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Irreligion
Irreligion
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Irreligion is the absence or rejection of religious beliefs or practices. It encompasses a wide range of viewpoints drawn from various philosophical and intellectual perspectives, including atheism, agnosticism, religious skepticism, rationalism, secularism, and non-religious spirituality. These perspectives can vary, with individuals who identify as irreligious holding diverse beliefs about religion and its role in their lives.[1]

Relatively little scholarly research was published on irreligion until around the year 2010.[2]

Overview

[edit]

Over the past several decades,[when?] the number of secular people has increased, with a rapid rise in the early 21st century, in many countries.[3][4]: 4 [1][5]: 112 [6] In virtually every high-income country and many poor countries, religion has declined.[5]: 112  Highly secular societies tend to be societally healthy and successful.[7] Social scientists have predicted declines in religious beliefs and their replacement with more scientific/naturalistic outlooks (secularization hypothesis).[8] According to Ronald Inglehart, this trend seems likely to continue and a reverse rarely lasts long because the trend is driven by technological innovation.[9] However, other researchers disagree (contra-secularization hypothesis).[8] By 2050, Pew Research Center (Pew) expects irreligious people to probably decline as a share of the world population (16.4% to 13.2%), at least for a time, because of faster population growth in highly religious countries and shrinking populations in at least some less religious countries.[1][10] Many countries may also be gradually becoming more secular, generation by generation.[10] Younger generations tend to be less religious than their elders.[10][11]: 5  They might become more religious as they age, but still be less religious than previous generations if their countries become more affluent and stable.[11]: 13  Nonetheless, secularization is compatible with religion since most versions of secularity do not lead to atheism or irreligion.[12] Religious congruence, that is consistency between beliefs and behaviors, in individuals is rare.[13]: 2  Religious incongruence is not the same thing as religious insincerity or hypocrisy.[13]: 5  The widespread religious congruence fallacy occurs when interpretations or explanations unjustifiably presume religious congruence.[13]: 19  This fallacy also infects "New Atheist" critiques of religion.[13]: 21 

Estimating the number of irreligious people in the world is difficult.[14][1] Those who do not affiliate with a religion are diverse. In many countries censuses and demographic surveys do not separate atheists, agnostics and those responding "nothing in particular" as distinct populations, obscuring significant differences that may exist between them.[15]: 60  People can feel reasonable anxieties about giving a politically ‘wrong’ answer – in either direction.[14] Measurement of irreligiosity requires a high degree of cultural sensitivity, especially outside the West, where the concepts of "religion" or "the secular" are not always rooted in local culture and may not even be present.[4]: 31–34  The sharp distinction, and often antagonism, between "religious" and "secular" is culturally and historically unique to the West since in most of human history and cultures, there was little differentiation between the natural and supernatural and concepts do not always transfer across cultures.[4]: 31  Forms of secularity always reflect the societal, historical, cultural and religious contexts in which they emerge, and distinctions are sharp in religiously dominant contexts.[4]: 31  Also, there's considerable prevalence of atheism and agnosticism in ancient Asian texts.[16] Atheistic traditions have played a significant part in those cultures for millennia.[16] "Cultural religion" must be taken into account: non-religious people can be found in religious categories, especially where religion has very deep-seated religious roots in a culture.[15]: 59  Many of the religiously unaffiliated have some religious beliefs and participate in religious practices.[17][18][19][20]

In 2016, Zuckerman, Galen and Pasquale estimated there were 400 million nonreligious or nontheistic people.[21] A 2022 Gallup International Association (GIA) survey, done in 61 countries, reported that 62% of respondents said they are religious, one in four that they aren't, 10% that they're atheists and the rest are not sure.[22] In 2016, it found similar results (62%, 25%, 9% and 5%), also in 2014.[22][23]: 1 : 3  People in the European Union, East Asia and Oceania were the least religious.[22] In 2010, according to Pew, the religiously unaffiliated numbered more than 1.1 billion, about one-in-six people (16.3% of an estimated 6.9 billion).[24][18][25]: 24 : 25  76% of them resided in the 60 countries of Asia-Pacific.[18][25]: 25 : 46 : 66  China, officially an atheist state and considered to be the world's first or second most populous country,[note 1] alone held the majority (62.2% or about 700 million).[26][27]: 1 [28][1][18][25]: 25 : 46 : 66  Nevertheless, several smaller countries, especially in Europe and Asia, eclipse China's percent of residents who are irreligious with even higher proportions.[28] Shares were relatively similar in three of the six regions: Asia-Pacific (21.2% of more than 4 billion), Europe (18.2% of more than 742 thousands) and North America (17.1% of more than 344 thousands).[18][25]: 25  Men, younger people, and whites, Asians, and people of Jewish heritage are more likely to be secular.[7]

Etymology

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Irreligion is either a borrowing from French or from Latin.[29] The term irreligion is a combination of the noun religion and the ir- form of the prefix in-, signifying "not" (similar to irrelevant). It was first attested in French as irréligion in 1527, then in English as irreligion in 1598. It was borrowed into Dutch as irreligie in the 17th century, though it is not certain from which language.[30]

Definition

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According to the encyclopedia Britannica, the term irreligion is frequently characterized differently depending on context.[1] Sometimes, surveys of religious belief use lack of identification with a religion as a marker of irreligion.[1] This can be misleading: in some cases a person may identify with a religious cultural institution but not hold the doctrines of that institution or take part in its religious practice.[1]

Some scholars define irreligion as the active rejection of religion, as opposed to the mere absence of religion.[1] The Encyclopedia of Religion and Society defines it as: "Active rejection of religion in general or any of its more specific organized forms. It is thus distinct from the secular, which simply refers to the absence of religion. [...] In contemporary usage, it is increasingly employed as a synonym for unbelief [...]"[31][32] Sociologist Colin Campbell also describes it as "deliberate indifference towards religion", in his 1971 Towards a Sociology of Irreligion.[33]

The Oxford English Dictionary has two definitions, one of which is labelled obsolete (first published in 1900).[29] It is want of religion; hostility to or disregard of religious principles; irreligious conduct.[29]

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines it as "the quality or state of being irreligious" and "irreligious" as "neglectful of religion: lacking religious emotions, doctrines, or practices", also "indicating lack of religion".[34]

Also for "religion", there is no universally agreed-upon definition, even within the social sciences.[4]: 15 

Types

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  • Agnostic atheism is a philosophical position that encompasses both atheism and agnosticism. Agnostic atheists are atheistic because they do not believe in the existence of any deity and agnostic because they claim that the existence of a deity is either unknowable in principle or unknown in fact.
  • Agnosticism is the view that the existence of God, the divine, and the supernatural are unknown or unknowable.
  • Alatrism or alatry (Greek: from the privative - + λατρεία (latreia) = worship) is the recognition of the existence of one or more gods, but with a deliberate lack of worship of any deity. Typically, it includes the belief that religious rituals have no supernatural significance and that gods ignore all prayers and worship.
  • Anti-clericalism is opposition to religious authority, typically in social or political matters.
  • Antireligion is opposition to or rejection of religion of any kind.
  • Antitheism is the explicit opposition to theism. The term has had a range of applications. It typically refers to direct opposition to belief in any deity.
  • Apatheism is the attitude of apathy or indifference toward the existence or non-existence of any deity.
  • Atheism is the lack of belief that any deities exist; in a narrower sense, positive atheism is specifically the position that there are factually no deities. There are ranges of negative and positive atheism.
  • "Cultural religion"[15]: 59 
  • Deism is a philosophical position and rationalistic theology that rejects revelation as a source of knowledge and asserts that empirical reason and observation of the natural world are exclusively logical, reliable, and sufficient to determine the existence of a Supreme Being as the creator of the universe.
  • Freethought.[4]: 14  It holds that positions regarding truth should be formed on the basis of logic, reason, and empiricism rather than authority, tradition, revelation, or dogma.
  • Ietsism is an unspecified belief in an undetermined transcendent reality.
  • Ignosticism, also known as igtheism, is the idea that the question of the existence of God is meaningless because the word "God" has no coherent, unambiguous definition.
  • Naturalism is the idea or belief that only natural (as opposed to supernatural or spiritual) laws and forces operate in the universe.
  • New Atheism is the position of some atheist academics, writers, scientists, and philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries, such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, and Daniel Dennett.
  • Nones can be used to refer to those who are unaffiliated with any organized religion. This use derives from surveys of religious affiliation, in which "None" (or "None of the above") is typically the last choice. Since this status can be chosen because of lack of organizational affiliation or lack of personal belief, it is a more specific concept than irreligion. A 2015 Gallup, Inc. poll concluded that in the United States "nones" were growing as a percentage of the population, while Christians were declining and non-Christians also increasing but to a much lesser degree, since the 1950s.[35]
  • Nontheism[4]: 14 
  • Post-theism is a variant of nontheism that proposes that the division of theism and atheism is obsolete and that the God-idea belongs to a stage of human development now past. Within nontheism, post-theism can be contrasted with antitheism.
  • Religious skepticism is a type of skepticism about religion.
  • Secular ethics is a branch of moral philosophy in which ethics is based solely on human faculties, such as logic, empathy, reason, and ethical intuition, and not derived from belief in supernatural revelation or guidance—a source of ethics in many religions.
  • Secular humanism is a system of thought that prioritizes human rather than divine matters.
  • Secular liberalism is a form of liberalism in which secularist principles and values, and sometimes non-religious ethics, are especially emphasized.
  • Secular paganism is an outlook that upholds the virtues and principles associated with paganism while maintaining a secular worldview.
  • Secularism.[3][4]: 14  It is also used to describe a political conviction in favor of minimizing religion in the public sphere that may be advocated for regardless of personal religiosity. Sometimes, especially in the United States, it is also a synonym for naturalism or atheism.[36]
  • "Spiritual but not religious" (SBNR) is a designation coined by Robert C. Fuller for people who reject traditional or organized religion but have strong metaphysical beliefs. The SBNR may be included under the definition of nonreligion,[37] but are sometimes classified as a wholly distinct group.[38]
  • Theological noncognitivism is the argument that religious language—specifically, words such as God—are not cognitively meaningful. It is sometimes considered synonymous with ignosticism.
  • Transtheism refers to a system of thought or religious philosophy that is neither theistic nor atheistic but beyond them.

