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History of Iran
History of Iran
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The History of Iran (also known as Persia) is intertwined with Greater Iran, which is a region encompassing all of the areas that have witnessed significant settlement or influence by the Iranian peoples and the Iranian languages – chiefly the Persians and the Persian language. Central to this region is the Iranian plateau, now largely covered by modern Iran. The most pronounced impact of Iranian history can be seen stretching from Anatolia in the west to the Indus Valley in the east, including the Levant, Mesopotamia, the Caucasus, and parts of Central Asia. It also overlaps or mingles with the histories of many other major civilizations, such as India, China, Greece, Rome, and Egypt.

Iran is home to one of the world's oldest continuous major civilizations, with historical and urban settlements dating back to the 5th millennium BC.[1] The Iranian plateau's western regions integrated into the rest of the ancient Near East with the Elamites (in Ilam and Khuzestan), the Kassites (in Kuhdesht), the Gutians (in Luristan), and later with other peoples like the Urartians (in Oshnavieh and Sardasht) near Lake Urmia[2][3][4][5] and the Mannaeans (in Piranshahr, Saqqez and Bukan) in Kurdistan.[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14] German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel called the Persians the "first Historical People" in his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History.[15] The sustained Iranian empire is understood to have begun with the rise of the Medes during the Iron Age, when Iran was unified as a nation under the Median kingdom in the 7th century BC.[16] By 550 BC, the Medes were sidelined by the conquests of Cyrus the Great, who brought the Persians to power with the establishment of the Achaemenid Empire. Cyrus' ensuing campaigns enabled the Persian realm's expansion across most of West Asia and much of Central Asia, and his successors would eventually conquer parts of Southeast Europe and North Africa to preside over the largest empire the world had yet seen. In the 4th century BC, the Achaemenid Empire was conquered by the Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great, whose death led to the establishment of the Seleucid Empire over the bulk of former Achaemenid territory. In the following century, Greek rule of the Iranian plateau came to an end with the rise of the Parthian Empire, which also conquered large parts of the Seleucids' Anatolian, Mesopotamian, and Central Asian holdings. While the Parthians were succeeded by the Sasanian Empire in the 2nd century, Iran remained a leading power for the next millennium, although the majority of this period was marked by the Roman–Persian Wars.

In the 7th century, the Muslim conquest of Iran resulted in the Sasanian Empire's annexation by the Rashidun Caliphate and the beginning of the Islamization of Iran. In spite of repeated invasions by foreign powers, such as the Arabs, Turks, and Mongols, among others, the Iranian national identity was repeatedly asserted in the face of assimilation, allowing it to develop as a distinct political and cultural entity. While the early Muslim conquests had caused the decline of Zoroastrianism, which had been Iran's majority and official religion up to that point, the achievements of prior Iranian civilizations were absorbed into the nascent Islamic empires and expanded upon during the Islamic Golden Age. Nomadic tribes overran parts of the Iranian plateau during the Late Middle Ages and into the early modern period, negatively impacting the region.[17] By 1501, however, the nation was reunified by the Safavid dynasty, which initiated Iranian history's most momentous religious change since the original Muslim conquest by converting Iran to Shia Islam.[18][19] Iran again emerged as a leading world power, especially in rivalry with the Turkish-ruled Ottoman Empire. In the 19th century, Iran came into conflict with the Russian Empire, which annexed the South Caucasus by the end of the Russo-Persian Wars.[20]

The Safavid period (1501–1736) is becoming more recognized as an important time in Iran's history by scholars in both Iran and the West. In 1501, the Safavid dynasty became the first local dynasty to rule all of Iran since the Arabs overthrew the Sasanid empire in the 7th century. For eight and a half centuries, Iran was mostly just a geographical area with no independent government, ruled by various foreign powers—Arabs, Turks, Mongols, and Tartars. The Mongol invasions in the 13th century were a turning point in Iran's history and in Islam. The Mongols destroyed the historical caliphate, which had been a symbol of unity for the Islamic world for 600 years. During the long foreign rule, Iranians kept their unique culture and national identity, and they used this chance to regain their political independence.[21]

In the 1940s there were hopes that Iran could become a constitutional monarchy, but a 1953 coup aided by U.S. and U.K. removed the elected prime minister, and Iran was ruled as an autocracy under the Shah with American support from that time until the revolution. The Iranian monarchy lasted until the Islamic Revolution in 1979, when the country was officially declared an Islamic republic.[22][23] Since then, it has experienced significant political, social, and economic changes. The establishment of an Islamic republic led to a major restructuring of the country's political system. Iran's foreign relations have been shaped by regional conflicts, beginning with the Iran–Iraq War and persisting through many Arab countries; ongoing tensions with Israel, the United States, and the Western world; and the Iranian nuclear program, which has been a point of contention in international diplomacy. Despite international sanctions and internal challenges, Iran remains a key player in regional and global geopolitics.

Prehistory

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Paleolithic

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The earliest archaeological artifacts in Iran were found in the Kashafrud and Ganj Par sites that are thought to date back to 100,000 years ago in the Middle Paleolithic.[24] Mousterian stone tools made by Neanderthals have also been found.[25] There are more cultural remains of Neanderthals dating back to the Middle Paleolithic period, which mainly have been found in the Zagros region and fewer in central Iran at sites such as Kobeh, Kunji, Bisitun Cave, Tamtama, Warwasi, and Yafteh Cave.[26] In 1949, a Neanderthal radius was discovered by Carleton S. Coon in Bisitun Cave.[27] Evidence for Upper Paleolithic and Epipaleolithic periods are known mainly from the Zagros Mountains in the caves of Kermanshah and Khorramabad and a few number of sites in Piranshahr, Alborz and Central Iran. During this time, people began creating rock art in Iran.[28][29]

Neolithic to Chalcolithic

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Early agricultural communities such as Chogha Golan in the 11th millennium BC[30][31] along with settlements such as Chogha Bonut (the earliest village in Elam) in the 9th millennium BC[32][33] began to flourish in and around the Zagros Mountains.[34] Around about the same time, the earliest-known clay vessels and modelled human and animal terracotta figurines were produced at Ganj Dareh.[34] There are 10,000-year-old human and animal figurines from Tepe Sarab in Kermanshah Province among many other ancient artefacts.[35]

The south-western part of Iran was part of the Fertile Crescent where most of humanity's first major crops were grown, in villages such as Susa (where a settlement was first founded possibly as early as 4395 BC)[36]: 46–47  and settlements such as Chogha Mish, dating back to 6800 BC;[37][38] there are 7,000-year-old jars of wine excavated in the Zagros Mountains[39] (now on display at the University of Pennsylvania) and ruins of 7,000-year-old settlements such as Tepe Sialk are further testament to that. The two main Neolithic Iranian settlements were Ganj Dareh and the hypothetical Zayandeh River Culture.[40]

Bronze Age

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Cylinder with a ritual scene, early 2nd millennium BC, Geoy Tepe, Iran
Chogha Zanbil is one of the few extant ziggurats outside of Mesopotamia and is considered to be the best preserved example in the world.

The Kura–Araxes culture (circa 3400 BC—ca. 2000 BC) stretched from northwestern Iran up into the neighbouring regions of the Caucasus and Anatolia.[41][42] Susa is one of the oldest-known settlements of Iran and the world. The general perception among archaeologists is that Susa was an extension of the Sumerian city-state of Uruk, hence incorporating many aspects of Mesopotamian culture.[43][44] In its later history, Susa became the capital of Elam, which emerged as a state founded 4000 BC.[36]: 45–46  There are also dozens of prehistoric sites across the Iranian plateau pointing to the existence of ancient cultures and urban settlements in the fourth millennium BC.[37] One of the earliest civilizations on the Iranian plateau was the Jiroft culture in southeastern Iran in the province of Kerman.

Iran is one of the most artefact-rich archaeological sites in the Middle East. Archaeological excavations in Jiroft led to the discovery of several objects belonging to the 4th millennium BC.[45] There is a large quantity of objects decorated with highly distinctive engravings of animals, mythological figures, and architectural motifs. The objects and their iconography are considered unique. Many are made from chlorite, a grey-green soft stone; others are in copper, bronze, terracotta, and even lapis lazuli. Recent excavations at the sites have produced the world's earliest inscription which pre-dates Mesopotamian inscriptions.[46][47]

There are records of numerous other ancient civilizations on the Iranian plateau before the emergence of Iranian peoples during the Early Iron Age. The Early Bronze Age saw the rise of urbanization into organized city-states and the invention of writing (the Uruk period) in the Near East. While Bronze Age Elam made use of writing from an early time, the Proto-Elamite script remains undeciphered, and records from Sumer pertaining to Elam are scarce.

Russian historian Igor M. Diakonoff states that the modern inhabitants of Iran are descendants of mainly non-Indo-European groups, more specifically of pre-Iranic inhabitants of the Iranian Plateau: "It is the autochthones of the Iranian plateau, and not the Proto-Indo-European tribes of Europe, which are, in the main, the ancestors, in the physical sense of the word, of the present-day Iranians."[48]

Early Iron Age

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Rhyton in the shape of a ram's head, gold – Saqqez - Kurdistan - western Iran[6] –, late 7th–early 6th century BCE
A gold cup at the National Museum of Iran, from the first half of the 1st millennium BC

Records become more tangible with the rise of the Neo-Assyrian Empire and its records of incursions from the Iranian plateau. As early as the 20th century BC, tribes came to the Iranian plateau from the Pontic–Caspian steppe. The arrival of Iranians on the Iranian plateau forced the Elamites to relinquish one area of their empire after another and to take refuge in Elam, Khuzestan and the nearby area, which only then became coterminous with Elam.[49] Bahman Firuzmandi says that the southern Iranians might be intermixed with the Elamite peoples living in the plateau.[50] By the mid-1st millennium BC, Medes, Persians, and Parthians populated the Iranian plateau. Until the rise of the Medes, they all remained under Assyrian domination, like the rest of the Near East. In the first half of the 1st millennium BC, parts of what is now Iranian Azerbaijan were incorporated into Urartu.

Classical antiquity

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Median and Achaemenid Empires (678–330 BC)

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In 646 BC, Assyrian king Ashurbanipal sacked Susa, which ended Elamite supremacy in the region.[51] For over 150 years Assyrian kings of nearby northern Mesopotamia had been wanting to conquer Median tribes of western Iran.[52] Under pressure from Assyria, the small kingdoms of the western Iranian plateau coalesced into increasingly larger and more centralized states.[51]

The Medes at the time of their maximum expansion

In the second half of the 7th century BC, the Medes gained their independence and were united by Deioces. In 612 BC, Cyaxares, Deioces' grandson, and the Babylonian king Nabopolassar invaded Assyria and laid siege to and eventually destroyed Nineveh, the Assyrian capital, which led to the fall of the Neo-Assyrian Empire.[53] Urartu was later on conquered and dissolved as well by the Medes.[54][55] The Medes are credited with founding Iran as a nation and empire, and established the first Iranian empire, the largest of its day until Cyrus the Great established a unified empire of the Medes and Persians, leading to the Achaemenid Empire (c. 550–330 BC).

The Achaemenid Empire at its greatest extent

Cyrus the Great overthrew, in turn, the Median, Lydian, and Neo-Babylonian empires, creating an empire far larger than Assyria. He was better able, through more benign policies, to reconcile his subjects to Persian rule; the longevity of his empire was one result. The Persian king, like the Assyrian, was also "King of Kings", xšāyaθiya xšāyaθiyānām (shāhanshāh in modern Persian) – "great king", Megas Basileus, as known by the Greeks.

Cyrus's son, Cambyses II, conquered the last major power of the region, ancient Egypt, causing the collapse of the Twenty-sixth Dynasty of Egypt. Since he became ill and died before, or while, leaving Egypt, stories developed, as related by Herodotus, that he was struck down for impiety against the ancient Egyptian deities. After the death of Cambyses II, Darius ascended the throne by overthrowing the legitimate Achaemenid monarch Bardiya, and then quelling rebellions throughout his kingdom. As the winner, Darius based his claim on membership in a collateral line of the Achaemenid Empire.

Darius' first capital was at Susa, and he started the building program at Persepolis. He rebuilt a canal between the Nile and the Red Sea, a forerunner of the modern Suez Canal. He improved the extensive road system, and it is during his reign that mentions are first made of the Royal Road (shown on map), a great highway stretching all the way from Susa to Sardis with posting stations at regular intervals. Major reforms took place under Darius. Coinage, in the form of the daric (gold coin) and the shekel (silver coin), was standardized (coinage had been invented over a century before in Lydia c. 660 BC but not standardized),[56] and administrative efficiency increased.

The Old Persian language appears in royal inscriptions, written in a specially adapted version of the cuneiform script. Under Cyrus the Great and Darius, the Persian Empire eventually became the largest empire in human history up until that point, ruling and administrating over most of the known world,[57] as well as spanning the continents of Europe, Asia, and Africa. The greatest achievement was the empire itself. The Persian Empire represented the world's first superpower[58][59] that was based on a model of tolerance and respect for other cultures and religions.[60]

Map showing key sites during the Persian invasions of Greece.

In the late 6th century BC, Darius launched his European campaign, in which he defeated the Paeonians, conquered Thrace, and subdued all coastal Greek cities, as well as defeating the European Scythians around the Danube river.[61] In 512/511 BC, Macedon became a vassal kingdom of Persia.[61]

In 499 BC, Athens lent support to a revolt in Miletus, which resulted in the sacking of Sardis. This led to an Achaemenid campaign against mainland Greece known as the Greco-Persian Wars, which lasted the first half of the 5th century BC, and is known as one of the most important wars in European history. In the First Persian invasion of Greece, the Persian general Mardonius re-subjugated Thrace and made Macedon a full part of Persia.[61] The war eventually turned out in defeat, however. Darius' successor Xerxes I launched the Second Persian invasion of Greece. At a crucial moment in the war, about half of mainland Greece was overrun by the Persians, including all territories to the north of the Isthmus of Corinth,[62][63] however, this was also turned out in a Greek victory, following the battles of Plataea and Salamis, by which Persia lost its footholds in Europe, and eventually withdrew from it.[64] During the Greco-Persian wars, the Persians gained major territorial advantages. They captured and razed Athens twice, once in 480 BC and again in 479 BC. However, after a string of Greek victories the Persians were forced to withdraw, thus losing control of Macedonia, Thrace and Ionia. Fighting continued for several decades after the successful Greek repelling of the Second Invasion with numerous Greek city-states under the Athens' newly formed Delian League, which eventually ended with the peace of Callias in 449 BC, ending the Greco-Persian Wars. In 404 BC, following the death of Darius II, Egypt rebelled under Amyrtaeus. Later pharaohs successfully resisted Persian attempts to reconquer Egypt until 343 BC, when Egypt was reconquered by Artaxerxes III.

A panoramic view of Persepolis

Greek conquest and Seleucid Empire (312 BC–248 BC)

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The Seleucid Empire in 200 BC, before Antiochus was defeated by the Romans

From 334 BC to 331 BC, Alexander the Great defeated Darius III in the battles of Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela, swiftly conquering the Achaemanid Empire by 331 BC. Alexander's empire broke up shortly after his death, and Alexander's general, Seleucus I Nicator, tried to take control of Iran, Mesopotamia, and later Syria and Anatolia. His empire was the Seleucid Empire. He was killed in 281 BC by Ptolemy Keraunos.

Parthian Empire (248 BC–224 AD)

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Bagadates I, first native Persian ruler after Greek rule

The Parthian Empire—ruled by the Parthians, a group of northwestern Iranian people—was the realm of the Arsacid dynasty. This latter reunited and governed the Iranian plateau after the Parni conquest of Parthia and defeating the Seleucid Empire in the late 3rd century BC. It intermittently controlled Mesopotamia between c. 150 BC and 224 AD and absorbed Eastern Arabia.

Parthia was the eastern arch-enemy of the Roman Empire, and it limited Rome's expansion beyond Cappadocia (central Anatolia). The Parthian armies included two types of cavalry: the heavily armed and armored cataphracts and the lightly armed but highly-mobile mounted archers.

For the Romans, who relied on heavy infantry, the Parthians were too hard to defeat, as both types of cavalry were much faster and more mobile than foot soldiers. The Parthian shot used by the Parthian cavalry was most notably feared by the Roman soldiers, which proved pivotal in the crushing Roman defeat at the Battle of Carrhae. On the other hand, the Parthians found it difficult to occupy conquered areas as they were unskilled in siege warfare. Because of these weaknesses, neither the Romans nor the Parthians were able completely to annex each other's territory.

The Parthian empire subsisted for five centuries, longer than most Eastern Empires. The end of this empire came at last in 224 AD, when the empire's organization had loosened and the last king was defeated by one of the empire's vassal peoples, the Persians under the Sasanians. However, the Arsacid dynasty continued to exist for centuries onwards in Armenia, the Iberia, and the Caucasian Albania, which were all eponymous branches of the dynasty.

Sasanian Empire (224–651 AD)

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Rock-face relief at Naqsh-e Rustam of Iranian emperor Shapur I (on horseback) capturing Roman emperor Valerian (kneeing) and Philip the Arab (standing).
Hunting scene on a gilded silver bowl showing king Khosrau I.

The first shah of the Sasanian Empire, Ardashir I, started reforming the country economically and militarily. For a period of more than 400 years, Iran was once again one of the leading powers in the world, alongside its neighbouring rival, the Roman and then Byzantine Empires.[65][66] The empire's territory, at its height, encompassed all of today's Iran, Iraq, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Abkhazia, Dagestan, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, parts of Afghanistan, Turkey, Syria, parts of Pakistan, Central Asia, Eastern Arabia, and parts of Egypt.

Most of the Sasanian Empire's lifespan was overshadowed by the frequent Byzantine–Sasanian wars, a continuation of the Roman–Parthian Wars and the all-comprising Roman–Persian Wars; the last was the longest-lasting conflict in human history. Started in the first century BC by their predecessors, the Parthians, and Romans, the last Roman–Persian War was fought in the seventh century. The Persians defeated the Romans at the Battle of Edessa in 260 and took emperor Valerian prisoner for the remainder of his life. Eastern Arabia was conquered early on. During Khosrow II's rule in 590–628, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Lebanon were also annexed to the Empire. The Sassanians called their empire Erânshahr ("Dominion of the Aryans", i.e., of Iranians).[67]

A chapter of Iran's history followed after roughly 600 years of conflict with the Roman Empire. During this time, the Sassanian and Romano-Byzantine armies clashed for influence in Anatolia, the western Caucasus (mainly Lazica and the Kingdom of Iberia; modern-day Georgia and Abkhazia), Mesopotamia, Armenia and the Levant. Under Justinian I, the war came to an uneasy peace with payment of tribute to the Sassanians. However, the Sasanians used the deposition of the Byzantine emperor Maurice as a casus belli to attack the Empire. After many gains, the Sassanians were defeated at Issus, Constantinople, and finally Nineveh, resulting in peace. With the conclusion of the over 700 years lasting Roman–Persian Wars through the climactic Byzantine–Sasanian War of 602–628, which included the very siege of the Byzantine capital of Constantinople, the war-exhausted Persians lost the Battle of al-Qādisiyyah (632) in Hilla (present-day Iraq) to the invading Muslim forces.

The Sasanian era, encompassing the length of Late Antiquity, is considered to be one of the most important and influential historical periods in Iran, and had a major impact on the world. In many ways, the Sassanian period witnessed the highest achievement of Persian civilization and constitutes the last great Iranian Empire before the adoption of Islam. Persia influenced Roman civilization considerably during Sassanian times,[68] their cultural influence extending far beyond the empire's territorial borders, reaching as far as Western Europe,[69] Africa,[70] China and India[71] and also playing a prominent role in the formation of both European and Asiatic medieval art.[72]

This influence carried forward to the Muslim world. The dynasty's unique and aristocratic culture transformed the Islamic conquest and destruction of Iran into a Persian Renaissance.[69] Much of what later became known as Islamic culture, architecture, writing, and other contributions to civilization, were taken from the Sassanian Persians into the broader Muslim world.[73]

Battle between Heraclius' army and Persians under Khosrow II. Fresco by Piero della Francesca, c. 1452.

Medieval period

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Early Islamic period

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Islamic conquest of Persia (633–651)

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Phases of the Islamic conquest
  Expansion under Muhammad, 622–632
  Expansion during the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661
  Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750

In 633, when the Sasanian king Yazdegerd III was ruling over Iran, the Muslims under Umar invaded the country right after it had been in a bloody civil war. Several Iranian nobles and families such as king Dinar of the House of Karen, and later Kanarangiyans of Khorasan, mutinied against their Sasanian overlords. Although the House of Mihran had claimed the Sasanian throne under the two prominent generals Bahrām Chōbin and Shahrbaraz, it remained loyal to the Sasanians during its struggle against the Arabs, but the Mihrans were eventually betrayed and defeated by their own kinsmen, the House of Ispahbudhan, under their leader Farrukhzad, who had mutinied against Yazdegerd III. Yazdegerd III fled from one district to another until a local miller killed him for his purse at Merv in 651.[74] By 674, Muslims had conquered Khorasan (which included Khorasan province and modern Afghanistan and parts of Transoxiana).

The Muslim conquest of Persia ended the Sasanian Empire and led to the eventual decline of the Zoroastrian religion in Persia. Over time, the majority of Iranians converted to Islam. Most of the aspects of the previous Persian civilizations were not discarded but were absorbed by the new Islamic polity. As Bernard Lewis has commented:

These events have been variously seen in Iran: by some as a blessing, the advent of the true faith, the end of the age of ignorance and heathenism; by others as a humiliating national defeat, the conquest and subjugation of the country by foreign invaders. Both perceptions are of course valid, depending on one's angle of vision.[75]

Umayyad era and Muslim incursions into the Caspian coast

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After the fall of the Sasanian Empire in 651, the Arabs of the Umayyad Caliphate adopted many Persian customs, especially the administrative and the court mannerisms. Arab provincial governors were undoubtedly either Persianized Arameans or ethnic Persians; certainly Persian remained the language of official business of the caliphate until the adoption of Arabic toward the end of the 7th century,[76] when in 692 minting began at the capital Damascus. The Islamic coins evolved from imitations of Sasanian coins (as well as Byzantine), and the Pahlavi script on the coinage was replaced with Arabic alphabet.

During the Umayyad Caliphate, the Arab conquerors imposed Arabic as the primary language of the subject peoples throughout their empire. Al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, who was not happy with the prevalence of the Persian language in the divan, ordered the official language of the conquered lands to be replaced by Arabic, sometimes by force.[77] In al-Biruni's From the Remaining Signs of Past Centuries for example it is written:

When Qutaibah bin Muslim under the command of Al-Hajjaj bin Yousef was sent to Khwarazmia with a military expedition and conquered it for the second time, he swiftly killed whoever wrote the Khwarazmian native language that knew of the Khwarazmian heritage, history, and culture. He then killed all their Zoroastrian priests and burned and wasted their books, until gradually the illiterate only remained, who knew nothing of writing, and hence their history was mostly forgotten.[78]

Several historians see the rule of the Umayyads as setting up the "dhimmah" to increase taxes from the dhimmis to benefit the Muslim Arab community financially and by discouraging conversion.[79] Governors lodged complaints with the caliph when he enacted laws that made conversion easier, depriving the provinces of revenues. In the 7th century, when many non-Arabs such as Persians entered Islam, they were recognized as mawali ("clients") and treated as second-class citizens by the ruling Arab elite until the end of the Umayyad Caliphate. During this era, Islam was initially associated with the ethnic identity of the Arab and required formal association with an Arab tribe and the adoption of the client status of mawali.[79] The half-hearted policies of the late Umayyads to tolerate non-Arab Muslims and Shias had failed to quell unrest among these minorities.

