Hubbry Logo
Liberalism and progressivism within IslamLiberalism and progressivism within IslamMain
Open search
Liberalism and progressivism within Islam
Community hub
Liberalism and progressivism within Islam
logo
7 pages, 0 posts
0 subscribers
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Be the first to start a discussion here.
Liberalism and progressivism within Islam
Liberalism and progressivism within Islam
from Wikipedia

Liberalism and progressivism within Islam or simply Islamic liberalism or Islamic progressivism are a range of interpretation of Islamic understanding and practice, it is a religiously left-leaning view, similar to Christian and other religious progressivism.[1] Some Muslims have created a considerable body of progressive interpretation of Islamic understanding and practice. Their work is sometimes characterized as progressive[2] (Arabic: الإسلام التقدمي al-Islām at-taqaddumī) or liberal Islam.[3] Some scholars, such as Omid Safi, differentiate between "progressive Muslims" (post-colonial, anti-imperialist, and critical of modernity and the West) versus "liberal advocates of Islam" (an older movement embracing modernity).[4] Liberal Islam originally emerged from the Islamic revivalist movement of the 18th–19th centuries.[1] Leftist ideas are considered controversial by some traditional fundamentalist Muslims, who criticize liberal Muslims on the grounds of being too Western and/or rationalistic.[1][5]

The methodologies of liberal and progressive Islam rest on the re-interpretation of traditional Islamic sacred scriptures (the Quran) and other texts (the Hadith), a process called ijtihad.[1][6][page needed] This reinterpreting can vary from minor to fundamental, including re-interpretation based on the belief that while the meaning of the Quran is a revelation, its expression in words is the work of the Islamic prophet Muhammad in his particular time and context.

Liberal Muslims see themselves as returning to the principles of the early ummah and as promoting the ethical and pluralistic intent of the Quran.[1][7] The reform movement uses monotheism (tawhid) as "an organizing principle for human society and the basis of religious knowledge, history, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, as well as social, economic and world order".[8]

Liberal Muslims affirm the promotion of progressive values such as democracy, gender equality, human rights, LGBT rights, women's rights, religious pluralism, interfaith marriage,[9][10] freedom of expression, freedom of thought, and freedom of religion;[1] opposition to theocracy and total rejection of Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism;[1] and a modern view of Islamic theology, ethics, sharia, culture, tradition, and other ritualistic practices in Islam.[1] Liberal Muslims claim that the re-interpretation of the Islamic scriptures is important in order to preserve their relevance in the 21st century.[1][11]

Background in Islamic philosophy

[edit]

The rise of Islam, based on both the transmission of the Quran and the life of Muhammad, strongly altered the power balances and perceptions of origin of power in the Mediterranean region. Early Islamic philosophy emphasized an inexorable link between religion and science, and the process of ijtihad to find truth — in effect, all philosophy was "political" as it had real implications for governance. This view was challenged by the "rationalist" Muʿtazilite philosophers, who held a more Hellenistic view, emphasizing reason above revelation, and as such are known to modern scholars as the first speculative theologians of Islam; they were supported by a secular aristocracy who sought freedom of action independent of the Caliphate. By the late ancient period, the "traditionalist" Ashʿarīte theology had in general triumphed over rationalists. According to the Ashʿarītes, reason must be subordinate to the Quran and the sunnah.[12]

Ibn Rushd

[edit]
Ibn Rushd was the preeminent philosopher in the history of Al-Andalus. 14th-century painting by Andrea di Bonaiuto

Ibn Rushd (1126–1198) often Latinized as Averroes, was an Andalusian polymath. Being described as "founding father of secular thought in Western Europe",[13][14] he was known by the nickname the Commentator for his precious commentaries on Aristotle's works. His main work was The Incoherence of the Incoherence in which he defended philosophy against al-Ghazali's claims in The Incoherence of the Philosophers. His other works were the Fasl al-Maqal and the Kitab al-Kashf.[13][14] Ibn Rushd presented an argument in Fasl al-Maqal (Decisive Treatise) providing a justification for the emancipation of science and philosophy from official Ash'ari theology and that there is no inherent contradiction between philosophy and religion; thus Averroism has been considered a precursor to modern secularism.[15][16][17] Ibn Rushd accepts the principle of women's equality. According to him, they should be educated and allowed to serve in the military; the best among them might be tomorrow's philosophers or rulers.[18][19] The 13th-century philosophical movement in Latin Christian and Jewish tradition based on Ibn Rushd's work is called Averroism. Ibn Rushd became something of a symbolic figure in the debate over the decline and proposed revitalization of Islamic thought and Islamic society in the late 20th century. A notable proponent of such a revival of Averroist thought in Islamic society was Mohammed Abed al-Jabri with his Critique de la Raison Arabe (1982).[20]

Islamic Modernists

[edit]

Rifa'a al-Tahtawi

[edit]
Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, 1801–1873

Egyptian Egyptologist and renaissance intellectual Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801−1873) is considered one of the early adapters to Islamic Modernism. Islamic Modernists attempted to integrate Islamic principles with European social theories. In 1831, Rifa'a al-Tahtawi was part of the statewide effort to modernize the Egyptian infrastructure and education. They introduced his Egyptian audience to Enlightenment ideas such as secular authority and political rights and liberty; his ideas regarding how a modern civilized society ought to be and what constituted by extension a civilized or "good Egyptian"; and his ideas on public interest and public good.[21] Tahtawi's work was the first effort in what became an Egyptian renaissance (nahda) that flourished in the years between 1860 and 1940.[22]

In 1826, Al-Tahtawi was sent to Paris by Mehmet Ali. There, he studied at an educational mission for five years, returning in 1831. Tahtawi was appointed director of the School of Languages. At the school, he worked translating European books into Arabic. Tahtawi was instrumental in translating military manuals, geography, and European history.[23] In total, al-Tahtawi supervised the translation of over 2,000 foreign works into Arabic. He even made favorable comments about French society in some of his books.[24] Tahtawi stressed that the Principles of Islam are compatible with those of European Modernity. In his piece, The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris, Tahtawi discusses the patriotic responsibility of citizenship. He uses Roman civilization as an example of what could become of Islamic civilizations; at one point, all Romans are united under one Caesar but split into East and West. After splitting, the two nations see "all its wars ended in defeat, and it retreated from a perfect existence to nonexistence." Tahtawi understands that if Egypt is unable to remain united, it could fall prey to outside invaders. He stresses the importance of citizens defending the patriotic duty of their country. One way to protect one's country, according to Tahtawi, is to accept the changes that come with a modern society.[25]

Muhammad Abduh

[edit]
Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905)

Egyptian Islamic jurist and religious scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849—1905), regarded as one of the key founding figures of Islamic Modernism,[26] broke the rigidity of the Muslim ritual, dogma, and family ties.[27] Abduh argued that Muslims could not simply rely on the interpretations of texts provided by medieval clerics, they needed to use reason to keep up with changing times. He said that in Islam, man was not created to be led by a bridle, man was given intelligence so that he could be guided by knowledge. According to Abduh, a teacher's role was to direct men towards study. He believed that Islam encouraged men to detach from the world of their ancestors and that Islam reproved the slavish imitation of tradition. He said that the two greatest possessions relating to religion that man was graced with were independence of will and independence of thought and opinion. It was with the help of these tools that he could attain happiness. He believed that the growth of Western civilization in Europe was based on these two principles. He thought that Europeans were roused to act after a large number of them were able to exercise their choice and to seek out facts with their minds.[28] In his works, he portrays God as educating humanity from its childhood through its youth and then on to adulthood. According to him, Islam is the only religion whose dogmas can be proven by reasoning. He was against polygamy and thought that it was an archaic custom. He believed in a form of Islam that would liberate men from enslavement, provide equal rights for all human beings, abolish the religious scholar's monopoly on exegesis, and abolish racial discrimination and religious compulsion.[29]

Muhammad Abduh claimed in his book Al-Idtihad fi Al-Nasraniyya wa Al-Islam that no one had exclusive religious authority in the Islamic world. He argued that the Caliph did not represent religious authority, because he was not infallible nor was the Caliph the person to whom the revelation was given; therefore, according to Abduh, the Caliph and other Muslims are equal.[30] ʿAbduh argued that the Caliph should have the respect of the ummah but not rule it; the unity of the umma is a moral unity which does not prevent its division into national states.[31] Mohammad Abduh made great efforts to preach harmony between Sunnis and Shias. Broadly speaking, he preached brotherhood between all schools of thought in Islam.[32] Abduh regularly called for better friendship between religious communities. As Christianity was the second biggest religion in Egypt, he devoted special efforts towards friendship between Muslims and Christians. He had many Christian friends and many a time he stood up to defend Copts.[32]

Other Islamic thinkers

[edit]

Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd

[edit]

Egyptian Qur'anic post-modern thinker, author, academic Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd is one of the leading liberal theologians in Islam. He is famous for his project of a humanistic Qur'anic hermeneutics, which "challenged mainstream views" on the Qur'an sparking "controversy and debate".[33] While not denying that the Qur'an was of divine origin, Zayd argued that it was a "cultural product" that had to be read in the context of the language and culture of seventh century Arabs,[34] and could be interpreted in more than one way.[35] He also criticized the use of religion to exert political power.[36] In 1995 an Egyptian Sharia court declared him an apostate, this led to threats of death and his fleeing Egypt several week later.[36] He later "quietly" returned to Egypt where he died.[36] According to scholar Navid Kermani "three key themes" emerge from Abu Zayd's work:

  1. to trace the various interpretations and historical settings of the single Qur'anic text from the early days of Islam up to the present;
  2. to demonstrate the "interpretational diversity" (al-ta 'addud alta 'wili)[37] that exists within the Islamic tradition;
  3. and to show how this diversity has been "increasingly neglected" across Islamic history.[35]

Abu Zayd saw himself as an heir to the Muʿtazila, "particularly their idea of the created Qurʿān and their tendency toward metaphorical interpretation".[38] Abu Zayd strongly opposed the belief in a "single, precise and valid interpretation of the Qur'an handed down by the Prophet for all times".[39] In his view, the Quran made Islamic Arab culture a 'culture of the text` (hadarat al-nass) par excellence, but because the language of the Quran is not self-explanatory, this implied Islamic Arab culture was also a culture of interpretation (hadarat al-ta'wil).[40] Abu Zayd emphasized "intellect" (`aql) in understanding the Quran, as opposed to "a hermeneutical approach which gives priority to the narrated traditions [ hadith ]" (naql). As a reflection of this Abu Zayd used the term ta'wil (interpretation) for efforts to understand the Quran, while in the Islamic sciences, the literature that explained the Quran was referred to as tafsir (commentary, explanation).[41] For Abu Zayd, interpretation goes beyond explanation or commentary, "for without" the Qur'an would not have meaning:

The [Qur'anic] text changed from the very first moment - that is, when the Prophet recited it at the moment of its revelation - from its existence as a divine text (nass ilahi), and became something understandable, a human text (nass insani), because it changed from revelation to interpretation (li-annahu tahawwala min al-tanzil ila al-ta'wil). The Prophet's understanding of the text is one of the first phases of movement resulting from the text's connection with the human intellect.[41][42]

Abu Zayd's critical approach to classical and contemporary Islamic discourse in the fields of theology, philosophy, law, politics, and humanism, promoted modern Islamic thought that might enable Muslims to build a bridge between their own tradition and the modern world of freedom of speech, equality (minority rights, women's rights, social justice), human rights, democracy and globalisation.[43]

Socialist Shi'ism

[edit]

Socialist Shi'ism had a significant impact on the first and so far only Islamist revolution, the 1979 Iranian Revolution by giving a radical political interpretation to the religious themes of Shia Islam. Socialist Shiaism arose from a 1970s movement of young secular-educated leftists in majority-Shia Iran who sought a socialist revolution to overthrow the pro-American authoritarian monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Shah. Although a socialist revolution never came, the Shah was overthrown by the Islamist revolution, whose leader, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, borrowed many of the socialist Shia ideas and in doing so was able to draw crucial support from students and the Iranian middle class.[44] In attempting to build their revolutionary force the Iranian socialists failed to establish "deep roots" with the Muslim Iranian masses[45] who did not relate to Marxist concepts of rationalism, materialism, and atheism.[46] Traditional peasant and manual laborer Iranians did however strongly relate to the traditional religious Messianic expectation of the return of the Mahdi to cleanse the world of injustice,[47] and to traditional stories of the tragic/heroic struggle of the Imam Husayn, one of the most revered figures in Shia Islam, who had been defeated and killed by the Sunni Umayyad Caliphate at Karbala.

