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Palestinian nationalism is the national movement of the Palestinian people that espouses self-determination and sovereignty over the region of Palestine.[1] Originally formed in the early 20th century in opposition to Zionism, Palestinian nationalism later internationalized and attached itself to other ideologies;[2] it has thus rejected the occupation of the Palestinian territories by the government of Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War.[3] Palestinian nationalists often draw upon broader political traditions in their ideology, such as Arab socialism and ethnic nationalism in the context of Muslim religious nationalism. Related beliefs have shaped the government of Palestine and continue to do so.

In the broader context of the Arab–Israeli conflict in the 21st century, Palestinian nationalist aims have included an end to the refugee status of individuals separated from their native lands during the 1948 Palestinian expulsion and flight, advocates stating that a "right of return" exists either to the occupied territories or to both those areas plus places within Israel itself. Nationalists have additionally worked to advance specific causes in terms of current residents' lives such as freedom of assembly, labor rights, the right to health care, and the right to travel. Divisions exist between nationalists over particular ideological goals, an example being the gulf between Islamist Palestinians favoring a more authoritarian state compared to centrist and secular Palestinians supporting democratic self-determination. Palestinian nationalists are also divided by preferred tactics; some favor nonviolent resistance while others advocate for and engage in political violence both inside and outside Israel.[4]

Flag of Palestine

Origins

[edit]
A 1930 protest in Jerusalem against the British Mandate by Palestinian women. The sign reads "No dialogue, no negotiations until termination [of the Mandate]".

Israeli historian Haim Gerber, a professor of Islamic History at Hebrew University of Jerusalem, traces Arab nationalism back to a 17th-century religious leader, Mufti Khayr al-Din al-Ramli (1585–1671) who lived in Ramla. Khayr al-Din al-Ramli's religious edicts (fatwa, plural fatawa), collected into final form in 1670 under the name al-Fatawa al-Khayriyah, mentions the concepts Filastin, biladuna (our country), al-Sham (Syria), Misr (Egypt), and diyar (country), in senses that appear to go beyond objective geography. Gerber describes this as "embryonic territorial awareness, though the reference is to social awareness rather than to a political one".[5] Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal suggest a singular Palestinian identity was first prefigured in the inter-community coalitions which emerged in the region after the 1834 Palestinian Arab revolt against Egyptian conquest and conscription.[6]

Khalil Beidas's 1898 use of the word "Palestinians" in the preface to his translation of Akim Olesnitsky's A Description of the Holy Land[7]

Zachary J. Foster suggests the first recorded use of the term "Filastini" (lit. 'Palestinian') to describe the region's Arab inhabitants dates to 1898, when Khalil Beidas used it in the preface to a book he translated from Russian to Arabic.[a] Foster said that the term "Palestinian" had already been used decades earlier in Western languages by the 1846–1863 British Consul in Jerusalem, James Finn; the German Lutheran missionary Johann Ludwig Schneller (1820–1896), founder of the Syrian Orphanage; and the American James Wells.[7] Foster also records early usage of the term by Farid Georges Kassab, "a Beirut-based Orthodox Christian" in 1909. Kassab refers to the Arabic-speaking locals as Palestinians throughout his book, Palestine, Hellenism, and Clericalism, but also says that "the Orthodox Palestinian Ottomans call themselves Arabs".[8] From 1911, the Palestinian Arab Christian newspaper Falastin also addressed its readers as Palestinians.[9][10]

1936 issue of the Palestinian Arab Christian Falastin newspaper addressed its readers as "Palestinians" since its establishment in 1911.[9][10]

In his 1997 book, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, historian Rashid Khalidi says that Palestinian identity has never been an exclusive one, with "Arabism, religion, and local loyalties" playing an important role.[11] Khalidi describes the Arab population of British Mandatory Palestine as having "overlapping identities", with some or many expressing loyalties to villages, regions, a projected nation of Palestine, an alternative of inclusion in a Greater Syria, an Arab national project, as well as to Islam;[12] and that this had not yet evolved into "nation-state nationalism".[13] He says that modern-day Palestinian identity is informed by the history of Palestine—encompassing the Biblical, Roman, Byzantine, Umayyad, Fatimid, Crusader, Ayyubid, Mamluk and Ottoman periods—as Palestinians have come to understand it over the last century,[14] but says that Palestinian nationalist consciousness is in fact "relatively modern".[15] Khalidi suggests the modern national identity of Palestinians has its roots in nationalist discourses that emerged among the peoples of the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th century, which sharpened following the demarcation of modern nation-state boundaries in the Middle East after World War I.[11] James L. Gelvin suggests the emergence of Palestinian nationalism during the interwar period was a "response to Zionist immigration and settlement".[16] He says this does not make Palestinian identity any less legitimate "or make it less valid than Zionism", since "all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose".[16] Khalidi also says that Zionism played a role in shaping the Palestinian identity, but says "it is a serious mistake to suggest that Palestinian identity emerged mainly as a response to Zionism".[11]

Bernard Lewis says Arab nationalism in the Ottoman Empire "had not reached significant proportions before the outbreak of World War I", and therefore Palestinians could not oppose Zionism based on Palestinian nationalism, since it did not yet exist.[17] Benny Morris suggests that the Arabs in Palestine remained part of a larger Pan-Islamist or Pan-Arab national movement until 1920.[18] Morris says the emergence of the Palestinian national identity can be traced through the successive postwar Palestine Arab Congresses: in January 1919, the First Congress saw "Palestine as part of Arab Syria"; in December 1920, the Third Congress called upon the British to establish a "native government", making no further mention of "Southern Syria".[19] Daniel Pipes suggests that, as a result of the carving of the British Mandate of Palestine out of Greater Syria, the Arabs of the new Mandate were forced to make the best they could of their situation, with a distinctly "Palestinian Arab" identity emerging by the end of 1920.[20]

Late Ottoman context

[edit]

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire was accompanied by an increasing sense of Arab identity in the Empire's Arab provinces, most notably Syria, considered to include both northern Palestine and Lebanon. This development is often seen as connected to the wider reformist trend known as al-Nahda ("awakening", sometimes called "the Arab renaissance"), which in the late 19th century brought about a redefinition of Arab cultural and political identities with the unifying feature of Arabic.[21]

Under the Ottomans, Palestine's Arab population mostly saw themselves as Ottoman subjects. In the 1830s however, Palestine was occupied by the Egyptian vassal of the Ottomans, Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha. The Palestinian Arab revolt was precipitated by popular resistance against heavy demands for conscripts, as peasants were well aware that conscription was little more than a death sentence. Starting in May 1834 the rebels took many cities, among them Jerusalem, Hebron and Nablus. In response, Ibrahim Pasha sent in an army, finally defeating the last rebels on 4 August in Hebron.[6]

The flag of the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire is a prominent symbol of Arab nationalism. Its design and colors are the basis of many of the Arab states' flags.

While Arab nationalism, at least in an early form, and Syrian nationalism were the dominant tendencies along with continuing loyalty to the Ottoman state, Palestinian politics were marked by a reaction to foreign predominance and the growth of foreign immigration, particularly Zionist.[22]

The Egyptian occupation of Palestine in the 1830s resulted in the destruction of Acre and thus, the political importance of Nablus increased. The Ottomans wrested back control of Palestine from the Egyptians in 1840–41. As a result, the Abd al-Hadi clan, who originated in Arrabah in the Sahl Arraba region in northern Samaria, rose to prominence. Loyal allies of Jezzar Pasha and the Tuqans, they gained the governorship of Jabal Nablus and other sanjaqs.[23]

In 1887 the Mutassariflik (Mutasarrifate) of Jerusalem was constituted as part of an Ottoman government policy dividing the vilayet of Greater Syria into smaller administrative units. The administration of the mutasarrifate took on a distinctly local appearance.[24]

Michelle Compos records that "Later, after the founding of Tel Aviv in 1909, conflicts over land grew in the direction of explicit national rivalry."[25] Zionist ambitions were increasingly identified as a threat by Palestinian leaders, while cases of purchase of lands by Zionist settlers and the subsequent eviction of Palestinian peasants aggravated the issue.

The programmes of four Palestinian nationalist societies jamyyat al-Ikha’ wal-‘Afaf (Brotherhood and Purity), al-jam’iyya al-Khayriyya al-Islamiyya (Islamic Charitable Society), Shirkat al-Iqtissad al-Falastini al-Arabi (lit. 'Arab Palestinian Economic Association') and Shirkat al-Tijara al-Wataniyya al-Iqtisadiyya (lit. 'National Economic Trade Association') were reported in the newspaper Filastin in June 1914 by letter from R. Abu al-Sal’ud. The four societies has similarities in function and ideals; the promotion of patriotism, educational aspirations and support for national industries.[26]

British Mandate period

[edit]

Nationalist groups built around notables

[edit]

Palestinian Arab A’ayan ("Notables") were a group of urban elites at the apex of the Palestinian socio-economic pyramid where the combination of economic and political power dominated Palestinian Arab politics throughout the British Mandate period. The dominance of the A’ayan had been encouraged and utilised during the Ottoman period and later, by the British during the Mandate period, to act as intermediaries between the authority and the people to administer the local affairs of Palestine.

Al-Husseini

[edit]

The al-Husayni family were a major force in rebelling against Muhammad Ali who governed Egypt and Palestine in defiance of the Ottoman Empire. This solidified a cooperative relationship with the returning Ottoman authority. The family took part in fighting the Qaisi family in an alliance with a rural lord of the Jerusalem area Mustafa Abu Ghosh, who clashed with the tribe frequently. The feuds gradually occurred in the city between the clan and the Khalidis that led the Qaisis however these conflicts dealt with city positions and not Qaisi-Yamani rivalry.[27]

The Husaynis later led resistance and propaganda movements against the Young Turks who controlled the Ottoman Empire and more so against the British Mandate government and early Zionist immigration.[27] Jamal al-Husayni was the founder and chairman of the Palestine Arab Party (PAP) in 1935. Emil Ghoury was elected as General Secretary, a post he held until the end of the British Mandate in 1948. In 1948, after Jordan had occupied Jerusalem, King Abdullah of Jordan removed Hajj Amīn al-Husayni from the post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and banned him from entering Jerusalem.

Nashashibi

[edit]

The Nashashibi family had particularly strong influence in Palestine during the British Mandate Period from 1920 until 1948.[28] Throughout this period, they competed with the Husaynis, for dominance of the Palestinian Arab political scene.[29] As with other A’ayan their lack of identification with the Palestinian Arab population allowed them to rise as leaders but not as representatives of the Palestinian Arab community.[30] The Nashashibi family was led by Raghib Nashashibi, who was appointed as Mayor of Jerusalem in 1920.[31] Raghib was an influential political figure throughout the British Mandate period, and helped form the National Defence Party in 1934.[32] He also served as a minister in the Jordanian government, governor of the West Bank, member of the Jordanian Senate, and the first military governor in Palestine.