However, all of Iran was still not under Arab control; the region of Daylam was under the control of the Daylamites, while Tabaristan was under Dabuyid and Paduspanid control, and the Mount Damavand region was under Masmughans of Damavand. The Arabs had invaded these regions several times but achieved no decisive result because of the inaccessible terrain of the regions. The most prominent ruler of the Dabuyids, known as Farrukhan the Great (r. 712–728), managed to hold his domains during his long struggle against the Arab general Yazid ibn al-Muhallab, who was defeated by a combined Dailamite-Dabuyid army and was forced to retreat from Tabaristan.[80]

With the death of the Umayyad Caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik in 743, the Islamic world was launched into civil war. Abu Muslim was sent to Khorasan by the Abbasid Caliphate initially as a propagandist and then to revolt on their behalf. He took Merv defeating the Umayyad governor Nasr ibn Sayyar. He became the de facto Abbasid governor of Khurasan. During the same period, the Dabuyid ruler Khurshid declared independence from the Umayyads but was shortly forced to recognize Abbasid authority. In 750, Abu Muslim became the leader of the Abbasid army and defeated the Umayyads at the Battle of the Zab. Abu Muslim stormed Damascus later that year.

Abbasid period and autonomous Iranian dynasties

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The Saffarid dynasty in 900 AD.
Map of the Iranian dynasties in the mid 10th-century.

The Abbasid army consisted primarily of Khorasanians and was led by Abu Muslim. It contained both Iranian and Arab elements, and the Abbasids enjoyed both Iranian and Arab support. The Abbasids overthrew the Umayyads in 750.[81] According to Amir Arjomand, the Abbasid Revolution essentially marked the end of the Arab empire and the beginning of a more inclusive, multi-ethnic state in the Middle East.[82] One of the first changes the Abbasids made after taking power from the Umayyads was to move the empire's capital to Iraq. The latter region was influenced by Persian history and culture, and moving the capital was part of the Persian mawali demand for Arab influence in the empire. The city of Baghdad was constructed on the Tigris River, in 762, to serve as the Abbasid capital.[83]

The Abbasids established the position of vizier like Barmakids in their administration, which was the equivalent of a "vice-caliph", or second-in-command. Eventually, this change meant that many caliphs under the Abbasids ended up in a much more ceremonial role than ever before, with the vizier in real power. A new Persian bureaucracy began to replace the old Arab aristocracy, and the entire administration reflected these changes, demonstrating that the new dynasty was different in many ways from the Umayyads.[83]

By the 9th century, Abbasid control began to wane as regional leaders sprang up in the far corners of the empire to challenge the central authority of the Abbasid caliphate.[83] The Abbasid caliphs began enlisting mamluks, Turkic-speaking warriors, who had been moving out of Central Asia into Transoxiana as slave warriors as early as the 9th century. Shortly thereafter the real power of the Abbasid caliphs began to wane; eventually, they became religious figureheads while the warrior slaves ruled.[81]

Babak Khorramdin was the leader of the Khurramīyah movement. A devout Zoroastrian, he led the Persian freedom movement against oppressive Arab rule.

The 9th century also saw the revolt by native Zoroastrians, known as the Khurramites, against oppressive Arab rule. The movement was led by a Persian freedom fighter Babak Khorramdin. Babak's Iranianizing[84] rebellion, from its base in Azerbaijan in northwestern Iran,[85] called for a return of the political glories of the Iranian[86] past. The Khorramdin rebellion of Babak spread to the western and central parts of Iran and lasted more than 20 years before it was defeated when Babak was betrayed by Afshin, a senior general of the Abbasid Caliphate.

As the power of the Abbasid caliphs diminished, a series of dynasties rose in various parts of Iran, some with considerable influence and power. Among the most important of these overlapping dynasties were the Tahirids in Khorasan (821–873); the Saffarids in Sistan (861–1003, their rule lasted as maliks of Sistan until 1537); and the Samanids (819–1005), originally at Bukhara. The Samanids eventually ruled an area from central Iran to Pakistan.[81]

By the early 10th century, the Abbasids almost lost control to the growing Persian faction known as the Buyid dynasty (934–1062). Since much of the Abbasid administration had been Persian anyway, the Buyids were quietly able to assume real power in Baghdad. The Buyids were defeated in the mid-11th century by the Seljuq Turks, who continued to exert influence over the Abbasids, while publicly pledging allegiance to them. The balance of power in Baghdad remained as such – with the Abbasids in power in name only – until the Mongol invasion of 1258 sacked the city and definitively ended the Abbasid dynasty.[83]

During the Abbasid period an enfranchisement was experienced by the mawali and a shift was made in political conception from that of a primarily Arab empire to one of a Muslim empire[87] and c. 930 a requirement was enacted that required all bureaucrats of the empire be Muslim.[79]

Islamic golden age, Shu'ubiyya movement and Persianization process

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Extract from a medieval manuscript by Qotbeddin Shirazi (1236–1311), a Persian astronomer, depicting an epicyclic planetary model

Islamization was a long process by which Islam was gradually adopted by the majority population of Iran. Richard Bulliet's "conversion curve" indicates that only about 10% of Iran converted to Islam during the relatively Arab-centric Umayyad period. Beginning in the Abbasid period, with its mix of Persian as well as Arab rulers, the Muslim percentage of the population rose. As Persian Muslims consolidated their rule of the country, the Muslim population rose from approximately 40% in the mid-9th century to close to 90% by the end of the 11th century.[87] Seyyed Hossein Nasr suggests that the rapid increase in conversion was aided by the Persian nationality of the rulers.[88] Although Persians adopted the religion of their conquerors, over the centuries they worked to protect and revive their distinctive language and culture, a process known as Persianization. Arabs and Turks participated in this attempt.[89][90][91]

In the 9th and 10th centuries, non-Arab subjects of the Ummah created a movement called Shu'ubiyyah in response to the privileged status of Arabs. Most of those behind the movement were Persian, but references to Egyptians, Berbers and Aramaeans are attested.[92] Citing as its basis Islamic notions of equality of races and nations, the movement was primarily concerned with preserving Persian culture and protecting Persian identity, though within a Muslim context.

The Samanid dynasty led the revival of Persian culture and the first important Persian poet after the arrival of Islam, Rudaki, was born during this era and was praised by Samanid kings. The Samanids also revived many ancient Persian festivals. Their successor, the Ghaznawids, who were of non-Iranian Turkic origin, also became instrumental in the revival of Persian culture.[93]

Persian manuscript describing how an ambassador from India, probably sent by the Maukhari King Śarvavarman of Kannauj, brought chess to the Persian court of Khosrow I.[94][95]

The culmination of the Persianization movement was the Shahnameh, the national epic of Iran, written almost entirely in Persian. This voluminous work, reflects Iran's ancient history, its unique cultural values, its pre-Islamic Zoroastrian religion, and its sense of nationhood. According to Bernard Lewis:[75]

Iran was indeed Islamized, but it was not Arabized. Persians remained Persians. And after an interval of silence, Iran re-emerged as a separate, different and distinctive element within Islam, eventually adding a new element even to Islam itself. Culturally, politically, and most remarkable of all even religiously, the Iranian contribution to this new Islamic civilization is of immense importance. The work of Iranians can be seen in every field of cultural endeavour, including Arabic poetry, to which poets of Iranian origin composing their poems in Arabic made a very significant contribution. In a sense, Iranian Islam is a second advent of Islam itself, a new Islam sometimes referred to as Islam-i Ajam. It was this Persian Islam, rather than the original Arab Islam, that was brought to new areas and new peoples: to the Turks, first in Central Asia and then in the Middle East in the country which came to be called Turkey, and of course to India. The Ottoman Turks brought a form of Iranian civilization to the walls of Vienna...

The Islamization of Iran was to yield deep transformations within the cultural, scientific, and political structure of Iran's society: The blossoming of Persian literature, philosophy, medicine and art became major elements of the newly forming Muslim civilization. Inheriting a heritage of thousands of years of civilization, and being at the "crossroads of the major cultural highways",[96] contributed to Persia emerging as what culminated into the "Islamic Golden Age". During this period, hundreds of scholars and scientists vastly contributed to technology, science and medicine, later influencing the rise of European science during the Renaissance.[97]

The most important scholars of almost all of the Islamic sects and schools of thought were Persian or lived in Iran, including the most notable and reliable Hadith collectors of Shia and Sunni like Shaikh Saduq, Shaikh Kulainy, Hakim al-Nishaburi, Imam Muslim and Imam Bukhari, the greatest theologians of Shia and Sunni like Shaykh Tusi, Imam Ghazali, Imam Fakhr al-Razi and Al-Zamakhshari, the greatest physicians, astronomers, logicians, mathematicians, metaphysicians, philosophers and scientists like Avicenna and Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī, and the greatest shaykhs of Sufism like Rumi and Abdul-Qadir Gilani.

Persianate states and dynasties (977–1219)

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The Kharaghan twin towers, built in 1067, Persia, contain tombs of Seljuq princes.

In 977, a Turkic governor of the Samanids, Sabuktigin, conquered Ghazna (in present-day Afghanistan) and established a dynasty, the Ghaznavids, that lasted to 1186.[81] The Ghaznavid empire grew by taking all of the Samanid territories south of the Amu Darya in the last decade of the 10th century, and eventually occupied parts of Eastern Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and north-west India.[83] The Ghaznavids are generally credited with launching Islam into a mainly Hindu India. The invasion of India was undertaken in 1000 by the Ghaznavid ruler Mahmud and continued for several years. They were unable to hold power for long, however, particularly after the death of Mahmud in 1030. By 1040 the Seljuqs had taken over the Ghaznavid lands in Iran.[83]

The Seljuqs, who like the Ghaznavids were Persianate in nature and of Turkic origin, slowly conquered Iran over the course of the 11th century.[81] The dynasty had its origins in the Turcoman tribal confederations of Central Asia and marked the beginning of Turkic power in the Middle East. They established a Sunni Muslim rule over parts of Central Asia and the Middle East from the 11th to 14th centuries. They set the Seljuq Empire that stretched from Anatolia in the west to western Afghanistan in the east and the western borders of modern-day China in the north-east; and was the target of the First Crusade. Today they are regarded as the cultural ancestors of the Western Turks, the present-day inhabitants of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, and they are remembered as great patrons of Persian culture, art, literature, and language.[89][98][99]

Seljuq empire at the time of its greatest extent, at the death of Malik Shah I[citation needed]

The founder of the dynasty, Tughril Beg, turned his army against the Ghaznavids in Khorasan. He moved south and then west, conquering but not wasting the cities in his path. In 1055 the caliph in Baghdad gave Tughril Beg robes, gifts, and the title King of the East. Under Tughril Beg's successor, Malik Shah (1072–1092), Iran enjoyed a cultural and scientific renaissance, largely attributed to his brilliant Iranian vizier, Nizam al Mulk. These leaders established the observatory where Omar Khayyám did much of his experimentation for a new calendar, and they built religious schools in all the major towns. They brought Abu Hamid Ghazali, one of the greatest Islamic theologians, and other eminent scholars to the Seljuq capital at Baghdad and encouraged and supported their work.[81]

When Malik Shah I died in 1092, the empire split as his brother and four sons quarreled over the apportioning of the empire among themselves. In Anatolia, Malik Shah I was succeeded by Kilij Arslan I who founded the Sultanate of Rûm and in Syria by his brother Tutush I. In Persia he was succeeded by his son Mahmud I whose reign was contested by his other three brothers Barkiyaruq in Iraq, Muhammad I in Baghdad and Ahmad Sanjar in Khorasan. As Seljuq power in Iran weakened, other dynasties began to step up in its place, including a resurgent Abbasid caliphate and the Khwarezmshahs. The Khwarezmid Empire was a Sunni Muslim Persianate dynasty, of East Turkic origin, that ruled in Central Asia. Originally vassals of the Seljuqs, they took advantage of the decline of the Seljuqs to expand into Iran.[100] In 1194 the Khwarezmshah Ala ad-Din Tekish defeated the Seljuq sultan Toghrul III in battle and the Seljuq empire in Iran collapsed. Of the former Seljuq Empire, only the Sultanate of Rum in Anatolia remained.

A serious internal threat to the Seljuqs during their reign came from the Nizari Ismailis, a secret sect with headquarters at Alamut Castle between Rasht and Tehran. They controlled the immediate area for more than 150 years and sporadically sent out adherents to strengthen their rule by murdering important officials. Several of the various theories on the etymology of the word assassin derive from these killers.[81] Parts of northwestern Iran were conquered in the early 13th century AD by the Kingdom of Georgia, led by Tamar the Great.[101]

Mongol conquest and rule (1219–1358)

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Mongol invasion (1219–1221)

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Eurasia on the eve of the Mongol invasions, c. 1200
The Mongol Empire's expansion

The Khwarazmian dynasty only lasted for a few decades, until the arrival of the Mongols. Genghis Khan had unified the Mongols, and under him the Mongol Empire quickly expanded in several directions. In 1218, it bordered Khwarezm. At that time, the Khwarazmian Empire was ruled by Ala ad-Din Muhammad (1200–1220). Muhammad, like Genghis, was intent on expanding his lands and had gained the submission of most of Iran. He declared himself shah and demanded formal recognition from the Abbasid caliph Al-Nasir. When the caliph rejected his claim, Ala ad-Din Muhammad proclaimed one of his nobles caliph and unsuccessfully tried to depose an-Nasir.

The Mongol invasion of Iran began in 1219, after two diplomatic missions to Khwarezm sent by Genghis Khan had been massacred. During 1220–21 Bukhara, Samarkand, Herat, Tus and Nishapur were razed, and the populations were slaughtered. The Khwarezm-Shah fled, to die on an island off the Caspian coast.[102] During the invasion of Transoxiana in 1219, along with the main Mongol force, Genghis Khan used a Chinese specialist catapult unit in battle; they were used again in 1220 in Transoxania. The Chinese may have used the catapults to hurl gunpowder bombs, since they already had them by this time.[103]

While Genghis Khan was conquering Transoxania and Persia, several Chinese who were familiar with gunpowder were serving in Genghis's army.[104] "Whole regiments" entirely made out of Chinese were used by the Mongols to command bomb hurling trebuchets during the invasion of Iran.[105] Historians have suggested that the Mongol invasion had brought Chinese gunpowder weapons to Central Asia. One of these was the huochong, a Chinese mortar.[106] Books written around the area afterward depicted gunpowder weapons which resembled those of China.[107]

Before his death in 1227, Genghis had reached western Azerbaijan, pillaging and burning many cities along the way after entering into Iran from its north east. The Mongol invasion was by and large disastrous to the Iranians. Although the Mongol invaders eventually converted to Islam and accepted the culture of Iran, the Mongol destruction in Iran and other regions of the Islamic heartland (particularly the historical Khorasan region, mainly in Central Asia) marked a major change of direction for the region. Much of the six centuries of Islamic scholarship, culture, and infrastructure was destroyed as the invaders leveled cities, burned libraries, and in some cases replaced mosques with Buddhist temples.[108][109][110] The Mongols killed many Iranian civilians. Destruction of qanat irrigation systems in the north east of Iran destroyed the pattern of relatively continuous settlements, producing many abandoned towns which were relatively quite good with irrigation and agriculture.[111] In 1221, Genghis Khan destroyed the city of Gurganj. Most if not all the ancient Iranic Khwarazmian people were killed or pushed out, paving the way for the Turkification of Khwarazm.

Ilkhanate (1256–1335)

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Mongol successor khanates

After Genghis's death, Iran was ruled by several Mongol commanders. Genghis' grandson, Hulagu Khan, was tasked with the westward expansion of Mongol dominion. However, by the time he ascended to power, the Mongol Empire had already dissolved, dividing into different factions. Arriving with an army, he established himself in the region and founded the Ilkhanate, a breakaway state of the Mongol Empire, which would rule Iran for the next 80 years and become Persian in the process.

Hulagu Khan seized Baghdad in 1258 and put the last Abbasid caliph to death. The westward advance of his forces was stopped by the Mamelukes, however, at the Battle of Ain Jalut in Palestine in 1260. Hulagu's campaigns against the Muslims also enraged Berke, khan of the Golden Horde and a convert to Islam. Hulagu and Berke fought against each other, demonstrating the weakening unity of the Mongol empire.

The rule of Hulagu's great-grandson, Ghazan (1295–1304) saw the establishment of Islam as the state religion of the Ilkhanate. Ghazan and his famous Iranian vizier, Rashid al-Din, brought Iran a partial and brief economic revival. The Mongols lowered taxes for artisans, encouraged agriculture, rebuilt and extended irrigation works, and improved the safety of the trade routes. As a result, commerce increased dramatically.

Items from India, China, and Iran passed easily across the Asian steppes, and these contacts culturally enriched Iran. For example, Iranians developed a style of painting based on a unique fusion of solid, two-dimensional Mesopotamian painting with the feathery, light brush strokes and other motifs characteristic of China. After Ghazan's nephew Abu Said died in 1335 the Ilkhanate lapsed into civil war and was divided between several petty dynasties – most prominently the Jalayirids, Muzaffarids, Sarbadars and Kartids. The mid-14th-century Black Death killed about 30% of the country's population.[112]

Sunnism and Shiism in pre-Safavid Iran

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Imam Reza shrine, the tomb of the eighth Imam of the twelver Shiites

Prior to the rise of the Safavid Empire, Sunni Islam was the dominant religion, accounting for around 90% of the population at the time. According to Mortaza Motahhari the majority of Iranian scholars and masses remained Sunni until the time of the Safavids.[113] The domination of Sunnis did not mean Shia were rootless in Iran. The writers of The Four Books of Shia were Iranian, as well as many other great Shia scholars.

The domination of the Sunni creed during the first nine Islamic centuries characterized the religious history of Iran during this period. There were however some exceptions to this general domination which emerged in the form of the Zaydīs of Tabaristan (see Alid dynasties of northern Iran), the Buyids, the Kakuyids, the rule of Sultan Muhammad Khudabandah (r. Shawwal 703-Shawwal 716/1304–1316) and the Sarbedaran.[114]

Apart from this domination there existed, firstly, throughout these nine centuries, Shia inclinations among many Sunnis of this land and, secondly, original Imami Shiism as well as Zaydī Shiism had prevalence in some parts of Iran. During this period, Shia in Iran were nourished from Kufah, Baghdad and later from Najaf and Hillah.[114] Shiism was the dominant sect in Tabaristan, Qom, Kashan, Avaj and Sabzevar. In many other areas merged population of Shia and Sunni lived together.[citation needed]

During the 10th and 11th centuries, Fatimids sent Ismailis Da'i (missioners) to Iran as well as other Muslim lands. When Ismailis divided into two sects, Nizaris established their base in Iran. Hassan-i Sabbah conquered fortresses and captured Alamut in 1090 AD. Nizaris used this fortress until a Mongol raid in 1256.[citation needed]

After the Mongol raid and fall of the Abbasids, Sunni hierarchies faltered. Not only did they lose the caliphate but also the status of official madhhab. Their loss was the gain of Shia, whose centre wasn't in Iran at that time. Several local Shia dynasties like Sarbadars were established during this time.[citation needed]

The main change occurred in the beginning of the 16th century, when Ismail I founded the Safavid dynasty and initiated a religious policy to recognize Shi'a Islam as the official religion of the Safavid Empire, and the fact that modern Iran remains an officially Shi'ite state is a direct result of Ismail's actions.[citation needed]

Timurid Empire (1370–1507)

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Forensic reconstruction of Turco-Mongol conqueror Timur
Detailed map of the Timurid Empire with its tributary states and sphere of influence in Western-Central Asia (1402–1403)

Iran remained divided until the arrival of Timur, a Turco-Mongol[115] belonging to the Timurid dynasty. Like its predecessors, the Timurid Empire was also part of the Persianate world. After establishing a power base in Transoxiana, Timur invaded Iran in 1381 and eventually conquered most of it. Timur's campaigns were known for their brutality; many people were slaughtered and several cities were destroyed.[116]

His regime was characterized by tyranny and bloodshed, but also by its inclusion of Iranians in administrative roles and its promotion of architecture and poetry. His successors, the Timurids, maintained a hold on most of Iran until 1452, when they lost the bulk of it to Black Sheep Turkmen. The Black Sheep Turkmen were conquered by the White Sheep Turkmen under Uzun Hasan in 1468; Uzun Hasan and his successors were the masters of Iran until the rise of the Safavids.[116]

Sufi poet Hafez's popularity became firmly established in the Timurid era that saw the compilation and widespread copying of his divan. Sufis were often persecuted by orthodox Muslims who considered their teachings blasphemous. Sufism developed a symbolic language rich with metaphors to obscure poetic references to provocative philosophical teachings. Hafez concealed his own Sufi faith, even as he employed the secret language of Sufism (developed over hundreds of years) in his own work, and he is sometimes credited with having "brought it to perfection".[117] His work was imitated by Jami, whose own popularity grew to spread across the full breadth of the Persianate world.[118]

Contemporary depiction of the Qara Qoyunlu Pir Budaq, son of Jahan Shah, c. 1455–1460

The Kara Koyunlu were a Turkmen[119] tribal federation that ruled over northwestern Iran and surrounding areas from 1374 to 1468. The Kara Koyunlu expanded their conquest to Baghdad, however, internal fighting, defeats by the Timurids, rebellions by the Armenians in response to their persecution,[120] and failed struggles with the Ag Qoyunlu led to their eventual demise.[121] Aq Qoyunlu were Turkmen[122][123] under the leadership of the Bayandur tribe,[124] tribal federation of Sunni Muslims who ruled over most of Iran and large parts of surrounding areas from 1378 to 1501 CE. Aq Qoyunlu emerged when Timur granted them all of Diyar Bakr in present-day Turkey. Afterward, they struggled with their rival Oghuz Turks, the Qara Qoyunlu. While the Aq Qoyunlu were successful in defeating Kara Koyunlu, their struggle with the emerging Safavid dynasty led to their downfall.[125]

Early modern period

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Persia underwent a revival under the Safavid dynasty (1501–1736), the most prominent figure of which was Shah Abbas I. Some historians credit the Safavid dynasty for founding the modern nation-state of Iran. Iran's contemporary Shia character and significant segments of Iran's current borders take their origin from this era (e.g. Treaty of Zuhab).

Safavid Empire (1501–1736)

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The Safavid Empire (1501–1736) at its greatest extent

The Safavid dynasty was one of the most significant ruling dynasties of Iran and "is often considered the beginning of modern Persian history".[126] They ruled one of the greatest Iranian empires after the Muslim conquest of Persia[127] and established the Twelver school of Shi'a Islam[18] as the official religion of their empire, marking one of the most important turning points in Muslim history. The Safavids ruled from 1501 to 1722 (experiencing a brief restoration from 1729 to 1736) and at their height, they controlled all of modern Iran, Azerbaijan and Armenia, most of Georgia, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Kuwait and Afghanistan, as well as parts of Turkey, Syria, Pakistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Safavid Iran was one of the Islamic "gunpowder empires", along with its neighbours, its archrival and principal enemy the Ottoman Empire, and to the east, the Mughal Empire.

Portuguese empire in the Persian Gulf - 1501-1750.

The Safavid ruling dynasty was founded by Ismāil, who styled himself Shāh Ismāil I.[128] Practically worshipped by his Qizilbāsh followers, Ismāil invaded Shirvan to avenge the death of his father, Shaykh Haydar, who had been killed during his siege of Derbent, in Dagestan. Afterwards he went on a campaign of conquest, and following the capture of Tabriz in July 1501, he enthroned himself as the Shāh of Iran,[129]: 324 [130][131] minted coins in this name, and proclaimed Shi'ism the official religion of his domain.[18]

Although initially the masters of Azerbaijan and southern Dagestan only, the Safavids had, in fact, won the struggle for power in Iran which had been going on for nearly a century between various dynasties and political forces following the fragmentation of the Kara Koyunlu and the Aq Qoyunlu. A year after his victory in Tabriz, Ismāil proclaimed most of Iran as his domain, and[18] quickly conquered and unified Iran under his rule. Soon afterwards, the new Safavid Empire rapidly conquered regions, nations, and peoples in all directions, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, parts of Georgia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Kuwait, Syria, Dagestan, large parts of what is now Afghanistan, parts of Turkmenistan, and large chunks of Anatolia, laying the foundation of its multi-ethnic character which would heavily influence the empire itself (most notably the Caucasus and its peoples).