Ali Shariati

[edit]
Ali Shariati

Ali Shariati Mazinani (Persian (1933–1977) was the leading member amongst the Shia socialists. He came from a "strictly religious family" but was a sociologist, not a religious scholar. He had studied in Paris and been influenced by the writings of Marxist-oriented writers such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, and Che Guevara.[48]

Shariati intertwined the Shia belief in an inevitable elimination of injustice by the Mahdi with socialist revolution against the Iranian ruling class.[47] Socialist Shia preached that Imam Hussein was not just a historical holy figure but the original oppressed one (muzloun), and his killer the "analog" of the modern Iranian people's "oppression by the shah".[47] His killing was not just an "eternal manifestation of the truth but a revolutionary act by a revolutionary hero".[49] Shi'a should respond to his killing not with the traditional lamentation, flagellation,[50] and patient awaiting of the return of the messiah, that the traditional clergy encouraged,[51] but by fighting against the injustice of the state as Ali and Hussein had.[50]

Shariati's harsh criticism of the traditional Usuli Shia clergy as standing in the way of the revolutionary potential of the masses,[51] was met with fatwas. Ayatullah Hadi Milani, the influential Usuli Marja' in Mashhad during the 1970s, issued a fatwa prohibiting his followers from reading Ali Shariati's books and Islamist literature produced by young clerics. This fatwa was followed by similar ones from Ayatullah Mar'ashi Najafi, Ayatullah Muhammad Rouhani, Ayatullah Hasan Qomi, and others. Ayatullah Khomeini, however, refused to comment.[52]

In addition to socialism, Shariati advocated women's rights, as evidenced in his book Fatima Is Fatima, where he argued that Fatima Zahra the daughter of the Islamic prophet Muhammad is as a role model for Muslim women around the world and a woman who was free.[citation needed]

Shariati did not advocate Western liberal democracy which he saw as involved in imperialist plundering of the developing world and advocated what he called "Commitment Democracy", which would be, according to Shariati, the government of Imam Ali. [citation needed] Shariati was influenced by anti-democratic Islamist ideas of Muslim Brotherhood thinkers in Egypt and tried to meet Muhammad Qutb while visiting Saudi Arabia in 1969.[53]

Iran was a petroleum exporter and had relatively large sums to devote to education, which led to the creation of a relatively large number of post-secondary students. While Iranian peasants, proletariat, and lumpen proletariat did not respond to Socialist Shiaism in large numbers, Shariati was phenomenally popular with students.[54][55] The Islamic Marxist movements, most notably the People's Mujahideen, were strongly influenced by Shariati. Ayatollah Khomeini emphasized Shariati's themes of revolution, anti-imperialism, and the radical message of Muharram; and incorporated into his public declarations such 'Fanonist' terms as the 'mostazafin will inherit the earth', 'the country needs a cultural revolution', and the 'people will dump the exploiters onto the garbage heap of history.'"[54]

Mahmoud Taleghani

[edit]

Mahmoud Taleghani (1911–1979) was another Shia leftist and contemporary of Khomeini, but also a cleric and a veteran leader in his own right of the movement against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. A founding member of the Freedom Movement of Iran, he has been described as a representative of the tendency of many "Shia clerics to blend Shia with Marxist ideals in order to compete with leftist movements for youthful supporters" during the 1960s and 1970s.[56] He served a total of a dozen years in prison,[57] where he developed connections with leftist political prisoners and the influence of the left on his thinking was reflected in his famous book Islam and Ownership (Islam va Malekiyat) which argued in support of collective ownership "as if it were an article of faith in Islam."[58]

Taleghani was instrumental in "shaping the groundswell movement" that led to the Iranian Revolution and served as the chair of powerful and secret Revolutionary Council during the Islamic Revolution.[57][59] He clashed with Khomeini in April 1979, warning the leadership against a 'return to despotism.'" After two of his sons were arrested[57] by revolutionary Guards, thousands of his supporters marched in the streets chanting "Taleghani, you are the soul of the revolution! Down with the reactionaries!" Khomeini summoned Taleghani to Qom where he was given a severe criticism, after which the press was called, and Khomeini made a statement pointedly not referring to Taleghani as an Ayatollah. "Mr. Taleghani is with us, and he is sorry for what happened."[60]

Specific issues and doctrines

[edit]

Ijtihad

[edit]

Ijtihad (lit. "effort, physical or mental, expended in a particular activity")[61] is an Islamic legal term referring to independent reasoning[62] or the thorough exertion of a jurist's mental faculty in finding a solution to a legal question.[61] It is contrasted with taqlid (imitation, conformity to legal precedent).[62][63] According to classical Sunni theory, ijtihad requires expertise in the Arabic language, theology, revealed texts, and principles of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh),[62] and is not employed where authentic and authoritative texts (Qur'an and hadith) are considered unambiguous with regard to the question, or where there is an existing scholarly consensus (ijma).[61] Ijtihad is considered to be a religious duty for those qualified to perform it.[62] An Islamic scholar who is qualified to perform ijtihad is called a mujtahid.[61]

Starting from the 18th century, some Muslim reformers began calling for the abandonment of taqlid and emphasis on ijtihad, which they saw as a return to Islamic origins.[61] Public debates in the Muslim world surrounding ijtihad continue to the present day.[61] The advocacy of ijtihad has been particularly associated with Islamic modernists. Among contemporary Muslims in the West, new visions of ijtihad have emerged, emphasizing substantive moral values over traditional juridical methodology.[61]

Freedom of religion

[edit]

The verse (ayah) 256 of Al-Baqara is a famous verse in the Islamic scripture, the Quran.[64] The verse includes the phrase that "there is no compulsion in religion".[65] Immediately after making this statement, the Quran offers a rationale for it: Since the revelation has, through explanation, clarification, and repetition, clearly distinguished the path of guidance from the path of misguidance, it is now up to people to choose the one or the other path.[64] This verse comes right after the Throne Verse.[66][67]

The overwhelming majority of Muslim scholars consider that verse to be a Medinan one,[68][69][70] when Muslims lived in their period of political ascendance,[71][72] and to be non abrogated,[73] including Ibn Taymiyya,[74] Ibn Qayyim,[75] Al-Tabari,[76] Abi ʿUbayd,[77] Al-Jaṣṣās,[78] Makki bin Abi Talib,[79] Al-Nahhas,[80] Ibn Jizziy,[81] Al-Suyuti,[82] Ibn Ashur,[83] Mustafa Zayd,[84] Abdul-Rahman al-Sa'di[85] and many others.[86] According to all the theories of language elaborated by Muslim legal scholars, the Quranic proclamation that 'There is no compulsion in religion. The right path has been distinguished from error' is as absolute and universal a statement as one finds,[87] and so under no condition should an individual be forced to accept a religion or belief against his or her will according to the Quran.[88][89][90][91]

Feminism

[edit]

A combination of Islam and feminism has been advocated as "a feminist discourse and practice articulated within an Islamic paradigm" by Margot Badran in 2002.[92] Islamic feminists ground their arguments in Islam and its teachings,[93] seek the full equality of women and men in the personal and public sphere, and can include non-Muslims in the discourse and debate. Islamic feminism is defined by Islamic scholars as being more radical than secular feminism,[94] and as being anchored within the discourse of Islam with the Quran as its central text.[95]

During recent times, the concept of Islamic feminism has grown further with Islamic groups looking to garner support from many aspects of society. In addition, educated Muslim women are striving to articulate their role in society.[96] Examples of Islamic feminist groups are the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, founded by Meena Keshwar Kamal,[97] Muslim Women's Quest for Equality from India,[98][99] and Sisters in Islam from Malaysia, founded by Zainah Anwar and Amina Wadud among other five women.[100][101][102][103]

In 2014, the Selangor Islamic Religious Council (MAIS) issued a fatwa declaring that Sisters In Islam, as well as any other organisation promoting religious liberalism and pluralism, deviate from the teachings of Islam. According to the edict, publications that are deemed to promote liberal and pluralistic religious thinking are to be declared unlawful and confiscated, while social media is also to be monitored and restricted.[104] As fatwas are legally binding in Malaysia,[104] SIS is challenging it on constitutional grounds.[105]

Hijab

[edit]

While most Conservative Muslims believe the hijab is mandatory, many Progressive Muslims take alternate views.

In a fatwa, Khaled Abou El Fadl states that the Quran requires women only to cover their bosoms. The idea that the Quran mandates a piece of cloth (khimar) to cover either a woman's face or her hair, but not her face, is ahistorical. In addition, he declares that it is an error for Muslim women to continue wearing a hijab if it brings them undue attention or puts her at risk of harm.[106] Sheikh Mustapha Mohamed Rashed at Al-Azhar University similarly defended a thesis that concluded wearing a hijab is not a religious duty, and that the Quran only mandates a piece of cloth to cover breasts.[107]

Wives' obedience to husbands

[edit]

Verse An-Nisa 34 of the Quran has traditionally been interpreted as mandating wives' obedience to their husbands and beating as a punishment for disobedience,[108] with the following translations from Mustafa Khattab and Sahih International:

Men are the caretakers of women, as men have been provisioned by Allah over women and tasked with supporting them financially. And righteous women are devoutly obedient and, when alone, protective of what Allah has entrusted them with. And if you sense ill-conduct from your women, advise them ˹first˺, ˹if they persist,˺ do not share their beds, ˹but if they still persist,˺ then discipline them ˹gently˺. But if they change their ways, do not be unjust to. Surely Allah is Most High, All-Great.

— Quran 4:34 ("The Clear Quran" translation by Mustafa Khattab)

Men are in charge of women by [right of] what Allāh has given one over the other and what they spend [for maintenance] from their wealth. So righteous women are devoutly obedient, guarding in [the husband's] absence what Allāh would have them guard. But those [wives] from whom you fear arrogance - [first] advise them; [then if they persist], forsake them in bed; and [finally], strike them [lightly]. But if they obey you [once more], seek no means against them. Indeed, Allāh is ever Exalted and Grand.

