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Science and technology in China
Science and technology in China
from Wikipedia

Donghai Bridge
Building infrastructure has been a major task for Chinese engineering during the past decades. This is the 32.5-kilometer (20.2 mi)-long Donghai Bridge, connecting mainland Shanghai to the offshore Yangshan Port – one part of the Port of Shanghai, the world's busiest container port.

Science and technology in the People's Republic of China have developed rapidly from the 1980s to the 2020s, with major scientific and technological progress over the last four decades.[1][2] From the 1980s to the 1990s, the government of the People's Republic of China successively launched the 863 Program and the "Strategy to Revitalize the Country Through Science and Education", which greatly promoted the development of China's science and technological institutions.[1][3]

As per the Global Innovation Index in 2025, China was considered one of the most innovative in the world, ranking 10th globally, third in the Asia & Oceania region, and second for large countries with a population of over 100 million.[4]

History

[edit]
The Dunhuang map, a star map showing the North Polar region. c. 700. The Dunhuang Star map is to date the world's oldest complete preserved star atlas.[5] The whole set of star maps contains over 1,300 stars.[6]
Su Song Star Map 2
Star map of the south polar projection for Su's celestial globe, Xin Yi Xiang Fa Yao, 1092
Su Song Star Map 1
One of the star charts from Su Song's Xin Yi Xiang Fa Yao published in 1092, featuring the cylindrical equirectangular projection and the corrected position of the pole star thanks to Shen Kuo's astronomical observations.[7][8][9] Su Song's celestial atlas of five star maps is actually the oldest in printed form.[10]

China was a global scientific and technological leader up until the early years of the Ming dynasty. Ancient and medieval Chinese discoveries and Chinese innovations such as papermaking, printing, the compass, and gunpowder (the Four Great Inventions) contributed to the economic development of ancient and medieval East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Chinese scientific activity began to neuter and wane around the fourteenth century. Unlike in Europe and other parts of the Western World, Western engineers and scientists did not attempt to reduce observations of nature to mathematical laws and nor did they not form a scholarly community with criticisms and progressive research. In the Chinese Confucian cultural ethos dating back to the Han dynasty, Confucian philosophers held a strong focus by placing an overemphasis on literature, the arts, and public administration, while scientific and technological pursuits were looked down upon in terms of prestige and respectability and regarded to be unworthy endeavors that were fell far beneath their social pay grade as such domains of inquiry were seen as trivial or restricted to limited practical applications.[11][12] One contributing factor is believed to be the imperial examination system, which deprived the incentives that encouraged up-and-coming Chinese intellectuals to actively engage in scientific and technological endeavors. The absence of motivating factors rooted in the imperial examinations stifled the development of scientific and technological innovation and resulted in a stagnation of Chinese scientific and technological creativity and development over the last several centuries.[13] By the 17th century, Europe and the Western world surpassed China in scientific and technological advancement.[14] The causes of this early modern Great Divergence continue to be debated by scholars to this day.[15]

After being defeated repeatedly by Japan and Western nations in the 19th century, Chinese reformers began promoting modern science and technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement. After the Communist victory in 1949 science and technology research was organized based on the model of the Soviet Union. It was characterized by a bureaucratic organization led by non-scientists, research according to the goals of central plans, separation of research from production, specialized research institutes, concentration on practical applications, and restrictions on information flows. Researchers should work as collectives for society rather than as individuals seeking recognition. Many studied in the Soviet Union which also transferred technology. The Soviet Union provided 10,000 experts to China to facilitate its development.[16]: 356 

China began a formal computing development program in 1956 when it launched the Twelve-Year Science Plan and formed the Beijing Institute of Computing Technology under the Chinese Academy of Sciences.[17]: 100 

From the 1950s until the end of the Mao era, China emphasized self-reliance in scientific and technological development.[16]: 356  This resulted from its relative international isolation and its ideological stance.[16]: 356 

Beginning in 1964, China through the Third Front construction built a self-sufficient industrial base in its hinterlands as a strategic reserve in the event of war with the Soviet Union or the United States.[18]: 1  The Third Front construction was primarily carried out in secret, with the location for Third Front projects following the principle of “close to the mountains, dispersed, and hidden” (靠山, 分散, 隐蔽; kàoshān, fēnsàn, yǐnbì).[19]: 179  From 1964-1974, China invested more than 40% of its industrial capacity in Third Front regions.[20]: 297–298  After Nixon's China trip in 1972, investment to the Third Front region gradually declined.[18]: 225–229  Rapprochement between the United States and China decreased the fear of invasion which motivated the Third Front construction.[19]: 180  Through its distribution of infrastructure, industry, and human capital around the country, the Third Front created favorable conditions for subsequent market development and private enterprise.[19]: 177 

The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), which sought to remove perceived bourgeois influences and attitudes, caused large negative effects and disruptions. Construction of the Third Front slowed during its early stages.[18]: 12  Among other measures it saw the scientific community and formal education attacked, intellectuals were sent to do manual labor, universities and academic journals were closed, most research ceased, and for nearly a decade China trained no new scientists and engineers.[12]

In 1966, China transitioned from vacuum-tube computers to fully transistorized computers.[17]: 101  In the mid-1960s through the late 1960s, China began a semiconductor program and was producing third-generation computers by 1972.[17]: 101 

After Mao Zedong's death, S&T was established as one of the Four Modernizations in 1976. The new leader Deng Xiaoping, and architect of the Chinese economic reform, was a strong promoter of S&T and reversed the policies of the Cultural revolution. The Soviet inspired system was then gradually reformed. Media began promoting the value of S&T, scientific thinking, and scientific achievement.[12] The third and fourth generations of leaders came almost exclusively from technical backgrounds.

In March 1986, China launched the large-scale technology development plan, the 863 Project.[21]: 88 

The State Council of the People's Republic of China in 1995 issued the "Decision on Accelerating S&T Development" which described planned Science & Technology development for the coming decades. It described S&T as the chief productive force and affecting economic development, social progress, national strength, and living standards. S&T should become closely associated with market needs. Not only Soviet style institutes should do research but also universities and private industries. State institutions should form joint ventures with Chinese or foreign venture capital in order for S&T developments to reach the industry. S&T personal should become more occupationally mobile, pay should be linked to economic results, and age and seniority should become less important for personal decisions. Intellectual property rights should be respected. Information exchange should improve and there should be competition and open bidding on projects. The environment should be protected. Chinese indigenous S&T in certain key areas should be especially promoted. Public officials should improve their understanding of S&T and incorporate S&T in decision making. Society, including Communist Party youth organizations, labor unions and the mass media, should actively promote respect for knowledge and human talents.[22]

Clock Tower from Su Song's Book desmear
An interior diagram of the astronomical clocktower of Kaifeng featured in Su Song's book, written by 1092 and published in printed form by the year 1094
11th century long serpent fire arrow rocket launcher
A depiction of the 13th Century "long serpent" rocket launcher. The holes in the frame are designed to keep the rockets separate, from the 1510 edition of Wujing Zongyao.
Chain drive, Su Song's book of 1092
The oldest known illustration of an endless power-transmitting chain drive. It was used for coupling the main driving shaft of his clock tower to the armillary sphere gear box.

Since the 1990s, China has concentrated on building physical infrastructure such as roads and ports. During the 2010s, a policy was implemented requiring technology transfer as a condition for foreign companies wanting entry into the Chinese market. However, China has shifted its growing focus towards prioritizing indigenous innovation to meet its national scientific and technological requirements.[23] During this period China has succeeded in developing an innovation infrastructure, founded on the establishment of over 100 science and technology parks in many parts of the country, along with encouragement of entrepreneurship outside the state-owned sector. Yip and McKern argue that Chinese firms have evolved through three phases as their innovation capabilities have matured and that by 2017 many of them are of world standard. They are now strong competitors in the China market and increasingly in foreign markets, where they are establishing local operations.[24]

Techno-nationalism

[edit]

While the term "techno-nationalism" was originally applied to the United States in the 1980s, it has since been used to describe nationalistic technology policies in many countries, particularly in Asia.[25] Chinese techno-nationalism is rooted in the country's humiliation at the hands of more advanced countries in the 19th century. Indeed, China's leaders (like those of other countries) have long seen scientific and technological development as vital for achieving economic affluence, national security, and national prestige. Lacking indigenous technological intellectual property and innovation are seen as key national problems. The 21st century has thus seen a series of central government initiatives designed to promote "indigenous innovation" and technological development more generally in China. These include the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006–20), the Strategic Emerging Industries initiative, the Internet Plus initiative, and the Made in China 2025 Program, among others.

Through these initiatives, the Chinese state has intervened in the economy in a variety of ways to promote national technological development and reduce reliance on other countries. Prioritized industries and firms are protected and guided. There are systematic efforts to replace foreign technology and intellectual properties with indigenous technology. Foreign companies are given many incentives for technology transfer and for moving R&D to China. At the same time the technological abilities of domestic companies are supported in various ways. Such policies have generated considerable conflict between China and developed countries, particularly the United States, although China has often proven flexible when its policies have been challenged.[26]

Nationalism and nationalistic achievements have been seen as becoming the main ideological justifications and societal glue for the regime as Marxism loses influence. Some science and technology mega-projects have been viewed as questionable trophy projects done for propaganda purposes with Chinese state-controlled media being filled with reports of Chinese achievements.[27][28] In 2019, reports surfaced stating that the Chinese government has ordered all foreign PC hardware and operating systems that are installed in government offices to be replaced in the next three years.[29][30][31][32][33] Other reports stated that the Chinese government would be increasing subsidies for tech firms.[34]

Gross domestic expenditure on research and development

[edit]

In its Medium and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2006–2020), China fixed itself the target of devoting 2.5% of GDP to research and development by 2020. Between 2003 and 2012, gross domestic expenditure on research and development (GERD) rose from 1.13% to 1.98% of GDP, suggesting that the country was on track to meet its target.[35]

The research firm Battelle estimates that China's GERD will exceed that of the United States by 2023.[36] However, several convergent factors cast doubt over the accuracy of Battelle's prediction: the deceleration in China's rate of economic growth in 2014, the considerable drop in industrial production since 2012 and the major stock market slide in mid-2015. After progressing rapidly for a decade, GERD stabilized at 2.07% of GDP in 2015.[37]

China devoted 5.1% of total research spending to basic research in 2015, according to the UNESCO Institute for Statistics. This is up from 4.8%, on average, over the past decade, but less than in 2004 (6.0%). The prolonged policy focus on experimental development has resulted in enterprises contributing three-quarters of Chinese research spending (77% of total expenditure on R&D in 2015). Enterprises focus on experimental development, which accounted for as much as 97% of their total research expenditure by 2015.[37] Business enterprises contributed 60% of GERD in 2000 and 74% in 2008. In 2004, 74% of GERD went on experimental development.[38] China aims to increase the share of basic research to 15% of total research spending by 2020.[23][35]

Institutions

[edit]

The State Council of the People's Republic of China is the top administrative organ in China. Immediately below it are several ministries and ministry level organizations involved with various aspects of science and technology.[39] The State Council Science and Education Leading Group, consisting of the leaders of the major science bodies, attempts to organize the national policy. Efficiency of overall coordination has been questioned with various agencies seen as having overlapping missions and rivalries for resources and sometimes engaging in wasteful duplication.[40]

The Ministry of Science and Technology of the People's Republic of China, formerly the State Science and Technology Commission, is the body primarily responsible for science and technology strategy and policy. It also administers national research programs, S&T development zones, and international cooperation. The Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China oversees education as well as research institutes at universities. Several other ministries such as the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People's Republic of China, the Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, and the Ministry of Agriculture of the People's Republic of China are also involved in S&T.[39]

The National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Sciences directs planning for social sciences and philosophy.

The Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) is the most prestigious professional science organization in China with China's scientific elite being members. It directs many research institutes, research programs, graduate training programs, and gives influential advice. The Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) gives important advice but unlike the CAS does not have research institutes of its own.[39] The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) has a similar role to CAS for social sciences and philosophy. There are also many more narrow academies such as the Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences.

The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) gives grants to individual researchers after peer-review.[40]

The People's Liberation Army General Armaments Department directs military R&D.

The national scientific and academic organizations affiliated to the China Association for Science and Technology are also important forces in scientific and technological research.

The Society of Chinese Scientific Journalism presides over the Society of Chinese Technical Communication, China's first government approved technical communication association. Since 2002, the group has held annual conferences.[41]

Research is carried out by governmental research institutes, in higher learning institutions, and by private enterprises.[40]

Local governments have become increasingly important in R&D funding and may now contribute up to half of government spending. Intense rivalry for research and high tech industry has been argued to sometimes create wasteful subsidized overcapacity, dispersal of efforts better centralized in a few localities, and poorly judged bureaucratic subsidizing of technologies that soon become out-dated.[40][42]

National programs

[edit]

As of 2010, China's national R&D programs encompassed the:[40]

  • Key Technologies Program (renamed in 2006 as "zhicheng" or Support)
  • National High Technology Program (863 Program)
  • National Basic Research Program (973 Program)
  • Spark Program - Rural technology
  • Torch Program - New technology commercialization by creating special hi-tech zones and incubators
  • Key Laboratories Program
  • Engineering Research Centers
  • State Key and New Product Program
  • Innovation Fund for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises
  • Special Technology Development Project for Research Institutes
  • Action Plan for Promoting Trade by Science and Technology
  • National New Products Program
  • Agricultural S&T Transfer Fund

The major national programs received 15-20% of government R&D spending in 2010. They funded research, after a stated competitive proposal procedure, in universities, institutes, and enterprise. Important project may receive funding from several programs. The programs have arguably had a strong effect but have also been involved in scandals, corruption and fraud. They have been accused mainly of producing derivative works rather than driving innovation and it has been claimed that they ignore merit in selecting projects in favor of cronyism. China is trying to improve its efficiency through measures such as more peer-review and evaluations.[40]

In 2014, the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund was established in an effort to reduce dependence on foreign semiconductor companies.[43]: 274 

Economic and Technological Development Zones

[edit]
Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area

Based on the success of the Special Economic Zones of the People's Republic of China, China has created Economic and Technological Development Zones. They have the purposes of building up high tech industries, attracting foreign investment, increasing exports, and improve the regional economy. They are considered to have been very successful and have been expanded from an initial fourteen to fifty-four.[44]

Education and R&D personnel

[edit]
PISA
2009 results for the top 10 nations[45]
Rank Mathematics Sciences Reading
1. China Shanghai, China 600 China Shanghai, China 575 China Shanghai, China 556
2.  Singapore 562  Finland 554  South Korea 539
3.  Hong Kong, China 555  Hong Kong, China 549  Finland 536
4.  South Korea 546  Singapore 542  Hong Kong, China 533
5.  Taiwan 543  Japan 539  Singapore 526
6.  Finland 541  South Korea 538  Canada 524
7.  Liechtenstein 536  New Zealand 532  New Zealand 521
8.   Switzerland 534  Canada 529  Japan 520
9.  Japan 529  Estonia 528  Australia 515
10.  Canada 527  Australia 527  Netherlands 508

In the first participation of Chinese student in an international student assessment test, the 2009 PISA, 15-year-old students from Shanghai ranked first in all of the three categories: mathematics, science, and reading. The Chinese students scored particularly well compared to other nations in mathematics. One explanation for the Chinese results may be a culture emphasizing education and competitive examinations and more time spent studying in part due to less participation in activities such as sports. Teaching has become a higher status occupation. Also, industrialized Shanghai which has done important educational reforms may not be representative for the rest of China. While there was no evidence of cheating or technical problems with the testing, Shanghai attracts many immigrants from the rest of China may have allowed particularly good students to study in the city. The OECD director of the testing, Andreas Schleicher, said that the results were expected to produce astonishment and had been examined for accuracy by international experts after the OECD received the Shanghai scores. He also said that the results "refute the commonly held hypothesis that China just produces rote learning" and "Large fractions of these students demonstrate their ability to extrapolate from what they know and apply their knowledge very creatively in novel situations".[46] He believes that China has moved away from learning by rote.[47] According to Schleicher, Russia performs well in rote-based assessments, but not in PISA, whereas China does well in both rote-based and broader assessments.[48] In 2018 four major regions (Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu and Zhejiang) in China topped the rankings in reading, mathematics and science[49] and China's school children are now the smartest in the world.[50] Chinese high school students won multiple gold medals every year consistently at many International Science Olympiad Competitions like the International Biology Olympiad,[51] the International Olympiad on Astronomy and Astrophysics,[52] the International Olympiad in Informatics,[53] the International Earth Science Olympiad,[54] the International Mathematical Olympiad,[55] the International Physics Olympiad[56] and the International Chemistry Olympiad.[57]

China's rank based on number of Gold Medals in last 10 years(2014-2023):

China has become one of the world's biggest sources for research and development personnel. Between 2000 and 2008, the number of engineers and scientists more than doubled to 1.59 million. Relative to population size this is still low compared to major developed nations like the United States and Japan but the gap is rapidly closing.[38] The number of doctorate awards in science and engineering have increased tenfold since the early 1990s.[58] The number of students in general at universities increased from 1 million to 5.4 million during the 1998-2007 period.[23] In 2009 alone, China produced over 10,000 PhD engineering graduates, and as many as 500,000 BSc graduates in engineering, mathematics, information technology, and computer science – more than any other country.[59]

The C9 League, pitched as China's Ivy League, is an alliance of nine elite Chinese universities which receive a high amount of national research funding and produce a large share of national research output.

