Hubbry Logo
Organisation of Ukrainian NationalistsOrganisation of Ukrainian NationalistsMain
Open search
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
Community hub
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists
from Wikipedia

Key Information

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN; Ukrainian: Організація українських націоналістів, romanizedOrhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv) was a Ukrainian nationalist organization established on February 2, 1929[21] in Vienna, uniting the Ukrainian Military Organization with smaller, mainly youth, radical nationalist right-wing groups. The OUN was the largest and one of the most important far-right Ukrainian organizations operating in the interwar period on the territory of the Second Polish Republic.[10][22] The OUN was mostly active preceding, during, and immediately after the Second World War. The ideology held by the OUN has been characterized by scholars as a Ukrainian form of fascism[23][24] and[25]/or integral nationalism,[26][27] itself sometimes characterized as proto-fascist,[28] or more broadly as extreme or radical nationalism influenced by fascist movements.[29] Its ideology was influenced by the writings of Dmytro Dontsov, from 1929 by Italian fascism, and from 1930 by German Nazism.[30][31][32][33][34][35] The OUN pursued a strategy of violence, terrorism, and assassinations with the goal of creating an ethnically homogeneous and totalitarian Ukrainian state.[34]

During the Second World War, in 1940, the OUN split into two parts. The older, more moderate members supported Andriy Melnyk's OUN-M, while the younger and more radical members supported Stepan Bandera's OUN-B. On 30 June 1941 OUN-B declared an independent Ukrainian state in Lviv, which had just come under Nazi Germany's control in the early stages of the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union.[36] OUN-B pledged to work closely with Germany, which was described as freeing the Ukrainians from Soviet oppression, and OUN-B members subsequently took part in the Lviv pogroms.[37] In response to the OUN-B declaration of independence, the Nazi authorities suppressed the OUN leadership. Members of the OUN took an active part in the Holocaust in Ukraine and Poland. In October 1942, OUN-B established the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA).[nb 5] In 1943–1944, in an effort to prevent Polish efforts to re-establish prewar borders,[44] UPA units carried out massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia.[36]

In the course of the war, with the approaching defeat of Nazi Germany, the OUN-B changed its political image, exchanging fascism for democratic slogans.[45] After World War II, the UPA fought Soviet and Polish government forces. In 1947, in Operation Vistula, the Polish government deported 140,000 Ukrainians as part of the population exchange between Poland and Soviet Ukraine.[46] Soviet forces killed 153,000, arrested 134,000, and deported 203,000 UPA members, relatives, and supporters.[36][nb 6] During the Cold War, Western intelligence agencies, including the CIA, covertly supported the OUN.[47] A contemporary organization that claims to be the same Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists is still active in Ukraine.[citation needed]

History

[edit]

Background and creation

[edit]
Yevhen Konovalets, the OUN's leader from 1929 to 1938

In 1919, with the end of the Polish–Ukrainian War, the Second Polish Republic took over most of the territory claimed by the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the rest was absorbed by the Soviet Union. One year later, exiled Ukrainian officers, mostly former Sich Riflemen, founded the Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrainian: Українська Військова Організація; Ukrainska Viiskova Orhanizatsiia), an underground military organization with the goals of continuing the armed struggle for independent Ukraine.[48] The UVO was strictly a military organization with a military command structure. Originally the UVO operated under the authority of the exiled government of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, but in 1925 following a power struggle all the supporters of the exiled president Yevhen Petrushevych were expelled from the organization.[49]

Symon Petliura (center) and Colonel Yevhen Konovalets (to Petliura's right) taking the oath of office of the Sich Riflemen training school in Starokostiantyniv, 1919

The UVO leader was Yevhen Konovalets, the former commander of the Sich Riflemen. West Ukrainian political parties secretly funded the organization. The UVO organized a wave of sabotage actions in the second half of 1922, when Polish settlers were attacked, police stations, railroad stations, telegraph poles and railroad tracks were destroyed. An attempt to assassinate Poland's Chief of State Józef Piłsudski was made in 1921. In 1922, they organized 17 attacks on Polish officials, 5 of whom were killed, and 15 attacks on Ukrainians, 9 of whom died, among them Sydir Tverdokhlib.[50]

UVO continued this type of activity, albeit on a smaller scale later. When the League of Nations recognized Polish rule over western Ukraine in 1923, many members left the UVO.[citation needed] The Ukrainian legal parties turned against the UVO's militant actions, preferring to work within the Polish political system. As a result, the UVO turned to Germany and Lithuania for political and financial support. It established contact with militant anti-Polish student organizations, such as the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, the League of Ukrainian Nationalists, and the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth. After preliminary meetings in Berlin in 1927 and Prague in 1928, at the founding congress in Vienna in 1929 the veterans of the UVO and the student militants met and united to form the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Although the members consisted mostly of Galician youths, Yevhen Konovalets served as its first leader and its leadership council, the Provid, comprised mostly veterans and was based abroad.[51][52]

Pre-war activities

[edit]

Prior to World War II, the OUN was smaller and less influential among the Ukrainian minority in Poland than the moderate Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance.[53][54] The OUN sought to infiltrate legal political parties, universities, and other political structures and institutions.[55][36][nb 7] OUN ideology was influenced by several political theorists,[30] such as Dmytro Dontsov, whose political thought was characterised by totalitarianism, national chauvinism, and antisemitism, as well as Mykola Stsiborskyi and Yevhen Onatsky [uk], and Italian fascism and German Nazism.[56][57][58] OUN nationalists were trained by Benito Mussolini in Sicily jointly with the Ustase, they also maintained offices in Berlin and Vienna.[59] Before the war, the OUN regarded the Second Polish Republic as an immediate target, but viewed the Soviet Union, although not operating on its territory, as the main enemy and greatest oppressor of the Ukrainian people.[60] Even before the war, impressed by the successes of fascism, OUN radicalised its stance, and it saw Nazi Germany as its main ally in the fight for independence.[61]

In contrast to UNDO, the OUN accepted violence as a political tool against foreign and domestic enemies of their cause. Most of its activity was directed against Polish politicians and government representatives. Under the command of the Western Ukrainian Territorial Executive (established in February 1929), the OUN carried out hundreds of acts of sabotage in Galicia and Volhynia, including a campaign of arson against Polish landowners (which helped provoke the 1930 Pacification), boycotts of state schools and Polish tobacco and liquor monopolies, dozens of expropriation attacks on government institutions to obtain funds for its activities, and assassinations. From 1921 to 1939 UVO and OUN carried out 63 known assassinations: 36 Ukrainians (among them one communist), 25 Poles, 1 Russian and 1 Jew.[62] This number is likely an underestimate because there were likely unrecorded killings in rural regions.[63]: 45 

The corpse of Bronisław Pieracki on 18 June 1934

The OUN's victims during this period included Tadeusz Hołówko, a Polish promoter of Ukrainian-Polish compromise, Emilian Czechowski, Lwow's Polish police commissioner, Alexei Mailov, a Soviet consular official killed in retaliation for the Holodomor, and most notably Bronisław Pieracki, the Polish interior minister. The OUN also killed moderate Ukrainian figures such as the respected teacher (and former officer of the Ukrainian Galician Army) Ivan Babii. Most of these killings were organized locally and occurred without the authorization or knowledge of the OUN's emigre leaders abroad.[63] In 1930 OUN members assaulted the head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society Kyryl Studynsky in his office.[64] Such acts were condemned by the head of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Andriy Sheptytsky, who was particularly critical of the OUN's leadership in exile who inspired acts of youthful violence, writing that they were "using our children to kill their parents" and that "whoever demoralizes our youth is a criminal and an enemy of the people."[65] OUN's terrorist methods, fascination with fascism, rejection of parliamentary democracy and acting against Poland on behalf of Germany did not find support among many other Ukrainian organizations, especially among the Petlurites, i.e. former activists of the Ukrainian People's Republic.[66]

As the Polish state's repressive policies with respect to Ukrainians during the interwar period increased, many Ukrainians (particularly the youth, many of whom felt they had no future) lost faith in traditional legal approaches, in their elders, and in the western democracies who were seen as turning their backs on Ukraine. The young were much more radical, calling for the use of terror in political struggle, but both groups were united by national radicalism and advocacy of a totalitarian system.[67] The leader of the "old" group Andriy Melnyk claimed in a letter sent to the German minister of foreign affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop on 2 May 1939 that the OUN was "ideologically akin to similar movements in Europe, especially to National Socialism in Germany and Fascism in Italy".[68][69][b] This period of disillusionment coincided with the increase in support for the OUN. By the beginning of the Second World War, the OUN was estimated to have 20,000 active members and many times that number of sympathizers. Many bright students, such as the talented young poets Bohdan Kravtsiv [uk] and Olena Teliha were attracted to the OUN's revolutionary message.[52]

As a means to gain independence from Poland and the Soviet Union the OUN accepted material and moral support from Nazi Germany before World War II. The Germans, needing Ukrainian assistance against the Soviet Union, were expected by the OUN to further the goal of Ukrainian independence. Although some elements of the German military were inclined to do so, they were ultimately overruled by Adolf Hitler, whose racial prejudice against the Ukrainians and desires for economic exploitation of Ukraine precluded formal cooperation. The interwar Lithuanian government had particularly close ties with the OUN.[70]

The OUN was active in the Kingdom of Romania as well, advocating for the separation of Bessarabia[71] and Bukovina from Romania and their integration in the future Ukrainian state.[72][73] According to the OUN-affiliated journalist Dmytro Andrievsky, USSR, Poland and Romania were OUN's main enemies.[73] After the Soviet occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the OUN branch in Northern Bukovina engaged in armed resistance against the Soviet troops.[15] The Soviet authorities alleged that they were backed by Romania.[15]

During World War II

[edit]

Split in the OUN

[edit]

In September 1939 Poland was invaded and split by Germany and the Soviet Union. On 1 November 1939, Polish territories annexed by the Soviet Union (i.e. Volhynia and Eastern Galicia) were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Initially, the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland was met with limited support from the ethnic Ukrainian population. Repression was directed mainly against the ethnic Poles, and the Ukrainisation of education, land reform, and other changes were popular among the Ukrainians. The situation changed in the middle of 1940 when collectivisation began and repressions hit the Ukrainian population. There were 2,779 Ukrainians arrested in 1939, 15,024 in 1940 and 5,500 in 1941, until the German invasion of the Soviet Union.[74]

The situation for ethnic Ukrainians under German occupation was much better. About 550,000 Ukrainians lived in the General Government in the German-occupied portion of Poland, and they were favoured at the expense of Poles. Approximately 20 thousand Ukrainian activists escaped from the Soviet occupation to Warsaw or Kraków.[75] In late 1939, Nazi Germany accommodated OUN leaders in the city of Kraków, the capital of the General Government and provided financial support for the OUN.[76][77] The headquarters of the Ukrainian Central Committee headed by Volodymyr Kubiyovych, the legal representation of the Ukrainian community in the Nazi zone, were also located in Kraków.[78][79]

Despite the differences, the OUN's leader Yevhen Konovalets was able to maintain unity within the organization. Konovalets was assassinated by a Soviet agent, Pavel Sudoplatov, in Rotterdam in May 1938. He was succeeded by Andriy Melnyk, a 48-year-old former colonel in the army of the Ukrainian People's Republic and one of the founders of the UVO. He was chosen to lead the OUN despite not having been involved in activities throughout the 1930s. Melnyk was more friendly to the Church than any of his associates (the OUN was generally anti-clerical), and had even become the chairman of a Ukrainian Catholic youth organization that was regarded as anti-nationalist by many OUN members. His choice was seen as an attempt by the leadership to repair ties with the Church and to become more pragmatic and moderate. However, this direction was opposite to the trend within western Ukraine.[80]

Cover of the OUN-B's Second Grand Congress resolutions.[c]

In Kraków on 10 February 1940 a revolutionary faction of the OUN emerged, called the OUN-R or, after its leader Stepan Bandera, the OUN-B (Banderites). This was opposed by the current leadership of the organization, so it split, and the old group was called OUN-M after the leader Andriy Melnyk (Melnykites). The OUN-M dominated Ukrainian emigration and the Bukovina, but in Ukraine itself, the Banderists gained a decisive advantage (60% of the agent network in Volhynia and 80% in Eastern Galicia).[81] Political leader Transcarpathian Ukrainians Avgustyn Voloshyn praised Melnyk as a Christian of European culture, in contrast to many nationalists who placed the nation above God.[82] OUN-M leadership was more experienced and had some limited contacts in Eastern Ukraine; it also maintained contact with German intelligence and the German army.[83]

Early years of the war and activities in central and eastern Ukraine

[edit]
Triumphal arches welcoming the Nazi occupation in Western Ukraine.[84]
Hlynska Gate, Zhovkva.
In Cyrillic, above: "Glory to Hitler! - Glory to Bandera!", below: "Long live the independent Ukr. Untd. State! Long live the leader St. Bandera!"
In Cyrillic, "Glory to Hitler! - Glory to Melnyk!".

On 25 February 1941, the head of Abwehr Wilhelm Franz Canaris sanctioned the creation of the "Ukrainian Legion". Ukrainian Nachtigall and Roland battalions were formed under German command and numbered about 800 men.[85] OUN-B expected that it would become the core of the future Ukrainian army. The OUN-B already in 1940 began preparations for an anti-Soviet uprising. However, Soviet repression delayed these plans and more serious fighting did not occur until after the German invasion of the USSR in July 1941. According to OUN-B reports, they then had about 20,000 men grouped in 3,300 locations in Western Ukraine.[86] The NKVD was determined to liquidate the Ukrainian underground. According to Soviet reports, 4435 members were arrested between October 1939 and December 1940.[87] There were public trials and death sentences were carried out. In the first half of 1941, 3073 families (11329 people) of members of the Polish and Ukrainian underground were deported from Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.[88] Soviet repression forced about a thousand members of the Ukrainian underground to take up partisan activities even before the German invasion.[89]

After Germany's invasion of the USSR, on 30 June 1941, OUN seized about 213 villages and organized diversion in the rear of the Red Army. In the process, it lost 2,100 soldiers and 900 were wounded.[90] The OUN-B formed Ukrainian militias that, displaying exceptional cruelty, carried out antisemitic pogroms and massacres of Jews.[91][92][93] The largest pogroms in which Ukrainian nationalists were complicit took place in Lviv in two waves in June–July 1941, involving OUN-B activists, German military and paramilitary personnel, Ukrainian, and to a lesser extent Polish urban residents and peasants from the nearby countryside, and in the later wave the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police.[94][95] Estimates of Jewish deaths in these events range between 4,000 (Dieter Pohl),[96] 5,000 (Richard Breitman),[97] and 6,000 (Peter Longerich).[98] The involvement of OUN-B is unclear, but certainly OUN-B propaganda fuelled antisemitism.[99] The vast majority of pogroms carried out by the Banderites occurred in Eastern Galicia and Volhynia.[100]

One of the versions of the "Act of Proclamation of Ukrainian State" signed by Stepan Bandera

