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Shia Islam
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Shia Islam[a] is the second-largest branch of Islam. It holds that Muhammad designated Ali ibn Abi Talib (r. 656–661) as both his political successor (caliph) and as the spiritual leader of the Muslim community (imam). However, his right is understood to have been usurped by a number of Muhammad's companions at the meeting of Saqifa, during which they appointed Abu Bakr (r. 632–634) as caliph instead. As such, Sunni Muslims believe Abu Bakr, Umar (r. 634–644), Uthman (r. 644–656) and Ali to be 'rightly-guided caliphs', whereas Shia Muslims regard only Ali as the legitimate successor.
Shia Muslims believe that the imamate continued through Ali's sons, Hasan and Husayn, after which various Shia branches developed and recognized different imams. They revere the ahl al-bayt, the family of Muhammad, maintaining that they possess divine knowledge. Shia holy sites include the shrine of Ali in Najaf, the shrine of Husayn in Karbala, and other mausoleums of the ahl al-bayt. Later events, such as Husayn's martyrdom in the Battle of Karbala (680 CE), further influenced the development of Shia Islam, contributing to the formation of a distinct religious sect with its own rituals and shared collective memory.[1]
Shia Islam is followed by 10–15%[2] of all Muslims, numbering at an estimated 200–300 million followers worldwide as of 2025. The three main Shia branches are Twelverism, Isma'ilism, and Zaydism. Shia Muslims form a majority of the population in Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan, as well as about half of the citizen population of Bahrain.[3] Significant Shia communities are also found in Lebanon, Kuwait, Turkey, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. Iran stands as the world's only country where Shia Islam forms the foundation of both its laws and governance system.[4]
Terminology
[edit]The word Shia (or Shīʿa) (/ˈʃiːə/) (Arabic: شيعيّ, romanized: shīʿī, pl. shīʿiyyūn) is derived from شيعة علي, shīʿat ʿAlī, 'followers of Ali'.[5][6][7] Shia Islam is also referred to in English as Shiism (or Shīʿism) (/ˈʃiːɪz(ə)m/), and Shia Muslims as Shiites (or Shīʿites) (/ˈʃiːaɪt/).[8]
The term Shia was first used during Muhammad's lifetime.[9] At present, the word refers to the Muslims who believe that the leadership of the Muslim community after Muhammad belongs to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, and his successors.[10] Nawbakhti states that the term Shia refers to a group of Muslims who at the time of Muhammad and after him regarded ʿAlī as the Imam and caliph.[10][11] Al-Shahrastani expresses that the term Shia refers to those who believe that ʿAlī is designated as the heir, Imam, and caliph by Muhammad[10][12] and that ʿAlī's authority is maintained through his descendants.[10][13] For the adherents of Shia Islam, this conviction is implicit in the Quran and the history of Islam. Shia Muslim scholars emphasize that the notion of authority is linked to the family of the Abrahamic prophets as the Quranic verses 3:33 and 3:34 show: "Indeed, Allah chose Adam, Noah, the family of Abraham, and the family of ’Imrân above all people. They are descendants of one another. And Allah is All-Hearing, All-Knowing."[14]
History
[edit]The original Shia identity referred to the followers of Imam ʿAlī,[15] and Shia theology was formulated after the hijra (8th century CE).[16] The first Shia governments and societies were established by the end of the 9th century CE. The 10th century CE has been referred to by the scholar of Islamic studies Louis Massignon as "the Shiite Ismaili century in the history of Islam".[17]
Origins
[edit]
The Shia, originally known as the "partisans" of ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Muhammad's cousin and Fatima's husband, first emerged as a distinct movement during the First Fitna from 656 to 661 CE. Shia doctrine holds that ʿAlī was meant to lead the community after Muhammad's death in 632. Historians dispute over the origins of Shia Islam, with many Western scholars positing that Shia Islam began as a political faction rather than a truly religious movement.[18][19] Other scholars disagree, considering this concept of religious-political separation to be an anachronistic application of a Western concept.[20]
Shia Muslims believe that Muhammad designated ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib as his heir during a speech at Ghadir Khumm.[21] The point of contention between different Muslim sects arises when Muhammad, whilst giving his speech, gave the proclamation "Anyone who has me as his mawla, has ʿAlī as his mawla".[10][22][23][24] Some versions add the additional sentence "O God, befriend the friend of ʿAlī and be the enemy of his enemy".[25] Sunnis maintain that Muhammad emphasized the deserving friendship and respect for ʿAlī. In contrast, Shia Muslims assert that the statement unequivocally designates ʿAlī as Muhammad's appointed successor.[10][26][27][28] Shia sources also record further details of the event, such as stating that those present congratulated ʿAlī and acclaimed him as Amir al-Mu'minin ("commander of the believers").[25]
When Muhammad died in 632 CE, ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib and Muhammad's closest relatives made the funeral arrangements. While they were preparing his body, Abū Bakr, ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, and Abu Ubaidah ibn al Jarrah met with the leaders of Medina and elected Abū Bakr as the first rāshidūn caliph. Abū Bakr served from 632 to 634, and was followed by Umar (634–644) and ʿUthmān (644–656).[21]

With the murder of ʿUthmān in 657 CE, the Muslims of Medina invited ʿAlī to become the fourth caliph as the last source,[29] and he established his capital in Kufa.[5] ʿAlī's rule over the early Islamic empire, between 656 CE to 661 CE, was often contested.[21] Tensions eventually led to the First Fitna, the first major civil war between Muslims within the empire, which began as a series of revolts fought against ʿAlī. While the rebels had previously affirmed the legitimacy of ʿAlī's khilafāʾ (caliphate), they later turned against ʿAlī and fought him.[29]
Tensions escalated into the Battle of the Camel in 656, where Ali's forces emerged victorious against Aisha, Talhah, and al-Zubayr. The Battle of Siffin in 657 turned the tide against ʿAlī, who lost due to arbitration issues with Muawiyah, the governor of Damascus.[21] ʿAlī withdrew to Kufa, overcoming the Kharijis, a faction that had transformed from supporters to bitter rivals, at Nahrawan in 658. In 661, ʿAlī was assassinated by a Khariji assassin in Kufa while in the act of prostration during prayer (sujud). Subsequently, Muawiyah asserted his claim to the caliphate.[31][30]
Hasan, Husayn, and Karbala
[edit]
Upon the death of ʿAlī, his elder son Ḥasan became leader of the Muslims of Kufa. After a series of skirmishes between the Kufa Muslims and the army of Muawiyah, Ḥasan ibn Ali agreed to cede the caliphate to Muawiyah and maintain peace among Muslims upon certain conditions: The enforced public cursing of ʿAlī, e.g. during prayers, should be abandoned; Muawiyah should not use tax money for his own private needs; There should be peace, and followers of Ḥasan should be given security and their rights; Muawiyah will never adopt the title of Amir al-Mu'minin ("commander of the believers"); Muawiyah will not nominate any successor.[32][33] Ḥasan then retired to Medina, where in 670 CE he was poisoned by his wife Ja'da bint al-Ash'ath, after being secretly contacted by Muawiyah who wished to pass the caliphate to his own son Yazid and saw Ḥasan as an obstacle.[34]

Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, ʿAlī's younger son and brother to Ḥasan, initially resisted calls to lead the Muslims against Muawiyah and reclaim the caliphate. In 680 CE, Muawiyah died and passed the caliphate to his son Yazid, thus breaking the treaty with Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī. Yazid asked Husayn to swear allegiance (bay'ah) to him. ʿAlī's faction, having expected the caliphate to return to ʿAlī's line upon Muawiyah's death, saw this as a betrayal of the peace treaty and so Ḥusayn rejected this request for allegiance. There was a groundswell of support in Kufa for Ḥusayn to return there and take his position as caliph and Imam, so Ḥusayn collected his family and followers in Medina and set off for Kufa.[21]
En route to Kufa, Husayn was blocked by an army of Yazid's men, which included people from Kufa, near Karbala. Rather than surrendering, Husayn and his followers chose to fight. In the Battle of Karbala, Ḥusayn and approximately 72 of his family members and followers were killed, and Husayn's head was delivered to Yazid in Damascus. The Shi'a community regard Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī as a martyr (shahid), and count him as an Imam from the Ahl al-Bayt. The Battle of Karbala and martyrdom of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī is often cited as the definitive separation between the Shia and Sunnī sects of Islam. Ḥusayn is the last Imam following ʿAlī mutually recognized by all branches of Shia Islam.[35] The martyrdom of Husayn and his followers is commemorated on the Day of Ashura, occurring on the tenth day of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar.[21]
Imamate of the Ahl al-Bayt
[edit]

Later, most denominations of Shia Islam, including Twelvers and Ismāʿīlīs, became Imamis.[10][37][38] Shia Muslims believe that Imams are the spiritual and political successors to Muhammad.[39] Imams are human individuals who not only rule over the Muslim community with justice, but also are able to keep and interpret the divine law and its esoteric meaning. The words and deeds of Muhammad and the Imams are a guide and model for the community to follow; as a result, they must be free from error and sin, and must be chosen by divine decree (nass) through Muhammad.[40][41] According to this view peculiar to Shia Islam, there is always an Imam of the Age, who is the divinely appointed authority on all matters of faith and law in the Muslim community. ʿAlī was the first Imam of this line, the rightful successor to Muhammad, followed by male descendants of Muhammad through his daughter Fatimah.[39][42]

This difference between following either the Ahl al-Bayt (Muhammad's family and descendants) or pledging allegiance to Abū Bakr has shaped the Shia–Sunnī divide on the interpretation of some Quranic verses, hadith literature (accounts of the sayings and living habits attributed to the Islamic prophet Muhammad during his lifetime), and other areas of Islamic belief throughout the history of Islam. For instance, the hadith collections venerated by Shia Muslims are centered on narrations by members of the Ahl al-Bayt and their supporters, while some hadith transmitted by narrators not belonging to or supporting the Ahl al-Bayt are not included.
Those of Abu Hurairah, for example, Ibn Asakir in his Taʿrikh Kabir, and Muttaqi in his Kanzuʿl-Umma report that ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb lashed him, rebuked him, and forbade him to narrate ḥadīth from Muhammad. ʿUmar is reported to have said: "Because you narrate hadith in large numbers from the Holy Prophet, you are fit only for attributing lies to him. (That is, one expects a wicked man like you to utter only lies about the Holy Prophet.) So you must stop narrating hadith from the Prophet; otherwise, I will send you to the land of Dus." (An Arab clan in Yemen, to which Abu Hurairah belonged).
According to Sunnī Muslims, ʿAlī was the fourth successor to Abū Bakr, while Shia Muslims maintain that ʿAlī was the first divinely sanctioned "Imam", or successor of Muhammad. The seminal event in Shia history is the martyrdom at the Battle of Karbala of ʿAlī's son, Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, and 71 of his followers in 680 CE, who led a non-allegiance movement against the defiant caliph.
It is believed in Twelver and Ismāʿīlī branches of Shia Islam that divine wisdom (ʿaql) was the source of the souls of the prophets and Imams, which bestowed upon them esoteric knowledge (ḥikmah), and that their sufferings were a means of divine grace to their devotees.[43][44] Although the Imam was not the recipient of a divine revelation (waḥy), he had a close relationship with God, through which God guides him, and the Imam, in turn, guides the people. Imamate, or belief in the divine guide, is a fundamental belief in the Twelver and Ismāʿīlī branches of Shia Islam, and is based on the concept that God would not leave humanity without access to divine guidance.[45]
Imam Mahdi, last Imam of the Shia
[edit]
In Shia Islam, Imam Mahdi is regarded as the prophesied eschatological redeemer of Islam who will rule for seven, nine, or nineteen years (according to differing interpretations) before the Day of Judgment and will rid the world of evil. According to Islamic tradition, the Mahdi's tenure will coincide with the Second Coming of Jesus (ʿĪsā), who is to assist the Mahdi against the Masih ad-Dajjal (literally, the "false Messiah" or Antichrist). Jesus, who is considered the Masih ("Messiah") in Islam, will descend at the point of a white arcade east of Damascus, dressed in yellow robes with his head anointed. He will then join the Mahdi in his war against the Dajjal, where it is believed the Mahdi will slay the Dajjal and unite humankind.
Dynasties
[edit]In the century following the Battle of Karbala (680 CE), as various Shia-affiliated groups diffused in the emerging Islamic world, several nations arose based on a Shia leadership or population.
- Idrisids (788–985 CE): a Zaydi dynasty in what is now Morocco.
- Qarmatians (899–1077 CE): an Ismaili Iranian dynasty. Their headquarters were in Eastern Arabia and Bahrain. It was founded by Abu Sa'id al-Jannabi.
- Buyids (934–1055 CE): a Twelver Iranian dynasty. at its peak consisted of large portions of Iran and Iraq.
- Uqaylids (990–1096 CE): a Shia Arab dynasty with several lines that ruled in various parts of al-Jazira, northern Syria and Iraq.
- Ilkhanate (1256–1335): a Persianate Mongol khanate established in Iran in the 13th century, considered a part of the Mongol Empire. The Ilkhanate was based, originally, on Genghis Khan's campaigns in the Khwarezmid Empire in 1219–1224, and founded by Genghis's grandson, Hulagu, in territories in Western and Central Asia which today comprise most of Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Pakistan. The Ilkhanate initially embraced many religions, but was particularly sympathetic to Buddhism and Christianity. Later Ilkhanate rulers, beginning with Ghazan in 1295, chose Islam as the state religion; his brother Öljaitü promoted Shia Islam.[46]
- Bahmanids (1347–1527): a Shia Muslim state of the Deccan Plateau in Southern India, and one of the great medieval Indian kingdoms.[47] Bahmanid Sultanate was the first independent Islamic kingdom in Southern India.[48]
Fatimid Caliphate
[edit]
- Fatimids (909–1171 CE): Controlled much of North Africa, the Levant, parts of Arabia, and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The group takes its name from Fāṭimah, Muhammad's daughter, from whom they claim descent.
- In 909 CE, the Shia military leader Abu Abdallah al-Shiʻi overthrew the Sunni rulers in North Africa, an event which led to the foundation of the Fatimid Caliphate.[49]
- Al-Qaid Jawhar ibn Abdallah (Arabic: جوهر; fl. 966–d. 992) was a Shia Fatimid general. Under the command of Caliph al-Muʻizz, he led the conquest of North Africa and then of Egypt,[50] founded the city of Cairo[51] and the al-Azhar Mosque. A Greek slave by origin, he was freed by al-Muʻizz.[52]
Safavid Empire
[edit]
A major turning point in the history of Shia Islam was the dominion of the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) in Persia. This caused a number of changes in the Muslim world:
- The ending of the relative mutual tolerance between Sunnis and Shias that existed from the time of the Mongol conquests onwards and the resurgence of antagonism between the two groups.
