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Succession of the Roman Empire
Succession of the Roman Empire
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Carolingian emperor Louis the Pious represented as a Roman soldier holding a Christian cross, with superimposed poem De Laudibus Sanctae Crucis by Rabanus Maurus, 9th century

The continuation, succession, and revival of the Roman Empire is a running theme of the history of Europe and the Mediterranean Basin. It reflects the lasting memories of power, prestige, and unity associated with the Roman Empire.

Several polities have claimed immediate continuity with the Roman Empire, using its name or a variation thereof as their own exclusive or non-exclusive self-description. As centuries went by and more political ruptures occurred, the idea of institutional continuity became increasingly debatable. The most enduring and significant claimants of continuation of the Roman Empire have been, in the East, the Ottoman Empire and Russian Empire, which both claimed succession of the Byzantine Empire after 1453; and in the West, the Carolingian Empire (9th century) and the Holy Roman Empire from 800 to 1806.

Many of these claims were monarchist in nature, with the ethnic or national identity of the Ancient Romans never actually becoming established among the common people (poor peasants and urban workers) of these empires (except in the Byzantine Empire), the idea of succession being restricted to niche groups of intellectuals and members of the elites. Thus, when these empires were replaced by successor states that are republics (such as the Republic of Turkey, the Federal Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation) there was an abandonment of these claims.

In relation to ethnic and national identity, the Italians of Rome continue to identify with the demonym 'Roman' to this day.[1][2][3] The vast majority of the Western Romance peoples (Portuguese, Spaniards, French, their colonial descendants, among others) diverged into groups that no longer identify as Romans. The Romansh people of Switzerland however, identify as Romans, and similar subnational "Roman" identity exists in the case of Romagnol. Roman identity is claimed by several Eastern Romance peoples. Prominently, the Romanians call themselves români and their nation România.[4] And the modern Greek people still sometimes use Romioi to refer to themselves, as well as the term "Romaic" ("Roman") to refer to their Modern Greek language (but the term Éllines and Hellēnikḗis are much more popular among the Greeks to refer to themselves and their language)[5]

Separately from claims of continuation, the view that the Empire had ended has led to various attempts to revive it or appropriate its legacy, notably in the case of Orthodox Russia. The vocabulary of a "Third Rome", the "First Rome" being Rome in Italy and the "Second Rome" being Constantinople in the Byzantine Empire, has been used to convey such assertions of legitimate succession.

Historiography and nomenclature

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In Western Europe, the view of the deposition of Romulus Augustulus in 476 AD as a historic watershed, marking the fall of the Western Roman Empire and thus the beginning of the Middle Ages, was introduced by Leonardo Bruni in the early 15th century, strengthened by Christoph Cellarius in the late 17th century, and cemented by Edward Gibbon in the late 18th century. In practice, it is little more than a historiographic convention, since the Imperial idea long survived the Western Roman Empire in most of Western Europe, and reached territories that had never been under Roman rule during classical antiquity.

The fall of Constantinople in 1453 is historically and broadly accepted as the end of the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire and the end of the Middle Ages.[6] Nonetheless, two notable claims to succession of the Eastern Roman Empire arose in the centuries after the fall of Constantinople: the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire; notably, Mehmed II, the Ottoman sultan who captured Constantinople, justified his assumption of the title of Emperor of the Romans (Kayser-i Rum) by right of conquest,[7] which was consistent with Byzantine imperial ideology which believed that control of Constantinople constituted the key legitimizing factor for an emperor[8] and also was supported by contemporary historiographer George of Trebizond.[9][10] Mehmed II's claim was also recognized by Gennadius Scholarius after Mehmed II installed him as ecumenical patriarch of Constantinople in 1454, the year after the fall of Constantinople.[11][12] Mehmed II's claims were not accepted by the Roman Catholic Church or the Christian states of Europe at the time, and though Mehmed II intended to follow through on his claims by launching a conquest of Italy, his death in 1481 signaled the last time the Ottoman state attempted to conquer Italy or Rome itself; rather subsequent Ottoman emperors instead fought rival claimants to the Roman title (the Holy Roman Empire and the Russian Empire). As the Ottoman Empire continued its break with Greco-Roman legitimacy in favour of strengthening its Islamic legitimacy, Ottoman claims to the Roman Empire faded; the last official use of the title Kayser-i Rum was in the 18th century.

Names

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De Byzantinæ historiæ scriptoribus, also known as the "Byzantine du Louvre [fr]", cover page with arms of Louis XIV

The empire that modern historiography calls the "Byzantine Empire" never used that expression, and kept calling itself the Roman Empire, Empire of the Romans, or Romania until the fall of Constantinople.[13] Following the establishment of the Holy Roman Empire in 800, Christian Western Europeans were reluctant to apply the "Roman" epithet to the Eastern Empire and frequently called it "Empire of the Greeks" or "Greek Empire", even though they also used Romania – the latter also for the Latin Empire of the 13th century.[citation needed] By contrast, Muslims in the Levant and farther east typically referred to the people of the Eastern Empire as "Romans" (Rum), and to Western Europeans, including those from the Holy Roman Empire, as "Franks" (Farang).[citation needed]

The name Byzantium refers to the ancient city on the Bosporus, now called Istanbul, which Constantine renamed Constantinople in 330. It was not used thereafter, except in rare historical or poetic contexts, until it first took its new meaning in 1557 when the German scholar Hieronymus Wolf published his Corpus Historiæ Byzantinæ, a collection of historical sources about the Eastern Empire. Then from 1648 onwards, Philippe Labbe and fellow French Jesuits published the 24-volume De Byzantinæ historiæ scriptoribus,[14] and in 1680 Du Cange produced his own Historia Byzantina. These endeavors further entrenched the use of the "Byzantine" label among French authors, including Montesquieu in the 18th century.[15] Outside France in the Western world, it only came into general use around the mid-19th century, after Barthold Georg Niebuhr and his continuators published the 50-volume Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae.[16]

Similarly, what historians call the "Carolingian Empire" and "Holy Roman Empire" – in French and Spanish, "Holy Roman Germanic Empire" (Saint Empire romain germanique, Sacro Imperio Romano Germánico) was the Roman Empire, Empire of the Romans or simply Empire to their own subjects and rulers, with "Frankish" or "of the Franks" sometimes added depending on context. Only in 1157 did the twists and turns of the Investiture Controversy lead to the practice of calling the Empire, though not the Emperor himself, "holy" (sacrum).[17][18] The reference to Germany (Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation, Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicæ), which first appeared in the late 15th century, was never much used in official Imperial documents,[19] and even then was a misnomer since the Empire's jurisdiction in Italy had not entirely disappeared. Other colloquial designations in the early Modern era included "German Empire" (Deutsches Reich) or "Roman-German Empire" (Römisch-Deutsches Reich).[20]

In 1773, a few decades before the Holy Roman Empire's demise, Voltaire made the famous quip that it "was in no way holy, nor Roman, nor an empire."[21]

Roman imperial legitimacy

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In the early decades of the Roman Empire, legitimacy was largely defined by the institutions inherited from the Roman Republic, initially together with a form of hereditary succession within the Julio-Claudian dynasty. As the old Republican institutions gradually lost relevance, many later Emperors derived their legitimacy from acclamation by the army, and during the Nerva–Antonine dynasty, adoption by their predecessor. The Roman Empire itself was long defined by its eponymous capital, but this equation became blurred after the crisis of the Third Century as the administrative center was moved to Mediolanum (Milan), then further fragmented into various locations (e.g. Nicomedia, Sirmium, Augusta Treverorum, Serdica) before being reconsolidated by Constantine the Great in Byzantium, renamed and dedicated as Constantinople in 330 - while Ravenna replaced Milan as Western political capital in 402. Meanwhile, the Empire was Christianized in the course of the 4th century, which partly redefined the authority of the Emperor as he became the protector of the new state religion.

Thus, the Imperial identity, and therefore the question of which polity could rightfully claim to be the Roman Empire, rested not on a single criterion but on a variety of factors: dominant territorial power and the related attributes of peace and order; rule over Rome and/or Constantinople; protection of justice and of the Christian faith (against paganism, heresy, and later Islam); as well as, albeit only intermittently, considerations of dynastic succession or of ethnic nationalism.

Conflicting claims

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The multidimensionality of the imperial claim, together with the unique prestige of the imperial title, explains the recurrence of often intractable conflicts about which polities and rulers could rightfully assume them. These conflicts lost their potency in the course of the Early modern period, however, as improved communications and literacy increasingly undermined any claim of universal supremacy.

Emperors Basil I (left, on horseback) and Louis II (right)

A letter of Carolingian Emperor Louis II to Byzantine Emperor Basil I, probably drafted in Roman circles close to the Papacy in response to a lost original and surviving in 13th-century copy kept at the Vatican Library, articulates how the debate was framed in its time (ca. 871). The following quotes are from a full translation by scholar Charles West.[22]

Territorial rule over Constantinople is not the exclusive criterion for a rightful Imperial claim:

Over here with us, in truth, many books have been read, and many are tirelessly being read, yet never have we found that boundaries were set out, or that forms or precepts were issued, so that no-one is to be called Emperor (Basileus) except whoever happens to hold the helm of rule (imperium) in the city of Constantinople.

While the Empire as an idea is unitary, there is no established doctrine that there should be only one Emperor at any time, especially if the two Emperors are on friendly terms. Whether on purpose or not, Louis's description of two Emperors of a single Empire matches the doctrine underlying the Tetrarchy or the division between Eastern and Western Empire between 395 and 476:

You say also that the four patriarchal sees [of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch and Jerusalem] have a tradition handed down from the God-bearing Apostles to commemorate a single empire (imperium) during mass, and you advise us that we should persuade them that they should call us emperors. But neither does reason demand this, nor does it need to be done. Firstly, since it is not fitting for us to instruct others on how we should be called. Secondly, because we know that, without any persuasion on our part, both patriarchs and all other people under this heaven, except Your Fraternity, both office-holders and private citizens, do call us by this name, as often as we receive letters and writings from them. And we find that our uncles, glorious kings [i.e. Charles the Bald and Louis the German], call us emperor without any envy and say without any doubt that we are the emperor, not taking age into account – for they are older than us – but considering instead unction and the blessing by which, through the laying on of hands and prayer of the highest pontiff, we are divinely raised to this height and to the rulership of the Roman principality (romani principatus imperium), which we hold by heavenly permission. But however this may be, if the patriarchs do make mention of a single empire during the holy sacraments, they should be praised as acting entirely appropriately. For there is indeed one empire of the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost, of which the church on earth is a part. But God has not granted this church to be steered (gubernari) either by me or you alone, but so that we should be bound to each other with such love that we cannot be divided, but should seem to exist as one.

Louis's claim is ancient enough to be justified by tradition since it has already held for several generations:

We are justified in feeling some astonishment that your Serenity believes we are aspiring for a new or recent title (appellatio). For as much as it pertains to the lineage of our descent (genus), it is neither new nor recent, for it comes from our great-grandfather of glorious memory [i.e. Charlemagne]. He did not usurp it, as you maintain, but received the imposition and the unction of his hands by the will of God, and by the judgement of the church and of the highest pontiff, as you will easily find written in your books. (...) Indeed none doubts that the dignity of our empire (imperium) is ancient, who is aware that we are the successor of ancient emperors, and who knows the wealth of divine piety.

Basilica of San Vitale in Ravenna, designed under the Ostrogothic Kingdom in 526
Palatine Chapel, Aachen, designed under Charlemagne around 792
Both buildings are thought to be modelled on large audience halls of the Imperial Palace in Constantinople, such as the Chrysotriklinos or Golden Reception Hall. San Vitale may also have served as direct inspiration for the Aachen Chapel.

Louis defends the Carolingian principle of dynastic succession as validated by tradition. Furthermore, Louis thinks that there should be no exclusive ethnic criterion for the Imperial dignity. Here Louis apparently refers to a claim by Basil that the Emperor should be a Roman and not from a non-Roman ethnicity (gens):

It is only right to laugh at what you said about the imperial name being neither hereditary (paternum) nor appropriate for a people (neque genti convenire). How is it not hereditary, since it was hereditary for our grandfather? In what way is it inappropriate for a people (gens), since we know – mentioning only a few for the sake of brevity – that Roman emperors were created from the people (gens) of Hispania [e.g. Theodosius I], Isauria [e.g. Leo III], and Khazaria [e.g. Leo IV]? And though you will not truthfully assert that these nations (nationes) are more outstanding in religion or virtues than the people (gens) of the Franks, yet you do not refuse to accept them nor disdain to talk of emperors coming from them. (...) Your beloved Fraternity moreover indicates you are surprised that we are called emperor of the Romans, not of the Franks. But you should know that if we were not emperor of the Romans, we should not be emperor of the Franks either. We derive this title and dignity from the Romans, amongst whom the first summit of glory and exaltation shone out, whose people (gens) and whose city we divinely received to govern, and whose church, the mother of all the churches of God, we received to defend and raise up. (...) Since things are so, why do you take such effort to criticise us, because we come from the Franks and have charge of the reins of the Roman empire (imperium), since in every people (gens) anyone who fears God is acceptable to Him? For certainly the elder Theodosius and his sons Arcadius and Honorius, and Theodosius the younger, the son of Arcadius, were raised from Spaniards to the summit of the Roman empire.

Using a modern vocabulary, Louis thought that those populations (gens) he cited (e.g. Spaniards, Isaurian etc.) were not Romans and that only the inhabitants of the city of Rome were Romans, not recognizing that those populations would have been seen as Romans, being citizens of the empire. While for Basil, the population (gens) of the Franks would not make good emperors because they were not citizens of the empire.

Empire and Christianity

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Since the 4th century and particularly since the Edict of Thessalonica in 380, the defense and promotion of Christianity has been a key driver of Imperial identity. After that date, the territorial scope of the Empire or any of its continuating entities has never exactly coincided with that of Christendom, and the discrepancies led to enduring conflicts of legitimacy. The most consequential of these was the East-West Schism, which crystallized in 1054 as a consequence of longstanding fights over governance and jurisdiction (known as ecclesiastical differences) and over doctrine (theological differences), and can be fairly viewed as a delayed effect of the problem of two emperors arising from the creation of the Carolingian Empire in 800.

Earlier examples include the preference of several barbarian kingdoms during the Migration Period for Arianism after the competing Nicene Creed had regained dominance in Constantinople: the Burgundians until 516, Vandals until 534, Ostrogoths until 553, Suebi until the 560s, Visigoths until 587, and Lombards intermittently until 652. The adoption of Arianism protected these kingdoms' rulers from the religious disputes and policy initiatives of Constantinople, while being more acceptable to their majority-Catholic subjects than paganism.[citation needed]

Presumed portrait of Emperor John VIII at the Council of Florence, by Benozzo Gozzoli, ca. 1459

On two occasions, the Eastern (Byzantine) Emperors reunited their church with its Western (Roman Catholic) counterpart, on political motivations and without durable effect. At the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, Emperor Michael VIII aimed to appease the Papacy to keep his Frankish adversaries in check, particularly Charles I of Anjou's plans to re-invade the Empire; the union was never widely accepted in Constantinople, and was reversed at the Council of Blachernae in 1285 after both Michael and Charles had died. At the Council of Ferrara/Florence in 1438–39, Emperor John VIII negotiated under the threat of Ottoman conquest, but the union agreement was again resisted in Constantinople and only proclaimed by Isidore of Kiev in December 1452, four years after John's death and too late to prevent the fall of Constantinople a few months later.

