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Taliban
Taliban
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Key Information

The Taliban,[a] which also refers to itself by its state name, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,[79][80][b] is an Afghan political and militant movement with an ideology comprising elements of the Deobandi movement of Islamic fundamentalism and Pashtun nationalism.[8][9][83][84][85] It ruled approximately 90% of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, before it was overthrown by an American invasion after the September 11 attacks carried out by the Taliban's ally al-Qaeda. Following a 20-year insurgency and the departure of coalition forces, the Taliban recaptured Kabul in August 2021, overthrowing the Islamic Republic, and now controls all of Afghanistan. The Taliban has been condemned for restricting human rights, including women's rights to work and have an education, and for the persecution of ethnic minorities. It is designated as a terrorist organization by several countries, and the Taliban government is largely unrecognized by the international community.

The Taliban emerged in 1994 as a prominent faction in the Afghan Civil War and largely consisted of students from the Pashtun areas of east and south Afghanistan, who had been educated in traditional Islamic schools (madāris). Under the leadership of Mullah Omar (r. 1996–2001), the movement spread through most of Afghanistan, shifting power away from the Mujahideen warlords. In 1996, the group established the First Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The Taliban's government was opposed by the Northern Alliance militia, which seized parts of northeast Afghanistan and maintained international recognition as a continuation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan.

During their rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law,[86] and were widely condemned for massacres against Afghan civilians, harsh discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, denial of UN food supplies to starving civilians, destruction of cultural monuments, banning women from school and most employment, and prohibition of most music.[87] The Taliban committed a cultural genocide against Afghans by destroying their historical and cultural texts, artifacts and sculptures.[88] The Taliban held control of most of the country until the United States invasion of Afghanistan began in October 2001, which led to the collapse of their government by December 2001. Many members of the Taliban fled to neighboring Pakistan

After being overthrown, the Taliban launched an insurgency to fight the US-backed Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the war in Afghanistan. In May 2002, exiled members formed the Council of Leaders based in Quetta, Pakistan. Under Hibatullah Akhundzada's leadership, in May 2021, the Taliban launched a military offensive, that culminated in the fall of Kabul in August 2021 and the Taliban regaining control. The Islamic Republic was dissolved and the Islamic Emirate reestablished. Following their return to power, the Afghanistan government budget lost 80% of its funding and food insecurity became widespread.[87] The Taliban reintroduced many policies implemented under its previous rule, including banning women from holding almost any jobs, requiring women to wear head-to-toe coverings such as the burqa, blocking women from travelling without male guardians, banning female speech and banning all education for girls.[89][90][91][92] As of 2025, only Russia has granted the Taliban government diplomatic recognition.[93]

Etymology

[edit]

The word Taliban is Pashto, طَالِباَنْ (ṭālibān), meaning "students", the plural of ṭālib. This is a loanword from Arabic طَالِبْ (ṭālib), using the Pashto plural ending -ān اَنْ.[94] (In Arabic طَالِبَانْ (ṭālibān) means not "students" but rather "two students", as it is a dual form, the Arabic plural being طُلَّابْ (ṭullāb)—occasionally causing some confusion to Arabic speakers.) Since becoming a loanword in English, Taliban, besides a plural noun referring to the group, has also been used as a singular noun referring to an individual. For example, John Walker Lindh has been referred to as "an American Taliban" rather than "an American Talib" in domestic media. This is different in Afghanistan, where a member or a supporter of the group is referred to as a Talib (طَالِبْ) or its plural Talib-ha (طَالِبْهَا). In other definitions, Taliban means 'seekers'.[95]

In English, the spelling Taliban has gained predominance over the spelling Taleban.[96][97] In American English, the definite article is used, the group is referred to as "the Taliban", rather than "Taliban". In English-language media in Pakistan, the definite article is always omitted.[98] Both Pakistani and Indian English-language media tend to name the group "Afghan Taliban",[99][100] thus distinguishing it from the Pakistani Taliban. Additionally, in Pakistan, the word Talibans is often used when referring to more than one Taliban member.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban is frequently called the گرُوهْ طَالِبَانْ (Goroh-e Taleban), a Dari term which means 'Taliban group'.[101] As per Dari/Persian grammar, there is no "the" prefix. Meanwhile, in Pashto, a determiner is normally used and as a result, the group is normally referred to as per Pashto grammar: دَ طَالِبَانْ (Da Taliban) or دَ طَالِبَانُو (Da Talibano).

Background

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Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1978–1992)

[edit]
President Ronald Reagan meeting with Afghan Mujahideen leaders in the Oval Office in 1983

After the Soviet Union intervened and occupied Afghanistan in 1979, Islamic mujahideen fighters waged a war against Soviet forces. During the Soviet–Afghan War, nearly all of the Taliban's original leaders had fought for either the Hezb-i Islami Khalis or the Harakat-i Inqilab-e Islami factions of the Mujahideen.[102]

Pakistan's President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq feared that the Soviets were also planning to invade Balochistan, Pakistan, so he sent Akhtar Abdur Rahman to Saudi Arabia to garner support for the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation forces. A while later, the US CIA and the Saudi Arabian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) funnelled funding and equipment through the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) to the Afghan mujahideen.[103] About 90,000 Afghans, including Mullah Omar, were trained by Pakistan's ISI during the 1980s.[103]

Afghan Civil War (1992–1996)

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In April 1992, after the fall of the Soviet-backed régime of Mohammad Najibullah, many Afghan political parties agreed on a peace and power-sharing agreement, the Peshawar Accord, which created the Islamic State of Afghanistan and appointed an interim government for a transitional period. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, Hezbe Wahdat, and Ittihad-i Islami did not participate. The state was paralysed from the start, due to rival groups contending for total power over Kabul and Afghanistan.[104][better source needed]

Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin party refused to recognise the interim government, and in April infiltrated Kabul to take power for itself, thus starting this civil war. In May, Hekmatyar started attacks against government forces and Kabul.[105] Hekmatyar received operational, financial and military support from Pakistan's ISI.[106] With that help, Hekmatyar's forces were able to destroy half of Kabul.[107] Iran assisted the Hezbe Wahdat forces of Abdul-Ali Mazari. Saudi Arabia supported the Ittihad-i Islami faction.[105][107][108] The conflict between these militias also escalated into war.

Due to this sudden initiation of civil war, working government departments, police units or a system of justice and accountability for the newly created Islamic State of Afghanistan did not have time to form. Atrocities were committed by individuals inside different factions.[109] Ceasefires, negotiated by representatives of the Islamic State's newly appointed Defense Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud, President Sibghatullah Mojaddedi and later President Burhanuddin Rabbani (the interim government), or officials from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), commonly collapsed within days.[105] The countryside in northern Afghanistan, parts of which were under the control of Defense Minister Massoud, remained calm and some reconstruction took place. The city of Herat under the rule of Islamic State ally Ismail Khan also witnessed relative calm.[citation needed] Meanwhile, southern Afghanistan was neither under the control of foreign-backed militias nor the government in Kabul, but was ruled by local leaders such as Gul Agha Sherzai and their militias.

History

[edit]

The Taliban movement originated in Pashtun nationalism, and its ideological underpinnings are with that of broader Afghan society. The Taliban's roots lie in the religious schools of Kandahar and were influenced significantly by foreign support, particularly from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, during the Soviet–Afghan War. They emerged in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s, capturing Kandahar and expanding their control across the country; they became involved in a war with the Northern Alliance. The international response to the Taliban varied, with some countries providing support while others opposed and did not recognize their regime.

During their rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban implemented strict religious regulations, notably affecting women's rights and cultural heritage. This period included significant ethnic persecution and the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan. After the US-led invasion in 2001, the Taliban were ousted from power but regrouped and launched an insurgency that lasted two decades.

The Taliban returned to power in 2021 following the US withdrawal. Their efforts to establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan continue, with education policies and international relations, including internal and external challenges faced by the Taliban regime.

2021 offensive and return to power

[edit]
A map of Afghanistan showing the 2021 Taliban offensive

In mid 2021, the Taliban led a major offensive in Afghanistan during the withdrawal of US troops from the country, which gave them control of over half of Afghanistan's 421 districts as of 23 July 2021.[110][111] By mid-August 2021, the Taliban controlled every major city in Afghanistan; following the near seizure of the capital Kabul, the Taliban occupied the Presidential Palace after the incumbent President Ashraf Ghani fled Afghanistan to the United Arab Emirates.[112][113] Ghani's Asylum was confirmed by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation on 18 August 2021.[114][115] Remaining Afghan forces under the leadership of Amrullah Saleh, Ahmad Massoud, and Bismillah Khan Mohammadi retreated to Panjshir to continue resistance.[116][117][118]

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (2021–present)

[edit]
Taliban Humvee in Kabul, August 2021
A Taliban member with chest flags in Kabul, September 2022

The Taliban had "seized power from an established government backed by some of the world's best-equipped militaries"; and as an ideological insurgent movement dedicated to "bringing about a truly Islamic state" its victory has been compared to that of the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949 or Iranian Revolution of 1979, with their "sweeping" remake of society. However, as of 2021–2022, senior Taliban leaders have emphasized the "softness" of their revolution and how they desired "good relations" with the United States, in discussions with American journalist Jon Lee Anderson.[87]

Anderson notes that the Taliban's war against any "graven images", so vigorous in their early rule, has been abandoned, perhaps made impossible by smartphones and Instagram. One local observer (Sayed Hamid Gailani) has argued the Taliban have not killed "a lot" of people after returning to power. Women are seen out on the street, Zabihullah Mujahid (acting Deputy Minister of Information and Culture) noted there are still women working in a number of government ministries, and claimed that girls will be allowed to attend secondary education when bank funds are unfrozen and the government can fund "separate" spaces and transportation for them.[87]

When asked about the slaughter of Hazara Shia by the first Taliban régime, Suhail Shaheen, the Taliban nominee for Ambassador to the U.N. told Anderson "The Hazara Shia for us are also Muslim. We believe we are one, like flowers in a garden."[87] In late 2021, journalists from The New York Times embedded with a six-man Taliban unit tasked with protecting the Shi'ite Sakhi Shrine in Kabul from the Islamic State, noting "how seriously the men appeared to take their assignment." The unit's commander said that "We do not care which ethnic group we serve, our goal is to serve and provide security for Afghans."[119] In response to "international criticism" over lack of diversity, an ethnic Hazara was appointed deputy health minister, and an ethnic Tajik appointed deputy trade minister.[87]

On the other hand, the Ministry of Women's Affairs has been closed and its building is the new home of Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice. According to Anderson, some women still employed by the government are "being forced to sign in at their jobs and then go home, to create the illusion of equity"; and the appointment of ethnic minorities has been dismissed by an "adviser to the Taliban" as tokenism.[87]

Reports have "circulated" of

"Hazara farmers being forced from their land by ethnic Pashtuns, of raids of activists' homes, and of extrajudicial executions of former government soldiers and intelligence agents".[87]

According to a Human Rights Watch's report released in November 2021, the Taliban killed or forcibly disappeared more than 100 former members of the Afghan security forces in the three months since the takeover in just the four provinces of Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, and Kunduz. According to the report, the Taliban identified targets for arrest and execution through intelligence operations and access to employment records that were left behind. Former members of the security forces were also killed by the Taliban within days of registering with them to receive a letter guaranteeing their safety.[120]

Despite Taliban claims that the ISIS has been defeated, IS carried out suicide bombings in October 2021 at Shia mosques in Kunduz and Kandahar, killing over 115 people. As of late 2021, there were still "sticky bomb" explosions "every few days" in the capital Kabul.[87]

Explanations for the relative moderation of the new Taliban government and statements from its officials such as – "We have started a new page. We do not want to be entangled with the past,"[87] –?include that it did not expect to take over the country so quickly and still had "problems to work out among" their factions";[87] that $7 billion in Afghan government funds in US banks has been frozen, and that the 80% of the previous government's budget that came from "the United States, its partners, or international lenders", has been shut off, creating serious economic crisis; according to the U.N. World Food Program country director, Mary Ellen McGroarty, as of late 2021, early 2022 "22.8 million Afghans are already severely food insecure, and seven million of them are one step away from famine"; and that the world community has "unanimously" asked the Taliban "to form an inclusive government, ensure the rights of women and minorities and guarantee that Afghanistan will no more serve as the launching pad for global terrorist operations", before it recognizes the Taliban government.[121] In conversation with journalist Anderson, senior Taliban leaders implied that the harsh application of sharia during their first era of rule in the 1990s was necessary because of the "depravity" and "chaos" that remained from the Soviet occupation, but that now "mercy and compassion" were the order of the day.[87] This was contradicted by former senior members of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, one of which who told Anderson, "they will do anything to convince the international community to give them financing, but eventually I'll be forced to wear the burqa again. They are just waiting."[87]

After Taliban retook power in 2021, border clashes erupted between the Taliban with its neighbors includes Iran and Pakistan, leading to casualties on both sides.[122][123]

In the early months of Taliban rule, international journalists have had some access to Afghanistan. In February 2022, several international journalists, including Andrew North were detained. The Committee to Protect Journalists described their detention as "a sad reflection of the overall decline of press freedom and increasing attacks on journalists under Taliban rule."[124] The journalists were released after several days.[125] Subsequently, watchdog organizations have continued to document a number of arrests of local journalists, as well as barring access to international journalists.[126]

The country's small community of Sikhs – who form Afghanistan's second largest religion[127] – as well as Hindus, have reportedly been prevented from celebrating their holidays as of 2023 by the Taliban government.[128] Despite this, the Taliban in a later statement praised the communities and assured that their private land and property will be secured.[129] In April 2024, the former sole Sikh member of parliament, Narendra Singh Khalsa, returned to Afghanistan for the first time since the collapse of the Republic.[129]

Current education policy
[edit]

In September 2021, the government ordered primary schools to reopen for both sexes and announced plans to reopen secondary schools for male students, without committing to do the same for female students.[130] While the Taliban stated that female college students will be able to resume higher education provided that they are segregated from male students (and professors, when possible),[131] The Guardian noted that "if the high schools do not reopen for girls, the commitments to allow university education would become meaningless once the current cohort of students graduated."[130] Higher Education Minister Abdul Baqi Haqqani said that female university students will be required to observe proper hijab, but did not specify if this required covering the face.[131]

Kabul University reopened in February 2022, with female students attending in the morning and males in the afternoon. Other than the closure of the music department, few changes to the curriculum were reported.[132] Female students were officially required to wear an abaya and a hijab to attend, although some wore a shawl instead. Attendance was reportedly low on the first day.[133]

In March 2022, the Taliban abruptly halted plans to allow girls to resume secondary school education even when separated from males.[134] At the time, The Washington Post reported that apart from university students, "sixth is now the highest grade girls may attend". The Afghan Ministry of Education cited the lack of an acceptable design for female student uniforms.[135]

On 20 December 2022, in violation of their prior promises, the Taliban banned female students from attending higher education institutions with immediate effect.[136][137][138] The following day, 21 December 2022, the Taliban instituted a ban on all education for all girls and women around the country alongside a ban on female staff in schools, including teaching professions. Teaching was one of the last few remaining professions open to women.[139]

Ideology and aims

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The Taliban's ideology has been described as an "innovative form of sharia combining Pashtun tribal codes",[140] or Pashtunwali, with radical Deobandi interpretations of Islam favoured by Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and its splinter groups.[141] Their ideology was a departure from the Islamism of the anti-Soviet mujahideen rulers[clarification needed] and the radical Islamists[clarification needed] inspired by the Sayyid Qutb (Ikhwan).[142] The Taliban have said they aim to restore peace and security to Afghanistan, including Western troops leaving, and to enforce Sharia, or Islamic law, once in power.[143][144][145]

According to journalist Ahmed Rashid, at least in the first years of their rule, the Taliban adopted Deobandi and Islamist anti-nationalist beliefs, and they opposed "tribal and feudal structures", removing traditional tribal or feudal leaders from leadership roles.[146]

The Taliban strictly enforced their ideology in major cities like Herat, Kabul, and Kandahar. But in rural areas, the Taliban had little direct control, and as a result, they promoted village jirgas, so in rural areas, they did not enforce their ideology as stringently as they enforced it in cities.[147]

Ideological influences

[edit]

The Taliban's religious/political philosophy, especially during its first régime from 1996 to 2001, was heavily advised and influenced by Grand Mufti Rashid Ahmed Ludhianvi and his works. Its operating political and religious principles since its founding, however, were modeled on those of Abul A'la Maududi and the Jamaat-e-Islami movement.[148]

Pashtun cultural influences

[edit]

The Taliban, being largely Pashtun tribespeople, frequently follow a pre-Islamic cultural tribal code that is focused on preserving honor. Pashtunwali strongly influences decisions regarding other social matters. It is best described as subconscious social values and attitudes promoting various qualities such as bravery, preserving honor, being hospitable to all guests, seeking revenge and justice if one has been wronged, and providing sanctuary to anyone who seeks refuge, even an enemy. However, non-Pashtuns and others usually criticize some of the values, such as the Pashtun practice of equally dividing inheritances among sons, even though the Qur'an clearly states that women are supposed to receive one-half of a man's share.[149][150]

According to Ali A. Jalali and Lester Grau, the Taliban "received extensive support from Pashtuns across the country who thought that the movement might restore their national dominance. Even Pashtun intellectuals in the West, who differed with the Taliban on many issues, expressed support for the movement on purely ethnic grounds."[151]

Islamic rules under Deobandi philosophy

[edit]
The Darul Uloom Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, India, where the Deobandi movement began

Written works published by the group's Commission of Cultural Affairs, including Islami Adalat, De Mujahid Toorah – De Jihad Shari Misalay, and Guidance to the Mujahideen outlined the core of the Taliban Islamic Movement's philosophy regarding jihad, sharia, organization, and conduct.[152] The Taliban régime interpreted the Sharia law in accordance with the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence and the religious edicts of Mullah Omar.[86] The Taliban, Mullah Omar in particular, emphasised dreams as a means of revelation.[153][154]

Prohibitions

[edit]

The Taliban forbade the consumption of pork and alcohol, the use of many types of consumer technology such as music with instrumental accompaniments,[155] television,[155] filming,[155] and the Internet, as well as most forms of art such as paintings or photography,[155] participation in sports,[156] including football and chess;[156] recreational activities such as kite-flying and the keeping of pigeons and other pets were also forbidden, and the birds were killed according to the Taliban's rules.[156] Movie theatres were closed and repurposed as mosques.[156] The celebration of the Western and Iranian New Years was also forbidden.[157] Taking photographs and displaying pictures and portraits were also banned because the Taliban considered them forms of idolatry.[156] This extended even to "blacking out illustrations on packages of baby soap in shops and painting over road-crossing signs for livestock.[87]

Women were banned from working,[158] girls were forbidden to attend schools or universities,[158] were required to observe purdah (physical separation of the sexes) and awrah (concealing the body with clothing), and to be accompanied by male relatives outside their households; those who violated these restrictions were punished.[158] Men were forbidden to shave their beards, and they were also required to let them grow and keep them long according to the Taliban's rules, and they were also required to wear turbans outside their households.[159][160] Prayer was made compulsory. Those men who did not respect the religious obligation after the azaan were arrested.[159] Gambling was banned,[157] and the Taliban punished thieves by amputating their hands or feet.[156] In 2000, the Taliban's leader Mullah Omar officially banned opium cultivation and drug trafficking in Afghanistan;[161][162][163] the Taliban succeeded in nearly eradicating the majority of the opium production (99%) by 2001.[162][163][164] During the Taliban's governance of Afghanistan, drug users and dealers were both severely persecuted.[161]

Views on the Bamyan Buddhas

[edit]
Taller Buddha in 1963 and in 2008 after destruction

In 1999, Mullah Omar issued a decree in which he called for the protection of the Buddha statues at Bamyan, two 6th-century monumental statues of standing buddhas which were carved into the side of a cliff in the Bamyan valley in the Hazarajat region of central Afghanistan. But in March 2001, the Taliban destroyed the statues, following a decree by Mullah Omar, which stated: "All the statues around Afghanistan must be destroyed."[165]

Yahya Massoud, brother of the anti-Taliban and resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, recalls the following incident after the destruction of the Buddha statues at Bamyan:

It was the spring of 2001. I was in Afghanistan's Panjshir Valley, together with my brother Ahmad Shah Massoud, the leader of the Afghan resistance against the Taliban, and Bismillah Khan, who currently serves as Afghanistan's interior minister. One of our commanders, Commandant Momin, wanted us to see 30 Taliban fighters who had been taken hostage after a gun battle. My brother agreed to meet them. I remember that his first question concerned the centuries-old Buddha statues that were dynamited by the Taliban in March of that year, shortly before our encounter. Two Taliban combatants from Kandahar confidently responded that worshiping anything outside of Islam was unacceptable and that therefore these statues had to be destroyed. My brother looked at them and said, this time in Pashto, 'There are still many sun- worshippers in this country. Will you also try to get rid of the sun and drop darkness over the Earth?'[166]

Views on bacha bazi

[edit]

The Afghan custom of bacha bazi, a form of pederastic sexual slavery, child sexual abuse and pedophilia which is traditionally practiced in various provinces of Afghanistan between older men and young adolescent "dancing boys", was also forbidden under the six-year rule of the Taliban régime.[167] Under the rule of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, it carried the death penalty.[168][169]

The practice remained illegal during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's rule, but the laws were seldom enforced against powerful offenders, and police had reportedly been complicit in related crimes.[170][171][172][173] A controversy arose during the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan's rule, after allegations surfaced that US government forces in Afghanistan after the invasion of the country deliberately ignored bacha bazi.[174] The US military responded by claiming the abuse was largely the responsibility of the "local Afghan government".[175] The Taliban has criticized the US role in the abuse of Afghan children.

