while sanctions signal intent, Houthi territorial control and smuggling ingenuity sustain military viability, often at greater cost to non-combatants than to the group's leadership.Poverty, Aid Dependency, and Reconstruction Barriers
Yemen's poverty levels are among the highest globally, with 82.7% of the population experiencing multidimensional poverty based on 2022-2023 survey data, encompassing deprivations in health, education, and living standards.[229] [230] Rural households face acute disparities, with 89.4% in multidimensional poverty compared to 68.9% in urban areas, driven by conflict-induced disruptions to agriculture and basic services.[231] Economic contraction, including a 2.0% GDP decline in 2023 and projected 1.0% drop in 2024, has intensified food insecurity and unemployment, with over 600,000 jobs lost since 2015.[6] [232] The nation exhibits profound aid dependency, as humanitarian assistance sustains basic survival for 18.2 million people—over 55% of the population—in 2024, amid projections of 19.5 million needing support in 2025.[233] [234] Foreign aid inflows reached $3.6 billion in 2022 but fall short of requirements, funding only about 10-12% of the $170-200 billion in GDP losses from 2015 onward.[235] [236] The 2024 Humanitarian Response Plan, targeting $2.7 billion, secured just $435 million by mid-year, reflecting donor fatigue and logistical hurdles like Houthi-imposed restrictions on aid delivery.[237] This reliance perpetuates a war economy where aid substitutes for domestic revenue, yet fragmented governance—split between Houthi-controlled north and government-held south—undermines fiscal unification and private sector revival.[238] Reconstruction efforts are stalled by entrenched barriers, foremost the decade-long conflict's persistence, which has fragmented the economy into parallel systems with divergent currencies and policies, eroding investor confidence.[239] [240] Infrastructure devastation, coupled with $90 billion in cumulative GDP erosion, demands coordinated governance absent due to political disputes over financial institutions and resource allocation.[232] Regional escalations, including Houthi attacks on shipping, amplify external shocks like inflation and supply chain breakdowns, while internal factors such as unchecked taxation by non-state actors deter long-term investment.[238] Sustainable rebuilding necessitates ceasefires and institutional reforms to address these causal impediments, as aid alone cannot substitute for endogenous growth mechanisms crippled by insecurity and division.[241]Society and Culture
Education and Literacy Challenges
Yemen's adult literacy rate stood at approximately 70% as of 2015, with significant gender disparities: 85% for males and 55% for females aged 15 and above.[242] This figure, drawn from pre-war surveys, likely understates current realities given the ongoing conflict's disruptions, as comprehensive national assessments have been infeasible since 2015. Earlier data from 2004 reported a lower total of 54%, reflecting chronic underinvestment and cultural barriers predating the war.[243] In Houthi-controlled areas, which encompass much of the north and population centers like Sana'a, literacy efforts face additional hurdles from curriculum alterations promoting Shia Zaydi ideology, potentially exacerbating sectarian divides and limiting exposure to diverse knowledge.[244] The civil war, intensifying since March 2015, has left over 4.5 million school-age children out of school, representing about 39% of that demographic and risking a "lost generation" with diminished future economic prospects.[245] [246] Infrastructure damage compounds this: approximately 2,900 schools have been destroyed or severely damaged by 2022, with ongoing attacks—55 verified incidents in 2022-2023 alone—further eroding access.[247] [248] Many facilities serve as shelters for the 4.5 million internally displaced persons or military bases, rendering one in four non-functional for education.[249] Teacher absenteeism and unpaid salaries, particularly in government-held south, force educators to seek alternative livelihoods, while in Houthi zones, recruitment of children as soldiers diverts youth from classrooms.[250] Gender disparities amplify these issues, with girls facing higher out-of-school rates due to early marriage, household duties, and conservative norms restricting female mobility and teacher gender composition.[251] Primary enrollment gaps persist at 79% for boys versus lower for girls, widening in rural areas where schools lack female staff or separate facilities.[252] In Houthi territories, policies emphasizing ideological conformity have correlated with reduced attendance, especially among girls, as families prioritize survival amid economic collapse.[253] Poverty drives child labor, affecting 1.5 million children, often pulling girls from education to support households strained by hyperinflation and aid dependency.[254] Displacement and insecurity perpetuate cycles of interruption: displaced children are twice as likely to drop out, with 14% of families citing violence as the primary barrier.[255] [256] Despite international efforts like World Bank-funded emergency projects sustaining basic learning in targeted schools, systemic corruption, financial constraints, and fragmented governance between Houthi, government, and southern separatist entities hinder reconstruction.[257] Without addressing root causes—war prolongation, aid obstruction, and militia control over resources—education recovery remains stalled, perpetuating illiteracy and vulnerability to exploitation.[258]Healthcare System and Crises