Tuqan

[edit]

The Tuqan family, originally from northern Syria, was led by Hajj Salih Pasha Tuqan in the early eighteenth century and were the competitors of the Nimr family in the Jabal Nablus (the sub-district of Nablus and Jenin). Members of the Tuqan family held the post of mutasallim (sub-district governor) longer than did any other family in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.The rivalry between the Tuqans and Nimr family continued until the 1820s.[33]

Abd al-Hadi

[edit]

Awni Abd al-Hadi of the ‘Abd al Hadi family. The Abd al-Hadis were a leading landowning family in the Palestinian districts of Afula, Baysan, Jenin, and Nablus. Awni established the Hizb al-Istiqlal (Independence Party) as a branch of the pan-Arab party. Rushdi Abd al-Hadi joined the British administrative service in 1921. Amin Abd al-Hadi joined the SMC in 1929, and Tahsin Abd al-Hadi was mayor of Jenin. Some family members secretly sold their shares of Zirʿin village to the Jewish National Fund in July 1930 despite nationalist opposition to such land sales. Tarab ‘Abd al Hadi feminist and activist was the wife of Awni ‘Abd al Hadi, Abd al-Hadi Palace built by Mahmud ‘Abd al Hadi in Nablus stands testament to the power and prestige of the family.

Khalidiy, al-Dajjani, al-Shanti

[edit]

Other A’ayan were the Khalidi family, al-Dajjani family, and the al-Shanti family. The views of the A’ayan and their allies largely shaped the divergent political stances of Palestinian Arabs at the time. In 1918, as the Palestinian Arab national movements gained strength in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Acre and Nablus, Aref al-Aref joined Hajj Amīn, his brother Fakhri Al Husseini, Ishaaq Darweesh, Ibrahim Darweesh, Jamal al-Husayni, Kamel Al Budeiri, and Sheikh Hassan Abu Al-So’oud in establishing the Arab Club.

1918–1920 nationalist activity

[edit]

Following the arrival of the British a number of Muslim-Christian Associations were established in all the major towns. In 1919 they joined to hold the first Palestine Arab Congress in Jerusalem. Its main platforms were a call for representative government and opposition to the Balfour Declaration.

The Faisal-Weizmann Agreement led the Palestinian Arab population to reject the Syrian-Arab-Nationalist movement led by Faisal (in which many previously placed their hopes) and instead to agitate for Palestine to become a separate state, with an Arab majority. To further that objective, they demanded an elected assembly.[34] In 1919, in response to Palestinian Arab fears of the inclusion of the Balfour declaration to process the secret society al-Kaff al-Sawada’ (the Black-hand, its name soon changed to al-Fida’iyya, The Self-Sacrificers) was founded, it later played an important role in clandestine anti-British and anti-Zionist activities. The society was run by the al-Dajjani and al-Shanti families, with Ibrahim Hammani in charge of training; ‘Isa al-Sifri developed a secret code for correspondence. The society was initially based in Jaffa but moved its headquarters to Nablus, the Jerusalem branch was run by Mahmud Aziz al-Khalidi.[35]

The Times report of the riots, 8 April 1920

After the April riots an event took place that turned the traditional rivalry between the Husayni and Nashashibi clans into a serious rift,[36] with long-term consequences for al-Husayni and Palestinian nationalism. According to Sir Louis Bols, great pressure was brought to bear on the military administration from Zionist leaders and officials such as David Yellin, to have the Mayor of Jerusalem, Mousa Kazzim al-Husayni, dismissed, given his presence in the Nabi Musa riots of the previous March. Colonel Storrs, the Military Governor of Jerusalem, removed him without further inquiry, replacing him with Raghib. This, according to the Palin report, 'had a profound effect on his co-religionists, definitely confirming the conviction they had already formed from other evidence that the Civil Administration was the mere puppet of the Zionist Organization.'[37]

Supreme Muslim Council under Hajj Amin (1921–1937)

[edit]

The High Commissioner of Palestine, Herbert Samuel, as a counterbalance the Nashashibis gaining the position of Mayor of Jerusalem, pardoned Hajj Amīn and Aref al-Aref and established a Supreme Muslim Council (SMC), or Supreme Muslim Sharia Council, on 20 December 1921.[38] The SMC was to have authority over all the Muslim Waqfs (religious endowments) and Sharia (religious law) Courts in Palestine. The members of the council were to be elected by an electoral college and appointed Hajj Amīn as president of the council with the powers of employment over all Muslim officials throughout Palestine.[39] The Anglo American committee termed it a powerful political machine.[40]

The Hajj Amin rarely delegated authority, consequently most of the council's executive work was carried out by Hajj Amīn.[40] Nepotism and favoritism played a central part to Hajj Amīn's tenure as president of the SMC, Amīn al-Tamīmī was appointed as acting president when the Hajj Amīn was abroad, The secretaries appointed were ‘Abdallah Shafĩq and Muhammad al’Afĩfĩ and from 1928 to 1930 the secretary was Hajj Amīn's relative Jamāl al-Husaynī, Sa’d al Dīn al-Khaţīb and later another of the Hajj Amīn's relatives ‘Alī al-Husaynī and ‘Ajaj Nuwayhid, a Druze was an adviser.[40]

Politicisation of the Wailing Wall

[edit]

It was during the British mandate period that politicisation of the Wailing Wall occurred.[41][further explanation needed] The disturbances at the Wailing wall in 1928[which?] were repeated in 1929, however the violence in the riots that followed, that left 116 Palestinian Arabs, 133 Jews dead and 339 wounded, were surprising in their intensity.[42]

Black Hand gang

[edit]

Izz ad-Din al-Qassam established the Black Hand gang in 1935. Izz ad-Din died in a shootout against the British forces.[43][44] He has been popularised in Palestinian nationalist folklore for his fight against Zionism.[45]

1936–1939 Arab revolt

[edit]

The Great revolt of 1936–1939 was an uprising by Palestinian Arabs in the British Mandate of Palestine in protest against mass Jewish immigration.

Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, a leader of the revolt, was a member of the Palestine Arab Party who had served as its Secretary-General and had become editor-in-chief of the party's paper Al-Liwa’[46] as well as of other newspapers, including Al-Jami’a Al-Islamiyya.[47] In 1938, Abd al-Qadir was exiled and in 1939 fled to Iraq where he took part in the Rashid Ali al-Gaylani coup.

Muhammad Nimr al-Hawari, who had started his career as a devoted follower of Hajj Amin, broke with the influential Husayni family in the early 1940s.[48] The British estimated the strength of the al-Najjada paramilitary scout movement, led by Al-Hawari, at 8,000 prior to 1947.[49]

1937 Peel Report and its aftermath

[edit]

The Nashashibi clan broke with the Arab High Committee and Hajj Amīn shortly after the contents of the Palestine Royal Commission report compiled by the Peel Commission were released on 7 July 1937, announcing a territorial partition plan.[50] The Nashashibis, the Arab Palestinian Communist Party, and many other Palestinians accepted the plan, but the split in the ranks between rejectionists and pro-partitionists led to Hajj Amin taking control of the Arab High Committee. He, with the support of the Arab League, rejected the plan.[51]

Results

[edit]

The revolt of 1936–1939 led to an imbalance of power between the Jewish community and the Palestinian Arab community, as the latter had been substantially disarmed.[50] The British also greatly reduced Zionist immigration to appease the Arab Middle East with a confrontation with Nazi Germany looming.[52][53] A further offer was made to the Palestinians in the British "White Paper of 1939", which proposed a ceiling of 75,000 on Jewish migration into Palestine over the next five years, after which Arab agreement would be required. It additionally proposed severely limiting Jewish land purchases, and offered an Arab-majority Palestinian state within ten years. This offer was rejected by the Arab Higher Committee.[52][54]

1947–1948 war

[edit]

Al-Qadir moved to Egypt in 1946, but secretly returned to Palestine to lead the Army of the Holy War (AHW) in January 1948, and was killed during hand-to-hand fighting against Haganah; where AHW captured Qastal Hill on the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem road, on 8 April 1948.[55] al-Qadir's death was a factor in the loss of morale among his forces, Ghuri, who had no experience of military command was appointed as commander of the AHW. Fawzi al-Qawuqji, at the head of the Arab Liberation Army remained as the only prominent military commander.[56]

1948–1964

[edit]
Haj Amin al-Husseini meeting with Gamal Abdel Nasser, the future Egyptian president, in 1948

In September 1948, the All-Palestine Government was proclaimed in Egyptian-controlled Gaza Strip, and immediately won the support of Arab League members except Jordan. Though jurisdiction of the Government was declared to cover the whole of the former Mandatory Palestine, its effective jurisdiction was limited to the Gaza Strip.[57] The Prime Minister of the Gaza-seated administration was named Ahmed Hilmi Pasha, and the President was named Hajj Amin al-Husseini, former chairman of the Arab Higher Committee.[58]

The All-Palestine Government however lacked any significant authority and was in fact seated in Cairo. In 1959 it was officially merged into the United Arab Republic by the decree of Nasser, crippling any Palestinian hope for self governance. With the establishment in 1948 of the State of Israel, along with the 1948 Palestinian exodus, the common experience of the Palestinian refugee Arabs was mirrored in a fading of Palestinian identity.[59] The institutions of a Palestinian nationality emerged slowly among Palestinian refugees in the diaspora. In 1950 Yasser Arafat founded Ittihad Talabat Filastin.[60] After the 1948 Arab–Israeli War, most of the Husseini clan relocated to Jordan and the Gulf States. Many family heads that remained in the Old City and the northern neighborhoods of East Jerusalem fled due to hostility with the Jordanian government, which controlled that part of the city.[61]

The Fatah movement, which espoused a Palestinian nationalist ideology in which Palestinians would be liberated by the actions of Palestinian Arabs, was founded in 1954 by members of the Palestinian diaspora—principally professionals working in the Gulf States who had been refugees in Gaza and had gone on to study in Cairo or Beirut—including Yasser Arafat who was head of the General Union of Palestinian Students (GUPS) (1952–1956) in Cairo University, Salah Khalaf, Khalil al-Wazir, Khaled Yashruti was head of the GUPS in Beirut (1958–1962).[62]

PLO until the First Intifada (1964–1988)

[edit]

The Palestine Liberation Organisation was founded by a meeting of 422 Palestinian national figures in Jerusalem in May 1964, following an earlier decision of the Arab League. Issued on 28 May, the PLO's founding charter sought a one-state solution within the boundaries of Mandatory Palestine, with a right of return and self-determination for Palestinians.[63][64] The charter also called for the dissolution of Israel and the expulsion of all Jews that had arrived after the Balfour Declaration, with any remaining Jews considered part of a single democratic state.[65] The charter also sought to "prohibit... the existence and activity" of Zionism.[66]

Following the defeat of the Arab states in the June 1967 Six-Day War, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip came under Israeli military control and occupation.[67] Following the Battle of Karameh in May 1968, which Yasser Arafat claimed as a victory (in Arabic, "karameh" means "dignity"), Arafat quickly became a Palestinian national hero. Masses of young Arabs joined the ranks of his group Fatah. Under pressure, Ahmad Shukeiri resigned from the PLO leadership and in July 1969, Fatah joined and soon controlled the PLO. The fierce Palestinian guerrilla fighting and the Jordanian Artillery bombardment forced the IDF withdrawal and gave the Palestinian Arabs an important morale boost. Israel was calling their army the indomitable army but this was the first chance for Arabs to claim victory after defeat in 1948, 1953, and 1967. After the battle, Fatah began to engage in communal projects to achieve popular affiliation.[68] After the Battle of Karameh there was a subsequent increase in the PLO's strength.[69][70]