Attitudes towards other Muslim communities

[edit]

Unlike other Islamic fundamentalist organizations, the Taliban are not Salafists. Although wealthy Arab nations had brought Salafist Madrasas to Afghanistan during the Soviet war in the 1980s, the Taliban's strict Deobandi leadership suppressed the Salafi movement in Afghanistan after it first came to power in the 1990s. Following the 2001 US invasion, the Taliban and Salafists joined forces to wage a common war against NATO forces. Still, Salafists were relegated to small groups which were under the Taliban's command.[176]

The Taliban are averse to debating doctrine with other Muslims and "did not allow even Muslim reporters to question [their] edicts or to discuss interpretations of the Qur'an."[177]

Opposition to Salafism

[edit]

Following the Taliban victory, a nationwide campaign was launched against influential Salafi factions suspected of past ties to the ISIS–K. The Taliban closed most Salafi mosques and seminaries in 16 provinces, including Nangarhar, and detained clerics it accused of supporting the Islamic State.[178][179]

Shia Islam

[edit]

During the period of the first Taliban rule (1996 to 2001), the Taliban attempted to sway Shias, particularly Hazaras, to their side, making deals with a number of Shia political figures, as well as securing the support of some Shia religious scholars.[180] One of these was Ustad Muhammad Akbari, a Shia Hazara politician who separated from Abdul-Ali Mazari's Islamic Unity Party to form the National Islamic Unity Party, thereafter politically aligning himself and his group, which gained the support of the majority of Islamic Unity Party members in the Hazara hinterland,[181] with the Taliban.[182] Another significant Shia political figure in the administration of the first Islamic Emirate was Sayed Gardizi, a Seyyed Hazara from Gardez, who was appointed as the wuluswal (district governor) of Yakawlang District, being the only Shia to hold the position of district governor during the period of the first Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.[183]

At the same time, however, certain incidents caused distrust between the Taliban and Afghan Shias. The 1998 Mazar-i-Sharif massacre was the most significant, having taken place in response to ethnic Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum's betrayal and subsequent massacre of Taliban fighters, as well as false rumors that Hazaras had beheaded senior Taliban leader Mawlawi Ihsanullah Ihsan at the grave of Abdul-Ali Mazari, which led to the massacre of a significant number of Hazaras.[184] The commander responsible for the massacre, Abdul-Manan Niazi, later became notable for his opposition to the Taliban's leadership, having formed the rebellious High Council of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in 2015, before being killed, reportedly by the Taliban themselves.[185][180]

The desire of the Taliban leadership to expand the group's relations with Afghan Shias continued after the American invasion of Afghanistan and the group's return to insurgency. Some time following the American Invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Taliban published "A Message to the Mujahid People of Iraq and Afghanistan" by Mullah Omar, in which he condemned sectarianism whilst jointly addressing the people of Iraq and Afghanistan, saying:[186]

"It's incumbent upon all Muslims to thwart all the cursed plots of the cunning enemy, and to not give him the opportunity to light the fires of disagreement amongst the Muslims. A major component of American policy is to categorize the Muslims in Iraq with the labels of Shī'ah and Sunnī, and in Afghanistan with the labels of Pashtun, Tājīk, Hazārah and Uzbek, in order to decrease the severity and strength of the popular uprisings and the accompanying armed resistance. [...] As such, I request the brothers in Iraq to put behind them the differences that exist in the name of Shī'ah and Sunnī, and to fight in unity against the occupying enemy, for victory is not possible without unity."

Multiple Hazara Shia Taliban commanders took part in the Taliban insurgency, primarily from Bamyan and Daikundi provinces. Among the Qarabaghi tribe of Shia Hazaras, a number of fighters voluntarily joined the Taliban due to their close relations with the nearby Taliban-supporting Sunni Pashtun population. Additionally, a pro-government Shia Hazara militia from Gizab district of Daikundi province, called Fedayi, defected and pledged allegiance to the Taliban a few years before 2016, with a reported size of 50 fighters.[187]

In reaction to the 2011 Afghanistan Ashura bombings, which targeted Shia Afghans in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, the Taliban published "Sectarian Killings; A Dangerous Enemy Conspiracy" by Taliban official Abdul Qahar Balkhi, in which he stated:[188]

"In Afghanistan, Sunnis and Shias have co-existed for centuries. They live communal lives and participate in their mutual festivities. And for centuries they have fought shoulder to shoulder against foreign invaders. [...] The majority of Shia populations in Bamyan, Daikundi and Hazarajat [have] actively aided and continue to support the Mujahideen against the foreigners and their puppets. The foreign occupiers seek to ignite the flames of communal hatred and violence between Sunnis and Shias in Afghanistan. [...] The followers of Islam will only ever reclaim their rightful place in this world if they forgo their petty differences and unite as a single egalitarian body."

In recent years, the Taliban have once again attempted to court Shiites, appointing a Shia cleric as a regional governor and recruiting Hazaras to fight against ISIS–K, in order to distance themselves from their past reputation and improve their relations with the Shia-led Government of Iran.[189] After the 2021 Taliban offensive, which led to the restoration of the Islamic Emirate, senior Taliban officials, including Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, have stressed the importance of unity between Shiites and Sunnis in Afghanistan and promised to protect the Shiite community.[190] The Ministry of Virtue and Vice have also agreed to hire Shia Ulama in order to implement the ministry's religious edicts.[191] In general, the Taliban has maintained peace with most Muslims in the Shiite community,[192][193] although the 2022 Balkhab uprising resulted in the deaths of some Hazaras.[194]

Consistency of the Taliban's ideology

[edit]

The Taliban's ideology is not static. Before its capture of Kabul, members of the Taliban talked about stepping aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power and once law and order were restored. The decision-making process of the Taliban in Kandahar was modelled on the Pashtun tribal council (jirga), together with what was believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by the building of a consensus by the believers.[195]

As the Taliban's power grew, Mullah Omar made decisions without consulting the jirga or visiting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We believe that this is in line with the Sharia. We abide by the Amir's view even if he alone takes this view. There will not be a head of state. Instead there will be an Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree. General elections are incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them.[196]

Another sign that the Taliban's ideology was evolving was Mullah Omar's 1999 decree in which he called for the protection of the Buddha statues at Bamyan and the destruction of them in 2001.[197]

Evaluations and criticisms

[edit]

The author Ahmed Rashid suggests that the devastation and hardship which resulted from the Soviet invasion and the period which followed it influenced the Taliban's ideology.[198] It is said that the Taliban did not include scholars who were learned in Islamic law and history. The refugee students brought up in a totally male society had no education in mathematics, science, history, or geography, no traditional skills of farming, herding, or handicraft-making, or even knowledge of their tribal and clan lineages.[198] In such an environment, war meant employment, peace meant unemployment. Dominating women affirmed manhood. For their leadership, rigid fundamentalism was a matter of principle and political survival. Taliban leaders "repeatedly told" Rashid that "if they gave women greater freedom or a chance to go to school, they would lose the support of their rank and file."[199]

November 1999 public execution in Kabul of a mother of five who was found guilty of killing her husband with an axe while he slept[200][201][202]

The Taliban have been criticized for their strictness towards those who disobeyed their imposed rules, and Mullah Omar has been criticized for titling himself Amir al-Mu'minin.

Mullah Omar was criticized for calling himself Amir al-Mu'minin because he lacked scholarly learning, tribal pedigree, or connections to the Prophet's family. The sanction for the title traditionally required the support of all of the country's ulema, whereas only some 1,200 Pashtun Taliban-supporting Mullahs had declared that Omar was the Amir. According to Ahmed Rashid, "no Afghan had adopted the title since 1834, when King Dost Mohammed Khan assumed the title before he declared jihad against the Sikh kingdom in Peshawar. But Dost Mohammed was fighting foreigners, while Omar had declared jihad against other Afghans."[203]

Another criticism was that the Taliban called their 20% tax on truckloads of opium "zakat," which is traditionally limited to 2.5% of the zakat payers' disposable income (or wealth).[203]

The Taliban have been compared to the 7th-century Kharijites who developed extreme doctrines that set them apart from both mainstream Sunni and Shiʿa Muslims. The Kharijites were particularly noted for adopting a radical approach to takfir, whereby they declared that other Muslims were unbelievers and deemed them worthy of death.[204][205][206]

In particular, the Taliban have been accused of takfir towards Shia. After the August 1998 slaughter of 8,000 mostly Shia Hazara non-combatants in Mazar-i-Sharif, Mullah Abdul Manan Niazi, the Taliban commander of the attack and the new governor of Mazar, who the Taliban later killed after forming the rebellious High Council of the Islamic Emirate,[185] declared from Mazar's central mosque:

Last year you rebelled against us and killed us. From all your homes you shot at us. Now we are here to deal with you. The Hazaras are not Muslims and now have to kill Hazaras. You either accept to be Muslims or leave Afghanistan. Wherever you go we will catch you. If you go up we will pull you down by your feet; if you hide below, we will pull you up by your hair.[207]

Carter Malkasian, in one of the first comprehensive historical works on the Afghan war, argues that the Taliban are oversimplified in most portrayals. While Malkasian thinks that "oppressive" remains the best word to describe them, he points out that the Taliban managed to do what multiple governments and political players failed to: bring order and unity to the "ungovernable land". The Taliban curbed the atrocities and excesses of the Warlord period of the civil war from 1992–1996. Malkasian further argues that the Taliban's imposing of Islamic ideals upon the Afghan tribal system was innovative and a key reason for their success and durability. Given that traditional sources of authority had been shown to be weak during the long period of civil war, only religion had proved decisive in Afghanistan. In a period of 40 years of constant conflict, the traditionalist Islam of the Taliban proved to be far more stable, even if the order they brought was "an impoverished peace".[208]: 50–51 

Condemned practices

[edit]

The Taliban have been internationally condemned for their harsh enforcement of their interpretation of Islamic Sharia law, which has resulted in their brutal treatment of many Afghans. During their rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban enforced a strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law.[86] The Taliban and their allies committed massacres against Afghan civilians, denied UN food supplies to 160,000 starving civilians, and conducted a policy of scorched earth, burning vast areas of fertile land and destroying tens of thousands of homes. While the Taliban controlled Afghanistan, they banned activities and media including paintings, photography, and movies that depicted people or other living things. They also prohibited music with instrumental accompaniments, with the exception of the daf, a type of frame drum.[209] The Taliban prevented girls and young women from attending school, banned women from working jobs outside of healthcare (male doctors were prohibited from treating women), and required that women be accompanied by a male relative and wear a burqa at all times when in public. If women broke certain rules, they were publicly whipped or executed.[210] The Taliban harshly discriminated against religious and ethnic minorities during their rule and they have also committed a cultural genocide against the people of Afghanistan by destroying numerous monuments, including the famous 1500-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan. According to the United Nations, the Taliban and their allies were responsible for 76% of Afghan civilian casualties in 2010, and 80% in 2011 and 2012.[211] The group is internally funded by its involvement in the illegal drug trade which it participates in by producing and trafficking in narcotics such as heroin,[212][213] extortion, and kidnapping for ransom.[214][215] They also seized control of mining operations in the mid-2010s that were illegal under the previous government.[216]

Massacre campaigns

[edit]

According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. UN officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. They also said, that "[t]hese have been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself." "These are the same type of war crimes as were committed in Bosnia and should be prosecuted in international courts", one UN official was quoted as saying. The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians. The report by the United Nations quotes "eyewitnesses in many villages describing Arab fighters carrying long knives used for slitting throats and skinning people". The Taliban's former ambassador to Pakistan, Mullah Abdul Salam Zaeef, in late 2011 stated that cruel behaviour under and by the Taliban had been "necessary".[217][218][219][220]

In 1998, the United Nations accused the Taliban of denying emergency food by the UN's World Food Programme to 160,000 hungry and starving people "for political and military reasons".[221] The UN said the Taliban were starving people for their military agenda and using humanitarian assistance as a weapon of war.[222][223][224][225][226]

On 8 August 1998, the Taliban launched an attack on Mazar-i-Sharif. Of 1500 defenders only 100 survived the engagement. Once in control the Taliban began to kill people indiscriminately. At first shooting people in the street, they soon began to target Hazaras. Women were raped, and thousands of people were locked in containers and left to suffocate. This ethnic cleansing left an estimated 5,000 to 6,000 people dead. At this time ten Iranian diplomats and a journalist were killed. Iran assumed the Taliban had murdered them, and mobilised its army, deploying men along the border with Afghanistan. By the middle of September there were 250,000 Iranian personnel stationed on the border. Pakistan mediated and the bodies were returned to Tehran towards the end of the month. The killings of the diplomats had been carried out by Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, a Pakistani Sunni group with close ties to the ISI. They burned orchards, crops and destroyed irrigation systems, and forced more than 100,000 people from their homes with hundreds of men, women and children still unaccounted for.[227][228][229][230][231]

In a major effort to retake the Shomali Plains to the north of Kabul from the United Front, the Taliban indiscriminately killed civilians, while uprooting and expelling the population. Among others, Kamal Hossein, a special reporter for the UN, reported on these and other war crimes. In Istalif, a town famous for handmade potteries and which was home to more than 45,000 people, the Taliban gave 24 hours' notice to the population to leave, then completely razed the town leaving the people destitute.[232][233]

In 1999, the town of Bamian was taken, hundreds of men, women and children were executed. Houses were razed and some were used for forced labour. There was a further massacre at the town of Yakaolang in January 2001. An estimated 300 people were murdered, along with two delegations of Hazara elders who had tried to intercede.[234][235]

By 1999, the Taliban had forced hundreds of thousands of people from the Shomali Plains and other regions conducting a policy of scorched earth burning homes, farm land and gardens.[232]

Human trafficking

[edit]

Several Taliban and al-Qaeda commanders ran a network of human trafficking, abducting ethnic minority women and selling them into sex slavery in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[236] Time magazine writes: "The Taliban often argued that the restrictions they placed on women were actually a way of revering and protecting the opposite sex. The behavior of the Taliban during the six years they expanded their rule in Afghanistan made a mockery of that claim."[236]

The targets for human trafficking were especially women from the Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and other non-Pashtun ethnic groups in Afghanistan. Some women preferred to commit suicide over slavery, killing themselves. During one Taliban and al-Qaeda offensive in 1999 in the Shomali Plains alone, more than 600 women were kidnapped.[236] Arab and Pakistani al-Qaeda militants, with local Taliban forces, forced them into trucks and buses.[236] Time magazine writes: "The trail of the missing Shomali women leads to Jalalabad, not far from the Pakistan border. There, according to eyewitnesses, the women were penned up inside Sar Shahi camp in the desert. The more desirable among them were selected and taken away. Some were trucked to Peshawar with the apparent complicity of Pakistani border guards. Others were taken to Khost, where bin Laden had several training camps." Officials from relief agencies say, the trail of many of the vanished women leads to Pakistan where they were sold to brothels or into private households to be kept as slaves.[236]

Oppression of women

[edit]
Taliban religious police beating a woman in Kabul on 26 August 2001[237]

To PHR's knowledge, no other régime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them on pain of physical punishment.[238]

— Physicians for Human Rights, 1998

Members of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan protesting against the Taliban, in Peshawar, Pakistan in 1998

Brutal repression of women was widespread under the Taliban and it received significant international condemnation.[239][240][241][242][243][244][245][246][247][248] Abuses were myriad and violently enforced by the religious police.[249] For example, the Taliban issued edicts forbidding women from being educated, forcing girls to leave schools and colleges.[250][251][252][217][218][253][254][232] Women who were leaving their houses were required to be accompanied by a male relative and were obligated to wear the burqa,[255] a traditional dress covering the entire body except for a small slit out of which to see.[250][251] Those women who were accused of disobedience were publicly beaten. In one instance, a young woman named Sohaila was charged with adultery after she was caught walking with a man who was not a relative; she was publicly flogged in Ghazi Stadium, receiving 100 lashes.[256] Female employment was restricted to the medical sector, where male medical personnel were prohibited from treating women and girls.[250][257][258] This extensive ban on the employment of women further resulted in the widespread closure of primary schools, as almost all teachers prior to the Taliban's rise had been women, further restricting access to education not only to girls but also to boys. Restrictions became especially severe after the Taliban took control of the capital. In February 1998, for instance, religious police forced all women off the streets of Kabul and issued new regulations which ordered people to blacken their windows so that women would not be visible from outside.[259]

Ban on women's participation in the healthcare sector

[edit]

In December 2024, the Taliban's health ministry banned women from being trained in nursing and midwifery, according to media reports confirmed by The Guardian.[260] This was a reversal of an earlier February 2024 decision to permit basic medical training for women.[261] According to NPR, the health ministry had lobbied for an exemption from the general ban on women's education in the healthcare sector because "in some provinces, the Taliban does not allow women to seek treatment from male medical professionals."[261] The Taliban's ban on basic medical training for women was widely condemned by human rights organizations as a danger to the health and well-being of Afghan women and children, with Afghanistan already having among the highest maternal mortality ratios in the world according to 2020 data, before the Taliban's 2021 seizure of power.[260][261] For example, Heather Barr of Human Right Watch stated: "If you ban women from being treated by male healthcare professionals, and then you ban women from training to become healthcare professionals, the consequences are clear: women will not have access to healthcare and will die as a result."[260] The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that the ban "is profoundly discriminatory, short-sighted and puts the lives of women and girls at risk in multiple ways."[262]

ICC case

[edit]

In July 2025, the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Taliban leaders over their alleged persecution of women in Afghanistan.[263]

Violence against civilians

[edit]

According to the United Nations, the Taliban and its allies were responsible for 76% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2009, 75% in 2010 and 80% in 2011.[224][264]

According to Human Rights Watch, the Taliban's bombings and other attacks which have led to civilian casualties "sharply escalated in 2006" when "at least 669 Afghan civilians were killed in at least 350 armed attacks, most of which appear to have been intentionally launched at non-combatants."[265][266]

Afghans in Germany protesting against Taliban violence, 14 August 2021

The United Nations reported that the number of civilians killed by both the Taliban and pro-government forces in the war rose nearly 50% between 2007 and 2009. The high number of civilians killed by the Taliban is blamed in part on their increasing use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), "for instance, 16 IEDs have been planted in girls' schools" by the Taliban.[267]

In 2009, Colonel Richard Kemp, formerly Commander of British forces in Afghanistan and the intelligence coordinator for the British government, drew parallels between the tactics and strategy of Hamas in Gaza to those of the Taliban. Kemp wrote:

Like Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in southern Afghanistan are masters at shielding themselves behind the civilian population and then melting in among them for protection. Women and children are trained and equipped to fight, collect intelligence, and ferry arms and ammunition between battles. Female suicide bombers are increasingly common. The use of women to shield gunmen as they engage NATO forces is now so normal it is deemed barely worthy of comment. Schools and houses are routinely booby-trapped. Snipers shelter in houses deliberately filled with women and children.[268][269]

— Richard Kemp, Commander of British forces in Afghanistan

Discrimination against Hindus and Sikhs

[edit]

Hindus and Sikhs have lived in Afghanistan since historic times and they were prominent minorities in Afghanistan, well-established in terms of academics and businesses.[270] After the Afghan Civil War they started to migrate to India and other nations.[271] After the Taliban established the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, they imposed strict Sharia laws which discriminated against Hindus and Sikhs and caused the size of Afghanistan's Hindu and Sikh populations to fall at a very rapid rate because they emigrated from Afghanistan and established diasporas in the Western world.[272] The Taliban issued decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building places of worship but allowed them to worship at existing holy sites, forbade non-Muslims from criticizing Muslims, ordered non-Muslims to identify their houses by placing a yellow cloth on their rooftops, forbade non-Muslims from living in the same residence as Muslims, and required that non-Muslim women wear a yellow dress with a special mark so that Muslims could keep their distance from them (Hindus and Sikhs were mainly targeted).[273] The Taliban announced in May 2001 that it would force Afghanistan's Hindu population to wear special badges, which has been compared to the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany.[274] In general, the Taliban treated the Sikhs better than Afghan Shiites, Hindus and Christians.[275]

Relationship with other religious groups

[edit]

Along with Hindus, the small Christian community was also persecuted by the Taliban.[276] Violence against Western aid workers and Christians was common during the Afghan conflict.[277]

On several occasions between 2008 and 2012, the Taliban claimed that they assassinated Western and Afghani medical or aid workers in Afghanistan, because they feared that the polio vaccine would make Muslim children sterile, because they suspected that the 'medical workers' were really spies, or because they suspected that the medical workers were proselytizing Christianity.