Tahmasp I, the son and successor of Ismail I, carried out multiple invasions in the Caucasus which had been incorporated in the Safavid empire since Shah Ismail I and for many centuries afterwards, and started with the trend of deporting and moving hundreds of thousands of Circassians, Georgians, and Armenians to Iran's heartlands. Initially only solely put in the royal harems, royal guards, and minor other sections of the Empire, Tahmasp believed he could eventually reduce the power of the Qizilbash, by creating and fully integrating a new layer in Iranian society. As Encyclopædia Iranica states, for Tahmasp, the problem circled around the military tribal elite of the empire, the Qizilbash, who believed that physical proximity to and control of a member of the immediate Safavid family guaranteed spiritual advantages, political fortune, and material advancement.[132] With this new Caucasian layer in Iranian society, the undisputed might of the Qizilbash (who functioned much like the ghazis of the neighbouring Ottoman Empire) would be questioned and fully diminished as society would become fully meritocratic.

Portrait of Shah Abbas I. Chehel Sotoun, painted c. 1647.[133]

Shah Abbas I and his successors would significantly expand this policy and plan initiated by Tahmasp, deporting during his reign alone around some 200,000 Georgians, 300,000 Armenians and 100,000–150,000 Circassians to Iran, completing the foundation of a new layer in Iranian society. With this, and the complete systematic disorganisation of the Qizilbash by his personal orders, he eventually fully succeeded in replacing the power of the Qizilbash, with that of the Caucasian ghulams. These new Caucasian elements (the so-called ghilman / غِلْمَان / "servants"), almost always after conversion to Shi'ism depending on given function would be, unlike the Qizilbash, fully loyal only to the Shah. The other masses of Caucasians were deployed in all other possible functions and positions available in the empire, as well as in the harem, regular military, craftsmen, farmers, etc. This system of mass usage of Caucasian subjects remained to exist until the fall of the Qajar dynasty.

The greatest of the Safavid monarchs, Shah Abbas I the Great (1587–1629) came to power in 1587 aged 16. Abbas I first fought the Uzbeks, recapturing Herat and Mashhad in 1598, which had been lost by his predecessor Mohammad Khodabanda by the Ottoman–Safavid War (1578–1590). Then he turned against the Ottomans, the archrivals of the Safavids, recapturing Baghdad, eastern Iraq, the Caucasian provinces, and beyond by 1618. Between 1616 and 1618, following the disobedience of his most loyal Georgian subjects Teimuraz I and Luarsab II, Abbas carried out a punitive campaign in his territories of Georgia, devastating Kakheti and Tbilisi and carrying away 130,000[134] – 200,000[135][136] Georgian captives towards mainland Iran. His new army, which had dramatically been improved with the advent of Robert Shirley and his brothers following the first diplomatic mission to Europe, pitted the first crushing victory over the Safavids' archrivals, the Ottomans in the above-mentioned 1603–1618 war and would surpass the Ottomans in military strength. He also used his new force to dislodge the Portuguese from Bahrain (1602) and Hormuz (1622) with aid of the English navy, in the Persian Gulf.

He expanded commercial links with the Dutch East India Company and established firm links with the European royal houses, which had been initiated by Ismail I earlier on by the Habsburg–Persian alliance. Thus Abbas I was able to break the dependence on the Qizilbash for military might and therefore was able to centralize control. The Safavid dynasty had already established itself during Shah Ismail I, but under Abbas I it really became a major power in the world along with its archrival the Ottoman Empire, against whom it became able to compete with on equal foot. It also started the promotion of tourism in Iran. Under their rule Persian Architecture flourished again and saw many new monuments in various Iranian cities, of which Isfahan is the most notable example.

Except for Shah Abbas the Great, Shah Ismail I, Shah Tahmasp I, and Shah Abbas II, many of the Safavid rulers were ineffectual, often being more interested in their women, alcohol and other leisure activities. The end of Abbas II's reign in 1666, marked the beginning of the end of the Safavid dynasty. Despite falling revenues and military threats, many of the later shahs had lavish lifestyles. Shah Soltan Hosain (1694–1722) in particular was known for his love of wine and disinterest in governance.[137]

The declining country was repeatedly raided on its frontiers. Finally, Ghilzai Pashtun chieftain named Mir Wais Khan began a rebellion in Kandahar and defeated the Safavid army under the Iranian Georgian governor over the region, Gurgin Khan. In 1722, Peter the Great of neighbouring Imperial Russia launched the Russo-Persian War (1722–1723), capturing many of Iran's Caucasian territories, including Derbent, Shaki, Baku, but also Gilan, Mazandaran and Astrabad. In the midst of chaos, in the same year of 1722, an Afghan army led by Mir Wais' son Mahmud marched across eastern Iran, besieged and took Isfahan. Mahmud proclaimed himself 'Shah' of Persia. Meanwhile, Persia's imperial rivals, the Ottomans and the Russians, took advantage of the chaos in the country to seize more territory for themselves.[138] By these events, the Safavid dynasty had effectively ended. In 1724, conform the Treaty of Constantinople, the Ottomans and the Russians agreed to divide large portions of Iran, which they had conquered between themselves.[139]

Nader Shah and his successors

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Nader Shah
The Afsharid Empire at its greatest extent in 1741–1745 under Nader Shah

Iran's territorial integrity was restored by a native Iranian Turkic Afshar warlord from Khorasan, Nader Shah. He defeated and banished the Afghans, defeated the Ottomans, reinstalled the Safavids on the throne, and negotiated Russian withdrawal from Iran's Caucasian territories, with the Treaty of Resht and Treaty of Ganja. By 1736, Nader had become so powerful he was able to depose the Safavids and have himself crowned shah. Nader was one of the last great conquerors of Asia and briefly presided over what was probably the most powerful military force in the world.[140] To financially support his wars against Iran's arch-rival, the Ottoman Empire, he fixed his sights on the weak but rich Mughal Empire to the east. In 1739, accompanied by his loyal Caucasian subjects including Erekle II,[141][142]: 55  he invaded Mughal India, defeated a numerically superior Mughal army in less than three hours, and completely sacked and looted Delhi, bringing back immense wealth to Iran. On his way back, he also conquered all the Uzbek khanates – except for Kokand – and made the Uzbeks his vassals. He also firmly re-established Iranian rule over the entire Caucasus, Bahrain, as well as large parts of Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Undefeated for years, his defeat in Dagestan, following guerrilla rebellions by the Lezgins and the assassination attempt on him near Mazandaran is often considered the turning point in Nader's impressive career. To his frustration, the Dagestanis resorted to guerrilla warfare, and Nader with his conventional army could make little headway against them.[143] At the Battle of Andalal and the Battle of Avaria, Nader's army was crushingly defeated and he lost half of his entire force, forcing him to flee for the mountains.[144][better source needed] Though Nader managed to take most of Dagestan during his campaign, the effective guerrilla warfare as deployed by the Lezgins, but also the Avars and Laks, made the Iranian re-conquest of the particular North Caucasian region this time a short lived one; several years later, Nader was forced to withdraw. Around the same time, an assassination attempt was made on him near, which accelerated his descent into paranoia and megalomania. He blinded his sons, whom he suspected of the assassination attempts, and showed increasing cruelty against his subjects and officers. In his later years, this eventually provoked multiple revolts and, ultimately, his assassination in 1747.[145]

Nader Shah's death was followed by a period of anarchy as rival army commanders fought for power. Nader's own family, the Afsharids, were soon reduced to holding on to a small domain in Khorasan. Many of the Caucasian territories broke away in various Caucasian khanates. Ottomans regained lost territories in Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Oman and the Uzbek khanates of Bukhara and Khiva regained independence. Ahmad Shah Durrani, one of Nader's officers, founded an independent state which eventually became modern Afghanistan. Erekle II and Teimuraz II, who in 1744 had been made the kings of Kakheti and Kartli respectively by Nader for their loyal service,[142]: 55  capitalized on the eruption of instability and declared de facto independence. Erekle II assumed control over Kartli after Teimuraz II's death, thus unifying the two as the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, becoming the first Georgian ruler in three centuries to preside over a politically unified eastern Georgia.[146] Due to the frantic turn of events in mainland Iran he would be able to remain de facto autonomous through the Zand period.[147] From his capital Shiraz, Karim Khan of the Zand dynasty ruled "an island of relative calm and peace in an otherwise bloody and destructive period,"[148] however the extent of Zand power was confined to contemporary Iran and parts of the Caucasus. Karim Khan's death in 1779 led to yet another civil war in which the Qajar dynasty eventually triumphed and became kings of Iran. During the civil war, Iran permanently lost Basra in 1779 to the Ottomans, which had been captured during the Ottoman–Persian War (1775–76),[149] and Bahrain to Al Khalifa family after Bani Utbah invasion in 1783.[citation needed]

Late modern period

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Qajar dynasty (1796–1925)

[edit]

Agha Mohammad Khan emerged victorious out of the civil war that commenced with the death of the last Zand king. His reign is noted for the reemergence of a centrally led and united Iran. After the death of Nader Shah and the last of the Zands, most of Iran's Caucasian territories had broken away into various Caucasian khanates. Agha Mohammad Khan, like the Safavid kings and Nader Shah before him, viewed the region as no different from the territories in mainland Iran. Therefore, his first objective after having secured mainland Iran, was to reincorpate the Caucasus region into Iran.[150] Georgia was seen as one of the most integral territories.[147] For Agha Mohammad Khan, the resubjugation and reintegration of Georgia into the Iranian Empire was part of the same process that had brought Shiraz, Isfahan, and Tabriz under his rule.[147] As the Cambridge History of Iran states, its permanent secession was inconceivable and had to be resisted in the same way as one would resist an attempt at the separation of Fars or Gilan.[147] It was therefore natural for Agha Mohammad Khan to perform whatever necessary means in the Caucasus in order to subdue and reincorporate the recently lost regions following Nader Shah's death and the demise of the Zands, including putting down what in Iranian eyes was seen as treason on the part Erekle II.[147]

Agha Mohammad Khan subsequently demanded that Erekle renounce its 1783 treaty with Russia, and to submit again to Iranian suzerainty,[150] in return for peace and the security of his kingdom. The Ottomans, Iran's neighboring rival, recognized the latter's rights over Kartli and Kakheti for the first time in four centuries.[151] Heraclius appealed then to his theoretical protector, Empress Catherine II of Russia, pleading for at least 3,000 Russian troops,[151] but he was ignored, leaving Georgia to fend off the Persian threat alone.[152] Nevertheless, Heraclius II still rejected the Khan's ultimatum.[153] As a response, Agha Mohammad Khan invaded the Caucasus region after crossing the Aras river, and, while on his way to Georgia, he re-subjugated Iran's territories of the Erivan Khanate, Shirvan, Nakhchivan Khanate, Ganja khanate, Derbent Khanate, Baku khanate, Talysh Khanate, Shaki Khanate, Karabakh Khanate, which comprise modern-day Armenia, Azerbaijan, Dagestan, and Igdir. Having reached Georgia with his large army, he prevailed in the Battle of Krtsanisi, which resulted in the capture and sack of Tbilisi, as well as the effective resubjugation of Georgia.[154][155] Upon his return from his successful campaign in Tbilisi and in effective control over Georgia, together with some 15,000 Georgian captives that were moved back to mainland Iran,[152] Agha Mohammad was formally crowned Shah in 1796 in the Mughan plain, just as his predecessor Nader Shah was about sixty years earlier. Agha Mohammad Shah was later assassinated in 1797 while preparing a second expedition against Georgia in Shusha[156] (now part of the Republic of Azerbaijan) and its King Heraclius II.

The reassertion of Iranian hegemony over Georgia did not last long; in 1799 the Russians marched into Tbilisi.[157] The Russians were already actively occupied with an expansionist policy towards its neighboring empires to its south, namely the Ottoman Empire and the successive Iranian kingdoms, since the late 17th/early 18th century. The next two years following Russia's entrance into Tbilisi were a time of confusion, and the weakened and devastated Georgian kingdom, with its capital half in ruins, was easily absorbed by Russia in 1801.[152][153] As Iran could not permit or allow the cession of Transcaucasia and Dagestan, which had been an integral part of Iran for centuries,[158] this would lead directly to the wars of several years later, namely the Russo-Persian Wars of 1804-1813 and 1826–1828. The outcome of these two wars (in the Treaty of Gulistan and the Treaty of Turkmenchay, respectively) proved for the irrevocable forced cession and loss of what is now eastern Georgia, Dagestan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan to Imperial Russia.[159][154]

The area to the north of the river Aras, among which the territory of the contemporary republic of Azerbaijan, eastern Georgia, Dagestan, and Armenia were Iranian territory until they were occupied by Russia in the course of the 19th century.[160]

Migration of Caucasian Muslims

[edit]
Persian Cossack Brigade in Tabriz in 1909

Following the official loss of vast territories in the Caucasus, major demographic shifts were bound to take place. Following the 1804–1814 war, but also per the 1826–1828 war which ceded the last territories, large migrations of so-called Caucasian Muhajirs set off for mainland Iran. Some of these groups included the Ayrums, Qarapapaqs, Circassians, Shia Lezgins, and other Transcaucasian Muslims.[161]

After the Battle of Ganja of 1804, many thousands of Ayrums and Qarapapaqs were settled in Tabriz. During the remaining part of the 1804–1813 war, as well as through the 1826–1828 war, a large number of the Ayrums and Qarapapaqs that were still remaining in newly conquered Russian territories were settled in and migrated to Solduz (in modern-day Iran's West Azerbaijan province).[162] As the Cambridge History of Iran states; "The steady encroachment of Russian troops along the frontier in the Caucasus, General Yermolov's brutal punitive expeditions and misgovernment, drove large numbers of Muslims, and even some Georgian Christians, into exile in Iran."[163]

From 1864 until the early 20th century, another mass expulsion took place of Caucasian Muslims as a result of the Russian victory in the Caucasian War. Others simply voluntarily refused to live under Christian Russian rule, and thus departed for Turkey or Iran. These migrations once again, towards Iran, included masses of Caucasian Azerbaijanis, other Transcaucasian Muslims, as well as many North Caucasian Muslims, such as Circassians, Shia Lezgins and Laks.[161][164] Many of these migrants would prove to play a pivotal role in further Iranian history, as they formed most of the ranks of the Persian Cossack Brigade, which was established in the late 19th century.[165] The initial ranks of the brigade would be entirely composed of Circassians and other Caucasian Muhajirs.[165] This brigade would prove decisive in the following decades in Qajar history.

Furthermore, the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay included the official rights for the Russian Empire to encourage settling of Armenians from Iran in the newly conquered Russian territories.[166][167] Until the mid-fourteenth century, Armenians had constituted a majority in Eastern Armenia.[168] At the close of the fourteenth century, after Timur's campaigns, the Timurid Renaissance flourished, and Islam had become the dominant faith, and Armenians became a minority in Eastern Armenia.[168] After centuries of constant warfare on the Armenian plateau, many Armenians chose to emigrate and settle elsewhere. Following Shah Abbas I's massive relocation of Armenians and Muslims in 1604–05,[169] their numbers dwindled even further.

At the time of the Russian invasion of Iran, some 80% of the population of Iranian Armenia were Muslims (Persians, Turkics, and Kurds) whereas Christian Armenians constituted a minority of about 20%.[170] As a result of the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), Iran was forced to cede Iranian Armenia (which also constituted the present-day Armenia), to the Russians.[171][172] After the Russian administration took hold of Iranian Armenia, the ethnic make-up shifted, and thus for the first time in more than four centuries, ethnic Armenians started to form a majority once again in one part of historic Armenia.[173] The new Russian administration encouraged the settling of ethnic Armenians from Iran proper and Ottoman Turkey. As a result, by 1832, the number of ethnic Armenians had matched that of the Muslims.[170] It would be only after the Crimean War and the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878, which brought another influx of Turkish Armenians, that ethnic Armenians once again established a solid majority in Eastern Armenia.[174] Nevertheless, the city of Erivan retained a Muslim majority up to the twentieth century.[174] According to the traveller H. F. B. Lynch, the city of Erivan was about 50% Armenian and 50% Muslim (Tatars[a] i.e. Azeris and Persians) in the early 1890s.[177]

Fath Ali Shah's reign saw increased diplomatic contacts with the West and the beginning of intense European diplomatic rivalries over Iran. His grandson Mohammad Shah, who succeeded him in 1834, fell under the Russian influence and made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Herat. When Mohammad Shah died in 1848 the succession passed to his son Naser al-Din Shah Qajar, who proved to be the ablest and most successful of the Qajar sovereigns. He founded the first modern hospital in Iran.[178]

Constitutional Revolution and deposition

[edit]

The Great Persian Famine of 1870–1871 is believed to have caused the death of two million people.[179]

A new era in the history of Iran dawned with the Persian Constitutional Revolution against the shah in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The shah managed to remain in power, granting a limited constitution in 1906 (making the country a constitutional monarchy). The first Majlis (parliament) was convened on 7 October 1906. The discovery of petroleum in 1908 by the British in Khuzestan spawned intense renewed interest in Persia by the British Empire (see William Knox D'Arcy and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, now BP). Britain's influence was solidified by the establishment of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the 1860s and the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889.[180] By the end of the 19th century, European interference became so pronounced that Iran's central government required Anglo-Russian approval for ministerial appointments.[181] Control of Persia remained contested between the United Kingdom and Russia, in what became known as The Great Game, and codified in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which divided Iran into spheres of influence, regardless of her national sovereignty.

During World War I, the country was occupied by British, Ottoman and Russian forces but was essentially neutral (see Persian Campaign). In 1919, after the Russian Revolution and their withdrawal, Britain attempted to establish a protectorate in Iran, which was unsuccessful. The Constitutionalist movement of Gilan and the central power vacuum caused by the instability of the Qajar government resulted in the rise of Reza Khan, later Reza Shah Pahlavi, who established the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. In 1921, Reza Khan, an officer of the Persian Cossack Brigade, (along with Seyyed Zia'eddin Tabatabai) led a military led a coup against governing officials (leaving the Qajar monarchy nominally head of state).[182] In 1925, after being prime minister for two years, Reza Khan did depose the Qajar dynasty and became the first shah of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Pahlavi era (1925–1979)

[edit]

Reza Shah (1925–1941)

[edit]

Reza Shah ruled for almost 16 years until 16 September 1941, when he was forced to abdicate by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. He established an authoritarian government that valued nationalism, militarism, secularism and anti-communism combined with strict censorship and state propaganda.[183] Reza Shah introduced many socio-economic reforms, reorganizing the army, government administration, and finances.[184] To his supporters, his reign brought "law and order, discipline, central authority, and modern amenities – schools, trains, buses, radios, cinemas, and telephones".[185] However, his attempts of modernisation have been criticised for being "too fast"[186] and "superficial",[187] and his reign a time of "oppression, corruption, taxation, lack of authenticity" with "security typical of police states."[185]

Many of the new laws and regulations created resentment among devout Muslims and the clergy. For example, mosques were required to use chairs; most men were required to wear western clothing, including a hat with a brim; women were encouraged to discard the hijab—hijab was eventually banned in 1936; men and women were allowed to congregate freely, violating Islamic mixing of the sexes. Tensions boiled over in 1935, when bazaaris and villagers rose up in rebellion at the Imam Reza shrine in Mashhad to protest against plans for the hijab ban, chanting slogans such as 'The Shah is a new Yezid.' Dozens were killed and hundreds were injured when troops finally quelled the unrest.[188]

World War II

[edit]

While German armies were highly successful against the Soviet Union, the Iranian government expected Germany to win the war and establish a powerful force on its borders. It rejected British and Soviet demands to expel German residents from Iran. In response, the two Allies invaded in August 1941 and easily overwhelmed the weak Iranian army in Operation Countenance. Iran became the major conduit of Allied Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union. The purpose was to secure Iranian oil fields and ensure Allied supply lines (see Persian Corridor). Iran remained officially neutral. Its monarch Rezā Shāh was deposed during the subsequent occupation and replaced with his young son Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.[189]

At the Tehran Conference of 1943, the Allies issued the Tehran Declaration which guaranteed the post-war independence and boundaries of Iran. However, when the war actually ended, Soviet troops stationed in northwestern Iran not only refused to withdraw but backed revolts that established short-lived, pro-Soviet separatist national states in the northern regions of Azerbaijan and Iranian Kurdistan, the Azerbaijan People's Government and the Republic of Kurdistan respectively, in late 1945. Soviet troops did not withdraw from Iran proper until May 1946 after receiving a promise of oil concessions. The Soviet republics in the north were soon overthrown and the oil concessions were revoked.[190][191]

Mohammad-Reza Shah (1941–1979)

[edit]
Tehran men celebrating the 1953 Iranian coup d'état

Initially there were hopes that post-occupation Iran could become a constitutional monarchy. The new, young Shah Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi initially took a very hands-off role in government, and allowed parliament to hold a lot of power. Some elections were held in the first shaky years, although they remained mired in corruption. Parliament became chronically unstable, and from the 1947 to 1951 period Iran saw the rise and fall of six different prime ministers. Pahlavi increased his political power by convening the Iran Constituent Assembly, 1949, which finally formed the Senate of Iran—a legislative upper house allowed for in the 1906 constitution but never brought into being. The new senators were largely supportive of Pahlavi, as he had intended.

In 1951 Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq received the vote required from the parliament to nationalize the British-owned oil industry, in a situation known as the Abadan Crisis. Despite British pressure, including an economic blockade, the nationalization continued. Mosaddeq was briefly removed from power in 1952 but was quickly re-appointed by the Shah, due to a popular uprising in support of the premier, and he, in turn, forced the Shah into a brief exile in August 1953 after a failed military coup by Imperial Guard Colonel Nematollah Nassiri.

1953: U.S. aided coup removes Mosaddeq
[edit]

Shortly thereafter on 19 August a successful coup was headed by retired army general Fazlollah Zahedi, aided by the United States (CIA)[192] with the active support of the British (MI6) (known as Operation Ajax and Operation Boot to the respective agencies).[193] The coup—with a black propaganda campaign designed to turn the population against Mosaddeq[194] — forced Mosaddeq from office. Mosaddeq was arrested and tried for treason. Found guilty, his sentence was reduced to house arrest on his family estate while his foreign minister, Hossein Fatemi, was executed. Zahedi succeeded him as prime minister, and suppressed opposition to the Shah, specifically the National Front and Communist Tudeh Party.

1971 film about Iran under the Shah

Iran was ruled as an autocracy under the Shah with American support from that time until the revolution. The Iranian government entered into agreement with an international consortium of foreign companies which ran the Iranian oil facilities for the next 25 years, splitting profits fifty-fifty with Iran but not allowing Iran to audit their accounts or have members on their board of directors. In 1957 martial law was ended after 16 years and Iran became closer to the West, joining the Baghdad Pact and receiving military and economic aid from the US. In 1961, Iran initiated a series of economic, social, agrarian and administrative reforms to modernize the country that became known as the Shah's White Revolution.

The core of this program was land reform. Modernization and economic growth proceeded at an unprecedented rate, fueled by Iran's vast petroleum reserves, the third-largest in the world. However, the reforms, including the White Revolution, did not greatly improve economic conditions and the liberal pro-Western policies alienated certain Islamic religious and political groups. In early June 1963 several days of massive rioting occurred in support of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini following the cleric's arrest for a speech attacking the Shah.