Yemen's healthcare system, already underdeveloped prior to the 2014 civil war, has collapsed under the strain of prolonged conflict, resulting in widespread destruction of infrastructure and chronic shortages of personnel and supplies. As of 2023, approximately 46% of health facilities were partially functioning or completely non-operational due to lacks in staffing, funding, electricity, and medicines. Over half of medical facilities have been damaged or destroyed by airstrikes, shelling, and looting since the war's onset, exacerbating access barriers in a country where 80% of the population resides in rural or remote areas. The exodus of healthcare workers, with many fleeing violence or unpaid salaries, has left critical gaps, particularly in surgical and emergency care capabilities.[259][260][261] The war has driven recurrent epidemics, with Yemen bearing the world's highest cholera burden as of late 2024. In 2024, over 260,000 suspected cholera cases and more than 870 deaths were reported, accounting for 35% of global infections. By June 2025, monthly cases surged 87% year-over-year to 18,675, with 55 fatalities and a case fatality rate of 0.3%, fueled by contaminated water sources, sanitation collapse, and weakened immunization coverage. Other outbreaks, including diphtheria and measles, persist due to disrupted vaccination programs, where only 68% of children received basic immunizations by 2023. These epidemics are causally linked to conflict-induced infrastructure failures rather than solely climatic factors, as pre-war systems managed similar environmental risks with greater efficacy.[262][263][264] Malnutrition compounds these infectious threats, affecting child health disproportionately. In 2024, acute malnutrition rates among children under five rose 34% in government-controlled areas, with one in five children in southern regions classified as severely malnourished amid food insecurity impacting 17 million people. This crisis stems from economic blockade effects, agricultural disruption, and aid diversion risks, leading to stunting in 39% of children and wasting in 7-9% nationwide. Infant mortality stands at 44.6 per 1,000 live births as of 2024 estimates, while overall life expectancy dipped to 66.6 years, reflecting war-attributable excess deaths exceeding 377,000 by 2021 analyses. Maternal mortality remains elevated at around 164 per 100,000 live births, hindered by obstetric care shortages.[265][266][267] International aid sustains limited functionality, with organizations like WHO and UNICEF providing 60% of Yemen's health services through mobile clinics and supplies, yet funding shortfalls—only 28% of 2024 appeals met—threaten further collapse. Obstructions by conflict parties, including Houthi restrictions on imports and coalition blockades, impede delivery, while politicized aid allocation favors certain governorates, per reports from neutral observers. Reconstruction demands demilitarization of facilities and salary restoration for 20,000+ unpaid workers, but entrenched factional control perpetuates dysfunction.[259][59][268]Cultural Heritage and Traditions
Yemen's cultural heritage traces back to ancient South Arabian civilizations, including the Sabaeans and Himyarites, which flourished from around 1000 BCE. These kingdoms developed advanced irrigation systems, such as the Marib Dam constructed circa 800 BCE, enabling large-scale agriculture in arid regions and supporting prosperous trade in frankincense and myrrh.[20] Inscriptions in the Old South Arabian script, dating to the 8th century BCE, document their polytheistic pantheon led by gods like Almaqah and administrative achievements.[269] The Himyarite Kingdom, rising in the 2nd century BCE, unified much of the peninsula by the 4th century CE, blending local traditions with influences from Aksumite Ethiopia and Sasanian Persia before converting to Judaism around 380 CE.[270] Following the advent of Islam in 630 CE, Yemen contributed significantly to early Muslim architecture, exemplified by the Great Mosque of Sana'a, constructed in the 7th century as one of the first mosques outside Mecca and Medina.[271] The Old City of Sana'a, designated a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1986, features over 6,500 traditional tower houses built before the 11th century, characterized by mud-brick construction, geometric motifs, and intricate gypsum decorations reflecting Zaydi Shia and Sunni influences.[271] This urban ensemble includes 106 mosques and 14 hammams, preserving a layered Islamic heritage amid earthen architecture adapted to seismic and climatic conditions.