In August 2008, three Western women (British, Canadian, US) who were working for the aid group 'International Rescue Committee' were murdered in Kabul. The Taliban claimed that they killed them because they were foreign spies.[278] In October 2008, the British woman Gayle Williams working for Christian UK charity 'SERVE Afghanistan' – focusing on training and education for disabled persons – was murdered near Kabul. Taliban claimed they killed her because her organisation "was preaching Christianity in Afghanistan".[278] In all 2008 until October, 29 aid workers, 5 of whom non-Afghanis, were killed in Afghanistan.[278]

In August 2010, the Taliban claimed that they murdered 10 medical aid workers while they were passing through Badakhshan Province on their way from Kabul to Nuristan Province – but the Afghan Islamic party/militia Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin has also claimed responsibility for those killings. The victims were six Americans, one Briton, one German and two Afghanis, working for a self-proclaimed "non-profit, Christian organization" which is named 'International Assistance Mission'. The Taliban stated that they murdered them because they were proselytizing Christianity and possessing which were translated into the Dari language when they were encountered. IAM contended that they "were not missionaries".[279]

In December 2012, unidentified gunmen killed four female UN polio-workers in Karachi in Pakistan; the Western news media suggested that there was a connection between the outspokenness of the Taliban and objections to and suspicions of such 'polio vaccinations'.[280] Eventually in 2012, a Pakistani Taliban commander in North Waziristan in Pakistan banned polio vaccinations,[281] and in March 2013, the Afghan government was forced to suspend its vaccination efforts in Nuristan Province because the Taliban was extremely influential in the province.[282] However, in May 2013, the Taliban's leaders changed their stance on polio vaccinations, saying that the vaccine is the only way to prevent polio and they also stated that they will work with immunization volunteers as long as polio workers are "unbiased" and "harmonized with the regional conditions, Islamic values and local cultural traditions."[283][284]

During the first period of Taliban rule, only two known Jews were left in Afghanistan, Zablon Simintov and Isaac Levy (c. 1920–2005). Levy relied on charity to survive, while Simintov ran a store selling carpets and jewelry until 2001. They lived on opposite sides of the dilapidated Kabul synagogue. They kept denouncing each other to the authorities, and both spent time in jail for continuously "arguing". The Taliban also confiscated the synagogue's Torah scroll. However, the two men were later released from prison when Taliban officials became annoyed by their arguing.[285] After August 2021, the last Jew Simintov and his relative left Afghanistan, ended centuries of Jewish presence in the country.[286][287]

Restrictions on modern education

[edit]

Before the Taliban came to power, education was highly regarded in Afghanistan and Kabul University attracted students from Asia and the Middle East. However, the Taliban imposed restrictions on modern education, banned the education of females, only allowed Islamic religious schools to stay open and only encouraged the teaching of the Qur'an. Around half of all of the schools in Afghanistan were destroyed.[288] The Taliban have carried out brutal attacks on teachers and students and they have also threatened parents and teachers.[289] As per a 1998 UNICEF report, 9 out of 10 girls and 2 out of 3 boys did not enroll in schools. By 2000, fewer than 4–5% of all Afghan children were being educated at the primary school level and even fewer of them were being educated at higher secondary and university levels.[288]

Attacks on educational institutions, students and teachers and the forced enforcement of Islamic teachings have even continued after the Taliban were deposed from power. In December 2017, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that over 1,000 schools had been destroyed, damaged or occupied and 100 teachers and students had been killed by the Taliban.[290]

Cultural genocide

[edit]

The Taliban have committed a cultural genocide against the Afghan people by destroying their historical and cultural texts, artifacts and sculptures.[88]

In the early 1990s, the National Museum of Afghanistan was attacked and looted numerous times, resulting in the loss of 70% of the 100,000 artifacts of Afghan culture and history which were then on display.[291]

On 11 August 1998, the Taliban destroyed the Puli Khumri Public Library. The library contained a collection of over 55,000 books and old manuscripts, one of the most valuable and beautiful collections of Afghanistan's cultural works according to the Afghan people.[292][293]

On 2 March 2001, the Buddhas of Bamiyan were destroyed with dynamite, on orders from the Taliban's leader Mullah Omar.[294]

In October of the same year, the Taliban "took sledgehammers and axes to thousands of years' worth of artifacts"[87] in the National Museum of Afghanistan, destroying at least 2,750 ancient works of art.[295]

Afghanistan has a rich musical culture, where music plays an important part in social functions like births and marriages and it has also played a major role in uniting an ethnically diverse country.[296] However, since it came to power and even after it was deposed, the Taliban has banned most music, including cultural folk music, and it has also attacked and killed a number of musicians.[296][297][298][299]

Ban on entertainment and recreational activities

[edit]

During their first rule of Afghanistan which lasted from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban banned many recreational activities and games, such as association football, kite flying, and chess. Mediums of entertainment such as televisions, cinemas, music with instrumental accompaniments, VCRs and satellite dishes were also banned.[300] Also included on the list of banned items were "musical instruments and accessories" and all visual representation of living creatures.[296][301][302][303] However, the daf, a type of frame drum, wasn't banned.[209]

It was reported that when Afghan children were caught kiting, a highly popular activity, they were beaten.[304] When Khaled Hosseini learned through a 1999 news report that the Taliban had banned kite flying, a restriction he found particularly cruel, the news "struck a personal chord" for him, as he had grown up with the sport while living in Afghanistan. Hosseini was motivated to write a 25-page short story about two boys who fly kites in Kabul that he later developed into his first novel, The Kite Runner.

Forced conscription and conscription of children

[edit]

According to the testimony of Guantanamo captives before their Combatant Status Review Tribunals, the Taliban, in addition to conscripting men to serve as soldiers, also conscripted men to staff its civil service – both done at gunpoint.[305][306][307]

According to a report from Oxford University, the Taliban made widespread use of the conscription of children in 1997, 1998 and 1999.[308] The report states that during the civil war that preceded the Taliban régime, thousands of orphaned boys joined various militia for "employment, food, shelter, protection and economic opportunity." The report said that during its initial period, the Taliban "long depended upon cohorts of youth". Witnesses stated that each land-owning family had to provide one young man and $500 in expenses. In August of that year 5000 students aged between 15 and 35 left madrassas in Pakistan to join the Taliban.

Leadership and organization

[edit]
Kandahar faction and Haqqani network

According to Jon Lee Anderson the Taliban government is "said to be profoundly divided" between the Kandahar faction and the Haqqani network, with a mysterious dispearance of deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghani Baradar for "several days" in mid-September 2021 explained by rumours of injury after a brawl with other Taliban.[87] The Kandahar faction is named for the city that Mullah Omar came from and where he founded the Taliban, and is described as "insular" and "rural", interested "primarily" with "ruling its home turf". It includes Haibatullah Akhundzada, Mullah Yaqoob, Abdul Ghani Baradar (see below).

The family-based Haqqani network, by contrast are "closely linked to Pakistan's secret services", "interested in global jihad", with its founder (Jalaluddin Haqqani) "connected" the Taliban with Osama bin Laden.[87] It is named for its founder Jalaluddin Haqqani and is currently led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, and includes Khalil Haqqani, Mawlawi Mohammad Salim Saad.[87] With Sirajuddin Haqqani as acting interior minister, as of February 2022, the network has control of "a preponderance of security positions in Afghanistan".[87]

Taliban leadership have denied tension between factions. Suhail Shaheen states "there is one Taliban", and Zabihullah Mujahid (acting Deputy Minister of Information and Culture), even maintains "there is no Haqqani network."[87]

Current leadership

[edit]

The top members of the Taliban as an insurgency, as of August 2021, are:[309]

  • Haibatullah Akhundzada, the Taliban's Supreme Leader since 2016, a religious scholar from Kandahar province.
  • Abdul Ghani Baradar, co-founder of the movement alongside Mullah Omar, was deputy Prime Minister as of March 2022.[87] From Uruzgan province, he was imprisoned in Pakistan before his release at the request of the United States.
  • Mullah Yaqoob, the son of the Taliban's founder Mullah Omar and leader of the group's military operations.
  • Sirajuddin Haqqani, leader of the Haqqani network is acting interior minister as of February 2022, with authority over police and intelligence services. He oversees the group's financial and military assets between the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The U.S. government has a $10 million bounty for his arrest brought on by several terrorist attacks on hotels and the Indian Embassy.[87]
  • Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, former head of the group's political office in Doha. From Logar province, he holds a university master's degree and trained as a cadet at the Indian Military Academy.
  • Abdul Hakim Ishaqzai, chief negotiatior of the group's political office in Doha, replacing Stanikzai in 2020. Heads the Taliban's powerful council of religious scholars.
  • Suhail Shaheen, Taliban nominee for Ambassador to the U.N.; former spokesperson of the Taliban's political office in Doha. University educated in Pakistan, he was editor of the English language Kabul Times in the 1990s and served as a deputy ambassador to Pakistan at the time.
  • Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban's spokesperson since 2007. He revealed himself to the public for the first time after the group's capture of Kabul in 2021.

All the top leadership of the Taliban are ethnic Pashtuns, more specifically those belonging of the Ghilzai confederation.[310]

Overview

[edit]

Until his death in 2013, Mullah Omar was the supreme commander of the Taliban. Mullah Akhtar Mansour was elected as his replacement in 2015,[311] and following Mansour's killing in a May 2016 US drone strike, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada became the group's leader.[312]

The Taliban initially enjoyed goodwill from Afghans weary of the warlords' corruption, brutality, and incessant fighting.[313] This popularity was not universal, particularly among non-Pashtuns.

In 2001, the Taliban, de jure, controlled 85% of Afghanistan. De facto the areas under its direct control were mainly Afghanistan's major cities and highways. Tribal khans and warlords had de facto direct control over various small towns, villages, and rural areas.[314]

Taliban police patrolling the streets of Herat in a pick-up truck

Rashid described the Taliban government as "a secret society run by Kandaharis ... mysterious, secretive, and dictatorial."[315] They did not hold elections, as their spokesman explained:

The Sharia does not allow politics or political parties. That is why we give no salaries to officials or soldiers, just food, clothes, shoes, and weapons. We want to live a life like the Prophet lived 1400 years ago, and jihad is our right. We want to recreate the time of the Prophet, and we are only carrying out what the Afghan people have wanted for the past 14 years.[316]

They modelled their decision-making process on the Pashtun tribal council (jirga), together with what they believed to be the early Islamic model. Discussion was followed by a building of a consensus by the "believers".[195] Before capturing Kabul, there was talk of stepping aside once a government of "good Muslims" took power, and law and order were restored.

As the Taliban's power grew, decisions were made by Mullah Omar without consulting the jirga and without consulting other parts of the country. He visited the capital, Kabul, only twice while in power. Instead of an election, their leader's legitimacy came from an oath of allegiance ("Bay'ah"), in imitation of the Prophet and the first four Caliphs. On 4 April 1996, Mullah Omar had "the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed" taken from its shrine for the first time in 60 years. Wrapping himself in the relic, he appeared on the roof of a building in the center of Kandahar while hundreds of Pashtun mullahs below shouted "Amir al-Mu'minin!" (Commander of the Faithful), in a pledge of support. Taliban spokesman Mullah Wakil explained:

Decisions are based on the advice of the Amir-ul Momineen. For us consultation is not necessary. We believe that this is in line with the Sharia. We abide by the Amir's view even if he alone takes this view. There will not be a head of state. Instead there will be an Amir al-Mu'minin. Mullah Omar will be the highest authority, and the government will not be able to implement any decision to which he does not agree. General elections are incompatible with Sharia and therefore we reject them.[196]

The Taliban were very reluctant to share power, and since their ranks were overwhelmingly Pashtun they ruled as overlords over the 60% of Afghans from other ethnic groups. In local government, such as Kabul city council[315] or Herat,[317] Taliban loyalists, not locals, dominated, even when the Pashto-speaking Taliban could not communicate with the roughly half of the population who spoke Dari or other non-Pashtun tongues.[317] Critics complained that this "lack of local representation in urban administration made the Taliban appear as an occupying force."[318]

Organization and governance

[edit]

Consistent with the governance of the early Muslims was the absence of state institutions and the absence of "a methodology for command and control", both of which are standard today, even in non-Westernized states. The Taliban did not issue press releases or policy statements, nor did they hold regular press conferences. The basis for this structure was Grand Mufti Rashid Ahmed Ludhianvi's Obedience to the Amir, as he served as a mentor to the Taliban's leadership.[319] The outside world and most Afghans did not even know what their leaders looked like, because photography was banned.[320] The "regular army" resembled a lashkar or traditional tribal militia force with only 25,000 men (of whom 11,000 were non-Afghans).

Cabinet ministers and deputies were mullahs with a "madrasah education". Several of them, such as the Minister of Health and the Governor of the State bank, were primarily military commanders who left their administrative posts and fought whenever they were needed. Military reverses that trapped them behind enemy lines or led to their deaths increased the chaos in the national administration.[321] At the national level, "all senior Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara bureaucrats" were replaced "with Pashtuns, whether qualified or not". Consequently, the ministries "by and large ceased to function".[318]

The Ministry of Finance did not have a budget nor did it have a "qualified economist or banker". Mullah Omar collected and disbursed cash without bookkeeping.

Economic activities

[edit]

The Kabul money markets responded positively during the first weeks of the Taliban occupation (1996). But the Afghani soon fell in value. They imposed a 50% tax on any company operating in the country, and those who failed to pay were attacked. They also imposed a 6% import tax on anything brought into the country, and by 1998 had control of the major airports and border crossings which allowed them to establish a monopoly on all trade. By 2001, the per capita income of the 25 million population was under $200, and the country was close to total economic collapse. As of 2007 the economy had begun to recover, with estimated foreign reserves of three billion dollars and a 13% increase in economic growth.[245][322][323][324][325][326]

Opium in Taliban safehouse in Helmand

Under the Transit treaty between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a massive network for smuggling developed. It had an estimated turnover of 2.5 billion dollars with the Taliban receiving between $100 and $130 million per year. These operations along with the trade from the Golden Crescent financed the war in Afghanistan and also had the side effect of destroying start up industries in Pakistan. Ahmed Rashid also explained that the Afghan Transit Trade agreed on by Pakistan was "the largest official source of revenue for the Taliban."[327][328][329]

Between 1996 and 1999, Mullah Omar reversed his opinions on the drug trade, apparently as it only harmed kafirs. The Taliban controlled 96% of Afghanistan's poppy fields and made opium its largest source of taxation. Taxes on opium exports became one of the mainstays of Taliban income and their war economy. According to Rashid, "drug money funded the weapons, ammunition and fuel for the war." In The New York Times, the Finance Minister of the United Front, Wahidullah Sabawoon, declared the Taliban had no annual budget but that they "appeared to spend US$300 million a year, nearly all of it on war." He added that the Taliban had come to increasingly rely on three sources of money: "poppy, the Pakistanis and bin Laden."[329]

In an economic sense it seems he had little choice, as the war of attrition continued with the Northern Alliance the income from continued opium production was all that prevented the country from starvation. By 2000, Afghanistan accounted for an estimated 75% of the world's supply and in 2000 grew an estimated 3276 tonnes of opium from poppy cultivation on 82,171 hectares. At this juncture Omar passed a decree banning the cultivation of opium, and production dropped to an estimated 74 metric tonnes from poppy cultivation on 1,685 hectares. Many observers say the ban – which came in a bid for international recognition at the United Nations – was only issued in order to raise opium prices and increase profit from the sale of large existing stockpiles. 1999 had yielded a record crop and had been followed by a lower but still large 2000 harvest. The trafficking of accumulated stocks by the Taliban continued in 2000 and 2001. In 2002, the UN mentioned the "existence of significant stocks of opiates accumulated during previous years of bumper harvests." In September 2001 – before the 11 September attacks against the United States – the Taliban allegedly authorised Afghan peasants to sow opium again.[329][330][331][332]

There was also an environmental toll to the country, heavy deforestation from the illegal trade in timber with hundreds of acres of pine and cedar forests in Kunar Province and Paktya being cleared. Throughout the country millions of acres were denuded to supply timber to the Pakistani markets, with no attempt made at reforestation, which has led to significant environmental damage. By 2001, when the Afghan Interim Administration took power the country's infrastructure was in ruins, Telecommunications had failed, the road network was destroyed and Ministry of Finance buildings were in such a state of disrepair some were on the verge of collapse. On 6 July 1999, then president Bill Clinton signed into effect executive order 13129. This order implemented a complete ban on any trade between America and the Taliban régime and on 10 August they froze £5,000,000 in Ariana assets. On 19 December 2000, UN resolution 1333 was passed. It called for all assets to be frozen and for all states to close any offices belonging to the Taliban. This included the offices of Ariana Afghan Airlines. In 1999, the UN had passed resolution 1267 which had banned all international flights by Ariana apart from preapproved humanitarian missions.[333][334][335][336][337][338][339][340]

According to the lawsuit, filed in December 2019 in the D.C. District Court on behalf of Gold Star families, some US defense contractors involved in Afghanistan made illegal "protection payments" to the Taliban, funding a "Taliban-led terrorist insurgency" that killed or wounded thousands of Americans in Afghanistan.[341][342] In 2009, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said that the "protection money" was "one of the major sources of funding for the Taliban."[343]

It is estimated that in 2020 the Taliban had an income of $1.6 billion, mostly from drugs, mining, extortion and taxes, donations and exports.[215]

On 2 November 2021, the Taliban required that all economic transactions in Afghanistan use Afghanis and banned the use of all foreign currency.[344][345][346]

In 2022 construction on the Qosh Tepa Canal began in northern Afghanistan.[347]

On 20 April 2024, the Taliban decided to abolish Afghanistan's pension system as Hibatullah Akhundzada claimed it was "un-Islamic", which prompted protests by retirees and older veterans of the Afghan Armed Forces in Kabul. The protest was dispersed by the Taliban.[348]

International relations

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During the war, the Taliban were supported by several militant outfits which include the Haqqani network, Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Several countries like China, Iran, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia and Saudi Arabia allegedly support the Taliban.[citation needed] However, all of their governments deny providing any support to the Taliban. Likewise, the Taliban also deny receiving any foreign support from any country.[349] At its peak, formal diplomatic recognition of the Taliban's government was acknowledged by three nations: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. In the past, the United Arab Emirates and Turkmenistan were also alleged to have provided support to the Taliban. It is designated by some countries as a terrorist organization.