In 1974 the PLO called for an independent state in the territory of Mandate Palestine.[71] The group used guerilla tactics to attack Israel from their bases in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as from within the Gaza Strip and West Bank.[72]

In 1988, the PLO officially endorsed a two-state solution, with Israel and Palestine living side-by-side contingent on specific terms such as making East Jerusalem capital of the Palestinian state and giving Palestinians the right of return to land occupied by Palestinians prior to the 1948 and 1967 wars with Israel.[73] Some scholars, journalists and politicians doubted the honesty in these declarations, and viewed the ambiguity in them as prevarications directed to a Western audience.[74][75]

First Intifada (1987–1993)

[edit]

Local leadership

[edit]

The First Intifada (1987–1993) would prove another watershed in Palestinian nationalism, as it brought the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza to the forefront of the struggle. The Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU; Arabic al-Qiyada al Muwhhada) mobilised grassroots support for the uprising.[76]

In 1987, the Intifada caught the PLO by surprise; the leadership abroad could only indirectly influence the events.[76] A new local leadership, the UNLU, emerged, consisting of many leading Palestinian factions. The initially spontaneous disturbances soon came under local leadership from groups and organizations loyal to the PLO that operated within the Occupied Territories: Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Palestine Communist Party.[77] The UNLU was the focus of the social cohesion that sustained the persistent disturbances.[78]

After King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988, the UNLU organised to fill the political vacuum.[79][80]

Emergence of Hamas

[edit]

In 1987, Palestinian Islamic scholar Ahmed Yassin founded the Islamic Resistance Movement, also known as Hamas,[81][82] after the outbreak of the First Intifada against the Israeli occupation. It emerged as a distinct Sunni Islamist organisation[83] from his 1973 Mujama al-Islamiya Islamic charity affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood.[84] According to their founding documents, including their first communique in 1987, and their 1988 charter, Hamas was borth with the goals of waging holy war against Zionism, opposing the peace process, and increase religiosity amongst the youth.[85][86] The organization advocated for "martyrdom" as the ideal objective in their struggle against Israel.[87] During the intifada, Hamas ended the PLO's monopoly as sole political representative of the Palestinian people.[88]

Peace process

[edit]

Some Israelis had become tired of the constant violence of the First Intifada, and many were willing to take risks for peace.[89] Some wanted to realize the economic benefits in the new global economy. The Gulf War (1990–1991) did much to persuade Israelis that the defensive value of territory had been overstated, and that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait psychologically reduced their sense of security.[90]

Yitzhak Rabin, Yasser Arafat and Bill Clinton at the signing of the Oslo Accords, 13 September 1993

A renewal of the Israeli–Palestinian quest for peace began at the end of the Cold War as the United States took the lead in international affairs. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western observers were optimistic, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in an article, titled "The End of History". The hope was that the end of the Cold War heralded the beginning of a new international order. President George H. W. Bush, in a speech on 11 September 1990, spoke of a "rare opportunity" to move toward a "New world order" in which "the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony," adding that "today the new world is struggling to be born".[91]

1993 Oslo Agreement

[edit]
Signing of the accords

The demands of the local Palestinian and Israeli populations somewhat differed from those of the Palestinian diaspora, which had constituted the main base of the PLO until then, in that they were primarily interested in independence, rather than the right of return for refugees. The resulting 1993 Oslo Agreement cemented the belief in a two-state solution in the mainstream Palestinian movement, as opposed to the PLO's original goal, a one-state solution which entailed the destruction of Israel and its replacement with a secular, democratic Palestinian state.[92][93][94]

The two-state solution had first been seriously discussed in the 1970s, when Said Hammami said the PLO would be willing to accept a two-state solution, on at least an interim basis.[95][96] By 1982, the PLO had officially committed to recognising a two-state solution based on a Palestinian state in the West Bank, Gaza, and East Jerusalem. By the mid-1980s, the two-state solution became the negotiating position of the PLO leadership, with leader Yasser Arafat and King Hussein of Jordan attempting to persuade the United States of the Palestinians' right to self-determination in return for acceptance of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, and therefore implicit acceptance of Israel's existence.[97] In 1988, the Palestine National Council (PNC) published the first official Palestinian statement recognising a two-state solution, which called only for withdrawal from East Jerusalem and the occupied Palestinian territories.[98] Together with Arafat's later statements in Geneva, this was accepted by the United States as a basis for dialogue.[99]

Palestinian National Authority (1993)

[edit]

In 1993 with the transfer of increased control of Muslim holy sites in Jerusalem from Israel to the Palestinians, PLO chairman Yasser Arafat appointed Sulaiman Ja'abari as Grand Mufti. When he died in 1994, Arafat appointed Ekrima Sa'id Sabri. Sabri was removed in 2006 by Palestinian National Authority president Mahmoud Abbas, who was concerned that Sabri was involved too heavily in political matters. Abbas appointed Muhammad Ahmad Hussein, who was perceived as a political moderate.[citation needed]

Goals

[edit]
Demonstration in Amman, Jordan, during the 2021 Israel–Palestine crisis

Palestinian statehood

[edit]
Main article: History of the State of Palestine

Contemporary proposals for a Palestinian state include establishment of an independent state for the Palestinian people in Palestine on land that was occupied by Israel since the Six-Day War of 1967 and prior to that year by Egypt (Gaza) and by Jordan (West Bank and East Jerusalem). The proposals include the Gaza Strip, which is controlled by the Hamas faction of the Palestinian National Authority; the West Bank, which is administered by the Fatah faction of the Palestinian National Authority; and East Jerusalem, which was unilaterally annexed by Israel in 1980 and remains under Israeli control.[100] A minority of Palestinians and Israelis support a one-state solution instead throughout the region of British Mandatory Palestine, which would include all of Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel.[b]

From the river to the sea

[edit]
Main article: From the river to the sea

"From the river to the sea" is, and forms part of, a popular Palestinian political slogan. It references the land which lies between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea and has been frequently used in statements by Arab leaders.[103][104] It is also chanted at pro-Palestinian protests and demonstrations,[105] where it is often followed or preceded by the phrase "Palestine will be free".[106][107]

From its establishment in 1964 until the 1980s, the PLO claimed "Palestine from the river to the sea" as its territory.[97][71][108] In a slightly different fashion, "Palestine from the river to the sea" is still claimed by Hamas, referring to all areas of former Mandatory Palestine.[109][110][111]

Other nationalisms

[edit]

Pan-Arabism

[edit]
A PFLP patrol in Jordan, 1969

Some groups within the PLO hold a more pan-Arabist view than Fatah, and Fatah itself has never renounced Arab nationalism in favour of a strictly Palestinian nationalist ideology. Some of the pan-Arabist members justifying their views by claiming that the Palestinian struggle must be the spearhead of a wider, pan-Arab movement. For example, the Marxist PFLP viewed the "Palestinian revolution" as the first step to Arab unity as well as inseparable from a global anti-imperialist struggle. This said, however, there seems to be a general consensus among the main Palestinian factions that national liberation takes precedence over other loyalties, including Pan-Arabism, Islamism and proletarian internationalism.[citation needed]

Pan-Islamism

[edit]
The Hamas flag.
See also: Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Palestinian Mujahideen Movement, and Islamist anti-Hamas groups in the Gaza Strip

In a later repetition of these developments, the pan-Islamic sentiments embodied by the Muslim Brotherhood and other religious movements, would similarly provoke conflict with Palestinian nationalism. About 90% of Palestinians are Sunni Muslims,[where?][citation needed] and while never absent from the rhetoric and thinking of the secularist PLO factions, Islamic political doctrines, or Islamism, did not become a large part of the Palestinian movement until the 1980s rise of Hamas.[citation needed]

By early Islamic thinkers, nationalism had been viewed as an ungodly ideology, substituting "the nation" for God as an object of worship and reverence. The struggle for Palestine was viewed exclusively through a religious prism, as a struggle to retrieve Muslim land and the holy places of Jerusalem. However, later developments, not least as a result of Muslim sympathy with the Palestinian struggle led to many Islamic movements accepting nationalism as a legitimate ideology. In the case of Hamas, the Palestinian offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood.[citation needed]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]
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Palestinian nationalism is a political movement and ideology advocating the self-determination and sovereignty of the Arab inhabitants of the region historically designated as Palestine, encompassing the area of the former British Mandate west of the Jordan River. It originated among the Arab elite in the late Ottoman period as a form of regional patriotism tied to opposition against centralized reforms and foreign influences, coalescing into a more defined national consciousness by the early 20th century amid rising Jewish immigration under Zionist auspices. The movement gained institutional form during the British Mandate era, with early manifestations including protests against the 1917 Balfour Declaration and the 1920 Nebi Musa riots (April 4–7), during which Arab mobs in Jerusalem's Old City assaulted Jewish civilians amid the Muslim festival commemorating the prophet Moses, killing five Jews and wounding 216 while looting homes and businesses; the violence was incited by inflammatory speeches from Arab leaders, including Haj Amin al-Husseini, decrying Zionist immigration and spreading rumors of Jewish plots against Muslim holy sites such as Al-Aqsa. Four Arabs were killed, mainly by British forces restoring order, with 18 Arabs and seven Britons also injured. This marked collective Arab resistance to perceived threats to land ownership and demographic balance. Key figures such as Haj Amin al-Husseini, appointed Grand Mufti in 1921, mobilized religious and communal networks to advance anti-Zionist and anti-British campaigns, culminating in the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, a sustained insurgency that highlighted the nationalist prioritization of territorial exclusivity over compromise. Post-1948, after the establishment of Israel and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arabs, Palestinian nationalism shifted toward armed struggle and international advocacy, formalized by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964, though it has been marked by internal divisions between secular factions like Fatah and Islamist groups such as Hamas. Defining characteristics include a persistent rejection of partition schemes, from the 1937 Peel Commission to the 1947 UN plan, often framed in maximalist terms seeking the entirety of Mandate Palestine free of Jewish sovereignty, alongside alliances with adversarial powers during World War II and Cold War proxy conflicts. Controversies persist over its causal links to violence, including fedayeen raids in the 1950s, the PLO's designation as a terrorist organization by multiple states until the 1990s, and ongoing militancy by offshoots like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which underscore a pattern where ideological commitments have impeded pragmatic state-building in controlled territories such as Gaza post-2007. Despite partial diplomatic gains like the 1993 Oslo Accords, which granted limited autonomy via the Palestinian Authority, the movement's empirical record reflects causal tensions between irredentist goals and the realities of demographic and military asymmetries with Israel.

