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Transition to the New Order
Transition to the New Order
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Transition to the New Order
30 September 1965 – 27 March 1968
Guided Democracy New Order class-skin-invert-image
Major General Suharto (at right, in the foreground) attending the funeral of assassinated generals on 5 October 1965
Leaders
Key events

Indonesia's transition to the New Order in the mid-1960s ousted the country's first president, Sukarno, after 22 years in the position. One of the most tumultuous periods in the country's modern history, it was also the commencement of Suharto's 32-year presidency.

Described as the great dhalang ("puppet master" or "puppeteer"), Sukarno drew power from balancing the opposing and increasingly antagonistic forces of the Army and Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). By 1965, the PKI extensively penetrated all levels of government and gained influence at the expense of the army.[1]

On 30 September 1965, six of the military's most senior officers were tortured and killed (generally labelled an "attempted coup") by the so-called 30 September Movement, a battalion of soldiers from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (Presidential Guard). Within a few hours, Major General Suharto mobilised forces under his command and took control of Jakarta. Anti-communists, initially following the army's lead, went on a violent purge of communists throughout the country, which killed an estimated half a million people and led to the banning and dissolution of the PKI, which was officially blamed for the attempted coup and crisis.[2][3]

The politically weakened Sukarno was forced to transfer key political and military powers to General Suharto, who had become head of the armed forces. In March 1967, the Indonesian parliament (MPRS) named General Suharto acting president. He was formally elected president one year later. Sukarno lived under house arrest until his death in 1970.

Background

[edit]
President Sukarno

The nationalist leader Sukarno had declared Indonesian independence in 1945 and was appointed president. After an internal national revolution and struggle against the former Dutch colonial government, Sukarno had managed to hold together the diverse country; however, his administration had not been able to provide a viable economic system to lift its citizens out of severe poverty. He stressed socialist policies domestically and an avidly anti-imperialist international policy, underpinned by an authoritarian style of rule dependent upon his charismatic personality. Pursuing an independent Indonesian foreign policy, Sukarno developed friendly ties with the Eastern Bloc and the People's Republic of China but courted friendly relations with the United States at the same time in his efforts to maximise Indonesian bargaining power in its foreign policy. Sukarno was also a pioneering figure in developing the Non-Aligned Movement by playing a lead role in hosting the Bandung Conference in 1955. In Indonesia's domestic politics, Sukarno also carefully balanced Indonesia's various political parties, including the PKI.

From the late 1950s, political conflict and economic deterioration worsened. By the mid-1960s, the cash-strapped government had to scrap critical public sector subsidies, estimates put annual inflation at 500–1,000%, export revenues were shrinking, infrastructure crumbling, and factories were operating at minimal capacity with negligible investment. Severe poverty and hunger were widespread, and Sukarno led his country in a military confrontation with Malaysia while stepping up revolutionary and anti-western rhetoric.[4]

Described as the great dhalang ("puppet master"), President Sukarno's position came to depend on balancing the opposing and increasingly hostile forces of the army and the PKI. His anti-imperial ideology saw Indonesia increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union and China. By 1965, at the height of the Cold War, the PKI penetrated all levels of government extensively. With the support of Sukarno and the air force, the party gained increasing influence at the expense of the army, thus ensuring the army's enmity.[5] By late 1965, the army was divided between a left-wing faction allied with the PKI and a right-wing faction that was being courted by the United States.[6]

Military split

[edit]

The same policies, however, won Sukarno few friends and many enemies in the Western world, especially including the United States and the United Kingdom, whose investors were increasingly angered by Sukarno's nationalisation of mineral, agricultural, and energy assets.[citation needed] In need of Indonesian allies in the Cold War against the Soviet Union, the United States cultivated a number of ties with officers of the military through exchanges and arms deals. That fostered a split in the military's ranks, with the United States and others backing a right-wing faction against a left-wing faction overlapping with the PKI.

When Sukarno rejected food aid from United States Agency for International Development, thereby exacerbating famine conditions, the right wing of the military adopted a regional command structure through which it could smuggle staple commodities to win the loyalty of the rural population. In an attempt to curtail the increasing power of the right, the PKI and the left wing of the military formed several peasant and other mass organisations.

Indonesia–Malaysia confrontation

[edit]
1966 ABC report discussing the Indonesian political context of Konfrontasi

In 1963, a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against the newly-formed Federation of Malaysia was announced by the Sukarno regime. This further exacerbated the split between the left-wing and right-wing military factions, with the left-wing faction and the Communist Party taking part in guerrilla raids on the border with Malaysia, while the right-wing faction was mostly absent from the conflict (whether by choice or orders of Sukarno is not clear).

The Confrontation further encouraged the West to seek ways to topple Sukarno, who was viewed as a growing threat to Southeast Asian regional stability (as with North Vietnam under the domino theory). The deepening of the armed conflict came close to all-out warfare by 1965, increased the widespread dissatisfaction with the Sukarno regime, and strengthened the hand of the right-wing generals whose forces were still close to the centre of power in Jakarta.[citation needed]

Collapse of Guided Democracy

[edit]


30 September Movement

[edit]

On the night of 30 September – 1 October 1965, six senior army generals were kidnapped and executed in Jakarta by a battalion of soldiers from the Tjakrabirawa Regiment (Presidential Guard) in an "attempted coup". The right faction among the top generals was wiped out, including the powerful Chief of Staff of the Army, Ahmad Yani, but the Minister of Defence, Abdul Haris Nasution, escaped. Around 2,000 troops from coup groups occupied three sides of Merdeka Square, and commanded the Presidential Palace, radio station, and telecommunications centre, but did not occupy the east side, site of Kostrad headquarters.[7] Calling themselves the "30 September Movement", the group announced on radio around 7 am that they were trying to stop a military coup backed by the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that was planned to remove Sukarno from power.[7]

They claimed to have arrested several generals belonging to a conspiracy, the "Council of Generals", that had plotted a military coup against the government of President Sukarno. They further alleged that this coup was to take place on Armed Forces Day (5 October) with the backing of the CIA and that the council would then install themselves as a military junta.[8][9] Furthermore, the soldiers proclaimed the establishment of a "Revolutionary Council" consisting of various well-known military officers and civilian leaders that would be the highest authority in Indonesia. Additionally, they declared President Sukarno's Dwikora Cabinet as invalid ("demisioner").[10]

According to one chief conspirator, Lt. Col. Latief, the Palace Guards had not attempted to kill or capture Major General Suharto, commander of Kostrad (Komando Strategi dan Cadangan TNI Angkatan Darat – the Army Strategic Reserve Command), because he was considered a Sukarno loyalist.[11] Suharto, along with the surviving General Nasution, made the counter-allegation that the G30S was a rebellious movement that sought to replace President Sukarno's government with a Communist government under the PKI, whose leaders were cabinet ministers without portfolio. Upon hearing of the radio announcement, Suharto and Nasution began consolidating their forces, successfully gaining the loyalty of Jakarta Garrison Commander Maj. Gen. Umar Wirahadikusumah and Colonel Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, the commander of army special forces RPKAD (Resimen Para Komando Angkatan Darat – the Army's Para-Commando Regiment).