During its time in power (1996–2001), at its height ruling 90% of Afghanistan, the Taliban régime, or Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, gained diplomatic recognition from only three states: the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, all of which provided substantial aid. The most other nations and organizations, including the United Nations, recognised the government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (1992–2002) (parts of whom were part of the United Front, also called Northern Alliance) as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Regarding its relations with the rest of the world, the Taliban's Emirate of Afghanistan held a policy of isolationism: "The Taliban believe in non-interference in the affairs of other countries and similarly desire no outside interference in their country's internal affairs".[350]

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo meeting with Taliban delegation in Doha, Qatar, on 12 September 2020

Traditionally, the Taliban were supported by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, while Iran, Russia, Turkey, India, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed an anti-Taliban alliance and supported the Northern Alliance.[351] After the fall of the Taliban régime at the end of 2001, the composition of the Taliban supporters changed. According to a study by scholar Antonio Giustozzi, in the years 2005 to 2015 most of the financial support came from the states Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, and Qatar, as well as from private donors from Saudi Arabia, from al-Qaeda and, for a short period of time, from the Islamic State.[352] About 54 percent of the funding came from foreign governments, 10 percent from private donors from abroad, and 16 percent from al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. In 2014, the amount of external support was close to $900 million.[353]

Following the Taliban's ascension to power, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's model of governance has been widely criticized by the international community, despite the government's repeated calls for international recognition and engagement. Acting Prime Minister Mohammad Hassan Akhund stated that his interim administration has met all conditions required for official recognition.[354] In a bid to gain recognition, the Taliban sent a letter in September 2021 to the UN to accept Suhail Shaheen as Permanent Representative of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – a request that had already been rejected by the UN Credentials Committee in 2021.[355]

With regards to international relations after the Taliban seizure of Afghanistan in 2021, Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen told the Russian news agency Sputnik: "Of course, we won't have any relations with Israel. We want to have relations with other countries; Israel is not among these countries. We would like to have relations with all the regional countries and neighbouring countries as well as Asian countries."[356]

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi (right) with Japanese Ambassador Takashi Okada in May 2022

On 10 October 2021, Russia hosted the Taliban for talks in Moscow in an effort to boost its influence across Central Asia. Officials from 10 different countries – Russia, China, Pakistan, India, Iran and five formerly Soviet Central Asian states – attended the talks, which were held during the Taliban's first official trip to Europe since their return to power in mid-August 2021.[357] The Taliban won backing from the 10 regional powers for the idea of a United Nations donor conference to help the country stave off economic collapse and a humanitarian catastrophe, calling for the UN to convene such a conference as soon as possible to help rebuild the country. Russian officials also called for action against Islamic State (IS) fighters, who Russia said have started to increase their presence in Afghanistan since the Taliban's takeover. The Taliban delegation, which was led by Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Salam Hanafi, said that "Isolating Afghanistan is in no one's interests," arguing that the extremist group did not pose any security threat to any other country. The Taliban asked the international community to recognize its government,[358] but no country has yet recognized the new Afghan government.[354]

On 23 January 2022, a Taliban delegation arrived in Oslo, and closed-door meetings were held during the Taliban's first official trip to Western Europe and second official trip to Europe since their return to power.[359] Western diplomats told the Taliban that humanitarian aid to Afghanistan would be tied to an improvement in human rights.[360] The Taliban delegation, led by acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, met senior French foreign ministry officials, Britain's special envoy Nigel Casey, EU Special Representative for Afghanistan and members of the Norwegian foreign ministry. This followed the announcement by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee that the committee would extend a travel ban exemption until 21 March 2022 for 14 listed Taliban members to continue attending talks, along with a limited asset-freeze exemption for the financing of exempted travel.[361] However, the Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said that the international community's call for the formation of an inclusive government was a political "excuse" after the 3-day Oslo visit.[362]

A Taliban official with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian in 2023

At the United Nations Security Council meeting in New York on 26 January 2022, Norwegian Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre said the Oslo talks appeared to have been "serious" and "genuine". Norway says the talks do "not represent a legitimisation or recognition of the Taliban".[363] In the same meeting, the Russian Federation's delegate said attempts to engage the Taliban through coercion are counter-productive, calling on Western states and donors to return frozen funds.[364] China's representative said the fact that aid deliveries have not improved since the adoption of UNSC 2615 (2021) proves that the issue has been politicized, as some parties seek to use assistance as a bargaining chip.[365]

Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, the Russian Federation, and China were the first countries to accept the diplomatic credentials of Taliban-appointed envoys, although this is not equivalent to official recognition.[366][367][368]

On 4 July 2024, the Russian president Vladimir Putin stated that Taliban is an ally of Russia in the fight against terrorism.[369]

In November 2024, Afghanistan's Foreign Ministry announced that Taliban officials would attend the 2024 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), marking the country's first participation since the Taliban regained control in 2021. Afghanistan had been unable to attend previous climate summits due to the lack of international recognition of the Taliban government. Despite this, the Taliban's environmental officials emphasized that climate change should be viewed as a humanitarian issue rather than a political one, arguing that addressing it transcends political disputes.[370]

After the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the Taliban congratulated the Syrian opposition and "the people of Syria", hoping for "a peaceful, unified and stable system".[371]

In April 2025, Russia's supreme court lifted the Taliban's designation as a terrorist organization.[372] On 3 July, Russia became the first country to formally recognize the Taliban as the de jure government of Afghanistan.[373]

Designation as a terrorist organization

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The Taliban movement is officially illegal in the following countries to date:

Former:

United Nations and NGOs

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Despite the aid of United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) given (see § Afghanistan during Taliban rule), the Taliban's attitude in 1996–2001 toward the UN and NGOs was often one of suspicion. The UN did not recognise the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, most foreign donors and aid workers were non-Muslims, and the Taliban vented fundamental objections to the sort of 'help' the UN offered. As the Taliban's Attorney General Maulvi Jalil-ullah Maulvizada put it in 1997:

Let us state what sort of education the UN wants. This is a big infidel policy which gives such obscene freedom to women which would lead to adultery and herald the destruction of Islam. In any Islamic country where adultery becomes common, that country is destroyed and enters the domination of the infidels because their men become like women and women cannot defend themselves. Anyone who talks to us should do so within Islam's framework. The Holy Koran cannot adjust itself to other people's requirements, people should adjust themselves to the requirements of the Holy Koran.[383]

In July 1998, the Taliban closed "all NGO offices" by force after those organisations refused to move to a bombed-out former Polytechnic College as ordered.[384] One month later the UN offices were also shut down.[385]

Around 2000, the UN drew up sanctions against officials and leaders of Taliban, because of their harbouring Osama bin Laden. Several of the Taliban leaders have subsequently been killed.[386]

In 2009, British Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband and US Secretary Hillary Clinton called for talks with 'regular Taliban fighters' while bypassing their top leaders who supposedly were 'committed to global jihad'. Kai Eide, the top UN official in Afghanistan, called for talks with Taliban at the highest level, suggesting Mullah Omar – even though Omar dismissed such overtures as long as foreign troops were in Afghanistan.[387]

In 2010, the UN lifted sanctions on the Taliban, and requested that Taliban leaders and others be removed from terrorism watch lists. In 2010 the US and Europe announced support for President Karzai's latest attempt to negotiate peace with the Taliban.[386][388][389]

Designated terrorist organisations

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Many designated terror groups have pledged their allegiance[390] to the new Taliban government, these groups include: Al Qaeda, al Shabaab, Boko Haram, Jemaah Islamiyah, Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, Tehreek-e-Taliban, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen

According to some reports Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have allegedly close ties to Pakistan's intelligence agency, have joined ISIS-K and ended their allegiance to Mullah Hibatullah.

The East Turkestan Movement and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan both distanced themself from the Taliban and ended their allegiance after the Talibans Zabul operation against Uyghurs in 2014, however newer reports indicate that those groups still have good relations with the Taliban.[391]

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The Taliban were portrayed in Khaled Hosseini's popular 2003 novel The Kite Runner[392] and its 2007 film adaption. The Taliban have also been portrayed in American film, most notably in Lone Survivor (2013) which is based on a real-life story.[citation needed] Hindi cinema have also portrayed the Taliban in Kabul Express (2006),[393] and Escape from Taliban (2003) which is based on a real-life novel A Kabuliwala's Bengali Wife,[394] whose author Sushmita Banerjee was shot dead by the Taliban in 2013.[395]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Taliban is a predominantly Pashtun, Sunni Islamist and political organization founded in southern in 1994, emerging from Deobandi religious students trained in Pakistani madrassas and adhering to a rigid interpretation of law derived from Hanafi . The group rapidly expanded during 's , capturing in 1996 and establishing the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which it ruled until the U.S.-led invasion in 2001 following the , after providing safe haven to leader . During its initial rule from 1996 to , the Taliban imposed severe restrictions on daily life, including bans on women's education and , destruction of such as the Bamiyan Buddhas, and public executions for moral offenses, while deriving significant revenue from the opium trade despite religious prohibitions on narcotics. Ousted in late , the Taliban regrouped in Pakistan's border regions, launching a persistent against forces and the Afghan government, employing guerrilla tactics, improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombings that caused thousands of casualties. In August 2021, amid the withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops, the Taliban swiftly overran Afghan security forces and reestablished the Islamic Emirate, controlling the country as of 2025 despite lacking international recognition and facing internal factionalism, ongoing resistance from groups like the National Resistance Front, and economic collapse exacerbated by frozen assets and sanctions. The regime has reinstated harsh edicts limiting women's , enforced by morality police, while pursuing diplomatic to regional powers like , and , and harboring concerns over ISIS-Khorasan affiliates challenging its authority.

Etymology and Origins

Name and Terminology

The term "Taliban" derives from the word ṭālibān, the plural form of ṭālib, meaning "students" or "seekers of knowledge," alluding to the group's origins among Pashtun students trained in Pakistani religious seminaries (madrasas) during the early . This emerged in 1994 as the movement coalesced in to combat local warlordism and restore order under strict Islamic principles. An alternative , "Taleban," appears in some English-language sources, reflecting variations in Pashto and . The Taliban designate themselves as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, employing the official titles Da Islāmī Emīrīṭat in and Emārat-e Eslāmī-ye Afghānestān in , underscoring their aspiration to govern as a caliphate-like led by an amīr al-muʾminīn (commander of the faithful). This self-identification rejects the external label "Taliban," which they view as reductive, preferring emphasis on their role as enforcers of law derived from Deobandi interpretations of . Symbolizing their ideological foundation, the Taliban's flag features a white field bearing the —the of faith—in black script: "Lā ʾilāha ʾillā Allāh, Muḥammadur rasūl Allāh" (There is no but ; is the Messenger of ). Adopted upon their capture of on September 27, 1996, the banner's white background evokes purity and peace under divine rule, with the shahada added in 1997 to affirm monotheistic primacy; it was reinstated on August 15, 2021, following their return to power. This emblem distinguishes them from other jihadist groups, prioritizing unadorned (oneness of ) over martial icons.

Formation in Pakistani Madrasas and Early Influences

The influx of millions of into following the Soviet invasion of in December 1979 created a vast pool of displaced Pashtun youth, many of whom were enrolled in religious seminaries known as madrasas, particularly in the (now ) bordering . These institutions, which numbered in the thousands by the late , provided , room, and board, drawing in orphans and rural boys with limited alternatives amid the chaos of war. Funded partly by Pakistani Zakat collections and Saudi Arabian donations channeled through organizations like the support network, the madrasas expanded rapidly, emphasizing rote memorization of the and over secular subjects. The predominant ideological strain in these border madrasas was Deobandism, a 19th-century Hanafi revivalist movement originating from in British , founded in 1866 to preserve orthodox against colonial influences and Hindu-majority rule. Deobandi curricula rejected Western modernism, Sufi folk practices, and Shia deviations, promoting a puritanical interpretation of focused on personal , clerical , and resistance to perceived moral . This framework, blended with Pashtun tribal codes () emphasizing honor, hospitality, and vengeance, and infused with Wahhabi rigor from Saudi funding, instilled in students a worldview hostile to secular governance and factional warlordism prevalent in post-Soviet . Prominent s such as Jamia Haqqania near produced generations of Taliban cadres, with alumni including key figures like and multiple emirate ministers who later formed the movement's core leadership. Mohammed Omar, the Taliban's founder and first , completed religious studies in Deobandi-affiliated seminaries in after initial training in Afghan s in and Uruzgan provinces. These institutions served not only as ideological incubators but also as recruitment hubs, where returning "talibs" (Arabic for students, hence the group's name) in 1994 began organizing against warlords, leveraging madrasa networks for manpower and 's (ISI) for logistical support. The resulting movement prioritized restoring Islamic order through strict enforcement, drawing directly from Deobandi anti-corruption ethos rather than Arab Salafism or global .

Historical Context

Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989) and Mujahideen Resistance

The Soviet Union launched its invasion of Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, deploying tens of thousands of troops to bolster the embattled communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime against widespread rural uprisings triggered by aggressive land reforms and secular policies. This intervention escalated a simmering civil conflict into a protracted guerrilla war, with Soviet forces peaking at over 100,000 personnel by the mid-1980s. Afghan resistance coalesced under the banner of the , a decentralized network of Islamist fighters from diverse ethnic and tribal backgrounds, including prominent Pashtun, Tajik, and Uzbek groups such as Hezb-e-Islami led by and Yunus Khalis, and under and . These warriors employed , ambushes, and , exploiting Afghanistan's rugged terrain to inflict unsustainable attrition on Soviet columns and outposts. Foreign backing proved decisive for sustainability; the initiated , a CIA-led covert program approved by President Carter days after the , funneling arms, training, and funds—later including anti-aircraft missiles from 1986—primarily via Pakistan's agency. matched U.S. contributions dollar-for-dollar, while hosted training camps and refugee networks, framing the fight as a global against atheistic . The conflict exacted immense costs: approximately 15,000 Soviet troops killed, with tens of thousands wounded; Mujahideen losses exceeded 75,000 fighters; and Afghan civilian deaths reached at least 500,000, alongside up to 2 million total fatalities from , , and . Over 3 million Afghans sought refuge in , where madrasas—often funded by Gulf states—indoctrinated orphaned or displaced Pashtun youth in rigid Deobandi , laying ideological groundwork for later Islamist movements. Many future Taliban cadres, including founder Mullah Mohammed Omar, gained combat experience as low-ranking operatives during the war, fostering a generation hardened by resistance and exposure to transnational jihadist networks. Facing domestic dissent, economic strain, and battlefield stalemate, the Soviets signed the Accords on April 14, 1988, commencing withdrawal on May 15 and completing it by February 15, 1989, which bequeathed a destabilized landscape of armed factions and unchecked weaponry. This vacuum precipitated civil war among allies, from which the Taliban would arise to challenge perceived moral decay and warlord predation.

Afghan Civil War (1989-1996) and Warlord Chaos

Following the Soviet Union's complete military withdrawal from Afghanistan on February 15, 1989, civil conflict persisted between the Soviet-backed under President and disparate alliances, with the government maintaining control over and major urban centers through residual , conscription, and militia loyalty until aid ceased in January 1992. Najibullah's regime, facing encirclement and defections—including Uzbek general Abdul Rashid Dostum's switch to the in March 1992—collapsed after Najibullah's failed bid for United Nations-mediated asylum on March 18, 1992; forces entered on April 24, 1992, overthrowing the government by April 28 amid initial celebratory but quickly fractious occupation. This triggered inter- warfare, as factions vied for dominance despite the nominal power-sharing framework of the Accords signed on March 10, 1992, by most groups excluding key holdouts like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami. Principal combatants encompassed (Tajik-dominated, led by as president from June 1992 and military commander ), Hezb-e Islami (Pashtun Islamist under Hekmatyar), Hezb-e Wahdat (Shia Hazara faction headed by ), Ittihad-e Islami (Wahhabi-influenced commanded by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf), and Junbish-i Milli (secular Uzbek forces of Dostum); these groups, previously allied against Soviet forces, fragmented along ethnic, ideological, and personal lines, with external patrons like , , and fueling proxy rivalries. The Battle for Kabul, erupting in earnest by June 1992, involved sustained artillery and rocket attacks—Hekmatyar's forces alone firing thousands of unguided projectiles into densely populated districts—killing an estimated 1,800-2,500 civilians by August 1992 and displacing around 500,000 residents amid and threats. Escalation peaked in January-February 1993 with citywide clashes claiming approximately 5,000 lives, including combatants. Atrocities defined the era's chaos, with all factions perpetrating war crimes under command structures that failed to restrain subordinates, including indiscriminate bombardments violating , mass abductions (thousands disappeared, often ethnically targeted), systematic rape, torture, executions, and that gutted Kabul's . Hekmatyar bears responsibility for orchestrating barrages on zones from 1992-1995; Massoud and Mohammad Qasim Fahim directed Jamiat assaults, including the February 11-16, 1993, Afshar operation alongside Sayyaf's Ittihad forces, where 70-80 Hazara civilians were summarily killed in streets, 700-750 abducted and presumed executed, and over 5,000 homes ransacked amid mutilations and forced labor. Dostum's Junbish troops conducted ransom executions and abuses, while Wahdat targeted ; investigations, drawing on eyewitness accounts and commissions, attribute these acts to deliberate policies rather than isolated excesses, eroding mujahideen legitimacy through mutual predation. By 1994-1996, splintered into enclaves—Dostum in the north, Massoud in the northeast, Hekmatyar in eastern pockets—sustaining extortion rackets, private militias, and economies that exacerbated and , with Kabul's continuing until Taliban advances in 1996 exposed the factions' inability to govern cohesively. This , yielding tens of thousands of civilian deaths in alone from 1992-1993 and broader devastation nationwide, stemmed causally from unchecked factional ambitions and arms proliferation, discrediting the anti-Soviet victors and fostering desperation for centralized security that the Taliban later exploited.