[272] Contemporary Yemeni traditions emphasize communal and tribal practices, with qat chewing serving as a central social ritual since at least the 14th century, typically occurring in afternoon gatherings that facilitate discussion and hospitality but contribute to economic strain through daily consumption costing households up to 20% of income.[273] Weddings involve elaborate customs, including dowries exceeding $5,000 in gold and cash, poetic chants, and the bara' dance performed with jambiya daggers by men in tribal attire to symbolize valor.[274] Oral traditions thrive in al-ghina al-san'ani, poetic songs recognized by UNESCO in 2008 as intangible heritage, often accompanied by the mi'zaf lute and drawing from humayni lyrical poetry rooted in Sufi mysticism.[275] Handicrafts form a vital tradition, particularly silversmithing using filigree and granulation techniques dating back over 2,000 years, producing amulets, bridal headdresses, and jewelry believed to offer protection, with regional variations among Bedouin and highland artisans.[269] These crafts, historically dominated by Jewish communities until their exodus in the mid-20th century, sustain cultural identity despite conflict disruptions, as seen in motifs echoing ancient South Arabian designs.[276] Folklore and dances like zafin and sharh, performed at celebrations, integrate African and Arabian elements, reinforcing tribal bonds in a patrilineal society where poetry recitals resolve disputes.[277]Media, Censorship, and Propaganda
Yemen's media landscape is fragmented and dominated by the warring parties, with the Houthis controlling outlets in the north and the internationally recognized government, alongside the Southern Transitional Council (STC), exerting influence in the south, severely limiting independent journalism.[278][279] The country ranked 154th out of 180 in the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, reflecting pervasive control, threats, and self-censorship driven by conflict dynamics.[280] Independent reporting is rare, as media outlets often serve as extensions of political or military agendas, with access to information restricted by territorial divisions and security risks.[278] Censorship is enforced systematically by all major actors, including arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and media blackouts. In Houthi-controlled areas, authorities have blocked internet access to independent sites, imposed bans on reporting certain topics, and detained journalists for coverage deemed critical, such as a May 2025 directive prohibiting interviews with foreign media or content creators on sensitive issues.[281][282] The Houthis seized state television channels in September 2014 and have since expanded control over telecommunications for surveillance and content filtering.[283] In government-held Aden, the STC has confiscated media headquarters and suppressed dissent, while both sides prosecute journalists in special courts lacking due process.[284][142] A 2025 Human Rights Watch report documented 14 cases of torture and abuse by Houthis, STC, and government forces, including five enforced disappearances, underscoring a pattern of using detention to silence coverage of corruption or military failures.[285] Propaganda permeates Yemen's media, transforming outlets into tools for mobilization and ideological warfare rather than information dissemination. Houthi channels like Al Masirah broadcast anti-coalition narratives, framing the conflict as resistance against foreign aggression and amplifying Iran-aligned messaging, with increased partisan websites and social media since the war's escalation.[286][283] Government media in Aden counters with portrayals of Houthi atrocities and calls for unity under the recognized administration, often funded externally but prone to incitement against rivals.[287] The Yemeni Journalists' Syndicate recorded 101 media freedom violations in 2024, many tied to propaganda enforcement, where reporting contradicting official lines leads to reprisals.[125] This dual-use of media as a "battleground" fosters widespread impunity, with violations from all parties eroding public trust in information sources.[287][288] Journalists face acute dangers, including targeted killings and assaults amid the civil war. The Committee to Protect Journalists and others reported 31 media workers killed in an Israeli airstrike on a Houthi-linked complex in Sanaa on September 10, 2025, marking one of the deadliest incidents against the press in modern conflicts, though occurring in the context of Houthi military activities from media sites.[289][290] Domestically, a July 2025 spike in arrests across territories prompted Reporters Without Borders to demand releases, highlighting how both Houthi and government forces exploit the chaos to eliminate critics.[291] Overall, these pressures have reduced Yemen's press to fragmented echo chambers, where empirical reporting yields to survival-driven alignment with power holders.[292]Human Rights and Humanitarian Issues
Violations by Conflict Parties