- Initial dependence of Shia clerics on the state followed by the emergence of an independent body of ulama capable of taking a political stand different from official policies.[55]
- The growth in importance of Persian centers of Islamic education and religious learning, which resulted in the change of Twelver Shia Islam from being a predominantly Arab phenomenon to become predominantly Persian.[56]
- The growth of the Akhbari school of thought, which taught that only the Quran, ḥadīth literature, and sunnah (accounts of the sayings and living habits attributed to the Islamic prophet Muhammad during his lifetime) are to be bases for verdicts, rejecting the use of reasoning.
With the fall of the Safavids, the state in Iran—including the state system of courts with government-appointed judges (qāḍī)—became much weaker. This gave the sharīʿa courts of mujtahid an opportunity to fill the legal vacuum and enabled the ulama to assert their judicial authority. The Usuli school of thought also increased in strength at this time.[57]
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The declaration of Twelver Shīʿīsm as the state religion of Safavids
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A monument commemorating the Battle of Chaldiran, where more than 7,000 Muslims of the Shia and Sunnī sects killed each other
Beliefs
[edit]This section may require cleanup to meet Wikipedia's quality standards. The specific problem is: cluttered, inconsistent, and confusing. (October 2022) |
Shia Islam encompasses various denominations and subgroups,[5] all bound by the belief that the leader of the Muslim community (Ummah) should hail from Ahl al-Bayt, the family of the Islamic prophet Muhammad.[21] It embodies a completely independent system of religious interpretation and political authority in the Muslim world.[58][59]
Alī: Muhammad's rightful successor
[edit]Shia Muslims believe that just as a prophet is appointed by God alone, only God has the prerogative to appoint the successor to his prophet. They believe God chose ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib to be Muhammad's successor and the first caliph (Arabic: خليفة, romanized: khalifa) of Islam. Shia Muslims believe that Muhammad designated Ali as his successor by God's command in several instances, but most notably at Eid Al Ghadir.[60][61] Additionally, ʿAlī was Muhammad's first-cousin, closest living male relative, and his son-in-law, having married Muhammad's daughter, Fāṭimah.[29][30]
Profession of faith (Shahada)
[edit]
The Shia version of the Shahada (Arabic: الشهادة), the Islamic profession of faith, differs from that of the Sunnīs.[62] The Sunnī version of the Shahada states La ilaha illallah, Muhammadun rasulullah (Arabic: لَا إِلٰهَ إِلَّا الله مُحَمَّدٌ رَسُولُ الله, lit. 'There is no god except God, Muhammad is the messenger of God'); Shia Muslims add the phrase Ali-un-Waliullah (Arabic: علي ولي الله, lit. 'Ali is the friend of God'). The basis for the Shia belief in ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib as the Wali of God is derived from the Qur'anic verse 5:55.
This additional phrase to the declaration of faith embodies the Shia emphasis on the inheritance of authority through Muhammad's family and lineage. The three clauses of the Shia version of the Shahada thus address the fundamental Islamic beliefs of Tawḥīd (Arabic: تَوْحِيد, lit. 'oneness of God'), Nubuwwah (Arabic: نبوة, lit. 'prophethood'), and Imamah (Arabic: إمامة, lit. 'Imamate or leadership').[63]
Infallibility (Ismah)
[edit]Ismah (Arabic: عِصْمَة, romanized: 'Iṣmah or 'Isma, lit. 'protection') is the concept of infallibility or "divinely bestowed freedom from error and sin" in Islam.[64] Muslims believe that Muhammad, along with the other prophets and messengers, possessed ismah. Twelver and Ismāʿīlī Shia Muslims also attribute the quality to Imams as well as to Fāṭimah, daughter of Muhammad, in contrast to the Zaydī Shias, who do not attribute ismah to the Imams.[65] Though initially beginning as a political movement, infallibility and sinlessness of the Imams later evolved as a distinct belief of (non-Zaydī) Shia Islam.[66]
According to Shia Muslim theologians, infallibility is considered a rational, necessary precondition for spiritual and religious guidance. They argue that since God has commanded absolute obedience from these figures, they must only order that which is right. The state of infallibility is based on the Shia interpretation of the verse of purification.[67][68] Thus, they are the most pure ones, the only immaculate ones preserved from, and immune to, all uncleanness.[69] It does not mean that supernatural powers prevent them from committing a sin, but due to the fact that they have absolute belief in God, they refrain from doing anything that is a sin.[64]
They[who?] also have complete knowledge of God's will. They are in possession of all knowledge brought by the angels (Arabic: ملائِكة, romanized: malāʾikah) to the prophets (Arabic: أنبياء, romanized: anbiyāʼ) and the messengers (Arabic: رُسل, romanized: rusul). Their knowledge encompasses the totality of all times. Thus, they are believed to act without fault in religious matters.[70] Shi'a Muslims regard ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib as the successor of Muhammad, not only ruling over the entire Muslim community in justice, but also in interpreting the Islamic faith, practices, and its esoteric meaning. ʿAlī is regarded as a "perfect man" (Arabic: الإنسان الكامل, romanized: al-insan al-kamil) similar to Muhammad, according to the Shia perspective.[71]
Occultation (Ghaybah)
[edit]
The Occultation is an eschatological belief held in various denominations of Shia Islam concerning a messianic figure, the hidden and last Imam known as "the Mahdi", that one day shall return on Earth and fill the world with justice. According to the doctrine of Twelver Shia Islam, the main goal of Imam Mahdi will be to establish an Islamic state and to apply Islamic laws that were revealed to Muhammad. The Quran does not contain verses on the Imamate, which is the basic doctrine of Shia Islam.[72]
Some Shia subsects, such as the Zaydism and Nizari Isma'ilism, do not believe in the idea of Occultation. The groups that believe in it differ as to which lineage of the Imamate is valid and, therefore, which individual has gone into Occultation. They believe many signs will indicate the time of his return.
Twelver Shia Muslims believe that the prophesied Mahdi and 12th Shia Imam, Hujjat Allah al-Mahdi, is already on Earth in Occultation, and will return at the end of time. Ṭayyibi Ismāʿīlīs and Fatimid/Bohra/Dawoodi Bohra believe the same but for their 21st Ṭayyib, At-Tayyib Abi l-Qasim, and also believe that a Da'i al-Mutlaq ("Unrestricted Missionary") maintains contact with him. Sunnī Muslims believe that the future Mahdi has not yet arrived on Earth.[73][better source needed]
Hadith tradition
[edit]Shia Muslims believe that the status of Ali is supported by numerous ḥadīth reports, including the Hadith of the pond of Khumm, Hadith of the two weighty things, Hadith of the pen and paper, Hadith of the invitation of the close families, and Hadith of the Twelve Successors. In particular, the Hadith of the Cloak is often quoted to illustrate Muhammad's feeling towards ʿAlī and his family by both Sunnī and Shia scholars. Shia Muslims prefer to study and read the hadith attributed to the Ahl al-Bayt and close associates, and most have their own separate hadith canon.[74][75]
Holy Relics (Tabarruk)
[edit]Shia Muslims believe that the armaments and sacred items of all of the Abrahamic prophets, including Muhammad, were handed down in succession to the Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt. Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the 6th Shia Imam, in Kitab al-Kafi mentions that "with me are the arms of the Messenger of Allah. It is not disputable."[76]
Further, he claims that with him is the sword of the Messenger of God, his coat of arms, his Lamam (pennon), and his helmet. In addition, he mentions that with him is the flag of the Messenger of God, the victorious. With him is the Staff of Moses, the ring of Solomon, son of David, and the tray on which Moses used to offer his offerings. With him is the name that whenever the Messenger of God would place it between the Muslims and pagans, no arrow from the pagans would reach the Muslims. With him is a similar object that the angels brought.[76]
Al-Ṣādiq also narrated that the passing down of armaments is synonymous with receiving the Imamat (leadership), similar to how the Ark of the Covenant in the house of the Israelites signaled prophethood.[76] Imam Ali al-Ridha narrates that wherever the armaments among us would go, knowledge would also follow and the armaments would never depart from those with knowledge (Imamat).[76]
Other doctrines
[edit]Doctrine about necessity of acquiring knowledge
[edit]According to Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar, God gives humans the faculty of reason and argument. Also, God orders humans to think carefully about creation, while he refers to all creations as his signs of power and glory. These signs encompass all of the universe. Furthermore, there is an analogy of humans as the little world and the universe as the large world. God does not accept the faith of those who follow him without thinking and only with imitation, but God also blames them for such actions. In other words, humans have to think about the universe with reason and intellect, a faculty bestowed on us by God. Since there is more insistence on the faculty of intellect among Shia Muslims, even evaluating the claims of someone who claims prophecy is based on the intellect.[77][78]
Practices
[edit]
Shia religious practices, such as prayers, differ only slightly from the Sunnīs. While all Muslims pray five times daily, Shia Muslims have the option of combining Dhuhr with Asr and Maghrib with Isha', as there are three distinct times mentioned in the Quran. The Sunnīs tend to combine only under certain circumstances.
Holidays
[edit]Shia Muslims celebrate the following annual holidays:
- Eid ul-Fitr, which marks the end of fasting during the month of Ramadan
- Eid al-Adha, which marks the end of the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca
- Eid al-Ghadeer, which is the anniversary of the Ghadir Khum, the occasion when Muhammad announced Ali's Imamate before a multitude of Muslims.[79] Eid al-Ghadeer is held on the 18th of Dhu al-Hijjah.
- The Mourning of Muharram and the Day of Ashura for Shia Muslims commemorate the martyrdom of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī, brother of Ḥasan and grandson of Muhammad, who was killed by the army of Yazid ibn Muawiyah in Karbala (central Iraq). Ashura is a day of deep mourning which occurs on the 10th of Muharram.
- Arba'een commemorates the suffering of the women and children of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī's household. After Ḥusayn was killed, they were marched over the desert, from Karbala (central Iraq) to Shaam (Damascus, Syria). Many children (some of whom were direct descendants of Muhammad) died of thirst and exposure along the route. Arbaein occurs on the 20th of Safar, 40 days after Ashura.
- Mawlid, Muhammad's birth date. Unlike Sunnī Muslims, who celebrate the 12th of Rabi' al-awwal as Muhammad's day of birth or death (because they assert that his birth and death both occur in this week), Shia Muslims celebrate Muhammad's birthday on the 17th of the month, which coincides with the birth date of Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the 6th Shia Imam.[80]
- Fāṭimah's birthday on 20th of Jumada al-Thani. This day is also considered as the "'women and mothers' day"[81]
- ʿAlī's birthday on 13th of Rajab.
- Mid-Sha'ban is the birth date of the 12th and final Twelver imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi. It is celebrated by Shia Muslims on the 15th of Sha'aban.
- Laylat al-Qadr, anniversary of the night of the revelation of the Quran.
- Eid al-Mubahila celebrates a meeting between the Ahl al-Bayt (household of Muhammad) and a Christian deputation from Najran. Al-Mubahila is held on the 24th of Dhu al-Hijjah.
Holy sites
[edit]
After Mecca and Medina, the two holiest cities of Islam, the cities of Najaf, Karbala, Mashhad and Qom are the most revered by Shia Muslims.[83][84] The Sanctuary of Imām ʿAlī in Najaf, the Shrine of Imam Ḥusayn in Karbala, The Sanctuary of Imam Reza in Mashhad and the Shrine of Fāṭimah al-Maʿṣūmah in Qom are very essential for Shia Muslims. Other venerated pilgrimage sites include the Kadhimiya Mosque in Kadhimiya, Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, the Sahla Mosque, the Great Mosque of Kufa, the Jamkaran Mosque in Qom, and the Tomb of Daniel in Susa.
Most of the Shia sacred places and heritage sites in Saudi Arabia have been destroyed by the Al Saud-Wahhabi armies of the Ikhwan, the most notable being the tombs of the Imams located in the Al-Baqi' cemetery in 1925.[85] In 2006, a bomb destroyed the shrine of Al-Askari Mosque.[86] (See: Anti-Shi'ism).
Purity
[edit]Shia orthodoxy, particularly in Twelver Shi'ism, has considered non-Muslims as agents of impurity (Najāsat). This categorization sometimes extends to kitābῑ, individuals belonging to the People of the Book, with Jews explicitly labeled as impure by certain Shia religious scholars.[87][88][89] Armenians in Iran, who have historically played a crucial role in the Iranian economy, received relatively more lenient treatment.[88]
Shi'ite theologians and mujtahids (jurists), such as Muḥammad Bāqir Majlisῑ, held that Jews' impurity extended to the point where they were advised to stay at home on rainy or snowy days to prevent contaminating their Shia neighbors. Ayatollah Khomeini, Supreme Leader of Iran from 1979 to 1989, asserted that every part of an unbeliever's body, including hair, nails, and bodily secretions, is impure. However, the current leader of Iran, ʿAlī Khameneʾī, stated in a fatwa that Jews and other Peoples of the Book are not inherently impure, and touching the moisture on their hands does not convey impurity.[87][90][89]
Demographics
[edit]

Shia Islam is the second largest branch of Islam.[92] It is estimated that 10–13%[93][94][95] of the global Muslim population are Shias. They may number up to 154–200 million as of 2009.[94] In 1985, Shia Muslims were estimated to be 21% of the Muslim population in South Asia, although the total number is difficult to estimate.[96]
Shia Muslims form a distinct majority of the population in three countries of the Muslim world: Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan.[97][98] A c. 2008 estimate asserted that Shia Muslims constituted 36.3% of the entire population (and 38.6% of the Muslim population) of the Middle East.[99]
Estimates have placed the proportion of Shia Muslims in Lebanon between 27% and 45% of the population,[97][100] 30–35% of the citizen population in Kuwait (no figures exist for the non-citizen population),[101][102] over 20% in Turkey,[94][103] 5–20% of the population in Pakistan,[104][94] and 10–19% of Afghanistan's population,[105][106] and 45% in Bahrain.[107][108]
Saudi Arabia hosts a number of distinct Shia communities, including the Twelver Baharna in the Eastern Province and Nakhawila of Medina, and the Ismāʿīlī Sulaymani and Zaydī Shias of Najran. Estimations put the number of Shia citizens at roughly 15% of the local population.[109] Approximately 40% of the population of Yemen are Shia Muslims.[110][111]
Significant Shia communities exist in the coastal regions of West Sumatra and Aceh in Indonesia (see Tabuik).[112] The Shia presence is negligible elsewhere in Southeast Asia, where Muslims are predominantly Shāfiʿī Sunnīs.