Rise to Power

Emergence in Kandahar (1994)

In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal and ensuing mujahideen civil war, southern Afghanistan, particularly , descended into anarchy characterized by rampant , , and by local commanders. Mohammed Omar, a one-eyed cleric and veteran of the anti-Soviet who had settled as an in the village of Singesar (also spelled Sangesar), grew disillusioned with this disorder. In early 1994, Omar founded the Taliban—meaning "students" in —drawing initial recruits from about 30 religious pupils (talibs) affiliated with Deobandi madrasas, many of whom were Pashtun refugees returning from . The group's explicit aim was to purge , restore Islamic order under strict , and eliminate the predatory warlords who had supplanted central authority. A pivotal incident crystallized the Taliban's emergence: a local commander abducted and raped two teenage girls in the Maiwand district near . Omar rallied his talibs, stormed the commander's compound, rescued the victims, and publicly executed the perpetrator by hanging his body from the barrel of a , an act framed as under Islamic principles. This vigilante response resonated amid widespread revulsion toward abuses, positioning the Taliban as avengers of Pashtun honor and security. Similar targeted strikes against other extortionists followed, amplifying local acquiescence and voluntary surrenders. By November 1994, the Taliban had consolidated control over city, disarming factions with little resistance as commanders either fled or defected, drawn by the promise of stability. Their success stemmed from disciplined enforcement—banning , theft, and —contrasting sharply with the mujahideen's factional predation, which had eroded public trust in prior governance. Initial backing included tacit local support from exhausted , alongside emerging logistical aid from Pakistan's , enabling the group's expansion beyond Kandahar into adjacent provinces. This foothold marked the Taliban's transformation from a localized into a burgeoning , capitalizing on the vacuum left by fractured rule.

Consolidation and National Control (1994-1996)

The Taliban, having seized in November 1994, extended their influence northward and westward through swift military campaigns against fragmented factions, capturing key southern districts like and Girishk with limited opposition as local commanders often defected or surrendered amid widespread resentment over extortion and banditry. By mid-1995, they held approximately one-third of Afghanistan's territory, primarily in the Pashtun-dominated south and east, enforcing initial measures of order such as disarming checkpoints and punishing corrupt officials, which garnered support from populations weary of chaos. Pakistani provided logistical aid, including fuel convoys and training for Taliban fighters recruited from border madrasas, facilitating their mobility via armed pickups in operations that emphasized rapid strikes over prolonged engagements. In September 1995, Taliban forces overran after a coordinated assault, defeating the defenses of governor , who fled to ; this victory secured a major supply route to and , bolstering their strategic depth despite Iranian protests over the displacement of ethnic minorities. Consolidation efforts included appointing regional shuras (councils) of clerics to administer justice under Hanafi interpretations of , suppressing cultivation in controlled areas—reducing output by an estimated 60% in 1995 through forced eradication—and establishing religious police to enforce dress codes and gender segregation, measures that restored basic security but alienated urban and non-Pashtun groups. Pakistani backing, including up to 30,000 fighters transiting via , proved decisive in offsetting the Taliban's numerical disadvantages against better-armed rivals like Hezb-e-Islami. By early 1996, the Taliban controlled over half of , including highways linking to , but faced setbacks such as a temporary retreat from Maidan Shahr after clashes with forces loyal to President Rabbani. Their advance culminated in September 1996, when they bypassed northern strongholds by sweeping through eastern provinces unopposed; fell on after its governor defected, enabling the capture of on , where Taliban troops executed the imprisoned former president Najibullah, signaling their intent to eliminate symbols of prior regimes. This national foothold ended the immediate phase of dominance in the capital, though control remained contested in the north under Uzbek and Tajik commanders, with the Taliban relying on tribal alliances and ideological appeals to Pashtun recruits to maintain cohesion amid internal debates over leadership under .

First Emirate Rule (1996-2001)

Governance Structure and Sharia Enforcement

The Taliban established a centralized theocratic under the supreme authority of Mohammed Omar, who assumed the title of (Commander of the Faithful) following a pledge of loyalty from Taliban leaders in in 1996. Omar exercised unilateral decision-making power, issuing decrees interpreted as binding Islamic law without consultation beyond a narrow circle of clerics, and rarely engaged directly with outsiders or delegated public appearances. Governance operated without a formal or elected bodies, relying instead on the Rahbari (Leadership Council) in for strategic guidance and a six-member council in for day-to-day administration after the capture of the capital on September 27, 1996. Provincial control was maintained through appointed governors () and district officials, who enforced central edicts while disarming local militias to consolidate power across roughly two-thirds of Afghan territory by late 1996. The judicial system comprised a network of courts staffed by qazis (judges) trained in Hanafi , emphasizing swift, summary proceedings over procedural appeals. Local courts handled routine disputes like theft and land claims, while 13 provincial high or appellate courts reviewed cases, culminating in oversight by the , initially based in and later in under the . Decisions drew exclusively from the Qur'an, , and tribal customs, with no provision for defense counsel or extended trials; convictions often resulted in immediate public enforcement to deter violations. The Department for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice—functioning as a force—patrolled cities and villages, conducting arbitrary inspections and detentions without judicial warrants to uphold behavioral codes. Sharia enforcement prioritized hudud (fixed Qur'anic punishments) and preventive measures against perceived moral decay, including mandatory burqas (chadri) for women in public, prohibitions on and employment beyond healthcare roles, and requirements for men to maintain untrimmed beards while performing five daily prayers. Additional edicts banned , , kite-flying, and Western media, with violators subjected to flogging or by religious police; these restrictions rendered an estimated 40,000 women jobless in alone by late 1996. Serious offenses triggered corporal penalties such as hand or foot amputations for theft, lashings for lesser infractions like or alcohol consumption, and public executions—via or —for murder or highway robbery; notable instances included a stoning in in July 1996 and a hanging in in August 1996. This system, while restoring order in war-torn areas by curbing banditry, systematically prioritized ideological purity over individual rights, as documented in contemporaneous reports from U.S. diplomatic observers.

Domestic Achievements: Security, Opium Eradication, and Order Restoration

Upon seizing on September 27, 1996, the Taliban imposed centralized control, disarming local militias and establishing religious police units to enforce order, which quelled the inter-factional chaos and banditry endemic during the preceding . In territories under their authority—encompassing over 90% of by late 1998—, , and highway ambushes declined sharply due to patrols, checkpoints, and immediate courts delivering corporal and capital punishments for offenses like robbery and murder. This restoration of basic enabled merchants to resume routes without the rackets previously operated by fragmented commanders, fostering a degree of economic predictability absent since the Soviet withdrawal. The regime's most quantifiable domestic success came in opium eradication. On July 27, 2000, Supreme Leader Mohammed Omar issued a religious banning poppy cultivation nationwide, with Taliban enforcers destroying fields and imposing fines or on violators in controlled regions that accounted for nearly all prior output. Cultivation plummeted from 82,171 hectares in 2000 to 7,606 hectares in 2001 (the latter largely in Northern Alliance-held areas), while production fell 95% from 3,656 metric tons to 185 metric tons, representing about 4.6% of the prior year's global supply from . This enforced interdiction, motivated by Islamist prohibitions on intoxicants, temporarily disrupted international narcotics trafficking networks reliant on Afghan sourcing.

International Relations and Isolation

The Taliban regime, upon establishing control over most of by 1996, received formal from only three states: , , and the . , which had provided extensive military and logistical support to the Taliban since their emergence, extended recognition in May 1997 to secure strategic depth against and promote a Pashtun-dominated government aligned with its interests. followed suit, motivated by shared Sunni Deobandi ideology and a desire to counter ian influence, while also supplying financial aid estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually. The 's recognition reflected similar regional calculations, including economic ties and opposition to Shia-led . These states maintained embassies in and facilitated limited trade, but even they distanced themselves over time amid growing international pressure. Relations with neighboring states were marked by asymmetry and conflict. Pakistan's (ISI) continued covert backing, including training and arms supplies, despite public denials, enabling Taliban advances against rivals like the . In contrast, viewed the Taliban as an existential threat due to sectarian killings of Hazara Shias and disputes over ; tensions escalated in when Taliban forces captured and executed Iranian diplomats and journalists, prompting to mobilize over 200,000 troops along the border and nearly triggering war. , concerned about Islamist spillover and narcotics trafficking fueling Chechen insurgents, supported the anti-Taliban with arms and intelligence, while Central Asian republics like and hosted opposition figures and feared cross-border . engaged pragmatically without recognition, hosting Taliban delegations in 2000 for discussions on stability and potential energy pipelines, but prioritized containing Uyghur militants allegedly sheltered by the . The Taliban's international isolation deepened due to its refusal to extradite , whom it hosted since 1996 despite his issuance of fatwas calling for attacks on Americans. Following 's August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in and , the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1193 on August 28, 1998, demanding the Taliban cease providing sanctuary to bin Laden and expel foreign terrorists, a demand ignored by leader . Non-compliance led to Resolution 1267 on October 15, 1999, imposing targeted sanctions including an overflight ban on , closure of bin Laden's training camps, and asset freezes on Taliban leaders—measures aimed at compelling handover of bin Laden for trial. The U.S. responded to the bombings with cruise missile strikes on sites in and , further entrenching non-recognition by most states, who continued according the UN seat to the ousted Rabbani government. Additional factors, such as severe restrictions on women barring them from education and work, public amputations, and tolerance of opium production despite eradication claims, alienated Western and Muslim-majority states alike, though sponsorship remained the causal core of pariah status.

Overthrow Following U.S. Invasion (2001)

The launched on October 7, 2001, initiating airstrikes against Taliban and targets across in response to the Taliban's refusal to extradite and dismantle training camps following the . The Taliban, who had provided safe haven to since 1996, rejected U.S. ultimatums issued on September 20, 2001, leading President to authorize military action to dismantle the terrorist network and remove the regime from power. Initial phases involved strikes and bombings of command centers, airfields, and 20 camps, coordinated with British forces, aiming to weaken Taliban defenses without immediate large-scale ground troop deployment. U.S. Special Operations Forces, numbering around 300-500 personnel, partnered with the —a coalition of anti-Taliban ethnic militias primarily Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara fighters—to conduct ground operations supported by precision airstrikes. This unconventional approach leveraged the 's local knowledge and manpower, estimated at 15,000-20,000 fighters, to advance against Taliban positions. Key victories included the capture of on November 9, 2001, where thousands of Taliban and foreign fighters surrendered or were killed in uprisings at fortress, followed by the fall of on November 13 after Taliban forces abandoned the capital. These rapid gains fragmented Taliban command structures, with defections and retreats accelerating under sustained air campaigns that destroyed over 50 armored vehicles and numerous artillery pieces in the early weeks. The Taliban's collapse culminated in the southern stronghold of , their birthplace, which fell on December 7, 2001, after intense fighting involving U.S. air support and advances, marking the effective end of centralized regime control. Taliban leader Mohammed Omar escaped from during the siege, reportedly on a , evading capture and fleeing toward with remnants of his forces. Concurrently, retreated to the cave complex in eastern , where U.S.-backed Afghan militias and limited American troops engaged holdouts from November 30 to December 17, 2001; bin Laden escaped into amid disputed decisions over troop commitments. By mid-December, the Taliban had lost all major cities, with surviving fighters dispersing into rural areas or across the border, though estimates suggest 10,000-15,000 combatants were killed or captured during the campaign. The overthrow paved the way for the Bonn Agreement on December 22, 2001, establishing an interim Afghan government, but Taliban elements persisted underground.

Insurgency Period (2001-2021)

Reorganization and Guerrilla Warfare

Following the U.S.-led in October 2001, which toppled the Taliban regime, surviving leaders including Mullah Mohammed Omar relocated primarily to , where they reorganized the group into a resilient insurgent network. The core leadership established the Rahbari Shura, commonly known as the Quetta Shura, in , , comprising veteran commanders and mullahs from the pre-2001 era to coordinate operations across four regional shuras and specialized committees for finance, intelligence, and . This structure emphasized decentralized , allowing local commanders in and tactics while maintaining strategic oversight from Pakistan-based councils, which facilitated rapid adaptation to coalition efforts. Mullah Omar retained his role as supreme leader (amir al-mu'minin) throughout the early insurgency, issuing annual Eid messages to legitimize the jihad against foreign forces and the Afghan government, though he operated in seclusion to evade capture. Upon Omar's death from tuberculosis in April 2013—kept secret for two years to avoid internal fractures—Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour assumed in July 2015, centralizing some command but facing dissent from rivals like Mullah Mohammad Rasul. Mansour's tenure ended with his death in a U.S. drone strike in Pakistan on May 21, 2016, after which the Quetta Shura selected Haibatullah Akhundzada as leader on May 25, 2016, prioritizing religious authority and consensus to unify factions. Akhundzada's delegated military operations to deputies like Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob (Omar's son) and , enabling sustained pressure on Afghan and forces. The Taliban shifted from to guerrilla tactics, avoiding direct confrontations with superior U.S. and firepower in favor of asymmetric methods that exploited 's rugged terrain and limited coalition presence. Key strategies included improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which by 2009 accounted for over 60% of U.S. casualties in , often emplaced along supply routes and patrol paths using pressure-plate triggers for low-tech effectiveness. Ambushes targeted fatigued foot patrols returning to bases, typically involving small-unit hit-and-run assaults with RPGs, machine guns, and mortars before rapid withdrawal to evade air support. Suicide bombings emerged as a hallmark tactic post-2003, with the Taliban conducting over 1,800 such attacks by 2015, often using vehicle-borne IEDs against military convoys, checkpoints, and urban targets to maximize psychological impact and casualties. Assassinations of government officials, tribal elders, and defectors via snipers or bombs further eroded local , while shadow provincial administrations collected taxes and enforced edicts in Taliban-held areas. Safe havens in Pakistan's tribal regions allowed training and resupply, enabling the to regenerate fighters—estimated at 25,000-40,000 by 2010—through recruitment and coercion, outpacing attrition rates. By 2005, these efforts had transformed scattered remnants into a coherent threat, controlling swathes of southern and eastern .

Strategic Alliances and Funding Sources

During the 2001–2021 , the Taliban forged strategic alliances with regional actors and militant networks to sustain operations against and Afghan forces. 's (ISI) provided critical support, including safe havens in and the (FATA), training, and logistical aid, enabling Taliban leaders like to regroup after 2001. officially denied direct involvement, framing its policies as defensive against Indian influence in , though U.S. intelligence assessments and captured documents indicated ISI orchestration of cross-border attacks. The , a semi-autonomous Taliban affiliate led by Jalaluddin Haqqani's successors, coordinated on complex assaults, such as the 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in and assaults on U.S. bases, leveraging strongholds in North for recruitment and funding. This partnership integrated Haqqani fighters into Taliban command structures by the mid-2010s, enhancing operational reach in eastern . Ties with persisted despite U.S. pressure, rooted in a 2001 pledge of allegiance from to , facilitating joint training camps and shared fighters in provinces like Kunar and Helmand. provided ideological reinforcement and suicide bombing expertise, with Taliban protection allowing figures like to operate from Afghan-Pakistani border areas until at least 2016. These links contravened Taliban assurances in the 2020 Agreement to sever terrorist affiliations, as evidenced by ongoing presence documented in UN monitoring reports. The Taliban's funding diversified across illicit economies and , generating hundreds of millions annually to arm an estimated 75,000 fighters by 2021. taxation formed the backbone, with levies of 10–20% on farm-gate prices, processing, and export, yielding $100–400 million yearly from Afghanistan's 90% share of global supply post-2001 cultivation surge. In peak years like , when production hit 8,200 metric tons, Taliban ushr () and transit fees captured up to 60% of revenue amid the post-invasion boom. Extortion via shadow governance added layers: checkpoints on Highway 1 imposed $1,000–2,000 per truck, while mining taxes in Taliban-held areas like Helmand extracted 20% cuts from and lapis smuggling to , estimated at $50–100 million annually by 2010. Informal networks channeled donations from sympathetic donors in Gulf states, including and , supplementing local ushr collections from businesses and farmers, though exact figures remain opaque due to cash-based transfers evading formal tracking. Kidnappings for , targeting foreigners and affluent Afghans, provided episodic influxes, with hauls like the 2008 release of hostages netting millions in untraceable funds. This financial resilience, unburdened by state oversight, sustained procurement of weapons from black markets in and .

Negotiations and Doha Agreement (2018-2021)

In September 2018, the United States appointed Zalmay Khalilzad as Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation to engage directly with the Taliban, bypassing the Afghan government in initial phases to focus on U.S. troop withdrawal conditions. The first confirmed direct talks occurred on October 12, 2018, in Doha, Qatar, where a Taliban delegation met Khalilzad to discuss ending the conflict, followed by three days of sessions in November 2018 emphasizing foreign troop exit timelines. Additional rounds in early 2019 yielded a draft framework agreement in principle by January 28, covering troop reductions, counter-terrorism guarantees, and intra-Afghan dialogue prerequisites, though the Taliban maintained their red line on full foreign withdrawal. Talks faltered in September 2019 when U.S. President abruptly halted negotiations after a Taliban-claimed bombing in killed a U.S. , canceling a planned summit, but indirect contacts resumed by October via Khalilzad in . Momentum rebuilt through late 2019, culminating in the Agreement for Bringing Peace to , signed on , , in by Khalilzad and Taliban co-founder , with U.S. Secretary of State presiding. The four-part accord committed the U.S. and to withdraw all approximately 13,000 American and allied forces by May 1, 2021, contingent on Taliban verification of no terrorist threats emanating from Afghan soil, including prevention of regrouping—a pledge rooted in the Taliban's 2001 hosting of the group but lacking enforcement mechanisms beyond monitoring. It mandated intra-Afghan negotiations to commence on March 10, (delayed to September 12 due to swap disputes), a phased U.S. drawdown starting with 8,600 troops by early summer , and goodwill gestures like exchanging up to 5,000 Taliban for 1,000 Afghan government captives, alongside temporary reductions in violence short of a full . Implementation exposed asymmetries: the Taliban secured U.S. withdrawal timelines without direct preconditions involving the Afghan government, enhancing their battlefield leverage, while intra-Afghan talks in yielded procedural rules by late 2020 but stalled on power-sharing, with the Taliban rejecting proposals amid ongoing attacks. U.S. forces reduced to 2,500 by January under President , who extended the deadline to before accelerating to August amid Taliban territorial gains exceeding 50% of districts by mid-, contravening assurances against offensive escalations. Post-agreement assessments highlighted Taliban non-compliance on ties, as the group sheltered senior figures without severance, prioritizing strategic patience over verifiable de-linkage from global jihadists. The deal's exclusion of Afghan stakeholders and vague verification—reliant on Taliban self-reporting—facilitated their 2021 resurgence, as U.S. withdrawals proceeded unilaterally despite unmet counter-terrorism benchmarks.

Return to Power and Second Emirate (2021-Present)

2021 Offensive and Fall of the Republic

Following the U.S.-Taliban Agreement signed on February 29, 2020, which stipulated a full American troop withdrawal by May 1, 2021, in exchange for Taliban commitments to prevent terrorist attacks and engage in intra-Afghan talks, the Taliban intensified operations despite not fully adhering to terms. President announced on April 14, 2021, an extension of the withdrawal deadline to , 2021, prompting the Taliban to launch their "Al-Khandaq" offensive on May 1, 2021, targeting rural districts amid reduced U.S. air support and logistics for Afghan forces. By mid-May, the Taliban had seized over 50 districts, exploiting Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) vulnerabilities such as poor leadership, widespread corruption, and dependency on foreign enablers. The offensive accelerated in July 2021, with Taliban fighters capturing key border crossings like Islam Qala and , disrupting government supply lines and generating revenue from customs. In early , provincial capitals began falling rapidly: in on August 6, the first such loss, followed by quick surrenders in , , and Taluqan due to ANDSF desertions and negotiated handovers that preserved lives but eroded national resistance. By August 12, the Taliban controlled 12 provincial capitals, including strategic , while ANDSF units, numbering around 300,000 on paper, fragmented amid ethnic fissures, unpaid salaries, and a lack of coherent command from President Ashraf Ghani's administration. and , major population centers, fell on August 13 with minimal fighting, as local governors capitulated to avoid bloodshed, reflecting broader morale collapse attributed to years of graft and perceived abandonment by U.S. allies. On August 15, 2021, Taliban forces entered unopposed after Ghani fled to the , citing threats to his life, leading to the instantaneous dissolution of the . Taliban spokesmen declared the war over, with fighters raising their flag over the by evening, as remaining government officials surrendered and U.S. Embassy staff evacuated to the airport amid chaotic scenes. The rapid fall, spanning less than four months from initial gains, stemmed from systemic ANDSF failures—including no effective defense plan, Taliban psychological operations fostering , and the absence of U.S. post-July 2021—rather than decisive battles, enabling the insurgents to control over two-thirds of the country by early August. This collapse marked the end of the U.S.-backed republic established in 2004, with the Taliban reasserting dominance without a formal of the capital.