Eight days after Germany's invasion of the USSR, on 30 June 1941, the OUN-B proclaimed the establishment of Ukrainian State in Lviv, with Yaroslav Stetsko as premier. In response to the declaration, OUN-B leaders and associates were arrested and imprisoned by the Gestapo (circa 1500 persons).[101] Many OUN-B members were killed outright or perished in jails and concentration camps (both of Bandera's brothers were eventually murdered at Auschwitz). On 18 September 1941, Bandera and Stetsko were sent to Sachsenhausen concentration camp in "Zellenbau Bunker", where they were kept until September 1944. While imprisoned, Bandera received help from the financial assistance from the OUN-B. The Germans permitted the Ukrainian nationalists to leave the bunker for an important meeting with OUN representatives in Fridental Castle which was 200 meters from Sachsenhausen.[102]

In Bessarabia and Bukovina, after they became again part of Romania after the Operation München, the local OUN branches, although initially supportive of the German-Romanian offensive in the USSR, were dissatisfied with the reincorporation of these territories into the Kingdom of Romania and began to organize militias to engage in armed resistance.[103] Initially, the Romanian Prime Minister Ion Antonescu agreed to allow the OUN branches to exist as part of the Romanian Gendarmerie troops but, after they engaged in clandestine activities, they were completely banned.[103]

As a result of the German crackdown on the OUN-B, the faction controlled by Melnyk enjoyed an advantage over its rival and was able to occupy many positions in the civil administration of former Soviet Ukraine during the first months of German occupation. The first city which it administered was Zhitomir, the first major city across the old Soviet-Polish border. Here, the OUN-M helped stimulate the development of Prosvita societies, the appearance of local artists on Ukrainian-language broadcasts, the opening of two new secondary schools and a pedagogical institute, and the establishment of a school administration. Many locals were recruited into the OUN-M. The OUN-M also organized police forces, recruited from Soviet prisoners of war. Two senior members of its leadership, or Provid, even came to Zhitomir. At the end of August 1941, however, they were both gunned down, allegedly by the OUN-B which had justified the assassination in their literature and had issued a secret directive (referred to by Andriy Melnyk as a "death sentence") not to allow OUN-M leaders to reach Ukrainian SSR's capital Kiev (now Kyiv, Ukraine). In retaliation, the German authorities, often tipped off by OUN-M members, began mass arrests and executions of OUN-B members, to a large extent eliminating it in much of central and eastern Ukraine.[104]

According to the Nuremberg Trials documents, on 25 November 1941, Einsatzkommando 5 received an order to "quietly liquidate" members of "Bandera-Movement" as it was confirmed that they were preparing a rebellion in the Reichskomissariat with the goal of establishing independent Ukraine.[105]

As the Wehrmacht moved East, the OUN-M established control of Kiev's civil administration; that city's mayor from October 1941 until January 1942, Volodymyr Bahaziy, belonged to the OUN-M and used his position to funnel money into it and to help the OUN-M take control over Kiev's police.[106] The OUN-M also initiated the creation of the Ukrainian National Council in Kiev, which was to become the basis for a future Ukrainian government.[107] At this time, the OUN-M also came to control Kiev's largest newspaper and was able to attract many supporters from the central and eastern Ukrainian intelligentsia. Alarmed by the OUN-M's growing strength in central and eastern Ukraine, the German Nazi authorities swiftly and brutally cracked down on it, arresting and executing many of its members in early 1942, including Volodymyr Bahaziy, and the writer Olena Teliha who had organized and led the League of Ukrainian Writers in Kiev.[106] Although during this time elements within the Wehrmacht tried in vain to protect OUN-M members, the organization was largely wiped out within central and eastern Ukraine.

A declassified 2007 CIA note summarised the situation as follows:

"The [German] army, which desired the genuine cooperation of the Ukrainians and was willing to allow the formation of a Ukrainian state, was quickly overruled by the [National-Socialist] party and the SS. The Germans used all means necessary to force the cooperation which the Ukrainians were largely unwilling to give. By summer 1941 a battle raged on Ukrainian soil between two ruthless exploiters and persecutors of the Ukrainian people [:] the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. The OUN and the partisan army created in late 1942, the UPA, fought bitterly against both the Germans and the Soviets and most of their respective allies".[108]

OUN-B's fight for dominance in western Ukraine

[edit]
An OUN-B leaflet from the World War II era

As the OUN-M was being wiped out in the regions of central and western Ukraine that had been east of the old Polish-Soviet border, in Volhynia the OUN-B, with easy access from its base in Galicia, began to establish and consolidate its control over the nationalist movement and much of the countryside. Unwilling and unable to openly resist the Germans in early 1942, it methodically set about creating a clandestine organization, engaging in propaganda work, and building weapons stockpiles.[109] A major aspect of its programme was the infiltration of the local police; the OUN-B was able to establish control over the police academy in Rivne. By doing so the OUN-B hoped to eventually overwhelm the German occupation authorities ("If there were fifty policemen to five Germans, who would hold power then?"). In their role within the police, Bandera's forces were involved in the extermination of Jewish civilians and the clearing of Jewish ghettos, actions that contributed to the OUN-B's weapon stockpiles. In addition, blackmailing Jews served as a source of added finances.[110] During the time that the OUN-B in Volhynia was avoiding conflict with the German authorities and working with them, resistance to the Germans was limited to Soviet partisans on the extreme northern edge of the region, to small bands of OUN-M fighters, and to a group of guerrillas knowns as the UPA or the Polessian Sich, unaffiliated with the OUN-B and led by Taras Bulba-Borovets of the exiled Ukrainian People's Republic.[109]

By late 1942, the status quo for the OUN-B was proving to be increasingly difficult. The German authorities were becoming increasingly repressive towards the Ukrainian population, and the Ukrainian police were reluctant to take part in such actions. Furthermore, Soviet partisan activity threatened to become the major outlet for anti-German resistance among western Ukrainians. By March 1943, the OUN-B leadership issued secret instructions ordering their members who had joined the German police in 1941–1942, numbering between 4,000 and 5,000 trained and armed soldiers, to desert with their weapons and to join the units of the OUN-B in Volyn.[111] Borovets attempted to unite his UPA, the smaller OUN-M and other nationalist bands, and the OUN-B underground into an all-party front. The OUN-M agreed while the OUN-B refused, in part due to the insistence of the OUN-B that their leaders be in control of the organization.

After negotiations failed, OUN commander Dmytro Klyachkivsky coopted the name of Borovets' organization, UPA, and decided to accomplish by force what could not be accomplished through negotiation: the unification of Ukrainian nationalist forces under OUN-B control. On 6 July, the large OUN-M group was surrounded and surrendered, and soon afterward most of the independent groups disappeared; they were either destroyed by the Communist partisans or the OUN-B or joined the latter.[109] On 18 August 1943, Taras Bulba-Borovets and his headquarters were surrounded in a surprise attack by an OUN-B force consisting of several battalions. Some of his forces, including his wife, were captured, while five of his officers were killed. Borovets escaped but refused to submit, in a letter accusing the OUN-B of among other things: banditry; of wanting to establish a one-party state; and of fighting not for the people but in order to rule the people. In retaliation, his wife was murdered after two weeks of torture at the hands of the OUN-B's SB. In October 1943 Bulba-Borovets largely disbanded his depleted force in order to end further bloodshed.[112] In their struggle for dominance in Volhynia, the Banderists would kill tens of thousands of Ukrainians for links to Bulba-Borovets or Melnyk.[113]

OUN-B near the end of World War II

[edit]

26 high-ranking members of the OUN-B (alongside Greek Catholic priest Ivan Hrynokh) gathered in the village of Zolota Sloboda between 21 and 25 August, holding a Third Supreme Assembly. Termed "extraordinary" (Ukrainian: надзвичайний, romanizednadzvychainyi; also read as "emergency") by the organisers, the meeting rejected the policies of integral nationalism in Bandera's absence in favour of pro-democratic and pro-peasantry positions. This was combined with the beginning of an insurgency against the Germans simultaneously with fighting Soviet partisans and Polish civilians in an effort to secure the existence of a Ukrainian state.[114]

The policies adopted at the Third Supreme Assembly had been spurred by the German defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad,[115] as well as a desire to appeal to people in central and eastern Ukraine who were reluctant to support the OUN-B due to its authoritarian policy. While this resistance to Germany was strongly opposed by the OUN-B's older members, who were reluctant to reform, it was welcomed by younger members who viewed Ukraine's independence as their primary aim.[116] Local western Ukrainians also positively assessed the OUN-B's anti-German activities, though the Soviets' Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive shortly after the insurgency began led to the expulsion of German forces from western Ukraine.[117] Marples has argued that the anti-German activities of the UPA were primarily interested in preventing the Germans from totally assuming control over Volhynia and Polesia, which were the primary strongholds of the UPA at the time.[118]

Besides armed struggle, according to ICJ documents, OUN-B (referred as "Banderagruppe") was spreading anti-German propaganda comparing German policy towards Ukrainians with Holodomor.[119]

By the fall of 1943, the OUN-B forces had established their control over substantial portions of rural areas in Volhynia and southwestern Polesia. While the Germans controlled the large towns and major roads, such a large area east of Rivne had come under the control of the OUN-B that it was able to set about creating a "state" system with military training schools, hospitals and a school system, involving tens of thousands of personnel.[120]

Beginning in 1944, the OUN began to ally with the Germans in exchange for arms and control of territory. In a top-secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadeführer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS-Obergruppenführer General Hans-Adolf Prützmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that "The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into the enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the [German] Army Group" on the southern front.[121] By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for the UPA for their anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom"[122] In the latter half of 1944, Germans were supplying the OUN/UPA with arms and equipment in exchange for the end of attacks on German positions, along with further UPA attacks on the Soviets.[16] In the Ivano-Frankivsk region, there even existed a small landing strip for German transport planes. Some German personnel trained in terrorist and intelligence activities behind Soviet lines, as well as some OUN-B leaders, were also transported through this channel.[123]

Adopting a strategy analogous to that of the Chetnik leader General Draža Mihailović,[124] the UPA limited its actions against the Germans in order to better prepare itself for and engage in the struggle against the Communists. Because of this, although the UPA managed to limit German activities to a certain extent, it failed to prevent the Germans from deporting approximately 500,000 people from Western Ukraine and from economically exploiting Western Ukraine.[124] Due to its focus on the Soviets as the principal threat, the UPA's anti-German struggle did not contribute significantly to the recapture of Ukrainian territories by Soviet forces.[125]

The OUN-B was actively involved in the massacres of Poles in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, through the formally independent but heavily connected UPA.[118] The majority of delegates at the Third Supreme Assembly expressed their formal approval the anti-Polish violence led by Dmytro Klyachkivsky.[126]

After the Second World War

[edit]

Cold War

[edit]

After the war, the OUN in eastern and southern Ukraine continued to struggle against the Soviets; 1958 marked the last year when an OUN member was arrested in Donetsk.[127] Both branches of the OUN continued to be quite influential within the Ukrainian diaspora. The OUN-B formed the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, a group headed by Yaroslav Stetsko, in 1943. The Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations it created and headed would include at various times emigre organizations from almost every eastern European country with the exception of Poland: Croatia, the Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, anti-communist émigré Cossacks, Hungary, Georgia, Bohemia-Moravia (today the Czech Republic), and Slovakia. In the 1970s, the ABN was joined by anti-communist Vietnamese and Cuban organizations.[128] The Lithuanian partisans had particularly close ties with the OUN.[70] In 1956, Bandera's OUN split into two parts,[129] the more moderate OUN(z) led by Lev Rebet and Zinoviy Matla, and the more ethno-nationalist OUN led by Bandera.[129]

Soon after the defeat of Nazi Germany in 1945 exiled members of the OUN established contacts with British intelligence. These contacts were facilitated by Gerhard von Mende, a German professor and supporter of the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc. Great Britain also hosted the archives of OUN-B's foreign branch, which were transferred from Germany after the victory of Willy Brandt's Social Democrats in 1970. During the Cold War OUN's agents provided British intelligence with data on Soviet military objects and other strategic locations not only in Ukraine, but also in other parts of the USSR, and also informed them about military maneuvers, mobilization process and general mood of the population in the Soviet Union and its satellite states. British intelligence, in its turn, engaged in training of OUN-B members. More than 10 schools preparing Ukrainian emigres for underground activities against the Soviet regime were organized in Bavaria, Lower Saxony and London. According to information provided to the KGB, training centres for OUN-B members remained active in the United Kingdom into the 1980s.[130]

In May 1951, a group of OUN-B agents was airlifted to Ukraine from the British base in Malta, landing in the Ternopil region and attempting to establish ties with the local anti-communist resistance. However, as a result of a provocation, they were captured by Soviet interior troops. During the same period a similar group was created by United States intelligence from supporters of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council. The last group of OUN-B agents from abroad entered Ukraine in 1960, illegally crossing the Polish-Soviet border in the area between Przemyśl and Dobromyl. After the cessation of open resistance against the Soviet regime in Ukraine, starting from the mid-to-late 1960s numerous OUN-B agents would penetrate the border posing as tourists. After the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s the OUN openly supported anti-Soviet intelligentsia circles in Soviet Ukraine.[131]

Independent Ukraine

[edit]
Euromaidan in Kyiv, December 2013. Protesters with OUN-B flag.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, both OUN factions resumed activities within Ukraine. The Melnyk faction threw its support behind the Ukrainian Republican Party at the time that it was headed by Levko Lukyanenko. The OUN-B reorganized itself within Ukraine as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN) (registered as a political party in January 1993[132]). Its conspiratorial leaders within the diaspora did not want to openly enter Ukrainian politics and attempted to imbue this party with a democratic, moderate facade. However, within Ukraine, the project attracted more nationalists who took the party to the right.[133] Until her death in 2003, KUN was headed by Slava Stetsko, widow of Yaroslav Stetsko, who also simultaneously headed the OUN and the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations.

On 9 March 2010, the Kyiv Post reported that the OUN (technically the OUN-M) rejected Yulia Tymoshenko's calls to unite "all of the national patriotic forces" led by the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc against Viktor Yanukovych. The OUN-M demanded that Yanukovych should reject the idea of cancelling the Hero of Ukraine status given to Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych, Yanukovych should continue the practice of recognising fighters for Ukraine's independence, which was launched by (his predecessor) Viktor Yushchenko, and posthumously award the Hero of Ukraine titles to Yevhen Konovalets and Symon Petliura.[134] On 19 November 2018, the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, as well as the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian nationalist groups Right Sector and C14, endorsed Ruslan Koshulynskyi's candidacy in the 2019 Ukrainian presidential election.[135] In the election Koshulynskyi received 1.6% of the votes.[136]

Organization

[edit]

The OUN was led by a Vozhd or Supreme Leader. Originally the Vozhd was Yevhen Konovalets; after his assassination he was succeeded by Andriy Melnyk resulting in a split where the Galician youths followed their own Vozhd, Stepan Bandera. Underneath the Vozhd were the Provid, or directorate. At the start of the second world war the OUN's leadership consisted of the Vozhd, Andrii Melnyk, and eight members of the Provid.[137] The Provid members were: Generals Kurmanovych and Kapustiansky (both generals from the times of Ukraine's revolution in 1918–1920); Yaroslav Baranovsky, a law student; Dmytro Andriievsky, a politically moderate former diplomat of the revolutionary government from eastern Ukraine; Richard Yary, a former officer of the Austrian and Galician militaries who served as a liaison with the German intelligence services, the Abwehr; colonel Roman Sushko, another former Austrian and Galician officer; Mykola Stsiborsky, the son of a tsarist military officer from Zhytomir, who served as the OUN's official theorist; and Omelian Senyk, a party organizer and veteran of the Austrian and Galician armies who by the 1940s was considered too moderate and too conservative by the youngest generation of Galician youths.[137] Yary would be the only member of the original Provid to join Bandera after the OUN split.[138]

Ideology

[edit]
Front page of a 1948 copy of the Decalogue of a Ukrainian Nationalist

The primary goal of OUN was to establish an independent and ethnically pure Ukrainian state.[139][140][34] The OUN's leadership felt that past attempts at securing independence failed due to democratic values in society, poor party discipline and a conciliatory attitude towards Ukraine's traditional enemies. Its ideology rejected the socialist ideas supported by Petliura,[citation needed] and the compromises of Galicia's traditional elite. Instead, the OUN, particularly its younger members, adopted the ideology of Dmytro Dontsov, an émigré from Eastern Ukraine.