Conversely, the Ottoman Sultans' policies as self-proclaimed Emperors of the Romans (i.e. in the language of the time, of the Eastern Orthodox Christians) supported the independence of the Orthodox Church from Rome and occasionally favored reforms to keep religiously inspired separatism in check, e.g. the revival of the Serbian Patriarchate of Peć in 1557. The initial instrument of that policy, Gennadius Scholarius, had been a prominent opponent of the union of the Eastern and Western churches in the 1440s and early 1450s.

The link between Empire and Christianity has a durable legacy: to this day, Rome remains the seat of the Catholic Church, and Constantinople (Istanbul) that of the Ecumenical Patriarchate with a widely recognized status of primus inter pares within the Eastern Orthodox Church. In 2018, the negotiations over autocephaly of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine led to a schism between Moscow and Constantinople as the Russian Orthodox Church unilaterally severed full communion with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. A similar schism had occurred in 1996 over the Estonian Apostolic Orthodox Church, but unlike in 2018 it was resolved after a few months.

The Imperial connection extends, through the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, to Islam as well. Istanbul was also until 1924 the seat of the only widely recognized Caliphate of the last half-millennium, and keeps most of the surviving Relics of Muhammad as the Sacred Trust in Topkapı Palace, close to the location of the former Roman Imperial palace.

Continuation in the East

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Roman/Byzantine Empire until 1204

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Territorial extent of the Roman/Byzantine Empire 476-1400

There is seamless continuity between the Roman and Byzantine Empires, to the extent that the date at which the former ends and the latter begins is essentially a matter of historiographical convention. The Byzantines consistently and near-exclusively called themselves Romans, before and after they adopted Greek as principal state language in the 7th century. Traditional Western European historiography retains 395 as the date of beginning of the Byzantine Empire, when Theodosius I was succeeded by Arcadius in the East and Honorius in the West.[citation needed] Alternative conventions date the transition from Rome to Byzantium at the translation of the imperial capital from Rome to Constantinople in 330, or at the reign of Heraclius marking the end of late antiquity.[23][citation needed]

Even though the Byzantine Empire went through numerous political upheavals, and faced periods of dramatic contraction in the 7th and late 11th centuries, it exhibited unquestionable institutional continuity until 1204, not least because its central and defining seat of power, Constantinople, was never conquered during this period. Conversely, in the Eastern Mediterranean territories that ceased being part of the Empire during that period, there emerged almost no competing claim of Imperial legitimacy. In their different ways, the Avars and Slavs in the Balkans, and the Sasanians and Muslims in the Levant and Northern Africa, had different models of governance and no appetite for posing as Romans. This may also be linked to their inability to conquer the Imperial capital despite numerous attempts, as is suggested by the counter-example of the Ottoman Sultans claiming the Imperial title after 1453.

Bulgarian Empire

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In the period before 1204, the only significant competing Imperial claim in the East appeared in 913, when Simeon I the Great, ruler of Bulgaria, was crowned "Emperor and Autocrat of all Bulgarians and Romans" (Car i samodǎržec na vsički bǎlgari i gǎrci in the modern vernacular) by the Patriarch of Constantinople and imperial regent Nicholas Mystikos outside of the Byzantine capital. The decade 914–927 was then spent in a destructive Byzantine–Bulgarian war over the Imperial claim and other matters of conflict. The Bulgarian monarch was eventually recognized as "Emperor of the Bulgarians" (basileus tōn Boulgarōn) by the Byzantine Emperor Romanos I Lakapenos in 924, following the convention also adopted with the Carolingian Empire that basileus (a Greek word that can translate as king or emperor depending on context) was not an equal title to that of the Emperor as long as it did not explicitly confer authority over the "Romans". Constantinople's recognition of the basileus dignity of the Bulgarian monarch and the patriarchal dignity of the Bulgarian patriarch was again confirmed at the conclusion of permanent peace and a Bulgarian–Byzantine dynastic marriage in 927. The Bulgarian title "tsar" (Caesar) was adopted by all Bulgarian monarchs up to the fall of Bulgaria under Ottoman rule.

During the Second Bulgarian Empire, 14th-century literary compositions portrayed the then capital of Tarnovo, now Veliko Tarnovo, as successor of both Rome and Constantinople.[24] Bulgarian contemporaries called the city "Tsarevgrad Tarnov", the Imperial city of Tarnovo, echoing the Bulgarian name then used for Constantinople, Tsarigrad.[25]

Fourth Crusade and its aftermath

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Political fragmentation in the aftermath of the sack of Constantinople, early 13th century

The Fourth Crusade and sack of Constantinople in 1204 marked a major rupture in the history of the Eastern Roman/Byzantine Empire, and opened a period of fragmentation and competing claims of Imperial legitimacy. The crusading (Latin) invaders divided most of the Empire among themselves by a formal treaty of partition, under which the Latin Empire of Constantinople's direct rule did not extend greatly further than the city itself. It included the Straits and their immediate hinterland, e.g. Adrianople and Nicomedia, but neither Salonica nor Nicaea. Other territories of the former Empire were not conquered by the Latin crusaders, and remained held by various holdovers of the former (Greek) Empire.

Several of the polities emerging from that fragmentation claimed to be the rightful successor of the prior Empire, on various motives: the Latin Empire held the Imperial capital; the rulers of the Empire of Trebizond stemmed from the formerly Imperial Komnenos family; those of the Despotate of Epirus (briefly the Empire of Thessalonica) were from the Angelos family, even though they renounced the imperial claim by accepting Nicaean overlordship in 1248; the Empire of Nicaea successfully claimed the patriarchate in 1206, and eventually prevailed through skillful management of alliances and its recapture of Constantinople in 1261.

Latin Empire of Constantinople

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The Latin Empire had its own line of Imperial succession, initially dominated by the House of Flanders then by the French House of Courtenay. It was embattled almost from the start, as the city was never able to recover from the trauma of 1204. Despite its theoretical suzerainty, the Latin Empire was not even politically dominant among the crusader states, which were referred to as Latin or Frankish by Easterners.

After being expelled from Constantinople in 1261, its titular Emperors occasionally held territorial power in parts of modern Greece. Jacques des Baux was Prince of Achaea in 1381–1383, and the last recorded claimant to the Latin Imperial title.[citation needed]

Late Byzantine era

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Byzantine Empire (purple) immediately before the fall of Constantinople

The Palaiologos dynasty prolonged the Roman Imperial experience from its recovery of Constantinople in 1261 until the Ottoman conquest in 1453. The Empire shrunk considerably during that period, and at the end it was only the imperial city itself without any hinterland, plus most of the Peloponnese (then referred to as Morea) typically under the direct rule of one of the Emperor's sons with the title of Despot. This line of Imperial succession ceased in 1453; even though the Despotate of the Morea lingered on a few more years, until the Ottomans conquered it in 1460, its rulers at the time did not claim Imperial authority.

Serbian Empire

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In 1345, the Serbian King Stefan Dušan proclaimed himself Emperor (Tsar) and was crowned as such at Skopje on Easter 1346 by the newly created Serbian Patriarch, as well as by the Patriarch of All Bulgaria and the Archbishop of Ohrid. His imperial title was recognized by, among others, the Bulgarian Empire, much diminished following the Battle of Velbazhd in 1330, albeit not by the Byzantine Empire. In Serbia, the title of "Emperor of Serbs and Romans" (in its final simplified form; цар Срба и Римљана / car Srba i Rimljana in modern Serbian) was only employed thereafter by Stefan Dušan's son Stefan Uroš V until his death in 1371. A half-brother of Dušan, Simeon Uroš, and then his son Jovan Uroš, used the same title until the latter's abdication in 1373, while ruling as dynasts in Thessaly.

Empire of Trebizond

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The Empire of Trebizond, one of the entities that had emerged from the fragmentation of the early 13th century, survived until Ottoman conquest in 1461. Its Komnenos rulers claimed the Imperial title for themselves in competition to the ones in Constantinople, even though they did not receive any meaningful international recognition.

A separate polity on the Crimean coast of the Black Sea, the Principality of Theodoro, only fell to the Ottomans in 1475. There is no indication that its rulers made any claim of being Roman Emperors.

Andreas Palaiologos's cessions

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Seal of Andreas Palaiologos, late 15th century. The Latin inscription translates as "Andreas Palaiologos by the Grace of God Despot of the Romans"

Andreas Palaiologos, a nephew of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos and the head of what remained of the Palaiologos family, started calling himself Emperor of Constantinople in 1483 and, possibly childless, sold what he viewed as his imperial title to Charles VIII of France in 1494.[26] The following Kings of France kept the claim until Charles IX in 1566, when it went into disuse. Charles IX wrote that the imperial Byzantine title "is not more eminent than that of king, which sounds better and sweeter."[27]

In his last will in 1502, Andreas Palaiologos again ceded his self-awarded imperial title, this time to Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile.[28] Other pretenders to the Byzantine throne have appeared following his death that year, with increasingly dubious claims as centuries went by. Charles I Gonzaga, Duke of Mantua, who also claimed descent from the Palaiologos family, declared in 1612 his intent to reclaim Constantinople but only succeeded in provoking an uprising in the Mani Peninsula, which lasted until 1619.

Ottoman Empire after 1453

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Mehmed II and Gennadius II, 18th-century mosaic at the Fener Patriarchate in Istanbul
The Ottoman Empire at its greatest extent, under Sultan Mehmed IV

After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II declared himself Roman Emperor: Kayser-i Rum, literally "Caesar of the Romans", the standard title for earlier Byzantine Emperors in Arab, Persian and Turkish lands.[29] In 1454, he ceremonially established Gennadius Scholarius, a staunch antagonist of Catholicism and of the Sultan's European enemies, as Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople and ethnarch (milletbashi) of the Rum Millet, namely Greek Orthodox Christians within the Empire. In turn, Gennadius endorsed Mehmed's claim of Imperial succession.[30][31]

Mehmed's claim rested principally with the idea that Constantinople was the rightful seat of the Roman Empire, as it had been for more than a millennium even if the 1204–1261 period is subtracted. Contemporary scholar George of Trebizond wrote that "the seat of the Roman Empire is Constantinople ... and he who is and remains Emperor of the Romans is also the Emperor of the whole world".[32] An additional though questionable claim of legitimacy referred to the past alliances between the Ottoman dynasty and Byzantine Imperial families. Byzantine Princess Theodora Kantakouzene had been one of the wives of Orhan I, and an unsupported but widespread story portrayed Mehmed as a descendant of John Tzelepes Komnenos.[26]

George of Trebizond addressed Mehmed in a poem:[33]

No one can doubt that he is emperor of the Romans. He who holds the seat of empire in his hand is emperor of right; and Constantinople is the centre of the Roman Empire.

Mehmed's imperial plans went further and aimed at conquering Rome itself, thus reuniting the Empire in a way it hadn't been for nearly eight centuries. His Italian campaign started in 1480 with the invasion of Otranto, but was cut short by Mehmed's sudden death on 3 May 1481.[34] None of his successors renewed that endeavor. Instead, they repeatedly (albeit never successfully) attempted to conquer the capital of the rival contenders to the Imperial Roman title, with a first siege of Vienna in 1529 and a second one in 1683.

Being the rightful heir of the Roman/Byzantine Empire became part of the identity of the Sultanate, along with its Turkish and Muslim heritage, even though that dimension was played down by Western observers. According to Turkish scholar F. Asli Ergul:[35]

Although this title was not recognized by either the Greeks or the Europeans, the Ottoman dynasty, by defining itself as Rum [Roman], internalized the hegemonic and multi-cultural structure of the Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire). Obviously it was a declaration of the Ottoman Sultan's seizure of the heritage of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Additionally, over the centuries, many Greeks abandoned Orthodoxy and embraced Islam, to the point that today, in part because of the intermingling of ethnic Greeks with Turks in the Ottoman Empire, genetic studies have found that modern Turks are closer, genetically, to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern people than to Central Asians.[35]

In diplomatic exchanges with the Holy Roman Empire, the Ottomans initially refused to acknowledge the latter's Imperial claim, because they saw themselves as the only rightful successors of Rome. In the Treaty of Constantinople (1533), the Austrian negotiators agreed not to make any mention of the Holy Roman Empire, only referring to Ferdinand I as King of Germany and Charles V as King of Spain. The Ottomans abandoned that requirement in the Treaty of Sitvatorok in 1606, and similarly to the Russian Empire in the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca in 1774.

Chinese usage during the Ming dynasty referred to the Ottomans as Lumi (魯迷), derived from Rûmi, literally "Roman". It is important to emphasize that in China there is the concept of "conquest dynasty", with the Chinese considering dynasties of non-Han ethnic origin as the Yuan dynasty (Mongolian origin) and Qing dynasty (Manchu origin) as Chinese dynasties, this concept (when used for non-Chinese foreign people) may have influenced the Chinese to see the Ottomans as a Roman dynasty.[36]

Continuation in the West

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Political fragmentation and imperial overlordship

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Western Empire as it started to fragment, 418 CE
Peak fragmentation in the West, 476 CE

By the start of the 5th century, the Western Roman Empire remained close to its maximum territorial extent, notwithstanding the loss of the Agri Decumates during the crisis of the Third Century, but Roman rule had become fragile and many areas were depopulated. In the early years of the century, the Empire withdrew from Great Britain, leaving it open to Anglo-Saxon settlement. Mounting foreign incursions soon resulted in permanent settlement of Germanic and other ethnic groups into territories that became gradually autonomous, were sometimes acknowledged or even encouraged by treaty (foedus) by the Western Empire, and often embarked on expansion by further conquest.

The Vandals crossed the Rhine in 406, the Pyrenees in 409, the Strait of Gibraltar in 428, and established the Vandal Kingdom in Northern Africa and the Western Mediterranean islands by the mid-5th century; the Suebi, initially moving alongside the Vandals, established their Western Iberian kingdom in 409; the Visigothic Kingdom was initially established by treaty in 418 in the Garonne Valley, and soon expanded into the Iberian Peninsula; the Alemanni expanded into Alsace and beyond, from their initial base in the Agri Decumates; in the 440s, the Kingdom of the Burgundians was established around the Rhone; an autonomous Kingdom of Soissons was carved out from 457 by Roman military commanders between the Seine and Somme rivers; last but not least, the Franks, which had been established north of the Rhine in 358 by treaty with Emperor Julian, expanded into what is now Belgium and Northern France. As a consequence, when the last Western Emperor Romulus Augustulus was deposed by military commander Odoacer in 476, his direct rule did not extend much beyond the current Northern borders of Italy. Another military leader, Julius Nepos, briefly Romulus Augustulus's predecessor, held territory in Dalmatia and kept the Imperial title until his assassination in 480.

In a symbolic act that would fascinate later historians, Odoacer sent back the Imperial regalia or accessories of Romulus Augustulus to the Eastern Emperor Zeno in Constantinople. Far from signaling the end of imperial rule in Italy, this meant that Odoacer acknowledged Zeno's overlordship and did not claim full sovereignty. Like previous foederati leaders, he adopted the title of King (Rex) and ruled in the name of the remaining Emperors, namely Zeno and also Julius Nepos while the latter was still alive. This arrangement was kept by Theodoric the Great, who vanquished and killed Odoacer in 493 and replaced him as King of Italy.