During the evening of 1 October, RPKAD soldiers recaptured RRI and Telecommunications Building without any resistance as the rebel soldiers had retreated to Halim Air Force Base. RPKAD forces proceeded to attack Halim Perdanakusumah AF Base on the morning of 2 October but was stopped by the rebel soldiers in a fierce gunbattle in which several fatalities were inflicted on both sides. A direct order from President Sukarno managed to secure the surrender of the rebel soldiers by noon, after which Suhartoist forces occupied the base. On 4 October, the generals' bodies were discovered at Halim, and on 5 October (Armed Forces Day) a large public funeral was held.[12]

Internal military power-struggle

[edit]

The killing of the generals saw influence in the Army fall to those more willing to stand up to Sukarno and the Army's enemies on the left.[13] After the assassinations of those generals, the highest-ranking officer in the Indonesian military, and third-highest in the overall chain-of-command, was the Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief-of-Staff Gen. Abdul Haris Nasution, a member of the right-wing camp. On 2 October, Suharto accepted Sukarno's order for him to take control of the army, but on the condition that Suharto personally have authority to restore order and security. The 1 November formation of Kopkamtib (Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, or Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), formalised this authority and Suharto was appointed its first commanding general.[12] However, on 5 October Sukarno moved to appoint Maj. Gen. Pranoto Reksosamudro, considered a Sukarno loyalist, to the office of Chief of Staff of the Army to fill the vacancy caused by Yani's death.

After the promotion, The New York Times reported that an unnamed Western "diplomatic report" alleged that Pranoto was a former member of the PKI. Pranoto's alleged communism, as well as his timely promotion, led them to promote the view that the PKI and Sukarno conspired to assassinate the generals to consolidate their grip on power.[14]

In the aftermath of the assassinations, however, Suharto and his KOSTRAD (Army Strategic Reserve Command) units were closest to Jakarta. By default, Suharto became the field general in charge of the prosecution of the G30S. Later, at the insistence of Gen. Nasution, Pranoto was relieved of his post, and Suharto was in his stead appointed the new Chief-of-Staff of the Army effective on 14 October 1965.[15]

Anti-communist purge

[edit]

In early October, a military propaganda campaign began to sweep the country, successfully convincing both Indonesian and international audiences that it was a Communist coup and that the murders were cowardly atrocities against Indonesian heroes.[16] 30 September Movement was called Gestapu (from Gerakan September Tigapuluh, "30 September Movement"). The Army, acting on orders by Suharto and supervised by Minister of Defense Nasution, began a campaign of agitation and incitement to violence among Indonesian civilians aimed at the Communist community and toward President Sukarno himself. PKI's denials of involvement had little effect.[17] The regime was quickly destabilised, with the Army the only force left to maintain order.[18]

At the funeral of Nasution's daughter Irma, Chief of Staff of the Navy Admiral Eddy Martadinata gave Muslim leaders the signal to attack Communists and their allies, who then responded with calls for Holy War against the PKI and its member and affiliate organisations in Indonesia, a general obligation upon the Muslim community. On 8 October, the PKI head office was ransacked and burned to the ground while firefighters stood by idly.[19] They then marched demanding the dissolution of the Communist Party. The homes of senior party figures, including PKI chairman D. N. Aidit, M. H. Lukman and Nyoto were also torched. The army led an armed forces campaign to purge Indonesian society, government, the armed forces and law enforcement of the influence and power of the communist party and other leftist organisations allied to it (but not the Murba Party that was against the PKI and had been banned by the government because of its opposition to it). Leading PKI members were immediately arrested, some summarily executed.[16]

On 18 October, a declaration was read over armed forces-controlled radio stations, banning the PKI and organizations affiated to the party. The ban included the party itself, and its youth and women's wings, peasant associations, intellectual and student groups, and the SOBSI trade union. At the time, it was not clear whether this ban applied only to Jakarta (by then controlled by the Army), or the whole Republic of Indonesia. However, the ban was soon used as a pretext for the Indonesian Army to go throughout the country carrying out extrajudicial punishments, including mass arrest and summary executions, against Sukarno loyalists and suspected leftists linked to the PKI and its allied organizations. As the violence spread, Sukarno issued orders to try to stop it, but he was ignored. He also refused to blame the PKI for the coup, let alone ban it as the Army demanded. However, although Suharto and Nasution were increasingly suspicious about Sukarno's role in the affair, the Army was reluctant to confront the president directly because of his still widespread popularity.[19]

Beginning in later October 1965, and feeding off pent-up communal hatreds, the Indonesian Army and its civilian allies (especially Muslim vigilante groups) began to kill actual and suspected[12] members and associates of the PKI and members of party affiliated organizations. The US government covertly supported the massacres, providing extensive lists of suspected communists to be targeted.[20][21][22] The killings started in the capital Jakarta, spread to Central and East Java, and later Bali. Although killings occurred across Indonesia, the worst were in the provinces of Central Java, East Java, Bali, and North Sumatra - all PKI-loyal provinces.[23] The massacres reached their peak over the remainder of the year before subsiding in the early months of 1966.[24] The estimates of the death toll of the violence range from over 100,000 to three million, but most scholars accept a figure of around 500,000.[25] Many others were also imprisoned, and for the next ten years, people were still being imprisoned as suspects. It is thought that as many as 1.5m were imprisoned at one stage or another.[26] As a result of the purge, one of Sukarno's three pillars of support, the PKI, had been effectively eliminated by the other two, the armed forces and political Islam, helped in Bali by proponents of the Balinese caste system who saw the PKI and its allies as a threat to their way of life.

Demonstrations

[edit]
Three People's Demands
Tri Tuntutan Rakyat
Part of the Transition to the New Order
KAMI, KAPPI mass demonstration, 1966
DateJanuary–March 1966
Location
Jakarta, Indonesia
Caused by
Goals
MethodsPolitical demonstration
Parties
Lead figures

No centralized leadership

In October 1965, students in Jakarta formed KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, Indonesian Students Action Front), which called for the banning of the PKI.[27] It was soon joined by a host of similar organisations made up of high school students, workers, artists and labourers and the like. Other targets for the demonstrators were rising prices and government inefficiency.[19] They also demonstrated against Subandrio, the foreign minister and head of the BPI intelligence agency and the number two man in the government.[9]

On 10 January 1966, demonstrators, including KAMI, demonstrated in front of the Provisional legislature and announced what became known as the Three Demands of the People (Tritura):

  • Dissolution of the PKI
  • The expulsion from the cabinet of G30S/PKI elements
  • Lower prices and economic improvements[27]

In February 1966, as anti-communist demonstrations continued, Sukarno tried to placate Suharto by promoting him. On 21 February, he tried to regain the initiative by announcing a new cabinet - the Revised Dwikora Cabinet, which included former Air Force chief AVM Omar Dani, who had issued a statement on 1 October 1965 initially supporting the coup. More provocatively still, Sukarno fired General Nasution as Minister of Defense and was replaced by MG Sarbini, while Suharto remained as Chief of Staff of the Army and a member of the cabinet. The new cabinet immediately became known as the Gestapu cabinet, after the acronym coined by the military for the 30 September Movement.[19]

Two days after the announcement, a huge crowd attempted to storm the presidential palace. The next day, while the new cabinet was being inaugurated, soldiers from the presidential guard opened fire on a crowd in front of the palace, killing student protester Arif Rachman Hakim, who was turned into a martyr and given a hero's funeral the following day.[19][27]

On 8 March 1966, students managed to ransack the foreign ministry building and held it for five hours. They daubed slogans, one accusing Subandrio of murdering the generals and drew graffiti showing him as a Pekingese dog (a reference to his perceived closeness to communist China) or hanging from gallows.[19]

Sukarno then planned a three-day series of meetings to restore his authority. The first, on 10 March, involved the leaders of political parties. He managed to persuade them to sign a declaration warning against the undermining of presidential authority by student demonstrations. The second stage was a cabinet meeting planned for 11 March. However, as this meeting was underway, word reached Sukarno that unidentified troops were surrounding the palace. Sukarno left the palace in haste for Bogor, where later that night, he signed the Supersemar document transferring authority to restore order to Major General Suharto. Suharto acted quickly. On 12 March, he ordered a nationwide ban on the PKI and its member and affiliate organizations, as well as all party activities. The same day, there was a "show of force" by the Army in the streets of Jakarta, which was watched by cheering crowds.[19] On 18 March, Subandrio and 14 other ministers were arrested, including the third deputy prime minister Chairul Saleh. That night, the radio announced that the ministers were in "protective custody".[19]

Suharto later admitted in his autobiography that he frequently liaised with the student protesters throughout this period and that Sukarno often pleaded with him to stop the demonstrations.