A significant Shia minority is present in Nigeria, made up of modern-era converts to a Shia movement centered around Kano and Sokoto states.[94][95][113] Several African countries like Kenya,[114] South Africa,[115] Somalia,[116] etc. hold small minority populations of various Shia subsects, primarily descendants of immigrants from South Asia during the colonial period, such as the Khoja.[117]
Significant populations worldwide
[edit]Figures indicated in the first three columns below are based on the October 2009 demographic study by the Pew Research Center report, Mapping the Global Muslim Population.[94][95]
| Country | Article | Shia population in 2009 (Pew)[94][95] | Percent of population that is Shia in 2009 (Pew)[94][95] | Percent of global Shia population in 2009 (Pew)[94][95] | Population estimate ranges and notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Islam in Iran | 66,000,000–69,500,000 | 90–95 | 37–40 | ||
| Shia Islam in the Indian subcontinent | 25,272,000 | 15 | 15 | A 2023 census estimate was that Shia made up about 15-20% of Pakistan's population.[118] | |
| Shi'a Islam in Iraq | 19,000,000–24,000,000 | 55–65 | 10–11 | ||
| Shia Islam in the Indian subcontinent | 12,300,000–18,500,000 | 1.3–2 | 9–14 | ||
| Shia Islam in Yemen | 7,000,000–8,000,000 | 35–40 | ~5 | Majority following Zaydi Shia sect. | |
| Shi'a Islam in Turkey | 6,000,000–9,000,000 | ~10–15 | ~3–4 | Majority following Alevi Shia sect. | |
| Islam in Azerbaijan | 4,575,000–5,590,000 | 45–55 | 2–3 | Azerbaijan is majority Shia.[119][120][121] A 2012 work noted that in Azerbaijan, among believers of all faiths, 10% identified as Sunni, 30% identified as Shia, and the remainder of followers of Islam simply identified as Muslim.[121] | |
| Shi'a Islam in Afghanistan | 3,000,000 | 15 | ~2 | A reliable census has not been taken in Afghanistan in decades, but about 20% of Afghan population is Shia, mostly among ethnic Tajik and Hazara minorities.[122] | |
| Islam in Syria | 2,400,000 | 13 | ~2 | Majority following Alawites Shia sect. | |
| Shi'a Islam in Lebanon | 2,100,000 | 31.2 | <1 | In 2020, the CIA World Factbook stated that Shia Muslims constitute 31.2% of Lebanon's population.[123] | |
| Shi'a Islam in Saudi Arabia | 2,000,000 | ~6 | |||
| Shi'a Islam in Nigeria | <2,000,000 | <1 | <1 | Estimates range from as low as 2% of Nigeria's Muslim population to as high as 17% of Nigeria's Muslim population.[b] Some, but not all, Nigerian Shia are affiliated with the banned Islamic Movement in Nigeria, an Iranian-inspired Shia organization led by Ibrahim Zakzaky.[124] | |
| Islam in Tanzania | ~1,500,000 | ~2.5 | <1 | ||
| Shi'a Islam in Kuwait | 500,000–700,000 | 20–25 | <1 | Among Kuwait's estimated 1.4 million citizens, about 30% are Shia (including Ismaili and Ahmadi, whom the Kuwaiti government count as Shia). Among Kuwait's large expatriate community of 3.3 million noncitizens, about 64% are Muslim, and among expatriate Muslims, about 5% are Shia.[126] | |
| Islam in Bahrain | 400,000–500,000 | 65–70 | <1 | ||
| Shi'a Islam in Tajikistan | ~400,000 | ~4 | <1 | Shi'a Muslims in Tajikistan are predominantly Nizari Ismaili | |
| Islam in Germany | ~400,000 | ~0.5 | <1 | ||
| Islam in the United Arab Emirates | ~300,000 | ~3 | <1 | ||
| Islam in the United States Shia Islam in the Americas |
~225,000 | ~0.07 | <1 | Shi'a form a majority amongst Arab Muslims in many American cities, e.g. Lebanese Shi'a forming the majority in Detroit.[127] | |
| Islam in the United Kingdom | ~125,000 | ~0.2 | <1 | ||
| Islam in Qatar | ~100,000 | ~3.5 | <1 | ||
| Islam in Oman | ~100,000 | ~2 | <1 | As of 2015, about 5% of Omanis are Shia (compared to about 50% Ibadi and 45% Sunni).[128] |
Major denominations or branches
[edit]The Shia community throughout its history split over the issue of the Imamate. The largest branch are the Twelvers, followed by the Zaydīs and the Ismāʿīlīs. Each subsect of Shia Islam follows its own line of Imamate. All mainstream Twelver and Ismāʿīlī Shia Muslims follow the same school of thought, the Jaʽfari jurisprudence, named after Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the 6th Shia Imam. Shia clergymen and jurists usually carry the title of mujtahid (i.e., someone authorized to issue legal opinions in Shia Islam).
Twelver
[edit]Twelver Shia Islam is the largest branch of Shia Islam,[129][92][130][131][132][133] and the terms Shia Muslim and Shia often refer to the Twelvers by default. The designation Twelver is derived from the doctrine of believing in twelve divinely ordained leaders, known as "the Twelve Imams". Twelver Shia are otherwise known as Imami or Jaʿfari; the latter term derives from Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the 6th Shia Imam, who elaborated the Twelver jurisprudence.[134] Twelver Shia constitute the majority of the population in Iran (90%),[135] Iraq (65%) and Azerbaijan (55%).[5][136] Significant populations also exist in Afghanistan, Bahrain (40% of Muslims) and Lebanon (27–29% of Muslims).[137][138]
Doctrine
[edit]Twelver doctrine is based on five principles.[61] These five principles known as Usul ad-Din are as follow:[139]
- Monotheism: God is one and unique;
- Justice: the concept of moral rightness based on ethics, fairness, and equity, along with the punishment of the breach of these ethics;
- Prophethood: the institution by which God sends emissaries, or prophets, to guide humankind;
- Leadership: a divine institution which succeeded the institution of Prophethood. Its appointees (Imams) are divinely appointed;
- Resurrection and Last Judgment: God's final assessment of humanity.
Books
[edit]Besides the Quran, which is the sacred text common to all Muslims, Twelver Shias derive scriptural and authoritative guidance from collections of sayings and traditions (hadith) attributed to Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. Below is a list of some of the most prominent of these books:
- Nahj al-Balagha by Ash-Sharif Ar-Radhi[140] – the most famous collection of sermons, letters & narration attributed to Ali, the first Imam regarded by Shias
- Kitab al-Kafi by Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni[141]
- Wasa'il al-Shiʻah by al-Hurr al-Amili
The Twelve Imams
[edit]According to the theology of Twelvers, the successor of Muhammad is an infallible human individual who not only rules over the Muslim community with justice but also is able to keep and interpret the divine law (sharīʿa) and its esoteric meaning. The words and deeds of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams are a guide and model for the Muslim community to follow; as a result, they must be free from error and sin, and Imams must be chosen by divine decree (nass) through Muhammad.[40][41] The twelfth and final Imam is Hujjat Allah al-Mahdi, who is believed by Twelvers to be currently alive and hidden in Occultation.[45]
Jurisprudence
[edit]The Twelver jurisprudence is called Jaʽfari jurisprudence. In this school of Islamic jurisprudence, the sunnah is considered to be comprehensive of the oral traditions of Muhammad and their implementation and interpretation by the Twelve Imams. There are three schools of Jaʿfari jurisprudence: Usuli, Akhbari, and Shaykhi; the Usuli school is by far the largest of the three. Twelver groups that do not follow the Jaʿfari jurisprudence include Alevis, Bektashi, and Qizilbash.
The five pillars of Islam to the Jaʿfari jurisprudence are known as Usul ad-Din:
- Tawḥīd: unity and oneness of God;
- Nubuwwah: prophethood of Muhammad;
- Muʿad: resurrection and final judgment;
- ʿAdl: justice of God;
- Imamah: the rightful place of the Shia Imams.
In Jaʿfari jurisprudence, there are eight secondary pillars, known as Furu ad-Din, which are as follows:[139]
- Salat (prayer);
- Sawm (fasting);
- Hajj (pilgrimage) to Mecca;
- Zakāt (alms giving to the poor);
- Jihād (struggle) for the righteous cause;
- Directing others towards good;
- Directing others away from evil;
- Khums (20% tax on savings yearly, after deduction of commercial expenses).
According to Twelvers, defining and interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) is the responsibility of Muhammad and the Twelve Imams. Since the 12th Imam is currently in Occultation, it is the duty of Shia clerics to refer to the Islamic literature, such as the Quran and hadith, and identify legal decisions within the confines of Islamic law to provide means to deal with current issues from an Islamic perspective. In other words, clergymen in Twelver Shia Islam are believed to be the guardians of fiqh, which is believed to have been defined by Muhammad and his twelve successors. This process is known as ijtihad and the clerics are known as marjaʿ, meaning "reference"; the labels Allamah and Ayatollah are in use for Twelver clerics.
Islamists
[edit]Islamist Shia (Persian: تشیع اخوانی) is a new denomination within Twelver Shia Islam greatly inspired by the political ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood and mysticism of Ibn Arabi. It sees Islam as a political system and differs from the other mainstream Usuli and Akhbari groups in favoring the idea of the establishment of an Islamic state in Occultation under the rule of the 12th Imam.[142][143] Hadi Khosroshahi was the first person to identify himself as ikhwani (Islamist) Shia Muslim.[144]
Because of the concept of the hidden Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, Shia Islam is inherently secular in the age of Occultation, therefore Islamist Shia Muslims had to borrow ideas from Sunnī Islamists and adjust them in accordance with the doctrine of Shia Islam.[145] Its foundations were laid during the Persian Constitutional Revolution at the start of 20th century in Qajar Empire (1905–1911), when Fazlullah Nouri supported the Persian king Ahmad Shah Qajar against the will of Muhammad Kazim Khurasani, the Usuli marjaʿ of the time.[146]
Ismāʿīlī
[edit]Ismāʿīlīs, otherwise known as Sevener, derive their name from their acceptance of Ismāʿīl ibn Jaʿfar as the divinely appointed spiritual successor (Imam) to Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, the 6th Shia Imam, wherein they differ from the Twelvers, who recognize Mūsā al-Kāẓim, younger brother of Ismāʿīl, as the true Imam.
After the death or Occultation of Muhammad ibn Imam Ismāʿīl in the 8th century CE, the teachings of Ismāʿīlīsm further transformed into the belief system as it is known today, with an explicit concentration on the deeper, esoteric meaning (bāṭin) of the Islamic faith. With the eventual development of Twelver Shia Islam into the more literalistic (zahīr) oriented Akhbari and later Usuli schools of thought, Shia Islam further developed in two separate directions: the metaphorical Ismāʿīlī group focusing on the mystical path and nature of God and the divine manifestation in the personage of the "Imam of the Time" as the "Face of God", with the more literalistic Twelver group focusing on divine law (sharī'ah) and the deeds and sayings (sunnah) attributed to Muhammad and his successors (the Ahl al-Bayt), who as A'immah were guides and a light (nūr) to God.[147]

Though there are several subsects amongst the Ismāʿīlīs, the term in today's vernacular generally refers to the Shia Imami Ismāʿīlī Nizārī community, often referred to as the Ismāʿīlīs by default, who are followers of the Aga Khan and the largest group within Ismāʿīlīsm. Another Shia Imami Ismāʿīlī community are the Dawudi Bohras, led by a Da'i al-Mutlaq ("Unrestricted Missionary") as representative of a hidden Imam. While there are many other branches with extremely differing exterior practices, much of the spiritual theology has remained the same since the days of the faith's early Imams. In recent centuries, Ismāʿīlīs have largely been an Indo-Iranian community,[148] but they can also be found in India, Pakistan, Syria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia,[149] Yemen, Jordan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, East and South Africa, and in recent years several Ismāʿīlīs have emigrated to China,[150] Western Europe (primarily in the United Kingdom), Australia, New Zealand, and North America.[151]
Ismāʿīlī Imams
[edit]In the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī interpretation of Shia Islam, the Imam is the guide and the intercessor between humans and God, and the individual through whom God is recognized. He is also responsible for the esoteric interpretation of the Quran (taʾwīl). He is the possessor of divine knowledge and therefore the "Prime Teacher". According to the "Epistle of the Right Path", a Persian Ismāʿīlī prose text from the post-Mongol period of Ismāʿīlī history, by an anonymous author, there has been a chain of Imams since the beginning of time, and there will continue to be an Imam present on the Earth until the end of time. The worlds would not exist in perfection without this uninterrupted chain of Imams. The proof (hujja) and gate (bāb) of the Imam are always aware of his presence and are witness to this uninterrupted chain.[152]
After the death of Ismāʿīl ibn Jaʿfar, many Ismāʿīlīs believed that one day the eschatological figure of Imam Mahdi, whom they believed to be Muhammad ibn Imam Ismāʿīl, would return and establish an age of justice. One group included the violent Qarmatians, who had a stronghold in Bahrain. In contrast, some Ismāʿīlīs believed the Imamate did continue, and that the Imams were in Occultation and still communicated and taught their followers through a network of Da'i ("Missionaries").