The OUN was formed from the UVO and several extreme right-wing organizations, including the Ukrainian National Association, the Union of Ukrainian Fascists and the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine.[141][142] Initially, it was led by war veterans who failed to establish a Ukrainian state in 1917–1920.[141] According to Per Anders Rudling, the ideology of the organization was heavily influenced by the philosophy of Nietzsche, German Nazism, and Italian fascism, combining extreme nationalism with terrorism, corporatism, and antisemitism.[141] Heorhii Kasyanov wrote that it manifested typical anti-democratic features.[142]

Chief principles of OUN's ideology were formulated by the Decalogue of a Ukrainian Nationalist published by Stepan Lenkavskyi in 1929.

Nationalism

[edit]

The nationalists who emerged in Galicia following the First World War, much as in the rest of Europe, adopted the form of nationalism known as Integral nationalism.[143][nb 8] According to this ideology, the nation was held to be of the highest absolute value, more important than social class, regions, the individual, religion, etc. To this end, OUN members were urged to "force their way into all areas of national life" such as institutions, societies, villages and families. Politics was seen as a Darwinian struggle between nations for survival, rendering conflict unavoidable and justifying any means that would lead to the victory of one's nation over that of others. In this context willpower was seen as more important than reason,[52] and warfare was glorified as an expression of national vitality.

Integral nationalism became a powerful force in much of Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. The OUN's conceptualization of this idea was particular in several ways. Because Ukraine was stateless and surrounded by more powerful neighbors, the emphasis on force and warfare was to be expressed in acts of terrorism rather than open warfare, and illegality was glorified. Because Ukrainians did not have a state to glorify or serve, the emphasis was placed on a "pure" national language and culture rather than a State. There was a strain of fantastic romanticism, in which the unsophisticated Ukrainian rejection of reason was more spontaneous and genuine than the cynical rejection of reason by German or Italian integral nationalists.[144] The OUN viewed the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church as a rival and condemned Catholic leaders as police informers or potential informers; the Church rejected integral nationalism as incompatible with Christian ethics. The conflict between the OUN and the Church eased in the late 1930s.[145]

Dmytro Dontsov claimed that the 20th century would witness the "twilight of the gods to whom the nineteenth century prayed" and that a new man must be created, with the "fire of fanatical commitment" and the "iron force of enthusiasm", and that the only way forward was through "the organization of a new violence." This new doctrine was the chynnyi natsionalizm – the "nationalism of the deed".[146] To dramatize and spread such views, OUN literature mythologized the cult of struggle, sacrifice, and emphasized national heroes.[52] The OUN, particularly Bandera, held a romantic view of the Ukrainian peasantry, glorified the peasants as carriers of Ukrainian culture and linked them with the deeds and exploits of the Ukrainian Cossacks from previous centuries. The OUN believed that a goal of professional revolutionaries was, through revolutionary acts, to awaken the masses. In this aspect the OUN had much in common with 19th-century Russian Narodniks.[147]

Fascism

[edit]

The classification of the ideology of interwar Ukrainian nationalism has been the subject of a long-running debate among historians.[148] Political scientist Ivan Gomza notes that heated debates have arisen around fascist designations of various interwar nationalist organizations, politicians, and ideologies, writing that "Due to the conceptual hindrance, it is difficult to characterize the OUN's ideology as fascist since it remains unclear what fascism is."[149] Gomza characterises the historiography as being divided between two polarized narratives that he terms the "invective" and the "heroic".[149] According to Gomza, the 'invective' narrative presents the OUN as a chauvinist organization "willingly committing the most egregious crimes" while the 'heroic' narrative presents the OUN as a patriotic organization fighting to liberate the subjugated Ukrainian people.[149]

Historian Per Anders Rudling described the OUN as having "the fascist attributes of anti-liberalism, anti-conservatism, and anticommunism, an armed party, totalitarianism, anti-Semitism, 'Führerprinzip', and an adoption of fascist greetings. Its leaders eagerly emphasized to Hitler and Ribbentrop that they shared the Nazi 'Weltanschauung' and a commitment to a fascist New Europe."[141] He described it as a "typical fascist movement" and wrote that it "cultivated close relations with Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, the Spanish Falange and the Croatian Ustaše".[150]

According to political scientist Ivan Gomza, the "morphological structure" of the OUN's ideology in the 1930s and early 1940s could be defined as fascist because it had the following principles: (1) rebirth of the national community; (2) the search for some new form of political and economic organization, which transcends liberal democracy and collectivistic communism; and (3) the use of threats and violence during its political struggle.[151] Gomza wrote that OUN writers rejected both Soviet communism and liberal democracy and wished to instill a single-party state, living in the unrealized glory of battles past and an economic system that aimed to avoid class conflict.[151] He also argued that violence was an "extensive, widespread and frequent" occurrence and was central in the group's ideology and policy; the group took advantage of wartime chaos to eliminate Polish, Muscovite and Jewish activist groups. However, he wrote that after 1943 some "peripheral concepts" came to substitute the fascist core, which led to a splinter within the OUN and subsequent democratization of one of its factions.[151]

The political scientist Ivan Katchanovski described it as "a semi-totalitarian organization which combined elements of extreme nationalism and fascism".[152] Historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe wrote that the OUN had "created its own form of fascism" and that it "attempted to become a mass movement and to establish an ethnically homogenous Ukrainian state. It viewed and used mass violence as a political aim and killed civilians en masse."[153] He also wrote that the members of the movement "claimed to be related to movements such as the Italian Fascists, the German Nazis, the Ustasa, and the Iron Guard".[59] Marples has described how some writers in the OUN tradition, as well as some later Ukrainian writers, have been "self-deceptive" in emphasizing the absence of racism from OUN ideology, downplaying its connection to western European fascism, and suggesting that the Ukrainian brand of nationalism was a product of domestic development.[142]

Political scientist Alexander J. Motyl considered the OUN to have fascist inclinations, but viewed it to be a kind of nationalist movement, with differences from fascism arising from the goal of nationalists to create nations, rather than run existing nations. He compared it in its nature to other national liberation movements which had authoritarian inclinations, strong leaders, and engaged in violence and terrorism, such as the Algerian National Liberation Front or the Palestine Liberation Organization.[154][155] According to historian Stanley Payne "there were elements in [the OUN] that favored fascism, but it was not so much a revolutionary movement as a composite radical nationalism". He said it was "highly authoritarian and violently antisemitic" but said that was "rather common in the East European politics of the era". According to him, it was on the "extreme end of the radical right but not fully fascist", and the ideology was comparable to Putinism, saying the only difference between them is the antisemitism.[156]

Political scientist Luboš Veselý criticises Rossoliński-Liebe as intentionally painting all Ukrainian nationalists negatively. Per Veselý, Rossoliński-Liebe "considers nationalism in general to be closely related to fascism" and fails to put Ukrainian nationalism, as well as antisemitism and fascist movements, in context of their rise in other European countries at the time. Rossoliński-Liebe does not mention arguments of other Ukrainian historians, such as Heorhii Kasianov. Veselý rejects Rossoliński-Liebe's conclusion that Ukrainian nationalists needed the protection of Nazi Germany and therefore collaborated with them.[157][clarification needed]

Ukrainian historian Oleksandr Zaitsev notes that Rossolinski-Liebe's approach ignores "the fundamental differences between ultra-nationalist movements of nations with and without a state". Zaitsev highlights that the OUN did not identify itself with fascism, but "officially objected to this identification". Zaitsev suggests that it would be more correct to see the OUN as the revolutionary ultranationalist movements of stateless nations, which were aiming not to "the reorganization of the existing state according to totalitarian principles, but to create a new state, using all available means, including terror, to this end." According to Zaitsev, Rossolinski-Liebe omits some facts[clarification needed], which do not fit into his "a priori scheme of 'fascism', 'racism' and 'genocidal nationalism'", and denies "the presence of liberatory and democratic elements" in Bandera movement.[158] Zaitsev offers the term ustashism as a designation for the ideology of the OUN which he defines in a generic sense pertaining to integral nationalism— he has since defined the OUN's ideology as "proto-fascist integral nationalism in the absence of nation-state".[27][159]

Beyond World War II

[edit]

Many Ukrainian historians, such as Peter Potichnyj, have argued that from 1941 and especially after the war, the OUN developed in a pro-democratic and anti-Nazi direction.[142][160] After the Second World War, OUN émigrés and UPA members began to produce documents that emphasised this shift and downplayed the controversial aspects of the organization. For example, they published anti-Nazi texts by OUN activists.[142] In some documents, they removed statements related to fascism or the Holocaust; in one case, they reprinted the April 1941 resolution in Kraków of the Second Great Congress of OUN, omitting that the organisation adopted an official salute consisting of the fascist salute while shouting "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes!".[12] OUN's denials of its role in the Holocaust began in 1943 after it became obvious that Germany would lose the war. What Rossolinski describes as a whitewashing of its history continued after the war, with OUN's propaganda describing its legacy as a "heroic Ukrainian resistance against the Nazis and the Communists".[161][162][163]

In 1943, the OUN developed a new political program that focused on a "new order of a free individual. A man's free will should animate social life." The group also accepted a market economy, officially abandoned ethnic chauvinism, and accepted liberal democratic values.[151]

Although the groups realized allegiance to these edits, and whether the group could in fact remove itself from the label of fascism is debated among historians, the result of these changes led to a split, which divided the faction into two groups, the fascists, and the liberals.[151] The infighting of these groups was limited to diasporic communities in the US, Canada, and Germany.[151] notably, the liberal faction became more powerful due to support from the United States Government which funded multiple thinktanks including the Prolog Research and Publishing Company.[151]

Authoritarianism

[edit]

The nation was to be unified under a single party led by a hierarchy of proven fighters. At the top was to be a Supreme Leader or Vozhd. In some respects the OUN's creed was similar to that of other eastern European, radical right-wing agrarian movements, such as Romania's Legion of the Archangel Michael (more commonly known as the Iron Guard), Croatia's Ustashe, Hungary's Arrow Cross Party, and similar groups in Slovakia and Poland;[52] however, there were significant differences within the OUN regarding its relationship to fascism. The more moderate leaders living in exile admired some facets of Benito Mussolini's Italian fascism but condemned Nazism, while the younger more radical members based within Ukraine admired the fascist ideas and methods as practised by the Nazis.[164] The faction-based abroad supported rapprochement with the Ukrainian Catholic Church while the younger radicals were anti-clerical and felt that not considering the Nation to be the Absolute was a sign of weakness.[82] The two factions of the OUN each had their own understanding of the nature of the leader. The Melnyk faction considered the leader to be the director of the Provid and in its writings emphasized a military subordination to the hierarchical superiors of the Provid. It was more autocratic than totalitarian. The Bandera faction, in contrast, emphasized complete submission to the will of the supreme leader.[165]

At a party congress in August 1943, the OUN-B rejected much of its fascistic ideology in favor of a democratic model, while maintaining its hierarchical structure. This change could be attributed in part to the influence of the leadership of Roman Shukhevych, the new leader of UPA, who was more focused on military matters rather than on ideology and was more receptive to different ideological themes than were the fanatical OUN-B political leaders, and was interested in gaining and maintaining the support of deserters or others from Eastern Ukraine. During this party congress, the OUN-B backed off its commitment to private ownership of land, increased worker participation in the management of industry, equality for women, free health services and pensions for the elderly, and free education. Some points in the program referred to the rights of national minorities and guaranteed freedom of speech, religion, and the press and rejected the official status of any doctrine. Nevertheless, the authoritarian elements were not discarded completely and were reflected in the continued insistence on the "heroic spirit" and "social solidarity, friendship and discipline."[166] In exile, the OUN's ideology was focused on opposition to communism.

Treatment of non-Ukrainians

[edit]

The OUN intended to create a Ukrainian state with widely understood Ukrainian territories, but inhabited by Ukrainian people narrowly understood, according to Timothy Snyder. Its first congress in 1929 resolved that "Only the complete removal of all occupiers from Ukrainian lands will allow for the general development of the Ukrainian Nation within its own state." OUN's "Ten Commandments" stated "Aspire to expand the strength, riches, and size of the Ukrainian State even by means of enslaving foreigners",[167] or "Thou shalt struggle for the glory, greatness, power, and space of the Ukrainian state by enslaving the strangers". This formulation was modified by OUN's theoreticians in the 1950s and shortened to "Thou shalt struggle for the glory, greatness, power, and space of the Ukrainian state".[151] According to Door Karel C. Berkhoff, due to the influence of Roman Shukhevych on the OUN[clarification needed] the organization in October 1943, issued a communication (in Ukrainian only) that condemned the "mutual mass murders" of Ukrainians and Poles.[168]

Antisemitism

[edit]

Antisemitism was a common attribute of agrarian radical right-wing Eastern European organizations, such as the Croatian Ustashe, the Yugoslav Zbor and the Romanian Iron Guard.[169][170] The OUN's ideology, on the other hand, did not initially emphasize antisemitism - despite the presence of antisemitic writings.[169] During the OUN's early years, there were many prominent Jewish members of the OUN, and the OUN broadly condemned antisemitic violence. In the 1930s, the OUN publicly compared Jews to parasites and called for the violent removal of Jews from Ukrainian society.[171] When the OUN allied with Nazi Germany in 1941 - the OUN-B called for the slaughter of Ukrainian Jewry, and the OUN praised the Germany for bringing their methods of segregating and executing Jews to Ukraine.[172]

Three of its leaders, General Mykola Kapustiansky, Rico Yary (himself of Hungarian-Jewish descent), and Mykola Stsyborsky, who was the OUN's chief theorist,[137] were married to Jewish women,[173] and some Jews belonged to the OUN's underground movement.[174] The OUN in the early 1930s considered Ukraine's primary enemies to be Poles and Russians, with Jews playing a secondary role as collaborators[110] An article published in 1930 by OUN leader Mykola Stsyborsky denounced the anti-Jewish pogroms of 1918, stating that most of its victims were innocent rather than Bolsheviks. Stsyborsky wrote that Jewish rights should be respected, that the OUN ought to convince Jews that their organization was no threat to them and that Ukrainians ought to maintain close contacts with Jews nationally and internationally. Three years later, an article in the OUN journal Rozbudova Natsii ("Development of the Nation"), despite its focus on Jews' alleged exploitation of Ukrainian peasants, also stated that Jews, as well as Ukrainians, were victims of Soviet policies.[171] Evhen Onatsky, writing in the OUN's official journal in 1934, condemned German Nazism as imperialist, racist and anti-Christian.[175] In response to objections within the organisation to Stsyborsky's dynamic marital past and his relationship with a Jewish woman in 1934, Konovalets wrote:

"If nationalism is waging war against mixed marriages insofar as conquerors (especially Poles and Russians) are concerned, then it cannot bypass the problem of mixed marriages with Jews, who are indisputably if not greater, then at least comparable, foes of our rebirth."[176]:325-6

Konovalets did however side with Stsyborsky when he complained about the particularly extreme antisemitic writings of theorist Oleksander Mytsiuk being published in the OUN newsletter Rozbudova natsiï, reprimanding the editor Volodymyr Martynets.[176]:321

By the late 1930s, the OUN's attitude towards Jews changed to one of hostility. Jews were described in OUN publications as parasites who ought to be segregated from Ukrainians. For example, an article titled "The Jewish Problem in Ukraine" published in 1938 by the OUN, called for Jews' complete cultural, economic and political isolation from Ukrainians, rejecting forced assimilation of Jews but allowing that they ought to enjoy the same rights as Ukrainians. Despite the increasingly negative portrayal of Jews, for all of its glorification of violence, Ukrainian nationalist literature generally showed little interest in Nazi-like antisemitism during the 1930s.[171] German documents from the early 1940s give the impression that extreme Ukrainian nationalists were indifferent to the plight of the Jews; they were willing to either kill them or help them, whichever was more appropriate, for their political goals.[110] The OUN-B's ambivalent early wartime attitude towards the Jews was highlighted during the Second General Congress of OUN-B (April 1941, Kraków)in which the OUN-B condemned anti-Jewish pogroms.[177] and specifically warned against the pogromist mindset as useful only to Muscovite propaganda.[178] At that conference the OUN-B declared "The Jews in the USSR constitute the most faithful support of the ruling Bolshevik regime and the vanguard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish sentiments of the Ukrainian masses to divert their attention from the true cause of their misfortune and to channel them in a time of frustration into pogroms on Jews. The OUN combats the Jews as the prop of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime and simultaneously it renders the masses conscious of the fact that the principal foe is Moscow."[179]

As the war progressed, the OUN's antisemitism descended into genocidal rhetoric and violence.[172] Despite its official condemnation of pogroms in April 1941, when German official Reinhard Heydrich requested "self-cleansing actions" in June of that year - the OUN organized militias answered the call, murdering several thousand Jews in western Ukraine soon afterward that same year.[180] During the German invasion of the USSR, Yaroslav Stetsko stated in a report to Bandera: "We are raising a militia that will assist in the extermination of Jews... I am of the opinion that the Jews should be annihilated by applying the German methods of extermination in Ukraine."[181] The Ukrainian People's Militia under the OUN's command led pogroms that resulted in the massacre of 6,000 Jews in Lviv soon after that city's fall to German forces.[182][183][184] OUN members spread propaganda urging people to engage in pogroms.[185] A slogan put forth by the Bandera group and recorded in the 16 July 1941 Einsatzgruppen report stated: "Long live Ukraine without Jews, Poles and Germans; Poles behind the river San, Germans to Berlin, and Jews to the gallows".[186][187]

In instructions to its members concerning how the OUN should behave during the war, it declared that "in times of chaos... one can allow oneself to liquidate Polish, Russian and Jewish figures, particularly the servants of Bolshevik-Muscovite imperialism" and further, when speaking of Russians, Poles, and Jews, to "destroy in struggle, particularly those opposing the regime, by means of: deporting them to their own lands, eradicating their intelligentsia, which is not to be admitted to any governmental positions, and overall preventing any creation of this intelligentsia (e.g. access to education etc)... Jews are to be isolated, removed from governmental positions in order to prevent sabotage... Those who are deemed necessary may only work under strict supervision and removed from their positions for slightest misconduct... Jewish assimilation is not possible."[188] Ivan Klymiv, the OUN-B leader in Volhynia, wrote a directive in August 1941 calling for the OUN-B to "wipe out Poles, Jews, professors, officers, leaders, and all established enemy elements of Ukraine and Germany."[189] OUN members who infiltrated the German police were involved in clearing ghettos and helping the Germans to implement the Final Solution. Although most Jews were actually killed by Germans, the OUN police working for them played a crucial supporting role in the liquidation of 200,000 Jews in Volyn in the beginning of the war.[190] OUN bands also killed Jews who had fled into the forests from the Germans.[191] One of the UPA leaders reportedly compared the OUN's massacres of Poles to the Final Solution: "When it comes to the Polish question, this is not a military but a minority question. We will solve it as Hitler solved the Jewish question."[192] The OUN did help some Jews to escape in isolated cases. According to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin, dated 30 March 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews."[193][194]

Once the OUN was at war with Germany, anti-Jewish instances lessened, but never stopped. According to documents released from the Security Service of Ukraine, the OUN not only never gave up its antisemitic ideology and always associated Jews with communists. Among the documents released was this, giving clear evidence of continued antisemitism.

"National minorities are divided into a / friendly to us ... b / hostile to us Muscovites, Poles, Jews ... a / They have the same rights as Ukrainians, we allow them to return to their homeland. b / Extermination in the struggle, in particular those that will fight the regime; extermination mainly of the intelligentsia, which is not free to admit to any government, and in general make it impossible to produce the intelligentsia, that is, access to schools, etc. Eg the so-called to assimilate Polish peasants, realizing to them that they are Ukrainians, only of the Latin rite ... To destroy leaders, to isolate Jews, to move from governments to avoid sabotage, especially Muscovites and Poles. If there was an irresistible need to leave a Jew in the household apparatus, put our policeman over his head and eliminate him for the slightest offence. Only Ukrainians can be leaders of individual spheres of life, not foreigners - enemies. Our government must be terrible for its opponents. Terror for foreign enemies and traitors. /Арх.спр. № 376, v.6, ark.294-302 /.

— Reference of the Security Service of Ukraine № 113 "On the activities of the OUN-UPA" dated 30 July 1993[citation needed]

Economic program

[edit]

OUN's ideologists underlined their adherence to the ideas of economic nationalism which emerged under the influence of German publicist Friedrich List. Unlike his compatriot Karl Marx, who considered class struggle to be the main factor of economic and social progress, List instead viewed nations as the most important actors in the development of human society. Both Marx and List supported state involvement in economic life, but their difference lay in their attitude to private property, with the former supporting its abolition and the latter seeing it as a basic element of social relations.[195] List's ideas found support in Germany under the leadership of Bismarck and in the Russian Empire, where their main proponents were Sergei Witte and Dmitri Mendeleev. During the Interwar era economic nationalism was also employed by newly emerged European states such as Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Estonia and Yugoslavia.[196] Elements of economic nationalism were also present in contemporary government policies in Spain, United States and the United Kingdom.[197]

OUN's economic platform was formed between 1927-1929 in advance to its First Congress. Among its authors were Yakiv Moralevych (1878-1961), Leonid Kostariv (1888-?) and Mykola Stsiborskyi (1897-1941), whose activities were connected with the Ukrainian Husbandry Academy in the Czechoslovak town of Poděbrady. All of them stemmed from Russian-ruled regions of Ukraine and supported pragmatic economic cooperation of Ukrainians with their neighbours in Russia and Poland. [198]

Financial policies

[edit]

In his report to the First Congress of the OUN in 1929, Moralevych promoted the introduction of a temporary Ukrainian currency, karbovanets, which would initially be tied to the Soviet ruble and later replaced with hryvnia, a proper national currency whose price would in its turn be tied to the currencies of the USA, UK and France (a similar scheme was eventually used during the 1996 Ukrainian monetary reform). He also concerned himself with the creation of a Ukrainian banking system and payment of government debts, supporting the foundation of a national bank, which would be independent from both businesses and other government institutions.[199]

OUN's financial program foresaw an important role of state authorities in many branches of the financial sphere.[200] Moralevych proposed the establishment of special control organs in order to supervise banking activities. According to his program, foreign debts of the Ukrainian People's Republic were to be recognized by the future independent Ukrainian government, and a special institution would be created for their repayment.[199]

In the sphere of taxation Moralevych's plan included the introducton of taxes on income, land, gifts, movable and immovable property, exports and imports, as well as a value added tax. Most of the taxes were to be introduced according to a proportional system based on the total income and social status of separate citizens. Moralevych also supported the establishment of state monopoly on the production of alcohol and tobacco, or the introduction of excises for private companies. An important role in his program was attributed to foreign investment.[201]

Economic policies

[edit]

According to Yakiv Moralevych, the initial goal of OUN's economic policies was to be the reform of the agrarian sector, including provision of necessary technologies and equipment to agriculture. The next important direction of economic policies would be the sphere of energy. His program promoted the development of heavy industry, although it was argued that light industry would have a better potential for swift development in Ukraine. International credits were to cover the expenses for construction of railways, development of water transport and hydroenergetics; meanwhile the road system was to be financed from local budgets and concessions.[202]

An important contribution to OUN's views on economy was made by Leonid Kostariv, whose program of industrial development of Ukraine was adopted at the First Congress of the OUN. It divided all industrial enterprises into three categories according to their level of strategic importance. The most significant enterprises, including mines, steel mills and part of chemical, machine and weapons producers, were to be owned and managed by the state. Less important branches were to be owned by joint-stock companies with part of their shares belonging to the state. Smaller enterprises were to remain in private ownership and engage in free competition. A special institution - Main Council of National Economy - was to be introduced for the management of state-owned shares, which would also observe service and production standards and provide labour protection. Nationalization was seen as a way of balancing private and state capitals and preventing foreign owners from exerting too much influence. According to OUN's views, the state had to create an environment in which own science and technologies could be developed.[203]

Mykola Stsiborskyi took part in the development of OUN's agrarian and trade policies.[204] He supported the transfer of grain trade to private farmers and opposed protectionism in that sphere, but promoted it for sugar trade. All industrial exports, in their turn, were to be subjected to state control. Stsiborskyi opposed the infiltration of private capital in large-scale industry. He viewed Russia as an important destination of Ukrainian exports of coal, ore and iron, and saw Germany, USA, Great Britain and Russia as important sources of imports in the sphere of light industry.[205]

In the sphere of agriculture Stsiborskyi's program supported the involvement of both private and state property. Both minimum and maximum size of a personal land plot was to be regulated by law, and land inheritance was to be limited to only one offspring, with the rest receiving a monetary compensation instead. The division of lands established after 1917 was to be preserved, with the land of collective farms being distributed between their members. Stsiborskyi saw the base of Ukrainian agriculture in private middle class farmers united into cooperatives. Support of agrarians was to be provided through long-term credits issued both by the state and by private capital. Excess rural population was to be requalified.[206]

Attempts at realization

[edit]

Soon after the beginning of World War II, in 1940 the Provid of OUN established the Commission on State Planning (KDP - Ukrainian: Комісія державного планування, КДП) headed by Oleh Olzhych, which consisted of 15 subcommissions. Among its members were notable scientists and statesmen Borys Martos and Kostiantyn Matsiyevych. The commission prepared plans on the development of finances and trade, agriculture, industry and general economy. Its activities were based on the economic platform of the OUN. The commission created a number of projects of laws concerning trade, finances, state budget, taxation, credits, banking and other economic issues. An important point of those projects was the protection of Ukrainian private enterprise. Ethnic Ukrainians had to receive priority in the management of industrial enterprises, although representatives of other nations could also be appointed if needed.[207]

The original KDP was dominated by Melnykites, as a result of which the Bandera wing of OUN created its own commission with an identical name. A decree issued by OUN-B before the outset of the German-Soviet War called for the preservation of existing social relations in Ukrainian lands. Opposition from German authorities, as well as the poor state of Ukraine's villages and lack of mechanization, forced the nationalists to postpone the introduction of certain measures from their program, such as the disbandment of collective farms, which were instead to be replaced by so-called "people's committees", whose representatives were to form the base of a future all-Ukrainian Constitutional Congress. The future redistribution of land was to prioritize war veterans and large working families. Following the adoption of the Act on the Reestablishment of the Ukrainian State on 30 June 1941, OUN promoted the gradual abolition of collective ownership on land, and in some cases threatened people leaving collectivized farms with punishment. Monetary policy also remained conservative, with the Soviet ruble remaining in use as currency. Permissions on private trade by OUN's authorities were combined with the introduction of price controls. Following the expulsion of Soviets from Lviv, Ukrainian cooperative organizations, such as the Maslosoyuz, resumed their activities in the city. Crediting was forbidden, and barter schemes were eventually outlawed in order to stop hyperinflation. On 13 July 1941 the Provid of OUN-B established an exchange rate for currencies. Taxation measures were introduced, with trade and banking enterprises gradually restoring their activities.[208]

In August 1941 a project of the Statute of a Ukrainian Economic Bureau was published. The institution was to analyze the Ukrainian economy and adopt development programs. However, it was never created due to the crackdown on the Ukrainian nationalist movement by German authorities, who in September broke their relations with the OUN and started persecuting its members. German war planners saw Ukraine as a mere source of labour force and raw materials, and used economic measures in order to subdue the local population. In the sphere of banking the Germans introduced strict centralization and removed all non-Germans from management. In the environment of severe repression, OUN's activists were forced to turn to underground activities, abandoning the previous conservative line and exploiting the opposition of Ukrianian peasants to collectivization. In September 1941 the Provid of Southern Ukraine issued an instruction on the privatization of land through specially created peasant committees.[209] In July 1943 the Chief Command of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army headed by Klym Savur issued a decree on the liquidation of collective farms and proclaimed the transfer of lands previously owned by Polish colonists to Ukrainian peasants.[210]

A bofon equivalent of 25 karbovanets, 1944

The Third Extraordinary Congress of OUN-B in August 1943 mentioned economic development as the main goal of a future democratic Ukrainian government. Land was to be transferred to peasants without compensation, with the maximal and minimal sizes of plots being limited by law; sale of land was to be forbidden; a right on the establishment of cooperatives was to be provided; the state was to promote agriculture with technical and financial means; all mineral deposits, water and forests were proclaimed to be communal property. The goal of state ownership over transport and large-scale industry was confirmed. OUN-B also proclaimed its allegiance to state involvement in banking and large-scale trade with simultaneous preservation of private ownership over small-scale enterperises.[211] During the following period UPA's propaganda emphasized the right to private property and economic protection of Ukrainians from foreign governments and capitalists as one of the chief goals of its struggle. The insurgents established an administrative structure in territories controlled by their forces, which included departments responsible for agriculture, finances, trade and industry. During that period UPA amassed German Marks and US dollars by exchanging devaluing Polish currency. The army's supplies by enterprises were subjected to an emerging bureaucratic system. During that time OUN introduced its own currency - bofon, whose value was tied to currencies valid in one or another region. In 1943 they were spread around Galicia, Volyn and Polissia.[212]

Starting from the second half of 1944, in the environment of Soviet occupation, OUN had to abandon the introduction of their economic program and concentrated on the destruction of the enemy's economic infrastructure. The creation of Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council in July 1944 failed to establish a real administrative vertical of power, and the economic measures of OUN and UPA in the following period had a predominantly declarative character.[213]

Economic legacy

[edit]

Despite its popularity in the Ukrainian nationalist movement, economic nationalism promoted by the OUN failed to take root in Ukraine due to the predominance of Marxist and, later, neoliberal ideas.[214]

Legacy

[edit]