History

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In the early 1970s, Colin Campbell began a sociological study of irreligion.[4]: 13 

Human rights

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In 1993, the United Nations Human Rights Committee declared that article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights "protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief."[39] The committee further stated that "the freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief necessarily entails the freedom to choose a religion or belief, including the right to replace one's current religion or belief with another or to adopt atheistic views." Signatories to the convention are barred from "the use of threat of physical force or penal sanctions to compel believers or non-believers" to recant their beliefs or convert.[40][41]

Most democracies protect the freedom of religion or belief, and it is largely implied in respective legal systems that those who do not believe or observe any religion are allowed freedom of thought.

A noted exception to ambiguity, explicitly allowing non-religion, is Article 36 of the Constitution of China (as adopted in 1982), which states that "No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion."[42] Article 46 of China's 1978 Constitution was even more explicit, stating that "Citizens enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to propagate atheism."[43]

Demographics

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Nonreligious population by country, in 2010[44]

Women, when in the labor force, are similar to men in their religiosity. When out of the labor force, women tend to be more religious.[45]

In many countries censuses and demographic surveys do not separate atheists, agnostics and those responding "nothing in particular" as distinct populations.[15]: 60  Both "religion" and "secular" are Western concepts and are not universal across cultures, languages, or time.[46]

In 2020, of the global atheist and non-religious population, 78% live in Asia and the Pacific, while the remainder reside in Europe (10%), North America (6%), Latin America and the Caribbean (4%), sub-Saharan Africa (1.5%) and the Middle East and North Africa (.1%).[47] Eleven countries have nonreligious majorities. In 2020, the countries with the highest percentage of "Non-Religious" ("Term encompassing both (a) agnostics; and (b) atheists") were North Korea, the Czech Republic and Estonia.[48] According to the 2018 Chinese General Social Survey, China had the largest count of unaffiliated people: about one billion adults.[49] According to Pew Research in 2025, China alone makes up 67% of the global religiously unaffiliated demographic.[50] Some broadly religious practices continue to play a significant role in the lives of a substantial shares of the Chinese population.[49] The Asia-Pacific region alone accounts for 78% of the global unaffliated demographic.[50]

Determining objective irreligion, as part of societal or individual levels of secularity and religiosity, requires a high degree of cultural sensitivity from researchers. This is especially so outside the Western world, where the concepts of "religious" and "secular" are not necessarily rooted in local culture or even exist.[4]: 31–34  "Cultural religion" is a vivid reality.[15]: 59  It must be taken into account when trying to ascertain the numeric strength of atheism and agnosticism in a country.[15]: 59  It is generally not considered more important than self-identification measures.[15]: 59  Non-religious people can be found in religious categories.[15]: 59  And many of the unafflilated still hold religious beliefs or practices.[17][20][19] This is especially the case where religion has very deep-seated religious roots in a culture, such as with Christianity in Europe, Islam in the Middle East, Hinduism in India, and Buddhism in South-east Asia.[15]: 59  For instance, Scandinavian countries have among the highest measures of nonreligiosity and even atheism in Europe. For example, 58% of the Swedish population identify with the Church of Sweden.[51] Yet, 47% of atheists who live in those countries are still formally members of the national churches.[52] In much of East Asia, ritual behavior holds greater salience than belief.[4]: 31  China has state atheism and is a Leninist religious state, which maintains dominance over all other religions.[1][26][27]: 1  About 85% of its population practice various kinds of religious behaviors with some regularity.[27]: 2  Many East Asians identify as "without religion" (wú zōngjiào in Chinese, mu shūkyō in Japanese, mu jong-gyo in Korean), but "religion" in that context refers only to Buddhism or Christianity. Most of the people "without religion" practice Shinto and other folk religions. In the Muslim world, those who claim to be "not religious" mostly imply not strictly observing Islam, and in Israel, being "secular" means not strictly observing Orthodox Judaism. Vice versa, many American Jews share the worldviews of nonreligious people though affiliated with a Jewish denomination, and in Russia, growing identification with Eastern Orthodoxy is mainly motivated by cultural and nationalist considerations, without much concrete belief.[53] In the United States, the majority of the "Nones", those without a religious affiliation, have belief in a god or higher power, spiritual forces beyond the natural world, and souls.[54] Even 23% of self-identified atheists believe in a higher power, but not a god as described in the bible.[55] A 2024 report by Pew on Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam found that though many in those countries are not affiliated with any religion, many of the unaffiliated still have beliefs in gods or unseen beings and engage in religious practices.[19] According to Pew in 2023, many unaffilaited Chinese believe in deities or other religious beliefs and participate in religious practicies.[49][56]

Secular people are complex and not always devoid of religious or spiritual involvement.[57] They persist in various forms of religiosity and spirituality.[58] "Secular churches" or "atheist churches" such as Sunday Assembly and others have emerged in multiple countries (e.g. USA, Britain, Australia) which deal with community needs that religious services often provide.[59][60][61][62] Atheists are diverse with some engaging spiritual practice and others having strong beliefs in that they seek to evangelize to others.[63] Nontheistic religions such as Buddhism, Jainism, along with atheistic schools in Hinduism, and other Indian schools like Carvaka, Ajivika have played a significant part in Asian cultures for millennia.[16] Anthropologist Jack David Eller states that "atheism is quite a common position, even within religion" and that "surprisingly, atheism is not the opposite or lack, let alone the enemy, of religion but is the most common form of religion."[64] In the Czech Republic, one of the most secular countries in the world, most nonbelievers are not atheists but are more religious skeptics fulfil their spiritual needs outside of traditional religion.[65]

In 2016, Zuckerman, Galen and Pasquale estimated there were 400 million nonreligious or nontheistic people.[21] In their 2013 essay, Ariela Keysar and Juhem Navarro-Rivera estimated there were about 450 to 500 million nonbelievers, including both "positive" and "negative" atheists, or approximately 7% of the world population.[66] These estimates come from the International Social Survey Programme 2008 survey in which 40 countries took part.[67] In 2010, the religiously unaffiliated numbered more than 1.1 billion (around 1,126,500,000 persons), about one-in-six people (16.3% of an estimated 6,9 billion world population), according to Pew Research Center.[24][18][25]: 24 : 25  In Pew reports, "unaffiliated" are atheists, agnostics, and people who checked "nothing in particular".[15]: 60  76% of them resided in one of the six regions: Asia-Pacific.[18][25]: 25  A 2012 WIN/Gallup International report on a poll from 57 countries reported that 59% of the world's population identified as a religious person, 23% as not a religious person, 13% as "convinced atheists", and also a 9% decrease in identification as "religious" when compared to the 2005 average from 39 countries.[68] A 2015 WIN/Gallup International poll found that 63% of the globe identified as a religious person, 22% as not a religious person, and 11% as "convinced atheists".[69] Their 2016 survey found that 62% of the globe identified as a religious person, less than 25% as not a religious person, 9% others as "convinced atheists" and 5% others "Do not know/no response".[23] Keysar and Navarro-Rivera advised caution with these figures since other surveys have consistently reached lower figures for the number of atheists worldwide.[70]: 553 : 554 