— Quran 4:34 (Sahih International translation)

However, Progressive Muslims have given many alternative interpretations and translations of the verse[109] (such as a deterrent from anger-based domestic violence).[110][111]

Riffat Hassan, has taken the view that qawwamun in the verse is not talking about men being superior to women, but rather is referring to men's role as breadwinners. Nushuz is interpreted as not referring to domestic disobedience but to a mass rebellion of all women against their role as child-bearers. Asma Barlas has taken a similar view that qawwamun means moral guidance or caring, nushuz means disharmony, and that wa-dribuhunna has multiple meanings, such as "to set an example" or "to separate", and that "to beat" is "the worst one!" of all possible interpretations.[109]

Amina Wadud has stated that qawwamun refers to men's financial support of women while nushuz refers to disharmony in the relationship. She interprets wa-dribuhunna, the word often translated as "strike" or "beat", as being used in a non-literal sense.[109][112]

Laleh Bakhtiar, in her Quran translation, The Sublime Quran, translated wa-dribuhunna as "to go away from" or "to leave", claiming the verse recommends husbands to leave their wives if there are irreconcilable disagreements and differences. She cites prophetic biographies claiming Muhammad never beat his wives and talking about his respect for women, and other Quran verses like 2:231.[109][113][114][115]

Laury Silvers, based on the methodology of medieval Islamic thinker Ibn Arabi, believes that "God may intend all meanings, but it does not follow that he 'approves' of all meanings." Using this, she believes that the Quran has to be ambiguous, as if it weren't, there would be no room for human responsibility. Using this, she claims that Allah did intend for all meanings of wa-dribuhunna, including beating, and that true human morality comes from the freedom to choose the best of these interpretations. It is claimed Muhammad never beat his wives, and that his "conflicted response" to this revelation shows that God revealed it out of necessity (to restrain existing violence against women) rather than out of approval, and that it remains best to refrain from violence entirely.[112][116]

Khaled Abou El Fadl claims nushuz is better understood as "a grave and known sin" and in 4:34, this is a lewd act or sexual sin that can be proven by evidence and verified by a judge. According to his interpretation, 4:34 is about how a judge would punish a woman for a sexual crime, rather than about wifely disobedience. Fatema Mernissi cites Quran 33:35 as evidence for gender equality within Islam and several hadith to claim that while beating was permissible, the best Muslims would never beat their wives.[112]

Edip Yüksel in his Quran translation, The Quran: A Reformist Translation, interprets qawwamun as "supporters" rather than as "guardians" or "in charge of", citing other Quran verses using the word. Furthermore, he believes nushuz is not referring to disobedience, but instead an extramarital affair or marital disloyalty, citing Quran 4:128. Finally, he claims idribuhunna does not mean beating, but rather means separation, saying beating would not make sense with Quran 30:21 stating that marriage is tranquil.[117]

Human rights

[edit]
Abdul Ghaffar Khan with Mahatma Gandhi.

Moderate Islamic political thought contends that the nurturing of the Muslim identity and the propagation of values such as democracy and human rights are not mutually exclusive, but rather should be promoted together.[118] Most liberal Muslims believe that Islam promotes the notion of absolute equality of all humanity, and that it is one of its central concepts. Therefore, a breach of human rights has become a source of great concern to most liberal Muslims.[119]

Liberal Muslims differ with their culturally conservative counterparts in that they believe that all humanity is represented under the umbrella of human rights. Many Muslim majority countries have signed international human rights treaties, although the impact of these largely remains to be seen in local legal systems. Muslim liberals often reject traditional interpretations of Islamic law, which allow Ma malakat aymanukum and slavery. They say that slavery opposed Islamic principles which they believe to be based on justice and equality and some say that verses relating to slavery or "Ma malakat aymanukum" now cannot be applied due to the fact that the world has changed, while others say that those verses are misinterpreted and twisted to legitimize slavery.[120][121] In the 20th century, South Asian scholars Ghulam Ahmed Pervez and Amir Ali argued that the expression ma malakat aymanukum should be properly read in the past tense. When some called for a reinstatement of slavery in Pakistan upon its independence from the British colonial rule, Pervez argued that the past tense of this expression means that the Quran had imposed "an unqualified ban" on slavery.[122] Liberal Muslims have argued against death penalty for apostasy based on the Quranic verse that "There shall be no compulsion in religion".[123]

LGBTQ rights

[edit]
El-Farouk Khaki, founding member of Salaam group and the Toronto Unity Mosque / el-Tawhid Juma Circle

In January 2013, the Muslim Alliance for Sexual and Gender Diversity (MASGD) was launched.[124] The organization was formed by members of the Queer Muslim Working Group, with the support of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force.[clarification needed] Several initial MASGD members previously had been involved with the Al-Fatiha Foundation, including Faisal Alam and Imam Daayiee Abdullah.[125]

The Safra Project for women is based in the UK. It supports and works on issues relating to prejudice against LGBTQ Muslim women. It was founded in October 2001 by Muslim LBT women. The Safra Project's "ethos is one of inclusiveness and diversity".[126] In Australia, Nur Wahrsage has been an advocate for LGBTI Muslims and founded Marhaba, a support group for queer Muslims in Melbourne, Australia. In May 2016, Wahrsage revealed that he is homosexual in an interview on SBS2’s The Feed, being the first openly gay Imam in Australia.[127]

In Canada, Salaam was founded as the first gay Muslim organization in Canada and the second in the world. Salaam was founded in 1993 by El-Farouk Khaki, who organized the Salaam / Al-Fateha International Conference in 2003.[128] In May 2009, the Toronto Unity Mosque / el-Tawhid Juma Circle (ETJC) was founded by Laury Silvers, a University of Toronto religious studies scholar, alongside Muslim gay-rights activists El-Farouk Khaki and Troy Jackson. Unity Mosque / ETJC is a gender-equal, LGBT+ affirming.[129][130][131][132]

In November 2012, a prayer room was set up in Paris by gay Islamic scholar and founder of the group Homosexual Muslims of France, Ludovic-Mohamed Zahed. It was described by the press as the first gay-friendly mosque in Europe. The reaction from the rest of the Muslim community in France has been mixed, and the opening has been condemned by the Grand Mosque of Paris.[133] Examples of Muslim LGBT media works are the 2006 Channel 4's documentary Gay Muslims,[134] the film production company Unity Productions Foundation,[135] the 2007 and 2015 documentary films A Jihad for Love and A Sinner in Mecca, both produced by Parvez Sharma,[136][137][138] and the Jordanian LGBT publication My.Kali.[139][140]

Story of Lut

[edit]

Quranic verses about the Story of Lut have traditionally been interpreted as condemning homosexuality, with the following translations of Al-A'raf 81 from Mustafa Khattab and Sahih International:

You lust after men instead of women! You are certainly transgressors.

— Quran 7:81 ("The Clear Quran" translation by Mustafa Khattab)

Indeed, you approach men with desire, instead of women. Rather, you are a transgressing people.

— Quran 7:81 (Sahih International translation)

Section 'Modern interpretation' not found

Secularism

[edit]

The definition and application of secularism, especially the place of religion in society, vary among Muslim countries as it does among non-Muslim countries.[141] As the concept of secularism varies among secularists in the Muslim world, reactions of Muslim intellectuals to the pressure of secularization also varies. On the one hand, secularism is condemned by some Muslim intellectuals who do not feel that religious influence should be removed from the public sphere.[142] On the other hand, secularism is claimed by others to be compatible with Islam. For example, the quest for secularism has inspired some Muslim scholars who argue that secular government is the best way to observe sharia; "enforcing [sharia] through coercive power of the state negates its religious nature, because Muslims would be observing the law of the state and not freely performing their religious obligation as Muslims" says Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, a professor of law at Emory University and author of Islam and the secular state: negotiating the future of Shariʻa.[143] Moreover, some scholars [which?] argue that secular states have existed in the Muslim world since the Middle Ages.[144]

Egalitarianism

[edit]

The place of equality versus hierarchy in Islam is sometimes disputed, with Progressive Islam coming down on the side of equity and equality.

Progressive Islam emphasizes what is sometimes called the "decidedly egalitarian spirit" (Judith Miller) of Islam,[145] and how it is "in principle egalitarian, recognizing no superiority of one believer over another by birth or descent, race or nationality, or social status" (Bernard Lewis).[146]

At the same time, Muslims known as Sayyids (those accepted as descendants of the Islamic prophet Muhammad) traditionally have special privileges in Islam, notably of tax exemptions and a share in Khums.[147] A number of scholars (quoted in a number of fatwa sites) have also encouraged discrimination in regards to intermarriage between persons of Arab and non-Arab lineages (Darul Ifta Birmingham (Hanafi fiqh) quoting Raddul Muhtar,[a] and Islamic Virtues website quoting the Shafi’i manual Reliance of the Traveller ...)[b] Quraishi and non-Quraishi,[c] and Sayyid and non-Sayyid,[d] as can be found in a number of fatwa sites.

This is notably in direct contrast to the Prophet Muhammad's last sermon, "...All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over a black nor a black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action."[152]

Movements

[edit]

Over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, in accordance with their increasingly modern societies and outlooks, liberal Muslims have tended to reinterpret many aspects of the application of their religion in their life in an attempt to reconnect. This is particularly true of Muslims who now find themselves living in non-Muslim countries.[153]

Islamic modernism

[edit]

Islamic modernism, also sometimes referred to as modernist Salafism,[154][155][156] is a movement that has been described as "the first Muslim ideological response"[e] attempting to reconcile Islamic faith with modern Western values such as nationalism, democracy, civil rights, rationality, equality, and progress.[158] It featured a "critical reexamination of the classical conceptions and methods of jurisprudence" and a new approach to Islamic theology and Quranic exegesis (Tafsir).[157]

It was the first of several Islamic movements – including secularism, Islamism and Salafism – that emerged in the middle of the 19th century in reaction to the rapid changes of the time, especially the perceived onslaught of Western Civilization and colonialism on the Muslim world.[158] Founders include Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), a Sheikh of Al-Azhar University for a brief period before his death in 1905, Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), and Sir Syed Ahmed Khan (1817–1898).

The early Islamic Modernists (al-Afghani and Muhammad Abdu) used the term "salafiyya"[159] to refer to their attempt at renovation of Islamic thought,[160] and this "salafiyya movement" is often known in the West as "Islamic modernism," although it is very different from what is currently called the Salafi movement, which generally signifies "ideologies such as wahhabism".[f] Since its inception, Modernism has suffered from co-option of its original reformism by both secularist rulers and by "the official ulama" whose "task it is to legitimise" rulers' actions in religious terms.[161] Modernism differs from secularism in that it insists on the importance of religious faith in public life, and from Salafism or Islamism in that it embraces contemporary European institutions, social processes, and values.[158]

Quranism

[edit]

Quranists reject the hadith and follow the Quran only. The extent to which Quranists reject the authenticity of the Sunnah varies,[162] but the more established groups have thoroughly criticised the authenticity of the hadith and refused it for many reasons, the most prevalent being the Quranist claim that hadith is not mentioned in the Quran as a source of Islamic theology and practice, was not recorded in written form until more than two centuries after the death of the Muhammad, and contain perceived internal errors and contradictions.[162][163] Quranists believe Muhammad himself was a Quranist and the founder of Quranism, and that his followers distorted the faith and split into schisms and factions such as Sunni, Shia, and Khawarij.