A number of contemporary far-right Ukrainian political organizations claim to be inheritors of the OUN's political traditions, including Svoboda, Right Sector, the Ukrainian National Assembly – Ukrainian National Self Defence, and the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists.[36][nb 9][215] According to historian Per Anders Rudling, one of the reasons the role of the OUN remains contested in historiography is the fact that some of these later political inheritors developed literature justifying or denying the organization's fascist political heritage and collaboration with Nazi Germany.[36][nb 10][216]

On 1 October 2023, during the Defenders Day, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy handed honorary titles, insignia and battle flags to military units, including a ribbon of honorary name to the 131st separate reconnaissance battalion of the Ground Forces, named in honor of OUN founder Yevhen Konovalets.[217][218][219]

Symbols

[edit]
Flag of OUN-M

The organization's symbols were established in 1932 and were published in a magazine 'Building a Nation' (Ukrainian: Розбудова Нації, Rozbudova Natsii). The author of the OUN emblem with a stylized trident (tryzub ) was Robert Lisovskyi.[citation needed] The organization's anthem "We were born in a great hour" (Ukrainian: Зродились ми великої години) was finalized in 1934 and also was published in the same magazine. Its lyrics were written by Oles Babiy, and it music by composer Omelian Nyzhankivsky.[citation needed]

For a long time OUN did not officially have its own flag. However, during the Hungarian campaign against the Republic of Carpathian Ukraine in 1939, Carpathian Sich, a militarized wing of OUN, adopted its flag from the OUN's emblem – a golden trident on a blue background. The flag was finalized and officially adopted by the organization only in 1964 at the 5th Assembly of Ukrainian Nationalists.[citation needed] The blue and yellow colours have a strong association with Ukrainian nationalism, including the 1917 Ukrainian People's Republic.[220]

Flag of UNA and OUN-B

When the organisation split in 1941, OUN-B refused to adopt the trident as a symbol and came up with its own heraldry. Lisovskyi created the organizational emblem for OUN-B as well. The central element of the new emblem was a stylized cross within a triangle. The flag and emblem consist of two colors: red and black. According to Bohdan Hoshovsky, the color combination of red and black was based on a concept of the OUN ideologue and veteran of the Ukrainian Galician Army Yulian Varanasi.[221] According to some sources, the black color symbolizes the black earth ("Chornozem") that Ukraine is synonymous for, and the red color represents blood spilled for Ukraine.[222][better source needed] Rudling summarises this as symoblsing blood and soil.[223] Others, such as Natalia Khanenko-Friesen, director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies (and scholar of Ukrainian folklore), say the red is traditionally synonymous with "life" rather than with violence. "Blood as life, as blossom, and not as blood lost in battles."[224] Jars Balan, head of the Ukrainian Canadian Studies Centre at the University of Alberta, says "The red is for love and the black is for sorrow and how they are intertwined", with references to those colours occurring in Slavic songs and poetry since the 12th century.[225][223]

Veteran status of OUN members

[edit]

In late March 2019 former OUN combatants (and other living former members of irregular Ukrainian nationalist armed groups that were active during World War II and the first decade after the war) were officially granted the status of veterans.[226] This meant that for the first time they could receive veteran benefits, including free public transport, subsidized medical services, annual monetary aid, and public utilities discounts (and will enjoy the same social benefits as former Ukrainian soldiers Red Army of the Soviet Union).[226] There had been several previous attempts to provide former Ukrainian nationalist fighters with official veteran status, especially during the 2005–2009 administration President Viktor Yushchenko, but all failed.[226]

Leaders

[edit]

Early OUN

[edit]
No. Picture Name
(Birth–Death)
Time in office Citizenship/Allegiance
1 Yevhen Konovalets
(1891–1938)
1929–1938
2 Andriy Melnyk
(1899–1964)
1938–1940

OUN (Melnyk)

[edit]

OUN (Bandera)

[edit]

OUN (abroad)

[edit]

Notable members and supporters

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The (OUN) was a militant Ukrainian nationalist organization founded on 3 February 1929 in , , by , who merged several émigré nationalist groups into a unified revolutionary front aimed at liberating from Polish, Soviet, Romanian, and Czechoslovak control to establish an independent nation-state. Its ideology emphasized , drawing from influences like Dmytro Dontsov's writings, , and authoritarian state-building, prioritizing ethnic Ukrainian dominance, , and total mobilization for independence through sabotage, assassinations, and armed uprising. The OUN's early activities included high-profile terrorist operations against Polish authorities, such as the 1934 assassination of Interior Minister by member Hryhoriy Matseiuk, which prompted Poland to establish concentration camps for Ukrainian activists at Bereza Kartuska. Following Konovalets' assassination by a Soviet agent in 1938, internal power struggles led to a 1940 schism into two factions: the OUN-M under the more diplomatic Andriy Melnyk, favoring collaboration with , and the radical OUN-B led by , advocating immediate revolutionary action. During , both factions initially cooperated with against the Soviets, with OUN-B proclaiming Ukrainian statehood in on 30 June 1941, but this alliance fractured as Germans arrested Bandera and suppressed Ukrainian autonomy, prompting OUN-B to form the (UPA) in 1942 for against both Nazi and Soviet forces. The OUN's legacy encompasses significant anti-Soviet resistance that sustained Ukrainian insurgencies into the , but is marred by documented involvement in anti-Jewish pogroms—such as the killings of thousands in 1941—and the UPA's campaigns against Poles in and (1943–1944), resulting in tens of thousands of civilian deaths, actions rooted in irredentist territorial claims and ethnic homogenization goals. While post-independence has rehabilitated OUN figures like Bandera as anti-totalitarian heroes amid efforts, Western often highlights the organization's fascist affinities and wartime atrocities, underscoring tensions between nationalist self-perception and empirical records of and .

Origins and Early Development

Founding in 1929 and Ideological Foundations

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) was founded at the , convened in from 28 January to 3 February 1929. This gathering united émigré representatives from disparate Ukrainian paramilitary and youth organizations, primarily the (UVO) under Colonel and the Group of Ukrainian National Youth, to form a centralized revolutionary body aimed at achieving Ukrainian independence. Konovalets, a former Sich Rifleman and UVO commander, was elected as the inaugural leader of the OUN's nine-member Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (PUN), which included figures such as Mykola Stsiborsky and Volodymyr Martynets. The OUN adopted a strictly hierarchical and conspiratorial structure, modeled on lines, to conduct clandestine operations against Polish administration in and Soviet rule in the east. Its foundational program emphasized unrelenting struggle (borot'ba) against all occupiers, rejecting compromise or assimilation, and prioritizing the creation of a through total national mobilization. This framework subordinated individual rights to the collective nation, endorsing authoritarian and amoral tactics where the ends of justified violent means. Ideologically, the OUN drew heavily from Dmytro Dontsov's doctrine of integral or "active" , which exalted heroic , rejection of , and the cult of action over ethical restraint. Dontsov's writings, particularly Nationalism (1926), portrayed the nation as an organic entity demanding fanatical devotion and elite to overcome historical subjugation, influencing OUN cadres to view pacifism and parliamentarism as decadent weaknesses. Anti-communism and anti-Polonism formed core pillars, with the organization committing to , , and as instruments of national revival, unburdened by . This radical ethos positioned the OUN as a totalitarian movement, akin to contemporaneous European nationalisms, focused on forging a unitary Ukrainian identity through unrelenting conflict.

Influences from Ukrainian Military Organization and Integral Nationalism

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) emerged directly from the (UVO), absorbing its paramilitary structure and operational methods upon formation in 1929. Established in 1920 by émigré officers including , a former commander of the in the army, the UVO focused on clandestine sabotage, expropriations, and assassinations targeting Polish administration in to undermine rule and assert Ukrainian claims. At a secret congress in from 3 to 10 February 1929, UVO representatives merged with five Ukrainian youth organizations, including the Group of Ukrainian National Youth of and the Ukrainian National Federation's youth section, to create the OUN as a unified conspiratorial elite dedicated to combating Polish, Romanian, and Soviet control over Ukrainian territories. , elected as the OUN's first Providnyk (leader), regarded the new entity initially as a political front for the UVO, leveraging it to expand recruitment, consolidate émigré networks in , and train cadres in while maintaining the UVO's emphasis on over electoral politics. This inheritance ensured the OUN's hierarchical, secretive organization and prioritization of armed struggle, with UVO veterans forming its core leadership and operational nucleus until Konovalets's assassination by Soviet agents in 1938. Ideologically, the OUN was profoundly shaped by Dmytro Dontsov's doctrine of integral or "active" nationalism, which rejected moderate cultural nationalism in favor of a voluntarist, elitist creed glorifying perpetual struggle, national egoism, and authoritarian discipline. In his seminal 1926 manifesto Natsionalizm, Dontsov—drawing from Nietzschean will to power, Sorel's myth of violence, and Machiavellian pragmatism—advocated for a heroic elite unbound by democratic norms or Christian ethics, employing amoral means including terror to forge a sovereign Ukrainian nation through conflict with perceived racial and imperial foes. Though not an OUN member, Dontsov's ideas permeated the organization via émigré intellectual circles and publications like Surma and Rozbudova Natsii, influencing leaders such as Konovalets and indoctrinating youth recruits to view compromise with Poland or the Soviet Union as treasonous weakness. This framework justified the OUN's totalitarian internal structure, cult of the leader, and strategic alliances with authoritarian powers when tactically advantageous, prioritizing national rebirth over universalist ideologies like socialism or liberalism. By the early 1930s, Dontsovian integral nationalism had solidified as the OUN's doctrinal core, distinguishing it from earlier federative or democratic Ukrainian movements and fostering a revolutionary absolutism that propelled its interwar militancy.

Interwar Period Activities

Underground Operations Against Polish Rule

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), established in 1929 as a successor to the (UVO), expanded underground operations in Polish-ruled through , , and targeted s aimed at disrupting administration and pressuring for Ukrainian autonomy. Building on the UVO's prior record of approximately 2,300 acts in 1922, the OUN coordinated attacks on , including derailing trains, severing lines, and incendiary actions against Polish estates and officials' property. These efforts, often executed by small militant cells under strict oaths of secrecy and loyalty, sought to economically weaken Polish control and foster Ukrainian resistance networks. In the second half of 1930, amid Polish pacification campaigns, OUN militants conducted 191 documented acts of terrorism, primarily involving arson and communications sabotage, which provoked reprisals but bolstered recruitment by highlighting grievances against colonization policies. Escalation continued with the August 1931 of Polish parliamentarian Tadeusz Hołówko, a proponent of Ukrainian-Polish , attributed to OUN operatives. The organization's campaign peaked in June 1934 with the killing of Interior Minister in by gunman Hryhoriy Matseyko, under orders from OUN leader and executed via planning by Stepan Bandera's regional command; this act, intended to deter Polish repression, resulted in mass arrests and the establishment of the Bereza Kartuska internment camp for nationalists. OUN operations also targeted perceived Ukrainian collaborators, such as the 1934 murder of lawyer Ivan Babii in for alleged cooperation with Polish authorities, reinforcing internal discipline through exemplary violence. By late 1938, amid tensions, activities intensified with 47 sabotage incidents and 34 terrorist attacks recorded between September 1938 and March 1939, alongside 397 illegal demonstrations, straining Polish security forces and amplifying OUN's clandestine propaganda via underground presses distributing anti-Polish leaflets. These actions, while militarily limited, sustained nationalist momentum despite Polish countermeasures, including and trials that inadvertently publicized OUN .

Assassinations, Terrorism, and International Ties

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) employed assassinations and terrorist acts as core tactics against Polish administration in Ukrainian-populated regions of interwar Poland, aiming to destabilize rule and compel independence through violence. These actions built on methods inherited from the Ukrainian Military Organization, targeting officials, infrastructure, and perceived collaborators to instill fear and disrupt governance. Key assassinations included the 1931 killing of Tadeusz Hołówko, a Polish senator advocating Ukrainian minority rights, murdered by OUN members in , which marked an escalation against moderate Polish figures. In 1933, OUN operatives assassinated Alexei Mailov, a Soviet worker in , reflecting broader anti-Soviet aims alongside anti-Polish efforts. The most prominent act occurred on June 15, 1934, when Hryhoriy Matseyko, an OUN activist, shot and killed Polish Interior Minister in ; was convicted as a co-organizer, receiving a death sentence later commuted to . These targeted killings prompted Polish mass arrests and trials of OUN members, intensifying repressions like the 1930 pacification campaign. Beyond assassinations, OUN orchestrated widespread , including 34 documented terrorist operations, 47 sabotages, and 397 demonstrations in during the 1930s, such as bombings of Polish post offices, railway disruptions, and assaults on administrative targets. These acts sought to paralyze Polish control and rally Ukrainian support, often involving local networks for execution. In , amid the German , OUN units conducted coordinated sabotages against Polish forces, including destruction of bridges and telegraph lines, aligning with their opportunistic strategy. Such drew condemnation and counter-terror from Polish authorities, framing OUN as a subversive . For resources and legitimacy, OUN cultivated international ties, particularly with Nazi Germany, viewing it as a potential ally against Poland and the Soviet Union due to shared revisionist interests. Leader Yevhen Konovalets established contacts with German intelligence (Abwehr) in the early 1930s, securing financial aid, training for militants in Reichswehr facilities, and propaganda support. By the late 1930s, OUN ideologues operated from Berlin and Paris, fostering a pro-German orientation that included coordination on anti-Polish actions. Ties extended to Italy and Hungary for arms and refuge, though German support remained primary, treating OUN as a tactical asset rather than equal partner. These alliances underscored OUN's pragmatic realpolitik, prioritizing anti-Soviet and anti-Polish goals over ideological purity.

World War II Involvement

Pre-1941 Preparations and OUN Split into Factions

Following the assassination of OUN leader by a Soviet agent on May 23, 1938, in , Andriy Melnyk, a former colonel in the army, assumed provisional leadership of the organization. Melnyk's tenure focused on centralizing command structures abroad while maintaining underground networks in and , where many Ukrainian nationalists operated in exile due to repression. He prioritized forging ties with , particularly , anticipating the outbreak of war as an opportunity for Ukrainian independence; OUN emissaries engaged German military intelligence () for training and logistical support starting in the late . Preparations intensified under Melnyk with the establishment of military training programs for OUN cadres, including sabotage units and propaganda dissemination aimed at mobilizing Ukrainian youth against Polish and Soviet rule. By 1939–1940, select OUN members underwent instruction in German facilities, learning explosives handling, reconnaissance, and guerrilla tactics to exploit chaos during a potential German invasion of the Soviet Union. These efforts were complemented by ideological indoctrination through publications and secret cells, emphasizing and as foundations for a . Melnyk's formal election as leader at the OUN's Second Great Congress in on August 27, 1939, reaffirmed this hierarchical approach, but it alienated radical factions in who favored decentralized, aggressive action over exile-based diplomacy. Discontent with Melnyk's perceived moderation and authoritarian style—viewed by critics as prioritizing elite alliances over —culminated in a schism in early 1940. Led by , a prominent young activist imprisoned multiple times by Polish authorities for organizational activities, the radicals in German-occupied Krakow convened a conference in February 1940, rejecting Melnyk's legitimacy and forming the "Revolutionary Leadership" of the OUN. Bandera's faction argued that Melnyk's exile insulated him from frontline realities and slowed preparations for immediate uprising, advocating instead for autonomous regional commands and uncompromising militancy. This opposition stemmed from tactical divergences: Melnyk emphasized disciplined, state-like and selective cooperation with , while Bandera's group sought broader revolutionary fervor, controlling the majority of OUN's 20,000–30,000 active members in by mid-1940. The resulting factions—OUN-M (Melnykites), retaining formal continuity and foreign diplomatic efforts, and OUN-B (Banderites), dominating domestic operations—continued parallel preparations despite mutual hostilities, including assassinations and intelligence rivalries. Both pursued German patronage for arms and infiltration routes into Soviet territory, but OUN-B accelerated cadre deployment into for wartime sabotage, setting the stage for divergent strategies upon Operation Barbarossa's launch in June 1941. The split reflected deeper generational and strategic cleavages, with OUN-B's revolutionary ethos prioritizing ethnic Ukrainian purity and against occupiers, unencumbered by Melnyk's concessions to potential allies.