Inverse association between intelligence and religiosity, and the inverse correlation between intelligence and fertility might lead to a decline in non-religious identity (contra-secularization hypothesis) in the foreseeable future.[8][71]: 2  In 2007, sociologist Phil Zuckerman's global studies on atheism have indicated that global atheism may be in decline due to irreligious countries having the lowest birth rates in the world and religious countries having higher birth rates in general.[72] A Pew 2015 global projection study for religion and nonreligion, projected that between 2010 and 2050, there will be some initial increases of the unaffiliated followed by a decline by 2050.[73] Some theorists think religion will fade away but Pew reveals a more complicated picture.[10] Pew predicts the unaffiliated share of the world population will decrease, at least for a while, from 16.4% to 13.2% by 2050.[74][10] Pew states that religious areas are experiencing the fastest growth because of higher fertility and younger populations.[10][75] By 2060, Pew says the number of unaffiliated will increase by over 35 million, but the overall population-percentage will decrease to 13% because the total population will grow faster.[76][77] This would be mostly because of relatively old age and low fertility rates in less religious societies such as East Asia, particularly China and Japan, but also Western Europe.[74][1] By 2019, 43 out of 49 countries studied continued to become less religious.[5]: 110 [6]

Relatively few unbelievers select ‘Atheist’ or ‘Agnostic’ as their preferred (non)religious or secular identity.[78]: 3  Being nonreligious is not necessarily equivalent to being an atheist or agnostic. Many of the nonreligious have some religious beliefs.[18][25]: 24  Also, some of the unaffiliated engage in certain kinds of religious practices.[18][25]: 24  For example, "belief in God or a higher power is shared by 7% of Chinese unaffiliated adults, 30% of French unaffiliated adults and 68% of unaffiliated U.S. adults.[18][25]: 24  Being unaffiliated with a religion on polls does not automatically mean objectively nonreligious since there are, for example, unaffiliated people who fall under religious measures, just as some unbelievers may still attend a church or other place of worship.[15][pages needed] Out of the global nonreligious population, 76.2% reside in Asia-Pacific, while the remainder reside in Europe (12%), North America (5.2%), Latin America and the Caribbean (4%), sub-Saharan Africa (2.4%) and the Middle East and North Africa (0.2%).[18][25]: 24 

By population

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The Pew Research Center in the table below reflects "religiously unaffiliated" in 2010 which "include atheists, agnostics, and people who do not identify with any particular religion in surveys".

The Zuckerman data on the table below only reflect the number of people who have an absence of belief in a deity only (atheists, agnostics). These do not include the broader number of people who do not identify with a particular religion, such as deists, pantheists, and spiritual but not religious people.

Country Pew (2012)[18] Zuckerman (2004)[79][80]
Mainland China 700,680,000 103,907,840 – 181,838,720
India 102,870,000
Japan 72,120,000 81,493,120 – 82,766,450
Vietnam 26,040,000 66,978,900
Russia 23,180,000 34,507,680 – 69,015,360
Germany 20,350,000 33,794,250 – 40,388,250
France 17,580,000 25,982,320 – 32,628,960
United Kingdom 18,684,010 – 26,519,240
South Korea 22,350,000 14,579,400 – 25,270,960
Ukraine 9,546,400
United States 50,980,000 8,790,840 – 26,822,520
Netherlands 6,364,020 – 7,179,920
Canada 6,176,520 – 9,752,400
Spain 6,042,150 – 9,667,440
Taiwan 5,460,000
Hong Kong 5,240,000
Czech Republic 5,328,940 – 6,250,121
Australia 4,779,120 – 4,978,250
Belgium 4,346,160 – 4,449,640
Sweden 4,133,560 – 7,638,100
Italy 3,483,420 – 8,708,550
North Korea 17,350,000 3,404,700
Hungary 3,210,240 – 4,614,720
Bulgaria 2,556,120 – 3,007,200
Denmark 2,327,590 – 4,330,400
Turkey 1,956,990 - 6,320,550
Belarus 1,752,870
Greece 1,703,680
Kazakhstan 1,665,840 – 1,817,280
Argentina 1,565,800 – 3,131,600
Austria 1,471,500 – 2,125,500
Finland 1,460,200 – 3,129,000
Norway 1,418,250 – 3,294,000
 Switzerland 1,266,670 – 2,011,770
Israel 929,850 – 2,293,630
New Zealand 798,800 – 878,680
Cuba 791,630
Slovenia 703,850 – 764,180
Estonia 657,580
Dominican Republic 618,380
Singapore 566,020
Slovakia 542,400 – 1,518,720
Lithuania 469,040
Latvia 461,200 – 668,740
Portugal 420,960 – 947,160
Armenia 118,740
Uruguay 407,880
Kyrgyzstan 355,670
Croatia 314,790
Albania 283,600
Mongolia 247,590
Iceland 47,040 – 67,620
Brazil 15,410,000
[edit]
An abandoned church in Australia

Since 2007, there has been a sharp trend away from religion.[6][5] From about 2007 to 2019, 43 out of 49 countries studied became less religious.[6] Past influential thinkers from Karl Marx to Max Weber to Émile Durkheim thought that the spread of scientific knowledge would dispel religion throughout the world.[5]: 112  Industrialization also didn't cause religion to disappear.[5]: 110  Political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris argue faith is "more emotional than cognitive", and both advance an alternative thesis termed "existential security." They postulate that rather than knowledge or ignorance of scientific learning, it is the weakness or vulnerability of a society that determines religiosity. They claim that increased poverty and chaos make religious values more important to a society, while wealth and security diminish its role. As need for religious support diminishes, there is less willingness to "accept its constraints, including keeping women in the kitchen and gay people in the closet".[81]

Prior to the 1980s

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Rates of people identifying as non-religious began rising in most societies at least as early as the turn of the 20th century.[82] In 1968, sociologist Glenn M. Vernon wrote that US census respondents who identified as "no religion" were insufficiently defined because they were defined in terms of a negative. He contrasted the label with the term "independent" for political affiliation, which still includes people who participate in civic activities. He suggested this difficulty in definition was partially due to the dilemma of defining religious activity beyond membership, attendance, or other identification with a formal religious group.[82] During the 1970s, social scientists still tended to describe irreligion from a perspective that considered religion as normative for humans. Irreligion was described in terms of hostility, reactivity, or indifference toward religion or as developing from radical theologies.[83]

1981–2019

[edit]

In a study of religious trends in 49 countries (they contained 60 percent of the world’s population) from 1981 to 2007, Inglehart and Norris found an overall, but not universal, increase in religiosity.[5]: 110  Respondents in 33 of 49 countries rated themselves higher on a scale from one to ten when asked how important God was in their lives. This increase occurred in most former communist and developing countries. Most high-income countries became less religious.[5]: 112  A sharp reversal of the global trend occurred from 2007 to 2019, when 43 out of 49 countries studied became less religious. This reversal appeared across most of the world.[5] The decline in belief was not confined to high-income countries and appeared across most of the world.[6] In virtually every high-income country, religion has continued to decline.[5]: 112  At the same time, many poor countries, together with most of the former communist states, have also become less religious.[5]: 112  From 2007 to 2019, only five countries became more religious, whereas the vast majority of the countries studied moved in the opposite direction.[5]: 112  India is the most important exception to the general pattern of declining religiosity.[5]: 112  The United States was a dramatic example of declining religiosity – with the mean rating of importance of religion dropping from 8.2 to 4.6 – while India was a major exception. Research in 1989 recorded disparities in religious adherence for different faith groups, with people from Christian and tribal traditions leaving religion at a greater rate than those from Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist faiths.[84]

Inglehart and Norris speculate that the decline in religiosity comes from a decline in the social need for traditional gender and sexual norms, ("virtually all world religions instilled" pro-fertility norms such as "producing as many children as possible and discouraged divorce, abortion, homosexuality, contraception, and any sexual behavior not linked to reproduction" in their adherents for centuries) as life expectancy rose and infant mortality dropped. They also argue that the idea that religion was necessary to prevent a collapse of social cohesion and public morality was belied by lower levels of corruption and murder in less religious countries. They argue that both of these trends are based on the theory that as societies develop, survival becomes more secure: starvation, once pervasive, becomes uncommon; life expectancy increases; murder and other forms of violence diminish. As this level of security rises, there is less social/economic need for the high birthrates that religion encourages and less emotional need for the comfort of religious belief.[5] Change in acceptance of "divorce, abortion, and homosexuality" has been measured by the World Values Survey and shown to have grown throughout the world outside of Muslim-majority countries.[5] Several very comprehensive surveys in the Middle East and Iran have come to similar conclusions: there is an increase in secularization and growing calls for reforms in religious political institutions.[85]

See also

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Notes

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References

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Bibliography

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Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Irreligion denotes the absence, indifference, or explicit rejection of religious beliefs and practices, distinguishing it from mere non-participation by encompassing active disbelief or opposition. It includes categories such as , defined as the lack of belief in deities; , the view that the existence of deities is unknown or unknowable; and broader secular orientations that prioritize empirical reasoning over claims. Globally, irreligion has grown substantially, with 24.2% of the world's population identifying as religiously unaffiliated in 2020, up from approximately 16% in 2010, reflecting demographic shifts including lower fertility rates among the unaffiliated and switching from religious affiliations in numerous countries. This trend manifests unevenly, with the highest proportions in East Asian nations like , where state policies promote atheism, and in parts of such as the , where over 70% report no religious affiliation. In Western countries, irreligion correlates with higher levels of education, , and toward institutional , contributing to secular and cultural norms emphasizing individual over doctrinal adherence. Defining characteristics include advocacy for , reliance on for formation, and philosophical frameworks like that derive from human experience rather than divine command, though irreligion faces controversies over its implications for social cohesion and moral foundations in diverse societies.