Ideological Foundations

Religious and Cultural Roots

Palestinian nationalism's cultural roots are embedded in the ethnic and linguistic ties of the Arab population in the region, which developed a distinct local identity through shared traditions, family clans (hamulas), and attachments to villages and farmland during the Ottoman era. This sense of place-based belonging predated modern nationalism, manifesting as regional patriotism amid the empire's administrative districts (sanjaks) that included Palestine, where inhabitants increasingly identified as "natives of Palestine" (ahl Filastin) by the late 19th century. Early expressions of this identity emphasized cultural continuity from Arab-Islamic heritage, including dialectal Arabic, folklore, and agrarian customs, which distinguished Palestinians from neighboring Arab groups while aligning with broader Levantine Arab culture. Religiously, the predominantly Sunni Muslim composition of the population—comprising over 80% of Arabs in Palestine by the early 20th century—provided a backdrop of shared practices and jurisprudence, yet early nationalism eschewed religious justification in favor of secular territorial sovereignty inclusive of Christian and indigenous Jewish communities. Leaders among both Muslim elites and urban notables prioritized national unity over Islamic revivalism, viewing sovereignty as tied to society and land rather than dynasty or doctrine, a stance influenced by emerging Arab cultural nationalism from 1908–1914 that eroded pan-Islamic Ottoman loyalties without invoking jihad or caliphal restoration. Holy sites like Al-Aqsa Mosque symbolized cultural heritage and resistance to perceived threats, but their mobilization, as in the 1920 Nebi Musa riots, served political ends rather than constituting ideological foundations. While later figures such as Haj Amin al-Husseini, appointed Grand Mufti in 1921, integrated religious authority into nationalist politics—framing opposition to Zionism partly through defense of Islamic endowments (awqaf)—this represented an adaptation amid British Mandate policies rather than a primordial root, as core ideology remained oriented toward ethnic Arab self-determination over theocratic aims. Palestinian Christians, numbering around 10% of the Arab population in 1914, actively participated in nationalist societies like the Arab Club (founded 1918), underscoring the movement's transcending of strict religious boundaries in its formative phase.

Integration with Arab and Islamic Ideologies

Palestinian nationalism initially developed within the broader framework of Arab nationalism during the late Ottoman period and British Mandate, where local Arab elites in Palestine articulated demands for self-rule as part of the Arab awakening against imperial control. By the 1910s, Palestinian Arabs increasingly identified with pan-Arab aspirations, viewing Zionism and British policies as threats to both local and regional Arab interests, leading to alignments with figures like Sharif Hussein of Mecca during the Arab Revolt of 1916. This integration positioned the Palestinian cause as a subset of Arab anti-colonial struggle, evident in the 1920 Nebi Musa riots, where protesters demanded Arab independence under Faisal's short-lived kingdom in Damascus. Under Haj Amin al-Husseini, appointed Grand Mufti in 1921, the Palestinian movement incorporated Islamic ideologies to mobilize support beyond secular Arab nationalism, framing the defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque and Jerusalem's holy sites as a religious imperative. Husseini redefined the anti-Zionist struggle as pan-Islamic, leveraging his control over the Supreme Muslim Council to collect waqf funds and promote jihad rhetoric during the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt, which combined nationalist grievances with appeals to Muslim solidarity across the Arab world and beyond. His wartime alliances, including broadcasts from Berlin urging Muslims to fight Jews and Allies, further embedded Islamist elements into the narrative, though these efforts prioritized tactical religious mobilization over doctrinal purity. Post-1948, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded in 1964, aligned with secular pan-Arabism under leaders like Gamal Abdel Nasser, who hosted PLO training and framed Palestinian fedayeen operations as part of Arab unity against Israel, culminating in the 1967 war where Arab states intervened on Palestine's behalf. However, the PLO's Marxist-influenced factions, such as Fatah, subordinated local Palestinian identity to broader Arab revolutionary goals, receiving ideological and material support from Nasserist Egypt and Ba'athist regimes until the 1970s decline of pan-Arabism exposed fractures. The late 1980s marked a shift toward deeper Islamic integration with the rise of Hamas, an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood founded in 1987, which fused Palestinian nationalism with Islamist ideology by declaring Palestine an inalienable Islamic waqf in its 1988 charter, rejecting secular nationalism as insufficient against Zionism. Hamas critiqued the PLO's secularism as a deviation from Islamic principles, drawing on Brotherhood teachings to advocate jihad as the path to liberation while maintaining nationalist territorial claims, thereby challenging Fatah's dominance and gaining traction during the First Intifada through social services and religious framing. This Islamist turn reflected disillusionment with pan-Arab failures, prioritizing transnational Muslim solidarity over defunct Arab unity, though Hamas pragmatically engaged in nationalist politics, as seen in its 2006 election victory and 2017 charter revisions softening anti-Semitic rhetoric while reaffirming armed resistance.

Historical Development

Late Ottoman and Early 20th Century Origins

Palestinian nationalism emerged in the late Ottoman period as a localized form of identity among Arab elites in response to Zionist immigration and land purchases, which threatened demographic and economic balances in Palestine. Under Ottoman rule from 1517 to 1918, inhabitants primarily identified through religious, familial, or regional affiliations rather than a unified national consciousness, with broader Arab awakening influencing but not dominating local sentiments. The term "Palestinians" (Filastiniyyun) first appeared in reference to the Arab population in Khalil Beidas's 1898 preface to his Arabic translation of Akim Olesnitsky's A Description of the Holy Land, signaling an early textual acknowledgment of a geographic-based collective tied to the region. The founding of Arabic newspapers marked a pivotal development in articulating this identity. Filastin, established in Jaffa on January 15, 1911, by brothers Issa and Yousef al-Isa, explicitly addressed its readership as Palestinians and critiqued Zionist settlement as an existential threat, fostering public discourse on shared territorial interests. Similarly, Al-Karmil in Haifa, launched in 1908 by Najib Nassar, monitored and opposed Jewish land acquisitions, contributing to awareness of Palestine as a distinct unit amid Ottoman decentralization and rising pan-Arab currents. These publications, alongside secret societies like the 1909 Jaffa Literary Club, represented the initial institutional expressions of proto-nationalism, blending local patriotism with opposition to foreign influences. Post-World War I transitions amplified these origins. After the Ottoman defeat in 1918 and British occupation, the 1919 King-Crane Commission encountered petitions from Palestinian Arabs demanding independence and rejection of Zionism, reflecting organized political claims rooted in prior local activism. The 1920 Nebi Musa riots in Jerusalem, erupting April 4–7 during the Muslim festival, saw approximately 5,000 Arabs clash with Jews, resulting in 95 deaths (64 Jewish, 31 Arab) and injuries to over 200, driven by agitation against the Balfour Declaration's promise of a Jewish national home. Historians view these events as the first mass demonstration of Palestinian nationalist fervor, catalyzed by fears of dispossession and British policy shifts.

British Mandate Period (1917–1948)

The British Mandate for Palestine, established in 1920 following the League of Nations' confirmation in 1922, incorporated the 1917 Balfour Declaration's commitment to facilitating a Jewish national home while safeguarding the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities. This policy fueled Arab opposition, as Palestinian Arabs viewed it as enabling Zionist immigration and land acquisition at their expense, prompting early expressions of collective resistance framed as defense of Arab rights in the territory. In April 1920, during the Nebi Musa festival in Jerusalem, inflammatory speeches against Zionism incited riots that killed five Jews and four Arabs, with over 200 Jews and 18 Arabs wounded, marking an initial violent assertion of Arab claims amid fears of displacement. Palestinian Arab nationalism coalesced through institutional efforts and recurrent violence. The Third Palestinian Arab Congress in Haifa in 1920 rejected the Mandate and demanded independence, reflecting a shift from pan-Syrian affiliations toward localized opposition to British-Zionist collaboration. The Arab Executive, formed in 1920 under Musa Kazim al-Husayni, coordinated boycotts and protests but proved ineffective due to internal divisions. In May 1921, Jaffa riots erupted from clashes between Jewish factions, escalating into attacks that killed 46 Jews and injured over 140, alongside Arab casualties, underscoring tensions over immigration waves that increased the Jewish population from about 83,000 in 1922 to 175,000 by 1931. Haj Amin al-Husayni, appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921 and president of the Supreme Muslim Council in 1922, emerged as a pivotal figure, leveraging religious authority to mobilize against Zionism by portraying the Al-Aqsa Mosque as a pan-Arab and Palestinian symbol. The 1929 riots, triggered by disputes over the Western Wall (al-Buraq) and rumors of Jewish encroachments, resulted in massacres at Hebron and Safed, with 133 Jews killed and 339 wounded, alongside 116 Arab deaths and 232 injuries, primarily from British suppression. These events, investigated by the Shaw Commission, highlighted Arab grievances over land sales and immigration but also revealed incitement by Husseini-led groups, galvanizing a distinct Palestinian identity rooted in anti-Zionist resistance rather than autonomous cultural revival. Rivalries between Husseini's faction and moderates like the Nashashibi family fragmented leadership, yet fostered parties such as the Arab Istiqlal Party in 1932, advocating independence. Jewish immigration surged in the 1930s due to Nazi persecution, raising the Jewish population to around 400,000 by 1936, intensifying economic pressures and land disputes in a territory where Arabs comprised about 80% of the 1.3 million residents. The Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 represented the zenith of Mandate-era Palestinian nationalism, initiated by a general strike in April 1936 demanding an end to Jewish immigration, prohibition of land transfers, and national government formation. Evolving into guerrilla warfare by local bands (fasa'il) targeting British forces and Jewish settlements, the uprising involved up to 15,000 fighters at its peak, causing over 5,000 Arab deaths, 400 British, and 400 Jewish fatalities, while crippling the economy through sabotage. Husseini initially supported the revolt from exile but his absolutist control exacerbated clan divisions, leading to assassinations of moderates and weakening unified action. British responses included the Peel Commission's 1937 partition recommendation—allocating 20% of land to a Jewish state—which Arabs rejected outright, viewing it as rewarding aggression, followed by the Woodhead Commission's abandonment of partition. The 1939 White Paper policy capped Jewish immigration at 75,000 over five years and envisioned an independent Palestinian state with an Arab majority within a decade, temporarily halting the revolt but failing to satisfy Arab demands for immediate sovereignty. Husseini's flight to Iraq in 1939 and subsequent Axis collaboration during World War II isolated Palestinian leadership, with the revolt's suppression decimating elites—over 100 executed or killed—and leaving the Yishuv relatively strengthened. By 1947, amid post-war immigration pressures and UN partition deliberations, Palestinian nationalism remained reactive, hampered by internal fractures and dependence on pan-Arab support, setting the stage for the 1948 conflict.