Chinese universities contribute an unusually large share of patents. The universities receive about half of R&D money from private enterprises.[23]

Eight out of nine members of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have engineering degrees, including CCP general secretary Hu Jintao.[23]

2.25 million students have studied abroad since 1978. 340,000 were studying abroad in 2011 which was an increase by 20% over the previous year. In total 818,400 have returned to China with this occurring in particular in recent years. 186,200 returned to China in 2011 which was an increase by 38% over the previous year. China offers several benefits for high-achieving foreign educated Chinese who return to China. Students are now also returning because increased job opportunities unlike previously when many stayed abroad due lack of jobs in China.[60] A 2009 study found that only 10% of Chinese students plan to stay in the United States due to visa restrictions, fear of lack of job opportunities, and belief that US growth will lag behind average world growth rates. 52% believed that the best job opportunities were in China which was in marked contrast with earlier surveys. 74% felt that the best days of China's economy was coming. 68% intended to start businesses.[61] When they return, foreign educated students often provide crucial science and technology knowledge, management skills, and innovation abilities for scientific research and industry. The senior management in high tech companies are often foreign educated.[62]

Chinese diaspora

[edit]

Overseas Chinese, as is the case for other diasporas and their homelands, have played a substantial role in contributing to China's scientific and technological development. The Chinese diaspora have been seen as a key conduit for channelling and facilitating expertise, investment, trade, and modern technology transfers to the country through their engagement in both commercial activities and public non-profit cooperation.[63] By using 'Brain Gain' to attract highly educated overseas Chinese to return to China to work, China has made significant improvements in its innovation ecosystem although there are some limitations to how sustainable this technique may be.

Industrial espionage

[edit]

One of the objectives of Chinese intelligence activity abroad is alleged to be industrial espionage as well gaining military technology. Also private companies have been accused of espionage. Intelligence agencies suspect that thousands of Western companies may have been affected by data breaches that can be traced back to China.[64]

International cooperation

[edit]

The China Internet Information Center stated in a 2005 article that China had inter-governmental cooperative S&T agreements with 96 nations, cooperative S&T programs with 152 nations and regions, and participated in more than 1,000 international S&T cooperative organizations. NGO international exchanges and cooperative activities had increased. The China Association for Science and Technology and related organizations as well as the National Natural Science Foundation of China participated in many cooperative international organizations. Chinese researchers held 281 leading posts on international organizations' expert committees and held 293 executive member-director or higher level positions.[65]

Technology transfer and R&D by multinational corporations

[edit]

In the early 1980s foreign companies began transferring technology by licensing agreements and sales of equipment. Later in the 1980s many multinational corporations started transferring technology by entering into joint ventures with Chinese companies in order to expand in China. China in the 1990s introduced increasingly sophisticated regulations of foreign investment by which access to the Chinese market was traded for technology transfer. The entry of China into the World Trade Organization in 2001 required this practice stop but critics argue that it continues. Chinese critics have argued such technology transfer may be useful for catching up but does not create new, cutting-edge technologies.[40]

China has increasingly encouraged multinational corporations to create R&D centers in China. Chinese critics have argued that foreign owned R&D mainly benefits foreign companies and removes many talented Chinese researchers from indigenous companies and institutions. Chinese supporters have argued that the foreign R&D serves as a role model and encouragement for indigenous companies and creates skilled communities from which labor and knowledge can easily flow to indigenous companies. In 2010 there were 1,200 such R&D centers and 400 out the Fortune 500 corporations had created such R&D centers. Corporations have argued that this is a necessity in order to adapt products for the local requirements of the Chinese market as well as it being essential for maintaining global competitiveness to make use the many available Chinese engineers and scientists. China is now ranked first when multinational corporations are asked in which nation future R&D centers are most likely to be located.[40]

Innovation

[edit]

A 2005 report found serious shortcomings to China's national innovation system. There were problems with services to help turn S&T work into results and the allocation of national funding to support S&T was far from optimal. Sometimes researchers became short-sighted if they get too close to the market. Another serious problem was that companies facing severe competition looked first to purchase foreign technology rather than investing in developing technology and technology development capacity at home in China. Many of the patent applications came from medium-sized enterprises (70%) since small enterprises invest little in research.[66] China's hierarchical, top-down society where authority is greatly respected and feared has been argued to stifle creative debate.[67]

China in a 2006 report outlined policies for improving innovation. They include 20 large megaprojects in areas such as nanotechnology, high-end generic microchips, aircraft, biotechnology, and new drugs. This is combined with a more bottom-up approach on a Silicon Valley model consisting of small start-ups, venture capital, and cooperation between industry and universities.[68]

It has also been argued that China is the world leader in making small, innovative improvements to existing designs. One example is continual improvements to the design of power supplies making them gradually smaller, less expensive, and more energy efficient. This may not create completely new products or create headlines but may be more important for creating employment.[69][70]

A 2016 NBER paper found that the Chinese economy is becoming increasingly innovative.[71] The study found that rising labor costs in China and "expanded market opportunities in the world economy" were the main drivers behind innovations.[71] The study also found that state-owned firms innovated less than private firms, even though state-owned firms received far greater subsidies.[71]

In 2020, China's spending on research and development climbed 10.3% to a record 2.44 trillion Chinese yuan ($378 billion) according to the nation's National Bureau of Statistics.[72]

A 2023 Australian Strategic Policy Institute study of what it deemed as 44 critical technologies concluded that China leads the world in 37 of them, including 5G internet, electric batteries, and hypersonic missiles.[73]: 155 

Per the Global Innovation Index in 2025, China was one of the most competitive in the world, ranking 10th in the world, 3rd in the Asia & Oceania region and 2nd for countries with a large population of over 100 million.[4] Since 2014, China has been the only middle-income economy and the only newly industrialized economy in the top 30.[74] It has increased its ranking considerably since 2013, where it was ranked 35th globally.[75] China ranks No. 1 globally in patents, utility models, trademarks, industrial designs, and creative goods exports. It also has two (Shenzhen-Hong Kong-Guangzhou and Beijing in the #1 and #4 spots, respectively) of the global top 5 science and technology clusters, which is more than any other country.[76]

As of 2024, the Nature Index ranks seven Chinese universities or institutions in the global top ten for volume of research output.[77] The Leiden Ranking rates six in the global top ten.[77]

Procurement

[edit]

The central Chinese government, a large buyer of high tech products, in 2009 proposed controversial policies demanding that companies selling to it promote Chinese innovation and that the products sold are free of foreign intellectual property.[68] The most controversial parts were later withdrawn but local Chinese governments continue to use procurement to encourage indigenous innovation.[40]

Intellectual property

[edit]

China's legal framework for intellectual property (IP) protection is developing rapidly as China becomes a source of innovation, but its IP framework is still less developed than most industrialized nations as of 2023.[78]: 2  The general trend of its IP system has been to develop towards increasing similarity with the E.U. and U.S. systems.[79]: 267 

Patents

[edit]

In 2011, China became the nation with the greatest number of filed patent applications.[citation needed] Nevertheless, this reflects in part that the government gives companies incentives for filing patent applications whether the patent ends up granted or does not. The percentage of patents applications in China filed by Chinese companies rose from less than 52% in 2006 to nearly 73% in 2010.[citation needed] World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) data show that Chinese companies have also become more important regarding patents overseas; Chinese companies are in places two and four, respectively, regarding the number of patent applications filed by individual companies.[citation needed] China aims to transform the economy from "Made in China" to "Designed in China,"[editorializing] and from contract manufacturing to having brand name companies with resulting improved profit margins.[80]

According to the recent data from the World Intellectual Property Indicators, China's patent office received 1.54 million patent applications in 2018, representing nearly half of patent applications worldwide—more than double the U.S.[81][82][unreliable source?] In 2019, China surpassed the U.S. as the top source of international patent applications filed with WIPO.[citation needed] China-based applicants filed for 58,990 patent applications; 57,840 applications were filed by American applicants.[83]

According to the WIPO, the U.S. had 247,609 equivalent patent applications filed abroad in 2021; Japan and China followed with 190,399 and 111,905, respectively.[84] China ranked second after South Korea in the gross domestic product (GDP)-adjusted number of applications, with 8,159 resident patent applications per US$100 billion in GDP. China also had 5,738 applications in this category. When considering patent applications adjusted for population, China held the fourth global position. South Korea led with 3,599 equivalent patent applications per million population, followed by Japan (1,770), Switzerland (1,119), and China (1,010).[84]

Standards

[edit]

To encourage innovation and avoid foreign intellectual property China has been developing indigenous technical standards. One example is the TD-SCDMA 3G standard. Critics have seen it as costly and delaying 3G introduction while supporters argue that it has increased technical abilities and experience which has increased Chinese competitiveness regarding 4G.[40] Long-Term Evolution Time-Division Duplex is being implemented as China's indigenous 4G standard.

Academic publishing

[edit]

The Royal Society in a 2011 report on academic publishing stated that in share of English scientific research papers the United States was first followed by China, the UK, Germany, Japan, France, and Canada. The report predicted that China would overtake the United States some time before 2020, possibly as early as 2013. Science-Metrix, a Canadian data-analysis company, predicted that in 2010 China would publish as many natural sciences and engineering peer-reviewed papers as the United States. In 2015 China is predicted to publish as many papers as the US across all fields. In 2030 China is predicted to surpass the US in life and social sciences.[85] In 2017, China overtakes the U.S. with the highest number of scientific publications.[86]

An analysis of ISI Web of Knowledge data found that China had increased its share of the most highly cited science articles from 1.85% in 2001 to 11.3% in 2011. By 2019, China overtakes UK in 'highly cited researchers' table and ranks second after the United States according to Web of Science, who publish the annual list.[87] Chinese research papers in the fields of material science, chemistry and engineering technology were the most cited in the world in the past decade, according to the same report.[88] The share of the United States declined from 64.3% to 50.7% during the same ten-year period.[89]

A 2009 study of Chinese social science studies in the Social Sciences Citation Index found a slow increase until 1999. The 1999-2007 period saw a very rapid increase. However, in 2007 China still only contributed 1.39% of the studies and mainland China only surpassed Hong Kong in 2006. Economics & business had larger share than social, political & communication science and psychology. The low share of social sciences compared to natural sciences may reflect that this is a common pattern in Asian nations, that Chinese social scientists publish in national journals not included in the Index and have less career incitements regarding publishing in international journals, and that state ideology and control is more important for social sciences than natural sciences. In China natural sciences are administered by the Ministry of Science and Technology while social sciences are administered by the National Planning Office of Philosophy and Social Sciences which may hinder inter-disciplinary collaboration.[90] Although the proportion of Social Science Citation Index (SSCI) articles published internationally from Mainland China has been increasing over time during 1999–2018, it only accounted for 14% of the world in 2018 compared to Eastern Europe (around 25 percent) and Western Europe (around 50 percent).[91]

Articles published in China related to basic medial science and clinical research and indexed by PubMed increased on average by 31.2% and 22% each year between 2000 and 2009. Randomized clinical trial were about 1/3 of clinical research articles. However, in 2009 this still represented only 1.5% of worldwide clinical research articles and 1.7% of worldwide randomized clinical trials. Clinical research education for medical students and the involvement and the supporting environment for medical doctors regarding clinical research have shortcomings.[92]

There are 8,000 journals and 4,600 in scientific fields. Almost all Chinese science organizations publish their own journal. The government owns or supports most journals with only a small number being privately owned. The "publish or perish" system has been argued to contribute to many low quality journals and articles that are infrequently cited and also to plagiarism and fraud. The Chinese government has put into place stricter regulations, punished or terminated some journals, and aims increase quality control and peer evaluation of journals as well as to create five to ten large publishing groups.[93] As part of the reforms, in 2012 the China Association for Science and Technology, which oversees 1,050 journals, in a declaration listed various forms of misconduct, plagiarism, and fraud and as well, the penalties for perpetrating them such as written warnings, blacklisting, contacting the researcher's home institution or funding agencies, or public disclosure. It has also been seen as important by increasing pressure on other journals and by informing editors who may not know that some actions such as favoring researchers based on personal relations are unacceptable. China also plans to give substantial financial incentives to top journals based on factors such as their Chinese and international impact factor. It has been questioned if this will have an effect on the many poor quality journals who in return for money help researchers fill their institutional requirements for published papers.[94] It has been suggested that intense and high profile scrutiny of publication misconduct in China is unsympathetic to the unrealistic pressures Chinese institutes place on their employees to publish, that this scrutiny is disproportionate to scrutiny of similar practices elsewhere in the world, and that this may reflect nationalist and racist biases.[95]

In 2022, China passed both the US and the European Union in the number of high-impact research papers published.[77]

State-owned enterprises

[edit]

Chinese state-owned enterprises are owned by a variety of actors such as local governments and governmental agencies. They may benefit from advantages not available for smaller, more innovative firms which have been seen as problematic. In 2010 state owned enterprises won many biddings for renewable energy projects since they did not have worry about paying off investments for several decades and could ignore risks and costs. The owners may attempt to protect their enterprises from competition by regulations or otherwise use their influence in an unfair manner which may stifle more innovative, private competitors. Private enterprises surpassed stated owned enterprises during the 2002-2007 period regarding rapidity of increase of research spending, patent applications, and R&D laboratories. The number of research scientists and engineers increased rapidly in private enterprises while they declined in state owned enterprises.[40]

Corruption

[edit]

Concerned about corruption in Chinese science,[96] some Chinese scientists, including Professor Liu Ming (刘明) of Zhejiang University in his 2005 book Critique of the Academic Evaluation System (学术评价制度批判), argue that interference from government officials and university bureaucrats makes peer review far less effective in China than it could be. The time scientists spend cultivating politically influential people is lost to scientific research. Liu argues that the command economy mentality of measuring everything by the numbers combined with pervasive political interference results in a great waste of money, human talent as well as considerable corruption in Chinese science.[97] A 2008 investigation into a certification for high tech enterprises allowing large tax breaks and other advantages found that more than 70% of the enterprises had gained this under questionable circumstances and an investigation of a sample found that 73% did not pass the requirements.[40]

Awards

[edit]

The State Science and Technology Prizes, including the State Preeminent Science and Technology Award, are the highest honor in People's Republic of China in science and technology, in order to recognize citizens and organizations who have made remarkable contributions to scientific and technological progress, and to promote the development of science and technology.

Specific areas of R&D

[edit]
Value in dollars of high tech exports by country in 2009. The value of Chinese high tech exports was more than twice that of any other nation.

The 13th Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Development (2016–2020) will initiate the key Scientific and Technological Innovation 2030 Project in the following key areas: aero-engines and gas turbines; a deep sea station; quantum communication and quantum computers; brain sciences and brain research. The project also encompasses nine other sub-projects, including an innovative seed industry, smart grid, space-terrestrial information network, intelligent manufacturing and robots.[98]

Agriculture

[edit]

There is a lack of arable land and water which means only new technology can increase the output of Chinese agriculture. Chinese Communist Party former general secretary Jiang Zemin has therefore called for a "new revolution in agricultural science and technology."[99] Restrictions and regulations concerning genetically modified foods have been introduced or proposed after widespread public concern.[100] China has been buying millions of foreign breeder animals as well as large amount of foreign semen and livestock embryos in order to rapidly improve the genetics of Chinese livestock.[101] More advanced agricultural methods such as increasing use of pesticides has contributed to concerns regarding the Food safety in China.

