Hubbry Logo
Early Muslim conquestsEarly Muslim conquestsMain
Open search
Early Muslim conquests
Community hub
Early Muslim conquests
logo
8 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Early Muslim conquests
Early Muslim conquests
from Wikipedia

Early Muslim conquests

  Expansion under Muhammad, 622–632
  Expansion under the Rashidun Caliphate, 632–661
  Expansion under the Umayyad Caliphate, 661–750
Date622–750 CE
Location
Result Muslim victory
Territorial
changes
Arab dominion (caliphate) established from Iberia in the west to the Indus River valley in the east
Belligerents
Commanders and leaders

The early Muslim conquests or early Islamic conquests (Arabic: الْفُتُوحَاتُ الإسْلَامِيَّة, romanizedal-Futūḥāt al-ʾIslāmiyya),[3] also known as the Arab conquests,[4] were a series of wars initiated in the 7th century by Muhammad, the prophet of Islam. He established the first Islamic state in Medina, Arabia that expanded rapidly under the Rashidun Caliphate and the Umayyad Caliphate, culminating in Muslim rule being established in Asia, Northern Africa, and Southern Europe over the following century. According to historian James Buchan: "In speed and extent, the first Arab conquests were matched only by those of Alexander the Great, and they were more lasting."[5] At their height, the territory that was conquered by the Arab Muslims stretched from Iberia (at the Pyrenees) in the west to India (at Sind) in the east; Muslim control spanned Sicily, most of the Middle East and North Africa, and the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Among other drastic changes, the early Muslim conquests brought about the collapse of the Sasanian Empire and great territorial losses for the Byzantine Empire. Explanations for the Muslim victories have been difficult to discover, primarily because only fragmentary sources have survived from the period. American scholar Fred McGraw Donner suggests that Muhammad's establishment of an Islamic state in Arabia coupled with ideological (i.e., religious) coherence and mobilization constituted the main factor that propelled the early Muslim armies to successfully establish, in the timespan of roughly a century, one of the largest empires in history. Estimates of the total area of the combined territory held by the early Muslim polities at the conquests' peak have been as high as 13,000,000 square kilometres (5,000,000 sq mi).[6] Most historians also agree that, as another primary factor determining the early Muslim conquests' success, the Sasanians and the Byzantines were militarily and economically exhausted from decades of warfare against each other.[7]

It has been suggested that Jews and some Christians in Sasanian and Byzantine territory were dissatisfied and welcomed the invading Muslim troops, largely because of religious conflict in both empires.[8] However, confederations of Arab Christians, including the Ghassanids, initially allied themselves with the Byzantines. There were also instances of alliances between the Sasanians and the Byzantines, such as when they fought together against the Rashidun army during the Battle of Firaz.[9][10] Some of the lands lost by the Byzantines to the Muslims (namely Egypt, Palestine, and Syria) had been reclaimed from the Sasanians only a few years prior to the Muslim conquests.

Background

[edit]
Byzantine and Sasanian Empires in 600 AD

Pre-Islamic Arabia

[edit]

Arabia was a region that hosted several cultures, some urban and others nomadic Bedouin.[11] Arabian society was divided along tribal and clan lines, with the most important divisions being between the "southern" and "northern" tribal associations.[12] Both the Byzantine and Sasanian empires competed for influence in Arabia by sponsoring clients; in turn, Arabian tribes sought the patronage of the two rival empires to bolster their own ambitions.[12] The Lakhmid kingdom, which covered parts of what is now southern Iraq and northern Saudi Arabia was a client of Persia, and in 602 the Persians deposed the Lakhmids to take over the defense of the southern frontier.[13] This left the Persians exposed and overextended, helping to set the stage for the collapse of the Persian Empire later that century.[14] Southern Arabia—especially what is now—Yemen, had for thousands of years been a wealthy region that had been a center of the spice trade.[14] Yemen had been at the center of an international trading network linking Eurasia to Africa, and Yemen. It had been visited by merchants from East Africa, Europe, the Middle East, India and even from as far away as China.[14] In turn, the Yemeni were skilled sailors, travelling up the Red Sea to Egypt and across the Indian Ocean to India and down the east African coast.[14] Inland, the valleys of Yemen had been cultivated by a system of irrigation that had been set back when the Marib Dam was destroyed by an earthquake in about 450 AD.[14] Frankincense and myrrh had been greatly valued in the Mediterranean region, being used in religious ceremonies. However, the conversion of the Mediterranean world to Christianity had significantly reduced the demand for these commodities, causing a major economic slump in southern Arabia which helped to create the impression that Arabia was a backward region.[14]

Little is known of the pre-Islamic religions of Arabia, but it is known that the Arabs worshipped gods such as al-Lāt, Manat, al-Uzza, and Hubal, with the supreme deity in their pantheon being Allah (God).[15] There were also Jewish and Christian communities in Arabia, particularly in regions like Yemen and Najran, and aspects of Arab culture and religious practices reflected their influence.[15] Arabian society during this time was primarily tribal, with strong kinship ties and a code of honor known as murūwah, which emphasized bravery, loyalty, and hospitality.[16]

Pilgrimage was a significant part of Arabian religious life, and one of the most important pilgrimage sites was Mecca, which housed the Kaaba, considered a sacred sanctuary.[15] The Kaʿbah was a central site of worship and was surrounded by 360 idols representing various deities.[17] The region also had an annual fair and market called Ukāẓ, where tribes gathered for trade, poetry competitions, and diplomacy.[18] Poetry was a vital cultural element, with poets serving as both entertainers and historians, preserving the oral traditions of their tribes.[19]

The Arabian Peninsula served as a hub for trade routes connecting the Roman Empire, Persian Empire, Byzantine Empire, and Indian subcontinent. The cities of Mecca and Medina—then known as Yathrib—prospered due to their strategic location along these trade routes.[20] Mecca, in particular, was an important commercial center and a place of truce where violence was prohibited, especially during the pilgrimage season.[21]

According to Islamic tradition, Muhammad, a merchant from Mecca, began receiving revelations through the archangel Gabriel, in which he was told that he was the last of the prophets, completing the message of monotheism brought by prophets such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus (known as Isa in Islam).[22] His teachings emphasized the worship of one God (Allah) and social justice, which brought him into conflict with the elite of Mecca, who opposed his message.[22]

After facing persecution, Muhammad and his followers migrated to the city of Yathrib, which became known as Medina ("City of Light, or the Luminous City").[22] In Medina, Muhammad established the first Islamic state based on faith, law, and mutual support.[23] By 630 CE, Muhammad and his followers returned to Mecca and took control of the city, cleansing the Kaaba of its idols and dedicating it solely to the worship of Allah.[22]

Byzantine–Sasanian Wars

[edit]
Arab conquests of the Sasanian Empire and Syria 620–630

The prolonged and escalating Byzantine–Sasanian wars of the 6th and 7th centuries and the recurring outbreaks of bubonic plague (Plague of Justinian) left both empires exhausted and weakened in the face of the sudden emergence and expansion of the Arabs. The last of these wars ended with victory for the Byzantines: Emperor Heraclius regained all lost territories and restored the True Cross to Jerusalem in 629.[24] The war against Zoroastrian Persia, whose people worshiped the fire god Ahura Mazda, had been portrayed by Heraclius as a holy war in defense of the Christian faith and the Wood of the Holy Cross, as splinters of wood said to be from the True Cross were known, had been used to inspire Christian fighting zeal.[25] The idea of a holy war against the "fire worshipers", as the Christians called the Zoroastrians, had aroused much enthusiasm, leading to an all-out effort to defeat the Persians.[25]

Nevertheless, neither empire was given any chance to recover, as within a few years they were overrun by the advances of the Arabs (newly united by Islam), which, according to James Howard-Johnston, "can only be likened to a human tsunami".[26][27] According to George Liska, the "unnecessarily prolonged Byzantine–Persian conflict opened the way for Islam".[28]

Arab invasion

[edit]

In late 620s Muhammad had already managed to conquer and unify much of Arabia under Muslim rule, and it was under his leadership that the first Muslim-Byzantine skirmishes took place in response to Byzantine incursions. Just a few months after Heraclius and the Persian general Shahrbaraz agreed on terms for the withdrawal of Persian troops from occupied Byzantine eastern provinces in 629, Arab and Byzantine troops confronted each other at the Battle of Mu'tah as a result of Byzantine vassals murdering a Muslim emissary.[29] Muhammad died in 632 and was succeeded by Abu Bakr, the first caliph with undisputed control of the entire Arab peninsula after the successful Ridda Wars, which resulted in the consolidation of a powerful Muslim state throughout the peninsula.[30]

Byzantine sources, such as Short History written by Nikephoros, claim that the Arab invasion came about as a result of restrictions imposed on Arab traders curtailing their ability to trade within Byzantine territory, and to send the profits of their trade out of Byzantine territory. As a result, the Arabs murdered a Byzantine official named Sergius whom they held responsible for convincing the Emperor Heraclius to impose the trade restrictions. Nikephoros relates that:

The Saracens, having flayed a camel, enclosed him in the hide and sewed it up. As the skin hardened, the man who was left inside also withered and so perished in a painful manner. The charge against him was that he had persuaded Heraclius not to allow the Saracens to trade from the Byzantine country and send out of the Byzantine state the thirty pounds of gold which they normally received by way of commercial gain; and for this reason they began to lay waste the Byzantine land.[31]

Some scholars assert that this is the same Sergius, called "the Candidatus", who was "killed by the Saracens" as related in the 7th century Doctrina Jacobi document.[31]

Armies

[edit]

Arab

[edit]

In Arabia, swords from India were greatly esteemed as being made of the finest steel and were the favorite weapons of the Mujahideen.[32] The Arab sword known as the sayfy closely resembled the Byzantine gladius.[22] Swords and spears were the major weapons of the Muslims, and armour was either mail or leather.[32]

In northern Arabia, Byzantine influence predominated; in eastern Arabia, Persian influence predominated; and in Yemen, Indian influence was felt.[32] As the caliphate spread, the Muslims were influenced by the peoples they conquered—the Turkic peoples in Central Asia, the Persians, and the Byzantines in Syria.[33] The Bedouin tribes of Arabia favored archery, though contrary to popular belief Bedouin archers usually fought on foot instead of horseback.[34] The Arabs usually fought defensive battles with their archers placed on both flanks.[35]

By the Umayyad period, the caliphate had a standing army, including the elite Ahl al-Sham ("people of Syria"), raised from the Arabs who settled in Syria.[36] The caliphate was divided into jund, or regional armies, stationed in the provinces being made of mostly Arab tribes who were paid monthly by the Diwan al-Jaysh (War Ministry).[36]

Byzantine

[edit]
Arab cavalry pursue fleeing Byzantines

The infantry of the Byzantine army continued to be recruited from within the Byzantine Empire, but much of the cavalry were either recruited from "martial" peoples in the Balkans or in Asia Minor or alternatively were Germanic mercenaries.[37] Most of the Byzantine troops in Syria were indigenae (local), and it seems that at the time of the Muslim conquest, the Byzantine forces in Syria were Arabs.[38] In response to the loss of Syria, the Byzantines developed the phylarch system of using Armenian and Arab Christian auxiliaries living on the frontier to provide a "shield" to counter raiding by the Muslims into the empire.[39] Overall, the Byzantine army remained a small but professional force of foederati.[40] Unlike the foederati who were sent where they were needed, the stradioti lived in the frontier provinces.[41]

Persian

[edit]

During the last decades of the Sasanian empire, the frequent use of royal titles by Persian governors in Central Asia, especially in what is now Afghanistan, indicates a weakening of the power of the Shahinshah (King of Kings), suggesting the empire was already breaking down at the time of the Muslim conquest.[42] Persian society was rigidly divided into castes with the nobility being of supposed "Aryan" descent, and this division of Persian society along caste lines was reflected in the military.[42] The azatan aristocracy provided the cavalry, the paighan infantry came from the peasantry and most of the greater Persian nobility had slave soldiers, this last being based on the Persian example.[42] Much of the Persian army consisted of tribal mercenaries recruited from the plains south of the Caspian Sea and from what is now Afghanistan.[43] The Persian tactics were cavalry based with the Persian forces usually divided into a center, based upon a hill, and two wings of cavalry on either side.[44]

Ethiopian

[edit]

Little is known about the military forces of the Christian state of Ethiopia other than that they were divided into sarawit professional troops and the ehzab auxiliaries.[44] The Ethiopians made much use of camels and elephants.[44]

Berber

[edit]

The Berber peoples of North Africa had often served as a federates (auxiliaries) to the Byzantine Army.[45] The Berber forces were based around the horse and camel but seemed to have been hampered by a lack of weapons or protection, with both Byzantine and Arab sources mentioning the Berbers lacked armour and helmets.[45] The Berbers went to war with their entire communities, and the presence of women and children both slowed down the Berber armies and tied down Berber tribesmen who tried to protect their families.[45]

Turkic

[edit]

The British historian David Nicolle called the Turkic peoples of Central Asia the "most formidable foes" faced by the Muslims.[46] The Jewish Turkic Khazar khanate, based in what is now southern Russia and Ukraine, had a powerful heavy cavalry.[46] The Turkic heartland of Central Asia was divided into five khanates whose khans variously recognized the shahs of Iran or the emperors of China as their overlords.[47]

Turkic society was feudal with the khans only being pater primus among the aristocracy of dihquans who lived in castles in the countryside, with the rest of Turkic forces being divided into kadivar (farmers), khidmatgar (servants) and atbai (clients).[47] The heavily armored Turkic cavalry played a significant role in influencing subsequent Muslim tactics and weapons; the Turkic peoples, who were mostly Buddhists at the time of the Islamic conquest, later converted to Islam and came to be regarded as the foremost Muslim warriors, to the extent of replacing the Arabs as the dominant peoples in the Dar al-Islam (House of Islam).[48]

Visigoth

[edit]

During the migration period, the Germanic Visigoths had traveled from their homeland north of the Danube to settle in the Roman province of Hispania, creating a kingdom upon the wreckage of the Western Roman Empire.[49] The Visigothic state in Iberia was based around forces raised by the nobility whom the king could call out in the event of war.[50] The king had his gardingi and fideles loyal to himself, while the nobility had their bucellarii.[50] The Visigoths favored cavalry with their favorite tactics being to repeatedly charge a foe combined with feigned retreats.[50]