1948 Arab-Israeli War and Nakba

The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, also known as Israel's War of Independence, commenced as a civil conflict within Mandatory Palestine following the United Nations General Assembly's adoption of Resolution 181 on November 29, 1947, which proposed partitioning the territory into separate Jewish and Arab states alongside an international zone for Jerusalem. Palestinian Arab leaders, led by the Arab Higher Committee under Haj Amin al-Husseini, rejected the plan outright, viewing it as unjust given the Arabs' demographic majority of approximately 67% of the population and 93% of the land ownership in the proposed Arab state areas. In response, Palestinian irregular forces, including the Army of the Holy War, initiated attacks on Jewish communities, convoys, and settlements, such as the ambush of a Jewish bus near Lod on November 30, 1947, marking the onset of widespread violence that escalated into full-scale civil war by December. These forces, numbering around 2,000-3,000 poorly equipped fighters fragmented by clan rivalries and lacking centralized command, proved ineffective against the more organized Haganah and Irgun militias, leading to the collapse of Arab villages and urban defenses in mixed areas like Haifa and Jaffa by April 1948. On May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence, prompting the immediate invasion by armies from Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon on May 15, with the stated aim of preventing the Jewish state's establishment rather than solely defending Palestinian Arabs. Palestinian forces had largely disintegrated by this phase, with many fighters absorbed into invading armies or fleeing; the Arab League's coordination was hampered by inter-state rivalries, as Jordan's King Abdullah sought to annex the West Bank for his own expansionist goals. The war concluded with Israeli victories and armistice agreements in 1949, resulting in Israel controlling about 78% of Mandatory Palestine—exceeding the UN partition allocation—while Jordan annexed the West Bank and Egypt occupied Gaza; no independent Palestinian Arab state emerged, as Arab leaders had prioritized pan-Arab unity and rejection of compromise over statehood. Casualties included roughly 6,000 Israelis (about 1% of the Jewish population) and 10,000-15,000 Arabs, including Palestinians. The Nakba, Arabic for "catastrophe," refers to the displacement of approximately 700,000-750,000 Palestinian Arabs—over half of the pre-war Arab population—between December 1947 and early 1949, primarily to neighboring states like Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. Historian Benny Morris identifies multiple causes: initial voluntary flight of urban elites and middle classes from December 1947 to March 1948 amid fears of violence; mass evacuations during battles from April to June 1948 due to combat, psychological warfare, and direct expulsions in cases like Lydda and Ramle (where 50,000-70,000 were ordered out by Israeli forces); and later displacements during the interstate phase. While some Arab radio broadcasts and leaders urged temporary evacuation to clear paths for invading armies, systematic Zionist expulsion policies were not premeditated from the war's start but emerged ad hoc in response to military necessities and to prevent rear threats, as documented in Israeli archives; Palestinian society collapsed under the weight of its leadership's incitement to total war and refusal of partition, exacerbating the exodus. This displacement profoundly shaped nascent Palestinian nationalism by embedding a narrative of collective trauma and dispossession, yet it initially subordinated Palestinian identity to broader Arab nationalism, with refugees placed in camps under Arab state control and no autonomous institutions formed until the 1960s. The failure of Palestinian militias and Arab armies to achieve victory highlighted the disorganization of local leadership—exemplified by Husseini's exile and Axis collaboration—fostering resentment toward both Jewish forces and Arab regimes that exploited the refugee crisis for political leverage without resolution. Over 400 Palestinian villages were depopulated or destroyed, often to secure frontiers, but the root causality lay in the Arabs' strategic choice to wage war against partition rather than negotiate, resulting in territorial losses and a refugee population denied citizenship in host countries, perpetuating statelessness. The Nakba thus became a mobilizing mythos for future irredentist claims, though empirical analysis underscores it as a consequence of rejected compromise and military defeat rather than unprovoked ethnic cleansing.

Stateless Interlude (1948–1964)

Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, approximately 700,000 Palestinian Arabs became refugees, displaced from territories that became Israel, with many fleeing to the Gaza Strip under Egyptian administration and the West Bank under Jordanian control, while others settled in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Jordan formally annexed the West Bank in 1950, granting its Palestinian residents Jordanian citizenship and integrating them into the kingdom's political system, which effectively subsumed potential Palestinian national institutions under Hashemite rule. In contrast, Egypt maintained military administration over Gaza without annexation or citizenship, treating its roughly 200,000 Palestinian inhabitants primarily as refugees managed through United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) aid established in 1949, while restricting local political autonomy to align with Cairo's broader regional strategies. Palestinian nationalism entered a dormant phase during this period, eclipsed by dominant pan-Arab ideologies promoted by leaders like Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser, who prioritized Arab unity over separate Palestinian statehood to consolidate influence against Israel and rival Arab regimes. Arab states, including Jordan and Egypt, adopted policies that absorbed or controlled Palestinian populations to prevent independent nationalist organizing that might challenge their authority; for instance, Jordan suppressed expressions of distinct Palestinian identity in the West Bank to maintain territorial claims, while Egypt viewed Gaza Palestinians as leverage in inter-Arab rivalries rather than as a sovereign entity. The short-lived All-Palestine Government, declared in Gaza in September 1948 under Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini, collapsed amid Arab infighting and lack of support from invading armies, underscoring how interstate competition undermined nascent Palestinian self-determination. Limited armed resistance emerged through fedayeen guerrilla groups, primarily operating from Gaza with Egyptian tolerance or sponsorship starting around 1951, conducting cross-border raids into Israel that numbered over 4,000 infiltrations by 1956, targeting civilians and infrastructure in acts of sabotage and revenge for the Nakba displacements. These operations, involving small bands of armed Palestinians, represented early assertions of agency amid statelessness but remained fragmented, lacking centralized leadership or widespread mobilization, and often served Egyptian tactical goals, such as escalating tensions to justify military buildup. Israeli retaliatory strikes, including major operations like the 1955 raid on Gaza's Khan Yunis camp that killed dozens, curtailed fedayeen activity by the mid-1950s, coinciding with the 1956 Suez Crisis, after which such raids diminished until the 1960s. Underground political activism persisted among diaspora Palestinians, with precursors to later organizations forming in the late 1950s; for example, Yasser Arafat and others established the al-Fatah group in Kuwait around 1959, focusing on clandestine recruitment and ideology centered on armed liberation independent of Arab state patronage. An Arab League meeting in Shtaura, Lebanon, in August 1960, saw Arab states decide to establish a distinct Palestinian "entity," which U.S. diplomatic assessments described as implying an Algerian-type liberation movement ultimately aimed at eliminating Israel, with longer-range plans for a military organization and Palestinian government pursued gradually. However, overt Palestinian nationalism remained marginalized until the Arab League's endorsement of a dedicated entity in 1964, as host governments and pan-Arab frameworks continued to prioritize their geopolitical interests, effectively prolonging the stateless interlude.

Institutionalization and Armed Struggle

Formation of the PLO (1964)

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established on May 28, 1964, during the first session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) held in East Jerusalem, following a resolution adopted at the inaugural Arab League Summit in Cairo from January 13 to 17, 1964. This initiative by the Arab League, comprising leaders from 13 member states, aimed to consolidate disparate Palestinian factions under a unified umbrella to coordinate efforts toward "liberation" of Palestine, while maintaining Arab state oversight amid rising pan-Arab nationalism under figures like Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Arab League appointed Ahmad Shukeiri, a former Saudi diplomat and Palestinian notable with ties to Nasser, to lead the preparatory committee and serve as the PLO's first chairman, reflecting the organization's initial dependence on interstate Arab patronage rather than independent grassroots mobilization. At the PNC meeting, attended by approximately 350 Palestinian delegates selected largely by Arab governments, the assembly approved the Palestinian National Charter (also known as the Covenant) and the PLO's Basic Law, formalizing its structure with an Executive Committee, legislative council, and secretariat. The Charter, comprising 33 articles, defined Palestine as "the homeland of the Arab Palestinian people" and an "indivisible part of the Arab homeland," rejecting the 1947 UN Partition Plan and asserting that "the partition of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of the state of Israel are entirely illegal." It emphasized armed struggle as the sole means of liberation, framing Zionism as an "imperialist invasion" to be repelled through national duty, while subordinating Palestinian claims within broader Arab unity and disclaiming recognition of Israel. The PLO's formation marked a shift from ad hoc refugee committees and Arab state-managed Palestinian affairs post-1948 to a centralized entity, though it initially lacked military capacity or widespread popular support, functioning more as a diplomatic and symbolic body funded by Arab governments. Shukeiri's leadership focused on advocacy at Arab forums and fundraising, but the organization's pan-Arab orientation and limited autonomy highlighted its role as a tool for interstate coordination rather than a purely sovereign Palestinian expression, a dynamic that would evolve after the 1967 Six-Day War.

Guerrilla Warfare and Internationalization (1967–1987)

Following Israel's victory in the Six-Day War of June 1967, which resulted in the capture of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and other territories, Palestinian guerrilla groups affiliated with Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) intensified armed operations against Israeli military and civilian targets, aiming to establish liberated zones and erode Israeli control through attrition. These fedayeen units, operating primarily from bases in Jordan with tacit Jordanian approval, conducted cross-border raids and ambushes, including attempts to incite uprisings in the newly occupied West Bank; however, Israeli counteroperations largely suppressed local insurgencies by late 1967. Fatah, founded in 1959 and led by Yasser Arafat, positioned armed struggle as the core strategy in its 1968 charter, rejecting negotiation and emphasizing people's war tactics inspired by Algerian and Vietnamese models. By 1968–1970, PLO factions had established semi-autonomous enclaves in Jordan, housing tens of thousands of fighters and refugees, which strained relations with King Hussein's government amid escalating attacks on Israel—over 2,000 raids documented in this period, causing dozens of Israeli casualties. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist splinter group, pioneered international operations, including the September 1970 Dawson's Field hijackings, where four Western airliners carrying over 300 passengers were seized and diverted to a Jordanian desert airstrip; three planes were exploded after hostages were released in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, heightening global awareness of the Palestinian cause while provoking Jordanian backlash. This culminated in Black September, a Jordanian military offensive from September 17, 1970, that crushed PLO infrastructure, killing thousands of fighters and civilians in clashes around Amman and expelling the organization eastward; the conflict stemmed from fedayeen attempts to impose parallel governance, including checkpoints and taxation, effectively challenging state sovereignty. Displaced to Lebanon by 1971, the PLO rebuilt bases in the south and Beirut, leveraging the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990) to launch rocket attacks and infiltrations into northern Israel, with annual incidents rising to hundreds by the late 1970s; Fatah's Black September Organization, formed post-Jordan expulsion, executed high-profile international strikes, such as the September 5, 1972, Munich Olympics attack, where eight militants infiltrated the Israeli delegation's quarters, killing two athletes immediately and nine hostages during a failed rescue, alongside five attackers and one German policeman. These operations, often targeting civilians to maximize media impact, drew widespread condemnation as terrorism while elevating the PLO's profile; between 1968 and 1985, Palestinian groups were linked to over 1,000 international attacks, per declassified analyses, though exact fatalities varied by source due to differing definitions of combatants. The PLO's strategy evolved toward internationalization, securing Arab League endorsement as the "sole legitimate representative" of Palestinians at the 1974 Rabat Summit and UN General Assembly observer status via Resolution 3210 on October 14, 1974, allowing Arafat's address equating Palestinian rights to self-determination. Ties with the Soviet Union provided training and arms, while European leftist networks offered logistical support, enabling operations like the 1976 Entebbe hijacking by PFLP allies. In Lebanon, PLO dominance fueled sectarian tensions, prompting Israeli incursions such as the 1978 Litani Operation and the full-scale 1982 invasion (Operation Peace for Galilee), which advanced to Beirut, besieging PLO headquarters and forcing Arafat's evacuation with 14,000 fighters to Tunisia under U.S.-brokered terms; the campaign followed the attempted assassination of Israel's ambassador in London and aimed to dismantle guerrilla infrastructure, resulting in over 17,000 Lebanese and Palestinian deaths. By 1987, residual PLO cells persisted in Lebanon amid Syrian influence, but sustained Israeli operations and internal fractures shifted momentum toward grassroots unrest in the territories, presaging the First Intifada.