Collaboration with Axis Powers and 1941 Independence Declaration

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) established tactical alliances with in the late , viewing the regime as a potential partner against Polish rule and Soviet influence in . OUN members, including figures from both the Bandera (OUN-B) and Melnyk (OUN-M) factions, underwent military training under the German intelligence agency, forming auxiliary units such as the Nachtigall and Roland battalions, which participated in the in 1939 and later in 1941. These collaborations were driven by shared anti-communist and anti-Polish objectives, though authorities maintained ultimate control and did not commit to Ukrainian independence. As German forces advanced into Soviet-occupied Ukraine during , launched on June 22, 1941, OUN-B leaders, who had infiltrated with the , seized the opportunity to assert Ukrainian sovereignty. On June 30, 1941, in (then under German control), Yaroslav , acting on instructions from Stepan , proclaimed the Act of Restoration of the Ukrainian State, establishing a and framing the declaration as complementary to Germany's war against the . The act emphasized Ukraine's right to independence and called for cooperation with in combating , but it unilaterally asserted sovereign authority without prior German approval, leading to immediate tensions. Nazi authorities rejected , viewing it as a challenge to their occupation plans for the , and arrested Bandera on July 5, 1941, along with Stetsko and other OUN-B leaders, interning them in concentration camps like Sachsenhausen. The OUN-M faction, led by Andriy Melnyk, pursued a more deferential approach, with Melnyk meeting in August 1941 to seek recognition, but received no concessions as Germany prioritized direct administration and resource extraction over states. Despite these arrests, lower-level OUN persisted through participation in German auxiliary police and administrative roles, motivated by opportunistic anti-Soviet goals rather than ideological alignment with . Historical analyses, often drawing from declassified German and Ukrainian archives, indicate that while OUN rhetoric praised German "liberation," the relationship was asymmetrical, with Ukraine treated as rather than an ally, underscoring the nationalists' pragmatic but ultimately subordinate position.

Conflicts with Germans, Formation of UPA, and Guerrilla Warfare

Following the OUN-B's declaration of Ukrainian statehood in Lviv on June 30, 1941, Nazi German authorities rejected the proclamation and arrested key leaders, including Stepan Bandera on July 5, 1941, in Kraków for refusing to rescind the act. Bandera was imprisoned in German facilities, including Sachsenhausen concentration camp from late 1941 until September 1944, while other OUN-B members faced internment or execution, prompting the faction to shift toward clandestine resistance against German occupation policies that denied Ukrainian autonomy. German exploitation of Ukrainian resources, forced labor recruitment—numbering over 2.5 million by 1944—and suppression of nationalist activities escalated tensions, leading OUN-B to view the occupiers as imperialists obstructing independence. In response to these conflicts, the OUN-B initiated low-level and avoidance of direct confrontation with superior German forces during 1941–1942, prioritizing survival and preparation amid the ongoing occupation. The came after the German defeat at Stalingrad in , when OUN-B leadership formally resolved to oppose the occupation actively, framing it as a barrier to Ukrainian . The (UPA) emerged as the OUN-B's armed branch on October 14, 1942, in the forests of and Polissia, symbolically tied to the Orthodox feast of Pokrova, with initial units formed from local groups and ex-Polish army deserters to conduct partisan operations against both Nazi and Soviet forces. Under commanders like , appointed UPA leader in 1943, the force grew to an estimated 20,000–30,000 fighters by mid-1943 through recruitment driven by anti-occupation sentiment and the need for territorial control in . UPA guerrilla warfare against Germans intensified from late 1942, involving ambushes on supply convoys, attacks on garrisons, and disruptions of infrastructure, with documented clashes rising in during 1943: regular engagements reported from spring onward, including operations that forced German reinforcements in areas like Kolky in April–May 1943. These actions, while not seeking full-scale war due to German military superiority, aimed to weaken control and assert Ukrainian authority locally, often coordinated with avoidance of major battles to preserve forces for the anticipated Soviet return. By 1944, as advances shifted priorities, UPA operations against Germans diminished, but the earlier phase established the group's dual-front resistance model.

Operations in Eastern Ukraine and Factional Struggles

Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, members of both OUN factions advanced eastward alongside Wehrmacht units into previously Soviet-controlled territories, aiming to propagate nationalist ideology and recruit locals in regions such as Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and the Donbas. However, these efforts yielded minimal results; German authorities, viewing Ukrainian nationalists as potential rivals, imposed repressive measures including arrests and executions of OUN activists by late summer 1941, while the local population—shaped by decades of Soviet Russification and collectivization—showed little receptivity to OUN agitation, with networks often compromised by informants or NKVD remnants. By 1942, OUN-B attempts to establish underground cells in eastern oblasts were largely dismantled, confined to sporadic propaganda leaflet distributions and sabotage against Soviet partisans, but without forming sustainable guerrilla structures due to logistical isolation from western bases and intense German counterintelligence operations. The OUN's pre-war schism, formalized in February 1940 between the more hierarchical OUN-M led by Andriy Melnyk and the revolutionary OUN-B under , intensified during the occupation over divergent strategies toward German collaboration. OUN-M pursued formal cooperation, securing training for units like the Nachtigall and battalions (approximately 800-1,000 men total) and integrating into roles, which allowed limited administrative influence but alienated OUN-B cadres who prioritized immediate over alliance. In contrast, OUN-B's June 30, 1941, proclamation of a Ukrainian state in —defying German directives—prompted the arrest of Bandera and over 1,000 associates by July 1941, shifting OUN-B toward clandestine anti-German resistance and the formation of the (UPA) in October 1942 from disparate groups totaling around 10,000 fighters by mid-1943. Factional rivalries escalated into violence, particularly in and Galicia, where OUN-B militias targeted OUN-M sympathizers to consolidate control; by 1943, OUN-B enforcers eliminated rival cells through assassinations and forced mergers, viewing Melnyk's faction as overly conciliatory and a barrier to unified . OUN-M, meanwhile, maintained separate armed formations like the (around 5,000-7,000 personnel under German nominal command until 1944), engaging in skirmishes with UPA units over recruitment and territory. Reconciliation efforts, including OUN-B's Third Extraordinary Congress in —which emphasized anti-German struggle but subordinated factional unity to broader goals—failed amid mutual distrust, with Melnyk rejecting Bandera's radicalism and OUN-B decrying OUN-M's perceived treasonous collaboration. These internal conflicts weakened overall resistance, diverting resources from eastern expansion and contributing to the OUN's marginalization in German administrative structures by 1944.

Post-World War II Resistance

Anti-Soviet Insurgency and UPA Campaigns (1944-1950s)

Following the Red Army's reconquest of in 1944, the (UPA), under the command of and aligned with the Bandera faction of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-B), intensified its guerrilla operations against Soviet forces. The UPA shifted from conventional skirmishes to , employing small mobile units of 30-50 fighters organized into platoons and squads for ambushes, of supply lines, and assassinations of local Soviet administrators and collaborators. Estimates of UPA combat strength in 1944 ranged from 20,000 to 40,000 fighters, supported by an extensive civilian network providing intelligence, food, and medical aid, though total membership including auxiliaries may have reached higher figures. Initial clashes in 1944-1945 involved larger UPA formations contesting advances, with Soviet sources reporting over 56,000 UPA personnel killed and 108,500 captured by 1946, figures likely inflated to exaggerate regime successes. Soviet countermeasures escalated under and later oversight, combining military blockades, infiltration by agent networks, and mass deportations to sever UPA logistics. Operations like the "Great Blockade" in from to April 1946 encircled regions, resulting in thousands of UPA casualties and captures, while policies of razed villages suspected of aiding insurgents. Between 1944 and 1952, Soviet authorities deported approximately 200,000-250,000 civilians from , targeting families of suspected OUN-UPA members to erode popular support; for instance, Operation "West" in 1947 relocated over 76,000 individuals to remote labor camps. UPA responses included targeted killings of Soviet officials, with OUN claims asserting 35,000 state security personnel eliminated by 1951, though independent verification is limited and Soviet records underreport such losses. The insurgency peaked in intensity through 1947 but waned as Soviet tactics dismantled UPA command structures; Shukhevych's death on March 5, 1950, during an raid near marked a critical blow, forcing remaining units into deeper clandestinity with fortified bunkers and reduced operations. By 1949, UPA issued orders for temporary of active units, transitioning to survival networks amid relentless Soviet pressure. Small pockets of resistance persisted into the mid-1950s, with the last documented UPA fighter, , captured in 1954 after operating solo; isolated actions occurred as late as 1960 in , but organized insurgency effectively ended by 1956 due to decapitation, population resettlement, and erosion of rural backing. Overall UPA losses exceeded dead or captured across the decade, reflecting the asymmetry against Soviet forces numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

Diaspora Activities During the Cold War

Following the Soviet reconquest of in 1944–1945, thousands of OUN members and affiliates fled westward, establishing diaspora communities primarily in , the , , and the , where they resettled as displaced persons or emigrants. The OUN-B faction, under Stepan Bandera's leadership from , prioritized sustaining underground networks to support remnants of the UPA insurgency inside while engaging Western governments in anti-communist advocacy. Bandera's group coordinated propaganda efforts, including publications and broadcasts aimed at exposing Soviet atrocities and promoting Ukrainian independence, often through alliances with other Eastern European exiles. In , , a key OUN-B figure, founded the (ABN) in , merging OUN-B initiatives with representatives from , , , and other Soviet-subjugated groups to form a unified anti-communist front representing 13 nations by the 1950s. The ABN organized annual conferences starting in , public demonstrations—such as the April 1949 rally in condemning Bolshevik religious and political persecution—and disseminated literature in multiple languages to lobby Western policymakers for "captive nations" liberation. These activities emphasized coordinated resistance to Soviet , though internal OUN factionalism limited broader unity, with ABN aligning closely with OUN-B's militant stance. The U.S. initiated contacts with both OUN factions in 1946–1947, viewing them as assets against the USSR despite their wartime Nazi ties, and provided covert funding, training, and logistical support for infiltration operations into , including airdrops of agents and supplies from 1949 to the mid-1950s under programs like Project AERODYNAMIC. These efforts, which involved roughly 100–200 parachuted operatives annually in the early 1950s, aimed to bolster UPA guerrillas but largely failed due to penetration, resulting in captured or killed agents and the eventual scaling back of operations by 1953. Meanwhile, the OUN-M faction, led by Andriy Melnyk until his death in 1964, pursued more diplomatic channels, influencing groups like the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America for congressional lobbying, such as the annual Captive Nations Week resolutions passed by the U.S. Congress starting in 1959. Soviet counterintelligence targeted diaspora leaders aggressively, exemplified by the 1959 assassination of Bandera in by KGB agent using cyanide gas, which underscored the perceived threat of exile activities to but also galvanized commemorative efforts, including monuments and publications preserving OUN-UPA narratives in host countries. Despite CIA assessments noting factional infighting and limited operational success, diaspora OUN networks contributed to Western intelligence on Soviet affairs and sustained anti-communist sentiment among Ukrainian emigrants, numbering over 100,000 by the .

Ideology

Core Principles of Ukrainian Integral Nationalism

Ukrainian integral nationalism, as articulated by ideologue and institutionalized in the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) founded on February 3, 1929, elevated the nation as an organic, supraindividual entity demanding total subordination and heroic sacrifice from its members to achieve sovereign statehood. This doctrine rejected Enlightenment , , and Marxist internationalism, instead embracing a influenced by and , wherein the "" and creative violence served as engines of national rebirth. Dontsov's 1926 Natsionalizm framed the Ukrainian struggle as a palingenetic revolution— a total rebirth through unrelenting action against imperial oppressors, prioritizing instinctual vitality over ethical constraints or compromise. Central to OUN practice was the Führerprinzip, or leader principle, mandating blind obedience to hierarchical authority—first embodied by until his assassination in 1938— to forge national unity amid division, with the organization's statutes prohibiting internal dissent and rival parties in a . The ideology's amoral justified terrorism, sabotage, and alliances of convenience against Polish, Soviet, and other occupiers, viewing moral norms as luxuries for weak nations; as Dontsov argued, "the strong do what they will, the weak suffer what they must." Ethnic homogeneity underpinned this vision, positing Ukraine as an exclusive domain for Ukrainians, with non-assimilable minorities deemed threats to vital national essence, though official tenets focused existential enmity on imperial powers rather than explicit racial hierarchies. The OUN Decalogue, a foundational circulated among members, distilled these imperatives into ten precepts emphasizing state attainment "or death in the struggle," exaltation of the and family as bulwarks of continuity, and rejection of theft or dishonor except in service to —such as expropriating enemy resources. This code, rooted in Konovalets-era directives, reinforced a millenarian : past glories (like Cossack hetmanates) as inspiration, future as destiny, and merciless against adversaries as duty, with expected or given. While scholars note parallels to European fascist movements, the doctrine's adaptation to Ukraine's stateless emphasized anti-imperial liberation over , though its totalitarian bent suppressed pluralism in favor of monolithic national will.

Anti-Communism and Opposition to Imperialism

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) regarded as a mortal enemy to Ukrainian ethnic cohesion and independence, equating Bolshevik ideology with the destruction of national traditions through class warfare, , and forced collectivization. This stance stemmed from the group's founding leader, , who during the Ukrainian-Soviet War of 1917–1921 commanded units that repelled Bolshevik incursions into and suppressed communist revolts in in January 1918, viewing Soviet expansion as an extension of Russian domination rather than mere ideological proselytism. The OUN's foundational congress in explicitly condemned communist internationalism as antithetical to , prioritizing the nation over class and rejecting Marxist as a tool for subjugating non-Russian peoples. OUN doctrine framed opposition to through the lens of Ukrainian , targeting empires—Polish, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and later Nazi German—that had historically partitioned Ukrainian lands and suppressed cultural revival. Soviet rule, in particular, was denounced as "Muscovite " masked by communist rhetoric, responsible for genocidal policies like the 1932–1933 famine, which killed an estimated 3.9 million through engineered and requisitions to crush resistance to collectivization. OUN leaders, including of the OUN-B faction, argued that and Russian were indivisible: "It is impossible to destroy one while leaving the other," as Bandera stated in a 1951 interview, insisting that anti-communist efforts must dismantle the imperial framework enabling Soviet control over . This perspective informed OUN propaganda and actions, such as the May 1943 resolution declaring the Eastern Front war "the struggle of the occupiers against the Ukrainian people," positioning Ukrainian insurgents as defenders against both Nazi occupation and impending Soviet reconquest. The OUN's anti-imperialist program extended beyond to advocate for a sovereign free from great-power spheres, drawing on historical precedents like the 1918 Ukrainian People's Republic's failed bid for independence amid Bolshevik invasions. While pragmatic alliances with were pursued temporarily to weaken Soviet forces, OUN ideology rejected permanent subordination to any imperialist entity, as evidenced by the 1941 Act of Renewal of , which proclaimed independence without pledging fealty to and anticipated conflict with all occupiers. Post-1945, this commitment fueled the Ukrainian Insurgent Army's (UPA) guerrilla campaigns, which inflicted over 30,000 Soviet casualties between 1944 and 1950 by targeting units and supply lines, sustaining resistance until the mid-1950s despite overwhelming superiority. Such efforts underscored the OUN's causal view that thrived on denying national agency, with serving as its contemporary vehicle in .