The Muslim conquest of most of Iberia in less than a decade does suggest serious deficiencies with the Visigothic kingdom, though the limited sources make it difficult to discern the precise reasons for the collapse of the Visigoths.[50]

Frankish

[edit]

Another Germanic people who founded a state upon the ruins of the Western Roman Empire were the Franks who settled in Gaul.[50] Like the Visigoths, the Frankish cavalry played a "significant part" in their wars.[50] The Frankish kings expected all of their male subjects to perform three months of military service every year, and all serving under the king's banner were paid a regular salary.[50] Those called up for service had to provide their own weapons and horses, which contributed to the "militarisation of Frankish society".[50] At least part of the reason for the victories of Charles Martel was he could call up a force of experienced warriors when faced with Muslim raids.[50]

Campaigns

[edit]

Conquest of the Levant: 634–641

[edit]

The province of Syria was the first to be wrested from Byzantine control. Arab-Muslim raids that followed the Ridda Wars prompted the Byzantines to send a major expedition into southern Palestine, which was defeated by the Arab forces under command of Khalid ibn al-Walid at the Battle of Ajnadayn in 634.[51] Ibn al-Walid had converted to Islam around 627, becoming one of Muhammad's most successful generals.[52] Ibn al-Walid had been fighting in Iraq against the Sasanians when he led his force on a trek across the deserts to Syria to attack the Byzantines from the rear.[53] In the Battle of the Mud fought at or near Pella (Fahl) and nearby Scythopolis (Beisan), both in the Jordan Valley, in December 634 or January 635, the Arabs scored another victory.[54] After a siege of six months the Arabs took Damascus, but Emperor Heraclius later retook it.[54] At the battle of Yarmuk (636), the Arabs were victorious, defeating Heraclius.[55] Ibn al-Walid appears to have been the "real military leader" at Yarmuk "under the nominal command of others".[53] Syria was ordered to be abandoned to the Muslims with Heraclius reportedly saying: "Peace be with you Syria; what a beautiful land you will be for your enemy".[55] On the heels of their victory, the Arab armies took Damascus again in 636, with Baalbek, Homs, and Hama to follow soon afterwards.[51] However, other fortified towns continued to resist despite the rout of the imperial army and had to be conquered individually.[51] Jerusalem fell in 638, Caesarea in 640, while others held out until 641.[51]

Arab campaigns in Anatolia 637–638

After a two-year siege, the garrison of Jerusalem surrendered rather than starve to death; under the terms of the surrender Caliph Umar promised to tolerate the Christians of Jerusalem and not to turn churches into mosques.[56] True to his word, Umar allowed the Church of the Holy Sepulchre to remain, with the caliph praying on a prayer rug outside of the church.[56] The loss to the Muslims of Jerusalem, the holiest city to Christians, proved to be the source of much resentment in Christendom. The city of Caesarea Maritima continued to withstand the Muslim siege—as it could be supplied by sea—until it was taken by assault in 640.[56]

In the mountains of Asia Minor, the Muslims enjoyed less success, with the Byzantines adopting the tactic of "shadowing warfare" — refusing to give battle to the Muslims, while the people retreated into castles and fortified towns when the Muslims invaded; instead, Byzantine forces ambushed Muslim raiders as they returned to Syria carrying plunder and people they had enslaved.[57] In the frontier area where Anatolia met Syria, the Byzantine state evacuated the entire population and laid waste to the countryside, creating a no man's land where any invading army would find no food.[57] For decades afterwards, a guerrilla war was waged by Christians in the hilly countryside of north-western Syria supported by the Byzantines.[58] At the same time, the Byzantines began a policy of launching raids via sea on the coast of the caliphate with the aim of forcing the Muslims to keep at least some of their forces to defend their coastlines, thus limiting the number of troops available for an invasion of Anatolia.[58] Unlike Syria with its plains and deserts — which favored the offensive — the mountainous terrain of Anatolia favored the defensive, and for centuries afterwards the line between Christian and Muslim lands ran along the border between Anatolia and Syria.[57]

Conquest of Egypt: 639–642

[edit]
The Byzantine Empire after the Arabs conquered the provinces of Syria and Egypt c. 650

The Byzantine province of Egypt held strategic importance for its grain production, naval yards, and as a base for further conquests in Africa.[51] The Muslim general Amr ibn al-As began the conquest of the province on his own initiative in 639.[59] The majority of the Byzantine forces in Egypt were locally raised Coptic forces, intended to serve more as a police force; since the vast majority of Egyptians lived in the Nile River valley, surrounded on both the eastern and western sides by desert, Egypt was felt to be a relatively secure province.[60] In December 639, Amr entered the Sinai with a large force and took Pelusium, on the edge of the Nile River valley, and then defeated a Byzantine counter-attack at Bibays.[61] Contrary to expectations, the Arabs did not head for Alexandria, the capital of Egypt, but instead for a major fortress known as Babylon located at what is now Cairo.[60] Amr was planning to divide the Nile River valley in two.[61] The Arab forces won a major victory at the Battle of Heliopolis in 640, but they found it difficult to advance further because major cities in the Nile Delta were protected by water and because Amr lacked the machinery to break down city fortifications.[62]

The Arabs laid siege to Babylon, and its starving garrison surrendered on 9 April 641.[61] Nevertheless, the province was scarcely urbanized and the defenders lost hope of receiving reinforcements from Constantinople when the emperor Heraclius died in 641.[63] Afterwards, the Arabs turned north into the Nile Delta and laid siege to Alexandria.[61] The last major center to fall into Arab hands was Alexandria, which capitulated in September 642.[64] According to Hugh Kennedy, "Of all the early Muslim conquests, that of Egypt was the swiftest and most complete. [...] Seldom in history can so massive a political change have happened so swiftly and been so long lasting."[65] In 644, the Arabs suffered a major defeat by the Caspian Sea when an invading Muslim army was almost wiped out by the cavalry of the Khazar Khanate, and, seeing a chance to take back Egypt, the Byzantines launched an amphibious attack which took back Alexandria for a short period of time.[61] Though most of Egypt is desert, the Nile Delta has some of the most productive and fertile farmland in the entire world, which had made Egypt the "granary" of the Byzantine empire.[61] Control of Egypt meant that the caliphate could weather droughts without the fear of famine, laying the basis for the future prosperity of the caliphate.[61]

Arab–Byzantine naval warfare

[edit]
Map of the main Byzantine-Muslim naval operations and battles in the Mediterranean

The Byzantine Empire had traditionally dominated the Mediterranean and the Black Sea with major naval bases at Constantinople, Acre, Alexandria and Carthage.[61] In 652, the Arabs won their first victory at sea off Alexandria, which was followed by the temporary Muslim conquest of Cyprus.[61] As Yemen had been a center of maritime trade, Yemeni sailors were brought to Alexandria to start building an Islamic fleet for the Mediterranean.[66]

The Muslim fleet was based in Alexandria and used Acre, Tyre and Beirut as its forward bases.[66] The core of the fleet's sailors were Yemeni, but the shipwrights who built the ships were Iranian and Iraqi.[66] In the Battle of the Masts off Cape Chelidonia in Anatolia in 655, the Muslims defeated the Byzantine fleet in a series of boarding actions.[66] As a result, the Byzantines began a major expansion of their navy, which was matched by the Arabs, leading to a naval arms race.[66] From the early 8th century onward, the Muslim fleet would launch annual raids on the coastline on the Byzantine empire in Anatolia and Greece.[66]

As part of the arms race, both sides sought new technology to improve their warships. The Muslim warships had a larger forecastle, which was used to mount a stone-throwing engine.[66] The Byzantines invented Greek fire, an incendiary weapon that led the Muslims to cover their ships with water-soaked cotton.[67] A major problem for the Muslim fleet was the shortage of timber, which led the Muslims to seek qualitative instead of quantitative superiority by building bigger warships.[67] To save money, the Muslim shipwrights switched from the hull-first method of building ships to the frame-first method.[67]

Conquest of Mesopotamia and Persia: 633–651

[edit]
Sasanian weaponry, 7th century

After an Arab incursion into Sasanian territories, the shah Yazdgerd III, who had just ascended the Persian throne, raised an army to resist the conquerors,[68] although many marzbans refused to help.[69] The Persians suffered a devastating defeat at the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah in 636.[68] Little is known about the Battle of al-Qadisiyyah other than it lasted for several days by the banks of the river Euphrates in what is now Iraq and ended with the Persian force being annihilated.[70] Abolishing the Lakhmid Arab buffer state had forced the Persians to take over the desert defense themselves, leaving them overextended.[69]

As a result of al-Qadisiyyah, the Arab-Muslims gained control over the whole of Iraq, including Ctesiphon, the capital city of the Sassanids.[68] The Persians lacked sufficient forces to make use of the Zagros Mountains to stop the Arabs, having lost the prime of their army at al-Qadisiyyah.[70] The Persian forces withdrew over the Zagros, and the Arab army pursued them across the Iranian plateau, where the fate of the Sasanian Empire was sealed at the Battle of Nahavand in 642.[68] The crushing Muslim victory at Nahavand is known in the Muslim world as the "Victory of Victories".[69]

After Nahavand, the Persian state collapsed with Yezdegird III fleeing further east and various marzbans surrendering to the Arabs.[70] As the conquerors slowly covered the vast distances of Iran punctuated by hostile towns and fortresses, Yazdgerd III retreated, finally taking refuge in Khorasan, where he was assassinated by a local satrap in 651.[68] In the aftermath of their victory over the imperial army, the Muslims still had to contend with a collection of militarily weak but geographically inaccessible principalities of Persia.[51] It took decades to bring them all under control of the caliphate.[51] In what is now Afghanistan—a region where the authority of the shah was always disputed—the Muslims met fierce guerrilla resistance from the militant Buddhist tribes of the region.[71] Despite the complete Muslim triumph over Sasanid Iran as compared to the only partial defeat of the Byzantine Empire, the Muslims borrowed far more from the vanished Sassanian state than they ever did from the Byzantines.[72] However, for the Persians the defeat remained bitter. Some 400 years later, the Persian poet Ferdowsi lets Yazdgerd III speak in his popular poem Shahnameh (Book of Kings):

Damn this world, damn this time, damn this fate,
That uncivilized Arabs have come to
Make me a Muslim
Where are your valiant warriors and priests
Where are your hunting parties and your feats?
Where is that warlike mien and where are those
Great armies that destroyed our county's foes?
Count Iran as a ruin, as the lair
Of lions and leopards.
Look now and despair[73]

First Fitna: Fall of the Rashidun Caliphate

[edit]

Right from the start of the caliphate, it was realized that there was a need to write down the sayings and story of Muhammad, which had been memorized by his followers before they all died.[74] Most people in Arabia were illiterate, and the Arabs had a strong culture of remembering history orally.[74] To preserve the story of Muhammad and to prevent any corruptions from entering the oral history, Abu Bakr had ordered scribes to write down the story of Muhammad as told to them by his followers, which was the origin of the Quran.[75] Disputes had emerged over which version of the Quran was the correct one and, by 644 different versions of the Quran were accepted in Damascus, Basra, Hims, and Kufa.[75] To settle the dispute, the Caliph Uthman had proclaimed the version of the Quran possessed by one of Muhammad's widows, Hafsa, to be the definitive and correct version, which offended some Muslims who held to the rival versions.[75] This, together with the favoritism shown by 'Uthman to his own clan, the Banu Umayya, in government appointments, led to a mutiny in Medina in 656 and 'Uthman's murder.[75]

Founding of the Umayyad Caliphate

[edit]

Uthman's successor Ali was faced with a civil war, known to Muslims as the fitna, when the governor of Syria Mu'awiya ibn Abi Sufyan revolted against him.[76] During this time, the first period of Muslim conquests stopped, as the armies of Islam turned against one another.[76] A group known as the Kharaji decided to end the civil war by assassinating the leaders of both sides.[76] However, the fitna ended in January 661 when Ali was killed by a kharaji assassin, allowing Mu'awiya to become caliph and found the Umayyad dynasty.[77] The fitna also marked the beginning of the split between Shia Muslims who supported Ali, and Sunni Muslims who opposed him.[76] Mu'awiya moved the capital of the caliphate from Medina to Damascus, which had a major effect on the politics and culture of the caliphate.[78] Mu'awiya followed the conquest of Iran by invading Central Asia and trying to finish off the Byzantine Empire by taking Constantinople.[79] In 670, a Muslim fleet seized Rhodes and then laid siege to Constantinople.[79] Nicolle wrote the siege of Constantinople from 670 to 677 was "more accurately" a blockade rather than a siege proper, which ended in failure as the "mighty" walls built by the Emperor Theodosius II in the 5th century proved their worth.[79]

The majority of the people in Syria remained Christian, and a substantial Jewish minority remained as well; both communities were to teach the Arabs much about science, trade and the arts.[79] The Umayyad caliphs are well-remembered for sponsoring a cultural "golden age" in Islamic history—for example, by building the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and for making Damascus into the capital of a "superpower" that stretched from Portugal to Central Asia, covering the vast territory from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of China.[79]

Explanations for the Muslim armies' success

[edit]

The rapidity of the early conquests has received various explanations.[80] Contemporary Christian writers conceived them as God's punishment visited on their fellow Christians for their sins.[81] Early Muslim historians viewed them as a reflection of the religious zeal of the conquerors and evidence of divine favor.[82] The theory that the conquests are explainable as an Arab migration triggered by economic pressures enjoyed popularity early in the 20th century but has largely fallen out of favor among historians, especially those who distinguish the migration from the conquests that preceded and enabled it.[83]

There are indications that the conquests started as initially disorganized pillaging raids launched partly by non-Muslim Arab tribes in the aftermath of the Ridda Wars and were soon extended into a war of conquest by the Rashidun caliphs,[84] although other scholars argue that the conquests were a planned military venture already underway during Muhammad's lifetime.[85] Fred Donner writes that the advent of Islam "revolutionized both the ideological bases and the political structures of the Arabian society, giving rise for the first time to a state capable of an expansionist movement."[86] According to Chase F. Robinson, it is likely that Muslim forces were often outnumbered, but unlike their opponents, they were fast, well coordinated and highly motivated.[87]