Uprisings and Political Evolution

First Intifada (1987–1993)

The First Intifada erupted on December 9, 1987, in the Gaza Strip following a traffic collision in which an Israeli truck struck a stationary vehicle carrying Palestinian laborers, killing four and injuring seven; Palestinians perceived the incident as deliberate retaliation for prior attacks on Israelis, igniting widespread protests. What began as spontaneous demonstrations quickly escalated into a coordinated uprising across Gaza and the West Bank, involving mass strikes, commercial boycotts, and barricades, coordinated initially by local committees and later by the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, an underground network aligned with factions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Underlying causes included decades of economic stagnation under Israeli occupation, high unemployment among Palestinian youth, restrictions on movement, and frustration with the PLO's exile and perceived ineffectiveness in advancing national goals. Palestinian tactics evolved from stone-throwing and tire-burning to more lethal methods, including Molotov cocktails, stabbings, and shootings targeting Israeli civilians and security forces; by early 1988, the violence had resulted in six Palestinian deaths and 30 injuries in the initial clashes, with attacks extending to Israeli buses and settlements. The uprising also featured internal enforcement, such as executions of alleged collaborators with Israel, estimated at over 800 by some accounts, which suppressed dissent within Palestinian communities. Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) responded with crowd-control measures, including tear gas, plastic bullets, and live ammunition, alongside Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's directive to suppress unrest forcefully—famously summarized as "break their bones"—leading to widespread arrests, curfews, and deportations of agitators. Casualties were asymmetric but reflected mutual violence: Israeli sources report approximately 160 Israelis killed, including 100 civilians, primarily from stabbings, shootings, and bombings, while Palestinian deaths totaled around 1,000-2,000, mostly from IDF gunfire, with over 100 minors among them according to B'Tselem data; injuries exceeded 10,000 on the Palestinian side, often from beatings and shootings at close range. The PLO, initially surprised by the grassroots surge, sought to co-opt the movement through smuggled directives and funding, portraying it internationally as a non-violent civil disobedience campaign to garner sympathy, though evidence from Israeli intelligence indicates PLO orchestration of violent cells. This framing, echoed in some human rights reports, downplays Palestinian-initiated attacks, a pattern attributable to ideological alignment in outlets like Al Jazeera. The Intifada peaked in 1988-1989 but waned by 1991, undermined by IDF countermeasures, economic strain on participants, and the PLO's diplomatic isolation after Yasser Arafat's support for Iraq during the Gulf War alienated Arab states and the U.S. Its impact on Palestinian nationalism was profound: it fostered a generation of mobilized youth, reinforcing collective identity and eroding acquiescence to occupation, while elevating the PLO's stature as the movement's de facto leader despite internal rifts. However, the violence's toll—exposing tactical limits and provoking harsh reprisals—shifted PLO strategy toward diplomacy, culminating in the 1991 Madrid Conference and recognition of Israel, marking a pragmatic pivot from armed rejectionism. The uprising's legacy includes heightened global awareness of Palestinian grievances but also entrenched cycles of confrontation, as grassroots fervor outpaced institutional control.

Oslo Accords and Palestinian Authority Establishment (1993–2000)

The Oslo Accords began with secret bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), mediated by Norway, culminating in the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements signed on September 13, 1993, at the White House in Washington, D.C. This agreement followed letters of mutual recognition exchanged on September 9, 1993, in which the PLO acknowledged Israel's right to exist in peace and security, and Israel recognized the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Declaration outlined a five-year interim period for Palestinian self-governance in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, establishing an elected Palestinian Council to assume responsibilities for education, health, social welfare, and direct taxation, while deferring final-status issues such as borders, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees to future negotiations. Implementation advanced with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement signed on May 4, 1994, in Cairo, which transferred limited authority to a newly formed Palestinian Authority (PA) in Gaza and Jericho, marking the first withdrawal of Israeli forces from parts of these territories. Yasser Arafat returned to Gaza on July 1, 1994, to lead the PA, which was intended as an interim body to administer specified areas and foster cooperation with Israel on security and economic matters. The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, known as Oslo II, signed on September 28, 1995, expanded PA control by dividing the West Bank into three zones: Area A (full PA civil and security control, comprising major Palestinian cities, about 3% of the territory), Area B (PA civil control with joint Israeli-PA security, about 23%), and Area C (full Israeli control, about 74%, including settlements and strategic areas). This division aimed to facilitate phased redeployments but preserved Israeli oversight in most of the West Bank. Palestinian legislative and presidential elections held on January 20, 1996, under international observation, resulted in Arafat's election as PA president with 88.1% of the vote (715,966 valid votes out of 736,825 cast, turnout approximately 72%). Fatah, Arafat's faction, secured 55 of 88 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council, establishing a Fatah-dominated legislature. However, the peace process faced significant obstacles, including the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995, by a Jewish extremist opposed to territorial concessions, and the election of Benjamin Netanyahu in May 1996, whose government slowed further redeployments. Despite initial progress, implementation eroded due to persistent violence and non-compliance on both sides. Palestinian terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings by groups like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, killed over 200 Israelis between 1993 and 2000, undermining public support for the accords and highlighting the PA's limited effectiveness in suppressing militancy as required under the agreements. Israeli settlement expansion continued, with the settler population in the West Bank and Gaza growing from approximately 110,000 in 1993 to over 200,000 by 2000, contravening the spirit of territorial freezes implied in the framework. Mutual distrust deepened as the PA engaged in incitement through official media and education, while economic aid inflows—totaling billions from donors—were marred by reports of corruption and mismanagement within PA institutions, stalling economic development and governance reforms essential for state-building. By late 2000, stalled negotiations at Camp David in July foreshadowed the collapse of the interim arrangements into renewed conflict.

Second Intifada (2000–2005)

The Second Intifada began on September 28, 2000, amid escalating tensions following the collapse of peace negotiations at the Camp David Summit in July and the Taba talks in January 2001, with immediate riots erupting after Ariel Sharon's visit to the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) accompanied by Israeli police for security. Although Palestinian leaders cited the visit as the spark, intercepted communications and PA documents later revealed preparations for coordinated violence by Palestinian security forces and militias prior to the event, including directives from Yasser Arafat to exploit the occasion for uprising. The violence quickly shifted from stone-throwing protests to armed clashes, shootings, and stabbings, with Palestinian gunmen firing on Israeli forces and civilians from PA-controlled areas, marking a departure from the largely non-lethal tactics of the First Intifada. By late 2000, the uprising incorporated systematic suicide bombings targeting Israeli civilians, primarily executed by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Fatah-affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, with over 130 such attacks recorded by 2005, peaking at an average of one every two days during 2002. Notable incidents included the June 1, 2001, Dolphinarium disco bombing in Tel Aviv killing 21 mostly teenage civilians and the March 27, 2002, Passover seder attack at Netanya's Park Hotel claiming 30 lives, which prompted Israel's Operation Defensive Shield in March-April 2002—a large-scale military incursion dismantling militant infrastructure in West Bank cities like Jenin and Nablus. Israel responded with targeted assassinations of militant leaders, aerial strikes, and checkpoints to curb mobility, while Palestinian tactics emphasized urban terror to undermine Israeli morale and Oslo-era concessions. According to B'Tselem data, 1,083 Israelis were killed during the period, including 741 civilians; Palestinian fatalities exceeded 3,000 by mid-decade, with many occurring in clashes involving armed combatants. The Intifada's intensity waned after Arafat's death on November 11, 2004, and Mahmoud Abbas's election as PA president on January 9, 2005, culminating in the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit on February 8, 2005, where Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon mutually declared an end to violence, though sporadic attacks continued. Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza settlements, completed by September 12, 2005, removed 21 settlements and 9,000 settlers but did not halt militancy, as Gaza-based groups like Hamas retained rocket capabilities. For Palestinian nationalism, the uprising entrenched armed struggle as a core strategy, eroding faith in diplomacy after Oslo's perceived failures, boosting Islamist factions over secular PLO elements, and framing resistance as existential against occupation—yet it yielded territorial gains only via Israel's withdrawal, not negotiation, while devastating PA institutions and economy.

Contemporary Divisions and Conflicts

Fatah-Hamas Split and Gaza Governance (2006–Present)

In the January 25, 2006, Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Hamas won 74 of 132 seats, securing a majority through the Change and Reform list, amid widespread disillusionment with Fatah's entrenched corruption, cronyism, and failure to deliver socioeconomic improvements or advance statehood. The United States, European Union, and Israel responded by withholding aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA), conditioning it on Hamas recognizing Israel, renouncing violence, and accepting prior agreements—conditions Hamas rejected, citing them as capitulation to occupation. This financial pressure exacerbated internal rivalries, as Fatah-dominated PA institutions, backed by Western and Israeli support, sought to marginalize the elected Hamas government. Efforts to form a unity government faltered amid escalating factional violence. Clashes between Hamas's Executive Force and Fatah-aligned security units intensified from late 2006, fueled by mutual accusations of coup attempts and power grabs. The decisive confrontation occurred during the Battle of Gaza from June 10 to 15, 2007, when Hamas militias overran Fatah positions in a coordinated offensive, killing over 160 Palestinians, mostly Fatah affiliates, and executing dozens of defeated rivals, including summary killings and throws from buildings. On June 14, PA President Mahmoud Abbas, based in the West Bank, dissolved the Hamas-led government and declared a state of emergency, but Hamas consolidated de facto control over Gaza, establishing parallel institutions and expelling Fatah loyalists. Fatah, in turn, purged Hamas elements from West Bank security forces, solidifying PA governance there under Abbas's Fatah-dominated leadership. This territorial bifurcation entrenched a dual-authority system, with Fatah exercising civil and security administration in the West Bank—coordinating checkpoints and economic policies with Israel—while Hamas imposed Islamist rule in Gaza. Hamas's governance in Gaza since 2007 has emphasized military prioritization, internal security dominance, and ideological conformity over economic development or democratic pluralism. The group dismantled Fatah networks, co-opted clans and clans, and built the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades into a parallel army exceeding PA forces in size, diverting aid and revenues—estimated at hundreds of millions annually from taxes, smuggling, and extortion—toward tunnels, rockets, and welfare patronage to maintain loyalty. Gaza's economy contracted sharply, with GDP per capita halving relative to the West Bank by 2015 and shrinking 24% in 2023 amid blockades, recurrent wars, and mismanagement, fostering dependency on Qatar and Iran for subsidies while unemployment hovered above 40%. In the West Bank, Fatah's PA has faced parallel legitimacy erosion from corruption scandals, fiscal crises, and Abbas's indefinite extension of his term since 2009, yet it maintains functional administration of services and limited security cooperation with Israel, contrasting Hamas's rejectionist stance. Reconciliation initiatives have repeatedly collapsed due to irreconcilable demands over security control, elections, and Hamas's armed wing. Notable efforts include the 2011 Cairo Agreement for joint elections (unimplemented), the 2014 unity government (dissolved amid Gaza war), the 2017 Cairo deal (stalled on Hamas disarmament), and the 2024 Beijing Declaration pledging technocratic governance and elections—yet without resolving power-sharing or ideological chasms, as Hamas insists on retaining military autonomy. This persistent schism has fragmented Palestinian nationalism, undermining unified diplomacy, economic viability, and internal reforms, while enabling external actors like Israel to manage divided territories separately and Arab states to bypass the PA in favor of selective Hamas engagement. As of 2025, the divide endures post the 2023-ongoing Gaza conflict, with no viable path to merged governance absent Hamas's moderation or Fatah's overhaul—outcomes precluded by each faction's survival incentives.