Political manoeuvring

[edit]
General Suharto is sworn in as Indonesia's second president on 27 March 1968 (Photo by the Department of Information, Indonesia)

On 27 March, the new cabinet line-up, agreed between Suharto and Sukarno, was announced. The Second Revised Dwikora Cabinet included the key figures of Suharto himself as interim deputy prime minister for defense and security and thus Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces concurrently, tasked with preventing the resurgence of communism, the Sultan of Yogyakarta Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX as deputy prime minister for economic, financial and development affairs, tasked with solving the nation's economic problems and Adam Malik as deputy prime minister for social and political affairs, whose job it would be to manage foreign policy.[19][28]

On 24 April 1966, Suharto gave a speech to members of the Indonesian National Party in which he spoke of the "three deviations" that would have to be corrected by the youth of the country in co-operation with the Armed Forces. These were:

  • The extreme-left radicalism of the PKI and its efforts to impose a class struggle on the Indonesian people;
  • Political opportunism motivated by personal gain led and exploited by the "puppet masters" of the Indonesian Central Intelligence Board (BPI), at the time led by Sukarno ally Subandrio;
  • Economic adventurism, resulting in the deliberate creation of economic chaos.[29]

The new cabinet, in defiance of Sukarno's wishes, began moves to end the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation and began to pull Indonesia away from China in retaliation for its backing of the Communists and konfrontasi.[19]

Meanwhile, Suharto and his allies continued to purge state institutions of Sukarno loyalists. The now disbanded Tjakrabirawa Regiment was replaced by an Army military police regiment, and following further student demonstrations in front of the legislature building on 2 May, the leadership of the Mutual Cooperation People's Representative Council (DPR-GR) led by Speaker I Gusti Gde Subamia was replaced and Sukarnoist and pro-communist members were stripped of their MP titles from the DPR-GR and the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS), the supreme lawmaking body and expelled. Pro-Suharto MPs for both bodies were appointed led by MPRS ad-interim speaker Wiluyo Puspoyudo.[8][19]

A session of the MPRS was scheduled to open 12 May, but eventually began on 20 June and continued until 5 July. One of its first actions was to appoint General Abdul Haris Nasution as speaker with Achmad Sjaichu serving as speaker of the DPR-GR. It then set about dismantling the apparatus Sukarno had built around himself. It passed several decrees, one of which was the ratification of the Supersemar, thus making revocation of it almost impossible. It also ratified the banning of the PKI and the teaching of Marxist ideology, instructed Suharto to form a new cabinet, called on Sukarno to explain the economic and political situation in the nation and stripped him of the title "president for life". It also passed a decree stating that if the president were unable to carry out his duties, the holder of the Supersemar would assume the presidency.[19][27] Suharto did not seek Sukarno's outright removal at this MPRS session due to the remaining support for the president amongst elements of the armed forces (particularly the Marines, the navy, and some regional army divisions).[citation needed]

The new cabinet, announced by Sukarno on 20 June, the Ampera Cabinet, was led by a five-person presidium headed by Suharto as de facto prime minister, and including Malik and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX as deputies. Suharto remained minister of defense and chief of the Army.

On 11 August, against the wishes of Sukarno, a peace treaty was signed, formally ending Konfrontasi. Indonesia announced it would rejoin the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations. It released political prisoners and paid compensation to the British and American governments for the damage caused to their diplomatic buildings during the demonstrations of the Sukarno era.

On 17 August, in his annual independence day speech, Sukarno claimed that Indonesia was not about to recognise Malaysia nor rejoin the UN. He also stated that he had not transferred power to Suharto. This provoked an angry reaction in the form of demonstrations, and Indonesia did indeed rejoin the UN in September, participating in the General Assembly on 28 September.[27] Meanwhile, criticism from demonstrators became increasingly vociferous and personal, and there were calls for him to be put on trial in front of the Special Military Court (Mahmilub).

On 22 June 1966, Sukarno delivered a speech known as Nawaksara (Nine Points) in front of the MPRS, where he seemed to give an account of his appointment as president for life, his plan of work as president, and how the Constitution worked in practice. Nothing about the G30S was mentioned. The MPRS would refuse to ratify this speech and ordered Sukarno to give additional account on the G30S. On 10 January 1967, Sukarno wrote to the MPRS, enclosing a document of the addendum of Nawaksara (Pelengkap Nawaksara) giving his version of the events surrounding the 30 September Movement. In it, he said the kidnappings and murders of the generals had been a "complete surprise" to him, and that he alone was not responsible for the nation's moral and economic problems. He also described the role of the PKI and the alleged roles of the neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist and other unwanted elements surrounding the G30S crisis. This led to demonstrators calling for Sukarno to be hanged.[19]

April 1967 ABC report of the political tensions at end of the Sukarno era

The MPRS leadership met on 21 January and concluded that Sukarno had failed to fulfil his constitutional obligations. In a resolution passed on 9 February, the DPR-GR rejected the Nawaksara and asked the MPRS to convene a special session.[27]

On 12 March 1967, the special session began. After heated debates, it agreed to strip Sukarno of his power. On 12 March, Suharto was appointed acting president. Sukarno went into de facto house arrest in Bogor. A year later, on 27 March 1968, another session of the MPRS appointed Suharto the second president of Indonesia.[27]

General Nasution was believed to have launched his own bid for power on 16 December 1965, when he won appointment to the Supreme Operations Command and gained a grip over the traditionally civilian-held portion of the military hierarchy. It was reported that Nasution would have preferred forming a military junta to replace Sukarno (The New York Times, 16 December 1965).[30]

Consequences

[edit]

Anti-Chinese laws

[edit]

While resentment toward Chinese Indonesians by indigenous Indonesians-descended peoples of the archipelago dated back to the Dutch East Indies era, the New Order instigated anti-Chinese legislation following the quashing of the Communists. Stereotypes of the Chinese as disproportionately affluent and greedy were common throughout the time (both in Indonesia as well as Malaysia), but with the anti-communist hysteria, the association of the Chinese Indonesians with the People's Republic of China caused them also to be viewed as a communist fifth column.[31][32]

Indonesia's hitherto friendly diplomatic relations with mainland China were severed, and the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta burnt down by a mob. New legislation included the banning of Chinese language signs on shops and other buildings, and the closure of Chinese language schools, adoption of "Indonesian" sounding names, and limits on Buddhist temple construction.[33]

New political system

[edit]

The liquidation and banning of the Communist Party (and related organisations) eliminated one of the largest political parties in Indonesia. It was also among the largest Communist Parties in the Comintern, at an estimated three million members. Along with the subsequent efforts by Suharto to wrest power from Sukarno by purging loyalists from the parliament, the civilian government in Indonesia was effectively put to an end by the coup countermeasures.

Strident anti-communism remained a hallmark of the 31-year regime.[34]

The new regime that emerged from the upheavals of the 1960s was dedicated to maintaining political order, promoting economic development, and excluding mass participation from the political process. The military was given a substantial role in politics, political and social organisations throughout the country were bureaucratised and corporatized, and selective but effective and sometimes brutal repression was used against opponents of the regime.[34]

Some seats in the parliament were set-aside for the military as part of the dwifungsi (dual function) doctrine. Under the system, the military took on roles as administrators at all levels of government. The political parties not banned outright were consolidated into a single party, the Party of the Functional Groups (Indonesian: Partai Golongan Karya), more commonly known as Golkar. Though Suharto would allow for the formation of two non-Golkar parties, these were kept weak during his regime.