Two years later, premier Hassan Ali Mansur was assassinated and the internal security service, SAVAK, became more violently active. In the 1970s, leftist guerilla groups such as Mujaheddin-e-Khalq (MEK), emerged and contributed to overthrowing the Shah during the 1979 Iranian Revolution.

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi with US President Richard Nixon in Tehran, Iran, 30 May 1972

Nearly a hundred Iran political prisoners were killed by the SAVAK during the decade before the revolution and many more were arrested and tortured.[195] The Islamic clergy, headed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (who had been exiled in 1964), were becoming increasingly vociferous.

Iran greatly increased its defense budget and by the early 1970s was the region's strongest military power. Bilateral relations with Iraq were not good, mainly due to a dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway. In November 1971, Iranian forces seized control of three islands at the mouth of the Persian Gulf; in response, Iraq expelled thousands of Iranian nationals. Following a number of clashes in April 1969, Iran abrogated the 1937 accord and demanded a renegotiation.

In mid-1973, the Shah returned the oil industry to national control. Following the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, Iran did not join the Arab oil embargo against the West and Israel. Instead, it used the situation to raise oil prices, using the money gained for modernisation and to increase defense spending.

A border dispute between Iraq and Iran was resolved with the signing of the Algiers Accord on 6 March 1975.

Contemporary period

[edit]

Revolution and the Islamic Republic (1979 to present)

[edit]
Ayatollah Khomeini returns to Iran after 14 years exile in France on 1 February 1979.

The Iranian Revolution, also known as the Islamic Revolution,[196] was the revolution that transformed Iran from an absolute monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to an Islamic republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, one of the leaders of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic.[23] Its time span can be said to have begun in January 1978 with the first major demonstrations,[197] and concluded with the approval of the new theocratic Constitution—whereby Ayatollah Khomeini became Supreme Leader of the country—in December 1979.[198]

In between, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi left the country for exile in January 1979 after strikes and demonstrations paralyzed the country, and on 1 February 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Tehran.[198] The final collapse of the Pahlavi dynasty occurred shortly after on 11 February when Iran's military declared itself "neutral" after guerrillas and rebel troops overwhelmed troops loyal to the Shah in armed street fighting. Iran officially became an Islamic Republic on 1 April 1979, after Iranians overwhelmingly approved a national referendum to make it so a day before.[22]

Ideology of the 1979 Iranian Revolution

[edit]

The ideology of the revolutionary government was populist, nationalist and most of all Shi'a Islamic. Its unique constitution is based on the concept of velayat-e faqih the idea advanced by Khomeini that Muslims – in fact everyone – requires "guardianship", in the form of rule or supervision by the leading Islamic jurist or jurists.[199] Khomeini served as this ruling jurist, or supreme leader, until his death in 1989.

Iran's rapidly modernising, capitalist economy was replaced by populist and Islamic economic and cultural policies. Much industry was nationalized, laws and schools Islamicized, and Western influences banned.

The Islamic revolution also created great impact around the world. In the non-Muslim world it has changed the image of Islam, generating much interest in the politics and spirituality of Islam,[200] along with "fear and distrust towards Islam" and particularly the Islamic Republic and its founder.[201]

Khomeini (1979–1989)

[edit]

Khomeini served as leader of the revolution or as Supreme Leader of Iran from 1979 to his death on 3 June 1989. This era was dominated by the consolidation of the revolution into a theocratic republic under Khomeini, and by the costly and bloody war with Iraq.

The consolidation lasted until 1982–3,[202][203] as Iran coped with the damage to its economy, military, and apparatus of government, and protests and uprisings by secularists, leftists, and more traditional Muslims—formerly ally revolutionaries but now rivals—were effectively suppressed. Many political opponents were executed by the new regimes. Following the events of the revolution, Marxist guerrillas and federalist parties revolted in regions comprising Khuzistan, Kurdistan and Gonbad-e Qabus, resulting in severe fighting between rebels and revolutionary forces. These revolts began in April 1979 and lasted between several months to over a year, depending on the region. The Kurdish uprising, led by the KDPI, was the most violent, lasting until 1983 and resulting in 10,000 casualties.

In the summer of 1979 a new constitution giving Khomeini a powerful post as guardian jurist Supreme Leader[204] and a clerical Council of Guardians power over legislation and elections, was drawn up by an Assembly of Experts for Constitution. The new constitution was approved by referendum in December 1979.

Iran hostage crisis (1979–1981)

[edit]

An early event in the history of the Islamic republic that had a long-term impact was the Iran hostage crisis. Following the admitting of the former Shah of Iran into the United States for cancer treatment, on 4 November 1979, Iranian students seized US embassy personnel, labeling the embassy a "den of spies."[205] Fifty-two hostages were held for 444 days until January 1981.[206] An American military attempt to rescue the hostages failed.[207]

The takeover was enormously popular in Iran, where thousands gathered in support of the hostage takers, and it is thought to have strengthened the prestige of the Ayatollah Khomeini and consolidated the hold of anti-Americanism. It was at this time that Khomeini began referring to America as the "Great Satan." In America, where it was considered a violation of the long-standing principle of international law that diplomats may be expelled but not held captive, it created a powerful anti-Iranian backlash. Relations between the two countries have remained deeply antagonistic and American international sanctions have hurt Iran's economy.[208]

Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)

[edit]
An Iranian soldier with gas mask during the Iran–Iraq War

During this political and social crisis, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein attempted to take advantage of the disorder of the Revolution, the weakness of the Iranian military and the revolution's antagonism with Western governments. The once-strong Iranian military had been disbanded during the revolution, and with the Shah ousted, Hussein had ambitions to position himself as the new strong man of the Middle East. He sought to expand Iraq's access to the Persian Gulf by acquiring territories that Iraq had claimed earlier from Iran during the Shah's rule.

Of chief importance to Iraq was Khuzestan which not only boasted a substantial Arab population, but rich oil fields as well. On the unilateral behalf of the United Arab Emirates, the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs became objectives as well. With these ambitions in mind, Hussein planned a full-scale assault on Iran, boasting that his forces could reach the capital within three days. On 22 September 1980, the Iraqi army invaded Iran at Khuzestan, precipitating the Iran–Iraq War. The attack took revolutionary Iran completely by surprise.

Although Saddam Hussein's forces made several early advances, Iranian forces had pushed the Iraqi army back into Iraq by 1982. Khomeini sought to export his Islamic revolution westward into Iraq, especially on the majority Shi'a Arabs living in the country. The war then continued for six more years until 1988, when Khomeini, in his words, "drank the cup of poison" and accepted a truce mediated by the United Nations.

Tens of thousands of Iranian civilians and military personnel were killed when Iraq used chemical weapons in its warfare. Iraq was financially backed by Egypt, the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states, the United States (beginning in 1983), France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Brazil, and the People's Republic of China (which also sold weapons to Iran).

There were more than 182,000 Kurdish victims[209] of Iraq's chemical weapons during the eight-year war. The total Iranian casualties of the war were estimated to be between 500,000 and 1,000,000. Almost all relevant international agencies have confirmed that Saddam engaged in chemical warfare to blunt Iranian human wave attacks; these agencies unanimously confirmed that Iran never used chemical weapons during the war.[210][211][212][213]

Starting on 19 July 1988 and lasting for about five months the government systematically executed thousands of political prisoners across Iran. This is commonly referred to as the 1988 executions of Iranian political prisoners or the 1988 Iranian Massacre. The main target was the membership of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI), although a lesser number of political prisoners from other leftist groups were also included such as the Tudeh Party of Iran (Communist Party).[214][215] Estimates of the number executed vary from 1,400[216] to 30,000.[217][218]

Khamenei (1989–present)

[edit]

On his deathbed in 1989, Khomeini appointed a 25-man Constitutional Reform Council which named then president Ali Khamenei as the next Supreme Leader, and made a number of changes to Iran's constitution.[219] A smooth transition followed Khomeini's death on 3 June 1989. While Khamenei lacked Khomeini's "charisma and clerical standing", he developed a network of supporters within Iran's armed forces and its economically powerful religious foundations.[220] Under his reign Iran's regime is said – by at least one observer – to resemble more "a clerical oligarchy ... than an autocracy."[220]

Rafsanjani: pragmatic conservativism (1989–1997)

[edit]

Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani succeeded Khamenei as president on 3 August 1989, as a pragmatic conservative who served two four-year terms and focused his efforts on rebuilding the country's economy and infrastructure damaged by war, though hampered by low oil prices. Rafsanjani sought to restore confidence in the government among the general population by privatizing the companies that had been nationalized in the first few years of the Islamic Republic, as well as by bringing in qualified technocrats to manage the economy. The state of their economy also influenced the government to move towards ending their diplomatic isolation. This was achieved through the reestablishment of normalized relations with neighbors such as Saudi Arabia and an attempt to improve its reputation in the region with assertions that its revolution was not exportable to other states.[221] During the Persian Gulf War in 1991 the country remained neutral, restricting its action to the condemnation of the U.S. and allowing fleeing Iraqi aircraft and refugees into the country.[citation needed]

Iran in the 1990s had a greater secular behavior and admiration for Western popular culture than in the previous decades. This admiration had become a way in which the urban population expressed their resentment at the invasive Islamic policies of the government.[222] The pressures from the population placed on the new Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei led to an uneasy alliance between him and President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Through this alliance they attempted to hinder the ulama's ability to gain further control of the state. In 1989, they created a sequence of constitutional amendments that removed the office of prime minister and increased the scope of presidential power. However, these new amendments did not curtail the powers of the Supreme Leader of Iran in any way; this position still contained the ultimate authority over the armed forces, the making of war and peace, the final say in foreign policy, and the right to intervene in the legislative process whenever he deemed it necessary.[222]

Khatami: reformers and conservatives struggle (1997–2005)

[edit]
Mohammad Khatami

President Rafsanjani's economic policies led to stronger relations with the outside world. But his government's relaxation of the enforcement of certain regulations on social behavior were met with some responses of widespread disenchantment among the general population with the ulama as rulers of the country.[222] This led to the defeat of the government's candidate for president in 1997, who had the backing of the supreme Islamic jurist. He was beaten by an independent candidate from the Reformists, Mohammad Khatami. He received 69% of the vote and enjoyed particular support from two groups of the population that had felt ostracized by the practices of the state: women and youth. The younger generations in the country had been too young to experience the shah's regime or the revolution that ended it, and now they resented the restrictions placed on their daily lives under the Islamic Republic. Mohammad Khatami's presidency was soon marked by tensions between the reform-minded government and an increasingly conservative and vocal clergy. This rift reached a climax in July 1999 when massive anti-government protests erupted in the streets of Tehran. The disturbances lasted over a week before police and pro-government vigilantes dispersed the crowds.

During his first term, President Khatami oversaw Iran’s second five-year development plan and introduced a new plan for 2000–2004 focused on economic reconstruction alongside social and political reforms. The plan aimed for privatization, job creation, and reduced subsidies but fell short on employment targets.[223] Despite this, Iran saw improved economic indicators: real GDP growth rose to nearly 6 percent, unemployment and inflation declined, external debt dropped significantly, and the government authorized private banks for the first time since 1979.[224] Poverty levels also decreased modestly.[225]

In the Majlis elections of 2000, for the first time liberals and Khatami’s supporters gained parliamentary control from conservatives.[226] That same year, following the adoption of a new press law, authorities banned the publication of 16 reformist newspapers.[226]

Khatami was re-elected in June 2001 but his efforts were repeatedly blocked by the conservatives in the parliament. Conservative elements within Iran's government moved to undermine the reformist movement, banning liberal newspapers and disqualifying candidates for parliamentary elections. This clampdown on dissent, combined with the failure of Khatami to reform the government, led to growing political apathy among Iran's youth.

Following the September 11 attacks in 2001, Iran initially was sympathetic with the United States.[227] However, relations deteriorated sharply after President George W. Bush labeled Iran part of the "Axis of Evil" in 2002, accusing the country of pursuing weapons of mass destruction that posed a threat to the U.S.[228][229]

Despite firm U.S. opposition, in 2002 Russian teams commenced work on Iran’s inaugural nuclear reactor at Bushehr.[226]

In June 2003, anti-government protests by several thousand students took place in Tehran.[230][231] Shirin Ebadi, a lawyer and human rights advocate, became the first Iranian to win the Nobel Peace Prize in 2003. She had been the country's first female judge until being forced to step down after the 1979 revolution.[226] The response to the award in Iran was mixed—enthusiastic supporters greeted her at the airport upon her return, the conservative media underplayed it, and Khatami criticized it as political.[232][233]

A violent earthquake struck the Kerman province of southeastern Iran in December 2003. The earthquake was particularly destructive in Bam, with the death toll amounting to at least 34,000 people and injuring up to 200,000.[234]

After the hardline Council of Guardians disqualified thousands of reformist candidates, conservatives regained control of parliament in the elections of 2004.[226]

Ahmadinejad: hardline conservatism (2005–2013)

[edit]
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad

In the 2005 Iranian presidential election, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, mayor of Tehran, became the sixth president of Iran, after winning 62 percent of the vote in the run-off poll, against former president Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.[235] During the authorization ceremony he kissed Khamenei's hand in demonstration of his loyalty to him.[236][237]

During this time, the American invasion of Iraq, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime and empowerment of its Shi'a majority, all strengthened Iran's position in the region particularly in the mainly Shi'a south of Iraq, where a top Shia leader in the week of 3 September 2006 renewed demands for an autonomous Shi'a region.[238] At least one commentator (former U.S. Defense Secretary William S. Cohen) has stated that as of 2009 Iran's growing power has eclipsed anti-Zionism as the major foreign policy issue in the Middle East.[239]

During 2005 and 2006, there were claims that the United States and Israel were planning to attack Iran, with the most cited reason being Iran's civilian nuclear energy program which the United States and some other states fear could lead to a nuclear weapons program. China and Russia opposed military action of any sort and opposed economic sanctions. Khamenei issued a fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons. The fatwa was cited in an official statement by the Iranian government at an August 2005 meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.[240][241] However, The IAEA reported in 2008 that Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons research remained “a matter of serious concern,” prompting European Union countries to agree on new sanctions.[242] Additional U.N. sanctions followed in 2010.[226] In 2011, Iran announced that the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant had been connected to the national electricity grid for the first time.[226] Eventually, the sanctions severely impacted Iran’s economy, contributing to a dramatic depreciation of the rial, which reportedly fell to a record low of 35,000 to the US dollar—an 80% drop since late 2011.[243]

In 2007, a diplomatic standoff erupted between Iran and the UK after Iranian forces detained 15 British sailors and marines near the Shatt al-Arab waterway, which forms part of the Iran-Iraq border.[226]

In 2009, Ahmadinejad's reelection was hotly disputed and marred by large protests that formed the "greatest domestic challenge" to the leadership of the Islamic Republic "in 30 years". The resulting social unrest is widely known as the Iranian Green Movement.[244] Reformist opponent Mir-Hossein Mousavi and his supporters alleged voting irregularities and by 1 July 2009, 1000 people had been arrested and 20 killed in street demonstrations.[245] Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other Islamic officials blamed foreign powers for fomenting the protest.[246]

In 2010, Stuxnet was reportedly found in the Natanz Nuclear Facility.[226] Stuxnet is a malicious computer worm[247] thought to have been in development since at least 2005. Stuxnet targets supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems and is believed to be responsible for causing substantial damage to the Iran nuclear program.[248] Although neither the United States nor Israel has openly admitted responsibility, multiple independent news organizations claim Stuxnet to be a cyberweapon built jointly by the two countries in a collaborative effort known as Operation Olympic Games.[249][250][251] The program, started during the Bush administration, was rapidly expanded within the first months of Barack Obama's presidency.[252]

On 14 February 2011, widespread protests erupted in Tehran as thousands gathered in response to opposition calls, expressing solidarity with pro-democracy movements in the region and reviving dissent over the contested 2009 presidential election. Security forces quickly suppressed the demonstrations, resulting in two deaths and numerous injuries. Further protests followed, including on 20 February and 1 March, when the opposition reported around 200 arrests. Authorities subsequently managed to prevent large-scale demonstrations.[253]

Reports of growing tensions between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei emerged during this period. In the 2012 parliamentary elections, Ahmadinejad’s allies lost ground to factions loyal to Khamenei, while the opposition Green Movement remained banned. Its leaders, Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, were placed under house arrest in early 2011 and have remained out of public view, with some government supporters demanding their execution.[253]

Rouhani: pragmatism (2013–2021)

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Hassan Rouhani 2017

On 15 June 2013, Hassan Rouhani won the presidential election in Iran, with a total number of 36,704,156 ballots cast; Rouhani won 18,613,329 votes. In his press conference one day after election day, Rouhani reiterated his promise to recalibrate Iran's relations with the world.[254]

On 14 July 2015, after years of negotiations, Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States, plus Germany)[255] together with the European Union finalized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal.[256] The agreement aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from international sanctions.[257] It followed the 2013 Joint Plan of Action, an interim deal that opened formal negotiations.[258] By April 2015, negotiators had agreed on a framework that set the stage for the final accord in Vienna.[259]

Under the JCPOA, Iran agreed to significant restrictions on its nuclear activities, including limits on uranium enrichment levels, the number and type of operating centrifuges, and the size of its enriched uranium stockpile. Key facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Arak were to be repurposed for civilian research and medical uses. Iran also accepted more intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify compliance. In return, it received relief from nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States, although many other U.S. sanctions remained in place, especially those targeting Iran’s missile program and regional activities.[260]

Beginning on 28 December 2017, protests known as the Dey protests spread across Iran, starting over economic grievances in Mashhad but quickly expanding to political opposition to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the theocratic system.[261][262] Marking the most serious unrest since 2009, the largely leaderless protests[263][264] featured anti-regime chants and attacks on government sites,[265] with at least twenty-one protesters and two security personnel killed, and around 3,700 arrested by early January 2018.[266] In response, thousands of government supporters held pro-government rallies in multiple cities.[267]

In May 2018, Donald Trump decided to pull out of the JCPOA, announcing he would reimpose economic sanctions on Iran effective from 4 November that year.[268][269] This marked the beginning of the Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign, an effort to force Iran to renegotiate the nuclear agreement by imposing intensified sanctions.[270]

On 22 September 2018, the Ahvaz military parade was attacked by gunmen in the southwestern Iranian city of Ahvaz.[271][272] The shooters killed 25 people, including soldiers of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and civilian bystanders.[273] The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack.[274] Iran blamed "militants in Syria"[275] and claimed the "U.S. and the Gulf states enabled the attack" and vowed revenge.[276] The U.S.,[277] Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates rejected the accusation.[278]

From mid-March to April 2019 widespread flash flooding affected large parts of Iran, most severely in Golestan, Fars, Khuzestan, Lorestan, and other provinces. Iran was hit by three major waves of rain and flooding over the course of two weeks[279] which led to flooding in at least 26 of Iran's 31 provinces.[280] At least 70 people died nationwide.[280]

The 2019–2020 Iranian protests began in response to a 50–200% fuel price increase[281][282] and quickly spread to 21 cities,[283][284] becoming the most violent unrest since the 1979 revolution.[285][286] Security forces reportedly shot protesters from rooftops, helicopters, and at close range, killing around 1,500 people according to U.S. sources,[287][288][289], while Amnesty International described efforts to cover up the scale of the violence.[290] Protesters attacked 731 banks, 50 military bases, and nine religious centers,[291][286] prompting the government to impose a near-total internet blackout for six days.[292] The uprising was crushed within three days,[293] though sporadic protests continued.

On 3 January 2020, the United States military executed a drone strike at Baghdad Airport, killing Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the Quds Force, an elite branch of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).[294] The assassination sharply increased tensions between the two countries. Iran vowed retaliation, and on 8 January launched missile attacks on U.S. forces based in Iraq, marking the first direct military exchange between Iran and the U.S. since 1988. The same day, the IRGC mistakenly shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752. Following these events, no further military escalation occurred.[295]

The 2020 parliamentary elections in Iran were marked by historically low voter turnout, officially reported at 42.6%—the lowest since the 1979 revolution. The elections took place in the wake of widespread public disillusionment following the violent crackdown on protests in late 2019, which severely damaged the credibility of President Hassan Rouhani and the reformist camp. As a result, conservative candidates won a dominant majority in the parliament, securing 221 out of 290 seats, while reformists managed to win only a small fraction. The outcome was widely seen as a significant blow to Rouhani ahead of the end of his term in 2021.[296]

The COVID-19 pandemic in Iran led to 7,627,863[297] confirmed cases of COVID-19 and 146,837[297] deaths. The first cases were reported in Qom on 19 February 2020.[298] The government responded by cancelling public events, closing institutions and shrines,[299][300] and requesting a $5 billion emergency loan from the IMF.[301] Initial resistance to quarantines and travel restrictions contributed to the virus’s spread before a ban on intercity travel was implemented.[300][302] After restrictions eased in April, cases surged again, peaking in June and July.[303][304] Despite these rising case numbers, the government had no option but to keep the economy open, as it was already under strain from U.S. sanctions and had suffered a further 15% GDP decline due to the pandemic by June 2020.[305] Estimates of deaths have varied widely, with some leaked data suggesting a much higher toll than official figures,[306][307] and the government faced allegations of mismanagement and censorship.[308] The virus also impacted Iran’s leadership, infecting 23 MPs by early March and killing at least 17 officials by late March.[309][310]

Ebrahim Raisi (2021–2024)

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Ebrahim Raisi in 2021

On 3 August 2021 Ebrahim Raisi was elected 8th President of Iran.[311]

On 16 September 2022, 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Amini died in a hospital in Tehran, Iran, under suspicious circumstances.[312] The Guidance Patrol, the religious morality police of Iran's government, had arrested Amini for allegedly not wearing the hijab in accordance with government standards. The Law Enforcement Command of the Islamic Republic of Iran stated that she had a heart attack at a police station, collapsed, and fell into a coma before being transferred to a hospital.[313] However, eyewitnesses reported that she was severely beaten and that she died as a result of police brutality,[314][315] which was denied by the Iranian authorities.[316] Amini's death resulted in a series of protests described as more widespread and larger than previous large protests.[317][318] Iran Human Rights reported that by December 2022 at least 476 people had been killed by security forces attacking protests across the country.[319][320] By spring 2023, the protests had largely subsided,[321][322] ultimately leaving the political leadership unchanged and firmly entrenched in power.[323]

In October 2023, an IAEA report estimated Iran had increased its uranium stockpile 22 times over the 2015 agreed JCPOA limit.[324]

On 1 April 2024, Israel's air strike on an Iranian consulate building in the Syrian capital Damascus killed an important senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Brig Gen Mohammad Reza Zahedi.[325] In retaliation for the Israeli strike, Iran attacked Israel with over 300 drones and missiles on 13 April. However, the Iranian attack was mainly intercepted either outside Israeli airspace or over the country itself. It was the biggest missile attack in Iranian history, and its first ever direct attack on Israel.[326] It was followed by a retaliatory missile strike by Israel on Isfahan, Iran on 19 April.[327]

On 19 May 2024, Ebrahim Raisi died in a helicopter crash in the country’s East Azerbaijan province.[328] First Vice President Mohammad Mokhber was appointed acting president after the death of President Raisi.[329]

Masoud Pezeshkian (2024–present)

[edit]
Masoud Pezeshkian

On 28 July 2024, Masoud Pezeshkian was formally endorsed as Iran's new president by Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Pezeshkian, a reformist, won in a presidential election runoff on 5 July.[330] Three days later, Ismail Haniyeh, political chief of Palestinian political and military organisation Hamas, was assassinated in Iran’s capital, Tehran, where he was to attend the inauguration ceremony of Iran’s President Masoud Pezeshkian.[331]