Scriptural fallibility

[edit]

Some Muslims (Saeed Nasheed, Abdul Karim Soroush, Sayyed Ahmad Al-Qabbanji, Hassan Radwan) have argued for taking "the bold step of challenging the very idea that the Qur’an and Sunna are infallible", and asserting that instead the Qur'an is "divinely inspired but ... human-authored".[164] Saeed Nasheed writes:

"The Qur’an is not the speech of God, just as the loaf of bread is not the work of the farmer. God produced the raw material, which was inspiration, just as the farmer produces the raw material, which is wheat. But it is the baker who turns the wheat or flour into bread according to his own unique way, artistic expertise, and creative ability. Thus it is the Prophet who was responsible for interpreting the inspiration and turning it into actual phrases and words according to his own unique view."[165][164]

By acknowledging this, Hassan Radwan argues, Muslims will be freed to use their reason to "take what is useful and helpful from religion and ignore what is not."[164][166]

Notable organizations

[edit]

Muslims for Progressive Values

[edit]

Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV) is a Progressive Muslim grassroots human rights organization founded by Ani Zonneveld and Pamela K. Taylor in 2007.[167][168] In December 2013, the United Nations recognized MPV as an official non-government organization (NGO) association member.[169] It has supported women's rights, LGBTQ rights, and interfaith marriage.[170][171]

For its progressive beliefs, the organization was expelled from the Islamic Society of North America Convention bazaar with it being accused of "promoting ignorance of Islam among Muslims at the event" and "claiming haram was good and virtuous".[172]

Sisters in Islam

[edit]
Sisters in Islam (SIS) is a Malaysian registered company committed to promoting the rights of women in Malaysia. Its efforts to promote the rights of Muslim women are based on the principles of equality, justice and freedom enjoined by the Quran. SIS work focuses on challenging laws and policies made in the name of Islam that discriminate against women. As such it tackles issues covered under Malaysia's Islamic family and sharia laws, such as polygamy,[173] child marriage,[174] moral policing,[175] Islamic legal theory and jurisprudence, the hijab and modesty,[176] violence against women and hudud.[177] It is noted for its Islamic feminist research and advocacy.[178]

Tolu-e-Islam

[edit]

This organization was initiated by Muhammad Iqbal, and later spearheaded by Ghulam Ahmed Pervez. Ghulam Ahmed Pervez did not reject all hadiths; however, he only accepted hadiths which "are in accordance with the Quran or do not stain the character of the Prophet or his companions."[179] The organization, which does not belong to any political party or to any religious group or sect, publishes and distributes books, pamphlets, and recordings of Pervez's teachings.[179]

List of notable members

[edit]

Scholars

[edit]

Writers

[edit]

Activists

[edit]

Politicians

[edit]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]

References

[edit]

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]
[edit]
Revisions and contributorsEdit on WikipediaRead on Wikipedia
from Grokipedia

Liberalism and progressivism within Islam denote intellectual currents and reformist efforts that reinterpret Islamic doctrine to align with modern values such as rational inquiry, democratic governance, individual liberties, and gender equity, often drawing on ijtihad (independent reasoning) to challenge literalist or traditionalist readings of scripture. These movements trace historical precedents to medieval philosophers like Ibn Rushd, who advocated for the harmony of faith and reason, and gained momentum in the 19th and early 20th centuries through figures such as Muhammad Abduh, who promoted educational reform and adaptation to modernity while rooted in Islamic ethics.
Emerging as responses to , secular , and later Islamist resurgence, these strands emphasize contextual interpretation of the and to support pluralism and , yet they have achieved limited institutional traction in most Muslim-majority societies, where orthodox implementations often prevail empirically. Key achievements include influencing moderate policies in contexts like Indonesia's pluralistic Pancasila framework and advocacy for by thinkers such as Fatima Mernissi, though controversies persist over doctrinal compatibility, with critics arguing that core Islamic tenets on , , and gender roles inherently conflict with liberalism's individualistic foundations. Contemporary progressive voices, including LGBTQ-affirming Muslims like , extend these efforts into domains, but face marginalization amid dominant conservative or fundamentalist narratives. Overall, while fostering debate and isolated reforms, the movements grapple with causal barriers rooted in scriptural primacy and communal authority structures that prioritize collective piety over secular individualism.

Conceptual Foundations

Definitions and Core Principles

Islamic liberalism denotes a strand of Muslim intellectualism that seeks to harmonize core Islamic tenets with modern liberal values, such as individual autonomy, democratic governance, and protections for personal freedoms, primarily through revived ijtihad—independent jurisprudential reasoning applied to scriptural sources. This approach posits that Islamic texts, when interpreted rationally and contextually, inherently support pluralism and limited government rather than theocratic absolutism, countering fundamentalist literalism that prioritizes divine sovereignty over human legislation. Advocates argue for a separation between religious ethics and state-enforced law, drawing on historical precedents like the rationalist Mu'tazila school, though critics within orthodox circles contend such views subordinate revelation to secular philosophy. Key principles of Islamic liberalism include:
  • Primacy of reason (aql): Elevating rational inquiry to reinterpret Quran and hadith, rejecting taqlid (blind imitation of predecessors) in favor of adaptive fiqh that aligns with empirical realities and scientific progress.
  • Democratic compatibility: Viewing shura (consultation) as a basis for participatory politics, where sovereignty derives from the community rather than unmediated divine rule, as exemplified in modernist calls for constitutionalism.
  • Human rights framework: Deriving universal rights from maqasid al-sharia (objectives of Islamic law), such as preservation of life, intellect, and property, to advocate freedoms of expression and religion without compromising tawhid (divine unity).
Progressivism within Islam builds on these foundations but emphasizes socio-ethical reforms, framing the faith as inherently dynamic and oriented toward () and equity, often through that historicize legal rulings to prioritize moral universals over time-bound applications. It critiques patriarchal or hierarchical interpretations as cultural accretions, advocating reinterpretations that promote and inclusivity as fulfilling prophetic , though empirical surveys indicate such views remain minority positions amid dominant traditionalist adherence. Core principles of Islamic progressivism encompass:
  • Social justice orientation: Pursuit of economic equity and anti-oppression via and broader redistributive ethics, extending to critiques of or as un-Islamic deviations.
  • Interpretive flexibility: Emphasis on the Quran's ethico-spiritual over (fixed punishments), enabling contextual that addresses modern issues like or without rigid literalism.
  • Pluralism and inclusivity: Recognition of interpretive diversity () as divinely sanctioned, fostering and internal reform against exclusionary orthodoxy.
Both and in this context emerged as responses to 19th-20th century encounters with Western and internal fundamentalist resurgence, yet they face empirical challenges: data from Pew Research (2013) shows overwhelming majorities in Muslim-majority countries favoring as official law, underscoring the marginality of these reformist paradigms despite intellectual advocacy.

Compatibility with Islamic Doctrine

Islamic doctrine, as derived from the and , establishes as the comprehensive divine legal and moral framework governing all aspects of Muslim life, including , , and personal conduct, leaving limited scope for secular human legislation that prioritizes. Classical Islamic , through the four Sunni madhabs and Shia equivalents, enforces punishments such as amputation for theft ( 5:38) and stoning for adultery based on prophetic , which inherently conflict with liberal principles of proportionality, rehabilitation over retribution, and protections against cruel punishment. Furthermore, the doctrine's mandate for and dhimmi status imposing tax on non-Muslims ( 9:29) undermines liberal egalitarianism and freedom of conscience, as these provisions subordinate non-believers to Islamic supremacy rather than granting equal irrespective of faith. Apostasy rulings exemplify doctrinal incompatibility, with scholarly consensus () prescribing death for leaving , drawn from like Sahih Bukhari 9:84:57 ("Whoever changes his , kill him"), clashing directly with liberalism's core tenet of in belief and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' Article 18 on freedom to change . prescriptions, such as women's valued at half a man's in financial matters ( 2:282) and permitted for men but not women ( 4:3), further diverge from progressive ideals of unqualified equality, rooted in the doctrine's view of complementary rather than identical roles. These elements reflect 's theocratic ontology, where belongs to alone ( 33:57 critiques human rule), rejecting liberalism's anthropocentric of the people and separation of from state. Islamic modernists, invoking revival of —independent reasoning closed by the 10th century in Sunni orthodoxy—argue for compatibility by prioritizing al-sharia (objectives like justice and welfare) over literal zari'at (branches), allowing reinterpretation to align with liberal norms such as and . Scholars like Andrew March propose an "overlapping consensus" where Muslims endorse liberal institutions instrumentally from Islamic premises, without fully endorsing liberalism's metaphysical foundations, as in Rawlsian . However, such approaches necessitate sidelining classical authorities and authenticity debates, often critiqued as (innovation) deviating from doctrinal purity, since the asserts its completeness and clarity ( 16:89), precluding fundamental alterations for modern ideologies. Empirical outcomes in Sharia-implementing states like and , with restricted freedoms, underscore the causal tension between unadapted doctrine and liberal governance.

Historical Context

Pre-Modern Philosophical Roots

The Mu'tazila, an early Islamic theological school originating in around the late 7th to early 8th century CE, represented a foundational rationalist approach within Islamic thought by prioritizing human reason ('aql) alongside revelation to discern theological truths. Adherents, including figures like (d. 748 CE), emphasized five core principles: divine unity (), divine justice ('adl), promising and threatening (al-wa'd wa al-wa'id), an intermediate position between belief and unbelief for grave sinners, and the obligation to enjoin good and forbid evil. Central to their doctrine was the assertion of human and , rejecting in favor of rational accountability, which aligned with concepts of justice requiring that God not punish without cause. They argued the was created, not eternal, to avoid compromising divine transcendence, and applied speculative theology () to defend these views against literalist interpretations. This rationalism extended to peripatetic philosophy (falsafa), heavily influenced by Greek thinkers like and , as systematized by (c. 870–950 CE), known as the "Second Teacher" after . integrated Aristotelian logic and Platonic political ideals into an Islamic framework, envisioning an ideal virtuous city (al-madinah al-fadilah) governed by a philosopher-prophet who unites practical wisdom with theoretical knowledge, promoting harmony between reason and revelation. His works, such as The Virtuous City, outlined a hierarchical society emphasizing intellectual virtue and ethical governance, laying groundwork for rational statecraft that valued merit over unbridled authority. Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980–1037 CE) advanced this tradition through his metaphysical system, distinguishing essence from existence and positing necessary emanation from the One, which underscored the primacy of demonstrative reason in understanding reality. He defended philosophy's compatibility with Islam, arguing that rational proofs could corroborate prophetic truths, and his Canon of Medicine exemplified empirical rationalism in science. Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198 CE) further bolstered by critiquing Al-Ghazali's Incoherence of the Philosophers in his Incoherence of the Incoherence, asserting harmony between Aristotelian philosophy and Islamic revelation rather than conflict. He advocated for the use of reason in interpreting scripture allegorically where literalism conflicted with logic, influencing later traditions by preserving Greek philosophical heritage within an Islamic context. These pre-modern developments fostered a tradition of intellectual autonomy and ethical , contrasting with the voluntarist Ash'arite that gained dominance after the , yet providing conceptual tools—such as , , and reason's —for subsequent modernist reinterpretations of Islamic doctrine. While not articulating modern liberalism's or , their emphasis on rational critique and prefigured progressive potentials in challenging dogmatic .