In 909 CE, Abdullah al-Mahdi Billah, a claimant to the Ismāʿīlī Imamate, established the Fatimid Caliphate. During this period, three lineages of Imams were formed. The first branch, known today as the Druze, began with Al-Ḥākim bi-Amr Allāh.[153] Born in 985 CE, he ascended as ruler at the age of eleven. When in 1021 CE his mule returned without him, soaked in blood, a religious group that was forming in his lifetime broke off from mainstream Ismāʿīlīsm and did not acknowledge his successor.[153]
Later to be known as the Druze, they believe Al-Ḥākim to be God incarnate[154] and the prophesied Mahdi on Earth, who would one day return and bring justice to the world.[155] The Druze faith further split from Ismāʿīlīsm as it developed into a distinct monotheistic Abrahamic religion and ethno-religious group with its own unique doctrines,[153] and finally separated from both Ismāʿīlīsm and Islam altogether.[153] Thus, the Druze do not identify themselves as Muslims,[153] and are not considered as such by Muslims either.[153][156][157][158][159]
The second split occurred between Nizārī and Musta‘lī Ismāʿīlīs following the death of Ma'ad al-Mustansir Billah in 1094 CE. His rule was the longest of any caliph in any Islamic empire. Upon his death, his sons, Nizār (the older) and Al-Musta‘lī (the younger), fought for political and spiritual control of the dynasty. Nizār was defeated and jailed, but according to the Nizārī tradition his son escaped to Alamut, where the Iranian Ismāʿīlī had accepted his claim.[160] From here on, the Nizārī Ismāʿīlī community has continued with a present, living Imam.
The Musta‘lī Ismāʿīlīs split between the Ṭayyibi and the Ḥāfiẓi; Ṭayyibi Ismāʿīlīs, also known as "Bohras", are further divided between Dawudi Bohras, Sulaymani Bohras, and Alavi Bohras. The former denomination claims that At-Tayyib Abi l-Qasim, son of Al-Amir bi-Ahkami l-Lah, and the Imams following him went into a period of anonymity (Dawr-e-Satr) and appointed a Da'i al-Mutlaq ("Unrestricted Missionary") to guide the community, in a similar manner as the Ismāʿīlīs had lived after the death of Muhammad ibn Imam Ismāʿīl. The latter denomination claims that the ruling Fatimid caliph was the Imam, and they died out with the fall of the Fatimid Empire.
Pillars
[edit]Ismāʿīlīs have categorized their practices which are known as seven pillars:
|
Contemporary leadership
[edit]The Nizārīs place importance on a scholarly institution because of the existence of a present Imam. The Imam of the Age defines the jurisprudence, and his guidance may differ with Imams previous to him because of different times and circumstances. For Nizārī Ismāʿīlīs, the current Imam is Karim al-Husayni Aga Khan IV. The Nizārī line of Imams has continued to this day as an uninterrupted chain.
Divine leadership has continued in the Bohra branch through the institution of the "Missionary" (Da'i). According to the Bohra tradition, before the last Imam, At-Tayyib Abi l-Qasim, went into seclusion, his father, the 20th Al-Amir bi-Ahkami l-Lah, had instructed Al-Hurra Al-Malika the Malika (Queen consort) in Yemen to appoint a vicegerent after the seclusion—the Da'i al-Mutlaq ("Unrestricted Missionary"), who as the Imam's vicegerent has full authority to govern the community in all matters both spiritual and temporal while the lineage of Musta‘lī-Ṭayyibi Imams remains in seclusion (Dawr-e-Satr). The three branches of Musta‘lī Ismāʿīlīs (Dawudi Bohras, Sulaymani Bohras, and Alavi Bohras) differ on who the current "Unrestricted Missionary" is.[citation needed]
Zaydī
[edit]

Zaydism, otherwise known as Zaydiyya or as Zaydi Shia Islam, is a branch of Shia Islam named after Zayd ibn ʿAlī. Followers of the Zaydī school of jurisprudence are called Zaydīs or occasionally Fivers. However, there is also a group called Zaydī Wāsiṭīs who are Twelvers (see below). Zaydīs constitute roughly 42–47% of the population of Yemen.[161][162]
Doctrine
[edit]The Zaydīs, Twelvers, and Ismāʿīlīs all recognize the same first four Imams; however, the Zaydīs consider Zayd ibn ʿAlī as the 5th Imam. After the time of Zayd ibn ʿAlī, the Zaydīs believed that any descendant (Sayyid) of Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī or Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī could become the next Imam, after fulfilling certain conditions.[163] Other well-known Zaydī Imams in history were Yahya ibn Zayd, Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, and Ibrahim ibn Abdullah.
The Zaydī doctrine of Imamah does not presuppose the infallibility of the Imam, nor the belief that the Imams are supposed to receive divine guidance. Moreover, Zaydīs do not believe that the Imamate must pass from father to son but believe it can be held by any Sayyid descended from either Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī or Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī (as was the case after the death of the former). Historically, Zaydīs held that Zayd ibn ʿAlī was the rightful successor of the 4th Imam since he led a rebellion against the Umayyads in protest of their tyranny and corruption. Muhammad al-Baqir did not engage in political action, and the followers of Zayd ibn ʿAlī maintained that a true Imam must fight against corrupt rulers.
Jurisprudence
[edit]In matters of Islamic jurisprudence, Zaydīs follow the teachings of Zayd ibn ʿAlī, which are documented in his book Majmu'l Fiqh (in Arabic: مجموع الفِقه). Al-Ḥādī ila'l-Ḥaqq Yaḥyā, the first Zaydī Imam and founder of the Zaydī State in Yemen, is regarded as the codifier of Zaydī jurisprudence, and as such most Zaydī Shias today are known as Hadawis.
Timeline
[edit]The Idrisids (Arabic: الأدارسة) were Arab[164] Zaydī Shias[165] whose dynasty, named after its first sultan, Idris I, ruled in the western Maghreb from 788 to 985 CE. Another Zaydī State was established in the region of Gilan, Deylaman, and Tabaristan (northern Iran) in 864 CE by the Alavids;[166] it lasted until the death of its leader at the hand of the Samanids in 928 CE. Roughly forty years later, the Zaydī State was revived in Gilan and survived under Hasanid leaders until 1126 CE. Afterwards, from the 12th to 13th centuries, the Zaydī Shias of Deylaman, Gilan, and Tabaristan then acknowledged the Zaydī Imams of Yemen or rival Zaydī Imams within Iran.[167]
The Buyids were initially Zaydī Shias,[168] as were the Banu Ukhaidhir rulers of al-Yamama in the 9th and 10th centuries.[169] The leader of the Zaydī community took the title of caliph; thus, the ruler of Yemen was known by this title. Al-Hadi Yahya bin al-Hussain bin al-Qasim ar-Rassi, a descendant of Ḥasan ibn ʿAlī, founded the Zaydī Imamate at Sa'dah in 893–897 CE, and the Rassid dynasty continued to rule over Yemen until the middle of the 20th century, when the republican revolution of 1962 deposed the last Zaydī Imam. See: Arab Cold War.
The founding Zaydī branch in Yemen was the Jarudiyya. With increasing interaction with the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī schools of Sunnī jurisprudence, there was a shift from the Jarudiyya group to the Sulaimaniyya, Tabiriyya, Butriyya, and Salihiyya.[170] Zaydī Shias form the second dominant religious group in Yemen. Currently, they constitute about 40–45% of the population in Yemen; Jaʿfaris and Ismāʿīlīs constitute the 2–5%.[171] In Saudi Arabia there are over 1 million Zaydī Shias, primarily in the western provinces.
Currently, the most prominent Zaydī political movement is the Houthi movement in Yemen,[172] known by the name of Shabab al-Mu'mineen ("Believing Youth") or Ansar Allah ("Partisans of God").[173] In 2014–2015, Houthis took over the Yemeni government in Sana'a, which led to the fall of the Saudi Arabian-backed government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi.[172][173][174] Houthis and their allies gained control of a significant part of Yemen's territory, and resisted the Saudi Arabian-led intervention in Yemen seeking to restore Hadi in power.[172][173] (See: Iran–Saudi Arabia proxy conflict). Both the Houthis and the Saudi Arabian-led coalition were being attacked by the Sunnī Islamist militant group and Salafi-jihadist terrorist organization ISIL/ISIS/IS/Daesh.[175][176][177][178][179][180]
Persecution of Shia Muslims
[edit]
The history of Shia–Sunni relations has often involved religious discrimination, persecution, and violence, dating back to the earliest development of the two competing sects. At various times throughout the history of Islam, Shia groups and minorities have faced persecution perpetrated by Sunnī Muslims.[181][182][183][184]
Militarily established and holding control over the Umayyad government, many Sunnī rulers perceived the Shias as a threat—both to their political and religious authority.[185] The Sunnī rulers under the Umayyad dynasty sought to marginalize the Shia minority, and later the Abbasids turned on their Shia allies and imprisoned, persecuted, and killed them. The persecution of Shia Muslims throughout history by their Sunnī co-religionists has often been characterized by brutal and genocidal acts. Comprising only about 10–15% of the global Muslim population,[92] Shia Muslims remain a marginalized community to this day in many Sunnī-dominant Arab countries, and are denied the rights to practice their religion and freely organize.[186]
In 1514, the Ottoman sultan Selim I (1512–1520) ordered the massacre of 40,000 Alevis and Bektashi (Anatolian Shia Muslims).[187] According to Jalal Al-e-Ahmad, "Sultan Selim I carried things so far that he announced that the killing of one Shia had as much otherworldly reward as killing 70 Christians."[188] In 1802, the Al Saud-Wahhabi armies of the Ikhwan from the First Saudi State (1727–1818) attacked and sacked the city of Karbala, the Shia shrine in Najaf (eastern region of Iraq) that commemorates the martyrdom and death of Ḥusayn ibn ʿAlī.[189]
During the rule of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist Iraq, Shia political activists were arrested, tortured, expelled or killed, as part of a crackdown launched after an assassination attempt against Iraq's Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz in 1980.[190][191] In March 2011, the Malaysian government declared Shia Islam a "deviant" sect and banned Shia Muslims from promoting their faith to other Muslims, but left them free to practice it themselves privately.[192][193]
The most recent campaign of anti-Shia oppression was the Islamic State organization's persecution of Shias in its territories in Northern Iraq,[177][194][178][195] which occurred alongside the persecution of various religious groups and the genocide of Yazidis by the same organization.[177][178][179][180]
See also
[edit]References
[edit]Notes
[edit]- ^ /ˈʃiːə/ /ˈɪzlɑːm, ˈɪzlæm/
- ^ A 2019 Council on Foreign Relations article states: "Nobody really knows the size of the Shia population in Nigeria. Credible estimates that its numbers range between 2 and 3 percent of Nigeria's population, which would amount to roughly four million."[124] A 2019 BBC News article said that "Estimates of [Nigerian Shia] numbers vary wildly, ranging from less than 5% to 17% of Nigeria's Muslim population of about 100 million."[125]
Citations
[edit]- ^ Armajani, Jon (2020). Shia Islam and Politics: Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. Lanham, MD: Lexington. p. 11. ISBN 978-1-7936-2136-8.
- ^ See
- "Shiʿi". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 4 October 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2019.
In the early 21st century some 10–13 percent of the world's 1.6 billion Muslims were Shiʿi.
- "Mapping the Global Muslim Population: A Report on the Size and Distribution of the World's Muslim Population". Pew Research Center. 7 October 2009. Retrieved 24 September 2013.
The Pew Forum's estimate of the Shia population (10–13%) is in keeping with previous estimates, which generally have been in the range of 10–15%. Some previous estimates, however, have placed the number of Shias at nearly 20% of the world's Muslim population.
- "Shia". Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. Archived from the original on 15 December 2012. Retrieved 5 December 2011.
Shi'a Islam is the second largest branch of the tradition, with up to 200 million followers who comprise around 15% of all Muslims worldwide...
- Jalil Roshandel (2011). Iran, Israel and the United States. Praeger Security International. p. 15. ISBN 9780313386985.
The majority of the world's Islamic population, which is Sunni, accounts for over 75 percent of the Islamic population; the other 10 to 20 percent is Shia.
- "Shiʿi". Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 4 October 2019. Retrieved 30 September 2019.
- ^ "وثيقة بحرينية: الشيعة أقل من النصف". Al Jazeera. 4 July 2011. Archived from the original on 20 March 2023.
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Further reading
[edit]- Chelkowski, Peter J. (2010). Eternal Performance: Taziyah and Other Shiite Rituals. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 978-1-906497-51-4.
- Dabashi, Hamid (2011). Shiʻism: A Religion of Protest. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-06428-7.
- Halm, Heinz (2004). Shiʻism. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-1888-0.
- Halm, Heinz (2007). The Shiʻites: A Short History. Markus Wiener Pub. ISBN 978-1-55876-437-8.
- Lalani, Arzina R. (2000). Early Shiʻi Thought: The Teachings of Imam Muhammad Al-Baqir. I.B.Tauris. ISBN 978-1-86064-434-4.
- Marcinkowski, Christoph (2010). Shiʻite Identities: Community and Culture in Changing Social Contexts. Lit Verlag. ISBN 978-3-643-80049-7.
- Momen, Moojan (1985). An Introduction to Shiʻi Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shiʻism. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-03499-8.
- Shirazi, Sultanu'l-Wa'izin (2013). Peshawar Nights, A Transcript of a Dialogue between Shia and Sunni scholars. Ansariyan Publications. ISBN 978-964-438-320-5.
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein; Hamid Dabashi (1989). Expectation of the Millennium: Shiʻism in History. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-88706-843-0.
- Rogerson, Barnaby (2007). The Heirs of Muhammad: Islam's First Century and the Origins of the Sunni Shia split. Overlook Press. ISBN 978-1-58567-896-9.
- Wollaston, Arthur N. (2005). The Sunnis and Shias. Kessinger Publishing. ISBN 978-1-4254-7916-9.
- Moosa, Matti (1988). Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0-8156-2411-0.
- Shi'a Minorities in the Contemporary World: Migration, Transnationalism and Multilocality. United Kingdom, Edinburgh University Press, 2020.
- Khalaji, Mehdi (27 November 2009). "The Dilemmas of Pan-Islamic Unity". Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. 9: 64–79.
- Bohdan, Siarhei (Summer 2020). ""They Were Going Together with the Ikhwan": The Influence of Muslim Brotherhood Thinkers on Shi'i Islamists during the Cold War". The Middle East Journal. 74 (2): 243–262. doi:10.3751/74.2.14. ISSN 1940-3461. S2CID 225510058.
External links
[edit]- "Shi'a History and Identity". shiism.wcfia.harvard.edu. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Project on Shi'ism and Global Affairs at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Harvard University). 2022. Archived from the original on 4 June 2022. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
- Daftary, Farhad; Nanji, Azim (2018) [2006]. "What is Shi'a Islam?". www.iis.ac.uk. London: Institute of Ismaili Studies at the Aga Khan Centre. Archived from the original on 31 March 2022. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
- Muharrami, Ghulam-Husayn (2003). "History of Shi'ism: From the Advent of Islam up to the End of Minor Occultation". Al-Islam.org. Translated by Limba, Mansoor L. Ahlul Bayt Digital Islamic Library Project. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
- Ayatullāh Jaʿfar Subḥānī. "Shia Islam: History and Doctrines". United Kingdom: Shafaqna (International Shia News Agency). Retrieved 18 April 2023.