Definition and Terminology

Core Definition

Irreligion refers to the absence of religious beliefs, practices, or affiliations, encompassing positions ranging from indifference to explicit rejection of religious doctrines and institutions. This includes individuals who do not identify with any organized or endorse supernatural claims typically associated with religions, such as deities, , or divine . In dictionary usage, it contrasts with by denoting a lack of or commitment to sacred traditions, without implying adherence to an alternative . While some interpretations emphasize hostility or opposition to religion—viewing it as or antagonism toward faith-based systems—others treat it as neutral non-participation, distinct from active disbelief. For instance, sociological analyses often frame irreligion broadly to include those who simply do not engage with religious communities, rather than requiring philosophical argumentation against . This broader scope differentiates irreligion from narrower categories like , which specifically denies the existence of gods, or , which asserts uncertainty about divine matters; irreligious individuals may hold either view or neither, prioritizing empirical or secular worldviews instead. In empirical surveys, irreligion manifests as self-reported "no religion" or "unaffiliated" status, capturing diverse motivations from rational to cultural disconnection, without presupposing uniform ideological commitment. This measurement approach, used by organizations tracking global trends, highlights irreligion's prevalence in modern societies but underscores definitional challenges, as respondents may vary in their rejection of spiritual elements versus institutional alone.

Etymology and Usage

The term irreligion originates from irreligiosus, formed by combining the negating prefix in- ("not") with religiosus ("religious" or "pious"), initially denoting , irreverence toward the divine, or disregard for sacred . This root, in turn, derives from irreligiō or irreligiōn-em, blending in- with religiō ( or "obligation to the gods"), reflecting an early of failing to fulfill religious duties rather than mere absence of belief. The word entered as irréligion before appearing in English by the late , coinciding with the Protestant Reformation's erosion of monolithic religious authority and the rise of individual skepticism. In modern usage, irreligion serves as an umbrella term for the lack, rejection, or indifference to organized religious beliefs, doctrines, and practices, distinguishing it from narrower concepts like atheism—which specifically entails disbelief in deities or the divine—or agnosticism, which posits uncertainty or unknowability about supernatural existence. Unlike atheism's focus on theistic claims, irreligion accommodates a spectrum of non-participatory stances, including those of "nones" who affiliate with no religion yet may retain cultural rituals or vague spirituality without doctrinal commitment, as observed in surveys where 28% of U.S. adults in 2024 self-identified as religiously unaffiliated across atheist, agnostic, or "nothing in particular" categories. Historically, the term carried pejorative undertones of moral or social deviance in religious societies, but contemporary applications emphasize empirical self-reporting in demographic studies, avoiding conflation with active antireligious activism. This breadth allows irreligion to capture implicit non-belief in secularizing contexts, where individuals eschew institutional religion without philosophical elaboration on gods.

Types and Variants

Explicit Non-Belief Forms

Explicit non-belief forms involve conscious positions rejecting or withholding assent to the existence of deities or entities, often derived from rational evaluation of or logical inconsistencies in theistic claims. These differ from implicit non-belief, such as in infants or those unaware of theistic propositions, by requiring deliberate and affirmation of disbelief. Atheism constitutes a central explicit form, characterized as the lack of in deities. Philosophers distinguish weak (or negative) , which asserts only the absence of theistic without claiming definitive of non-existence, from strong (or positive) , which explicitly denies the existence of any gods based on evidential or argumentative grounds. Weak aligns with positions where the burden of proof is placed on theists, as no compelling evidence supports theistic claims. Strong , conversely, advances affirmative arguments, such as the problem of evil or inconsistencies in divine attributes, to conclude non-existence. Agnosticism represents another explicit stance, focusing on the epistemological limits of knowing divine existence. Termed by in 1869 to denote suspension of judgment due to insufficient evidence, it holds that the truth about deities is either currently unknown or inherently unknowable. is orthogonal to : an agnostic atheist lacks in gods while acknowledging uncertainty, whereas an agnostic theist believes despite . This position critiques both dogmatic and unsubstantiated atheistic certainty, emphasizing empirical verifiability. Other variants include , which contends that the concept of a is too vaguely defined to warrant belief or disbelief, rendering theistic debates semantically incoherent until clarified. These forms collectively prioritize reason and over , though surveys indicate self-identification varies; for instance, many who lack belief prefer "agnostic" to avoid connotations of militancy associated with "."

Implicit and Cultural Forms

Implicit irreligion refers to the absence of religious belief or active theistic commitment without an explicit rejection of religion, often manifesting as indifference or unexamined non-affiliation rather than deliberate skepticism. This form contrasts with explicit non-belief by lacking conscious deliberation, encompassing individuals who simply do not hold or prioritize religious views amid daily life. In contemporary surveys, implicit irreligion appears prominently among the "religiously unaffiliated" or "nones," particularly those identifying as "nothing in particular." In the United States, as of , 28% of adults fall into this unaffiliated category, with approximately two-thirds classified as "nothing in particular" rather than atheists or agnostics; many in this subgroup report vague spiritual leanings or belief in a without institutional ties. Globally, nones often outnumber explicit atheists and agnostics, with "nothing in particular" responses predominant in regions like and , where up to 70% may express non-affiliation yet retain openness to supernatural elements. Cultural forms of irreligion involve selective engagement with religious traditions as social or heritage practices, detached from doctrinal adherence or personal faith. In , where surveys indicate about 70% of the population holds non-religious sentiments, individuals commonly participate in visits for New Year's or Buddhist funerals without viewing these as expressions of belief, treating them instead as communal customs rooted in and ancestry. This syncretic approach yields formal religious adherents exceeding the population—182 million in 2016—due to multiple nominal affiliations, underscoring irreligion's compatibility with ritual observance. In , cultural Christianity exemplifies this pattern, where non-practicing individuals—comprising a majority of self-identified Christians—celebrate holidays like or for familial and seasonal reasons, while rarely attending services or affirming core tenets. Such practices preserve social cohesion and historical identity amid broader , differing from unaffiliated nones primarily in nominal labeling rather than behavioral rejection of tradition. These implicit and cultural variants highlight irreligion's , where empirical reveal non-affiliation often coexists with residual or instrumental , challenging binary categorizations of belief and unbelief.

Historical Development

Ancient and Pre-Modern Instances

In ancient , the Cārvāka (or Lokāyata) school represented an early materialist that explicitly rejected the existence of gods, an , karma, and the authority of the , relying solely on direct perception as a valid means of . This tradition, traceable to at least the 6th century BCE through references in texts like the Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, emphasized sensory experience and hedonistic ethics, dismissing supernatural explanations for natural phenomena as unprovable. Cārvāka thinkers critiqued ritualistic practices and priestly authority, arguing that consciousness arises from the body like intoxication from fermented liquids, with no enduring soul. In , explicit toward traditional gods emerged among certain philosophers and poets in the 5th century BCE. , dubbed "the Atheist," was prosecuted around 415 BCE for mocking the and denying divine intervention, leading to his exile from . of Abdera expressed by stating, "Concerning the gods I am unable to say whether they exist or not," resulting in his books being burned and expulsion from circa 411 BCE. Atomists like (c. 460–370 BCE) posited a mechanistic of indivisible particles in void, reducing phenomena to chance collisions without need for divine creation or providence. Roman Epicureanism, building on Greek atomism, promoted irreligion through denial of active godly involvement in human affairs. (c. 99–55 BCE) in argued that gods, if existent, reside in distant intermundia unaffected by the world, rendering religious fears of divine punishment irrational and advocating a life free from superstitious piety. Such views faced , as seen in the execution of philosopher Theodorus of Cyrene (c. 300 BCE) for . In ancient , Confucian thought from the 6th–5th centuries BCE emphasized ethical and ritual over theistic devotion, with (551–479 BCE) treating "Heaven" as an impersonal cosmic order rather than a personal demanding worship. Legalist philosophers like (c. 280–233 BCE) focused on statecraft and without invoking sanctions, prioritizing empirical over . However, these strands coexisted with folk and ancestor veneration, limiting widespread irreligion. Pre-modern instances in monotheistic regions were rarer and more covert due to severe penalties, including execution for . In medieval , accusations of atheism surfaced against figures like the poet Cecco d'Ascoli, burned at the stake in 1327 for denying divine foreknowledge, though such cases often conflated doubt with sorcery. Underground skepticism persisted among some intellectuals, but explicit irreligion remained marginal until the , suppressed by inquisitorial authorities enforcing orthodoxy. In Islamic contexts, occasional materialist critiques appeared, such as in the writings of Rhazes (865–925 CE), who questioned prophetic miracles, but these were outliers amid dominant .