19th-Century Modernist Beginnings


Islamic modernism emerged in the mid-19th century as a response to European colonial expansion and the evident technological and military superiority of the West, prompting Muslim intellectuals to advocate for the revival of rational inquiry (ijtihad) and the reconciliation of Islamic principles with modern science and governance. This movement sought to address Muslim societies' stagnation by drawing on historical precedents of rationalism within Islam, such as the Mu'tazila school, while rejecting blind imitation (taqlid) of traditionalist scholarship. Key proponents argued that true Islamic essence was inherently compatible with progress, emphasizing education reform and selective adoption of Western innovations without abandoning core doctrines.
Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), an Egyptian scholar, laid early groundwork during his studies in Paris from 1826 to 1831 as part of Muhammad Ali Pasha's modernization efforts. In his 1834 travelogue An Imam in Paris, Tahtawi described European social and scientific advancements positively, attributing them to rational organization and education rather than inherent cultural superiority, and urged Muslims to integrate such elements with Islamic ethics. He supervised translations of over 30 Western works on military science, history, and geography, and in 1835 founded Cairo's School of Languages to facilitate this knowledge transfer, marking a foundational step in Egypt's nahda (renaissance). Tahtawi's approach emphasized patriotism, linguistic reform, and the idea that progress stemmed from applying reason to faith, influencing subsequent generations without advocating secularism. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), a Persian activist and thinker, advanced modernism through pan-Islamic advocacy, traveling across the , , and to rally against . He contended that Muslim decline resulted from despotism and clerical stagnation, prescribing scientific education, philosophical revival, and political unity under Islamic leadership to restore strength; in publications like Urwat al-Wuthqa (1884), he critiqued Western materialism while endorsing reason as a divine gift. Afghani mentored figures like and inspired anti-imperial movements, framing reform as a return to Islam's rational rather than Western imitation. His ideas blended anti-colonial resistance with calls for intellectual awakening, though critics note his pragmatic alliances, including possible freemasonic ties, reflected strategic rather than ideological liberalism. Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), Afghani's disciple and Egypt's Grand Mufti from 1899, systematized these ideas by promoting ijtihad over rigid jurisprudence, arguing in Risalat al-Tawhid (1897) that Islam's essence aligned with natural law and scientific truth. Abduh reformed Al-Azhar University curricula to include modern subjects, advocated polygamy restrictions and judicial modernization within Sharia, and viewed democracy as compatible with consultation (shura). His rationalist hermeneutics sought to purge taqlid's accretions, enabling ethical flexibility on issues like usury and education for women, though he upheld orthodoxy on fundamentals like divine sovereignty. Abduh's influence extended through students like Rashid Rida, establishing modernism as a bridge between tradition and progress, albeit one prioritizing Islamic authenticity over wholesale Westernization.

20th-Century Developments and Influences

In the early 20th century, expanded through organized movements that emphasized rational interpretation and social reform. The organization, founded in 1912 by in , , advocated , modern education, and purification of religious practices from local superstitions, establishing schools, hospitals, and orphanages to promote progressive Islamic values. This approach reconciled Islamic principles with contemporary needs, influencing millions and fostering a model of modernist in . Mid-century developments saw integrations of with , particularly in and the , as responses to and . emerged, drawing on Quranic emphases on and , while incorporating leftist ideas; for instance, thinkers like Maulana Abdul Hamid Bhashani in (now ) promoted land reforms and under an Islamic framework in the 1950s. Similarly, in , Sarekat Islam's early 20th-century evolution incorporated socialist elements, blending them with nationalist aspirations. These syncretic ideologies sought egalitarian redistribution without fully abandoning , though they often clashed with orthodox interpretations. Influential figures advanced non-violent and interpretive reforms grounded in Islamic sources. , known as Badshah Khan, established the movement in 1929 among , mobilizing up to 100,000 followers for non-violent resistance against British rule, interpreting as ethical struggle and drawing on Sufi and prophetic traditions of peace. Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) proposed a "" in the mid-20th century: returning to the Quran's ethical objectives while reinterpreting them contextually for modernity, critiquing blind and advocating historical-critical methods for scripture. His works, such as those analyzing Islamic intellectual transformation, influenced reformist thought by prioritizing reason and adaptability. Post-World War II decolonization accelerated these trends in emerging Muslim-majority states, where constitutions often balanced Islamic identity with democratic mechanisms. In Pakistan's 1949 and Indonesia's 1945 Pancasila, framers integrated Islamic principles with pluralism and , though implementation varied amid tensions with traditionalists. Nationalist movements, exposed to Western via and , further propelled demands for gender and legal reforms, yet faced backlash from revivalist currents emphasizing literalism. These developments highlighted causal links between geopolitical shifts—such as the 1924 —and the push for decentralized, interpretive authority within .

Key Intellectual Figures

Early Modernists

Rifa'a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873), an Egyptian scholar and translator, initiated modernist reforms by integrating European knowledge with Islamic principles after his 1826–1831 mission in Paris. His 1834 work Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Paris described French society, emphasizing patriotism (wataniyya), rational governance, and scientific advancement as compatible with Islamic ethics, while critiquing aspects like secularism. Tahtawi founded Cairo's School of Languages in 1835, promoting translation of Western texts on military science, engineering, and administration to strengthen Egypt under Muhammad Ali Pasha. His efforts laid groundwork for nahda (renaissance), advocating education reform to revive ijtihad (independent reasoning) over rigid taqlid (imitation). Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897), a Persian activist, advanced modernism through , urging Muslims to reclaim rationalist heritage against colonial domination. In publications like Urwat al-Wuthqa (1884), co-authored with disciples, he argued inherently supports progress, , and unity, criticizing and Western materialism while endorsing in and Ottoman reforms. Al-Afghani influenced anti-colonial movements in and , promoting education and parliamentary systems as Islamic imperatives, though his prioritized collective strength over individualism. His travels and lectures fostered a network of reformers, emphasizing in to align with . Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), al-Afghani's Egyptian protégé and Grand Mufti from 1899, institutionalized modernism by reforming Al-Azhar University and Islamic jurisprudence. Abduh advocated reviving ijtihad to reinterpret Sharia dynamically, asserting Islam's harmony with reason, democracy, and natural law, as in his Risalat al-Tawhid (1897), which reconciled Quranic exegesis with scientific empiricism. He liberalized education, supporting girls' schooling and secular subjects, and issued fatwas permitting bank interest (riba) under necessity (darura), challenging traditional prohibitions. Abduh's reforms aimed at ethical progressivism, viewing taqlid as a cause of Muslim decline, though critics note his retention of hierarchical caliphal ideals limited full egalitarianism. These early modernists shared a causal view that Muslim stagnation stemmed from interpretive ossification rather than doctrinal flaws, privileging empirical revival through education and reason. Their influence waned amid rising Salafism, yet they established precedents for progressive reinterpretation.

Socialist and Shi'ite Influenced Thinkers

Ali Shariati (1933–1977), an Iranian sociologist and revolutionary thinker, synthesized Marxist socialism with Shi'ite Islam, portraying Shi'ism as an inherently egalitarian and anti-imperialist ideology akin to liberation theology. Influenced by thinkers like Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon during his studies in Paris, Shariati critiqued both Western capitalism and traditional clerical authority, advocating for a "return to the true Islam" led by progressive intellectuals rather than 'ulama. His lectures at the Hosseiniyeh Ershad in Tehran during the 1960s and 1970s mobilized youth against the Pahlavi regime, emphasizing social justice, class struggle, and the revolutionary potential of figures like Imam Hussein as prototypes for the oppressed. Shariati's ideas contributed to the intellectual groundwork of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, though his opposition to Western liberal democracy and preference for a theocratic model limited alignment with classical liberalism. Mahmoud Taleghani (1910–1979), a prominent Shi'ite cleric and social reformer, integrated Islamic principles with concerns for economic equity and democratic governance, positioning as a framework for progressive societal rules. As a key figure in Iran's National Front and opponent of the Shah's , Taleghani emphasized communal and warned against atheistic while promoting for adapting Islamic law to modern challenges like . His post-revolutionary role included chairing the Revolutionary Council, where he advocated moderation, tolerance toward ethnic minorities, and consultations with diverse groups, reflecting a vision of compatible with pluralism and . Taleghani's writings, such as interpretations of Qur'anic verses on , underscored social welfare over individualistic , influencing leftist-leaning Islamists while critiquing Marxist . These thinkers exemplified "socialist Shi'ism," a 20th-century current that radicalized opposition to and foreign influence by framing Shi'ite narratives of martyrdom and in class-based terms, impacting the 1979 Revolution's mobilization but diverging from secular due to theocratic emphases. Their works prioritized causal analyses of oppression rooted in historical Islamic events over abstract egalitarian ideals, yet faced criticism for enabling authoritarian outcomes post-revolution.

Contemporary Reformers

Contemporary reformers within Islam advocate for interpretations that align core doctrines with principles such as , , and secular governance, often emphasizing independent reasoning () over rigid traditionalism. These thinkers, primarily active since the late , operate largely in academic, , or exile contexts due to resistance from conservative clerical establishments. Their efforts focus on distinguishing eternal ethical principles in Islamic sources from context-bound legal rulings, proposing reforms to address issues like religious freedom and . Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, a Sudanese-American legal scholar, argues that a is essential for genuine adherence to , as undermines faith. In his 2008 book Islam and the Secular State, he proposes ongoing public deliberation on Islamic principles to foster , , and equality among citizens irrespective of . An-Na'im contends that historical Islamic governance relied on theocratic models incompatible with modern pluralism, necessitating reform through collective to prioritize ethical over punitive aspects of . His work draws on the legacy of his mentor Mahmoud Mohamed Taha, executed in in 1985 for , highlighting risks faced by such reformers. Amina Wadud, an American convert and Quranic scholar, promotes egalitarian readings of scripture, challenging patriarchal interpretations. Her 1999 book Qur'an and Woman reexamines verses on to emphasize spiritual equality, arguing that cultural biases, not divine intent, underpin inequalities in , testimony, and leadership. In 2005, Wadud led a mixed-gender in , symbolizing her push for inclusive worship practices and female , which drew international condemnation from orthodox authorities but support from progressive networks. She frames these reforms as fulfilling Islam's progressive potential, rooted in the Quran's emphasis on justice () over literalism. Mohsen Kadivar, an Iranian cleric and exile, critiques the politicization of religion, advocating a "reformist Islam" that subordinates (jurisprudence) to universal . In works like Human Rights and Reformist Islam (2020 English edition), he classifies Islamic rulings into temporal (contextual) and permanent (ethical), permitting revision of the former via rational to eliminate practices such as gender discrimination and penalties. Kadivar's opposition to Iran's doctrine of velayat-e faqih (guardianship of the jurist) led to his 1999 imprisonment, underscoring tensions between reformist thought and state-enforced orthodoxy. He maintains that true Islamic governance prioritizes moral principles over legal compulsion. El-Farouk Khaki, a Canadian of Tanzanian-Indian origin, advances inclusion for LGBTQ Muslims, founding Salaam, a Muslim support group, in 1991 and co-founding the inclusive el-Tawhid Juma Circle in 2009. Khaki interprets Islamic narratives on compassion and diversity to affirm same-sex relationships and gender variance, rejecting punitive hadiths as culturally contingent. His extends to refugee rights and , positioning progressive Islam as a response to marginalization within orthodox communities. Khaki's efforts, including leading inclusive prayers, represent diaspora-driven reforms emphasizing personal piety over communal enforcement. Adnan Ibrahim, a Palestinian scholar based in , employs philosophical analysis to challenge literalist views, advocating equal shares and critiquing slavery's historical acceptance in Islamic law. His lectures, disseminated via online platforms since the 2000s, promote a "free-thinking" that integrates reason and ethics, gaining traction among youth despite bans in countries like and for perceived . Ibrahim argues that evolving societal contexts demand reinterpretation, aligning with modern norms without abandoning foundational texts.