All parties to the Yemen conflict, including Houthi forces, the internationally recognized Yemeni government, and the Saudi-led coalition (supported by the United Arab Emirates), have committed serious human rights violations and potential war crimes, such as unlawful attacks on civilians, arbitrary detentions, torture, and recruitment of child soldiers.[128][293][294] The United Nations has documented grave violations against children by multiple actors, including killing, maiming, and sexual violence, with patterns persisting into 2025.[295] Houthi forces, controlling much of northern Yemen including Sana'a, have systematically recruited thousands of children into combat roles since 2015, using deception, coercion, and payments to families amid poverty, despite a 2022 UN action plan pledging to end the practice.[296][297] In controlled areas, Houthis have conducted arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and public executions of perceived opponents, including journalists and activists, often without due process.[298] Between January 5 and 12, 2025, Houthi forces targeted civilian homes and infrastructure in searches for armed men, killing and injuring non-combatants in what Human Rights Watch described as potential war crimes.[299] The Saudi-led coalition's airstrikes have caused disproportionate civilian casualties, with estimates of over 9,200 civilian deaths from coalition operations between March 2015 and July 2023, including strikes on markets, weddings, and hospitals.[300] More than 130 health facilities were damaged or destroyed by coalition airstrikes by 2019, exacerbating medical crises.[58] The coalition's naval and air blockade, tightened in late 2017 and intermittently since, has restricted humanitarian imports, delaying aid and contributing to famine risks for millions, though justified by Saudi officials as countering arms smuggling.[301] Yemeni government forces and affiliated militias have engaged in arbitrary detentions, torture, and extrajudicial killings, particularly in southern and eastern areas, targeting suspected Houthi sympathizers and rival factions.[293] In Taizz, government-aligned groups have restricted water access, destroying infrastructure and blocking repairs, leading to civilian deaths from dehydration and disease as of 2023. UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council forces have similarly imposed movement restrictions and conducted abusive arrests in Aden and other southern governorates.[57] No party has provided comprehensive accountability, with investigations stalled and access to justice limited, perpetuating impunity amid ongoing hostilities.[294][298]Famine, Displacement, and Child Exploitation
Yemen's ongoing civil war, exacerbated by Houthi rebel control over key ports and agricultural areas, Saudi-led coalition blockades, and disrupted imports, has driven widespread acute food insecurity bordering on famine conditions. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), between May and August 2025, approximately 4.95 million people faced crisis-level or worse food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+), including 1.5 million in emergency conditions (Phase 4).[302] Projections for September 2025 to February 2026 indicate a deterioration, with 18.1 million people—about 60% of the population—expected to experience acute hunger, driven by conflict-induced displacement, economic collapse, and restricted humanitarian access.[303] Up to 41,000 individuals remain at risk of catastrophic famine-like conditions (Phase 5) without scaled-up aid, particularly in Houthi-controlled governorates like Hodeidah and Taiz.[304] Internal displacement affects over 4.5 million Yemenis, representing roughly 14% of the population, with many having been uprooted multiple times due to frontline fighting, Houthi advances, and coalition airstrikes since 2015.[98] Yemen hosts the world's fourth-largest internally displaced persons (IDP) population, concentrated in urban areas like Marib and Aden, where host communities strain under resource shortages.[305] Displaced families face heightened vulnerability to violence, lack of shelter, and disease outbreaks, with UNHCR reporting that over one-third of IDPs have no income and 62% have reduced meals to cope as of mid-2025.[306] Conflict parties' territorial shifts, including Houthi offensives in 2024-2025, continue to generate new displacements, hindering return and reconstruction efforts. Child exploitation manifests acutely through malnutrition, forced labor, and military recruitment amid the war's economic devastation. By late 2024, an estimated 609,808 children under five were acutely malnourished, including 118,570 with severe acute malnutrition—a 34% increase from prior years—projected to persist into 2025 due to aid funding shortfalls and supply chain disruptions.[307] [308] Houthi forces have intensified child soldier recruitment since October 2023, enlisting thousands of minors through indoctrination camps and economic coercion, with summer boot camps launched as early as April 2025 despite international prohibitions.[309] Government-aligned forces and other militias have also contravened domestic laws by using children in hostilities, while poverty drives widespread child labor, including hazardous street vending and abuse-prone work, affecting an increasing number of minors as family breadwinners perish or emigrate.[310] [311] These practices, documented by human rights monitors, perpetuate cycles of trauma and stunted development, with reintegration programs limited by ongoing hostilities.[312]International Aid Obstruction and Misuse