Enlightenment to 19th Century

The Enlightenment, spanning roughly the mid-17th to late 18th centuries, marked a pivotal intellectual shift in toward empirical reason and skepticism of traditional religious authority, fostering early expressions of irreligion through and clandestine . Thinkers like critiqued organized religion in works such as The Natural History of Religion (1757), arguing that beliefs arose from human fears and superstitions rather than divine , leading to accusations of atheism despite his agnostic leanings. In France, and Paul-Henri Thiry, , advanced explicit atheism; d'Holbach's System of Nature (1770) posited a materialist devoid of intervention, influencing underground networks of freethinkers. These ideas circulated secretly due to persecution risks, with atheism remaining a minority stance amid dominant deism, which accepted a creator but rejected and . The (1789–1799) represented the first state-sponsored push toward irreligion, culminating in the dechristianization campaign of 1793–1794 during the . Radical , influenced by Enlightenment , enacted laws closing churches, confiscating ecclesiastical property, and mandating civil oaths that forced approximately 30,000 priests into exile or execution for non-compliance; public worship was suppressed, and revolutionary cults like the promoted atheistic festivals. This policy, driven by viewing the as allied with monarchy, briefly aimed to eradicate but faltered amid social chaos, ending with Maximilien Robespierre's 1794 decree establishing the deistic . In the , irreligion evolved into organized and , particularly in Britain and parts of , propelled by industrialization, scientific advances, and lingering revolutionary ideals. George Jacob Holyoake coined "" in 1851, advocating a non-religious based on and utility, separate from theistic metaphysics; he faced imprisonment in 1842 as the last Briton convicted for . societies proliferated, challenging biblical literalism amid Darwin's (1859), though explicit remained marginal, often conflated with radical politics; by mid-century, secular publications and lectures promoted irreligion as compatible with moral progress without divine sanction. This era saw irreligion transition from elite philosophy to public discourse, laying groundwork for later mass , though persisted among majorities.

20th Century State Imposition

In the , several communist regimes pursued state-imposed irreligion as a core policy, rooted in Marxist-Leninist ideology that viewed as an instrument of class and a barrier to . This led to systematic campaigns of , closure of religious institutions, and promotion of scientific through state organizations. The under Bolshevik rule from 1917 onward exemplified this approach, declaring a hindrance to socialist progress and initiating aggressive anti-religious measures. The Soviet campaign intensified after the 1917 Revolution, with the 1918 decree on evolving into active suppression. By 1939, only about 200 Orthodox churches remained open from approximately 46,000 prior to the Revolution, as were executed, imprisoned, or exiled and thousands of religious sites were destroyed or repurposed. The League of Militant Atheists, established in 1925, grew to millions of members by the late , propagating anti-religious and mobilizing public actions against believers. Under in the late 1950s, a renewed drive closed an additional 20,000 churches between 1958 and 1964, enforcing official atheism while underground religious practice persisted despite severe penalties. In the , following the 1949 communist victory, Mao Zedong's policies escalated during the from 1966 to 1976, where targeted religious sites as symbols of and . Buddhist temples, Taoist shrines, Christian churches, and mosques were looted, desecrated, or demolished en masse, with monks and clergy subjected to , forced labor, or execution. This destruction extended to cultural artifacts, effectively eradicating public religious expression and aligning with the regime's aim to replace traditional beliefs with Maoist ideology. Albania under Enver Hoxha represented the most explicit declaration of , with the 1967 constitution proclaiming it the world's first atheist state and banning all religious practices, institutions, and symbols. Churches, mosques, and monasteries—over 2,000 in total—were closed, demolished, or converted, while possessing religious texts or artifacts became punishable by imprisonment or death. Hoxha's regime, influenced by Stalinist models, enforced this through and , though private belief endured covertly. Similar impositions occurred in other communist states, such as under the (1975–1979), where nearly all monks were killed and pagodas destroyed, and , where ideology supplanted religion with state worship. These policies, driven by the causal logic of totalitarian control over , resulted in millions of deaths and widespread cultural erasure, yet failed to eliminate entirely, as evidenced by post-regime revivals.

Post-1945 to Present

![Countries by percentage of unaffiliated (Pew Research 2010)][float-right] Following , irreligion expanded significantly in regions under communist governance, where became official policy. In the , anti-religious campaigns intensified after a brief wartime relaxation, with the number of active Russian Orthodox churches declining from around 20,000 in 1948 to fewer than 6,000 by 1985 due to closures and restrictions on religious practice. Similarly, in after the 1949 , the (CCP) denounced religion as superstition and incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, leading to the suppression of religious institutions and promotion of atheism through education and propaganda. By 2012, a Gallup poll reported 47% of Chinese as convinced atheists and 30% as non-religious in belief, though folk practices persisted informally. In and other communist states, such as , which declared itself the world's first atheist state in 1967 by banning all religious activity, irreligion was enforced through legal prohibitions and , resulting in near-total suppression of until the 1990s. Post-communist transitions saw partial religious revivals in some countries like and , but others, including the , retained high levels of irreligion, with surveys indicating over 70% unaffiliated by the 2010s. In Asia beyond , countries like and exhibited elevated irreligion, influenced by both communist policies in the latter and historical cultural factors, with Vietnam's state maintaining Marxist-Leninist atheism since unification in 1976. Western Europe experienced accelerated after 1945, marked by declining and affiliation. In countries like and the , regular churchgoing fell from over 40% in the to under 10% by the 2000s, driven by , scientific advancements, and cultural shifts away from institutional . This trend contrasted with a temporary religious resurgence in the United States, where church membership peaked at 70% in the , but by 2024, Pew Research found 28% of U.S. adults religiously unaffiliated ("nones"), up from about 5% in the , with the share stabilizing somewhat after rapid growth in the 2010s. The U.S. rise correlates with generational shifts, as 40% of identified as unaffiliated by 2019. Globally, while irreligion grew in developed regions, the proportion of unaffiliated individuals remained stable at around 16% from to 2020, offset by higher religiosity in and the . In , high unaffiliation persists, with at about 50% non-religious by recent surveys, reflecting modernization and weak institutional ties to . These patterns highlight regionally divergent drivers, including state policies in atheist regimes and voluntary disaffiliation in liberal democracies, though empirical data from sources like underscore that global atheism prevalence has not surged uniformly.

Demographics and Geography

Global Prevalence

![Countries by percentage of religiously unaffiliated (Pew Research, 2010)][float-right] As of 2020, approximately 1.9 billion people worldwide, representing 24.2% of the global population, identified as religiously unaffiliated, meaning they did not adhere to any organized religion. This figure marked a 17% increase from 1.6 billion in 2010, outpacing overall population growth and reflecting a slight rise in the unaffiliated share from about 23% to 24%. This growth has been driven primarily by religious switching and disaffiliation, especially among former adherents of Christianity, rather than natural population increase, as the unaffiliated tend to have lower fertility rates than religious groups. In contrast, religions such as Islam have grown faster due to higher fertility and younger median ages, contributing to the relatively stable global share of the unaffiliated. The unaffiliated category encompasses atheists, agnostics, and those selecting "none" in surveys, though many retain spiritual or supernatural beliefs, with surveys indicating that a majority of nones in various regions endorse ideas like an afterlife or a higher power. The largest concentrations of unaffiliated individuals occur in , particularly , where over 700 million people—more than half the national population—report no religious affiliation, driven by historical under and cultural . follows, with countries like the , , and the showing unaffiliated rates exceeding 30-50% in national censuses and surveys, attributable to post-Enlightenment and declining institutional religion. In contrast, and the Middle East-North Africa region exhibit the lowest rates, often below 5%, where traditional and Abrahamic faiths remain deeply embedded in social structures. Explicit irreligion, such as self-identified or , constitutes a smaller globally, estimated at 2-7% depending on and regional focus, with higher explicit non-belief in urbanized, educated demographics in Western nations and parts of . Data reliability varies, as self-reported affiliation can understate irreligion in religiously repressive societies and overstate it where social desirability biases responses toward ; cross-national surveys like those from and Gallup consistently highlight , , and as harboring the world's largest irreligious populations in absolute terms.