Doctrinal and Ethical Reforms

Revival of Ijtihad

, the process of independent reasoning to derive Islamic legal rulings from primary sources such as the and , was historically perceived as restricted after the tenth century CE, when Sunni orthodoxy emphasized , or adherence to established juridical schools, effectively "closing the gates of " to prevent divergence from consensus. This closure, though debated in scope and never absolute, contributed to a rigid interpretive framework ill-suited to evolving societal conditions, prompting modernist reformers to advocate its revival as essential for Islamic renewal. In the late nineteenth century, Egyptian scholar (1849–1905) emerged as a pivotal proponent of reopening , arguing that Muslims must return directly to the and authentic , employing rational inquiry to address contemporary challenges rather than uncritical imitation of medieval precedents. Influenced by his mentor , Abduh contended that remained open to qualified scholars across generations, enabling adaptation of to modern , , and without compromising core doctrines. His reforms, implemented during his tenure as of from 1899 to 1905, included fatwas permitting innovations like postal savings and challenging literalist interpretations that hindered progress. Twentieth-century thinkers extended this revival, with Pakistani-American scholar Fazlur Rahman (1919–1988) emphasizing a "double movement" in : a return to the Quran's ethical objectives () while contextualizing historical rulings to contemporary realities, thus fostering a "living " through ongoing communal consensus and reasoning. Rahman's methodology, outlined in works like Islamic Methodology in History (1965), critiqued ossified traditions and advocated as a tool for moral reconstruction, influencing progressive interpretations on issues such as pluralism and . Similarly, initiatives like the 2004 report urged systematic to reinterpret principles for the twenty-first century, highlighting its potential to resolve conflicts between tradition and . Proponents of ijtihad's revival within liberal Islamic thought view it as causally enabling doctrinal flexibility, allowing empirical engagement with scientific and social advancements while grounding reforms in scriptural realism, though critics from traditionalist circles, including Salafi and some Deobandi scholars, warn it risks subjective innovation () absent strict qualifications. Empirical outcomes remain mixed, with revivals in contexts like Indonesia's demonstrating adaptive fatwas on , yet facing resistance in more conservative milieus. This ongoing debate underscores ijtihad's role not as wholesale reinvention but as reasoned extension of Islam's foundational emphasis on and public welfare ().

Human Rights and Egalitarianism

Reformist Muslim thinkers within liberal and progressive traditions argue that core Islamic principles, such as adl (justice) and the Quranic affirmation of human dignity, provide a foundation for universal human rights and egalitarianism when interpreted through independent reasoning (ijtihad) rather than rigid adherence to classical jurisprudence. For instance, Quran 17:70 declares God has "honored the children of Adam," which progressives like Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im interpret as establishing inherent equality and protections against arbitrary discrimination, extending to freedoms of belief and expression as echoed in Quran 2:256's prohibition on religious compulsion. These interpreters contend that early Islamic practices reflected seventh-century Arabian contexts, necessitating doctrinal evolution to discard elements like hereditary slavery or non-Muslim subjugation (dhimmi poll taxes), which contradict the Quran's meritocratic ethos in verses like 49:13, prioritizing piety over tribal or ethnic origins. An-Na'im, a Sudanese-American legal scholar, posits that true Islamic fidelity requires decoupling religious ethics from state enforcement to avoid , as theocratic implementation of —with fixed punishments like amputation for theft—conflicts with international prohibitions on cruel treatment under frameworks like the 1948 . He advocates a "post-enlightenment" secular where Muslims reform internal norms via ongoing to embrace egalitarian rights, drawing on historical precedents like the Medinan of 622 CE, which granted collective protections to and pagans as a pluralistic model. This approach, An-Na'im argues, resolves apparent scriptural tensions by prioritizing ethical universals over literalist applications, though critics from orthodox circles maintain such reforms dilute divine sovereignty. Nineteenth-century Egyptian modernist laid groundwork for these views by emphasizing rational inquiry to derive egalitarian implications from scripture, asserting that inherently upholds human equality in intellect and moral agency, as all souls derive from a single origin per 4:1. Abduh critiqued colonial-era inequalities while urging Muslims to transcend (imitation of precedents) for a dynamic ethic aligned with justice, influencing later calls to abolish slavery—formally ended in in 1962 and in 1981—by reinterpreting prophetic incentives as mandates for abolition. Progressive networks, such as those inspired by Abduh's legacy, extend this to advocate non-discrimination against religious minorities, citing 60:8's endorsement of kindness toward non-hostile non-believers, though empirical implementation remains limited in governance, with only select constitutions like Tunisia's 2014 charter incorporating explicit equality clauses. Egalitarian reformists further invoke the Quranic principle of qist (equity), appearing 22 times to denote proportionate justice, as a doctrinal basis for socioeconomic rights, challenging classical zakat distributions that favored free Muslims over others. Scholars like Abla Hasan retrieve "lost voices" in tafsir to argue for interpretive methodologies that override patriarchal or hierarchical readings, promoting rights to education and participation as intrinsic to human honor. Yet, these efforts face doctrinal hurdles, as verses permitting corporal punishments (e.g., Quran 5:38) require contextual suspension, a position An-Na'im substantiates through historical variability in sharia application but which traditionalists reject as innovation (bid'ah). Overall, while progressive doctrines aspire to full compatibility, realization hinges on voluntary cultural shifts rather than imposed orthodoxy.

Gender Roles and Feminism

Progressive interpretations of Islam emphasize gender complementarity rooted in spiritual equality, drawing from Quranic verses such as 49:13, which states humanity's creation from male and female for mutual recognition, and 33:35, which equates rewards for believing men and women. These views reject rigid patriarchal roles as cultural accretions rather than divine mandates, advocating to adapt roles to contemporary contexts where women pursue , , and economic alongside family responsibilities. Traditional distinctions, such as male financial maintenance in exchange for obedience, are reframed as reciprocal partnerships rather than . Islamic feminism, a subset of this progressivism, seeks to reclaim egalitarian intent from scriptures by critiquing androcentric (). Proponents argue that patriarchal biases in classical scholarship distorted texts; for instance, the concept of qiwama (male oversight) in 4:34 is interpreted not as inherent superiority but as conditional responsibility tied to moral and financial equity, applicable bidirectionally if women fulfill provider roles. Similarly, inheritance disparities in 4:11—granting sons double daughters' shares—are contextualized to pre-modern economic realities where males bore sustenance, proposing modern equalization via wasiyya (bequests) or societal welfare systems. This hermeneutic prioritizes (divine unity) as abolishing all hierarchies except piety, dismissing literalism in favor of holistic readings that align with universal human dignity. Key figures include , whose 1999 book Qur'an and Woman applies thematic analysis to assert women's full interpretive authority, leading to her 2005 conduction of a mixed-gender in New York, symbolizing ritual equality. Fatima Mernissi, in works like The Veil and the Male Elite (1987), historically deconstructed collections, arguing many gender-restrictive narrations originated from urban Medinan elites threatened by women's public roles during the Prophet's era, thus lacking prophetic authenticity. Riffat Hassan extended this by emphasizing Quran 4:1's shared origin from a single soul, positing ontological equality incompatible with subordination. These scholars, often trained in Western academia, face criticism for selective emphasis on meccan verses over medinan legal ones, potentially undermining textual fixity central to orthodox Islam. Efforts have yielded partial reforms, as in Morocco's 2004 Moudawana family code, influenced by feminist advocacy, which mandated mutual consent in , raised the minimum age to 18, and curtailed by requiring court approval and spousal notification. Tunisia's 1956 code, predating but echoed in progressive thought, banned outright and granted equal rights. Organizations like Musawah (founded 2009) compile such precedents to lobby for sharia-aligned equality. Yet empirical data reveals limited penetration: the 2023 Gender Gap Report ranks most Muslim-majority countries below global averages in economic participation and political empowerment, with legal testimony disparities persisting in 20+ nations under systems. Progressive feminism's reliance on rejecting sunni consensus correlates with marginal adoption, as conservative deem reinterpretations (innovation), sustaining traditional roles amid socioeconomic pressures favoring stability over equity.

LGBTQ Rights and Scriptural Narratives

Progressive interpretations of Islamic scriptures on LGBTQ rights emphasize contextual rereadings of Quranic narratives to argue against blanket prohibitions on same-sex relations, focusing instead on themes of , , and excess rather than orientation itself. Central to these views is the story of the Prophet Lot (Lut) in the , recounted in multiple surahs including Al-A'raf (7:80-84), Hud (11:77-83), and An-Naml (27:54-58), where Lot's people are condemned for "approaching men with desire instead of women" and engaging in acts deemed (indecency). Traditional exegeses, such as those by , interpret this as a divine of , linking it to the destruction of Sodom-like cities. Progressive scholars counter that the narrative targets coercive , , and violation of guest hospitality—elements absent in consensual adult relationships—rather than inherently, drawing on linguistic analyses of terms like "shudhudh" (deviation) as referring to exploitative excess, not mutual love. Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle, in his 2010 book Homosexuality in Islam: Critical Reflection on Gay, , and Muslims, advances this by examining and traditions selectively, arguing that pre-modern Islamic sometimes tolerated and relationships without equating them to (unlawful sex), provided no penetration or harm occurred. Kugle posits that allows affirming LGBTQ identities through Quranic principles of rahma (mercy) and adl (justice), rejecting punishments derived from contested , as the itself prescribes no specific penalty for same-sex acts beyond general moral admonition. Organizations like (MPV) echo this, asserting the lacks explicit rules for same-sex unions and promotes inclusion via verses on human diversity (e.g., 49:13), enabling rituals like same-sex nikah since 2011. These scriptural reframings often prioritize Quran-only approaches or de-emphasize weaker , with figures like Imam Daayiee Abdullah claiming traditional condemnations stem from cultural imports rather than core texts, as the omits stoning or execution for —penalties sourced from Israelite-influenced collections like Sahih Bukhari (c. 846 CE). Critics, including mainstream , contend such views impose modern egalitarian norms onto unambiguous prohibitions, noting the 's framing of Lot's sin as inversion of natural (innate disposition) in 7:81, and historical consensus () against same-sex acts in all major madhabs. Empirical support for progressive efficacy remains limited; surveys indicate over 90% of Muslims in countries like and view as morally wrong, per 2013 Pew data, highlighting the marginal status of these interpretations amid dominant orthodoxy.

Secularism and Freedom of Religion

A Muslim secularist (Arabic: العلماني المسلم) refers to a person who holds an Islamic identity, whether through religious faith or cultural affiliation, while adopting secular principles such as the separation of religion from the state, rejection of religious governance, and support for freedom of belief and expression. This distinguishes them from Islamists, who seek to apply Sharia in governance; Muslim secularists may remain personally religious or not but advocate for secular political systems. Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, a Sudanese-American legal scholar, contends that the institutional separation of Islam from the state is necessary to enable Muslims to adhere to Sharia out of personal conviction rather than coercion, drawing on historical precedents where religious and political authority were distinct during early Islamic periods. In his 2008 book Islam and the Secular State, An-Na'im argues that state enforcement of Sharia contradicts the Quran's emphasis on voluntary faith, as seen in verse 2:256 stating "there is no compulsion in religion," and undermines constitutionalism by prioritizing one interpretation over pluralistic citizenship. He proposes a framework where Sharia remains a moral guide for individuals and communities but yields to secular legislation for public order, facilitating human rights protections including freedom of belief. Indonesian reformer Nurcholish Madjid, known as Cak Nur, advanced as a doctrinal renewal in the 1970s, advocating the depoliticization of to prevent its reduction to state ideology and to revitalize personal piety. In lectures from 1970 onward, Madjid distinguished —understood as freeing religion from worldly entanglements—from Western secularism, asserting it aligns with Islamic principles by echoing the Prophet Muhammad's Medina Charter, which granted religious autonomy to non-Muslims. His ideas influenced Indonesia's pluralistic Pancasila state ideology, promoting tolerance amid diverse faiths without mandating Islamic governance. The 2015 Declaration of the , issued on December 4 in , by reformers from the U.S., , and , explicitly endorses secular governance to counter and ensure equality under law irrespective of faith. Signatories reject as state-enforced law, affirming , conscience, and as universal rights derived from Quranic pluralism, and call for abolishing apostasy penalties to align with ethical monotheism. This stance positions not as anti-religious but as a safeguard against theocratic overreach, enabling Muslims to negotiate 's role ethically rather than politically. Organizations like (MPV) operationalize these principles by campaigning against and laws, which they view as innovations () violating Quranic injunctions against forced belief. In a 2022 Washington, D.C., workshop, MPV addressed reforming such laws in Muslim societies, producing toolkits that reinterpret hadiths on as context-specific to during wartime, not perpetual religious exit. These efforts emphasize empirical protection of converts and dissenters, citing data from 13 Muslim-majority countries where remains punishable by death or imprisonment as evidence of needed doctrinal shifts toward liberty.