Shia Islam
View on GrokipediaTerminology
Etymology and Core Terms
The term "Shia" originates from the Arabic noun شِيعَة (shīʿa), denoting a "faction," "sect," "party," or collective "followers" aligned with a particular leader or cause.[10] In the specific Islamic context, it abbreviates "Shīʿat ʿAlī" (شِيعَة عَلِيّ), translating to "partisans" or "followers of Ali," referring to those who advocated for Ali ibn Abi Talib as the rightful successor to Muhammad immediately after the Prophet's death on June 8, 632 CE.[11] [12] This designation emerged amid the Saqifa assembly, where Abu Bakr was selected as the first caliph by a majority, prompting Ali's supporters to form a distinct political and religious alignment emphasizing familial succession through the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law.[13] Linguistically, shīʿa derives from the root sh-y-ʿ (ش ي ع), connoting "to follow" or "to support," with pre-Islamic and Quranic usages applying it to companions of figures like Noah or Moses, as in Quran 37:83 ("And of his party [shīʿatihi] was Abraham").[14] By the late 7th century, the term solidified as a self-identifier for pro-Ali groups in regions like Kufa, evolving from a political label into a marker of theological divergence by the 8th century under Abbasid rule.[15] English variants include "Shi'a" (preserving the Arabic glottal stop) and "Shiite" (from Persian shīʿī, meaning "partisan-like"), with the latter gaining prominence in Western scholarship from the 17th century onward.[10] Core Shia terms build on this foundation, emphasizing leadership continuity. "Imam" (إِمَام), from the root ʾ-m-m (أ م م) meaning "to lead" or "precede," denotes in Shia doctrine not merely a congregational prayer leader (as in Sunni usage) but a divinely guided, infallible successor from Ali's lineage, responsible for interpreting revelation and safeguarding the community.[16] "Imamate" (Imāmah) refers to this hereditary institution of Imams, viewed as essential for religious authority post-Prophethood. "Wilāyah" (ولاية), rooted in w-l-y (و ل ي) signifying "guardianship" or "authority," encapsulates the Imam's spiritual and temporal mastery over believers, a concept central to Shia allegiance distinct from Sunni caliphal legitimacy.[14] "Ahl al-Bayt" (أَهْلُ ٱلْبَيْت), or "People of the House," designates the Prophet's purified household—including Ali, Fatima, Hasan, and Husayn—entitled to unique veneration and interpretive privilege, as referenced in Quran 33:33.[16] These terms underscore Shia's focus on esoteric guidance and descent-line purity, contrasting with broader Islamic lexicon.Distinction from Sunni Terminology
In Shia Islam, the term Shīʿa (or Shīʿatu ʿAlī, meaning "party" or "faction of Ali") specifically denotes adherents who affirm the divine designation of Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants as rightful successors to the Prophet Muhammad, emphasizing a lineage-based spiritual and political authority rooted in events like Ghadir Khumm in 632 CE.[3] This self-designation contrasts with Sunni terminology, where adherents identify as Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah ("people of the Sunnah and the community"), prioritizing consensus (ijmāʿ) among the Prophet's companions and adherence to his reported traditions (Sunnah) over familial succession.[17] Sunnis view the Shia emphasis on Ali's partisanship as sectarian, sometimes applying the pejorative label Rāfiḍa ("rejectors") to denote rejection of the first three caliphs' legitimacy, a term Shia sources reject as historically imposed by Umayyad authorities post-661 CE to delegitimize Ali's claim.[18] The concept of Imāmate (Imāmah) represents a core terminological divergence: in Shia doctrine, an Imām is an infallible (maʿṣūm), divinely appointed guide possessing esoteric knowledge (ʿilm ladunni) and interpretive authority over the Quran and Sunnah, with the Twelve Imams forming a continuous chain from Ali to Muhammad al-Mahdi.[19] Sunni usage of imām, by contrast, applies generically to any qualified prayer leader, jurist, or even the caliph, without implications of infallibility or divine appointment, as leadership legitimacy derives from communal election or nomination rather than prophetic designation.[20] This distinction extends to wilāyah (guardianship or mastery), a foundational Shia tenet denoting obligatory allegiance to the Imams as extensions of prophetic authority, absent in Sunni frameworks where khilāfah (caliphate) signifies temporal rule by consensus-selected rulers, potentially fallible and non-hereditary.[11] Shia terminology further differentiates in sources of religious authority: ḥadīth collections prioritize narrations from the Imams and Ahl al-Bayt (Prophet's household), termed akhbār al-aʾimmah, over Sunni reliance on the companions' reports compiled in the Six Books (e.g., Sahih al-Bukhari, authenticated circa 846 CE).[18] Practices like mutʿah (temporary marriage) are affirmed in Shia jurisprudence as permissible per Quranic verse 4:24 and narrations from Ali and Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), while Sunnis classify it as abrogated post-conquest of Mecca in 630 CE, using terms like nikāḥ al-mutʿah only to denote prohibition.[19] Similarly, taqiyyah (concealment of faith under persecution) is a doctrinal necessity in Shia texts due to historical marginalization, such as under Umayyad and Abbasid rule, whereas Sunni discourse treats it as a limited expedient without elevating it to a systematic principle.[21] These terms reflect causal divergences in authority validation: Shia from divine appointment via textual proofs like the hadith of the Twelve Successors (narrated in Sunni sources like Sunan Abi Dawud, book 36, hadith 4271), versus Sunni emphasis on historical precedent and majority practice.[22]Historical Development
Succession Dispute and Origins (632–661 CE)
The Prophet Muhammad died on 10 Rabi' al-Awwal 11 AH (8 June 632 CE) in Medina, leaving no explicit written designation for political or religious leadership of the Muslim community.[23] A group of Ansar (Medinan helpers) convened urgently at the Saqifa hall of the Banu Sa'ida clan to discuss succession amid fears of tribal fragmentation, particularly with potential claims from the Khazraj tribe.[24] Abu Bakr al-Siddiq, Umar ibn al-Khattab, and Abu Ubaida ibn al-Jarrah from the Muhajirun (Meccan emigrants) arrived and argued for leadership from the Quraysh tribe, citing Muhammad's tribal affiliation; Abu Bakr was elected caliph by acclamation from a small assembly of about a dozen key figures, emphasizing unity over broader consultation.[25] Ali ibn Abi Talib, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was absent, occupied with washing and burying the Prophet's body alongside family members like Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib; historical accounts, primarily from later compilations like those of al-Tabari (d. 923 CE), indicate Ali viewed the Saqifa proceedings as hasty and illegitimate, withholding his pledge of allegiance (bay'ah) for several months.[26] Supporters of Ali, later termed Shi'at Ali ("partisans of Ali"), traced his rightful claim to events like the Ghadir Khumm declaration earlier that year. On 18 Dhu al-Hijja 10 AH (March 632 CE), during the return from the Farewell Pilgrimage, Muhammad halted a large caravan of approximately 100,000 at Ghadir Khumm oasis and raised Ali's hand, proclaiming: "For whomever I am his mawla (master/guardian), Ali is his mawla," followed by prayers for Ali's acceptance.[27] This hadith is authenticated in both Sunni collections (e.g., Musnad Ahmad) and Shia sources, but interpretations diverge: Shi'at Ali understood mawla as designating Ali for immediate leadership and wilayah (authority), implying divine appointment akin to prophetic succession, while prevailing Sunni views, as in later exegeses, limited it to endorsing Ali's virtue, friendship, and aid against detractors without implying caliphate.[28] [29] Scholarly analyses, such as Wilferd Madelung's examination of early sources, highlight how tribal politics and urgency at Saqifa marginalized such prior endorsements, fostering early partisan divisions.[25] Under Abu Bakr's caliphate (632–634 CE), Ali eventually pledged allegiance after about six months, reportedly following the death of his wife Fatimah (Muhammad's daughter) amid disputes over inheritance like the Fadak estate, which Abu Bakr denied based on prophetic precedent.[30] Umar (r. 634–644 CE) and Uthman ibn Affan (r. 644–656 CE) followed, with Ali serving in advisory roles but facing growing grievances over nepotism and wealth distribution under Uthman, whose assassination by Egyptian rebels on 17 Dhul-Hijjah 35 AH (17 June 656 CE) precipitated Ali's acclamation as caliph in Medina by local residents and incoming provincials.[31] Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, Uthman's Umayyad kinsman and governor of Syria, withheld recognition, demanding retribution, while Aisha (Muhammad's widow), Talha, and al-Zubayr challenged Ali's legitimacy. Ali's caliphate (656–661 CE) was defined by the First Fitna (civil war), originating the distinct Shi'at Ali identity as loyalists prioritizing Ali's leadership. In December 656 CE, the Battle of the Camel near Basra pitted Ali's forces against Aisha's coalition, resulting in 10,000–13,000 deaths and victory for Ali, who pardoned survivors but relocated the capital to Kufa in Iraq for stronger support.[31] The Battle of Siffin (May–July 657 CE) against Muawiya's 120,000 troops along the Euphrates ended inconclusively after arbitration calls, alienating Kharijites ("secessionists") who rejected human judgment over divine; Ali defeated them at Nahrawan (658 CE) but lost momentum.[32] On 21 Ramadan 40 AH (27 January 661 CE), Ali was assassinated in Kufa mosque by Kharijite Ibn Muljam during prayer, wounding him mortally; his sons Hasan and Husayn buried him secretly near Najaf to evade Muawiya's forces.[33] This era crystallized Shi'at Ali as those upholding Ali's precedence from Ghadir and protesting Saqifa's exclusion, distinct from consensus-based Sunni trajectories, though early divisions were more political than fully doctrinal, with numbers of Ali's partisans evident in Kufan backing during the Fitna.[34] Later Shia historiography, drawing from sources like Nahj al-Balagha (attributed to Ali), emphasizes these events as causal to imamate doctrine, while Sunni accounts prioritize communal election for stability; both rely on ninth-century compilations, underscoring interpretive variances over empirical records.[35]Battle of Karbala and Early Martyrdom Narrative (680 CE)
The Battle of Karbala occurred on October 10, 680 CE (10 Muharram 61 AH), pitting a small group led by Husayn ibn Ali, grandson of Muhammad, against forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazid I near the Euphrates River in present-day Iraq.[36] Husayn had refused to pledge allegiance to Yazid following the death of Muawiya I in April 680 CE, viewing the hereditary succession as a deviation from consultative election among the early Muslim community.[36] Invitations from residents of Kufa, a center of pro-Alid sentiment, prompted Husayn to depart Medina in late April or early May 680 CE, initially heading toward Kufa after a stay in Mecca.[36] En route, Husayn's advance scout Muslim ibn Aqil was captured and executed in Kufa on September 9, 680 CE by Umayyad governor Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad, who suppressed support for Husayn.[36] Husayn's caravan of approximately 50 men, plus women and children, was intercepted on October 2, 680 CE at Karbala by a detachment under Hurr ibn Yazid al-Tamimi, forcing a halt short of Kufa.[36] Umar ibn Sa'd arrived with an Umayyad force estimated between 4,000 and 30,000 soldiers, under orders to secure Husayn's submission or elimination; modern assessments favor around 4,000 troops.[36] From October 3, Umayyad forces blocked access to the Euphrates, depriving Husayn's camp of water for several days amid demands for allegiance.[36] Combat commenced at dawn on October 10, lasting until dusk, with Husayn's roughly 72 male companions and relatives—including his half-brother Abbas ibn Ali and sons like Ali al-Akbar—engaging in individual combats before a final assault.[36] [37] Husayn himself fought until slain, reportedly beheaded by Shimr ibn Dhil-Jawshan; total casualties on his side reached 72, including non-combatants like his infant son Ali al-Asghar, killed by arrow.[36] Umayyad losses were minimal, around 88 killed.[37] Survivors, including Husayn's son Ali ibn Husayn (Zayn al-Abidin), incapacitated by illness, and female relatives like Zaynab bint Ali, were taken captive to Kufa and then Damascus, where Yazid reportedly disavowed direct responsibility but displayed the severed heads.[36] The events at Karbala crystallized an early martyrdom narrative among Husayn's supporters, framing his refusal to submit as a principled stand against perceived caliphal illegitimacy and tyranny, distinct from mere political rivalry.[36] Zaynab's public rebukes in Kufa and Damascus, alongside Ali ibn Husayn's survival, facilitated oral transmission of accounts emphasizing the Ahl al-Bayt's endurance of injustice, fostering rituals of mourning that differentiated proto-Shia communal memory from Umayyad-aligned narratives.[36] This narrative, preserved in early histories like those drawing from eyewitnesses, portrayed the slain as sacrificial exemplars, galvanizing pro-Alid factions into a more cohesive identity amid the Second Fitna's broader unrest.[36] While Umayyad sources minimized the event's moral weight, attributing it to rebellion, the martyrdom motif endured, influencing subsequent Shia emphasis on vicarious suffering and eschatological justice without reliance on contemporaneous non-Muslim corroboration due to the conflict's intra-Muslim scope.[36]Evolution of the Imamate and Twelver Lineage
The Imamate doctrine in Shia Islam asserts that rightful leadership after Muhammad consists of infallible Imams divinely designated from his progeny, commencing with Ali ibn Abi Talib as the first Imam, based on interpretations of events like Ghadir Khumm in 632 CE. Initially intertwined with political claims to the caliphate, the Imamate faced suppression under Umayyad rule, prompting a shift toward doctrinal emphasis on the Imams' interpretive authority in fiqh and esoteric sciences, as articulated by figures like Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), who systematized Shia jurisprudence amid Abbasid tolerance before renewed persecution. This evolution reflected causal pressures from state hostility, transitioning Imams from overt rebellion—as in Husayn's case—to quietist scholarship and taqiyya (concealment of belief), preserving the lineage's continuity despite physical isolation.[38][39] Twelver Shia, comprising the largest branch, trace an unbroken chain of twelve Imams through Husayn's descendants, each succeeding by explicit designation (nass) from the predecessor, culminating in the twelfth Imam's occultation to evade Abbasid elimination campaigns targeting Alids. Historical records confirm the existence and martyrdoms of early Imams via cross-sectarian accounts, though later ones rely more heavily on Shia narrations, which posit their imprisonment and poisoning by caliphs like Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809 CE). The doctrine's finalization around the 10th century CE reconciled apparent leadership vacuum post-874 CE by invoking ghaybah (occultation), enabling Twelver survival as a non-state faith until Safavid institutionalization.[40][41] The Twelver lineage is as follows:| No. | Name | Lifespan (CE) | Key Events and Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ali ibn Abi Talib | c. 600–661 | Caliph (656–661); assassinated in Kufa; al-Murtada.[42] |