Regional and National Patterns

Irreligion displays pronounced regional variations, with the highest proportions concentrated in and select European nations. As of 2020, the region accounted for the majority of the global religiously unaffiliated population, estimated at 1.9 billion worldwide, driven primarily by where over 700 million individuals lack formal religious affiliation due to state-enforced and cultural . In contrast, and the exhibit near-total religious adherence, with irreligion rates below 5% in most countries. In , reports irreligion rates exceeding 80%, with surveys indicating 86% of the population identifying as non-religious, reflecting a cultural emphasis on secular rituals over doctrinal belief. Similarly, and show high unaffiliation, around 81% and 60% respectively, where traditional practices persist without exclusive religious commitment. China's figures, often cited at 91% atheist or unaffiliated, stem from communist policies suppressing since 1949, though underground folk beliefs may inflate actual practice beyond official tallies. Europe features elevated irreligion in post-communist states and . The leads with approximately 75-78% of its population irreligious, a legacy of Habsburg-era compounded by 20th-century under Soviet influence. follows closely at 78%, per 2023 Gallup data, where secular welfare systems correlate with declining since the 1960s. and other Baltic nations exceed 60%, contrasting with more religious . In the Americas, patterns diverge sharply. North America sees rising unaffiliation, reaching 29% in the United States by 2020, up from 16% in 2007, amid cultural shifts toward individualism. Latin America maintains lower rates, though Uruguay and Chile report over 30% irreligious, influenced by urbanization. Australia aligns with Western trends at around 30-40% unaffiliated.
CountryEstimated Irreligion Rate (%)Primary Source
75-78Gallup/Times of India
86Various surveys
78Gallup 2023
91State data/surveys
60World Population Review

Demographic Projections

Projections indicate that the global share of religiously unaffiliated individuals, encompassing atheists, agnostics, and those identifying with no , will decline from approximately 16% of the in 2010 to 13% by 2050, despite a modest absolute increase from 1.1 billion to 1.2 billion . This trend stems primarily from lower rates among the unaffiliated (averaging 1.7 children per woman) compared to religiously affiliated groups (2.5 children per woman), coupled with higher retention and switching rates into religious affiliations in high-growth regions, including faster expansion in Islam due to elevated fertility. By mid-century, only about 9% of global births are expected to occur to unaffiliated mothers, reinforcing the relative numerical dominance of religious populations in developing areas. In , the unaffiliated population is forecasted to nearly double in size by 2050, rising from 16% to around 26% of the U.S. population, driven by generational switching where 31% of those raised Christian disaffiliate by age 30. However, recent U.S. data suggest the pace of Christian decline may be stabilizing, with unaffiliation growth potentially plateauing if current retention patterns hold, projecting shares between 34% and 52% by 2070 under varying scenarios of switching and . Europe exhibits similar upward trajectories in unaffiliation shares, with countries like the projected to reach nearly 39% by 2050, though actual recent surveys indicate faster growth exceeding earlier estimates. In , where accounts for over half of the world's unaffiliated (due to historical state policies), absolute numbers may grow modestly but face demographic pressures from low birth rates and aging, limiting proportional gains amid regional religious resurgence elsewhere. Globally, these dynamics highlight that while irreligion expands in absolute terms in secularizing contexts, its demographic footprint contracts relative to faster-reproducing religious majorities in and the .

Long-Term Historical Shifts

Irreligion remained a rarity throughout most of , with global estimates placing the number of self-identified atheists at approximately 0.01 million in and 0.23 million in 1900, constituting less than 0.1% of the world's population amid near-universal religious adherence shaped by cultural norms and institutional enforcement. In pre-modern , overt disbelief was exceptional and often concealed due to severe social and legal repercussions, including execution for heresy, limiting irreligion to isolated philosophical skeptics like those in rather than measurable populations. The 18th-century Enlightenment marked an initial shift, fostering deistic and materialistic ideas among intellectuals—figures such as and , openly advocated in works like System of Nature (1770)—yet public identification remained negligible, with religiosity dominant even in nominally secularizing post-Revolution. By the , movements emerged in Britain and the , but adherents comprised small fractions, such as under 1% of the British per nonconformist estimates excluding "no religion" categories in early censuses. Accelerating in the , organic irreligion rose in and alongside , , and existential security from welfare states, with unaffiliated shares climbing from low single digits in to 20-40% by the 1980s in nations like and . State-imposed in communist regimes—such as the , where surveys post-1991 revealed 20-30% non-belief persisting after official collapse—artificially inflated figures, though rebounding religiosity followed liberalization. Globally, however, irreligion's proportional growth lagged, reaching 16.3% unaffiliated in 2010 before edging to 24.2% by 2020, offset by rapid religious expansion in developing regions like . Empirical support for the secularization thesis—positing modernization erodes —holds in high-income contexts via reduced , gains, and rational worldviews, but falters elsewhere, where economic insecurity sustains faith, as evidenced by rising in post-communist and until the late . Long-term data indicate generational transmission weakens in secure societies, with three-stage declines: initial drops in practice, then , culminating in cultural normalization of irreligion, though recent stabilizations in the United States suggest limits tied to persistent human needs for meaning. Since 1980, the global share of religiously unaffiliated individuals has remained relatively stable around 23-24%, with a slight increase observed from 23.3% in to 24.2% in , despite lower rates among this group compared to religious populations. Absolute numbers grew from approximately 1.13 billion in to 1.9 billion in , driven partly by religious switching, particularly former disaffiliating and contributing to Christianity's declining global share. However, estimates indicate a modest overall decline in the prevalence of irreligion (combining atheists and nonreligious) globally over the four decades, attributable to faster in highly religious regions like and parts of Asia, where Islam expands most rapidly due to fertility differentials and a younger demographic profile, though the proportion identifying as atheists among the irreligious has risen substantially. In the United States, irreligion has surged markedly since the , with the religiously unaffiliated ("nones") rising from 5% in 1972 and 9% in 1993 to 29% by , accelerating post-2007 from 16% to the current level. This increase, estimated at 21.5 percentage points in irreligion since 2000, reflects widespread disaffiliation from , which fell from about 90% in the early to 63% recently, with younger generations showing persistently higher rates of non-affiliation. Western Europe has exhibited continued secularization, building on pre-1980 trends, with accelerated declines in religious beliefs and practices documented between 1980 and 2000 across multiple countries via surveys like the European Values Study. Irreligion rates, already elevated, exceed 50% in nations such as those in , , and the , with further rises in and nonreligious identification amid generational shifts away from and doctrinal adherence. In contrast, former communist states in experienced partial religious revivals post-1990 following the collapse of , though irreligion persists at high levels, for instance over 70% in Czechia. In , irreligion remains entrenched in countries like and , where shares surpass 50%, with stability overall since but a noted uptick in explicit alongside declines in nonreligious self-identification. Globally, surveys from 2005 to 2024 corroborate a downward trend in religious identification from 68% to 56%, paralleled by rises in nonreligious (21% to 28%) and convinced atheists (6% to 10%), signaling a broadening rejection of particularly in developed economies.