Movements and Organizational Efforts

Islamic Modernism and Quranism

Islamic Modernism developed in the 19th century amid encounters with Western colonialism and industrialization, as Muslim scholars sought to harmonize Islamic doctrine with rational inquiry, science, and governance reforms through the revival of ijtihad, or independent juristic reasoning, challenging the rigidity of taqlid (imitation of past authorities). Key proponents like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) fostered transnational networks advocating pan-Islamic unity and resistance to foreign domination via renewed intellectual engagement with core texts. His collaborator Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) advanced educational modernization at Al-Azhar University and promoted reinterpretation of Islamic law to accommodate constitutionalism and ethical evolution, influencing subsequent reformist circles in Egypt and beyond. While lacking large-scale formal organizations, modernist efforts manifested through intellectual societies, periodicals such as Al-Urwah al-Wuthqa (The Indissoluble Bond) launched by al-Afghani and Abduh in 1884, and reform initiatives in institutions like Dar al-Ulum in , established in to blend traditional learning with secular sciences. These networks laid groundwork for later groups emphasizing adaptive , though many evolved toward ; for instance, Indonesian organizations like , founded in 1912, incorporated modernist calls for social welfare and education while navigating local orthodoxies. Quranism, a related yet distinct movement privileging the as the exclusive source of divine guidance and dismissing compilations as unreliable or secondary, gained traction in the late in , where Abdullah Chakralawi (d. 1914) established the Ahl al-Quran association in circa 1882, attracting followers disillusioned with sectarian reliance. This Lahore-based group, emphasizing direct Quranic without intermediary traditions, represented an early organizational push for scriptural purism, influencing splinter efforts like the Amritsari variant led by Khwaja Ahmad Din Amritsari (d. 1950s). Proponents argued that Quran-only adherence enables flexible application to modern ethical dilemmas, bypassing -derived rulings often viewed as culturally contingent. Quranist organizations remain fragmented and marginal, with notable examples including Nigeria's Kala Kato sect, active since the early 20th century and comprising tens of thousands of adherents who reject prophetic traditions in favor of literal Quranic literalism, leading to distinct rituals such as simplified prayer forms. Despite potential for progressive reinterpretations—such as egalitarian views on inheritance or testimony derived solely from Quranic verses—these groups encounter doctrinal ostracism and legal restrictions in many Muslim-majority states, limiting their institutional growth to informal study circles and online communities. Empirical data indicate Quranists constitute less than 1% of global Muslims, underscoring their peripheral status amid dominant hadith-centric orthodoxies.

Progressive Networks in Specific Regions

In , (NU), founded in 1926 and claiming over 90 million members as of 2019, operates as a major network promoting tolerant and contextualized Islamic interpretations through concepts like , which integrates local traditions with core doctrines to foster pluralism and reject extremism. NU's 2018 initiatives, including the Forum of Muslim and the declaration against transnational caliphates, emphasize humanitarian principles over rigid literalism, positioning the organization as a counter to radical ideologies by advocating religious moderation and . Despite its traditionalist roots in Sunni , NU has supported progressive reforms such as women's education and economic participation, though it maintains conservative stances on issues like same-sex relations. Muhammadiyah, established in 1912 with approximately 30 million adherents, complements NU by focusing on modernist reforms, including the establishment of schools, hospitals, and universities to align Islamic practice with scientific and social progress. This network promotes tajdid (renewal) through rational , encouraging adaptation of to contemporary needs like gender equity in education and , while operating independently of state control to influence grassroots communities. In , (), formed in 1988 as a NGO, networks to reinterpret family laws for equality, advocating against practices like and arbitrary through , legal , and public grounded in Quranic principles of justice. has challenged laws and patriarchal , collaborating with international bodies like Musawah to push for reforms, though it faced a 2009 fatwa labeling its views deviant and, in July 2025, rebranded to SIS Forum after a royal edict barred non-state entities from using "" in their name. These efforts highlight tensions with conservative authorities, yet persists in litigation and awareness campaigns, citing empirical data on to argue for protective reforms. In the , progressive networks remain limited and often repressed; for instance, post-2011 saw , an Islamist party with roots in the , evolve toward moderation by endorsing a 2014 constitution balancing with , though it prioritizes political pragmatism over doctrinal . In , reformist voices like those in the Wasat Party splinter have advocated pluralistic interpretations but faced dissolution and marginalization under authoritarian crackdowns since 2013. Turkey's landscape features few autonomous progressive Islamic networks, with state-aligned Diyanet dominating discourse and reformist groups like Gülen's Hizmet suppressed after , underscoring how political consolidation stifles independent liberal Islamic organizing.

Diaspora and Western-Based Initiatives

Muslim diaspora communities in Western countries have launched organizations that reinterpret Islamic teachings to align with contemporary human rights standards, including gender equality and LGBTQ inclusion, benefiting from greater freedom of expression compared to many Muslim-majority nations. Muslims for Progressive Values (MPV), established in 2007 by Ani Zonneveld in the United States, operates as a grassroots nonprofit advocating for social justice, religious pluralism, and reforms such as women's leadership in prayer and same-sex unions within an Islamic framework. MPV engages in community education, UN advocacy, and interfaith dialogues, while maintaining chapters in cities like Los Angeles and Atlanta, though its membership remains limited to hundreds rather than representing broader diaspora populations. In 2017, MPV formed the Alliance of Inclusive Muslims, extending partnerships to affiliates in Europe and Latin America for global human rights-focused initiatives. In , the Unity Mosque in , co-founded in 2009 by , an openly gay Muslim lawyer and , provides an egalitarian worship space emphasizing gender-neutral prayer lines, female-led sermons, and affirmation for LGBTQ Muslims. This inclusive model, which rejects traditional gender segregation and punishments, has inspired similar prayer circles across and the , attracting and progressive Muslims seeking reconciliation between faith and identity, though services typically draw small congregations of 20-50 attendees. Khaki's approach draws on Sufi traditions and to challenge literalist interpretations, positioning the mosque as a refuge amid mainstream Islamic opposition to . European diaspora efforts include the Inclusive Mosque Initiative in the , which since 2012 has hosted mixed-gender, LGBTQ-welcoming prayers and educational events promoting egalitarian , and Germany's Liberale Muslime association, advocating secular compatibility and critique of . These groups, often networked with North American counterparts, prioritize anti-extremism and integration but encounter resistance from dominant orthodox institutions, resulting in marginal influence within Europe's estimated 25 million Muslim population, where surveys indicate low support for such reforms among practicing believers. Despite limited scale, these Western-based initiatives facilitate online dissemination of progressive texts and foster niche communities, occasionally influencing policy discussions on religious freedom.

Empirical Challenges and Outcomes

Theological and Internal Opposition

Theological opposition to liberal and progressive movements within centers on the assertion that such interpretations undermine the foundational authority of divine revelation as articulated in the and , introducing anthropocentric revisions that prioritize modern secular values over imperatives. Orthodox scholars, particularly those from Salafi and traditionalist schools, maintain that core doctrines—encompassing punishments, gender complementarity, and the ummah's collective obedience to Allah's sovereignty—cannot be subjected to relativistic without constituting , or impermissible innovation, which risks diluting (divine oneness) by elevating human autonomy. This critique posits that progressive hermeneutics, by de-emphasizing authentication and historical consensus (), foster doctrinal fragmentation akin to the early sects condemned in prophetic traditions. Prominent among these objections is the incompatibility between liberalism's ontological —where the is —and Islam's view of the (soul) as submissive to Allah's will, rendering concepts like unqualified freedom of expression or tolerance antithetical to scriptural mandates such as Al-Baqarah 2:256's qualified non-coercion alongside communal preservation of . Salafi theologians, drawing from Ibn Taymiyyah's methodologies, decry modernist revival of as unqualified that mirrors Mu'tazilite excesses, historically rejected for subordinating to (speculative theology). For example, critiques of figures like highlight how their rationalist reforms, while initially reform-oriented, paved the way for hadith skepticism and , eroding fiqh's textual anchors. Internal opposition manifests through fatwas and scholarly treatises that label progressive stances as gateways to kufr (disbelief), particularly when they challenge unambiguous texts on issues like (usury) abolition or polygamy's permissibility. Institutions such as Saudi Arabia's Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta have issued rulings against Western-influenced , arguing it inverts qiwamah (male responsibility) outlined in 4:34, potentially leading to societal inversion. In , ulama affiliated with bodies like Indonesia's and Malaysia's International Islamic University decry "liberal Islam" as an ideological infiltration that corrodes by conflating with democratic pluralism, evidenced by documented cases where reformist calls for Quran-only approaches were rebuffed as akin to Quranist deviations. These positions are substantiated by empirical patterns of intra-madhhab consensus, where to established mujtahids preserves doctrinal stability against what critics term "cafeteria Islam," selectively adopting verses while discarding others. Such theological resistance is not merely preservative but causally linked to historical precedents, where unchecked during Abbasid contributed to , prompting the "closing of the gates" by the 10th century to prioritize emulation over innovation. Contemporary Salafi works reinforce this by cataloging modernist errors, such as equating with policy adaptation absent mujtahid qualifications, which traditionalists argue requires mastery of , usul al-fiqh, and nusus (texts)—criteria unmet by most progressive advocates. This internal bulwark, while accused of stagnation by reformers, is defended as causal realism: unaltered adherence to usul (precepts) has sustained Islam's resilience across eras, whereas progressive dilutions correlate with observed declines in religious observance in modernist-influenced communities.