Authoritarian State Vision and Ethnic Homogeneity

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) drew heavily from Dmytro Dontsov's formulation of integral or "active" , which rejected democratic pluralism in favor of a hierarchical, voluntarist state led by an elite vanguard under a supreme providnyk (leader) exercising dictatorial powers to mobilize the nation for total struggle. Dontsov's influence, peaking in the 1920s–1930s through works like Nationalism (1926), emphasized amoral heroism, rejection of compromise, and the subordination of individuals to the organic will of the ethnic nation, shaping OUN ideology toward as a means to achieve unbreakable national unity against perceived existential threats. This vision positioned the providnyk—initially , later split between Andriy Melnyk and —as an infallible authority, with internal OUN structure mirroring this through discipline and oaths of absolute loyalty. A 1939 OUN draft explicitly outlined as "a , authoritarian, totalitarian and corporate state," where power would derive from national corporations rather than parliamentary bodies, ensuring centralized control over , , and to forge a self-sufficient, expansionist entity. This corporate model, inspired by fascist experiments in and elsewhere, aimed to eliminate class conflict by aligning all sectors under nationalist imperatives, with the state functioning as the embodiment of 's will rather than a neutral arbiter. The OUN's founding reinforced this through the Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist, a catechism-like code mandating that " is everything for the Ukrainian" and requiring revolutionaries to sacrifice for collective struggle, effectively sacralizing authoritarian obedience as a moral absolute. The OUN's pursuit of ethnic homogeneity stemmed from its definition of the nation as an exclusive ethnic community bound by blood, , and historical destiny, viewing non-Ukrainians—particularly Poles, , and —as imperial implants diluting and necessitating purification for state viability. framed the Ukrainian ethnos as the sole legitimate claimant to the territory, with ideological texts decrying multiculturalism as a tool of subjugation and advocating policies to enforce Ukrainian dominance through assimilation, , or exclusion of minorities to achieve an undivided national . This ethnic exclusivity was codified in OUN directives prioritizing "" of mixed regions, as seen in pre-war and wartime platforms that subordinated to the imperative of national consolidation, reflecting a causal logic where demographic heterogeneity perpetuated foreign domination. While the OUN avoided explicit doctrinal calls for extermination, its vision implicitly justified violence against perceived ethnic threats to forge a homogeneous state, aligning with the Decalogue's command to "attain a Ukrainian state or perish," interpreted as eradicating internal divisions.

Relations with Fascism, Nazism, and Other Movements

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) drew ideological inspiration from and , adopting elements such as the (leader principle), glorification of violence, and rejection of parliamentary democracy in favor of total national mobilization. Influenced by Dmytro Dontsov's doctrine of "active nationalism," which paralleled fascist voluntarism and anti-rationalism, OUN ideologues viewed Mussolini's and Hitler's regimes as models for overcoming national subjugation through ruthless authoritarianism. In the early , OUN founder established contacts with , securing training for militants in Italian camps and financial aid, while praising Mussolini's suppression of internal divisions as exemplary for Ukrainian unity. Relations with were initially collaborative, rooted in mutual and opposition to Polish rule over Ukrainian territories. From 1934 onward, the OUN cooperated with German military intelligence (), conducting sabotage against —such as the 1934 assassination of Polish Interior Minister —and receiving arms, funds, and specialized training in facilities. Andriy Melnyk's moderate OUN-M faction deepened these ties, with Melnyk meeting Hitler on July 12, 1941, to discuss Ukrainian autonomy under German oversight, though demands for full were rebuffed. In contrast, Stepan Bandera's radical OUN-B proclaimed Ukrainian on June 30, 1941, in , prompting German arrests of Bandera and other leaders by July 1941, exposing the alliance's fragility as OUN prioritized sovereignty over subservience to Nazi expansionism. The OUN's worldview shared fascism's anti-liberalism, cult of the nation, and willingness to employ terror, yet diverged in its ethno-specific focus on Ukrainian statehood rather than fascist internationalism or Nazi racial . Scholars classify OUN ideology as "," a variant akin to Croatian Ustashe "ustashism," emphasizing amoral and ethnic homogeneity for stateless peoples, rather than generic . By late , amid conflicts with German occupation forces, OUN rhetoric shifted, condemning and adopting democratic facades to appeal to Western Allies, while maintaining core authoritarian tenets. OUN engaged selectively with other authoritarian movements, viewing Romania's and Hungary's as potential anti-Soviet partners but prioritizing bilateral hostilities with and Bolshevik internationalism. No formal alliances formed with these groups, as OUN's clashed with their territorial claims, though shared anti-communist militancy fostered informal tactical exchanges in the .

Organizational Structure

Internal Hierarchy and Factional Divisions (OUN-M vs. OUN-B)

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) maintained a rigidly hierarchical structure inspired by fascist organizational models, featuring a supreme leader known as the or provodnyk at the top, who wielded absolute authority over subordinate bodies including a general secretariat, regional krays (commands), okruhas (districts), and local povits (counties). This chain of command enforced strict discipline and one-man rule, with decisions flowing downward and obedience emphasized as paramount. Following the assassination of founding leader by Soviet agents on 23 May 1938, internal tensions escalated over succession and strategy, particularly regarding collaboration with and the pace of revolutionary action. A conference in on 25–27 August 1939 elected Andriy Melnyk, a conservative military figure and Konovalets's associate, as the new provodnyk, favoring a disciplined, elitist approach aligned with potential German support. This provoked opposition from younger radicals, led by , who advocated more aggressive, independent tactics against Polish and Soviet rule. The schism formalized on 10 February 1940, when Melnyk's leadership expelled Bandera and his supporters, creating two parallel organizations: OUN-M (Melnykivtsi), which upheld the original centralized with Melnyk as unquestioned head, emphasizing orderly expansion and diplomatic maneuvering; and OUN-B (Banderivtsi), the faction under Bandera's Revolutionary Leadership, which retained a similar vertical structure but infused it with greater emphasis on grassroots militancy and decentralized initiative for uprisings. Ideological divergences centered on OUN-M's preference for hierarchical loyalty and phased cooperation with versus OUN-B's insistence on immediate sovereignty through mass mobilization, as evidenced by their rejection of subservience to foreign patrons. These factional divides intensified during , with OUN-M dispatching structured expeditionary groups to administer territories alongside German advances and seeking formal alliances, while OUN-B's Second Extraordinary Congress on 22–25 April 1941 in affirmed Bandera's leadership and prepared for unilateral action, culminating in the 30 proclamation of Ukrainian independence in —prompting German arrests of Bandera and key figures. Post-split, both factions preserved paramilitary networks but competed for resources and legitimacy, with OUN-B eventually overlapping its command with the (UPA) for sustained resistance, highlighting the causal rift between conservative institutionalism and radical autonomism.

Leadership Succession and Key Figures

Yevhen Konovalets served as the founding leader of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) from its establishment on February 3, 1929, until his assassination, holding the position of (supreme leader). A former Rifleman and organizer of the (UVO), Konovalets directed the OUN's early efforts toward unifying disparate nationalist groups and coordinating anti-Polish and anti-Soviet activities from exile in and later . Konovalets was killed on May 23, 1938, in , , by a bomb concealed in a box of chocolates, orchestrated by Soviet agent Pavlo Sudoplatov under direct orders from . This act, confirmed through declassified Ukrainian intelligence archives, triggered a and internal power struggles within the OUN, as Konovalets had not formally designated a successor despite grooming figures like Andriy Melnyk. The was addressed at the Second Great in from August 27–29, 1939, where Andriy Melnyk, a former colonel in the and Konovalets' close associate, was elected Vozhd of the unified OUN. Melnyk's leadership emphasized centralized authority and collaboration with , but it exacerbated tensions with younger, more militant members who viewed his approach as insufficiently aggressive. By early 1940, ideological and tactical disputes led to the OUN's formal schism into two rival factions during preparations for the Second OUN Conference in : the OUN-Melnyk (OUN-M), retaining loyalty to Melnyk's conservative, hierarchical structure, and the OUN-Bandera (OUN-B), led by , which prioritized immediate revolutionary action and grassroots mobilization. The split was solidified by April 1941, with OUN-M comprising older elites and OUN-B drawing support from radical youth cadres in ; Melnyk retained control of OUN-M until his death on November 1, 1964, in , while Bandera headed OUN-B until his assassination by KGB agent on October 15, 1959, in . Key figures in the leadership included , who bridged military command across factions before aligning with OUN-B as commander of the (UPA), and , Bandera's deputy who co-proclaimed Ukrainian statehood on June 30, 1941, and later succeeded in OUN-B's external leadership. Melnyk's faction maintained diplomatic outreach to , while Bandera's emphasized armed insurgency, reflecting their divergent paths in pursuing Ukrainian sovereignty amid alliances and betrayals.

Military and Paramilitary Efforts

Pre-War Militancy and

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), formed in 1929 through the merger of the (UVO) and other nationalist groups, inherited and intensified the UVO's militant tradition of and targeted violence against Polish administration in . The UVO, established around 1920 by veterans of the Ukrainian independence struggle, had conducted early acts of disruption including attacks on Polish officials, post offices, and infrastructure to challenge Poland's control over Galicia and following the Polish-Ukrainian War of 1918-1919. These operations aimed to undermine Polish authority and prepare for an anti-Polish uprising, reflecting the nationalists' rejection of Poland's sovereignty over ethnically Ukrainian territories. In the 1930s, OUN escalated militancy amid Polish policies perceived as assimilationist, including land reforms favoring Poles and restrictions on Ukrainian cultural institutions. During the Polish pacification campaign of 1930, which involved demolishing Ukrainian cooperative buildings in response to earlier , OUN claimed responsibility for coordinated disruptions such as and bombings to retaliate and assert defiance. The organization's propaganda emphasized these acts as necessary resistance to "," though mainstream Ukrainian political parties distanced themselves, favoring negotiation over violence. A pivotal pre-war action was the of Polish on June 15, 1934, in , carried out by OUN operative Hryhoriy Matseyko using a silenced . The killing targeted Pieracki due to his role in countering Ukrainian separatism, intending to internationalize the Ukrainian cause and provoke Polish overreaction. OUN leadership, under , approved the operation to demonstrate resolve against perceived oppression, but it prompted severe Polish reprisals, including mass arrests and the establishment of the Bereza Kartuska internment camp for over 10,000 Ukrainian activists by 1939. These pre-war efforts, involving an estimated dozens of incidents and assassinations between 1929 and 1939, solidified OUN's radical image but alienated moderate and invited international condemnation, as Polish diplomatic protests highlighted the terrorist nature of the attacks. Despite limited strategic success in achieving , the militancy fostered a cadre of hardened fighters who later transitioned into wartime roles.

World War II Combat Roles and UPA Formation

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), split between the Bandera-led OUN-B and Melnyk-led OUN-M factions, pursued tactical alliances with ahead of to combat Soviet occupation. OUN-B formed the Nachtigall and battalions in spring 1941, comprising approximately 350 to 800 Ukrainian volunteers under German command, which advanced with units into . These battalions participated in initial combat against forces, reaching by June 30, 1941, where OUN-B proclaimed the Act of Ukrainian Statehood, declaring independence from both Soviet and Polish control. German authorities rejected the proclamation and arrested on July 5, 1941, along with other OUN-B leaders, dissolving the battalions by August and interning members in concentration camps, signaling the collapse of the anticipated partnership. OUN-M, under Andriy Melnyk, maintained limited collaboration longer, including through formations that supported German anti-partisan operations, though both factions increasingly viewed Nazi occupation as imperial domination akin to Soviet rule. By late 1941, OUN-B shifted to underground activities, organizing and against German forces while avoiding direct confrontation initially due to resource constraints. In response to escalating German exploitation, including forced labor deportations exceeding 2.5 million by 1943, OUN-B established self-defense units in and Polissia starting in early 1943, formalizing them as the (UPA) with October 14, 1942, recognized symbolically as the founding date to align with the Feast of the Protection of the Virgin Mary. Actual combat formation occurred in January-February 1943 from existing boivkas ( groups), with official naming on April 15, 1943, enabling against German garrisons; the first significant UPA action against Germans took place in February 1943 in , escalating to larger engagements like the Battle of Radovychi in September 1943, where UPA forces numbering around 3,000 repelled a German assault. UPA ranks swelled to 8,000-10,000 by mid-1943, focusing on ambushes, supply raids, and territorial control to counter German reprisals that killed thousands of civilians. OUN-M developed separate partisan networks, such as the Ukrainian National Self-Defense, but these were smaller and less effective, often clashing internally with OUN-B over strategy; by 1944, unified under UPA command in some areas, these forces prioritized anti-German operations amid retreating Wehrmacht lines, destroying infrastructure and conscripting locals to sustain insurgency until Soviet reoccupation intensified. The UPA's three-front warfare—against Germans, Soviets, and Polish Home Army—reflected OUN's core aim of securing ethnically Ukrainian territories through asymmetric combat, though initial German cooperation had provided training and arms later repurposed against the occupiers.

Post-War Guerrilla Tactics and Effectiveness

Following the Red Army's reoccupation of in , the OUN-B's military arm, the (), reoriented its efforts toward prolonged against Soviet forces, aiming to disrupt reconsolidation and foster conditions for eventual independence. Operations intensified in regions like , Polissia, and Galicia, where UPA units initially controlled rural territories and leveraged local support networks for intelligence and logistics. Peak strength estimates varied, with UPA forces numbering up to 40,000-100,000 combatants by late , though sustained combat reduced this to smaller, decentralized bands by 1945. UPA tactics emphasized mobility and attrition, including hit-and-run ambushes on highways and supply convoys, sabotage of rail and communication lines, and targeted assassinations of Soviet commanders, personnel, and perceived collaborators. These actions disrupted Soviet ; for example, UPA units severed rail connections and destroyed depots, complicating troop movements and collectivization drives. Small-scale raids often involved mining roads for improvised explosives, followed by gunfire to eliminate survivors, minimizing UPA exposure while maximizing enemy casualties. efforts complemented military operations, with leaflets and radio broadcasts urging defection and resistance, though these yielded limited defections due to Soviet reprisals. Effectiveness waned as Soviet countermeasures—mass deportations, informant networks, and fortified garrisons—eroded bases by 1946-1947. Soviet records, likely inflated to rationalize repression, attribute 14,424 -initiated combat clashes, 4,904 "terrorist acts," and 195 incidents to the insurgents from 1944-1953, with inflicting several thousand military deaths, including high-profile cases like the 1944 ambush of General . However, suffered heavy attrition, with estimates of 30,000-50,000 fighters killed by 1950, amid broader Soviet operations that arrested or deported over 200,000 suspected sympathizers, severing civilian support. By 1953, organized resistance collapsed under demographic engineering and inducements, though isolated holdouts persisted into the late 1950s; the campaign delayed but failed to prevent Soviet integration, highlighting guerrilla limits against a totalitarian state with overwhelming manpower.