Justinian's reconquest campaigns in the West, 535-554

Political boundaries kept moving in the later 5th and 6th centuries. Clovis I, king of the Franks (d. 511), conquered Alemannia, the Kingdom of Soissons and most of the Visigothic Kingdom north of the Pyrenees, and his sons conquered the Kingdom of the Burgundians in 534, thus creating a vast kingdom of Francia, which was periodically divided between various members of the Merovingian dynasty. Meanwhile, Eastern Emperor Justinian I reestablished direct Imperial rule in Southern Spain, North Africa and especially Italy, reconquered during the hard-fought Gothic War (535–554). Later in the 6th century, Emperor Maurice sponsored Gundoald, a member of Clovis's Merovingian dynasty, in his claim to the Frankish kingdom, which ended unsuccessfully in 585 at Saint-Bertrand-de-Comminges.

Even though it was out of the Empire's direct military reach, Francia kept acknowledging the overlordship of Constantinople throughout the 6th century. At a ceremony in early 508 in Tours, Clovis received the insignia sent by Emperor Anastasius I which established his service to the Empire as Consul. Similarly, in the early 6th century, King Gundobad of the still-independent Burgundians, despite being an Arian, was Magister militum in the name of the Emperor.[37] The Gesta pontificum Autissiodorensium, a compendium of information about the Bishops of Auxerre first compiled in the late 9th century, keeps referring to the reigning Roman Emperor up to Desiderius (d. 621), listed as bishop "in the reigns of Phocas and Heraclius" (imperantibus Foca, atque Heraclio).[38][39] No such deference appears to have existed in the Visigothic Kingdom at the same time. Chris Wickham portrays the Visigothic king Euric (466–484) as "the first major ruler of a 'barbarian' polity in Gaul - the second in the Empire after Geiseric - to have a fully autonomous political practice, uninfluenced by any residual Roman loyalties."[40] A century and a half later in the 620s, Isidore of Seville articulated for the Visigothic Kingdom, by then a Catholic monarchy following the conversion of Reccared I in 587, a vision of Christian monarchy on an equal status with the Eastern Roman Empire that would have seminal influence on later Western European political thinking.[41]: 236 

572
652
744
751
Respective Italian territories of the Roman Empire (orange) and Lombards (grey).

Imperial rule in the West eroded further from the late 6th century. In Britain, to the extent discernible from scarce documentation, Roman rule was at best a distant memory. In Francia, references to Imperial overlordship disappear at the time of Merovingian renewal in the early 7th century under Chlothar II and Dagobert I. In the Iberian Peninsula, the Visigothic King Suintila expelled the last Imperial forces from Southern Spain in 625. In Italy, the Lombards invaded in 568, and the resulting Kingdom of the Lombards was hostile to the Empire whose territorial footprint shrank gradually.

Papal pivot

[edit]

The Roman Papacy was to become the instrument of the Imperial idea's revival in the West. Rome was increasingly isolated from Constantinople following the devastations of Gothic War (535–554), subsequent imperial choices to favor Ravenna over Rome,[41]: 149  and the Lombard invasion of Italy starting in 568, which limited its communications with the main imperial outposts in Ravenna and Sicily.[41]: 141  The Column of Phocas on the Roman Forum, dedicated in 608, counts among the last monumental expressions of (eastern) imperial power in Rome. In 649, in breach of tradition, Pope Martin I was elected and consecrated without waiting for imperial confirmation.[41]: 218  Constans II was the last (eastern) emperor to visit Rome for centuries, in 663, and plundered several of the remaining monuments to adorn Constantinople. Meanwhile, and for various reasons, Catholicism finally triumphed over Arianism in the Western kingdoms: in the Visigothic Iberian Peninsula with the conversion of Reccared I in 587, and in Lombard-held Italy, after some back-and-forth, following the death of King Rothari in 652. Pope Gregory I (590–604) established the foundations for the papacy's incipient role as leader of Christianity in the West, even though at the time there was no conception of an alternative imperial authority to be established there in competition with Constantinople.[41]: 182 

The promotion of iconoclasm by Emperor Leo III the Isaurian from 726 led to a deepening rupture between the Eastern Empire and the Papacy. Pope Gregory II saw iconoclasm as the latest in a series of imperial heresies. In 731, his successor Pope Gregory III organized a synod in Rome which declared iconoclasm punishable by excommunication. Leo III responded in 732/33 by confiscating all papal patrimonies in south Italy and Sicily, and further removed the bishoprics of Thessalonica, Corinth, Syracuse, Reggio, Nicopolis, Athens, and Patras from papal jurisdiction,[citation needed] instead subjecting them to the Patriarch of Constantinople. This was in effect an act of triage: it strengthened the imperial grip in Southern Italy, but all but guaranteed the eventual destruction of the exarchate of Ravenna, which soon occurred at Lombard hands. In effect, the papacy had been "cast out of the empire".[42] Pope Zachary, in 741, was the last pope to announce his election to a Byzantine ruler or seek their approval.[43]

Coronation of Pepin the Short by Pope Stephen II in 754 (right), miniature by Jean Fouquet, Grandes Chroniques de France, ca. 1455-1460

The Popes needed to quickly reinvent their relationship to secular authority. Even though the neighboring Lombard kings were no longer heretical, they were often hostile. The more powerful and more distant Franks, which had by and large been allies of the Empire, were an alternative option as potential protectors. In 739, Gregory III sent a first embassy to Charles Martel seeking protection against Liutprand, King of the Lombards, but the Frankish strongman had been Liutbrand's ally in the past and had asked him in 737 to ceremonially adopt his son. The Papacy had more luck with the latter, Pepin the Short, who succeeded Charles in October 741 together with his elder brother Carloman (who withdrew from public life and became a monk in 747). Pope Zachary was pressed into action by the final Lombard campaign against the exarchate of Ravenna, whose fall in mid-751 sealed the end of Byzantine rule in Central Italy. He was in contact with the Frankish ruling elites through the venerable Boniface, Archbishop of Mainz, and other clerics such as Burchard of Würzburg and Fulrad. In March 751 he moved to depose Childeric III, the last Merovingian King, following which Pepin was dedicated as King of France in Soissons. In 754, Zachary's successor Pope Stephen II undertook the first-ever papal visit north of the Alps, met Pepin in Ponthion and anointed him as king at Saint-Denis on July 28, setting the template for later rites of coronation of French Kings. Stephen further legitimized the Carolingian dynasty by also anointing Pepin's sons Charles and Carloman, by prohibiting the election of any non-descendant of Pepin as king, and by proclaiming that "the Frankish nation is above all nations".[44] This in return prompted the Donation of Pepin in 756, cementing the Popes' rule over the Papal States over the next eleven centuries. Subsequently, in 773–774, Pepin's son and successor Charlemagne conquered the Lombard Kingdom of Italy.

Holy Roman Empire

[edit]
Coronation of Charlemagne, probably by Gianfrancesco Penni on a design by Raphael, fresco in the Raphael Rooms of the Vatican, 1516-1517
Carolingian (green) and Byzantine (purple) Empires in the early 9th century

The coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III, in Rome on Christmas Day 800, was explicitly intended as establishing continuity with the Roman Empire that still existed in the East. In Constantinople, Irene of Athens had blinded and deposed her son Emperor Constantine VI a few years earlier. With no precedent of a woman being sole holder of the imperial title, her critics in the West (e.g. Alcuin) viewed the imperial throne as vacant rather than recognizing her as Empress. Thus, as Peter H. Wilson put it, "it is highly likely Charlemagne believed he was being made Roman Emperor" at the time of his coronation; however, Charlemagne's imperial title rested on a different base from any of the Roman emperors until him, as it was structurally reliant on the partnership with the Papacy, embodied in the act of his coronation by the Pope.[17]

Meanwhile, the accession to the Byzantine throne of Nikephoros I in 802 confirmed the conflict of legitimacy between the Frankish and Byzantine incarnations of the Roman Empire, known in historiography as the problem of two emperors (in German, Zweikaiserproblem). According to Theophanes the Confessor, Charlemagne had attempted to prevent that conflict with a project to marry Irene, but this was not completed. The territorial conflicts were addressed in the following years through a series of negotiations known as the Pax Nicephori, but the broader conflict with Constantinople about Imperial legitimacy proved extremely durable.

The change of territory of the Holy Roman Empire superimposed on present-day state borders
Imperial Crown of the Holy Roman Empire, late 10th / early 11th century
Statue of Constantine the Great inside Albi Cathedral, showing him with a mantle adorned with the Holy Roman Empire's Reichsadler emblem

Political authority fragmented within the Empire following Charlemagne's death. The eventual outcome was an association of the Imperial dignity with the easternmost ("German") lands of the Carolingian geography, but that was not self-evident at the start and took a long time to happen. From 843 to 875, the holders of the Imperial title only ruled over Northern Italy and, at the start, the "middle kingdom" of Lotharingia. On Christmas Day 875, exactly 75 years after Charlemagne, Charles the Bald of West Francia was crowned Emperor in Rome by Pope John VIII, adopting the motto renovatio imperii Romani et Francorum, which raised the prospect of an Empire centered on what is today France. Charles died soon afterwards in 877, and his successor Charles the Fat only briefly managed to reunite all the Carolingian domains, and after his death in 888 the Western part of Francia was dominated by the non-Carolingian Robertians, later the Capetian dynasty. For over seven decades, the Emperors' authority was then mostly confined to Northern Italy, until Otto I revived the Imperial idea and was crowned by Pope John XII in Rome in 962. From then on, all Emperors had dynastic roots in the Germanic-speaking lands (even though Frederick II was born in Italy, Henry VII in Valenciennes, Charles IV in Prague, Charles V in Ghent, Ferdinand I in Spain, Charles VII in Brussels, Francis I in Nancy, and Francis II in Florence).

During the millennium of the Holy Roman Empire, several specific attempts were made to recall the Empire's classical heritage. Emperor Otto III reigned from Rome from 998 to his death in 1002, and made a short-lived attempt to revive ancient Roman institutions and traditions in partnership with Pope Sylvester II, who chose his papal name as an echo of the time of Constantine the Great. Frederick II took a keen interest in Roman antiquity, sponsored archaeological excavations, organized a Roman-style triumph in Cremona in 1238 to celebrate his victory at the battle of Cortenuova, and had himself depicted in classical imagery.[45] Similarly, Maximilian I was highly mindful of classical references in his "memorial" projects of the 1510s that included the three monumental woodblock prints of the Triumphal Arch, Triumphal Procession and Large Triumphal Carriage.

Papacy and the imperial title

[edit]
The Hohenstaufen-ruled Holy Roman Empire. (The Kingdom of Sicily in pink was in personal union with the Holy Roman Empire)

According to his biographer Einhard, Charlemagne was unhappy about his coronation, a fact that later historians have interpreted as displeasure about the Pope's assumption of the key role in the legitimation of Imperial rule. Instead of the traditional recognition by popular acclamation, Leo III had crowned Charlemagne at the outset of the ceremony, just before the crowd acclaimed him. In September 813, Charlemagne tried to override that precedent by himself crowning his son Louis the Pious in Aachen, but the principle of Papal coronation survived and was renewed in 962 when Otto I restored the Empire and its rituals after decades of turmoil and received the Imperial Crown from Pope John XII.

The interdependence between Pope and Emperor led to conflict after the Papacy started asserting its position with the Gregorian Reform of the mid-11th century. The Investiture Controversy (1076–1122) included episodes of dramatic confrontation, in which the pope attempted to deprive the emperor of his imperial dignity. The Dictatus papae, a papal document issued in 1075 shortly after the election of Gregory VII, states that the pope "alone may use the Imperial Insignia", that "All princes shall kiss the feet of the Pope alone", and that "It may be permitted to him to depose emperors". Following Emperor Henry IV's walk to Canossa in January 1077, Gregory VII pronounced his absolution but referred to him as rex Teutonicorum ("king of the Germans"), thus omitting the imperial title and the fact that Henry was king (rex) of several realms, including Burgundy and Italy.[46] Wars of Guelphs and Ghibellines, the respective partisans of the Pope and the Emperor, lasted until the 15th century. In 1527, the Pope's involvement in the Italian Wars led to the traumatic sack of Rome by Charles V's imperial troops, after which the Papacy's influence in international politics was significantly reduced.

Kingdoms and the imperial title

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Habsburg dominions personally united with Holy Roman Empire at Charles V.
Imagined standard of the Holy Roman Empire, from the former Louis XIV Victory Monument on Place des Victoires in Paris (1686), anachronistically combining the SPQR motto with the double-headed eagle

Early in the Empire's history, Louis the Pious formally established the supremacy of the Empire over Catholic kingdoms through the document issued in 817 and later known as Ordinatio Imperii. The view at the time was that the Empire covered all Western Christendom under one authority. (The British Isles, Brittany, and the Kingdom of Asturias were omitted in this vision.) Under Louis's arrangement, only his elder son Lothair would hold the title of Emperor, and Lothair's younger brothers Pepin and Louis should obey him even though they were kings, respectively, of Aquitaine and Bavaria. That document was controversial from the start, not least as it did not conform to Frankish succession law and practices. Following Louis the Pious's death in June 840, the Battle of Fontenoy (841), Oaths of Strasbourg (842) and Treaty of Verdun (843) established a different reality, in which the Imperial title remained undivided but its holder competed with kings for territory, even though at the time all were still bound by the family links of the Carolingian dynasty and the bounds of Catholic Christianity.

Following the gradual demise of the Carolingian dynasty in the late 9th and 10th centuries, the rivalry between the Empire and individual kingdoms developed on these early precedents. The Kingdom of France, developing from Charles the Bald's West Francia, was continually reluctant to acknowledge the Emperor's senior status among European monarchs. As Latin Christendom expanded in the High Middle Ages, new kingdoms appeared outside of the Empire and would similarly bid for territory and supremacy. France itself was instrumental in the developments that led to the Empire's political decline from the 16th to the early 19th centuries.

Modern-era nationalist revivals

[edit]

A number of political regimes have claimed various forms of successorship of the Roman Empire, even though they acknowledged a significant time lag between what they viewed as the Empire's extinction and their own efforts to revive it. These attempts have increasingly been framed in nationalist terms, in line with the times.

Imperial Russia

[edit]
Coat of arms of the Russian Empire with the double-headed eagle, formerly associated with the Byzantine Empire

Ivan III of Russia in 1472 married Sophia (Zoé) Palaiologina, a niece of the last Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI, and styled himself Tsar (Царь, "Caesar") or imperator. In 1547, Ivan IV cemented the title as "Tsar of All Rus" (Царь Всея Руси). In 1589, the Metropolitanate of Moscow was granted autocephaly by the Patriarchate of Constantinople and thus became the Patriarchate of Moscow, thanks to the efforts of Boris Godunov. This sequence of events supported the narrative, encouraged by successive rulers, that Muscovy was the rightful successor of Byzantium as the "Third Rome", based on a mix of religious (Orthodox), ethno-linguistic (East Slavic) and political ideas (the autocracy of the Tsar).[47][48] Supporters of that view also asserted that the topography of the seven hills of Moscow offered parallels to the seven hills of Rome and the seven hills of Constantinople.