| 2 | Hasan ibn Ali | 625–670 | Brief caliphate (661); abdicated to Muawiya; poisoned; al-Mujtaba.[42] |
| 3 | Husayn ibn Ali | 626–680 | Martyred at Karbala; al-Shahid.[42] |
| 4 | Ali ibn Husayn | 659–713 | Zayn al-Abidin; survived Karbala; focused on supplications; al-Sajjad.[42] |
| 5 | Muhammad ibn Ali | 677–733 | al-Baqir; expanded hadith transmission.[42] |
| 6 | Ja'far ibn Muhammad | 702–765 | al-Sadiq; foundational in usul al-fiqh; poisoned under al-Mansur.[42] |
| 7 | Musa ibn Ja'far | 745–799 | al-Kazim; imprisoned 17 years by Abbasids; poisoned in Baghdad.[43] |
| 8 | Ali ibn Musa | 765–818 | al-Rida; designated heir by al-Ma'mun but poisoned.[43] |
| 9 | Muhammad ibn Ali | 811–835 | al-Jawad; married at youth; poisoned under al-Mu'tasim.[43] |
| 10 | Ali ibn Muhammad | 827–868 | al-Hadi; confined in Samarra; al-Naqi.[43] |
| 11 | Hasan ibn Ali | 846–874 | al-Askari; under house arrest; father of twelfth Imam.[43] |
| 12 | Muhammad ibn Hasan | b. 869; occulted | al-Mahdi; minor occultation (874–941 CE) via four na'ibs; major occultation from 941 CE ongoing.[44] |
Major Dynasties and Political Ascendancy
The Buyid dynasty, of Daylamite origin from northern Iran, seized power in western Iran and Iraq starting in 934 CE, exerting control over the Sunni Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad until their decline around 1062 CE.[46] This marked the first significant Shia political dominance in the Islamic heartlands, with the Buyids—initially Zaydi Shia but later aligning with Twelver doctrines—patronizing Shia scholarship, speculative theology like Mu'tazilism, and rituals such as Ashura commemorations, while maintaining tolerance toward the Sunni majority to stabilize rule.[46] Their era facilitated the emergence of prominent Shia thinkers and weakened Abbasid authority without fully supplanting Sunni institutions.[46] Concurrently, the Fatimid Caliphate emerged in 909 CE under Abdullah al-Mahdi Billah in present-day Tunisia, as an Ismaili Shia dynasty claiming direct descent from Prophet Muhammad via Fatima and Ali, challenging Abbasid legitimacy by establishing a parallel caliphate.[47] Expanding eastward, they conquered Egypt in 969 CE, founding Cairo as their capital and al-Azhar Mosque as a center for Ismaili da'wa, which propagated esoteric Shia doctrines while accommodating Sunni populations through pragmatic governance.[47] At its peak, the Fatimids controlled North Africa, Sicily, Syria, and parts of the Hijaz, fostering trade and cultural flourishing but facing internal schisms and external Crusader pressures, leading to their overthrow by Saladin in 1171 CE.[47] After centuries of marginalization under Sunni empires like the Seljuks and Mongols, Shia political ascendancy revived with the Safavid dynasty in 1501 CE, when Shah Ismail I, a Twelver Shia of mixed Turkic and Kurdish descent, conquered Tabriz and declared himself shah, systematically converting Persia from Sunni Hanafi dominance to Twelver Shiism as the state religion.[48] This transformation involved coercive policies, including mass executions of Sunni ulama, forced recantations, and importation of Lebanese Shia scholars to embed Twelver jurisprudence, resulting in an estimated demographic shift where Iran became predominantly Shia by the 17th century.[48] The Safavids ruled until 1736 CE, institutionalizing Shia rituals like public Ashura processions and ta'zieh theater, while clashing with the Sunni Ottoman Empire in wars such as Chaldiran in 1514 CE, which entrenched sectarian boundaries in the Middle East.[48] Their legacy endures as the foundation of Iran's Shia identity, distinguishing it from surrounding Sunni regions.[48]Modern Revival and 20th–21st Century Shifts
The Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 marked a pivotal revival of Shia political agency, transforming clerical quietism into revolutionary governance. Widespread protests erupted in January 1978 against the Pahlavi monarchy's secular reforms, economic inequalities from the White Revolution, and perceived subservience to Western powers, with Shia clergy denouncing the regime's irreligion. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, exiled since 1964 for opposing land reforms and suffrage extensions to women, coordinated opposition from Iraq and later France via cassette tapes that reached millions, framing resistance as a religious duty rooted in Shia narratives of injustice. The Shah fled on January 16, 1979; Khomeini returned triumphantly on February 1, and armed forces declared neutrality on February 11, collapsing the monarchy. A March 30–31 referendum overwhelmingly approved an Islamic Republic, enshrined in a December 1979 constitution that implemented velāyat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist), vesting supreme authority in a leading Shia cleric to enforce Sharia and counter secularism.[49] This upheaval exported Shia activism beyond Iran, inspiring militant networks amid regional instability. In Lebanon, Hezbollah coalesced in 1982 during Israel's invasion, drawing on Iranian Revolutionary Guards for training and ideology, positioning itself as a Shia vanguard against occupation while providing social welfare to marginalized communities, thereby embedding Shia Islamism in state-like functions. The group's 1985 manifesto pledged expulsion of Western influences and establishment of Islamic rule, reflecting Khomeini's influence on Shia resistance paradigms.[50] The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 accelerated Shia empowerment by dismantling Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated Ba'athist regime, which had suppressed Shia rituals and massacred dissidents, such as during the 1991 uprisings. With Shia comprising approximately 60–65% of Iraq's population, the post-Saddam power vacuum enabled Shia parties to dominate elections; Nouri al-Maliki, a Shia, served as prime minister from 2006 to 2014, overseeing a sectarian-tinged government that prioritized Shia interests. This shift, alongside Iran's theocratic model, fostered cross-border Shia alliances, including militias combating Sunni insurgents like ISIS from 2014 onward.[51] Demographic concentrations—Shia forming 10–15% of global Muslims, with majorities in Iran and Iraq, and significant blocs in Lebanon (around 45%), Bahrain, and Azerbaijan—amplified this revival, enabling political mobilization in democracies and oil-rich Gulf states. Iran's post-1979 ascent as a Shia pole, coupled with Iraq's transformation, realigned Middle Eastern power from Sunni Arab states toward Shia entities, intensifying sectarian rivalries while boosting communal practices like the Arba'een pilgrimage, which draws tens of millions to Karbala annually in defiance of historical marginalization. These developments underscore a causal pivot from doctrinal introspection to geopolitical assertion, though they have provoked Sunni backlash and internal Shia fractures over clerical versus lay authority.[8][52]Core Theological Beliefs
Ali as Rightful Successor and Imamate Doctrine
Shia Muslims maintain that Ali ibn Abi Talib was explicitly designated by Prophet Muhammad as his successor during the Event of Ghadir Khumm on 18 Dhu al-Hijjah 10 AH (March 10, 632 CE), shortly before the Prophet's death.[53] In a public sermon delivered to assembled pilgrims returning from the Farewell Pilgrimage, Muhammad reportedly declared, "For whomsoever I am his mawla, Ali is his mawla," which Shias interpret as an appointment to religious and political leadership, with "mawla" signifying authority and guardianship rather than mere friendship.[53] This event, recorded in both Shia and Sunni hadith collections such as Al-Kafi and Musnad Ahmad, forms the foundational Shia claim against the subsequent selection of Abu Bakr as caliph at the Saqifa assembly days after Muhammad's death on June 8, 632 CE.[54] The doctrine of Imamate posits that Ali served as the first Imam, a divinely appointed guide possessing infallibility (ismah), meaning immunity from sin and error in conveying divine guidance.[55] In Twelver Shia theology, which predominates among adherents, Imams are selected by God through the Prophet and preceding Imams, inheriting esoteric knowledge ('ilm) of the Quran's inner meanings and authority to interpret Islamic law.[56] This lineage continues through 11 successors to Ali, culminating in the twelfth Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, whose occultation underscores the Imams' role as preservers of truth amid political marginalization.[55] Shias argue that without such infallible leadership, the ummah risks deviation, drawing on Quranic verses like 5:55, interpreted as referencing Ali's unique merit during prayer.[57] Historical analysis, including by scholars like Wilferd Madelung, supports the view that Ali enjoyed strong tribal and prophetic favor for succession, evidenced by pre-Islamic oaths and Muhammad's repeated endorsements, though immediate post-prophetic consensus favored Abu Bakr due to pragmatic concerns over unity.[58] Primary sources for Shia claims rely on hadith compilations from the 9th-10th centuries CE, such as those attributing divine appointment to Ali's designation at Ghadir, which Sunnis acknowledge but construe as affirmation of Ali's virtue without implicating caliphal succession.[59] The Imamate's infallibility is rationalized as essential for unerring guidance, paralleling prophetic authority, and is upheld by consensus among Twelver jurists despite interpretive disputes in early Islamic texts.[60]
Infallibility (Ismah) and Esoteric Knowledge
In Twelver Shia theology, ismah (infallibility) denotes the divine protection granted to the Prophet Muhammad and the Twelve Imams from sin, error, and forgetfulness, ensuring their role as flawless guides in religious matters. This doctrine posits that without ismah, the Imams could not reliably interpret or transmit divine guidance, rendering the institution of Imamate ineffective for preserving Islam's purity post-Prophethood.[61][62] It extends to both major and minor sins, as well as mistakes in judgment or conveyance of revelation, applying from childhood onward for the Imams.[63] Shia scholars derive ismah primarily from Quranic verses interpreted as mandating the sinlessness of the Ahl al-Bayt (Prophet's household), such as Surah al-Ahzab 33:33, which states that Allah intends to remove impurity from them and purify them thoroughly—a verse Twelvers apply exclusively to the Prophet, Fatima, Ali, Hasan, Husayn, and their succeeding Imams.[64] Additional support comes from Surah al-Baqarah 2:124, where Abraham's appointment as an Imam is conditioned on not being from polytheists, implying infallibility as a prerequisite for leadership, and hadiths like the Hadith of Thaqalayn, where the Prophet instructs adherence to the Quran and his progeny to avoid misguidance.[65] Logically, Twelvers argue that an Imam's fallibility would undermine obedience to "those in authority" mandated in Surah an-Nisa 4:59, as followers could not trust erroneous directives.[65] Complementing ismah, the concept of esoteric knowledge ('ilm batin or ta'wil) holds that the Imams possess divinely inspired insight into the Quran's inner meanings (batin), beyond its exoteric (zahir) legal rulings, enabling comprehensive spiritual guidance. This knowledge, often termed 'ilm ladunni (knowledge from God's presence), is transmitted exclusively through the Imams, who act as interpreters of hidden truths inaccessible to ordinary scholars.[66] For instance, Twelver exegesis during Imam Muhammad al-Baqir's era (d. 733 CE) emphasized dialectical balance between zahir and batin, applying ta'wil to verses for prophetic or eschatological significances, such as allegorical readings of creation narratives.[67] This esoteric dimension underscores the Imams' superiority in jurisprudence and theology, where ta'wil reveals causal and metaphysical layers of revelation, distinct from Sunni reliance on apparent meanings and consensus. Critics, including Sunni theologians, contend that such claims elevate Imams to near-prophetic status without explicit Quranic warrant beyond prophets, potentially introducing unverified interpretive privileges.[68] Nonetheless, Twelvers maintain it as essential for the Imamate's continuity, evidenced by narrations attributing to Imam Ali unique unraveling of Quranic profundities.[66]Occultation (Ghaybah) and the Awaited Mahdi
In Twelver Shia theology, the doctrine of occultation (ghaybah) pertains to the prolonged concealment of Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Mahdi, the twelfth Imam, who is regarded as the eschatological figure destined to reappear and establish divine justice. Born on 15 Sha'ban 255 AH (approximately 869 CE) in Samarra to Imam Hasan al-Askari and his wife Narjis, al-Mahdi's existence was kept secret from Abbasid authorities due to fears of persecution, with his birth acknowledged only among a close circle of followers.[69] [70] Following his father's death on 8 Rabi' al-Awwal 260 AH (874 CE), the Imam assumed the imamate at age five, initiating the minor occultation (ghaybat al-sughra), a 69-year period during which he maintained indirect communication with the Shia community through four successive deputies known as nuwwab arba'ah.[71] The four deputies—Uthman ibn Sa'id al-Amri (d. circa 917 CE), his son Muhammad ibn Uthman (d. 917 CE), Abu Ja'far Muhammad ibn Uthman al-Nawbakhti (wait, correction: actually Husayn ibn Ruh al-Nawbakhti, d. 938 CE), and Ali ibn Muhammad al-Samuri (d. 941 CE)—served as intermediaries, collecting religious dues (khums), conveying tawqi'at (signed letters) purportedly from the Imam, and resolving doctrinal doubts.[72] These agents, trusted wakils from prior imams, facilitated limited access, with reports of occasional meetings for select individuals, preparing followers for the eventual major occultation. The minor phase concluded with al-Samuri's death in 329 AH (941 CE), marked by a final letter from the Imam announcing the end of direct deputyship and the onset of ghaybat al-kubra, where no intermediary contact occurs, and guidance devolves to qualified jurists (mujtahids).[73] During the major occultation, spanning from 941 CE to the present, Twelver Shia hold that al-Mahdi remains alive but hidden from public view, sustaining himself through divine means, observing humanity, and intervening subtly via natural events or inspirations to scholars. This belief draws from hadiths attributed to earlier Imams, emphasizing the Imam's ismah (infallibility) and role as the hujjah (proof) of God on earth, preventing cosmic disorder (fasad). Critics, including Sunni scholars, contend the doctrine lacks empirical corroboration and contrasts with their expectation of a future Mahdi born ordinarily, not in prolonged seclusion, highlighting interpretive divergences in prophetic traditions.[71] [74] The Awaited Mahdi (al-Mahdi al-Muntazar) is prophesied to emerge alongside Jesus (Isa) at the end times, defeating the Dajjal (Antichrist), eradicating tyranny, and ruling equitably for seven to nineteen years, filling the world with justice as it was filled with oppression. This eschatology, rooted in narrations from the Prophet Muhammad and Imams like Ja'far al-Sadiq, underscores themes of redemption and the fulfillment of divine will, with devotees engaging in practices like signing petitions (tawassul) or visiting sites such as Jamkaran Mosque, believed linked to the Imam's spiritual presence. While providing theological continuity amid political marginalization, the doctrine has fueled messianic expectations and occasional false claimants historically.[75][74]Hadith, Relics, and Auxiliary Doctrines