Aquaculture and fishing

[edit]
The common carp (Cyprinus carpio)

In 2008 the fishing industry in China accounted for 34% of the global output. Aquaculture in China had more than twice the output of capture fishing and contributed 62.3% of the global aquaculture output.[102] The rapid growth of aquaculture is in part due to Chinese research such as regarding the artificial breeding of carps.[103][104]

Chemistry, materials science and nanotechnology

[edit]

A 2012 study found that China's share of academic papers in the field of nanotechnology had increased from less than 10% in 2000 to nearly a quarter in 2009 and had overtaken the United States for first position. However, China was less influential in the top three journals and regarding citations, suggesting a lesser quality.[105] In terms of the density of publication, however, the United States remained ahead, with 68.76 articles on nanotechnology per million inhabitants, compared to 25.44 per million for China in 2014.[35] China was in second place for the number of patents granted. A number of bodies have been created to establish national standards and ensure oversight.[105]

According to the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Science and Technology, China contributed about one-quarter of all academic articles published around the world in materials science and chemistry and 17% of those published in physics between 2004 and 2014 but just 8.7% of those in molecular biology and genetics. This nevertheless represents a steep rise from just 1.4% of the world share of publications in molecular biology and genetics over 1999–2003.[35][37]

Jinling oil refinery in Nanjing

KPMG in 2010 predicted that the Chinese chemical industry will become world's largest producer by 2015. The Chinese government aims to make China self-sufficient regarding petrochemicals and plastics with the exception of the raw feedstock of oil and gas. The Chinese industry is increasing R&D in order to create higher value products using more advanced technology.[106]

Deep sea exploration

[edit]

China is developing its deep sea exploration capabilities, such as by the Jiaolong submersible, with an eye to future applications such as deep sea mining.[107]

Electronics and information technology

[edit]

In 2009 China manufactured 48.3% of the world's televisions, 49.9% of mobile phones, 60.9% of personal computers and 75% of LCD monitors. Indigenously made electronic components have become an important source of recent growth.

Artificial intelligence

[edit]

On 8 July 2017, the Chinese State Council announced plans to turn China into the world leader in artificial intelligence (AI) by 2030, seeking to make the industry worth 1 trillion yuan.[108] The State Council published a three-step road map to that effect in which it outlined how it expects AI to be developed and deployed across a wide number of industries and sectors, such as in areas from the military to city planning.[108] According to the road map, China plans to catch up to current AI world leaders' technological abilities by 2020, make major breakthroughs by 2025 and be the world leader in 2030.[109][110]

Drones and robotics

[edit]

China is the leader in drone technology, it is the first country in the world to create large scale transport drones, as well as the first to produce an amphibious drone. Chinese drone companies such as DJI and Ehang (Beijing Yi-Hang Creation Science & Technology) conquered majority of the civilian drone industry, with DJI alone dominating 85% of the global market share. Ehang also created the world's first flying taxi drone, Ehang 184, an eco-friendly low altitude autonomous aerial vehicle capable of providing transportation and medium distance communication.[111][112][113][114][115]

In some regions, such as the Pearl River Delta, manufacturers have problems with labor shortages, raising wages, and higher expectations regarding work from more highly educated young people. This has increased the demand for industrial robots. As of 2017, China is the largest user and producer of robotics technology, as well as the first country in the world to perform an automated dental implant. It is the largest and fastest-growing robotics market in the world, and plans to manufacture at least 100,000 industrial robots annually by 2020.[116][117][118]

Software industry

[edit]

The Chinese software industry in 2010 had a higher than 15% share of the world's software and information service market and had been growing by an average 36% each year during the previous decade. Chinese IT companies have been moving away from narrow downstream services and products to having a full range. China, with the active support of the Chinese government, is a leading pioneer in Internet of Things technology.[119]

According to the China Internet Network Information Center there were 751 million internet users as of 2017, with 53.2% of the population being internet users. The number of mobile internet users reached 724 million, with high penetration rates for mobile phones and broadband internet.[120][121] By 2017, China has the largest e-commerce market in the world, worth US$1.132 trillion, with a significant lead on other markets and almost tripling US market, the second largest.[122]

In 2017, there were more than 1.36 billion mobile subscribers in China, with the number of fixed line subscriptions hitting 310 million. The number of 4G users increased significantly, hitting 932 million by August 2017.[123][124][125] By 2020, China plans to adopt 5G network nationwide. State-owned China Telecom has already deployed 5G-oriented C-RAN fronthaul network, unveiling that it will be conducting commercial trials of 5G technology in 2019 and carry out network field trials in six Chinese cities in the latest sign of China's determination to lead the global deployment of the next-generation mobile technology.[126][127][128]

Microprocessors

[edit]

China has its own versions of microprocessors, manufactured and developed domestically, which are also used to build the world's most powerful supercomputers.

processor architecture Processor name Manufacturer supported OS Supercomputer
RISC64 SW26010 ShenWei RaiseOS (Linux) Sunway TaihuLight
MIPS64 Loongson, Godson ICT & CAS Android, Linux, BSD Dawning 6000
Power8, Power9 (IBM) PowerCore CP1, CP2 Suzhou PowerCore Suse Linux
SPARC64 FeiTeng3rd gen, Galaxy FT-1500 YinHeFeiTeng Kylin Linux Tianhe-2
IA64 (Itanium) FeiTeng 1st gen YinHeFeiTeng
ARM64 Phytium Mars, Xiaomi Phytium Technology Kylin Linux
x86-64 (VIA) KX-7000, KH-40000 Zhaoxin Unity Operating System
ARM64 Kungpeng HiSilicon EulerOS/Unity Operating System
ARM64 Kirin 900 HiSilicon Android/Harmony OS
x86-64 (AMD Zen) THATIC

Supercomputing

[edit]

Supercomputing in China has expanded rapidly. Supercomputing affects the possibility to do cutting-edge research in many areas such as design of pharmaceuticals, cryptanalysis, natural resource exploration, climate models, and military technology. As of 2017, China had 202 of the 500 most powerful supercomputers in the world, far exceeding any other country (including the US which has 143), in addition to possessing the top 2 most powerful supercomputers.[129][130] China is developing the capacity to manufacture the components domestically and plans to be the first to build an exascale supercomputer. China may also be planning to create much more powerful large-scale distributed supercomputing by connecting its supercomputer centers together.[131] Tianhe-1 was for a period in 2010-2011 the world's fastest supercomputer.[132] In June 2013, Tianhe-2, the successor to Tianhe-1, took the crown from its predecessor. In 2016, China's new supercomputer, Sunway TaihuLight became the world's most powerful supercomputer, significantly surpassing Tianhe-2's capabilities by three folds, while using Chinese-made chips. This signals China's success not only in the supercomputing industry, but also its domestic chip-making technology.[133][134]

Semiconductors

[edit]

China's semiconductor industry has, despite extensive governmental support, had many problems, such as innovative new designs. This may be due to factors such as poorly guided state and local government support for soon outdated technologies and geographically scattered efforts, lacking engineering education, and poor protection of intellectual property. However various trends may change this, such a new emphasis on market mechanisms rather than direct support, concentration of efforts, the return of Chinese who have studied abroad, increased pressure on foreign companies to transfer technology, indigenous Chinese technological standards, and increased demands for indigenous technology in the local market.[42][135][136]

The country has rapidly progressed in the semiconductor industry, while backing its largest chip maker and developer, Tsinghua Unigroup, with a US$150 billion funding to secure China's dominance in the semiconductor technology, and build a world-class semiconductor industry over the next 5 years.[137][138][139] However, as of 2020 China has yet to achieve dominance.[140]

[edit]

The Chinese animation industry and access to the latest technology, such as 3D computer-generated imagery technology, is actively supported by the Chinese government and included in the latest national planning. In part, this may be because of a desire to increase Chinese soft power. The same technology as in Hollywood is available and much postproduction is outsourced to China. Successful indigenous artistic creativity is seen as a problem and may be restricted by factors such as production being aimed at getting government patronage rather than public approval, censorship, and some storylines based on Chinese culture not appealing to foreign audiences.[141] DreamWorks Animation, in a joint venture with Chinese companies, will set up a studio in Shanghai that may eventually get bigger than DreamWorks HQ, in part to avoid to quota restrictions on foreign films with China within a decade having been predicted to become the world's biggest cinema and entertainment market.[142][143] Disney has also entered into a partnership in order to help develop the Chinese animation industry.[144]

The China Research Institute of Film Science & Technology and the China Film Group Corporation developed and in 2012 put into commercial use the DMAX motion picture film format as well as associated technologies. It has been described as a competitor to IMAX and as laying the foundation for Chinese film projection technology using indigenous Chinese technology and intellectual property.[145]

Environment-friendly technologies

[edit]

Rapid industrialization has been accompanied by many environmental problems and rising pollution in China. One part of the Chinese response involves advanced technology such as the world's largest high-speed rail network and high fuel efficiency requirements for vehicles.[146] China is rapidly expanding its wastewater treatment systems and power plant emission reduction systems.[147][148] Due to the Chinese water crisis, as well as for future exports, China is building up its desalination technological abilities and plans to create an indigenous industry. Some cities have introduced extensive water conservation and recycling programs and technologies.[149]

Health sciences

[edit]

Biotechnology and genetics

[edit]

Monitor Group in a 2010 report predicted that China within a decade will become the world leader in discovery and innovation in life sciences. Some research is seen as less controversial in China than elsewhere such as research regarding the genetic causes of intelligence. BGI, formerly Beijing Genomics Institute, has been described as having the world's largest DNA sequencing facilities.[131]

Stem cell research and stem cell treatments are less controversial in Chinese culture which have supported Chinese research as well medical tourism to China in order to receive experimental and often unproven therapies. In 2012 a regulatory crackdown was instituted which may increase the ability of the Chinese industry to get approval for sales of future therapies to other nations.[150][151] More generally, China aims and has made progress towards becoming a world leader in regenerative medicine which also includes areas such as tissue engineering and gene therapy.[152]

China in 2011 stated that biotechnology (including biopharmacy, biological engineering, bio-agriculture and biomanufacturing) was a major priority for science and technology spending. Biotechnology will be used to enhance economic development as well as for improving Chinese environmental protection, nutrition, healthcare, and medicine. The Chinese governments expects biotechnology to add 1 million jobs during the 2011-2015 period.[153]

Neuroscientific research

[edit]

On 22 March 2018, an agreement was signed establishing the Chinese Institute for Brain Science, Beijing.[154] The launch of this institute may represent a significant departure from the current policy focus on applied research and development.[37]

Once completed, the new brain institute will serve as a core facility for the country's planned project to study the human brain. The institute will not be part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Rather, it will collaborate with the academy, along with Beijing's other leading biomedical institutions, including Tsinghua University, Peking University and the Academy of Military Medical Sciences.[37]

The new institute will probably receive funding both from the National Natural Science Foundation and from the megascience programs within the Scientific and Technological Innovation 2030 Project. In March 2018, the government announced plans to place the National Natural Science Foundation under the Ministry of Science and Technology but the implications of this latest reorganization of science are unclear, as the two agencies have different missions in support of basic research.[37]

Pharmaceuticals and medical technology

[edit]
The malaria drug artemisinin was developed by Chinese scientists from traditional Chinese herbology which is part of traditional Chinese medicine.

Merrill Lynch predicted in 2011 that China would become the world's second largest pharmaceutical market in 2013 and the largest in 2020.[155] The chief executive of Hoffmann-La Roche in 2012 stated a few years ago many Chinese life sciences scientists had to leave China but that many were now returning to conditions often better than in the West regarding laboratories, funding, and political support for the industry.[156] Counterfeit drugs have caused a number of scandals as well as being a problem for drug development and authorities have increased regulations and enforcement.[157][158]

A 2011 report by PwC stated that a decade earlier China barely had any presence in the medical technology industry but its abilities had been rapidly growing. China could well become more important than Europe by 2020.[159]

Industrial manufacturing

[edit]

Development of advanced machine tools, such as computer numerical control machine tools, are seen as a priority and supported by the Chinese government. China is the world's leading producer and consumer of machine tools.[160] A 2010 US government report stated that US export controls of advanced five axis machine tools were ineffectual due to the technical capabilities of Chinese and Taiwanese manufacturers.[161]

Military technology

[edit]

One example of new Chinese military technology is the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile which reportedly has contributed to a quick and major change in US naval strategy.[162] China is developing anti-satellite weapons and plans to make the navigational Beidou system global by 2020.[163] Other new technologies include Chinese anti ballistic missile developments, the Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation jet fighter, and possibly electromagnetic pulse weapons.[164][165] Chinese reconnaissance satellites are, according to a 2011 report, almost equal to those of the United States in some areas in which China had almost no capability a decade earlier.[166] Despite increased defense spending, China's share of the world's import of arms is rapidly falling, in part reflecting the increased abilities of the indigenous military production.[167] China is also developing power projection military capabilities such as through the Chinese aircraft carrier program and the Type 071 amphibious transport dock.

15-28% of governmental R&D expenditures may go to military research according to some unofficial estimates. The Chinese defense sector remains almost completely state-owned but military equipment production has been reorganized into corporate bodies allowing limited competition and the defense patent system has been reformed to allow greater rewards to innovative enterprises and individuals. The organizational structure has shed civilian applications while at the same time cooperation with the civilian sector has increased and state supported civilian research sometimes have dual use applications.[40] Chinese jet engines remains a problematic area that has caused concern at the highest levels with China still being largely dependent on imports from foreign manufacturers. One possible explanation is a continued Soviet style fragmentation of the research and production line into many isolated units having little contact with one another causing problems with overall standardization, integration, and quality control. More problems from this may be duplication of efforts, dispersal of efforts, and unproductive competition over patronage causing problems such as dishonest reporting of problems. High precision jet engines may be particularly sensitive to accumulated quality problems.[168]

History of China's hydrogen bomb

[edit]

China became a nuclear power in the 1960s.[16]: 356  China successfully tested a hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967, at Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, in Malan, Xinjiang (also known as "Test No. 6"). China became the fourth country to have successfully developed a thermonuclear weapon after the United States, Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The device was dropped from a Hong-6 (Chinese manufactured Tu-16) and was parachute-retarded for an airburst at 2960 meters. The bomb was a three-stage device with a boosted U-235 primary and U-238 pusher. The yield was 3.3 megatons.

It was a fully functional, full-scale, three-stage hydrogen bomb, tested 32 months after China had made its first fission device. China thus produced the shortest fission-to-fusion development known in history. China had received extensive technical help from the Soviet Union to jump-start their nuclear program, but by 1960, the rift between the Soviet Union and China had become so great that the Soviet Union ceased all assistance to China.[1] Thus, the Number 6 test was indeed an independent endeavor, after the induced military and economic sanctions enacted by the superpowers at the time, the United States and the Soviet Union.

China's H-bomb was different from the traditional Teller-Ulam configuration. As an advantage, it was completed without the calculations needed from supercomputers, which would consume a lot of time. To shrink the size of the weapon, the reflectors were made parabolic with the solid fusion fuel located at the foci. It is also known as Yu Min Design (or Yu-Deng Design) as Yu Min made major contributions including the solutions to a series of fundamental and critical theoretical problems of nuclear weapons, which led to breakthrough of the unique hydrogen bomb.

The goal of China was to produce a thermonuclear device of at least a megaton in yield that could be dropped by an aircraft or carried by a ballistic missile. Several explosions to test thermonuclear weapon designs, characteristics and yield boosting preceded the thermonuclear test.[1]

Mining and rare earth industry

[edit]
Coal mining in Inner Mongolia

Advisory firm The Beijing Axis director Lilian Luca in 2010 stated that China was becoming a world leader in mining technology. Technological solutions were initially concentrated on achieving massive low-cost production but increasing emphasis has been placed on environmental and safety issues in part reflecting greater concern in China with environmental issues. China was already a world leader in certain areas such as rare earth elements.[169] China has imposed export quotas on rare earth elements, 95% of which are mined in China, citing environmental issues, but has been accused of wanting to force high tech industry using rare earth elements to move to China.