Underlying Causal Factors

Empirical studies consistently identify a strong negative between national GDP and levels of , with wealthier nations exhibiting higher rates of irreligion as diminishes the reliance on for existential reassurance. This pattern aligns with existential , positing that reduced exposure to , , and uncertainty—facilitated by welfare systems and technological advancements—weakens the adaptive role of religious beliefs in providing comfort and social cohesion. For instance, cross-national data from over 100 countries reveal that as average income rises, the proportion of individuals affirming 's importance falls sharply, except in outliers like the where cultural factors moderate the trend. Higher education emerges as a robust predictor of irreligion, with longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses showing that individuals attaining postsecondary degrees are significantly more likely to reject traditional religious affiliations and doctrines. This association persists after controlling for confounders like age and income, attributed to curricula emphasizing , critical analysis, and exposure to and cosmology, which challenge supernatural explanations. Globally, unaffiliated adults average 1.3 more years of schooling than their religious counterparts, suggesting that formal fosters skepticism toward unverified claims. Cognitive abilities also correlate inversely with religiosity, as evidenced by meta-analyses of 63 and 83 studies encompassing tens of thousands of participants, which report effect sizes indicating that higher —measured via IQ or general cognitive ability—predicts lower endorsement of religious beliefs and practices. Proposed mechanisms include greater analytical thinking overriding intuitive faith-based reasoning and a for parsimonious, evidence-based worldviews over those requiring of doctrinal inconsistencies. These findings hold across diverse populations, though critics note potential reverse causation or cultural confounds, such as nonreligious environments selecting for higher-IQ individuals. Shifts in family structure contribute to intergenerational transmission failures, with rising rates and nontraditional households linked to accelerated among youth. Data from U.S. surveys indicate that parental breakup disrupts religious , reducing children's salience of and increasing odds of later by up to twofold compared to intact families. This dynamic reflects weakened institutional reinforcement of beliefs within the primary unit of moral and communal formation, compounded by interfaith or secular unions diluting doctrinal consistency. Additionally, diminished exposure to credible religious practices during formative years—such as participation or observed —serves as a key determinant of adult , per controlling for demographics. While these factors explain much of the variance in Western contexts, theory's broader claims of inevitable decline face empirical challenges, as rebounds in insecure environments or competitive religious markets, underscoring that correlations do not invariably imply universal causation.

Societal Outcomes and Empirical Data

Effects on Individual Well-Being

Empirical studies consistently indicate that irreligious individuals experience lower compared to their religious counterparts, with meta-analyses revealing small but significant positive associations between and across diverse populations. For instance, a 2022 meta-analysis of and dimensions found that religious attendance, practices, and experiences correlate positively with , with effect sizes ranging from modest to moderate. Longitudinal data further supports a causal direction, where higher predicts improved future , independent of baseline levels. In terms of , non-religious individuals, particularly atheists and agnostics, exhibit elevated risks for depression, anxiety, and suicidality. A review of U.S. data from the National Health Interview Survey (2011–2018) showed atheists and agnostics were twice as likely to receive clinical diagnoses of mood disorders and three times more likely to report treatment compared to religious groups. Similarly, analysis from the Nashville Stress and Health Study (2023) linked lack of in divine control to higher suicidality odds, with irreligious respondents reporting poorer coping mechanisms during stressors. These patterns hold in cross-national surveys, where actively religious adults in 26 countries reported 7–10% higher daily and lower depression rates than the unaffiliated. Nuances emerge in subgroup comparisons: atheists sometimes report fewer psychiatric symptoms like than other secular identifiers, yet overall fare worse than religious individuals on aggregated metrics. Curvilinear relationships suggest extremes—strong or firm —may buffer against distress better than uncertainty, though religious extremes consistently outperform irreligious ones in and . These outcomes persist after controlling for demographics, , and , pointing to religiosity's role in fostering purpose, , and resilience rather than mere with socioeconomic stability.

Impacts on Family and Social Stability

Empirical studies consistently show that higher levels of irreligion correlate with elevated divorce rates and reduced marital stability. Regular attendance at religious services is associated with approximately 50% lower odds of over a 14-year period, based on longitudinal data from the Human Flourishing Program. Active religious participation yields rates 27 to 50 percent lower than among non-participants or nominal adherents. Individuals from nonreligious upbringings exhibit annual rates around 5 percent among married women, compared to lower rates for those raised in religious households. Less religious persons are more prone to due to weaker adherence to moral norms discouraging dissolution. Irreligion also links to lower fertility rates, undermining long-term family and demographic stability. Countries with predominant or high maintain below-replacement fertility levels, typically under 2.1 children per woman, as evidenced by recent global statistics. Societal emerges as a distinct predictor of reduced across 181 nations, independent of economic or educational factors. Religious individuals consistently demonstrate higher fertility than their secular counterparts, with this gap widening in highly secular environments where even religious subgroups exhibit depressed birth rates. , religious women attending services weekly average more children than irregular or non-attenders, particularly post-2000. Secular union practices, such as premarital or civil marriages without religious elements, precede higher instability, with such arrangements more frequently ending in separation. Spousal religious homogeneity fosters greater relationship endurance across denominations, whereas heterogeneous or irreligious pairings show elevated dissolution risks. On social cohesion, bolsters ties through shared rituals, frameworks, and mutual obligations, patterns absent or diminished in predominantly irreligious settings. Quantitative analyses confirm 's positive influence on prosocial behaviors and group , suggesting irreligion may erode these bonds by prioritizing over collective norms. While secular welfare systems in partially offset family fragmentation via state support, underlying metrics of delayed , , and kin network weakening persist, signaling causal strains from diminished religious incentives for familial commitment.

Correlations with Crime and Economic Mobility

Empirical studies consistently find an inverse relationship between religiosity and criminal behavior at the individual and community levels. A systematic review of over 40 years of research indicates that religious participation and adherence are associated with reduced delinquency and offense rates, with 75% of analyzed studies showing beneficial effects of religious involvement on youth crime prevention. Similarly, higher religious adherence correlates with lower property crime rates across countries, even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. In the United States, states and counties with greater religiosity exhibit lower homicide rates, with negative correlations observed for overall adherence and specific racial groups. These patterns hold in structural models where religious participation acts as a deterrent, responding negatively to prior crime increases but exerting a stabilizing influence. Cross-nationally, the relationship is more nuanced, influenced by confounders such as national IQ and cultural norms. Declines in predict rises in rates, but primarily in countries with average IQs below 90, suggesting that religion's protective role strengthens in environments with lower cognitive capital or institutional trust. Highly secular nations like and maintain low rates, yet this aligns with their high average IQs and homogeneous social structures rather than irreligion per se; in contrast, rapid in lower-IQ contexts correlates with elevated . Community-level data further supports this, with denser religious congregations linked to reduced in socioeconomically disadvantaged areas. Regarding economic mobility, U.S. data from large-scale analyses reveal that regions with higher fractions of religious individuals exhibit greater upward mobility, particularly when coupled with stable family structures like two-parent households. For instance, Chetty et al.'s mobility studies identify as a positive correlate in high-mobility areas, independent of raw income levels, attributing this to religion's role in fostering , , and social networks that support intergenerational advancement. Individuals raised by religious parents but later identifying as non-religious often achieve higher earnings, hinting at lingering from early exposure. Globally, frequently precedes , with non-religious countries showing higher GDP and ; a 2018 study of 109 nations from 1945–2010 found that religious decline Granger-causes future wealth increases, potentially via reduced barriers to and . However, this does not uniformly translate to mobility: increased correlates with riskier behaviors like , which can undermine long-term and family formation essential for mobility. In contexts of rapid irreligion, such as parts of , persistent intergenerational mobility gaps emerge where once buffered against traps, underscoring causal pathways beyond mere wealth accumulation.

Philosophical and Ethical Dimensions

Moral Foundations Without Religion

Secular moral foundations typically rely on rational inquiry, empirical observation of , and social cooperation rather than authority or divine . Philosophers in this tradition, such as , ground ethics in universal principles derived from reason, positing that moral duties arise from the to act only according to maxims that could become universal laws, independent of religious precepts. Similarly, utilitarian frameworks, advanced by thinkers like , evaluate actions based on their consequences for overall human welfare, prioritizing the greatest happiness for the greatest number through calculable outcomes rather than faith-based commands. Evolutionary biology provides another basis, suggesting that moral intuitions—such as , reciprocity, and aversion to harm—emerged through to facilitate group survival and cooperation among early humans and their ancestors. Studies of non-human primates reveal proto-moral behaviors like after conflicts and fairness in resource sharing, indicating that these traits predate religious institutions and likely underpin human via genetic and cultural . This perspective aligns with descriptive , which views as an adaptive behavioral repertoire shaped by environmental pressures, though it faces criticism for potentially reducing to subjective preferences without objective grounding. Social contract theory, as articulated by and later , posits as arising from implicit agreements among rational individuals to protect mutual interests, such as , , and , enforced through reason and societal norms rather than theological sanctions. , drawing from Aristotle's emphasis on cultivating character traits like and for (human flourishing), offers a non-religious path by focusing on habitual excellence informed by observation of what promotes personal and communal well-being. Humanist approaches synthesize these, advocating ethics rooted in human dignity, empathy, and evidence-based decision-making, as exemplified by Albert Einstein's assertion that ethical behavior stems from sympathy, education, and social needs without requiring religion. Empirical data supports the viability of these foundations, with studies finding no inherent deficit in moral behavior among the non-religious; for instance, atheists and agnostics often score comparably to the religious on measures of , prosociality, and avoidance, attributing their ethics to internalized norms of fairness and . However, highlights differences in emphasis: secular individuals tend to prioritize care () and fairness (cheating aversion) over , , and sanctity, which are more prominent in religious , potentially leading to divergent judgments on issues like tradition or purity. Critics from religious perspectives argue that without a transcendent source, risk or inconsistency, as evidenced by historical philosophical debates, yet proponents counter that reason and provide robust, adaptable alternatives testable against real-world outcomes.