In 1492, Zosimus, Metropolitan of Moscow, in a foreword to his Presentation of the Paschalion, referred to Ivan III as "the new Tsar Constantine of the new city of Constantine — Moscow."[49] In a panegyric letter to Grand Duke Vasili III composed in 1510, Russian monk Philotheus (Filofey) of Pskov proclaimed, "Two Romes have fallen. The third stands. And there will be no fourth. No one shall replace your Christian Tsardom!"[47]

Imperial Spain

[edit]

The Hispano-Gothic Monarchy, recognized himself politically and legally as the heir and successor of Roman Empire in Hispania,[50] using the Roman symbols of monarchy.[51] Additionally, two Roman usurpers of the Visigothic Kingdom attempted to claim imperial authority: Burdunellus (496) and Petrus (506).[52][53]

During the Middle Ages in Spain, some iberian monarchs, mostly from Kings of Castile and Kings of Leon, used the title of Imperator totius Hispaniae,[54] in which there were claims, not only of the suzerainty over the other kings of the peninsula (both Christian and Muslim), but also the king's equality with the rulers of the Byzantine Empire and Holy Roman Empire.

The last titular holder heir to the rank of Eastern Roman emperor, Andreas Palaiologos, sold his imperial title, along with his domains in Morea,[55] to the Catholic Monarchs of Spain (Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile)[56][57] in his will, written on 7 April 1502,[58] designating them, and their successors (the future Spanish monarchs) as his universal heirs.[59] Andreas argued that the Spanish kings held, through the Aragonese line, the ownership of the duchy of Athens and Neopatria, also because in Spanish noble circles there was a belief that the Álvarez de Toledo family (cousins of Ferdinand of Aragon) descended from the ancient Byzantine imperial lineage of the Komnenos. He was hoping that the Spanish Army would launch a crusade (during Ottoman–Venetian wars) from their south-Italians domains in Apulia, Calabria, and Sicily to conquer the Peloponnese, before moving on to Thrace, Macedonia, and Constantinople; however, no Spanish monarch is known to have used the Byzantine imperial titles.[55] In 1510, Pope Julius II revoked Alexander VI's granting of the title of King of Jerusalem to Louis XII of France, and transferred it to Ferdinand the Catholic (which was included in his title of King of Naples after Treaty of Blois).[60][61] This gave a step to make the confrontation with the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean in the Spanish-Ottoman wars, against Turkish claims of being Rome Successor.[55]

During this times of the Catholic Monarchy, Antonio de Nebrija conceived Spain, after the end of the Reconquista and its political unification of Castille and Aragon, as the heir of the Roman empire, because there was a direct lineage from the Roman emperors and the Visigothic kings (considered their legal successors of Hispania), also appealed to a literary legitimisation in which Castilian replaced Latin as the language of the Empire.[62]

Coat of arms of Charles I of Spain, formerly associated with Spain imperial claims of Roman heritage.

With the succession of Charles I of Spain to the throne of Castile and Aragon, the peninsular territories were included in a greater inheritance that included the Burgundians (the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Burgundy, Franche-Comté) and the Austrians (Tyrol, Austria, Styria, Carinthia, Carniola), to which in 1519 was added the title of Holy Roman Emperor. It was the first time, since the coronation of Charlemagne in 800, and after the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, in which the Romano-Germanic and Byzantine crowns coincided in the same person.[55] The followers of the Empire of Charles V (and his imperial ideal of being the universal monarch of Christendom, the Universitas Christiana)[63] created maps, like the Europa regina, in which Hispania is the head, crowned with the Holy Roman Empire's insignia, its Carolingian crown (inherited of its Roman claims).[64][65][66]

During Bourbon Spain, following the Renaissance tradition, the Spanish Bourbons, like Philip V, in their attempts to establish the Enlightenment programme, conceived the Spanish empire to be the equal of the Roman empire. So, they started to recover the cultural hegemony, lost under the last Austrian rulers, by imitating Rome political power, institutions and symbols.[62]

With all of this history in the Spanish Monarchy,[67] Spanish nationalism claims that there is a legitimate ideological-dynastic (titles of Emperor of Constantinople and King of Jerusalem in the Spanish Crown, also in the past have been Holy Roman Emperor), geostrategic (kingdom of Naples and Sicily together, the conquests of North African plazas in Barbary, like Melilla, Ceuta, Mazalquivir, Oran, Bugia and Peñón of Algiers) and cultural basis (being a Latin country) to claim the inhertiance of the Roman Empire. Also, because many cities and institutions in the Kingdom of Spain still use the Roman double-headed eagle to this day, like the city of Toledo, the province of Toledo and the province of Zamora.[68] and the manual of history of Edebé editorial (conservative nationalist) establishes a continuity between the Iberians, Rome, the Visigoths, and the peninsular Christian kingdoms as direct heirs of this Roman imperial tradition as Hispano-romans.[69] This claim is also reinforced by the history of Spanish colonization of the Americas, which a lot of Hispanists claim is the definitive proof that Spain is the most accurate heir of Rome's imperial legacy, as Spain was important for the culture of a continent, America (the New World), like Rome was to Europe (the Old World), some even claim that Spain surpassed Rome, since it also knew how to unify diverse peoples for centuries and maintaining cultural unity despite the imperial collapse.[70][71][72][73] Even today there are opinions in which Philip VI of Spain is considered the nearest heir of Rome.[74][75]

Risorgimento and Fascist Italy

[edit]

Italy's nationalist visionary Giuseppe Mazzini promoted the notion of the "Third Rome" during the Risorgimento (Italian word that means 'Resurgence'). Addressing Italian unification and the establishment of Rome as the capital, he said: "After the Rome of the emperors, after the Rome of the Popes, there will come the Rome of the people."[76] After the Italian unification into the Kingdom of Italy, the state was referred to as the Third Rome by some Italian figures.[77] After unification, Rome was chosen as capital despite its relative backwardness as it evoked the prestige of the former Empire. Mazzini spoke of the need of Italy as a Third Rome to have imperial aspirations, to be realized in the Italian Empire.[78] Mazzini said that Italy should "invade and colonize Tunisian lands" as it was the "key to the Central Mediterranean", and he viewed Italy as having the right to dominate the Mediterranean Sea as ancient Rome had done.[78]

In his speeches, Benito Mussolini echoed the rhetoric of the Risorgimento and referred to his regime as a "Third Rome" or as a New Roman Empire.[79] Terza Roma (Third Rome) was also a name for Mussolini's plan to expand Rome towards Ostia and the sea. The EUR neighbourhood was the first step in that direction.[80]

Anglo-Western powers

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Both the United Kingdom and the United States took inspiration from the Roman Empire in constructing their visions for dominating and transforming the world.[81] For example, leading thinkers in British India saw the possibility to reconstruct the colony's education system and leave a legacy similar to that produced by the Romans in ancient Britain.[82]

Famous historian Gordon S. Wood writes, “The Roman Republic was the model of a virtuous republic in which citizens acted for the common good, and it was the model that American patriots looked to as they established their republic.[83]  

Non-Roman reinterpretations

[edit]
Apotheose of Empire (Hermann Wislicenus, ca. 1880) in the Kaisersaal of the Goslar Imperial Palace. Frederick Barbarossa and other Holy Roman Emperors are watching William I and his son Frederick from the sky; on the sides are, left, Bismarck holding a hammer and Generalfeldmarschall von Moltke; and right, the personifications of just-conquered Alsace and Lorraine as ancestral Imperial lands.

Several political regimes in the 19th and early 20th centuries defined themselves with reference to continuators of the Roman Empire, but not to the (Classical) Roman Empire itself. They all assumed nationalist reinterpretations of those continuators, and underplayed the extent to which the latter had portrayed themselves as Roman.

  • The Austrian Empire, and after it the Austrian Republic, borrowed from the imagery and symbolism of the Holy Roman Empire following its demise in 1806. To this day, the Imperial eagle is a symbol of the Austrian government, as is also the case in Germany.
  • In Greece, the Megali Idea ("Great Idea") developed shortly after the War of Independence of recreating the Byzantine Empire, understood as an ethnic-Greek polity with capital in Constantinople. The idea first appeared during the debates of Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis with King Otto that preceded the promulgation of the 1844 constitution.[84] This nationalist aspiration drove Greek foreign relations and, to a significant extent, domestic politics for much of the first century after independence. The expression was new in 1844 but the concept had roots in the Greek popular psyche – the "Greece of Two Continents and Five Seas" (Europe and Asia, the Ionian, Aegean, Marmara, Black and Libyan seas, respectively).[84] The effort to realize the idea after the World War I defeat of the Ottoman Empire ended in disaster with the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922).
  • Certain links between the German Empire in 1871 and the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire were shown in propaganda and actions, such as the creative restoration of the Imperial Palace of Goslar in the 1870s.[85][86] Nazi Germany has been subsequently called the Third Reich (Drittes Reich) by certain figures during its regime, succeeding both the Holy Roman Empire and the German Empire. The Holy Roman Empire reference was awkward, as it did not fit well with Nazi ideology. In 1939, a circular not intended for publication prohibited further use of the expression "Third Reich".[87]
  • In Bulgaria, the assumption in 1908 of the title Tsar by Ferdinand I was primarily a reference to the First and Second Bulgarian Empires;[88]: 297  unlike in Russia, it was translated into Western languages as "king" rather than "emperor".[89]

Supranationalism and the Roman imperial idea

[edit]

In the 20th century, several political thinkers and politicians have associated the multi-level governance and multilingualism of the Roman Empire in its various successive incarnations with the modern legal concepts of federalism and supranationalism.[clarification needed]

League of Nations

[edit]

French historian Louis Eisenmann, in a 1926 article titled The Imperial Idea in the History of Europe, portrayed the newly created League of Nations as the modern expression of an "imperial idea" that had been degraded by the nationalistic drift of the German Empire, Habsburg monarchy and Russian Empire. He argued that the three empires' final demise and the League's establishment represent a renewal of the Pax Romana imperial idea.[90]

European Union

[edit]
Logo of the Court of Justice of the European Union

Memories of the Roman Empire have accompanied the European Union since its inception with the 1950 Schuman Plan.[citation needed] The Roman Empire has provided the European Union, like many countries, with Roman legal concepts and their language, Latin. As such Latin has been used in some circumstances as one non-official lingua franca in the European Union,[citation needed] for example by EU Institutions using Latin concepts in texts and titles.

The comparison of the European Union with the Holy Roman Empire, in a negative or positive light, is a common trope of political commentary.[91][92] The European Union has been viewed as a reincarnation of a foreign and overbearing Roman Empire in some European countries, particularly the United Kingdom. The 2020 withdrawal of the UK from the Union, or Brexit, has been variously compared with the Boudica Rebellion[93][94] or with end of Roman rule in Britain.[95] A different negative view of the European Union as new Roman Empire has been regularly formulated in Christian fundamentalist circles, principally in the United States. According to that view, the EU, like other supranational endeavors such as the United Nations and World Bank, by attempting to revive the Roman Empire, signals the approaching end time, rapture or Second Coming. Occasionally, the European Union is portrayed as a "Fourth Reich", further emphasizing its demonic nature. This critique is often portrayed as fringe despite its widespread following among American Evangelicals for several decades.[96]

See also

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References

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Bibliography

[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
The succession of the refers to the political, institutional, and ideological claims to continuity following the deposition of the last Western emperor, , by the Germanic leader in 476 AD, which marked the effective end of centralized imperial authority in the Latin West while the Greek-speaking persisted uninterrupted from its founding as a separate administrative entity in 395 AD. This event did not constitute a total collapse of Roman structures, as provincial governance, taxation, and military organization continued in varying degrees under in the West, but it severed the West from the imperial center in , where emperors retained Roman titles, law codes like the , and administrative continuity. The , self-identified as Romaioi and employing Roman imperial ideology, represents the primary line of succession, enduring invasions and internal reforms until the Ottoman conquest of in 1453 AD, after which alternative claimants emerged based on conquest or symbolic revival rather than unbroken governance. Subsequent Western aspirations to Roman legitimacy culminated in Charlemagne's coronation as emperor by on Christmas Day 800 AD, establishing a Frankish imperium that evolved into the , justified through alliances with the papacy and invocation of a purported translatio imperii from via the , though lacking direct administrative or dynastic links to antiquity. This claim competed with Eastern Roman assertions, fostering schisms like the Photian controversy and mutual excommunications in 1054 AD, underscoring ideological rather than empirical succession. Later pretenders included the Norman Kingdom of Sicily under Roger II, who styled himself after Roman models; the Russian Principality of Moscow proclaiming itself the "Third " post-1453 to inherit Orthodox Roman heritage; and the Ottoman sultans, who upon capturing assumed the title Kayser-i Rum (Caesar of ) while integrating Byzantine administrative practices. Historiographical controversies persist regarding the Eastern Empire's "Romanness," with 19th-century Western scholars retroactively dubbing it "Byzantine" to emphasize perceived deviations in language, theology, and urbanism from classical norms, potentially influenced by nationalist biases favoring Latin Europe's medieval evolution over Mediterranean persistence. Empirical evidence, including coinage, seals, and chronicles like those of Procopius and Anna Komnene, affirms self-perception as Romans, with causal factors like the Theodosian Walls' defense and Justinian I's reconquests (e.g., Italy in 535–554 AD) demonstrating active imperial restoration rather than mere survival. In contrast, Western successors often prioritized feudal decentralization over Roman centralism, as Voltaire's quip that the Holy Roman Empire was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire highlights the gap between claim and reality. These debates underscore that true succession hinges on institutional fidelity amid territorial flux, privileging the East's millennium-long endurance over symbolic Western revivals.

Historiography and Conceptual Framework

Evolution of Scholarly Debates

Early scholarly interpretations of Roman imperial succession were shaped by contemporary political imperatives rather than detached analysis. Byzantine authors, such as in the , explicitly framed their empire as the direct institutional heir to , maintaining Roman administrative structures, legions, and the codified under in 529–534 CE, without acknowledging a rupture at the Western deposition of in 476 CE. Western Latin chroniclers, by contrast, emphasized discontinuity in the West while advancing rival claims; for instance, Einhard's (c. 830 CE) portrayed Charlemagne's imperial coronation by on December 25, 800 CE, as a renovatio imperii Romani, implying the Eastern throne's illegitimacy due to and perceived Greek cultural drift. The and Enlightenment eras introduced a more critical, Western-centric lens, influenced by classical revivalism and emerging . Hieronymus Wolf's 16th-century coining of "" retroactively bifurcated Roman history, portraying the East as a medieval aberration rather than successor, a view amplified by Edward Gibbon's The History of the Decline and Fall of the (1776–1789), which dated the empire's effective end to 476 CE while conceding Eastern persistence as a "degeneration" marked by and loss of . Gibbon's narrative, grounded in primary sources like Zosimus and contemporary travelogues, prioritized causal factors such as barbarian invasions and internal decay over institutional continuity, shaping 19th-century historiography amid European imperial rivalries, where scholars like reinforced the "fall" paradigm to underscore Western exceptionalism. 20th-century debates reflected ideological shifts, with Marxist and Annaliste schools emphasizing economic transformations over cataclysmic collapse; Henri Pirenne's Mohammed and (1937) argued for Mediterranean unity persisting until Arab conquests disrupted trade, implicitly affirming Eastern Roman resilience. Post-World War II scholarship, wary of nationalist teleologies, increasingly highlighted continuity: George Ostrogorsky's History of the Byzantine State (1952) documented unbroken Roman fiscal and military systems into the 11th century, while Arnold Toynbee critiqued the "Byzantine" label as anachronistic, noting self-identification as Romaioi. Contemporary analyses, informed by prosopography and identity studies, robustly affirm Eastern succession as the primary lineage, rejecting Western revivals like the (dissolved 1806 CE) as ideological constructs lacking administrative or legal inheritance. , in The Byzantine Republic (2015), posits that from the 5th to 12th centuries, the Eastern polity retained republican underpinnings—senatorial influence, popular acclamation, and nomos empsychos (law as living emperor)—with ethnic Romanity evolving via assimilation rather than rupture, evidenced by 10th-century texts like the . This view counters earlier biases in Western academia, which, per Kaldellis, undervalued Byzantine sources due to linguistic barriers and cultural prejudice, privileging Latin narratives; empirical data from seals, coins, and treaties confirm basileus Rhomaíon titulature enduring until 1453 CE. Debates persist on endpoint—1453 or 1461 Trebizond—but consensus favors Eastern continuity as causally direct, with Western "successors" representing aspirational rather than substantive claims.