Finding rare earth elements is only the first and some argue the easiest step. Other steps towards manufacturing such as refining is controlled by China and Japan with the previously dominant United States having lost all of its producers and much of its fundamental technological ability with the number of scientists and engineers in the area declining dramatically.[170]

Polar research

[edit]

The Chinese Arctic and Antarctic Administration (CAA) organizes China's scientific program for both the Arctic and Antarctic. Polar research by China, in particular in Antarctica, has been growing rapidly. China now has three Antarctic research stations and one in the Arctic on the Norwegian island of Svalbard.[171][172]

Space science

[edit]
Long March 5 heavy-lifted rocket, China's most powerful launch vehicle

The Chinese space program is a major source of national pride.[173] In 1970 the first Chinese satellite, Dong Fang Hong I, was launched. In 2003 China become the third country to independently send humans into space with Yang Liwei's spaceflight aboard Shenzhou 5. In 2008 China conducted a spacewalk with the Shenzhou 7 mission. In 2011 Tiangong-1 was launched which was the first step towards a Chinese space station around 2020. The active Chinese Lunar Exploration Program includes a lunar rover in 2013 and possibly a crewed lunar landing in the 2020s. Experience gained from the lunar program will be used for future programs such as exploration of Mars and Venus.[174][175]

China plans to launch 5 commercial satellites for foreign customers in 2012 and aims to capture 15% of the commercial launch market and 10% of the satellite export market by 2015. In 2011 China launched a total of 19 rockets, which was the second most after Russia.[176]

The Five hundred meter Aperture Spherical Telescope, completed in 2016, is the world's largest radio telescope.[177][178]

Textiles

[edit]

China in 2012 produced more than one-third of the developed world's apparel import but the share has been decreasing in recent years as low-technology and labor-intensive production has been moving to regions like Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe.[179][180]

Transportation

[edit]

Transportation infrastructure continues to be rapidly developed. The National Trunk Highway System was in 2011 estimated to surpass the US interstate system in length.[181] Many Chinese cities have or are planning to build metros or other forms of rapid transit.

Commercial aircraft

[edit]

The state owned Comac aerospace manufacturer aims to reduce Chinese dependency on foreign companies for large passenger aircraft.[182] The future C919 aims to be completely made in China.[183]

Motor vehicles

[edit]

The automotive industry in China is the world's largest producer of motor vehicles.[184] However, China's indigenous car companies have had difficulties on the global market and the growing electric vehicle market has been seen as way to remedy this. China in 2010 proposed controversial legislation requiring foreign electric vehicle producers to form minority joint-ventures and share technologies with Chinese carmakers in order to get market access.[185] A 2011 report financed by the World Bank stated that China was becoming the world leader on electric vehicles.[186]

Shipbuilding

[edit]

In 2009-2010 China became the world's largest shipbuilder, however South Korea regained the top position in 2011 due to more advanced technology. China is developing its technological abilities and competition is expected to increase.[187][188]

Trains

[edit]
A Changchun-built CR400BF-C intelligent EMU in 2020

The BBC wrote in a 2011 article on high-speed rail in China that China in 2005 had no high-speed railways. In 2010 it had more than Europe and in 2012 China was expected to have more than the rest of the world combined. China demanded that foreign companies wanting to participate had to share their technology. Some 10,000 Chinese engineers and academics then in three years produced a faster Chinese high-speed train that China is now exporting to other nations.[67]

See also

[edit]

References

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[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia
Science and technology in China refers to the organized endeavors to generate empirical knowledge and engineer practical innovations within the , featuring a millennia-old tradition of contributions like seismographs, chain drives, and precursors alongside a post-1978 through centralized planning and fiscal outlays that have positioned it as the second-largest national investor in globally. Historically, Chinese inventors pioneered technologies such as the for navigation, for propulsion, and intricate water-powered astronomical clocks during the , laying foundations for mechanical and that spread worldwide via trade routes. In the contemporary era, state-led initiatives have driven exponential growth, with surpassing the in the annual production of doctoral degrees—awarding over 77,000 projected by 2025—and commanding more than 40% of tertiary graduates in fields, far exceeding proportions in Western nations. This scale has yielded leadership in patent applications, including sixfold dominance in filings from 2014 to 2023, alongside breakthroughs in space exploration such as the Chang'e-6 mission's retrieval of far-side lunar samples in 2024. Notable achievements include dominance in applied domains like networks spanning over 40,000 kilometers and infrastructure deployments, reflecting efficient mobilization of resources under directives like "Made in China 2025." However, systemic challenges persist, including a political apparatus that prioritizes applied outcomes over fundamental inquiry, fostering an environment where intellectual property theft—documented in sectors from semiconductors to —supplements domestic deficits. While patent volumes soar, many filings exhibit lower citation rates indicative of incremental rather than groundbreaking advances, compounded by that constrains open discourse and international collaboration in sensitive areas. These dynamics underscore a model excelling in quantity and adaptation but grappling with the causal barriers to truly autonomous, high-impact discovery.

Historical Development

Ancient and Imperial Innovations

Ancient Chinese innovations in science and technology emerged from empirical observations and practical necessities, spanning from the to the late imperial dynasties. During the (c. 1600–1046 BC), advanced bronze metallurgy allowed for the production of complex ritual vessels using lost-wax and piece-mold casting techniques, demonstrating early mastery of alloying copper with tin and lead. inscriptions from sites like , dating to around 1200 BC, recorded divinations and early astronomical data, including solar eclipses observed as early as 1217 BC. In the Warring States period (475–221 BC), mechanical devices advanced with the invention of the , featuring trigger mechanisms for improved accuracy and range up to 350 meters, and the south-pointing spoon used for by the 4th century BC. The (206 BC–220 AD) saw further progress, including Cai Lun's refinement of around 105 AD using mulberry bark and rags, which replaced bamboo slips for writing and record-keeping. Zhang Heng's seismoscope, completed in 132 AD, employed a vessel with heads to detect distant earthquakes through inverted pendulums dropping balls into toad mouths. The (618–907 AD) introduced , discovered by alchemists in the 9th century while seeking an immortality elixir, initially applied in and incendiary devices before military rockets and bombs. emerged in the for reproducing texts and images, enabling mass dissemination of knowledge. Astronomy advanced with detailed star catalogs; the Dunhuang manuscript from the depicts 1,565 stars across 284 constellations. During the (960–1279 AD), technological sophistication peaked with Bi Sheng's movable type printing using clay characters around 1040 AD, facilitating cheaper book production. The magnetic compass evolved for maritime navigation by the , aiding exploration and trade. Su Song's water-powered tower, erected in in 1092 AD, stood 12 meters tall and integrated an , celestial globe, and escapement mechanism driven by chain links to track time and celestial motions accurately for calendrical purposes. This device represented an early fusion of , , and astronomy, though it was destroyed in 1127 AD during Jurchen invasions. In mathematics, the Han-era Nine Chapters on the Mathematical Art (c. 100 AD) outlined solutions to linear equations, fractions, and areas using the decimal system and rod calculus. Medicine progressed empirically, with the Huangdi Neijing (c. 200 BC) systematizing pulse diagnosis, acupuncture, and yin-yang balance, while later imperial compendia like Li Shizhen's Bencao Gangmu (1596 AD) cataloged over 1,800 drugs from empirical testing. These innovations emphasized observation and utility over abstract theorizing, influencing agriculture through iron plows and seed drills, and hydraulics via the Dragon Backbone Waterway system in the 6th century BC for irrigation. Later imperial periods saw refinements but fewer breakthroughs, as bureaucratic conservatism and focus on classical scholarship sometimes stifled further experimentation.

Republican Period Challenges (1912-1949)

The Republican era in , spanning 1912 to 1949, encountered severe obstacles to scientific and technological progress due to pervasive political fragmentation, military conflicts, and economic turmoil. After the abdication of the Qing emperor in February 1912, the nation descended into warlordism, with regional militarists controlling territories and diverting resources toward warfare rather than research infrastructure. This decentralization stifled coordinated national efforts in science, as funding for universities and nascent research bodies remained inconsistent and localized. Intellectuals returning from overseas studies, numbering in the thousands by the 1920s, often faced inadequate facilities and institutional support amid competing loyalties to factional leaders. The establishment of key institutions, such as the in 1928 under the , represented an attempt to centralize scientific endeavors, yet these were undermined by persistent instability. Intended to promote advanced research in fields like physics and , the academy struggled with limited budgets and brain drain, as many scholars emigrated or aligned with safer foreign affiliations. Engineering societies and technical associations emerged during this period to professionalize disciplines, but their growth was hampered by the absence of stable and industrial base. Economic policies prioritizing over industry, rooted in Confucian traditions, further constrained technological innovation, leaving reliant on imported machinery and expertise. The Second Sino-Japanese War from July 1937 to September 1945 inflicted catastrophic damage on scientific infrastructure, particularly in coastal cities hosting major universities like Peking and Tsinghua. Bombings and occupations destroyed laboratories, libraries, and equipment, while forced migrations of faculty to remote areas like disrupted collaborations and data continuity. in the late 1940s, peaking at rates exceeding 1,000% annually by 1949, eroded purchasing power for imports and salaries, compelling scientists to prioritize survival over experimentation. The ensuing between Nationalists and Communists from 1946 onward compounded these losses, scattering personnel and halting projects, with an estimated exodus of over 1,000 academics to or the West by 1949. These cumulative disruptions ensured that, despite sporadic advancements in applied fields like for military purposes, overall scientific output remained marginal compared to global peers.

Early People's Republic (1949-1976)

Following the establishment of the on October 1, 1949, the new government prioritized reorganizing scientific institutions along Soviet lines, emphasizing central planning and ideological alignment with Marxism-Leninism. The was restructured in 1949 from its Republican-era predecessor, serving as the primary body for , while applied sciences were integrated into state ministries for and defense. In 1949, China had approximately 50,000 scientific and technical personnel nationwide, with fewer than 500 engaged in formal research activities, reflecting the devastation from decades of war and limited prior investment. Soviet assistance from 1950 onward included dispatching 11,000 to 50,000 specialists to aid in building industrial and scientific infrastructure, alongside training around 38,000 Chinese scientists and engineers in the USSR. This support facilitated the 1956 Twelve-Year National Plan for Scientific and Technological Development, which aimed to prioritize 79 key disciplines in fields like , , and to catch up with advanced nations. The First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) allocated resources to emulate Soviet models in sectors such as machine-building and chemicals, yielding modest gains in technical education and , with over 100 specialized institutes established by 1957. However, the (1958-1962) shifted focus to mass mobilization and ideological campaigns, promoting pseudoscientific practices like backyard steel furnaces and exaggerated agricultural techniques, which diverted scientists from rigorous research and contributed to widespread resource misallocation. This period saw industrial output claims inflated through falsified data, but actual scientific productivity plummeted amid the ensuing famine, which killed tens of millions and eroded institutional capacity, as rural labor requisitions pulled personnel from labs and universities. The 1960 ended technical aid, compelling a policy of ("zili gengsheng"), yet it spurred determination in strategic areas; China's nuclear program, initiated in 1955 with initial Soviet blueprints, achieved its first atomic bomb test on October 16, 1964, at , followed by a hydrogen bomb on June 17, 1967—accomplishments driven by concentrated state resources despite isolation. The (1966-1976) inflicted profound damage on civilian science, with universities shuttered, over 200,000 intellectuals labeled "counterrevolutionaries" and sent for manual labor re-education, and research institutes paralyzed by factional struggles and anti-expert rhetoric. in fields like biology and physics stagnated, as campaigns against "bourgeois" knowledge suppressed empirical methods in favor of Maoist axioms, leading to a brain drain and loss of expertise; for instance, research was condemned as reactionary. Military-related projects, however, were somewhat insulated under the initiative, culminating in the launch of , China's first satellite, on April 24, 1970, demonstrating orbital capabilities with limited . By 1976, scientific output remained far below global leaders, with R&D constrained by political turmoil, though defense technologies advanced selectively to counter perceived threats from the and USSR. These disruptions underscored the causal primacy of ideological interference over institutional autonomy in hindering sustained progress.

Reform Era Acceleration (1978-2000)

Following the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in December 1978, China initiated comprehensive economic reforms that prioritized science and technology as foundational to national modernization. emphasized this shift in his March 1978 speech at the National Science Conference, stating that science and technology constitute the primary productive force and are central to the —encompassing agriculture, industry, national defense, and science and technology itself. These policies marked a departure from the ideological disruptions of the (1966–1976), which had decimated scientific institutions and personnel; post-1978 efforts focused on rehabilitating researchers, restoring academies like the , and drafting an Eight-Year Plan for science and technology development to rapidly expand research capacity. Reform measures included aggressive technology importation, establishment of special economic zones starting in to attract foreign investment and know-how, and encouragement of overseas study for thousands of Chinese scholars. By the mid-1980s, had signed agreements for worth billions, including joint ventures in and machinery, while R&D began to rise, though remaining low as a of GDP—around 0.7% by the early compared to over 2% in leading Western economies. The 1986 National High-Tech Research and Development Program (), approved under Premier , targeted breakthroughs in seven priority areas: , , , , energy, new materials, and lasers, with initial state of approximately 10 billion RMB supporting applied and . This initiative launched over 4,500 projects by the early 2000s, yielding advancements such as domestic supercomputers and novel biomedicines, though outputs were often incremental rather than transformative due to limited foundational capabilities. Complementing the 863 Program, the Torch Program, formally approved by the State Council in August 1988, promoted high-tech industrialization through technology business incubators, software parks, and high-tech development zones, such as the Economic-Technological Development Area established in 1984. These efforts spurred commercialization of , with incubators hosting nascent enterprises in semiconductors and ; by the late , had developed over 50 such zones, facilitating tech transfer from state labs to industry. Key achievements included the deployment of the Yinhe-1 in 1983 for vector processing and progress in strains by , enhancing agricultural yields, though overall lagged behind global leaders due to institutional rigidities and brain drain, with many trained scientists emigrating. Scientific output grew modestly, with and journal articles rising from about 6,000 in 1990 to higher volumes by 2000, reflecting expanded researcher numbers exceeding 1 million by decade's end. Despite these strides, systemic challenges like overemphasis on quantity over quality in publications and heavy reliance on state directives persisted, setting the stage for intensified efforts in the 21st century.

21st-Century Push (2001-Present)

Following China's accession to the in December 2001, the country accelerated technology acquisition through foreign investment and joint ventures, laying groundwork for domestic capabilities. The government issued the Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development in , targeting indigenous innovation to reduce reliance on imported technologies by 2020. This plan emphasized core technologies in areas like , , and space, backed by increased state funding. Research and development expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose from approximately 1% in 2000 to 2.56% in 2022, with total R&D spending reaching 3.613 trillion yuan (about $500 billion) in 2024, up 8% from the previous year. China's share of global R&D grew from 4% in 2000 to 26% in 2023, driven by state-directed investments and enterprise contributions. Annual growth averaged 10.5% from 2021 to 2024, outpacing major economies. In , China achieved its first with on October 15, 2003, becoming the third country to independently send astronauts to orbit. Subsequent milestones included the launch of space lab module in 2011, multiple crewed missions, and the operational Chinese Space Station by 2022, with plans for lunar exploration via the program, including sample returns from the moon's in 2020. High-speed rail construction expanded rapidly from the mid-2000s, with the Beijing-Tianjin line opening in 2008 as the first operational segment exceeding 300 km/h. By , the network spanned over 35,000 km, comprising two-thirds of the global total, facilitated by technology transfers from foreign firms like Kawasaki and , followed by domestic production. This infrastructure supported and . The 2015 Made in China 2025 initiative prioritized self-sufficiency in ten high-tech sectors, including semiconductors, robotics, and new-energy vehicles, with goals to elevate domestic content in core components to 70% by 2025. Progress included dominance in infrastructure deployment and advancements in applications, though challenges persist in cutting-edge chip fabrication. In , China developed the Zuchongzhi processor, demonstrating supremacy in specific tasks by 2021, alongside efforts to integrate quantum with AI for industrial applications. Under since 2012, policies shifted toward "new quality productive forces," emphasizing breakthroughs in and dual-use technologies amid U.S. export controls. By 2025, led in filings and scientific publications by volume, though assessments of breakthrough quality vary, with state control influencing research directions.