Controversies

Allegations of Antisemitism and Role in Pogroms

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) incorporated rhetoric into its ideological framework during the , as evidenced by publications in the Ukrainian nationalist press of that portrayed as economic exploiters and cultural threats to Ukrainian identity. Influential figures like , whose shaped OUN thought, espoused views aligning with European antisemitic currents, though direct attribution of genocidal intent remains debated among historians. OUN propaganda leaflets during occasionally invoked anti-Jewish sentiments, framing as Bolshevik collaborators, which contributed to local animosities amid the German invasion. In the immediate aftermath of the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, OUN members, particularly from the Bandera faction (OUN-B), played a documented role in organizing and participating in anti-Jewish pogroms in western Ukrainian cities, most notably Lviv. Ukrainian militias formed under OUN auspices in Lviv between June 30 and July 4, 1941, conducted assaults involving beatings, humiliations, and murders, resulting in an estimated 2,000 to 6,000 Jewish deaths during this initial wave. German forces encouraged these actions by staging discoveries of Soviet atrocities, such as mutilated Ukrainian prisoners, to incite crowds, but OUN activists provided organizational structure through pre-formed nationalist groups and auxiliary units. Primary accounts, including eyewitness testimonies and OUN internal records, indicate that while OUN leadership had issued a resolution in April 1941 cautioning against pogroms to avoid alienating potential allies, rank-and-file participation reflected underlying antisemitic attitudes fostered by the organization's xenophobic nationalism. Historians such as argue that OUN's pre-war facilitated militia involvement in these , though the violence often escalated beyond organized intent into mob actions amplified by German propaganda and local resentments from Soviet repressions. Similar patterns occurred in other locales like and , where OUN-affiliated groups contributed to the summer 1941 pogrom wave across , killing thousands before systematic German extermination policies dominated. These events formed part of broader local initiatives in the Holocaust's opening phase, with OUN units later serving in roles that aided deportations, though the organization shifted toward anti-German resistance by late 1941, complicating attributions of sustained policy. Allegations persist due to the ideological continuity and lack of post-war OUN reckonings with these actions, contrasted by defenses emphasizing contextual anti-Soviet motivations over inherent .

Involvement in Ethnic Cleansing and Polish Massacres

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), particularly its Bandera faction (OUN-B), directed the (UPA) in a systematic campaign of against Polish civilians in and during , with operations commencing in late March 1943 and peaking in July and August of that year. This effort, framed by OUN-B leadership as necessary to eliminate Polish demographic presence and secure Ukrainian territorial claims, involved coordinated attacks on Polish villages, targeting non-combatants including women and children. UPA units, under the command of figures like , encircled settlements, burned homes, and executed inhabitants using firearms, axes, scythes, and pitchforks, often mutilating bodies to instill terror. Planning for the cleansing originated in OUN-B directives issued in early 1943, with , a key OUN leader, explicitly advocating in to "cleanse the entire revolutionary territory of the Polish population." UPA reports from the period documented implementation, such as an account of 500 Poles killed in a single village action. By August 15, 1943, Shukhevych ordered the redistribution of Polish-held land to , incentivizing participation through property seizure amid wartime . Attacks extended into December 1943, including assaults on Polish churches during Christmas services, and sporadic violence persisted into 1944 as Polish self-defense units and Soviet forces disrupted UPA operations. The brutality of the massacres was characterized by deliberate savagery, with UPA fighters compelling local Ukrainian peasants to join killings under threat of death, transforming civilian bystanders into perpetrators to broaden and deter resistance. Notable waves included the 11-12, 1943, assaults across multiple Volhynian counties, resulting in approximately 10,000 Polish deaths in that phase alone. While retaliatory Polish actions by the caused several thousand Ukrainian casualties, the asymmetry favored UPA initiative, with OUN-B ideology portraying Poles as existential threats to Ukrainian statehood. Casualty estimates from the Volhynia phase alone reach about 50,000 Polish deaths in , with total figures for and ranging from 60,000 to 100,000 when including subsequent operations, based on archival records, survivor testimonies, and demographic analyses. These actions aligned with OUN-B's pre-war goals of expunging non-Ukrainian populations to forge an ethnically homogeneous nation-state, exploiting the power vacuum under German occupation to preempt Polish post-war. OUN documentation and UPA operational logs substantiate the premeditated nature, refuting claims of spontaneous reprisals by revealing top-down orchestration.

Accusations of Fascism and Totalitarianism

The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) has faced accusations of primarily due to its adoption of , which emphasized as an organic entity demanding total subordination of individuals and suppression of opposing views, akin to fascist doctrines in and . OUN ideologue Mykhailo Stsiborskyi explicitly praised as a political method aligning with the organization's goals, describing it as a system prioritizing national unity over liberal individualism in his writings on state organization. The group's statutes mandated absolute obedience to leaders under the (leader principle), enforced through discipline and expulsion of dissenters, mirroring totalitarian structures observed in Mussolini's . Critics, including Soviet authorities, labeled the OUN fascist to equate with Nazi collaboration, a amplified post-1945 to justify repressions against Ukrainian insurgents; this portrayal persisted in equating OUN figures like with Hitlerite ideology, despite the OUN's initial tactical alliance with aimed at anti-Soviet liberation rather than ideological alignment. Historians such as Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe argue that the OUN embodied a "fascist kernel" through its genocidal anti-Semitism, cult of violence, and rejection of , evidenced by pre-war assassinations of Polish officials and endorsement of ethnic homogeneity in occupied territories. However, some scholars contend this classification overlooks the OUN's conspiratorial, elite-driven nature, distinct from mass-mobilizing fascist parties, and note its post-1941 shift toward anti-Nazi resistance after German suppression of Ukrainian autonomy declarations. Accusations of arise from the OUN's vision of a controlling all societal spheres to forge national consciousness, as articulated in its founding congress resolutions calling for elimination of "alien" influences through and force. Factional leaders Andriy Melnyk and Bandera both advocated authoritarian governance, with OUN-M (Melnyk faction) exhibiting stronger hierarchical rigidity and pro-Axis sympathies until 1943, while OUN-B emphasized revolutionary terror but similarly rejected pluralism. Empirical evidence includes the OUN's internal purges and oaths binding members to and unconditional , practices enabling clandestine operations but fostering cult-like devotion to leaders. Soviet and Polish sources, often biased by territorial grudges, exaggerated these traits to portray the OUN as inherently totalitarian aggressors, though declassified archives confirm the ideology's authoritarian bent without full implementation due to wartime constraints.

Legacy

Impact on Ukrainian Independence Movements

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) exerted a profound influence on Ukrainian independence movements through its establishment of the (UPA) in October 1942, which conducted guerrilla operations against both Nazi German occupiers and advancing Soviet forces during and after . The UPA, drawing from OUN ranks, peaked at an estimated 100,000 fighters by and sustained resistance into the mid-1950s, reportedly killing over 30,000 Soviet personnel while suffering heavy losses from Soviet campaigns that deployed up to 500,000 troops. This prolonged insurgency, rooted in OUN's integral nationalist ideology emphasizing ethnic homogeneity and anti-Soviet struggle, preserved a tradition of armed amid occupations, contrasting with passive accommodation in eastern regions. In the post-Soviet era following Ukraine's independence declaration on August 24, 1991, OUN and UPA legacies were rehabilitated through diaspora-led that countered Soviet-era denunciations, framing them as anti-totalitarian fighters essential to national survival. Ukrainian émigré communities, including former OUN affiliates, repatriated to promote narratives of continuous resistance against Russian imperialism, influencing educational reforms and public monuments; by 2010, over 100 Bandera-related memorials existed in . Parliamentary resolutions, such as the 2009 and 2015 recognitions of UPA as freedom fighters, integrated OUN symbols like the red-and-black flag and "Slava Ukraini" greeting into state discourse, bolstering against lingering Soviet nostalgia. The OUN's ideological imprint became evident in the 2013-2014 Revolution, where protesters adopted Bandera portraits and OUN-derived chants to symbolize defiance of pro-Russian President , galvanizing mass mobilization that culminated in his ouster on February 22, 2014. This revival of OUN motifs, including UPA red-and-black armbands among right-wing groups like , linked contemporary pro-European aspirations to historical anti-occupation struggles, contributing to Ukraine's pivot toward and integration amid in March 2014. Despite far-right electoral marginality—garnering under 3% in 2019 parliamentary votes—the pervasive use of OUN symbols in military units and public rallies reinforced resilience against subsequent Russian incursions, as evidenced by their prominence in 2022 defense efforts.

Rehabilitation in Post-Soviet Ukraine (1991-Present)

Following Ukraine's declaration of independence on August 24, 1991, nationalist groups began efforts to revive the legacy of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as symbols of anti-Soviet resistance, with early commemorations including monuments to OUN figures in western regions. The first monument to OUN leader Stepan Bandera was erected on October 14, 1990, in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast, shortly before independence, followed by additional memorials in cities like Lviv (2007) and Ternopil (2008), totaling over 40 Bandera monuments primarily in western Ukraine by the 2010s. These initiatives drew on émigré nationalist histories produced abroad to counter Soviet-era condemnations of the OUN as collaborators. The of 2004–2005 marked a turning point, as President pursued systematic rehabilitation of OUN leaders, positioning them as central figures in Ukraine's independence narrative. On January 22, 2010, in the final days of his presidency, Yushchenko posthumously awarded Bandera the title "" for "defending the idea of Ukrainian statehood," alongside similar recognition for (UPA) commander . This decree, however, faced domestic legal challenges and was annulled by a court in April 2011 under President , reflecting regional divides over the OUN's wartime record. The 2014 Euromaidan Revolution and ensuing conflict with accelerated OUN veneration, framing it as anti-imperialist heroism amid Russian propaganda portraying as fascist. In April 2015, President signed four "decommunization" laws, including one granting legal recognition to the OUP and UPA as "freedom fighters" for Ukrainian independence, providing veteran benefits to surviving members and their families, and prohibiting of their "struggle." These measures, upheld by Ukraine's on July 16, 2019, facilitated widespread renaming of streets and removal of over 1,300 Soviet monuments by 2015, often replacing them with OUN-related tributes. By 2022, amid the full-scale Russian invasion, public support for Bandera and OUN symbols surged in western and , with polls indicating 40–50% favorable views in those regions, though rehabilitation efforts have been criticized internationally for overlooking the OUN's documented involvement in wartime atrocities. State policies under President have continued selective elevation of OUN figures as anti-Soviet icons, including annual commemorations and museum exhibits, while avoiding full endorsement of their fascist-era ideology.

International Criticisms and Russian Narratives

Polish officials have repeatedly condemned Ukraine's post-1991 efforts to honor OUN leaders like , citing the organization's role in the massacres of 1943–1945, where (UPA) units killed an estimated 50,000–100,000 Polish civilians in campaigns. In 2024, Polish opposition lawmakers proposed criminalizing the propagation of "Banderism" akin to or , with penalties up to three years imprisonment, reflecting ongoing demands for exhumations of massacre victims and formal Ukrainian acknowledgment of . President Andrzej Duda's administration in 2025 advanced amendments to ban "Banderite symbols" alongside Nazi and communist emblems, underscoring bilateral tensions despite alliance against . The (USHMM) expressed alarm in 2015 over Ukraine's parliamentary recognition of the OUN and UPA as "freedom fighters," arguing it whitewashes their participation in antisemitic pogroms and auxiliary roles in Nazi killing actions during , where local collaborators aided in the murder of over 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews. In 2020, Israeli and Polish ambassadors jointly criticized for glorifying OUN figures who advocated of Jews and Poles, urging rejection of such narratives in favor of historical accountability. Western historians, including those examining interwar influences, have characterized OUN ideology as bearing a "fascist kernel" through its authoritarian , totalitarian aspirations, and alliances with , though debates persist on whether it fully met generic criteria. Russian state narratives frame the OUN as archetypal fascists and Nazi collaborators, amplifying Bandera's brief 1941 declaration of independence under German auspices and initial tactical alliances to depict contemporary as a direct, unrepentant continuation of "Banderism." President in his 2021 essay "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" invoked Bandera alongside figures like Mazepa and Petliura as betrayers who collaborated with Nazis, using this to justify the 2022 invasion as "de-Nazification" against a allegedly reviving OUN genocidal tendencies. routinely ties OUN symbols, such as the red-and-black flag, to modern events like and the Azov Battalion, portraying them as evidence of systemic despite OUN's later anti-Soviet and limited post-war influence, thereby exploiting verified historical crimes for geopolitical aims while omitting Soviet atrocities like the . This rhetoric intensified post-2014, with annual Bandera commemorations in Ukraine cited as proof of fascist resurgence, though analysts note it serves to dehumanize opponents and consolidate domestic support rather than purely reflect empirical continuity.

Recent Developments in Commemoration (2014-2025)

Following the Revolution of Dignity in 2014, enacted policies that elevated the status of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and its armed affiliates. On April 9, 2015, the passed a package of four laws, signed into effect by President on May 15, which officially recognized OUN and (UPA) members as "freedom fighters" who struggled for 's independence against Soviet and Nazi occupations. These laws granted OUN-UPA veterans legal protections, including immunity from prosecution for their wartime actions and eligibility for state pensions, while criminalizing the denial of their legitimacy or the promotion of communist symbols. The measures facilitated the removal of over 1,300 Soviet-era monuments by 2017 and the renaming of thousands of streets and localities previously honoring communist figures. This legal framework spurred increased public commemoration of OUN leaders, particularly , head of the OUN-B faction. Post-2015, numerous monuments to Bandera were erected or existing ones preserved in , with over 40 documented by the early 2020s in regions like , , , and oblasts. In , Moscow Avenue was renamed Stepan Bandera Avenue in 2016 as part of efforts. Similar renamings occurred in other cities, such as , where Stepan Bandera Street was established after 2014. Annual torchlight marches honoring Bandera's January 1 birthday became prominent symbols of this resurgence; in 2015, thousands participated in carrying torches and portraits, a tradition that persisted amid the ongoing conflict with . By 2022, hundreds marched in despite wartime restrictions, framing Bandera as a symbol of resistance to foreign domination. Under President , elected in 2019, OUN commemoration faced no official rollback, even as Russian propaganda amplified accusations of Ukrainian "Nazism" tied to Bandera's legacy during the full-scale starting February 24, 2022. In 2021, Ukrainian lawmakers proposed granting national "Hero of Ukraine" status to Bandera and UPA commander , figures previously honored by Poroshenko in 2010 but stripped by a in 2011. The reinforced this in January 2023 by tweeting a commemorative image of Bandera on his 114th birthday, prompting condemnation from Polish officials who linked him to wartime atrocities against Poles. Zelenskyy, in pre-presidential remarks, described Bandera as one who "fought for Ukrainian independence" but urged focus on contemporary heroes in arts and defense. By 2025, public opinion polls indicated sustained domestic support, with 81% viewing OUN-UPA as legitimate independence fighters, a figure stable since 2015 and aligned with wartime narratives equating Soviet history with Russian aggression.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.