Political Repression and Persecution

In Muslim-majority countries enforcing strict interpretations of law, political authorities have frequently repressed advocates of liberal or progressive Islamic thought through charges of (riddah) or (sabb al-Islam), resulting in executions, forced , , and . These measures target individuals promoting contextual rereadings of Islamic texts to support , , or pluralism, viewing such efforts as threats to doctrinal authority and state legitimacy. remains punishable by death in at least 13 countries as of 2023, including , , and , often applied selectively against reformers rather than explicit renouncers of faith. A prominent case occurred in , where Islamic reformer Mahmoud Muhammad was executed by hanging on January 18, 1985, following a conviction for under President Jaafar Nimeiri's Islamist . , founder of the Republican Brothers movement, advocated distinguishing between the tolerant Meccan surahs and the more legalistic Medinan ones of the , arguing for a progressive "second message of " that prioritized individual freedoms and rejected punishments. His trial, expedited after Nimeiri's imposition of in 1983, ignored procedural appeals and drew international condemnation as a politically motivated silencing of dissent. The date of his execution is now commemorated as Arab by activists. In , Quranic scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd faced judicial persecution in 1995 when a court declared him an apostate based on his writings applying literary and to the , which he argued revealed its contextual, non-eternal nature. The ruling annulled his marriage to fellow academic Ibtihal Younes—under Egyptian prohibiting a Muslim woman from marrying a non-Muslim—and prompted death threats from groups like , forcing the couple into exile in . Abu Zayd, who maintained his Muslim identity and rejected the apostasy label, described the verdict as an abuse of civil courts to enforce theological conformity rather than legal evidence of faith abandonment. He died in 2010 in . Saudi Arabia exemplifies ongoing corporal repression, as seen in the 2012 sentencing of blogger Raif Badawi to 10 years imprisonment, 1,000 lashes, and a 1 million riyal fine for managing the "Free Saudi Liberals" website, which hosted debates on secularism, atheism, and religious freedom within an Islamic framework. On January 9, 2015, Badawi received the first 50 lashes publicly outside Jeddah's al-Jafali mosque after Friday prayers, enduring shackling and visible bruising without outcry, though subsequent sessions were halted due to health concerns. The Supreme Court upheld the verdict in 2014, framing his advocacy for liberal reforms as insulting Islam and the Prophet. Badawi was released in March 2022 after nearly a decade, but the case underscores how Saudi authorities use vague cybercrime and anti-terror laws to target online progressive discourse. In , blasphemy provisions under Sections 295-B and 295-C of the Penal Code—expanded in the under General Zia-ul-Haq—have been weaponized against Muslim intellectuals challenging orthodox views, with at least 62 people on death row for such charges as of 2023, including several accused of liberal interpretations rather than outright insults. reports document cases where personal vendettas or ideological opposition lead to arrests of progressive writers and academics, fostering among reformers advocating contextual or . These laws, carrying mandatory death penalties for blaspheming the , have resulted in mob violence and extrajudicial killings, deterring intra-Islamic debate.

Marginalization in Muslim Societies

In many Muslim-majority countries, legal frameworks enforcing orthodox interpretations of Islamic doctrine, such as and laws, systematically marginalize individuals advocating liberal or progressive views within . As of 2019, 13 countries imposed the death penalty for from , all Muslim-majority, with enforcement varying but often resulting in imprisonment or extrajudicial violence for perceived deviations from orthodoxy. These laws, rooted in classical , target reformers who reinterpret scripture to promote , secular , or , equating such efforts with heresy. For instance, in , statutes under Section 295-C of the penal code mandate death for insulting the Prophet , leading to over 1,500 accusations since 1987, many against critics of rigid who face mob lynchings or lengthy detentions even without formal charges. Public attitudes reinforce this marginalization, with surveys indicating widespread support for punitive measures against dissent. A 2013 poll across 39 countries found majorities favoring the death penalty for in several Muslim-majority nations, including 86% in , 76% in , 79% in , and 62% in , reflecting societal endorsement of over progressive . Similarly, acceptance of LGBTQ rights—often tied to progressive scriptural narratives—is negligible; a 2020 global survey reported homosexuality acceptance below 10% in surveyed Muslim-majority countries like (9%) and (2%), with respondents citing religious incompatibility. This hostility extends to feminist advocates, as seen in Iran's 2022 crackdown on women protesting mandatory , resulting in thousands of arrests and executions under morality laws derived from Shia . Social ostracism compounds legal pressures, compelling many progressive Muslims to conceal their views to avoid familial rejection or community exile. In the Middle East and North Africa, ex-Muslims or reformers report hiding disbelief or liberal interpretations due to risks of disownment, honor-based violence, or vigilante attacks, with a 2023 Associated Press analysis documenting cases in Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon where individuals feign orthodoxy during Ramadan or family gatherings. In Egypt, liberal thinker Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd was declared an apostate by Al-Azhar in 1995 for his Quranic hermeneutics, forcing him into European exile amid fatwas and threats. Iranian reformer Abdolkarim Soroush, critiquing velayat-e faqih, faced house arrest and scholarly isolation post-1979 Revolution, exemplifying how state-aligned clerics suppress ijtihad favoring pluralism. In Pakistan, university lecturer Junaid Hafeez received a death sentence in 2019 for alleged blasphemy after sharing progressive content online, highlighting how accusations stifle academic discourse. These dynamics result in progressive Islamic thought remaining subterranean or diaspora-dependent within Muslim societies, where orthodox institutions like Al-Azhar or dominate fatwa issuance and education. Empirical outcomes include among intellectuals and low institutionalization of reformist groups, as conservative majorities—bolstered by Wahhabi funding in Sunni contexts or Twelver Shia guardianship in —view as bid'ah (innovation) threatening communal cohesion. Despite pockets of tolerance in urban or pre-2021 Afghanistan, pervasive fatwas and social norms ensure marginalization, with reformers often fleeing to the West for safety.

Broader Criticisms and Debates

Accusations of Westernization and Inauthenticity

Critics from traditionalist and Islamist perspectives, including influential thinkers like Sayyid Qutb and Abul A'la Maududi, have accused liberal and progressive interpretations of Islam of constituting a form of cultural and ideological Westernization that undermines the religion's authentic foundations. Qutb, in works such as Milestones (1964), condemned modernist reformers for seeking to "reform" Islam by incorporating Western ideas like secular democracy and individualism, arguing that such adaptations subordinate divine law (Sharia) to human legislation and represent a return to jahiliyyah (pre-Islamic ignorance). He viewed these efforts as not only inauthentic but actively corrosive, prioritizing Western rationalism over Quranic sovereignty (hakimiyya), which he deemed the core of Islamic polity. Maududi, founder of in 1941, echoed this critique by warning against the "indiscriminate adapting" of Western concepts such as and pluralism to ic thought, which he saw as incompatible with the comprehensive nature of as a total system of life. In his writings, including The Reality of Muslims and the Way to Uplift Them (circa 1930s-1940s), Maududi highlighted how Western cultural influence, propagated through colonial and media, had led to a dilution of orthodox practices, fostering a hybridized detached from scriptural primacy and historical caliphal models. He contended that true required rejecting such imports to preserve cultural authenticity against colonial-era erosion. These accusations extend to contemporary progressive initiatives, which detractors label as inauthentic because they often emerge from Western-educated elites or communities rather than indigenous scholarly traditions. For instance, reinterpretations advocating gender egalitarianism or separation of and state are dismissed as projections of Enlightenment values onto Islamic texts, lacking endorsement in classical (jurisprudence) or the practices of the (early generations). Empirical indicators of this perceived disconnect include the limited popular uptake of such views in Muslim-majority countries; surveys like the 2013 poll across 39 nations showed overwhelming majorities (often over 70%) favoring as official law, with progressive stances on issues like or LGBT rights garnering minimal support outside urban or expatriate circles. Critics argue this marginalization stems from the movements' reliance on Western academic frameworks, which prioritize over literal adherence to and , rendering them ahistorical and unrooted in Islam's causal ontology of divine command over humanistic . While some academic sources sympathetic to attribute these charges to reactionary resistance against , the traditionalist position holds substantive weight when evaluated against primary ic sources, where resides unequivocally with God rather than popular will or —principles Qutb and Maududi substantiated through exegeses of verses like 5:44, which equates ruling by non-divine laws to disbelief. This critique persists in Islamist discourse, framing progressive as a postcolonial that fails to address empirical failures of Western liberalism, such as , while eroding 's unique claim to universal truth.

Impacts on Islamic Orthodoxy

Progressive movements within Islam have endeavored to reinterpret core orthodox doctrines, such as those derived from traditional and schools, by advocating for unbound by (imitation of past scholars) and emphasizing ethical (objectives) over literalism. This has manifested in challenges to orthodox positions on punishments, gender segregation, and , with proponents arguing for contextualized readings that align scripture with modern norms. However, such efforts have largely failed to penetrate mainstream orthodox institutions, where scholars maintain that they constitute (heretical innovation) by undermining the authoritative interpretive tradition established over centuries. Orthodox ulama have responded with doctrinal refutations and legal pronouncements, including fatwas that equate progressive liberalism with secular deviation from (divine unity). For instance, conservative scholars have issued rulings against interpretations promoting or transgender accommodations, clarifying earlier ambiguous fatwas—such as those by Egypt's or Iran's Khomeini—as inapplicable to progressive expansions that contradict orthodox gender binaries rooted in prophetic . These responses have reinforced by mobilizing educational campaigns and institutional gatekeeping, as seen in madrasas and councils like Al-Azhar, which prioritize authentication over Quran-only approaches like . , by rejecting as non-divine, has been dismissed by orthodox authorities as selectively rationalist, leading to its marginalization and portrayal as a gateway to rather than reform. Empirically, the net impact on Islamic has been one of entrenchment rather than erosion, with progressive initiatives provoking backlash that strengthens traditionalist cohesion. In regions dominated by Salafi or Hanbali , such as , modernist influences have prompted stricter curricula emphasizing literalism, while in , Deobandi networks have issued tracts decrying modernism as colonial residue. Prosecutions of liberal Muslim thinkers—evident in cases from to , where bloggers faced charges for questioning orthodox narratives—underscore how these movements catalyze repressive mechanisms, preserving doctrinal purity at the expense of internal pluralism. Overall, 's resilience stems from its embeddedness in state-backed religious hierarchies and popular , rendering progressive impacts confined to enclaves or online discourse with minimal spillover into core ritual or legal practices.

Reception Among Muslim Populations

Surveys conducted among Muslim populations in majority-Muslim countries reveal limited receptivity to liberal or progressive reinterpretations of , with strong majorities favoring the application of traditional law as the basis for governance and personal conduct. A 2013 study across 39 countries found that medians of 74% in , 77% in , and 64% in the Middle East-North Africa region supported making the official , including in countries like (99%), (91%), and (84%). This preference extends to enforcing Sharia-derived punishments, such as for (median 57% favor) and for (median 56% favor), indicating resistance to secular or reformist dilutions of Islamic . Attitudes toward progressive stances on and personal further underscore this trend. In the same survey, majorities in several nations endorsed the death penalty for , including 86% in , 82% in , 79% in , and 88% in , reflecting a view that leaving warrants severe sanction under rather than liberal tolerance. Arab Barometer data from waves spanning 2011–2022 similarly shows persistent support for as a primary or exclusive source of in countries like (median around 40–50% prioritizing over democratic pluralism) and , where viewing as the immutable word of correlates with reduced endorsement of secular . While nominal support for "" exists (often 70–80% in Arab Barometer polls), it frequently entails -compliant governance rather than Western-style , with Islamist parties gaining traction post-Arab Spring as evidenced by rising approval for religious political leadership. These patterns suggest that progressive Islam, which emphasizes egalitarian reinterpretations and compatibility with secular norms, remains marginal outside intellectual or diaspora circles, as mass preferences align more closely with orthodox frameworks prioritizing divine sovereignty over human-centric reforms. Exceptions appear in secular-leaning contexts like (e.g., only 12% in favor as law per ) or among Western Muslims, where a 2017 Pew poll indicated 52% acceptance of —up from 27% in 2007—but even here, traditional views predominate globally.

References

Add your contribution
Related Hubs
User Avatar
No comments yet.