The Houthi movement, controlling much of northwest Yemen including Sana'a, has systematically diverted humanitarian aid for military and personal gain, including imposing unauthorized taxes on aid convoys and redirecting food supplies to fighters and loyalists. In late 2018, the World Food Programme (WFP) documented trucks illicitly removing food from distribution centers in Houthi-held areas, prompting accusations that rebels stole aid "from the mouths of hungry Yemenis."[313] [314] By mid-2019, the WFP head threatened to suspend operations in Houthi territories due to ongoing diversion, with evidence showing aid being sold on black markets or stockpiled for non-civilian use.[315] Human Rights Watch has reported numerous instances of Houthi interference, such as lengthy project approval delays and confiscation of supplies, exacerbating the crisis where over 18 million Yemenis require assistance.[128] Houthi authorities have also raided UN facilities and detained aid workers, further obstructing delivery. On October 18, 2025, Houthi forces raided a UN compound in Sana'a, detaining at least 20 staff members in an escalation of restrictions on international organizations.[316] [317] The U.S. State Department noted in its 2023 human rights report that Houthis diverted humanitarian assistance while collecting taxes on businesses, funding their war efforts amid a conflict displacing over 4.5 million people.[293] These actions, including control over aid distribution committees, have weaponized relief, prioritizing political allegiance over need-based allocation, as detailed in analyses of Houthi-controlled aid mechanisms.[222] The Saudi-led coalition has obstructed aid through naval and air blockades imposed since March 2015, primarily to curb arms smuggling to Houthis but resulting in delays and shortages of essentials like fuel and medicine.[301] Port inspections at Hodeidah and other entry points have held up shipments, with over 200 medical containers delayed in 2020 alone due to Houthi demands for waivers intertwined with coalition restrictions.[318] Amnesty International reported in 2018 that coalition restrictions on imports contributed to civilian risks, though the blockade included humanitarian exemptions that processed over 80% of aid vessels by 2019.[319] Both parties' actions have compounded Yemen's dependency, where aid constitutes up to 20% of GDP, yet delivery inefficiencies and diversions leave millions vulnerable to famine despite $4 billion in annual pledges.[320] Government-aligned forces have occasionally hindered access in southern areas, but Houthi misuse remains the dominant documented barrier in controlled territories.[293]Foreign Interventions
Iranian Role and Proxy Dynamics
Iran has provided substantial military, financial, and logistical assistance to Yemen's Houthi movement (Ansar Allah) since at least 2009, enabling the group to sustain its insurgency and expand its operational reach during the Yemeni civil war that escalated after the Houthis' capture of Sanaa on September 21, 2014.[187] This support includes transfers of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and anti-ship weapons, with components bearing Iranian markings seized in multiple interdictions by U.S. and coalition forces.[321] United Nations Panel of Experts reports from 2020 onward have documented Iran's violation of the Security Council arms embargo through smuggling routes, including dhows departing from Iranian ports like Bandar Abbas, carrying munitions traceable to Iranian defense firms such as the Shahid Bagheri Industrial Group.[322][323] The proxy dynamics reflect a strategic alignment rather than direct command-and-control, with the Houthis exhibiting significant autonomy in decision-making while relying on Iranian expertise for advanced capabilities. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-Qods Force operatives and Hezbollah trainers have instructed Houthi fighters in missile assembly, drone operations, and naval tactics, transforming the group from a localized insurgency into a force capable of over 100 attacks across land, sea, and air domains using Iran-supplied systems as of 2024.[187][324] Financially, Iran facilitates revenue streams for the Houthis via illicit oil and fuel smuggling, with UN experts noting shipments from Iran funding Houthi military efforts, estimated to generate hundreds of millions annually despite Tehran's denials.[325] This assistance aligns with Iran's broader "Axis of Resistance" strategy to counter Saudi Arabia and U.S. interests, as evidenced by Houthi missile barrages on Saudi oil facilities in 2019, which incorporated Iranian Quds-1 and Quds-3 designs modified for extended range.