Post-2006 Wars and October 7, 2023 Attack

Following Hamas's violent seizure of control over Gaza in June 2007, Israel engaged in multiple military operations against Hamas and allied groups in response to persistent rocket attacks and other aggressions originating from the territory. These conflicts included Operation Cast Lead from December 27, 2008, to January 18, 2009, initiated after thousands of rockets were fired into southern Israel, resulting in approximately 1,166 Palestinian deaths and 13 Israeli deaths. Subsequent escalations occurred in Operation Pillar of Defense from November 14 to 21, 2012, targeting Hamas rocket infrastructure after intensified barrages, with around 150 Palestinians and 6 Israelis killed. The most extensive pre-2023 confrontation was Operation Protective Edge, from July 8 to August 26, 2014, sparked by the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank and subsequent rocket fire from Gaza, leading to efforts to dismantle Hamas tunnel networks; it caused roughly 2,251 Palestinian fatalities and 73 Israeli deaths, including 67 soldiers. A briefer but intense clash unfolded in Operation Guardian of the Walls from May 10 to 21, 2021, amid tensions over Jerusalem evictions and clashes at Al-Aqsa Mosque, yielding about 256 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths. Each operation aimed to deter future attacks and degrade militant capabilities, yet Hamas rebuilt rocket arsenals, often with Iranian support, framing the engagements as legitimate resistance within Palestinian nationalist discourse. On October 7, 2023, Hamas's Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, alongside Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other factions, executed a coordinated assault on southern Israel involving over 3,000 rockets, paraglider incursions, and ground breaches of the border fence, targeting civilian communities, military outposts, and the Nova music festival. The attack killed 1,195 individuals—815 civilians and 380 security personnel—and saw 251 hostages taken into Gaza, with widespread reports of atrocities including executions, sexual violence, and mutilations. Israel responded with a declaration of war, extensive airstrikes, and a ground offensive in Gaza aimed at dismantling Hamas's military and governance structures while seeking hostage recovery; as of late 2025, over 45 hostages remained in captivity. Gaza's Hamas-controlled Health Ministry reported exceeding 40,000 Palestinian deaths by mid-2024, but these figures have faced scrutiny for lacking differentiation between combatants and civilians, incorporating pre-war and natural deaths, and potential inflation, with the ministry admitting data flaws for thousands of cases and later revisions removing names. Independent analyses suggest significant overstatement, undermining their reliability as an unbiased metric. Within Palestinian nationalism, these post-2006 wars reinforced Hamas's position as a vanguard of armed struggle against Israeli presence, contrasting Fatah's diplomatic path and appealing to sentiments of defiance amid perceived occupation. Polls from the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research indicated that two-thirds of Palestinians supported the October 7 attack initially, with Hamas approval rising to around 40-60% across Gaza and the West Bank post-assault, reflecting a surge in endorsement for militant tactics as expressions of national resistance, though support later waned amid Gaza's devastation. This dynamic highlighted persistent divisions, as Hamas's Islamist-infused nationalism prioritized jihadist confrontation over unified state-building efforts.

Goals and Claims

Territorial Demands and Statehood

The territorial demands of Palestinian nationalism originated in the Palestinian National Charter of 1968, which defined Palestine as an indivisible unit encompassing the full extent of the British Mandate territory—from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea—and rejected the 1947 UN partition plan and Israel's establishment as illegitimate. The charter positioned the PLO as the sole representative of Palestinian Arabs, advocating armed liberation of the entire land to establish an Arab state, with no provision for Jewish sovereignty or coexistence. Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PLO leadership exchanged letters of mutual recognition with Israel, and in 1996, the Palestinian National Council voted to amend the charter by repealing 26 articles deemed incompatible with this recognition, including those denying Israel's right to exist and calling for its dissolution. This shift aligned Palestinian demands with a two-state framework, limiting claims to the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War: the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza Strip, comprising about 22% of Mandatory Palestine's area. The Palestinian Authority (PA), established under Oslo in 1994 to govern these areas interimly, has since formalized this position in negotiations and international advocacy, insisting on 1967 borders with land swaps, sovereignty over East Jerusalem, and resolution of refugee claims. Pursuit of statehood culminated in UN General Assembly Resolution 67/19, adopted on November 29, 2012, by a vote of 138-9 (with 41 abstentions), granting Palestine non-member observer state status and implicitly endorsing borders based on pre-1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps. This status enhanced Palestine's diplomatic standing, enabling accession to treaties like the Rome Statute, but fell short of full UN membership, which requires Security Council approval vetoed by the United States. The PA's statehood bid emphasized ending Israeli occupation of the 1967 territories while upholding the "right of return" for approximately 5.9 million registered refugees (as of 2023 UNRWA figures) to their pre-1948 homes within Israel's recognized borders, a demand Israel views as demographically transformative, potentially reducing its Jewish majority from 74% to under 50% if fully implemented. Internal divisions complicate unified demands: Hamas, controlling Gaza since 2007, adheres to maximalist claims in its 1988 charter, mirroring the original PLO's rejection of partition and asserting Islamic waqf over all Palestine, though its 2017 revision pragmatically endorsed a state on 1967 borders as a "formula of national consensus" without renouncing overall liberation goals or recognizing Israel. This contrasts with Fatah-led PA positions, fostering stalled reconciliation efforts and inconsistent territorial rhetoric, as evidenced by PA maps and curricula often depicting the full Mandate area without Israel. Despite formal two-state endorsements, empirical indicators like public opinion polls (e.g., 2023 data showing 72% of Palestinians rejecting Israel's permanence) suggest persistent aspirational claims beyond 1967 lines.

Maximalist Rhetoric and Implications

The Palestinian National Charter of 1968, the foundational document of the Palestine Liberation Organization, asserts that Palestine constitutes the indivisible homeland of the Arab Palestinian people and mandates armed struggle to liberate the entire territory from Zionist control, explicitly rejecting any partition or recognition of a Jewish state within its borders. Article 19 of the charter denies Jewish historical or religious ties to Palestine, portraying Zionism as a colonial enterprise rather than a national movement, thereby framing the conflict as one of existential reclamation rather than territorial dispute. This rhetoric positions the establishment of Israel in 1948 not as legitimate statehood but as an illegitimate occupation of Arab land, calling for its complete reversal through force if necessary. Hamas's 1988 covenant extends this maximalism into an Islamist framework, declaring the land of Palestine an Islamic waqf (endowment) consecrated for future Muslim generations and prohibiting any surrender of territory or peace accords with Israel, which it equates with Judeo-Christian conspiracies against Islam. The document invokes jihad as the sole path to "liberating" all of Palestine from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, rejecting secular nationalism in favor of religious absolutism that views compromise as apostasy. Although Hamas's 2017 principles document introduced pragmatic language—accepting a Palestinian state on 1967 borders as a "national consensus" formula without formal recognition of Israel—the core rejection of Zionist legitimacy persists, with the full liberation of historic Palestine framed as the irrevocable end goal. Slogans such as "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free," originating in PLO-era rhetoric during the 1960s and enduring in protests, official maps, and educational materials, encapsulate this territorial maximalism by implying the dissolution of Israeli sovereignty across the entire contested area. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas has invoked similar phrasing in speeches, such as his 2018 UN address rejecting partial solutions short of full rights over historic Palestine, while Hamas leaders like Ismail Haniyeh have repeatedly tied it to armed resistance against Israel's existence. These rhetorical commitments have profound implications for conflict dynamics, as they embed sacred, non-negotiable claims that experimental studies identify as barriers to rational compromise, with Palestinian participants showing heightened opposition to concessions on issues like Jerusalem or refugee return when framed as existential threats to national identity. By denying Israel's right to exist, maximalist discourse sustains rejection of peace offers—such as the 2000 Camp David parameters or 2008 Olmert plan—which proposed viable Palestinian statehood on over 90% of the West Bank and Gaza, instead portraying acceptance as betrayal and fueling escalations like the Second Intifada. This absolutism correlates with persistent violence, as charters justify terrorism as obligatory duty, contributing to over 1,000 suicide bombings and rocket attacks from 2000–2005 alone, while undermining internal reforms by prioritizing ideological purity over governance. Ultimately, it perpetuates a zero-sum paradigm, where tactical moderation coexists with strategic irredentism, eroding trust in negotiations and enabling rival factions to outbid each other on militancy.

Relations to Other Movements

Pan-Arabism

Palestinian nationalism initially developed as a component of broader Arab nationalism, with early leaders framing opposition to Zionism and British rule in Palestine as a pan-Arab cause. Haj Amin al-Husseini, appointed Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in 1921, promoted the al-Aqsa Mosque as a symbol uniting pan-Arabic and local Palestinian resistance, seeking to rally regional Arab support against Jewish immigration and land purchases. His efforts aligned Palestinian grievances with the emerging Arab nationalist movement, which emphasized ethnic unity across the Arab world from the Levant to North Africa. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Palestinian cause was subsumed under pan-Arab initiatives, exemplified by the Arab League's establishment of the All-Palestine Government in Gaza on September 22, 1948, under Husseini's leadership. This entity, however, lacked sovereignty and served more as a propaganda tool for Arab unity than a viable state, reflecting how pan-Arab leaders prioritized collective Arab interests over distinct Palestinian self-determination. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, rising to power in 1954, elevated pan-Arabism through the 1958-1961 United Arab Republic union with Syria and positioned the Palestinian fedayeen as vanguards of Arab liberation, providing training and rhetorical support while viewing Palestinians as integral to a supranational Arab nation rather than a separate people. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), founded on May 28, 1964, at an Arab League summit in Cairo, initially operated under Nasser's influence, with its charter emphasizing recovery of Palestine as an Arab duty and coordination with Arab states. Nasser's patronage included arming guerrilla groups and broadcasting anti-Israel propaganda via Voice of the Arabs radio, which fueled recruitment among Palestinian refugees. Yet, this alignment exposed tensions: Arab armies' defeat in the June 1967 Six-Day War, losing the West Bank and Gaza, discredited pan-Arab military promises and shifted momentum toward independent Palestinian armed struggle. By the early 1970s, events like Jordan's Black September clashes in 1970, where King Hussein's forces expelled PLO fighters, underscored the subordination of Palestinian priorities to host states' stability, prompting a pivot from pan-Arab dependence. Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction, gaining PLO control in 1969, increasingly asserted a distinct Palestinian identity, rejecting full integration into Arab federations as pan-Arabism waned amid intra-Arab rivalries and the 1973 Yom Kippur War's limited gains. This evolution marked Palestinian nationalism's transition from a subset of pan-Arabism to a more autonomous force, though residual ideological ties persisted in rhetoric invoking Arab solidarity.