Terminology and Nomenclature

The Eastern Roman polity, following the division formalized upon the death of Emperor Theodosius I on January 17, 395 AD, retained the official designation of Imperium Romanum (Roman Empire) in both Latin and Greek administrative documents, with its inhabitants self-identifying as Rhomaioi (Romans) across legal, ecclesiastical, and literary sources until the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople on May 29, 1453. This nomenclature emphasized institutional continuity in governance, including the use of Roman imperial titles such as basileus (equivalent to Augustus) and adherence to the Corpus Juris Civilis codified under Justinian I between 529 and 534 AD. The retrospective term "," derived from the ancient city of (renamed in 330 AD), was coined by German historian in his 1557 edition of Byzantine chroniclers' works, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae, to distinguish the Greek-oriented eastern state from western European imperial pretensions and facilitate scholarly separation from classical Roman history. This label gained traction in 19th-century Western amid nationalist movements that sought to Hellenize the empire's identity, despite primary evidence showing no contemporary use of "Byzantine" and persistent Roman self-conception, as evidenced in treaties like the 911 AD agreement with the Rus' referring to the realm as "the Empire of the Romans." In contrast, western successor states adopted nomenclature asserting Roman revival, notably the Carolingian realm under , crowned Imperator Romanorum (Emperor of the Romans) by on December 25, 800 AD in , invoking (transfer of empire) from the eastern line amid the latter's refusal to recognize the title until diplomatic necessities arose. This evolved into the "Holy Roman Empire" (Sacrum Romanum Imperium), a phrase first systematically used in the late under and formalized by the early , blending Frankish-Germanic kingship with papal sanction to claim universal Christian Roman authority, though lacking direct administrative or legal continuity with antiquity. Debates over succession nomenclature often hinge on these self-applied versus imposed terms: "Eastern Roman Empire" aligns with primary sources for the post-395 continuity, underscoring causal persistence in state structures like the themata military districts and praetorian prefectures, whereas "Byzantine" implies a cultural rupture unsubstantiated by the empire's maintenance of ( Romana) extended via the 212 AD and subsequent edicts. "" reflects ideological claims rooted in 8th-century Frankish expansion and Ottonian reforms from 962 AD onward, but empirical discontinuity is evident in the absence of Roman fiscal systems or senatorial institutions, prioritizing over hereditary imperial succession.

Methodological Approaches to Legitimacy

Scholars evaluate claims to Roman imperial legitimacy through frameworks emphasizing institutional continuity, effective control, and ideological self-presentation, often drawing on Max Weber's typology of legitimate —traditional (dynastic or customary), charismatic (personal or military acclaim), and rational-legal (formal procedures like or ). In the Roman context, early imperial succession blended adoptive designation by the emperor with acclamation by the , , and legions, as usurpations succeeded when military backing overrode nominal legalities, evident in the third-century crisis where over 20 claimants vied for power between 235 and 284 CE. Dynastic ties, formalized under emperors like Constantine I (r. 306–337), provided traditional legitimacy by associating successors with imperial bloodlines, stabilizing rule amid , though this coexisted with merit-based selection to ensure administrative competence. For post-395 Eastern continuity, methodological approaches prioritize empirical evidence of administrative, legal, and military persistence, with Byzantine rulers maintaining Roman titles ( and ), codified law via Justinian's (529–534 CE), and tax systems rooted in late Roman practices, rejecting the "Byzantine" label as a 16th-century Western historiographical that implies rupture. Historians like those analyzing fiscal and bureaucratic records argue this unbroken chain—spanning from (r. 395–408) to Constantine XI (r. 1449–1453)—establishes de facto legitimacy via causal continuity of state functions, rather than ethnic or linguistic shifts, as Constantinople's elites self-identified as Romaioi (Romans) and administered provinces under praetorian prefectures until the . Discontinuity theses, which posit a "transformation" around the 7th-century Arab conquests, are critiqued for overemphasizing cultural while ignoring persistent Roman imperial in coinage, , and senatorial continuity. Western claims, particularly Frankish and Holy Roman, invoke translatio imperii—the doctrinal transfer of imperial authority—as a legitimating mechanism, justified by Pope Leo III's coronation of on December 25, 800 CE, amid perceived Byzantine lapses in and protection of . This approach relies on ecclesiastical ratification over institutional inheritance, with medieval chroniclers framing the shift from "Greek" tyrants to Germanic renewers, though contemporaries like Byzantine envoys contested it as usurpation lacking Eastern imperial consent. Modern functionalist methods assess such transfers by territorial efficacy and peer recognition, noting the Carolingian realm's adoption of Roman administrative titles but fragmentation by 843 CE, contrasting with Eastern resilience. Later claimants, such as Ottomans post-1453, adapted pragmatic legitimacy via conquest and caliphal endorsement, but historiographical scrutiny applies causal realism: II's self-styling as Kayser-i Rum (Caesar of ) leveraged military subjugation of yet lacked the ideological or legal precedents of prior Roman systems, rendering it a symbolic rather than substantive succession in scholarly consensus. Overall, rigorous approaches cross-verify primary sources like imperial diplomata and chronicles against archaeological data on continuity, privileging verifiable state mechanisms over retrospective nationalistic narratives.

Foundations of Roman Imperial Succession

Pre-Christian Mechanisms of Legitimacy

In the early Roman Empire under the Principate, established by Augustus in 27 BC, there was no codified law of succession akin to later hereditary monarchies; instead, legitimacy derived from a combination of republican institutional continuity, military endorsement, and selective dynastic practices. Emperors maintained the facade of restoring the Republic by securing senatorial approval for their powers, such as the grant of imperium maius and the title Augustus, which symbolized collective consent rather than divine right or strict bloodline inheritance. This approach allowed claimants to invoke mos maiorum—ancestral custom—as a legitimating principle, emphasizing competence and public benefit over automatic primogeniture. Military emerged as the decisive mechanism, with legions and the proclaiming emperors through ritual shouts and oaths of loyalty, often preceding or overriding other claims. For instance, in AD 41, the Praetorians acclaimed as emperor after murdering , demonstrating the Guard's pivotal role in enforcing succession amid elite intrigue. Similarly, during the in AD 69, Vespasian's legions in the East acclaimed him, leading to victory in civil war and subsequent senatorial ratification, underscoring that control of armed forces conferred practical legitimacy. The 's formal confirmation provided ideological legitimacy, ratifying titles, deifications of predecessors, and legal powers, though its influence diminished as military might dominated. Senators would vote to deify a deceased emperor as divus, integrating him into the and bolstering successors' claims through association with divine ancestry; himself was deified in AD 14 by senatorial decree, setting a for pagan rulers to claim continuity with godly forebears. However, by the third century, senatorial acclamations often followed battlefield outcomes, as seen in AD 193 when the Senate confirmed after his military triumph over rivals. Dynastic mechanisms blended and , with emperors designating heirs to ensure loyalty and merit rather than rigid blood succession. From AD 96 to 180, the "adoptive emperors"— adopting (AD 97), adopting (AD 117), adopting (AD 138), and adopting (AD 161)—prioritized capable outsiders or relatives, fostering stability until named his biological son co-emperor in AD 177, reverting to and precipitating crisis upon 's assassination in AD 192. This adoptive system reflected pragmatic selection over automatic inheritance, though it required military and senatorial backing to endure. Pagan religious elements reinforced legitimacy through rituals like taking auspices and participation in the , portraying emperors as favorites of the gods and guardians of Roman piety. As , the emperor oversaw , with success in war or omens interpreted as divine favor; for example, Augustus's victories were linked to Jupiter's patronage, enhancing his aura of providential rule. Deification of emperors post-mortem by senatorial vote allowed successors to rule under the "eye" of deified kin, blending personal piety with political authority in a polytheistic framework.

Transition to Christian Imperial Ideology

Constantine the Great's victory at the Milvian Bridge on October 28, 312 AD, following a reported vision of the Chi-Rho symbol, marked the initial pivot toward Christian imperial ideology, as he attributed his success to the God and subsequently favored the faith. The , issued jointly with in 313 AD, granted legal tolerance to , ending prior persecutions and elevating it from a marginalized to a permissible religion within the empire. Constantine's patronage extended to convening the in 325 AD, where he intervened to resolve the , positioning the emperor as a steward of doctrinal unity and thereby intertwining imperial authority with ecclesiastical oversight. This reframed legitimacy from pagan rituals and senatorial acclamation toward divine sanction, with of Caesarea portraying Constantine as a "Man of God" akin to biblical prophets, emphasizing God's direct appointment over hereditary or adoptive precedents alone. Under Constantine's son (r. 337–361 AD), Arian Christianity gained imperial preference, prompting further church councils and highlighting the emperor's role in enforcing , though this sparked resistance from Nicene adherents. Julian the Apostate's brief reign (361–363 AD) attempted a pagan revival, but his death reaffirmed the Christian trajectory. (r. 379–395 AD) solidified the transition via the on February 27, 380 AD, which mandated adherence to as the empire's sole legitimate faith, suppressing pagan practices and heresies. Theodosian decrees in 391–392 AD prohibited sacrifices and closed temples, eradicating state support for pagan cults and reorienting imperial ideology toward the emperor as God's , responsible for upholding true against deviation. This ideological shift impacted succession by subordinating traditional mechanisms—such as military acclaim or dynastic bloodlines—to religious validation, where an emperor's and church alignment became proxies for divine favor. Constantine's division of the empire among his sons in 337 AD, followed by fratricidal conflicts, illustrated persistent reliance on force, yet subsequent rulers like Theodosius sought and conciliar endorsement to legitimize their rule. By Theodosius's death in 395 AD, which partitioned the empire between sons and Honorius under church-influenced regencies, Christian had embedded the notion that imperial continuity required alignment with God's will, as manifested through episcopal approval, foreshadowing Byzantine where the emperor acted as equal to the apostles in authority. This prioritized causal fidelity to revealed truth over pluralistic pagan tolerance, enabling the Eastern Roman state to claim unbroken legitimacy through doctrinal continuity rather than mere institutional persistence.

Criteria for Valid Succession Claims

The Roman Empire operated without a rigid constitutional framework for imperial succession, relying instead on a confluence of practical and symbolic factors to validate claims. Central to legitimacy was the reigning emperor's explicit designation of a successor, typically through , elevation to Caesar, or appointment as co-Augustus, as exemplified by Augustus's choice of in 4 CE and the adoptive succession from to (96–180 CE). This mechanism drew from republican precedents of but increasingly intertwined with familial ties to project continuity. Military formed the bedrock of effective power transfer, with legions and the proclaiming emperors based on loyalty and battlefield success; the army's endorsement often trumped other criteria during crises, as in the of by eastern legions in 69 CE amid the . Without armed support, even designated heirs faltered, underscoring that de facto control over provincial forces and territories—particularly , , and the East—was indispensable for sustaining rule against rivals. Senatorial ratification provided formal constitutional veneer, granting titles such as and while ostensibly linking the new ruler to republican traditions; though influential in the early Empire (e.g., confirming in 98 CE), the Senate's role eroded to ritualistic approval by the third century, overshadowed by military dynamics. emerged as a strengthening criterion from the Severan era (193–235 CE), with emperors like fabricating Antonine lineage for dynastic appeal, and solidified under Constantine I (r. 306–337 CE), who prioritized blood relations over Diocletian's meritocratic model. Yet heredity alone proved insufficient without military and senatorial convergence, as evidenced by frequent usurpations during the third-century crisis (235–284 CE), where short-lived reigns depended on rapid territorial consolidation. Overall, valid succession required alignment across these elements to achieve broad elite and provincial acceptance, ensuring the regime's stability; claims faltered when any core pillar—designation, armed backing, or formal recognition—lacked, perpetuating endemic absent a predefined hereditary code.

Direct Institutional Continuation in the East

The Undivided Empire and Eastern Persistence Post-395

The Roman Empire functioned as a unified entity under successive emperors from the establishment of the by in 27 BC until the death of on 17 January 395 AD. Theodosius, who ruled the entire empire from 394 following his victory over the usurper at the , divided administrative authority between his sons , who received the eastern provinces with as capital, and Honorius, who governed the west from and later . This partition, while formalizing prior co-emperorship practices, did not initially sever the notion of a singular Roman , as both halves recognized mutual legitimacy and coordinated against external threats. Post-395, the Eastern Roman Empire persisted as the direct institutional continuation of the Roman state, maintaining unbroken lines of administrative, legal, and succession without the caesuras that marked Western fragmentation. Emperors in retained core Roman titles including Caesar and , emphasizing their role as heirs to the Augustan tradition and universal sovereigns of the res publica Romana. The bureaucratic framework of praetorian prefectures, vicars, and provinces remained intact, evolving incrementally rather than through rupture, while the army preserved Roman organizational principles in field armies () and frontier troops (), later adapting into the thematic system by the . This continuity was evident in the Eastern Empire's response to the Western collapse in 476 AD, when the deposition of by prompted no succession crisis in the East; Emperor Zeno (474–491) instead granted a acknowledging his rule over as a subordinate to , underscoring the East's claim to overarching Roman authority. Legal codification under (r. 527–565), who commissioned the between 529 and 565 AD to systematize prior Roman jurisprudence, further affirmed institutional fidelity to classical precedents, with the Digest compiling juristic writings from the 2nd and 3rd centuries. Military reconquests, such as the (533–534) recovering and the reclaiming , were framed explicitly as restorations of the undivided empire's territorial integrity. Eastern persistence thus represented not mere survival but active embodiment of Roman imperial ideology, with self-identification as Romaioi (Romans) persisting among elites and populace until the empire's end in , unmarred by the ethnic and structural discontinuities that characterized post-Roman Western kingdoms. Scholarly consensus, drawing from primary sources like imperial diplomata and chronicles, rejects notions of a "Byzantine" break, viewing the East as the Roman Empire's enduring core amid Western dissolution.