Policy and Investment Framework

Techno-Nationalism and Strategic Directives

China's manifests as a state-driven prioritizing technological self-sufficiency and as pillars of and economic , particularly intensified under Xi Jinping's since 2012. This approach frames science and technology advancement as essential to the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation," with Xi emphasizing in a 2025 speech that building a "country strong in science and technology" requires overcoming "card-neck" vulnerabilities in core technologies through indigenous . Policies reflect a "whole-of-nation" , integrating party oversight, state resources, and efforts to reduce dependence on foreign inputs, amid escalating U.S.-China rivalry. A cornerstone directive is "," unveiled by the State Council in May 2015, which targets upgrading manufacturing through 10 priority sectors including , , and . The plan sets quantifiable goals, such as achieving 70% domestic content for core components and materials by 2025, while promoting "indigenous innovation" to shift China from assembly-based production to high-value design and production leadership. Implementation involved fiscal incentives, R&D subsidies, and standards favoring local firms, though assessments indicate mixed progress, with advancements in electric vehicles and renewables but persistent gaps in semiconductors. Complementing this is the (MCF) strategy, elevated to a national mandate in 2015 and formalized in subsequent five-year plans, aiming to leverage civilian technological ecosystems for modernization. MCF mandates bidirectional , enabling civilian entities to access classified defense projects while channeling commercial breakthroughs—like in AI and —into People's Liberation Army capabilities. Xi has described MCF as integral to constructing a "world-class " by 2049, with directives requiring state-owned enterprises and universities to align R&D with dual-use applications. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) and emerging 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030) reinforce these through "strategic emerging industries" and "," doubling down on amid U.S. export controls. In October 2025, China's economic blueprint explicitly prioritizes tech autonomy in chips and biotech, allocating resources via national programs to achieve breakthroughs in foundational technologies by mid-century. Within this framework, artificial intelligence is designated as a key "new quality productive force" to drive economic growth, secure global leadership in AI, and diminish reliance on U.S. technology. The government promotes accelerated AI development, including open-sourcing models and offering free access to foster adoption among global developers and in developing countries, paralleling approaches in hardware dissemination such as Huawei smartphones. These directives underscore a causal link between technological prowess and geopolitical standing, with Xi asserting in 2024 that sci-tech self-strengthening is non-negotiable for national revival. China's research and development (R&D) expenditure has grown rapidly in absolute terms, reaching 3.613 yuan (approximately $496 billion) in 2024, an 8.3% increase from 2023. This marks a continuation of double-digit growth rates observed in prior years, with expenditures rising from 2.439 yuan in 2020 to 3.336 yuan in 2023. As a percentage of (GDP), known as R&D intensity, China's figure has steadily increased from around 2.14% in 2018 to 2.6% in 2023, approaching levels in many countries, though it remains below leaders like the (3.45%) and (3.45%). Funding sources for R&D have shifted toward business enterprises, which accounted for 79.3% of total expenditures in recent data, reflecting a model where state-directed enterprises drive applied . Government funding, while comprising a smaller overall share, dominates , serving as the primary or sole source for foundational studies, with business contributions to this category rising from 21% in 2012 to 35% by later years. In contrast, applied research sees significant government involvement (around 85% in some analyses), underscoring a state-centric approach to strategic priorities over pure market-driven allocation. Allocation by R&D type emphasizes experimental development over basic research, with the latter consistently representing a low share of total spending—approximately 6.8% in 2023 (225.91 billion yuan out of 3.336 trillion yuan)—compared to higher proportions in Western economies. In 2024, funding grew by 10.7%, applied research by 17.6%, and experimental development by 7.6%, indicating accelerating in near-term technological applications amid policy pushes for self-reliance in sectors like semiconductors and . This structure prioritizes outcomes aligned with national goals, such as the "" initiative, over balanced scientific inquiry, potentially limiting long-term breakthroughs despite volume growth.
YearTotal R&D Expenditure (trillion yuan)R&D Intensity (% GDP)Basic Research Share
20202.439~2.4~5-6%
20233.3362.66.8%
20243.613~2.58N/A (growth +10.7%)

Major National Programs and Initiatives

China's major national programs and initiatives in science and technology have emphasized state coordination to achieve self-reliance and global competitiveness, often prioritizing strategic sectors like , , and advanced manufacturing. The National High-Tech Research and Development Program, known as the , launched in March 1986, targeted seven priority areas including , , and , with the aim of developing indigenous capabilities in high-tech fields through targeted funding and international collaboration. By focusing on applied research with potential for commercialization, it supported over 10,000 projects by the early 2000s, contributing to advancements in areas like and components, though implementation involved significant technology transfers from abroad. Complementing this, the National Basic Research Program (973 Program), initiated in 1997, allocated funds for frontier in fields such as , materials, and , funding around 1,000 projects during its run until 2016, with an emphasis on building long-term scientific foundations rather than immediate applications. The Outline of the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and Technology Development (2006-2020), promulgated in February 2006, set ambitious goals for to become an innovation-driven economy by 2020, including mastering 402 key technologies across 25 megaprojects in areas like core electronic components, , and new energy vehicles. This plan committed approximately 4 trillion yuan (about $580 billion USD at the time) to R&D, aiming for indigenous innovation rates exceeding 60% in core technologies, though progress was uneven, with dependencies on foreign inputs persisting in semiconductors and high-end equipment. It integrated earlier programs like 863 and 973 into a broader framework, fostering national laboratories and emphasizing "leapfrog development" in strategic domains. In 2015, the State Council issued , a 10-year to transform from a low-end manufacturer to a high-tech leader, targeting self-sufficiency in core materials and components at 40% by 2020 and 70% by 2025 across 10 priority sectors including , , and biopharmaceuticals. Supported by subsidies exceeding 100 billion yuan annually and policies favoring domestic firms, it accelerated adoption of technologies like and electric vehicles, with achieving over 50% global in photovoltaics and lithium batteries by 2020, though international concerns arose over forced technology transfers and market distortions. Following the phase-out of 973 and integration of 863 into the National Key R&D Program in 2016, this successor initiative streamlined funding for over 30,000 projects by 2023, prioritizing basic research alongside applied breakthroughs in and brain science. The 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025), approved in March 2021, reinforces these efforts with directives for "high-quality" innovation, allocating resources to "AI Plus" applications, deep-sea and , and satellite internet constellations, aiming for breakthroughs in 7 major frontiers like integrated circuits and stem cells. By 2024, R&D intensity reached 2.68% of GDP, with national labs expanded to 34, driving outputs like the completion of the FAST upgrades and advancements in fusion energy research. The 2025 Government Work Report further specifies the cultivation of emerging future industries, including the low-altitude economy, embodied intelligence, 6G, quantum technology, and bio-manufacturing, through investment mechanisms, construction of future industry technology parks and pioneer zones, and standardization initiatives covering brain-machine interfaces. These programs collectively reflect a "whole-of-nation" approach, channeling state resources through entities like the Ministry of Science and Technology to address technological bottlenecks, though efficacy varies by sector due to factors like institutional silos and reliance on imported expertise.

Institutional and Organizational Structure

State Research Academies and Laboratories

The (CAS), established in 1949, serves as China's foremost national research institution for natural sciences, functioning as both a comprehensive research performer and a scientific advisory body to the government. It oversees 104 research institutes, 12 branch academies, three universities, and auxiliary organizations across 23 provincial-level regions, employing over 60,000 researchers as of recent reports. CAS has driven key advancements, including contributions to sequencing 1% of the and the full rice genome, alongside pioneering China's early talent attraction programs for overseas experts. CAS operates numerous state key laboratories, which form a core component of China's national laboratory system, emphasizing frontier and applied technologies aligned with state priorities such as and environmental information systems. These labs, often housed within CAS institutes, have produced over 250 significant awards in fields like since the institution's early development. The academy's integrates multidisciplinary divisions, with 728 elected members providing peer-reviewed guidance on , though its outputs are directed toward national strategic goals under the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST). The (CAE), founded in 1994 under the State Council, complements CAS by focusing on engineering sciences and technology advisory roles, comprising elected members who represent the pinnacle of engineering expertise in . Unlike CAS's broader scientific scope, CAE emphasizes practical applications in , , and strategic technologies, serving as a national for engineering policy recommendations. It has facilitated international collaborations and launched journals like to disseminate findings, with its 2022 budget underscoring investments in advisory functions over direct R&D execution. China's State Key Laboratories (SKLs), numbering 533 as approved by MOST in 2023, represent a decentralized network of elite facilities hosted by academies like CAS, universities, and state-owned enterprises, tasked with advancing core technologies through long-term funding and evaluation cycles. These labs prioritize areas such as , bioreactors, and , with geocoded distributions showing concentrations in eastern provinces and ties to national programs like the 863 High-Tech R&D Initiative. Performance metrics include mandatory five-year assessments, fostering outputs in ultrafine powders and luminescent devices, though critics note dependency on state directives may limit serendipitous discovery compared to more autonomous Western models.

Universities and Academic Institutions

China's has undergone rapid expansion since the late 1970s, with over 3,000 institutions by 2024, emphasizing (STEM) disciplines to support national innovation goals. Elite universities, concentrated in coastal regions, drive much of the country's research output, producing over 50,000 STEM PhD graduates annually as of 2025, surpassing the in volume. This scale stems from state-directed policies prioritizing higher education investment, yet outcomes reflect heavy emphasis on quantitative metrics like publications and patents over foundational breakthroughs. The Double First-Class Initiative, launched in 2015 and expanded post-2020, targets building world-class universities and disciplines through selective funding for 147 institutions, succeeding earlier and efforts. Under this plan, resources flow to disciplines like and , with Phase 2 emphasizing long-term sustainability and evaluation reforms to address prior inefficiencies in talent training and metrics. Leading examples include , ranked first domestically and globally competitive in per QS 2025 assessments, and , strong in natural sciences. Other top performers, such as and , contribute significantly to patent filings and technological standards, with Double First-Class universities forming innovation hubs linked to state programs. Universities play a central role in China's national innovation system, conducting substantial R&D funded by government allocations and collaborating with state labs and enterprises. In 2024, they accounted for a growing share of high-impact publications and applied research in areas like and , bolstered by massive STEM enrollment exceeding 11 million undergraduates overall. However, systemic challenges persist, including political oversight that curtails , with the assuming direct control over university governance since 2023, merging administrative and party roles. This has intensified on sensitive topics, potentially stifling creative inquiry, as evidenced by restrictions under Xi Jinping's leadership. Quality assurance remains uneven, with reports of academic misconduct such as and fabricated data undermining credibility, despite efforts to establish systems. International rankings highlight progress in metrics like citation volume, but critics note overreliance on state incentives may prioritize incremental improvements over , with domestic evaluations often inflating outputs through metric gaming. While universities repatriate talent via programs attracting overseas PhDs—over 80% return rate since 2012—the brain drain of top researchers to freer environments persists due to these constraints. Overall, the system excels in scale and applied R&D alignment with but faces hurdles in fostering independent, high-quality essential for sustained technological leadership.

Economic Development Zones and Innovation Hubs

China's national-level Economic and Technological Development Zones (ETDZs), first established in 1984, serve as key platforms for integrating with technological advancement, attracting (FDI) and fostering industrial clusters in high-tech sectors. By 2024, these zones, numbering over 230 under review by the Ministry of Commerce, contributed significantly to foreign trade, totaling 10.3 trillion yuan in the reviewed zones. They implement preferential policies such as tax incentives and streamlined regulations to promote and R&D activities, leading to enhanced patent outputs; for instance, the establishment of special economic zones, precursors to modern ETDZs, has been associated with a 21.2% increase in invention patent citations. These zones host a substantial portion of China's innovation , accounting for 18.3% of national high-tech enterprises and over 700 state-level incubators as of mid-2025, which support startups in areas like semiconductors, , and advanced . ETDZs lead in applying national sci-tech policies, creating environments for technological spillover from FDI, where a 10% FDI increase correlates with a 0.86% rise in patent applications, particularly in resource-intensive regions. Examples include the Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area, which exemplifies urban-tech integration with modern infrastructure supporting R&D clusters. Prominent innovation hubs within or akin to these zones include national demonstration zones such as Science Park in , established in 1988 and dubbed "China's ," which by 2024 hosted 114 companies and drove 43% of 's top tech firms, fueling advancements in AI and software. in focuses on integrated circuits and , while Suzhou's biotech cluster aims to host over 10,000 companies by 2030, leveraging for and life sciences. These hubs, part of broader initiatives like the National Innovation Demonstration Zones approved since 2016, enhance regional innovation by concentrating talent, capital, and policy support, though their effectiveness varies by local for foreign R&D spillovers.

State-Owned Enterprises versus Private Sector Dynamics

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in dominate strategic sectors of science and technology, such as semiconductors, infrastructure, and , where they benefit from preferential access to state financing, policy directives, and national resources to pursue long-term, high-risk projects aligned with government priorities like in core technologies. In contrast, private firms excel in consumer-oriented and digital technologies, including , mobile applications, and applications, leveraging market responsiveness and entrepreneurial incentives to achieve faster . This division reflects a hybrid model where SOEs provide scale and stability for foundational R&D, while private entities drive incremental and gains, though indicates private firms generally outperform SOEs in converting R&D inputs into marketable outputs. R&D expenditure dynamics underscore these disparities: China's total R&D spending reached 3.613 trillion yuan in 2024, growing 8% year-over-year, with SOEs accounting for a disproportionate share of state-allocated funds due to their role in national programs like "Made in China 2025." However, studies of firms show SOEs exhibit lower R&D efficiency, with correlating to reduced returns owing to bureaucratic inertia, agency problems, and softer budget constraints that diminish incentives for cost-effective resource use. Private firms, facing market , allocate R&D more productively, though they often rely on SOE partnerships or equity stakes for access to subsidized capital and data resources, as evidenced by increasing SOE shareholdings in private tech companies since the early . In terms of outputs, private enterprises generated 77.4% of applications in 2017, a trend persisting into the as their share of high-value patents in digital and biotech fields outpaces SOEs, which focus on models in heavy industries but lag in breakthrough inventions per R&D dollar spent. SOE filings have declined from around 45% in the early to under 10% by the mid-2020s, partly due to reforms that boost post-reform by cutting agency costs, though SOEs retain advantages in state-protected sectors like defense tech. Efficiency metrics reinforce this: SOEs in the tech sector show lower returns on assets and productivity compared to private counterparts, often prioritizing national objectives over profitability, which enables sustained investment in areas like but hampers agility. Policy frameworks amplify these dynamics through "techno-nationalist" directives that channel resources to SOEs for , while subjecting private firms to regulatory scrutiny—such as antitrust actions against tech giants since 2020—to align them with state goals, fostering hybrid "state-connected" private entities that blend private with SOE oversight. This has led to gains in market value share among top firms, reaching 37.2% in early 2025, yet SOEs absorb over half of corporate credit despite contributing less than a quarter of GDP, raising concerns about resource misallocation that could stifle broader unless balanced by further reforms. episodes demonstrate causal links to heightened firm-level , suggesting potential for gains if state dominance eases in non-strategic tech domains.

Human Capital and Talent Ecosystem

STEM Education System and Outputs

China's basic education system, comprising nine years of compulsory schooling from ages six to fifteen, places significant emphasis on and from primary levels, with curricula designed to build foundational STEM competencies through rigorous drills and problem-solving exercises. This approach contributes to strong performance in international assessments; for instance, students from selected Chinese provinces and cities, such as those represented in prior PISA cycles, achieved mean scores of 591 in 2018, surpassing the OECD average by over 100 points, while scores reached 590. Although full national participation in PISA 2022 was limited, participating Chinese economies like Macao (China) scored 535 in overall , , and reading—second globally after Singapore—indicating sustained proficiency in analytical skills among top performers. The national college entrance examination, known as the , further reinforces STEM prioritization, as in , physics, and chemistry determines access to , channeling a disproportionate share of top students into technical fields. In higher education, over 40% of undergraduate degrees awarded in are in STEM disciplines, compared to about 20% in the United States, reflecting deliberate incentives to expand technical talent pools. Enrollment in STEM programs has surged, with 's universities producing around 5 million STEM graduates annually at the bachelor's and associate levels as of recent estimates, alongside more than 50,000 STEM PhDs in 2022—a 13.7% increase from the prior year. Projections based on current trends suggest annual STEM PhD outputs could exceed 77,000 by 2025. Government initiatives, including the 2024-2035 Outline for Building into a Leading Country in , aim to elevate STEM education quality by integrating practical skills, interdisciplinary approaches, and reduced emphasis on rote , while expanding enrollment—reaching 92% for ages 3-5—to foster early STEM interest. However, critiques highlight persistent challenges: many programs prioritize theoretical knowledge over hands-on application, leading to outdated curricula that inadequately prepare graduates for innovative roles, with some studies noting stagnation or declines in during undergraduate years. Despite these outputs' scale enabling rapid workforce scaling, the system's exam-driven nature may constrain originality, as evidenced by lower per capita innovation metrics relative to inputs, though recent reforms seek to address this through policy-mandated shifts toward . ranks second globally in overall STEM education development, per a 2025 index, underscoring its quantitative strengths amid ongoing qualitative enhancements.