Another key reason was the weakness of the Byzantine and Sasanian Empires, caused by the wars they had waged against each other in the preceding decades with alternating success.[88] It was aggravated by a plague that had struck densely populated areas and impeded conscription of new imperial troops, while the Arab armies could draw recruits from nomadic populations.[81] The Sasanian Empire, which had lost the latest round of hostilities with the Byzantines, was also affected by a crisis of confidence, and its elites suspected that the ruling dynasty had forfeited the favor of the gods.[81] The Arab military advantage was increased when Christianized Arab tribes who had served imperial armies as regular or auxiliary troops switched sides and joined the West Arabian coalition.[81] Arab commanders also made liberal use of agreements to spare lives and property of inhabitants in case of surrender and extended exemptions from paying tribute to groups who provided military services to the conquerors.[89] Additionally, the Byzantine persecution of Christians opposed to the Chalcedonian creed in Syria and Egypt alienated elements of those communities and made them more open to accommodation with the Arabs once it became clear that the latter would let them practice their faith undisturbed as long as they paid tribute.[90]

The conquests were further secured by the subsequent large-scale migration of Arabian peoples into the conquered lands.[91] Robert Hoyland argues that the failure of the Sasanian empire to recover was due in large part to the geographically and politically disconnected nature of Persia, which made coordinated action difficult once the established Sasanian rule collapsed.[92] Similarly, the difficult terrain of Anatolia made it difficult for the Byzantines to mount a large-scale attack to recover the lost lands, and their offensive action was largely limited to organizing guerrilla operations against the Arabs in the Levant.[92]

Conquest of Sindh: 711–714

[edit]

Although there were sporadic incursions by Arab generals in the direction of India in the 660s and a small Arab garrison was established in the arid region of Makran in the 670s,[93] the first large-scale Arab campaign in the Indus valley occurred when the general Muhammad bin Qasim invaded Sindh in 711 after a coastal march through Makran.[94] Three years later the Arabs controlled all of the lower Indus valley.[94] Most of the towns seem to have submitted to Arab rule under peace treaties, although there was fierce resistance in other areas, including by the forces of Raja Dahir at the capital city Debal.[94][95] Arab incursions southward from Sindh were repulsed by the armies of Gurjara and Chalukya kingdoms, and further Islamic expansion was checked by the Rashtrakuta dynasty, which gained control of the region shortly after.[95]

Conquest of the Maghreb: 647–742

[edit]

Arab forces began launching sporadic raiding expeditions into Cyrenaica (modern northeast Libya) and beyond soon after their conquest of Egypt.[96] Byzantine rule in northwest Africa at the time was largely confined to the coastal plains, while Berber kingdoms and tribes controlled the rest.[97] In 670 Arabs founded the settlement of Qayrawan, which gave them a forward base for further expansion.[97] Muslim historians credit the general Uqba ibn Nafi with subsequent conquest of lands extending to the Atlantic coast, although it appears to have been a temporary incursion.[97][98] The Berber king Kusayla and an enigmatic leader referred to as Kahina (prophetess or priestess) seem to have mounted effective, if short-lived resistance to Muslim rule at the end of the 7th century, but the sources do not give a clear picture of these events.[99] Arab forces were able to capture Carthage in 698 and Tangiers by 708.[99] After the fall of Tangiers, many Berbers joined the Muslim army.[98] In 740 Umayyad rule in the region was shaken by a major Berber revolt, which also involved Berber Kharijite Muslims.[100] After a series of defeats, the caliphate was finally able to crush the rebellion in 742, although local Berber dynasties continued to drift away from imperial control from that time on.[100]

Conquest of Hispania and Septimania: 711–721

[edit]
Bilingual Latin-Arabic dinar minted in Iberia AH 98 (716/7 AD)

The Muslim conquest of Iberia is notable for the brevity and unreliability of the available sources.[101][102] After the Visigothic king of Spain Wittiza died in 710, the kingdom experienced a period of political division.[102] The Visigothic nobility was divided between the followers of Wittiza and his successor Roderic.[103] Akhila, Wittiza's son, had fled to Morocco after losing the succession struggle, and Muslim tradition states that he asked the Muslims to invade Spain.[103] Starting in the summer of 710, the Muslim forces in Morocco had launched several successful raids into Spain, which demonstrated the weakness of the Visigothic state.[104]

Taking advantage of the situation, the Muslim Berber commander, Tariq ibn Ziyad, who was stationed in Tangiers at the time, crossed the Strait of Gibraltar with an army of Arabs and Berbers in 711.[102] Most of the invasion force of 15,000 were Berbers, with the Arabs serving as an "elite" force.[104] Ziyad landed on the Rock of Gibraltar on 29 April 711.[71] After defeating Roderic at the river Guadalete on 19 July 711, Muslim forces advanced, capturing cities one after another.[101] The capital of Toledo surrendered peacefully.[104] Some of the cities surrendered with agreements to pay tribute and local aristocracy retained a measure of former influence.[102] The Spanish Jewish community welcomed the Muslims as liberators from the oppression of the Catholic Visigothic kings.[105]

In 712, another larger force of 18,000 from Morocco, led by Musa Ibn Nusayr, crossed the Strait of Gibraltar to link up with Ziyad's force at Talavera.[105] The invasion seemed to have been on the initiative of Ziyad: the caliph, al-Walid, in Damascus reacted as if he was surprised to see him.[106] By 713 Iberia was almost entirely under Muslim control.[101] In 714, al-Walid summoned Ziyad to Damascus to explain his campaign in Spain, but Ziyad took his time travelling through North Africa and Palestine, and was finally imprisoned when he arrived in Damascus.[71] The events of the subsequent ten years, the details of which are obscure, included the capture of Barcelona and Narbonne, and a raid against Toulouse, followed by an expedition into Burgundy in 725.[101]

The last large-scale raid to the north ended with a Muslim defeat at the Battle of Tours at the hands of the Franks in 732.[101] The victory of the Franks, led by Charles Martel, over 'Abd al-Rahman Ibn 'Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi has often been misrepresented as the decisive battle that stopped the Muslim conquest of France, but the Umayyad force had been raiding Aquitaine with a particular interest in sacking churches and monasteries, not seeking its conquest.[107] The battle itself is a shadowy affair with the few sources describing it in poetic terms that are frustrating for the historian.[108] The battle occurred between 18 and 25 October 732 with the climax being an attack on the Muslim camp led by Martel that ended with al-Ghafiqi being killed and the Muslims withdrawing when night fell.[108] Martel's victory ended whatever plans there may have been to conquer France, but a series of Berber revolts in North Africa and in Spain against Arab rule may have played a greater role in ruling out conquests north of the Pyrenees.[108]

Conquest of Transoxiana: 673–751

[edit]
Battle of Talas between Tang dynasty and Abbasid Caliphate c. 751

Transoxiana is the region northeast of Iran beyond the Amu Darya or Oxus River roughly corresponding with modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and parts of Kazakhstan. Initial incursions across the Oxus River were aimed at Bukhara (673) and Samarqand (675), and the results were limited to promises of tribute payments.[109] In 674, a Muslim force led by Ubaidullah Ibn Zayyad attacked Bukhara, the capital of Sogdia, which ended with the Sogdians agreeing to recognize the Umayadd caliph Mu'awiaya as their overlord and to pay tribute.[79]

In general, the campaigns in Central Asia were "hard fought" with the Buddhist Turkic peoples fiercely resisting efforts to incorporate them into the caliphate. China, which saw Central Asia as its own sphere of influence, particularly because of the economic importance of the Silk Road, supported the Turkic defenders.[79] Further advances were hindered for a quarter century by political upheavals within the Umayyad caliphate.[109] This was followed by a decade of rapid military progress under the leadership of the new governor of Khurasan, Qutayba ibn Muslim, which included the conquest of Bukhara and Samarqand in 706–712.[110] The expansion lost its momentum when Qutayba was killed during an army mutiny and the Arabs were placed on the defensive by an alliance of Sogdian and Türgesh forces with support from Tang China.[110] However, reinforcements from Syria helped turn the tide and most of the lost lands were reconquered by 741.[110] Muslim rule over Transoxania was consolidated in 751 when a Chinese-led army was defeated at the Battle of Talas.[111]

Expeditions into Afghanistan

[edit]

Medieveal Islamic scholars divided the area of modern-day Afghanistan into two regions: the provinces of Khorasan and Sistan. Khorasan was the eastern satrapy of the Sasanian Empire, containing Balkh and Herat. Sistan included Ghazna, Zarang, Bost, Qandahar (also called al-Rukhkhaj or Zamindawar), Kabul, Kabulistan and Zabulistan.[112]

Before Muslim rule, the regions of Balkh (Bactria or Tokharistan), Herat and Sistan were under Sasanian rule. Further south in the Balkh region, in Bamiyan, indication of Sasanian authority diminishes, with a local dynasty apparently ruling from late antiquity, probably Hephthalites subject to the Yabghu of the Western Turkic Khaganate. While Herat was controlled by the Sasanians, its hinterlands were controlled by northern Hepthalites who continued to rule the Ghurid mountains and river valleys well into the Islamic era. Sistan was under Sasanian administration, but Qandahar remained out of Arab hands. Kabul and Zabulistan housed Indic religions, with the Zunbils and Kabul Shahis (for the most part) offering stiff resistance to Muslim rule for two centuries until the Saffarid and Ghaznavid conquests.[113] The Umayyad Caliphate regularly claimed nominal overlordship over the Zunbils and Kabul Shahis, and in 711 Qutayba ibn Muslim managed to force them to pay tribute.[114]

Other expeditions

[edit]

Cyprus, Armenia, and Georgia

[edit]

In 646 a Byzantine naval expedition was able to briefly recapture Alexandria.[115] The same year Mu'awiya, the governor of Syria and future founder of the Umayyad dynasty, ordered construction of a fleet.[115] Three years later it was put to use in a pillaging raid of Cyprus, followed by a raid in 650 that concluded with a treaty under which Cypriots surrendered many of their riches and slaves.[115] In 688 the island was made into a joint dominion of the caliphate and the Byzantine Empire under a pact which was to last for almost 300 years.[116]

In 639–640 Arab forces began to make advances into Armenia, which had been partitioned into a Byzantine province and a Sasanian province.[117] There is considerable disagreement among ancient and modern historians about events of the following years, and nominal control of the region may have passed several times between Arabs and Byzantines.[117] Although Muslim dominion was finally established by the time the Umayyads acceded to power in 661, it was not able to implant itself solidly in the country, and Armenia experienced a national and literary efflorescence over the next century.[117] As with Armenia, Arab advances into other lands of the Caucasus region, including Georgia, had as their end assurances of tribute payment and these principalities retained a large degree of autonomy.[118] This period also saw a series of clashes with the Khazar kingdom whose center of power was in the lower Volga steppes, and which vied with the caliphate over control of the Caucasus.[118]

Failed incursions into Byzantium and Afghanistan

[edit]
Byzantine manuscript illustration showing Greek fire in action

Other Muslim military ventures were met with outright failure. Despite a naval victory over the Byzantines in 654 at the Battle of the Masts, the subsequent attempt to besiege Constantinople was frustrated by a storm which damaged the Arab fleet.[119] Later sieges of Constantinople in 668–669 (674–678 according to other estimates) and 717–718 were thwarted with the help of the recently invented Greek fire.[120] In the east, although Arabs were able to establish control over most Sasanian-controlled areas of modern Afghanistan after the fall of Persia, the Kabul region resisted repeated attempts at invasion and would continue to do so until it was conquered by the Saffarids three centuries later.[121]

End of the conquests

[edit]

By the time of the Abbasid Revolution in the middle of the 8th century, Muslim armies had come against a combination of natural barriers and powerful states that impeded any further military progress.[122] The wars produced diminishing returns in personal gains and fighters increasingly left the army for civilian occupations.[122] The priorities of the rulers also shifted from conquest of new lands to administration of the acquired empire.[122] Although the Abbasid era witnessed some new territorial gains, such as the conquests of Sicily, the period of rapid centralized expansion would now give way to an era when further spread of Islam would be slow and accomplished through the efforts of local dynasties, missionaries, and traders.[122]

Aftermath

[edit]
The early Muslim conquests by reign after Muhammad's unification of Arabia

Significance

[edit]

Nicolle writes that the series of Islamic conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries was "one of the most significant events in world history", leading to the creation of "a new civilisation", the Islamicised and Arabised Middle East.[123] Islam, which had previously been confined to Arabia, became a major world religion, while the synthesis of Arab, Byzantine, and Sasanian elements led to distinctive new styles of art and architecture emerging in the Middle East.[124] English historian Edward Gibbon writes in The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire:

Under the last of the Umayyads, the Arabian empire extended two hundred days journey from east to west, from the confines of Tartary and India to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean ... We should vainly seek the indissoluble union and easy obedience that pervaded the government of Augustus and the Antonines; but the progress of Islam diffused over this ample space a general resemblance of manners and opinions. The language and laws of the Quran were studied with equal devotion at Samarcand and Seville: the Moor and the Indian embraced as countrymen and brothers in the pilgrimage of Mecca; and the Arabian language was adopted as the popular idiom in all the provinces to the westward of the Tigris.