Pan-Islamism and Jihadist Elements

Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) represent the primary vehicles through which pan-Islamic and jihadist ideologies have fused with Palestinian nationalism since the 1980s, recasting the conflict as a divinely mandated struggle to reclaim land viewed as perpetually Islamic rather than a secular territorial dispute. These groups emerged amid disillusionment with secular pan-Arabism's failures, particularly after the 1967 Six-Day War, drawing inspiration from the Muslim Brotherhood's emphasis on societal Islamization and Iran's revolutionary model, though adapted to local conditions. Unlike earlier nationalist frameworks focused on Arab unity, their doctrines invoke the ummah—the global Muslim community—and frame resistance as fard ayn, an individual religious obligation for jihad against perceived infidel occupation. Hamas, formally the Islamic Resistance Movement, was founded on December 14, 1987, by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin as the Palestinian branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, amid the First Intifada's onset. Its 1988 Covenant articulates a pan-Islamic worldview by declaring Palestine "an Islamic Waqf [endowment] consecrated for future Moslem generations until Judgement Day," rendering compromise or partition heretical and mandating armed jihad as the sole means of liberation, with no recognition of Israel's legitimacy. Article 13 rejects international peace initiatives like the Madrid Conference as contraventions of Islamic law, while Article 15 elevates jihad above mere nationalism, stating it "is its path" and an "individual duty" if enemy forces invade Muslim land. Though the 2017 revised document pragmatically accepts a state on 1967 borders as a "national consensus" formula, it retains core Islamist tenets, subordinating tactical nationalism to ultimate religious restoration of Islamic rule over all historic Palestine. Hamas's military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades—named after the Syrian preacher who led 1935-1936 revolts against British mandates and Jewish settlement, pioneering modern Palestinian guerrilla jihad—embodies this synthesis, conducting operations like the October 7, 2023, assault framed as defense of Al-Aqsa Mosque. PIJ, established in 1981 by Fathi Shiqaqi and Abd al-Aziz Awda in Gaza, espouses a more uncompromising jihadism influenced by Sayyid Qutb's radicalism and Khomeini's wilayat al-faqih, prioritizing transnational Islamic revolution over Palestinian-specific nationalism. Its ideology rejects all negotiations or hudna (temporary truces) as un-Islamic, seeking an Islamist state across mandatory Palestine through perpetual holy war, with Iran providing funding and training since the 1980s to export its Shia-inspired militancy despite Sunni doctrinal differences. PIJ's Saraya al-Quds Brigades pioneered suicide bombings in the 1990s, such as the 1994 Dizengoff Street attack killing 21, justifying them as martyrdom operations (istishhad) to expel Jews from Dar al-Islam. This approach aligns jihadist tactics—indiscriminate rocketry, tunnel warfare—with pan-Islamic goals, viewing local Palestinian identity as a vehicle for broader Muslim resurgence. These elements distinguish Islamist factions from secular ones like Fatah, as pan-Islamism elevates the conflict beyond national self-determination to cosmic religious warfare, often invoking antisemitic tropes from the Covenant's hadith citations predicting Muslim victory over Jews. Hamas has pragmatically engaged governance in Gaza since 2007, blending welfare Islamism with militancy, yet jihadist rhetoric persists in charters and actions, contributing to cycles of violence that reject two-state compromises. Salafi-jihadist splinter groups, such as Jaysh al-Ummah, have even critiqued Hamas for insufficient purity, favoring global caliphate over nationalism, leading to intra-Gaza clashes. Empirical outcomes include over 1,200 Israeli deaths in jihadist attacks since 2000, per Israeli data, underscoring causal links between ideological absolutism and persistent conflict.

Criticisms and Analytical Perspectives

Rejectionism and Peace Process Failures

Arab leaders and Palestinian representatives rejected the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan (Resolution 181), which proposed dividing Mandatory Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states with international administration of Jerusalem, despite the plan allocating approximately 56% of the territory to the Arab state given the Jewish population's minority status. This rejection, voiced by the Arab Higher Committee and the Arab League, initiated civil war in Palestine and prompted the invasion by five Arab armies in May 1948, resulting in Israel's establishment and the displacement of around 700,000 Palestinians amid the ensuing conflict. Following Israel's victory in the 1967 Six-Day War, the Arab League summit in Khartoum adopted the "Three No's" resolution on September 1, 1967: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiation with Israel, while insisting on the full restoration of pre-war boundaries and the rights of Palestinian refugees. This stance, influenced by Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, rejected UN Security Council Resolution 242's call for land-for-peace negotiations and perpetuated a policy of non-engagement that delayed diplomatic progress for decades. The Oslo Accords, signed on September 13, 1993, established the Palestinian Authority (PA) for limited self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza but collapsed due to mutual non-compliance, including the PA's failure to amend its charter's clauses denying Israel's right to exist and to suppress terrorist groups like Hamas, which continued attacks killing over 1,000 Israelis during the subsequent Second Intifada. PA President Yasser Arafat's equivocal response to suicide bombings and state media incitement to violence undermined trust, as documented by U.S. negotiators who noted persistent glorification of "martyrdom" operations despite commitments to renounce terrorism. At the July 2000 Camp David Summit, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak proposed a Palestinian state comprising 91% of the West Bank, 100% of Gaza, land swaps for the remainder, and sovereignty over East Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods, but Arafat rejected it without presenting a counteroffer, leading President Bill Clinton to attribute the failure primarily to Arafat's inflexibility on core issues like refugees and holy sites. This impasse triggered the Second Intifada in September 2000, characterized by over 1,000 Palestinian suicide bombings and shootings that killed 1,000 Israelis and derailed further talks. In September 2008, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert offered PA President Mahmoud Abbas a framework for a state on 93.7% of the West Bank with equivalent land swaps from Israel proper, international stewardship of Jerusalem's Temple Mount, and absorption of 5,000 refugees, but Abbas neither accepted nor negotiated further, later admitting in 2015 that he turned it down without studying the detailed map provided. Olmert's proposal addressed key Palestinian demands more comprehensively than prior offers, yet its rejection—amid Abbas's concerns over internal divisions with Hamas—highlighted a recurring preference for maximalist claims, including unlimited refugee return that would demographically overwhelm the proposed state. These episodes illustrate a consistent pattern in Palestinian leadership: declining territorial compromises that would realize statehood short of Israel's elimination, often followed by escalation rather than concessions, as analyzed by former U.S. negotiator Dennis Ross, who argued that Palestinian rejectionism stems from ideological commitments to "right of return" for all refugees and undivided sovereignty over historic Palestine, incompatible with negotiated coexistence. Empirical data from multiple offers—spanning 1947 to 2008—show Palestinian Arabs receiving viable state proposals on 45-94% of disputed lands yet opting for conflict, contributing to prolonged statelessness and recurrent violence.

Antisemitism

Antisemitic elements have been documented in aspects of Palestinian nationalist rhetoric, particularly within Islamist components. The 1988 Hamas Covenant invokes antisemitic tropes, including allegations of a worldwide Zionist conspiracy manipulating global events, media, and finance (Article 22), and references a hadith foretelling the annihilation of Jews by Muslims as a sign of the end times (Article 7). Scholarly examinations, such as Alexander Flores's analysis, identify historical Judeophobia among modern Palestinians, tracing influences from European antisemitic imports during the British Mandate—exacerbated by Nazi propaganda broadcasts—and their integration into local discourses, often conflated with but distinguishable from anti-Zionism in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While not foundational to secular Palestinian nationalism, such attitudes have persisted in certain charters, educational content, and media, contributing to analytical perspectives on ideological barriers to coexistence. Palestinian nationalist organizations have historically integrated terrorism into their strategies, targeting civilians to advance claims against Israel. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), formed in 1964 as the representative of Palestinian nationalism, adopted a program of armed struggle under Yasser Arafat's Fatah faction, which dominated from 1969 and orchestrated international attacks including hijackings and bombings in the 1970s. Factions like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist group within the PLO, pioneered airplane hijackings, such as the 1968 El Al flight seizure, to publicize nationalist grievances. The Black September Organization, a Fatah-linked splinter formed after the PLO's 1970 expulsion from Jordan, exemplified this approach through operations like the September 5, 1972, Munich Olympics attack, where eight militants killed 11 Israeli athletes and coaches in a bid to free prisoners and draw global attention to Palestinian demands. This incident, claimed by Black September, resulted in additional deaths during a failed rescue, underscoring tactics that blurred combatants and non-combatants. The U.S. State Department later designated the PLO itself as a terrorist entity in 1987 due to such patterns, though contacts resumed post-1988 renunciation. During the Second Intifada from September 2000 to 2005, nationalist groups escalated suicide bombings, with over 135 such attacks killing around 500 Israeli civilians and injuring thousands, primarily executed by Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives. Hamas, founded in 1987 as an Islamist offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood within the nationalist framework, formalized its commitment to violence in its 1988 charter, rejecting Israel's existence and mandating jihad until an Islamic state replaces it. The U.S. has designated Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and PFLP as Foreign Terrorist Organizations since the 1990s for attacks including rocket barrages and stabbings that persist in promoting maximalist territorial goals. These links persist in governance, as Hamas's 2007 control of Gaza enabled militarization, with thousands of rockets fired at Israeli population centers annually in cycles like 2008-2009, 2014, and post-2023, framed as resistance but classified as terrorism due to indiscriminate civilian targeting. While some sources attribute violence to occupation-induced desperation, empirical patterns show strategic choices prioritizing high-casualty tactics over negotiations, correlating with rejection of peace offers like Camp David 2000.

Governance Failures and Internal Issues

The Palestinian Authority (PA), established under the Oslo Accords, has faced persistent governance challenges characterized by prolonged authoritarian rule and institutional corruption. Mahmoud Abbas was elected PA president on January 9, 2005, for a four-year term, yet as of 2025, he remains in office without subsequent elections, marking over two decades of extended tenure amid repeated postponements justified by internal divisions and external conditions. This absence of democratic renewal has contributed to weakened rule of law, with the PA parliament dissolved since 2007 and senior officials evading accountability for embezzlement and nepotism, eroding public trust and exacerbating factional rivalries. Human rights abuses under PA control in the West Bank include systemic arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial punishments by security forces, often targeting political opponents or critics. Reports document routine use of beatings, stress positions, and solitary confinement, with impunity persisting due to lack of independent investigations; for instance, in 2022, Human Rights Watch highlighted ongoing abuses a year after the death of critic Nizar Banat from PA custody beating. U.S. State Department assessments confirm torture remains a problem despite legal prohibitions, frequently employed to suppress dissent against corruption or policy failures. Internal divisions culminated in the 2007 Fatah-Hamas civil war, where Hamas seized Gaza after intense fighting that killed approximately 100-600 Palestinians, including combatants and civilians, leading to a bifurcated governance structure with Fatah dominant in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza. This schism has perpetuated policy paralysis, with failed reconciliation attempts reinforcing economic isolation and mutual accusations of treason. In Gaza, Hamas's rule since 2007 has featured economic mismanagement, with unemployment peaking at 44% in 2018 amid poverty rates exceeding 50%, despite billions in international aid inflows diverted toward military infrastructure like tunnels and rockets rather than civilian welfare. Israeli military estimates indicate up to 25% of aid supplies redirected to fighters or black-market sales, though U.S. analyses in 2025 found no evidence of massive systematic theft, highlighting contested claims amid Hamas's suppression of protests against corruption and hardship. Hamas has quashed dissent through force, including against 2019 demonstrations over living costs, prioritizing ideological militancy over accountable administration.

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