Reestablishment of the Islamic Emirate

Following the rapid collapse of the Afghan Republic amid the U.S. military withdrawal, Taliban forces entered on , 2021, after President fled to the , marking the end of the post-2001 government. The insurgents captured the and key institutions with minimal fighting, as Afghan security forces largely disbanded or surrendered, allowing the Taliban to declare victory and begin consolidating control over the capital and surrounding areas. In the immediate aftermath, the Taliban reasserted the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan as the governing entity, reviving the theocratic framework they had operated under from 1996 to 2001, emphasizing strict law enforcement and rejection of secular democratic elements. Spokesmen announced intentions to prevent chaos and looting, deploying fighters to patrol streets, secure airports, and interface with evacuating foreign personnel, while assuring for former government collaborators to facilitate a transition without widespread reprisals. On September 7, 2021, the Taliban formalized the reestablishment by announcing a in , appointing Mohammad as , a figure sanctioned by the UN for ties to and past sheltering of . retained his role as supreme leader, issuing decrees from without assuming a formal cabinet position, centralizing authority under a dominated by Pashtun clerics and excluding women, non-Pashtuns, and technocrats from top roles. Key appointments included hardliners like Interior Minister , head of a U.S.-designated terrorist network, and Foreign Minister , reflecting prioritization of ideological loyalty over administrative expertise. The new administration moved quickly to dismantle republican symbols, reinstating Sharia-based courts, banning music and , and enforcing dress codes, particularly for women, while assuming control of to broadcast Taliban messaging. This reestablishment faced logistical hurdles, including a banking freeze and aid dependency, but achieved initial stabilization by suppressing rival militias like the National Resistance Front in Panjshir by late August. No foreign government formally recognized the Emirate, citing concerns, though engagement ensued for humanitarian and purposes.

Initial Governance Challenges and Stabilization Efforts

Following the Taliban's capture of on August 15, 2021, the group faced an acute administrative vacuum as thousands of officials from the former fled or went into hiding, leaving key ministries understaffed and lacking institutional knowledge for managing a modern state apparatus. The interim government, declared the same day under , prioritized filling positions with loyalists, but this resulted in governance inefficiencies, including disrupted public services and a banking exacerbated by frozen international reserves and sanctions that halted liquidity flows. Economic contraction was severe, with GDP shrinking by an estimated 20-30% in the first 18 months due to aid suspension—previously comprising 75% of public spending—and , pushing over half the population into and acute food insecurity affecting 55% by early 2022. Security stabilization emerged as a relative success, with overall violence levels dropping sharply after the collapse of organized resistance; UN reports indicated a considerable decrease in fighting one year post-takeover, shifting Taliban focus from to countering ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K) attacks, which numbered in the dozens by mid-2022. The group enforced an for former government and security personnel, reducing immediate revenge killings, though extrajudicial detentions persisted, and rural order was restored through localized patrols and via traditional jirgas integrated with courts. This contributed to moderate stability by 2024, with no resurgence of large-scale , though urban unrest and sectarian tensions in areas like Panjshir required ongoing military deployments. Key stabilization measures included a nationwide opium cultivation ban decreed on April 3, , which exempted the harvest but rigorously targeted subsequent planting, leading to a 95% reduction in cultivation area to 10,800 hectares by 2023 and slashing production from 6,200 tons in to 333 tons. involved provincial eradication campaigns and alternative livelihood promises, though implementation strained rural economies dependent on for 10-15% of GDP pre-ban, exacerbating short-term humanitarian pressures without comprehensive substitution programs. Administratively, the Taliban centralized control by dissolving rival factions and appointing technocrats to ministries, while seeking limited aid bypass mechanisms to avert , stabilizing basic service delivery like primary healthcare despite amplified pre-existing shortages from the transition. These efforts halted the economy's freefall by late , with night-time lights data showing localized recovery in non-aid sectors, but sustained growth remained elusive amid isolation and policy rigidity.

Ideology and Objectives

Deobandi Foundations and Pashtunwali Integration

The Taliban movement traces its ideological roots to the Deobandi school of , a Hanafi reformist tradition established in 1866 at the seminary in British to preserve orthodox Islamic practices amid colonial pressures by emphasizing scriptural fidelity, rejection of innovation (), and resistance to non-Muslim influences. This tradition spread to South Asia's networks, particularly in during the 1980s Soviet-Afghan War, where Afghan refugees and fighters received education in Deobandi institutions funded partly by and Pakistani authorities, fostering a generation of clerics opposed to and . Taliban founders, predominantly Pashtun clerics and students (talibs), emerged from these Pakistani Deobandi seminaries, such as Jamia Darul Uloom Haqqania in Nowshera, which produced numerous leaders including Mullah Mohammad Omar, who completed religious studies there before leading the group's formation in in 1994. Deobandi principles shaped the Taliban's core objectives: enforcing a puritanical interpretation of law, abolishing un-Islamic customs, and establishing an emirate under clerical rule, as articulated in Omar's 1996 declaration of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which invoked Deobandi-derived calls for moral revival against warlord corruption and foreign interference. This foundation provided theological legitimacy, drawing on Deobandi fatwas against Soviet occupation and later U.S. presence, while prioritizing taqlid (adherence to classical Hanafi ) over modernist reforms. In practice, the Taliban integrates Deobandi orthodoxy with elements of , the pre-Islamic tribal code of the Pashtun ethnic majority, creating a hybrid model where serves as the nominal superstructure but accommodates cultural norms like nang (honor), badal (revenge), and nanawatai (asylum), often reframed as Islamic imperatives to legitimize enforcement. For instance, public punishments such as amputations and executions, justified via Deobandi-endorsed penalties, align with Pashtunwali's emphasis on swift retribution to restore communal honor, as seen in the Taliban's campaigns against perceived moral deviance, which blended religious edicts with tribal vendettas against rivals. This fusion, while ideologically subordinated to Deobandi scripturalism—evident in prohibitions against Pashtunwali practices like music or shrine veneration deemed idolatrous—has sustained recruitment among Pashtun communities by embedding Islamic rhetoric in ethno-tribal loyalties, contributing to the group's resilience despite external critiques of .

Sharia Interpretation and Prohibitions

The Taliban interpret primarily through the Deobandi tradition of Hanafi Sunni , which emphasizes literal adherence to Quranic injunctions and , integrated with elements of tribal customs such as strict gender segregation and honor codes. This approach rejects modernist or reformist readings prevalent in some Muslim contexts, viewing them as dilutions of , and prioritizes the enforcement of (fixed punishments for offenses like , , and alcohol consumption) as obligatory for establishing an Islamic order. Supreme Leader has defended this system, including corporal punishments like for and for , as essential to Islamic , issuing directives in November 2022 for their full implementation across courts. Enforcement occurs via the Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, which revived its role to police public morality through patrols, arrests, and edicts. In August 2024, the Taliban enacted the "Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice," comprising over 700 articles that mandate absolute obedience to Sharia-derived rules, authorizing any Muslim—particularly enforcers—to compel compliance, including through physical correction if verbal warnings fail. This law explicitly prohibits women from raising their voices above a "natural whisper" in public, exposing their faces or bodies beyond eyes and hands, or traveling without a male guardian, framing such acts as moral corruption warranting intervention. Key prohibitions target women's public life and , with 54 edicts by January 2023 specifically restricting females, including a nationwide ban on girls' secondary and higher education since September 2021, affecting 1.1 million students and leading to the closure of universities to women. Men face mandates to grow beards, attend mosques for prayers, and avoid Western attire, while broader bans proscribe , , and visual media as idolatrous or distracting from —evident in the shuttering of over 200 media outlets and arrests of journalists since 2021. Hudud punishments have been applied publicly, such as the first recorded hadd flogging of 80 lashes in in December 2024 for false accusation, alongside directives for (retaliatory justice) and potential stonings, as reaffirmed by Akhundzada in 2024 despite international condemnation. These measures, justified by the Taliban as restorative and deterrent, contrast with their pre-2021 guerrilla-era flexibility but align with Akhundzada's vision of uncompromised to prevent societal "decay."

Stance on Non-Muslims, Minorities, and Sectarian Groups

The Taliban's ideological framework, rooted in a strict interpretation of Hanafi , views non-Muslims as dhimmis entitled to limited protection under law in exchange for submission, payment of tax, and prohibition on public worship or proselytizing. This stance subordinates non-Muslims to , denying them equal and often requiring visible identification to enforce segregation. During their 1996-2001 rule, the Taliban mandated that and wear yellow badges and pay for protection, while destroying non-Islamic sites like the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001 as idolatrous. and other groups faced severe restrictions, with converts from subject to execution as apostates; by 2001, 's tiny had largely fled or gone underground. Sectarian groups, particularly Shia Muslims including and Ismailis, are regarded by the Taliban as heretics (rafidah) deviating from orthodox Sunni doctrine, justifying discrimination or violence. In 1998, Taliban forces massacred up to 8,000 Hazara civilians in following the city's fall, targeting them for their Shia faith and ethnic identity. Similar atrocities occurred in 2000-2001 in Yakaolang, where Taliban troops executed hundreds of Hazara villagers. Ismailis faced forced conversions and property seizures during the first emirate. Post-2021, despite public assurances of minority protections upon seizing on August 15, 2021—including and rights for all—the Taliban's implementation has prioritized Sunni Pashtun dominance, leading to ongoing . endure targeted ISIS-K bombings at mosques and schools, with Taliban responses inadequate or absent, alongside forced evictions and land grabs in Shia areas like September 2021 in Daikundi and Ghor provinces. By 2023, Hazara populations had declined sharply due to displacement, with UN reports documenting systematic exclusion from governance and public life. Ismailis report arbitrary detentions, such as 15 community members held in in May 2024, and erasure of distinct religious practices under uniform Hanafi enforcement. Sikh and Hindu communities, numbering around 1,000 pre-2021, have shrunk to fewer than 100 by 2023 amid bans on religious holidays, beard mandates for men, and property confiscations; a Taliban minister in 2023 described non-Muslims as "worse than four-legged animals." remain in hiding, with zero public practice tolerated and conversions punishable by death; International Christian Concern reported in July 2023 the Taliban's intent to "completely erase " from . While the Taliban appointed a few Shia figures to symbolic roles for , such as in 2021 provincial administrations, core policies enforce sectarian conformity, with dissent crushed via arrests and floggings. This discrepancy between and action reflects ideological rigidity over pragmatic inclusion, exacerbating minority flight and vulnerability.

Ideological Consistency vs. Pragmatic Adaptations

The Taliban has upheld its foundational Deobandi ideology, emphasizing a puritanical enforcement of Sharia law integrated with Pashtunwali codes, as evidenced by the August 2024 enactment of the "Law on the Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice," which institutionalizes morality police oversight of dress, speech, and interactions to align public behavior with religious precepts. This continuity extends from their 1996–2001 emirate, where similar edicts banned television, music, and non-Islamic imagery, to post-2021 policies prohibiting girls' secondary education nationwide since March 2022 and restricting women from most public roles, reflecting an unwavering commitment to gender segregation and patriarchal authority derived from their interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence. Despite this rigidity, governance imperatives have compelled pragmatic deviations to sustain control and economic viability, such as permitting limited and access—tools ideologically suspect for enabling unfiltered information—primarily to facilitate , taxation, and dissemination rather than a blanket ban seen in their earlier rule. In economic spheres, the group has pursued , including a 2023 agreement with for oil extraction in the Amu Darya basin valued at up to $540 million annually, prioritizing resource revenues over purist isolationism amid sanctions-induced liquidity crises that halved GDP per capita to approximately $300 by 2023. These shifts mirror insurgent-era adaptations, where necessities drove bureaucratic structures for administration, as documented in Taliban commissions that balanced ideological edicts with to secure loyalty and logistics. On security fronts, ideological opposition to groups like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)—deemed heretical for deviating from Deobandi orthodoxy—has justified pragmatic alliances with former adversaries, including intelligence-sharing with and targeted operations that eliminated over 200 ISKP fighters in 2023 alone, stabilizing rule without compromising core sectarian exclusivity. Public rhetoric, such as spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid's 2021 assurances of moderated women's policies to attract aid, has served diplomatic , yet reveals tactical flexibility confined to necessities like allowing female health workers in underserved areas, where male alternatives are unavailable, rather than ideological evolution. Analysts note these adjustments stem from causal pressures of statehood— risks affecting 15 million by 2022 and non-recognition by 190+ states—yet do not signal moderation, as core prohibitions on and modern persist, underscoring adaptations as survival mechanisms subordinate to unchanging doctrinal primacy.

Organizational Structure and Leadership

Current Leadership Hierarchy

The Taliban's leadership is centralized under Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, who has held the position of (Commander of the Faithful) since May 25, 2016, following the death of his predecessor, . Akhundzada, a Deobandi cleric from , exercises absolute authority over religious, political, and military decisions, issuing decrees that enforce strict interpretations, such as bans on female and restrictions, with a notable nationwide shutdown ordered on September 29, 2025. His rule has emphasized consolidation of power, including routine reshuffles of officials to prevent factionalism, as seen in appointments of nine officials on July 17, 2025, and fifteen on October 13, 2025. No designated successor has publicly emerged, raising concerns about potential instability upon his death, given the lack of clear transition mechanisms. Beneath Akhundzada is the Rahbari Shura (Leadership Council), a consultative body of approximately 20-30 senior Taliban figures, primarily Pashtun clerics and military commanders, that advises on policy but lacks veto power over the supreme leader's edicts. The council, historically based in , , during the , now operates from and plays a role in vetting ministerial appointments and resolving internal disputes, though Akhundzada's dominance has reduced its influence since 2021. Membership details are opaque, with key figures including close allies like Maulvi and figures from the , but exact composition fluctuates due to Akhundzada's frequent reassignments. The executive branch is led by Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund, appointed in September 2021 and confirmed without the "acting" prefix by decree on August 15, 2025, as the regime entered its fifth year. Akhund, a founding member and former under the 1996-2001 , oversees day-to-day governance through a cabinet of ministers responsible for ministries such as interior, defense, and . The cabinet, numbering around 30-40 positions including deputies, is appointed by Akhundzada and focuses on administrative control, , and limited diplomacy, with no parliamentary oversight. Key cabinet positions include:
PositionIncumbentNotes
Minister of Foreign AffairsHandles international outreach to nations like , , and ; conducted first post-2021 visit to on October 9, 2025.
Minister of InteriorOversees security forces and counter-ISKP operations; U.S.-designated terrorist with a $10 million bounty.
Minister of DefenseSon of Taliban founder ; manages military structure post-2021.
Provincial governance falls under appointed governors, often military veterans, who report to the central leadership and enforce edicts locally, with recent changes including three new governors in the October 2025 reshuffle. This hierarchy prioritizes loyalty to Akhundzada's vision over technocratic expertise, contributing to governance inefficiencies amid economic isolation.

Military and Administrative Organization

The Taliban's military organization is structured around the Ministry of National Defense, headed by Acting Minister Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, son of the group's founder , which oversees the Islamic Emirate Army comprising regular combat units drawn from former fighters. The army has incorporated captured equipment from the former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, including armored vehicles and small arms valued at billions of dollars, enabling conventional operations alongside guerrilla tactics refined during two decades of conflict. Taliban leadership announced plans in to expand the force to approximately 110,000 personnel, though active strength estimates vary and include integration efforts with former regime troops under strict ideological vetting. Elite elements include the Badri 313 , an approximately 700-strong unit under Taliban command, specialized in , close-quarters battle, and against groups like (ISKP). Led by figures tied to the , Badri 313 maintains security in key areas such as and the , utilizing U.S.-origin gear like M4 rifles, night-vision devices, and Humvees acquired post-2021 withdrawal. The Ministry of Interior, directed by , handles paramilitary policing and rapid-reaction forces, including units evolved from pre-takeover "Red Units" trained for high-intensity assaults, focusing on internal stability and border enforcement. Overall command emphasizes loyalty to Supreme Leader , with operations coordinated through regional corps rather than a fully modernized general staff, reflecting the group's insurgent origins. Administratively, the Taliban maintains a centralized theocratic under Akhundzada's absolute from , issuing binding edicts enforced via the General Directorate of Intelligence and provincial monitors to curb factionalism. A prime minister's cabinet, led by Hasan Akhund since 2021, supervises ministries for finance, propagation of virtue, and other functions, staffed predominantly by Pashtun loyalists with deputy appointments ensuring ideological alignment. At the subnational level, Afghanistan's 34 provinces are led by walis (governors) appointed directly by Akhundzada and publicly announced, often rotating officials from core southern strongholds to prevent entrenched local power. administrators report upward through these governors, supported by (council) mechanisms for , while bodies advise on compliance and monitor implementation, blending clerical oversight with military-derived command chains. This structure prioritizes doctrinal purity over technocratic efficiency, retaining shadow governance practices from the era amid limited bureaucratic capacity.

Internal Factions and Decision-Making

The Taliban maintains a hierarchical structure dominated by , who serves as supreme leader and holds ultimate decision-making authority, often issuing decrees that override ministerial input or broader consultation. This centralization has intensified since the 2021 takeover, with Akhundzada relocating key fiscal controls from to in May 2025, bypassing pragmatic elements in the capital to favor his hardline base. The Rahbari Shura, or leadership council, functions as an advisory body comprising senior figures, but its role remains subordinate to Akhundzada's directives, evolving from the historical Shura's policymaking functions during the . Internal factions primarily divide along ideological lines between hardliners, rooted in Akhundzada's Deobandi purism and loyalists enforcing strict interpretations, and pragmatists, including military leaders like Defense Minister and Interior Minister , who advocate limited adaptations for governance stability and international engagement. Tensions have surfaced over policies such as women's education bans, where Kabul-based officials reportedly urged reversals for economic aid, only to be overruled by Akhundzada's insistence on uncompromised Islamic law, as evidenced in assessments of power dynamics. The , integrated via Haqqani's security portfolio, represents a semi-autonomous faction focused on counter-ISKP operations but aligned with Akhundzada's authority, contributing to factional cohesion against external threats while suppressing dissent. Decision-making processes emphasize religious legitimacy over consensus, with Akhundzada convening ulema gatherings to extract pledges of obedience and framing policies as divine imperatives, as in his February 2025 statement defending governance as rooted in "divine commands" without need for Western laws. While pragmatists push for flexibility—evident in Haqqani's October 2023 calls for unity amid economic woes—hardliners' dominance has stifled reforms, leading to reported internal friction but no overt fractures, as Akhundzada's reclusive style and Kandahar-centric control marginalize opposition. This dynamic sustains regime stability but exacerbates governance challenges, with decisions like Eid 2024 messages urging officials to "set aside differences" highlighting ongoing efforts to enforce unity.