Socio-political developments

[edit]

The military victories of armies from the Arabian Peninsula heralded the expansion of Arab culture and religion. The conquests were followed by a large-scale migration of families and whole tribes from Arabia into the lands of the Middle East.[91] The conquering Arabs had already possessed a complex and sophisticated society.[91] Emigrants from Yemen brought with them agricultural, urban, and monarchical traditions; members of the Ghassanid and Lakhmid tribal confederations had experience collaborating with the empires.[91] The rank and file of the armies was drawn from both nomadic and sedentary tribes, while the leadership came mainly from the merchant class of the Hejaz.[91]

Two fundamental policies were implemented during the reign of the second caliph Umar (r. 634–644): the Bedouins would not be allowed to damage agricultural production of the conquered lands, and the leadership would cooperate with the local elites.[125] To that end, the Arab-Muslim armies were settled in segregated quarters or new garrison towns such as Basra, Kufa, and Fustat.[125] The latter two became the new administrative centers of Iraq and Egypt, respectively.[125] Soldiers were paid a stipend and prohibited from seizing lands.[125] Arab governors supervised collection and distribution of taxes but otherwise left the old religious and social order intact.[125] At first, many provinces retained a large degree of autonomy under the terms of agreements made with Arab commanders.[125]

As the time passed, the conquerors sought to increase their control over local affairs and make existing administrative machinery work for the new regime.[126] This involved several types of reorganization. In the Mediterranean region, city-states which traditionally governed themselves and their surrounding areas were replaced by a territorial bureaucracy separating town and rural administration.[127] In Egypt, fiscally independent estates and municipalities were abolished in favor of a simplified administrative system.[128] In the early 8th century, Syrian Arabs began to replace Coptic functionaries and communal levies gave way to individual taxation.[129] In Iran, the administrative reorganization and construction of protective walls prompted agglomeration of quarters and villages into large cities such as Isfahan, Qazvin, and Qum.[130] Local notables of Iran, who at first had almost complete autonomy, were incorporated into the central bureaucracy by the Abbasid period.[130] The similarity of Egyptian and Khurasanian official paperwork at the time of the caliph al-Mansur (r. 754–775) suggests a highly centralized empire-wide administration.[130]

New Arab settlements

[edit]
Mosaic from Hisham's Palace, an Umayyad residence near Jericho (c. 724–743)

The society of new Arab settlements gradually became stratified into classes based on wealth and power.[131] It was also reorganized into new communal units that preserved clan and tribal names but were in fact only loosely based around old kinship bonds.[131] Arab settlers turned to civilian occupations and in eastern regions established themselves as a landed aristocracy.[131] At the same time, distinctions between the conquerors and local populations began to blur.[131] In Iran, the Arabs largely assimilated into local culture, adopting the Persian language and customs and marrying Persian women.[131] In Iraq, non-Arab settlers flocked to garrison towns.[131] Soldiers and administrators of the old regime came to seek their fortunes with the new masters, while slaves, laborers and peasants fled there seeking to escape the harsh conditions of life in the countryside.[131] Non-Arab converts to Islam were absorbed into the Arab-Muslim society through an adaptation of the tribal Arabian institution of clientage, in which protection of the powerful was exchanged for loyalty of the subordinates.[131] The clients (mawali) and their heirs were regarded as virtual members of the clan.[131] The clans became increasingly economically and socially stratified.[131] For example, while the noble clans of the Tamim tribe acquired Persian cavalry units as their mawali, other clans of the same tribe had slave laborers as theirs.[131] Slaves often became mawali of their former masters when they were freed.[131]

Contrary to the belief of earlier historians, there is no evidence of mass conversions to Islam in the immediate aftermath of the conquests.[132] The first groups to convert were Christian Arab tribes, although some of them retained their religion into the Abbasid era even while serving as troops of the caliphate.[132] They were followed by former elites of the Sasanian empire, whose conversion ratified their old privileges.[132] With time, the weakening of non-Muslim elites facilitated the breakdown of old communal ties and reinforced the incentives of conversion which promised economic advantages and social mobility.[132] By the beginning of the 8th century, conversions became a policy issue for the caliphate.[133] They were favored by religious activists, and many Arabs accepted the equality of Arabs and non-Arabs.[133] However, conversion was associated with economic and political advantages, and Muslim elites were reluctant to see their privileges diluted.[133] Public policy towards converts varied depending on the region and was changed by successive Umayyad caliphs.[133] These circumstances provoked opposition from non-Arab converts, whose ranks included many active soldiers, and helped set the stage for the civil war which ended with the fall of the Umayyad dynasty.[134]

Taxation policies and conversions to Islam

[edit]

The Arab-Muslim conquests followed a general pattern of nomadic conquests of settled regions, whereby the conquering peoples became the new military elite and reached a compromise with the old elites by allowing them to retain local political, religious, and financial authority.[126] Peasants, workers, and merchants paid taxes, while members of the old and new elites collected them.[126] Payment of taxes, which for peasants often reached half of the value of their produce, was an economic burden as well as a mark of social inferiority.[126] Scholars differ in their assessment of relative tax burdens before and after the conquests. John Esposito states that in effect this meant lower taxes.[135] According to Bernard Lewis, available evidence suggests that the change from Byzantine to Arab rule was "welcomed by many among the subject peoples, who found the new yoke far lighter than the old, both in taxation and in other matters".[136] In contrast, Norman Stillman writes that although the tax burden of the Jews under early Islamic rule was comparable to that under previous rulers, Christians of the Byzantine Empire (though not Christians of the Persian empire, whose status was similar to that of the Jews) and Zoroastrians of Iran shouldered a considerably heavier burden in the immediate aftermath of the conquests.[137]

Egyptian papyrus PERF 558 containing a bilingual Greek-Arabic tax receipt dated from 643 AD

In the wake of the early conquests taxes could be levied on individuals, on the land, or as collective tribute.[138] During the first century of Islamic expansion, the words jizya and kharaj were used in all three senses, with context distinguishing between individual and land taxes.[139] Regional variations in taxation at first reflected the diversity of previous systems.[140] The Sasanian Empire had a general tax on land and a poll tax having several rates based on wealth, with an exemption for aristocracy.[140] This poll tax was adapted by Arab rulers, so that the aristocracy exemption was assumed by the new Arab-Muslim elite and shared by local aristocracy who converted to Islam.[141] The nature of Byzantine taxation remains partly unclear, but it appears to have been levied as a collective tribute on population centers and this practice was generally followed under the Arab rule in former Byzantine provinces.[140] Collection of taxes was delegated to autonomous local communities on the condition that the burden be divided among its members in the most equitable manner.[140] In most of Iran and Central Asia local rulers paid a fixed tribute and maintained their autonomy in tax collection.[140]

Tax evasion and reforms

[edit]

Difficulties in tax collection soon appeared.[140] Egyptian Copts, who had been skilled in tax evasion since Roman times, were able to avoid paying the taxes by entering monasteries, which were initially exempt from taxation, or simply by leaving the district where they were registered.[140] This prompted imposition of taxes on monks and introduction of movement controls.[140] In Iraq, many peasants who had fallen behind with their tax payments converted to Islam and abandoned their land for Arab garrison towns in hope of escaping taxation.[142] Faced with a decline in agriculture and a treasury shortfall, the governor of Iraq, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, forced peasant converts to return to their lands and subjected them to the taxes again, effectively forbidding them from converting to Islam.[143] In Khorasan, a similar phenomenon forced the native aristocracy to compensate for the shortfall in tax collection out of their own pockets, and they responded by persecuting peasant converts and imposing heavier taxes on poor Muslims.[143]

The situation where conversion to Islam was penalized in an Islamic state could not last, and the Umayyad caliph Umar ibn Abd al-Aziz (r. 717–720) has been credited with changing the taxation system.[143] Modern historians doubt this account, although details of the transition to the system of taxation elaborated by Abbasid-era jurists are unclear.[143] Umar II ordered governors to cease collection of taxes from Muslim converts, but his successors obstructed this policy and some governors sought to stem the tide of conversions by introducing additional requirements such as circumcision and the ability to recite passages from the Quran.[144] Taxation-related grievances of non-Arab Muslims contributed to the opposition movements which resulted in the Abbasid Revolution.[145] Under the new system that was eventually established, kharaj came to be regarded as a tax levied on the land, regardless of the taxpayer's religion.[143] The poll-tax was no longer levied on Muslims, but the treasury did not necessarily suffer and converts did not gain as a result, since they had to pay zakat, which was probably instituted as a compulsory tax on Muslims around 730.[146] The terminology became specialized during the Abbasid era, so that kharaj no longer meant anything more than land tax, while the term jizya was restricted to the poll-tax on dhimmis.[143]

The influence of jizya on conversion has been a subject of scholarly debate.[147] Julius Wellhausen holds that the poll tax amounted to so little that exemption from it did not constitute sufficient economic motive for conversion.[148] Similarly, Thomas Arnold states that jizya was "too moderate" to constitute a burden, "seeing that it released them from the compulsory military service that was incumbent on their Muslim fellow subjects." He further adds that converts escaping taxation would have to pay the legal alms, zakat, that is annually levied on most kinds of movable and immovable property.[149] Other early 20th century scholars suggest that non-Muslims converted to Islam en masse in order to escape the poll tax, but this theory has been challenged by more recent research.[147] Daniel Dennett has shown that other factors, such as desire to retain social status, had greater influence on this choice in the early Islamic period.[147]

Sharia and non-Muslims

[edit]

The Arab conquerors did not repeat the mistakes which had been made by the governments of the Byzantine and Sasanian empires, which had tried and failed to impose an official religion on subject populations, which had caused resentments that made the Muslim conquests more acceptable to them.[150] Instead, the rulers of the new empire generally respected the traditional middle-Eastern pattern of religious pluralism, which was not one of equality but rather of dominance by one group over the others.[150] After the end of military operations, which involved sacking of some monasteries and confiscation of Zoroastrian fire temples in Syria and Iraq, the early caliphate was characterized by religious tolerance and peoples of all ethnicities and religions blended in public life.[151] Before Muslims were ready to build mosques in Syria, they accepted Christian churches as holy places and shared them with local Christians.[132] In Iraq and Egypt, Muslim authorities cooperated with Christian religious leaders.[132] Numerous churches were repaired and new ones built during the Umayyad era.[152]

The first Umayyad caliph Muawiyah made deliberate efforts to convince those whom he had conquered that he was not opposed to their religion, and tried to enlist support from Christian Arab elites.[153] There is no evidence for public display of Islam by the state before the reign of Abd al-Malik (685–705), when Quranic verses and references to Muhammad suddenly became prominent on coins and official documents.[154] This change was motivated by a desire to unify the Muslim community after the second civil war and rally them against their chief common enemy, the Byzantine Empire.[154]

A further change of policy occurred during the reign of Umar II (717–720).[155] The disastrous failure of the siege of Constantinople in 718 which was accompanied by massive Arab casualties led to a spike of popular animosity among Muslims toward Byzantium and Christians in general.[155] At the same time, many Arab soldiers left the army for civilian occupations and they wished to emphasize their high social status among the conquered peoples.[155] These events prompted introduction of restrictions on non-Muslims, which, according to Hoyland, were modeled both on Byzantine curbs on Jews, starting with the Theodosian Code and later codes, which contained prohibitions against building new synagogues and giving testimony against Christians, and on Sassanid regulations that prescribed distinctive attire for different social classes.[155]

In the following decades Islamic jurists elaborated a legal framework in which other religions would have a protected but subordinate status.[154] Islamic law followed the Byzantine precedent of classifying subjects of the state according to their religion, in contrast to the Sasanian model which put more weight on social than on religious distinctions.[155] In theory, like the Byzantine empire, the caliphate placed severe restrictions on paganism, but in practice most non-Abrahamic communities of the former Sasanian territories were classified as possessors of a scripture (ahl al-kitab) and granted protected (dhimmi) status.[155]

Jews and Christians

[edit]

In Islam, Christians and Jews are seen as "People of the Book" as the Muslims accept both Jesus Christ and the Jewish prophets as their own prophets, which accorded them a respect that was not reserved to the "heathen" peoples of Iran, Central Asia and India.[156] In places like the Levant and Egypt, both Christians and Jews were allowed to maintain their churches and synagogues and keep their own religious organizations in exchange for paying the jizya tax.[156] At times, the caliphs engaged in triumphalist gestures, like building the famous Dome of the Rock mosque in Jerusalem from 690 to 692 on the site of the Jewish Second Temple, which had been destroyed by the Romans in 70 AD—though the use of Roman and Sassanian symbols of power in the mosque suggests its purpose was partly to celebrate the Arab victories over the two empires.[157]

Those Christians out of favor with the prevailing orthodoxy in the Roman Empire often preferred to live under Muslim rule as it meant the end of persecution.[158] As both the Jewish and Christian communities of the Levant and North Africa were better educated than their conquerors, they were often employed as civil servants in the early years of the caliphate.[79] However, a reported saying of Muhammad that "Two religions may not dwell together in Arabia" led to different policies being pursued in Arabia with conversion to Islam being imposed rather than merely encouraged.[158] With the notable exception of Yemen, where a large Jewish community existed right up until the middle of the 20th century, all of the Christian and Jewish communities in Arabia "completely disappeared".[158] The Jewish community of Yemen seems to have survived as Yemen was not regarded as part of Arabia proper in the same way that the Hejaz and the Nejd were.[158]

Mark R. Cohen writes that the jizya paid by Jews under Islamic rule provided a "surer guarantee of protection from non-Jewish hostility" than that possessed by Jews in the Latin West, where Jews "paid numerous and often unreasonably high and arbitrary taxes" in return for official protection, and where treatment of Jews was governed by charters which new rulers could alter at will upon accession or refuse to renew altogether.[159] The Pact of Umar, which stipulated that Muslims must "do battle to guard" the dhimmis and "put no burden on them greater than they can bear", was not always upheld, but it remained "a steadfast cornerstone of Islamic policy" into early modern times.[159]

Some Persians, now known as Parsees, fled to India to continue to follow the pre-Islamic traditions and religion of their homeland.[68]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The early Muslim conquests, known in as al-Futūḥāt al-Islāmiyyah, were a series of rapid military campaigns launched by Arab forces under the from 632 to 661 CE, following the death of and the unification of , which overthrew the exhausted Byzantine and Sassanid empires to seize control of the , , , and Persia. These expeditions, directed by the first four caliphs—, , , and —exploited the mutual exhaustion of the two superpowers after decades of warfare, internal religious schisms among their subjects, and the Arabs' advantages in mobility, tribal cohesion, and incentives of booty and land grants, enabling conquests that transformed the geopolitical landscape from the to the borders of India and within a generation. Notable achievements included the decisive Battle of Yarmouk in 636 CE against Byzantine forces and the capture of , the Sassanid capital, in 637 CE, which dismantled Persian resistance and opened paths to further eastern advances. While traditional Islamic historiography attributes success to divine favor and , modern analyses emphasize pragmatic factors like the empires' overextension and unpopular taxation systems that facilitated local defections, though debates persist over the scale of forced conversions and the reliability of early chronicles due to their composition centuries after events. The conquests laid the groundwork for the Umayyad Caliphate's even broader expansions but also sowed seeds of discord, culminating in the civil war upon 's accession.