Rise of Islamism

[edit]

The purging of two secularist parties, the Nationalists and the Communists, had a notable side effect of giving more space for the development of Islamism in Indonesia. This included liberal, conservative, and extremist groups practising Islam in Indonesia.

Improved ties with the West

[edit]

The change in regime brought a shift in policy that allowed USAID and other relief agencies to operate within the country.[citation needed] Suharto would open Indonesia's economy by divesting state-owned companies, and Western countries, in particular, were encouraged to invest and take control of many of the mining and construction interests in Indonesia. The result was stabilisation of the economy and the alleviation of absolute poverty and famine conditions that had resulted from shortfalls in the rice supply and Sukarno's refusal to take Western aid.

As a result of his elimination of the communists, Suharto would come to be seen as a pro-Western and anti-Communist. Ongoing military and diplomatic relationships between Indonesia and the Western powers were cemented, leading to US, British, and Australian arms sales and training of military personnel.[citation needed]

United States assistance to Suharto

[edit]
General Suharto

Some experts assert that the United States directly facilitated and encouraged the mass murder of hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists in Indonesia during the mid-1960s.[35][36] Bradley Simpson, Director of the Indonesia/East Timor Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, says "Washington did everything in its power to encourage and facilitate the army-led massacre of alleged PKI members, and U.S. officials worried only that the killing of the party's unarmed supporters might not go far enough, permitting Sukarno to return to power and frustrate the [Johnson] Administration's emerging plans for a post-Sukarno Indonesia."[37] According to Simpson, the terror in Indonesia was an "essential building block of the quasi neo-liberal policies the West would attempt to impose on Indonesia in the years to come".[38] Historian John Roosa, commenting on documents released from the US embassy in Jakarta in 2017, says they confirm that "the US was part and parcel of the operation, strategising with the Indonesian army and encouraging them to go after the PKI."[39] Geoffrey B. Robinson, a historian at UCLA, argues that without the support of the U.S. and other powerful Western states, the Indonesian Army's program of mass killings would not have happened.[40]: 22–23, 177  Vincent Bevins writes in his book The Jakarta Method that "The United States was part and parcel of the operation at every stage, starting well before the killing started, until the last body dropped and the last political prisoner emerged from jail, decades later, tortured, scarred, and bewildered."[41] Ruth J. Blakeley, Professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Sheffield, says the case of Indonesia demonstrates the extent to which the United States put the interests of Western capitalist elites over the human rights of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians by supporting the Indonesian Army as it waged "an extensive campaign of state terrorism."[42]

As early as 1958, the U.S. and its allies backed anti-communist elements within the Indonesian Army with secret assurances, financial and military support, and this support solidified once the mass killing campaigns were underway, demonstrating the "resolve" of the army.[40]: 83, 179  During the height of the violence, U.S. embassy official Robert J. Martens provided lists containing roughly 5,000 names of high ranking PKI members to the Indonesian Army, which, according to Robinson, "almost certainly aided in the death or detention of many innocent people". He notes that providing these kill lists "sent a powerful message that the US government agreed with and supported the army's campaign against the PKI, even as that campaign took its terrible toll in human lives."[40]: 202–203 

References

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The Transition to the New Order refers to the tumultuous political shift in from 1965 to March 1967, during which President Sukarno's regime was dismantled and replaced by the military-led New Order under General , emphasizing , centralized authority, and economic pragmatism. This period commenced with the (G30S), an abortive coup by mid-level military officers and elements associated with the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), who assassinated six high-ranking generals in , prompting a swift counteraction by forces under Suharto's command. The army's response escalated into widespread anti-communist pogroms across the , with estimates of fatalities ranging from 500,000 to over one million, primarily targeting PKI members, affiliates, and suspected sympathizers, facilitated by military coordination and civilian militias amid economic chaos and Sukarno's failing confrontational policies. gradually consolidated power through the controversial decree in March 1966, which delegated extraordinary authorities to him, leading to the suppression of leftist elements, the dissolution of the PKI, and Sukarno's effective sidelining by 1967. The New Order's inception marked a pivot from Sukarno's ideological volatility to developmental authoritarianism, prioritizing foreign investment, agricultural modernization, and political stability, though at the cost of and the entrenchment of influence in , setting the stage for three decades of Suharto's rule until 1998. Controversies persist over the G30S's origins—debated as a PKI-orchestrated plot or internal intrigue—and the scale and orchestration of the ensuing , with declassified documents revealing U.S. logistical support for the anti-communist campaign amid imperatives.

Antecedents

Sukarno's and Economic Decline

In July 1959, President unilaterally decreed a return to the 1945 Constitution, effectively suspending the established under the 1950 Constitution and dissolving the elected . This shift marked the formal inception of , a system emphasizing Sukarno's personal leadership over multiparty deliberation, which stripped legislative bodies of statutory authority and promoted an anti-party ethos. By centralizing executive power, the regime prioritized ideological guidance from , sidelining institutional checks and enabling unchecked decision-making that bred administrative inefficiency and opportunities for among loyalists. Guided Democracy's economic policies exacerbated Indonesia's vulnerabilities through aggressive nationalizations and foreign policy adventurism. Starting in , the government seized Dutch enterprises, followed by British and American assets in the early , disrupting foreign investment and expertise essential for sectors like oil and plantations. The 1963-1966 Konfrontasi campaign against the formation of involved economic boycotts and military incursions, severing trade ties that accounted for approximately 30% of Indonesia's exports in 1962, primarily reexport commodities, while diverting resources to low-yield guerrilla operations. These measures, coupled with excessive money printing to finance deficits and state-led projects, fueled , reaching an annual rate of around 650% by 1965, alongside acute rice shortages and a contraction in real GDP per capita. Sukarno's Nasakom doctrine, articulated in 1960 as a fusion of (nasionalisme), (agama), and (komunisme), aimed to unify political forces but increasingly tilted toward empowering the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). This alliance allowed the PKI to expand its influence within the regime, advocating for policies that weakened military and religious opposition while promoting tactics that eroded legal norms and institutional stability. By prioritizing leftist agitation over economic stabilization, Nasakom contributed to policy paralysis, as competing factions vied for Sukarno's favor amid mounting fiscal chaos, setting the stage for broader societal discontent.

Expansion of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) underwent significant expansion during Sukarno's period from 1959 to 1965, with membership surging from about 1.5 million in 1959 to a claimed 3.5 million by mid-1965, establishing it as the world's largest non-ruling communist party. Affiliated mass organizations, including the Indonesian Peasants Front (BTI), women's group, and SOBSI labor federation, amplified its reach to an estimated 15–25 million adherents, enabling widespread mobilization in rural and urban areas. This growth capitalized on Sukarno's policy of balancing leftist and conservative forces, positioning the PKI as a key ally against perceived right-wing threats while fostering its influence in and regional governments. Under D.N. Aidit's leadership since 1951, the PKI adopted strategies to infiltrate state institutions, including efforts to cultivate sympathizers within the military and to neutralize anti-communist elements. Aidit emphasized a "progressive" interpretation of the state, advocating alliances with Sukarno's while building covert networks to advance revolutionary goals, such as forming people's militias. These tactics, combined with the party's vocal support for Sukarno's Konfrontasi against (1963–1966), masked preparations for greater power seizure amid economic turmoil and . The PKI's initiatives underscored its disruptive potential, as it promoted "unilateral actions" (aksi sepihak) starting in 1963–1964, where BTI-led peasants seized estates from absentee landlords without legal process. In , a PKI stronghold, these campaigns escalated into , including , property destruction, and of landlords and local Muslim leaders opposed to redistribution, framed by party rhetoric as necessary class struggle against feudal remnants. Such actions provoked fierce resistance from groups like , exacerbating rural instability and highlighting the PKI's threat to traditional social structures under Sukarno's permissive oversight, which included shielding the party from military demands for dissolution despite evidence of arms stockpiling and training.