Governance and Policies

Security and Counter-Terrorism Measures

Following the Taliban's takeover on August 15, 2021, internal security has been centralized under the Ministry of Interior, led by , which directs police units, the General Directorate of (GDI), and the former Ministry of Vice and Virtue's enforcement mechanisms to suppress dissent, enforce edicts, and combat rival militants. The GDI, drawing on the Taliban's pre-2021 insurgency-era intelligence networks, conducts surveillance, arrests, and targeted killings, often prioritizing threats from groups like the (ISKP) over allied networks such as . These structures have enabled rapid crackdowns, including amnesties for former officials tempered by selective detentions of perceived opponents, contributing to a reported decrease in overall violence compared to the prior phase. Counter-terrorism efforts have focused predominantly on ISKP, which rejects Taliban authority as insufficiently puritanical and has launched high-profile attacks, such as the 2021 Kabul airport bombing and subsequent mosque assaults. The Taliban has claimed successes in thwarting plots, with U.S. assessments noting multiple raids against ISKP cells in early 2025 alone, leading to arrests and an overall reduction in terrorism-related incidents in 2023. Operations include joint intelligence-driven sweeps in eastern provinces like Nangarhar and Kunar, where ISKP recruitment draws from disaffected and Central Asians, though exact casualty figures remain opaque due to Taliban non-disclosure. In contrast, ties to persist, with the group maintaining training camps and leadership presence under Taliban protection, as evidenced by UN monitoring of shared facilities and personnel exchanges, undermining claims of 's denuclearization as a terrorist haven. Despite these measures, effectiveness is limited by , resource constraints from sanctions, and intra-jihadist dynamics; ISKP attacks continued into 2024, including bombings in and , while Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) exploits border areas with tacit Taliban tolerance. UN reports highlight the Taliban's lobbying for external counter-terrorism aid while sustaining links to designated groups, with al-Qaeda's operational capacity rebuilding through Taliban non-interference, posing ongoing risks to regional stability. Internal factionalism, including dominance in security roles, further complicates unified action, as evidenced by uneven responses to cross-border threats from TTP incursions into . Overall, while ISKP pressure has forced tactical adaptations, the Taliban's approach prioritizes regime survival over comprehensive de-radicalization, allowing allied extremists to regroup.

Economic Management: Resources, Trade, and Sanctions Impact

Afghanistan's under Taliban rule has experienced initial contraction followed by modest recovery, with GDP estimated to have grown by 2.5 percent in , marking the second consecutive year of expansion after a sharp decline post-2021 takeover. However, at current rates, it would take over a decade to regain pre-Taliban levels, amid persistent fragility, high affecting over half the population, and reliance on informal sectors. The Taliban administration has prioritized collection, achieving a 9 percent increase in 2023 through higher imports and non-tax sources, while claiming successes in trade volume growth despite limited formal banking access. Natural resources, particularly minerals estimated at up to $1 trillion in value including , rare earths, , and , represent untapped potential but face extraction challenges due to insecurity, poor , and lack of technical expertise. The Taliban have sought foreign investment, particularly from , which has shown interest in concessions, though progress remains limited with only about $100 million in mining revenue generated in the year ending January 2025. Taliban control over operations has centralized revenues, often through informal taxation, but and conflict risks exacerbate an "Islamic resource curse" dynamic under their governance. , including , historically drove rural economies; the Taliban's 2022 ban reduced cultivation by 85 percent in 2023, shifting to low-value but causing income losses for farmers and potential rebounds in 2024 amid rising prices. Trade has expanded, with total volume rising 30 percent in mid-2025 periods, exports reaching approximately $1.8 billion in 2024 from $850 million in 2021, primarily fruits, nuts, carpets, and minerals to , and . Imports, dominated by , , textiles, and machinery, totaled higher volumes from (top partner at 30 percent share), UAE, , , and , sustaining large deficits without severe currency pressure due to systems and returnee remittances. Regional dynamics facilitate overland routes via and , bypassing some sanctions, though Taliban integration into urban trading networks has displaced prior elites. International sanctions, including the freezing of $7 billion in Afghan central bank assets by the post-2021, have disrupted formal , elevated transaction costs, and isolated the economy from global systems, contributing to initial humanitarian crises like spikes and job losses exceeding 500,000. These measures, aimed at pressuring Taliban policy changes, have inadvertently boosted informal economies and regional dependencies, with limited evidence of altering governance while exacerbating civilian hardships through banking restrictions. Despite this, Taliban fiscal management has averted total collapse, leveraging trade surpluses in select goods and mineral bids for diplomatic leverage, though sustained growth requires sanction relief or recognition unlikely under current conditions.

Social Policies: Education, Healthcare, and Family Law

The Taliban enforce a strict interpretation of in , prohibiting girls from secondary schooling since September 17, 2021, a ban that persists as of 2025 and affects approximately 2.2 million girls who remain excluded from post-primary . Primary for girls continues in segregated settings, but secondary and higher education for females is forbidden, with no timeline for reversal despite international pressure. For boys, has faced disruptions including curriculum Islamization and teacher shortages, yet enrollment persists, supplemented by a surge in —religious seminaries whose numbers have quadrupled under Taliban rule, reaching over 22,000 Islamic centers by mid-2025. attendance has boomed, with reports of over one million new students, often prioritizing rote memorization of the over modern subjects, raising concerns among analysts about fostering due to limited oversight and ideological focus. In healthcare, Taliban policies impose severe barriers on women, including a December 2024 decree banning female enrollment in medical institutes, , and training programs, effectively halting the production of new health workers at a time when male doctors are culturally restricted from treating women. This exacerbates access issues, as women face mobility curbs requiring male guardian approval for clinic visits, compounded by fear of morality police enforcement and the broader exclusion of females from professional roles. The system, already strained by the post-2021 and aid freezes, serves a population where maternal mortality remains high; qualitative studies from 2023-2025 highlight providers' experiences of reduced female patient turnout due to these edicts. production, a former economic staple, plummeted 95% after the Taliban's April 2022 cultivation ban, deepening and indirectly straining resources by eliminating informal funding streams previously tied to the narcotics trade, though official s have seen minimal direct opium-related shifts. Family law under the Taliban adheres to interpretations of , with a September 2022 edict mandating its exclusive use for rulings on and , effectively nullifying thousands of prior court decisions from the pre-2021 . Women seeking face overturned grants, with tens of thousands of cases revoked by 2024, often compelling to former husbands or branding women as adulterers if they had wed anew. persists amid weak enforcement of Sharia's puberty minimum, while female-initiated separations are curtailed, as courts prioritize male testimony and reconciliation over autonomy, closing legal avenues that existed previously. This framework integrates local customs with Islamic , limiting shares for women to half that of men and restricting , per Hanafi precedents.

Women's Roles: Restrictions, Cultural Context, and Debates

Since regaining control of Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban has enacted numerous edicts severely limiting women's public participation, including prohibitions on secondary and higher education for girls beyond age 11 or 12, which have persisted through 2025 and affected approximately 1.1 million girls in secondary school alone. Women are also barred from most employment sectors, with exceptions confined to specific health and primary education roles under male supervision, and extensions of these bans to NGO and UN positions by April 2023. Mobility restrictions require women to be accompanied by a male guardian (mahram) for travel beyond short distances, enforce full-body coverings like the burqa, and in some interpretations limit public speaking or singing by women to prevent perceived moral corruption. By January 2023, at least 54 of the Taliban's 80 documented edicts explicitly targeted women, systematically excluding them from parks, gyms, and most media roles. These policies draw from a stringent Deobandi interpretation of Hanafi Sharia, emphasizing gender segregation (purdah) to avert fitna (social temptation), intertwined with Pashtunwali tribal codes prevalent among the Taliban's Pashtun base, which prioritize family honor (namus) through female seclusion and male guardianship. Pashtunwali's pre-Islamic roots reinforce patriarchal structures, viewing women's visibility as a threat to tribal stability, a custom the Taliban frames as authentically Islamic rather than cultural innovation, despite variations in Sharia application elsewhere in the Muslim world. This fusion has enabled the Taliban to present restrictions as restorative justice against prior governments' alleged Western-influenced laxity, aligning with their broader rejection of urban, post-2001 reforms that increased female workforce participation to around 20% by 2020. Debates center on whether these measures constitute protective Islamic or systematic . Taliban spokesmen defend them as Sharia-mandated safeguards preserving societal and averting chaos from unchecked female autonomy, citing Quranic injunctions on and historical precedents in early Islamic caliphates, while dismissing international outcry as . Critics, including UN agencies and monitors, label the regime's approach "gender apartheid," arguing it inflicts measurable harms like elevated rates among women (up 150% post-2021 per local reports) and economic contraction from halved female labor contributions, with 92% of Afghans surveyed in 2025 favoring girls' as essential for national recovery. Internal Taliban factions reportedly harbor pragmatic dissent, with some leaders advocating limited schooling to bolster administrative capacity, yet supreme authority under enforces uniformity, reflecting ideological rigidity over adaptive . Sources critiquing these policies often stem from Western-aligned institutions prone to framing Islamic traditionalism as inherently abusive, potentially underemphasizing how pre-2021 Afghan gains were unevenly distributed and sustained amid , though empirical data on access declines—such as maternal mortality rising 25% due to mobility barriers—underscore tangible causal impacts beyond ideological disputes.

Military Capabilities

Forces Composition and Tactics

The Islamic Emirate Armed Forces, comprising the Taliban's military apparatus, maintain approximately 172,000 active personnel as of October 2025, with announced intentions to increase this to 200,000 through recruitment and reorganization efforts. The force structure is decentralized and regionally oriented, divided into seven corps covering Afghanistan's provinces—such as the 215 Azam Corps in the southwest and the 205 Al-Badri Corps in the south—alongside the 313 Central Corps tasked with Kabul's defense and rapid response operations. Elite elements include the Badri 313 unit, a special operations force numbering in the low thousands, which conducts high-value targeting, reconnaissance, and counter-insurgency missions, often integrated with Haqqani network commanders for operational flexibility. Equipment inventories derive largely from U.S.-supplied abandoned during the 2021 withdrawal, totaling an estimated $7.2 billion in value, encompassing over 20,000 M16 rifles, thousands of Humvees, and limited armored vehicles like Soviet-era T-55/ tanks repurposed for patrols. However, capabilities remain constrained by the absence of a functional , minimal modern , and reliance on small arms, mortars, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with maintenance challenges exacerbating equipment degradation due to sanctions and lack of technical expertise. Taliban tactics emphasize adapted for , prioritizing internal security through fixed checkpoints, foot and vehicle patrols, and intelligence-driven raids to suppress groups like ISIS-Khorasan, which they have targeted in operations resulting in hundreds of enemy casualties since 2021. In border confrontations, such as those with Pakistani forces in 2024–2025, units deploy asymmetric methods including ambushes, sniper fire, and suicide tactics inherited from their era, supplemented by captured night-vision gear for night operations, while avoiding sustained conventional engagements due to inferior . This hybrid approach leverages terrain familiarity and ideological motivation over technological superiority, enabling control over rugged provinces but exposing vulnerabilities to coordinated insurgent attacks.

Conscription Practices and Child Recruitment

The Taliban maintains a military structure reliant on voluntary enlistment rather than formalized , drawing primarily from Pashtun tribal networks, religious motivations, and economic incentives such as payments to fighters. Recruits often join due to ideological alignment with the group's interpretation of Islamic , to local commanders, or financial needs amid Afghanistan's following the 2021 takeover. Unlike state armies with mandatory drafts, the Taliban lacks a centralized conscription apparatus, but localized occurs, including threats to families or communities in contested areas to supply fighters against rivals like the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). Such practices, while not systematic nationwide, have been reported in rural districts where refusal can lead to detention or reprisals, contributing to asylum claims citing fear of forced . Child recruitment remains a documented issue, with the Taliban integrating boys under 18 into fighting units, often via madrasas that blend religious education with paramilitary training. The United Nations verified 342 cases of child soldier recruitment and use by the Taliban in 2023, including roles in combat and support functions. Methods include enticing impoverished orphans or families with promises of stipends, abductions in conflict zones, and leveraging bacha bazi (boy exploitation) networks where vulnerable youths are redirected into service. Historical patterns pre-2021 involved surges in madrasa-based training for ages 13-17, with verified instances of 196 boys recruited for suicide operations or front-line duties. Post-takeover, recruitment persists despite the Taliban's stated internal prohibition on enlisting minors, with inconsistencies attributed to decentralized command structures allowing rogue units to bypass directives. The Taliban has publicly denied systematic child recruitment, framing documented cases as isolated or fabricated by adversaries, and emphasizing religious edicts against using minors in warfare. Independent verification challenges this, as UN monitoring mechanisms and defector testimonies highlight ongoing vulnerabilities, particularly for post-pubescent boys in Taliban-controlled religious schools. Enforcement gaps stem from the group's reliance on irregular forces, where tribal customs prioritize early martial socialization over age restrictions. International reports, while drawing from accounts and data, face Taliban obstruction in investigations, underscoring credibility issues in opaque environments.

International Relations

Relations with Pakistan and Regional Dynamics

Relations between the Taliban and have deteriorated significantly since the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, shifting from historical patronage to mutual accusations of harboring militants. , which provided covert support to the Taliban during the 1990s through its agency, now faces intensified attacks from the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant group ideologically aligned with but operationally distinct from the Afghan Taliban. The TTP has exploited safe havens in eastern to launch cross-border incursions, with attacks in surging by over 150 incidents in the three months leading up to late 2024. Pakistan has responded with unilateral military actions, including airstrikes on December 24, 2024, targeting TTP strongholds in Afghanistan's and Paktika provinces, which reportedly killed 46 civilians according to Taliban officials, though Pakistani sources claimed 20 militants were eliminated. These strikes marked a shift toward direct intervention, escalating into border clashes in October 2025, where Taliban forces retaliated against alleged Pakistani incursions, killing several Pakistani troops. A temporary was agreed upon on October 19, 2025, mediated indirectly, but underlying tensions persist as the Taliban denies providing sanctuary to TTP fighters while refusing to extradite key leaders. The Taliban's ideological reluctance to suppress the TTP fully stems from shared Deobandi roots and opposition to the i state, despite public pledges to prevent Afghan soil from being used against neighbors. The , the 1893 colonial-era border dividing the two countries, remains a flashpoint, with the Taliban consistently rejecting its legitimacy as an artificial division of Pashtun ethnic territories. Taliban officials, including Deputy Foreign Minister in February 2024, have affirmed that will never recognize the line, fueling Pakistani concerns over territorial and complicating border fencing efforts completed by in 2023. This stance echoes historical Afghan and has contributed to recurring skirmishes, including TTP-orchestrated attacks in 2025 that killed dozens of Pakistani security personnel. Despite security frictions, economic interdependence endures, with bilateral reaching approximately $2 billion annually post-2021, driven by Afghanistan's reliance on Pakistani transit routes for exports to and . A preferential signed on July 23, 2025, reduced tariffs on key goods like fruits and minerals, aiming to boost volumes amid sanctions on . Pakistan briefly suspended transit in October 2025 during clashes but resumed it phasedly following the , underscoring pragmatic necessities over ideological rifts. Regionally, the Taliban-Pakistan rift has reshaped dynamics, enabling greater Indian engagement with , including Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit to in October 2025 for talks on connectivity and security. Central Asian states, wary of Islamist spillover, have deepened economic ties with the Taliban via routes bypassing Pakistan, such as the , while Pakistan's instability amplifies proxy warfare risks across South and . This volatility, evidenced by TTP's 16 attacks in a single 24-hour period in October 2025, threatens broader stability, prompting calls for multilateral pressure on the Taliban to curb cross-border militancy.

Engagement with China, Russia, and Iran

Following the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, the group pursued pragmatic diplomatic and economic ties with , , and to secure trade, investment, and regional stability amid . These engagements prioritized mutual interests in counter-terrorism, resource extraction, and border security over ideological alignment, though progress remained limited by security risks and lack of formal recognition except from . and maintained de facto interactions without diplomatic acknowledgment, reflecting caution toward the Taliban's governance and internal threats like ISIS-Khorasan. China engaged the Taliban cautiously, focusing on economic incentives tied to security guarantees against East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) militants, whom Beijing designates as terrorists threatening Xinjiang stability. In July 2021, Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen pledged a "clean break" from ETIM and all terrorist groups to secure Chinese support. This led to high-level meetings, including Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi's visit to Beijing in 2022, but no formal recognition followed due to persistent doubts over the Taliban's counter-terrorism efficacy and governance. Economically, China revived stalled projects like the Mes Aynak copper mine, the world's second-largest untapped deposit, with ground-breaking on access roads in July 2024 and accelerated work reported in August 2025 after 17 years of delays under prior contracts held by China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC). However, investments remained modest, with a 2024 Taliban-China oil exploration deal collapsing amid contract disputes, underscoring Beijing's risk aversion amid Taliban control over security and local warlords. Trade volumes grew modestly, with China exporting machinery and consumer goods while eyeing Belt and Road extension, but Taliban frustration mounted over slow progress. Russia deepened ties with the Taliban to counter ISIS-K threats and expand influence in , delisting the group from its terrorist registry in June 2024 to facilitate dialogue. became the first state to formally recognize the Taliban on July 3, 2025, raising the Islamic Emirate's at Afghanistan's embassy in and aiming to bolster regional stability amid its own geopolitical shifts. Practical cooperation began earlier with a September 2022 preliminary agreement for Russia to supply gasoline, diesel, liquefied gas, and to alleviate Afghanistan's , marking the first major post-2021 economic deal. By 2025, these imports continued, including shipments to northern provinces as , with Taliban delegations attending events like the in June 2024. viewed the Taliban as a bulwark against extremism spilling into former Soviet states, conducting security consultations and favoring constructive engagement over isolation. Relations with combined robust trade with persistent tensions over water resources from the , governed by a 1973 allocating 850,000 acre-feet annually. surged, reaching approximately $4 billion in 2024, with 's non-oil exports to exceeding $3.143 billion—an 84% increase from 2023—primarily fuels, materials, and foodstuffs, while exported limited goods like minerals. facilitated cross-border via rail and road links, viewing as a key market despite non-recognition. However, disputes escalated as Taliban dams, including Kamal Khan completed in 2021 and new projects announced in August 2025, reduced downstream flows amid droughts, prompting Iranian accusations of deliberate withholding. This culminated in May 2023 border clashes near Islam Qala, killing two Iranian guards and one Taliban fighter, followed by Iranian artillery strikes on Afghan positions. urged compliance with the , but Taliban insistence on over internal waters strained ties, though and shared anti-Western sentiments prevented escalation to open conflict.

Western Interactions: Sanctions, Aid Bypass, and Recognition Debates

Following the Taliban's takeover of on August 15, , Western governments maintained and intensified pre-existing sanctions regimes against the group, primarily through the Security Council's ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee framework established in 1999 for harboring terrorists like . These measures include asset freezes, travel bans, and arms embargoes targeting Taliban leaders and affiliates, with over 250 individuals and entities designated as of 2025; the U.S. Treasury's enforces parallel designations, prohibiting transactions with the Taliban while exempting humanitarian activities. In response to the 2021 resurgence, the U.S. froze approximately $7 billion in Afghan central bank reserves held in New York accounts, splitting them into half for Taliban control (inaccessible) and half for an Afghan Fund managed by the U.S. for relief efforts, a policy upheld despite legal challenges. The aligns with UN lists via its , imposing asset freezes and travel restrictions on Taliban figures, with no easing reported by October 2025 despite economic fallout critiques. To circumvent Taliban diversion, Western aid donors—led by the U.S. and EU—channeled over $7 billion in humanitarian assistance from 2021 to mid-2025 through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations agencies, and cash-for-work programs, emphasizing direct beneficiary delivery via biometric verification and third-party monitoring to minimize regime capture. Mechanisms include U.S. State Department exemptions under General License 20 (issued September 2021 and renewed), allowing financial transactions for essentials like food and medicine without Taliban intermediation, though reports document Taliban taxation on aid convoys—up to 20% in some provinces—and interference in NGO staffing, reducing effectiveness. By early 2025, the U.S. suspended most non-humanitarian aid amid fiscal constraints and efficacy doubts, shifting to private sector and diaspora remittances, which totaled $775 million annually pre-takeover but surged post-2021 as informal bypasses. EU policies similarly prioritize "off-budget" allocations, with €1.3 billion disbursed by 2023 via direct grants to locals, bypassing state channels to avoid legitimizing the regime. No Western nation has granted to the Taliban government as of October 2025, conditioning it on verifiable improvements in , inclusive governance, and counter-terrorism commitments, as reiterated in U.S. Congressional reports and EU resolutions. Debates persist: proponents of pragmatic engagement, including some analysts, argue non-recognition exacerbates isolation, hindering aid coordination and economic stabilization amid a 97% rate, potentially fostering ; critics, emphasizing causal links between Taliban policies—like the August 2024 morality law banning women's public voices—and systemic abuses, counter that recognition would reward intransigence without reforms. U.S. policy under successive administrations maintains engagement via Doha talks for hostage releases and but rejects formal ties, mirroring EU stances that prioritize isolating the regime to pressure compliance, even as Russia's July 2025 recognition highlights diverging non-Western approaches.