Historical Context

Pre-Islamic Arabia and the Rise of Islam

encompassed the , a vast arid region dominated by deserts and steppes, where society was organized into kinship-based tribes that emphasized pastoral nomadism, raiding, and militaristic traditions for survival and dominance. tribes, such as the in the Hijaz region, relied on camel herding, date cultivation in oases, and intertribal warfare governed by codes of honor and blood feuds, with sedentary populations concentrated in trading settlements like and Yathrib (later ). Social structures were patriarchal and tribal, lacking centralized political authority beyond temporary confederations, which fostered chronic instability and vendettas. The economy centered on overland caravan trade routes linking Yemen's incense and spice production to the and Mediterranean markets, bypassing riskier sea paths, with Mecca emerging as a key controlled by the tribe, which profited from seasonal fairs and pilgrimage traffic to the sanctuary. , by contrast, supported agriculture through oasis farming, particularly dates, and local markets, though less tied to long-distance . This late sixth-century economic uptick, driven by regional disruptions in Byzantine-Sasanian conflicts, enhanced tribal wealth disparities and social tensions. Religiously, the period known as featured widespread , with tribes venerating local deities, spirits, and idols—reportedly numbering around 360 at the in —through rituals, sacrifices, and annual pilgrimages that reinforced tribal alliances. While dominant, coexisted with pockets of , including Hanifs who rejected for a vague Abrahamic , alongside Jewish communities in and , and Christian groups influenced by Byzantine and Ethiopian contacts. These diverse beliefs lacked unified , often blending and ancestor worship. The rise of Islam began with , born circa 570 CE into the tribe in , where he worked as a before receiving his first in 610 CE, proclaiming strict and social reforms challenging polytheistic practices and tribal inequities. Facing from Meccan elites, and his followers migrated (Hijra) to in 622 CE, marking year one of the and establishing the first Muslim polity through the , which allied diverse tribes under Islamic governance. Military engagements followed, including the Muslim victory at Badr in 624 CE against Meccan forces, culminating in the bloodless in 630 CE and the gradual unification of Arabian tribes by Muhammad's death in 632 CE, setting the stage for expansion beyond the peninsula.

Geopolitical Vulnerabilities of Byzantium and Persia

The Byzantine–Sasanian War of 602–628 exhausted both empires through prolonged campaigns that drained manpower, finances, and infrastructure, rendering them incapable of mounting effective defenses against emerging threats. Initiated by Sasanian King Khosrow II's invasion following the usurpation and murder of Byzantine Emperor Maurice, the conflict saw Persian armies overrun Syria, Palestine, and Egypt, capturing Jerusalem in 614 and briefly threatening Constantinople itself. Byzantine Emperor Heraclius's counteroffensive, aided by alliances with Turkic khaganates, reclaimed these territories and inflicted decisive defeats, such as at Nineveh in 627, leading to Khosrow's overthrow. Yet the war's toll—marked by massive casualties, territorial devastation, and fiscal collapse—left Byzantine field armies skeletonized and Sasanian reserves depleted, with neither side able to replenish forces swiftly amid ongoing recovery efforts. In the Sasanian Empire, the assassination of in 628 unleashed a cascade of internal chaos, including civil wars, rapid turnover of rulers (over twelve kings in fourteen years, including two ), and factional strife among nobility and regional satraps that fragmented command structures. , who assumed the throne in 632 as an eight-year-old under regents, presided over a realm where loyalty to the crown eroded due to unpaid military stipends, heavy taxation burdens from the war, and revolts in provinces like and . Geopolitically, this instability exposed vulnerable desert frontiers and the Mesopotamian heartland, where decentralized defenses relied on unreliable levies from noble estates rather than a unified imperial army, facilitating piecemeal Arab incursions starting in 633. Byzantium grappled with parallel geopolitical frailties, including overextended supply lines across to the and economic hemorrhage from ransoming captives (such as the in 629) and rebuilding ravaged provinces. Religious divisions, rooted in the Council of Chalcedon's 451 affirmation of , alienated Monophysite majorities in and , who viewed imperial orthodoxy as oppressive and often withheld support or defected during invasions. This undermined cohesion, as local militias and Ghassanid federates—Byzantium's frontier buffers—proved disloyal or ineffective post-war, leaving exposed flanks along the vulnerable to mobile raids by 634. Both empires' reliance on static fortifications and , ill-suited to the arid frontiers shared with Arabian tribes, compounded these issues, as the sudden unification of Arab forces under the in 632 exploited the absence of robust mobile reserves or diplomatic buffers previously maintained against incursions.

Military Composition and Capabilities

Arab Muslim Forces: Structure, Motivation, and Tactics

The Arab Muslim armies of the (632–661 CE) were structured around tribal contingents mobilized from and settled Arabian tribes, with command delegated to experienced leaders like and , who operated with significant autonomy under caliphal oversight. Recruitment relied on voluntary participation driven by religious duty and promises of spoils, transitioning under Caliph (r. 634–644 CE) to a more formalized diwan system registering fighters for stipends from conquest revenues, which professionalized the force while maintaining tribal cohesion for unit loyalty. Composition emphasized armed with spears, swords, and shields, supported by mobile —initially camel-mounted for endurance in arid terrain and later incorporating captured horses—comprising perhaps one-third to half the force in major campaigns, enabling logistical superiority over heavier, supply-dependent foes. Total field armies varied, often 15,000–40,000 strong for pivotal battles like Yarmouk (636 CE), though exact figures are debated due to reliance on later chronicles. Motivations blended religious zeal with pragmatic incentives, rooted in Quranic injunctions framing as a defensive and expansionary struggle against perceived and , promising martyrdom's reward of paradise and divine favor. Fighters were exhorted that true elevated Allah's word above others, distinguishing it from mere pursuit of fame or plunder, though the latter—via systematic division of ghanimah (booty), with four-fifths to participants—was a key attractor amid Arabia's economic scarcity post-Muhammad's death in 632 CE. This fusion fostered high morale and cohesion, as apostasy threats during the (632–633 CE) underscored Islam's role in unifying fractious tribes against external enemies, while opportunities for land and slaves in fertile conquered regions like and provided tangible gains. Tactics prioritized speed and adaptability over static engagements, leveraging Arabian expertise in desert mobility to conduct rapid marches, ambushes, and flanking maneuvers that exploited enemies' exhaustion from mutual Byzantine-Sasanian wars. Cavalry wings, often led by elite mujahideen, executed feigned retreats to draw foes into vulnerable pursuits, as at the (633 CE), where orchestrated a double envelopment to encircle Persian forces despite numerical inferiority. Infantry held defensive lines with javelins and to disrupt advances, while camels facilitated extended supply lines and surprise raids; against fortified positions, sappers and rudimentary sieges were employed, though preference for open battles minimized attrition. These methods, unburdened by heavy armor, allowed outnumbered —typically 1:3 or worse against Byzantine cataphracts or Sasanian —to dictate terms through concentration of force and psychological intimidation via relentless pursuit.

Byzantine, Sasanian, and Other Opposing Armies: Strengths and Weaknesses

The during the initial Muslim conquests (circa 632–638) possessed notable strengths in its professional structure and tactical adaptability, particularly after Emperor Heraclius's reforms emphasizing cavalry-heavy forces to counter Persian threats. Elite mobile units, known as praesental armies stationed near , numbered approximately 10,000–20,000 troops, supported by thematic precursors that integrated local garrisons with expeditionary capabilities. These reforms, implemented post-622, shifted from infantry-dominant legions to versatile cavalry and , enabling successes like the 627 victory at against the Sasanians. However, exhaustion from the 602–628 Romano-Persian War had reduced overall field strength to an estimated 98,000–130,000 empire-wide, with only 20,000–30,000 deployable in the against incursions, further eroded by the 627–628 plague that killed up to a quarter of the population, including soldiers. Logistical strains, scattered fortifications, and reliance on unreliable allies like the compounded vulnerabilities, as did internal religious schisms—such as Monophysite discontent in —undermining loyalty and recruitment. The Sasanian army, structured around the spāh (professional forces), derived core strengths from its —the asbāran or savārān cataphracts—armored noble horsemen trained for shock charges, supplemented by war elephants and composite bow-equipped for ranged harassment. This composition had proven effective in prior campaigns, with effective archery ranges up to 120 yards and integrated infantry for holding lines. Yet, by Yazdegerd III's accession in 632, the military was critically weakened by the 628 overthrow of , sparking four years of civil war among pretenders that fragmented command and depleted veteran ranks. Administrative collapse, economic overextension from territorial losses, and nobility's parochial loyalties prevented cohesive mobilization, leaving Yazdegerd reliant on ad hoc levies lacking discipline; battles like al-Qādisiyyah (636) exposed these flaws as elephants panicked and cavalry faltered against Arab mobility. A devastating plague in 627–628 further halved populations in core regions, eroding manpower reserves. Other opposing forces, primarily client buffer states, offered limited counterbalance. The Ghassanid Arabs, Byzantine foederati since the 6th century, provided light cavalry phyla for frontier scouting and raids, numbering perhaps 5,000–10,000 horsemen versed in desert warfare, but their Monophysite Christianity clashed with Heraclius's Chalcedonian policies, fostering defections to Muslim armies by 634 and eroding their role as a cohesive barrier in Syria. The Lakhmids, erstwhile Sasanian allies at al-Hirah, had been disbanded in 602 by Khosrow II, depriving Persia of a similar Arab vanguard; residual tribal levies proved ineffective without centralized support. Peripheral groups like Armenian highlanders contributed infantry to Byzantine field armies but suffered from local revolts and Sasanian reprisals, diluting their impact against unified Arab thrusts.

Chronological Campaigns

Ridda Wars and Consolidation under Abu Bakr (632–633)

Following the death of Muhammad on 8 June 632 CE, Abu Bakr was elected as the first caliph in Medina through a hasty assembly at the Saqifa of Banu Sa'ida, amid tensions with Ali ibn Abi Talib's supporters. Many Bedouin tribes across Arabia, who had submitted during Muhammad's lifetime primarily for political or economic reasons rather than deep conviction, renounced formal allegiance to Medina—either by withholding the zakat tax, adopting false prophets, or reverting to paganism—perceiving their pacts as personal to the Prophet rather than to the nascent Islamic polity. Abu Bakr, rejecting Umar ibn al-Khattab's initial counsel for leniency, insisted that zakat constituted an integral pillar of faith equivalent to prayer, declaring war on all apostates and rebels to preserve the ummah's unity and fiscal base, which numbered around 11,000–13,000 warriors at Medina's disposal against widespread tribal levies. The Ridda Wars erupted in late July 632 CE, beginning with expeditions against early rebels like al-Aswad al-Ansi in Yemen, who had already seized control before Muhammad's death but was swiftly eliminated by local Muslim forces under Shahr ibn Badhan. Abu Bakr dispatched multiple columns: Usama ibn Zayd's force raided Byzantine frontiers in the north as a diversion, while internal campaigns targeted key apostate leaders. In the northeast, Khalid ibn al-Walid, commanding 4,000–6,000 men, subdued Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid of Banu Asad at the Battle of Buzakha in October 632 CE, where superior Muslim cohesion and archery prevailed despite numerical parity, followed by victories at al-Butah and Dhul-Qassah against remaining Tamim and Hawazin factions. In the east, Ikrimah ibn Abi Jahl and Shurahbil ibn Hasana quelled rebellions in Bahrain and Oman, restoring zakat collection from coastal trade hubs. The fiercest resistance centered on Yamama, where al-Kadhdhab, claiming prophethood and amassing 40,000 followers among , withstood initial assaults until Khalid's reinforced army of approximately 13,000 engaged in the Battle of Aqraba (or Yamama) in December 632 CE–January 633 CE, suffering heavy casualties—up to one-third of Medina's fighting men, including many memorizers—but ultimately routing the rebels through flanking maneuvers and close-quarters combat, with slain by . Concurrent operations in the south under al-Mujahid ibn Jabr suppressed the Banu Madh'hij and other Yemenite tribes, while diplomacy co-opted neutral or opportunistic groups like the Kindites. By June 633 CE, after roughly 11 months of intermittent fighting across 20–30 engagements, had reimposed central authority, extracting zakat from subdued tribes and eliminating false prophets, thereby consolidating the under a unified Islamic for the first time, with an estimated 30,000–40,000 tribesmen reintegrated into the fold. This internal pacification, achieved through a combination of decisive military action—leveraging mobile and tribal rivalries—and pragmatic reintegration policies that spared repentant fighters, averted the fragmentation of the Muslim community into warring fiefdoms, preserving resources and manpower for subsequent external campaigns despite the demographic toll. Abu Bakr's refusal to compromise on fiscal-religious obligations, rooted in the principle that state legitimacy derived from enforcing core Islamic tenets, contrasted with more conciliatory views and underscored the causal role of centralized coercion in forging the caliphate's cohesion amid Arabia's tribal volatility.