Byzantine Administration, Law, and Military Continuity to 1204

The , commonly termed Byzantine, sustained a centralized administrative apparatus rooted in late Roman precedents, characterized by a professional staffed by logothetes and sakellarioi overseeing fiscal, military, and judicial affairs from . Provincial governance initially followed the Roman dioceses and prefectures established under and Constantine, with revenues collected via the adapted for grain and taxation. By the mid-7th century, amid Persian and incursions, Emperor (r. 610–641) reorganized territories into themata, large districts combining civil administration and military command under a , who held fiscal and defensive authority over soldier-settlers granted land (stratiotika ktemata) in exchange for hereditary service; this , numbering about 20–30 themes by the 9th century covering , the , and , preserved Roman provincial decentralization while enhancing resilience against invasions. Under the (867–1056), administrative efficiency peaked with figures like (r. 976–1025) employing eunuch officials such as the parakoimomenos to curb provincial corruption, maintaining an estimated annual budget of 5–6 million nomismata from taxes on agriculture and trade. The (1081–1185) recentralized power through the vestiarion (imperial wardrobe) for logistics and the grants—temporary land assignments to nobles for provision—yet themes endured as core units in frontier regions until the empire's contraction before 1204. Roman legal continuity manifested in the Corpus Iuris Civilis, commissioned by Justinian I in 528 and promulgated between 529 and 565, which consolidated over 1,000 years of jurisprudence into four parts: the Codex of imperial edicts (12 books), the Digest synthesizing juristic writings, the Institutes as a student textbook, and the Novellae of new constitutions totaling 168 post-534 enactments. This compilation, drawing from classical sources like Gaius and Ulpian, standardized property, contract, and inheritance law across diverse populations, with the emperor positioned as dominus wielding absolute legislative authority; it influenced daily adjudication via provincial judges (kritai) and the quaestor sacri palatii in the capital. Subsequent adaptations, including the 9th-century Basilika (60 books in Greek under Basil I and Leo VI, r. 886–912), integrated Christian canon law from the Nomokanon while retaining core Roman civil principles, such as the ius gentium for foreigners; by 1100, under Alexios I Komnenos (r. 1081–1118), legal treatises like the Hexabiblos of Constantine Harmenopoulos (1345, but reflecting earlier practice) evidenced ongoing reliance on Justinianic norms for imperial succession disputes and fiscal obligations. Militarily, the Byzantine forces represented an evolutionary adaptation of the late Roman comitatenses field armies and limitanei border troops, with total strength fluctuating from 100,000–150,000 men in the 6th century under Justinian's reconquests to 80,000–120,000 by the 11th century amid territorial losses. The theme armies, formalized post-640, comprised infantry and cavalry units (banda and tourmai, each ~1,000–5,000 strong) recruited locally, equipped with Roman-derived gear like the kontarion spear and skoutarion shield, and drilled per Maurice's Strategikon (late 6th century), which prescribed combined-arms tactics including feigned retreats and fire weapons. Elite tagmata—professional guard regiments such as the Scholae (tracing to Constantine's 4th-century Scholae Palatinae) and Excubitores, numbering 4,000–6,000 horsemen by 900—served as mobile reserves under the domestikos ton scholon, enabling offensives like Nikephoros II Phokas's (r. 963–969) Syrian campaigns. Innovations, including heavy kataphraktoi cataphracts and naval dromons deploying Greek fire (first attested 674 at Constantinople), built on Roman engineering, sustaining defensive victories such as those against Bulgars in 1014 (20,000 enemy slain at Kleidion); despite pronoiaroi feudal levies emerging under the Komnenoi, the pre-1204 army retained Roman organizational manuals and logistics, exemplified by Anna Komnene's accounts of Alexios I's 80,000-man force against Normans in 1081.

Impact of the Fourth Crusade and Temporary Fragmentation

The Fourth Crusade, proclaimed by Pope Innocent III in 1198 and initially directed against Muslim-held Egypt, deviated under Venetian influence and Byzantine exile intrigues, leading to the siege and sack of Constantinople on April 13, 1204. The crusader army, comprising approximately 20,000 men including knights from France, Flanders, and Italy, breached the city's sea walls using modified Venetian galleys, resulting in three days of plunder that destroyed irreplaceable libraries, artworks, and relics, while killing an estimated 2,000 defenders and civilians. This event, decried by contemporary chroniclers like Niketas Choniates as a fratricidal betrayal by Latin Christians against their Eastern Roman coreligionists, severed direct control over the imperial capital and precipitated the empire's temporary fragmentation into Latin and Greek polities. In the aftermath, the crusaders established the of , with Baldwin IX of elected as its first emperor on May 9, 1204, styling himself "Emperor of Romania" to claim Roman succession, though lacking endorsement from Eastern Orthodox hierarchies or traditional Roman administrative continuity. Concurrently, Byzantine elites and refugees formed successor states preserving Roman imperial institutions: the in northwestern Anatolia under , who was proclaimed emperor around 1205–1208 after initial acclamation in and victories over Seljuks at Antioch on the in 1211; the in the under ; and the on the coast, continuing Komnenian rule. Among these, asserted primary legitimacy through retention of the , Orthodox ecclesiastical authority—including the exile —and adherence to Justinianic law and thematic administration, positioning itself as the against the Latin "usurpers." The fragmentation exacerbated vulnerabilities: the , reliant on Frankish feudal levies and Venetian naval support, controlled core and Macedonia but faced chronic revolts and Seljuk incursions, lasting only until its in 1261; expanded to reclaim western and parts of , defeating Latin forces at Poimanenon in 1224 under John III Vatatzes. briefly contended for supremacy, crowning in 1225 after victories over Latins at Klokotnitsa in 1230, but internal divisions and Bulgarian interventions diminished its threat. Trebizond maintained autonomy through diplomacy and trade but renounced broader imperial claims. This period of dispersion, while disrupting centralized fiscal and military structures—evidenced by halved tax revenues and dispersed senatorial families—did not erode the causal continuity of Roman statehood, as Nicaean rulers invoked pre-1204 precedents, minted coins with imperial , and negotiated with Western powers as the legitimate Rhomaioi authority. Restoration occurred on July 25, 1261, when Nicaean general Alexios Strategopoulos exploited a Latin-Venetian dispute to seize with a force of 800 men, prompting Michael VIII Palaiologos's as and the transfer of the patriarchate, thus reestablishing institutional unity under the Palaiologan dynasty. The interregnum's impacts lingered: demographic losses from the sack (population dropping from ~400,000 to under 50,000) and diverted resources to reconquest efforts left the restored empire territorially shrunken to , Macedonia, and , with chronic deficits funding Michael VIII's anti-Latin alliances and concessions to in 1267. Nonetheless, the episode underscored resilience in Roman succession criteria—territorial control secondary to ideological and administrative —as Nicaea's Orthodox-centric Latin caesaro-papism, preserving the Eastern Empire's claim against Western interlopers and affirming continuity to 1453.

Palaiologan Dynasty and Fall to Ottomans in 1453

The Palaiologan dynasty, ruling from 1261 to 1453, represented the final phase of the Byzantine Empire's direct institutional continuity as the Roman state in the East, maintaining Roman legal codes, administrative structures, and imperial titles despite territorial contraction. Michael VIII Palaiologos (r. 1259–1282), originally a general under the Nicaean Empire, became co-emperor with John IV Laskaris in 1259 and orchestrated the recapture of Constantinople from Latin crusaders on July 25, 1261, restoring Greek Orthodox rule after 57 years of Western occupation. To secure his position, Michael blinded and deposed the child-emperor John IV shortly after, an act that alienated potential allies but solidified Palaiologan control. His reign focused on diplomacy, including the controversial Union of Lyon in 1274 with the Roman Catholic Church to avert Western invasion, though this provoked domestic Orthodox backlash without halting losses in Asia Minor to Turkish beyliks. Successive Palaiologan emperors presided over accelerating decline marked by dynastic strife and external pressures. Andronikos II (r. 1282–1328) repudiated the union, disbanding the navy to cut costs, which facilitated Catalan mercenary raids and Ottoman naval emergence. ravaged the empire: the 1321–1328 conflict between Andronikos II and his grandson Andronikos III weakened defenses, followed by the 1341–1347 war pitting against , exacerbated by social unrest and the , allowing Serbian expansion under and Ottoman footholds in Europe. Further civil strife in 1373–1379 between John V and Andronikos IV invited greater Ottoman intervention, with sultans like aiding factions in exchange for territorial concessions, reducing Byzantine holdings to , Thessalonica, and the despotate by the early . These internal divisions, rooted in succession disputes and fiscal exhaustion, eroded the professional tagmata and pronoiar system, once pillars of Roman military continuity. The dynasty's end came with the Ottoman of from April 6 to May 29, 1453, under Sultan , whose forces numbered approximately 80,000–100,000 against Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos's defenders of about 7,000, bolstered by Genoese and Venetian allies. employed massive bombards, including the 8-meter-long Urban casting 500-pound stone balls, breaching the Theodosian Walls after weeks of bombardment and mining. On May 29, Ottoman janissaries overran the defenses; Constantine XI, refusing flight, died fighting near the gates, marking the extinction of the imperial line. The fall severed the unbroken chain of Roman governance in the East, with Ottoman administration supplanting Byzantine institutions, though Palaiologan descendants persisted in exile claiming titular rights.

Ottoman Claim as Eastern Successor

Mehmed II's Conquest and Self-Styling as Roman Emperor

Mehmed II, sultan of the since 1451, laid siege to on April 6, 1453, employing massive cannons designed by the Hungarian engineer to breach the city's ancient Theodosian Walls. The siege lasted 53 days, culminating in the Ottoman forces breaching the walls on May 29, 1453, leading to the death of the last Byzantine emperor, , and the effective end of the Eastern Roman Empire's political continuity. Mehmed entered the city that day, proclaiming it the new Ottoman capital, Edirne's successor, and converting the from cathedral to mosque as a symbol of Islamic triumph over Byzantine Christianity. In the immediate aftermath, declared himself Kayser-i Rûm, translating to "Caesar of the Romans," explicitly claiming succession to the Roman imperial held by Byzantine rulers. This self-styling positioned him as the legitimate heir to the by virtue of conquering its historic capital and subjugating its "Roman" () subjects, whom Ottoman ideology increasingly linked to ancient Roman heritage in and the . assertion drew on the Ottoman conceptualization of as the Roman territorial legacy, reinforced by prior sultans' use of related titles, but elevated post-conquest to embody universal sovereignty akin to Roman emperors. To consolidate this claim, reestablished the in early 1454, appointing the anti-Unionist scholar Gennadios II Scholarios (formerly George Scholarios) as patriarch on January 6. He personally invested Gennadios with symbols of office, including the crosier, and granted him authority over all Orthodox Christians in the empire, mirroring Byzantine emperors' caesaropapist control over the church while instituting a proto-millet system for non-Muslim governance. Gennadios presented with a confession of Orthodox faith, which the sultan accepted, signaling tolerance and administrative continuity to legitimize Ottoman rule over former Roman domains. This act underscored Mehmed's intent to inherit not just territory but the imperial ideology, blending Islamic sulṭānate with Roman , though Western rejected the claim as heretical usurpation.

Administrative and Symbolic Adoption of Roman Elements

Following the conquest of on May 29, 1453, adopted the title Kayser-i Rum (Caesar of Rome), positioning the Ottoman sultanate as the direct successor to the Roman imperial tradition and asserting sovereignty over the "Rum" (Roman) lands and peoples. This titular claim was reinforced by symbolic acts, such as the reconstitution of the Ecumenical Patriarchate; in early 1454, Mehmed appointed Gennadios II Scholarios as patriarch, issuing a (imperial charter) that granted the patriarch extensive judicial, fiscal, and administrative powers over Orthodox Christians, echoing the Byzantine emperors' caesaropapist oversight of the church while integrating it into Ottoman governance. Administratively, the Ottomans preserved and adapted Byzantine bureaucratic mechanisms to maintain continuity in tax collection and provincial management; Mehmed's regime incorporated elements of the Byzantine land tenure and communal tax liability systems into sultanic kanun law, which supplemented Islamic and facilitated efficient rule over heterogeneous populations in former Roman territories. This pragmatic adoption extended to urban administration in , where Mehmed ordered the repopulation of the city with incentives for resettlement, preserved key Byzantine monuments like the and city walls, and reorganized districts (kullas) under governors (kadı) drawing on pre-existing Roman-Byzantine infrastructural frameworks. Symbolically, the use of "Rum" in Ottoman nomenclature for Anatolia and the Balkans underscored a deliberate linkage to Roman imperial geography, while Mehmed's court employed Greek scholars and maintained select Byzantine protocols, such as imperial ceremonial elements, to legitimize the transition; historian Halil İnalcık argues this selective continuity served to stabilize rule by invoking the prestige of Roman universalism amid the empire's expansion. These measures, however, were subordinated to Islamic sovereignty, with Roman elements functioning more as tools for practical administration and ideological projection than wholesale ideological endorsement.

Duration and Decline of the Claim

Mehmed II established the Ottoman claim to Roman succession immediately after capturing Constantinople on May 29, 1453, adopting the title Kayser-i Rûm ("Caesar of Rome") to assert continuity with the Byzantine emperors. This title, along with others evoking imperial authority such as basileus, was used to legitimize rule over former Roman territories and Christian subjects, with Mehmed II even requesting recognition from Western powers like and the Holy Roman Emperor. Successors including Bayezid II and Selim I continued employing variants of the title, particularly after Selim I's conquest of the Mamluk Sultanate in 1517, which incorporated Egypt and further Roman imperial symbols like the caliphal mantle, blending Islamic and Roman elements. The claim persisted symbolically into the 17th and 18th centuries, with Kayser-i Rûm appearing in official documents sporadically to invoke historical prestige amid territorial expansions reaching their zenith around 1683. However, military setbacks, such as the failed Siege of Vienna in 1683 and subsequent in 1699, which ceded Hungary and other lands, eroded the empire's Roman imperial aura as European rivals like Russia promoted alternative succession narratives. By the 18th century, the title's official usage had largely ceased, supplanted by emphasis on the sultanate's Islamic caliphal role following 's assumption of the caliphate. In the 19th century, during the Tanzimat reforms initiated by the Edict of Gülhane in 1839, Ottoman identity pivoted toward multi-ethnic Ottomanism, reducing reliance on Roman imperial claims to foster loyalty among diverse subjects amid nationalist revolts, such as the Greek War of Independence concluding in 1830. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 further marginalized dynastic pretensions, prioritizing Turkish nationalism over universal empire legacies. The claim effectively ended with the Ottoman defeat in World War I, the partition under the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, and the abolition of the sultanate on November 1, 1922, by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, marking the transition to the secular Republic of Turkey in 1923.