Relationship to Objective Truth and First Principles

Irreligion, encompassing and , frequently positions itself as adherence to objective truth through and rational inquiry, rejecting explanations as unnecessary. However, foundational principles such as the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—which holds that every fact or true proposition must have an explanation for why it obtains rather than not—pose challenges to irreligious accounts of reality. Articulated by in the , the PSR implies that contingent entities, including the itself, cannot exist without an ultimate sufficient reason, leading to an unless terminated by a necessary being whose essence entails existence. Irreligious naturalism often treats the universe's existence as a without further explanation, which critics argue violates the PSR by exempting the totality of contingent reality from rational accounting. This tension extends to , where irreligion's reliance on unaided reason encounters self-undermining difficulties. Philosopher has argued that naturalism, a common correlate of irreligion, combined with unguided Darwinian , renders human cognitive faculties unreliable for discovering truth, as prioritizes survival over veridical belief formation. Under this view, the probability that our beliefs, including atheistic ones, track objective truth is low or inscrutable, making naturalistic irreligion on its own terms unless supplemented by theistic guidance for reliable . Empirical on cognitive biases and , such as studies showing heuristics that favor adaptive but not necessarily truth-oriented decisions, lend indirect support to this critique, though irreligious responses invoke or Bayesian updating as mitigations without resolving the probabilistic defeat. In the domain of ethics, irreligion struggles to ground objective moral truths—facts about right and wrong independent of human opinion or utility—from first principles. Without a transcendent source, devolves into , , or , as there lacks a necessary foundation for why moral obligations bind universally rather than conventionally. Philosophers critiquing , such as , contend that duties imply a moral lawgiver, akin to legal obligations requiring a legislator; absent this, appeals to human flourishing or harm avoidance reduce to descriptive preferences rather than prescriptive truths. Historical attempts to derive objective ethics from or rational self-interest, as in utilitarian frameworks, founder on is-ought gaps, where empirical facts about what is cannot dictate what ought to be without smuggling in ungrounded normative premises. Thus, irreligion's commitment to objective truth falters in providing causal realism for moral , contrasting with theistic systems where moral facts inhere in divine nature.

Criticisms and Controversies

Claims of Moral Relativism

Critics of irreligion argue that the rejection of divine or transcendent moral order inherently fosters , where ethical judgments lack universal grounding and devolve into subjective preferences or cultural norms. Without a source of absolute right and wrong, proponents of this view maintain, individuals and societies are left to derive from human reason, , or social contracts, which are inherently contingent and variable. This perspective holds that irreligion severs from any claim to objectivity, rendering it prone to manipulation by power dynamics or personal whim, as seen in historical philosophical critiques linking to nihilistic outcomes. Theistic philosophers, such as those drawing on the moral argument for God's existence, assert that objective moral values—such as the inherent wrongness of gratuitous —require a transcendent foundation to avoid ; otherwise, moral claims reduce to expressions of preference without binding force. For instance, in atheistic frameworks, evolutionary explanations for may account for cooperative behaviors but fail to elevate them to obligatory imperatives, permitting rationalizations for behaviors like or if they confer survival advantages. Critics like have emphasized that atheism's naturalistic worldview struggles to sustain , often tacitly endorsing despite protestations to the contrary. Empirical observations cited in these claims include surveys indicating higher endorsement of relativistic views among non-religious populations, such as in Western secular contexts where traditional moral absolutes have eroded alongside declining . Detractors point to phenomena like shifting societal norms on issues such as or as evidence of relativism's corrosive effects, arguing that irreligion's emphasis on over divine command accelerates normative flux without a stabilizing anchor. While atheists counter with secular ethical systems grounded in human flourishing or rational principles, critics contend these remain vulnerable to the is-ought problem, lacking prescriptive authority beyond descriptive consensus.

Historical Atrocities Under Atheistic Regimes

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under (1924–1953) implemented as official policy, closing over 40,000 churches and persecuting religious institutions as part of Marxist-Leninist ideology that viewed religion as a tool of class oppression. The (1936–1938) resulted in an estimated 700,000 to 1.2 million executions, targeting perceived enemies including clergy and believers, while broader Stalinist repressions, including the famine in (1932–1933) that killed approximately 3.9 million, contributed to tens of millions of total deaths from execution, forced labor in Gulags, deportation, and engineered famines. Overall estimates for deaths under Soviet range from 20 million, encompassing direct killings and policy-induced starvation, though methodologies for aggregation remain debated among historians. In the under (1949–1976), the enforced , destroying temples and suppressing religious practice during campaigns like the (1958–1962) and (1966–1976). The 's collectivization policies led to a killing an estimated 15 to 55 million people through starvation and overwork, with scholarly consensus around 30–45 million excess deaths. The added 1–3 million deaths from purges, violence, and forced labor, targeting intellectuals, traditionalists, and religious adherents as part of ideological purification. Aggregate estimates for Mao-era deaths reach 40–80 million, primarily from and repression, with communism's atheistic framework facilitating the devaluation of individual life in favor of state goals. Cambodia's regime (1975–1979), led by and rooted in Maoist , promoted radical by demolishing religious sites and executing monks, aiming to eradicate "feudal" influences including . This resulted in the , with 1.5 to 3 million deaths—about 25% of the population—from execution, starvation, forced labor, and disease in "" and labor camps. under (1944–1985) declared itself the world's first atheist state in 1967, banning all religious practice, demolishing over 2,000 churches and mosques, and imprisoning or executing , contributing to thousands of deaths amid broader purges, though on a smaller scale than other cases. These regimes, unified by Marxist 's rejection of transcendent moral limits, enabled policies prioritizing ideological conformity over , yielding death tolls estimated collectively at 80–100 million across communist states per compilations like , though critics argue some figures include indirect deaths and methodological overreach.

Debates on Societal Decline

Proponents of the view that irreligion contributes to societal decline argue that the erosion of religious adherence correlates with measurable deteriorations in key social metrics, particularly and stability. Empirical analyses indicate a strong negative association between societal and rates across 181 countries, with secular environments suppressing birth rates even among highly religious subgroups more than among the irreligious. In the United States, among nonreligious women has declined by 26% since 2005, widening the gap with religious counterparts whose rates have remained relatively stable, exacerbating demographic imbalances that strain welfare systems and . This pattern extends globally, where is cited as a factor in plummeting birth rates, potentially leading to population collapse in advanced economies without offsets, which introduce their own integration challenges. Critics of irreligion further link declining to reduced social trust and cohesion, drawing on data showing interpersonal trust in the U.S. falling from 46% in 1972 to 34% in 2018 amid broader secular trends. Over 40 years of consistently finds an inverse relationship between religious participation and , with religious adherence deterring delinquency and congregations correlating with lower rates, especially in disadvantaged areas. Declines in have been associated with rises in rates in nations with lower average IQs, suggesting religion's role in fostering prosocial norms may be context-dependent but empirically supportive of stability. These observers contend that without religion's emphasis on transcendent and communal bonds, societies risk moral fragmentation, as evidenced by rising family breakdown and youth disconnection in increasingly unaffiliated populations. Opponents counter that secularization does not inherently cause decline, pointing to prosperous, low-crime secular nations like those in , where high living standards persist despite low ; however, these examples often rely on inherited cultural norms from prior religious eras, and they face acute fertility shortfalls below replacement levels, questioning long-term viability. Some studies attribute 's apparent crime-reducing effects to reverse causation, where high prompts religious adherence rather than vice versa, though meta-analyses affirm religion's net beneficial impact on reducing offenses. Defenders of argue that prosperity and drive religious decline without precipitating collapse, as global data on religious importance waning correlates with and expansion rather than institutional failure. Yet, such interpretations may understate causal links, given academia's prevalent secular orientation, which could bias toward minimizing religion's stabilizing functions in favor of narratives emphasizing material progress. The debate underscores unresolved tensions: while short-term metrics like GDP favor secular hubs, long-term indicators such as demographic and erosion suggest irreligion may undermine societal resilience. Cross-national patterns reveal religion's decline unfolding in predictable stages—first participation, then personal importance, finally —potentially amplifying vulnerabilities in value-neutral frameworks lacking religion's first-principles anchors for and purpose. Empirical caution prevails, as correlation does not prove causation, but the weight of data on , trust, and tilts toward religion buffering against decline in otherwise comparable contexts.

References

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