On 1 October 2024, Iran launched about 180 ballistic missiles at Israel in retaliation for assassinations of Haniyeh, Hassan Nasrallah and Abbas Nilforoushan. On 27 October, Israel responded to that attack by strikes on a missile defence system in the Iranian region of Isfahan.[332]

In December 2024, the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, a close ally of Iran, was a severe setback for the political influence of Iran in the region.[333]

Protest in Tehran against Israeli strikes on Iran, 20 June 2025

In early 2025, Iran was enriching substantial quantities of uranium to 60% purity, close to weapons-grade. Analysts warned that such activity exceeded any plausible civilian justification.[334] Beginning in April 2025, Iran and the United States entered negotiations for a new nuclear agreement, but progress stalled as Iran's leaders have refused to stop enriching uranium.[335] Among the main points of disagreement were the conditions for lifting sanctions against Iran.[336][337] In June 2025, IAEA found Iran non-compliant with its nuclear obligations for the first time in two decades.[338] In response, Iran announced the activation of a new enrichment facility and began installing additional advanced centrifuges.[339]

On 13 June 2025, Israel launched coordinated strikes across Iran, targeting nuclear facilities and eliminating top members of Iran's military leadership.[340][341] Iran retaliated with waves of missile and drone strikes against Israeli cities and military sites.[342][343][344] On 22 June, also the US bombed three Iranian nuclear sites.[345] On 24 June, Israel and Iran agreed to a ceasefire after insistence from the US.[346][347][348]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Sources

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Further reading

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The history of Iran—its name deriving from Middle Persian Ērān, meaning "Land of the Iranians" or "Land of the Aryans," used internally for millennia though internationally known as "Persia" until Reza Shah Pahlavi's official request in 1935—traces the evolution of civilizations on the Iranian plateau from prehistoric eras through successive empires, invasions, and transformations up to the present-day Islamic Republic, characterized by enduring Persian cultural continuity amid political upheavals. Archaeological evidence indicates early settlements and the Elamite civilization flourishing by the 3rd millennium BCE, followed by Indo-Iranian migrations around 1000 BCE that introduced Iranian-speaking peoples, culminating in the unification of the Median kingdom under Cyaxares in the 7th century BCE, laying the foundation for Iranian statehood, before Cyrus the Great founded the Achaemenid Empire in 550 BCE. This empire expanded under Darius I (r. 522–486 BCE) to become the largest in ancient history, spanning three continents from the Balkans to the Indus Valley, renowned for administrative innovations like satrapies, the Royal Road, and a policy of relative tolerance toward conquered peoples' customs. The Achaemenid dynasty fell to Alexander the Great in 330 BCE, leading to Hellenistic influences under the Seleucids, Parthian resurgence, and the Sassanid Empire (224–651 CE), which revived Persian imperial grandeur, promoted Zoroastrianism as state religion, and engaged in protracted wars with Rome and Byzantium that exhausted its resources. The Sassanids' collapse came swiftly during the Arab Muslim conquests starting in 633 CE, as internal strife and military overextension enabled Rashidun Caliphate forces to overrun Persia by 651 CE, initiating centuries of Islamic rule, gradual conversion to Islam, and the fusion of Persian administrative traditions with Arab governance under caliphates and later Persian dynasties like the Buyids and Samanids, though disrupted by the devastating Mongol invasions of the 13th century. The Safavid dynasty (1501–1736) marked a pivotal revival by establishing Twelver Shiism as Iran's official faith, fostering a distinct Persian identity against Sunni neighbors, and achieving artistic and architectural peaks, though subsequent fragmentation under Afsharids and Zands preceded Qajar rule (1789–1925), which grappled with European encroachments and modernization pressures. In the 20th century, Reza Shah Pahlavi's 1925 coup initiated secular reforms, centralization, and Western-oriented modernization, continued by his son Mohammad Reza Shah until the 1979 Revolution, driven by widespread discontent over authoritarianism, economic inequality, and cultural alienation, overthrew the monarchy and installed Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's theocratic regime, fundamentally reshaping Iran's domestic policies and international relations through export of revolutionary ideology and confrontations with global powers. This era solidified Iran's role as a regional power, albeit amid sanctions, internal dissent, and nuclear program disputes, reflecting persistent tensions between traditional Persian heritage and Islamist governance.

Prehistoric and Protohistoric Periods

Paleolithic to Neolithic Eras

The earliest evidence of hominin occupation in the Iranian plateau dates to the Lower Paleolithic period, with Acheulean hand axes and associated artifacts discovered at sites such as Ganj Par in the northern Alborz foothills, indicating tool-using populations possibly migrating from the northwest around 900,000 to 800,000 years ago. Lower Paleolithic assemblages, characterized by large bifacial tools, remain sparse but suggest intermittent exploitation of the region's resources by early hominins adapted to diverse environments from the Zagros Mountains to the central desert fringes. The Middle Paleolithic, spanning approximately 250,000 to 40,000 years ago, is better represented in the Zagros region, where Mousterian lithic industries—levallois flakes, points, and scrapers—predominate at caves like Warwasi, Bisitun, and Do-Ashkaft, pointing to Neanderthal or archaic modern human groups hunting gazelle, equids, and processing ochre for symbolic use. These sites yield faunal remains dominated by large herbivores, reflecting a hunter-gatherer economy reliant on seasonal mobility in a landscape of steppes and oak-pistachio woodlands during Marine Isotope Stage 3. Recent surveys in eastern Iran, including Tabas county, have identified over 90 open-air and cave sites with Middle Paleolithic tools, extending the known distribution beyond the western mountains. Upper Paleolithic occupations, from about 40,000 to 11,000 years ago, mark a technological shift with blade-based industries like the Baradostian and Zagros Aurignacian at Yafteh Cave and Shanidar-adjacent locales, featuring backed blades, burins, and bone tools alongside art objects such as pierced stones, indicative of modern human behavioral modernity. These assemblages, dated via radiocarbon to around 34,000 BP at some levels, coincide with climatic fluctuations that may have facilitated dispersals into the plateau, though population densities remained low compared to the Levant. The transition to the Neolithic era, beginning around 10,000 BCE in the Zagros foothills, involved the gradual adoption of sedentism and resource management, evidenced by proto-Neolithic sites like Hallan Çemi (near the Iran-Turkey border) with early goat herding and wild cereal processing. Full Neolithic developments by 9000–7000 BCE at Ganj Dareh and Tepe Guran feature mud-brick architecture, basketry, and the world's earliest unambiguous evidence of goat domestication, with mandibular morphology shifts in Capra hircus remains suggesting selective breeding for milk and meat. Plant remains, including emmer wheat and two-row barley, indicate incipient cultivation, though full dependence on domesticated crops emerged later, around 7000–6000 BCE, as aridification post-Younger Dryas pressured foraging groups toward intensified herding and farming in oases and river valleys. Neolithic communities in central and western Iran, such as those at Ali Kosh in Deh Luran, produced unpainted pottery by 7000 BCE alongside ground stone tools for grinding wild and proto-domesticated grains, reflecting a mixed economy where pastoralism complemented limited agriculture in a semi-arid milieu. This period's hallmark was the establishment of year-round villages, with population estimates per site rising to 100–200 individuals, driven by predictable resource yields rather than climatic determinism alone, as isotopic analyses of faunal bones show year-round site occupation. By 6000 BCE, ceramic Neolithic phases extended eastward, incorporating mud-brick platforms and obsidian trade networks linking the plateau to Mesopotamia, laying groundwork for subsequent Chalcolithic innovations.

Chalcolithic and Early Bronze Age Developments

The Chalcolithic period on the Iranian plateau, approximately 5500–3500 BCE, represented a transitional phase from Neolithic subsistence economies to proto-urban societies, characterized by the initial exploitation of copper ores, advancements in ceramic technology, and the establishment of settlement hierarchies. Divided into Early (ca. 5500–4500 BCE), Middle (ca. 4500–4000 BCE), and Late (ca. 4000–3500 BCE) phases, it featured small to medium-sized villages (0.5–20 hectares) with mud-brick architecture, irrigation systems emerging in the Middle phase, and a peak in site density—such as 146 settlements in the Kor River basin—followed by partial depopulation and pastoral mobility in the Late phase. Key sites include Tal-e Bakun in Fars province, a type-site for distinctive geometric painted pottery on buff ware; Chogha Mish in lowland Khuzistan (11 hectares, Middle phase); and Susa, which expanded to 20 hectares by the Late phase with fine red-polished Susa A ceramics. In the Zagros Mountains, Godin Tepe and Tepe Giyan yielded black-on-buff pottery and early copper artifacts, while Tal-i Iblis in Kerman province provided evidence of copper smelting and casting, marking the onset of metallurgical specialization. These developments reflect localized adaptations to arid environments, with no evidence of centralized political structures but increasing craft differentiation, such as bead-making and textile production. The Early Bronze Age, commencing around 3400–3300 BCE and extending to circa 2000 BCE, built on Chalcolithic foundations with accelerated urbanization, interregional trade networks, and intensified bronze production, linking the Iranian plateau to Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, and Central Asia. Urban centers emerged, exemplified by Shahr-i Sokhta in Sistan-Baluchistan (82 hectares, occupied 3200–1800 BCE), a mud-brick metropolis at Bronze Age trade junctions, featuring residential quarters, craft workshops for chlorite vessels and seals, and rare innovations like artificial eye prosthetics and a 4500-year-old board game unearthed in elite graves. In southeastern Iran, Tepe Yahya (sequence from ca. 4500 BCE) hosted third-millennium phases (3000–2100 BCE) with standardized steatite (soapstone) workshops producing engraved vessels in an "intercultural style" exported westward to Sumer and eastward to the Indus, alongside arsenical copper alloys indicating evolving smelting techniques. The Jiroft plain in Kerman yielded looted chlorite artifacts from ca. 2500 BCE burials, including intricately carved stone bowls depicting mythical scenes, suggesting a regional production hub that contributed to widespread stylistic influences across the Near East without implying a singular "lost civilization." Northern sites like Tepe Hissar near Damghan produced burnished gray wares and fortified structures, while Ban-e Sorma in Luristan revealed Early Bronze necropoleis with bronze pins and pottery linking to Mesopotamian Uruk influences. These cultures exhibited diverse trajectories—craft specialization and commerce in the southeast, pastoral fortifications in the north—fostering economic interdependence but regional fragmentation, with lapis lazuli from Badakhshan and tin possibly from Central Asia facilitating alloy advancements. Radiocarbon data confirm continuity from Late Chalcolithic villages to these trading emporia, underscoring gradual intensification rather than abrupt revolution.

Late Bronze and Early Iron Age Cultures

The Late Bronze Age (c. 1550–1200 BCE) on the Iranian plateau was characterized by decentralized settlements and continuity from earlier Bronze Age traditions, with limited direct influence from collapsing Mesopotamian powers after the Old Babylonian period. Archaeological evidence from Godin Tepe in the central Zagros reveals administrative complexes and storage facilities used through the late second millennium BCE, including metal artifacts analyzed for composition, indicating local bronze production and trade connections along highland routes. Pottery and small finds at such sites show stylistic persistence, with some Urartian or Kassite parallels emerging toward the period's end, though no large-scale urbanization occurred. The transition to the Early Iron Age (c. 1200–800 BCE) brought iron metallurgy, fortified citadels, and regional specialization in metalworking, coinciding with broader Near Eastern disruptions and possible Indo-Iranian migrations evidenced by horse-related artifacts and grey wares. In northwestern Iran, Hasanlu Tepe's citadel, rising 25 meters, featured monumental columned halls and elite structures from Period IV (c. 1200–800 BCE), destroyed by conflagration around 800 BCE, yielding weapons, jewelry, and ivory carvings suggestive of a hierarchical society. Northern Iran's Marlik necropolis, active ca. 1400–1000 BCE, exemplifies elite burial practices with over 50 chamber tombs containing tin-bronze vessels, gold rhyta, and seals depicting composite beasts, analyzed as local high-tin alloys indicating advanced casting techniques. In the Zagros, Luristan's bronzes from ca. 1250–650 BCE include finial pins, quivers, and horse bits with dynamic animal motifs, primarily from unstratified finds but corroborated by excavations like Sangtarashan, pointing to a pastoral warrior culture. Northeastern sites show ties to Central Asian Yaz I pottery and settlement patterns, with fortified dehes and iron tools from ca. 1500–800 BCE, bridging steppe nomadism and plateau sedentism. These developments laid foundations for later Median and Persian polities, with strontium isotope studies of burials indicating mobility patterns consistent with tribal integrations.

Ancient Iranian Empires

Median and Achaemenid Foundations (c. 700–330 BC)

The Medes, an Indo-Iranian people inhabiting the region of modern northwestern Iran, coalesced into a centralized kingdom by the late 8th or early 7th century BC amid pressures from Assyrian expansion. Archaeological evidence from sites like Tepe Nush-e Jan and Godin Tepe indicates fortified settlements and early state formation, though written records are sparse and primarily derived from Assyrian annals and later Greek historians such as Herodotus. The kingdom's capital was Ecbatana (modern Hamadan), serving as a political and economic hub controlling trade routes including precursors to the Silk Road. Under Cyaxares (r. c. 625–585 BC), the Medes underwent significant military reforms, establishing a professional standing army divided into specialized units for cavalry, infantry, and archery, which enabled expansion beyond tribal confederations. Cyaxares defeated invading Scythians around 625 BC and allied with the Babylonian king Nabopolassar to dismantle the Assyrian Empire, capturing Assur in 614 BC and sacking Nineveh on August 10, 612 BC, events corroborated by Babylonian chronicles. This victory ended Assyrian dominance in the Near East, allowing Median control over former Assyrian territories in eastern Anatolia and northern Mesopotamia until Astyages (r. c. 585–550 BC) inherited a stable but overstretched realm. The Persians, kin to the Medes and settled in Parsa (modern Fars province), rose under the Achaemenid dynasty. Cyrus II, initially king of the minor state of Anshan (r. c. 559–530 BC), rebelled against Median overlordship, defeating Astyages in 550 BC near Ecbatana through a combination of military prowess and possible internal Median discontent, as suggested by the Nabonidus Chronicle. Rather than destroying Median institutions, Cyrus integrated Median nobility into his administration, fostering a Medo-Persian elite that symbolized unity in Achaemenid art and governance. This conquest marked the foundation of the Achaemenid Empire, with Cyrus rapidly expanding westward by subduing Lydia in 546 BC under Croesus and eastward into Central Asia. Cyrus's capture of Babylon in 539 BC, documented in the Nabonidus Chronicle and the Cyrus Cylinder, exemplified his policy of religious tolerance and administrative continuity; he restored temples, repatriated exiles including Jews to Jerusalem, and portrayed himself as a liberator rather than conqueror to legitimize rule over diverse subjects. His son Cambyses II (r. 530–522 BC) extended the empire to Egypt in 525 BC via a naval-assisted campaign, incorporating the Nile Valley while respecting local priesthoods. A succession crisis followed Cambyses's death, resolved by Darius I (r. 522–486 BC), who quelled widespread revolts in his first year and proclaimed his legitimacy in the multilingual Behistun Inscription carved c. 520–519 BC on Mount Bisitun, detailing victories over nine rebel kings and affirming Ahura Mazda's favor. Darius restructured the empire into approximately 20–30 satrapies (provinces), each governed by a satrap responsible for taxation, justice, and military recruitment, checked by royal inspectors known as the "King's Eyes and Ears" to prevent corruption. Tribute was standardized, with silver talents assessed per satrapy—e.g., Babylon and Syria-Eber-Nari contributed 1,000 talents annually—funding imperial infrastructure like the 2,500-kilometer Royal Road from Susa to Sardis, serviced by relay stations for couriers covering 500 kilometers per day. This system supported an empire spanning 5.5 million square kilometers, encompassing 40–50% of the global population at its peak under Darius and Xerxes I (r. 486–465 BC). Zoroastrianism influenced royal ideology, evident in inscriptions invoking Ahura Mazda, though religious pluralism prevailed without forced conversions. Xerxes I's invasion of Greece in 480 BC, involving battles at Thermopylae and Salamis, initially succeeded but ended in Persian retreat after Plataea in 479 BC, straining resources without territorial gains. Subsequent kings like Artaxerxes I (r. 465–424 BC) focused on consolidation amid satrapal revolts and Greek mercenary influences. The empire endured internal stability until Darius III (r. 336–330 BC) faced Macedonian invasion under Alexander the Great. Defeats at Granicus (334 BC), Issus (333 BC), and Gaugamela (331 BC) shattered Achaemenid forces, with Alexander capturing Persepolis and Susa; Darius III was assassinated by his own satrap Bessus in 330 BC, marking the empire's collapse and the onset of Hellenistic rule.

Conquest by Alexander and Seleucid Transition (330–248 BC)

Alexander the Great initiated the conquest of the Achaemenid Empire in 334 BC by crossing the Hellespont into Asia Minor with approximately 40,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, defeating Persian satraps at the Battle of the Granicus River that same year. In 333 BC, he secured victory at the Battle of Issus against Darius III, capturing the Persian king's family and opening the route to the Levant and Egypt. The decisive Battle of Gaugamela occurred on October 1, 331 BC near modern-day Iraq, where Alexander's forces routed the larger Persian army, precipitating the empire's collapse as satraps surrendered or fled. Following Gaugamela, Alexander advanced into the Iranian plateau, overcoming resistance at the Persian Gates before entering Persepolis in January 330 BC, the ceremonial capital symbolizing Achaemenid power. He oversaw the looting of treasuries holding vast gold and silver reserves—estimated at 120,000 talents—and authorized the burning of palaces, an act ancient sources attribute to revenge for Persian destruction of Athens in 480 BC or possibly impulsive revelry led by his companion Thaïs. Darius III was murdered by his satrap Bessus in July 330 BC, after which Alexander pursued and executed Bessus in 329 BC, declaring himself successor to the Achaemenid throne while integrating Persian administrative practices and marrying Roxana, a Bactrian noblewoman, to legitimize rule over Iranian elites. Alexander's death in Babylon on June 11, 323 BC, without a clear heir, triggered the Wars of the Diadochi among his generals, fragmenting the empire. Seleucus I Nicator, initially satrap of Babylon from 321 BC, fled during Perdiccas's campaigns but returned in 312 BC to defeat Antigonid forces, establishing the Seleucid era dated from Babylonian new year April 3, 311 BC. By 305 BC, Seleucus reconquered eastern territories including Susiana, Media, and Persis through military campaigns and diplomacy, founding cities like Seleucia on the Tigris and Antioch to Hellenisticize administration while retaining Persian satrapal structures. Under Seleucid rule (c. 312–248 BC), Iranian regions experienced Greco-Macedonian settlement, with veterans garrisoned in Media and Persis, fostering cultural syncretism evident in bilingual inscriptions and hybrid art, though Zoroastrian temples persisted and local revolts simmered due to heavy taxation and cultural impositions. Antiochus I (r. 281–261 BC) stabilized the east but faced growing autonomy; Diodotus I declared independence in Bactria around 250 BC, weakening central control. The transition culminated in 247 BC when Arsaces I, a chieftain of the Parni tribe from the Dahae confederation east of the Caspian, invaded Parthia, overthrowing the Seleucid satrap, and founding the Arsacid dynasty—marking the inception of Parthian independence and the erosion of Seleucid dominion in northeastern Iran.

Parthian Resilience and Roman Conflicts (248 BC–224 AD)

The Parthian Empire, established by the Arsacid dynasty, emerged from the Parni tribe's revolt against Seleucid rule in northeastern Iran around 247 BC, when Arsaces I seized Parthia and declared independence, marking the beginning of a resilient Iranian state that endured for nearly five centuries. Under Arsaces' successors, particularly Mithridates I (r. 171–132 BC), the empire expanded aggressively, conquering Media, Mesopotamia, and parts of Armenia by 141 BC, capitalizing on Seleucid internal weaknesses to control key trade routes along the Silk Road and amass wealth from commerce in silk, spices, and horses, while Parthian control of these routes also facilitated the transmission of Buddhism to China, notably through the Parthian prince An Shigao, a monk who translated Buddhist sutras into Chinese around 148–180 AD. This rapid territorial growth, spanning from the Euphrates to the Indus at its peak under Mithridates II (r. 124–91 BC), relied on a decentralized feudal system where noble clans (e.g., Surens and Karens) commanded semi-autonomous forces, fostering loyalty through land grants while enabling flexible responses to threats. Parthian resilience against Roman expansion stemmed from superior cavalry tactics, including cataphract heavy cavalry armored in scale mail and the famed "Parthian shot" by horse archers, which allowed hit-and-run warfare that neutralized Roman legionary infantry formations on open terrain. The empire's vast geography, with defensible mountain passes and arid steppes, compounded logistical challenges for Roman supply lines, as seen in the catastrophic Roman defeat at the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC, where general Marcus Licinius Crassus lost seven legions (approximately 20,000 men) to Parthian forces under general Surena, who employed feigned retreats to exhaust and encircle the invaders. Subsequent Roman efforts, such as Mark Antony's failed invasion of 36 BC, which suffered heavy losses from Parthian ambushes and attrition without capturing key fortresses, underscored Rome's inability to project power deep into Parthian territory despite occasional border skirmishes. Tensions peaked in the 1st and 2nd centuries AD, with diplomatic truces like the 20 BC return of Roman standards captured at Carrhae under Augustus, reflecting mutual recognition of stalemate rather than outright Parthian submission. Trajan's ambitious campaign of 114–117 AD briefly occupied Mesopotamia and reached the Persian Gulf, annexing territories temporarily, but rebellions and overextended logistics forced withdrawal under Hadrian, restoring the pre-war Euphrates frontier. Later, during the Parthian-Roman War of 161–166 AD, Roman co-emperor Lucius Verus sacked Ctesiphon and recovered the standards again, yet Parthian king Vologases IV (r. 147–191 AD) regrouped, leveraging nomadic mobility and alliances with Armenian client states to reclaim losses, preventing permanent Roman dominance. These conflicts highlighted Parthia's adaptive strategy: avoiding pitched battles where Roman discipline excelled, instead using attrition, diplomacy, and internal Roman divisions (e.g., civil wars) to maintain sovereignty. Internal factors bolstered endurance, including Zoroastrian religious continuity from Achaemenid times, minted coinage promoting economic stability, and cultural synthesis of Iranian, Greek, and Central Asian elements in art and administration at cities like Nisa and Hecatompylos. However, succession disputes among Arsacid kings and noble factionalism eroded cohesion by the 3rd century AD, exacerbated by Roman pressures and incursions from eastern nomads. The empire collapsed in 224 AD when Ardashir I, a Persian noble from Fars, defeated the last Parthian king Artabanus IV at the Battle of Hormozdgan, overthrowing the Arsacids and founding the Sasanian dynasty amid widespread noble support for centralized reform. This transition ended Parthian rule but preserved Iranian imperial traditions, with the Arsacids surviving as vassals in Armenia and Iberia.