Conquest of the Levant and Initial Byzantine Engagements (634–638)

Following the consolidation of Arabia during the Ridda Wars, Caliph Abu Bakr dispatched four separate armies into the Levant in early 634 to challenge Byzantine control, targeting regions around Damascus, Homs, Jordan, and Palestine with forces totaling approximately 15,000-20,000 men under commanders Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan, Shurahbil ibn Hasana, Amr ibn al-As, and Abu Ubayda ibn al-Jarrah. These expeditions encountered initial resistance, including a minor Byzantine-Ghassanid defeat at Dathin in February 634, but faced a coordinated Byzantine response led by Theodore Jush, brother-in-law of Emperor Heraclius. The first major engagement occurred at Ajnadayn in late July 634, where a Muslim force of about 16,000-20,000 under Abu Ubayda clashed with a similar-sized Byzantine army; the Muslims employed mobile cavalry tactics to outmaneuver the heavier Byzantine infantry and secure a decisive victory, opening central Palestine to further advances and capturing cities like Nablus, Lod, and Bayt Jibrin. Reinforced by Khalid ibn al-Walid, redirected from Iraq, the Muslims besieged Damascus in August 634, dividing into three corps to encircle the city; despite fierce resistance, including sallies by Byzantine defenders, Damascus fell in September after a prolonged assault, marking the first major urban conquest in the Levant. Emperor Heraclius assembled a large counteroffensive force of 40,000-100,000 men under generals Vahan and Theodore Trithyrius, bolstered by Armenian and Ghassanid allies, which engaged the unified Muslim army of 20,000-40,000 at the Yarmuk River from August 15-20, 636; Khalid ibn al-Walid, as field commander under overall leader Abu Ubayda, exploited Byzantine command disunity, terrain, and a sudden sandstorm to rout the enemy, inflicting heavy casualties estimated at tens of thousands while Muslim losses numbered around 4,000, effectively shattering Byzantine military presence in Syria. In the aftermath of Yarmuk, Muslim forces rapidly secured northern , including Antioch in late 637, and turned to , which Sophronius besieged from November 636; the city surrendered in February 638 only after Caliph ibn al-Khattab, succeeding in 634, arrived personally to negotiate terms, granting protection of life, property, and worship in exchange for tribute, as stipulated in the . This capitulation concluded the initial phase of conquest, establishing dominance over the by 638 through a combination of tactical superiority and exploitation of Byzantine internal divisions.

Conquest of Mesopotamia and Persia (633–651)

Following the Ridda Wars, Caliph Abu Bakr dispatched Khalid ibn al-Walid with an army of approximately 18,000 men to invade southern Mesopotamia in April 633, targeting the Sassanid frontier garrisons and client states like the Lakhmids at al-Hira. Khalid's forces achieved rapid victories in a series of engagements, including the Battle of the Chains (late April 633), where Sassanid-aligned tribes were defeated, and the Battle of Walaja (May 633), employing encirclement tactics against a larger Persian-backed coalition. These successes culminated in the surrender of al-Hira in May 633 after the Battle of Ullais, where Khalid's mobile cavalry overwhelmed the defenders, leading to the pacification of much of lower Iraq and the establishment of Muslim control over key agricultural regions. Under Caliph ibn al-Khattab, who succeeded in 634, a more systematic campaign was launched against the Sassanid heartland. In 636, commanded around 30,000 troops at the (late November to early December 636), facing a Sasanian army of 50,000-100,000 under Rustam Farrokhzad, bolstered by war elephants. Despite initial setbacks from sandstorms and elephant charges, the exploited Persian disarray after Rustam's death in combat, routing the Sasanian forces and inflicting heavy casualties estimated at 6,000 Arab dead versus tens of thousands Persian, including most of the elite asawira cavalry. This battle shattered Sassanid military cohesion in , enabling Sa'd's advance to the capital at (al-Mada'in). The Siege of Ctesiphon began in January 637 and ended with its evacuation by in March, after which the city fell without prolonged resistance, yielding vast spoils including the Persian treasury and royal regalia. Muslim forces under Hashim ibn Utba then defeated a Sasanian counterattack at the (April 637), securing eastern , though guerrilla resistance persisted in pockets like Jalula, which held out until 638. regrouped in the , but internal divisions and nomadic incursions weakened further mobilization. A decisive phase resumed in 642 with Umar's order for the invasion of central Persia. ibn Muqrin led 30,000-40,000 troops to the (January 642), where feigned retreats lured the Sasanian army under al-Nu'man ibn Vahrām Chobin and Mardanshah into ambush, resulting in a crushing victory dubbed the "Victory of Victories" due to its role in collapsing organized resistance. Persian losses exceeded 100,000 in exaggerated accounts, but the battle's significance lay in eliminating remaining field armies, allowing piecemeal conquest of Fars, , and other provinces through 649, often via sieges and local surrenders amid famine and defection. Yazdegerd III fled eastward, attempting alliances with Turks and Chinese, but faced relentless pursuit; by 651, Muslim governors like Abdullah ibn Amir had subjugated and reached , where Yazdegerd was assassinated by a local miller amid demands for tribute, conventionally marking the end of Sassanid sovereignty. The conquest integrated Persia into the , with garrisons in new misr cities, though Zoroastrian revolts simmered into the Umayyad era, reflecting incomplete pacification.

Conquest of Egypt and North Africa (639–647)

In December 639, Amr ibn al-As led an Arab Muslim force of approximately 4,000 men into Egypt from Palestine, initiating the invasion without prior caliphal approval but later securing permission from Umar ibn al-Khattab after initial successes. The expedition crossed the Sinai Peninsula and captured the border fortress of Pelusium (Farama) after a brief siege, securing the eastern gateway to Egypt. Advancing westward, the Arabs defeated Byzantine forces at Belbeis, a fortified town east of the Nile Delta, where local Coptic populations reportedly provided minimal resistance due to religious grievances against Chalcedonian Byzantine rule. The decisive Battle of Heliopolis occurred in mid-640, where Amr's cavalry outmaneuvered a larger Byzantine army led by regional commanders, resulting in heavy Byzantine losses and the collapse of organized resistance in the Delta. Following this, the Arabs besieged the Babylon Fortress near Memphis from late 640 to spring 641, enduring a prolonged standoff until the garrison surrendered, allowing control over Upper Egypt after the Thebaid region's submission without major fighting. Amr then marched on Alexandria, the Byzantine administrative capital, besieging it from March to September 641; Patriarch Cyrus of Alexandria negotiated terms, but after his death and a brief reinforcement attempt by Byzantine naval forces, the city capitulated, marking the effective end of Byzantine rule in Egypt by 642. Amr established Fustat as the new Muslim administrative center near Babylon Fortress, facilitating governance and tribute collection from the predominantly Coptic population, who were granted dhimmi status under Islamic law. With Egypt secured, Arab forces under Amr's subordinates extended operations westward into starting in 642, capturing Barqa () after overcoming local Byzantine garrisons and Berber tribes. By 643, Tripoli fell, extending Muslim control along the North African coast, though deeper penetration into Berber territories faced sporadic resistance. In 647, under Caliph ibn Affan, a larger expedition led by ibn Abi Sarh invaded (modern ), defeating the Byzantine at the Battle of Sufetula (), which compelled tribute and opened the to further conquests despite fierce Berber opposition. These campaigns exploited Byzantine exhaustion from prior Persian wars and internal religious divisions, with Arab mobility and cohesion proving superior against fragmented defenses.

Expansion into Iberia, Sindh, and Transoxiana (711–751)

In 711, Tariq ibn Ziyad, a Berber commander serving under the Umayyad governor of Ifriqiya Musa ibn Nusayr, led an expedition of approximately 7,000 troops across the Strait of Gibraltar into the Visigothic Kingdom of Hispania. The force defeated King Roderic's larger army of around 30,000 at the Battle of the Río Guadalete in July 711, exploiting Visigothic internal divisions and possible betrayal by local figures such as Count Julian of Ceuta. This victory enabled rapid advances, with Toledo falling without resistance and much of the peninsula under Muslim control by 714, facilitated by the collapse of Visigothic centralized authority amid succession disputes. Musa ibn Nusayr reinforced the campaign with additional Arab forces, consolidating gains and extending raids into southern Gaul by 720, though a defeat at the Battle of Covadonga around 722 marked the beginning of resistance in the northern Christian kingdoms. Concurrently in 711, , nephew of the Umayyad viceroy , initiated the conquest of at the behest of the to secure maritime routes and punish piracy. His army of about 6,000-8,000, supported by naval forces, first captured the port of after a , then defeated the forces of Raja Dahir at the Battle of Aror in 712, leading to the submission of key cities like Brahmanabad and Alor. By mid-712, was under Umayyad administration, with policies allowing local Hindu and Buddhist populations to retain practices under tax, though temples were sometimes repurposed; the campaign extended eastward to in 713 before al-Qasim's recall and execution in 715 amid political shifts. This established the first enduring Muslim foothold in the , primarily through superior tactics and like manjaniqs against fragmented local rulers. Further east, Umayyad expansion into advanced under , appointed governor of Khurasan in 705, who by 711 had secured crossings over the River and subdued after multiple campaigns. In 712, captured following the Battle of Samarkand, where Turkic and Sogdian forces were defeated, and imposed tribute on Ferghana and , though rebellions persisted due to heavy taxation and Arab settlement policies. His assassination in 715 triggered uprisings that temporarily reversed gains, but renewed efforts under later governors maintained nominal control; the in 751, involving Abbasid forces allied with Karluk Turks against a Tang Chinese expedition, resulted in a Muslim victory that halted Tang influence in the region without significantly altering prior Umayyad acquisitions, as Chinese withdrawal was already underway due to internal rebellions. These campaigns relied on exploiting Sogdian disunity and mobile , but faced ongoing resistance from local principalities and nomadic groups, limiting permanent consolidation until Abbasid reforms.

Peripheral Raids and Failed Expeditions

In addition to the core campaigns, Muslim armies under the and Umayyad caliphates launched numerous raids into peripheral regions, often testing defenses without achieving lasting territorial gains. These operations targeted , where annual incursions from the 640s onward disrupted frontier settlements but were repelled by Byzantine thematic armies and fortifications, preventing penetration beyond and . Similarly, naval raids struck and in the 650s, yielding tribute but no due to Byzantine counter-raids and logistical strains on Arab fleets. The most ambitious peripheral expeditions against culminated in the failed s of . The first, from 674 to 678 under Caliph , involved a combined land and naval force of approximately 100,000 troops blockading the city, but Byzantine defenses, including incendiary weapons, inflicted heavy losses—estimated at over 30,000 Arab casualties—and forced withdrawal after a harsh winter. The second , in 717–718 under Caliph , mobilized up to 120,000 soldiers and 1,800 ships under Maslama ibn Abd al-Malik, but Bulgarian allies harried the Arab rear, storms destroyed much of the fleet, and renewed use of decimated the besiegers, resulting in perhaps 100,000 Arab deaths and abandonment of the campaign. These failures stemmed from overextended supply lines across the Anatolian plateau and the resilience of 's triple walls and moats, halting further deep incursions into for decades. Southward, an 642 expedition into under Abdallah ibn Abi al-Sarh, dispatched by from , advanced to but encountered fierce resistance from Makurian spearmen and archers, who inflicted significant casualties with ambushes in the cataracts. The Arabs withdrew after initial clashes, opting for a treaty by 652 that exchanged Nubian slaves for Egyptian goods rather than conquest, as the kingdom's terrain and warrior culture deterred sustained invasion. In the Caucasus, early raids from 639–640 targeted and Iberia, with forces under Habib ibn Maslama reaching and extracting tribute, but rugged mountains and alliances between local princes and Khazar nomads blocked full subjugation. Subsequent pushes into faltered against Khazar cavalry in the 730s, as Arab commanders like Jarrah ibn Abdullah suffered defeats near the Caspian Gates due to nomadic mobility and harsh winters, confining Muslim control to southern fringes like while northern passes remained contested. These operations yielded plunder and nominal vassals but failed to integrate the region, highlighting limits imposed by terrain, climate, and decentralized resistances.

Causal Factors in Conquest Success

Military and Strategic Advantages

The Muslim armies demonstrated marked military advantages through their emphasis on mobility, derived primarily from the widespread use of camels for transport and operations, which permitted swift advances and retreats across arid terrains where Byzantine and Sasanian forces, dependent on extensive wagon trains and , struggled logistically. This capability was critical in early campaigns, such as ibn al-Walid's 634 march through waterless desert regions between and , covering hundreds of miles to reposition forces unexpectedly and outflank enemies. Nomadic traditions among many tribes further enhanced endurance in harsh environments, allowing sustained raids that disrupted opponent cohesion without committing to prolonged engagements. Tactically, the forces employed flexible formations integrating tribal infantry (armed with spears and swords), archers, and mounted lancers, enabling adaptive maneuvers like feigned retreats to bait pursuers into ambushes—a method honed by , who repeatedly drew Byzantine contingents into vulnerable positions. These contrasted sharply with the heavier, more static Byzantine cataphracts and Sasanian armored , which prioritized shock charges but proved cumbersome in prolonged battles or uneven terrain. The Battle of Yarmouk ( 636) illustrated this edge: an Arab army estimated at 20,000–40,000, under unified command, leveraged dust storms, ravine traps, and rotational assaults to dismantle a Byzantine force of 80,000–150,000 over six days, despite numerical inferiority. 's tactical leadership, including dividing forces into mobile wings for flanking, compensated for equipment disparities and secured Syria's decisive fall by 638. The (632–633) under forged these advantages by unifying disparate tribes into a cohesive structure, with commanders like gaining experience in suppressing rebellions through tactics and rapid deployments, totaling around 10,000–12,000 core fighters initially expanded via levies. This created a battle-tested cadre that transitioned seamlessly into external conquests, emphasizing archer harassment and pursuits over direct clashes favored by exhausted imperial armies post their mutual 602–628 war. Strategically, centralized directives from enabled multi-front coordination, as under Caliph (r. 634–644), who dispatched parallel invasions into the (four columns of ~7,000 each in 634) and , reallocating reinforcements like 4,000 Iraqi cavalry to mid-campaign. Smaller detachments (2,000–6,000) focused on attrition via raids on supply lines and peripheral settlements, avoiding overextension while exploiting imperial overreliance on fortified cities, as seen in the 636–637 sieges of and al-Qadisiyyah's prelude raids that weakened Sasanian morale before the main clash. This approach, blending opportunistic strikes with phased reinforcements, sustained momentum across vast distances, culminating in Persia's collapse by 651 despite initial Arab forces numbering only 6,000–12,000 at key engagements like al-Qadisiyyah (636–637).