R&D Workforce Scale and Demographics

China possesses the world's largest (R&D) workforce, with (FTE) personnel reaching 6.35 million in 2022, surpassing all other nations. This figure marked an increase from 5.72 million in 2021 and reflected a 1.8-fold expansion since 2012. In terms of researchers specifically, the count stood at approximately 1.85 million FTE that year, yielding 1,849 researchers per million inhabitants—higher than many developed economies but below leaders like or . The business enterprise sector dominates, accounting for the majority of personnel, with compound annual growth rates exceeding 11% in recent years. Demographically, the R&D workforce skews male, with women comprising an average of 24.9% nationally, though regional variations exist—such as 29% in in 2021. In 2018, female R&D personnel numbered 1.76 million, up 6% from the prior year, amid broader growth in and technology roles. Age-wise, the cohort remains relatively youthful, with over 80% of researchers in national key R&D programs under 45 years old as of 2023, aligning with a national labor force average age of 38.3 in 2022. Education levels are elevated, reflecting China's emphasis on higher STEM training; in 2018, among R&D personnel, 452,000 held doctoral degrees and 976,000 master's degrees, with the share of highly educated workers continuing to rise. This composition supports concentration in fields like and applied sciences, though technicians form a significant portion—44% of total R&D personnel in 2020. Overall, the workforce's scale and underpin China's innovation push, though per capita intensity lags advanced peers.

Chinese Diaspora and Talent Repatriation Programs

The , comprising millions of ethnic Chinese living abroad, has played a pivotal role in global science and technology advancements, particularly in fields like , , and . Researchers born in but working overseas—estimated to number in the tens of thousands in top global institutions—have contributed disproportionately to high-impact publications and innovations, often collaborating with China-based teams to facilitate . For instance, diaspora scholars have co-authored papers that propelled China toward parity in certain scientific domains, with exceptional influence in AI where they lead at high-tech firms and academia. China's talent repatriation efforts, formalized through national programs since the mid-2000s, aim to reverse historical brain drain by incentivizing experts to return or contribute remotely. The flagship (TTP), launched in 2008 under the Chinese Communist Party's "innovative country" strategy, targets senior scientists and entrepreneurs with financial incentives, research funding, and institutional positions to bolster domestic R&D in strategic areas like military technologies and . By 2017, the TTP had recruited over 7,000 high-end researchers, many from the , with participants often maintaining dual affiliations to accelerate . Complementary initiatives, such as the Young Thousand Talents (YTT) program introduced in 2011, focus on early-career talent under 40, offering up to 1 million yuan (about $150,000 USD) in startup grants and priority access to labs. These programs have demonstrated measurable success in attracting and retaining talent, with over 16,000 scientists and entrepreneurs returning via various schemes by 2018, contributing to surges in high-quality publications and outputs. Empirical analyses of YTT recruits show that more than half hold PhDs from the world's top 100 STEM universities, and post-recruitment, their scientific exceeds that of non-participants by metrics like citation rates and grant acquisitions, fostering long-term ecosystems in . Returnees often enhance host institutions' global rankings and interdisciplinary collaborations, though outcomes vary by field, with stronger impacts in applied sciences than pure theory. However, repatriation efforts have drawn international scrutiny for potential risks, including non-disclosure of participation and facilitation of acquisition. U.S. agencies like the FBI have documented cases where TTP participants covertly transferred sensitive technologies to Chinese entities, prompting visa restrictions and prosecutions under statutes since 2018. While Chinese officials frame these as merit-based recruitment, critics argue the programs prioritize state-directed goals over , sometimes leading to ethical lapses like grant or undeclared foreign funding, which have eroded trust in networks abroad.

Brain Drain and Retention Challenges

China's science and technology sector has historically faced substantial brain drain, as many of its most talented STEM graduates pursued and remained in careers abroad, particularly , due to higher salaries, advanced infrastructure, and fewer restrictions on inquiry. Between 2017 and 2019, over 83% of Chinese nationals earning science and PhDs in the US continued residing there five years post-graduation. This exodus was exacerbated by domestic factors such as relatively low academic pay, limited spousal opportunities, challenges in children's abroad, and family separations, alongside perceptions of inferior facilities and political constraints on sensitive topics. Geopolitical shifts, including US scrutiny under initiatives like the and visa restrictions, have accelerated a partial since the late 2010s, with Chinese-origin increasingly relocating to amid concerns over , funding cuts, and professional insecurity in the West. The annual number of such departing the US grew from 900 in 2010 to 2,621 in 2021, with 67% of relocations targeting by that year; at least 85 US-based researchers joined Chinese institutions full-time starting in 2024. Surveys of US-based Chinese indicate 61% contemplating departure, 72% feeling unsafe in research, and 42% fearing arbitrary investigations, driving talent toward 's competitive incentives. To retain and repatriate talent, China implemented aggressive programs like the (launched 2008), offering grants, labs, salaries, and family support to attract overseas experts, alongside the Young Thousand Talents initiative targeting early-career PhDs. These efforts have proven effective: the Young Thousand Talents program successfully recruited elite expatriates, boosting their productivity and China's overall STEM output, with participants outperforming domestic peers in publications and grants. By 2023, over 200 such recruitment schemes operated, contributing to rising return rates among diaspora scientists trained abroad. Notwithstanding these gains, retention challenges endure, rooted in systemic issues like restricted , ideological oversight in research prioritization, and of politically sensitive findings, which deter sustained high-impact . Returning frequently experience diminished international visibility, with bibliometric showing declines in global citations and collaborations post-repatriation, as institutional pressures favor applied, state-aligned work over basic inquiry. While incentives have repatriated talent, incomplete integration—evident in hesitancy among "hesitant Hai Gui" (sea turtles, for returnees) due to persistent quality-of-life gaps and risks—limits long-term retention, particularly in fields vulnerable to export controls or allegations. Empirical assessments suggest that without addressing these causal barriers, China's talent risks recurring outflows despite scaled inputs.

Innovation Processes and Outputs

Patent Filings and Technological Standards

has led global patent filings by volume since 2011, with residents filing 1.64 million applications worldwide in 2023, accounting for nearly half of the global total of 3.55 million. The National Administration (CNIPA) received 1.68 million applications in 2023, a 3.6% increase from 2022, predominantly in fields like digital communication and computer technology. This surge stems from government incentives, including subsidies and filing quotas for state-owned enterprises, universities, and research institutions, which prioritize quantity over novelty. In 2024, CNIPA granted 1.045 million , up 13.5% year-on-year, though grants continued to decline amid efforts to curb low-value filings. Despite the volume, analyses indicate lower average quality of Chinese patents compared to those from the or , as measured by forward citations and triadic patent families (filed in multiple jurisdictions). For instance, in , granted nearly 13,000 AI patents in 2024—exceeding the U.S. figure—but U.S. patents garnered higher citation impacts, reflecting greater technological influence. The 2023 patent grant rate was approximately 55%, with many filings involving incremental improvements rather than breakthroughs, exacerbated by lax examination standards and a focus on domestic utility models that offer weaker protection. patent grants dropped 28.75% in the first half of 2025 versus the prior year, signaling potential tightening of criteria amid international scrutiny. Under the (PCT), originated 70,160 international applications in 2024, up nearly 1% from 2023, demonstrating growing outbound ambition but still trailing in high-value international validations. In technological standards, China has transitioned from participant to influencer, contributing significantly to bodies like the (ITU), (ISO), and 3rd Generation Partnership Project (). Chinese firms, notably , hold substantial standard-essential patents (SEPs) in , with Huawei representatives chairing key 3GPP working groups and contributing to over 20% of 5G essential patents declared globally as of 2021. This involvement supports China's "" initiative, aiming for dominance in standards by 2035 through domestic bodies like the Standardization Administration of China (SAC), which aligns national rules with international ones while prioritizing local technologies. However, proposals like Huawei's "New IP" protocol have raised compatibility concerns, viewed by critics as mechanisms to embed Chinese preferences into global , potentially enabling control or features incompatible with Western systems. Participation in European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has expanded, but geopolitical tensions have prompted restrictions on Chinese firms in sensitive areas like development.
Top Origins of Patent Applications Worldwide (2023)Number of Filings
1,640,000
518,364
414,413
Republic of Korea287,954
167,097

Academic Publishing and Citation Metrics

has emerged as the world's leading producer of scientific publications by volume, with Chinese authors contributing approximately 33% of global SCI-indexed papers in 2023, totaling 728,700 publications. This represents a rapid ascent, as 's output surpassed the around 2017 and by 2024 accounted for over 60% more papers than the U.S., driven by substantial investments in research funding that grew from a smaller base to prioritize publication metrics in evaluations. In science and fields specifically, held 27% of global publications in 2022, compared to 17% for the U.S.. In high-quality journals tracked by the , which emphasizes contributions to 82 selective periodicals in the natural s, China maintained its global lead in 2024 based on 2023 data, with its Share metric—a fractional count of author affiliations—rising 17% to 32,122. This dominance spans fields like chemistry, and environmental sciences, and physical sciences, where Chinese institutions such as the University of and University of Science and Technology of China ranked highest. However, citation patterns reveal limitations: over 50% of citations to China's top 10% most-cited papers originate domestically, compared to about 37% for U.S. papers, potentially inflating perceived impact through self-referential networks rather than broad international validation. Concerns over quality persist amid this expansion, as accounts for nearly half of the world's retracted scientific articles as of 2024, with hotspots linked to fabricated data and operations that produce fraudulent manuscripts for sale. In response to scandals, including thousands of retractions by publishers like Hindawi primarily involving Chinese authors, the initiated a nationwide of misconduct in early 2024. These issues trace to structures, where universities historically awarded bonuses exceeding $43,000 for papers in elite journals like or , fostering a "" culture that prioritized quantity and incentivized over rigorous inquiry. Reforms since 2018, including bans on monetary rewards for publications and shifts toward quality-based evaluations, aim to mitigate these distortions, though enforcement challenges remain evident in ongoing retraction trends. Despite leading in volume and select high-impact metrics, 's bibliometric edge lags the U.S. in normalized citation influence for top 1% papers, underscoring a persistent gap between output scale and foundational impact.

Procurement Mechanisms and Market Integration

China's government procurement mechanisms serve as a key instrument for advancing science and technology by prioritizing domestic products and innovations, particularly those deemed "indigenous" under policies initiated in 2006. These mechanisms, governed by the Government Procurement Law (GPL) enacted in 2003 and amended subsequently, mandate eligibility for of products manufactured in unless imports are demonstrably necessary, thereby creating a protected market for local technology firms. The National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation program, launched as part of the 2006 Medium- and Long-Term Plan for Science and Technology Development, granted preferences in to high-tech products incorporating Chinese , aiming to stimulate original innovation through assured government demand. Empirical studies indicate that such has boosted corporate innovation efficiency by signaling market viability and alleviating financing constraints for domestic developers. Under the initiative, unveiled in May 2015, policies were expanded to target self-sufficiency in ten priority sectors, including , , and new materials, with goals to elevate domestic content in core components to 70% by 2025. Government entities and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increasingly substituted foreign technologies with domestic alternatives, supported by catalogs listing accredited indigenous products eligible for preferential bidding. Recent reforms, including a July 2024 State Council action plan, seek to enhance transparency and regulatory oversight in processes while maintaining favoritism for local firms, with the overall market valued at over 3.3 yuan (approximately $463 billion) in 2024. Effective January 1, 2026, new regulations will provide a 20% price preference for "" goods in bidding, further incentivizing localization in areas like AI chips and advanced manufacturing. Market integration in China's technology sector is facilitated through these procurement channels, which bridge state directives with private sector capabilities under the strategy formalized in 2020. This approach emphasizes "internal circulation" via domestic demand and supply chains to achieve technological , while selectively engaging "external circulation" for complementary imports and expertise. acts as a demand-pull mechanism, integrating private firms—often through joint ventures or supplier networks with SOEs—into national ecosystems by guaranteeing scale for viable technologies, as evidenced in green tech sectors where public contracts have accelerated . However, local favoritism persists, with studies showing a 39.9% higher winning probability for bidders from the same as the procuring entity, potentially distorting despite central efforts to unify standards. This integration supports broader goals of reducing foreign dependence, as seen in accelerated swaps of Western tech post-2023 U.S. export controls, though it has drawn criticism for limiting foreign participation and fostering non-market advantages.

International Interactions

Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation

China maintains bilateral science and technology cooperation agreements with over 150 countries and regions, encompassing more than 100 intergovernmental pacts that facilitate joint , academic exchanges, and technology transfers. These arrangements have historically emphasized areas such as , environmental technologies, and high-energy physics, enabling to access advanced methodologies while contributing its growing R&D capacity. However, escalating geopolitical tensions, particularly with Western partners, have prompted restrictions on sensitive technologies, shifting focus toward alliances with and (BRI) participants. The and represent key Western bilateral partners, though cooperation has contracted amid security concerns. The U.S.- Science and Technology Agreement, originally signed in 1979 and renewed through December 2024, has supported breakthroughs in and but faces scrutiny over risks and military end-use, leading to U.S. export controls and reduced academic collaborations. Similarly, the EU- Science and Technology Agreement, in effect since 1998 and tacitly renewed in 2019, promotes reciprocal research in fields like , yet EU de-risking policies have curtailed joint initiatives in and AI due to concerns over technology leakage and uneven reciprocity. Cooperation with has intensified in dual-use technologies, including AI, quantum communications, and space systems, as both nations navigate Western sanctions. In December 2023, joint efforts achieved quantum communication over 3,800 kilometers, exemplifying deepened ties in amid Russia's isolation from Euro-Atlantic partnerships. Under the BRI framework, China has signed science and technology agreements with 49 partner countries, establishing over 70 joint laboratories to advance fields like and , often prioritizing infrastructure-linked R&D over pure scientific exchange. Multilateral engagements, while less dominant than bilateral ones, occur through intergovernmental programs and global initiatives. China's Ministry of Science and Technology supports key R&D plans for international cooperation, funding projects aligned with priorities like and has contributed to efforts such as the U.S.-led but globally participated on technologies, though participation is mediated by bilateral channels. In broader forums, China leverages platforms like the mechanism for technology standards harmonization and joint labs, yet these often reflect power asymmetries favoring host-country agendas over equitable knowledge sharing.