Ties to Al-Qaeda and ISIS Opposition

The Taliban provided safe haven to founder and his organization from 1996 until the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, hosting training camps and refusing extradition demands despite UN sanctions. Following their 2021 return to power, the Taliban pledged not to allow Afghan soil to be used for international , yet evidence indicates persistent symbiotic ties with . A 2023 United Nations Security Council report assessed the relationship as "strong," with maintaining leadership presence, training facilities, and operational coordination in Taliban-controlled areas, including joint activities with affiliated groups like the Tehrik-e-Taliban . This continuity was underscored by the July 31, 2022, U.S. drone strike killing leader in central , where he resided in a house rented by a senior Taliban official affiliated with the , a key Taliban faction. U.S. intelligence confirmed Taliban awareness of Zawahiri's presence, contradicting official denials from Taliban spokesmen who claimed no knowledge or complicity. By 2025, assessments indicated had reestablished safe havens under Taliban protection, enabling recruitment, propaganda, and planning, with no dismantlement of core leadership structures despite international pressure. In contrast, the Taliban maintains active hostility toward the (ISIS-K), viewing it as a theological and territorial rival that challenges their authority through attacks on civilians, Shia minorities, and Taliban personnel. , formed in 2015 from defectors including former and Central Asian militants pledging allegiance to central, has conducted high-profile assaults such as the 2021 bombing killing 13 U.S. service members and over 170 , prompting Taliban retaliation. Since 2021, Taliban forces have launched counteroperations, including raids and arrests, suppressing 's estimated 1,500-2,000 fighters by 2023, though the group retains recruitment from disillusioned Taliban ranks and conducts asymmetric attacks like the 2024 concert hall assault claimed by . This opposition stems from ideological differences—ISIS-K's Salafi-jihadist global vision rejects the Taliban's Deobandi Hanafi focus on local governance—and competition for resources, leading to territorial clashes in eastern provinces like Nangarhar and Kunar. U.S. officials have noted potential for pragmatic Taliban-ISIS-K cooperation against shared threats, but mutual enmity persists, with Taliban designating ISIS-K as the primary internal enemy and conducting over 100 operations against them in 2022-2023 alone. Despite these efforts, ISIS-K's resilience highlights limits to Taliban control, as the group exploits governance vacuums and ethnic tensions to sustain low-level .

Criticisms and Defenses

Alleged Atrocities and Human Rights Violations

Since regaining control of in August 2021, the Taliban have been documented carrying out extrajudicial killings, primarily targeting former Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) members and government officials, despite issuing a general . The Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded at least 218 such killings between August 2021 and June 2023, with nearly half occurring in the first year of Taliban rule and many involving prior to execution. These acts often involved house-to-house searches, summary trials, or no trials at all, contravening international standards against arbitrary deprivation of life. Public corporal punishments and executions have resumed under Taliban edicts enforcing their interpretation of law, including floggings for offenses such as , , and "moral crimes." UNAMA documented 18 cases of , all lashings, from August 2021 to November 2022, with public floggings continuing into 2025, such as the whipping of 46 individuals in over one week in early 2023 for similar charges. Amputations for were announced as forthcoming by Taliban officials in September 2021, though specific implementations remain less frequently verified; public executions, including by shooting or , have occurred, with UN experts in April 2025 condemning them as inhumane and urging their halt. These practices, often conducted in stadiums or open areas to instill fear, echo the Taliban's 1996-2001 rule and have been criticized for constituting . Women and girls face systematic restrictions amounting to gender-based , as classified by UN reports, including bans on secondary and higher education since September 2021, affecting over 1 million girls, and prohibitions on most outside the home. These edicts, enforced through morality police patrols, have led to arbitrary arrests, beatings, and forced veiling, exacerbating risks of and early marriage amid economic desperation. While the Taliban issued a December 2021 decree prohibiting forced marriages and requiring consent, reports indicate a rise in child marriages post-takeover, linked to girls' exclusion from and family , with some instances involving Taliban members. UN experts in July 2023 described the cumulative policies as potentially constituting "gender apartheid," involving segregation, erasure from public life, and denial of basic . Targeted abuses against ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Shia , include discriminatory enforcement of restrictions and failure to prevent attacks, though direct Taliban killings are less documented than those by ISIS-Khorasan, which the Taliban oppose. Historical Taliban campaigns against during the involved massacres, and current rule has seen disproportionately affected by edicts limiting Shia religious practices, alongside over 700 Hazara deaths from ISIS-K bombings since , which UNAMA attributes partly to inadequate Taliban protection. Arbitrary detentions and of Hazara communities persist, fueling fears of systemic marginalization in a Pashtun-dominated .

Cultural and Educational Policies: Destruction vs. Preservation

The Taliban regime has historically prioritized the eradication of cultural expressions deemed incompatible with its interpretation of Islamic doctrine, exemplified by the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in March 2001, when two 1,500-year-old statues—measuring 55 meters and 38 meters high—were demolished using anti-aircraft guns, artillery, and dynamite following an edict from leader Mullah Muhammad Omar on February 26, 2001, which labeled all non-Islamic statues as idolatrous. This act targeted pre-Islamic heritage sites across , including the systematic smashing of artifacts in the national museum, reflecting a policy rooted in Deobandi-influenced that viewed such relics as promoting shirk (). Since regaining power in August 2021, the Taliban has extended destructive policies to contemporary cultural practices, enforcing bans on , , and media representations of living beings, with provincial decrees in 2024 prohibiting images of humans or animals in advertisements and news to align with strict interpretations. Public burnings of musical instruments, such as guitars and drums in in 2023, and edicts silencing women's voices in audio media underscore this suppression, driving artists and musicians into exile or underground activity. Post-2021, at least 37 archaeological sites dating back to 1000 BCE have been bulldozed or systematically looted under Taliban oversight, including threats to the Buddhist complex, prioritizing short-term resource extraction over conservation. In education, the regime's policies emphasize destruction of secular and gender-inclusive systems, banning girls from secondary schooling since December 2021—a prohibition affecting over 2.2 million girls as of August 2025—and prohibiting women from universities, framing these restrictions as safeguards against moral corruption. Boys' education has shifted toward "madrasafication," with the number of religious seminaries quadrupling since 2021 to over 4,000, curricula purged of arts, civics, and content in favor of rote Islamic jurisprudence and Taliban ideology, potentially fostering over broad . Contrasting these actions, the Taliban has articulated preservationist rhetoric since 2021, reopening the National Museum in December 2021—where it once destroyed 2,500 pre-Islamic items—and assigning guards to sites like the Bamiyan Valley, with officials in 2025 pledging protection of ancient relics to attract and rehabilitate international image post-Buddhas . This includes nominal safeguards for Islamic-era structures, such as fortified edifices in Bamiyan, and expansion of madrasas to transmit Sunni Hanafi texts, positioning the regime as custodians of "authentic" Afghan-Islamic heritage amid claims of curbing illicit . However, independent assessments highlight inconsistencies, with ongoing site neglect and looting suggesting preservation efforts serve pragmatic or propagandistic ends rather than comprehensive stewardship, lacking transparency or sustained funding.

Global Terror Designations and Export of Ideology

The Taliban has been subject to international terrorist designations primarily due to its history of harboring operatives prior to 2001 and ongoing associations with designated terrorist entities, though designations vary by jurisdiction and have evolved post-2021 takeover to accommodate diplomatic and humanitarian considerations. The designates the Taliban as a (SDGT) entity under since September 2001, imposing asset freezes and travel bans, but has refrained from Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) status to enable negotiations and aid delivery; a for potential FTO classification was initiated in May 2025 amid concerns over persistent terrorism links. The established sanctions against Taliban leaders via Resolution 1267 in October 1999, targeting support for ; these persist through the Consolidated Sanctions List, affecting over 130 Taliban-associated individuals and entities as of 2025, with regular updates based on analytical reports documenting non-compliance with pledges. The maintains restrictive measures against Taliban figures under Common Position 2001/931/CFSP since December 2001, focusing on and arms embargoes, though pragmatic engagement has increased since 2021 without full delisting.
Organization/CountryDesignation TypeKey Details
SDGT (not FTO)Asset freezes since 2001; FTO review ongoing in 2025.
United NationsSanctions List (UNSCR 1267)Targets leaders and entities; active as of 2025.
Restrictive MeasuresTerrorism financing sanctions since 2001; individual listings.
SuspendedDelisted in April 2024 after 2003 designation; formal recognition in July 2025.
Listed EntitiesUnder Anti-Terrorism Act; includes Taliban affiliates.
Russia suspended its 2003 terrorist designation of the Taliban in April 2024, citing the group's role in Afghan governance, and extended formal recognition in July 2025 to counter regional instability, reflecting a shift prioritizing geopolitical interests over prior ideological concerns. Neighbors like and avoid designations, viewing the Taliban as a stabilizing force against shared threats such as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), despite evidence of sanctuary provision. The Taliban's export of ideology manifests through providing safe havens that enable affiliated and inspired groups to propagate strict Deobandi-Salafi interpretations of , including violent against perceived apostate regimes, contravening Doha Agreement commitments to prevent from serving as a terrorism launchpad. Since August 2021, under Taliban control has hosted leadership and training facilities, allowing the group—despite reduced operational capacity—to maintain global recruitment networks and ideological output, with UN monitors reporting over 20 foreign fighter contingents, including AQ affiliates, as of 2023. This sanctuary facilitates ideology transfer, as evidenced by 's continued issuance of fatwas and propaganda from Afghan bases targeting Western and regional targets. Ideological influence extends to groups like the TTP, formed in 2007 as an umbrella of Pakistani militants emulating Taliban governance models, which has intensified attacks since 2021—claiming over 800 incidents in by 2024—while basing operations in with tacit Taliban protection, despite public disavowals. Similarly, Central Asian militants such as the (IMU) have pledged loyalty or cooperated, using Afghan territory to advance transnational ambitions aligned with Taliban-enforced punishments and gender segregation. The Taliban's 2021 victory has further exported morale-boosting narratives to global jihadists, as documented in the 2024 , inspiring asymmetric tactics and recruitment spikes in and by validating persistence against superior forces. While the Taliban prioritizes internal consolidation and opposes ISIS-Khorasan ideologically, these ties underscore a permissive environment for exporting puritanical enforcement over pluralistic governance.

Taliban Perspectives and Contextual Justifications

The Taliban conceive of legitimate governance as an Islamic Emirate where sovereignty derives exclusively from God, with —interpreted through the of jurisprudence—serving as the sole source of law and authority. They reject secular or democratic mechanisms that prioritize popular will, asserting that leadership must be vested in a Hanafi Muslim selected by qualified scholars or "people who loose and bind," ensuring enforcement of divine mandates over human innovations. This framework, drawn from classical Hanafi texts and their 1998 draft , positions their rule as a restoration of Afghanistan's pre-2001 emirate, which they maintain was never lawfully dissolved. Taliban leaders justify their 2021 takeover as the culmination of a defensive against foreign occupation, aimed at achieving national and instituting an authentic Islamic system free from Western-imposed governance. Spokesman has stated that "our and struggle were not for a desire to seize power. They were to achieve the country’s from foreign occupation and create an Islamic system," framing the prior U.S.-backed as illegitimate due to its reliance on external coercion and deviation from . Supreme leader has echoed this by declaring no need for Western laws, emphasizing that Taliban rule has unified the country, ensured security, and liberated citizens from corrupt influences, warning that ingratitude toward this Islamic order invites divine punishment. Regarding social policies, the Taliban defend restrictions on women—such as bans on , in certain sectors, and unaccompanied public travel—as protections aligned with to preserve societal morality, family structures, and Islamic modesty, rejecting characterizations of these as rights violations. Mujahid has affirmed that women retain rights "within the framework of ," permitting participation in and work under regulated conditions to avoid "" or moral , while Akhundzada has ordered enforcement of morality laws to enforce veiling and gender segregation as religious imperatives. They contextualize these measures as countermeasures to the prior regime's promotion of Western liberalism, which they claim eroded Afghan cultural and religious norms, leading to societal decay. In the realm of justice and security, the Taliban portray their declarations and punishments—like for or for —as restorations of Sharia-based equity, superior to the corruption and favoritism of the former system. Akhundzada has defended such penalties as divinely ordained deterrents that foster public order and moral purity, insisting their implementation addresses the pre-2021 era's lawlessness and foreign-aligned injustices. Mujahid extended pardons to former adversaries in 2021, arguing it prevents cycles of conflict and aligns with Islamic mercy, provided former opponents abstain from opposition. Overall, these positions frame Taliban governance as a corrective to decades of interventionist disruption, prioritizing eternal Islamic principles over transient discourses.

Economic Activities

Opium Production and Eradication Efforts

During their initial rule from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban expanded poppy cultivation in controlled areas by issuing licenses, setting minimum prices, and imposing taxes of up to 10-20% on production and , which generated significant revenue estimated at $40-100 million annually by the late . In July 2000, the Taliban leadership decreed a nationwide ban on poppy cultivation, motivated partly by religious edicts and efforts to secure international legitimacy ahead of anticipated . Enforcement involved direct destruction of fields by Taliban forces, resulting in a 94% decline in cultivation area from 82,172 hectares in 2000 to 7,606 hectares in 2001, and a corresponding 92% drop in potential production to approximately 185 metric tons. Following the 2001 U.S.-led invasion and the Taliban's ouster, the group relied on opium-related , protection rackets, and ushr taxes during their , with commanders facilitating cultivation in Taliban-influenced districts and deriving up to 60% of local income from activities in some areas. After regaining control in August 2021, the Taliban issued a comprehensive on April 2, 2022, prohibiting poppy cultivation, processing, and trade, with a two-month for compliance and penalties including property confiscation and forced labor. Initial enforcement through manual eradication and aerial monitoring reduced cultivation by 95% to 10,800 hectares in 2023, yielding just 333 metric tons of —93% below 2022 levels—though stockpiles and price surges to $700 per kilogram incentivized . Subsequent surveys indicate partial resurgence despite ongoing efforts: cultivation rose 19% to 12,800 hectares in 2024 amid laxer in peripheral provinces, followed by a 30% production increase in 2025, though totals remained 93% below pre-ban peaks due to sustained destruction campaigns. These measures have exacerbated , displacing over 40,000 farming households and prompting debates on alternative livelihoods, as opium previously accounted for 20-30% of agricultural income in key provinces like Helmand and . Taliban officials attribute the bans to Islamic prohibitions on intoxicants, rejecting Western critiques of inconsistency by citing religious prioritization over economic concerns.
YearCultivation Area (hectares)Opium Production (metric tons)Source
200082,1723,656UNODC
20017,606185UNODC
2022233,0006,200UNODC
202310,800333UNODC
202412,800N/AUNODC
2025N/A~433 (est., +30% from 2023)UNODC

Mining, Agriculture, and Informal Economy

remains the dominant sector in Afghanistan's under Taliban rule, employing the majority of the workforce in rural areas where over 70 percent of the resides. , as the primary staple , saw production of 4.83 million metric tons harvested in from 2.12 million hectares of cultivated land. Projections for 2025 anticipate a 16 percent increase to 5 million metric tons, supported by favorable precipitation in key growing regions, though recurrent droughts continue to threaten yields. production, including apples, grapes, and pomegranates, has sustained activity, with 466 tons of fresh and dried fruits generating $643 million in during the solar year from to 2025. Taliban policies emphasize agricultural self-sufficiency through diversification away from narcotics, but implementation lacks technical inputs, improvements, and , exacerbating amid the 2022 opium ban's fallout. The sector represents a strategic priority for Taliban generation, leveraging Afghanistan's untapped reserves of , , rare earth elements, and , conservatively valued at over $1 trillion. In the year ending January 2025, activities yielded nearly $100 million in , primarily from taxes on small- and medium-scale operations extracting , , and precious metals. The Taliban has pursued foreign partnerships, notably with via security-for-minerals arrangements at sites like mine, though progress stalls due to inadequate , ongoing illegal controlled by local factions, and investor hesitancy over sanctions. Reported commitments exceeded $7 billion by mid-2024, but actual inflows remain minimal, with the sector contributing marginally to GDP amid extraction inefficiencies and environmental neglect. Afghanistan's informal economy encompasses roughly 80 percent of total activity, driven by hawala networks handling remittances, cross-border trade, and unbanked transactions in the absence of formal financial systems crippled by international sanctions and asset freezes since 2021. Smuggling of consumer goods, fuel, and timber via porous borders with and sustains urban markets and rural incomes, while human smuggling routes exploit post-takeover migration pressures, generating fees for facilitators often linked to Taliban affiliates. The regime extracts informal taxes from these flows, bolstering fiscal resources estimated at 10-15 percent of GDP, though this reliance perpetuates opacity, money laundering vulnerabilities, and economic fragility without broader formalization.

Humanitarian Aid Dependency and Black Market

Since the Taliban's takeover in August 2021, Afghanistan's has remained heavily dependent on international , which has propped up basic services and prevented total collapse despite sharp contractions in formal GDP estimated at 20-30% in the initial years. Donors provided $10.72 billion in from August 2021 through early 2025, including $3.83 billion from the , primarily channeled through UN agencies and NGOs to address acute food insecurity affecting over half the . This has effectively substituted for Taliban in , , and welfare, allowing the to allocate its $2.2-3 billion annual domestic —largely from duties, taxes on , and informal sectors—to and administrative priorities rather than public needs. However, donor fatigue and shifts, including U.S. cancellations in 2025, have reduced inflows, exacerbating fragility in an economy where once comprised up to 40% of pre-takeover GDP and continues to sustain informal remittances and cash-based transfers. The Taliban has systematically diverted portions of this through , , and direct interference, channeling resources to supporters and loyal communities while blocking access for minorities like and . U.S. oversight reports document Taliban officials using threats against aid workers, demanding bribes, and redirecting food and cash distributions to Pashtun-dominated areas, with one instance involving the killing of an NGO employee who exposed food diversion to fighters. Charities have reported Taliban pressure to prioritize regime allies in beneficiary selection, undermining neutrality and effectiveness, as verified by multiple UN and donor audits. This diversion not only bolsters Taliban finances—estimated to skim 10-20% of value through taxation or resale—but also perpetuates dependency by discouraging private investment and formal economic recovery. Parallel to this, a sprawling has flourished under Taliban rule, fueled by sanctions, leakages, and regime controls on the , which accounts for over 60% of economic activity. Taliban enforcement of stricter licensing and taxation on routes, networks, and cross-border trade has generated revenue but also entrenched kleptocratic practices, with officials profiting from diverted resold on markets for commodities like and . International restrictions have driven financial flows underground, with systems handling billions in untraceable remittances and trade evasion, while Taliban bans on narcotics have shifted some illicit profits to unregulated mining and timber . This shadow economy sustains regime stability but entrenches , as dependency discourages structural reforms and enables Taliban abdication of welfare responsibilities.

References

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