In Twelver Shia Islam, hadith collections emphasize narrations transmitted through the Prophet Muhammad and the infallible Imams of the Ahl al-Bayt, prioritizing chains of transmission (isnad) linked to Ali ibn Abi Talib and his descendants over those from other companions. The primary compilations, known as the Four Books (al-Kutub al-Arba'ah), include al-Kafi by Muhammad ibn Ya'qub al-Kulayni (compiled circa 939 CE, containing approximately 16,199 narrations), Man La Yahduruhu al-Faqih by Ibn Babawayh al-Qummi (completed 939 CE), Tahdhib al-Ahkam by Shaykh al-Ta'ifah al-Tusi (early 11th century), and al-Istibsar also by al-Tusi.[76][77] Unlike Sunni methodologies that designate entire collections like Sahih al-Bukhari as fully authentic, Shia scholars apply ilm al-rijal (science of narrator biography) to individually classify hadiths as sahih (authentic), hasan (good), muwaththaq (reliable), or da'if (weak), with no single Shia book claiming comprehensive soundness due to historical transmission gaps and potential fabrications.[78] Shia sources often reject Sunni hadiths that appear to contradict Imamate doctrine, such as those elevating Abu Bakr's succession, while accepting some overlapping narrations after scrutiny.[79] Relics (athar) associated with the Prophet and Imams hold significance for tabarruk (seeking blessings), viewed as conduits for divine favor rather than objects of worship, grounded in hadiths narrating the Imams' encouragement of such practices. Common examples include turbah (dried clay tablets from Husayn's Karbala shrine, used for prostration to symbolize humility and connection to martyrdom), hairs or garments attributed to Muhammad or Ali (preserved in sites like the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf), and footprint impressions or sandals linked to prophets, venerated through touch, circumambulation, or incorporation into architecture for barakah.[80][81] These practices intensified post-Occultation, with relics displayed in shrines during rituals like Ashura processions, though Sunni critiques often label them as innovations (bid'ah) bordering on idolatry, a charge Shia rebut by citing Quranic precedents for honoring prophetic remnants (e.g., Moses' staff).[82] Auxiliary doctrines, derived from hadith exegesis and supporting core principles like Imamate, include raj'ah (the return of select Imams, martyrs, and adversaries before the final Resurrection for justice, as in narrations from Imam al-Baqir predicting Husayn's revival), bada' (apparent alteration in divine decree to manifest wisdom, not implying imperfection in God's knowledge, per al-Kafi traditions), and tawassul (intercession via the Prophet's family, extending to relics and supplications at graves). These are not among the five usul al-din (roots of faith) but inform jurisprudence and eschatology, with raj'ah tied to 1,700 hadiths in Shia collections emphasizing accountability.[83] Such beliefs underscore causal emphasis on the Imams' interpretive authority, though their acceptance varies by denomination and invites scrutiny for potential anthropomorphism in divine attributes.[84]Religious Practices and Jurisprudence
Five Pillars with Shia Interpretations
In Twelver Shia Islam, the foundational acts of worship, often aligned with the Five Pillars of Islam (Shahada, Salat, Zakat, Sawm, and Hajj), incorporate distinctive interpretations emphasizing the authority of the Imams descended from Ali ibn Abi Talib. A hadith attributed to Imam Muhammad al-Baqir (d. 733 CE) states that the "foundation of Islam is upon five" principles: prayer (salat), almsgiving (zakat), fasting (sawm), pilgrimage (hajj), and divine guardianship (wilayah) of Ali and the Imams.[85] This framing integrates wilayah—loyalty to the rightful successors of Prophet Muhammad—as integral to faith, distinguishing Shia practice from Sunni formulations that omit it as a pillar.[86] While Twelver Shia adhere to the Quran and hadith collections like those of al-Kulayni (d. 941 CE) in Al-Kafi, their jurisprudence (fiqh) derives rulings through ijtihad by mujtahids, leading to variations such as the combination of daily prayers.[87] The Shahada, or declaration of faith, in Shia recitation extends beyond "There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is His messenger" to affirm "and Ali is the wali (guardian) of Allah," underscoring the belief in Ali's divinely appointed leadership post-Muhammad, as per events like Ghadir Khumm in 632 CE.[88] This addition reflects the doctrine of Imamate, one of the five usul al-din (roots of religion): tawhid (divine unity), adl (divine justice), nubuwwah (prophethood), imamate, and ma'ad (resurrection).[87] Unlike Sunni usage, where the Shahada suffices for conversion without explicit Imamate reference, Shia sources mandate wilayah for true faith, citing Quran 5:55 ("Your ally is none but Allah and [therefore] His Messenger and those who have believed...").[89] Salat (ritual prayer) requires five daily sessions but permits consolidation into three periods: dawn (fajr) alone, noon-afternoon (zuhr-asr) combined, and evening-night (maghrib-isha) combined, based on hadith from Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE) allowing flexibility for congregational or travel needs.[90] Prayers involve standing with hands at sides (not folded across the chest as in some Sunni schools), facing Mecca, and prostration on natural earth like a turbah (clay tablet from Karbala soil) to symbolize humility and connection to Imam Husayn's martyrdom in 680 CE.[86] Shia prayers include unique phrases invoking blessings on the Imams, such as in the tashahhud, and emphasize intention (niyyah) toward the Hidden Imam. Zakat (obligatory alms) applies to specific assets like livestock, crops, and gold at rates of 2.5–10% as in Sunni tradition, but Shia impose an additional khums (one-fifth tax) on annual savings exceeding basic needs, instituted per Quran 8:41 and hadith directing half to descendants of the Prophet (sayyids) and half to the Imam or his representatives for social welfare.[90] This dual system, absent in Sunni fiqh, funds religious scholars and the poor among Ahl al-Bayt lineages, with historical application under Safavid rule (1501–1736 CE) supporting Shia institutions.[88] Sawm (fasting during Ramadan) mirrors Sunni observance—abstaining from dawn to sunset for 29–30 days—but Shia permit limited exemptions for the ill or travelers, with makeup fasts or fidya (feeding the poor) as alternatives, and include recommended fasts on days like Ashura (10th of Muharram) for mourning rather than thanksgiving.[90] Intention must align with Imamate loyalty, per furu al-din (branches of religion), which expand practices beyond the five to ten obligations including jihad (striving, defensive per Shia just war theory) and tabarra (disavowing oppressors of the Imams).[87] Hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) fulfills the pillar for those able, involving tawaf (circumambulation) and sa'i (running between Safa and Marwah), but Shia perform it under marja' taqlid (emulation of a living jurist) guidance, often combining with umrah and emphasizing avoidance of sites linked to historical Sunni caliphs.[86] Post-hajj, many undertake ziyarat (visitation) to shrines like Imam Ali's in Najaf, viewed as near-equivalent merit due to hadith equating such pilgrimages to supplementary hajj.[90] In Ismaili Shia, pillars extend to seven, adding walayah (allegiance to the living Imam) and taharah (purity), reflecting esoteric priorities over literal rituals.[91] Zaydi Shia align closer to Sunni pillars without khums emphasis, prioritizing political activism.[88]Mourning Rituals and Ashura Observances
![Brooklyn Museum - Battle of Karbala - Abbas Al-Musavi - overall.jpg][float-right] Ashura, observed on the 10th day of Muharram, commemorates the martyrdom of Husayn ibn Ali, the grandson of Muhammad and third Shia Imam, who was killed alongside his companions and family members at the Battle of Karbala on 10 October 680 CE (10 Muharram 61 AH).[92] Husayn's refusal to pledge allegiance to the Umayyad caliph Yazid I led to his caravan of approximately 72 fighters and supporters being intercepted by a much larger Umayyad force of up to 4,000 soldiers near the Euphrates River in present-day Iraq, where they were denied access to water for days before the massacre.[36] This event, rooted in disputes over rightful leadership following Muhammad's death, symbolizes for Shia Muslims the stand against tyranny and injustice, distinguishing their observances from Sunni fasting traditions linked to earlier events like the Exodus.[93] Shia mourning rituals during the first ten days of Muharram, culminating on Ashura, include majlis gatherings where participants recite elegies (marsiya) and narratives of the Karbala tragedy known as rawda-khwani to evoke grief and reflection on Husayn's sacrifice.[94] Processions feature black flags, banners depicting the event, and chest-beating (sinazani) as expressions of sorrow, with participants donning black attire and abstaining from joyous activities such as music or weddings.[95] Ta'zieh, ritual theatrical reenactments of the battle, originated in the Safavid era (16th century) and dramatize the suffering of Husayn and his followers, serving to educate and emotionally engage communities in the narrative of resistance.[96] More intense practices, such as self-flagellation with chains (zanjir zani) or blades (tatbir, involving scalp incisions to draw blood), emerged in later centuries as symbolic solidarity with Husayn's wounds but lack basis in early Islamic traditions and are absent from accounts of immediate post-Karbala mourning by the Prophet's family.[97] These bloodletting rituals, performed by some Shia groups particularly in South Asia, Iraq, and Lebanon, have drawn criticism from prominent clerics including Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who in 2016 deemed tatbir a "wrongful and fabricated tradition" akin to superstition that harms Islam's image and lacks religious justification.[98] Bans on extreme self-harm during processions have been enacted in countries like Iran and Azerbaijan to curb health risks and public backlash, with alternatives like blood donation promoted to channel devotion constructively.[99] While proponents view such acts as profound empathy, opponents argue they distort the rational remembrance emphasized in Shia hadith, prioritizing emotional excess over doctrinal substance.[100]Pilgrimages, Purity Rites, and Tabarruk
In Shia Islam, particularly among Twelvers, ziyarat refers to visitation pilgrimages to the shrines of the Prophet Muhammad's family members, especially the Imams, undertaken to seek spiritual proximity and divine favor.[101] These pilgrimages emphasize devotion to the Ahl al-Bayt, with major sites including the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, Iraq, housing the tomb of the first Imam; the Imam Husayn Shrine in Karbala, Iraq, site of the third Imam's martyrdom in 680 CE; the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, Iran; and the Fatima Masumeh Shrine in Qom, Iran.[102] Pilgrims perform specific supplications, such as the Ziyarat of Imam Husayn, recited annually on Ashura and during Arba'een.[103] The Arba'een pilgrimage, marking the 40th day after Imam Husayn's martyrdom, draws the largest annual gathering of pilgrims worldwide, converging on Karbala from Najaf and other routes, often on foot over 80 kilometers.[102] In 2024, over 21 million Shia Muslims participated, with estimates reaching 22 million in 2023 and forecasts up to 25 million for 2025, underscoring its scale despite security risks.[104][105] Participants engage in mourning processions, communal meals, and recitations, viewing the event as emulation of loyalty to Husayn's stand against tyranny. Ritual purity, or taharat, is prerequisite for ziyarat and prayer in Shia jurisprudence, mirroring Islamic norms but with distinct rulings on impurities (najasat).[106] Shia sources classify ten intrinsic impurities, including urine, blood, dogs, pigs, and kafir (non-Muslim) sweat if known, requiring removal via water or tayammum for worship validity.[106] Pilgrims typically perform ghusl (full ablution) before approaching shrines to ensure taharat, and bodies of non-Muslims are presumed tahir unless proven otherwise, differing from some Sunni views that deem all non-Muslims intrinsically impure.[107] In prayer, Shia prostrate on natural earth or derivatives like turbah to fulfill the Quranic directive for prostration on clean soil, avoiding impurity from direct ground contact in urban settings.[108] Tabarruk, the practice of seeking divine blessings (baraka) through contact with holy relics or sites associated with the Prophet and Imams, is endorsed in Twelver Shia tradition as a means to invoke God's favor via pious intermediaries.[109] Common acts include kissing shrine doors, walls, or graves during ziyarat, as reported in hadiths permitting blessings from the Prophet's remnants, extended to Imams like Ali and Husayn.[110] A prominent example is the turbah, a clay tablet molded from Karbala's soil near Husayn's grave, used for forehead prostration in daily prayers to symbolize humility and connection to his sacrifice; its baraka stems from the site's sanctity, not inherent power.[108] Pilgrims collect this soil for personal tabarruk, believing it aids spiritual purification, though Shia scholars stress tawhid by attributing efficacy to God alone.[111]Unique Practices: Taqiyya, Mut'ah, and Ijtihad