Sasanian Zenith and Zoroastrian Statecraft (224–651 AD)

The Sasanian Empire was established in 224 CE when Ardashir I, a local ruler from Persis, defeated the Parthian king Artabanus IV at the Battle of Hormozdgan, consolidating control over Iran and Mesopotamia. Ardashir proclaimed himself Shahanshah ("King of Kings"), claiming divine mandate from Ahura Mazda and positioning the dynasty as restorers of Achaemenid legitimacy. Zoroastrianism was enshrined as the state religion, with the monarch as its earthly protector, fostering a hierarchical society divided into clerical, warrior, scribal, and agrarian classes to underpin centralized authority. Under Shapur I (r. 241–272 CE), the empire expanded aggressively against Rome, capturing Emperor Valerian in 260 CE at the Battle of Edessa—the first time a Roman emperor was taken alive by an enemy—and sacking key cities like Antioch. This victory symbolized Sasanian military prowess, bolstered by heavy cavalry (cataphracts) and innovative siege tactics, while rock reliefs at Naqsh-i-Rustam commemorated imperial triumphs and Zoroastrian cosmology. Administrative reforms included provincial divisions under marzbans (border commanders) and the construction of fire temples, integrating religious orthodoxy with state infrastructure like qanats for irrigation that sustained agricultural output in arid regions. The zenith occurred during Khosrow I (r. 531–579 CE), known as Anushirvan ("Immortal Soul"), who reformed taxation through cadastral surveys assessing land productivity, reducing noble privileges and funding a professional bureaucracy. Military reorganization emphasized dehqan landholders as a loyal cavalry class, enabling victories over Byzantium, including the 540 sack of Antioch and annexation of Lazica. Zoroastrian statecraft peaked with academies at Gundishapur synthesizing Persian, Indian, and Greek knowledge, patronizing medicine, astronomy, and philosophy under royal oversight to legitimize rule as cosmic order (asha). Economic vitality derived from state-controlled trade along the Silk Road, minting standardized silver drachms, and monopolies on silk production after smuggling worms from Byzantium circa 553 CE. Subsequent rulers like Khosrow II (r. 590–628 CE) pursued expansion, conquering Egypt and Syria in 614–618 CE, but overextension and civil wars eroded resources. Zoroastrian orthodoxy intensified under priestly influence, suppressing heterodox sects and minorities, yet internal strife and Byzantine-Sasanian exhaustion facilitated Arab Muslim invasions from 633 CE. Decisive defeats at al-Qadisiyyah (636 CE) and Nahavand (642 CE) shattered Sasanian armies, leading to the flight and assassination of Yazdegerd III in 651 CE, marking the empire's collapse amid fiscal collapse and noble disunity.

Islamic Conquest and Medieval Transformations

Arab Invasions and Initial Islamization (633–750 AD)

The Arab invasions of the Sassanid Empire commenced in 633 AD under the Rashidun Caliphate, led by Caliph Abu Bakr, as Muslim forces under Khalid ibn al-Walid targeted Mesopotamia, the empire's economic heartland. The Sassanids, exhausted from prolonged wars with the Byzantine Empire (602–628 AD) and subsequent civil strife (628–632 AD), coupled with plagues and decentralized authority, proved vulnerable to the mobile Arab armies. Initial clashes included victories at the Battle of Chains, Battle of Walaja, and Battle of Ullais in 633 AD, securing southern Mesopotamia. Under Caliph Umar (r. 634–644 AD), the invasions intensified with the Battle of the Bridge in 634 AD and culminated in the decisive Battle of al-Qadisiyyah in late 636 or early 637 AD, where 30,000 Arab troops under Sa'd ibn Abi Waqqas defeated a larger Sassanid force commanded by Rustam Farrukh Hormizd, leading to the fall of the capital Ctesiphon in March 637 AD after a siege. The Battle of Nahavand in 642 AD shattered remaining Sassanid resistance, prompting Emperor Yazdegerd III to flee eastward. By 651 AD, Arab forces had conquered Fars, Kerman, Khorasan, and Sakastan, with Yazdegerd III assassinated near the Oxus River, marking the effective end of Sassanid rule. During the Umayyad Caliphate (661–750 AD), Arab governors administered Iran through existing Sassanid bureaucratic structures, imposing the jizya tax on non-Muslims while granting dhimmis protected status. Conversion to Islam remained limited, with estimates suggesting only about 10% of the Iranian population had converted by the end of Umayyad rule, as economic incentives like tax exemptions encouraged gradual adherence rather than mass coercion. Zoroastrianism persisted, particularly in rural areas and among elites, though urban centers saw emerging Muslim communities; resistance flared in regions like Tabaristan, where local dynasties maintained autonomy until later Abbasid times. This period laid the groundwork for Persian integration into Islamic governance, with many converts retaining Zoroastrian cultural elements, fostering a distinct Iranian Islamic identity without full Arabization. The Umayyad era ended in 750 AD with the Abbasid Revolution, bolstered by Persian discontent over Arab favoritism and heavy taxation.

Abbasid Caliphate and Persian Contributions (750–977 AD)

The Abbasid Revolution of 750 AD, which overthrew the Umayyad Caliphate, relied heavily on Persian support from Khorasan, where Abbasid propaganda had been propagated since the early 8th century, culminating in the leadership of Abū Moslem Ḵorāsānī, a Persian convert who mobilized forces from Marv to defeat Umayyad armies at the Battle of the Zab River on February 25, 750 AD. This eastern Iranian backing shifted the caliphal center eastward, with Caliph al-Manṣūr founding Baghdad in 762 AD as a new capital, incorporating Persian architectural and urban planning elements inspired by Sasanian models such as circular layouts reminiscent of Firuzabad. Persians, as mawālī (non-Arab converts), filled key administrative roles, introducing diwān systems of taxation and bureaucracy adapted from pre-Islamic Persian practices, which replaced Umayyad tribal Arab dominance with a merit-based, professional apparatus. The Barmakid family, of Iranian Zoroastrian origin from Balkh, exemplified Persian administrative influence, serving as viziers from the reign of al-Manṣūr (r. 754–775 AD) onward; Khalid ibn Barmak acted as chief minister under al-Saffāḥ (r. 750–754 AD), while his son Yaḥyā ibn Khālid and grandson Jaʿfar held vizierates under Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 786–809 AD), managing finances, diplomacy, and court etiquette until their abrupt dismissal and execution in 803 AD amid rivalries with Arab factions. This period saw the Shuʿūbiyya movement emerge in the late 8th century, a literary and cultural assertion by non-Arab Muslims, particularly Persians, challenging Arab cultural supremacy through poetry and prose that highlighted pre-Islamic Persian achievements in governance and ethics, though it remained primarily intellectual rather than overtly political. Under al-Maʾmūn (r. 813–833 AD), who drew on Persian resources from Marv to secure his throne against his brother al-Amīn in the Fourth Fitna (811–813 AD), Persian viziers like Faḍl ibn Sahl integrated Sasanian administrative concepts such as tadbīr (prudent governance) into caliphal policy. Cultural and scientific advancements flourished through the translation movement patronized by the caliphs, particularly al-Maʾmūn's Bayt al-Ḥikma (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad, established circa 830 AD as a library and research center where Persian, Greek, Syriac, and Indian texts were rendered into Arabic; Persian scholars like Muḥammad ibn Mūsā al-Khwārizmī (c. 780–850 AD) contributed foundational works on algebra (his 820 AD treatise Al-Kitāb al-mukhtaṣar fī ḥisāb al-jabr wa-l-muqābala) and algorithms, drawing from Indian numerals and Persian astronomical traditions. This synthesis preserved and expanded knowledge, with Persian adab literature influencing Arabic genres like "mirrors for princes" by the 9th century, blending Sasanian ethics with Islamic thought. In eastern Iran, semi-autonomous Persian dynasties under nominal Abbasid suzerainty marked a revival of local rule: the Ṭāhirids, of Persian dehqān (landowning) origin, governed Khorasan from 821 to 873 AD under governors like Ṭāhir ibn Ḥusayn, maintaining Abbasid loyalty while consolidating power in Nishapur. The Saffārids, founded by Yaʿqūb ibn Layth al-Saffār in Sistan around 861 AD, expanded aggressively, capturing Khorasan in 873 AD and challenging Baghdad directly before submitting in 876 AD, though retaining de facto independence in eastern provinces until the 10th century. The Sāmānids, another Persian family from Balkh, ruled Transoxiana and Khorasan from circa 819 AD, achieving peak influence by 892 AD under Ismāʿīl ibn Aḥmad, fostering a Persian linguistic renaissance through patronage of New Persian (Dari) literature and Sunni scholarship in Bukhara, laying groundwork for cultural autonomy despite Abbasid overlordship. By 945 AD, the Daylamite Buyids, Iranian Shiʿite military leaders from the Caspian, entered Baghdad and assumed effective control over the caliph, reducing him to a figurehead while Persianate administration dominated until around 977 AD, when internal fractures presaged further fragmentation.

Independent Persianate Dynasties (977–1219 AD)

The era from 977 to 1219 AD saw the emergence of independent dynasties of Turkic military origins that governed Iranian territories while deeply integrating Persian administrative systems, language, and cultural patronage, thereby constituting Persianate polities. These regimes succeeded the weakening Samanid and Buyid structures, asserting autonomy from Abbasid caliphal oversight and fostering a synthesis of Sunni Islamic rule with pre-Islamic Iranian traditions. The Ghaznavids initiated this phase, followed by the expansive Seljuks and the Khwarezmshahs, each contributing to military consolidation, economic prosperity via trade routes, and intellectual revival amid intermittent conflicts with Byzantines, Fatimids, and internal rivals. The Ghaznavid dynasty originated in 977 AD when Sabuktigin, a Turkic mamluk governor under the Samanids, seized Ghazna in modern Afghanistan and founded an empire extending across Khorasan, eastern Iran, and into the Indian subcontinent. Sabuktigin's son, Mahmud of Ghazni (r. 998–1030 AD), expanded the realm through 17 invasions of northern India between 1001 and 1026 AD, amassing wealth estimated at tens of millions of dirhams from temples like Somnath, which funded architectural projects and military campaigns while propagating Sunni Islam. Persian served as the court language, with poets like Firdausi completing the Shahnameh around 1010 AD under Mahmud's patronage, preserving epic Iranian heritage. The dynasty's decline accelerated after defeat by the Seljuks at the Battle of Dandanaqan in 1040 AD, ceding western Iran but retaining eastern domains until the Ghurids overthrew them in 1186 AD. The Great Seljuk Empire, established by Tughril Beg (r. 1037–1063 AD) and his brother Chaghri from the Oghuz Turkic Qiniq tribe, supplanted Ghaznavid control in Iran following their victory at Dandanaqan. By 1055 AD, Tughril captured Baghdad, securing nominal Abbasid caliphal endorsement and legitimacy as protectors of Sunni orthodoxy against Shia Buyid influence. Under Alp Arslan (r. 1063–1072 AD) and Malik Shah I (r. 1072–1092 AD), the empire peaked, spanning from Anatolia to Central Asia, with victories like Manzikert in 1071 AD opening Anatolia to Turkic settlement. Persian viziers such as Nizam al-Mulk (d. 1092 AD) centralized administration through the diwan system, founded the Nizamiyya madrasas for Sunni scholarship, and authored the Siyasatnama, a treatise on governance blending Islamic and Iranian principles. Cultural efflorescence included advancements in astronomy by Omar Khayyam, who reformed the Jalali calendar in 1079 AD under Malik Shah, achieving precision within one day per 5,000 years. Dynastic fragmentation after Malik Shah's death led to rival sultans and the empire's effective dissolution by 1194 AD, though successor states persisted. The Khwarezmshah dynasty, initially Seljuk vassals in Khwarezm (modern Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan), transitioned to independence under Anushtegin Gharchai around 1097 AD and consolidated power through figures like Atsiz (r. 1130–1156 AD), who rebelled against Seljuk suzerainty. Il-Arslan (r. 1157–1172 AD) and his son Tekish (r. 1172–1200 AD) expanded into eastern Iran, defeating the Qara Khitai at the Battle of Kash in 1194 AD to claim Transoxiana. Under Muhammad II (r. 1200–1220 AD), the empire reached its zenith, controlling Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia with a population exceeding 10 million and armies numbering up to 400,000, sustained by Silk Road commerce and agriculture. Muhammad's execution of Mongol envoys in 1218 AD provoked Genghis Khan's invasion, culminating in the sack of cities like Samarkand and Nishapur by 1219–1221 AD, devastating an estimated 2–4 million lives and terminating Khwarezmian rule in Iran. These dynasties, despite Turkic elites, perpetuated Persianate identity through bureaucratic continuity, literary output in New Persian, and architectural innovations like the muqarnas vault, bridging Islamic and Iranian legacies until the Mongol onslaught.

Mongol Devastation and Ilkhanate Recovery (1219–1370 AD)

In 1219, Genghis Khan launched the Mongol invasion of the Khwarezmian Empire, which encompassed much of Persia, after Shah Muhammad II executed Mongol envoys and seized their caravan, prompting a retaliatory campaign that systematically devastated eastern Iran. Armies under commanders like Jochi, Chagatai, and Ögedei advanced from the east, sacking Otrar in 1219 after a five-month siege, followed by Bukhara and Samarkand in 1220, where resistance was crushed through mass executions and the razing of fortifications. In Khorasan, cities such as Nishapur (captured February 1221, with reports of 1.7 million killed) and Merv (where up to 1.3 million perished according to Persian chroniclers) suffered near-total annihilation, with Mongol tactics emphasizing terror to induce surrenders, including pyramid constructions from skulls and the enslavement or displacement of survivors. This phase alone caused severe depopulation across Persia, with scholarly analyses indicating workforce and urban population losses exceeding 50% in affected regions due to killings, famine, and migration, though medieval estimates of total deaths (often 10-15 million) are likely inflated by rhetorical exaggeration in sources like Juvayni's history. The conquest extended westward under Ögedei Khan from 1230 onward, incorporating Iraq-i Ajami and systematic subjugation of Isma'ili strongholds, but full consolidation awaited Hulagu Khan's campaigns starting in 1253 with an army of approximately 130,000-150,000 troops. Hulagu destroyed the Nizari Assassins by 1256, eliminating their mountain fortresses, then sacked Baghdad in 1258, ending the Abbasid Caliphate with the execution of Caliph al-Musta'sim and the slaughter of tens of thousands, alongside the destruction of libraries and infrastructure that exacerbated economic collapse. These operations, while completing Mongol dominance over Persia, inflicted further demographic and agricultural ruin, with irrigation systems sabotaged leading to desertification in Mesopotamia and persistent famine. Hulagu established the Ilkhanate as a semi-autonomous ulus in 1256, centered in Persia and extending to Anatolia and the Caucasus, initially governed under shamanist-Buddhist rites, with early rulers like Hulagu and Arghun patronizing Buddhism by inviting waves of scholars and monks from India (such as Kashmir) and Central Asia (including Uyghur and Tibetan regions), fostering temporary Buddhist communities and temples before the dynasty's Islamization, alongside Persian administrators co-opted for fiscal management. Recovery began under later Ilkhans, notably Mahmud Ghazan (r. 1295-1304), who converted to Sunni Islam in 1295—marking the dynasty's shift from nomadic paganism to Persianate Islamic rule—and implemented reforms advised by vizier Rashid al-Din Hamadani to revive the economy. These included settling nomadic Mongol tumens on state lands to reduce extortionate taxation, standardizing land surveys for equitable iqta' assignments, and reconstructing qanats and canals to restore agriculture, which boosted grain yields and trade along the Silk Road by the early 1300s. Ghazan's policies also curbed corruption among noyans, promoted Persian bureaucracy over tribal levies, and fostered cultural patronage, with Rashid al-Din overseeing the compilation of the Jami' al-Tawarikh (c. 1307-1316), a universal history integrating Mongol and Islamic traditions, alongside advancements in medicine and astronomy at observatories like Maragheh. Under successors like Öljaitü (r. 1304-1316), Shi'ism gained traction, and economic stabilization enabled urban rebuilding in Tabriz as capital, though persistent intertribal rivalries and overreliance on paper currency experiments strained resources. The Ilkhanate fragmented after Abu Sa'id's death in 1335 without a clear Chinggisid heir, sparking civil wars among claimant khans and the rise of autonomous warlords like the Jalayirids in Baghdad and western Persia, and Chobanids in Azerbaijan. By the 1340s, puppet rulers vied amid plagues and famines, eroding central authority; the Black Death (c. 1340s) further halved populations in some areas, compounding earlier Mongol-induced declines. Regional powers solidified, with Hasan Buzurg establishing the Jalayirid dynasty by 1336 and local Persian atabegs asserting independence, effectively ending Ilkhanid cohesion by 1370 as Turkmen tribes like the Kara Koyunlu began encroaching from the west. This era transitioned Persia from direct Mongol overlordship to a mosaic of successor states, preserving administrative legacies like diwan taxation while exposing vulnerabilities from over-centralization and nomadic integration failures.

Timurid Cultural Flourishing amid Turmoil (1370–1507 AD)

Timur (1336–1405), a Turco-Mongol conqueror claiming descent from Genghis Khan, consolidated power in Transoxiana by 1370 and launched invasions into Persian territories starting in 1380, beginning with Khorasan where Herat submitted as a tributary. His campaigns from 1381 to 1394 devastated cities across Iran, including the sack of Isfahan in 1387 where an estimated 70,000–100,000 residents were massacred, and subsequent conquests of Fars, Azerbaijan, and Iraq, resulting in widespread depopulation estimated at millions across his empire due to warfare, famine, and pyramids of skulls erected as warnings. These conquests unified fragmented post-Ilkhanid Iran under Timurid suzerainty by the 1390s, though Timur's focus remained on Central Asia, with Persian lands administered through local vassals amid ongoing rebellions. Following Timur's death in 1405 during a campaign against Ming China, his son Shah Rukh (r. 1405–1447) seized control after defeating rival princes, establishing Herat as the empire's capital and shifting emphasis from conquest to administration and cultural patronage across Iran and Central Asia. Shah Rukh's policies stabilized eastern Iran, particularly Khorasan, by integrating Persian bureaucratic traditions with Timurid military structure, fostering economic recovery through trade along the Silk Road and agricultural revival, though western regions faced intermittent raids from Turkmen confederations like the Qara Qoyunlu. Under his rule, Herat emerged as a premier cultural hub, attracting scholars, poets, and artisans who revived Persian literary and artistic forms, including illuminated manuscripts and tilework architecture drawing on Seljuq precedents. Shah Rukh's son Ulugh Beg (r. 1410–1449 in Samarkand) exemplified Timurid scientific patronage, constructing a massive observatory in Samarkand around 1420 with a mural quadrant over 40 meters long, enabling precise astronomical observations that produced the Zij-i Sultani, a star catalog of 1,018 entries with positional accuracies rivaling Ptolemy's, many within 1 arcminute. This work advanced trigonometry, compiling sine tables to seven decimal places, and influenced subsequent Islamic and European astronomy, though Ulugh Beg's focus on scholarship neglected military defenses, contributing to his assassination in 1449 amid familial strife. In parallel, Timurid libraries and scriptoria proliferated, producing lavishly illustrated Persian epics and histories, with imperial workshops standardizing techniques in calligraphy and illumination that bridged Mongol and Persian aesthetics. Post-Shah Rukh turmoil intensified after 1447, with civil wars fragmenting the empire as princes vied for thrones, enabling Qara Qoyunlu incursions into western Iran and temporary losses of Baghdad and Tabriz by 1460. Abu Sa'id (r. 1451–1469), a grandson of Shah Rukh, briefly reunified much of Iran through campaigns recapturing Khorasan and Herat, but his execution by Aq Qoyunlu forces in 1469 ushered further division. Despite this, cultural efflorescence persisted in pockets like Herat under Husayn Bayqara (r. 1469–1506), where the city hosted over 15,000 students and artisans, birthing the Herat school of miniature painting led by Kamal ud-Din Behzad, whose works integrated realistic portraiture with symbolic Persian motifs, and poets like Abd al-Rahman Jami synthesized Sufi mysticism with classical verse. Bayqara's patronage extended to madrasas and gardens, embodying a Persianate renaissance amid fiscal strains from endless fortifications against Uzbeks. By the early 16th century, Timurid holdings in Iran eroded under external pressures, culminating in 1507 when Uzbek leader Muhammad Shaybani defeated and killed Husayn Bayqara's successors, paving the way for Safavid consolidation in core Persian territories. This period's cultural legacy—marked by over 200 surviving Timurid manuscripts and architectural ensembles—outshone its political instability, as rulers channeled war spoils into enduring Persian intellectual traditions, though reliant on coerced labor and tribute systems that prioritized elite patronage over broad societal welfare. The Timurids' synthesis of Turco-Mongol rule with Iranian administration preserved Persian as the lingua franca of high culture, influencing Mughal India and Ottoman arts.

Early Modern Dynastic Revivals

Safavid Shiism and Centralized Power (1501–1736 AD)

The Safavid dynasty was founded in 1501 by Shah Ismail I, a charismatic leader of the Safavid Sufi order, who at age 14 defeated the Aq Qoyunlu Turkman confederation at the Battle of Sharur and proclaimed himself shah in Tabriz on December 22, 1501. Ismail's military relied on the Qizilbash, Turkic tribal warriors loyal to the Safavids' messianic Shiite ideology, which portrayed him as a divine incarnation or representative of the Hidden Imam. This force enabled rapid conquests unifying greater Iran, including Azerbaijan, Armenia, and parts of Iraq, by 1510. Ismail decreed Twelver Shiism as the state religion in 1501, a deliberate policy to differentiate Iran from its Sunni Ottoman and Uzbek rivals, importing scholars from Lebanon and Syria to propagate doctrine and enforce orthodoxy. Conversion was coercive: Sunni populations faced execution, exile, or forced recitation of Shiite prayers, transforming a predominantly Sunni Iran into a Shiite-majority society over generations, though initial resistance persisted in regions like Khorasan. This sectarian shift centralized religious authority under the shah as the Imam's deputy, fostering national identity but sparking prolonged wars, such as the Ottoman-Safavid conflict culminating in the 1514 Battle of Chaldiran, where Ottoman gunpowder superiority halted Safavid expansion. Under Ismail's son Tahmasp I (r. 1524–1576), the dynasty stabilized amid Qizilbash factionalism and invasions, relocating the capital to Qazvin for defensibility and suppressing revolts, though tribal emirs retained provincial influence, limiting full centralization. Tahmasp's 1555 Treaty of Amasya with the Ottomans ceded temporary western territories but secured borders, allowing internal consolidation. The apogee of Safavid centralization occurred under Shah Abbas I (r. 1588–1629), who ascended amid civil war and Ottoman incursions. Abbas reformed the military by curtailing Qizilbash dominance—replacing tribal levies with a professional standing army of 100,000, including ghulam corps of Caucasian Christian converts trained as elite musketeers and artillerymen loyal solely to the throne. He recaptured territories, defeating Uzbeks at the 1598 Battle of Mehrab and Ottomans by 1612, expanding to include Baghdad briefly. Administratively, Abbas divided Iran into 12 crown provinces under appointed governors (kalantars), bypassing hereditary Qizilbash chiefs, and established a bureaucracy with divans for finance and justice. Relocating the capital to Isfahan in 1598, he orchestrated urban planning yielding Naqsh-e Jahan Square, royal mosques, and bridges, accommodating 600,000 residents and symbolizing absolutist grandeur. Economically, he monopolized silk exports via the 1619 Anglo-Persian trade agreement, generating revenues exceeding 10 million tumans annually and funding infrastructure like the 1,500-mile road network. Post-Abbas rulers weakened the system: Shah Safi (r. 1629–1642) and Abbas II (r. 1642–1666) maintained stability but devolved power to ulama and eunuchs, while Sultan Husayn (r. 1694–1722) prioritized religious piety over governance, alienating tribes through puritanical edicts. Corruption eroded military readiness, with army strength halving to under 50,000 effectives by 1720. The 1722 Hotaki Afghan uprising, exploiting Ghilzai tribal grievances, sacked Isfahan after a six-month siege, forcing Husayn's abdication. A puppet restoration under Tahmasp II ended in 1736 when Nader Qoli, his general, deposed the dynasty, marking the collapse of Safavid centralized Shiism after 235 years.