Western Fragmentation and Revival Attempts

Collapse of Western Administration in 476 and Interim Overlordship

On 4 September 476, Odoacer, a Germanic leader of Herulian, Rugian, Scirian, and other foederati troops, deposed the child emperor in Ravenna, marking the effective end of the Western Roman imperial line resident in Italy. Odoacer, whose forces had mutinied over land grants, did not proclaim a new puppet emperor or claim the purple himself; instead, he styled himself rex Italiae and dispatched the imperial regalia to , acknowledging Eastern Emperor Zeno as the sole Roman sovereign. This gesture underscored the collapse of autonomous Western administration, as Odoacer governed Italy through existing Roman senatorial and bureaucratic mechanisms while distributing lands to his followers, blending barbarian military dominance with Roman civil continuity. Although the Eastern Empire continued to recognize Julius Nepos, exiled in Dalmatia since 475, as the legitimate Western emperor until his death in 480, Odoacer's control of Italy rendered this claim nominal, with no effective restoration. Odoacer's regime maintained tax collection, urban infrastructure, and legal traditions, but power rested with his comitatus of warriors rather than imperial authority, signaling a shift from centralized Roman governance to federated barbarian monarchy under Eastern suzerainty. Facing threats from Odoacer's growing power and Ostrogothic incursions near the Balkans, Zeno commissioned , king of the Ostrogoths, in 488 to invade Italy and displace Odoacer, framing it as imperial service. 's forces entered Italy in 489, besieging Odoacer in Ravenna; after a truce, assassinated Odoacer on 15 March 493 (or 5 March per some accounts), assuming rule over Italy. Theodoric reigned as rex from 493 to 526, establishing an Ostrogothic kingdom centered in Ravenna that preserved Roman administrative, legal, and cultural frameworks, including the Senate's consultative role and Theodosian Code enforcement. Holding the Eastern-granted title of patricius, Theodoric governed as a viceroy, minting coins in Zeno's (later Anastasius's) name, corresponding with Eastern emperors as subordinates, and avoiding imperial pretensions. This arrangement exemplified interim overlordship, wherein the Eastern Empire exerted theoretical authority over Western successor states through appointed barbarian proxies, who managed territories as de facto autonomies while nominally deferring to Constantinople's sovereignty. Such overlordship extended variably to other Western kingdoms, like the Visigoths in Hispania and Gauls, where kings issued charters recognizing Eastern imperial legitimacy, though practical independence prevailed amid fragmented loyalties and local customs. This phase endured until Justinian I's Gothic War (535–554), when direct Byzantine reconquest briefly restored imperial administration in Italy before renewed fragmentation under Lombards.

Papal Influence and Charlemagne's Coronation in 800

Following the deposition of the last Western Roman emperor in 476, the popes of Rome increasingly asserted temporal influence amid the power vacuum in Italy, negotiating protections from barbarian rulers such as the under and later the , while maintaining nominal suzerainty. By the mid-8th century, expansion under kings like threatened papal territories, prompting to seek alliance with the Frankish kingdom, crossing the Alps in late 753 to appeal directly to , marking the first such papal journey north of the Alps. In January 754 at Ponthion, Stephen anointed Pepin and his sons Charles (later ) and Carloman as patricians of the Romans, legitimizing Pepin's kingship—which he had usurped from the Merovingians in 751—and establishing a precedent for papal investiture of secular authority in exchange for military aid against . Pepin fulfilled his pledge with campaigns in 754–756, defeating Aistulf and compelling the return of seized territories including the Exarchate of Ravenna, which Pepin then donated to the papacy via the Donation of Pepin, forming the basis of the Papal States and granting the popes sovereignty over independent of Byzantine or Lombard control. This alliance shifted papal reliance from the distant and weakened Byzantine Empire to the rising Franks, enhancing Rome's autonomy and positioning the papacy as arbiter of Western legitimacy, a role rooted in claims of Petrine primacy and Roman continuity absent effective imperial oversight. Charlemagne, succeeding Pepin in 768, expanded Frankish dominion, subjugating the decisively by 774 when he deposed King Desiderius and assumed the iron crown as King of the , thereby securing papal lands without further conquest. Tensions arose under , elected in 795, who faced accusations of adultery and perjury from Roman nobles, leading to a violent assault on him in June 799 that reportedly involved attempted blinding and tongue removal, though Leo recovered and fled to Charlemagne at Paderborn in November 799. Charlemagne escorted Leo back to Rome in late 800, convened a synod that cleared the pope after he swore an oath of innocence on December 23, affirming Frankish protection of papal authority against internal Roman factions. On Christmas Day 800, during Mass at Saint Peter's Basilica, as Charlemagne rose from prayer before the altar, Leo III unexpectedly placed a upon his head and acclaimed him "Emperor and Augustus of the Romans," with the assembled clergy and people chanting imperial acclamations in a ceremony evoking Roman precedents but enacted without prior imperial consent. Charlemagne's biographer Einhard later claimed the king would not have entered the basilica had he anticipated the act, suggesting it caught him unawares and potentially strained relations, though it aligned with Carolingian ambitions for Roman revival. The coronation asserted in conferring imperial dignity, transferring legitimacy from —then under regency of Empress Irene amid dynastic instability—to the Western protector, thereby reviving the imperial title in the West after 324 years and initiating the Holy Roman Empire's claims to Roman succession. Byzantine authorities viewed the event as an illegitimate usurpation, maintaining their exclusive claim as Romans (Romaioi) and initially refusing to recognize Charlemagne's title, leading to diplomatic tensions resolved only in 812 when Emperor Michael I acknowledged him as "basileus" (emperor) but not "basileus ton Rhomaion" (emperor of the Romans), preserving Eastern precedence. This act formalized the East-West schism in imperial pretensions, with the papacy leveraging Frankish might to counter Byzantine influence in Italy while fostering a distinct Western Christian under Carolingian rule.

Holy Roman Empire: Structure, Conflicts with East, and Dissolution in 1806

The Holy Roman Empire emerged as a Western successor to the Roman imperial tradition through the coronation of Otto I as emperor by Pope John XII on February 2, 962, in Rome, reviving the title dormant since the deposition of Berengar I in 924. This act positioned the Empire as protector of the Papacy and heir to Charlemagne's 800 coronation, emphasizing a translatio imperii from ancient Rome via the Franks to the Germans. The imperial dignity was elective rather than strictly hereditary, with the emperor chosen by a body of secular and ecclesiastical princes, a process initially informal but codified in the Golden Bull of 1356 issued by Charles IV, which designated seven prince-electors—three ecclesiastical (archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne) and four secular (King of Bohemia, Count Palatine of the Rhine, Duke of Saxony, and Margrave of Brandenburg)—to select the king of the Romans, who would then seek papal coronation as emperor. Structurally, the Empire functioned as a decentralized encompassing roughly 300 semi-autonomous territories by the 16th century, including kingdoms (e.g., Bohemia, Burgundy), duchies, counties, prince-bishoprics, abbacies, and over 50 free imperial cities directly subject to the emperor, bound together by feudal oaths, imperial courts like the Reichskammergericht established in 1495, and diets such as the Reichstag for legislative consent on taxes and war. This patchwork lacked centralized taxation or a standing army, relying instead on contributions from estates and the emperor's hereditary lands (e.g., Habsburg domains after 1438), fostering a balance where imperial authority mediated disputes but princes retained significant sovereignty, as evidenced by the Perpetual Diet at Regensburg from 1663 onward. Reforms under Maximilian I, including the 1500 establishment of imperial circles (Reichskreise) for defense and administration, aimed to bolster cohesion but highlighted the Empire's federal character over absolutism. Relations with the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire were marked by mutual claims to exclusive Roman legitimacy, with Byzantines deriding Western emperors as mere "kings of the Germans" or "Frankish rulers" unfit for the Roman title, rooted in their continuity of Roman law, administration, and Greek heritage since Constantine I's founding of Constantinople in 330. Diplomatic maneuvering, such as Otto I's 967 betrothal of his son Otto II to Byzantine princess Theophano, secured nominal recognition of Western imperial status but underscored rivalry, as Byzantium only conceded the title under duress from military pressures like Otto's Italian campaigns. Tensions escalated over southern Italy, where Norman incursions challenged Byzantine holdings, prompting Western emperors like Henry III to intervene, while the 1054 Great Schism formalized ecclesiastical rupture, framing the East as schismatic and justifying Western assertions of primacy. Later encounters, including the Fourth Crusade's 1204 sack of Constantinople, briefly elevated Latin emperors but reinforced Byzantine distrust, with restored emperors like Michael VIII Palaiologos viewing the HRE as a barbarian upstart despite occasional alliances against Ottomans. The Empire dissolved on August 6, 1806, when Emperor Francis II abdicated following Napoleon's decisive victory at Austerlitz on December 2, 1805, and the proclamation of the on July 12, 1806, which absorbed key imperial territories and rendered the structure obsolete. Facing French demands to relinquish the crown or risk usurpation—Napoleon had already crowned himself in 1805—Francis preemptively declared the Empire's extinction to preserve Habsburg prestige, transitioning to rule solely as Francis I of Austria, an act confirmed by the absence of protest from electors amid revolutionary upheavals. This ended a polity spanning over 840 years, characterized by resilience through decentralization but vulnerability to external conquest, as Napoleon's consolidation of German states under French influence exposed the Empire's inability to mobilize unified resistance.

Peripheral and Dynastic Claims

Russian Empire as "Third Rome" from Ivan III

Ivan III Vasilyevich (r. 1462–1505), Grand Prince of Moscow, initiated the Russian assertion of succession to the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire through strategic marriages and symbolic adoptions following the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453. His marriage to Sophia Palaiologina (born Zoe, c. 1449–1503) occurred on 12 November 1472 in Moscow's Dormition Cathedral; she was the niece of Constantine XI Palaiologos, Byzantium's final emperor. Arranged initially by Pope Paul II in 1469 to extend Catholic influence, the union instead reinforced Orthodox ties, as Sophia, raised in Rome but adhering to Eastern rites, imported Byzantine courtiers, artists, and manuscripts that elevated Moscow's cultural pretensions. Sophia's influence prompted Ivan III to adopt Byzantine imperial insignia, notably the double-headed eagle—symbolizing dominion over East and West—which appeared on Muscovite seals by the late 1470s and became Russia's enduring state emblem. Ivan's decisive break from Mongol overlordship, marked by the non-violent "Standing on the Ugra River" confrontation with Khan Akhmat in October 1480, freed Moscow from tribute payments and enabled territorial expansion, absorbing principalities like Novgorod (1478) and (1485). These actions, coupled with centralized reforms such as the 1497 Sudebnik legal code, positioned Moscow as an emerging Orthodox autocracy claiming Byzantium's mantle, with Ivan styling himself gosudar (sovereign) in diplomatic correspondence evoking imperial authority. The ideological framework crystallized under Ivan's son, Vasily III (r. 1505–1533), via epistles from monk Philotheus (Filofey) of Pskov's Yeliazar Monastery, dispatched around 1510–1521. In a letter to Vasily, Philotheus proclaimed: "Two Romes have fallen—the first through heresy, the second through the infidels' onslaught—yet the third stands firm, and a fourth shall not be," attributing Rome's decline to doctrinal corruption (Filioque clause) and Constantinople's to moral decay and Turkish subjugation, while lauding Moscow's uncompromised Orthodoxy under the grand prince's piety. This eschatological vision, rooted in earlier hesychast theology and Slavic messianism, cast Russia as the divinely ordained guardian of true Christianity, justifying autocratic rule and expansionist policies without papal or ecumenical subordination. Subsequent rulers operationalized the claim: Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584), Vasily's son, received patriarchal endorsement for his 1547 coronation as tsar'—etymologically from Latin Caesar—in a rite mimicking Byzantine precedents, complete with as a purported symbol of imperial continuity. The Russian Church's de facto autocephaly, asserted post-1453 and formalized later, underscored Moscow's ecclesiastical primacy, enabling interventions like the 1517 transfer of the Ecumenical See's prestige. While the doctrine served pragmatic state-building amid steppe threats and princely rivalries, its causal role in unifying "all Rus'" under Moscow derived from Orthodox exclusivity rather than mere dynastic ties, distinguishing it from Ottoman or Western pretensions.

Spanish Habsburg Universal Monarchy Aspirations

The Spanish Habsburg dynasty, beginning with Charles I (r. 1516–1556 as King of Spain, simultaneously Holy Roman Emperor Charles V from 1519), pursued aspirations of universal monarchy that evoked the Roman Empire's tradition of imperium mundi, positioning the ruler as supreme arbiter of Christendom against external threats like the Ottoman Empire and internal divisions from the Protestant Reformation. Charles inherited an unprecedented aggregation of territories through dynastic marriages and successions, including Spain and its American colonies (from 1492 onward), the Low Countries, Franche-Comté, Naples, Sicily, and Austrian lands, which by 1519 encompassed roughly half of Europe and expanding New World domains, fueling perceptions of a potential global hegemony. Elected King of the Romans in June 1519 and crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Clement VII in Bologna on 24 February 1530—the last such papal coronation—Charles framed his rule not as conquest for dominion but as a divine mandate for unity and defense, stating, “I sought the imperial crown not in order to rule over a multitude of kingdoms but merely to ensure the welfare and prosperity of the country and my other kingdoms, and to preserve peace and concord in the whole of Christendom.” This ideology revived medieval notions of translatio imperii from Rome through the Holy Roman Empire, with Charles viewing his role as restoring Christian universality amid Ottoman advances, such as the 1529 Siege of Vienna. Under Philip II (r. 1556–1598), who inherited the Spanish realms upon Charles's abdication in 1556 while the imperial title passed to the Austrian Habsburg branch under Ferdinand I, these aspirations persisted through Spain's vast overseas empire, which by 1580 included Portugal and its colonies following Philip's succession as Philip I of Portugal, creating a maritime domain spanning the , (via the Philippines), and Africa. Philip adopted his father's goals of a Habsburg global monarchy and Catholic restoration, investing heavily in naval power—evident in the 1571 Battle of Lepanto victory over the Ottomans and the 1588 Spanish Armada against Protestant England—to assert dominance as Catholicism's protector, thereby claiming a de facto universal authority akin to Roman imperium without the formal imperial diadem. Ideological support drew from potential Byzantine legitimacy via Andreas Palaiologos, nephew of the last Byzantine emperor Constantine XI, who in his 1502 will bequeathed imperial rights to Spain's Catholic Monarchs Ferdinand II of Aragon and Isabella I of Castile—Charles V's grandparents—though this claim was symbolic and subordinated to the practical exercise of Habsburg power rather than actively invoked for titular succession. These ambitions waned under later Spanish Habsburgs like Philip III (r. 1598–1621) and Philip IV (r. 1621–1665), as military overextension, economic strain from endless wars (e.g., the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648), and revolts such as the 1640 Portuguese Restoration eroded the empire's cohesion, failing to achieve the envisioned monarchia universalis despite foundational dominions that briefly approximated Roman-scale universality. By the 17th century, European balance-of-power politics and the Peace of Westphalia (1648) fragmented any pretense of singular Habsburg hegemony, relegating Spanish claims to nostalgic ideology rather than realized succession to Rome's comprehensive authority.