[326] While some analyses emphasize Houthi independence—citing instances where the group pursued local grievances without Iranian prompting—their sustained projection of power, including Red Sea shipping disruptions starting October 2023, correlates with Iranian-supplied anti-ship ballistic missiles like the Noor and Ghader variants, interdicted en route from Iran.[327][328] Proxy ties have intensified post-2014, with Iran viewing the Houthis as a low-cost vector for regional pressure, though Houthi leadership has occasionally diverged, such as in ceasefire negotiations with Saudi Arabia in 2023 that Iran did not veto.[329] Despite U.S. designations of Houthis as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group in January 2024 (later adjusted) and coalition strikes degrading stockpiles, evidence from 2025 seizures indicates persistent Iranian resupply, underscoring the resilience of these dynamics amid Yemen's fragmented conflict.[330][321]Saudi-Led Coalition Operations
The Saudi-led coalition, primarily comprising Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Sudan, and other Arab states, launched military intervention in Yemen on March 26, 2015, in response to the Houthi rebels' seizure of Sanaa in September 2014 and their subsequent advance toward Aden, which threatened to overthrow the internationally recognized government of President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.[2][300] The intervention, initiated at Hadi's request, aimed to restore constitutional legitimacy, repel the Houthi-Saleh alliance's offensive, and curb Iranian arms supplies to the Houthis, who had received ballistic missiles and other weaponry enabling cross-border attacks on Saudi territory.[331][332] Operation Decisive Storm commenced with over 100 airstrikes on the first night, systematically targeting Houthi-controlled air bases, missile sites, and command structures, which granted the coalition swift air superiority and neutralized Yemen's limited air defenses.[300] The offensive incorporated a comprehensive blockade—encompassing air, land, and sea restrictions—to interdict Iranian resupplies via ports like Hodeidah, thereby limiting Houthi logistics while Houthi forces embedded military assets in civilian infrastructure, complicating targeting.[2][300] By April 21, 2015, after degrading key Houthi capabilities, the phase concluded, transitioning to Operation Restoring Hope, which emphasized ground support for pro-government forces alongside diplomatic efforts under UN Security Council Resolution 2216 demanding Houthi withdrawal.[169] The UAE assumed a pivotal role in ground operations, deploying special forces and conducting amphibious assaults to liberate southern provinces, including the recapture of Aden in July 2015 through coordination with Yemeni allies like the Giants Brigades.[333] UAE training programs equipped local militias with equipment such as AT-802 light attack aircraft, enabling sustained advances against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Houthi remnants in areas like Taiz and Mukalla.[333] Saudi forces focused predominantly on aerial and artillery support along the northern border, repelling repeated Houthi incursions that involved drone and missile strikes on Saudi cities, including Riyadh.[332] Airstrikes, numbering over 10,000 by some tallies, inflicted significant attrition on Houthi combatants—estimated in the thousands—though precise figures remain contested due to Houthi obfuscation and embedding in populated zones.[334] Independent monitors, including the Yemen Data Project, have documented approximately 84 civilian deaths in select periods from coalition raids, often near verified military targets, while UN-verified incidents highlight errors like strikes on markets, but coalition investigations attributed many to Houthi munitions or misreporting.[334][335] The naval blockade, tightened after Iranian convoy interceptions in 2015, curtailed Houthi imports by up to 80% in critical periods, forcing reliance on smuggling but also exacerbating shortages in Houthi-held areas where rebels diverted aid.[2] By 2018, coalition advances had secured the Red Sea coast and major southern cities, preventing a full Houthi conquest, though stalemates persisted in the north amid Houthi guerrilla tactics and Iranian resupply via Oman.[332] Saudi Arabia announced a unilateral ceasefire in March 2022 to enable talks, reducing operations amid domestic reforms and Houthi Red Sea attacks, though sporadic exchanges continued.[336] The campaign's longevity reflected Houthi resilience but underscored the coalition's success in containing Iranian proxy expansion at Yemen's borders.[337]US, UK, and Israeli Counteractions