Religious Zeal and Ideological Cohesion

The unification of Arabian tribes under following Muhammad's death in 632 CE transformed a historically fragmented society into a cohesive force capable of sustained expansion. was characterized by intertribal feuds and polytheistic rivalries, but the new faith emphasized (monotheism) and (believer community), subordinating kinship loyalties to religious allegiance. This ideological framework enabled Caliph to quell the (632–633 CE), suppressing apostate tribes and those withholding (alms tax), with estimates of 10,000–20,000 rebels killed in campaigns that reasserted central authority and prevented disintegration. Religious zeal, rooted in Quranic injunctions and prophetic traditions, propelled warriors through the doctrine of as defensive and expansionary struggle against unbelievers. Verses like 2:191–193 and 9:5–29 framed combat as a religious duty, promising martyrdom () with immediate entry , including sensory rewards for fighters, which incentivized high-risk engagements despite numerical disadvantages. Contemporary non-Muslim sources, such as the Syriac Chronicle of Seert, describe Arab armies invoking divine aid and fighting with "fanatical devotion," contributing to improbable victories like the conquest of by 638 CE, where smaller Muslim forces routed larger Byzantine armies weakened by internal religious strife. Ideological cohesion extended to command structures, with caliphs positioned as successors to (khalifat rasul ), ensuring obedience across tribal lines via shared eschatological beliefs and egalitarian access to spoils under the 's distribution rules (e.g., one-fifth to the state, Quran 8:41). This contrasted sharply with the Byzantine Empire's Christological divisions—between Chalcedonian Orthodox and Monophysite subjects—and the Sassanid Empire's Zoroastrian alienating minorities, allowing to recruit defectors and maintain momentum. Historians such as contend that this religious mobilization, rather than solely economic gain, underpinned the conquests' speed, covering 2.2 million square miles by 651 CE, though some accounts from later Muslim chroniclers may exaggerate zeal to legitimize rule.

Exploitation of Enemy Exhaustion and Internal Divisions

The recent conclusion of the Byzantine–Sasanian War (602–628 CE) left both empires militarily exhausted, with depleted treasuries, ravaged territories, and undermanned garrisons, creating a strategic vacuum that Arab forces under Caliph Abu Bakr and Umar rapidly filled beginning in 633 CE. The Byzantine Empire under Heraclius I had barely recovered its eastern provinces from Persian occupation by 629 CE, only to face immediate Arab incursions into southern Iraq and the Levant, where local Byzantine commanders lacked reinforcements due to ongoing fiscal strain and the need to defend against potential Persian resurgence. This exhaustion manifested in hesitant responses, such as the delayed mobilization for the Battle of Yarmouk in August 636 CE, where Byzantine armies, numbering around 40,000–100,000 but plagued by supply shortages and desertions, suffered decisive defeat against a more agile Arab force of approximately 20,000–40,000. Internal divisions further eroded Byzantine cohesion, particularly religious schisms between the imperial Chalcedonian and Miaphysite (non-Chalcedonian) majorities in , , and , who resented Constantinople's enforcement of doctrinal unity through persecutions and heavy taxation. Heraclius's promotion of in 638 CE as a only deepened alienation among provincial populations and , leading to passive resistance or defections during Arab advances; for instance, cities like surrendered in 634 CE after minimal sieges, with local leaders negotiating terms rather than fighting to the death for an unpopular emperor. Arab commanders exploited these fissures by offering lighter taxes and to Monophysite communities compared to Byzantine policies, facilitating the conquest of by 638 CE and by 642 CE without prolonged in many cases. Similarly, the Sasanian Empire's collapse accelerated due to post-war anarchy following the assassination of in February 628 CE, which triggered a four-year (628–632 CE) involving over a dozen ephemeral rulers amid noble factionalism and Zoroastrian clergy disputes. This fragmented military command, with regional governors (marzbans) acting autonomously and the young ascending in 632 CE to a lacking centralized or resources, as the empire's 120,000-strong had been decimated in the prior . Arab invasions from 633 CE onward targeted these divisions, as seen in the Battle of the Chains (633 CE) and Qadisiyyah (636 CE), where Persian forces under Rustam splintered due to internal betrayals and poor coordination, enabling and Saad ibn Abi Waqqas to overrun despite numerical inferiority. By 651 CE, with death, the Sasanians' exhaustion—exacerbated by plague outbreaks and nomadic incursions—allowed piecemeal surrenders rather than unified defense. In both cases, Arab success stemmed from opportunistic timing: unification under the caliphs post-632 CE coincided with enemies' recovery phases, permitting swift, decentralized campaigns that bypassed fortified cores by leveraging provincial disaffection and logistical overextension. Historians such as Walter Kaegi emphasize that these structural weaknesses, rather than solely Arab military superiority, were decisive, though debates persist on the relative weight of endogenous imperial decay versus exogenous pressures.

Role of Local Alliances and Population Responses

In the , local alliances played a pivotal role in facilitating advances, particularly among Christian tribes and non-Chalcedonian Christian communities disillusioned with Byzantine religious orthodoxy and fiscal exactions. Tribes such as the , initially Byzantine , fragmented, with some factions like the Judham and Lakhm providing intelligence or neutrality during early raids, such as the Dhat al-Salasil expedition in 629 CE, driven by grievances over Byzantine centralization and heavy tribute demands. Monophysite Syrians, persecuted under Chalcedonian emperors, often surrendered cities without prolonged resistance; for instance, Bostra capitulated in late May 634 CE via a agreement, while submitted peacefully in 635 CE, preserving local governance in exchange for tribute lighter than prior Byzantine impositions. Population responses varied: urban Greek elites frequently fled to , but rural peasants and groups, including acting as guides, accommodated the invaders due to land ties and prospects of tax relief, contributing to the rapid fall of Hims in December 635–January 636 CE. In and Persia, alliances with border Arab tribes and disaffected local s exploited Sasanian exhaustion from decades of warfare and internal strife, including floods devastating around 629 CE. Tribes like and Bakr ibn Wa'il, long chafing under Persian overlordship and high krurg taxes, defected early, aiding Muslim forces at al-Hira's surrender in 633 CE, where a secured 190,000 dirhams annually while retaining Christian and Zoroastrian communal structures. Persian dihqans () and asawira increasingly collaborated post-Qadisiyyah in 636 CE, receiving stipends of up to 2,000 dirhams yearly for and administrative continuity, as rural populations accepted Muslim rule to avoid the disruptions of Sasanian flight and noble abandonments. Zoroastrian communities offered limited initial resistance, with surrenders at in 637 CE and Nihawand in 642 CE reflecting pragmatic acceptance amid empire collapse, though fortified urban centers like held out longer before -based submissions preserved local customs. Population attitudes leaned toward non-resistance in agrarian regions, where Arab settlement policies awarded lands to collaborators, contrasting with sporadic Zoroastrian and Christian tribal opposition tied to elite loyalties. The conquest of from 639–642 CE exemplified population acquiescence rooted in Coptic resentment toward Byzantine religious coercion and extortionate taxation under Patriarch Cyrus. Coptic Christians, predominant in the native bureaucracy and rural base, provided logistical support and minimal resistance, enabling Amr ibn al-As's forces to bypass strongholds like via local defections, culminating in Alexandria's negotiated surrender in 642 CE after Byzantine evacuation. Treaties emphasized protections and reduced fiscal burdens compared to prior Byzantine demands, fostering elite integration without immediate social upheaval, as Coptic patriarchs like Benjamin I reemerged to administer under Muslim oversight. This collaboration stemmed from Chalcedonian-Monophysite schisms, where Arabs positioned themselves as liberators, though isolated Byzantine garrisons mounted defenses until overwhelmed.

Controversies and Scholarly Debates

Expansionist vs. Defensive Interpretations of Jihad

The concept of —literally "struggle" or "striving" in —encompasses both spiritual and martial dimensions in Islamic doctrine, but its application to the early Muslim conquests (circa 632–750 CE) divides scholars into expansionist and defensive camps. The expansionist interpretation, dominant in classical Islamic legal traditions () from the four major Sunni schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i, Hanbali), regards offensive (jihad al-talab) as permissible and obligatory under a legitimate caliph to extend the domain of (dar al-Islam), subdue unbelievers, and enforce submission via tribute or conversion. This draws from Quranic verses like Surah at-Tawbah 9:29, mandating combat against "until they give the jizyah willingly while they are humbled," and 9:5, calling for fighting polytheists after unless they repent and establish prayer. Early jurists such as (d. 820 CE) codified rules for offensive campaigns, including division of spoils and enslavement of combatants, reflecting practices in the (632–633 CE) and subsequent invasions of Byzantine and Sassanid , where Arab armies under advanced proactively beyond defensive perimeters, capturing in 634 CE and by 637 CE. Proponents of the defensive interpretation emphasize jihad al-daf' (defensive struggle), limiting martial efforts to repelling aggression as per Surah al-Baqarah 2:190–193, which prohibits fighting except against those who fight you and forbids transgression. Some modern scholars, including certain revisionists, portray the conquests as reactive to Byzantine Emperor Heraclius's alliances with Arab Christian tribes like the and Sassanid border encroachments, framing Abu Bakr's (r. 632–634 CE) and Umar's (r. 634–644 CE) campaigns as preemptive defenses against rather than ideological . This view aligns with reports prioritizing protection of , such as Muhammad's alleged statement post-Hudaybiyyah (628 CE) emphasizing the "greater jihad" as internal struggle over the "lesser" martial one, though such narrations are debated for authenticity. However, empirical evidence undermines a purely defensive framing: Arab forces penetrated 2,000 miles into Persia by 651 CE, conquering the Indus Valley (711–713 CE) under without prior existential threats from those regions, and imposed contracts systematically, extracting from millions—outcomes inconsistent with temporary border skirmishes. The debate reflects source biases and historiographical evolution. Traditional Muslim chroniclers like (d. 823 CE) and (d. 892 CE) glorify conquests as divinely sanctioned futuhat (victorious openings), emphasizing jihad's rewards like martyrdom and spoils, which motivated tribal levies amid Arabia's post-Ridda unification. In contrast, 20th–21st-century Western and apologetic analyses, influenced by postcolonial sensitivities, often minimize religious drivers in favor of socioeconomic factors (e.g., , trade routes), as seen in works questioning jihad's centrality despite its invocation in caliphal orders and Friday sermons. Yet causal analysis favors expansionism: the conquests' speed—spanning 6 million square miles in a century—exploited enemy exhaustion but was propelled by doctrinal incentives, with defectors and locals sometimes aiding Arabs due to promises, not conquest aversion. Defensive claims falter against the absence of negotiated truces post-victory and the Umayyad era's (661–750 CE) sustained frontier raids (ghazw), which perpetuated expansion until checked at Tours (732 CE) and Talas (751 CE).

Treatment of Conquered Populations: Dhimmi Status and Coercion

The dhimmi system established a protected yet subordinate status for non-Muslim populations, primarily , , and Zoroastrians designated as "," in territories conquered during the (632–661) and early Umayyad (661–750) caliphates. Under this arrangement, dhimmis received guarantees of life, property, and the right to practice their faith in exchange for payment of the , a levied on adult males, which exempted them from and zakat obligations imposed on Muslims. This framework originated from Quranic injunctions, such as Surah 9:29, directing Muslims to fight those who do not believe until they pay jizya "with willing submission and feel themselves subdued," and was operationalized through surrender treaties during campaigns in , , and Persia between 634 and 651. For instance, in the 637 conquest of , Caliph ibn al-Khattab issued assurances preserving Christian churches and , contingent on jizya payment and non-aggression toward Muslims. Dhimmi protections came with enforceable restrictions aimed at maintaining Muslim supremacy and discouraging public displays of non-Islamic identity. Surrender agreements and later codifications, such as the attributed —circulating by the but reflecting 7th-century practices—prohibited dhimmis from building or repairing places of worship, ringing church bells loudly, holding public processions, teaching Muslim children, or resembling Muslims in dress, saddles, or architecture; violators faced fines, demolition, or expulsion. In practice, under the caliphs, enforcement varied by locality: Persian Zoroastrians in paid jizya at rates up to 4 dirhams per person annually, while Egyptian faced assessments tied to land productivity, fostering administrative integration but also resentment. Umayyad rulers intensified these measures, with governors like in (d. 673) imposing distinctive clothing and curfews on dhimmis to symbolize subordination, as recorded in early Abbasid-era chronicles drawing from administrative records. Official doctrine, rooted in Quranic verse 2:256 stating "there is no compulsion in religion," barred direct forced conversions, with early caliphs like Abu Bakr (r. 632–634) punishing tribal leaders for enslaving or coercing surrendering non-combatants. Mainstream historians find no evidence of systematic genocide, widespread rape as policy, or mass forced conversions in the 7th-8th centuries. However, systemic incentives exerted indirect coercion: jizya exemptions for converts reduced fiscal burdens, while social humiliations—such as ceremonial tax collection involving physical prostration—and legal disabilities (e.g., dhimmis' testimony inadmissible against Muslims in court) eroded status over generations. Sporadic violence occurred, as in the 720s under Caliph Umar II, who briefly mandated conversion for certain Iraqi peasants amid famine, though this was reversed due to revenue loss; overall, conversion rates remained low initially, with non-Muslims comprising 80–90% of the empire's population into the 8th century, indicating preference for taxable subjects over mass Islamization. These dynamics prioritized economic extraction and political stability, with coercion manifesting more through attrition than outright mandates, though primary sources like Baladhuri's Futuh al-Buldan (9th century) document localized revolts by dhimmis citing tax oppression as a catalyst for uprising or flight.