Technology Transfer via Foreign Corporations

Foreign corporations have contributed significantly to technology transfer in China through mechanisms such as joint ventures (JVs), (FDI), and licensing agreements, particularly in restricted sectors like automobiles, , , and semiconductors, where regulations historically mandated partnerships with domestic firms to gain . China's "market for technology" strategy, formalized in policies dating to the and intensified post-2001 WTO accession, leveraged its vast market size to compel foreign firms to share proprietary knowledge, including processes, blueprints, and operational expertise, often via equity JVs requiring technology contributions from the foreign partner. This approach resulted in substantial inflows; for instance, cumulative FDI reached $3.5 trillion by 2022, with a notable portion tied to technology-intensive sectors, enabling Chinese partners to absorb and adapt foreign innovations. In the automotive sector, emblematic of these dynamics, foreign entrants like (with in 1984) and (with SAIC in 1997) transferred engine, assembly, and vehicle platform technologies through JVs, which accounted for over 90% of passenger car production in until the mid-2010s. Empirical analyses indicate these arrangements facilitated quality upgrading for local firms, with JV-exposed Chinese automakers showing 20-30% improvements in and competitiveness by the 2010s, as domestic suppliers integrated transferred know-how into indigenous production. Similar patterns emerged in aviation, where and licensed technologies to Chinese JVs like , contributing to capabilities in composite materials and that underpinned projects like the C919 . However, U.S. assessments, including the Section 301 , documented how these transfers often involved non-market , such as administrative approvals conditioned on IP disclosure, distorting global as Chinese firms later leveraged the acquired technologies to challenge foreign incumbents. Critics, including the U.S. Trade Representative and , argue that such policies systematically eroded foreign firms' competitive edges, with surveys of U.S. companies reporting that 20-30% faced pressure to transfer unrelated to JV operations between 2012 and 2018. In response, enacted reforms, such as prohibiting forced transfers in its 2019 Foreign Investment Law and lifting JV mandates in automobiles (phased out by 2022) and select other industries, alongside the 2020 Phase One trade deal commitments to end discriminatory practices. A 2024 USTR review found partial compliance, with reduced overt coercion but persistent indirect pressures via cybersecurity reviews and rules, sustaining spillovers through ongoing FDI channels. These transfers have accelerated 's technological catch-up, evidenced by rising domestic content in high-tech exports from under 20% in 2000 to over 60% by 2020, though reliance on foreign partnerships highlights gaps in original .

Industrial Espionage and Intellectual Property Acquisition

China engages in systematic acquisition of foreign intellectual property (IP) through espionage and coercive mechanisms, contributing to its technological advancement while imposing significant economic costs on targeted nations. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) characterizes Chinese counterintelligence and economic espionage as a grave threat, involving theft of trade secrets, cyber intrusions, and targeting of businesses, academia, and researchers. A comprehensive survey by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) documents 224 reported instances of Chinese espionage directed at the United States since 2000, spanning sectors like aviation, semiconductors, and biotechnology. These activities often leverage state-directed actors, including hackers affiliated with the People's Liberation Army and Ministry of State Security operatives, to exfiltrate proprietary data for commercial and military gain. High-profile U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) prosecutions underscore the prevalence of such efforts. In June 2020, Chinese national Hao Zhang was convicted of economic and theft for conspiring to steal from U.S. firms while employed at AVIC, a state-owned entity. More recently, in January 2025, former adviser Nathan Rogers was indicted for conspiring in economic to benefit , involving false statements to conceal ties to Chinese entities. The FBI reports a 1,300% increase in Chinese investigations since 2014, with over 2,000 active cases as of 2023, reflecting a shift toward persistent cyber campaigns like those attributed to groups such as APT41. Economic impacts are substantial; the FBI estimates annual U.S. losses from goods, pirated software, and theft at $225 billion to $600 billion, with as the principal source. Beyond direct theft, employs forced policies to compel foreign firms to divulge IP in exchange for . The U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR) 2025 Special 301 Report highlights 's regulatory regime, including mandates and administrative approvals, which condition technology licensing on non-market terms favorable to domestic entities. These practices, prevalent in sectors like automobiles and semiconductors, involve ownership restrictions that enable Chinese partners to extract proprietary knowledge during collaborations. A 2024 USTR review of Section 301 actions confirms that such coerced transfers persist despite reforms, with foreign direct investment and s serving as primary vectors. While maintains these are voluntary market outcomes, empirical evidence from U.S. and EU firm surveys indicates coercion, with non-compliance risking exclusion from 's vast consumer base. Critics, including U.S. congressional reports, argue that these methods underpin China's "" initiative, blending civilian and military applications under doctrines. Enforcement challenges persist, as Chinese courts rarely convict state-linked actors, and extraditions are infrequent, limiting accountability. The U.S. Intelligence Community's 2025 Annual Threat Assessment notes over 90 economic cases involving (PRC) entities as of 2021, emphasizing and advanced as priority targets. Despite the termination of the DOJ's in 2022 amid concerns over profiling, underlying patterns of IP misappropriation continue to drive bilateral tensions and export controls.

Geopolitical Tensions and Export Controls

The has imposed increasingly stringent export controls on advanced technologies to since 2018, framing these measures as necessary to protect amid perceptions of as a strategic competitor in and economic domains. These controls target , hardware, and related manufacturing equipment, with the stated objective of limiting 's capabilities in supercomputing, AI model training, and advanced chip production for potential applications. For instance, in October 2022, the U.S. (BIS) enacted rules restricting exports of chips exceeding certain performance thresholds, such as those with total processing performance over 4800 , and manufacturing equipment capable of producing nodes below 16nm. These were expanded in 2023 and 2024 to close loopholes, including restrictions on U.S. persons assisting Chinese entities in advanced chip design, and further tightened in March 2025 under the subsequent administration by blacklisting additional Chinese firms involved in AI and computing. Allied coordination has amplified these efforts, with the restricting ASML's (EUV) machines essential for cutting-edge chip fabrication, and limiting exports of photoresists and other materials, effectively creating a multilateral barrier to China's access to sub-7nm technology. Empirical data indicates these controls have disrupted China's ecosystem; for example, China's share of the global supercomputer list dropped from leading positions pre-2022 to relying more on domestically produced but less efficient systems, as access to A100/H100 GPUs and equivalents was severed, slowing large-scale AI training by an estimated 20-30% in compute-intensive tasks. However, workarounds persist, such as stockpiling pre-ban hardware and , though enforcement has reduced their scale, with U.S. SME exports to falling from $6.8 billion in 2021 to $4.4 billion by 2023. In response, has accelerated self-reliance initiatives, embedding technological independence in its 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) and previewed expansions in the 15th Plan draft released in October 2025, prioritizing domestic R&D funding exceeding 1 trillion yuan annually and AI chip development to mitigate foreign dependencies. has retaliated with its own export controls, notably imposing licensing requirements and bans on rare earth elements and critical minerals for military end-uses in October 2025, targeting Western defense and sectors while controlling over 80% of global rare earth processing capacity. These measures reflect a causal dynamic where Western restrictions have incentivized 's investment in indigenous innovation, yielding progress in mid-range chips (e.g., Huawei's 7nm Kirin series) but persistent gaps in and high-end AI accelerators, as evidenced by 's lag in producing GPUs competitive with NVIDIA's latest architectures. Critics from U.S.-based think tanks argue the controls risk backfiring by spurring 's long-term capabilities, while Chinese state analyses portray them as hegemonic , though independent assessments confirm short-term efficacy in preserving U.S. technological edges without fully decoupling global supply chains.

Systemic Challenges and Criticisms

Corruption, Fraud, and Governance Issues

China's scientific research sector has been plagued by widespread fraud, particularly in , where the country accounts for the highest global rate of paper retractions. A nationwide ordered by authorities revealed over 17,000 retractions involving Chinese co-authors since 2021, with retraction rates exceeding 20 per 10,000 articles, including papers. This surge stems from systemic incentives prioritizing publication volume for promotions and funding, fostering practices like , , and the use of paper mills. From 2012 to 2023, China's average retraction rate for scientific articles hovered at 0.14%, with hotspots concentrated in domestic institutions. Corruption in allocation exacerbates these issues, as evidenced by breaches in grant protocols, unauthorized labeling of support, and embezzlement. In July 2025, the targeted the sector, investigating cases of buying and selling papers alongside , amid broader drives. The National Natural Science Foundation of sanctioned 25 researchers in July 2025 and 26 in April 2025 for , including falsified applications, reflecting ongoing efforts to deter but highlighting persistent vulnerabilities in distribution. Empirical analysis indicates that such disrupts the intended link between state R&D subsidies and genuine outputs. Governance structures compound these problems through heavy state oversight and politicization, which prioritize national directives over independent inquiry. Chinese scientists report stronger obligations to serve agendas compared to international peers, potentially stifling critical and enabling cover-ups of flawed data, as seen in tech sectors like and where officials have been purged for graft. Limited transparency in misconduct probes and ethical lapses, such as inadequate bioethics , further undermine integrity, despite platforms like New Threads exposing violations. Funding agencies employ both proactive audits and complaint-driven investigations to address fraud, yet remains uneven due to institutional protections for high-profile actors.

Intellectual Property Enforcement Weaknesses

China's intellectual property enforcement framework, while bolstered by recent legal reforms such as the 2021 Patent Law amendments increasing potential damages, continues to exhibit systemic weaknesses that undermine protection, particularly for patents and trade secrets in high-technology domains. Judicial enforcement is hampered by local protectionism, where provincial courts often prioritize regional economic interests over impartial adjudication, resulting in favorable rulings for domestic firms in infringement disputes. Empirical analysis of IP cases from to revealed that courts in patent-heavy regions exhibited biases toward local defendants, with win rates for plaintiffs dropping significantly when suing nonlocal entities. This persists despite the establishment of specialized IP courts in , , and in 2014, as evidenced by ongoing concerns in econometric studies confirming judicial favoritism through metrics like case acceptance rates and verdict patterns. Trade secret enforcement poses acute challenges in science and technology sectors, where employee mobility and state-supported acquisition facilitate misappropriation without robust recourse. Proving trade secret theft requires stringent evidence under China's Anti-Unfair Competition Law, often unattainable due to limited discovery mechanisms and ineffective non-compete agreements, leading to low success rates in civil actions. The U.S. Trade Representative's 2024 Special 301 Report highlights persistent deficiencies in addressing trade secret theft, including cyber-enabled intrusions targeting U.S. tech firms, with enforcement efforts failing to deter state-linked actors or yield deterrent penalties. In 2023, stakeholders reported minimal progress in prosecutorial outcomes for such cases, exacerbating vulnerabilities in semiconductors and AI, where proprietary algorithms and designs are routinely compromised. Patent enforcement weaknesses further erode incentives for , as administrative invalidation proceedings are exploited to challenge foreign-held technologies in strategic industries like and . Requests for patent invalidation surged, with Chinese entities filing over 70% of challenges against non-domestic s at the China National Administration in recent years, often preceding infringement suits to weaken rights holders. Courts award statutory damages infrequently exceeding RMB 1 million (approximately USD 140,000) in most cases, insufficient to offset R&D costs in advanced , while tech components—such as fake semiconductors—proliferate with limited border seizures translating to prosecutions. These gaps, compounded by platforms hosting pirated software and designs, stifle original research, as firms anticipate rapid reverse-engineering post-disclosure. Overall, these enforcement shortcomings, rooted in decentralized judicial authority and inadequate deterrence, perpetuate reliance on over indigenous in China's S&T ecosystem, as quantified by persistent high infringement volumes despite rising case filings—over 37,000 police investigations in 2024—yielding disproportionately few convictions with meaningful sanctions. Foreign technology providers thus face elevated risks, contributing to self-reliance gaps in critical domains.

Imbalance Between Basic and Applied Research

China's research and development (R&D) framework exhibits a pronounced emphasis on applied research over basic research, reflecting policy priorities geared toward rapid technological commercialization and national self-reliance goals. Basic research, which involves exploratory investigations without immediate practical applications, constitutes a minor fraction of total R&D expenditures, standing at 6.91% in 2024 (249.7 billion yuan out of 3.613 trillion yuan total). This share marked a slight increase from prior years, reaching 6% for the first time in 2019, yet remains substantially below levels in advanced economies like the United States, where basic research accounted for 15% of R&D in 2021. Enterprises, which funded 77.1% of national R&D in 2015, allocate disproportionately little to basic research, prioritizing applied and experimental development for competitive market gains. This skew stems from systemic incentives in China's innovation ecosystem, where evaluation metrics and funding mechanisms reward quantifiable outputs such as patents and prototypes over long-term fundamental inquiries. Government-directed R&D, comprising a significant portion of public spending, aligns with strategic sectors like semiconductors and , favoring applied advancements to support and military capabilities. Historically, central funding bodies like the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) support , but enterprise contributions lag, with Chinese firms devoting far less to foundational work compared to their U.S. counterparts. Consequently, China produces high volumes of applied innovations—evident in its dominance in and infrastructure technologies—but generates fewer Nobel-level breakthroughs or paradigm-shifting theories, perpetuating reliance on imported core technologies. Recent policy shifts under leaders like Xi Jinping aim to rectify this disparity by elevating basic research as a pillar of self-reliance, with priorities directed toward strategic fields including quantum technology and information, artificial intelligence, biotechnology and life health sciences, semiconductors and integrated circuits, advanced materials and nanotechnology, new energy technologies, and aerospace and deep exploration, emphasizing forward-looking, systematic research linked to national needs and industrial applications over purely fundamental projects with less direct strategic returns, such as certain high-energy physics initiatives like the CEPC. In 2023, directives emphasized strengthening foundational studies to achieve "higher-level self-reliance" in science and technology, with basic research funding growth outpacing overall R&D at 10.5% in 2024. The 14th Five-Year Plan and subsequent initiatives target raising the basic research share toward 8%, alongside reforms to NSFC grants amid surging applications (over 380,000 in 2024, approved at 13%). However, structural hurdles persist, including fragmented organizational coordination and a cultural bias toward short-term results, which analysts argue could hinder original innovation without deeper institutional changes.

Dependence on Foreign Technology and Self-Reliance Gaps

Despite ambitious initiatives like "," which targeted 70% domestic self-sufficiency in semiconductors by 2025, has fallen short, with actual self-sufficiency rates projected at around 50% or lower in advanced nodes due to persistent technological barriers in and sub-7nm fabrication processes. The plan achieved gains in mid-range chip production and assembly but failed to close gaps in core and equipment, leaving reliant on imports for over 80% of high-end logic chips as of 2024, a exacerbated by U.S. export controls since 2018. In aviation, China depends heavily on foreign suppliers for critical components, including jet engines for its aircraft, where domestic WS-20 turbofans lag behind Western equivalents in thrust-to-weight ratios and reliability, prompting suspended U.S. exports of engines and in May 2025 that halted production ramps. Efforts to indigenize have progressed in airframes but stalled in high-bypass technology, with China importing over 90% of its engines from firms like GE and Rolls-Royce as of 2023. Software and operating systems represent another gap, with Chinese firms like still incorporating U.S.-origin code in enterprise solutions and relying on foreign kernels for Android alternatives, despite bans; this exposure was highlighted in 2025 trade analyses showing acute vulnerabilities to software export restrictions. In shipbuilding, while dominates hull construction, it imports foreign marine engines and design software for high-end vessels, underscoring incomplete in . The 15th Five-Year Plan, outlined in October 2025, reaffirms pushes for self-sufficiency in semiconductors, AI, and basic research amid U.S. rivalry, but analysts note structural hurdles like talent shortages in foundational R&D and overemphasis on state-directed scaling over innovation, perpetuating import dependence in 20-30% of high-tech inputs across sectors. These gaps, while narrowing in volume for mid-tier goods, remain pronounced in cutting-edge domains, as evidenced by slowed progress under export curbs and internal assessments of "Made in China 2025" shortcomings.

Key Research and Development Domains

Space Science and Exploration

China's space science and exploration efforts, coordinated primarily by the China National Space Administration (CNSA) and the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA), have advanced rapidly since the early 2000s, emphasizing independent launch capabilities via the Long March rocket family and a focus on lunar, planetary, and human spaceflight missions. The program has achieved milestones such as the first crewed launch in 2003 with astronaut Yang Liwei aboard Shenzhou 5, establishing China as the third nation to independently send humans to space. By 2025, China had conducted over 200 space missions since 2020, including satellite deployments and interplanetary probes, underscoring its emergence as a major space power with state-directed investments prioritizing self-reliance amid geopolitical restrictions on foreign technology. The , representing a key achievement in global space leadership through China's independent operation of a permanent human spaceflight infrastructure, became fully operational in 2022 following the assembly of its core Tianhe module (launched 2021) and laboratory modules Wentian and Mengtian. In 2025, the station supported ongoing crewed operations, including the Shenzhou 20 mission's docking and multiple extravehicular activities for maintenance and experiments, alongside resupply via Tianzhou 9 carrying a record cargo load and upgraded spacesuits. Scientific payloads on Tiangong have facilitated microgravity research in life sciences, materials, and fluid physics, with plans for modular expansions in 2025 to enhance long-duration habitation capabilities ahead of a targeted crewed lunar landing around 2030. Lunar exploration under the Chang'e program has yielded key scientific data on the Moon's and resources. Chang'e-4 achieved the first on the far side in 2019, with the rover operating for over two years to analyze subsurface composition via radar. Chang'e-5 returned 1.7 kilograms of near-side samples in 2020, followed by Chang'e-6's successful far-side sample retrieval of 1.9 kilograms in 2024, providing insights into basaltic volcanism and the Moon's evolutionary history. Upcoming missions include Chang'e-7 in 2026 for resource surveys and Chang'e-8 in 2028 to test in-situ utilization technologies like with lunar . Planetary science efforts include the Tianwen-1 mission, launched in 2020, which orbited Mars in 2021 and deployed the Zhurong rover for surface traversal and geological mapping, marking China's first independent Mars landing and the second nation after the U.S. to achieve orbiting, landing, and roving on a debut attempt. In 2025, Tianwen-2 launched for asteroid sample return from 469219 Kamo'oalewa, advancing understanding of near-Earth objects. Future probes encompass Tianwen-3 for Mars sample return, Tianwen-4 for Jupiter system exploration around 2030, and solar polar-orbit missions, positioning China to contribute data on outer solar system dynamics despite challenges in propulsion and deep-space communications reliant on iterative domestic development. The Xuntian space telescope, slated for mid-2025 launch, will support astrophysics observations in ultraviolet and optical wavelengths, flying in formation with Tiangong for servicing.