Military Divisions and External Conflicts

Within the , internal divisions deepened in the early 1960s amid the Indonesian Communist Party's (PKI) expanding influence, which sought to establish a of paramilitary auxiliaries parallel to the regular military, heightening suspicions rooted in the 1948 —a communist-led uprising in that the army crushed, resulting in the execution of key PKI figures like and the deaths of thousands. These tensions manifested in factional rifts, including between Defense Minister Abdul Haris Nasution's command, which oversaw elite units like the RPKAD paratroopers (distinguished by red berets), and the mainstream army leadership under Chief of Staff , who viewed PKI encroachments as existential threats but operated amid Sukarno's balancing act favoring leftist alliances. The army's doctrinal emphasis on dwifungsi (dual function in defense and socio-political roles) amplified these strains, as PKI agitation for grassroots militias echoed Madiun-era fears of subversion, fostering paranoia about communist infiltration without unified countermeasures. Concurrent external commitments exacerbated these vulnerabilities through the Konfrontasi policy, initiated by in 1963 to oppose the formation of , which evolved into the Dwikora campaign—a sustained but ineffective guerrilla effort against Malaysian and forces in . Indonesia mobilized approximately 108,000 troops and volunteers for operations, yet achieved minimal territorial gains due to chronic logistical shortcomings, such as inadequate supply lines and failed amphibious assaults like the Pontianak landing on August 17, 1964 (resulting in naval casualties and captures) and the Labis landing on September 1–2, 1964 (where most paratroopers were apprehended). Inter-service rivalries, including between and elements, compounded by frequent command reshuffles (five in quick succession), fragmented coordination under the Komando Operasi Tertinggi (KOTI) structure, diverting elite units like from domestic vigilance and exposing supply chain frailties that strained overall readiness. This resource drain—encompassing around 17,000 troops actively engaged in Borneo border incursions by mid-1964—left the army ill-positioned to counter internal subversion, as covert U.S. intelligence support for anti-PKI monitoring (including awareness of a purported PKI 1965 action plan uncovered late 1964) yielded limited operational impact amid the focus on external adventurism. The campaign's inefficacy, marked by disrupted planning and half-hearted deployments, underscored causal weaknesses in unified doctrine and logistics, ultimately contributing to Konfrontasi's cessation via a 1966 peace agreement brokered after Suharto's ascendance, which redirected military priorities inward.

The Crisis of September 1965

The 30 September Movement: Events and Actors

On the night of 30–1 October 1965, a group identifying itself as the (Gerakan Tigapuluh September, or G30S), comprising junior army officers primarily from the Cakrabirawa Presidential Guard Regiment, initiated kidnappings of senior Indonesian Army generals in Jakarta. Led by Lieutenant Colonel , the deputy commander of the Cakrabirawa's first infantry battalion, the operation targeted anti-communist military leaders perceived as threats to President Sukarno's regime. The assailants, numbering around 2,000–3,000 troops including elements from the and Brawijaya divisions, departed from the around midnight, proceeding in approximately 200 vehicles to the residences of their targets. The kidnappers seized six generals—Army Chief of Staff , Deputy Commander M.T. Haryono, First Deputy D.I. Pandjaitan, Third Deputy S. Parman, Fourth Deputy Suprapto, and Fifth Deputy Sutoyo—along with Yani's , , who was abducted in place of Defense Minister after Nasution escaped. The victims were transported to the Halim Perdanakusuma Air Force base southeast of , where they were executed by gunfire and bayoneting; their mutilated bodies were then dumped into an abandoned well at , a nearby military training site. Untung's group also briefly held Sukarno's family at and attempted to capture Nasution's daughter, who was killed in the . By early morning on 1 October, G30S forces occupied key installations in , including the studios, the central post and telegraph office, and parts of Square near the . At approximately 1:00 a.m., Untung broadcast the movement's over state radio, declaring that the action safeguarded from an imminent coup plotted by a "Council of Generals" allegedly sponsored by the U.S. (CIA) and aimed at establishing a pro-Western . The announcement named a 15-member revolutionary council, including Untung as chief of staff, and listed deputy commanders such as Colonel Abdul Latief of the Division. was conveyed to Halim by loyal guards, where he reportedly endorsed the movement's stated protective intent. Civilian participants included members of PKI-affiliated organizations, such as the youth wing Pemuda Rakyat, who provided logistical support like trucks and personnel at Halim, though their role was auxiliary to the actors. , chairman of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), arrived at Halim around midnight and subsequently directed PKI broadcasts endorsing the movement as a defense against right-wing subversion, with the party's issuing statements of solidarity later that day. The operation faltered by midday as uncoordinated actions failed to secure broader allegiance, limiting effective control to isolated Jakarta sites.

Attribution to Communist Conspiracy

The 30 September Movement, also known as Gestapu, has been attributed to orchestration by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) based on evidence from military trials, confessions of key plotters, and contemporaneous intelligence assessments. The PKI's clandestine Special Bureau, led by Sjam Kamaruzaman (a PKI operative reporting directly to party chairman ), coordinated infiltration of sympathetic army officers and distributed arms smuggled from to PKI-affiliated youth and women's organizations, such as Pemuda Rakyat and , in preparation for revolutionary action. This bureau's activities, including training sessions for "progressive" officers, aligned with PKI's push for a "" of armed civilians to parallel the military, as advocated in PKI resolutions from early 1965. Lieutenant Colonel , the movement's proclaimed leader and commander of the presidential guard regiment Cakrabirawa, maintained operational ties to the PKI Special Bureau, with records from post-event interrogations indicating his collaboration in plotting the kidnappings and executions of anti-communist generals. Aidit himself held meetings with plotters in the weeks preceding 30 September, including directives issued around mid-August 1965 to co-opt military elements for a preemptive strike against perceived right-wing threats within the army. These interactions, corroborated by Sjam's testimony during his 1966 trial, positioned the PKI as the ideological and logistical architect, aiming to decapitate army leadership and install a "Revolutionary Council" dominated by leftists. The movement's operational shortcomings—such as failure to secure key installations beyond and the rapid recapture of sites by loyalist forces under —did not negate PKI complicity, as evidenced by the party's initial reluctance to denounce the action. PKI leaders Aidit and Njoto relocated to Halim Air Force Base on the night of 30 September, where plotters convened, rather than issuing public repudiation; only after the army's counteroffensive did the PKI attempt to frame the events as an internal military affair. This delay, spanning days amid escalating revelations of PKI involvement, contrasted with the party's swift propaganda machinery, suggesting tacit endorsement consistent with Aidit's prior advocacy for armed struggle against "reactionary" elements. Alternative narratives positing an "army provocation" or internal military factionalism as the primary driver lack empirical support from declassified intelligence and trial records. No documentation substantiates a genuine plot by the targeted generals (e.g., Nasution or Yani) to overthrow , with the invoked "Council of Generals" appearing as a fabricated invoked in Untung's radio announcement to justify preemptive action. U.S. assessments, drawing from intercepted communications and asset reports, consistently identified PKI initiative, with plotter confessions emphasizing revolutionary intent to consolidate leftist power rather than defensive response to an . These accounts, cross-verified against timelines of arms caches and meeting logs, align with causal sequences wherein PKI expansion under —reaching three million members by 1965—fueled ambitions for dominance, unmarred by verifiable evidence of fabricated provocation.