Taqiyya, or dissimulation, permits Shia Muslims to conceal their religious beliefs or practices when facing persecution or harm, prioritizing preservation of life and faith over overt expression. Rooted in Quranic verses such as 16:106, which excuses verbal denial of faith under compulsion provided the heart remains steadfast in belief, and 3:28, advising caution in alliances with non-believers amid fear, taqiyya originated as a pragmatic response to early Shia vulnerabilities under Umayyad and Abbasid rule following the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE.[112] [113] Shia hadith collections attribute its formalization to Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), who emphasized it as obligatory in dire threats, stating it constitutes "nine-tenths of religion" in contexts of minority status and systemic hostility from Sunni majorities.[114] While not exclusively Shia—Sunni jurisprudence permits similar precautionary lying (e.g., in war or reconciliation)—Shia doctrine integrates taqiyya more systematically into jurisprudence, allowing temporary suspension of rituals like prayer timing or dietary observance to evade detection, though it prohibits actions affirming disbelief.[115] Critics, including some Sunni scholars, view it as enabling deceit beyond necessity, but Shia sources counter that empirical historical persecution, such as the execution of Imams and suppression of Shia communities, causally necessitated this adaptive mechanism for survival without compromising core theology.[116] Mut'ah, or temporary marriage, is a fixed-term contract between consenting adults specifying duration (from hours to years) and mahr (dowry), dissolving automatically without divorce proceedings and legitimizing any offspring with full inheritance rights akin to permanent unions. Shia jurists maintain its permissibility based on Quran 4:24, interpreting it as endorsing enjoyment for a specified term, a practice attested in hadith from the Prophet Muhammad's era, including during the conquest of Mecca in 630 CE when companions engaged in it openly.[117] Unlike Sunni schools, which deem mut'ah abrogated—citing hadith attributed to Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab's (r. 634–644 CE) public prohibition around 632 CE as either prophetic revocation or executive policy—Twelver Shia hold that no such abrogation occurred, viewing Umar's ban as an unauthorized innovation lacking Quranic or prophetic mandate.[117] [118] Empirical data from Shia-majority regions like Iran show regulated mut'ah registrations exceeding 100,000 annually in the 2010s, often justified for travelers or economic constraints, though critics argue it facilitates exploitation absent permanent commitment; Shia apologists respond that causal conditions like prolonged separations in pre-modern trade routes rendered it a realistic alternative to illicit relations, with conditions prohibiting concurrent permanent marriages for women.[119] Ijtihad in Shia usul al-fiqh denotes the mujtahid's exhaustive exertion to derive rulings from primary sources—Quran, authentic hadith (especially from the Imams), consensus (ijma' limited to Imams), and reason ('aql)—without the Sunni constraints of qiyas (analogy) or istihsan (juristic preference). Unlike Sunni madhabs, which largely sealed ijtihad's "gate" by the 10th century CE under Ash'ari and Maturidi orthodoxy favoring taqlid (imitation of founders like Abu Hanifa or Shafi'i), Shia jurisprudence, formalized by scholars like al-Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022 CE), sustains open ijtihad through chains of mujtahids tracing to Imam Ali, enabling adaptation to novel issues like modern finance or bioethics.[120] [121] This doctrinal continuity, absent in Sunni taqlid-dominant systems post-classical era, reflects causal realism in Shia thought: the Imams' infallibility provides interpretive authority, averting stagnation amid historical shifts, as evidenced by fatwas from Ayatollah Khomeini (d. 1989 CE) on contemporary warfare.[122] Lay Shia must follow a living mujtahid's taqlid, but the practice's dynamism contrasts Sunni rigidity, where revivalist calls for ijtihad (e.g., by Muhammad Abduh in the 19th century) remain marginal against established schools.[123]Denominations and Internal Diversity
Twelver Shia: Doctrine, Imams, and Global Dominance
Twelver Shia, known as Ithna Ashariyya, represents the predominant branch of Shia Islam, with adherents believing in a lineage of twelve infallible Imams as the rightful spiritual and political successors to the Prophet Muhammad, beginning with Ali ibn Abi Talib. This doctrine emphasizes Imamah as a foundational principle (usul al-din), wherein each Imam is divinely appointed through explicit designation (nass) by the previous one, possessing esoteric knowledge and authority to interpret Islamic law and guide the community. Unlike Sunni views of caliphal election, Twelvers hold that deviation from this line constitutes a rupture in legitimate leadership, rooted in events like Ghadir Khumm where Muhammad reportedly affirmed Ali's guardianship.[124][125] The twelve Imams span from Ali (d. 661 CE) to Muhammad al-Mahdi (b. 869 CE), the latter entering minor occultation in 874 CE and major occultation in 941 CE, during which he remains alive but hidden, communicating through deputies until his return to establish justice. This occultation doctrine underpins Twelver eschatology, positioning the Mahdi's reappearance as a corrective force against corruption. Key Imams include Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765 CE), who systematized jurisprudence (fiqh), and Ali al-Rida (d. 818 CE), whose shrine in Mashhad draws millions annually.| Imam | Name | Lifespan (CE) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Ali ibn Abi Talib | 600–661 |
| 2 | Hasan ibn Ali | 625–670 |
| 3 | Husayn ibn Ali | 626–680 |
| 4 | Ali Zayn al-Abidin | 659–713 |
| 5 | Muhammad al-Baqir | 677–733 |
| 6 | Ja'far al-Sadiq | 702–765 |
| 7 | Musa al-Kadhim | 745–799 |
| 8 | Ali al-Rida | 765–818 |
| 9 | Muhammad al-Jawad | 811–835 |
| 10 | Ali al-Hadi | 827–868 |
| 11 | Hasan al-Askari | 846–874 |
| 12 | Muhammad al-Mahdi | 869–present (occultation) |
Ismaili Shia: Imamate Lineage and Esotericism
![Fatimid Caliphate territories in 1100 CE, representing a period when Ismaili Imams ruled as caliphs][float-right] Ismaili Shia diverged from other Shia groups upon the death of Ja'far al-Sadiq in 765 CE, designating his son Ismail ibn Ja'far as the seventh Imam instead of Musa al-Kadhim, based on the belief in hereditary succession through the eldest capable male heir possessing divine knowledge.[132] This line traces continuously from Ali ibn Abi Talib, emphasizing the Imam's role as bearer of esoteric (batini) wisdom inaccessible without his guidance.[133] The Imamate remained concealed during periods of persecution, emerging prominently with the Fatimid Caliphate in 909 CE, where Imams such as Abd Allah al-Mahdi ruled North Africa and Egypt until 1171 CE.[134] A major schism occurred in 1095 CE after the death of al-Mustansir Billah, splitting into Nizari and Musta'li branches; Nizaris followed Nizar, son of al-Mustansir, establishing the Alamut state under Hassan-i Sabbah from 1090 to 1256 CE, after which Imams operated in concealment until the 19th century.[135] Musta'li further divided into Tayyibi and Hafizi lines, with Tayyibis recognizing a hidden Imam and Da'is as representatives, as in the Dawoodi Bohra community.[136] Nizari Imams resurfaced publicly with Aga Khan I in 1817 CE, appointed by Persian Qajar authorities, leading to the current 50th Imam, Prince Rahim al-Hussaini Aga Khan V, who succeeded Aga Khan IV on February 5, 2025 CE, following the latter's death.[137] [138] The Imamate's hereditary nature mandates the outgoing Imam's designation of a successor during his lifetime, ensuring continuity of authority.[139] Central to Ismaili doctrine is esotericism, embodied in ta'wil, the allegorical interpretation that uncovers the inner (batini) meanings of Quranic verses beyond their exoteric (zahiri) forms, guided exclusively by the living Imam as the "speaking Quran."[140] Ta'wil, derived from returning to origins (aslu), posits that scripture's apparent commands veil spiritual realities, such as equating prayer's five daily obligations with seven encompassing pillars including walaya (devotion to the Imam).[141] This hermeneutic framework, developed in Fatimid texts, structures a hierarchical cosmology where the Imam originates the esoteric order, interpreting creation, prophecy, and law through cycles of manifestation (zuhur).[141] Ismaili thinkers maintain that without ta'wil, exoteric adherence alone risks literalism, obscuring the faith's transformative intellect (aql) and the Imam's role in unveiling haqiqa (ultimate truth).[140] Esotericism thus integrates ethics, intellect, and devotion, with the Imam adapting guidance to contemporary contexts while preserving doctrinal continuity.[142]Zaydi Shia: Political Activism and Yemen Focus
Zaydi Shia doctrine mandates that legitimate imams must publicly claim their right to leadership as descendants of Ali and Fatima, actively rising against unjust rulers through armed struggle if necessary, distinguishing it from the more quietist approaches in Twelver Shiism. This activist ethos traces to the founding figure Zayd ibn Ali, who in 740 CE led a revolt against Umayyad oppression in Kufa, Iraq, emphasizing ijtihad (independent reasoning) and opposition to tyranny as core obligations. Subsequent Zaydi imams, such as Yahya ibn Zayd in 743 CE and Husayn ibn Ali al-Mukhtar in the 760s CE, continued this pattern of uprisings, establishing da'wa (propagation) networks that prioritized political mobilization over esoteric quietism.[143][144] In Yemen, Zaydis consolidated power from the late 9th century, with al-Hadi Yahya establishing the first stable imamate around 897 CE in Saada, marking the onset of nearly a millennium of intermittent Zaydi rule over northern highlands. The imamate formalized under al-Qasim al-Rassi's descendants by 999 CE, blending religious authority with tribal alliances to govern against Abbasid and later Ottoman incursions, enduring as a theocratic polity until the 1962 republican revolution overthrew Imam Muhammad al-Badr after his father's assassination on September 26, 1962. This period saw Zaydi imams repel invasions, such as the Wahhabi raids post-1800 CE, while maintaining a jurisprudence closer to Hanafi Sunni schools, fostering relative doctrinal moderation compared to other Shia branches.[145][146][147] Post-1962, Zaydis faced marginalization under republican governments, prompting revivalist movements amid perceived cultural erosion and Salafi proselytizing funded by Saudi Arabia from the 1980s. The Houthi movement, formally Ansar Allah, emerged in the 1990s under Hussein Badreddin al-Houthi as a Zaydi cultural and theological revival in Saada governorate, criticizing President Ali Abdullah Saleh's regime for corruption and foreign influence; it militarized after al-Houthi's killing by Yemeni forces in September 2004, sparking six wars between 2004 and 2010. By 2014, Houthis allied with Saleh's loyalists to seize Sana'a on September 21, ousting President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi and controlling Yemen's capital and northwest, where Zaydis comprise about 35-40% of the population despite not all endorsing the group's authoritarian tactics or Iranian ties.[147][148][149] Contemporary Zaydi activism via Houthis intertwines traditional calls for justice with anti-imperialist rhetoric, including Red Sea shipping attacks since November 2023 justified as solidarity with Palestinians, though traditional Zaydi scholars decry the group's adoption of Twelver-inspired elements like vilification of early caliphs, viewing it as a deviation from Yemen's historically tolerant Zaydi-Sunni coexistence. Yemen's civil war, with over 377,000 deaths by 2021 per UN estimates, underscores Zaydi political agency amid sectarian framing, yet internal Zaydi divisions persist, with many rejecting Houthi governance as unrepresentative of the sect's rationalist heritage.[150][151][152]Minor Sects: Alawites, Alevis, and Druze Offshoots
The Alawites, also known as Nusayris, emerged in the 9th century as a secretive esoteric offshoot from Twelver Shia Islam, founded by Muhammad ibn Nusayr, a disciple of the 10th and 11th Imams, Ali al-Hadi and Hasan al-Askari.[153] Their doctrine incorporates Gnostic, Neoplatonic, and Christian influences, including a trinitarian conception where Ali represents the divine essence (ma'na), Muhammad the name (ism), and Salman al-Farisi the gate (bab), alongside beliefs in reincarnation (tanasukh) rejected by orthodox Shia and Sunni scholars.[154] Alawites revere Ali as a manifestation of God but maintain taqiyya (dissimulation) due to historical persecution, leading to debates over their Islamic orthodoxy; while they affirmed Twelver Shia affiliation in 1973 to gain legitimacy, external analyses describe their practices as syncretic and divergent from core Islamic monotheism.[155] Comprising about 12% of Syria's population, Alawites have held political dominance under the Assad family since 1970, leveraging alliances with Iran despite doctrinal variances.[156][157] Alevis, primarily in Turkey and numbering 10-20 million, trace origins to 13th-century syncretism of Shia veneration of Ali with Anatolian Sufi, Bektashi, and pre-Islamic Turkic-Shamanistic traditions, emphasizing the Twelve Imams but rejecting mainstream Shia ritual obligations like daily prayers and fasting.[158] Their beliefs include allegorical Quran interpretation, reverence for Haji Bektash Veli as a spiritual guide, communal cem rituals with music and dance (semah), and a focus on inner purity over external jurisprudence, leading many Alevis to self-identify as cultural rather than strictly religious adherents.[159] While sharing Shia terrain like Ali's primacy, Alevism diverges through elements such as potential reincarnation and gender equality in worship, prompting Sunni authorities to deem it non-Islamic and resulting in historical massacres, such as the 16th-century Ottoman persecutions.[160][161] Orthodox Shia view Alevis as heterodox Sufi offshoots rather than core believers, with some Alevi groups rejecting Shia labeling to emphasize indigenous roots.[162] The Druze faith originated in 1017 CE as a closed esoteric branch from Fatimid Ismaili Shia Islam, proclaimed by al-Darazi and Hamza ibn Ali under Caliph al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, whom followers deified as a divine incarnation, marking a decisive split from Islamic tawhid (monotheism).[163] Proselytism ended in 1043, forming an endogamous community of about 1 million, primarily in Syria, Lebanon, and Israel, with doctrines blending Ismaili esotericism, Neoplatonism, Greek philosophy, and reincarnation, while rejecting Quran centrality and five pillars.[164] Druze do not self-identify as Muslims, viewing their Tawhid as a distinct monotheistic revelation superseding Islam; Ismaili Imams condemned the deification, and mainstream Muslims classify Druze as a separate religion due to abrogating prophetic finality and Sharia.[165] Despite shared Ismaili roots, causal divergences—like al-Hakim's occultation paralleling the Hidden Imam—render Druze politically neutral and theologically autonomous, often allying with non-sectarian states amid regional conflicts.[166]Demographics and Socioeconomic Profile
Global Population Estimates and Growth Trends
Shia Muslims constitute approximately 10-13% of the global Muslim population, estimated at 200-300 million adherents as of 2025.[2][128] This range reflects uncertainties in self-identification and regional censuses, with Twelver Shia forming the largest subgroup at over 85% of Shias, followed by smaller Zaydi and Ismaili branches. Iran hosts the largest Shia population at around 68 million, comprising over 90% of its total populace, while significant minorities exist in Iraq (20.5 million), Pakistan (21.5 million), and India (20 million).[128][2] Projections indicate Shia numbers grew from 162-211 million in 2010 to an anticipated 219-285 million by 2030, mirroring the overall Muslim demographic expansion driven by higher fertility rates in developing regions.[2] The Shia share of Muslims has remained stable at 10-13% over this period, with no evidence of disproportionate growth or decline relative to Sunnis, despite localized variations such as sub-replacement fertility in Iran (around 1.7 births per woman as of recent data).[2] Global Muslim fertility averages 2.9-3.1 children per woman, exceeding the world rate of 2.5, sustaining Shia growth alongside migration from high-fertility areas like Iraq and Yemen.[2]| Country | Estimated Shia Population (2025) |
|---|---|
| Iran | 68,000,000[128] |
| Pakistan | 21,500,000[128] |
| Iraq | 20,500,000[128] |
| India | 20,000,000[128] |
| Others (e.g., Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Lebanon, Yemen) | ~70-100 million aggregate[2][128] |