Nader Shah's Conquests and Afsharid Chaos (1736–1796 AD)

Nader Shah Afshar, born in 1688 to a pastoralist family of the Afshar tribe in Khorasan, emerged as a military commander amid the Safavid dynasty's collapse following Afghan invasions in the 1720s. By 1726, he had captured Mashhad and began consolidating power, defeating Afghan forces and restoring Safavid puppet Abbas III by 1732 before deposing the Safavids entirely in 1736 to proclaim himself shah, founding the Afsharid dynasty. His rule emphasized military innovation, including a professional standing army equipped with advanced artillery and musketry, which enabled rapid expansions. Nader's early conquests focused on reclaiming lost territories: he subdued rebellious tribes in Khorasan and pushed into Afghanistan, defeating Hotaki Afghan remnants by 1738, thereby securing eastern frontiers and access routes for further campaigns. The pinnacle of Nader's expansions came with his invasion of Mughal India in 1738–1739, motivated by Mughal support for Ottoman enemies and opportunities for plunder. Marching an army of approximately 50,000 through the Hindu Kush, Nader decisively defeated Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah's larger force of over 100,000 at the Battle of Karnal on February 24, 1739, leveraging superior tactics and firepower. Entering Delhi in March 1739, his troops looted vast treasures—including the Peacock Throne, Koh-i-Noor diamond, and an estimated 700 million rupees in gold and jewels—before a civilian uprising prompted a massacre killing 20,000–30,000. The campaign weakened the Mughal Empire irreversibly, allowing Nader to extract tribute and install a puppet governor in Kabul, though he withdrew by May 1739 due to logistical strains and revolts in Persia. Subsequent campaigns targeted the Ottomans, recapturing Baghdad in 1743 and western territories, and northern foes like the Lezgians in Dagestan (1741–1743), but these overextensions, coupled with brutal taxation to fund endless wars—extracting up to 10 times annual revenue—fueled domestic unrest. Nader's paranoia intensified after 1740, marked by the execution of rivals, blinding of his son Reza Qoli Mirza in 1742 on suspicion of regicide, and mass purges, eroding loyalty among his officers. On June 20, 1747, he was assassinated in his camp near Quchan by a conspiracy of tribal guards, including Kurdish and Afshar elements, amid widespread revolts. The empire fragmented immediately: nephew Ali Qoli Khan seized power as Adil Shah (July 1747–1748), executing Nader's remaining kin except grandson Shahrokh, but was deposed and killed by his brother Ibrahim Shah (1748–1749), who in turn fell to tribal coalitions. The Afsharid era devolved into localized warlordism, with nominal rule confined to Khorasan under Shahrokh (r. 1748–1796), Nader's grandson, who survived brief depositions—like by Solayman II in 1750—and Afghan sieges by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1754–1755, often as a puppet extracting tribute. Regional powers proliferated: Ahmad Shah Durrani founded an independent Afghan empire using Nader's former troops and treasury; Zand forces under Karim Khan consolidated southern Iran by 1751; Qajars and others carved autonomies in the north and west. Afsharid pretenders vied futilely, but by the 1760s, central authority evaporated, enabling economic collapse from war devastation and depopulation—Persia's population dropped by millions. Shahrokh's rule ended in 1796 when Qajar leader Agha Mohammad Khan captured Mashhad, tortured him to death for hidden treasures, and annexed the remnants, marking the dynasty's extinction after six decades of initial brilliance yielding to anarchy.

Qajar Decline and European Encroachments (1796–1925 AD)

The Qajar dynasty was established in 1796 by Agha Mohammad Khan, who unified fragmented Persian territories following the collapse of the Zand and Afsharid regimes, but subsequent rulers faced mounting internal decay characterized by administrative corruption, fiscal mismanagement, and ineffective military reforms. By the mid-19th century, the dynasty's treasury was depleted through extravagant court expenditures and failure to modernize the economy, exacerbating reliance on foreign loans and concessions that drained national resources. These weaknesses were compounded by tribal revolts and provincial autonomy, which undermined central authority under shahs like Fath-Ali Shah and Naser al-Din Shah. Russia's expansionist campaigns initiated the era's major territorial losses during the Russo-Persian War of 1804–1813, culminating in the Treaty of Gulistan signed on October 24, 1813, whereby Iran ceded the khanates of Derbent, Baku, Shirvan, Ganja, Karabakh, and other eastern Caucasus regions to Russia, while recognizing Russian suzerainty over Georgia. A second conflict from 1826–1828 ended with the Treaty of Turkmenchay on February 22, 1828, forcing Iran to relinquish the Erivan Khanate, Nakhichevan, and remaining Transcaucasian territories south of the Aras River, pay a 20 million ruble indemnity, and grant Russia exclusive navigation rights on the Caspian Sea along with capitulatory privileges for Russian subjects. These defeats, inflicted by a technologically superior Russian army, not only halved Iran's pre-1800 territory but also exposed the obsolescence of Qajar forces reliant on tribal levies rather than disciplined infantry. British encroachments focused on securing routes to India, leading to the Anglo-Persian War of 1856–1857 over Iran's occupation of Herat in Afghanistan; British naval forces blockaded southern ports and captured Kharg Island, compelling Iran to abandon claims to Herat via the Treaty of Paris in 1857. Economic penetration intensified through concessions, such as the 1890 tobacco monopoly granted to a British company, which provoked widespread protests and clerical fatwas, resulting in its revocation in 1892 after mass boycotts demonstrated public resistance to foreign control over domestic commerce. The 1901 D'Arcy oil concession awarded vast southwestern territories to a British prospector, laying groundwork for Anglo-Persian Oil Company dominance and further fiscal dependency. The 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention formalized European partition, designating northern Iran as a Russian sphere of influence, the southeast as British, and a neutral central buffer, effectively treating Iran as a semi-colonized buffer state without its consent and prioritizing great-power rivalry over Persian sovereignty. This arrangement fueled resentment amid Qajar absolutism, sparking the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911, triggered by bastinado punishments over tariff disputes and sugar price gouging but rooted in broader grievances against despotic rule, foreign meddling, and economic exploitation by elites. Protests escalated into demands for a constitution, assembly (Majles), and limits on monarchical power, yielding Iran's 1906 Fundamental Laws—modeled partly on Belgium's—establishing parliamentary oversight, though implementation faltered under shah Mohammad Ali Shah's 1908 bombardment of the Majles and Russian-backed repression. By World War I, Qajar Iran was neutral but suffered occupation by Russian, British, and Ottoman forces, with famine and disease claiming over 2 million lives amid disrupted agriculture and blockades. Postwar chaos, including Bolshevik withdrawal and British subsidies to southern tribes, enabled Colonel Reza Khan's February 21, 1921, coup d'état with the Cossack Brigade, installing Sayyid Zia al-Din Tabataba'i as prime minister while Reza assumed war ministry control to suppress separatists and centralize power. Reza's campaigns unified the country militarily, leading to Ahmad Shah Qajar's deposition by Majles decree on October 31, 1925, marking the dynasty's end after 129 years of progressive territorial and sovereign erosion.

Modernization and Revolution

Constitutional Movement and Parliamentary Dawn (1905–1925)

The Constitutional Movement in Iran arose amid widespread discontent with Qajar absolutism, exacerbated by economic hardships and foreign encroachments. In December 1905, guild merchants and clerics staged a bast (sanctuary protest) in Tehran's royal mosque following the bastinado of a sugar merchant for pricing complaints and the imposition of rigid tariffs by a Belgian customs official, demanding a house of justice to curb arbitrary rule. These grievances stemmed from broader issues, including currency depreciation, urban unemployment from rural migration, and monopolistic concessions like the 1890 tobacco regie, which had previously sparked nationwide boycotts. The movement sought to replace unchecked royal authority with legal constraints and representative institutions, drawing intellectual inspiration from European models while incorporating Persian reformist traditions. Under pressure from escalating protests, including general strikes, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah issued a decree on 5 August 1906 for an electoral law, followed by the opening of Iran's first Majlis (parliament) on 7 October 1906 with 156 deputies representing guilds, clergy, and landowners. The Fundamental Law, ratified on 30 December 1906, established a bicameral legislature, ministerial responsibility to parliament, and limits on the shah's prerogatives, modeled partly on Belgium's constitution but adapted to Persian context. A supplementary law on 7 October 1907 added Islamic safeguards, mandating that no legislation contradict Sharia and requiring approval by a committee of five mujtahids, reflecting clerical support from figures like Seyyed Abdullah Behbahani amid fears of unchecked secularism. However, the 31 August 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention undermined these gains by partitioning Iran into Russian (north), British (south), and neutral zones, prioritizing great-power rivalry over Iranian sovereignty and emboldening foreign vetoes on internal reforms. Succession to the anti-constitutionalist Mohammad Ali Shah in January 1907 intensified conflict; backed by Russian arms, he ordered the bombardment of the Majlis on 23 June 1908, dissolving parliament and imposing martial law, which sparked regional uprisings in Tabriz, Rasht, and Isfahan. Constitutionalist forces, led by fighters like Sattar Khan and Baqir Khan in Tabriz—under siege from September 1908 to April 1909—resisted with popular militias, while Russian troops intervened to relieve the shah's forces despite Iran's neutrality declaration. By July 1909, constitutionalist armies from the north and south converged on Tehran, forcing Mohammad Ali's abdication in favor of his son Ahmad Shah (aged 11) and restoring the Majlis on 15 July 1909, though the victory exposed parliament's fragility against external pressures. The second Majlis (1909–1911) grappled with fiscal reforms, including the appointment of American W. Morgan Shuster as treasurer-general in 1911 to curb corruption and foreign loans, but Russian ultimatums—demanding his dismissal and the disbandment of his treasury guard—led to armed incursions into Tabriz and Tehran, effectively ending Shuster's tenure on 16 December 1911 and highlighting great-power dominance over Iranian autonomy. World War I further eroded parliamentary authority; despite official neutrality proclaimed on 1 November 1914, Russian, British, and Ottoman forces occupied swaths of territory, causing famine that killed up to 2 million amid disrupted agriculture and blockades. Postwar instability included the unratified 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement, which proposed British financial and military oversight in exchange for loans, rejected by nationalists as a veiled protectorate; Soviet incursions in Gilan (1920–1921); and tribal revolts amid central government collapse. Parliamentary paralysis persisted through the third to fifth Majlis (1914–1923), marked by factionalism, assassinations of premiers like Hasan Taqizadeh (attempted), and inability to enforce tax collection or suppress separatists, as foreign withdrawals left a power vacuum. On 21 February 1921, Reza Khan, commander of the Cossack Brigade, staged a bloodless coup alongside journalist Seyyed Zia'eddin Tabatabaee, marching on Tehran with 4,000 troops; Zia became prime minister briefly, but Reza, appointed war minister on 25 February 1921, swiftly consolidated control by ousting Zia in May and suppressing Bolshevik-backed soviets in Gilan by October 1921. Reza's campaigns unified the fragmented military, defeated southern tribes like the Qashqai by 1924, and centralized authority, reflecting causal realities of state weakness from prior parliamentary impotence and foreign meddling rather than ideological triumph. By 1923, Reza Khan had become prime minister, leveraging Majlis support to enact secularizing measures like uniform dress codes and conscription, amid declining Qajar legitimacy under the absentee Ahmad Shah. On 31 October 1925, the sixth Majlis voted 80–5 to depose the Qajars, paving Reza's ascension as shah on 15 December 1925 and marking the parliamentary era's close, as constitutional ideals yielded to authoritarian stabilization amid existential threats of balkanization.

Reza Shah's Secular Reforms (1925–1941)

Reza Shah Pahlavi, who seized power through a 1921 coup and was formally crowned in December 1925 after the deposition of the Qajar dynasty, pursued aggressive secularization to consolidate central authority and emulate European models of state-building, drawing inspiration from Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's reforms in Turkey. His policies systematically diminished the influence of Shia clergy (ulama) and tribal confederations, which had fragmented authority under the Qajars, by redirecting resources from religious endowments (waqfs) to state control and deploying a modernized military to subdue nomadic groups like the Bakhtiyari and Qashqai in the 1920s and early 1930s. This centralization enabled secular governance, as evidenced by the regime's confiscation of clerical lands and suppression of religious opposition, including the 1935 uprising at Goharshad Mosque near the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad, where protesters against the unveiling decree and broader secular policies were met with military force, resulting in hundreds of deaths. By the mid-1930s, these measures had provoked widespread clerical discontent, yet they laid the groundwork for a bureaucratic state less beholden to Islamic jurisprudence. In education, Reza Shah dismantled the traditional madrasa system dominated by religious instruction, establishing over 800 modern primary schools by 1941 and passing a 1928 bill for compulsory elementary education, though not effectively implemented until 1943 (initially for five years) to foster national unity and technical skills over theological training. The pinnacle was the founding of the University of Tehran in 1934, Iran's first secular higher education institution, which enrolled initial classes in medicine, law, and engineering, drawing faculty from Europe and prioritizing Persian-language curricula to erode Arabic-influenced religious scholarship. These reforms replaced clergy-controlled learning with state-supervised programs, though enrollment remained limited to urban elites, with approximately 85,000 students enrolled in primary and secondary modern education by 1941, though higher education remained much smaller and exacerbating rural-urban divides. Judicial secularization advanced through the 1927–1928 civil code, which curtailed sharia courts' jurisdiction over family and property matters, introducing European-inspired civil and penal codes that prioritized state law over religious edicts, including bans on polygamy without judicial approval and minimum marriage ages. Clerical judges were sidelined, with secular tribunals handling most cases by the 1930s, reducing the ulama's economic and interpretive power derived from inheritance and divorce rulings. Military modernization complemented this, as Reza Shah expanded the conscript army from 40,000 in 1925 to over 120,000 by 1941, equipping it with imported German and Swedish arms to enforce secular edicts and pacify tribes, thereby preventing clerical alliances with local warlords. Women's emancipation formed a core secular thrust, culminating in the 1936 kashf-e hijab decree that prohibited veiling in public, enforced by police who forcibly removed chadors from resisters, aiming to symbolize national progress and weaken clerical moral authority over family life. This "Women's Awakening" (1936–1941) integrated women into the workforce and education, with female enrollment in schools rising from negligible numbers to thousands by 1941, though the top-down coercion alienated conservative segments and sparked underground resistance. Critics, including some ulama, decried it as cultural imposition, yet it facilitated urban women's entry into professions like teaching and nursing, aligning with broader mandates for Western dress codes for men in 1934 to promote a uniform secular identity. Infrastructure projects underscored the secular state's capacity for self-reliant development, notably the Trans-Iranian Railway, initiated in 1927 and completed in 1938 at a cost of over 6 billion rials, spanning 1,400 kilometers without foreign loans to connect the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea and integrate peripheral regions under central oversight. Accompanying road networks expanded to 14,000 kilometers by 1941, facilitating administrative control and economic secularization by bypassing clergy-influenced trade routes. While these advances boosted literacy from 5% to 15% and industrialized key sectors like textiles, the coercive secularism fueled resentment among traditionalists, contributing to Reza Shah's forced abdication in 1941 amid Allied occupation, as rural and religious populations viewed reforms as disruptive to established social orders.

World War II Occupation and Transition (1941–1953)

In August 1941, British and Soviet forces launched a coordinated invasion of Iran, with Soviet troops advancing from the north and British Commonwealth forces from the south and west, capturing key cities including Tabriz, Hamadan, and Tehran within days due to limited Iranian resistance. The operation, code-named Operation Countenance by the British, was justified by the Allies as necessary to secure the Persian Corridor—a vital supply route for Lend-Lease aid to the Soviet Union—and to neutralize perceived German influence, as Iran hosted approximately 700–800 German technicians and advisors despite its declared neutrality. Reza Shah Pahlavi, whose modernization policies had fostered economic ties with Germany, refused Allied ultimatums to expel the Germans, prompting the invasion that effectively ended his rule. On 16 September 1941, Reza Shah abdicated under Allied pressure, naming his 21-year-old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, as successor before departing into exile first to Mauritius and later South Africa, where he died in 1944. The occupation divided Iran into zones: Soviet control in the northwest, British in the south, with U.S. forces later establishing the Persian Gulf Command in 1942 to manage logistics, transporting over 5 million tons of materiel—including 2.5 million tons by truck and rail—to the Soviet Union via the Corridor by war's end. This aid, comprising 10% of total Lend-Lease to the USSR, proved crucial for Soviet operations on the Eastern Front, though it strained Iran's economy through inflation, food shortages, and infrastructure overuse. The 1943 Tehran Conference formalized Allied commitments to withdraw troops six months after Germany's defeat, with Britain and the U.S. fulfilling this by January and March 1946, respectively. Soviet forces, however, lingered in the northwest, backing the Azerbaijan People's Government—a Soviet-supported separatist regime declared in December 1945—and a similar Kurdish entity in Mahabad, amid demands for oil concessions in northern Iran. Iran appealed to the United Nations in January 1946, marking the organization's first crisis; U.S. diplomatic pressure, including threats to withhold reconstruction loans, prompted Soviet leader Joseph Stalin to announce withdrawal on 24 March 1946, completed by 9 May. Iranian forces reasserted control over Azerbaijan in December 1946, dissolving the puppet government without major bloodshed, an episode later viewed as an early Cold War test of Soviet expansionism. Post-occupation instability fueled political fragmentation, with the communist Tudeh Party gaining influence amid economic woes and weak royal authority. In 1951, escalating disputes over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's dominance—controlling 85% of Iran's oil production but remitting minimal royalties—led the Majlis to pass a nationalization bill on 15 March, verified days later, prompting Prime Minister Hossein Ala’s resignation and the appointment of nationalist Mohammad Mossadegh as premier on 28 April. Mossadegh's government expropriated British assets, triggering a naval blockade, UN complaints, and economic isolation that halved oil revenues and sparked domestic unrest, including Tudeh-led strikes. By 1953, Mossadegh's consolidation of power—dissolving the Majlis in 1952 via referendum and expanding emergency authority—raised fears in Washington and London of communist infiltration via the Tudeh Party and loss of oil access, amid Britain's Abadan refinery shutdown. The U.S. CIA and British MI6 orchestrated Operation Ajax (TPAJAX), a covert coup approved by President Dwight Eisenhower, involving bribes to military officers, paid mobs, and propaganda to portray Mossadegh as unstable. On 15 August, the Shah issued a dismissal decree, but Mossadegh resisted; a second attempt on 19 August succeeded with military intervention, leading to Mossadegh's arrest, the Shah's return from brief exile, and restoration of monarchical preeminence, setting the stage for centralized rule. Declassified documents confirm U.S. expenditure of about $1 million, highlighting strategic oil and anti-communist motives over democratic concerns.

Mohammad Reza Shah's White Revolution and Oil Era (1953–1979)

Following the success of the 1953 coup d'état, codenamed Operation Ajax and executed by the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in collaboration with British intelligence, Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh was overthrown on August 19, 1953, allowing Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to reassert monarchical authority after a brief exile. The coup, motivated by Mossadegh's nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 which threatened Western interests, resulted in the 1954 oil consortium agreement that allocated Iran 50% of revenues while restoring foreign involvement in extraction and sales. In its immediate aftermath, the Shah purged disloyal military officers and political opponents, consolidating power through increased control over the military and judiciary. To safeguard the regime against communist and nationalist threats, the Shah established Sazeman-e Ettela'at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK), Iran's national intelligence and security organization, in 1957 via national security legislation, with training and advisory support from the CIA and Israel's Mossad. SAVAK's mandate encompassed domestic surveillance, counterintelligence, and suppression of dissent, employing tens of thousands of agents and informants; it detained, tortured, and executed thousands of perceived opponents, including leftists, Islamists, and ethnic separatists, thereby enabling the Shah's authoritarian governance but fostering widespread resentment. By the early 1960s, amid economic stagnation and rural unrest, the Shah shifted toward reformist policies to legitimize his rule and undercut clerical and landowning influence, culminating in the White Revolution announced in January 1963 following a referendum that officially recorded 5,598,711 affirmative votes out of 5,598,711 eligible, though the process faced accusations of manipulation due to restricted participation and lack of independent oversight. The White Revolution's core components included land reform, which redistributed approximately 1.8 million hectares from absentee landlords to over 1 million peasant families by 1971, compensating owners with shares in privatized state factories and bonds while abolishing feudal sharecropping obligations. This dismantled the traditional landlord class's political power, redistributed wealth, and initially boosted agricultural output in some regions through mechanization incentives, but empirical analyses indicate it often failed smallholders lacking capital or expertise, leading to land resale, rural proletarianization, and mass migration to urban areas that swelled shantytowns around Tehran and other cities. Complementary initiatives established Literacy Corps (deploying 10,000 conscripts annually to rural schools, raising adult literacy from 26% in 1960 to 50% by 1976), Health Corps for village clinics, and Reconstruction and Development Corps for infrastructure like roads and dams. Women's suffrage was granted in 1963, enabling female participation in elections and public life, while nationalization of forests and pastures aimed to prevent overgrazing and support rural cooperatives. Parallel to these social reforms, the era saw rapid industrialization and infrastructure expansion, including the construction of over 10,000 kilometers of new roads, multiple universities, and steel mills, financed increasingly by oil exports. Iran's real GDP grew at an average annual rate of 8-10% from 1960 to 1977, with per capita income rising from $170 in 1955 to over $2,000 by 1978 (in constant dollars), reflecting oil-driven investment in petrochemicals, automobiles, and heavy industry. Oil production surged from 215,000 barrels per day pre-World War II levels to over 5.7 million by 1978, with revenues escalating from $4.6 billion in 1972 to $22.9 billion in 1976 following the 1973 OPEC embargo and price quadrupling, enabling ambitious five-year plans that prioritized military spending (reaching 20% of GDP) and urban development but exacerbated inflation (peaking at 25% annually) and income disparities, as oil wealth concentrated among elites and state-connected contractors. Despite measurable advances in education (university enrollment tripling) and health (life expectancy rising from 45 to 55 years), the reforms' top-down imposition alienated key groups: clerics opposed secularization and land seizures from religious endowments, bazaar merchants resented state monopolies and Western-style commerce, and displaced peasants fueled urban underemployment. SAVAK's intensified crackdowns, including the 1963 Qom uprising where security forces killed dozens of protesters, highlighted the regime's reliance on coercion over consensus, while cultural policies promoting pre-Islamic Persian heritage and Western attire deepened divides with traditionalist Shia society. By the late 1970s, oil boom-induced corruption and rapid urbanization had created a volatile mix of modernization gains and social fractures, setting the stage for revolutionary mobilization.

Islamic Republic and Contemporary Crises

1979 Revolution: Ideologies and Overthrow

The 1979 Iranian Revolution arose from a broad coalition of opposition groups united primarily by opposition to Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi's autocratic rule, which combined political repression through the SAVAK secret police, economic disparities amid oil-driven growth, and cultural alienation from rapid Western-style modernization. Ideologically, the movement encompassed Shia Islamist factions advocating for clerical governance under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), Marxist-leftist groups like the Tudeh Party and Fedayeen-e Khalq guerrillas seeking class revolution, and secular nationalists in the National Front pushing for constitutional limits on monarchy. This temporary alliance masked underlying tensions, as Khomeini's vision of theocratic rule—articulated in his 1970 treatise Islamic Government—prioritized absolute clerical authority over non-religious ideologies, a concept that garnered limited pre-revolutionary support even among Shia clerics but gained traction through his exile-based network and anti-Shah tapes. Economic grievances fueled mass mobilization, with the Shah's White Revolution reforms from 1963 exacerbating rural-urban divides through land redistribution that displaced traditional landowners and clerics while urban inflation—reaching 30% annually by 1977—eroded middle-class support despite per capita income rising from $170 in 1960 to $2,000 by 1978. Political repression, including SAVAK's estimated 3,000 political prisoners and documented use of torture, alienated intellectuals and students, while perceived foreign influence—stemming from the 1953 CIA-backed coup restoring the Shah—framed the regime as a puppet of the United States and United Kingdom. Khomeini's Islamist ideology resonated by blending anti-imperialism with calls for Islamic governance, portraying the Shah's secularism as moral corruption; leftist groups contributed organizational muscle via strikes and urban guerrilla actions, but their secularism clashed with the clerics' long-term theocratic aims. The overthrow unfolded through escalating protests ignited on January 7, 1978, in Qom after a state newspaper article denigrated Khomeini, sparking riots that killed several demonstrators and initiated a cycle of 40-day Shia mourning commemorations leading to nationwide unrest. By September 8, 1978, "Black Friday" saw security forces fire on Tehran crowds, killing at least 64 and up to 88 per eyewitness accounts, galvanizing defections and radicalizing moderates. Oil sector strikes from October 1978 crippled the economy, reducing output by 4.8 million barrels daily and forcing the Shah to impose martial law on September 9, which instead amplified demonstrations during Muharram processions in December, drawing millions to Tehran streets. Facing terminal cancer and U.S. pressure under President Jimmy Carter's human rights policy, the Shah appointed moderate Shapour Bakhtiar as prime minister on January 6, 1979, and fled Iran on January 16, ostensibly for "medical treatment." Khomeini returned triumphantly from Paris exile on February 1, rejecting Bakhtiar's government and appointing Mehdi Bazargan as provisional prime minister on February 5, amid clashes between loyalist forces and revolutionary militias. The regime collapsed on February 11 when the military declared neutrality, allowing Islamist and leftist guerrillas to seize key installations, marking the effective overthrow after 22 months of intensifying civil resistance involving up to 10% of Iran's 37 million population at peak protests. This ideological convergence enabled the revolution's success but foreshadowed Khomeini's consolidation of power, sidelining non-Islamist factions through purges and referendums establishing the Islamic Republic by April 1, 1979.