Military Response and Purge

Suharto's Assumption of Command

Major General Suharto, serving as commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad), was awakened around 5:30 a.m. on 1 October 1965 by reports of the kidnappings of senior generals by elements of the 30 September Movement led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung. Unlike targeted officers such as Army Chief of Staff Ahmad Yani and Defense Minister Abdul Haris Nasution, Suharto was not among the victims, allowing him to mobilize Kostrad troops stationed near Jakarta to counter the insurgents. By midday, directed forces to secure Merdeka Square and the , key sites initially occupied by movement sympathizers, regaining control of without significant bloodshed in the capital by 8:00 p.m. that evening. Army units under his operational authority began broadcasting announcements framing the events as a communist-inspired plot by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), emphasizing the defense of constitutional order against subversion. Local commanders, leveraging pre-existing authority under the Komando Operasi Tertinggi (Koti), declared in several regions starting 1 October to facilitate rapid suppression of unrest. Suharto's forces neutralized remaining Untung loyalists by 2 October, capturing key figures and dismantling movement-held positions in Jakarta, averting escalation into widespread civil conflict. With Nasution wounded and in hiding, operational loyalty within the army shifted toward Suharto's decisive leadership, enabling centralized command without factional infighting among senior officers. This pragmatic military response prioritized restoring institutional stability over immediate political maneuvering, positioning the army to address the perceived PKI threat systematically.

Anti-Communist Purge: Operations and Justifications

The , assuming operational control under Major General after the , initiated a nationwide purge against the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in early October 1965, with peak violence extending through March 1966 in regions including Central and , , and . Military units drew on pre-existing intelligence lists to identify and eliminate PKI members, regional cadres, and affiliated organization leaders from groups like the Barisan Tani Indonesia (peasants' front) and (women's movement), aiming to decapitate the party's command structure and prevent coordinated resistance. Operations were executed decentrally through provincial army commands, which coordinated arrests, interrogations, and summary executions, often at the regimental level, supplemented by ad hoc detention sites where suspects were held briefly before killing. Civilian participation was actively mobilized by the army to amplify reach and speed, particularly in rural areas where PKI influence was entrenched; in , for instance, Ansor—the youth wing of —formed armed squads under military guidance to hunt and dispatch targets, leveraging local knowledge to target lower-level sympathizers. This hybrid approach, combining professional army detachments with militia auxiliaries, achieved swift structural collapse of the PKI, with an estimated 500,000 fatalities derived from U.S. embassy tallies of regional body counts and survivor registries in high-incidence areas like (where 80,000 perished) and . The was rationalized by army leadership as a preemptive eradication of a subversive network poised for total takeover, evidenced by the PKI's orchestration of the generals' assassinations and its prior pattern of unilateral violence, such as the 1964 land reform "actions" that seized properties and incited clashes killing hundreds of landlords and religious figures. With PKI ranks exceeding 3 million—the largest non-governing globally—and mass fronts arming supporters amid Sukarno's pro-Beijing tilt, the military invoked parallels to Vietnam's , warning of foreign-armed peasant revolts that demanded rooting out influences "down to the very roots" to avert national disintegration. Such precedents as PKI-backed mobilizations during the Ganyang confrontations, which fueled domestic and anti-army rhetoric, underscored the causal imperative for decisive action to neutralize the party's demonstrated capacity for state subversion.

Role of Civilian Mobilization

Following the army's attribution of the to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on 8 October 1965, student groups rapidly mobilized in opposition, forming the to organize demonstrations in and other major cities. These protests, beginning in early to mid-October 1965, demanded the dissolution of the PKI, the resignation of , and an end to communist influence in government, reflecting widespread revulsion against the perceived atheistic threat posed by the PKI to Indonesia's religious and nationalist foundations. Islamic organizations, particularly (NU), played a pivotal role in civilian mobilization, especially in rural , where NU-affiliated youth wings and militias actively participated in anti-PKI purges starting in late October 1965. NU leaders framed the PKI as an existential threat to Islamic values and traditional rural society, intensified by sensationalized reports of mutilations of kidnapped generals by PKI-affiliated members, which galvanized religious communities to view the communists as morally corrupt and anti-religious. This mobilization was rooted in long-standing tensions over and ideological clashes, with NU perceiving the PKI's atheism as incompatible with Indonesia's pancasila principles incorporating belief in God. The scale of civilian involvement was vast, with KAMI-orchestrated urban demonstrations drawing tens of thousands in alone by November 1965, while NU-led actions in Central and encompassed millions in affected communities amid economic turmoil including exceeding 500% annually under Sukarno's regime. Protesters linked the G30S coup attempt and PKI influence to the prevailing chaos of food shortages, currency , and breakdown, shifting public blame toward the Sukarno-PKI and pressuring the to accelerate anti-communist measures and political transition. This pressure, loosely aligned with encouragement, amplified the momentum against the old order without direct orchestration of the protests themselves.

Transfer of Power

The Supersemar Decree

On 11 March 1966, amid escalating political instability following the , President issued the (Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret, or Order of 11 March), a decree granting Lieutenant General , the army commander, broad emergency powers to restore order and security. The decree was signed under significant pressure after 's confrontation with army elements failed, reflecting his inability to effectively address the crisis. Its text instructed to take all necessary steps to safeguard the state from and ensure governmental functions, without specifying limits on military actions. Suharto promptly leveraged the to issue follow-up directives expanding its scope, including the formal dissolution of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) on 12 March 1966 and authorization for widespread arrests of suspected subversives without immediate trials. These measures targeted organizations linked to the PKI, enabling the suppression of perceived communist threats under the decree's security restoration mandate. The thus served as the operational framework for stabilizing the state through decisive anti-subversion actions. The decree maintained a veneer of constitutional continuity by operating within the 1945 Constitution's provisions for emergency presidential authority, later ratified by the Mutual Consultation of People's Representative Council (MPRS) as a legitimate basis for power transfer rather than an extralegal coup. This ratification underscored its role in facilitating an orderly transition amid Sukarno's governance paralysis, prioritizing security imperatives over immediate parliamentary processes.

Erosion of Sukarno's Authority

![KAMI and KAPPI mass demonstration][float-right] Following the issuance of the Supersemar decree on 11 March 1966, which granted Major General Suharto broad powers to restore order, Sukarno's influence began to wane amid mounting opposition from military elites and civilian groups. Student-led protests organized under the Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI) and Kesatuan Aksi Pelajar Indonesia (KAPPI) culminated in the Tri Tuntutan Rakyat (Tritura) on 10 January 1966, demanding the dissolution of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), a purge of the Dwikora Cabinet, and reductions in prices for essential goods. These demands reflected widespread public frustration with economic hyperinflation exceeding 600% annually and perceived government complicity in the 30 September Movement, further eroding Sukarno's base among moderates and the middle class. Sukarno's reluctance to fully endorse the PKI's dissolution alienated key allies, as he continued to advocate for leftist elements despite the post-purge shift toward anti-communist consensus. By mid-1966, elite defections accelerated; on 25 July 1966, a cabinet reshuffle under 's influence isolated by appointing anti-communist figures like Foreign Minister and sidelining pro-Sukarno loyalists, effectively transferring executive control to the military. This restructuring, justified as necessary for stabilizing the economy and politics, marked a pivotal shift, with assuming de facto leadership while retained nominal presidency. Public opinion increasingly rejected Sukarno's Nasakom ideology—blending , , and —following the violence of 1965-1966 and subsequent stabilization efforts, evidenced by declining support in urban centers where demonstrations persisted into late 1966. Tritura evolved to include explicit calls for Sukarno's resignation, amplifying pressure from military-backed civilian mobilization. By March 1967, Sukarno faced , and on 12 March 1967, the Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara (MPRS) formally stripped him of presidential powers, appointing as acting president amid a consensus that Sukarno's alliances had precipitated national crisis. This culmination reflected empirical shifts, including improved security and early economic recovery under Suharto, which bolstered acceptance of the power transfer.