In response to Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea beginning in November 2023, the United States and United Kingdom initiated defensive measures under Operation Prosperity Guardian, a multinational coalition effort launched on December 23, 2023, to secure maritime routes against drone, missile, and small boat assaults linked to the group's solidarity with Hamas following the October 7, 2023, attacks on Israel.[338] The operation involved naval patrols, interceptions of over 100 Houthi projectiles by U.S. forces through 2024, and prevention of vessel seizures, though shipping disruptions persisted, with major carriers like Maersk rerouting around Africa.[339][340] Joint U.S.-UK airstrikes commenced on January 11, 2024, targeting Houthi radar systems, air defenses, storage facilities, and missile launch sites in governorates including Sanaa, Hodeidah, and Al Bayda, with U.S. Central Command reporting degradation of launch capabilities in initial waves.[341] Between January 11 and May 30, 2024, the partners executed at least five coordinated operations, involving aircraft from carriers like the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower and RAF Typhoons.[342] Additional U.S. strikes occurred on March 16, 2025, described as a "wave" against military targets, while the UK participated in a U.S.-supported strike on April 29-30, 2025, hitting a Houthi facility with RAF assets.[343][344] Houthi sources claimed over 900 such strikes by early 2025 resulted in 106 deaths and 314 injuries, though independent verification remains limited and U.S. officials emphasized precision to minimize civilian harm.[345] Israel conducted independent retaliatory airstrikes against Houthi targets starting in 2024, escalating in 2025 following direct attacks on Israeli territory, including ballistic missiles and drones targeting Eilat and Ben Gurion Airport. On July 6-7, 2025, the Israeli Air Force struck ports and a power plant in Hodeidah province, marking the first such action post-Iran ceasefire.[346] Further operations included August 24 strikes on Sanaa killing at least six per Houthi reports, the August 28 "Operation Lucky Drop" against multiple sites, and September 11 attacks Houthi officials said killed 35 with over 130 wounded.[347][348] On September 25, 2025, Israeli jets hit command centers in Sanaa using approximately 20 aircraft, resulting in eight deaths and 142 injuries according to preliminary Houthi tallies, in response to a prior drone incursion.[349] These actions focused on degrading Houthi offensive infrastructure but faced criticism from Houthi media for alleged civilian impacts, with Israel asserting targeted military hits.[350]Broader Geopolitical Implications
The Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, initiated in November 2023 in solidarity with Hamas amid the Israel-Hamas war, have disrupted a critical global trade artery, forcing over half of container ships to reroute around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, adding up to two weeks and thousands of dollars in fuel costs per voyage.[2][351] By October 2024, the Houthis had conducted over 190 such attacks, resulting in an 80% reduction in container ship transits through the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aden, with corresponding spikes in shipping insurance premiums and freight rates for 40-foot containers that peaked in late 2023 before partially retreating.[352][353][354] These disruptions have exacerbated supply chain vulnerabilities, increased emissions from longer voyages, and contributed to inflationary pressures in Europe and Asia, where reliance on Asian imports via the Suez route amplifies the economic fallout.[355][356] Regionally, Yemen's conflict exemplifies Iran-Saudi Arabia's proxy rivalry, with Iran's provision of ballistic missiles, drones, and training to the Houthis enabling sustained pressure on Saudi borders and maritime chokepoints, while Saudi-led interventions since 2015 aimed to curb this influence but yielded limited gains amid Houthi resilience.[329][357] This dynamic has entrenched sectarian fault lines, drawing Yemen deeper into broader Middle Eastern contests, including Iran's "axis of resistance" against Israel, as Houthi strikes on Israel-linked targets extend the Gaza conflict's ripple effects.[358][359] Saudi Arabia's partial drawdown of forces by 2023, coupled with a 2023 China-brokered détente with Iran, has shifted Riyadh toward de-escalation, yet persistent Houthi capabilities underscore Iran's strategic depth through non-state allies, complicating Gulf Cooperation Council security and normalization efforts with Israel.[360][329] On the global stage, U.S. and UK airstrikes against Houthi targets—launched in January 2024 under Operation Prosperity Guardian—have degraded some capabilities but failed to halt attacks, signaling limits to Western deterrence against Iran-backed militias and emboldening similar actors in Iraq and Lebanon.[361][362] Israel's direct retaliatory strikes on Yemen, including a July 2024 hit on Sana'a's port, highlight the multi-front strain but also expose coordination gaps among U.S. allies, with abstentions by China and Russia at the UN underscoring great-power divisions that favor revisionist actors.[358][342] This perceived U.S. restraint, amid domestic political shifts, risks eroding credibility in countering asymmetric threats, potentially inviting Russian arms transfers to Houthis and amplifying Iran's leverage in nuclear talks or regional bargaining, while straining transatlantic ties over inconsistent enforcement of freedom-of-navigation norms.[363][358][364]References
- https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Yemen