Other Dynastic and Regional Pretensions

Tsar Simeon I of the (r. 893–927) pursued imperial pretensions through extensive wars against Byzantium, culminating in his self-styling as "Tsar of the Bulgarians and Autokrator of the Romans," a title evoking Roman sovereignty. In 913, Patriarch Nicholas I of Constantinople crowned him with imperial regalia, granting the title basileus Bulgarôn (emperor of the Bulgarians), which Simeon leveraged to assert broader Roman claims amid conquests reaching the walls of Constantinople by 924. This Bulgarian assertion of Roman continuity predated Russian equivalents and reflected adaptation of Byzantine administrative and titular norms, though full equivalence to the Roman imperial dignity remained contested by Constantinople. Later rulers like Tsar Roman (r. 977–991) upheld the tsarist title in exile, perpetuating dynastic links to these ambitions despite Byzantine subjugation. In the 14th century, Stefan Dušan of Serbia (r. 1331–1346 as king; 1346–1355 as emperor) elevated his realm to imperial status by proclaiming himself "Emperor of the Serbs and Greeks" on 16 April 1346 in , explicitly positioning the Serbian state as heir to Byzantine Roman authority. This claim accompanied conquests of Byzantine territories in Macedonia, Thessaly, and Epirus, expanding Serbia's domain to control over one-third of the Balkans by 1350 and issuing a legal code, the Dušan's Code of 1349–1354, that mimicked Roman-Byzantine jurisprudence. Dušan's coronation by the Serbian Archbishopric, elevated to patriarchate in 1346, underscored ecclesiastical independence from , framing Serbia as a superior claimant amid Byzantium's decline, though the empire fragmented after his death in 1355. Regional Byzantine successor entities like the (1204–1461), ruled by the dynasty, asserted legitimacy as the true Roman imperium by styling rulers as autokratores and rejecting rival dynasties in Nicaea and Constantinople. Founded by Alexios I as a refuge post-Fourth Crusade, Trebizond maintained imperial protocol, coinage, and diplomatic ties invoking Roman heritage until its submission to the Ottomans in 1461, after which dynastic remnants sold titular claims to Western powers. Similarly, the Despotate of Epirus (1205–1479), under the Komnenos Doukas line, harbored ambitions for imperial restoration, with Michael I (r. 1205–1215) briefly claiming Thessalonica and broader Hellenic domains before accepting subordinate status to Nicaea. These pretensions, rooted in familial Byzantine ties, emphasized cultural and territorial continuity but lacked the sustained military or universal scope of major claimants.

Modern Nationalist and Ideological Revivals

19th-Century Risorgimento and Fascist Italy's Romanita

The Risorgimento, the 19th-century movement for Italian unification, drew extensively on ancient Roman symbolism to legitimize the creation of a centralized Italian state as a revival of Rome's imperial unity. Figures such as and invoked Rome's historical grandeur to inspire nationalist fervor, portraying the fragmented Italian peninsula's consolidation under the House of Savoy as a resurrection of the peninsula's classical heritage rather than mere territorial amalgamation. This rhetorical strategy emphasized Rome's role as the eternal center of Italian identity, culminating in the capture of the city from papal control on September 20, 1870, which completed unification and established Rome as the capital of the proclaimed in 1861. The new regime adopted imperial motifs, such as the SPQR acronym on public buildings and coinage, to evoke continuity with republican and imperial Rome, though this served primarily to forge a modern national myth amid diverse regional loyalties rather than asserting formal succession to the ancient empire. In the early 20th century, Benito Mussolini's Fascist regime intensified this Roman revival through the doctrine of romanità, which framed Fascism as the spiritual and political heir to ancient Rome's discipline, expansionism, and hierarchical order. Following the in October 1922, which elevated Mussolini to prime minister, the regime sponsored extensive archaeological excavations in the and imperial sites, uncovering artifacts to bolster claims of cultural continuity while relocating medieval structures to prioritize ancient grandeur. Mussolini's speeches, such as his 1922 address on Rome's birthday, positioned the Fascist state as departing from and reference point for a reborn imperial capital, integrating romanità into education, propaganda, and urban planning to instill martial virtues and justify authoritarian governance. Fascist romanità reached its apex in imperial ambitions, exemplified by the 1935–1936 conquest of Ethiopia, after which Mussolini proclaimed the "restoration of the empire" on May 9, 1936, from the balcony of Palazzo Venezia in Rome, invoking Augustus's Res Gestae to equate Fascist Italy with Rome's classical expanse. This declaration, accompanied by architectural projects like the EUR district designed as a modern imperial forum and the isolation of the Ara Pacis in a fascist-era museum, aimed to project Italy as resurrecting Rome's Mediterranean dominance, though it masked economic strains and military overreach. While romanità unified propaganda across regime institutions, its opportunistic fusion of antiquity with modernism—evident in neoclassical fasces symbols and youth indoctrination—prioritized totalitarian mobilization over historical fidelity, collapsing with Italy's defeat in World War II in 1943–1945.

Tsarist and Soviet Echoes in Russia

In the Tsarist era following Ivan III's foundational claims, the notion of Russia as heir to Byzantine and thus Roman imperial legacy endured through symbolic and ideological continuity. Tsar Peter I formalized the Russian Empire in 1721, yet preserved Byzantine-derived emblems such as the double-headed eagle, adopted by Ivan III from the Palaiologos dynasty via his marriage to Sophia Palaiologina in 1472, representing dual sovereignty over Europe and Asia. The title "Tsar," a phonetic rendering of "Caesar," explicitly invoked Roman caesaro-papism, blending autocratic rule with Orthodox primacy, as articulated in the 16th-century Third Rome doctrine by monk Philotheus, which warned that "two Romes have fallen, the third stands, and there will be no fourth." This framework justified expansionist policies, including the conquest of Kazan in 1552 and Siberia's colonization, mirroring Roman provincial assimilation while framing Russia as protector of Orthodoxy against Islamic powers. By the 19th century, under rulers like Alexander I and Nicholas I, Tsarist ideology integrated Pan-Slavism with Roman-Byzantine universalism, portraying the empire as a civilizing force over diverse ethnic groups, much as Rome imposed pax romana. Interventions in the Russo-Turkish Wars (1768–1774, 1806–1812, 1828–1829) aimed to liberate Balkan Christians, echoing Byzantine reconquests and reinforcing Moscow's self-conception as Constantinople's successor. The double-headed eagle remained the state symbol until 1917, adorning coins, seals, and architecture, underscoring causal continuity from Palaiologan heraldry to Russian autocracy despite Peter's Westernizing reforms. The Soviet Union, established in 1922 after the Bolshevik Revolution, repudiated Tsarist Romanism in rhetoric, promoting proletarian internationalism over imperial hierarchy, yet exhibited structural echoes of Roman empire-building in practice. Retaining 90% of the Russian Empire's territory across 15 republics by 1940, the USSR centralized authority in Moscow, enforcing ideological conformity akin to Roman legal standardization and cultural Romanization. Post-1945 expansions incorporated Eastern European satellites via the Warsaw Pact (1955), paralleling Roman client states and legions' frontier consolidations, with the Red Army—numbering 11 million at its peak—functioning as a modern equivalent for territorial control. Despite Marxist denial of empire, Soviet policies involved extracting resources from peripheries (e.g., Ukrainian grain requisitions during the 1932–1933 , affecting 3–5 million) and suppressing nationalisms, reflecting Roman tactics of divide-and-rule amid multi-ethnic governance over 100 ethnic groups. Historians identify parallels in resilience and overextension: like Rome's 3rd-century crises, the USSR faced internal decay from bureaucratic rigidity and peripheral revolts (e.g., 1956 Hungarian uprising), contributing to its 1991 dissolution, yet its 69-year span demonstrated imperial durability through coercive infrastructure like the Gulag system, which held up to 2.5 million by 1953. These echoes stemmed not from ideological intent but from geographic and administrative inheritance, where Bolshevik pragmatism adapted Tsarist imperial mechanisms for communist ends.

Anglo-American and Other Western Appropriations

While there was no direct ethnic, political, or institutional continuity from the ancient Roman Empire, which ended in the 5th century AD, to the British Empire that emerged centuries later in the modern era, British imperialists frequently invoked parallels to ancient Rome to legitimize the expansion and administration of the British Empire, portraying it as a providential extension of Roman civilizing missions through infrastructure, law, and governance in terms of imperial ideology and iconography. Lord Cromer, in his 1910 work Ancient and Modern Imperialism, explicitly compared British rule in Egypt and India to Roman provincial administration, arguing that both empires succeeded through superior administrative efficiency and the diffusion of order to "backward" peoples, though he noted Britain's avoidance of Rome's militaristic excesses. Similarly, late Victorian and Edwardian writers, such as James Bryce in The Holy Roman Empire (1864, revised editions through 1904), alluded to Britain's global dominion as inheriting Rome's mantle of universal order, emphasizing Pax Britannica as analogous to Pax Romana, with Britain's navy securing trade routes much as Roman legions secured frontiers. These appropriations served to frame imperialism not as exploitation but as a moral duty, drawing on Tacitean critiques of Roman excess to claim British moral superiority, despite empirical evidence of famines and revolts under colonial rule, such as the 1876–1878 Indian famine killing an estimated 5.25 million. American appropriations emerged prominently around the Spanish-American War of 1898, when the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines, prompting intellectuals to adapt the medieval concept of translatio imperii—the westward transfer of imperial authority—to position the U.S. as Rome's modern heir in spreading republican virtues and commerce. In this era, writers like Josiah Strong in Our Country (1885, influential through 1900s) depicted Anglo-Saxon expansion as fulfilling a divine mandate akin to Rome's, with America's continental consolidation by 1890 and overseas ventures mirroring Rome's shift from republic to empire. Figures such as , in speeches and writings like The Winning of the West (1889–1896), echoed Roman exemplars of virtuous conquest, justifying interventions as civilizing akin to Rome's integration of provinces, though this rhetoric coexisted with anti-imperialist critiques from and others highlighting parallels to Rome's corrupting overextension. By the early 20th century, such analogies informed U.S. policy in the Philippines, where Governor-General in 1901–1903 reports described American administration as Roman-style tutelage toward self-rule, despite native resistance culminating in the Philippine-American War's estimated 200,000–1 million Filipino deaths from 1899–1902. Other Western appropriations included Dutch and Belgian colonial rhetoric in the 19th century, which occasionally drew on Roman models for justifying rule over Indonesia and the Congo, respectively, as extensions of enlightened despotism; for instance, Dutch Governor-General James Loudon in the 1870s likened the Ethical Policy to Roman provincial assimilation, emphasizing infrastructure like roads and irrigation as legacies of imperial benevolence. In France, post-Napoleonic imperialists like Ferdinand Lot in early 20th-century histories contrasted Third Republic colonialism with Rome's integrative approach, using it to defend assimilation policies in Algeria from 1830 onward, though empirical failures such as the 1871 Mokrani Revolt underscored limits to such analogies. These rhetorical borrowings, often selective and ignoring Rome's internal decay—evident in the third-century crisis with over 20 emperors in 50 years—served ideological purposes rather than formal succession claims, reflecting a broader Western pattern of invoking Romanitas to rationalize dominance amid Enlightenment skepticism of absolutism.

Contemporary Supranational Interpretations

European Union as Analogous Imperial Framework

The European Union's supranational architecture, established through treaties like the 1957 Treaty of Rome and expanded via accessions such as the 2004 enlargement incorporating ten Central and Eastern European states, has prompted comparisons to the Roman Empire's framework for integrating disparate territories under a common legal and economic order. Proponents argue that the EU's Court of Justice, which asserts primacy over national laws in areas like trade and competition, echoes the Roman ius gentium's role in harmonizing provincial disputes, fostering a de facto imperial cohesion without direct conquest. This structure binds 27 member states as of 2023, covering 4.2 million square kilometers and 448 million people, through mechanisms like the and the , which includes 20 countries sharing a currency introduced in 1999 and physical notes from 2002. Such analogies extend to the EU's bureaucratic multiplicity, with institutions dispersed across Brussels, Strasbourg, and Luxembourg, paralleling the Roman Empire's decentralized administration reliant on provincial governors and itinerant emperors rather than a fixed capital. Unlike Rome's legions, the EU lacks a centralized military but exerts influence through enlargement conditionality, as seen in the 2013 accession of Croatia following reforms aligned with acquis communautaire standards encompassing 35 policy chapters. Historians note that this voluntary absorption of peripheries, from Greece in 1981 to potential candidates like Ukraine amid its 2022 invasion, mimics imperial expansion by extending normative control over economic and judicial norms, though grounded in treaty consent rather than subjugation. Critics of the direct Roman parallel, including political scientists emphasizing scale-community tensions, contend that the EU's confederal elements—such as veto powers in foreign policy and national fiscal autonomy outside the euro—prevent true imperial centralization, rendering it more akin to the Holy Roman Empire's loose confederation of estates under nominal imperial oversight until 1806. Empirical divergences are evident in events like the 2016 Brexit referendum, where the UK's withdrawal effective January 31, 2020, highlighted opt-out clauses absent in Roman provincial integration, underscoring the framework's fragility against nationalist retrenchment. Nonetheless, the EU's pursuit of "ever closer union" per the 1957 treaty preamble sustains claims of imperial analogy, positioning it as a contemporary vessel for Roman-derived universalism in Europe, albeit one vulnerable to internal fragmentation akin to late antiquity's barbarian incursions.

Critiques of Modern Claims from Institutional Perspectives

The Catholic Church has historically critiqued modern political appropriations of Roman imperial succession that emphasize secular or pagan elements over the Christian transformation of the empire, viewing such claims as distortions of Rome's legacy under Constantine and subsequent popes. For instance, during the Fascist era, Pope Pius XI contested Mussolini's promotion of romanità—a cult of ancient imperial grandeur that prioritized pagan Roman symbols and architecture, such as excavations at the to evoke pre-Christian glory—arguing instead for a Christian interpretation of Rome centered on the papacy's spiritual authority and the city's role as the seat of St. Peter. This tension manifested in rival visions for Rome's urban landscape, with the Vatican resisting Fascist efforts to overshadow ecclesiastical heritage with state-sponsored imperial revivalism, as seen in Pius XI's broader condemnations of ideological totalitarianism in encyclicals like Non Abbiamo Bisogno (1931), which indirectly targeted the regime's nationalist mythology. From an Eastern Orthodox institutional standpoint, the "Third Rome" doctrine propagated by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) since the 16th century has faced rejection by other Orthodox patriarchates, particularly the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, which regards it as a politicized innovation lacking canonical basis in conciliar tradition or apostolic succession. The original formulation by monk Philotheus of Pskov in 1510 warned against doctrinal laxity rather than asserting Moscow's imperial primacy, and subsequent Orthodox bodies have critiqued its evolution into a tool for Muscovite , subordinating church autonomy to state power, as evidenced in the ROC's alignment with tsarist and later Soviet ideologies that prioritized national messianism over universal Orthodoxy. Modern critiques from Constantinople highlight how the doctrine justifies expansionist policies, such as the ROC's support for Russian interventions, contradicting the Orthodox principle of symphonia—harmonious church-state relations without imperial dominance—and echoing historical schisms like the autocephaly disputes of 2018-2019 over . Institutional Catholic perspectives on supranational entities like the as analogous to Roman succession emphasize the absence of a unifying Christian anthropological foundation, with popes such as Benedict XVI arguing in speeches like his 2005 address to the European Peoples Party that the EU's secular constitutional framework severs continuity from Rome's legacy of ius naturale and evangelized governance, reducing imperial succession to bureaucratic technocracy devoid of transcendent authority. Orthodox critiques similarly dismiss such analogies, with figures from the Ecumenical Patriarchate viewing the EU as a Western construct alien to Byzantine oikoumene, prioritizing Enlightenment rationalism over the theocratic symbiosis that defined Eastern Roman polity, thereby invalidating claims to authentic succession. These institutional positions underscore that genuine Roman continuity resides in ecclesiastical preservation of doctrine and law, not transient political revivals, privileging verifiable historical transmission over ideological projection.

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