Khomeini's Theocratic Consolidation (1979–1989)

Following Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's return to Tehran on February 1, 1979, after 15 years in exile, he swiftly assumed de facto leadership of the nascent revolutionary government, directing the consolidation of Islamist authority amid the collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy. The provisional government under Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan resigned on November 4, 1979, yielding uncontested control to Khomeini and clerical allies, who prioritized embedding velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the Islamic jurist) as the regime's foundational principle. A national referendum on March 30-31, 1979, approved the establishment of an Islamic Republic with 98.2% support from over 20 million voters, though critics noted the binary yes/no format and lack of alternatives precluded broader debate. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was formally established on May 5, 1979, by decree to safeguard the revolution's Islamist ideology against internal threats, including remnants of the monarchy's military and leftist factions, functioning parallel to the regular armed forces. Revolutionary tribunals, operating under Sharia principles, conducted rapid trials leading to the execution of over 600 former regime officials, generals, and SAVAK agents between February and August 1979, framing these as retribution for prior abuses while eliminating potential counter-revolutionary elements. A new constitution, enshrining Khomeini as vali-e faqih (supreme leader) with veto power over elected bodies via the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts, was drafted by a clerically dominated assembly and ratified by referendum on December 2-3, 1979, with 99.3% approval from 16 million participants, solidifying theocratic supremacy over parliamentary democracy. To purge secular and Western influences from education, the "Cultural Revolution" was launched in June 1980, closing all universities for over two years until late 1982, during which committees expelled thousands of professors and students deemed ideologically incompatible, including leftists and Baha'is, replacing curricula with Islamist frameworks. This process, overseen by the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council appointed by Khomeini, facilitated the Islamization of academia, though it disrupted intellectual output and prompted an exodus of scholars. By the mid-1980s, opposition from groups like the Mujahedin-e Khalq faced intensified crackdowns, culminating in the 1988 mass executions of 2,800 to 5,000 political prisoners ordered by Khomeini in response to ceasefire overtures during the Iran-Iraq War, targeting those refusing recantation of anti-regime views. Through these measures—institutionalizing clerical oversight, suppressing dissent via judicial and paramilitary apparatuses, and enforcing doctrinal purity—Khomeini's regime achieved theocratic consolidation by 1989, transforming Iran into a centralized Islamist state where religious jurisprudence superseded civil law, though at the cost of widespread purges and human rights curtailments documented by international observers. Economic nationalizations and subsidies under the guise of self-reliance further aligned state resources with revolutionary guards, embedding the IRGC in governance and diminishing pre-revolutionary bureaucratic autonomy. Khomeini's death on June 3, 1989, marked the period's end, with his successor Ali Khamenei inheriting a fortified hierarchy resistant to reformist challenges.

Iran-Iraq War and Hostage Crisis (1979–1988)

The Iran hostage crisis began on November 4, 1979, when Iranian militants, self-identified as Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line and supported by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, stormed the United States Embassy in Tehran, seizing 66 American diplomats, staff, and citizens. Of these, 13 were released within days (six on November 9 and seven more shortly after, including women and African Americans), one was freed in July 1980 on medical grounds, and the remaining 52 were held captive for 444 days until their release on January 20, 1981, coinciding with Ronald Reagan's presidential inauguration. The seizure was framed by the militants as retaliation for the U.S. granting asylum to the deposed Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whom they accused of crimes against Iran, amid broader revolutionary fervor portraying the U.S. as the "Great Satan" for decades of perceived interference, including the 1953 coup against Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh. Khomeini endorsed the takeover on November 5, 1979, declaring it the "second revolution" and consolidating power by sidelining moderates like Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, who resigned in protest. The U.S. response included freezing approximately $12 billion in Iranian assets, imposing economic sanctions, and severing diplomatic ties on April 7, 1980; a rescue operation, Operation Eagle Claw, on April 24, 1980, aborted due to helicopter failures and a collision that killed eight American servicemen, further humiliating the Carter administration. Negotiations, mediated by Algeria, culminated in the Algiers Accords signed January 19, 1981, under which Iran released the hostages in exchange for the unfreezing of assets and a U.S. pledge to avoid interference, though allegations of covert U.S.-Iran dealings (later known as the October Surprise theory) persist without conclusive evidence. The crisis isolated Iran internationally, strained its economy, and bolstered hardliners domestically by framing external pressure as justification for theocratic intransigence. Concurrently, the Iran-Iraq War erupted on September 22, 1980, when Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, launched a full-scale invasion of western Iran, exploiting post-revolutionary disarray including purges of the Iranian military officer corps, which reduced its effectiveness by an estimated 50-70%. Iraq's aims included annexing the oil-rich Khuzestan province (with its Arab minority) and securing full control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway, amid longstanding border disputes abrogated by Iran in 1975 and Hussein's fears of Khomeini's Shia revolutionary ideology inciting Iraq's Shia majority against his secular Ba'athist regime. Initial Iraqi advances captured 1,000-1,500 square miles, including Khorramshahr by October 1980, but stalled by December due to Iranian resistance and logistical overextension. By 1982, Iran counterattacked, recapturing Khorramshahr on May 24 and pushing into Iraq, rejecting ceasefires as Hussein refused to withdraw or face trial for aggression; the conflict devolved into attrition warfare characterized by Iran's human-wave assaults involving poorly trained Basij volunteers—often teenagers—and Iraq's use of chemical weapons, beginning with mustard gas near Susangerd in 1980 and escalating to tabun and sarin nerve agents in attacks like Halabja (March 16, 1988, killing 5,000 Kurdish civilians). Iraq deployed chemical agents in over 100 documented instances, causing an estimated 50,000-100,000 Iranian casualties, while both sides targeted Gulf shipping in the "Tanker War" from 1984, sinking over 500 vessels and disrupting 20% of global oil transit. Casualties totaled 500,000-1 million dead (Iran: 200,000-600,000 military; Iraq: 150,000-375,000) and millions wounded or displaced, with economic costs exceeding $1 trillion, funded by Iraq's Gulf allies and Western credits despite condemnations of chemical use. The war ended in stalemate with Iran's acceptance of UN Security Council Resolution 598 on July 18, 1988, after Iraqi counteroffensives, the U.S. Navy's downing of Iran Air Flight 655 (killing 290 civilians) on July 3, and internal exhaustion; a ceasefire took effect August 20, 1988, monitored by 350 UN observers along the 740-mile border, restoring pre-war boundaries without reparations or war crimes accountability. No formal peace treaty followed, leaving latent tensions, as Hussein rebuilt forces for the 1990 Kuwait invasion while Iran focused on reconstruction amid sanctions. The conflict entrenched Khomeini's regime through wartime mobilization but exposed its isolation, with Western and Soviet support tilting toward Iraq to contain Iranian expansionism.

Khamenei's Supremacy and Presidential Cycles (1989–present)

Following the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini on 3 June 1989, Ali Khamenei—previously Iran's president from October 1981 to August 1989—was elected Supreme Leader by the Assembly of Experts on 4 June 1989, receiving 60 of 74 votes. To enable his selection despite lacking the highest clerical qualifications, the constitution was amended in July 1989 to remove the stipulation that the Supreme Leader must be a marja'-e taqlid, a grand ayatollah. This transition marked the onset of Khamenei's indefinite tenure, during which he has centralized authority beyond Khomeini's era by cultivating loyalty among security forces and clerical networks. Khamenei's constitutional powers grant him command over the armed forces, including direct oversight of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), appointment of the judiciary chief, state broadcaster head, and six of the twelve Guardian Council members—who vet candidates and bills—and delineation of overarching state policies. He exercises veto authority over presidential decisions conflicting with his ideological framework, particularly in foreign policy, defense, and nuclear development, while controlling bonyads—quasi-governmental foundations managing vast economic assets equivalent to 20-60% of GDP through exempt enterprises in oil, telecom, and construction. These mechanisms ensure policy continuity, as evidenced by sustained proxy support in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Syria, and nuclear enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels despite international sanctions. Presidential cycles under Khamenei—from Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) to Masoud Pezeshkian (elected July 2024 after Ebrahim Raisi's death in a May 2024 helicopter crash)—have alternated reformist and hardline figures, yet all operate within his bounds due to Guardian Council disqualifications limiting contenders to regime loyalists. Elections feature low turnout (e.g., 41% in the 2024 runoff), signaling voter apathy toward preordained outcomes, with Khamenei endorsing winners post-vote to affirm alignment. This facade of electoral competition masks his dominance, enabling suppression of dissent via IRGC-led forces during protests in 2009 (over disputed Ahmadinejad reelection), 2019 (fuel price hikes), and 2022 (Mahsa Amini death), while economic mismanagement—exacerbated by sanctions from anti-Western stances—persists under his strategic red lines. Khamenei's endurance, now at age 86 as of 2025, relies on this institutional web, rendering presidents executors rather than challengers.

Rafsanjani to Khatami: Pragmatism vs. Reform Strains (1989–2005)

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani assumed the presidency on August 17, 1989, following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, with a mandate focused on postwar reconstruction after the Iran-Iraq War's devastation, which had destroyed much of Iran's oil infrastructure and urban centers in western provinces. His administration prioritized rebuilding efforts, including the repair of bombed cities and energy facilities, while initiating a shift toward pragmatic economic policies aimed at stabilization and growth. This "reconstruction jihad" involved partial liberalization measures, such as encouraging private sector involvement and foreign investment, though constrained by ongoing U.S. sanctions and domestic resistance from ideological hardliners. Rafsanjani's economic reforms included pro-market adjustments launched in 1989, such as privatization initiatives and efforts to integrate Iran into regional trade, yielding oil revenues of approximately $123 billion from 1989 to 1996 and modest GDP growth amid high inflation. However, these policies exacerbated inequality and corruption, as state-linked elites captured benefits, while external pressures like the 1996 Iran-Libya Sanctions Act deterred investment and deepened economic strains. Foreign policy under Rafsanjani emphasized normalization with neighbors and pragmatic overtures to Europe to reduce isolation, contrasting with revolutionary export of ideology, yet maintained core theocratic controls. Re-elected in 1993, his tenure laid groundwork for moderated governance but faced criticism for failing to resolve structural inefficiencies or fully transition from war-era command economics. The 1997 presidential election marked a pivot, with Mohammad Khatami, a former culture minister, winning 69 percent of the vote in a high-turnout contest (over 80 percent), reflecting public demand for social and political liberalization after Rafsanjani's technocratic focus. Khatami advocated "dialogue of civilizations," expanded press freedoms, and promotion of civil society, leading to over 200 new publications and reduced censorship in early years, alongside economic continuity with subsidy reforms. Re-elected in 2001 with 77 percent support, his administration pursued non-aggressive foreign policy, including temporary nuclear negotiations with European powers to avert escalation. Reform strains intensified as conservative institutions—the Guardian Council, judiciary, and security forces—systematically obstructed Khatami's agenda, disqualifying reformist candidates, closing newspapers, and imprisoning activists, which undermined legislative efforts like the "twin bills" for institutional balance. Hardliner backlash, including the 1999 student protests sparked by a dormitory raid and attacks on reform symbols, highlighted the limits of executive power against unelected clerical vetoes, with Khatami conceding he could not override the Supreme Leader's authority. Economic stagnation persisted, with unemployment rising and growth faltering below 5 percent annually, as privatization favored insiders over broad development. By 2005, Khatami's reforms had fostered cultural openings but failed to alter the theocracy's core power structure, as conservative dominance in key bodies preserved veto power and ideological primacy, exposing the inherent tensions between pragmatic governance and entrenched revolutionary guards. This era underscored causal limits: electoral mandates for change clashed with constitutional designs prioritizing clerical oversight, resulting in partial policy gains overshadowed by institutional gridlock.

Ahmadinejad's Confrontational Policies (2005–2013)

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad assumed the presidency on August 3, 2005, following a runoff election victory over Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, securing 62% of the vote amid accusations of irregularities from opponents. His administration pursued a hardline ideological approach, emphasizing resistance to Western influence and acceleration of Iran's nuclear program, which intensified international tensions. Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and policies framed Iran as a defender against perceived imperialism, leading to multiple rounds of UN Security Council sanctions between 2006 and 2010 for non-compliance with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands to suspend uranium enrichment. Central to Ahmadinejad's confrontational stance was defiance on the nuclear issue, with Iran installing thousands of centrifuges at Natanz by 2006 and announcing uranium enrichment to 20% purity in 2010 despite UN resolutions demanding suspension. In a December 14, 2005, speech, Ahmadinejad described the Holocaust as a "myth," prompting global condemnation and reinforcing Iran's isolation from Europe and the US. He reiterated calls for Israel's elimination, stating in October 2005 that the regime occupying Jerusalem must "vanish from the page of time," which aligned with state-sponsored conferences on Holocaust denial in Tehran in 2006. These positions, defended as challenging "Zionist narratives," escalated proxy conflicts, including support for Hezbollah during the 2006 Lebanon War, where Iran supplied rockets amid Israeli incursions. Domestically, Ahmadinejad's policies manifested confrontation through suppression of dissent, culminating in the June 12, 2009, presidential election where official results granted him 62.6% against reformist Mir-Hossein Mousavi's 33.8%, sparking the Green Movement protests. Independent analyses, including from Iranian reformists and Western observers, documented irregularities such as inflated turnout in rural areas loyal to Ahmadinejad and pre-marked ballots, though the Guardian Council upheld the results after partial recounts. Security forces, including the Basij militia, responded with lethal force, killing at least 72 protesters by official counts and arresting thousands, with trials extracting forced confessions amid allegations of torture. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei endorsed Ahmadinejad's victory on June 15, 2009, framing protests as foreign-orchestrated, which solidified the regime's crackdown and led to house arrests of opposition leaders like Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi persisting beyond 2013. Economically, Ahmadinejad's populism clashed with fiscal orthodoxy, as massive spending from oil revenues—peaking at $80 billion annually by 2008—fueled subsidies and cash handouts, driving inflation from 12% in 2005 to over 40% by 2013 per Central Bank data. Resistance to subsidy reforms until 2010, when partial cuts were implemented under parliamentary pressure, combined with sanctions, caused currency devaluation—the rial lost 80% value against the dollar by 2012—and industrial contraction, with unemployment rising to 14%. These policies, justified as empowering the "oppressed," prioritized ideological goals over market stabilization, exacerbating sanctions' impact from nuclear defiance and alienating pragmatic elites. By 2013, Ahmadinejad's tenure had entrenched Iran's pariah status, with GDP growth stagnating at 0.9% amid hyperinflation, setting the stage for his successor's diplomatic pivot.

Rouhani's Nuclear Diplomacy and JCPOA (2013–2021)

Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric and former nuclear negotiator, was elected president on June 14, 2013, securing 50.71% of the vote in the first round against conservative rivals. His campaign emphasized easing Iran's international isolation through renewed nuclear talks, promising to resolve the standoff inherited from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's confrontational approach, which had intensified sanctions and UN resolutions. Rouhani's victory reflected public frustration with economic hardships from sanctions, though Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei retained ultimate authority over foreign policy and nuclear matters. Negotiations with the P5+1 (United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and Germany) resumed promptly, building on interim agreements like the November 2013 Joint Plan of Action, which temporarily froze aspects of Iran's uranium enrichment in exchange for limited sanctions relief. These talks culminated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), finalized on July 14, 2015, in Vienna. Under the JCPOA, Iran committed to reducing its centrifuges by two-thirds, capping low-enriched uranium stocks at 300 kg (versus prior levels exceeding 7,000 kg), redesigning the Arak reactor to minimize plutonium production, and allowing enhanced IAEA monitoring, including access to undeclared sites if warranted. In return, upon IAEA verification of compliance on Implementation Day (January 16, 2016), the UN, EU, and participating states lifted nuclear-related sanctions, unfreezing approximately $100 billion in Iranian assets and enabling resumed oil exports, which rose from 1.1 million barrels per day in 2013 to over 2 million by 2016. The deal faced domestic opposition in Iran from hardliners who viewed it as capitulation without addressing ballistic missiles or regional influence, while Khamenei endorsed it conditionally, insisting on "resistance economics" to mitigate reliance on Western trade. Internationally, critics, including U.S. conservatives, argued the JCPOA's "sunset clauses"—expiring restrictions after 10–15 years—merely delayed Iran's potential weaponization path without verifiable dismantlement of know-how or past military dimensions flagged by IAEA reports. On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced U.S. withdrawal, citing these flaws and Iran's post-deal proxy activities, and reimposed "maximum pressure" sanctions targeting oil exports and banking, which halved Iran's oil sales to under 500,000 barrels per day by 2019. Iran initially adhered to JCPOA limits despite the U.S. exit, seeking European incentives to bypass sanctions via mechanisms like INSTEX, but faced limited success amid secondary U.S. penalties. Starting May 8, 2019—marking one year post-withdrawal—Rouhani announced phased reductions in commitments, exceeding enrichment caps to 4.5% (then 20% by late 2020) and accumulating over 2,400 kg of low-enriched uranium by mid-2021, per IAEA verification, while blocking some inspector access. These steps, framed as reversible leverage for sanctions relief, escalated tensions but preserved diplomatic channels into 2021, as Iran rejected direct U.S. talks under Biden without full sanction lifts. By Rouhani's term end in August 2021, Iran's "breakout time" to potential weapons-grade material had shortened to months from over a year under JCPOA compliance, amid unresolved IAEA concerns over undeclared nuclear traces.

Raisi's Hardline Tenure and Death (2021–2024)

Ebrahim Raisi, a judiciary chief and loyalist to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, was elected president on June 18, 2021, in an election marked by the disqualification of several candidates by the Guardian Council, resulting in low voter turnout of approximately 48.8%. Raisi secured 62.9% of the vote against limited opposition, assuming office on August 3, 2021, with promises to prioritize economic self-sufficiency, combat corruption, and resist Western pressure. His administration deepened the Islamic Republic's hardline orientation, emphasizing alignment with Khamenei's vision of resistance to external influences and internal reform through ideological enforcement rather than liberalization. Domestically, Raisi's tenure faced escalating unrest, culminating in nationwide protests following the death of Mahsa Amini on September 16, 2022, after her arrest by morality police for alleged improper hijab wearing. A UN fact-finding mission determined that Iranian authorities bore responsibility for the "physical violence" causing Amini's death, sparking demonstrations that challenged compulsory veiling and broader governance failures. Security forces responded with lethal force, killing at least 551 protesters including 68 children and executing several, while detaining thousands; the crackdown, involving the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), highlighted Raisi's prioritization of regime stability over concessions. Economically, Iran grappled with persistent inflation exceeding 40% annually, rial depreciation to record lows, and sanctions-induced constraints, despite Raisi's focus on domestic production and non-oil exports. Crude oil exports rose from 0.6 million barrels per day in June 2021 to over 1.6 million by April 2024, aiding GDP growth estimated at 4.7% in 2023 by the IMF, though projections for 2024 fell to 3.3% amid structural inefficiencies and corruption. Policies emphasized "resistance economy" principles, reducing import reliance but failing to alleviate widespread hardship, as evidenced by Khamenei's public criticism of the administration's handling of inflation. In foreign policy, Raisi's government stalled Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) revival talks initiated under predecessor Hassan Rouhani, advancing uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels and installing advanced centrifuges, which the IAEA reported as non-compliance with safeguards. Negotiations in Vienna from November 2021 yielded no agreement, with Raisi demanding guarantees against U.S. withdrawal and linking talks to sanction relief, while pivoting toward China, Russia, and regional proxies to circumvent isolation. Raisi's presidency ended abruptly on May 19, 2024, when the Bell 212 helicopter carrying him, Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian, and six others crashed in dense fog near Uzi village in East Azerbaijan province during return from a dam inauguration. An official investigation attributed the incident to adverse weather and atmospheric conditions, ruling out sabotage or mechanical failure beyond overload from summer heat, though the aging U.S.-made aircraft underscored Iran's sanctioned aviation limitations. His death prompted a swift succession process, with Vice President Mohammad Mokhber as acting president until elections, amplifying uncertainties in Iran's theocratic power structure.

Pezeshkian's Reformist Facade amid 2024–2025 Turmoil

Masoud Pezeshkian, a cardiac surgeon and veteran parliamentarian, assumed the presidency on July 28, 2024, following a snap election triggered by the death of hardliner Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash on May 19, 2024. Campaigning as a reformist advocating moderate domestic policies and détente with the West, Pezeshkian secured victory in the July 5 runoff against conservative Saeed Jalili with 54.8% of the vote amid historically low turnout of approximately 40%, signaling widespread public disillusionment with the electoral process. Despite his self-description as a "reformist-principalist" loyal to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the revolutionary principles, expectations of liberalization were tempered by Iran's constitutional framework, where the presidency holds executive authority subordinate to the unelected Guardian Council and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), limiting unilateral action. Pezeshkian's initial moves, including the formation of a "national accord" cabinet on August 21, 2024, blending reformist and principalist figures, underscored the facade of incremental change within entrenched power structures rather than substantive reform. Pledges to ease social restrictions, such as on mandatory hijab enforcement, and revive nuclear diplomacy faced immediate hardline pushback, with parliament approving the cabinet only after concessions to conservative demands. Critics, including domestic hardliners and independent analysts, argued that Pezeshkian's rhetoric masked an inability or unwillingness to challenge the theocracy's core, positioning him as a potential scapegoat for systemic failures amid Khamenei's overriding influence on key decisions like foreign policy and security. By late 2024, efforts to de-escalate proxy conflicts yielded no tangible shifts, as regional policy remained anchored in continuity despite structural constraints imposed by the IRGC and supreme leadership. The period saw escalating domestic turmoil, exacerbated by economic collapse characterized by runaway inflation exceeding 40%, currency devaluation, and the snapback of UN sanctions in September 2025, which Pezeshkian attributed more to internal mismanagement than external pressures. Widespread protests and strikes erupted on October 6, 2025, targeting government corruption, foreign adventurism, and ethnic grievances in regions like Baluchestan, reflecting a deepening disconnect between the regime and society that reformist overtures failed to bridge. Pezeshkian's administration grappled with a "permanent state of crisis," including fallout from the Twelve Day War with Israel and proxy losses, yet prioritized national unity rhetoric over dismantling repressive apparatuses, highlighting the superficiality of his reformist branding. By his one-year mark in July 2025, persistent IRGC dominance and Khamenei's veto power rendered promised changes illusory, reinforcing perceptions of Pezeshkian as a moderate figurehead navigating, rather than transforming, Iran's authoritarian dynamics.

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