Suharto's Consolidation

In March 1967, the (MPRS) formally stripped of his presidential title and appointed as acting president, retroactive to February 22, 1966, when had initially transferred powers via the decree. This move marked 's institutional entrenchment, shifting authority from 's personalist rule to a military-led framework emphasizing professional governance. On March 27, 1968, the MPRS elected to a full five-year term as president, solidifying his without reliance on charismatic appeals. Central to Suharto's consolidation was the doctrine of dwi fungsi (dual function) for the Indonesian Armed Forces (ABRI), which institutionalized the military's role in both security and socio-political oversight. Originating from army conceptualizations in the early but formalized under the New Order, dwi fungsi positioned ABRI as guardians of national stability, with officers appointed to cabinet positions, legislative seats, and regional administrations to integrate military expertise into civilian governance. This approach prioritized institutional military professionalism over Suharto's personal authority, fostering unity among army factions by embedding ABRI's territorial command structure into state functions while avoiding overt . Suharto suppressed pro-Sukarno remnants through targeted measures, including purges of sympathetic elements in , the , and student organizations, but refrained from wholesale elimination of non-communist opponents to preserve elite cohesion. By late , this selective approach had neutralized Sukarnoist influence without fracturing broader alliances, as evidenced by the MPRS's composition of loyalists and technocrats. Empirical indicators of success included rapid economic stabilization: annual , which exceeded 600% in 1966 amid fiscal chaos, declined to approximately 112% in through stringent monetary controls and budget discipline under Suharto's direction. This turnaround, achieved by mid-, underscored the efficacy of decisive, institutionally backed in restoring order.

Controversies and Interpretations

Debates on Coup Motives and PKI Involvement

The official Indonesian narrative, propagated by the New Order regime under Suharto, attributes the 30 September Movement (G30S) primarily to a premeditated coup attempt orchestrated by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to exploit President Sukarno's declining health and seize control from the military establishment. This view posits that PKI Chairman D.N. Aidit, fearing a power vacuum upon Sukarno's potential incapacitation in August 1965, directed mid-level officers like Lieutenant Colonel Untung Syamsuri to kidnap and murder six senior generals, framing it as a preemptive strike against an alleged "Council of Generals" plotting a right-wing takeover. Supporting evidence includes declassified documents revealing Aidit's instructions to PKI-affiliated military units, such as the Special Bureau, to coordinate with Untung's Cakrabirawa Guard Regiment, as well as Untung's radio broadcast on 1 October 1965 announcing the movement's aims, which aligned with PKI rhetoric on purging "reactionary" elements. Confessions extracted from PKI leaders, including Aidit before his execution in November 1965, further corroborated planning meetings where the PKI sought to install a "revolutionary council" dominated by leftist forces, consistent with the party's doctrine of armed struggle outlined in its 1959 program. Alternative interpretations, often advanced by Western left-leaning academics and Indonesian exiles in the 1970s–1980s, portray the G30S as an internal army provocation or a fabricated for anti-communist purges, with some alleging CIA orchestration to destabilize Sukarno's neutralist government. Proponents like and Ruth McVey in their 1971 Cornell Paper argued the movement stemmed from factional rivalries within the military, possibly incited by anti-PKI officers to justify eliminating the PKI, which had grown to over 3 million members by 1965 and posed the largest non-ruling globally. Claims of a CIA "plot" cite U.S. embassy contacts with anti-Sukarno generals pre-coup, but these lack documentary proof of direct instigation and ignore the Kennedy-Johnson administration's initial surprise at the events, as U.S. intelligence cables from 1–2 October 1965 described the killings as a chaotic officer revolt rather than a scripted operation. Such theories are undermined by the absence of verifiable evidence for the movement's stated rationale—a pre-coup generals' conspiracy—which records and independent audits found no trace of, alongside the PKI's opportunistic post-coup maneuvers to seize abandoned police stations and arm militias, indicating foreknowledge rather than victimhood. These critiques, frequently rooted in sympathy for Sukarno's and anti-imperialist stance, overlook the PKI's doctrinal commitment to , which empirically drove its infiltration of the military's "" youth auxiliaries. A more evidence-based synthesis recognizes elements of military adventurism among disaffected mid-rank officers frustrated by elite corruption and Sukarno's favoritism toward PKI allies, but traces the causal impetus to PKI encouragement and logistical support, given the party's strategic imperative to neutralize opposition amid Sukarno's illness. Declassified U.S. assessments affirm PKI planning in "every detail," including unit selections and framing, while the movement's failure to consolidate power—evident in its limited geographic scope to and failure to rally broader leftist forces—highlights tactical overreach but not detachment from communist motives. This hybrid view aligns with causal realism: the PKI's revolutionary ideology, evidenced by Aidit's covert directives and the party's prior advocacy for "people's tribunals" against generals, provided the subversive intent, whereas elements supplied operational muscle without independent mastery. Left-biased academic sources, often insulated from Indonesian primary archives, tend to inflate provocation theories to rehabilitate the PKI, yet empirical data from captured documents and perpetrator testimonies prioritize PKI agency over speculative external machinations.

Assessments of Purge Violence and Death Toll

Estimates of the death toll from the 1965–1966 anti-communist purge vary significantly, with official Indonesian military figures reporting around 78,000 executions, while scholarly assessments range from 300,000 to over 1 million fatalities, including deaths from direct killings, starvation, and disease in detention. The higher figures reflect the decentralized nature of the violence, often involving local militias encouraged by the army, rather than a centrally orchestrated genocide. Regional disparities were pronounced, with the highest concentrations in areas of strong PKI influence such as Central and East Java and Bali, where PKI membership exceeded 20% of the population in some districts, fueling intense local confrontations. Critics, including many Western academics, highlight the extrajudicial nature of the killings, widespread , and long-term societal trauma, portraying the events as disproportionate retribution exceeding legal norms. However, these assessments often overlook the immediate context of self-defense following the September 30 Movement's assassination of senior generals, which the army attributed to PKI orchestration, amid the party's organizations and prior violent actions like unilateral seizures that displaced and killed rural elites. PKI strength, with over 3 million members and affiliated unions by 1965, posed an existential threat to the state, substantiated by its infiltration of and confrontations with religious and groups, rendering a restrained response improbable in the ensuing chaos. The purge's violence, while brutal, is defended by Indonesian analysts and survivors as a necessary bulwark against communist takeover, averting a potential "" in akin to or Cambodia's fates. It dismantled the PKI apparatus, enabling Suharto's New Order to deliver over three decades of political stability and economic growth averaging 7% annually from 1967 to 1997, transforming from hyperinflationary turmoil under to regional power status. Many non-communist Indonesians, including those in affected communities, retrospectively credit the action with securing national survival, prioritizing long-term order over retrospective moralizing from distant observers. Exaggerated narratives in biased academic , influenced by left-leaning institutional priors, inflate tolls without accounting for combat-like conditions or PKI-initiated violence, undermining causal analysis of the events as reactive containment rather than unprovoked excess.