Reliability and Biases in Early Historiographical Sources

Early Muslim historiographical sources for the conquests (632–750 CE) are predominantly late compilations within the Islamic tradition, such as al-Baladhuri's Futuh al-Buldan (composed circa 892 CE) and al-Tabari's Ta'rikh al-Rusul wa-l-Muluk (completed 923 CE), which aggregate oral reports (akhbar) from narrators two to three generations removed from events. These texts employ chains of transmission (isnad) to claim authenticity, yet systematic analysis reveals frequent contradictions, legendary elements, and retrospective projections of later doctrinal unity, as compilers prioritized edifying narratives glorifying the Prophet's companions and portraying victories as manifestations of divine favor. Al-Tabari, while reporting variant accounts to mitigate bias, operates within an Abbasid-era framework that favors proto-orthodox Sunni perspectives, often downplaying internal Arab divisions or Umayyad-era pragmatism in favor of idealized jihad motifs. Non-Muslim sources, contemporaneous or near-contemporary, offer an external counterpoint, including Syriac chronicles like the Chronicle of Khuzistan (circa 660 CE) and the Armenian History of Sebeos (completed circa 661 CE), which describe Arab incursions as opportunistic raids by monotheist nomads exploiting imperial exhaustion. These accounts, rooted in Christian or Zoroastrian milieus, exhibit clear polemical biases—depicting as a false prophet or the invasions as apocalyptic tribulations—yet their proximity to events (often within decades) provides verifiable details on battles like Yarmuk (636 CE) absent in later Muslim elaborations. Byzantine fragments and Jewish apocalypses similarly corroborate the rapid collapse of Sasanian and Byzantine frontier defenses but frame Arabs as heretical kin rather than unified believers, highlighting how theological antagonism distorts but does not fabricate the conquests' scale. Robert Hoyland's Seeing Islam as Others Saw It (1997) evaluates over 120 such non-Muslim texts up to the 780s CE, arguing their volume and independence outweigh the sparser, doctrinal-laden Muslim sources for reconstructing causal sequences, though both traditions inflate Arab cohesion and minimize local collaborations. Scholarly consensus, informed by isnad scrutiny and comparative philology, deems Muslim chronicles unreliable for granular tactics or motivations due to pious forgeries and sectarian filtering—evident in duplicated motifs across akhbar—while non-Muslim records, despite hostility, align empirically with numismatic and papyrological evidence of gradual fiscal integration over cataclysmic overthrow. This duality necessitates cross-referencing: Islamic sources supply insider rationales potentially shaped by 8th-century caliphal politics, whereas outsider biases underscore the invasions' disruptive realism without theological varnish, yielding a composite where core expansions are factual but narrativized through rival credos.

Modern Revisionism and Critiques of Traditional Narratives

Scholars since the 1970s have advanced revisionist critiques of traditional narratives on the early Muslim conquests, emphasizing the paucity of contemporary Muslim sources and the retrospective nature of later Islamic . Accounts by historians like (d. 892 CE) and (d. 923 CE), composed 150–250 years after the events, rely on oral chains of transmission (isnad) that revisionists contend were susceptible to Abbasid-era embellishments to forge a unified Arab-Islamic identity and legitimize caliphal authority. These narratives portray swift, ideologically unified campaigns spanning from to Persia between 632 and 651 CE, but lack corroboration from 7th-century Muslim documents, with the earliest datable Islamic inscriptions, such as the (691–692 CE), emerging only later. Prominent among revisionists, and Michael Cook in (1977) argued that traditional sources obscure an initial Judeo-Arab messianic movement focused on reclaiming , with "Islamic" elements retrojected post-conquest to distinguish from ; Crone later moderated this, acknowledging tribal and secular strands in early accounts but upholding skepticism toward religious framing as primary driver. Robert Hoyland's analysis of non-Muslim sources—Syriac, Armenian, and Greek texts from the 630s–660s, such as the Armenian History of —confirms Arab invasions as tribal confederations exploiting Byzantine-Sasanian exhaustion, but depicts them variably as "" or monotheists without detailed Quranic references, suggesting gradual doctrinal consolidation rather than premeditated . These outsiders' reports, often hostile, highlight pragmatic alliances and tribute over mass conversions or forced Islamization. Archaeological evidence further tempers claims of rapid, transformative upheaval, revealing administrative continuity in conquered regions: Egyptian papyri and Nessana documents (late 7th century) show pre-conquest Byzantine fiscal systems persisting under Arab rule, with minimal disruption in , , and settlement patterns. In and , sites like and exhibit no widespread destruction layers attributable to 630s–640s invasions, implying negotiated surrenders and local elite accommodations over wholesale military dominance. Revisionists thus posit a slower consolidation—perhaps decades for effective control—driven by economic incentives and mobility rather than inexorable religious fervor, though core conquest events align across biased sources when stripped of anachronistic details.

Aftermath and Long-Term Consequences

Political Fragmentation and Caliphal Transitions

The assassination of the third caliph, ibn Affan, in June 656 CE amid accusations of nepotism and favoritism toward his Umayyad kin in provincial governorships triggered the , a civil war that fractured the nascent Islamic polity. ibn Abi Talib, elected as the fourth caliph, faced immediate challenges from Aisha's faction at the in December 656 CE and from Muawiya ibn Abi Sufyan, Uthman's relative and governor of , culminating in the inconclusive in July 657 CE. The subsequent arbitration agreement alienated a splinter group, the , who assassinated in January 661 CE, enabling Muawiya to seize the and inaugurate the as a , marking the end of the elective system. The Second Fitna (680–692 CE), erupting upon Muawiya's death in 680 CE, stemmed from opposition to hereditary succession under his son , including Husayn ibn Ali's rebellion crushed at in October 680 CE and Abdullah ibn al-Zubayr's proclamation of a rival from , which controlled much of the Hijaz, , and until suppressed by Umayyad forces under Abd al-Malik in 692 CE. These conflicts exacerbated tribal divisions and ideological schisms, such as emerging Shi'a allegiance to Ali's lineage and Kharijite puritanism, while the Umayyads consolidated power through Syrian military dominance but alienated non-Arab converts (mawali) via discriminatory taxation and exclusion from full privileges. Umayyad expansionist policies, emphasizing perpetual to sustain Arab tribal cohesion, diverted resources from internal governance, fostering resentment in peripheral provinces like where Persianized elements chafed under Arab supremacy. The Abbasid Revolution (747–750 CE), originating in under Abu Muslim's mobilization of diverse discontented groups including Shi'a sympathizers and mawali, overthrew the Umayyads, with the decisive in February 750 CE leading to the massacre of most Umayyad princes; survivor established an independent emirate in al-Andalus in 756 CE, initiating enduring fragmentation. The Abbasids, claiming descent from the Prophet's uncle al-Abbas, promised egalitarian rule but retained Umayyad administrators for continuity, as under (r. 754–775 CE), who suppressed Alid revolts like that of Muhammad ibn Abdallah in 762 CE. Relocating the capital to in 762 CE facilitated Persian bureaucratic influence, but rapid provincial autonomy—evident in the Tahirid (821–873 CE) and Saffarid (861–1003 CE) dynasties in the east—eroded central authority, culminating in the caliphs' subjugation by Buyid Shi'a military overlords in 945 CE. The conquests' success in forging a transcontinental empire inherently sowed fragmentation, as vast distances, heterogeneous populations, and reliance on tribal levies undermined unified command, transitioning the caliphate from conquest-driven cohesion to dynastic rivalries and regional warlordism. Abbasid-era chronicles, such as those of al-Tabari, often portray Umayyad misrule to legitimize the victors, reflecting historiographical bias that privileges Abbasid narratives over potentially more balanced Umayyad accounts lost to suppression. By the 10th century, the caliphate devolved into a symbolic institution amid splinter states, with effective power devolving to Turkic slave soldiers and local emirs, perpetuating cycles of fitna over centralized governance.

Economic Policies: Taxation, Land Distribution, and Arab Settlements

The economic policies implemented during the early Muslim conquests under the Rashidun Caliphs, particularly Umar ibn al-Khattab (r. 634–644), emphasized revenue extraction from conquered agrarian economies while minimizing disruption to local production to sustain fiscal inflows and facilitate surrenders. In regions like Iraq's Sawad (fertile alluvial plains), Umar dispatched surveyors in 637–638 to assess land productivity and impose kharaj, a fixed land tax originally derived from Sassanid practices, typically ranging from one-quarter to one-half of crop yields depending on irrigation and soil quality. Similarly, in Byzantine-held Syria and Egypt, existing poll and land taxes were adapted into jizya (a capitation tax on non-Muslim adult males) and kharaj, often at rates comparable to or lower than prior Byzantine impositions, such as four dinars annually for the able-bodied in Syria, to incentivize payment over resistance. These taxes were collected in kind or coin and funneled into the bayt al-mal (public treasury), which Umar formalized as a central repository for state revenues, excluding zakat (obligatory alms on Muslim wealth). Land distribution policies prioritized tax continuity over wholesale confiscation, as extensive redistribution risked collapsing agricultural output in densely cultivated areas like and the Valley. Conquered properties remained with incumbent owners—Zoroastrians in Persia, Christians in and —who retained rights in exchange for kharaj payments, with explicitly prohibiting the seizure of productive lands to avoid famine or rebellion, as evidenced by his orders to governors like in . Lands captured without pitched battle (fay') were designated for communal Muslim benefit, funding stipends via the diwan al-jund (military registry) rather than individual grants, ensuring warriors' loyalty without tying them to the soil. This approach yielded substantial revenues—estimated at 100 million dirhams annually from alone by the late 630s—supporting conquests without alienating taxpayers whose prior Sassanid or Byzantine burdens had often exceeded Islamic rates due to wartime exactions. Arab settlements were strategically confined to purpose-built garrison towns () to preserve tribal cohesion, prevent assimilation, and project military power, rather than dispersing into rural areas. was established in 636 CE by Utba ibn Ghazwan near conquered Persian territories in southern , accommodating around 80,000 divided into tribal quarters with central mosques and administrative hubs. followed in 637 CE under north of , housing northern tribes and serving as a base for further Persian campaigns, while was founded in 641 CE by adjacent to Byzantine in , initially for 12,000–18,000 troops. These featured allotted plots (hisn) for temporary use but no heritable ownership, with residents receiving fixed stipends from revenues—e.g., 2,000 dirhams yearly for early Meccan migrants—to discourage permanent agrarian settlement and maintain a mobile force. By segregating from indigenous populations, this system reinforced fiscal extraction, as locals continued farming under tax obligations, though it sowed seeds for later Umayyad-era disputes over land privatization.

Religious Transformations: Conversions, Sharia Implementation, and Non-Muslim Persistence

The process of religious conversion following the early Muslim conquests was gradual and varied regionally, spanning several centuries rather than occurring immediately after military victories. In territories such as , , , and Persia, Muslim armies, typically numbering 10,000 to 20,000 soldiers, were vastly outnumbered by local populations, rendering mass forced conversions logistically unfeasible. Initial Muslim settlers formed a small minority—estimated at around 10% in and 20% in —prioritizing administrative control over religious homogenization. Conversion rates remained low during the (632–661) and Umayyad (661–750) periods, with non-Muslims comprising the majority in most conquered regions until the 9th–10th centuries or later; for instance, Zoroastrians persisted as a significant portion of Persia's population into the Abbasid era. Factors driving conversions included fiscal incentives, such as exemption from the poll tax imposed on non-Muslims, alongside opportunities for and administrative roles under Muslim rule, though Quranic verses permitted non-Muslims to retain their faiths upon payment of rather than mandating conversion. Early treaties, like the 638 agreement with Jerusalem's Christian patriarch Sophronius, explicitly guaranteed protection of non-Muslim lives, property, and places of worship without coercion. While some scholarly analyses highlight indirect pressures—such as higher taxes on non-Arab Muslim converts (mawali) under Umayyad policies that delayed widespread adoption—evidence indicates no systematic forced conversions, as rulers derived revenue from jizya payments, which would diminish with mass Islamization. Regional variations existed, with potentially faster elite conversions in compared to slower agrarian shifts elsewhere. Implementation of in conquered territories proceeded incrementally during the Umayyad period, beginning with the appointment of qadis (Islamic judges) by provincial governors in garrison cities like () and () to adjudicate disputes among Muslims. These early qadis, often drawn from military or administrative backgrounds with tenures averaging 3–4 years, applied rudimentary procedures based on testimony, oaths, and confessions, handling civil and criminal matters in open venues such as markets before transitioning to mosques. primarily governed Muslim litigants, incorporating elements of pre-conquest Byzantine, Sassanid, and customary laws, while non-Muslims largely retained communal courts for internal affairs; by the late Umayyad era, jurists advocated separating non-Muslim cases to reinforce Islamic distinctiveness. Full codification of schools emerged later under the Abbasids (post-750), reflecting ongoing experimentation rather than uniform enforcement from the outset of conquests. Non-Muslim persistence was facilitated by the system, which granted protected status to "" (Christians, Jews, and later Zoroastrians) in exchange for submission to Muslim political authority and payment of as an alternative to military service or . Surrender agreements ensured security of life, property, and religious practice, prohibiting public displays that challenged Islamic supremacy but allowing internal community governance. This framework, echoed in later documents like the debated (likely 8th–9th century compilation rather than authentic to Caliph ), codified restrictions such as bans on church bells or new constructions while enabling non-Muslims to maintain distinct identities, resulting in their demographic dominance for generations—e.g., Christians formed over half of Syria's population into the .

Broader Geopolitical and Cultural Impacts

The early Muslim conquests precipitated the collapse of the by 651 CE following decisive battles such as Qadisiyyah in 636 CE and in 642 CE, eliminating a major Eurasian power that had dominated Persia for over four centuries and reshaping alliances across . Simultaneously, the suffered irrecoverable losses of its Levantine, Egyptian, and North African provinces between 634 and 698 CE, reducing its territorial extent by approximately two-thirds and redirecting Mediterranean trade routes under Muslim control, which facilitated the caliphate's economic integration from Iberia to . This geopolitical reconfiguration established the as a transcontinental empire by 750 CE, encompassing over 11 million square kilometers and influencing subsequent dynasties through centralized fiscal systems derived from conquered bureaucracies. Long-term, the conquests engendered institutional legacies that hindered state centralization in successor polities, as evidenced by persistent extractive governance patterns traceable to the military occupations of 632–1100 CE, which prioritized tribal elites over inclusive administration and contributed to recurrent fragmentation post-Umayyad. The halting of advances at natural barriers like the after 732 CE and the preserved and Frankish , averting deeper incursions but fostering enduring frontier tensions that defined Eurasian into the medieval period. Culturally, the invasions accelerated the dissemination of via trade corridors including the , with conversions surging in urban centers by the due to exemptions from the tax and enhanced for Muslims, leading to demographic majorities in core regions like and within two centuries. In Persia, Zoroastrian institutions eroded under discriminatory policies, with fire temples repurposed or abandoned, though Persian linguistic and administrative elements permeated Islamic governance, as seen in the adoption of diwans for taxation. Byzantine territories experienced partial in frontier zones, while North African Berber societies underwent phased Islamization, blending indigenous customs with by the , fundamentally altering intellectual traditions from Hellenistic to Islamic paradigms.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.