Electronics, Semiconductors, and Information Technology

China's electronics industry leads global manufacturing output, accounting for approximately 30% of worldwide production in 2024, with particular dominance in consumer electronics such as smartphones, where it exports 63% of the global total. This scale stems from extensive assembly operations, low labor costs, and supply chain integration, enabling firms like and BYD Electronics to produce billions of devices annually for international brands. However, value-added remains concentrated in labor-intensive assembly rather than high-end design or components, with core often sourced abroad. In semiconductors, China operates the world's largest market by consumption, representing 29% of global demand in recent years, but fabrication capabilities trail leaders like in advanced nodes. (SMIC), the leading domestic , achieved of 7nm chips by 2023 without () , a feat reliant on deep ultraviolet adaptations and multi-patterning techniques that yield lower efficiency and higher costs compared to Western peers. Efforts to reach 5nm by 2025 face technical hurdles, including equipment shortages due to U.S. export controls imposed since October 2022 and expanded in 2023–2025, which restrict access to critical tools from firms like ASML and . These controls have demonstrably slowed China's progress in chips, though domestic investment—exceeding $150 billion since 2014 under initiatives like —has boosted capacity in mature nodes (28nm and above) for automotive and IoT applications. The program targeted 70% self-sufficiency in core materials by 2025, yet import dependency persists at over 80% for advanced logic and chips, highlighting gaps in yield rates and despite filings surging to 55% of global applications in 2021–2022. Information technology hardware integrates these sectors, with Huawei's HiSilicon designing chips like the Kirin series and Ascend AI processors, the latter produced by SMIC to circumvent Nvidia restrictions. Huawei plans to double Ascend 910C output in 2026, signaling adaptation to sanctions via stockpiling and indigenous alternatives, though performance lags Nvidia's H100 by 20–40% in training efficiency. China's IT ecosystem supports infrastructure deployment, operating the world's largest network with over 4.7 million base stations by late 2025. In digital payments, platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay provide the most mature ecosystems globally, leading the revolution in mobile transactions. China has also advanced quantum communication, achieving the longest quantum key distribution network spanning 1200 km via the Micius satellite. However, software and ecosystem challenges persist, including reliance on foreign operating systems and vulnerabilities exposed by state-directed backdoors in equipment. Overall, while scale drives market leverage—evident in Huawei's across the chain—systemic barriers like restricted technology access and inefficiencies in R&D allocation impede parity with global leaders.

Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning

China's pursuit of leadership in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) is guided by the 2017 New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan, which sets a target for achieving global preeminence by 2030 through massive investments in research, infrastructure, and applications. The plan emphasizes integration across sectors like manufacturing and defense, with recent policies such as the 2024 Central Economic Work Conference initiative promoting AI-driven digital transformation in traditional industries. By 2024, China had deployed 246 exaflops (EFLOP/s) of AI compute capacity, targeting 300 EFLOP/s by the end of 2025, supported by state-backed infrastructure megaprojects to bolster domestic computing power amid technological deglobalization. Private investment in generative AI surged nearly fivefold from $650 million in 2023, reflecting accelerated commercialization despite overall private AI funding trailing the United States at $9.3 billion versus $109.1 billion in 2024. Leading Chinese firms, including Alibaba, , , and , alongside startups like DeepSeek and , have developed competitive large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba's Qwen series and DeepSeek's offerings, which narrowed performance gaps with U.S. counterparts on benchmarks in 2024. DeepSeek's open-source models, trained at significantly lower costs (approximately $6 million versus billions for leading U.S. models), demonstrate cost efficiency surpassing U.S. equivalents in applications like clinical and public health benchmarks, where they match or exceed proprietary LLMs in performance. Chinese models, often optimized for efficiency and cost-effective scaling, achieved scores comparable to American ones on metrics like MMLU and GSM8K, with Alibaba's Qwen3 235B outperforming some U.S. open-source models in specific evaluations by mid-2025. However, U.S. institutions released 40 notable AI models in 2024 compared to fewer high-impact ones from , maintaining an edge in breakthrough innovations and total compute resources. dominates in AI volume, filing over 2.5 times more annually than the U.S., particularly in subfields, and leads global AI publications, though critiques highlight quantity over foundational quality. AI applications in China extend to military domains under the People's Liberation Army (PLA), where generative AI supports intelligence analysis, target identification, and autonomous systems, evidenced by multiple defense industry patent filings for AI-enhanced tasks. Civilian-military fusion blurs sector boundaries, with firms contributing to PLA capabilities in surveillance and decision-making, raising concerns over dual-use technologies that challenge export controls. Despite progress, systemic challenges persist, including dependence on imported advanced semiconductors—exacerbated by U.S. restrictions—and internal hurdles like data silos, talent gaps in cutting-edge algorithms, and deployment obstacles in military contexts. These factors, combined with a state-directed model prioritizing applied over basic research, may constrain long-term innovation despite volume metrics.

Biotechnology, Health Sciences, and Pharmaceuticals

China's biotechnology sector has experienced rapid expansion, driven by substantial government investment and policy initiatives such as the "" plan, which designates biotech as a priority for . By 2023, biopharma expenditure reached approximately $15 billion, a marked increase from $35 million in , reflecting a shift from production toward innovative therapies in areas like , , and precision . In the first half of 2025, Chinese assets accounted for 32% of global pharmaceutical out-licensing deal value, up from 21% in prior years, with projections estimating 37% for the full year according to investment analyses. The pharmaceutical market, the world's second-largest, generated $80.4 billion in revenue in 2024 and is forecasted to reach $126.6 billion by 2030, with output valued at $183.2 billion in 2025. In 2024, China approved 93 innovative drugs, the highest in a decade, with 42% developed domestically, focusing on biologics and small-molecule therapies amid a transition from generics dominance. Key players include BGI Genomics, a leader in DNA sequencing and with global impact, and firms like Innovent Biologics and Junshi Biosciences, which have advanced antibody drugs and partnered internationally for treatments. In health sciences, China has emerged as the top global venue for clinical trials, conducting trials across cancer, cardiovascular, and metabolic diseases, supported by regulatory reforms accelerating approvals. Innovations include AI-assisted and , with the market size exceeding 286 billion RMB ($40 billion) in 2024. Companies such as Abogen Biosciences and Harbour BioMed contribute through antibody platforms and bispecific therapies, often licensing to Western firms like and . Despite these advances, the sector confronts challenges including vulnerabilities, which heighten risks for global partners due to enforcement gaps and potential pressures, and issues amid geopolitical tensions. concerns in and a historical reliance on generics have persisted, though reforms aim to foster genuine ; however, much progress builds on foreign collaborations, raising questions about indigenous breakthroughs versus adaptive strategies.

Advanced Manufacturing and Materials Science

China's advanced manufacturing sector has been propelled by state-led initiatives such as "," launched in 2015 to elevate the country from low-end assembly to high-tech production, targeting 70% self-sufficiency in core components and materials by 2025. By 2024, China achieved substantial progress in select areas, including electric vehicles, , high-speed rail with the world's largest network exceeding 48,000 km in operational length, and batteries, where domestic content and global market shares surged, contributing to a 3.5% increase in China's global manufacturing share between 2019 and 2022. However, overall self-sufficiency goals remain unmet in critical technologies like semiconductors, with reliance on foreign inputs persisting despite heavy subsidies exceeding $100 billion annually. In and , leads global installations, deploying 295,000 industrial robots in 2024—over half of the worldwide total and nearly ten times the U.S. figure—bringing operational stock to over 2 million units, surpassing the rest of the world combined. This leadership extends to consumer drones, where DJI dominates with over 90% of the global market share as of 2024, pioneering widespread commercial and prosumer applications. This density supports in sectors like automobiles and , with robot manufacturing output reaching one-third of global supply in 2024. State policies, including fiscal incentives and preferences, have driven this scale, enabling efficiencies in high-volume assembly but often prioritizing quantity over proprietary innovation, as many systems integrate imported components. Materials science advancements underpin these manufacturing gains, particularly in rare earth elements, where China controls 61% of global extraction and 92% of refining capacity as of 2025. Recent export controls announced on October 9, 2025, by the Ministry of Commerce further restrict dual-use magnets and processing technologies, reinforcing leverage for applications in EVs, wind turbines, and defense. In battery materials, China dominates lithium-ion production, with breakthroughs in graphene-enhanced cells improving charge rates and capacity, though scalability relies on state-backed R&D from institutions like the . research, including atomic-scale nanolasers developed in 2024, positions China at the forefront of next-generation and , yet peer-reviewed outputs highlight incremental adaptations of Western foundational work rather than paradigm shifts. Key challenges include uneven and overcapacity, as evidenced by excess production in solar panels and , which distort global markets. Despite these, investments totaling trillions of yuan have yielded tangible outputs, such as high-strength alloys for , supporting exports that reached $3.6 trillion in manufactured goods in 2024. Future trajectories hinge on bridging gaps in , where China's patent filings lead quantitatively but lag in high-impact citations compared to the U.S. and .

Energy, Environment, and Sustainable Technologies

maintains the world's largest , with comprising the dominant fuel source, accounting for approximately 79% of CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in recent years. In , demand reached a record 4.9 billion tonnes, increasing by 1% year-on-year, while coal-fired power generation also hit a historic high of 9,852 billion kilowatt-hours, up nearly 7% from 2023. power generation, predominantly coal-based, rose by 1.5% in , underscoring 's role in meeting surging demand amid economic recovery and . Despite policy commitments to peak emissions before 2030, new coal power construction accelerated in , reaching a 10-year high with initiating 93% of global coal plant starts, often justified as backup for intermittent renewables but contributing to overcapacity. Renewable energy deployment has expanded rapidly, driven by state subsidies, manufacturing dominance, and grid investments, positioning as the global leader in production and installation scales. China dominates global solar panel manufacturing, holding over 80% of photovoltaic module capacity, and leads in wind turbine production, accounting for more than 65% of global installations in recent years. In 2024, the country added over 373 gigawatts (GW) of renewable capacity, including a record 277 GW of solar photovoltaic and 80 GW of , bringing total installed renewables to 1,878 GW and surpassing 2030 targets years early. This accounted for about 60% of projected global renewable expansion through 2030, with solar capacity alone exceeding 600 GW by year-end. invested $625 billion in clean energy in 2024, representing 31% of worldwide totals, fueling exports of solar panels, turbines, and batteries while lowering global costs through scale. However, challenges persist, including grid curtailment rates and leading to price collapses in solar modules. Nuclear power supports baseload needs, with 58 operable reactors providing 55 GW of capacity as of 2025, ranking second globally after the . China connected three new reactors to the grid in 2024 and approved ten more in April 2025 across five projects, including advanced designs like the , enabling costs below global averages through standardized builds and domestic supply chains. By 2030, nuclear capacity is projected to exceed the U.S., with over 20 reactors under , though inland projects face pauses due to water and concerns. In sustainable transportation, dominates electric vehicle (EV) production, manufacturing around 10 million units in 2024, capturing over 50% of domestic market share and 58% globally, bolstered by battery giants like and BYD controlling over 75% of global lithium-ion battery cell production and key supply chain elements. These firms excel in cost efficiency and fast-charging technologies, with CATL demonstrating batteries enabling over 300 miles of range in five minutes of charging, positioning them ahead of competitors like Tesla in these metrics. Exports surged, with EVs comprising 40% of global shipments, though trade tensions highlight dependencies on imported minerals despite self-reliance pushes. Battery and EV innovations, including solid-state prototypes, stem from heavy R&D, but environmental costs arise from mining and recycling gaps. Environmental outcomes reflect mixed policy efficacy: air quality improved with average PM2.5 concentrations falling to 29.3 micrograms per cubic meter in , a 2.7% decline meeting interim targets, attributed to curbs in cities and renewable shifts. Yet severe episodes persist, with ranking among the world's top polluted cities on multiple days, and regions like exceeding WHO guidelines. Carbon emissions, at 15.8 GtCO2e excluding land use, grew modestly by 0.4-0.8% in but showed signs of plateauing due to clean energy surges outpacing demand; analysts note this as the first reversal in rises, though 's persistence and data opacity raise verification doubts from independent monitors. Policies like the 14th Five-Year Plan have reduced intensities but face enforcement inconsistencies, with local growth priorities often overriding national emission caps.

Military and Dual-Use Technologies

China's military modernization emphasizes the integration of advanced technologies through the (MCF) strategy, which mandates the sharing of resources, expertise, and innovations between civilian enterprises and the (PLA) to accelerate capabilities in dual-use domains such as , , and semiconductors. This approach, formalized in national policies since 2015, leverages commercial sector advancements to address gaps in indigenous military tech, with state directives compelling private firms to contribute to defense R&D. By 2024, MCF had facilitated rapid prototyping and deployment, though implementation faces challenges from issues and uneven technological maturity. In hypersonic weapons, China maintains a lead, having operationalized systems like the paired with the (HGV), capable of speeds exceeding Mach 5 and maneuvers to evade defenses. In September 2025, showcased a new hypersonic designed for "powerful penetration" strikes, highlighting ongoing tests and production scaling. These developments, supported by sustained investment over two decades, outpace U.S. efforts in testing and deployment volume. Dual-use aspects include shared facilities and from civilian firms, enabling applications in both precision strikes and potential anti-satellite roles. Artificial intelligence applications in the PLA focus on autonomous systems, intelligence analysis, and decision-making tools, with military adaptations of civilian large language models like Meta's Llama repurposed for tactical planning and . Generative AI tools, deployed by June 2025, process vast intelligence datasets for the PLA, enhancing non-combat functions like and extending to simulations. Under MCF, private firms supply AI algorithms for drone swarms and command systems, with PLA directives integrating these into operations to achieve "informatized" warfare by 2035. Such efforts prioritize speed over ethical constraints, contrasting with Western regulatory approaches. Quantum technologies represent a dual-use frontier, with China advancing military-grade quantum radars and computers to counter stealth aircraft and secure communications. By October 2025, mass production of photon detectors enabled quantum radars purportedly capable of detecting U.S. stealth fighters at extended ranges, drawing on civilian quantum communication networks. In September 2025, the firm TuringQ delivered initial quantum computers to the PLA's Cyberspace Force for code-breaking and simulation tasks. The 2024 DoD assessment notes PLA investments in quantum imaging and navigation to bolster ISR and precision-guided munitions, though full operational maturity lags behind sensing applications. Nuclear forces have expanded significantly, with over 600 operational warheads as of mid-2024, more than doubling since 2019, including new silo-based ICBMs and submarine-launched systems under development. Dual-use elements involve civilian nuclear tech for warhead miniaturization and hypersonic delivery vehicles, projecting a stockpile exceeding 1,000 by 2030. Directed-energy weapons, such as vehicle-launched high-power microwaves tested in 2024, exemplify MCF's role in blending commercial electronics with anti-drone and electronic warfare capabilities. Shipbuilding dual-use further supports naval expansion, with commercial yards producing hulls adaptable for carriers and amphibious assault ships. These advancements, driven by state subsidies and acquisition of foreign know-how, aim for strategic deterrence but raise proliferation risks due to opaque testing and export controls evasion.

References

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