Alleged Foreign Influences

Declassified U.S. State Department and CIA documents indicate that American officials provided Indonesian military authorities with lists of approximately 5,000 alleged (PKI) members and sympathizers starting in late October 1965, following the army's suppression of the G30S coup attempt, to aid in identifying targets for arrest and elimination. These lists were compiled by U.S. embassy staff and CIA officers based on prior gathering, with embassy cables reporting satisfaction that the materials facilitated the purge's efficiency, though U.S. involvement remained logistical and post-facto rather than directive. Similarly, British shared comparable PKI rosters via covert channels, including radio broadcasts inciting anti-communist violence, as revealed in declassified Foreign Office files, but such actions aligned with reactive containment rather than premeditated orchestration of the transition. Prior to the 1965 events, the extended substantial economic and to under , totaling over $1 billion in loans and credits from 1956 to 1965—more than to any non-Egyptian developing nation—while training thousands of PKI cadres in and providing ideological support that fueled perceptions of PKI subservience to foreign powers. , leveraging post-Sino-Soviet split alignments, supplied arms, propaganda materials, and hosted PKI delegations for guerrilla training in the early , exacerbating domestic suspicions amid Sukarno's Nasakom policy integrating communists, which leaders viewed as externally manipulated . However, archival evidence from Soviet and Chinese records shows no direct or operational direction for the G30S coup itself, with aid focused on broader ideological expansion rather than tactical coups. Claims of Western orchestration, including CIA-engineered provocations like the marginal PAMREX propaganda broadcasts simulating PKI dissent, lack substantiation in declassified timelines, which place U.S. escalation after Suharto's initial countermeasures on October 1, 1965, and emphasize internal -PKI frictions rooted in Sukarno-era power struggles and the coup's self-proclaimed PKI affiliations. Testimonies from key actors, such as generals, and coup participant accounts attribute primary causation to domestic ideological clashes and autonomy, with foreign roles confined to opportunistic amplification amid evident PKI overreach, as corroborated by contemporaneous U.S. intelligence assessments dismissing pre-coup plotting. Conspiratorial narratives overstating external agency overlook the organic momentum of civilian militias and regional commanders, independent of verified foreign inputs.

Foundations of the New Order

Political Restructuring

The political restructuring under 's New Order regime began with decisive measures to neutralize perceived threats to national unity following the upheaval. On March 12, 1966, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was formally banned, along with its affiliates and Marxist-Leninist ideologies, as part of efforts to purge leftist elements from , , and society. This action, enacted via decree under 's authority from the , eliminated the largest , which had amassed over three million members by , thereby reducing ideological factionalism that had exacerbated Sukarno-era instability. Central to the New Order's framework was the promotion of "Pancasila democracy," which emphasized the five principles of the Pancasila—belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy through consensus, and —as the ideological foundation for governance, supplanting the confrontational of the pre-1965 period. (Golongan Karya), structured as a non-partisan "" representing professional and societal sectors rather than ideological factions, was elevated to dominate electoral politics, achieving victories exceeding 60% in general elections from 1971 to 1997 through mobilization of state apparatus and civil servants. Opposition parties were reorganized in 1973 into two limited entities: the (PPP) for Islamic groups and the (PDI) for nationalists and Christians, curtailing their autonomy and preventing challenges to the regime's monopoly on power. Reforms to the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly (MPRS) and its successor, the (MPR), further centralized authority by appointing regime loyalists and sidelining hereditary or party-based representation, while institutionalizing the military's dwifungsi (dual function) . This policy granted the Armed Forces of the Republic of (ABRI) reserved seats in the People's Representative Council (DPR)—typically around 20% of total membership—allowing direct influence over legislation and executive oversight, justified as safeguarding national development from political volatility. These changes empirically diminished the hyper-factionalism and regional secessions of Sukarno's , fostering policy continuity that sustained governance without major interruptions for over three decades, though it systematically suppressed through and electoral engineering. Compared to Sukarno's tenure, marked by konfrontasi policies, exceeding 600% annually by 1965, and pervasive administrative graft that stifled investment, the New Order's initial phase demonstrated reduced overt via streamlined and anti-graft rhetoric, enabling measurable stability despite later . This shift prioritized causal efficacy in over populist mobilization, yielding uninterrupted national planning but at the expense of pluralistic competition.

Economic Stabilization Measures

Following the transition to Suharto's leadership in 1966, faced exceeding 1,000 percent annually, a collapsed , and budget deficits driven by Sukarno-era policies of heavy subsidization and military confrontation expenditures. In October 1966, the government initiated a stabilization program emphasizing , including sharp budget cuts to eliminate deficits and reduce growth, alongside unification and multiple rupiah devaluations to restore . A team of technocratic economists, led by Widjojo Nitisastro, advised on these orthodox measures, prioritizing market-oriented reforms over Sukarno's interventionism to curb , which fell to around 3 percent by 1969 through disciplined and subsidy rationalization. These policies facilitated a rebound in economic activity, with the enactment of Law No. 1 of 1967 on Foreign Capital Investment providing guarantees for repatriation of profits and tax incentives to attract direct investment, reversing from the prior regime. The termination of Konfrontasi in 1966 similarly alleviated resource drains from border militarization, enabling reallocation toward productive sectors and contributing to GDP growth averaging approximately 7 percent annually from through the , fueled initially by resource exports like oil and timber amid restored . Agricultural reforms complemented stabilization by promoting high-yield varieties and under five-year plans, achieving national rice self-sufficiency in 1984 and thereby reducing dependence that had exacerbated inflation. This progress correlated with absolute declining from roughly 60 percent of the population in the mid-1960s to about 17 percent by the early , as expanded output lowered rural costs and supported rural incomes. While these outcomes stemmed causally from stabilized enabling investment in productivity-enhancing , critics noted rising income inequality, with Gini coefficients increasing from 0.31 in 1976 to 0.36 by 1996, as urban-industrial gains outpaced rural benefits despite overall poverty alleviation.

Foreign Policy Realignment and Western Aid

Following the transfer of authority to General in 1966, Indonesia rapidly abandoned Sukarno's policy of Konfrontasi, the low-level war against the formation of , which had strained relations with neighbors since 1963. A peace agreement was signed on August 11, 1966, in , formally ending hostilities and paving the way for normalized diplomatic ties with and, subsequently, . This reversal addressed the economic drain of the conflict, which had diverted resources amid domestic exceeding 1,000% in 1966, and aligned with Suharto's emphasis on stability over ideological adventurism. The New Order regime also moderated Sukarno's assertive stance within the , shifting toward pragmatic engagement with Western powers while maintaining formal non-alignment. Indonesia rejoined the on September 28, 1966, after a withdrawal under , signaling openness to international cooperation. Suharto's prioritized anti-communist , fostering ties with the and its allies as a bulwark against Soviet or Chinese influence, evidenced by the regime's suppression of domestic leftist elements. This tilt, though criticized in some leftist analyses as subservience, empirically supported economic recovery by attracting foreign investment and expertise absent under Sukarno's confrontational . Western aid, particularly from the , surged post-1966 to stabilize the collapsing and , with the U.S.-led Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia coordinating over $325 million in assistance by 1968 to meet IMF-estimated needs and avert through PL 480 food shipments. This support, including economic stabilization loans and equipment transfers, was framed as a pragmatic counter to communist resurgence risks, given the 1965-1966 upheavals, and facilitated Indonesia's accession to the in February 1967 and rejoining the World Bank that year. Critics, often from academic circles with left-leaning biases, alleged dependency creation, yet subsequent GDP growth averaging 7% annually from 1967-1997 demonstrated self-sustained development through export-led policies rather than perpetual reliance. Such aid's causal role in containing instability is supported by the regime's avoidance of the famines and insurgencies plaguing comparable post-colonial states without similar interventions.

References

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